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Incident Management Organization Succession Planning Stakeholder Feedback

Anne E. Black



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Abstract

This report presents complete results of a 2011 stakeholder feedback effort conducted for the National Wildfire Coordination Group (NWCG) Executive Board concerning how best to organize and manage national wildland fire Incident Management Teams in the future to meet the needs of the public, agencies, fire service and Team members. Feedback was collected from 858 survey respondents and 57 email comments. In order to facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the affected community and issues of relevance for implementation, the report includes: a final overview, complete narrative and survey responses, relevant statistical results and interpretation.

Keywords: Incident Management, wildland fire, National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG), IMT succession planning

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The results presented here were definitely not a solo effort! The survey instrument was largely developed by the Incident Management Organization Succession Planning Team (IMOSPT), in particular, team lead Sue Husari. In addition to the IMOSPT members, several others were invaluable to this process. The Organization Development Enterprise Team (ODE), which the IMOSPT and NWCG contracted with to develop and implement the Stakeholder Feedback, and the State of Texas took the lead on the non-Federal survey and response. The ODE team consisted of: John Able, (ODE) Team Lead; Dr. Anne Black, Social Science Analyst (USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station); Chris Barrett, Data Resource Specialist and Susan Sova, Program Support Assistant (Adaptive Management Services Enterprise Team); and Jules Riley, Software Engineer (Vegetation Management Solutions Enterprise Unit). The State of Texas team was headed by Don Hannemann, Emergency Operations Coordinator. L. Scott Baggett, Statistician with Rocky Mountain Research Station provided much appreciated support during statistical analysis.

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Executive Summary

We present full and final results of stakeholder feedback concerning how best to organize and manage national wildland fire Incident Management Teams in the future to meet the needs of the public, agencies, fire service and Team members. This data was collected and analyzed for, and in close coordination with, the Incident Management Organization Succession Planning Team (IMOSPT) at the request of the National Wildfire Coordination Group (NWCG) Executive Board. We include a final overview of data, the full narrative response data, complete responses to survey questions, and relevant statistical results.

This report provides stakeholders, members of the NWCG, and recommendation implementation committees with the complete results of the feedback effort. This level of detail is presented to help develop a more comprehensive understanding of the affected community and issues of relevance for implementation.

Respondent Demographics

The IMOSPT sought feedback from March to May 2011, over which time 858 survey responses and 57 email comments were collected. Respondents included members from each of the three types of stakeholders the IMOSPT identified as their primary, secondary, and general targets of their effort, in particular: national and regional agency, state, and tribal leadership; Area and Incident Commanders, and Incident Management Team members; retirees, contractors, members of the Militia, and dispatch and coordination communities.

- 51% of respondents identified themselves as Forest Service (USFS), 16% Bureau of Land Management (BLM), 9% National Park Service (NPS), 3% each U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and Bureau of Indian Affairs or Tribe (BIA/Tribe), and 0% (2 respondents) from U.S. Fire Administration/Federal Emergency Management Agency (USFA/FEMA).
- 11% are Line Officer/Agency Administrators; 39% Fire Program; 22% Other fire, Fuels, Dispatch, and National Incident Management Organization (NIMO); 21% Other Agency Position; 6% Contractor/retired (AD); and 1% have no professional role in Incident Management.
- 78% of respondents identified themselves as Federal, 22% State, Local or Other.
- 62% work primarily in a fire or fuels program role.
- 42% serve on a Type 1 or 2 team; 12% on a Type 3 team; 40% have some other qualification (e.g., Agency Administrator or single resource) and 6% of respondents do not have current incident qualifications.
- 19% are 40 years of age or younger.

Overarching Principles

Respondents gave a predominantly positive response to all Overarching Principles.

- Significant Support: Five overarching principles (*Single Qualification System*, *Accountability, Incident Complexity/Scalability*, *Responsiveness to Federal fire Policy*, and *Support for IMT Decisions*) received greater than 75% support.
- More than 50% of Line officer/Agency Administrator respondents and those in a Fire Program position expressed that a *Single Qualification System* was Highly Important. All (except those in Dispatch/No Incident Role) felt similarly strongly about *Support for IMT Decisions. Agency Accountability* and *Responsiveness to Federal fire Policy* also received greater than 50% response in the Highly Important class among Functional groups *(*Dispatch and those with No Incident Role, and Fuels and Other Fire respondents, respectively).
- *Agency Accountability* and *Support for IMT Decisions* received the least negative rankings (3% and 4%, respectively).
- Responses to *Modules and Service Centers* were least positive (44%), most neutral (28%), and most negative (11%).
- *Compensation Strategies and Incentives* received a fairly notable neutral response (23%).
- Respondents who feel *Succession Planning* is important tend to feel strongly about it.

Building Blocks

Responses show:

- strong support for the status quo -- *Role of the militia* and *Dispatching;*
- strong support for change – *Funding;*
- moderate support for the status quo -- *Area Command*, *Number of Interagency Teams*, and *Use of Contract Teams;*
- moderate support for change – *Governance*;
- Strong consensus as to the direction of change – *Performance*; and
- no clear consensus for -- *Workforce development*.

For purposes of this effort, "strong" support indicates a two-thirds (66%) majority perspective. "Moderate" support indicates the most frequent selection captures between 25 and 50% of all responses.

- Only three of the Building Blocks garnered a majority (>50%) in any single response category, indicating that while there may be preferences, in most cases, there will be both support for and resistance to future actions among some segment of the surveyed population.

Organizational Models

Responses look considerably different from those for the Overarching Principles.

- Ratings are overall much more muted -- only three rise above 50% when combining both *Highly Important* and *Somewhat Important* categories, and two (*External Capacity Contract* and *External Capacity All Hazard + Contract*) are negative. *Core Team* received 51%.
- The most moderate responses, as indicated by high proportion of neutral and low proportion of positive ratings, are for the two models based on the *Current Situation*.
- The most positive responses are for the *Core Team* models, and most negative responses are for the *External Capacity* models.
- Considering the strength of opinions by comparing the extremes of the rating scale (*Highly Desirabl*e and *Highly Undesirable*) against the middle (*Somewhat Undesirable, Neutral*, and *Somewhat Desirable)* conveys a lukewarm reception for all models, although there is still a strong negative response to the *External Capacity* models.

Narrative Comments

In addition to the 858 respondents to the online survey, we received narrative comments from 55 individuals (26 Bureau of Land Management (BLM), 1 National Park Service (NPS), 19 U.S. Forest Service (USFS), 1 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), 3 State, and 5 Local Government/Fire Department).

Several key themes emerged from these comments:

- a sense that lack of participation stems in great measure from an inability to train and serve rather than lack of interest;
- the value of non-fire (or Militia) participation in fire linked with the value of integrating fire as a process and a staff area into the broader mission of public land management;
- there is much that works well with the current system and meeting the needs of the future should begin by building on these attributes;
- a sense that while full-time fire management teams (i.e., NIMO-like) may have a useful future role, this concept needs further refinement;
- incident management is an inherently governmental function that should not be contracted;
- one of the most frequent new suggestions was to provide flexibility, support, compensation or reward for supervisors to encourage and release employees for fire participation; and
- one of the most frequent comments submitted in the Alternative Organizational Models section identified a preferred model as one that combines key elements of the Core and the Current with Overarching Principles.

Project Background

In early 2010, the NWCG Executive Board tasked the interagency IMOSPT to develop a recommendation for future IMO structures, governance, workforce planning, and development.

By late 2010, the IMOSPT:

- identified a set of Overarching Principles which it felt were essential to the success of the future IMO and as such should underpin organization and management of inter-agency Incident Management Team structure;
- identified a set of Building Blocks that explore various options for team management and coordination, workforce succession, management framework, compensation strategies, and funding;
- developed six new Organizational Models to provide concrete examples of how the Building Blocks and Overarching Principles might be combined; and
- determined that obtaining stakeholder feedback prior to making a final recommendation would best serve the community.

In early December 2010, the IMSOPT recommended that the NWCG Executive Board use its products to start a conversation with key stakeholders about the role of the IMO and how IMTs might best be organized and managed in the future to meet the needs of the public, agencies, fire service and Team members. The NWCG Executive Board tasked the IMOSPT to conduct such an outreach and feedback effort, which occurred during winter and spring 2011. Preliminary results were presented to the IMOSPT members at the June 2011 meeting and subsequently used to develop the recommendation presented to NWCG Executive Board in September 2011.

Purpose

This document serves as a companion to the "Evolving Incident Management: a recommendation for the future' (NWCG 2011b) and replaces the initial release of stakeholder feedback data (NWCG 2011c). The initial data summary briefly presents data and preliminary conclusions of the three primary means by which the NWCG Executive Board sought feedback: a survey, open-ended comments submitted to a project email account, and feedback obtained by Project Team members during presentations to annual inter-agency fire meetings. The initial Data Summary focused on preliminary analysis as directed by the IMOSPT.

This report presents full and final results and analysis of stakeholder feedback, including presentation and analysis of:

- a final overview of data;
- the full narrative response data;
- complete responses to survey questions; and
- relevant statistical results.

In this way, readers can obtain a richer perspective on a given issue than what may be gleaned from the closed-ended survey responses alone. This report provides stakeholders, members of the National Wildland Fire Coordination Group, and recommendation implementation committees with the complete results of the feedback effort. This level of detail is presented to help develop a more comprehensive understanding of the affected community and issues of relevance for implementation.

Methods

IMOSPT members worked with Organization Development Enterprise Team (ODE) and Rocky Mountain Research Station to develop the feedback system, including both outreach and feedback efforts.

Outreach

Outreach efforts were based on a series of webinars and presentations by Project Team members, and work by the appointed agency Point of Contact (POC) for each NWCG agency/state. The POCs were responsible for developing and coordinating their agency's internal notification and outreach to disseminate information about the project and inform personnel of the various feedback mechanisms.

During winter 2011, members of the NWCG Steering Group, the IMOSPT, and agency POCs crossed the country to give over 40 presentations at fire, IMT and Geographic Area Coordination Group meetings. IMOSPT members and POCs also developed and held approximately 10 online webinars with interested members of the interagency fire community. These focused on informing the inter-agency fire community of the working team's activities, current thinking, and opportunities to provide feedback. These meetings were also used to refine and target the emerging feedback systems open-ended email account, webinar content, and the survey.

Feedback Structure and Analysis

Feedback mechanisms included an online survey; open-ended comments submitted to a project email account, and feedback obtained by Project Team members during presentations to annual interagency fire meetings.

Survey development

The online survey was based on the IMOSPT's work during calendar year 2010 (NWCG 2011a). The goal of the survey was to understand stakeholders' responses to the importance of Overarching Principles, desirability of Alternative Organizational Models, and specific tactics contained within the organizational model matrix (NWCG 2011a). See Appendix A for the complete survey.

After piloting initial versions at stakeholder meetings in January and early February 2011, the final Federal instrument was created using the Google Docs shareware program (part of GoogleApps). The State of Texas ultimately adopted the survey to provide similar feedback opportunities for non-Federal stakeholders. Between March 1 and May 3, 2011, links to the survey (separate for Federal employees and non-Federal partners) were posted on the NWCG's web site. Notification of the survey and its availability was distributed through the POCs, IMOSPT, and fire community annual meetings. ODE monitored and collected Federal data; the State of Texas monitored and collected non-Federal data.

NOTE: The full number of potential respondents is unknown, but likely to be somewhere between several thousand (if seasonal forces are excluded) and several tens of thousands (if seasonal forces are included), it is impossible to determine the statistical representativeness of these responses. A recent Federal effort estimates the five-year average for Federal employees billing more than 51% of their time to a fire program is 7200 permanent and 2800 temporary. Nor was it possible to quantify the number of people notified of the availability of the survey. It is likely that permanent employees who track incident management activities and were interested in responding, did so. Results should be considered in this light (see also Survey Considerations section).

Survey structure

The survey was broken into four main sections: Overarching Principles, Building Blocks, Organizational Models, and Demographics.

In the first section, Overarching Principles, the IMOSPT sought feedback on the importance of 11 areas the Team considered of critical importance to any future incident management program. (see NWCG 2011a for additional description): succession planning, single qualification system, agency accountability, incident complexity/scalability, modules and service centers, responsiveness to Federal policy, compensation strategies, incentives and accountability, standard operating procedures for IMTs, support for agency administrator and IMT decisions, interagency cooperation/external considerations, and consistent business management practices. Respondents rated the value they place on implementation of each of the Overarching Principles using a five point Likert response scale: *1 = Highly Unimportant, 2 = Somewhat Unimportant, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Somewhat Important, 5 = Highly Important*.

The IMOSPT developed a number of Building Blocks that cover critical features of organizational structure: Team management, Coordination, Workforce Succession, Management Framework, Compensation Strategies, and Funding Strategies. IMOSPT members developed a series of questions to obtain feedback on alternative ways that each Building Block might be configured as a component of the future incident management system. Preferences were captured through closed-ended categorical survey questions constructed from the matrix (NWCG 2011a: 53-54). In general, each question included the status quo as well as at least two alternatives, *No Preference*, and *Other*. Respondents were allowed to select only one option and were provided the space to select and then describe an *Other* category for each question.

The IMOSPT created a series of six new organizational models to provide more concrete examples of how the Building Blocks might be combined. Using another 5 point Likert-scale, respondents rated the desirability of the current and six alternative Organizational Models.

Five demographic items were developed to assess variation among respondents based on agency affiliation (*Agency*), organizational perspective (*Organizational Level*), role in incident management (*Incident Qualification*s), day-job function (*Functional Area*), and age (*Age Range*).

Finally, to assist in understanding the context and rationale for closed-ended survey selections, an open-ended text box was provided at the end of the main survey sections (Overarching Principles, Building Blocks, and Organizational Models) to capture comments, suggestions, and explanations. Stakeholders were also provided an email address to which they were invited to submit comments. Many of the comments received pertained to a specific Overarching Principle, Building Block, or Organizational Model. All comments from the survey and email were read and assigned to the survey section to which they were most relevant.

Survey analysis

Graphic and tabular summary statistics were developed for all survey results and integrated with open-ended responses from both the survey and email responses. Data were analyzed using the SAS data analysis program (v9.2) to determine whether and where significant differences occur between respondents and response categories (SAS Institute Inc).

Prior to statistical testing, each survey item was examined to determine whether to collapse categories to ensure at least five observations in each response cell in order to meet assumptions for chi-square tests. Where collapsing was required, categories were collapsed based on similarity (statistically and substantially) or were dropped.

The following condensation of data was conducted for demographic variables:

- *Organizational Level* - categories of *Other* and *Cooperator* were dropped because there were too few total C*ooperator* responses and there is insufficient substantive similarity between *Cooperator* and *Other* to warrant collapsing into a single category. However, *State Government/Fire* and *Local Government/Fire* were retained as separate categories because, although there are small sample sizes in a few cross-tab cells, the two sets of respondents did not appear to respond similarly.
- *Agency - USFA/FEMA, Other,* and *Contractor* categories were dropped from analysis due to small sample sizes.
- *Functional Area* - the categories *of Non-agency Fire*, *NIMO* and *Fuels* were collapsed into *Other Fire* while *No Role* and *Dispatch* were combined into *Other*.
- *Incident position/qualification - FEMA/DHS* was collapsed into *Other*.
- *Age range - Less than 20* and *21-30* were collapsed into a single category *Less than 31*.

Data condensation for each of the Building Blocks is described in the relevant section, below.

For statistical analysis of Likert-scale data, we conducted chi-square tests of distribution, collapsing Likert-scale response categories into *Negative, Neutral*, and *Positive* and collapsing demographic sub-group categories, as noted in the beginning of the relevant section, to ensure adequate cell size. We used chi-square tests of homogeneity to assess differences of frequency in response levels between pairs of survey items (Conover 1999). Results of significance for overall models are reported, with individual distributions noted where individual cell chi-square values met or exceeded 3.8415 (chi-square value at alpha = .05 with 2 degrees of freedom; Cox 1993).

Narrative analysis

Optional text boxes were provided at the end of each survey section (Overarching Principles, Building Blocks, and Alternative Organizational Models) for respondents to express comments that might help the IMOSPT and NWCG Executive Board understand respondents' thinking.

All comments from the survey and email account were read and assigned to the survey question to which they were most relevant, either using the respondents' assignment or making an assignment (where none was provided). Comments were stripped of names or other identifying information. Following standard grounded narrative analysis methods (Strauss and Corbin 1990), these groupings were read again and coded to identify major emergent themes. Themes are presented in the Results--Overview section.

The verbatim responses (eliminating identifying information, and lightly editing for distracting typos) are presented in tables following the survey item to which they were assigned.

Several organizations submitted organizational comments and alternative models. To retain coherency and integrity, these were not integrated as individual comments were; they are presented in the final section – Group Responses.

Respondent Profile (demographics)

Combining responses from Federal and non-Federal instruments, 858 usable responses were submitted to the survey. These represent members from each of the three types of stakeholders the IMOSPT identified as primary, secondary, and general targets of their effort, in particular: national and regional agency, state, and tribal leadership; Area and Incident Commanders, and Incident Management Team members; retirees, contractors, members of the Militia, dispatch, and coordination communities.

Demographic information captured in the online survey shows that the majority of respondents identified themselves as:

- being employed by the Federal government (83%), 1% as *Contractor/Other*, and 17% by *State* or *Local Government* (Fig. 1). In addition, the IMOSPT received 55 individual submissions to the project email account: 26 BLM, 1 NPS, 19 USFS, 1 USFWS, 3 state, and 5 local employees.



Figure 1. Distribution of respondents by primary organization.

- working at a local level (66% *Federal-Local* and *Local Government/Fire*), 22% at a regional or state level, and 8% at a national level (Fig. 2).



Figure 2. Distribution of respondents by organizational level.

- working primarily in a fire or fuels program role (66% *NIMO, Fire, Fuels, Dispatch, Other fire,* and *Non-agency fire*), while 11% are *Line Officers/Agency Administrators* (Fig. 3).



Figure 3. Distribution of respondents by functional area.

- serving on a Type 1, 2, or 3 team (54%); another 40% have some other qualification (e.g., *Line Officer/Agency Administrator* or *Single resource*) and 6% of respondents do not currently have incident qualifications (Fig. 4).



Figure 4. Distribution of respondents by incident qualification.

- over 40 years of age (81%) (Fig. 5).



Figure 5. Distribution of respondents by age-range.

It is useful to recognize that, unlike the general land management agency population, the overwhelming majority of respondents have some current incident qualification: *Agency Administrators/Line Officers* (86%), *Fire Program* (98%), *Other Agency Position* (94%),

Other Fire/Fuels (96%), and *Other* (73%). The *Line Officer/Agency Administrator* group is also more likely to work for local government than respondents in the other groups (31% for *Line Officer/Agency Administrator* versus 7% in *Other Agency Position*, 3% in *Fire Program*, and 10% in *All Other* categories).

Tables 1 to 4 provide a detailed break-down of agency respondents by the other demographic variables. The most significant differences were in the distribution of line officers and by incident qualification.

The following patterns are based on statistical tests between various demographic categories (no other relationships were significant). Note that these differences represent deviations from statistically expected patterns only:

- *Line Officer/ Agency Administrators* were more likely to work for *Local Government/Fire* and less likely to work for Federal agencies (all levels combined).
- Fewer *Fire* staff worked for *Local Government/Fire* than expected.
- There are relatively more *IMT-Type 3* respondents currently working for the *NPS* and *Local Government/Fire* than for other agencies.
- Relatively more respondents with *Other Incident Qualifications* work for the *USFS*, and relatively fewer work for *Local Government/Fire*.
- Respondents with *IMT-IC* qualifications are more likely to work for either *Local Government/Fire* or *State Government/Fire*, with relatively fewer working for *BIA/Tribe*.
- Respondents with *IMT-C&G* qualifications are relatively more likely to work for the *USFWS*.
- Respondents in *Fire* positions play greater role on Teams (*IMT–T3*, *IMT-IC*, *IMT–C&G*).
- *Agency Administrators/Line Officers* are more likely to either be Type 1 or 2 IC's or hold *No Current Incident Qualifications* than other functions.
- Those holding *Other Incident Qualifications* are more likely to be either in *Other agency* positions or *Other Fire* positions.
- Fewer respondents at the *Federal-Local* level have qualifications for Type 1 or 2 teams (*IMT-IC* or *IMT-C&G*) than statistically expected.
- There were more respondents in *Federal-National* positions with current *IMT–C&G* qualifications.
- Fewer *Local Government/Fire* respondents and more *Federal–Local* respondents have *No Current Incident Qualifications*.

Table 1. Respondents' Organizational level by Agency.

Organization Level	BIA/ TRIBE	BLM	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Contractor	Total
Contract	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	6	0	5	15
Fed - Local	4	83	0	56	0	0	0	332	13	0	488
Fed - Region	10	32	0	16	0	0	2	45	14	0	119
Fed - Natl	10	13	0	6	2	0	0	34	1	0	66
Local Govt	0	1	72	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	77
Other	1	3	0	1	0	2	0	18	0	0	25
State Agency	0	0	3	0	0	63	0	2	0	0	68
Total	25	134	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	5	858

Table 2. Respondents' Functional area by Agency.

Functional area	BIA/ TRIBE	BLM	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Contractor	Total
Dispatch	0	13	1	0	0	2	0	24	0	0	40
Fire	19	50	10	35	1	28	0	171	18	0	332
Fuels	1	12	2	8	0	0	0	31	5	0	59
LO/AA	2	12	29	15	0	12	0	23	2	0	95
NIMO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	8
Other	1	2	1	2	0	0	0	5	0	0	11
Other agency	1	29	12	14	2	12	2	110	2	0	184
Other fire	0	10	16	3	1	8	0	37	1	0	76
Other non-agency	1	6	4	3	0	4	0	30	0	5	53
Total	25	134	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	5	858

Table 3. Respondents' Incident qualification by Agency.

Incident Qualification	BIA/ TRIBE	BLM	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Contractor	Total
FEMA	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3
IMT-Type 3	3	16	17	15	0	5	0	44	4	0	104
IMT-C&G	9	41	26	22	2	22	1	137	16	3	279
IMT-IC	0	14	13	4	0	10	0	36	1	0	78
None	3	15	1	8	0	2	0	23	1	0	53
Other	10	48	16	31	2	27	0	199	6	2	341
Total	25	134	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	5	858

Table 4. Respondents' Age range by Agency.

Age Range	BIA/ TRIBE	BLM	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Contractor	Total
<20	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	2
21-30	2	7	0	1	0	1	0	14	1	0	26
31-40	5	22	3	13	1	6	0	83	5	1	139
41-50	8	38	14	35	0	21	0	136	11	0	263
>50	10	67	58	31	3	37	2	205	11	4	428
TOTAL	25	134	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	5	858

Overview of Results

Overarching Principles

There is remarkable consistency across the data. Overall, respondents place *somewhat importance* on all Overarching Principles as indicated by the mean ratings across all respondents (Fig. 6). The overall pattern shown here, in which *Support of IMT Decisions* ranks highest and *Modules and Service Centers* rank lowest, may be further described by considering the distribution of ratings. The mean and full distribution of responses are provided in the following figures to help readers interpret results.

Combining selections at each end of the response spectrum and comparing these to the neutral selection shows how many respondents feel positively, neutrally, and negatively toward each principle (Fig. 7). This method indicated a predominantly positive response to all Overarching Principles. Responses were least positive for *Modules and Service Centers* (44%), with several choices receiving at or above 75% support (*Single Qualification System*, *Accountability, Incident Complexity/Scalability*, *Response to Federal fire Policy*, and *Support for IMT Decisions*). *Modules and Service Centers* also received the highest neutral (28%) and negative ranking (11%). *Compensation Strategies and Incentives* also received a fairly notable neutral (23%). *Agency Accountability* and *Support for IMT Decisions* received the lowest negative ranking (3% and 4%, respectively).

Figure 8 refines this picture by showing the strength of perceptions, which is approximated by comparing the two ends of the spectrum (*1-Highly Unimportant, 5-Highly Important*) against the middle (*2-Somewhat Unimportant, 3-Neutral,* and *4-Somewhat Important*). This parsing of the data indicated that the majority of respondents are more neutral. Key exceptions are *Support for IMT Decisions*, which was considered *5-Highly Important*, and *Succession Planning*, which moved from 10th rank overall up to 7th.

Additional insight may be gained by considering the variations and trends among and between sub-groups, which may be found in the subsequent section.

Figure 6. Comparison of ratings for Overarching Principles.



Figure 7. Comparison of negative, neutral, and positive ratings for Overarching Principles. (Unimportant = highly and somewhat important; Neutral = neutral; Important = somewhat and highly important.)



Figure 8. Comparison of strength of ratings for Overarching Principles. (Highly Important = highly unimportant; Neutral = somewhat unimportant, neutral, and somewhat important; Highly Important = highly important.)



Building Blocks

Responses indicated strong support for the status quo in some areas (*Role of the Militia* and *Dispatching*) and strong support for change in others, such as how incident management participation is funded (*Team Funding*). Likewise, some Building Blocks received moderate support for the status quo (*Role of Area Command*, *Number of Interagency Teams*, and *Role of Contract Teams*), while responses indicated moderate support for change (*Governance*). As might be expected, in some cases, respondents showed a strong consensus as to the direction of change (*Performance*), while for others, there was no clear indication of consensus (*Workforce Development*). For the purposes of this effort, "strong" support is indicated by a two-thirds (66%) majority perspective. "Moderate" support indicates the most frequent selection captures between 25 and 50% of all responses.

Only three of the Building Blocks garnered a majority (>50%) in any single response category, indicating that while there may be preferences, in most cases there will be both support for and resistance to future actions among some segment of the surveyed population. The following tables and text summarize results and narrative comments and note key variation among demographic sub-groups. Complete response information for each question is presented in subsequent sections.

Strong Support for Existing Structures (>60% support)

There was considerable support for continued reliance upon non-fire militia to participate in and fill out IMT positions (Fig. 9). There was also strong support for dispatching teams at the Geographic Area level and moving to national coordination during scarcity.



Figure 9. Responses indicating strong support for the status quo. (Darker bars indicate status quo.)

Moderate Support for Existing Structures (25-50% support)

Another suite of Building Blocks related to teams and trainees garnered moderate support; that is, though the status quo was most frequently selected, respondents were

less than a majority (Fig. 10). There was no clear consensus on any change in direction for both *Area Command* and *Number of Interagency Teams*, with several respondents proposing additional study to test what seemed to them to be an unsubstantiated assumption on the part of the IMOSPT that change is needed. Respondents only marginally supported retaining two types of teams and were not in agreement yet about the direction to improve trainee management or use of contract teams.



Figure 10. Comparison of responses gathering 25-50% support for the existing structure.
(Darker bars indicate status quo.)

Strong Support for Change

A set of Building Blocks concerning *Funding* team participation, *Team Configuration*, *Role of FEMA/DHS* teams, and *Performance* received strong support for change. In the first case (Fig. 11), there was both strong support for change and a clear future direction. In the remainder, there was a fairly clear preference for the direction of change–smaller teams, using *FEMA/DHS*, and formalizing participation--but not for how to achieve this (Fig. 12).



Figure 11. Responses for "How should team participants be funded?"



Figure 12. Responses indicating strong preference for change, but no clear consensus on tactic. (Darker bars indicate status quo.)

Strong Support for Change—Direction Unclear

Perhaps ironically, for two Building Blocks–*NIMO/NIMO-like* full-time teams and *Workforce Development*–respondents overwhelmingly supported changing the status quo but were very much divided about which direction to take (Fig. 13). There were many negative comments about NIMO as it is currently understood, but there was support for considering full-time teams. Similarly, more than 75% of respondents said they would like to see something done about workforce development, but few provided thoughts on how to proceed.



Figure 13. Responses indicating strong preference for change, but no clear consensus on direction for change. (Darker bars indicate status quo; diagonals indicate summation of all change options.)

Moderate Support for Change—Implementation Tactic Unclear

The final grouping of Building Blocks represented a suite of issues--*Participation*, *Governance*, and *Compensation*--for which the status quo was not preferred but with no clear direction or perhaps even interest in how to change or improve it (Fig. 14). There was nearly universal support for encouraging any and all employees of land management agencies to participate in incident management in some way, at some time, in their employment; but it was unclear whether and for whom this might be mandatory or remain voluntary. There also appeared to be a significant interest in stronger national presence in team governance but no consensus on how to do that. In the case of *Compensation*, nearly as many respondents selected *No Preference* to changing compensation strategies as made any other selection.



Figure 14. Responses indicating moderate preference for change, but no clear consensus on direction for change, as proportion of total response. (Darker bars indicate status quo).

Alternative Organizational Models

The Alternative Organizational Models combine the Building Blocks in various ways and emphasize the Overarching Principles to various degrees. We requested feedback on a series of alternative organizational models to help the NWCG Executive Board envision how the Building Blocks might be best configured. The Board made it clear it had no expectation that any one of the models would be adopted as is. Thus, responses should be used to build general impressions. Readers may dive more deeply into responses to individual Building Blocks (previous section) and comments (following section) to add clarity and nuance to what emerges here.

Responses to the Alternative Organizational Models look considerably different from those for the Overarching Principles. Support for Organizational Models was overall much more muted--only three models obtained more than 50% support (*4-Somewhat Desirable* and *5-Highly Desirable*, combined) (Fig. 15). Beyond that, responses showed marked variation. The most moderate responses, as indicated by high proportion of neutral and low proportion of positive ratings, were for the two models based on the Current Situation. The most positive responses were for the Core Team options and most negative were for the External Capacity options.

Figure 15. Comparison of negative, neutral, and positive ratings for Alternative Organizational Models. (Undesirable = highly undesirable and somewhat undesirable; Neutral = neutral; Desirable = somewhat desirable and highly desirable.)



Considering the strength of opinions by comparing the extremes of the rating scale (*5-Highly Desirable, 1-Highly Undesirable*) against the middle (2-*Somewhat Undesirable, 3-*Neutral and *4-Somewhat Desirable*) (Fig. 16) suggests more similarity to Overarching Principles. This perspective on the data conveys the sense of a lukewarm reception for all models, although there was still a strong negative response to the External Capacity options.

A couple of differences between the models might explain the relatively dramatic variation in response:

- both *Core Team* options include only 7 NIMO teams and both are based on a single team type (i.e., collapsing Type 1 and Type 2 teams). All other options call for 20 NIMO teams;
- *External Capacity* options essentially externalize Incident Management; and
- the *Current Situation* models are known.

Figure 16. Comparison of strength of importance ratings for Alternative Organizational Models. (Highly Undesirable = highly undesirable; Neutral = somewhat undesirable, neutral, somewhat desirable; Highly Desirable = highly desirable.)



Narrative Comments

Narrative comments submitted in various sections of the electronic survey and those received from the email account are remarkably consistent. Several themes repeated themselves:

- a sense that lack of participation stems, in great measure, from an inability to train and serve rather than from lack of interest;
- the value of non-fire (Militia) participation in fire linked with the value of integrating fire as a process and a staff area into the broader mission of public land management;
- there is much that works well with the current system and meeting future needs should begin by building on these attributes; and
- a sense that while full-time fire management teams (i.e., NIMO-like) may have a useful future role, this concept needs further refinement.

Inability to train and serve

The most frequent theme concerned an inability to train and serve in incident management and was attributed to two main causes:

- tension between home unit targets and fire assignment; and
- sub-optimal training qualifications and assignment system.

The first of these was frequently expressed as a lack of agency support for training and team participation, a heavy workload at the home unit that makes it difficult to leave for extended periods, dwindling staff that makes it difficult for others at the home unit to fill

in for a team member while they are on assignment, and the lack of any mechanism for relief from targets at the home unit. These apply to both the team member and the unit.

Respondents expressed the desire for flexibility in meeting targets (individual and unit level), acknowledgement of the value of IMT participation to off-set demerits for being unable to meet individual performance measures, and/or compensation to the unit to help it meet targets through other means. Creating performance measures specific to incident management participation was frequently mentioned as a change that was expected to be valuable to all--line officers, supervisors, and employees--to help promote and ensure participation.

The second cause was expressed as difficulty in getting training and team assignments. Although related to the previous comments, these comments focused on the desire for acknowledgement and acceptance of skills acquired in other tasks and jobs (such as of accepting day-job skills and tasks as meeting incident management qualifications); description of multiple paths for qualifying for positions; more formal emphasis on shadowing and follow-up mentoring; utilizing locals who desire/need training; and more accountability to ensure that if training is acquired, the individual will be able and required to serve.

Non-fire participation crucial

The second most common theme concerned the value of non-fire participation. Respondents noted that non-fire participation benefits land management missions by bringing ecological knowledge and skills to the teams and by providing non-fire staff with a more concrete understanding of fire effects and management. Stove-piping of fire by specializing fire was seen by respondents to isolate fire staff from other tasks involved in public land management while limiting participation by non-fire staff. Others noted that fire staff are often less interested in non-operations positions on teams and these positions can be effectively filled by non-fire personnel. According to respondents, the untapped well of non-fire personnel who are interested, but not currently serving, in incident management represents an under-utilized resource.

Formalizing an expectation for all land management employees to participate in incident management in some way--through creating specific expectations in Position Descriptions, and including participation (employee) or providing training and assignments (supervisors/Line Officers) in Performance Measures--was a suggestion to re-integrate fire/land management and boost participation in incident management.

The current system has many strengths

Another significant theme was that a lot works well in the current system and that modifications rather than wholesale replacement is the best strategy to pursue. Specifically, respondents noted that a primary strength of incident performance derives from teams whose members work consistently together. Respondents expressed that the cohesion forged over time produces effective performance and is the primary personal reward drawing people to incident management. Many of these respondents

voiced concern that modularization of functions may jeopardize both personal commitment to incident participation and operational efficiency.

Another strength of the current system, and one that is also proposed as an Overarching Principle, is the inherent scalability of the Incident Command System. Respondents noted that the issue seems to be cultural rather than structural, i.e., re-configuring teams may be less important than re-configuring how team sizing is determined for each incident.

Many respondents pointed to the inter-agency composition of teams and of inter-agency participation as great strengths of the existing system. This response seemed to include both inter-disciplinary and inter-agency expertise that ideally allows a team to understand and effectively function in any jurisdictional or ecological situation.

Finally, many respondents noted that while there is and will continue to be a role for contract single resources and specialized modules, incident management is an "inherently governmental function". That is, responsibility for public lands management is the responsibility of the public land manager, be it a state or a Federal agency, and incident management should not be contracted entirely.

Role of full-time teams

A final common theme revolved around the notion that the role of full-time teams needs refinement. Respondents frequently expressed this as the NIMO structure is not working as currently deployed and understood by field personnel. There was considerable skepticism among respondents that full-time teams and cost containment are compatible. Few said they understand what the teams do in the off-season or when not on fire assignment and thus do not see a value to incident management. As national teams, members are accountable to the national office instead of attached to specific geographic areas and accountable to local agency administrators. Support for some full-time "core" command and general staff teams seemed to stem from the ability of those teams to avoid (or resolve) the home unit--fire work load tensions.

New themes

Several themes captured new concepts for consideration. One of the most frequent was the suggestion to provide flexibility, support, compensation, and/or reward for supervisors to encourage them to release employees for fire participation. Another was the strong feeling that incident management is an inherently Governmental function that should not be contracted. One of the most frequent comments submitted in the Alternative Organizational Models section identified a preferred model as one that combines key elements of the Core Team Concept and the Current with Overarching Principles.

Results—By Overarching Principle

To facilitate interpretation and improve power of statistical analysis, several types of data were collapsed.

- All Likert-scale response data were collapsed into three categories: *Negative* combines *1-Highly Unimportant* and *2-Somewhat Unimportant*, *Neutral* captures *3-Neutral*, and *Positive* combines *4-Somewhat Important* and *5-Highly Important*.

Succession Planning

"The current system relies on voluntary participation and the current model cannot be sustained due to a lack of sufficient incentives and accountability measures. All organizational models will develop or make use of interagency workforce development and succession plans at both the National and Geographic level. These plans should embrace a "hire to retire" model that encourages incident management team (IMT) participation rather than discourage it. Critical attributes of this strategy and training plan include:

- *Promotion and marketing of IMT participation to encourage recruitment of new talent into the IMT program.*
- *Performance management objectives for employees and supervisors for required participation. One example that supports this concept is inclusion of IMT job duties in position descriptions for Federal employees.*
- *Career paths to enable easier and quicker transition to new qualification requirements.*
- *Academies for functional training to decrease time to acquire training and streamline training.*
- *National, interagency mentoring and trainee programs to ensure qualified individuals for needs; core teams, modules/service centers are trained and succession plans are implemented.*
- *More efficient use of retired employees. Utilize highly skilled workforce composed of retirees to fill gaps, to mentor and train current employees and explore their use as surge forces rather than permanent team fixtures" (NWCG 2011a: 9).*

Survey Question 2.1: *Changing the current "voluntary" participation system, and developing an interagency succession system that supplies sufficient staffing for IMTs.*

Figure 17. Importance of Succession Planning.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Unimportant	56	7
Somewhat Unimportant	80	9
Neutral	143	17
Somewhat Important	262	31
Highly Important	314	37
Total:	855	100

Missing = 3

The most frequently selected rating *5-Highly Important* was chosen by 37% of respondents, closely followed by *4-Somehwat Important* which garnered 31% of response (Fig. 17). Significant differences existed in several distributions of responses by demographic sub-group (Fig. 18):

- *Incident Position:* There was a significant difference in distribution of responses-- respondents with *No Incident Qualifications* were significantly more neutral than expected.
- *Functional Area:* There was a significant difference in distribution of responses with those in the Other sub-group selecting *Neutral* more frequently than expected.

Figure 18. Importance of Succession Planning by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level.



b. by Incident position.



c. by Functional area



d. by Agency.



e. by Age range.



Comments submitted concerning this Overarching Principle are rich and detailed (Tables 5, 6). There is both support for and opposition to mandatory incident participation. Those supporting a mandatory system pointed to: lack of ability to participate currently (*"voluntary system currently does not work because Fire Managers will not let their people be on teams during their fire seasons. I have experienced this while working for 2 different agencies for 5 different managers for 16 fire seasons. Now I have lost interest in teams"*), and the value those with resource backgrounds bring to this fundamental agency mission ("*we need to keep wildfire management integrated with land management as a whole...not as some separate entity. Encouraging ecologists to serve as resource advisors and nothing else is unacceptable. On that same note, the idea of having traditional fire management personnel that have no passion or interest in the ecology of the landscape that they're managing is also unacceptable"*). As one opposer of a mandatory system countered "*Take away the voluntary participation and you will end up with a mindset that will cause disaster in the future. Voluntary participation ensures new ideas, thoughts, teamwork. A set team without voluntary participation will end up like the military where rank is often the determining factor not common sense. Leaders are not all higher up on the food chain."*

Table 5. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Succession Planning.

From Question 3.17
Anyone who works for an agency that has fire suppression/ incident response as part of it's mission should be expected to support that mission at some level. That is the expectation with my state agency as it relates to incidents in our jurisdiction. That support may mean an office manager who can serve as a PTRC or all the way up to FSC. It may be a seasonal laborer who functions as a driver in Ground Support. Everyone has an expectation to participate. Knowing that participation is required, people then seek out their areas of interest and skill to serve in. If we are really short in an area we may request someone to attain qualifications in a needed area. We don't really have many "fire only" positions anyway. We all do what it takes to carry out the many aspects of our mission. This concept helps, but even so, providing for IMT succession has to be intentional and include advanced planning. We do this with yearly meetings when we analyze training needs, future IMT position needs, etc.
K.I.S.S Keep it simple...Why are so many parts of Type 1 & 2 teams filled w/AD's??? We need to get people who are still in fire involved. It can be a very useful experience. I think that forcing people to fill positions on a team is a bad idea. We need to get more people(who are still in fire) involved so that they can learn and develope the skills necessary to help contribute more to IMT's.
I think the best fire suppression management comes from employees of federal land management agencies. We need to make this work part of everyone's job again. Each unit (Forest, BLM District, etc.) should be required to maintain a Type 3 Team to manage low-complexity incidents without calling in off-unit Teams. I don't think we can afford NIMO Teams and I don't think they necessarily have the skills needed to manage complex incidents.
Incident management and suppot should be a condition of hire. If that were true, why would you need incentives? Employees should be recognized and valued for their contributions. National standards and training pools will alleviate likelihood of faroritism. But this needs to be coupled with a strong and consistent evaluation process. Those who excel should be rewarded with addtional responsibility and opportunity. If more participte all would hve fewer days assigned. Find the fit for all employees even if it is picking up addtional worlkload at home during PL 4 and 5 events.
From Question 4.08
You need some people who have not been in your circle to come up with new ideas based on New Orleans and

Fukujima, Victoria and Canberra. We are boxing ourselves in and capping a conversation that is not in keeping with anyone's best interest. How about asking video gamers and computer programmers and Microsoft or Apple managers to look at the picture and write us a report? How about asking the Australians at Victoria what they think? How about asking the Israelis to comment. How about asking ski patrols to check out our fundamentals? How about asking young smart Marine officers to give it a look? How about asking policy wonks in Washington think tanks to grill our ideas over a slow flame as see how much fat they find? Blow off the doors. Are you afraid of the answers?

Table 6: Comments submitted to the Gmail account relevant to Succession Planning.

In my opinion, the project has overlooked three major focus areas that should be considered before selecting a final option: 1. Type 3 IMT's are not evaluated nor considered. Numerous studies, reports, and briefing papers exist citing the need to expand capabilities in this area. Type 3 IMO's feed personnel upwards to type 2/1 IMO's, and manage many more incidents nationally each year than Type 2 and Type 1 IMT's. However, the agencies have failed to react- Type 3 teams are not formally recognized or supported, and no Command and General Staff positions for IMT's at the Type 3 level exist other than the Incident Commander. Failing to establish standards, qualifications, and support for these teams is contrary to the mission. 2. The training, qualification, and certification system should be evaluated as part of this effort. One of the driving factors for undertaking this effort is the reduced number of qualified personnel at the Type 2 and Type 1 levels. A recent study indicated that it takes 20+ years to become a Type 2 Incident Commander, and one could become a neurosurgeon or astronaut in half that time. Perhaps the training and qualifications system should be evaluated to see if efficiencies can be gained, and roadblocks to becoming qualified could be removed or streamlined. 3. Re-emphasizing fire management duties and participation by employees as a fundamental part of the Agencies' mission, on par with oil and gas, grazing, timber, recreation, and other programs. Simple amendments to PD's agency-wide (requiring participation in incident management), coupled with a mechanism for relief of targets because of participation in incident management would increase the pool of participants at all levels of fire and incident management. These three issues contribute to the lack of personnel available and qualified to participate at the Type 1 and Type 2 level. I also believe involvement in the project at the Departmental level would be a benefit. Thanks for the opportunity to comment. Good luck with the project.
Fewer employees pursue training for several reasons. Organizations have reduced to a point that historic work crews are but a memory, and remaining employees have plates so full that their supervisors are reluctant to support any absence for any reason. Family dynamics find more single parents that can not be gone from home for any extended period. Anything close to a busy season has present IMT participants looking at a 50-70 day commitment, which is more then most supervisors and families care to support. The "old dogs" in the fire community are old enough to remember that Bob Dylan lyric that says, "The Times They Are A Changin'" Along with death and taxes, change is something we must all accept as inevitable. One can only say that it's about time that we not only recognize the need for change, but also do something about it. Such is the charter of this Team it appears. The need for Incident Management is certainly not going away. It is rather growing and becoming more obvious. As time passes, and energy on the landscape increases, an evolution has taken place. Some see it and some do not. The old Type 1 Teams no longer manage fires of hundreds or thousands of acres. They manage "mega-fires" of tens to hundreds of thousands of acres that occur in or near very populated landscapes. The old fairly local Type 2 Teams of old are stepping up to fires in the interface of sizes that reach upwards of 20 and 30 thousand acres, in places well beyond their historic Regional neighborhoods. They are called for other large non-fire incidents as well. Meanwhile Type 3 Teams are being formed and are learning to work in local partnership with state and local resources, to manage the small local fires.
Yes there are many AD hires to fill assignments/round out a team – it seems to work and there is a lot of knowledge that come with these folks.
In my opinion, the project's proposed options don't address the basic problem: we don't have enough people to continue what we're doing. In fact, a few of the options actually contradict a solution to this problem. Furthermore, it seems that the literature on the project makes some incorrect assumptions:

A. the current system is entirely broken and we need to throw the baby out with the bathwater. In reality, the current system has worked for many years, has been constantly refined and focused, and has been both resilient and responsive to change. Much time and effort have been put into the system as we currently know it- I have to believe that was time and effort well spent, and it is the way it is for a reason.

B. preservation of team cohesion and rapid response is not a factor in the decision. These principles are a few of the fundamental elements of safety and effectiveness, and are one of the main reasons why our system is organized in the current configuration.

C. there is additional funding for something different. In the current and projected budget climate, any decision must remain budget-neutral, if not provide savings of preparedness funds.

If we reverse these flawed assumptions, it seems to me that we're left with two basic questions:

1. Why don't we have enough current employees that participate on IMT's?

2. Why don't we have an adequate pool of future IMT participants?

The next logical step would be to formulate simple answers to these questions:

Why don't we have an adequate pool of future IMT participants?

a. Current training and qualification procedures and standards do not allow employees to achieve IMT qualifications in a timely manner (i.e. it takes the average Type 2 Incident Commander 20+ years to become qualified, etc.). Our agencies are full of exceptionally bright and competent employees- we should do everything in our power to place these employees quickly into incident management positions while still ensuring that their experience and training are adequate.

b. There is no requirement, or benefit, to new employees to participate in fire management activities (i.e. is employed as a Lands and Realty Specialist and nothing requires them to participate in fire). Again- our agencies are full of exceptionally bright and competent employees and some of them need to be told that fire management is part of their agencies' mission.

How do we fix this? Let's address the answers by providing solutions:

1a. increase participation by non-fire employees on IMTs. This would offset the unavailability of fire staffs with existing primary fire management or suppression missions. See 1b. and 2b.

1b. implement an interagency policy from top levels that provides relief from targets for employees participating in fire management activities at PL 4 and PL 5. If fire management is a fundamental core part of each agencies' mission, let's put our money where our mouth is and treat it as such, and be willing to take the heat for it.

2a. perform a top to bottom analysis of the training and qualifications system (taskbooks, position flow, training courses, training requirements, etc.) and modify it with the intent of gaining efficiency, reducing duplication, and shortening the length of time required to progress to higher qualifications. Coupled with the stomach to tell employees they aren't cut out for a position, I believe we could gain a lot of ground here.

2b. implement an interagency policy requiring every position description to contain language such as "employee is required to participate in fire management activities commensurate with qualifications and level of fire activity." Hold employees and supervisors accountable for making participation happen.

Finally, we must evaluate whether our solutions have addressed the problem. This will be evidenced by more employees participating on IMT's and more fire management capability by all employees at all levels, and will result in safer and more efficient incident management and better integration of fire management across disciplines and agencies.

Although the primary driver for all this is getting qualified people on teams, I think these models have approached the problem from the top down – that is changing the type of teams. I suggest that there is another approach to the problem.

On an individual level I have seen discussions about this from two points of view – teams that cannot get people to fill positions; and individuals that cannot get assignments. There seems to be a disconnect here. On the fundamental levels of people getting training, qualifications and experience, and being available and selected for teams, there are several complex issues involved with these problems (large and small). But I did not see anything in the models that attempt to solve these 'lower level' people based issues. I would suggest that these are under lying issues (problems that need to be fixed no matter what model is selected) and that a significant amount of time and effort should be expending into addressing these components before the next version of the models are developed. I see them as outside of model development, but a step that should be addressed either in parallel with or before any further development and modification of models and options. If these issues are addressed, decisions on models would be much clearer.

As I stated earlier one of my primary comments is that the process is too rushed. We should continue moving forward, but move back the self imposed deadlines so the field and project designers can develop a solution that works and solves the problem.

I appreciate this opportunity to comment on the IMT reorganizational process. First, I would like to say that I think you are going about it all wrong. I think you should have gone through the stakeholder process BEFORE you developed the models. To, it looks like the models were developed with very little if any outside input. There is very little to distinguish between them. For example most of the models have as a component an increase in the number of NIMO teams. The simple question is why. I do not see anything in any of the models that would dictate that particular piece of the solution pie. It seems to me if the stakeholder input is to have any REAL impact on the project then should have occurred earlier in the process.

As an AD, you are correct that you cannot count on us to be there forever, and some of us may only do it for a few years as we may wish to actually vacation during august (lol).

Especially for non-fire personnel attached to IMT's there continually a problem/conflict with program targets and participation on IMT's. While the Chief sends out memo's making fire suppression a top priority there is no relief for meeting agency/unit program targets. On busy fire seasons both are not always 100% possible. Consideration of length of commitment on IMT's was not mentioned. Will it be 3 or 4 or 5 year commitments. On that note, there have been cases where an employee applied for a team and was selected. The agency administrator called CWCG and was given the flexibility to authorize the employee's commitment to the team on a year-to-year basis. This should not be the case. If an employee is selected then the commitment should be for the full term and not conditional. There are also times during the year where supervisor's make IMT members available or not depending on their discretion. This needs to be addressed as well- a commitment is should be a commitment.

I find it interesting that the cover document that was provided addresses "Some teams fill nearly half of their positions with 'Administratively Determined' (AD) employees. AD employees are casual hires and often have excellent skills and experience; however most are retirees and (as a group) cannot be considered as an effective long-term workforce." I have looked at all the referred to documents on the NWCG website and can not find any such reference in any of the evaluating documents so I am not sure where in this statement comes from because it is not addressed or even mentioned anywhere in any document is such abrasive terms.

Besides my own personal comments and evaluation of where I think we are at, I am sure that there are many many more comments and ideas besides what are currently there. Some of the suggestions that are driving this assessment, I find hard to believe that these issues are just now at the surface and seem to be an issue. These issues have been around for as long as I have been doing fire, which is since 1977 and have never been adequately addressed. The issue of Stress on employees and families is one that I have a hard time of anyone dealing with. When you get in the fire program, and at an early age, one should know that this job is a long arduous job that takes you away from family and friends for long periods of time and this is a personal commitment to stay in fire. If you dont want this impact, its easy to resolve, get out of the fire fighting job.

The increasing fire season length is negatively impacting all wildland fire agencies' abilities to meet their mission, due, in part, to personnel serving on teams having less time to accomplish their normal job duties.

Agency Administrators are frustrated by having employees gone for extended periods on All Hazard incidents

Stresses on employees and families

Teams are often engaged for multiple assignments in busy years

I can see alot of work has been put into this assessment, but, so many of the issues and decisions have been discussed

for many years with no real resolution to it. Probably the best alternative if you want a permanent firefighting community to be able to respond to fires and other types of incidents, is to make them permanent positions for anyone to be able to apply for and not have a so called "malitia" on IMT's. I have addressed many other issues that I have and I have heard others discuss and complain about in the attached document.

Let me introduce myself to you. I retired from the BLM in January of 2005 with Firefighter/Law Enforcement Retirement. I have been participating in fire since 1977 in one form or another. All of it ranging from prescribed fires to wild fires and all hazard incidents. I have worked in Operations and Logistics and on overhead teams off and on through out my career and as an AD since retiring.

I read this document with interest to say the least. I do not see this position nor the situation that you are trying to solve as a new one. This discussion and evaluation of IMT's has taken place way before I retired in 2005. At that time, the fire management community and fire managers and BLM Mangers had been told that the fire staff and support staff was in the process of becoming older and that you were loosing the main cadre of fire folks supporting fire. Whether or not it was the so called "militia" or permanent fire staff, it was common knowledge that a large gap was going to take place in the staffing of IMT's and no one wanted to listen at that time, and I find it interesting that you are wanting to address it now. Its almost a day late and dollar short, but, I really do think that the current system can be saved with a few little tweaks to it.

One of the most offensive comments that all of you made, whomever it is, put in this issue paper is concerning the position of the AD's. You state; "AD employees are casual hires and often have excellent skills and experience; however most are retirees and (as a group) cannot be considered as an effective long-term workforce."

How can you make such a statement? The AD program has held fire together for many many years, but, it is very obvious that upper management is now further trying to get rid of the AD program and those that hold fire together. The dedicated AD's have been, in many instances, the stable force to the fire program for a number of years. But, these kinds of statements clearly show that no one really believes it and there is now a bigger push to get rid of those employees then ever.

One of the big reasons that AD's don't support or apply for positions on IMT's is this. Most AD's are looking to make money besides doing a good job for the fire program. Over the many years there have been many discussions, some were very heated, over the pay that AD's got and some just over the commitment that AD's would make to the IMT program. Many AD's do not and will not commit to being on an IMT just because of the fact that in many cases, the IC will not allow them to "free lance" when the teams are off rotation and the team is in down status. This causes many AD's to stick with free lancing so they can make money to make ends meet and not apply for an IMT position.

Now, I for one have said for many years, where can you go make the kind of pay that many AD's make to supplement their Government pension. Not many. But, many AD's are not Government retirees. And some of those folks have very legitimate concerns over the pay. The AD program includes more than just one status of employee which so many managers forget.

So to say that the AD's can not be counted on for the long term is not accurate in my assessment of the situation, you may have just cut your own throat even further by making this kind of statement. I personally think that you and the other managers really need to take a second look and reassess your position on AD's. You hit part of the critical assessment of AD's on the head. But, its very late in the process and it makes all AD's take a harder look at how little they are appreciated in what experience and commitment they do have and offer to this program.

And YES, they can be considered a long term and effective workforce whether or not you want to admit it. They probably have more commitment than many permanent fire employees who are currently working.

I think you have things backwards too on why so few employees are pursuing fire training into the 420 and 520 training classes that you talk about. Having been around fire for the years I have, I think you forgotten, and that in the recent past years, there have been many fatalities on fires. Such fires as the Cramer fire on the Salmon Challis NF and others where fatalities occurred and ultimately those who were responsible for managing those fires were personally sued because of suit happy lawyers and others. There has been little support for a program that is dangerous in and of it's self. Could this have played a role in not participating on an IMT, not wanting to be sued and wanting to enjoy your retirement and the rest of your career? I believe so as do many others.

There are some employees, and AD's, trying to get to the point where they can serve on an IMT in the positions that require 420 and/or 520, but, they can not get a sponsor and/or the process to get to those positions has become so burdensome that they just finally give up. And further, many employees just don't want the supervisory responsibility that comes with serving in the C&G staff positions you talk about to fill IMT's. Did you ever think of that?
Issues with Participation on Teams Participation in the fire program by non-fire folks should be strengthened. The general attitude toward resource/staff participation has greatly contributed to a lack of interest and participation in fire, teams, and project fire position qualifications. Pack tests, fire refresher, and other training and prescribed fire participation are conducted with the assumption that non-fire staff can drop whatever they are doing and attend, because, of course, fire staff has nothing else going on so it is no problem for them. Sufficient advanced planning for participation is infrequent. Pack tests and fire refresher locations are set to be inconvenient for non-fire staff to participate.
I am a PIO2 trainee. I'd like to have the opportunity to be assigned to a team as a trainee, with the requirement that I do not have to attend every incident. I have school age children and that requirement means that I need to give up all summer family vacations with them. Since my kids are in school this is the main time that we can go on vacation together. As trainees, if we could have more flexibility to make a good faith effort to be available for incidents, but have the understanding that you can still plan for 1-2 weeks in the summer that you can spend with school-age children.
It appears that most of the models reflect retirees being used as ready reserves. Not being utilized or integrated into incidents unless the most resources are depleted. I think this is not the most productive use of these knowledgeable resources. In some models it seems they would be the entire make up of these back up contract teams. It is rarely a good idea not to have diversity in an organization. A lot of career federal non fire employees enjoy working fires at any capacity and would like to continue involvement in (Semi)retirement. Currently this involves signing up with local fire dept. sponsor or taking on AD status.Enact special legislation for fire qualified folks participate on IMT and draw un-reduced retirement benefits 1. Need to look into possibilies for those current employees ready or qualified to retire, to be able to draw retirement but be kept on federal rolls (at AD or equielent fire wages which may or may not be current GS wages) for IMT participation only. This would keep their status as Fed employees, allow them to work on IMTs with out having to stay with federal "day job". They could continue to deposit to accrew years of service (pro rata), and deposit to TSP when actually employed. This may attract those CSRS (especially)between 55 and 62 to continue with IMT participation, training their replacements and being available the entire fire season for deployment. 2. Need to explore a retired annuitant version of the above for those already retired. Even if they did not participate on a dedicated "Team" they could be called in as single resources and share skills with exiting team members in those positions they are qualified for. Even be assigned to a trainee that is on a team. Being involved in the logistics section I know of the lack of resources and trainees interested in participating. I understand these ideas may be take policy changes but thought I would throw them out for discussion.
The "OVERARCHING PRINCIPLES" are not necessary for the foundation for all current and future IMT programs, are weak, and do not link to the alternatives proposed. Adherence to these principles would eliminate most of the alternatives being considered. Some of these principles have been identified as issues for years and have not been able to be corrected. They should not restrict an Organization model from being considered. Ask NWCG to modify the principles to better reflect the goals of the IMT succession planning.
It is not that the current IMT system is broke regarding the on the ground incident management. It's that the current system cannot be sustained. Having just been to the SW area IMT meeting, it is clearly apparent looking around the room that the average age of IMT participants is a lot closer to 50 then 30 and ADs make up a high percent of the teams. There are multiple reasons for this. Aging population, lack of management support, stagnation in the top IMT positions, qualification systems, and work/family time constraints all contribute. The overarching principles set a good foundation to build on.
Succession Planning: Looking at my home unit, the trends are unsustainable even with the recommendations found throughout the alternatives. Over the last 4 years, the Medford District has slashed the number of full-time employees from 240 to 181 with more expected in future years. As budgets and staff get smaller, there is greater pressure on supervisors to reach targets, which will lead to more supervisors making the decision to not allow a fire assignment. It will not be too long before the "Moses letter" from the Secretaries will have to come out at PL3 if we are to adequately

respond to seasonal challenges. To write IMT participation into position descriptions is a good step, but without some relief of targets made with no regard to fire demands, it will be difficult to not only staff teams but also mobilize the single resources that are critical to an incident's success.

Academies, trainees, and retirees are all good suggestions. I am not sure I understand the career paths bullet. I am all for more availability within the process, like regular 420 and 520 classes, but do not necessarily favor easier and quicker attainment of qualifications. It is my observation that a certain amount of patience and even failure is necessary to make a successful C&G member. Most people wanting to attain such qualifications are a bit egotistical to begin with and if it becomes quicker and easier, there is less chance of a humbling event. This could lead to hubris and as we all know from the ancient Greek playwrights, hubris leads to disaster. I think if we work at getting more people into the IMT world and provide good incentives to do so, there will be enough that are ambitious enough to pursue higher qualifications without making it easier. Again, I think the process is invaluable and teaches you many useful skills.

Overarching Principles

Since one of the greatest advantages to the IMT system is the ability to mobilize teams that can immediately go to work with a minimum of the "storming, forming and norming" and the mating dances typically associated with any new organizational structure, it is surprising that there is not an Overarching Principle focused on Team Dynamics or Team Cohesion. On the contrary, several of the suggested organizational models would prevent any effective team cohesion from existing.

I certainly applaud the long hours and work that has gone into the IMT successional planning process. However I feel compelled to make some comments that to me are the keys to any solution. I am not naive enough to believe that politics does not play a role in many of these types of discussions but in my opinion there are some basic items that need to be brought into the mix. Therefore some of my points are directly related to the successional process and some are deep rooted into the system that are partially to 'blame'.

1. Training opportunities are lacking- not just for C & GS positions but all those that lead to them. This is especially true for those who are in the east and do not have a large number of large incidents to be involved in. In my opinion there is not a national commitment to this problem. It has been going on and being discussed for my 20+ years in my capacity. We talk about the problem, try and develop solutions, but nothing has worked and until there is a real commitment on the national scene this will always be a real stumbling block. Training assignments are lacking (except perhaps at the local District level) except when there is a bad fire season, then everyone goes. Many times quality training assignments are not the norm in that situation. Someone has to really make an effort to address this.

2. There are many qualified wildland fire personnel in the east that will never have opportunities to be involved with an IMT. We are leaving them behind. No question. None of the scenarios can and do address this. Through FEMA and the USFA we are giving opportunities to local Type III, IV teams to get their qualifications and local state wildfire resources are being left out. I understand the big picture that we need type 3 teams for many reasons. However, it certainly appears that the all risk type 3 teams that are being given opportunities are going to be in the mix when we get into an active national fire season. These teams will be given opportunities to manage wildfire incidents without much wildfire experience. We will have highly qualified wildfire experienced people working for a Team without wildfire experience. Sounds like a receipt for problems and disaster. The NIMO teams are mentoring these local all risk teams and good wildfire resources are not in the mix. I believe the politics of it all is a major reason this is happening. There will certainly be a response to this indicating we should be more involved with the local type 3, all risk, teams. Many times that is not possible due to our mandates and more than anyone wants to admit, the 'system' doesn't support or encourage this. It can be a very closed system.

P1- Succession planning: There is not a real acknowledgement of why and how the current IMT system has been so successful. Success has been the result of the historically large pool of employees (all agencies) over time gaining experience through incident participation and education; and then being encouraged and nurtured onto teams, and mentored to ever-increasing levels of qualification. In addition, the historic pool of people that moved up through the ranks and are now at the ends of their careers came from organizations that did things. Resource folks were all over the place, doing trails, campgrounds, and wildlife work; timber folks did roads and timber sales, and fire folks burned the units. Often lots of units! Many of the team participants had careers outside of fire but started their participation as seasonal employees that did some fire fighting for the overtime (and because it was mandatory in "the good old days"). This is true for all agencies and not just the FS. Personnel had to deal with all manner of practical problems while doing their daily work which built an experience 'memory'. The diversity of talent and experience that was available both as single resources and team cadre helped support making difficult decisions under stress. This why the current T1-T2-T3 configuration needs to be preserved. It took many years, and assignments, to work up through the single resource ranks and become a boss or division supervisor. This provided the foundation for generally safe, effective, broadly

experienced, and informed incident management.

The creation of the task-book system was instrumental in achieving uniform resource qualifications and helped bring non-federal agencies up to par. But there is a potential failing of the task book system now with the attendant desire to push resources up the ladder without a truly wide experience base. Only what is needed to get “signed-off”. This combined narrowing of the resource pool (consolidations and staff reductions) and reduction in total experience of many individual resources is depleting the reservoir of expertise that is trying to manage incidents. Please refer to the Triangle diagrams provided below. As drawn the triangles are symmetric, and of course we know that in fact the various elements depicted are uneven. But the model could be used to fill in numbers by period to compare past and present participation along with total agency populations. I think the historic model would show a wide base with lots of lower levels to “promote” from into ICS. The current model is much narrower at the base, and with almost whole sections missing. The only way to increase the participation base would be to use the carrot & stick approach to bring in a larger percentage of the dramatically smaller personnel pool. Make fire support mandatory but also augment salaries for participation (also support more training early in a career to increase the chance of assignments and gaining expertise). This is going to be a difficult challenge due to budget constraints and leaner attitude for virtually all agencies! Year to year fluctuations in the need for IMT’s has caused erosion in readiness in the past. A system of ‘refresher’ sessions needs to be instituted, complete with the team computers and incident scenarios. This is far beyond the social ‘Team Meetings’ that happen each year. This could be used as recruiting/indoctrination sessions for potential team recruits.

The qualified C&G problem has been identified correctly and will worsen over time.

The C&G academy concept that Jim Cook is working on seems like the only reasonable way to hold up any of the succession planning efforts.

The current model we currently use, and have for many years, worked well when local workloads allowed freedom to engage on IMT assignments freely.

With the reduction of workforce, it seems almost without question that some amount of additional full-time standing teams will have to be implemented.

A C&G school that tests, teaches, and grooms future IMT members needs to be strongly considered. Much like we have for entry level FFTR's at the WFAP academy.

With this method we would then effectively harvest and groom identified leaders, provide standardized advanced training, and reap excellent results. This is how the Marine Corps transformed itself and ensures it's leaders truly exemplify their standards of performance and leadership.

The HRO concepts that we collectively try to embrace will never be reached to the extent we wish as we employ ad hoc members to teams on a regular basis. The speed that fire management and incident management is evolving has left many behind that do not understand our current wildland fire policy and will likely not be able to keep up.

If we fail to adapt, we will be replaced with something that does..

You have no doubt got a difficult chore ahead of you. I in no way could comprehend the immense challenges you will face. I would like to give you some insight from where we have been. I retired in 2003 and my time in service began 1975. Until the mid to later 80's the Forest Service was considered a blue chip organization paying for itself through timber sales. I benefitted from this in Fuels Management being funded when timber was selling. At this time on the Olympic National Forest there were 5 Districts all with Fuel Management Programs. The Shelton Ranger District hired 100 + employees each season to complete the workload. As you can guess, being exposed to fire almost on a daily basis gave outstanding fire skills and exposure to us. Our experience showed when we arrived at a fire assignment with qualifications from Prescribed Fire Boss, Type 2 and 3 IC, Operations Section Chiefs, Division Supervisors, Air Operations, to firefighters or today's equivalent. When the Timber Sales stopped so did the funding and presently there are only 2 Districts remaining on the Olympic. My best guess is this resulted in the loss of in excess of 200 firefighters on the Olympic. This did not happen only here. When Timber funding stopped, so did the Fuels Management. Yes, this was a major impact to fire resources as most of these personnel were available to assist fire efforts during the season.

I eventually took a position on the Boise National Forest where funding was strictly fire funded. The Boise has always had a history of fire suppression and continues because of lightning and fuel types. Still, they continue to struggle with cycles when resources are funded and then stripped away, mostly politically driven by budget constraints. My brothers and sisters from the days on the Olympic were highly trained and gained skills from their constant exposure to fire. You

did not progress due to lack of qualified personnel. I do not say this lightly and have seen firsthand the result of personnel moving up because a position was vacant, not because they meet the requirements for the job or have the skill set and experience. Continuing up and down cycles removing personnel who have attained some of these skill sets and knowledge is not beneficial to the safety of our firefighters. For part of my time on the Boise we went from 3 engines to 1 to protect the entire North Zone, Emmett RD, Cascade RD and Lowman. We were funded to have no engines at this time.

Yes you have some special challenges facing you. I am an AD retired from the Forest Service who has served as a Type 2 Team Member every year.

Single Qualification System

"In support of interagency workforce development and succession planning strategies, a common wildland fire qualification system will be utilized. Progress towards completion of an all hazard qualification system applicable across emergency services must be accelerated." (NWCG 2011a: 9)

Survey Question 2.2: *Supporting a common wildland fire qualification system and completing the All Hazard qualification system.*

Figure 19. Importance of Single Qualification System.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Unimportant	25	3
Somewhat Unimportant	46	5
Neutral	124	15
Somewhat Important	270	32
Highly Important	390	46
Total:	855	100

Missing = 3

The majority (78%) of respondents selected either *4-somewhat important* or *5-Highly Important* (Fig. 19).

Significant differences exist among distributions of responses for *Organizational Level* and *Agency* sub-groups (Fig. 20):

- *Organizational Level: Federal-Regional* respondents were significantly less enthusiastic than expected.
- *Agency:* Analysis of collapsed categories for distribution showed an overall significance, yet no individual cell was identified.

Comments (see Tables 7, 8) submitted observed the current variation in training requirements-- state to Federal, prescribed fire to emergency operations, and wildland fire to all hazard--and most made a plea for addressing these *("One standard qualification system is critical and HAS to include the states as well. Some states have additional requirements above the NWCG requirements that make the process to become qualified very burdensome"*). Comments also noted the need to acknowledge the different operational environments in fire *("For concerns of unqualified folks being on Fires add 2 more letters to the quals AH [for all Hazard] and WF [for fire]s. WF would carry all the quals in the 310-1 (5109) and over-ride AH but AH could still respond in certain positions. IE the only real need on Wildland Fire is the OPS Section be fully qualified as WF complete with the physical requirements. All other functions can be filled as WF or AH."*).

Figure 20. Importance of Single Qualification System by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level.



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age range.



Table 7. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Single Qualification System

From Question 2.12
2.2, 2.10-- There are quite a number of qualified people at the state, county and city level that are forming their own ICS all hazard teams. Why not train and include these qualified people in the pool? Most of them are not eligible to participate on the federal teams.
Single qualification system is very important, for an agency to place an order for an individual who is 310-1 qualifed because there employee is not 5109.17 qualified is insanity. But we do it all summer long and invite a local governement employee to a Forest Service Fire. All hazard qualification, is less important.
We all have known for years this was coming down in some fashion. What does concern me are we going to push non-quailified people to fill needed position?
Like the single Quals system. For concrens of unqualified folks being on Fires add 2 more letters to the quals AH for all Hazard and WF for fires. WF would carry all the quals in the 310-1 (5109) and over-ride AH but AH could still respond in certian positions. IE the only real need on Wildland Fire is the OPS Section be fully qualified as WF complete with the physical requirements. All other functions can be flled as WF or AH. This will intergrate and can allow good trained employees and contractors to fill out the need on teams.
Items 2.1 & 2.2 reflect an unfortunate "command and control" approach rather than an approach to make working on these teams desireable. It is extremely unadvisable to try to force employees or managers to be involved in fire. Such a high risk occupation is better approached on a voluntary basis. To effectively determine how to increase participation, a first step should be to determine why participation is decreasing. Right now it appears that management is speculating and/or using past information to determine why the problem of lack of participation is occurring now. This is likely to result in developing "solutions" that don't fix the problem & we will be dealing with this again in a few years.
It's about time that fire and all hazard gets together. It's a pain to have to ask if the I-400 class I'm taking is NWCG or NIMS because the NIMS doesn't qualify for fire. Command is command.
Qualification standards are different for cooperators and by regional areas, this MUST be corrected!
There should be one universal qualification standard to occupy a national team position for fire and one for all hazard (which would be lesser) Except for operations, all hazard is usually a good training ground for wildfire positions coupled with proficiency assignments. The 4 NIMO teams could help with this development
The travel ceiling in the NPS often prevents folks from getting into training, and then also training assignments which would qualify folks to go on incident management teams. Most of my experience is in Type 4 and Type 3 responses for LE, but I have been to Command and General Staff Academies (Logistics Section chief)for the National level and the local incident management teams. The local incident managment team training is where there should be a major effort. Allow folks to use ICS at the local level in park to get comfortable with what it is, how it works, and how beneficial it is as a planning tool. LE and Fire are so used to it - but park management, resource advisors etc, don't know how it can and will (properly implemented) benefit them and the event. Encouraging the use of ICS for planning anniversary events at Historic parks for instance is key to recruiting more folks. Those smaller parks often have the multi ability employees who "get it done" on staff, and as Section chief etc, I value those kind of people and their attitude. Also, when someone is in a smaller park, getting exposed to a larger perspective is key to good professional development.
The single qualification system is one bottleneck that many of us cann't get thru... Case in point: PSC2 - must have strike team leader qualification. There are several of us with multiple Plans understaff quals that can't jump the hurdle of strikteam leader qual. The current role of PSC doesn't require the need for STKL ... it just doesn't. And many of our ADs were 'grandfathered' in to PSC position early in their careers without that qual. There should be several avenues reaching some of these C&G staff positions, where appropriate. PSC is defintely one that should be re-evaulated!
Captains and Battalions should be qual'd at unit leader or above; FMOs need to be qual'd at the section chief or command level. All hazard important, but still need to separate out wildland fire and require the skill set specific to fire eg wildland fire operations section chief - not just any ops section chief. Without a doubt - GET RID OF THE DUAL QUALIFICATION SYSTEM!! eg 310-1 and 5109.17 and I'm sure the states have yet other standards too. If we use state and local there needs to be a way to balance the pay equity between federal wildland firefighters and muninciple firefighters
Need to create multiple pathways to positions and remove the glass cielings to positions such as planning section chief requirments for STL. Create incentive for folks to move out of Operations positions into other functional areas. Can a plans Section Chief/Resource unit leader be a duty Officer I believe they can. Can an Air ops be a duty officer I believe they could. We need to open up the incentives to do these types of positions so people with the tallent want to branch out.
An issue related to the whole idea of succession planning is the use of the common qualification system. 5109.17 stated early on that it was intended to be a national standard for all land management agencies, but was never adopted. Fixing

the problem of how people are developed must also be addressed in order to develop a solvent plan for IMO's.
2.2, 2.10-- There are quite a number of qualified people at the state, county and city level that are forming their own ICS all hazard teams. Why not train and include these qualified people in the pool? Most of them are not eligible to participate on the federal teams.
Consolidate the quals system between agencies and reduce the overall positions. Example: Strike team and task force should be one qualification not five.
Single qualification: as we transition to all risk, we must establish a standard that is utilized all players.
2.2 - I believe this simplifies the qualifications required if there is only one set of standards to follow.
There has got to be a way to recognize non-fire experience as transferable equivalent skills.
A single qualification system would level the playing field for all agencies.
2)One training standard should be adopted.
2.2 - Hard to implement, but important
Under 2.2: AD staffing is more important than ever, as more federal employees retire. As it currently stands, AD's opportunities for ongoing training are lowest priority. Regardless of their current positions on Type I +II teams. Their ability and knowledge should NOT relegated low prioroty be simply because they retired. AD's, especially C+G and Unit leader positions, should be encouraged and funded in maintaining up to date training.
2.2 is important but is not conducive of the comment in 2.1. there should be no disadvantage for enabling localized and diverse structure where some are currently under state standards and others under federal standards. especially in remote areas that are the last to get assistance from outside resources. there is potential to eventually get the job done with local resources significantly reducing the overall cost in the long term.
There is no standard succession plan to bring type III "all hazard" teams into the mix with type II and type I teams. If you're not a fire person, the process to gain experience and qualifications is really non-existent. IMT is evolving into the all hazards world, yet the experience in law enforcement, public heath, etc is left out because of no standard qualification process to move up through teams.
team leadership continues to determine the qualifications for positions. There are various levels available but most are hard to accomplished based on lack of job shadowing. A predetermined qualification for national recognition is necessary to be deployable to other regions.
310-1 has become very weak in the Dispatch/Coordination field. Those requirements for EDRC;EDSD;EDSP;CORD need to be brought back to the higher standards we previously had. EOC's lack qualified personnel because some agencies are moving personnel to fast.....
Completing the All Hazards Quals system is important, but it will not solve the issue at hand as most of the folks being trained quickly lose skills and there is not much of a follow up system after they receive AHIMT training
One standard qualification system is critical and HAS to include the states as well. Some states have additional requirements above the NWCG requirements that make the process to become qualified very burdensome.
One standard qualification system is critical and HAS to include the states as well. Some states have additional requirements above the NWCG requirements that make the process to become qualified very burdensome.
The need for more affordable classes. The need for more shadowing experiences. Merge a Type I or II team with a Type III team for more depth and experience. You learn more out in the field.
I feel that each IMT need to be accountable for it's individual members. I sense that some newly forming teams are "hurrying" members to be qualified which can have a catastrophic result.
Better definition of Type 3 IMT qualifications, roles, responsibilities. The IMT3 will be the cornerstone of local, zone fire management responses with multiple objective wildland fires.
It would be important to have IMT's, regardless of association, be interoperable with other IMT's; USAR Incident Support Teams, FEMA IMT"s, State IMT's (Cal Fire), etc. All-Risk Incidents, will require an interface between the personnel assigned to manage a multitude of disciplines.
The current task book system does not support any succession planning model. It takes years to get a person qualified to perform at the type 2 level or higher. Once a person is qualified, he/she is only there for a short time before retiring. A new method needs to be implemented so personnel can reach those higher qualified postions within command and general staff, and still have time left in their career to mentor the next generation of leaders.
IMOs should not only be trained with consistent and global models, that have "set" successive teams that inherit the older teams efforts, but it should be a HONOR and a SPECIALIZED experience that would give the member of the IMO a kick-up in their professional life.
From Question 3.17
GS-401 series is too broadly applied, and prevents quality employees from bridging the gap between fire seasonal and PFT positions in fire or elswhere within the agencies. A fire ecologist should have a degree in ecology. An FMO with a degree in public administration, budget/finnace/accounting, psychology, etc. will have the requisite ability to read/write

communicate and to manage a program.
Need the same system for developing people.
Their certainly needs to be accoutability, standardization where practical, flexible, and all hazard ready. However, team participation needs to be predictable (as far as participation), and cost effective.
It is vital that a national interagency all hazards IMT policy, proceedure and coordinating be developed. A large portion of the present group of personnel will be retiering soon and there will be a need to have worked out the ability to surge forces at all levels to response to incidents of all hazards. The credentialling and qualifications issues need to be developed and settled quickly between agencies. This was the way the NIMS was supposed to work.
All agencies, contractors should be trained and qualified using standardized, national system.
From Question 4.08
As stated pervious, bring cooperators (State and Local) up to Fed standards and make sure that everyone is accountable to the same standards.
Fire needs to engage/accept agency positions as qualified under "Fire" guidelines. As long as double standards exist there will remain resistance to participate. As budgets decrease and workloads increase the ability to maintain qualifications for day to day job functions will take priority over support to fire from the militia standpoint. Seems to me that this program was designed by "pure" fire folks with limited input from the militia that many teams rely on to work. I would like to see a plan that accepts the skills folks use in their day to day jobs. Case in point would be the need for a Public Affairs Officer to attend additional training to serve as a Public Information Officer. Many take this as an insult to the job they are already doing. I would like this plan to address the use of these skills without jumping through the multitude of "hoops" to participate. Do not really see any of these options engaging the militia. If you want to develop teams of dedicated folks solely for the response to incidents in our current era of decreasing budgets and in the near future decreasing employees I wish you luck. It would seem we should be finding ways to include existing skill sets instead of creating an "elite" group of teams. The double standard for fire has always confused me, especially when jobs overlap in so many areas. Seems that we have lost focus on the local resources that exist on many units.

Table 8. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Single Qualification System.

Single Qualification System: Yes, absolutely.
P2- The single qualification system is a short sighted solution in an attempt to fill out some larger number of teams in the immediate future. It is a recipe for problems as there is a demonstrated need for teams to handle more complex incidents. Additionally, if there is going to be an increase in the number of NIMO teams (T1 quals) then they will have to be vetted somehow, so why not just keep the T1-2-3 system for some period (6-9 years)while the Single-qualification system is thought through? As IMT qualified/available cadre are reduced in numbers, we will have to step back the number of teams available by configuration. And this should be expected regardless. Not everyone gets to be an astronaut; some people will not be able or interested in T1 assignments and putting some people in that setting could cause problems (a real risk if all teams are the same type in a fixed national rotation schedule).
There are potential impacts on the agency prescribed burn and hazardous fuels program by moving away from the current FS training requirements for Prescribed Burn Bosses, and potential impacts from moving to mandatory participation on incident management teams. Background Information: Eleven principles were identified as critically important to the future of Incident Management Organizations. One of the overarching eleven principles identified was a single interagency qualification system. Currently, the Forest Service (FS) requires additional training in prescribed burning beyond those courses outlined in NWCG 310-1 (Qualifications Standards) for qualification. The proposal seeks to align all agencies into a single qualification standard with the intent of shortening the time period to become qualified and filling a shortage of qualified personnel. Many employees are trained and qualified in both incident management and prescribed fire. Some courses and competences are complementary and or additive. It is unclear if the team evaluated the availability of and succession planning for prescribed burn bosses. Qualification standard differences between Forest Service (5109.17) and NWCG 310-1. FS qualification standards to become a Prescribed Burn Boss require 12 training courses totaling 280 hours of instruction above NWCG 310-1. This additional training generally takes several years longer to complete. DOI agencies generally follow NWCG 310-1 qualification standards; although many DOI Burn Bosses have taken some or all of the FS required courses.

Implications from changing to NWCG standards?

The last revision of FSM 5140 removed prescriptive policy elements for prescribed burning in favor of a doctrine approach of advanced training and required competencies. The doctrine approach empowers employees to be creative and decisive, to exercise initiative, accept responsibility, and to use their training, experience, and judgment in decision making to carry out the agency mission. If the number of escaped prescribed burns increases the agency may have a tendency to require additional prescriptive policy elements, counter to doctrine.

One difference in burn boss requirements between the Forest Service and NWCG 310-1 is the smoke management competency met by attending the FS required RX-410. With impending tightening of air quality standards and greater public concerns about smoke, reliance upon skills outlined in RX-410 and use of basic smoke management practices will not be discretionary. The new air quality standards will create many new nonattainment areas where the air quality complexity and requirement to address General Conformity for all burn projects will likely increase smoke management training needs beyond those currently required. To meet this requirement could be inconsistent with doctrine, and inconsistent with the single qualification system.

In 2008, all federal Bureaus agreed to implement the same policy standards outlined in the Interagency Prescribed Fire Guide. Annually 2-3 FS prescribed burns are converted to wildfire with a suppression objective. Over the last ten years, there is very little difference in the escape rate between federal bureaus (less than 1/10 of 1% of treatments). In the short term, given the number and distribution of FS qualified burn bosses who have taken prerequisite courses, no immediate impacts in the escape rates are anticipated if the FS adopts NWCG 310-1 qualifications.

Comparison of (# of Acres and # of Treatments) between the federal agencies that conduct prescribed burns.

Bureau	Avg # of Treatments	Avg # of Acres Treated by Bureau	% Treatment from of Federal Bureau	% Acres by Federal Bureau
FS	4,743	1,522,781	61	66
BIA	343	104,105	4	5
BLM	650	149,396	9	7
FWS	1,724	378,975	22	16
NPS	330	148,283	4	6

* Data for acres treated and number of treatments compiled from 2006 – 2010 information through NFPORS database.

** Prescribed burning accounts for 65% of Forest Service hazardous fuels treatment acreage.

Forest Service accomplishes more treatments on more acreage than other federal bureaus.

I fear that the document does not provide ample explanation or imperative on training and mentoring. We all know you cannot arrive at our current HRO without actual experience on a variety of complex incidents. The document seems to imply that we can skip this - hire NIMOs and agency teams and send them on their way as IMTs. This is a fatal flaw. We train all these people in classes and on incidents - it takes time!

Agency Accountability

"Interagency identified needs for target positions and training will be met. This system must be actively supported by both agency leadership and supervisors. The system should monitor this and hold agencies accountable." (NWCG 2011a: 9)

***Survey Question 2.3**: Interagency needs for target positions and training will be met. Hold agencies accountable.*

Figure 21. Importance of Agency Accountability.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Unimportant	20	2
Somewhat Unimportant	37	4
Neutral	95	11
Somewhat Important	299	35
Highly Important	399	47
Total:	850	100

Missing = 8

This Overarching Principle was highly rated--47% rated this *5-Highly Important* and 85% rating this either *4-Somewhat Important* or *5-Highly Important* (Fig. 21).

There was relatively high and consistent support for Agency Accountability, with no significant differences in distributions among sub-groups (Fig. 22).

Figure 22. Importance of Agency Accountability by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level.



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age range.



Comments submitted for this Overarching Principle often focused on the inability to train and serve (Tables 9, 10), as in the following: *"There are no incentives for fire qualified people or their supervisors and administrators to be involved, in fact disincentives exist for programs and agencies that are not allowed flexibility in getting their program of work done"* and "*The line officers are held to meet assigned targets. Therefore the line officers are often reluctant to release employees to support incident management teams. Without addressing this issue the agencies are going to encounter reduced availability of staff due to reduced work forces."* Suggestions range from target relief to funding options to backfill non-fire personnel who participate on incidents.

Table 9. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Agency Accountability.

From Question 2.12
Most line officers don't understand what an IMT is let alone allow you to be team member. Team members should not have to beg. We should be held up as going the extra mile to help those in need. Anyway there are a lot of folks with no fire experince in management positions.
My day job is not within the fire program. I was lucky to have been brought into fire as a BAER THSP and READ early in my career. I moved to working onto IMTs later on and have had to fight to continue. I love working on an IMT; it's the primary reason I've stayed with the government and not taken jobs in the private sector. But the issue I continue to run into is support from my supervisor and agency administrators. They all say "I support you" but as soon as the call out

comes something is always more important and I have to beg to go. Most of the time, I can do what's needed to be done on the incident. Last year, I had a one-day meeting in a different part of the state, which I was planning on attending. My team got called out and after being unable to get the project manager to allow for a conference call instead, I found a replacement, left the fire early and flew to attend. The meeting lasted 20 minutes and I only had to answer 1 question. Where would I have been more useful - on the incident or sitting in chair saying 'yes'? In a previous position, I was the only person on the Forest qualified (red carded and experienced) to work on a BAER team within my specialty. The only person on an entire Forest with 5 districts each having their own specialist? One summer, I was out nearly every week for 3 months. I was doing BAER, READ and going out with my team. I actually cried one August afternoon when my ranger stepped into my office and told me to pack because I had to leave in the morning. I was exhausted and I had a ton of work that had piled up. I was glad that my ranger supported the fire program and allowed me to go, but why couldn't all of the rangers? Why couldn't their specialists get trained and do these duties? I have several young District specialists coming in and are interested in working in fire as READs or on BAER teams. Not only would their participation be beneficial when a fire occurs on that District, but also understanding how supression tactics and fire behavior impacts their resources will help in them in their positions. Most of them complain that their supervisors won't allow it and refuse to send them to fire academy. These are the people that will be ICs and Command Staff in the future. We need to get them hooked now and get them trained. But we can't do that if managers aren't pushed to make it happen. It needs to come from the top down that participation on an IMT is an agency priority. We typically have phone and internet access, so if there's anything that is truly a priority at the home unit, it can be taken care of on an incident.
It is not responsiveness or accountability that is the problem. It is in the managers at the home unit. There are many persons on IMTs that are not full time fire. These are constantly under fire from the home unit to perform and not go on fire. The solution is complex here to say the least. But the home unit managers need to be given some sort of encouragement to send out their employees to work on IMTs or we need to find some other solution that is not evident at this time.
1-require groups of agency adminstrators to recruit, train, establish and maintain x NUMBER of type 1 and 2 teams during a 3-4 yrs period. 95% of my fellow agency adminstrators feel no responsibility to train and provide their employees as team members much less field a team. If they need want they just push the button.
Accountability is a key item. If more supervisors were accountable for supporting their employees in going on assignments, we might not be facing the dilemma we're in.
The critical issue that has caused the need for this task group is the FS failure to make supporting and maintaining individual's qualifications a priority. Many members of IMTs only serve for selfish reasons and basically avoid doing their assigned job at their home unit. You have lost many good qualified people (single resource no-less) due to poor supervisors and District Rangers, FMOs etc. who fail to support "volunteer" firefighters. The result, the nation's land agencies have allowed young "kids" to fast-track while experienced, fit, qualified and able people have lost their "quals" due to lack of support and "me first" mentality. You made the bed...
Agency Accountability is critical and plays into several of the principles here. In a nutshell, agency administrators from Washington on down to the local level only pay lip service to providing staff fire training/qualifications/availability. This is easily shown at the difference between militia representation 20-30 years ago and today. There are no incentives for fire qualified people or their supervisors and administrators to be involved, in fact disincentives exist for programs and agencies that are not allowed flexability in getting their program of work done.
More accountability and standardization will improve team transition and tranititon back to home unit. Non-incident Managers/Supervisors need to support incidents as needed, not as workload allows. Incident support is mob as needed, with declining budgets, who can afford and support full time staffing? Managers need to accept incident support is part of the mission and home targets may not be met depending on the seasons. Managers need to change their attitudes and mentality towards incident support.
Accountability needs to be enforced not changed, I believe leaderships intent in manuals is clear and line doesn't follow it. Is fire a priority nationally or isn't it? If line has a problem with tasks being completed then perhaps their scheduling skills could use some polishing. Fire season is the reason the FY was moved to October 1 so work being an issue in June should be addressed in April.
Succession planning will need to have full management support. This includes having performance measures and targets assigned relating to Fire Program Support. Forest Supervisors and District Managers should have an assigned target of X% of their employees or X days/yr/employee will support fire suppression efforts. This will make managers acountable in reaching succession targets.
The line officers are held to meet assigned targets. Therefore the line officers are often reluctant to release employees

to support incident management teams. Without addressing this issue the agencies are going to encounter reduced availability of staff due to reduced work forces.
2.3 Hold agencies accountable!? Good idea but line officers are pulled many different ways and staffs keep shrinking due to budgets. If a higher priority arises, fire qualified employees are held back to complete work on the home front.
Our problem is internal. If every Line Officer was required to have a current Red Card we wouldn't have a staffing problem, Lack of line support of individuals who want to become involved in Incident Management is our only problem.
IMT members need to be supported by the agency.When their functional area is administratively changed;ie. fuels from fire into ecosystems, ecosystems does not support the fire/incident management funtions.
It is my experience, until line officers are held accountable for people participating in IMT's you will not have the participation needed to sustain our teams.
There hasn't been a problem finding people to date...the problem has been with their availability and their's supervisor's support.
Line Officers and supervisors should be required to allow personnel to participate in team and single resource assignments.
Incentives or quotas for agencies to make their wildland fire-funded positions available for assignments is long overdue.
Need t have supervisors (fire and nonfire) support their employees to be gone for assignments.
Line officer involvement and oversight is a TOP PRIORITY that is missing from the list!
Have line officers accountable to let employees be on IMT.... This is not being done...
Acountability -- avoid over-staffing with expensive, unnessary resources by allowing flexibility to fit the evolving complexity of an incident. Type one teams, over the past 25 years, pay lip-service to cost containment without any care to the actual bottom line cost. There is a disconect from the resulting long-term effects of the incident as soon as they demob.
Natural resource agencies need to elevate the importance of incident response to a higher level and take the stigma away that a person is sherking their "regular" work when they respond.
Natural resource agencies need to elevate the importance of incident response to a higher level and take the stigma away that a person is sherking their "regular" work when they respond.
At least within my organization, the executive team needs to become more pro-active to educate managers in the ICS system and hold them accountable for dispatching unqualified people.
2.3 localized position structure and training opportunities should be identified based on local conditions, potential partnerships, and fire history.
Support of a team member by the home unit is vital,
Agencies should be accountable.
All base savings should go to the local unit program and targets should be adjusted down based on deployments. Supervisors at all levels should be held accountable for not encouraging team participation or participating themselves.
The local management needs to support employees to get these ecperinces. Being stuck on local districts is not in the best interest ofr career development. Our orginisations SHOULD be the experts in wildland fire and we should make it a prority to support our IMTs.
In order to get Agency personnel qualified and available for IMO duties, there needs to be a mechanism within each aprticipating agency to designate the priority of such duties and directly integrate these priorities into day to day operations and yearly mission and objectives. Currently there is a disconnect between Wildfire operational groups and normal agency operations and little coordination between budget and operational functions of each. Better integration of incident management into all aspects of agency operation needs to take place including managerial training.
How will agencies be held accountable if they do not do their identified part in providing qualified personnel?
1) Line Officer and Agency Management ~ real support ~ for commitment of agency personnel to support and participate in IMT / Local Incident activities.
Agencies should be accoutable for suppling staff to support IMT positions and development out of normal staff (not just fire staff).
It is important that we support team members by creating incentives for supervisors to release employees, employees to receive financial incentives to make the sacrifices required to support IMT, and the agency support IMT decisions.
Support for participation on IMTs is limited. Limited by needing to staff the home unit for fire folks, so just a capacity issue. And, participation by non-fire folks is severely limited by lack of line officer and supervisor support. The home unit and its targets are the priority. Orgs and budgets are getting crunched, and there is often little to no leeway. Whether it's local fire support or IMT/IMO, the FS needs more flexibility in targets so we can keep more of all of our folks involved w/ incident management. It's not a sustainable or good idea to rely on more and more AD, state, and local. A mix is for sure a good thing, but with the trajectory we are on we run the risk of our IMTs being more and more out of touch on FS or Fed issues.

Also, holding agencies and individual units accountable to support the IMT's and fire call-out's in general is highly important.
From Question 3.17
Obviously that has to be combined w/ much greater target flexibility, which means that fire incident management has to trump targets and other work. We can't be held to producing widgets that are not time critical when there's a fire to manage, and you can't just call someone else to come deal with it, and you can't keep putting them all out while they're small. We have to see it as integral to what we do, and as an activity that is time critical and necessarily shifts the priorities and work activities of our entire org as a logical response.
One of the biggest drawbacks is the lack of MGTs' support of non fire personnel participating. Managers have workloads that must be accomplished. When employees are gone on fires, often there is no relief to home unit work load, Managers get dinged for not accomplishing work load.
Managers need better funding options to provide backfill when skilled incident support personnel are on assignment. i.d. a backfill detailer will cost additional dollars to cover per diem. Local units are unable/willing to pay this additional cost out of ever limited project dollars and yet cannot achieve Targets (the accomplishment of which sometimes determine future funding levels!) with key people away on incident support assignments and unable to fully fund backfill personnel. Suggestion: allow units to use suppression dollars to pay any ADDITIONAL costs for backfill resources…
This planning needs to also address agency workload/accomplishments for those individuals that are non-fire but particpate on IMTs. As a supervisor I feel torn letting a person be on an IMT because if we fall short on getting a work accomplishment done, it could reflect poorly on my evaluation. Today, most managers did not grow up in the organaztion fighting fire so there isn't the life experiences to draw from and to help relate. Since we have created a professional fire fighting corp, we don't use summer seasonals to help man an engine or be on a 20 man handcrew. So when the sesonal starts their professional career they are already behind the power curve wanting fire quals or to acquire fire quals. This is especially true for offices that aren't co-located with a fire organziation associated with the office. I'm a Type III IC, but if I was trying to get that qualification today and hadn't started as a fire seasonal, it would be very hard to reach that goal compared to 15-20 years ago. I realize some offices have a big enough fire load it is easier to get people that experience, but like in NE MT I don't think a person could. Thanks
The problem here is that home units are hesitant to send personnel out on fire duty, holding duties at home till fire responsabilities are completed. If no incentive for the home unit can be made, the the solution is to make the IMT positions full time, including a pool of trainees. These positions can be filled in the usual way through USA Jobs or something like that.
Tied to this is the lack of relief in targets that we used to see during high fire seasons, when personnel were helping support the fire organization. We no longer see these target adjustments to compensate for folks being gone on fires. Again we are trying to accomplish more with fewer people, without compensating them for the extra work. Not only are they not compensated for being available and helping out, but they may be penalized for not meeting their targets because of this.
Sure I would love to get paid more to be on a fire assignment, but I don't think that is the solution. We just need to make sure supervisors are mandated to let people particiapte on IMT's, right now it is optional...no matter what your told.
I think if all fed employees were required to support incidents like it use to be, and they are their supervisors were held accountable for that, we would not be having this problem with staffing IMTs. It's not that militia don't want to be on IMTs or support incidents, it's that supervisors aren't allowing them.
The use of trainees must be increased. We cannot complain of a lack of qualified firefighters and then allow the Unit/GACC to not allow a reasonable number of trainees. Cost containment must be balanced against future needs. If this problem is as severe as we say that it is, supervisors must be forced to allow employees to participate in fire and off-agency dispatches.
Agencies need to step up to the plate and support the fire suppression effort with trained personnel and the commitment to make them available as needed.
Why are we making such a big deal out of a problem that is purely a lack of Leadership. In 35 years I have not seen a problem in the Forest Service that was not created internally and here we go again. Our Leaders need to support employees not hinder them.
I don't want someone there who doesn't want to be... However, if they have recieved training, because they volunteered for it, they should have to respond to an incident. Supervisors agreed to let them have the training, it

should be required that they then allow them to take assignments and question it when they don't. IDP's are required, but Supervisor's and employees are not doing their jobs.
As it stands now I'm expected to meet my assigned duties in my daily job even if I'm dispatched with the IMT. Making sure that I can keep my job is more important than assisting the IMT. I don't get a higher rating on my performance evaluation if I support the IMT. The only financial compensation is overtime and hazard pay for taking on additional duties.
Accountability.....boots on the ground
Other than the shrinking size of the federal workforce, participation seems less linked to the absence of of incentives and more influenced by the presence of disincentives and line officers being reluctant to allow the militia to be available. I question the advisability of increasing costs by the full time funding of core teams or IMT C&Gs. Agencies would be much better served by incouraging the recruitment and involvement of potential militia members and developing a high level of support for them by their supervisors and line officers. Also, if pay on assignments was comensurate with the level of resposibility, it might incourage people to accelerate their pace of development.
I have been on a Type 1 team for 4 out of the last 5 years. I spent 30 years in the Forest Service and BLM When I started, fire was a part of all field going personnels job. Although I worked in timber, I was required to go to basic fire training and go on fires. I was given opportunites for training and allowed to get qualified for several types of positions. It was an agency expection. Now everyone is a specialist and the agency doesn't give support to employees who want to participate in incident management teams. The main issue as I see it, is not enough employee's wanting to on a team but agency, management and supervisor support.
1.Eliminate possibility of team members from being sued except for gross negligence.2.Team members need training and drill time to keep up their skills.3.Team members deserve support, recognition, and added training from the federal government.It is my opinion that teams provide a valuable service to the federal wildand agencies and the nation as a whole. However, they are ignored year round until they are activated. A few atta boys would be nice instead of advice on how to purchase liability insurance. I don’t think upper management demonstrates support for teams. Then they wonder why they don’t get many volunteers.
Agency Administrators need to be "encouraged" to support IMT participation by allowing personnel to participate on an IMT.
Local supervisiors should also be required to allow staff personnel to participate on a "as needed" basis.
There is a disincentive for managers to allow team membership, ie work not being done at home unit.
Supervisors need to be given relief from programs accomplishment requirements when they allow employees to participate on incidents.
Agencys need to consider the collective impact of a declining workforce. May of us have seen the negitive impacts of a work forece that is becoming more specialize every day. We see the impacts in a lack shared responsibility on our local landscapes. Many of the workers feel that there is a fire shop, timber shop, rec shop, etc...We need to enourage all shops to work with eachother. The IMT'S and the NEMO'S can benifit from the experiance of employees that are not just full time fire folks. We can not afford to continue done this road of all employees be so specialized.
From Question 4.08
I believe that it is important to keep the mission focused on land management and therefore wildland fire management. This means utilizing more specialized and local resource managers to guide fire management decisions.
I believe our problem is lack of line support to train and free up individuals to be available for assignments. It is not a lack of interested employees. If line encouraged and supported employees with an interest in being part of the militia our successional planning would be complete. "Food for Thought:: Take a look around at various Forests, Parks, Refuges, etc. Isn't it amazing how one unit can have 25+ people on interagency teams and others may have not have any? It's the Leadership Support not the Militia that's the problem. I do not believe we need more full-time fire positions and I would recommend significantly less and more militia if Line Leadership Support can be fixed.
Already serving on a Type I team, One of the hardest hurtles we face, and a big reason for the reduction in IMT members is there is less and less support from our home units all the time. We're all "team Players", and it's neccessary for our Agency's to be also.
Again, We need to stress that our only problem is lack of leadership and line support of individuals who want to pursue incident management qualifications.
Mandatory fire incident participation for personnel who are not full-time fire personnel is an organization-breaking idea. Militia people who are being denied fire assignments because of existing workload aren't helped by adding more requirements. They are more likely to simply not get qualified.
The teams (as they are now) are not broken -- leave them alone. The fact that there are fewer and fewer folks coming up the ranks is largely associated with FS budget (having to do more and more with less and less) which makes it difficult for people to get away from their day jobs to support fire. Not to mention the fact that their SUPERVISORS ARE NOT ALLOWING THEM TO GO. T

Agency Administrators are going to have to let people participate and they should be rewarded, not penalized for doing so.
If the agencies want teams then they need to show support from all levels. Teams dont even have an operating budget. I have no faith in the contract or state team options.
As we continue to make orginizations more complex and rigid it should come as no suprise that fewer people wish to participate. Agency support for teams has continued to decrease from the top down. You are forced to spend the money and complete the project now. In addition, the loss of one key player may prevent completion of the project.

Table 10. Comments from Gmail relevant to Agency Accountability.

I'm a Field Manager and it seems that at some level the fire program is not as integrated as it could be or should be in our over all program. Biologist and Law Enforcement are two other areas where we have started to do too much "deferring" to the "experts". In our office the FMO, Biologist, Rangers, etc. all know that they work for Field Office goals. Part of the reason I think we are seeing less "volunteers" for assignments is because Field Managers are not involved enough with the fire program nor do they indicate to their staff members that there are real opportunities.
As for stressing out the IMT's due to lengthening fire and all risk assignments, this is not true. Look at the last three (3) fire seasons. There have been teams that have only gone out one time over this period of time. So that assessment is not true. Many individuals on teams that have not gone out or on a limited basis over the past 3 years have gotten off of teams and started free lance. Why? Because they too enjoy going out on assignments as much as those not on teams do. And they too enjoy making extra money on the side. How do you keep your fire skills current? You use them. And if your on a team that doesn't go out, you are going to loose those skills compared to those that do go out. So, this statement and assessment is not true, at least for the last 3 years.
One of the problems we have now is that we train people and even get their task books completed, and then they decide they do not want to participate or are not available the majority of the time. Or just cannot commit to the teams. Then what in the world did we train them for? Are they accountable? Are their fire organizations accountable? Are their managers accountable? We spend a lot of money and salary with very little return. I came into Nevada as a qualified DIVS. I recall that in spite of having a list of DIVS that was over one page long (single spaced), the teams were short of DIVS. This was not because of a shortage of DIVS qualified people, but because a lack of commitment to the teams in spite of having training. Are any of these models going to fix that? I doubt it!! Task books were established to ensure appropriate and thorough training of employees for fire participation. It was understood that it was probably going to take more than the few fires to complete a task book and gain a full capability in the position. This was the problem prior to the task book. Someone in the 'old boy' system would get a chance at a trainee position on a fire and be considered qualified after one fire or maybe part of a fire. Due to the number of people retiring, there is now a tremendous push to get people trained. The problem with task books is that completing them gives a person the training, but not the competencies, experience, and ability to fully function. I know several people that are going from one task book to another in an effort to get qualified at a certain level or position. In camp, the risk might be minimal depending upon the position, but this effort is totally unacceptable on the fire line and is going to cost lives in the future. Red Card committees are pushing people through the task books, red card qualifications, etc. as fast as possible without regard to gaining experience and a true ability to carry out the job on the fire. We are shortly going to be in the position we were prior to task books.
Management should be encouraging non-fire staff to participate in firefighting to the greatest extent possible. The fire organization as a culture should be encouraging non-fire staff to participate--including having full access to funding for training. Pack tests and fire refreshers at the least need to be planned at convenient locations, multiple times, and in advance more than a week or two. The fire culture needs to understand the impacts on programs, schedules, etc. when non- fire staff employees (the militia) want to participate. It is inappropriate for non-fire employees who choose not to participate to chastise those who do. In other words, if you do not want to participate, then you stay home and carry the load. I am tired of hearing non-fire participants complaining when I am away from my home, family and job on a fire assignment. Management condones this behavior year after year, instead of supporting those of us who make sacrifices to support fire needs.
Lets not reinvent the wheel. The IMT system as it has been set up and time-tested over decades is a good system, but as you state, we are having difficulty keeping the IMTs staffed. Lets focus on the staffing problem and do things to bolster participation, not scrap a good system and start from scratch. What is needed more than anything else is strengthened support from managers and supervisors to allow/encourage their employees to serve on IMTs.
There seems to be a lot of detail missing from this principle and the devil is always in the details. In times of declining

budgets and personnel, it will be tough for agency administrators to not cast a gluttonous eye towards IMT personnel. If there is to be true accountability—and support—there need to be teeth to these proposals.
Lack of Management support I expect that the higher levels in the agencies will say “not true” but having been a manager in three different field offices, it is my observation that there is actually little real support for the IMTs at the field level. Oh everyone notes the annual memos from the Secretaries, the Director and the Chief that fire is the top priority, then they go back to their day-to-day business. Field managers have nothing to gain from having staff on IMTs. On the contrary, they are usually held to their annual work plan commitments regardless of what kind of a fire season there is. It is very easy for managers to approve IMT participation in the spring but say “just not right now” when there is a work crunch in mid-summer. Until managers, ALL managers, and this includes FMOs as well, support and encourage IMT participation, and truly believe in it, there will always be a shortage of personnel. Recruiting IMT members is everyone’s responsibility, and no ones The process of recruiting IMT members is ineffective because there is no one at the field level responsible for it. NWCG puts out the annual call for nominations, some managers and FMOs mention it at staff meetings and then it is up to the individual to carry through. There is no repercussion or stigma if no one in an office applies. Managers are far more concerned with completing their work commitments and FMOs are far more concerned with making sure their IA plan is staffed. No manager or FMO gets a bad performance rating if none of their staff participate in IMTs. The current study does not recognize this problem. Staffing multiple types of management teams erodes capabilities Even though as early as 1994 it was becoming apparent that IMT staffing was starting to become more difficult, new types of teams have been created that sucked up qualified individuals and made staffing even more difficult. During the 90s Fire Use Teams became quite popular and effective (did a couple assignments with them myself). But each of these teams removed a group of C&G staff from availability. In the last decade the NIMO teams were created. Again, but this time with the lure of higher pay, another large group of C&G staff were removed from availability. The current study does not reflect any acknowledgement of this situation and seems to assume that NIMO teams (not clear on Fire Use) will continue to exist.
P3- Agency accountability: All agencies are being told to “Do more with less”, some more so than others. Many state agencies are reducing staff and ratcheting down the time an individual can be away from their day-job. There are not enough fire track personnel to make the system work. Additionally, the cost of staffing full-time teams like NIMO will come under increasing scrutiny with the expected continued budget constraints. The militia system works! When there are enough trained and available personnel. It is cost effective considering the alternatives. The key will be to find the monies and structure to train and motivate more agency personnel to be involved. This methodology would promote the wide base of participation (a key to past success) and distribute the impact to individual programs and offices across agencies; which was one of the founding principles of ICS to begin with. There appears to be a paralysis in how to deal with the critical position shortages, particularly finance and logistics section chiefs. The finance cadre has been decimated by the FS centralized billing system. Local units just don’t have people who know understand the accounting and are able or willing to serve on IMT’s. This could (should) be a target for trying contracted mini-teams. But remember, the retiree pool will eventually fade away! There must be new blood in the system or teams will not be able to meet the demands for complex, instant & detailed fiscal accountability expected for ongoing incidents!
Why don’t we have enough current employees that participate on IMT’s? a. Current employees qualified for IMT positions have a “day job” mission that doesn’t allow participation and precludes them from participating during fire season (i.e. District FMO on a complex district, Smokejumper whose primary mission is initial attack, Fire PAO, etc.) These people are managing fire; they just aren’t an IMT member. b. Current employees wishing to participate in fire management activities receive no relief from workload requirements when they do participate. (i.e. the Range Conservationist qualified as a Type 1 Operations Section Chief that cannot participate because his EPAP and the AWP require him to produce 24 Allotment Evaluations prior to the end of the fiscal year, etc.) These employees want to participate in fire management but cannot balance it with the non-fire workload requirements.

Incident Complexity/Scalability

"All incidents will be evaluated in terms of specific criteria that assess the difficulty associated with accomplishing the objectives. This complexity analysis will guide Agency Administrators in selection of the appropriate management organization for the specific situation, regardless of whether it is escalating or moderating.

Models will be based on the discontinuance of automatic dispatch of full teams; rather, IMTs will respond in configuration as requested or negotiated, commensurate with incident complexity. All models will represent a system that allows team size to be adjusted by managers. Team size, configuration, and skill sets will match fire complexity and specific incident needs. Incident staffing can easily be adjusted up or down as needed rather than holding a fixed team configuration in its entirety to a set assignment length." (NWCG 2011a: 9).

Survey Question 2.4: *IMTs will respond in configurations as requested or negotiated. Incident staffing can be easily adjusted up or down.*

Figure 23. Importance of Incident Complexity/Scalability.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Unimportant	30	4
Somewhat Unimportant	47	6
Neutral	132	16
Somewhat Important	300	35
Highly Important	341	40
Total:	850	100

Missing = 8

The overall ratings for this Overarching Principle were positive, with 75% of respondents selecting either *4-Somewhat Important* or *5-Highly Important* (Fig. 23).

No significant differences existed among demographic sub-groups (Fig. 24).

Many respondents who submitted comments identified with strengths of the current system *("Scalability is a basic feature of ICS which is not consistently used."*) and the values that familiarity brings in efficiency and reward--among a standing team and between a geographic area team and the local Agency Administrators--*"One of the primary strengths of the team concept is the team atmosphere of camaraderie, trust and respect. If you abandon those, you will lose many of the current IMT members, and certainly lose team effectiveness"* (Tables 11, 12).

Figure 24. Importance of Incident Complexity/Scalability byDemographic.

a. by Organizational level.



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age range.



Table 11. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Incident Complexity/Scalability.

From Question 2.12
The current team typing system is a good and valid one. While many of the possible changes sound enticing on paper, there are some very real consequences to these choices. Any scenario that does away with the team concept (e.g. modules, short configurations, NIMO) erodes team cohesion and effectiveness. One of the primary strengths of the team concept is the team atmosphere of camaraderie, trust and respect. If you abandon those, you will lose many of the current IMT members, and certainly lose team effectiveness.
3-Adding NEMO teams just throws money at symptoms of the problem
I am noticing that it IMTs are not able to order trainees if the hosting unit declines them. This doesn't help fill the future and current IMT positions.
Flexibility with the use of retirees, AD's state and local cooperators will be key to ensuring long term survival of IMT's.
The models presented seem to make a lot of pre-decision decisions, short teams, NIMO teams etc. There seems to be little support for what the teams have developed into, even though much of that was in response to the situations teams found themselves in with large numbers of UTF's so they developed bigger teams with more commitment from team members.
2.4 IMTs can currently be scaled up and down -- we just don't do it! Will address IMT size in the later section. No one wants to send team members home or not order them in the first place. That is a dispatching and AA issue right now. If they would use the system as it was originally set up, there wouldn't be this issue. Teams need to be more than C&G, but not much more than the MOB 27. Address this later.
Do not get rid of AD's. The knowledge of our past employees is vital to the IMT organization. With the down sizing of current agencies and lack of support for fire from current employees and management, we need to still utilize our retired employees. Too many fire functions are moving up too fast and don't have the IMT experience. Wisdom with age is a good thing. Don't thru the baby out with the bathwater! Figure out what to do with NIMO or get rid of them. No one knows what their real function is. A short team, who has to order all of the long team positions? A glorified Area Command? And what do they do during the winter months? They are the joke of the IMT world.
Please take into account the potential problem of not maintaining currency and experience for positions lower than Command and General Staff. For example: the current IMTs in Region 4 that are exercising the whole fire plan are negotiating with home units to only bring C&G and utilize local/host unit operations folks leaving team operations folks at home not getting assignments. So, part of the problem is people have gained commitment to be a team member and that is being squashed/hampered in the future by these types of actions.
IMT response configurations should be honored by the IMT's and and more standardized SOP's.
Keep team sizes in preportion to the size of incident/complexity. Keep working on ways to keep the costs contained. Work on exchange of resources between the dispatch centers and teams so both sides work seemlessly.
The issue of scalability is complex, size and makeup of the teams is caught up in the buzz ofcost savings and the need to save face when asking for help. Managers may not have the incident experience or knowledge to make these decisions in the vacumn they are often in. The dynamics of an incident can be very fluid and that incident should be somewhat stabilized or a comprehensive plan in place before (down) size adjustments are made. It is better to have a full staff to implement a plan and then as needed reduce to a working incident staff. Quick and full response can sometimes save money over a shorthanded response. Stay flexible and adjust to the work at hand.
I feel that team cohesiveness at all levels of an IMT is critical for the team's success, NOT just at the C & G level. I also believe that the local connect formed from having Southern Area IMT's with memebers from local units makes the relationship with Agency Administrators and other local agencies stronger and more functional.
3-Adding NEMO teams just throws money at symptoms of the problem.
It is critical that agency administrators can order what they need ONLY, not necessarily all the bells and whistles. For example they should have the option to order an abbreviated Planning section that would close out the fire with 1/2 page of text, not 50 pages of graphs, photos, tables, and bureaucratese.
2) Scalability is critical to address rising cost.
IMT structure should be flexible, but with a standardized framework to build teamwork. The modular option opens the door for ineffecient, burdensome and incomplete team functionallity (re: ASC/HRM). Most importantly, let us pay attention to the lessons learned from the people who so tragically experienced the; learn from the younger employee who's ideas and expertise rival any SES or upper GS'er in practicallity and functionallity.
Flexibility is key. Locally type 3 teams stay flexible to the size and scope of thier fires. In recent years many take on fires that would have traditionally been type 2 anyway because of their ability to adjust as needed. Why must a type 1 or 2

team come with a set number of people? Why has that number gotten so high in the last few years? How can an ICT3 who is concerned with cost containment not worry about calling in a type 2 team when out of the gate they cost so much? This is at least part of the reason why a ICT3 will hang on to a fire. We are told to be flexible, its time for the IMT's to do the same.
Too often, the cost of fire fighting is driven by personal preferences. This begins with the Agency Administrator (and local political factors) down to teams wanting to do things the same way regardless of their incident. Ex. I challenged a T1 team from out of region on why they spent so much money on one aspect of their suppression--the short answer was "because we are a T1 team and this how we do it..."
I do not think that working as part of an ITM should be your number one day job repsosibility. IMT assignments SHOULD be in addition to your normal work duties. This would require that agencies, both national and local, be more flexible in their management of staff.
I don't understand 2.4. We operate under ICS which has as a basic tenet that the response should be in line with the complexity of the incident.
Scalability is a basic feature of ICS which is not consistently used. Over the years we have allowed IC's to increase the size of their teams (aka "family") under the rationale that all the positions are needed at the onset of the incident, familiarity builds stronger and more efficient teams, start-to-finish mobilization is an incentive for attracting members, etc. Being a member of a 7-person NIMO team offers me a different perspective. Although not as "easy" as having a full team, necessary skills are ordered and quite readily built into a functioning unit when you have a strong functional/team leader. As an incident increases/decreases in complexity so should the organization. As skill needs come and go, so should the organization. The unique characteristics of an incident need to be matched with the right-sized organization and skills mix.
Future IMT's need to be flexible and scalable. Need to move away from one size fits all organizations and descition support models and try to develop IMT staff with depth of training and experience. Adjusting pay for incident complexity and duties, I believe would be a terrible idea. IMT qualified would evaluate assignmnet request. The more experienced and connected IMT staff would then "cherry pick" the higher pay assignments.
The current system is not functional, and appears to be managed in a "fraternity" fashion, that does not equitably represent the potential that IMO's could be. The current teams are bearly able to fill the critical positions, and without a significant change, are destined to fail. Appearances are reality for some people, and without a change, there is little chance of success. Instead of ordering a T2 team and getting 64 people, the scalability must be a primary feature of future IMO's.
2.4 - IMT's are on a detail working for the Host Agency and Agency Administrator (AA), the AA should have a lot to say in determining the size and scalability of an IMO. Bigger is not always better. Same goes for the supplies or equipment, or any of the functionl positions, that is order what we need; and we need to remember one of the basics is to "size up and demob what is not necessary and get it back into the system."
Scalability is less important as an overarching principle because it is inherent in ICS. The current situation includes options for NIMO (C&G)or a larger team. The larger teams have 3 built-in sizes: short, long, expanded. Scalability is inherent in the functions of Ordering and Demob. The most significant scaling ability is related to the other resources, not the Team.
Within-team working relationships & trust levels are what make teams successful. 'Pulling teams together' NEVER works as well as a group of people who have worked together a long time in managing fire. Cohesiveness from long experience creates a High Reliability Organization- this must be incorporated into whatever is forthcoming for a fire management proposal.
Scalability- we have that option now but don't enforce. But don't handcuff the IC by saying they can only bring20 people. Let them get there and decide what they need to support the operation and then downsize. Most folks are needed at the front end of an incident to get things in motion. Don't have the Team start from a handicapped position.
Scalability, in my opinion, is the most significant principle as we identify succession planning for IMT's. The current lack of an adequete pipeline for C & G staffing that does not rely on AD's will require the identification and implementation of an accelerated approach to achieve.
- Objectives to limit the "team" size (numbers of overhead personnel) appear to be related to managing cost, while the cost of overhead is a very small part of the cost of managing an incident. Focus should be on having the "right leadership" to manage t
Consistent core team members help to know what is expected, who to contact, how to work through difficult problems, and develops a sense of family so your work effort goes up, a desire to be on the IMT roster is increased, and success is more likely.
One type of organization above type 3 organizations should be a focus. Short or Long configuration to be specified on order... Performance based pay... Deputies in all C&G so a team gets a fire and sticks with it till it is complete...
2.4 Scalability is impossible without a robust coordination system to make incident staffing easily adjustable up or down a reality.

Smaller teams would be preferable, let the ICS system work.
1. Scalability is a response to a symptom, not the problem. The problem is an inability by agency administrators (I am also an agency administrator) to accurately predict incident complexity and order the right-sized team in the initial days of an incident; or, they are simply ordering the closest available team within their Zone. The notion that agency administrators should pick which individual positions they need off a "menu" of scalability to save costs (from incident over staffing) is ridiculous.
As for point 2.4 - an IMT should have the ability to have some say in what resources they send instead of just what a requesting organization asks for. A requesting organization may not realize, for example, how much logistical support they need, or may not think that they need a finance person - the responding IMT should be able to negotiate which positions actually need to get filled.
Item 2.4 Incident Complexity/Scalability: ICS provides for IMT scalability. This is already possible without any changes to the existing system provided that agency admiistrators and fire staff are involved and workingclosely with the IMT.
2.4 entirely needed to truly achieve local capacity that could eventually achieve balanced financial needs in the implementation of local operating plans involving multiple partners.
Reasons for 5 Rating. 2.4. This is a critical priority to implement, if interagency fire management is serious about managing costs effectively.
2.4) In my experience, teams have never "right sized" the organization once everyone is mobilized. Excuses are, their flight has already been paid for, we can use them in other areas, etc.
Due to the importance and critical need to respond to emergencies in a timely way, any positions needed should be obtained immediately. If qualified people are available, their participation should not be an option.
From Question 3.17
I like the flexibility of being able to more readily match organization put on a fire with the conditions on the ground and the ability to more easily flex the structure as conditions change.
As a general rule I don't see the current system as entirely broken. However the following are the principles that guide my comments. 1) We routinely tend to respond to incidents in the Type 1 and Type 2 team environment without really knowing what the incidents requirements are. However the team needs to be able to arrive with some level of capacity to be successful upon arrival, prior to receiving additional personnel. 2) A certain level on IMT participation is required by the NWCG participating agencies and can not be left to completely volunteerism. However the distribution of the required participation, per GACC, is best understood at the GACC and below level. 3) Taking a lesson from the private sector. Reward required participation, provide incentives to volunteer participation and remove disincentives. 4) Not having a stable/successful IMT system is unacceptable.
The current IMT model works. NIMO does not replace the need for full IMT's.
No comments From Question 4.08

Table 12. Comments from Gmail relevant to Incident Complexity/Scalability.

I won't dwell on each organizational model. I will instead dwell on what I believe to be a couple key points. The first point is that the present IMT program has been extremely successful and served us well for many years. The Incident Command System is used regionally and nationally with the current Team approach with great success. With some additional support, along with some incentive for the Supervisor and Units that support IMT members, I believe it could still be reasonably successful into the future. The second point I would make, and have made for years, is a human behavior consideration. The simple point is that a Team is not a list of names. Successful Teams of any kind build a sense of mutual respect and support and camaraderie that can not be achieved by constantly changing memberships of a Team entrusted with a critical mission. Another point is that success is built on strength of Leadership and quality of relationships. Regional Teams return to the same counties, with the same mayors, and county commissioner, and Country Sheriffs. There is a developing sense of trust and Partnership, and even ease of operation that is unlikely to be achieved by a Team from a distant location that has no familiarity with local issues and local leadership.
Current staffing can be ramped up and down. The issue is cost and who decides if it is equitable. For example, consider a fire that scales its staffing down—only to have the fire blow up later. The team has to ramp back up, so the same

positions are filled again. What would have cost more money: keeping the staff you have till the fire reaches full containment, or increasing risks by increasing travel costs by shipping them out and then back in? Improper ramping up and down increases the safety risk and increases the costs in most cases.
Incident Complexity/Scalability: I am puzzled by the references in the cost savings section for some of the models. We currently have long team and short team configurations. Operating under ICS principles, we should already be scaling our response to what is appropriate for the incident. Regarding the fixed costs for Fed teams, I am only aware of a pittance of funds being allocated each season to teams. It does not seem like a cost that would be a justified driver for this kind of change. In fact, many of the costs of Federal teams are probably hidden due to team members scrounging home units for supplies and such where with contract teams the charges would be better documented, openly billed, and ultimately more expensive. The repeated phrase “not going out with 50+ O#s” raises questions. Again, under ICS, we should already be aligning our response with the needs of an incident. One would think that if a full team is not needed, the requesting agency would place an order for a NIMO team or a short team. If an agency places an order for a team, then that probably means they think the incident is complex enough to warrant a full team and if an incident is at that level it likely means the team will need the additional support that takes you up to 50+ O#s. So, instead of going out with 50+ O#s, you just order an additional 20 positions as soon as you can, which delays your ability to deal with the incident. I do not see how that saves money, but I can see how that would affect team cohesiveness and effectiveness in the negative. Again, a major problem is the complexity of the incidents, which necessarily leads to more team members. In my area, for instance, a Type I Team that travels with just one PIO is considered a team that will not perform very well for the first few days while one that travels with two PIOs (and a webmaster) has a chance at getting ahead of the curve. If we are serious about reducing the numbers on a team callout, we need to work very hard at reducing the expectations of that team because they will not be met.
Under “Organizational Models”, “Approach to Organizational Analysis”, Bullet 4 “What influences costs”, it states: “Staffing strategies that cannot be ramped up and down commensurate with the Incident needs adds significant costs to incidents.” This statement implies that the current IMT structure is static and fixed. This is an inaccurate assumption. IMT's are in fact structured for ramping up and down commensurate with an incident. The agency administrator should be having those discussions with the incoming IMT on what team configuration is needed to support an incident.
Hello, I have been a dispatcher since 1997 working in both GACC and Initial Attack Dispatch Centers in 3 states and 2 regions. I've seen the evolution of IMT's go from a close knit well oiled machine to monster teams of 60+ people (Excluding their "preorder" folks) and I feel we've lost the premise of a team coming in to relieve the IA forces in a timely fashion as it takes so long to mobilize the current Type 1 and Type 2 teams. I currently work in an environment where fires ramp up in complexities extremely fast and then ramp down just as quick. Generally our fires last 3-5 days with larger ones lasting a week or two. We never have the "plateau" that comes between the mob and demob process that you get with larger timber fires. Many times we are in the demob process before everyone from the team arrives. Many of our fires are truly Type 3 but because of a few complexities they fall into the Type 1 or 2 category. With that said, I am very interested in the IMT reorganization process. I have read through the expanded version of your organizational models and this is what my thoughts are.
As far as NIMO teams I don't think we really need more of them, and certainly not 20 of them since I've heard we currently have 2 vacancies in the IC positions.
Complexity & Scalability are the keys to this challenge so I was pleased to see it mentioned. However other less important (more bureaucratic) issues appear to trump the requirement for developing a long-term, cost effective solution.

Modules and Service Centers

"Continue to develop the use of preconfigured modules that can be ordered as needed commensurate with need. Functional modules are in place nationally for support to augment IMT skill sets and operational capability. Modular units can be added to base team configurations as needed to meet incident objectives. Modules can comprise specific areas of expanded capability and expertise in defined functional work areas, including, but not limited to: planning, operations, aviation, and logistics. Modules will be cohesive to semi-cohesive predetermined units that are managed by the Geographic Area Coordinating Groups (GACGs) and which include leadership positions.

Increase efficiency through the use of Service Centers and web-based systems. These centers will support decision support for long term events, incident finance, incident information, and logistical functions such as camp set-up and break down." (NWCG 2011a: 10)

***Survey Question 2.5**: Preconfigured modules in place nationally to augment IMT skill sets managed by the GACGs and Service Centers to serve multiple incidents, i.e. incident finance, incident information, logistics.*

Figure 25. Importance of Modules and Service Centers.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Unimportant	82	10
Somewhat Unimportant	148	17
Neutral	241	28
Somewhat Important	253	30
Highly Important	128	15
Total:	852	100

Missing = 6

This was the least supported Overarching Principle, with the highest proportion of unimportant ratings (27%) and highest neutral ratings (28%) (Fig. 25).

Significant differences in the distribution of responses occurred for the following sub-groups (Fig. 26):

- *Incident Qualifications: IMT-ICs* were significantly more negative and less neutral than expected.
- *Agency:* The high degree of variation among respondents leads to relatively low ratings. Among the collapsed categories, NPS responses were significantly less likely to be negative.

Figure 26. Importance of Modules and Service Centers by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level.



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age range.



Cohesion was a theme expressed in comments pertaining to Modules and Service Centers. Respondents expected negative impacts of moving toward modules and service centers on teams: *"The concept of modules makes sense in terms of enhancing the scalability of an IMT. However, in practice it seems to fly in the face of the concept of a standing team and the value of close working relationships"* (Tables 13, 14). Others noted potential for specific functions and roles, including Logistics, Minimum Impact Minimum Tool/Fire Use teams, Fire Behavior Analyst, Incident Meteorologist, and Medical Unit Leader: *"There are certain "modules" of "service center" components that could be utilized by IMT's .such as SOPL's, GIS for SIT, etc. Logistics/Finance don't lend themselves to this...require crew cohesion to Functional Area at acceptable standard"*[SOPL = Strategic Operational Planner, SIT = Situation Unit Leader]. Yet others were in full support: *"The concept of a center of excellence for incident management and the ability to scale teams up or down depending on incident complexity are very smart solutions to ensure the mission is met in an efficient and economical manner. "*

Table 13. Open-ended survey questions relevant to Modules and Service Centers.

From Question 2.12
Support for participation on IMTs is limited. Limited by needing to staff the home unit for fire folks, so just a capacity issue. And, participation by non-fire folks is severely limited by lack of line officer and supervisor support. The home unit and its targets are the priority. Orgs and budgets are getting crunched, and there is often little to no leeway. Whether it's local fire support or IMT/IMO, the FS needs more flexibility in targets so we can keep more of all of our folks involved w/ incident management. It's not a sustainable or good idea to rely on more and more AD, state, and local. A mix is for sure a good thing, but with the trajectory we are on we run the risk of our IMTs being more and more out of touch on FS or Fed issues.
2.5 should have been split in two. Modules is one question: The module idea forms another layer of pseudo-teams. IMTs have units (modules) to accomplish specialty duties. Units are part of standing teams because the specialties must communicate and support one another in an environment of trust. Having "on call" modules will decrease *any* team configuration efficiency substantially. Service centersis another question: They will not be able to accomplish accountability without someone at the incident managing it. We do today what we do because it works. Logistics and Finance are essential IMT on-site services that are responsive and reduce cost. We know how well the FEMA model works for incident information. NOT!
The current team typing system is a good and valid one. While many of the possible changes sound enticing on paper, there are some very real consequences to these choices. Any scenario that does away with the team concept (e.g. modules, short configurations, NIMO) erodes team cohesion and effectiveness. One of the primary strengths of the team concept is the team atmosphere of camaraderie, trust and respect. If you abandon those, you will lose many of the current IMT members, and certainly lose team effectiveness.
2.5 You don't have enough people to fill the modules! You are creating boxes at the top of the food chain and have not grown the food yet -- there are no people to put in all those modules. If you fill all the teams -- regardless of configuration, there are still not enough people left to make 45 modules. YOU HAVE TO START AT THE BOTTOM!!!!
Does anyone remember 30 mile and the report. Crew/team cohesion was a mojor contributor. Working together as a group is what make this work. Having to deal with and learn new personalities and ways of doing things every time you role will only make the incident harder, and more room for error. Every where we go on all risk assignment folks comment on how well we do. Kitrina we were know as the green pants. WTC we were know as the folks behind the scene that made it possible for the USAR teams to operate. This is/was because of the current system in place and the same folks working together to bring peace to stressfull sit. It works fine now. We don't need more NEMo type spending millions of dollars and nobody knows where they are and what they are doing. We need folks tied to forest and districts to get the work done for the American publics, not more folks playing in the shadows. we need to encourage more of the old malitia way allowing rangers to tell folks you will participate in fire activities. This will help get folks interested weather they like it or not. We don't need to stovepipe fire management anymore that it is.
I really like the module concept for some positions I think if it was to be implemented it should be a pilot type program to see how it works
2.5 - Any preconfigured models need to be very basic with alot of flexibility allowed, depending on type of fire, available staffing, location, complexity, etc.
The use of Joint Information Centers is reducing the need for incident-based information dissemination is inaccurate. The most accurate and timely information comes from the incident.

Teams are just that. A group of people who have long standing relationships that capitalize on each others strengths and weakness, which have been tested over time. To think a team is just a bunch of interchangeable parts that can be summoned together is dangerous.
The regional modules concept gets in the way of team cohesion. A bean counter on a cell phone is not in tune with why something may be needed in the way they are if they attend briefings and experience the unique dynamics of that incident, the same with logistics.
2.5 What is proposed is to take Sections and Units out of teams. Very bad idea. Finance and Logistics support at the incident are essential to ensuring policy requirements and agency administrator objectives are fulfilled. MIMIT modules are a good idea.
Preconfigured modules may be a good idea conceptually, but Teams are "TEAMS" for a reason---there are personalities and work ethic standards that the IC looks for to establish his/her "Team"....preconfiguration may cause internal issues.
T = Team. When IMTs consist of modules, or are "scalable" or skeletons on which an organization is "fleshed out", cohesion suffers. Beyond cohesion, a lot of what happens on teams is dependent on personal relationships among team members.
There are certain "modules" of "service center" components that could be utilized by IMT's..such as SOPL's, GIS for SIT, etc. Logistics/Finance don't lend themselves to this...require crew cohesion to function at acceptable standard.
The concept of a center of excellence for incident management and the ability to scale teams up or down depending on incident complexity are very smart solutions to ensure the mission is met in an efficient and economical manner.
Modules and Service Centers are good to develop but again may cause constraints in flexibility where you only really need part of whatever a module consists of.
2.5 - Confusing, seems related to specific models - relates to centralized modules that should be already occurring, finance, risk assessment, information
I do not support modules, or position descriptions for all positions. We need to find a better way of maintaining team viability.
I am not a big fan of the module concept! It takes the "team" out of Incident Management Team.
4) Team cohesion and functionality could be compromised with a modular concept.
Pacific Northwest Team 2 supports the module and incentive proposals.
Utilization of existing local resources that are qualified makes sense as these are the experts in their knowledge of the culture and practices of their districts. I am a MEDL on a Type 2 & Type 3 teams. It seems as if the function of the MEDL has no future according to the literature I have read.The health and safety of the members of the team and the responders assigned to any incident still needs the expertise of a qualified MEDL.Safety officers seem to be inhibitied by fear of law suits and investigations rather than relying on a solid medical plan 216 that is clear and consise and relative. Utilizing some of the key points of a AAR like Dutch Creek is helpful but not to be a rubber stamp template. Providing well trained and authorized EMT's and Paramedics for every incident should be a standard. Assigning an ambulance to a specific division on a fire does not assure that the injured FF will be extracted by the ambulance crew as these entities are not usually qualified physically to do this arduous task. Not all geographic areas allow for short haul of a critical pt. Not every state will allow out of state EMT's and Paramedics to practice at their level. We need to address the payment for Basic Life Support and Advanced Life Support kits. This needs to be standardized nationally.I still see the "good ole boy" culture continuing to be the standard. A team that works together for at least 3 years is efficient.
This new VPR program is great, but there is one area that is of concern to me. I know it doesn't take effect till next year, but the typing of Medical Units will be interesting. There are some contract units out there that are GREAT support units to the folks on the incident and are able to produce a product that is "cost containing" while still taking care of the needs of the incident personnel. There are other So Called MEDICAL contract units that state in there contract that they are capable of supporting an incident and when they show up they are just a chapstick,sunscreen and ice pack distributor. I hope you are able to weed out those, as they always outsource to Doctors, ER rooms and so on, which costs the incident more in the long run. Those units that can handle heat cases, poison oak/ivy, and other injuries in camp are the true cost containing units and most bag for your buck when it comes to keeping the cost down. Thank you for your time!
We are in favor of developing modules (ie. logistics) to fill in and support IMTs. Support for IMTs should be strong and personal liability issues need to be addressed. We are a contractor that currently provides IMTs to states to manage evacuation shelters and our personnel are cross trained at higher levels in NIMS. We also contract within the fire service to the USFS. There are other contractors, both in fire and not in fire, that have the capacity to provide teams, or modules, in support of the Agency mission. We favor the idea of "modules" to supplement agency teams (for instance, contract out for Logistics and operations modules). Because a large majority of the contract team members are retired agency personnel with a high degree of experience and qualifications, transition into existing teams will be easily adoptable.
The financial impact of increasing up to 20 NIMO teams would have a far greater impact on field units' ability to

accomplish goals and targets than the unit's personnel participation on IMT's. The same for service centers. "There is no new money." I would assume that for every person added to NIMO or service centers at least one field unit position would be eliminated. NWCG should not support existing or expanding NIMO teams, service centers, or modules at field unit expense.
There was discussion of modules and/or smaller core organizations. The size of teams should not be reduced. A team that is used to working together can provide for better incident management including mitigation and caring for the firefighters or emergency workers. Teams that have not been together long or have many new members does not work as well or efficiently as a "well seasoned" team. Efforts should be made to maintain teams than to divide and seperate personnel.
2.5 Modules and Service Centers. I firmly believe this is not a viable option. It has been proven in the last few years by the dismal performance of the ASC concept, along with several other "centralization" efforts by the Federal Government. There is a reason we call our IMT's "teams"---you need that good team dynamic to be successful in critical incidents. I believe that being a part of a team also encourages participation on IMT's by many of the members.
The concept of modules makes sense in terms of enhancing the scalability of an IMT. However, in practice it seems to fly in the face of the concept of a standing team and the value of close working relationships. If everything is broken into models we will not have a congruent team from the moment they arrive on an incident. This decreases their ability to serve the needs of the agency that requested them.
2. I believe the preconfigured modules principle (as written) to simply be an effort to figure out a way to staff NIMO Teams. Since I strongly disagree with the NIMO concept, I strongly disagree with this principle as presented.
One work used over and over is TEAM.You are able to perform at a higher level if you know how to interact with each other. It seems a lot of the discussion misses this. You don't get a winnung team by playing "PICK-UP"
2.5 this is critical to reducing cost and increasing efficiency relating to broader scope issues like informing the public, acquisition and distribution of infrared data in larger flight patterns, etc.
We need a federal Medical Director that would cover medical personnel on scene. Its hard to hire a Paramedic and only use them as an EMT.
2.5--I like the idea of modules for some capabilities such as map making, IR flights, the idea of using USFS Service Centers scares me.
A team of inter-agency people that consistantly work together make for a much stronger/safer team.
Plug and play is not a team.
Modular Support failed when the Albuquerque Service Center was developed. The work load there precludes individuals supporting teams in appreciable numbers.The reason teams got so large (44 members) in the first place was because you cannot get timely support. "If you don't bring it you won't have it". Where will support modules magically come from?
Current team configuration models have been proven to be successful. Module concept takes the "team" out of IMT. Team configurations need to be negotiated. Dispatching full team and scaling back is more efficient then coming short and trying to fill holes. Incentives could include and extra 1% of high 3 for team participation of >10 years.
As federal fire policy steers us towards managing fire for multiple objecitves the importance of having well prepared long duration plans become paramount. Not once in the IMOSP document were the Strategic Operations Planner, Long Term Fire Behavior Analyst or Fire Behavior Analyst mentioned. These positions are critical to the successful outcomes of these non traditional suppression events. I hope that these positions will be given more consideration in the development of your final alternatives.
I would like to see a return of the National Fire Use Management Teams or teams that specialize in such 'fire use', 'benefit' fires. The former teams were extremely effective in supporting the small organizations of these types of fires ie wilderness/backcountry. I understand that all teams are 'capable' of managing such indcidents but there is very good reason for having such specialized teams. The incidents that were/are managed are small organizationaly and coohesiveness between teams and modules make working/transitioning on the afore mentioned incidents smooth and effective.
It seems to me that the guiding principles do not consider team building and cohesiveness very high. One main reason the team concept has been so successful is that teams work together and can set standards, travel together and get set up without a lot of team building. By reducing this to short C$G teams, even with modules you will at times set this back. If you get off to a wrong start you may never recover in a type 1 situation. The main problem is not that the team concept did not work, but that there are not enough players entering the game. Fix this first, before messing with what is not broken.
With experience working in Finance I understand the importance of cost containment. Having worked in various remote sections of the US, I also know what a vital role the finance section on the ground plays. I believe that a good finance section brings stability and perspective that aids in cost containment, as well as direct firefighter support and assurance. With this on-site support the boots on the ground can stay focused on the mission and not on whether they

will be paid. They like this assurance, as I believe we all would. The finance section presence in camp gives the assurance that firefighters are supported financially.
An IMT is a preconfigured module that can be ordered commensurate with need. Breaking an IMT into individual unit modules will ultimately be a fragmented IMT. Whether or not IMT functions were modularized, the pool from whom you draw is inherently the same from which you draw current IMT positions. Although it is tempting to believe a module can be ordered, perform a task, and be released depending on immediate needs, then re-ordered at the end of the incident to tie up business, the reality is that with only a few exceptions, every Section Chief and Unit Leader within an IMT has oversight responsibilities and interactions with team members, single resources, contractors, cooperators, and agency administrators on a continuing/daily basis. Under the Service Center concept there may be some processing efficiencies, but we need to recognize there will be a loss in the benefit of having face-to-face contacts, less efficiency in resolving issues timely and at the ground level, and will inhibit "big picture" thinking and building one-on-one team or customer relationships. The inspection process (Finance and Logistics Sections provide oversight) Developing service centers (financial) is similar to developing an expanded dispatch center. Multiple incidents cannot be serviced efficiently for several days. Some fires will be out (or over the hill) before the service center is functioning efficiently. The more incidents the service center is processing, the more people they will need to assist…again, drawing from the same pool of people. Modules exist to the extent they are efficient and useful. Teams currently share resources (modules) between multiple incidents. An example is IMT's frequently sharing air resources, engines, supplies, etc. Under "Organizational Models", "Approach to Organizational Analysis", Bullet 4 "What influences costs", it states: "Staffing strategies that cannot be ramped up and down commensurate with the Incident needs adds significant costs to incidents." This statement implies that the current IMT structure is static and fixed. This is an inaccurate assumption. IMTS are in fact structured for ramping up and down commensurate with an incident. The agency administrator should be having those discussions with the incoming IMT on what team configuration is needed to support an incident.
From Question 3.17
On modules and service centers: MUST be careful about the cost/benefit of doing so. While putting some positions in a service center (for example, FBANs or IMETs) may seem to make economic sense, it actually may be detrimental and least cost effective. Example: A helicopter sits on the ground waiting for the inversion to lift. Currently the base manager talks to the IMET and FBAN (face-to-face) and is able to pin-point a time they will be able to take off. If the FBAN/IMET is at a service center, there may be little incentive to contact them, thus the helicopter sits on the ground an hour after it could have prepped to take off. Now, not only have you paid the FBAN/IMET to sit at the service center, but you've also paid for that helicopter to sit when it could have been working. Service centers make sense for busy work with little face to face interaction needed. However, service centers for scientific/technical positions is questionable as it has been proven over and over that you get a much better, thus safer, product when the scientist/technical specialist is on-site to assess the entire environment, not just what can be remotely sensed.
Modules or Service Centers destroy the Team concept and would interfere with Team cohesion and the elevated performance that results from the true Team concept.
Also, what separates teammembers from modules or a group of freelancers is that ackward getting to know each other phase.
No comments from 4.08.

Table 14: Comments from Gmail relevant to Modules and Service Centers.

Module and Service Centers: Good in theory, but I do not have a complete picture as to how these would work. For instance, if the JIC modules proposed in the Core Team alternatives consisted of one or two PIOs and 13-14 positions to fill upon ordering, that would be good, If it meant that 15 PIOs were waiting for a module call out, that could be problematic.
Logistics as a Module Whomever wrote the description of the Logistics Module "Set up and Breakdown of ICP (Mobilization and Demob module) Logistics can work across fires where appropriate to reduce demand.", has absolutely no idea what Logistics does or how a Logistics Section functions. Reportedly a senior NIFC manager (of another agency) said in their briefing on the models that Logistics could just come in, set up camp and then go home until needed to break it down. If this is the level of knowledge evaluating options then you've got a bigger problem. Set up and breakdown of ICP is the function of the Facilities Unit, a part of Logistics. The Base Camp Manager (BCMG) has to be at the base camp he/she manages 24/7, not at another fire. The Food Unit Leader (FDUL) has to be at the contract kitchen at every meal, not at another fire.

The Ground Support Unit Leader (GSUL) has to be at the motor pool, not somewhere else. The Receiving manager (RCDM) has to be there to receive, inspect and verify deliveries 24/7. The Communications Unit Leader (COML) has to be available to Plans for the Comm Plan for the IAP and present the Comm Plan at daily shift briefings. Can't brief two incidents at the same time. The Radio Operator (RADO) has to be at the radio, not at another fire.
An IMT is a preconfigured module that can be ordered commensurate with need. Breaking an IMT into individual unit modules will ultimately be a fragmented IMT. Whether or not IMT functions were modularized, the pool from whom you draw is inherently the same from which you draw current IMT positions. Although it is tempting to believe a module can be ordered, perform a task, and be released depending on immediate needs, then re-ordered at the end of the incident to tie up business, or that a section can function located remotely from the incident, the reality it that with only a few exceptions, every Section Chief and Unit Leader within an IMT has oversight responsibilities and interactions with team members, single resources, contractors, cooperators, and agency administrators on a continuing/daily basis. Under the Service Center concept there may be some processing efficiencies, but we need to recognize there will be a loss in the benefit of having face-to-face contacts, less efficiency in resolving issues timely and at the ground level, and will inhibit "big picture" thinking and building one-on-one team or customer relationships. Developing service centers (financial) is similar to developing an expanded dispatch center. Multiple incidents cannot be serviced efficiently for several days. Some fires will be out (or over the hill) before the service center is functioning efficiently. The more incidents the service center is processing, the more people they will need to assist…again, drawing from the same pool of people. Modules exist to the extent they are efficient and useful. Teams currently share resources (modules) between multiple incidents. An example is IMT's frequently sharing air resources, engines, supplies, etc.
The whole section on "modules" and "scalability" was very unclear as to how it would be implemented in the real world. It was also indistinguishable (at least in the presentation) from the way we currently manage incidents.
2.05 one problem with the core or modular ideas is there is strength in being activated as a whole team and the cross-function interactions that become stronger and more intuitive.
P5- Module and service centers: See above. Good idea if there are enough players. The risk is that they could end up like the buying teams were during the campaign years-completely "burned out" by August.

Responsiveness to Federal Fire Policy

"IMTs and agency administrators will be accountable for ensuring a high degree of responsiveness to Federal fire policy. IMTs have the necessary knowledge, expertise, and capability to implement all management responses and oversee management actions consistent with the Federal fire policy." (NWCG 2011a: 10)

Survey Question 2.6: *IMTs will have the necessary knowledge to implement all management responses consistent with the Federal Fire Policy.*

Figure 27. Importance of Responsiveness to Federal Fire Policy.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Unimportant	21	2
Somewhat Unimportant	25	3
Neutral	98	12
Somewhat Important	326	38
Highly Important	382	45
Total:	852	100

Missing = 6

Although this Overarching Principle has one of the highest proportions of positive ratings (83% rated this either *4-Somewhat Important* or *5-Highly Important* (Fig. 27)) demographic breakdowns indicate distinctly different considerations. NOTE: NWCG modified this principle after release of the survey to cover state and Federal policy.

As might be expected, state respondents consistently differed significantly from Federal respondents in their opinion of the importance of this Overarching Principle. Specific results follow (Fig. 28):

- *Organizational Level:* The differences in the distribution of responses were highly significant. *State* responses were significantly more negative, more neutral, and less positive than expected and compared to all other sub-groups.
- *Incident Qualifications:* There were marginally significant differences in distributions, with *IMT-Type 3* responses significantly more neutral than expected.
- *Functional Area:* Significant differences overall were driven by *Line Officers/Agency Administrators* who responded significantly more neutral than expected. Still, the most frequently selected rank was *5-Highly Important* for *Line Officers/Agency Administrators* and *Fire* and *Other Fire* programs. The high proportion of neutral responses for *Line Officers/Agency Administrators* likely reflects the high proportion of non-Federal respondents in this sub-group; quite a few of whom responded negatively to the apparent Federal bias of the question. The IMOSPT subsequently modified this Overarching Principle to reflect all agencies' policies. Overall, *Other Fire/Fuels* rated this

higher than other groups (88% selecting either *4*-Somewhat Important or *5-Highly Important*).

- *Agency:* The high significance of difference in distribution (p<.0001) was driven by *State* responses being significantly more negative, more neutral, and less positive than expected and *Local Government* responses more neutral.
- *Age Range:* There were no significant differences in distributions of responses across age groups.

Figure 28. Importance of Responsiveness to Federal Fire Policy by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level.



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age range.



The few comments received highlighted the divide between agency fire directives, with Federal agencies seeking to use fire to restore systems and states seeking to minimize fire (Tables 15, 16).

Table 15. Open-ended Survey comments relevant to Responsiveness to Federal Fire Policy.

From Question 2.12
Responsiveness to federal fire policy must be inclusive of the fact that IMT members must be able to successfully respond to federal agency objectives and work within the policy but must also respond to non-federal organization objectives and work within that organization's policy
2.6 - I believe a better understanding and implementation of the Federal Fire Policy will allow better decisions for the suppression resources as well as natural resource management.
It is no wonder that people are not participating in the IMT program. More and more people do not believe in or trust the current fire management leadership direction and results. Fire policy implementation has no limits or bounds related to the science of fire effects. The Natural beauty and wonder of our forests have been severely compromised. Millions of acres have been burned and billions of trees killed. Fire policy implementation results vary but in many cases initial attack and suppression may have been a better option but were never post fire evaluated and decision makers held accountable. Fires were arguably not ecologically sound, scientifically sound, or resource beneficial. They destroyed scenic quality, promoted climate change, overall cost more, may not have been safer, threatened communities, did not meet LMP direction, and/or exceeded historic norms. WFDSS projections have been poor in these cases, do not support the actions taken, and have been a public embarrassment. There is no place in the system for this dissention except to distance ones self from the accountable leadership and IMT process. The alignment of personal values to organizational values is lacking. Requiring and forcing personnel to be “Responsiveness to Federal Fire Policy” without addressing these issues will not solve the problem. The recommendations are, 1. That NWCG hire a social scientist to determine why IMT’s (or the fire policies) are not supported and how to correct the issue. 2. Require interdisciplinary post fire review and make the results public. In addition, 3. Modify the WFDSS system or policy implementation guide to add a fire effects element to the evaluation that set resource prescription limits and controls. The statement "Responsiveness to federal Fire Policy (IMTs will have the necessary knowledge to implement all management responses consistent with the Federal Fire Policy" appears to show a lack of awareness of NWCG managers to the issues. In many cases IMT's have been asked to implement fire policy responses that are not "RIGHT".
Our interagency Incident Management Teams are not organized to function as USFS Prescribed Fire modules (nor should they be). Principle 6 is dead wrong and continued efforts to force this notion on cooperators is likely to lead to various cooperators extracting themselves from interagency teams (with Federal partners) and forming their own local teams(within regions). If the USFS wants to host a "multiple objectives" incident and manage it as a prescribed fire - fine, just do it with your own resources.
2.6 this is important, however intimate knowledge of local landscapes and treatment actions and outcomes for projects upon those landscapes is equally important. An Agency Administrator may not have the long term institutional knowledge of what has occurred in his area of responsibility let alone that which has been done across jurisdictional boundaries.
2.6--Seems like the role of the Agency Rep or line officer is to convey the federal fire policy as it relates to the fire.
Item 2.6 Responsiveness to the Fedderal Fire Policy: Same answer as above.
No comments from Question 3.17
From Question 4.08
The Overarching Principles should reflect consistent and robust federal responsibility for incidents on federal land. The incident management organization adopted by the NWCG needs to reinforce this responsibility. It is unacceptable for

the federal agencies to hand over their responsibilities for land management (i.e. fire suppression) to state teams, contractors, or non-land management Federal agencies. Federal land management agencies have the skills and the responsibility for this role."

Table 16. Comments from Gmail relevant to Responsiveness to Federal Fire Policy.

Responsiveness to Federal Fire Policy: Yes, provided there is true support of IMT decisions.
P6- Responsiveness to Federal Fire Policy: This is an ever-evolving and often inexplicable task. Agency administrators who are unfamiliar with fire often ask for results that are either not possible, not affordable, or not rational.

Compensation Strategies

"All models include compensation systems with incentives and accountability measures sufficient to sustain the organizational model selected. The model selected will ensure individual participation on IMTs through robust agency support and accountability measures. Examples of compensation strategies, incentives and accountability measures are imbedded in the organizational models and expanded in Appendix A." (NWCG 2011a: 10) [NOTE: For purposes of the survey, Overarching Principle 7 was split into two. Survey question 2.7a was directed towards compensation strategies.]

Survey Question 2.7a Compensation Strategies: *IMT participants compensated based on complexity and duties while engaged in IMT duties.*

Figure 29. Importance of Compensation Strategies.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Unimportant	64	8
Somewhat Unimportant	82	10
Neutral	199	23
Somewhat Important	258	30
Highly Important	249	29
Total:	852	100

Missing = 6

There was considerable variety and ambivalence among respondents concerning this Overarching Principle. Nearly 60% (59%) of respondents selected either *4-Somewhat Important* or *5-Highly Important* (Fig. 29). Eighteen percent of respondents said they did not feel this was an important principle and almost one-quarter were neutral.

Significant differences in distribution of responses occurred only for *Incident Qualifications*: Respondents with *No Incident Qualifications* responded significantly more neutral and *IMT-ICs* responded less neutral than expected (Fig. 30).

Figure 30. Importance of Compensation Strategies by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level.



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age range.



Comments submitted for this Overarching Principle run the gamut from aligning compensation to the greater of day-job or incident position while on incident, to addressing differences between portal-to-portal organizations from actual shift time (opposed to and in support of), to focusing incentives on supervisors for releasing employees for incident participation (Tables 17, 18). The majority of alternative perspectives were voiced as *Other* for the Building Block 3-15--*Compensation Strategies*. A summary is presented under that section.

Table 17. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Compensation Strategies/Incentives.

From Question 2.11
Compensation commensurate with duties performed on incidents will entice capable personnel to strive for excellence and desire a higher level of qualification. Currently, there is a lack of incentive to take on the additional responsibility associated with higher level positions
4-I would offer incentives to units that have team members. For example, a FS district or refuge that has a type 1 or 2 team member might get $4 to $5,000/yr for travel training and salary,
Concerned with being paid what the position is on IMT that a person performs. In some cases they could get paid much less than their home position.
To get thes peoples' attention, top dolloar financial compensation should be "on-the-table".
2.7a Compensation for an incident season - usually summer -- probably would bring out a few more people. It's the time commitment to rotations that is the huge issue.
I think it is undesirable to ask a GS-7 or GS-9 to fill a role on an IMT in the Command or General staff and not receive fair wages that match the stress and complexity of the position.
The Flame Act is crucial to the future of FS FIRE Position based pay should be looked at, If you are an OPS Chief, you should be paid as an OPS chief. If you choose to go as a Radio Operator, Driver, lower level position then those positions should be paid at the lower level. AD pay system captures this but the GS pay system does not.
With the difficulty in keeping National IMT's staffed, I think it is imperative that funding for training, commitment by not only IMT members, but their supervisors, opportunity to exercise teams, and incentives for folks being on teams. The biggest issue I have seen lately has been incentives. Folks will not hold back and commit to a team rotation. They need the $$ to make ends meet and holding back for a team means loss of $$ at times. Also this makes holes in the team structure and Team Cohesiveness is a big safety issue once folks pull off for single resource assignments. What the incentive needs to be? Not sure. Monetary Bonus would be great, but would have to be discussed in length on need of position, difficulty to reach that qualification, the complexity of the qualification and the complexity of the IMT. Type 1 or 2 or 3...
4-I would offer incentives to units that have team members. For example, a FS district or refuge that has a type 1 or 2 team member might get $4 to $5,000/yr for travel training and salary,
1) Currently there is no incentive to participate on teams by regular government employees other than personal. There needs to be an incentive. Private industry exemplifies this principle.
5) Financial practices currently employed by the Forest Service provides an incentive that DOI does not use.
Fair compensation for KSA's and performance evaluations and rewards will present emergency managers the insentives to recruit, retain and train a steady flow of personnel. Participation incentives and rewards (actual pay for the KSA's you must retain/improve) will award the best people for what they do, and align these highly complex C&G's, supervisor and leader positions with the Nat'l Response Framework mission.
Compensation for federal employee to partipate on a team, Need to develop incentives to partipate and added workload. Bonus? percent based on position?
Incentives, whether monetary or acknowledgment, would be a great tool for getting more participation. Even more effective would be a demerit system for those managers and agency administratiors that refuse to allow their employees to participate.
Fire organization has become more stovepiped and seperated from the "militia", and in many instances the militia no longer feels welcome to participate. Budget reality cannot support seperate fire & incident management organizations -- need to be reincorportated into the overall Agency organization and mission. This would also strengthen the fire organization by providing members better cross training and support in resource managment skills -- incident response is only partially about firefighting, but that fact seems often lost to many fire org. members.
The issue of pay always seems to be an issue, there should be a cap on the amount someone can make while on assignment. Being a fed guy I always am a little bitter on how structure fire depts get paid. it seems like if they are assisting on our fires then they should go by our pay rules. not the other way around. I know alot of federal people who feel the same way when it comes to the money.
Compensation: 1) Increase rate of base and overtime when position compensation duties and complexity would result in a higher rate of pay than in their home unit rate of pay. Do not reduce the incidetnn rate of pay when the home unit rate of pay exceeds that of an incident position. 2) Pay incident team positions that are filled with AD's (administratively determined) the standard overtime rate of 1.5X for shifts over 8 hours and/or work weeks over 40 hours. 3) Pay Federal Employees or Team memebers who are AD's a yearly bonus of say $10,000 that is not part of the yearly maximum compensation rule.

There are many agency personnel that are non-fire based funding such as law enforcement rangers, interpreters, administrative and resource staff that are underutilitzed by most agencies. These are a huge pool of well trained, fit individuals, and with great resource knowledge. I recommend a strategy to re-engage these other staff members in the fire program and as a funnel towards IMT positions. They will need encouragement and offer of reward to engage and remain engaged in the fire program in addition to their primary duties.
There needs to be more monetary incentives for federal resources to join a IMT. Everyone on the incident in California is getting portal to portal except for us. Our employer is treating other agencies better than its own. This has a negative effect on moral and is the biggest reason the teams are turning from green to blue. You can have a municipal firefighter from the city handing out double A batteries in the com unit and be making more money than the forest service incident commander. This needs to change.
2.7.a - I really like the idea of 120 day details, including a defined GS level or pay scale. Then only those individuals who really want to participate will apply. Backfilling or bringing in another detailer to the vacated position then offers other incentives because the backfill offers growth and learning as well as to the original individual who accepted the 120 detail for incident management.
Compensation should not be in the form of a financial incentive--Team members do this job because they like it, not because they are forced to be there---and they make good overtime; instead consider Fire qualifications as a boost to employment opportunites in fire (more weight provided to those who have participated on IMTS);
I've been to some fires where some of the crews (Individuals) get paid for 24 hrs a day; motels ect., when others are paid strictly for the hours they work , & are responsable to bring there own sleeping bag/ tent ect.I've also been to insidents where everyone is offered motels (eaqual) . These are strictly commits.
Incentives for Agency Administrators to encourage employees to participate, ESPECIALLY employees that are militia or collateral duty. Incentives for these same Agency Administrators to actually let their people participate, other than PL 5 mandatory (Moses letter).
Compensation for the additional duties of an IMT member is definitely needed and would encourage more participation. Right now a person can take more assignments not being an IMT member due to the required on call period every two weeks.
It is impoprtant that we support team members by creating incentives for supervisors to release employees, employees to receive financial incentives to make the sacrifices required to support IMT, and the agency support IMT decisions.
2.7 Does this mean that fire qualified employees have it written in their EPAP/yearly performance appraisal? Isn't this already the case?
I would like to see emphasis placed on bringing more people in thru the Agencies (all) that incents employees to participate.
There shoudl be a financial incentive to allowing employees the ability to participate (backfill or base cost savings).
Incentives are not necessary for most individuals.
I also like the idea of paying particpants at an appropriate grade for their IMT participation. GS 11 ICT 2 and GS 9 OPS chiefs is not right. I also do not like the idea of employees with high grades (GS 11-13) doing lower grade work on IMTs. GS 13 Rangers as rapplers, Supply Unit Leaders , Check in Staus Recorders, is sinful shamefull and a travesty to the hard working taxpayers. Think how the GS 5 employees feel about this. These high graded employees should either work at a position commesurate with their grade or stay home and do their job, no excuse we need em, lets get on with the work at hand and train and develop our up and comers instead. This sounds like IMOSP intent.
Pay rates should be based on the fire position held on an incident . The I.C. should be paid the top scale and other positions according to quals. Fire pay should not be connected to your regular gov. rate (GS,WG, etc). People need compensation that inspires rising up the pay/qual ladder. Muliple qualifications would give an employee flexibility in taking assignment or participating on IMT's.
2.7a. not enough information supplied and readily available for comment. compensation should be based on the policies and procedures of the partner in question. If standardization of compensation is needed then it should be coordinated between all potential partners. This is difficult for Tribes that have no base funds. cant find appendix A
Also, the use of incentives, etc. does not reflect basic management theories such as Maslow's Theory of Hierarchy relative to what satisfies individual employees. Increasing employee interest in "fire service" needs to consider a lot more than additional money in their pockets.
WHAT district ranger could ever be allowed to do a position like this as a plans chief or similar? and when i came up - an IC didn't have to be a particular GS level - if they had the skill a GS 6 could be an IC. How can you ever have a GS 6 be detailed as an GS 13?????
-On the Federal side many managers (outside of IMT's) do not understand the cost of doing business, appear to have been very sheltered from3real world needs and costs, examples are in local Agreements referring to backfill needs and overhead costs. -2.7
Item 2.7a Compensation Stratagies: Will not affect state/local employees and will work as a "dis" incentive for this pool

of IMT participants.
Actual pay/ benefit equity across the board with cooperators and contractors is vital to public support and IMT participation.
2.7a--People will not work in the lower paying positions if they are qualified for a higher paying position.
Pay per position is in equal. Fluctuation is because of home unit Fed, State, County, Contract.
pay incentive is vital.
We also need to provide incentives for membership on teams, not necessarily single resource. Team committment is just that a committment which takes more time, energy and expertise to sustain.
IMOs should not only be trained with consistent and global models, that have "set" successive teams that inherit the older teams efforts, but it should be a HONOR and a SPECIALIZED experience that would give the member of the IMO a kick-up in their professional life. The BLM should recognize such an employee who serves on IMOs with an honest open heart who actually HELPS people in the time of crisis. these people are rare and often are not sought after by the 17 traits of a "good leader". Membership in this team could also be looked at as being a good leader as well.
It is important that we support team members by creating incentives for supervisors to release employees, employees to receive financial incentives to make the sacrifices required to support IMT, and the agency support IMT decisions.
They need support to be away from their day job.
From Question 3.17
By the same token, those that do particpate successfully should be recognized and rewarded by their agency for the knowlege and experience gained.
No comments from 4.08.

Table 18. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Compensation Strategies/Incentives.

My choice is number 1 with incentives for employees to join IMTs. If you want more employees to participate in IMT have an incentive program. For example, if you are a primary team member you get a $ 2,000 award for your commitment up front. In the BLM there is not a real incentive for management to allow employees to participate on an IMT since there is no program savings when on a fire. That is why you see considerably less BLM involvement. On the aviation side of IMTs, we don't have helicopter folks interested in becoming an ASGS or AOBD. An incentive program may make that pathway more desirable.
There has been no effort to compensate team members for the time they are on standby. The government has already proved less than reliable when I tried to help on projects with my personal time and equipment. If it were not for my loyalty to the fire teams and fire organizations nationwide, I would say as I do for my regular job: I work you pay; if you do not pay, I do not work. Relief from work targets at least in heavy and severe years is needed for those on teams--if not all employees--who participate. The current system does not encourage fire participation when it comes to work target accomplishments and this IMOSP models do not address this issue. The manager and employee who is not in a fire position receive little if any relief from targets due to fire participation.
Compensation Strategies, Incentives and Accountability: One of the most unfair and absurd elements of the current situation is the pay levels of some C&G members. There should be a minimum base level for these positions when on assignment. For instance, it is ridiculous for a GS-7 or 9 to go through all the trials it takes to become a member of a Type I C&G staff and have them paid at half or less of what the incident personnel they are supervising earn, simply because your pay is based on your regular job. The amount of responsibility and liability assumed by C&G member is a huge burden and people should be compensated fairly. I applaud the Team for providing some alternatives that address this problem, and I believe such a solution for both Type I and Type II teams needs to be included in the final decision. Also, if a model is selected that includes the additional NIMO teams, selection criteria for those positions must allow performance on a team to substitute as the equivalent to experience at the next lowest grade level. While I am sure the Team looked at it, what about portal-to-portal? If you pay all hours on the incident at the base rate, it works out to 20 more hours per week (168) then you would pay someone working 16 hour days (8 regular and 8 OT for 5 days plus 16 OT hours on weekend days for the equivalent of 148 base hours). This would be an additional financial incentive for participation, simplify things greatly, and would also alleviate the hidden costs of incident employees tracking time for themselves and the people they supervise. Finance would have a much reduced burden, potentially freeing up personnel to work on other tasks and building more depth in that tough to fill section. I believe there needs to be more financial incentives to bring new people into the system. Perhaps a bonus for going out

the first time, completing a task book, or achieving a new qualification.
incentives for being a trainer and getting folks signed off, a bonus or reward of some kind
P7- Compensation ...: See comments above. Additionally, the cost of keeping more NIMO teams on the books should be weighed against using that money to motivate for more ICS participation and training, in many forms.

Accountability

"All models include compensation systems with incentives and accountability measures sufficient to sustain the organizational model selected. The model selected will ensure individual participation on IMTs through robust agency support and accountability measures. Examples of compensation strategies, incentives and accountability measures are imbedded in the organizational models and expanded in Appendix A." (NWCG 2011a: 10) [NOTE: For purposes of the survey, Overarching Principle 7 was split into two. Survey question 2.7b is directed toward accountability.]

Survey Question 2.7b: *IMT participants held accountable for performance as IMT members through measures such as position descriptions and performance standards executed by their direct supervisor.*

Although *4-Somewhat Important* was the most frequently selected response (37%), there were quite a few neutral responses (19%) (Fig. 31).

Figure 31. Importance of Accountability.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Unimportant	32	4
Somewhat Unimportant	67	8
Neutral	161	19
Somewhat Important	311	37
Highly Important	279	33
Total:	850	100

Missing = 8

Overall, *Local Government* staff and respondents with *No Incident Role* tended to rate Accountability of higher importance than other sub-groups. Other significant differences in distribution are as follows (Fig. 32):

- *Organizational Level:* There were overall significant differences in distributions, with *State Government/Fire* more positive and less negative than expected.
- *Agency:* The distribution of responses was significant. *Local Government* respondents were more positive, less neutral, and less negative than expected, and the *NPS* respondents were significantly more neutral.

Figure 32. Importance of Accountability by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level.



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age range.



Comments concerned both individual and team accountability (Tables 19, 20), with some noting that supplementing PDs for non-fire positions are as important as for fire. There was a disagreement as to whether teams are currently held accountable or not, indicating variation of experience, and differences of opinion about how, what, and who is involved. As one commenter noted about individual IMT participation: *"Though I believe establishing the IMT participation in PDs is a good solution, the language needs to be flexible to include various IMT positions that the incumbent could choose from (i.e,. one individual may be good and interested in being an Operations Section Chief while another may be interested in a Facilities Unit Leader position). This proposal would take advantage of an individual's skill set. In addition to adding this language to the PD would be some recognition of a loss of performance at the individual's "Day Job" with support from the supervisor and within their agency."*

Table 19. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Accountability.

From Question 2.12
2-Put in all Postion Descriptions a requirement to have a red card job within 2 yrs. All GS-7 and above should have a requirement to have a unit leader card after 5 yrs and all gs-12's and above must have be qualified as command or general staff within 2 yrs.
2.7b People who do a poor job have never been written up and taken out of the system. We continue to see them year after year. So there needs to be performance standards so incompetency is stopped at the home unit and not sent to the field.
ALL fire personnel under a fire PD or fire retirement must be qualified and on IMT's. The fire service should be under the US Fire Administration. 0401 series what a joke biology-really?! We are professional fire fighters and should rank the same as we have paid for through various degrees. don't want 0301 series? fine then get serious. Physical standards are not applied equally and unilaterally across the nation either. All the knowledge, skill, experience etc will not do any good after the system has removed them. All fire qualifications null and void, removed from red card as if never existed -which is pretty much how it would feel. No one gets paid the same for the same pd. what is good in one district or forest is not the same in another. IFPM standards not being met and applied differently, paid differently, and have different qualifications levels. Not to mention if you cried loud enough the postition was removed from IFPM or reclassified.
2-Put in all Postion Descriptions a requirement to have a red card job within 2 yrs. All GS-7 and above should have a requirement to have a unit leader card after 5 yrs and all gs-12's and above must have be qualified as command or general staff within 2 yrs.
6) Accountability is Critical. The current model, reliance on militia participation, is likely not sustainable even if moderate incentives are applied. However providing a cookie cutter approach to establishing IMT participation in a PD would require careful crafting of the language. Though I believe establishing the IMT participation in PDs is a good solution the language needs to be flexible to include various IMT positions that the incumbent could choose from (ie. One individual may be good and interested in being an Operations Section Chief while another may be interested in a Facilities Unit Leader position). This proposal would take advantage of an individual's skill set. In addition to adding this language to the PD would be some recognition of a loss of performance at the individual's "Day Job" with support from the supervisor and within their agency.
in 2.7.B the inference is that we are not accountable and that is BS. In my org/team we are accountable and yet we never get any credit or compensation other than O.T. for the hours worked. Many folks put in more hours than the 16 you write down to get the job done on time and under cost.
Team members are already being held accountable, so question 2.7.b is erroneous.
2.7.b Accountability is only addressed in the alternatives for fire-funded personnel on teams. What about non-fire funded personnel who also hold team positions? How does accountability factor in for those folks? Is it fair that some team members have an accountability performance elements while others do not? Seems like this should be for all team members or for none.
I think there does need to be accountability and consistency; however I would like to see most of the principles of the current team structure and method of operation maintained. I do not support modules, or position descriptions for all positions. We need to find a better way of maintaining team viability.
Performance on an Incident Management Team should be conducted by the Team, not the individual's supervisor as the Sup will have very little useable knowledge regarding the person's individual performance on an Incident;
2.7.b - All should be held accountable in whatever position we hold. We should also set positive examples and be accountable in our positions to our supervisors, those we work with and to the public.
Agency support is an important factor because w/o the support from supervisors and AA employees cannot participate.

Direction needs to come down from above with a tie to performance standards.
Establish fire support as a part of position description. Everyone will have a support role for emergency management. Recognize that these agencies have emergency response repsonsibility.
2.7b- I was unsure how this would work and did not answer. Mandating participation on IMT's has many implications that could negatively affect team and individual performance.
27.b. Are you talking about the Direct (home office) supervisor? how would that be done,? by including ratings from your IMT leader?
3) Performance accountability should be developed across the agencies participating, with incentives and corrective consequences.
Home units (supervisors) that supply members to participate in teams should have this as a critical performance element.
Supplimental PD statements to include operations/command and one other section should be required.
Teams should be held accountable for the team's performance.
2.7b - Hard to implement, participation or performance?
2.7b. is important but not so much in the manner of financial liability. As focus of local partnerships move more towards responsible management of planned ignitions as an integral component of maintaining anthropogenic fire regimes utilizing local workforce then eventually suppression will be a moot point. the financial liability coverage needs to be a funded activity if we are to have individuals willing to take this next step.
Reasons for 5 Rating. 2.7b. Important to improve the quality and performance of IMT personnel. Related to this is the problem of giving too many trainees a pass on completing taskbook assignments. Based on my experience as a lead TII PIO, about 1 in 3 fully qualified PIOs (not including name requests)assigned through general resource orders had limited abilities and skills for the job.
FS should make fire the top priority of all employees and performance ratings must include such an element.3 year commitment for should be kept, if needed years 2 and 3 would need to be validated. If denied, the supervisor must justify situation and approved by that supervisor's supervisor.
Utilzing performance ratings for the feds involved on teams is great. Part of the job description and an appropriate percentage of the job description should be allocated for the IMT service, especially for the command and general staff.
In hiring non-fire agency employees, interview questions and PD's must address fire and IMT participation.
I think the accounability piece is huge. Too many teams were made up of "good ole boys" and they were often not accountable for their performance on the incidents. Too many times selections are made based on who you know or what agency you represent, rather than if the person has the best skill set for the job.
There needs to be something in PDs to get people the experience and it would help if base pay could be charged to an incedent.
From Question 3.17
Again, teams with strong trust levels and working relationships self-govern. Anyone who can't/won't perform is not asked back.
Some teams and or members currently lack motivation to serve the best they can towards the land management objectives. They place personal monitary gain over the responsibility to serve as effectively as they can. Contractors and or AD's are paid more the longer they are activated, thus there is no incentive beyond reputation for delivering a product that is quick and effective. Performance base varies, marginal performance that maximises length of tour is the result.
No Comments from 4.08

Table 20. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Accountability.

Agency Administrators need to be held accountable for decision making and IMTs need to be held accountable to manage fires as directed.
It is a challenge for me to understand the lack of accountability in various situations. Some managers are getting paid for making hard decisions, yet they appear incapable of doing so. If the IC or Team or manager failed, why weren't held accountable by upper management? How are they going to get better? SUPER TEAMs are going to have the same problems. Who is going to hold them accountable? The same managers that must not be holding ICs, teams, or managers accountable now. Accountability could be implemented, and it is needed with existing teams. The problem with the core team approach (let's just go ahead and call it the NIMO teams) is that if you are not a member, you are not accepted by the 'club'; it is only a team for the 7 or 9 members. It is an unusual team that makes one feel like a member and actually functions as one. If you become a member, it is toward the end of the assignment (not initially), and this is just human nature (not good or bad).

Standard Operating Procedures for Incident Management Teams

"Standard Operating Procedures that incorporate concepts contained within the organizational model selected will improve the consistency of service provided by IMTs. These operating procedures should be developed in a coordinated effort involving the geographic area, states and national coordinating groups." (NWCG 2011a: 10)

***Survey Question 2.8: Standard operating procedures** should be developed in a coordinated effort involving the geographic area, states, and national coordinating groups.*

Figure 33. Importance of Standard Operating Procedures for IMTs.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Unimportant	33	4
Somewhat Unimportant	49	6
Neutral	164	20
Somewhat Important	325	39
Highly Important	255	31
Total:	826	100

Missing = 32

Response was somewhat more muted for this Overarching Principle than for others--the most frequently selected rating was *4-Somewhat Important* (39% of respondents). Overall, 70% of respondents rated this either *4-Somewhat Important* or *5-Highly Important* (Fig. 33).

There was a significant difference in the distribution of responses in *Incident Qualifications*: those with *No Incident Qualification* were less neutral than expected (Fig. 34).

The few comments concerned the balance between consistency and flexibility, with many noting the value of SOPs, but questioning whether additional SOPs are necessary or whether local or national (Tables 21, 22): *"Standard Operating Procedures for IMTs: All team SOPs need to be developed using the same core procedures or framework. Each IMT should have the ability to create their own SOP that suits the operation of that team, while including the core procedures for all IMTs." "Standardize SOP for IMTs: Sounds good, but we should always remember and make clear that they are procedures, not laws or regulations. There may be cases when it would be prudent to deviate from the SOP and given what is going on with liability, we do not want to unnecessarily tie the hands of an IMT by having SOPs become inviolate."*

Figure 34. Importance of Standard Operation Procedures for IMTs by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level.



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age range.



Table 20. Open-ended survey questions relevant to Standard Operating Principles.

From Question 2.12
Standard Operating Procedures have been in existence for many, many years - so question 2.8 is not well thought out.
2.8. We have Standard Operating Procedures from handbooks, and regulations..... Why regulate further (if that's what your saying) it kills the opportunity to learn from others and better ourselves.
2.8 - Standardized Operating Procedures will provide consistency and direction for those working with the IMO's. Adaptability to incidents and events is also a plus for IMO's.
If this is truly going to be an Interagency effort, then the playing filed needs to be leveled and everyone needs to work under the same standards and rules of engagement.
2.8 - national standards should include mobilization, organization, selection/advertisement, and rotation.
2.8 Allow for flexibility to apply standards to varying situations! It is not one size fits all!!!
2.8- National Fire Polcy would seem to create SOP's for teams.
I am don't believe that national SOPs are valuable for IMTS, financial practices, etc... Control of procedures and practices should devolve to and remain within regions and locales...There is a real strength in maintaining diverse practices to suit the respective geographies...This is how learn how to do things better, and where we innovate. Perhaps there are inefficiencies in allowing different SOPs, but anecdotally, standardarization/centralization/consolidation seems horribly inefficient and ineffective...look no further than Albuquerque Service Center and USUC.A single qualification system is fine as long as it becomes more simple and streamlined.
Understanding of the IMT's that one size doesn't always fit the situation. An understanding that their are local issues, besides the Feds!The interagency concept is great but too many individuals get hung up with their own agency or government level. I have worked on the Fed side and now at the local side and their lots of differences and perspectives even between counties and states. So trying to develop a one size fits all will never work and forcing issues causes lots of resentment.
You'll never make things consistent everywhere because of local needs and because people are involved (instead of machines you can program). So, don't get so wrapped up in all this bureaucratic jargon that you forget how important it is to be flexible and adaptive. There's too much paper pushing as it is. Too many are slaves of a database, unable to think outside narrow directions. That will get somebody killed.
Standard SOP's can get you into trouble IF the SOP's are cetermined to be the only way to do something. It makes perfect sense to have standard accounting SOP's but you cannot expect standard SOP's to apply to Operations on the ground. One of the things that make certain IMT's more effective than others is their creativity. SOP's can stifle creativity if they beomce too far reaching.
The Standardized operation principles concerns me. I believe there is room for some standardized principles but this can be taken too far. Teams have different personalities and different approaches to solve problems. There must be some room for creativity.
2.8 this sounds great but we all know that different areas have different situations. any such procedures should be adaptable at the in local operating plans involving multiple stakeholders.
Without strong operating procedures and proper trained personnel, any incident is at risk to fail or even worse.
Standardized SOPs are critical when pulling together teams that do not always work together.Partnerships mean everything in Incident Management.
Standards are important, as are flexibility and accountability. These three should be the cornerstones of our future IMO configurartions.
Standard Operating Procedures for IMT's: All team SOPs need to be developed using the same core procedures or framework. Each IMT should have the ability to create their own SOP that suits the operation of that team, while including the core procedures for all IMT's.
From Question 3.17
All Federal Agencies should have same model.
No comments from 4.08.

Table 22. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Standard Operating Procedures.

Standardize SOP for IMTs: Sounds good, but we should always remember and make clear that they are procedures, not laws or regulations. There may be cases when it would be prudent to deviate from the SOP and given what is going on with liability, we do not want to unnecessarily tie the hands of an IMT by having SOPs become inviolate.
Standard Operating Procedures for IMT's: All team SOPs need to be developed using the same core procedures or framework. Each IMT should have the ability to create their own SOP that suits the operation of that team, while including the core procedures for all IMT's.
P8- Standardized SOP's for IMT's: Good idea, but going to be difficult to impose with regional orientation of teams. This

will require cross-training and mentoring during cadre development; and is the kind of thing that (necessarily, if it's important) adds to costs and runs counter to limiting team size if it is to be accomplished. If there is a real push in this direction, it underscores the need for detailed yearly refreshers and exercises.

Support of Incident Management Team Decisions

"The organizational model chosen will provide for strong agency support of Agency Administrator and IMT decision making, regardless of outcomes. Agencies should address deep-seated concerns regarding personal liability that discourage the participation of employees, especially as Incident Commanders. " (NWCG 2011a: 10)

Survey Question 2.9: *The model chosen should provide for strong agency support of Agency Administrators and IMT decision making, regardless of outcomes. Agencies should address personal liability concerns.*

Figure 35. Importance of Support of IMT Decisions.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Unimportant	17	2
Somewhat Unimportant	15	2
Neutral	73	9
Somewhat Important	293	35
Highly Important	448	53
Total:	846	100

Missing = 12

This Overarching Principle gathered the strongest and most positive response, with the vast majority of respondents (89%) selecting either *4-Somewhat Important* or *5-Highly Important* (Fig. 35). Only 4% rated this unimportant.

Ratings on *Support for IMT Decisions* were both relatively higher than for other Overarching Principles and with a lower proportion of neutrals for many functional groups. There were no significant differences in distributions (Fig. 36).

The relatively few comments (Tables 23, 24) voiced succinct support for IMT decisions, for example:*"Supporting agency administrators who are willing to take risks with the type of strategy employed regardless of outcome, except in the cases of gross negligence or misconduct, is critical to changing future wildfire outcomes and controlling wildfire costs.* Some noted the personal risk perceived: *"Personal liability is a huge issue",* and others called for education: *"An effort must be made to educate line officers and those above, including political appointees, on the decision space in which we operate."*

Figure 36. Importance of Support of IMT Decisions by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level.



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age range.



Table 23. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Support of IMT Decisions.

From Question 2.12
3) Reasonable decisions need to be supported to remove a disincentive to participate.
2.9 Personal liability is a big issue. Agencies should be consistent and back up the employee providing that person stays within the scope of their duty. For contract staff, this issue needs to be clear if contract staff by the federal gov't are covered or not when performing their duty on a fire assignment. Why would a retiree risk liability if the gov't won't cover that person? This issue needs to be clear under all models considered.
Question 2.9 is a given. IMTs are not line officers or ultimate decision makers; they do not have the authority to make decisions without the support of line officers. It is incredibly important that we move to less suppression and more use of wildfire. Agency leaders (talking Washington Office and Regional Offices) need to support IMTs when decisions to use wildfire are well-documented and make sense given the conditions on the ground during the time of the decision and the anticipated future conditions during the time of the decision - even if things go bad. And leadership needs to spotlight and encourage the use of wildfire, at least internally. We are in an unsustainable condition across nearly all of our forests, in terms of fuels buildup and departure from ecologically healthy/historic conditions. It's time to quit doing what's politically expedient (i.e, suppression) and start tackling the unhealthy fuels on our landscapes; we cannot do it with prescribed fire and mechanical treatments alone. The true heroes are not just those that fight fire, but those that have the courage to use wildfire in an ecologically and socially sensitive way.
2.9- Personal liability is a huge issue. For the situations that incident response personnel are asked to perform in it seems that they accept a significant ammount of personal risk. Revisiting the decision making process after a bad out come and with good documentation (operational tempo and understanding of the actual situation affect this) can open many decisions to be questioned though during the incident it was the obvious right decision. Incident responders need to know that they will not be falulted for trying to do a good job. No one makes the right decision all the time.
The agencies need to support their personnel in making tough decisions in a short time frame that effects life and property. This includes liability insurance and backing their decisions. I'm no longer a type 3 IC somewhat because of the liability issues (also age and contract doctor physical hassle vs my personal doctor's annual physical) that could bring risk to my personnel assets side (advice by my personnel lawyer). I do think teams (ICs) need to have some leeway to fight fire instead of one size fits all approach.
2.9 is highly important to me because as long as the decision is within the scope of proper management responsibilities and a poor outcome occurs, that those individuals making the decision were doing so with the best information they had at that time and with the intent of a good outcome. We sometimes encounter bad outcomes. My opinion no one within the incident command system intentionally decides to plan a bad outcome.
As a dispatcher I have seen individuals remove upper level quals from their red card after 30 mile and creamer due to a feeling if you make a error, the forest service will hang you out to dry. (no support). And if you want people to join a IMT team, provide support in the event something happens, or you will not have anyone.
It is impoprtant that we support team members by creating incentives for supervisors to release employees, employees to receive financial incentives to make the sacrifices required to support IMT, and the agency support IMT decisions.
"Agencies should address personal liability concerns" the amount paid is not worth the loss of ones lively hood. The agency has to back its fire fighters. Unless it is willing, more will choose not to stick ones neck out.
2.9 - Hard to implement, related to personal liability, still important
2.9. Don't understand this Statement.
The overarching principals lay the foundation of a federal biased IMT vision which is continued throughout the proposal.Having an overarching principal of IMT fidelity to federal fire policy with no consideration of state or local government fire objectives is inappropriate.I interept "Support for IMT decisions" as an endorsement of the WFDDS process. WFDDS is unworkable on the front end of a fire and detracts from timely suppression decisions. The perception of personal liability of IMT members is a seperateissue and the combination of the two topics will skew survey results.
2.9 agencies should address liability concerns, however there could be instances of gross negligence that may require the removal of individuals from participation that cannot come to terms with a new way of managing for the long term restoration of fire adapted social and ecological systems. in some cases outcomes of an individuals actions can be inexcusable.
Decision makers need to have the necessary knowledge to ask for the correct response and they need to be held accountable for mistakes. IMT's need more authority to negociate and correct this issue. It is not a matter of knowledge on the part of the IMT's, its a matter of selecting the correct response and doing what is right.
The IMT should have the full support and backing of the AA. This of course depends on the fact that the IMT and all members are properly qualified for the position they fill. If that is adhered to, personal liability, should also be covered without question.
I see Accountability and liability grounded in Just culture, High Reliability Organizing and in being a learning culture. These are the fundamentals of Doctrine and all wildland agencies whould not have too much difficulty empbarcing

doctrine.
Supporting agency administrators who are willing to take risks with the type of strategy employed regardless of outcome, except in the cases of gross negligence or misconduct, is critical to changing future wildfire outcomes and controlling wildfire costs.
No comments from 3.17.
No comments from 4.08.

Table 24. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Support for IMT Decisions.

Support of IMT Decisions: Yes. This is an easy recommendation but perhaps the toughest to implement. Obviously, there is a lot of wariness in the wildland fire agencies these days and while it is easy to write down the words, there will continue to be cautious personnel until it is proven that from the top down, decisions are truly supported. A corollary to this is support of personnel when times get tough. Having spent 5 years working on the Cerro Grande Fire, I know we can and must do better in this regard. Liability insurance should be required for certain positions and cost reimbursement should be a given. Our world is too complex for it to be an unsupported option anymore. An effort must be made to educate line officers and those above, including political appointees, on the decision space in which we operate. We must continue to develop a culture based on HRO principles, acknowledge that tough incidents happen, and be prepared to help our people weather the storm.
P9- Support of IMT Decisions: This is a very large problem and the cause of some people dropping out of the system. Additionally, there is often the perception that when a team is called to an incident-they are expected to make the world perfect again. And not have any messy outcomes. This does not reflect reality. There needs to be a higher level of agency administrator awareness of the real world, and not just an obsessive growth in complex CYA documentation tools and requirements which are a time sink for team personnel, and do little to make an incident safer, and which in fact just add to incident costs. (A cynical person might suggest that this is partially a result of the aforementioned problem of narrowing the experience base of agency personnel.)

Interagency Cooperation/External Considerations

"All models will involve an interagency structure where teams are comprised of Federal, state, and local government agency personnel that minimize the use of non-governmental participants. Alternatives that present contracted resource opportunities may contain non-governmental participants but must still maintain oversight by interagency personnel and comply with interagency team standards. All models will involve the need to coordinate with external partners to establish agreements, operating standards, and procedures." (NWCG 2011a: 10)

Survey Question 2.10: *The model will involve interagency structure with Federal, state and local government personnel that make appropriate use of Non-governmental participants.*

Figure 37. Importance of Internal Cooperation/External Considerations.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Unimportant	36	4
Somewhat Unimportant	43	5
Neutral	164	19
Somewhat Important	303	36
Highly Important	304	36
Total:	850	100

Missing = 8

Similar proportions of respondents selected *4-Somewhat Important* and *5-Highly Important*—36% each (Fig. 37)—although this Overarching Principle also had a fairly high proportion of *neutral* responses (19%).

Internal Cooperation/External Considerations as an Overarching Principle appears more important to non-Federal respondents and to leaders (*Incident Commander*s and *No Incident Role*), resulting in several statistically significant results (Fig. 38). Specific results are described below:

- *Organizational Level:* There were significant differences among respondents, with *State Government/Fire* respondents ranking less neutral and *Local Government/Fire* ranking less negative than expected.
- *Agency:* Distributions differed significantly, with *State Government/Fire* respondents ranking less neutral than expected.
- *Age Range:* Across the collapsed categories there were a significant differences in distribution of responses ($p<0.0001$), with older respondents (both *41-50* and *Over 50*) having significantly less negative responses than those *Under 30*.

Figure 38. Importance of Interagency Cooperation/External by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level.



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age range.



Comments (Tables 25, 26) reflect the opinions that interagency teams and cooperation exist and are crucial *("Keeping teams interagency in nature is essential in order to Functional Area properly in today's political climate"),* though not being taken as much advantage of as possible: *"I personally do not think that state agencies are offered the opportunity to participate in the Type 1 & 2 level team to a great extent. The same training opportunities should be extended and funded to take advantage of the greater number of people in the East."* There was also a division about whether IMTs should stay focused on land management or include all hazard: *"Make IMTs accountable for all risk emergencies versus IMTs should be focused on land management emergencies of the agencies—Federal and State they are organized from and managed by")*. Contractors are viewed as being expensive: *"The use of private contractors is truly very expensive."*

Table 25. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Interagency Cooperation/External Considerations.

From Question 2.12
The Overarching Principles should reflect consistent and robust federal responsibility for incidents on federal land. The incident management organization adopted by the NWCG needs to reinforce this responsibility. It is unacceptable for the federal agencies to hand over their responsibilities for land management (i.e. fire suppression) to state teams, contractors, or non-land management Federal agencies. Federal land management agencies have the skills and the responsibility for this role.
Keeping teams interagency in nature is essential in order to function properly in today's political climate. Not sold on NIMO concept. Support dropping Type 1 and 2 labels.
Also, AD employees are essentially contracted resources, no need for "Contract Teams".
4) One of the success stories is having a wide perspective that is created by interagency cooperation, including folks outside Federal, state and local governments.
2.10Teams are already interagency. And non-feds are truly limited because of their state-specific missions, so you're "pissin' up a rope" if you think you can change their partricipation for out of state.
Make IMT's accountable for all risk emergencies. Every team should have the training if deployed on an all risk incident. Teams from the West don't get training dealing with hurricains. My experience is that most of the Western Teams don't want those details either. FEMA training should be required and is most valuable when deployed.
IMT's should be focused on land management emergencies of the agencies - Fed & State they are organized from and managed by. They should not be primary responders for all risk that is FEMAs task. IMT's can be called on to assist in All Risk where their current skills can be used to support FEMA.
The use of expensive retirees (AD Hires)through local gov fire is hampering the agencies with getting people trained.
I don't understan why we continue to pay an insane amount of money to have a cooperator work on an IMT when you could invest the money into our own employees for training and have our own experts. That would save the government a ton of money. When I see the bills for these cooperators on the IMT's, I am ashamed as to who is controlling government spending. We continue to cut our own employees (training is cut for 2011 to only one course). Yet, we continue to pay these high fees for cooperators. I do think the IMT"s are very successful in what they do. They accomplish the mission needed to in a timely manner. The team members do need to be compensated for the job they do. Not sure what that woulb be, but it would encourage others to apply to.
The more teams made up of agency and cooperator personnel will allow for the greatest opportunity for people to become trained and actually perform in the function they are trained for. We may need to consider a limit to the number of years you can be on any given team in the same position. This would then free up more positions for new people to move towards and into. For years one of the complaints I have heard is that "I won't apply for a team it is just the same people that get the teams every year".
It is vital that a national interagency all hazards IMT policy, proceedure and coordinating be developed. A large portion of the present group of personnel will be retiering soon and there will be a need to have worked out the ability to surge forces at all levels to response to incidents of all hazards. The credentialling and qualifications issues need to be developed and settled quickly between agencies. This was the way the NIMS was supposed to work.
Contracting can provide surge capacity in greater than normal years. This approach supports an all-hazard, year around incident management program.
The make up of the teams need to include knowledge of policies governing the incident.
I feel that there is a huge need to link the DHS IMT effort with this push by the NWCG. I know that most federal NWCG organizations have thus far given little credit to local and state efforts to develop local Type 3 IMT's; however this is

perhaps one of the best answers to solving the personnel shortage issue which is at the heart of this IMO effort. I also find it interesting that there remains such a "federal" feel to this effort. A majority of the wildland fires in this country are in the SE United States and are managed by State Resources, not federal resources. The federal IMO structure is definitely the best model for the truly large fires of the western US, but resource limitations and a real need for cost containment makes this model impractical for the eastern and southeastern US, at least for local and state wildland response.The fact that this effort lists Responsiveness to Federal Fire Policy as an overarching principal speaks volumes on the real focus of this effort. Federal Fire is important, but what about the fire policy of State and to a lesser degree local government. This is probably where 75% of the national wildfire load is handled, yet we want to continue to push the federal emphasis. Until that mindset changes, there can really be little or no positive progress with this effort.
The use of private contractors is truly very expensive. The position I hold I chose not to use them and to run the unit wisely without the extra costed. The cost savings of not ordering a private contract trailer is at least 4,500.00 a day. During the last IMT meeting I listen to one leader stating they have a certain private contract trailer that gets ordered every time their team is activated. So why this additional cost? When I spoke with this unit leader in regards to running the unit with out the private contractor and showing the cost savings, the statement was, it was just easier having the private contractor there, no regards to the cost. My feelings are the unit leader are there to do there jobs they are assigned and being paid to do, not just order up a private contract trailer to do the work, yet the unit leader is still receiving full pay for not running the unit wisely with cost savings in mind.
Reasons for 5 Rating. 2.10. I worked as a PIO2 as a federal employee for more than 10 years, and since then as an AD for 5 seasons. I am the same person with the same skills and always have had positive evaluations for performance -yet attitudes toward me changed when I became an AD. While it is denied officially, a negative attitude toward ADs does exist. I would not call it prevalent, but it is serious enough to be detrimental to organizational effectiveness and morale. If staffing shortages are really an issue, there should be positive support for ADs, especially if experience and instutional memory is truly valued.
I find it interesting that this plan is concentrating on the federal employee aspect for positions descriptions and awards and really does not address the Local State entity that responds and is responsible for the daily lives and activities of citizens in our jurisdiction. At the Local and State level we respond to the majority fo the incidents are are responsible for the citizens under State Law, but this plan does not address that responsbility.
I personnally do not think that State Agencies are offered the opportunity to participate in the Type 1 & 2 level team to a great extent. The same training opportunities should be extended and funded to take advantage of the greater number of people in the east. No dedicated wildfire training facilities are located, to my knowledge, in the east - and relatively few teams are here to mentor trainees.
I think it is very importnat that you include non federal participation in the future IMOs. You will likely not have enough feds to do the work for average fire seasons for many many years,(NOT TO MENTION A 2008 SEASON) just look at the composition the California IMT's, the Washington IMTs, and to a lesser extent Oregon IMTs, heavy on other local agencies and AD's.
I think it's important to know that in today's world IMTs must be Intregrated with local government. A lot of money and effort has gone into training and qualifying local responders and we must use them for all the right reasons. I have been an ic in 3 geo areas, and responded as ic for almost 70 incidents and feel strongly about the above solutions.Best of luck
2.10 extremely important however it would not in all cases be considered contracted resources. in some cases cooperative agreements with a sponsoring agency can provide for such oversight. Mechinisms for interdepartmental compacting of Tribal partnerships in neighboring responsibility areas would be beneficial for actions that are not inherently federal.
IMT's should be truely interagency and individual agencies should not try to staff their own teams, example the state of Oregon currently has their own teams separate from federal agencies. I think joining forces would strengthen agencies relations, increase available IMT members and provide stronger teams.
3. My response to item 10 is based on the pre-requisite established by item 6. If item 6 changes, then my response to item 10 changes.4. I am sure the blunt nature of my comments will result in them being discounted, but the blatant Federal bias of this effort is disturbing.
Teams need to be truly Interagency, and local govt. team members welcomed. Yearly the federal govt. institutes more restrictions on using fully qualified local govt. individuals. Eventually local govt. will not be able to participate on teams.
2.10 Interagency Cooperation/External Considerations: Most important principal. Wildland fire is an interagency effort. Any model that does not include the input and participation of all the stakeholders will fail.
I have been most concerned by how FEMA has implemented ICS. The structure of ICS needs to be consistent. FEMA version of a division bears no resemblance to scale or scope of wildland incidents.
Don't make this 100% Federal. You have lots of Local and State folks who support teams.
While the overarching principles are laudable, failure to consider the impacts and implications to the remainder of the agencies involved in wildfire response will lead nowhere. None of the federal or state agencies can afford to have IMTs composed solely of fire-funded personnel, which is what the overarching principles strongly imply. Therefore, there will

be impacts to the other management functions of all the agencies. Continued reliance on ADs to fill holes calls into question the whole idea of firefighter retirement; it's clear that secondary firefighters retiring at age 55-57 are retiring too soon if they can continue to do their jobs quite adequately as ADs.
No one agency can suppoort heir needs internally. we should value and empbrace inclusivenss as we move forward.
I think it is always in the best interest of all of us to engage with our state and local cooperators as much as possible. When we do this the differences between us become less and we have a common operating picture which we can use to operate better. We do this now at the Initial and Extended Attack levels in alot of different geographic areas with great success, we could get much better at this at the Type 1 and 2 levels. A good model for this is the Interagency Type 3 teams we produce in Central Oregon that are comprised of FS/BLM, ODF, and local fire department members.
Principle 10 seems to contradict statements made under principles 4, 5, and 6. IFPM emphasizes operations skills to the exclusion of all other skills, exacerbating shortages in planning, logistics, and finance with no appreciable gain and some identifiable losses in the competency of the fire organization as a whole.
From Question 3.17
The inclusion of "State teams will still be governed by their respective states" reflects a lack of understanding of how IMT are supposed to function. Interagency IMT are that, share IMT between partners; federal and state. Working with the BLM and USFWS they understand the shared nature of the teams. However, the USFS treats the IMT as their own and that is reflected in this statement and the entire proposal.Maybe it is time for state agencies to completely withdraw from interagency IMT as this proposal seems to prefer.
From Question 4.08
MOST AD's are retired FEDERAL and they have worked hard to suppose/or be in fire. They AD's did they time but still want to stay in fire so they should have perference on fire just like a Fed employee. I think there should be different classification for AD's 1) on for RETIRED Fed's 2)Contractors or hired off the street. I am sick and tired of individuals referring to me as just an AD when I did 20 years in fire. NO I am NOT hired off the street but have a lot of knowledge and do not require anything but someone doing my travel when I get home. YES I like fire but I want to be in a classification call RETIRE FEDERAL WORKER

Table 26. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Interagency Cooperation/External Considerations.

On a related note, there is this. It is not stated specifically in the over arching principles or the models, but I think that all teams should respond to all risk incidents.
Interagency Cooperation/External Considerations: Absolutely, but take it a step farther. We need to expand our range of partners, particularly in areas that are not usually considered mission-critical. For example, why are we using people who are likely red-carded for multiple positions as DOCLs? Why not approach the National Archives and Records Administration about using their archivists as DOCLs? This would free up our current DOCLs to work in other positions and would accomplish the following for NARA: • It would save NARA personnel costs • It would expose archivists to real-time decision-making • It would expose archivists to a number of agency cultures • NARA would be assured that incidents are properly documented I would think most NARA field offices would appreciate saving a few weeks out of the personnel budget while providing their employees with worthwhile experiences and a shot at overtime. There are other possibilities as well: USGS for GIS, GSA for Supply, and PHS Commissioned Corps for Medical to name three. These may not work, but it is worth pursuing. If we can fill a few specialized positions through non-traditional agencies, it increases the pool of our available resources.
P10- Interagency cooperation/External considerations: See comments above.

Consistent Financial Practices

"All models will include consistent financial practices among Federal agency regarding charging base salaries to emergency accounts. Consistent practices for backfill will also be employed." (NWCG 2011a: 11)

Survey Question 2.11: *The model will include consistent financial practices among Federal agencies regarding charging base salaries to emergency accounts.*

Figure 39. Importance of Consistent Financial Practices.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Unimportant	29	3
Somewhat Unimportant	31	4
Neutral	130	15
Somewhat Important	301	36
Highly Important	356	42
Total:	847	100

Missing = 11

A majority of respondents (78%) rated this positively, selecting either *4-Somewhat Important* or *5-Highly Important* (Fig. 39). Only 7% of respondents said they felt this was an unimportant principle.

While *State Government/Fire* respondents rated this low and more neutral and *IMT-Type 3* respondents rated this more neutral, *Line Officers/Agency Administrator*s rated the value of consistent financial practices quite high (Figs. 40). Significant tests:

- *Organizational Level:* This reflected in the overall significance of distribution of responses (p=.0008), with *State Government/Fire* respondents significantly less positive and more neutral than expected.
- *Incident Qualifications:* A test of distribution based on the broad negative, neutral, positive groupings showed an overall significant difference, with *IMT-Type 3* respondents more neutral and *IMT-C&G* respondents less neutral than expected.
- *Agency:* The distribution of responses was significantly different (p<.0001), with *State* respondents more neutral and less positive and *NPS* and *BLM* respondents less neutral.

Figure 40. Importance of Consistent Financial Practices by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age Range.



The relatively few comments (Tables 27, 28) noted the importance of consistency, some citing continuing specific needs for state and local partners (back-fill potential: "*It is extremely valuable for our department to participate. However it is equally important that fiscal policies remain in place that allow us to cover backfill costs for those on IMT assignments. Any loss of this policy would completely remove us from the IMT or national response efforts*"), and others assisting DOI programs ("*this is a long time coming and will help to enable preparedness dollars in DOI fund Tribes and other DOI sponsored partnerships in achieving the future of wildland fire management*").

Table 27. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Consistent Financial Practices.

From Question 2.12
It's critical to have consistency between agencies. Othewise, people from differnet agencies aren't seen as 'equals'. It baffels me that the Forest Service (in the 5109) requires so much more training to be qualified for a position than the Dept of the Interior (310-1). Do Forest Service employees perform better in these positions than the 'lesser' trained DOI employees? I don't think so.
2.11 Pay for contractors/federal retirees needs to be close to what is paid for government workers; base hourly rate.
Require a warranted Contracting Officer on every team as Procurement Unit Leader (like in the past) they have authority hire, resolve claims, and approve, most financial issues. Buying Teams will not be needed (or a few micro purchaser could work for the PUL). Buying teams are not responsive or understand of needs of Teams, and expensive.
We need to get the cost of Contractors undercontrol, we pay way to much for there services. On Federal fires we need to have more Forest Service personnel to also help save cost.
I find it very difficult to sole source fund IMT's and NIMO teams when our federal deficit and budget constraints are in serious trouble. It seems fiscally irresponsible.
2.11 - May be too narrow to be an overarching principle, is this an incident business practice? Suggest a change to "Consisten Business Practice."
2.11 This might help bring in more state, county, city capacity. It seems differences in financial practices keep us from drawing in these folks.
Base Pay not being charged to the incedent might create problems on home units wich may lead to line officers not leting people be on teams.
All Federal agencies need to play by the same set of financial rules when it comes to charging base pay to incidents.
It is extremely valuable for our department to participate. However it is equally important that fiscal policies remain in place that allow us to cover backfill costs for those on IMT assignments. Any loss of this policy would completely remove us from the IMT or national response efforts.
2.11 this is a long time coming and will help to enable preparedness dollars in DOI fund Tribes and other DOI sponsored partnerships in achieving the future of wildland fire management.
Fiscal responsibility should include how state and local government employees fit into federal fiscal guidelines.
From Question 3.17
DOI AND USFS, MUST USE THE SAME MODEL OF FUNDING. HAVING THE FS COVER NORMAL ACTIVITIES FROM P CODES HAS TO BE ILLEGAL.
Financial support, contracting and personnel pay should be unified with a single accounting system across agencies. Personnel pay should be from dispatch to return (24 Hr) at set rates. Ovetime and payroll tracking could be minimized and financial records simplified and reduced. Current process is cumbersome, complicated and confusing across agencies and locations. A National Standardized system should be developed to handle finances and accounting for all incident types
No comments from 4.08

Table 28. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Consistent Financial Practices.

Ideas I fully support for selfish reasons: consistent financial practices among federal agencies regarding charging base salaries to emergency accounts.....it should not be done increase the number of NIMO Teams Regarding Cost: (I did not receive "Cost estimates in Appendix B of the Evolving Incident Management") Aviation - almost every fire's #1 cost is aviation. There has been many cost/benefit (some slanted) on the use of aircraft on fires and the bottom line the use of heavy helicopters and retardant planes other than for initial attack have had

little success. consistent practices for backfill.....one of many money draining scams that have been exposed and should come to an end Mega fires.....the $$$ spent on fires that will only end with a season ending event has become part of our culture.
Consistent Financial Practices: Sure, but Finance seems an area ripe for changes in SOPs, streamlining, and reducing burdens on both the Finance Section and other incident personnel. I do not know enough to offer constructive suggestions, but it does seem like attempts at innovation in this area are still wedded to the way we have traditionally done tasks and the assumptions underlying those traditions (paper red dogs lead to automated red dogs without questioning if there's a better way than red dogs).
P11- Consistent financial practices: The suggestion here is again Federal-centric. Teams function in many environments, the lack of finance personnel due to systemic changes has been a chronic problem. And state agencies all have their own concerns which can make managing state jurisdiction incidents challenging. The solution is more trained and available personnel.

Additional Comments on Overarching Principles

Several comments that were not assigned elsewhere are presented in Tables 29 and 30.

Table 29. Open-ended survey comments not assigned elsewhere.

From Question 2.12
In general, I support each of these principles. I do believe that the NWCG must strike an appropriate balance between consistency and flexibility, however. Standardized practices and approaches have their merits. So do localized adapatability.
Suggest another overarching principle - Minimizing Fixed Costs in Slack Season. (The model will minimize fixed costs and underutilized resources during seasons of low fire incidence)
*Missing one: Revisit current training and qualification requirements.
No comments from 3.17.
No comments from 4.08.

Table 30. Comments submitted to Gmail not assigned elsewhere.

Overarching Principles: Several comments address specific principles below. But there are some caveats that need to be noted up-front in this discussion. 1) The first is that most of this discussion is both Forest Service (FS) and fire-track centric. Admittedly, the FS has the bulk of the fire-fighting resources and is often (but not always) the site of most of the fire activity. But an increasing number of team-managed incidents are on other jurisdictions, and an increasing number of team and single resource participants come from state and municipal organizations, and may or may not be primarily employed in fire mgt positions. This is important in the larger context of potential team participation. 2) The FS is giving increasingly confounding direction as time moves on. Agency administrators are demanding ever greater paper support (WFDSS et al.) and are decreeing team behaviors that require additional fire (greater map products, public information, road management) and non-fire (Human resources, recycling, etc.) support. Then there is the direction that teams (and incidents) be streamlined and to try and be more cost effective. Make up your mind (or find a better way to articulate the goals). It seems that one side of the organization does not know what the other side is up to. This is one of the reasons people are not participating in teams; the mission is no longer to just put-out-the-fire (or more politically correctly-manage the fire to an advantageous conclusion). The traditional mission and sense of incident urgency has been obfuscated. 3) The most critical problem assumption is that any of the various team models can be supported in the future. There are simply not enough people currently involved from the various agencies to build the knowledge and experience base to support the current and proposed configurations.

Results—By Building Block

To facilitate analysis and interpretation, demographic response groups were collapsed as follows:

- *Functional Area: NIMO*, *Fuels*, *Non-agency Fire* were combined into *Other Fire*; those selecting *Dispatch* and with *No Incident Role* were combined into a new category of *Other*;
- *Incident Qualifications*: *FEMA/DHS* respondents were dropped from statistical analysis;
- *Organizational Level*: *Contractor* and *Other, no incident role* were dropped from statistical analysis;
- *Agency: USFWS* and *BIA/Tribe* responses were collapsed into a new *Other DOI* category; and
- *Age Range: Less than 21* and *21-30* were collapsed into a new category *Less than 30*.

Team Management

Team Management covers Team Governance, Number of Teams. Typing, and Role of various types of players and teams.

Survey Question 3.1 – Team Governance - *What is the best way to govern teams? (State teams will still be governed by their respective states.)*

Slightly more respondents suggested using a combination of Geographic Area and national involvement in team governance (37%) than those who suggested retaining the current Geographic Area structure (33%), though the status quo was a close second (Fig. 41, Table 31).

Figure 41. Number and distribution of responses forTeam Governance.



Table 31. Text provided as 'Other' choice for Team Governance.

Exact Comment
A new goverance, please see IAFC alternative.
Agency
Agency line officers, line to line.
all teams governed by single organization (which one doesn't matter)

All teams governed by the GACC's with strong direction from NWCG
All teams state included governed by GACCs with National Standards and Guidelines
Area teams by their customers National teams by their GACC
Current, fires are local regional or higher control will mess things up big time!
I select the 1st option- all interagency teams governed by NWCG- but see my Comment section regarding State ICT, which no doubt will have to remain under State jurisdiction, but MUST be required to rise to the level of Quals and Training of interagency teams. The reason being, that in today's fire and all-risk environment, the State ICTs will frequently be utilizing inter-agency resources, and functioning in an incident environment requiring multi-agency cooperation/communication/decision-making
Leave things the way they are
locally formed governed
National interagency coordinating group
NICC
NICC
NIMO
NIMO = NWCG, IMT's = GACG
only national teams, a combination of entities, no duplication of effort, national less specific, GACG more specific, may establish support comittees or groups; establish standards and ensure full compliance at all levels
Regional Foresters
Regional Teams governed by a common set of principles
same method as now.
T1 - NWCG T2- GACC
T1 - NWCG T2- GACC
Type 2 teams governed by GACG & Type 1 by NWCG.
We need to come together under one umbrella - state local and fed

The only significant differences in distribution of responses by demographic sub-groups (Table 32) were:

- *Functional Area: Fire* positions showed more preference.
- *Incident Qualifications*: There was a significant difference in responses, with respondents with no incident qualifications (*None)* indicating greater *No Preference* than expected.

Table 32. Cross-tabulations and significance of responses to Team Governance by demographic sub-group. [Note: Most frequent response is indicated by **bold**. Significant difference in distribution is indicated by * at end of Table title. Cell counts significantly higher than expected are in *italics*; counts significantly less than expected are also enclosed in *()*.]

(a) by Agency.

	BIA/ Tribe	BLM	Contractor	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Total
GACGs and NWCG	**12**	**53**	1	**33**	**32**	2	20	1	155	8	317
Governed by the GACGs	6	51	2	25	16	2	**27**	0	140	**13**	282
Governed by the NWCG	3	17	1	9	17	0	10	1	72	3	133
No preference	3	8	1	6	13	0	7	0	55	4	97
Other	1	4	0	2	1	0	0	0	55	0	19
Null	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	0	6	0	10
Total	25	134	5	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	858

(b) by Organizational level.

	Contractor	Fed-Local	Federal-National	Federal-Regional	Local Govt/Fire	No professional role	State Govt/ Fire	Total
GACGs and NWCG	4	**167**	**29**	**50**	**31**	13	23	317
Governed by the GACGs	**6**	156	19	42	27	5	**27**	282
Governed by the NWCG	4	86	9	12	10	3	9	133
No preference	1	63	5	10	7	4	7	97
Other	0	11	1	5	2	0	0	19
Null	0	5	3	0	0	0	2	10
Total	15	488	66	119	77	25	68	858

(c) by Functional area*.

	Dispatch	Fire	Fuels	LO/AA	NIMO	No role	Non-agency fire	Other agency	Other fire	Total
GACGs and NWCG	**18**	**125**	18	**36**	2	3	**24**	**61**	**30**	317
Governed by the GACGs	12	**125**	**23**	28	1	1	13	53	26	282
Governed by the NWCG	5	53	10	11	1	2	10	32	9	133
No preference	4	*(18)*	7	*17*	2	**5**	5	*29*	10	97
Other	1	8	1	3	0	0	0	5	1	19
Null	0	3	0	0	2	0	1	4	0	10
Total	40	332	59	95	8	11	53	184	76	858

(d) by Incident qualification*.

	FEMA/DHS	IMT-Type 3	IMT-IC	IMT C&G	None	Other	Total
GACGs and NWCG	2	**39**	**33**	**108**	**19**	**116**	317
Governed by the GACGs	0	34	31	106	10	101	282
Governed by the NWCG	0	16	7	34	10	66	133
No preference	1	12	3	20	11	*50*	97
Other	0	3	4	7	2	3	19
Null	0	0	0	4	1	5	10
Total	3	104	78	279	53	341	858

(e) by Age range.

	21-30	31-40	41-50	< 20	> 50	Total
GACGs and NWCG	**14**	44	**90**	0	**169**	**317**
Governed by the GACGs	3	**49**	88	1	141	282
Governed by the NWCG	5	21	44	0	63	133
No preference	3	21	31	1	41	97
Other	0	3	7	0	9	19
Null	1	1	3	0	5	10
Total	26	139	263	2	428	858

Comments suggested a combination of Geographic Area and national involvement in team governance because it would maintain the local ties yet also ensure greater consistency across the country (Tables 33, 34).

Table 33. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Team Governance.

No comments from 2.12
From Question 3.17
3.1 All teams managed by GACC following NMAC standards.
3.1 NWCG for teams dispatched under national and regional operating plans. for teams identified in local area operating plans and do not leave the local area, governance should deffer to the GACG to be managed in accordance with such plan. Special or unique circumstances identified in local area operating plans could affect the structure or area of concern for one or more partners signatory to such plan and GACGs have the responsibility to ensure appropriate coverage
3.1: NWCG will maintain more coherent standards/Requirements. If States/GACC's set standards, they will vary too much over time.
In general, I have a preference for 1) keeping decision making authority at the local level (in this case the GACCs) and 2) implementing change through existing structure as much as possible, hence keep the TI and TII model and GACCs. In my experience in the federal govt, implementing change through existing organizational structures seemed to work best.
No comments from 4.08

Table 34. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Team Governance.

The present system of governance works well. The GACCs need to retain control of their respective teams. It is important to the agencies/units that the teams from the Southwest be responsive to the needs of their local areas first. A local team ensures a higher level of familiarity with local fuel types, management issues, politics etc… then one from out of GACC. The national rotation triggered by scarcity and maintained by NICC to supply teams to areas when local capacity is exhausted works well and should be continued.
Before even addressing the IMOSP organizational models it must be stated that all GAC should encouraged and expand the use of Type 3 Teams. The Type 3 organization provides a local more cost effective alternative to fire management. It should be the first option and used when appropriate. Management has gotten away from using the type 3 organization in recent years. Type 2 teams are routinely dispatched to short duration fires that would be well suited for a Type 3 organization.
If we go to a national rotation please still use some closest resource concept. If I have a fire in California I do not want to wait two days for a team from the south east if there is a closer team in California, Oregon or Washington.

3.2 – Number of Teams - How many interagency Type 1 and Type 2 teams will we

The most frequent--but minority voice (39%)--suggested maintaining the status quo (Fig. 42). Those who prefer change were split between increasing or decreasing numbers, with a large proportion of respondents (22%) voicing *No Preference*.

Figure 42. Number and distribution of responses to Number of Teams needed.



There was a significant difference in distribution of responses by *Incident Qualifications* (Table 35): Respondents with no current incident qualification (*None)* were significantly more likely to select *No Preference* and less likely to select *45 (current number*).

Table 35. Cross-tabulations and significance of responses to Number of Teams needed, by demographic sub-group. [Note: Most frequent response indicated by **bold**; significant difference in distribution by * at end of Table title. Cell counts significantly higher than expected are in *italics*; counts significantly less than expected are also enclosed in *()*.]

(a) by Agency.

	BIA/ Tribe	BLM	Contractor	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Total
45 (current number)	**8**	**58**	2	**39**	**27**	1	**24**	0	**168**	**10**	337
Less than current	**8**	34	1	15	17	2	14	0	119	5	215
More than current	2	11	0	11	11	1	13	2	44	7	102
No preference	7	30	2	10	24	0	14	0	100	6	193
Null	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	8	0	11
Total	25	134	5	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	858

(b) by Organizational level.

	Contractor	Federal -Local	Federal-National	Federal-Regional	Local Govt/Fire	No professional role	State Govt/Fire	Total
45 (current number)	7	**191**	20	**44**	**40**	**9**	**26**	337
Less than current	3	125	16	35	14	6	16	215
More than current	3	53	8	12	12	2	12	102
No preference	2	111	**21**	27	11	8	13	193
Null	0	8	1	1	0	0	1	11
Total	15	488	66	119	77	25	68	858

(c) by Functional area.

	Dispatch	Fire	Fuels	LO/AA	NIMO	No role	Non-agency fire	Other agency	Other fire	Total
45 (current number)	**14**	**126**	**22**	**37**	2	3	**26**	**74**	**33**	337
Less than current	9	100	19	16	1	0	10	44	16	215
More than current	8	39	4	13	0	1	7	17	13	102
No preference	9	64	13	29	**4**	**7**	9	46	12	193
Null	0	3	1	0	1	0	1	3	2	11
Total	40	332	59	95	8	11	53	184	76	858

(d) by Incident qualification*.

	FEMA/DHS	IMT-Type 3	IMT-IC	IMT C&G	None	Other	Total
45 (current number)	2	**33**	**36**	**125**	(9)	**132**	337
Less than current	0	30	18	63	**17**	87	215
More than current	1	18	13	31	4	35	102
No preference	0	23	10	57	*23*	80	193
Null	0	0	1	3	0	7	11
Total	3	104	78	279	53	341	858

(e) by Age range.

	21-30	31-40	41-50	< 20	> 50	Total
45 (current number)	**12**	**46**	**111**	2	**166**	337
Less than current	5	**46**	72	0	92	215
More than current	2	13	24	0	63	102
No preference	6	32	53	0	102	193
Null	1	2	3	0	5	11
Total	26	139	263	2	428	858

Comments on this Building Block (Tables 36, 37) indicated that the ideal number of teams depends upon the fire season and that a final answer should be based on a specific study of needs *("do an analysis and plan for average bad year"*). One commenter noted that fewer teams and longer, larger fires are contradictory, while another noted that the number of teams should be reduced to meet succession planning goals.

Table 36. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Number of Teams needed.

From Question 2.12
This study speaks to how to organize the available qualified personnel, but could benefit from a parallel effort that looks at modernizing our qualification and certification system. The value of a single qualification system (merging T1 and T2) is that all IMOs are trained to the highest level and are capable of managing the highest complexity incidents. As the complexity of an incident waxes and wanes there is no need to adjust the type of team to match the complexity. This facilitates continuity in incident management and a reduction in mobilization/demobilization costs when switching between team types. I support and value the need for more "local" or "regional" IMOs, and believe that this need can be accommodated through governance and mobilization systems not team typing.
Team typing need to remain as is,
From Question 3.17
see 2.12 More teams less rotation esp Type 1. Teams standard rotation 3 weeks on 3 weeks off; minimum 3 week (21)day assignment/commitment.

With the number of State IMT Type 2 and 3 being trained and qualified I do not see the need for additional interagency teams.
The number of teams- a study needs to be done to ID how many teams we need and where they are located. To me this is basic info that is missing from this study. How can you say we need more or less when we don't know? We dont staff for the huge years on engines/crews, why would teams be different?
Type 2 teams - I think they are necessary and initially have the local knowledge to manage the incident at the Type 2 complexity level. I do think, however, that there are too many Type 2 teams organized. Depending on the GACC I am thinking 2 Type 2 teams per GACC where a few GACC's based on numbers of historic responses with a need 1 or 2 additional. This may be augmented by Type 1 or surge teams however.
To clarify my comments, I recommend having 10 perminent nimo type teams, 10 large type 1 IMT's and 25 type 2 IMT's.
Predicting how many Type 1 and Type 2 teams we will need is too subjective - there will never be enough teams if you have a fire season like 2008.
3.2- GACC's should set the number of teams that are needed.
TOTAL NUMBER OF TEAMS. Models 1 and 2 based on current situation have 57 Teams total. Models 3-7 have 49 or 45 Teams total. This contradicts concepts of more and longer fire events.
For "How many interagency Type 1 and Type 2 teams will we need?", do an analysis and plan for "average bad year".
3.2 Depends on the fire year! Use of teams has been low in the NW during the last two years.
3.2: 45 Teams need to be ready. In slow years 15-20 are fine; but with large Incidents becoming the norm. We need to be prepared with 45. This number could drop to 32 or so, if we went back to 21 day assignments.
he effectiveness and value of “standing T1 and T2 teams” should not be underestimated. However, being sustainable, flexible/scalable and cost effective are important factors as well.
Typing of 1 and 2 teams should be ended. Allow for IMT to run an incident with flexibility to the size needed, knowing that the team will be accountable for possible over staffing.
Our experience has been that many of the Type2 teams are better equipped to handle our local needs than the large Type1 teams and more approachable.
From Question 4.08
3) Less teams is viable if there is s realistic surge capacity with contract teams.
You might want to contract with an outside research organization (preferrably a university) to survey federal agency employees to determine the barriers to participation on fires (militia). Many of us want to participate in fire management (on incidents, recovery and restoration, and in other capacities related to fuels, prevention, and ecosystem restoration) but find we are either unwelcome or that needed training is unavailable to us. 420 has been a barrier for years and -- in spite of complaints -- NWCG has totally failed to address this barrier. There are other barriers that keep us out and they have little or nothing to do with pay. Get a competent survey done and you may find that you are your own worst enemy when it comes to sustaining fire participation among federal employees not paid by fire management.

Table 37. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Number of Teams needed.

Having done all of my fire time for the Federal Government in the Great Basin, let me address one thing as far as the future look of the IMT’s in this GACC. Currently there are six (6) type 2 IMT’s and 3 type 1 IMT’s. In what I have experience over the past say 10 years, I think that for the most part, you could get by with four (4) Type 2IMT’s and 2 type I IMT’s. Yes on occasion you needed more, but this is where the NIMO teams come in to play.
With a stronger commitment to developing small local Type 3 teams I feel we could effectively reduce the perceived number (45) of IMTs need to meet national demand.
How many interagency Type 1 and Type 2 teams will we need? A needs analysis for the number of teams needed in the nation was conducted several years ago. Fire seasons have changed significantly in the last several years. There needs to be a national needs assessment performed in order to have current data for a “basis for change.” This should determine the number of teams needed in the nation. We think that the total number of teams would be less than 45, but how much below, the needs analysis should determine. A survey of every agency with fire responsibilities also needs to be conducted to answer these questions: Is the issue really team configuration, lack of interest, supervisory support, or are there too few people in the system to support the needs of the wildland fire community? We do not feel that team configuration is the issue. We believe it is lack of interest, lack of supervisory support, and a changing philosophy within the younger workforce. Historically, some teams have been ordered so that the local unit can get priority resources they otherwise would not

be available to them. This practice must stop. If a unit has an incident and needs an additional resource (such as a helicopter or crews), they should not be forced to activate an IMT in order to become a high enough priority to get that resource. Recommend reducing the number of teams nationally to ensure viability and meet appropriate succession planning goals. Keep current team model that promotes efficiencies, effectiveness, and viability of structured long and short teams (if needed). This ensures a strong, viable, sustainable, and qualified organization.

3.3 – Team Typing - How should interagency Teams be typed?

Just under half of all respondents (47%) chose the status quo *Two Types of Teams*, while 40% chose *One Type of Team* (Fig. 43, Table 38). Fire personnel and ICs were more likely to support single type.

Figure 43. Number and distribution of responses to Team Typing.



Table 38. Text provided as 'Other' choice for Teams Typing.

Grouping (n)	Exact Comment
Three types (7)	1 2 and 3 with potential for variation.
	1,2, & 3
	2 types " Extended Attack IMT" (would cover current Type 3 and some Type 2 incidents), and "Complex Incident IMT" Would cover the rest of the current Type 2, and type 1 incidents).
	Consider adding a Type 3. I have worked with one on several occasions and it makes transitioning to a Type 2 or 1 easier
	Include Type 3
	keep type 1 and 2, formalize more type 3 teams
	T1 and T2 merged and include T3 teams in the mix.
	Type 1&2, type 3 critical
	Type 1,2,3 and fireuse/specialized
	Three types with greater emphasis on T3 teams.
Misc	Agency Decision
	Based on expected service in a given area. Type 1 Fire, Type 2 all risk, type 3 fire and earthquake, type 1 nuclear. This survey is highly skewed toward your own personal default of IMTs as the model. No creativity at all. Would you like it our way or our way is not a choice.
	configure to need!
	Dedicated NWCG teams (NIMO) + 25 select positions Type 1 - Type 2 teams core C&G + ad hoc leaders by GACC
	Define teams by "skill set", i.e. Suppression vs. Multiple Objective
	I think we need to retain a typing system, but that the system may need to be focused on factors other than the ones used by the present system.

	Identify Type 2 teams with Type 1 capability and use them for both type 1 and 2 incidents
	Make accomidations for the highly skilled/train Type 2 teams that could be used for those incidents more complex than a Type 2 but the low end of a type 1 in complexity.
	Modularize: # of people and skills based on fire complexity and objectives
	Need the short team option
	Need to move towards one type of team that can be scaled to whatever the incident is. Tired of the "distinction" of type 1 teams. Makes type 2 personell feel inferior.
	One type of team to replace T1, T2, T3, Fire Use, NIMO, etc.
	One type of team with multiple deputies or trainees depending on incident complexity.
	Scalable teams to meet complexity of the incident.
	Short Teams as well
	specialized FUMT
	The Wildland Fire Management Team is not mentioned as a possible team type. These teams have done a remarkable job of managing complex long duration fires at minimal cost.
	There is a difference between Type 1 and Type 2. It willl take awhile to get the entire system fully qualified at the Type 1 level. Type 3 teams are not being addressed at all here.
	Two teams but have IC's and Unit Leaders be qualified for both Type 1 and Type 2 incidents to facilitate quick and efficient transitions from Type 2 to Type 1 incidents and vice versa.
	Type 1 and 2 combined and specialized IMT for MMO fires
	Type 1 and Type 2 combined, but able to respond with IMT members qualiifed for the appropriate complexity
	Type positions, not teams
	Typed to the complexity of the incident, not typed to start with.
	Typing reflects IMT ability to handle different levels of complexity. It doesn't matter how you type teams--as long as the structure recognizes that some incidents are going to be highly complex and whatever team is assigned has better have the ability to handle the incident.

Statistically significant differences in response distribution include (Table 39):

- *Functional Area:* Respondents in a primary *Fire* position were more likely than expected to select *One Type of Team*. Those in *Other Fire* positions were more likely to select *No Preference* than expected.
- *Incident Qualifications*: Those in *Other* incident positions were less likely to choose *One Type of Team* and more likely to select the status quo: *Two Types of Teams*.

Table 39. Cross-tabulations and significance of responses to Team Typing by demographic sub-group.
[Note: Most frequent response is indicated by **bold**. Significant difference in distribution is indicated by * at end of Table title. Cell counts significantly higher than expected are in *italics*; counts significantly less than expected are also enclosed in *()*.]

(a) by Agency.

	BIA/ Tribe	BLM	Contractor	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Total
No preference	4	14	0	6	5	0	2	0	32	2	66
Null	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	3	0	6
One type of team	**10**	55	2	31	32	0	29	0	171	11	341
Other	2	8	1	3	4	0	5	0	16	0	39
Two types of team	9	**56**	2	**34**	**37**	4	**30**	2	**217**	**15**	406
Total	25	134	5	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	858

(b) by Organizational level.

	Contractor	Federal-Local	Federal-National	Federal-Regional	Local Govt/Fire	No professional role	State Govt/Fire	Total
No preference	0	41	5	10	7	1	2	66
One type of team	5	191	26	47	33	10	29	341
Two types of team	**7**	**238**	**27**	**56**	**33**	**13**	**32**	406
Other	3	13	8	6	3	1	5	39
Null	0	5	0	0	1	0	0	6
Total	15	488	66	119	77	25	68	858

(c) by Functional area*.

	Dispatch	Fire	Fuels	LO/AA	NIMO	No role	Non-agency fire	Other agency	Other fire	Total
No preference	4	15	8	6	1	2	2	17	*11*	66
Null	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	6
One type of team	15	***163***	18	34	**6**	3	18	57	(27)	341
Other	0	15	6	7	0	0	4	5	2	39
Two types of team	**21**	138	**27**	**47**	1	**6**	**28**	**103**	**35**	406
Total	40	332	59	95	8	11	53	184	76	858

(d) by Incident qualification*.

	FEMA/DHS	IMT-Type 3	IMT-IC	IMT C&G	None	Other	Total
No preference	0	11	4	14	9	28	66
Null	0	2	0	1	1	2	6
One type of team	0	**43**	***42***	125	20	*(111)*	341
Other	0	7	3	13	2	14	39
Two types of team	**3**	41	29	**126**	**21**	***186***	406
Total	3	104	78	279	53	341	858

(e) by Age range.

	21-30	31-40	41-50	< 20	> 50	Total
No preference	3	17	21	0	25	66
Null	0	1	3	0	2	6
One type of team	8	46	**114**	0	173	341
Other	0	8	11	0	20	39
Two types of team	**15**	**67**	**114**	2	**208**	406
Total	26	139	263	2	428	858

While *Two Types of Teams* edges out *One Type of Team* in frequency, there were many comments on both sides (Tables 40, 41). Those who responded with *Two Types of Teams* tended to base this on a view that there are real differences in complexity between the two type of fire, and these require different levels of experience. There is also a sentiment that a single-type of team will shift control away from the local level. Those who argued for a single type of team pointed to recent instances in which the types has been used almost interchangeably and to the only training difference being S520 (which some noted is difficult to get into). Another frequent comment about *Team Typing* urged NWCG and the IMOSPT not to forget the role and integration of IMT Type 3 teams in any discussion about IMTs.

Table 40. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Team Typing.

From Question 2.12
Calif, type 1 & 2 teams are nearly identical in capability, so make them same level.
Bring all teams to a type one level and cover all risk.
Typing of Type 1 and 2 teams should be eliminated.
Standardize required qualifications for team positions so type 3 teams have the same standards as type 2 and 1. There shouldn't be a difference in qualifications between teams as there is now. I.E. division boss on type 3 team may only actually be two single resource boss quals but not actually division boss. On a type 1 or 2 team, a division boss is actually qualified as a division.
From Question 3.17
Team typing (type 1 and 2 teams) plays an important role in managing incidents. Like it or not, some personnel are more experienced and qualified in this business than others. If you dissolve team typing, you have to hold all teams to the same standard. Given current difficulties staffing type 1 teams, likely this would mean downgrading all teams to

type 2 qualifications. If the Board believes that we no longer have incidents in this country that require type 1 skills, than this makes some sense. For my part, having worked for both type 1 and type 2 teams, I believe that there is a significant and important difference between the two that I'd like to see remain.
3.3 - Only have one type of team and use the Type 2 requirements. Get rid of S-520 and Type 1 PTB's
Teams should be one type -- T2s have been managing really complex incidents already so there isn't much difference. Their C&Gs might need a little extra brush up training if they are combined with T1s.
see the traditional team going away to very expensive NIMO teams. I also see Type 2 Sections Chief's not being able to put in for NIMO if that is the direction we go to. The only difference between Type 1 and Type 2 Sections Chiefs is 520, majority off all Section Chiefs who have been on teams/fires have more than made up for not going to a 40 hour class. I would think 5 years or more as a Type 2 Section Chief should be equivalant to those 40 hours of 520. Some Type 1 Section Chiefs think of 520 as the holy grail. Having been a Section Chief for 11 years, I would think that would make up for those 40 hours that I missed. There are a lot of militia who make up fire teams, those folks should be able to compete just as much as the fire funded folks. My big fear is that if it comes down to a Type 1 chief, or a Type 2 Chief, the Type 1 will always get selected. Years of experience should count for experience, a lot of Type 2 teams go out more than the Type 1 teams, and with the fire complexities that we have any more, the fires are a lot of the so called Type 1 fires. Keep it fair for everyone if we do go the NIMO route.
All teams should be a single type other than CGS positions all UL train to one level.
There should be no difference between type I and type II teams. Both types of teams end up working on both types of incidents eventually. Training should be the same for all team members to allow more consistency in training and equality in opportunities/ overlap and interchange of personnel on teams/ sharing of skills. Would also remove the "elitist" image of the type I teams versus the "lower" or "less skilled" type II teams.
- Incident complexity is highly variable - therefore Type 1 should be eliminated. Maybe more to HIGH complexity (current Type 1 and 2), MODERATE complexity (current Type 3), and LOW complexity. - The KEY to long term safe and efficient management of land
Type 1 and 2 could be combined into a single type. However, this would require the current Type 2 teams to be able to handle the additional complexities of the Type I level especially political and resource concerns that occur over and beyond just "suppressing the fire".
There has become very little distinction between Type 1 and Type 2, and both types of teams have become unwieldy and process driven (instead of situation driven).
3.3 One type of team, Type 1 is a long team with ~45 positions, Type 2 is a short team with ~30 positions.
The typing of IMT should be such that each can slide to the lesser type or rise to the higher type. There should not be a hard line between the Type 1 and Type 2. Type 1 teams should be able available and ready to function in the upper gray area of a type two incident.
SINGLE STANDARD. If NIMOs are"Type 1" will the Single Standard be "Type 2"? This would mean in effect two types.
OTHER CRITICAL NEEDS. NWCG needs to address projected demands for Type 3 Teams (NWCG meaning), and associated development and succession– ICs in particular. Other critical positions that are often in short supply should be indentified for larger developmental strategy: fireline EMTs, safety officers, fireline paramedics, etc.
3.3 I freelanced for a number of year. There can be a huge difference between one Type 2 team and and another. Some are great, others can be pretty low functioning. If you meld Type 1 & 2 teams together, how do you match a team with fire complexity?
3.3 Type 1 2 and 3. Type3 local partnership team members comprise the initial team to expedite information collection based on long term knowledge of the actions across multi-jurisdictional boundaries. would be comprised of agency, tribal and local government, volunteer fire departments, fire safe councils, etc. Teams unique to local situations. as fires get more more complex and resources become available, these become expanded type 3 teams. Expandable type 1 and 2 team modules would be available as management action support expansion is needed.
We need to keep type 1 and type 2 teams distinct. Type 1 teams come in with a big cast of characters, which they need for large, complex incidents. My wildfire mgmt. team is a small (12 person) team, with several alternates in most C&GS positions. We grow and contract as needed. That's what you need, not rigid standards.
3.3: Combine Type 1+2 teams. In 25 years of ICS functions, I see NO difference between the abilities of a Type I C+G, verses Type II. Mostly, it has just become a class distinction. The argument was always about political-social issues. That is what Area Command is for...
CA state teams are equal (at best) to CA type 2 teams. They are 90-95% CDF. So I don't think they are interagency teams in the sense that Type 1 and 2 teams are.
1) Maintain team type configurations to account for cadre experience, knowledge and incident complexity
3.3 I think the T1- TII distinction still is practical.
We need analysis to determine the number of teams we need. We should not base this on historical needs, there should be solid analysis and cost benefit to determine a range of numbers.

If teams were typed alike and a good needs annalysis was completed, I think we would find we have more then enough teams. Type II teams would need to be certified like Hotshot crews - by NIMO?
3.3 How should interagency Teams be typed? Support organizational model to collapse Type 1 and Type 2 teams into a single type of team. Type 1 teams are already on a year-round rotation and this should not change with the implementation of single typing. Restructure S-420 and S-520 courses into one course which would result in substantial savings. Design the course to include complex scenarios incorporating interaction between all sections to include leadership and advanced skill levels. Bump up the Type 2 skills without "dummying down" the Type 1 skill levels.
3.17 -How many interagency Type 1 and Type 2 teams will we need?A needs analysis for the number of teams needed in the nation was conducted several years ago. Fire seasons have changed significantly in the last several years. There needs to be a national needs assessment performed in order to have current data for a "basis for change." This should determine the number of teams needed in the nation. We think that the total number of teams would be less than 45, but how much below, the needs analysis should determine.A survey of every agency with fire responsibilities also needs to be conducted to answer these questions: Is the issue really team configuration, lack of interest, supervisory support, or are there too few people in the system to support the needs of the wildland fire community? We do not feel that team configuration is the issue. We believe it is lack of interest, lack of supervisory support, and individual lack of interest, and a changing philosophy within the younger workforce. Historically, some teams have been ordered so that the local unit can get priority resources they otherwise would not be available to them. This practice must stop. If a unit has an incident and needs an additional resource (such as a helicopter or crews), they should not be forced to activate an IMT in order to become a high enough priority to get that resource. Recommend reducing the number of teams nationally to ensure viability and meet appropriate succession planning goals. Keep current team model that promotes efficiencies, effectiveness, and viability of structured long and short teams (if needed). This ensures a strong, viable, sustainable, and qualified organization.
From Question 4.08
Ideally eliminating the difference between T1 and 2 teams sounds good but there will be more IMTs available under the status quo due to the lack of available personnel that are capable at the T1 complexities. It's probably best to keep the best and most experienced IMTs on the most complex fires.
I think it would be good to do away with Ty 1 versus Ty 2 teams. However, there is an experience level needed for some fires, which requires more skilled folks that generally are on a Ty 1, so how is that resolved?
T1/2 teams need to stay separate for size flexibility and maintaining coverage for number type of incidents of incidents. This is also a learning process through incident complexity.

Table 41. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Team Typing.

I have seen virtually no information as to the current status of the Type 1 & Type 2 teams. I have not seen a single independent study referencing any of the "succession" issues mentioned. I would think that needs assessments/analyses would be good start. Not speculation, not opinion from the top management, but actual factual information as to what is working and what is not working; and more importantly…why it is not working. Most of that information would come from team clients not team members.
• The factors/issues I see for the existing Type 1 & 2 concept are fairly clear: • There is no logical argument to maintain Type 1 & 2 and NIMO team segregated standards. An IMT should be able to manage an incident. If they can't, then there is a problem with a particular team. • While an argument could be made for full-time team members there is little substantial fact to back it up. Incidents are varied and spread out over a full year. However, incidents that rise to the level of "national" are few and far between other than during fire season. And during the vast majority of fire seasons not all Type 1 teams are engaged. • If you were to combine Type 1 & Type 2 teams into simply IMT's, that would virtually eliminate the occasional season where there would be a need for additional incident management. Keeping teams on the board year-round on a rotating basis would maintain IMT available. • NIMO teams draw budget dollars year-round when those same dollars could/would be far more effective in helping some of the more pressing issues experienced by IMT's (i.e. lack of training and travel budgets). Reviewing an independent "Cost-Benefit" analysis of the NIMO program would be interesting. • Many non-fire employees are not supported by their supervisors. The vast majority of employee's time is spent in day-to-day job responsibilities, and those responsibilities take priority over incident team participation. So the employee gets frustrated if the team gets called out but they are told they can't go by their supervisor. Why would

that employee what to maintain that level of frustration? • Local budget money is required for team training and travel. The teams have state and/or national level responsibilities but local budgets are saddled with funding those activities. If you combine Type 1 & 2 teams and they handle state/national level incidents, then they should receive their own team level funding stream for training/travel activities. Eliminating NIMO teams could provide that funding stream while improving the overall national response capability by increased number of national level teams.
Yes, you probably could have one type of team. Many of the type 2 teams are conducting the same function as a type I.
I like the idea of merging/collapsing the Type I and Type II team designation into a single type of team. I think fire IMTs (and all risk IMTs) can mage incidents with just one top level team designation. I do not think we would lose anything in terms of team strength, skills and capabilities to do the job.
I like the idea of merging/collapsing the Type I and Type II designations into a single type of team.
One of the better solutions you have stated is to do away with the Type 1 and Type 2 team nomenclature. If you think back, and I can over my career, almost any current Type 2 team is handling fires and all risk assignments that years ago were only assigned to a Type 1 team. But now days, many of the C&G positions are or were made up of older Type 1 managers but just got tired of the political BS and inflated egos that many times goes with the Type 1 teams and moved back down to a type 2 IMT. I truly believe that you could effectively do away with this type of nomenclature and have just one type of team. Just call it a fire management team or what ever may suit the need for a name. So, to me, the single standard IMT could work very effectively. But, I don't see you being able to staff or have available 20 NIMO teams or the sub staff to support them. You may need a couple more NIMO's, but 20, be realistic. Where are you going to get people to support that many teams? I don't really believe you will. You may get another 3 or 4 NIMO teams to be staffed but I don't believe you will get 20. And then, where are you going to get the sub staff to support the NIMO teams. You have to think further than just the C&G on those teams.
Collapsing the typing of teams seems to be a significantly hazardous proposal. The safety ramifications seem obvious and rationale for collapsing is unclear. Maintain the typing of teams.
With any of the organizational models we should retain the distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 teams. Generally either type of team can run the majority of fires that occur over a season. However, there are those seasons when fires occur which are highly political that will need the seasoned IC and experienced team. Granted this is more the exception then the norm.
How should interagency Teams be typed? Support organizational model to collapse Type 1 and Type 2 teams into a single type of team. Type 1 teams are already on a year-round rotation and this should not change with the implementation of single typing. Restructure S-420 and S-520 courses into one course which would result in substantial savings. Design the course to include complex scenarios incorporating interaction between all sections to include leadership and advanced skill levels. Increase the Type 2 skills without "dummying down" the Type 1 skill levels.

3.4 – NIMO/NIMO-like - *How many Teams should be NIMO or NIMO-like (full time teams composed of Command and General staff and funded out of wildland fire emergency funds)?*

While the *None* category seems to dominate (Fig. 44, Table 42), 20% of respondents suggested *Other*, often a percentage of all teams, or number or percentage for each Geographic Area. When these are re-classed and options that include *NIMO or NIMO-like* teams are summed together, there is actually a more even split: none = 44%; some (A*ll*, H*alf*, A*t Some Level*, and C*urrent*) = 38%.

Figure 44. Number and distribution of responses to Number of NIMO/NIMO-like teams.

a. As reported.



	All	Half	None	No preference	Other	Null	Total
Number of Responses	50	135	369	119	168	17	858
Percent	6%	16%	43%	14%	20%	2%	100%

b. Re-classified



	At some level	No preference	None	Null/Other	Total
Number or responses	322	120	376	40	858
Percent	38	14	44	5	100

Table 42. Text provided as 'Other' choice Number of NIMO/ NIMO-like.

Grouping (n)	Exact Comment
1-4	3
	3
	3 two in the west 1 in S.E.
	two or three
	1
(2)	2
4-8	4 to 6 max
	4-8 teams
5-10	5
(6)	5
	6
	6 NIMO + at least 1 Type 2 per state
(3)	7
	8
	A few (4-10)
	One per region
(3)	~10 NIMO teams
(2)	10 or less

	Ten teams seems about the right number. This would allow for at least one in each region. This should also eliminate the need for area command teams and those duties would be absorded by the perminent teams.
	less than 6; used for long term assignments; may not need any if FEMA continues to increase it's management of incidents other than fires.
<10	one for each region
	12
5-10	0.1
>10	0.1
10%	Limited Amount based on number of IMT teams total. e.g. 1 team for every 10 IMT groups.
	10 %
	less than 25% NIMO or NIMO like
	0.2
< 25%	1/4th the # of teams
	fourth
25% (6)	0.25
33%	one-thrid NIMO IMTs
	approx 30% - build capacity on SMALL fires/non-fire forests and to oversee long term incidents
(3)	0.3
	less than half
	Some, but less than half
< 50%	A few. More than none, less than half.
	25%-33%
	Fewer than half
	Less than half. Seems like a huge accountability issue is what NIMO does when not assigned. Probably the idea of detail for season duration is most efficient. Some years there is very little fire.
	something less than half seems appropritate
	Half BUT ONLY IF they gets some better guidance. NOT what they are now
	more than half
50%	1 for each geographic area
>50%	1 or 2 from each GACC of each type.
1-2 per GACC	1 per GACC
	1 per GACC - assigned to the GACC
	2 in each GACC
	At least 1-2 teams per GACC
	One for each GACC
	One for each geo area would be max. Need to clarify what teams do, how they fit in the whole picture, and where they are going in the future. Without extensive time spent laying this out, the model will not succeed.
	one NIMO per GACC
	One per geographical area (e.g. USFS Region, GACC or other logical geographical boundary)
	two for each Geographic area
	One per GACG to have a dedicated, up-to-date, ready-to-roll team that can provide leadership to other IMT's but with their primary focus as a high-performing team
Current 4	4
(6)	4 Nationaly
	4 with changes
	about the current level of nimos
(8)	Current 4 NIMO Teams
	Current number is apporprate
	Current number of 4 seems to work well
	Current number of NIMO Teams is fine.
	est. one to cover every two GACC's.
	Keep NIMO as is, do not have full time IMTs other than NIMO.
	Keep the same amount of NIMO teams. No full time IMT.
	NO more than what you have now.
	Not sure the correct number but current number seems about right
	Only a small % (4-5)
	retain current number only
	retain what we have
	THe 4 we have currently and maybe the other 3 that were part of the original plan, but no more until we can determine whether or not they are helpful in the overall picture.
	The current number of NIMO teams is enough.
	There is value to NIMO but not a set #. keep as is but utilize more
	Wiht current NIMO teams, still getting their roles , outside of Incident Managemnent, refined and determined by

	Agency Leads, I find it difficult to support a theme of adding additional NIMO teams at this time, or even in the near future. I do believe there is a role for the exixting teams (best explained to me as the Operational Branch of the WO FAM, USFS. That concept along with Incident Mgmt, I can buy into, for the 4 existing teams, adding more , cant see the need.
	Current 4 OK
	current 4 teams in current 4 quadrants of country. NIMO team concept is a good one, and the recent use I have seen of them as working on an some incidents as advisory/training role seems to be good use of their full-time position (if they are diplomatic and truely helpful, with clear roles)
	current and add some Type 2's
	around 4 to 6 NIMO teams that would combine with IMT's on particularly complex or political incidents.
Depends	Dependent upon Section 2 choices
	depends on need and budget
	Depends on other duties to have full time workload
	based on number of fires in average year keeping the team 75% on incident
	HOW MANY CAN BE FUNDED
	The number should be justifiable based on analysis of cost, use, etc.
Few	a few
	as few as needed to meet 'off season' demand
	few
	Only a few
GACC	Scaled to meet the needs of the geographic area
	GACC should determine
Minimal	Very few
	minimal amount
	Minimal.... what else do these teams do?
	As few as possible
Most	Most
None	Get rid of NIMO and use current teams
	NIMO too expensive for resulting benifit.
	no need for nimo teams
	None and get rid of NIMO!
	None or having an actual full team that doesn't just order another team to fill their positions.
	None, should be geographically determined.
	The NIMO as configured is worthless and more expensive. They can't do anything without support from a team. Stand up a solid interdisciplinary team that can start dealing with an incident while more resourse are being ordered. At least you have the infrastructure to manage and people that have worked together before. About 30 people with additional support modules to ramp up to the mega incidents. These have to be All Hazard [not just wildland fire. This is a national problem not just NWCG.
	The NIMO teams I have seen have been horrible
Some	1/8: we can't afford more
	Some
	some should be full time, don't know the number
	some, based on an analysis of need
Special Need	A few "Teaching Teams"
	Ad Hoc members to mentor
	Command and general staff plus unit leaders.
	Core Team type, fire or militia qualified agency folks
	DOI and FS Teams, that could do Serious Accident Investigation, national training, and all hazard incidents
	no pref on #; use to train teams up to Type 1 skill w/ shadow assignments
	Research Need
Misc	Agency Decision
	as needed, depending on need for these teams over last 10 years
	Either all or none.
	Fire funds should not bear brunt of All-Risk IMT's
	How many full time year round teams do we really need? Can we afford them?
	Need to evaluate proof of concept of NIMO to determine how well the 1st objectives have been met.
	Nimos need to be more flexible and provide more than 'oversight'
	segrrgation of teams will be counterproductive
	State is not set up to have NIMO teams work on assignments
	Type 1 and type 3 teams that morph int the appropriate type 2 team structure when needed
	Unsure of the number, yet I would put additional duties on the teams, i.e. training responsibilities in the off season.
	Whatever the baseline demand is to keep teams busy
	Why full-time really needed?

There were significant differences in distribution of responses among the following demographic sub-groups (Table 43, Note: The tables show the full results; statistical tests were run on the re-classed and collapsed three categories.):

- *Functional Area:* Respondents whose bulk of their day-job responsibilities lay in *Fire* were more likely than expected to want no NIMO teams, and those with no professional responsibilities with incident management in their day job (*None)* were less likely than expected to want no NIMO teams. Respondents in *Fire* functions were also less likely, and *Line Officers/Agency Administrators* were more likely to have *No Preference*.
- *Incident Qualifications*: Type 1 and Type 2 Incident Commanders (*IMT-IC)* and Command and General Staff (*IMT-C&*G) were less likely than expected to select *No Preference*, and those with no incident qualification (*None)* were more likely to select *No Preference*.
- *Agency:* Significant differences in responses (p=.0001) appeared only in the proportion of *No Preference* responses: *Other DOI* respondents were more likely than expected and *USFS* respondents were less likely to have *No Preference*.

Table 43: Cross-tabulations and significance of responses to Number of NIMO/NIMO-like Teams by demographic sub-group. [Note: Most frequent response indicated by **bold**; significant difference in distribution by * at end of Table title. Cell counts significantly higher than expected - *italics*; counts significantly less than expected enclosed in *()*.]

(a) by Agency.

	BIA/ Tribe	BLM	Contractor	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Total
All	4	7	0	4	6	1	3	0	25	0	50
Half	0	14	0	17	15	1	7	2	74	5	135
No preference	**8**	18	0	17	18	0	4	0	47	7	119
None	**8**	**67**	**4**	**27**	**28**	1	**36**	0	**187**	**11**	369
Other	5	28	1	8	12	1	14	0	95	4	168
Null	0	0	0	2	1	0	2	0	11	1	17
Total	25	134	5	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	858

b) by Organizational level.

	Contractor	Federal-Local	Federal-National	Federal-Regional	Local Govt/Fire	No professional role	State Govt/Fire	Total
All	0	30	5	6	5	1	3	50
Half	3	74	12	16	16	6	8	135
No preference	1	72	5	15	17	4	5	119
None	**7**	**205**	**25**	**59**	**28**	**9**	**36**	369
Other	3	99	17	22	8	5	14	168
Null	1	8	2	1	3	0	2	17
Total	15	488	66	119	77	25	68	858

(c) by Functional area.

	Dispatch	Fire	Fuels	LO/AA	NIMO	No role	Non-agency fire	Other agency	Other fire	Total
All	1	19	5	9	1	0	0	11	4	50
Half	**12**	40	9	16	1	**4**	7	33	13	135
No preference	7	31	9	23	1	3	7	30	8	119
None	10	**166**	**24**	**33**	0	3	**25**	**65**	**43**	369
Other	9	73	12	13	**4**	1	12	40	4	168
Null	1	3	0	1	1	0	2	5	4	17
Total	40	332	59	95	8	11	53	184	76	858

(d) by Incident qualification.

	FEMA/DHS	IMT-Type 3	IMT-IC	IMT C&G	None	Other	Total
All	0	5	9	12	1	23	50
Half	1	26	4	47	7	50	135
No preference	1	22	3	21	19	53	119
None	0	**38**	**45**	**126**	**18**	**142**	369
Other	1	12	16	66	7	66	168
Null	0	1	1	7	1	7	17
Total	3	104	78	279	53	341	858

(e) by Age range.

	21-30	31-40	41-50	< 20	> 50	Total
All	0	10	15	0	25	50
Half	**8**	23	41	1	62	135
No preference	5	22	36	0	56	119
None	7	**58**	**119**	0	**185**	369
Other	5	22	50	1	90	168
Null	1	4	2	0	10	17
Total	26	139	263	2	428	858

Comments in support of full-time teams focused primarily on the resolution this brings to the tension between day-jobs and home unit workloads and fire assignments, and on the opportunity to focus these teams on training, mentoring, and coordination activities (Tables 44, 45). Respondents were particularly interested in some full-time teams if team members were located on local units and the teams were assigned to a Geographic Area and accountable to local Agency Administrators.

The main concerns expressed were the cost and work-load; in particular, respondents questioned whether there was sufficient work to keep them busy, and if so, what would they be tasked with and by whom. This highlighted the lack of familiarity with how current work assignments are determined and whether and how they assist the fire program. Considerable skepticism was voiced over how full-time teams manage incidents, particularly concerning cost effectiveness. A number of respondents wondered about the potential for keeping costs down if a 'core team' (additional NIMO, or short-teams) would be expected to order a Type 2 team in order to function. Other concerns were that full-time teams may crowd out opportunities for others, increase specialization and stove-piping instead of seeking to broaden participation by non-fire staff, and eliminate the value of integration and connection with other disciplines and the field created by having a local day-job.

Table 44. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Number of NIMO/NIMO-like.

From Question 2.12
I support a dedicated team to a degree that they provide some functional work when not on fire. I have always found that the attitude of a slow fire year repulsive when personnel state "I need fire time to buy a new pickup"or something similar. It's also the same with our budgets when managers state "lets hope we can save some money and get a fire assignment or 2". Most people are only in it for money and most people on fire now sit around in camp and support the few that are actually building line or fighting the fire. Expectations of firefighting camps has greatly added to the costs. It really is a time to think about better models and costs. A lot of actions don't get completed when people leave on fire assignments or more falls on the shoulders of others remaining at the units who don't go on fire.
NIMO is a waste of time and resources. Farm them out or create a few new T-1 Teams. Nobody can really figure out their role, and they are not sure of it either. Let's do something that works, and utilize the resources for more than busy work or attending training they don't need just to stay busy. These folks could be core players on multiple new T-1 Teams, providing a lot more 'all risk' coverage and being a known commodity, not some "who the hell do they work

for?" outfit that shows up without a clear mission or purpose, but just because they are available and need to appear busy.
They need to remember they work for the unit and should be following that land managers direction for fire management. Sorry to say, but I don't believe the current NIMO teams meet the needs of an incident and land based units. They (NIMO) are giving the impression they are there to save the world and the unit should do as they want and they don't come with much to offer other than high paid advice. An IMO needs to be built within the local units and not some big national group that is above the the people they serve.
The NIMO Team concept is good in theory, but they are not fully staffed. The NIMO team then "steal" other command and general staff and make up another team (that does not make sense) Hire the NIMO members as Ad Hoc members that are available to "Float" across the Nation and mentor new recruits.
I do not support more "paid off the top" NIMO's, for the simple reason that we cannot afford them. Can't fathom how we would support 16 more NIMO's like we are with the four we now have. Do not think their mission has ever been clearly defined in first place.
Going to more NEMO teams will eliminate the training of the next generation of IMT's . I see no way that NEMO teams will allow the most people to practice and utilize their IMT skills when 20 of the teams will have very little or very slow turnover.
I have yet to see a cost/benefit analysis done on the NIMO teams, and have yet to really see their benefit to the IMT organization. NWCG may want to reconsider the existance of NIMO teams, and verify if there is a true need for them.
Pacific Northwest Team 2 does not feel that that the NIMO model is tested enough to warrant expansion of the current teams.
I support a blend of permanent full-time and call-when needed teams.
Glad to see the term "NIMO" dropped - too much baggage with this.
20 NIMO teams is not realistic.
Strong consideration must be expended to phasing out NIMO and using the funding the current resources to support current teams. Full time ICs to recruit,train and manage teams will result in a much more cohesive IMT program and stronger resilient teams.
I had the chance to watch a NIMO team take over a fire from my team 2010 and the waste that they had was unreal to me. The fire budget blew up in size by having a NIMO team show up and take over the fire. I saw alot of money wasted with them.
NIMO has been nothing but a personal insult, implying they will do it safer/smarter/cheaper.
NIMO is not the answer
NIMO teams haven't met objectives of what they were proposed to provide. Use money and effort in other ventures.
From Question 3.17
Taking money out of fire and adding it to this NIMO model is a cost. If we have that kind of money available, let's distribute it to the units where it will do the most good. Additionally we do not have the personnel to handle the personnel actions we already have, how are we going to process all of these additional actions.
AND GET RID OF THE WORD NIMO! That word has the connotation of being highly paid and doing nothing but getting in the way. They promise to help with training, yet they never have been available for the dates they promise, they arrive at incidents they are not invited to and stand around looking for work and getting in the way until the incident IC has to tell them directly to leave - it was not their fire! A NIMO PSC gave one of the worst operational briefings I have ever seen - T3 PSCs do better. I'm not impressed by NIMO. Call it Core Team, call it C&G only, don't call it NIMO. NIMO to many fire people means -- high paid do nothings!
No NIMO teams as they are just as expensive and to date has added no value to the IMT program.
3.4 Will need to make sure people not on teams will still get C&G training opportunities and non team memebres can be qualiifed in C&G positions.
Considering the fire seasons of 2009 and 2010, How many days were NIMO teams deployed on wildfire incidents? I do not think we should create a new, expensive stove pipe fire command organization based on the busy seasons of 2000-2007.
We have failed as an whole by allowing AD's, Contractors and now NEMO to play such a big part of our program. You fail as an indidual if someone does not know what you know. We waste millions of dollars on NEMO just in travel alone. "it is a junkit" playing in the shadows. We need to get thoes dollars on the ground in prescribed fire, that alone will reduce the need for IMT's by providing the resources we manage on the ground with RX fire and fuels projects. Don't stovepipe this anymore. We are land managers not a fire department!!
Creating more NIMO teams and cliques is not a solution for long-term IMT development.

NIMO was developed to respond to national emergencies (typically other than wildlfire). They are expensive ... crowd-out opportunities for others to dedicate/participate time, enegery and expertise as IMT members (A NIMO IMT managing a 'resource benefit fire in NW Colorado!???) ... These teams are only only associated with wildfires --- other agencies have evolved to address the "national incident" storm, security and earthquake/volcano emergencies. NIMO has now become an orphan looking for a handout and a home!
I'd suggest getting rid of the NIMO teams who have never really found their Niche in the organization, use that money, and keep those details employeed with that money.
I'm concerned about reducing budgets so to set up "standing IMT armies" fudned year round may not be sustainable.
The nimo team already shows how much money we waste on small team during slow fire seasons. The way that we been doing business in the past is the way to go. If you are on a type one or two team, that means you want to do this. Its not about money it what you want to do.
I think the NIMO teams are an excellent example of a idea that has turned into a huge waste of government spending. It stripped many of the existing teams of C&G and they have been on exercises to justify their existence ever since. This has been a poor choice for them and for the agency. I do not believe that the liability for the local Line Officer/Agency Administrator would justify the use of Contract Teams. The local unit would always be responsible for doing "damage control" after the fact.
A NIMO approach would be nice but is there enough workload for full time employment?
I realize that fire is the emphasis in this survey, but my choices are also guided by this same need in all hazard. I also think that having full time modules is a waste of money.
Get rid of NIMO. They cost too much and don't actually do anything. Has anyone ever done a cost analysis on these Yahoos and their travel budgets? what a joke, worthless!
Not a big fan of NIMO, need more local and regional participation, use NEMO for All-Hazard and mega-fires.
NIMO could take on responsibility for training;
NIMO IC and IMT IC grades should all be GS13. Structure pay tied to responsibility would both encourage participation and development; Create a maximum pay for each position per day, regardless of assignment or duration. Eliminate portal to portal pay, special pay rates/policies for certain states etc. The incidents will balance out over time in terms of complexity, which alleviates the pay question.
NO MORE NIMO!!!!! HUGE waste of money and resourses.....
There is a need for full time NIMO like teams but not all IMTs should be full time. If the majority of teams became NIMO like then there would be a disconnect between fire and all federal agencies which would eventually lead to a stand alone fire service which most federal agencies cannot afford.
I do not see any benefit for full time, stand alone IMTs (like NIMO.
No NIMO this is a waste and paying for people doing noting. Bring back that all employees have some form of fire duties.
And we do need permanent IMT C&G's who are assigned to each region of the country who have incident management as their primary function. I know a lot of people don't like the NIMO model, but if it was implemented as originally intended, and was assigned a dedicated geopgraphic region to operate as a team for that region, it would be a lot more valuable and palatable.
NIMO and Area Command functions are overlapping. Pick one or another. NIMO role is still confusing and not worth the expenditure. Money would be better served in presuppression adding to IA capacity.
Can we reward actively engaged programs by offering additional position support rather wasting money staffing NIMO teams year round? The field needs help and the NIMO teams provide non of this. If we are to stick with the NIMO team concept have those positions work in several field loactions at locally busy times to support the work getting done on the ground.
Lastly I believe NIMO had some merit, but not how they are currently being used - what is the point of ordering a NIMO team when the first thing they order is a Type 2 team - we can do that with a Type 3 team. They should at minimum have a core command and general staff and then an assigned roster like every other team - or do away with them.
Why the shift to dedicated teams instead of making it easier for other employees to assist. I do not feel an active move to engage militia. It strikes me that this is simply a move for a professional group of IMT's with an effective use of about 6 to 7 months a year. Not cost effective in my mind.
I'm not clear on how using emergency suppression accounts to fund permanent full time positions (NIMOs and other proposals) isn't contrary to our efforts to contain and track costs of incidents, except where they are doing work for that incident.
NIMO needs to go away. they have no place and have never done any effective incident management, only spent an enormous amount of money that could be better spent at the local level.
Create a NIMO type team in every Region (or GACC) with the reponsibility to provide coordination and mentoring to the

C&Gs on the IMTs in the respective regions. The NIMO type teams should promote standardized protocols throughout the regions (or GACCs). This not only occurs during the fire season assignments but through winter coordination and training sessions. It is really important at this time because many IMTs are made up of retirees (ADs) that don't have the opportunity to stay up to date on the latest policy and technology developments during the year. There needs to be an Air Operation Branch Director on the NIMO type teams and more emphasis needs to be given to the use and management of aircraft on all incidents (it's usually the highest cost and risks associated with fire suppression). Most IMTs have an AOBD on the C&G these days. If the NIMO type teams traveled around the region as experts and respected leaders in their field assisting and mentoring the existing incident management teams then those teams would less likely be threatened by the NIMOs existence and welcome the concept.
Feel as if the management of incidents as gotten worst over time. Too many layers. NIMO worked well on the Zaca LPF 2007, but not as well on LPF-Indians, Basin, 2008.
With NIMO type-c&g, the remainder of the team can be filled out with militia. The c&g are critically important in the successful mngt of an incident, and the NIMO-type structure allows for scalability and also provides for the mentoring of up and coming personnel.
NIMO teams are useful serving as super training consultants. They work for the local agency line officer, whoever they are, and the line is ultimately responsible.
The nature of the questions indicates a preference in the designers' minds for a fairly dramatic departure from current practice. Why should NIMO-type organizations replace the current IMT model for a significant fraction of teams (Question 3.4)?
I think the NIMO teams need to be phased out after succession planning and this study is completed.
The first couple of questions in this section seem to discount the existence of the NIMO teams, based on the options given for an answer.
My experiance with the the NEMO teams are that they are un-organized and the most of the positions are filled with the good old boys club. Most if not all are retirees, Most can't even pass the required physical fitness or pack test required by NWCG at more then the light level. I feel the NEMO teams need to be eliminated and regular IMT teams need to be established.
lso please do not make any more NIMO teams. Why would we want 20 teams out there that don't have a day job? This is already hurting the morale of the Teams that are staffed with the volunteers
Too many full time NIMO teams without enough work. Limit it to 5 or less for off season details and utilize them first for Area Command duties.
Making more NIMO type teams or providing pay incentives will only pull the fire people into those jobs NOT the militia. It is already difficult enough to get quality applicants in the fire management ranks. If you pull them into TEAM only scenarios you will lose your quality fire management people as well.
nimo seems wasteful so far. Efficenices are gained with voluntary teams.
To clarify my comments, I recommend having 10 perminent nimo type teams, 10 large type 1 IMT's and 25 type 2 IMT's.
The present Nimo teams have not been successful in training and bring on new people in the agency. They seem to focus on special projects and working more with State folks to get them trained instead of agency folks. The special projects seem more like junkets to France, Hawaii, Super Bowl etc.
This proposal for more standing NIMO personnel could provide core teams ready to go, but in some ways looks to pay base positions (FTEs) out of the suppression budgets to make up for normal appropriations shortfall. With that said, I think if the federal government goes to standing NIMO teams, then fire could easily "stove pipe" into a general incident agency (FEMA) and end up not working for the land agencies. While it may be time to look at consolidating resource agencies for budget savings, this could done in fire. I think standing NIMO type teams will be sitting around a lot looking for something to do unless they have a "day job": like training program, fire planning, NEPA, cache support, BAER, etc....something so that the tax payers and congress sees them providing a government service in between incidents and helping with work loads with fewer people. With reducing federal budgets, we are going to have to use all our resources: federal, state, NIMO, contract, all hazard teams to figure out the best way to come together when the country needs us, so I understand that change is coming to how we do some of our business.
3.4-GACC's should set the number of full time teams that are needed.
There is a role for NIMO and full time support to improve our organizational efficiency. But the public would be better served by agencies embracing a broader stewardship mission rather than become even more specialized. In the long run we would reduce costs, by having a smaller number of highly skilled individuals, that can be supported locally when agencies have a reasonable amount of skill sets to supplement.
3.4 NO NIMO - IMT members must remain tied to resource management organizations NOT to WO doing who knows what!
NIMO was originally discussed post terrorist attack (9/11/2001) as a national resource for primarily non-fire incidents – ie. Avian Flu, etc. Are the models with 20 NIMO teams envisioning NIMO availability for floods, tornados, epidemics,

hazmat, oil spills, etc.? Not clear since net # of teams for most models is less than current situation. WORKFORCE ACCOUNTABILITY. Seems like a huge accountability issue is what NIMO does when not assigned. The non-incident workload for NIMO needs to be better thought out. Details for fire season duration is most efficient and responsible at present. Some years there is very little fire. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT AS PRIMARY JOB. I definitely think there are many benefits to having more FTEs dedicated to incident management who are responders first and foremost. All non-NIMO team members, even fire positions, have availability conflicts arise with “day jobs”.
WFPR funds from reduced Forest staffing used to fund full time IMT positions with their own PDs at defferent grades based on complexity, all available to scale to events under NIMO.
What is the cost of funding NIMO teams? Is it sustainable/ cheeper than how businesses is being done now? Can all agencies, particularly those with shallower workforce beds sill contribute their fair share? How are NIMO teams held accountable? Not a strong supporter of NIMO teams because haven’t seen them work well and not familiar enough with “intent” of team structure. Do not see their overall value as they are very expensive to use overall.
3.4 The focus of the NIMO teams has been all over the chart. The team members I know, or have spoken with, are constantly on the road, they appeared to be travel weary and tired. The role they signed up for appears to have completely changed from when they were hired. Where are you going to find enough highly skilled employees to fill 20 NIMO teams????
3.4 type 1 short NIMO or Geographically limited NIMO type teams could be paid out of emergency fire budgets, but more importantly is establishing the local capacity to eventually handle local situations without non-local resources. that would not only comprise not only staffing local base team resources, but ensuring that partners capacity to utilize people working on fuels reduction and landscape restoration projects are available to complete on the ground fire management actions is going to be critical in reducing overall cost and increasing the saftey that inherently comes with landscape familiary.
Regarding NIMO, my observation is that we don't know what to do with them, so we let them make up their own roles with the help of a bunch of administrators with different needs and agendas. If NIMOs had real jobs in fire, beyond NIMO, this wouldn't be an issue. I think NIMO is one of the best arguments for not 'professionalizing' the firefighter workforce. In point of fact, most of the time, there aren't fires to deal with. In my opinion, this notion of creating a full time firefighter-only workforce is CRAZY.
NIMO teams should be used as they first were when developed, to come in behind a Type 1 or 2 team when the complexity or size of the incident is more than a Type 3 organization should be managing. To have a NIMO team working along side a Type 1 or 2 team is not cost effective but alos is disruptive to running a smooth incident.
3.4: NIMO teams should be about 10-12; supplemented with National/Area teams. 10-12 will respond well to All Risk throughout the year, with the other 30 or so teams available as needed.3.5: A/C Teams have important roles. Especially when resources need to be prioritized, political and social issues are involved.
Every time I have worked on incidents with a NIMO team it was not ran smoothly, there was very poor decision making and actions. NIMO teams are a waste of money and a pure embarrassment, they show backwards movement not improvement of standards, or performance for incident management.
NIMO teams are not teams. They are guys from out of town with an attitude and are depenedent on type 2 teams for support, teams whose leaders have been replaced. I can't think of a worse way to boost morale.
NIMO was an experiment that does not work. They should be considered a C&GS Group only, not a team. -Need to define what a team is, to be a team it must include the "worker bees", and a cohesive group.
3.4 3.5. I have worked with both NIMOs and area commands and it is my impression that we do not need both - they seem to duplicate each other.
I beleive NIMO teams have robbed much needed C and G from IMTs and I do not believe they are being utilized well currently on fire assignments.
3.4: Keep the number of NIMO teams at or below current levels. The NIMO teams have not proven them selves a benefit to the current system.
NIMO is a concept that arrived too late. Post-bubble economy, state & federal budgets can no longer afford it.
NIMO Teams are a huge wast of man power and environmental resources!
- NIMO positions need to be PRODUCTIVE during off seasons-
3.4 How many teams should be NIMO or NIMO-like?NIMO – there are some disadvantages to this concept: (1) the short-team (command and general) approach draws from other teams and from the same resource pool in order to fill key unit leader positions under a long team concept--long teams are utilized on the majority of incidents; (2) requires year-round funding that some agencies may not have the ability to pay with suppression funds; (3) results in loss of efficiencies by having to rotate key unit leader positions on every incident– this approach does not build a cohesive long team; (4) promotes ineffective management by trying to find busy work throughout the year that is suppression related; (5) causes confusion to other teams because it has oftentimes added another layer between the Agency Administrator and Area Command teams, (6) confusion in rotation with other teams—who’s up now, (7) blocks positions for those

individuals who are not “NIMO” from performing those jobs and gaining experience, and (8) the investment is high with questionable returns and (9) the NIMO team function within the national team framework has never been defined. Eliminate NIMO.
From Question 4.08
NIMO teams are very expensive with all of the down time. They rob the organization of it's best talent, it's a part of the reasons we are short management staff as it is. If every one of those NIMO folks were back on a district or a Forest or in a regional office the agency would be better off and making better decisions on a day to day basis. To put 20 NIMO teams out would mean 160 highly qualified people would stop contributing on the day to day decisions and accomplisment of the land management agencies. I think they provide more service where they are at now closer to the ground.
I don’t think full time NIMO teams are efficient use of suppression funds during slow fire seasons. Plus the resource knowledge learned by agency personnel during their 'day' jobs is an invaluable contribution in their suppression decisions. I think smaller core IMTs with modular options and service centers will greatly contribute to the concerns behind this study. Ideally eliminating the difference between T1 and 2 teams sounds good but there will be more IMTs available under the status quo due to the lack of available personnel that are capable at the T1 complexities. It’s probably best to keep the best and most experienced IMTs on the most complex fires.
Why is NIMO included in almost every Option? Has there been an analysis done that determined that the NIMO Teams are worth the amount of money being spent every year? Granted they may be accomplishing a good number of "nice to have" projects that might not otherwise get done but is there not a more cost effective way to accomplish the same things they are doing? If agencies are going to throw suppressin dollars around why not give the dollars to Agency Administrators for Term Positions to accomplish the same work? At the end of the Term the money can be provided to another Agency Administrator to accomplish another/more tasks.
I don’t think full time NIMO teams are efficient use of suppression funds during slow fire seasons. Plus the resource knowledge learned by agency personnel during their 'day' jobs is an invaluable contribution in their suppression decisions.
I have been reviewing large fires since 2001 and my first experience with NIMO was in Georgia in 2006. A tremendous amount of confusion on roles and responsibilites occurred and significant suppression funding was wasted on failed suppression efforts. $30 million in Federal suppression funds was expended on a state fire. By signing for and accepting the financial responsibility of the Zaca Fire in southern California, a NIMO IC caused a $130 million liability to be incurred by the Federal government for a state fire. In northern California in 2008, Type 1 and 2 IMTS reported that were in-briefed by the forest, by area command, and then again by NIMO Teams wanting to exert control over suppression forces. The "theatre" discussion was interesting but largely not useful. I have yet to see the NIMO concept work as it is stated and promised. Expanding it would continue the waste of suppression funding, continue the confusion on the part of IMTs as to what is the role of NIMO versus Area Command. The Area Command system is not broken and does not need to be fixed. At any rate, NIMO is not the right fix. NWCG need to listen to the ICs and Acs on this issue and be not be led down the road to Abilene by highly placed NIMO influence. I am not convinced that NIMO has saved a single dollar since its inception and I am convinced that NIMO wastes a significant amount of suppression funding with little to no results. They produce many reports that state otherwise, but the the question remains "show me the money" and we can believe that NIMO leadership and actions caused it to be saved.
I am a strong supporter of militia with some clearly identified team structures that can be mobilized quickly. I do not feel expanding NIMO is a good use of funding. Their use now is at best marginal. They work best as staff to the WO FAM and as trainers to Type 3 state teams. 20 teams is neither affordable or appropriate. The grade structure of NIMO is out of balance with pay scale of typical units--GS 13 IC and GS12 C&G makes more sense, limited to 4 teams spread around the country as "first respondiers"
The introduction of the NIMO teams in 2005 has been highly disruptive and has yielded little tangible benefit to our customers (remember them?) The only group that seems happy with the NIMO concept are those individuals who are employed by a NIMO team. This IMOSP exercise appears to be an under-handed attempt to expand the NIMO sphere of influence/empire. IMTs have a core compentency in the 'business' of fire. The introduction of NIMO teams in 2005 is a textbook illustration of scope creep. None of the options presented here considers the reduction of NIMO teams, and, in fact, most of them call for an increase. I believe this will only exacerbate the problems, not resolve them. We need to have an honest, frank discussion about the efficacy of NIMO teams (from the customer's perspective), and the courage to revisit the decision and ask ourselves if we got the results we anticipated. This IMOSP effort appears to have an

underlying agenda: to increase the influence of NIMO teams. Let us not forget who our customers are and prioritize our effort/focus around their needs, not ours. Thank you for the opportunity to comment.
How will the rising costs of Fire be addressed if we continue down the road of year round suppression funding for standing teams? How do we justify standing teams without other duties during periods of low incidence?
Since the inception, I am still trying to figure out the role of the NIMO teams. We need to either totally rethink that program or dissolve them and chalk it up to a good learning experience of trying something new. If you try and compare NIMO to any other organization, you really cannot. Lets use sports for example; what professional team has only a handful of players and just picks up the rest as they go along? When you look at Thirty-mile and a number of significant incidents, you can see where team cohesiveness was a factor.....why would placing NIMO on a significant event be any different. Another option is to dissolve C&G on the Type 1 teams and replace them with a standing NIMO team. So when NIMO team "A" gets activated for a large scale event, their Type 1 team would be activated.....in a sense, this is basically converting C&G on type 1 teams to full-time positions. Who is going to pay for this?
Nimo Teams are not working! The concept is good, but as a person that is trying to develop a new training workshop for field going personnel, for a national shortage position, I have never received a phone call asking if we needed any help. This seals my thoughts on this concept. Reconfigure this group as single resources that will be available as mentors. Marry these folks with a large list of trainees and ensure that they always have a minimum of two trainees assigned per 2 week incident. These personnel will be final signatures on task books. If they say they are one then they are. No second guessing. Use Nimo teams in the off season to TRAIN or DEVELOP new training for shortage postions. Hire private personnel that may have special skill sets to help train in the shortage positions. Look into the other Agencies to provide Subject Matter Experts to help train in all entities outside of the actual suppression end of the work.
I believe the increase of NIMO organizations would not be effective. What would they do effectively and efficiently during the off seasons? It seems the current four units are engaged with mostly training and it seems having several more NIMO's would become problamatic with effectiveness during non-assignment periods. When NIMO's deploy they need to build a "team" of doers and that is not effective due to time lags, and team relationships early in an incident.
Am also OPPOSED to any more NIMO teams....for the most part, most people don't even know what they do and there has been no proof of concept with the NIMO teams. The idea of increasing the number of NIMO teams, which translates to raking more money off the top, is outrageous....you can fund a lot a ground-pounders for the price of just one NIMO team. The FS budget doesn't need any more cuts than it already has, especially for something that hasn't even been proven to be efficient or effective.
WO supervision interferes with on scene direction. NIMO is not engaged in current program.
Dump NIMO model. Waste of money and high grade levels sucks money off the top for no benefit to the ground pounders!
NIMO teams are a huge expense, who do not have meaningful work year around. They are like contractors in the respect that they are trying to stay busy and waiting for an emergency so they can work. It is a mystery how four NIMO teams have been able to stay busy, let alone the number of teams some of these alternatives are proposing. If there has been any value added by the NIMO teams, it has not been communicated to the rank and file in the Fire Organization. Are their accomplishments things that are unique to them or could it be completed by other agency personnel, i.e., training sessions? It appears in these days of reducing budgets, their funds, even from Suppression funds, could be better utilized.
The continued increase of NIMO teams is not cost effective to the organization as a whole for year round job duties/needs especially using emergency funding needed for fire season. NIMO funding should not come out or E funding in off season.
Incident management should be practiced daily. If your "day" job is running well, so should your incident management. I was advised to "fight fire every day" or to base your actions on a potential future incident.
Not sure why the push for more NIMO's, since the 4 we have now have not really been used for what they were created for and they are spending a whole lot of money, with not much to show for it.
NIMO, or other full-time teams, are very expensive and separate the team from managing the land. There is a long term highly undesirable outcome of having teams just do tasks, such as managing incidents, instead of feeling some responsibility for manag
For those of us that have been around for more than 30 years we know that the NIMO concept does not work and is a huge waste of money.
I feel that the work in support of incidents is enherently governmental, not contract. All wildland entities should train, and work togehter particulalry in view of the fact that many incidents today are not single jurisdictional events.
NIMO type teams are hard to keep adequately engaged in work during off season.
I'd like at least some option that doesn't include addition of numerous unfunded NIMO teams that have an unclear role, mission, and haven't shown tangible positive results.

Table 45. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Number of NIMO/NIMO-like.

I disagree with having more NIMO teams. Give better support to the teams you currently have and you will have participation. To date I have not been impressed with the NIMOs and their management. They don't seem to know their mission except they are full time doing it.They dabble in everything....staff rides, bark beetle management, and IMT meetings to fill out their year. Don't see how we can afford 20 NIMO teams and there is not a need for anymore full time NIMOs. The workload and current federal budgets do not support it.Take the money you would waste with 20 more NIMO teams and give your existing IMTs a budget and an incentive program for the functions we are always short on.....aviation, finance, etc. As an IMT AOBD, I have also seen the NIMO teams playing the game that the older WFU teams did on incidents where they have multiple aircraft assigned and they have much less than a full staffed air show, usually with just a helibase manager assigned. The excuse was 'We're a Fire Use Team" not an IMT. The same airshow for a Type II team would be staffed with at least a helibase manager and ASGS. The complexity of the air show should dictate what staffing is required not because of the team configuration assigned. There aren't twenty more AOBDs nationally available for the 20 new NIMOs to order either. Having 20 more teams with less staffing this isn't going to help our fire aviation accident rate improve.
Lastly is the notable investment needed to support 20 NIMO Teams in a tough economy. The country is in an historically challenging position, with many suggestions out there that major cuts are in order. With the Federal Agencies being part of that small portion of the budget that is discretionary, we can expect Congress to suggest, and we have already been asked, that we help solve the problem by reducing budgets. We are all already contributing as individuals through forgone costs of living adjustments. When I was part of the Team that suggested the initial NIMO proposal, and when I was part of a NIMO implementation Team 8 years ago, or so, a single NIMO Team was estimated at 1 million dollars per year. Surely that has increased, and perhaps even doubled. So, do we really believe we will get Congressional support for a wholesale renovation from our current program to a 20 NIMO Team configuration? Reeaallly? Do we really think a 30 to 40 million dollar proposal to establish specialized Teams because we just might need them, will get any serious consideration? I really rather doubt it.
Why do all the 'new' options include more NIMO teams? I don't think we need more NIMO teams and including them in the options screws up any critical evaluation of the alternatives. It is almost like those thatdeveloped the alternatives started with the premise that we add more NIMOs,and then tacked on various changes. What they should DO is go back to the drawing board and leave the NIMO teams off of any alternative.
there is no need to expand NIMO teams. Actually there is a far stronger case to eliminate them (NIMO teams) and utilize a single national team standard.
Don't like the idea of expanding NIMO.
For me, there is too much emphasis on adding more NIMO teams. It seems like the people working on the models started with the premise that were are going to add more NIMO teams and then developed models to do that. My suggestion is to take the addition of more NIMO teams out of the models. Develop options and models based on the feedback from the field, and one of those models may have additional NIMO teams. I could see some of these models being the starting point for viable solutions if they did not include those types of teams. One of the pieces of the current that I think should be continued in any model/option selected would be that of having a day job. All team members should have a 'normal' job, and working on teams would be as collateral/ancillary duties. I think we get a larger pool of team candidates, and it is cheaper in long run than having full time paid team members. I also think this type of arrangement gives teams a broader perspective of the issues involved in incident management.
Now for my input about the model I like best. As I noted earlier, I don't think the addition of more NIMO teams is a solution to any part of the problem. In that sense, it makes it hard to evaluate the various models. That being said I can state that I do not like any of the models as they are presented. There are parts of each that I do like.
Having seen how some of the NIMO teams work, I do not believe that they are very effective myself. First off, they need to recruit folks to serve on incidents that they are managing from the Unit Leader down. Where do they generally get those folks? Generally speaking it's from the AD pool. The same folks that you just cut down in your position paper. Do you think you will get AD's to serve on teams like this on a continuing basis when management makes comments like that? I don't believe so. Also, as far as the NIMO teams go, how many times really since the NIMO teams have been organized and been made available have all the teams been assigned to an incident at the same time? I don't know of any. So why increase the number of NIMO teams to the 20 that you want?
NIMO teams have developed a negative perception. To put it bluntly, the IMOSP materials gives one the feeling that, if you are not on a NIMO Forest Service funded team, you are not training enough, you can't possibly know the fire system, and you are incompetent to function in the position you hold. OH, but by the way, you can come in when they call you to fill in for the team. BUT you will NOT be a member of the team!! Even many of the regular fire staff will find participation

with NIMO unappealing. If you're not in the "in crowd," you're not on an NIMO team. But you're good enough to pull their fat out of the fire when they find they cannot get it done on their own.
I can only assume that given the mental models discussed, the present approach is an "inflexible" mental model. To me, the NIMO teams are the inflexible mental model that does not work and has never worked because the 'super teams' has been tried before and did not work for several reasons. The NIMO teams operate under a different set of guidelines because they wanted it that way and believe that makes them better than everyone else. Time will tell. Grades just happen to be higher and more costly with NIMO teams. How many GS-13 and GS-14 exist on the average Type I and II teams? These teams are filled based upon training, skill, experience, and knowledge. They are not based upon being a GS-14 or GS-15 or being a member of a particular team. This is actually a plus for the current situation. It is less expensive, and those with qualifications are those on teams. This is evaluated every 3 years and has to change every 6 years, unlike the inflexibility of the NIMO configuration. NIMO teams are funded out of suppression. They are always funded whether they are on a fire or not. NOW that is efficient!! (Sarcasm) So the question is why aren't regular teams better trained, supported, exercised, and used out of suppression as well? I see no reason why the current teams could not receive funding, extra time for exercises, and training. This would certainly improve their efficient and abilities. There are several instances where teams (the entire team) could be improved through joint training and exercises. I get the feeling that the Forest Service through the NIMO teams would just like to be the know-all, do-all, SUPER teams and then the Forest Service could manage everyone's fires since they are so capable now. The NIMO teams could not do squat if not supported by Type II teams as it stands. If they are so good, what can they do by themselves? Nothing.
Where are the NIMO teams going to be housed and how is that going to be paid for? Would a 90-day detail cost more than just salary? This works when those on the NIMO teams or agency teams are fire staff. What happens if they are non-fire staff? What about targets? What about work back home? Etc.? Less participation on teams will result in more than the limited amount we have now.
Many of the other models listed by the IMOSP Team incorporate NIMO into their solution and focus on making sections of IMTs into discrete modules. Based on my experience the NIMO concept does not meet the objectives of lowering cost and providing for a succession strategy. While this would guarantee the availability of a certain number of teams with the core IC and Section Chief Positions filled, it would not address the need for qualified unit leaders. If the NIMO deployments were evaluated it would become clear that the unit leader positions are still required for efficient incident response. Over the past several years as the NIMO teams have deployed they have had to staff to the same levels as Type I and Type II teams to handle complex assignments. The only apparent cost savings that the NIMO teams have brought to these incidents is their ability to exceed the length of assignment requirements that the Type I and Type II teams are held to thus reducing the team transition costs. Based on the costs of supporting the full time NIMO teams a cost benefit analysis should be conducted to ensure that these transition cost savings are greater than the NIMO support costs. Additionally, the length of assignments that teams are held to is from critical lessons learned on fatigue and the ability to make sound decisions. These lessons learned should be considered before any decisions are made on the sustainability of the NIMO model or on increasing the length of assignment requirements.
The financial impact of increasing up to 20 NIMO teams would have a far greater impact on field units' ability to accomplish goals and targets than the unit's personnel participation on IMT's. The same for service centers. "There is no new money." I would assume that for every person added to NIMO or service centers at least one field unit position would be eliminated. NWCG should not support existing or expanding NIMO teams, service centers, or modules at field unit expense.
Adding stovepipe NIMO teams would reduce the opportunity for fire managers to integrate with other resource managers. On the other hand adding field fire management staff would enhance the Interdisciplinary teams and process. NIMO teams have developed a stigma of being the Forest Services Fire Policy implementation "Gestapos" lacking interdisciplinary involvement or capability. Expanding NIMO teams and making them more interagency would expand this stigma and isolation. Request that NIMO teams not be continued or expanded and integrate the positions into field units. No known or referenced evaluation and review was performed for the current NIMO program as required in the original proposal for the creation of NIMO. Were they successful? Feedback from those that worked directly with them suggest not. NIMO utilization was low and costs were very high. Historic use of NIMO has had very little if any interagency application. This evaluation must be completed and reviewed by fire leadership teams before considering any future alternative that continues or expands NIMO teams or structures.

I was very surprised to see that 5 out of the 6 alternatives to our current system involved exponential increases to the use of NIMO Teams. I do not have a ton of fire experience, but I have been out on assignments and worked with around 15 different IMTs and one NIMO team over the past nine years. Of the 15 IMTs I worked with, 8 of them did what I thought was an impressive job of handling their incidents. Of the remaining 7 IMTs, I would rate 5 of their performances as "good" and only 2 as "fair". However, the NIMO team was the least efficient and used the least common sense of all of the teams I have worked with. Similarly, others that were involved were not impressed with the NIMO team's performance. The NIMO team that I worked with was mainly comprised of people who are in high positions in their regular jobs and seemed to me to be too far removed from the ground where true hands-on management takes place. As such, they had difficulty coming up with simple solutions to problems and constantly struggled to get things done efficiently.
No matter what organizational model is used the teams need to remain interagency in nature. Team members should also have a “day job”. Contrary to the present NIMO model it is important that team members be working at the local or state/regional level in a regular job. The “day job’ keeps team members connected to the issues of their respective agency and local GAC. Also, the “militia” should be retained and encouraged to participate at all levels/positions of the IMTs. In light of the realities of current and future federal budgets it is unlikely that there is funding for creation of more stand alone incident management teams. The use of AD hires to supplement team positions should continue but not at the expense of developing qualified agency individuals. The Incident Management Organization Succession Planning document is heavily weighted in promotion of NIMO. While the NIMO organizational structure might be a viable model for future IMTs, it is not working in its present form. From a state/local level perspective NIMO is viewed as a waste of both talent and money. NIMO has removed some of our most able individuals from an already shallow pool of potential team participants. Because they do not work at a local level NIMO team members are less connected with local issues and resource management. On incidents they are redundant, more of a “fifth wheel”. They do not fit well in the present system. How or why they get ordered is not understood. The teams are not interagency and are expensive to set up and maintain. In looking over the IMOSP models we need to consider the realities of future federal budgets. Where is the funding coming from for more stand alone incident management teams? Where are the people coming from to fill behind the folks taking the NIMO jobs? There is no need to expand NIMO teams as they stand in their present state. The present NIMO model like the existing IMT model needs some overhauls if is the direction we take nationally.
How many teams should be NIMO or NIMO-like? NIMO – there are some disadvantages to this concept: (1) the short-team (command and general) approach draws from other teams and from the same resource pool in order to fill key unit leader positions under a long team concept--long teams are utilized on the majority of incidents; (2) requires year-round funding that some agencies may not have the ability to pay with suppression funds; (3) results in loss of efficiencies by having to rotate key unit leader positions on every incident– this approach does not build a cohesive long team; (4) promotes ineffective management by trying to find busy work throughout the year that is suppression related; (5) causes confusion to other teams because it has oftentimes added another layer between the Agency Administrator and Area Command teams, (6) confusion in rotation with other teams—who’s up now, (7) blocks positions for those individuals who are not “NIMO” from performing those jobs and gaining experience, and (8) the investment is high with questionable returns and (9) the NIMO team function within the national team framework has never been defined. Eliminate NIMO concept for Type 1 and 2 incidents. They are configured for Type 3 incidents. As Type 1 and Type 2 IMT's, they draw their staffs from the same pool of resources from which the other IMT's draw.
Firstly, my experiences are we DO NOT need anymore NIMO teams period. I see absolutely no advantage to having these teams as they provide no additional capabilities that we do not already have other than the fact that they can get around the 14 and 21 day rules as far as remaining in place indefinately. Well, we can do that with our existing teams if we just rework redbook policy for team members. The Nimo teams we currently have should be disbanded as they are to costly and the first thing they do is ask for another team to support them, so why do we need them in the first place? In addition, I have worked on fires with these teams and see absolutely NO increase in skills with these teams, as a matter of fact I see a decrease as the team members are generally older and out of touch with the latest programs and technology as far as WFDSS and providing long term fire analysis. I actually see a disadvantage as they are another level of management that serves no purpose that cannot be handled by a "regular" IMT, and it wastes valuable time and money to mobilize this additional resource (NIMO). The training that they have conducted for WFDSS that I have attended has been very poor at best.
I have not been impressed from what I have seen NIMO perform and feel there makeup is not strong enough to address Aviation and other issues. The benefit of the Type 1 and 2 Teams is the knowledge and internal relationships by knowing you have the makeup to adjust to the assignment. NIMO needs to adjust by bringing in personnel to adjust and are

never sure of the skillsets they may recieve. Remember States are cutting back budgets and have the same issues.
1. The NIMO concept is never looked at going away? Did anyone really explore this as an alternative? It should have been. From a district level I never felt the NIMO concept was a good thing, you pulled Forest and district level FMO's out of the jobs, gave them a NIMO job and we lost forest level leadership that in some places has never been replaced.
You allude to this well, but if we choose to maintain a full-time incident management organization - we will lose the militia. This is something that should receive some analysis. Under any model, we cannot handle extreme seasons or situations without a topnotch militia.
The CORE concept has the same issues as NIMO, the people that will get these jobs (at a high pay rate I am sure) are the ones we need to keep out on the units providing leadership. The other issue is that when NIMO and/or a CORE group is ordered, they still have to fill all these other positions so they can function, you have not dealt with the issue of there is not enough people to do the job. It seems to me someone made the assumption NIMO was here to stay.

*3.5 – **Area Command**- What do you see as the role for Area Command?*

The most frequent – but still minority- selection suggests maintaining the status quo (Fig. 45, Table 46). Those who prefer change are split between increasing or decreasing numbers.

Figure 45. Number and distribution of responses to Role for Area Command.



Table 46. Text provided as 'Other' choice for Role for Area Command.

Exact Comment
Advisory role.
Area Command doesn't have much of a role. GMACs should step in and arbitrate resource distribution when multiple incidents are occurring in a geographic area.
Area commands work for and report to line officers at the appropriate scale.
Bring in as needed for coordination
Depends on number and quality of teams
I select "more than at present" , with regard to being assigned sooner when situations are obviously escalating. This would probably require more AC teams (downside being that you dip into the already small pool of T1 IC, but future changes should improve that situation). One key thing, is that AreaCommand Teams are notorious for being the BIG BULLY. My position in the pecking order may seem to not qualify me to comment, but I know the prevailing opinion and experience of the many ICTs I have worked with, and the demands put on them (and NIROPS) by Area Command Teams. I percieve a need to create more positive relationship with the ICTs (I do have some understanding of the heavy pressure that comes down on the AC teams from the political realm. When things are so bad that you need AC, then the people, politicians and agency heads are freaking out.)
In addition to current Area Command functions, Area Command's role would expand to include management and oversight of Service Centers, coordination of Module resources, and assuring that an assigned and scalable IMT structure is appropriate for the complexity of the assigned incident.
MAC, and in Multiple Emergency coincident roles
More than at present with smaller teams that are supported by "module concepts".
NIMO should take on this role.

not worked well last few years
Only in Complexes
serve as decision support
Take over NIMO role
that will depend on the team model developed/selected at the end of this process
USE NIMO
Use NIMO for this in addition
Wording is confusing, not a question of #s, but responsibilities, this quesiton gives #s for resposne; any team should be able to support these roles; relly a quesiton of functions, need these coordination roles

There were significant differences in the distribution of responses among the following demographic sub-group (Table 47):

- *Functional Area: Fire* function respondents were less likely than expected to select *No Preference,* and those in an *Other Agency* function were more likely than expected for the same category.
- *Incident Qualifications*: The highly significant difference in response distribution was largely driven by differences in frequency of *No Preference* responses: fewer *IMT-C&G* respondents than expected (those currently holding Type 1 or Type 2 Command and General staff positions) and more respondents than expected with *Other* qualifications or *None*. Among Type 1 and 2 respondents, statistically more *IMT-ICs* said they would like *More* Area Command teams (although the second most frequent choice for IC's was *No Longer Needed*).
- *Organizational Level:* Marginal significant difference in distribution of responses was driven by *Local Government/Fire* respondents, more of whom than expected said they prefer *More* Area Command teams than at present.
- *Agency:* The marginally significant difference was driven by *Local Government/Fire* respondents, who said they much prefer *More* Area Command teams than expected.

Table 47. Cross-tabulations and significance of responses to Role for Area Command by demographic sub-group. [Note: Most frequent response indicated by **bold**; significant difference in distribution by * at end of Table title. Cell counts significantly higher than expected are in *italics*; counts significantly less than expected are also enclosed in *()*.]

(a) by Agency*.

	BIA/ Tribe	BLM	Contractor	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Total
Less than current	5	16	0	8	10	0	9	0	70	5	123
More than current	1	11	0	*16*	5	1	9	1	42	2	88
No longer needed	3	18	0	5	13	0	5	0	68	2	114
No preference	4	16	0	3	13	1	3	0	46	5	91
Other	1	4	0	0	0	0	2	0	9	0	16
Same as current	**11**	**67**	**5**	**43**	**36**	2	**37**	1	**201**	**14**	417
Null	0	2	0	0	3	0	1	0	3	0	9
Total	25	134	5	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	858

(b) by Organizational level*.

	Contractor	Federal-Local	Federal-National	Federal-Regional	Local Govt/Fire	No professional role	State Govt/Fire	Total
Less than current	0	72	10	18	8	5	10	123
More than current	2	44	5	10	*16*	2	9	88
No longer needed	2	65	13	21	5	4	4	114
No preference	0	60	9	13	5	1	3	91
Other	0	8	2	2	0	2	2	16
Same as current	**11**	**231**	**27**	**55**	**43**	**11**	**39**	417
Null	0	8	0	0	0	0	1	9
Total	15	488	66	119	77	25	68	858

(c) by Functional area*.

	Dispatch	Fire	Fuels	LO/AA	NIMO	No role	Non-agency fire	Other agency	Other fire	Total
Less than current	8	58	12	8	1	0	7	21	8	123
More than current	3	33	5	11	1	0	5	23	7	88
No longer needed	6	42	11	12	3	1	9	19	11	114
No preference	2	*(18)*	6	14	1	3	2	*34*	11	91
Other	0	6	1	1	0	1	2	4	1	16
Same as current	**21**	**170**	**24**	**49**	2	**6**	**28**	**80**	**37**	417
Null	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	9
Total	40	332	59	95	8	11	53	184	76	858

(d) by Incident qualification*.

	FEMA/DHS	IMT-Type 3	IMT-IC	IMT C&G	None	Other	Total
Less than current	1	8	11	*52*	6	45	123
More than current	2	12	*14*	27	3	30	88
No longer needed	0	12	16	35	8	43	114
No preference	0	14	*(1)*	*(13)*	*12*	*51*	91
Other	0	1	4	7	0	4	16
Same as current	0	**57**	**32**	**142**	**23**	**163**	417
Null	0	0	0	3	1	5	9
Total	3	104	78	279	53	341	858

(e) by Age range.

	21-30	31-40	41-50	< 20	> 50	Total
Less than current	6	18	40	0	59	123
More than current	3	15	23	0	47	88
No longer needed	1	20	43	0	50	114
No preference	6	19	32	0	34	91
Other	0	1	5	0	10	16
Same as current	**10**	**63**	**117**	2	**225**	417
Null	0	3	3	0	3	9
Total	26	139	263	2	428	858

Narratives indicated some skepticism about the need to adjust numbers of teams (Tables 48, 49). For *Area Command*, one respondent noted, *"it is not a question of numbers but of role and responsibility."* A number of individual and group comments suggested a continued need for strategic direction, coordination, and decision support, perhaps even with a clarification or combination of Area Command and NIMO roles. A number of respondents expressed the desire to remove "a layer of bureaucracy."

Table 48. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Role of Area Command.

No comments from 2.12
From Question 3.17
There is no longer a need for Area Commands. I have been around them for 30 years and haven't seen one yet in the last 10 years that did anything good for our team except make us create more documents and spend more time in briefings that we didn't have time for. They have no idea what to do to keep themselves busy except make-work for the

teams. Don't need them! The ICs these days are totally competent at deciding amongst themselves on what needs to be share and done.
AC teams as they are configured have little utility.
Need to remove the layers of bureaucracy - area command & some GACC functions.
Feel as if the management of incidents as gotten worst over time. Too many layers. As with Area command, good up to the mid 2006. then poorly
Area Command needs to be phased out and the MAC groups need to assume that role, (Add ACAC or other quals if needed).
AC Teams can be activated as backup
3.5 Area Command is not needed, those duties should be performed by MAC groups. Area Command consumes skills needed on IMTs.
AREA COMMAND. Seems like “one standard” could be applied to NIMO / Area Command teams as with Type 1 / Type 2; NIMO has been used in an Area Command / Theatre of Operations way in the past. (2008 CA fire siege)
3.5 current area command centers could serve as the location for the decision support center where electronic data is generated, compiled, and distributed as needed. this should be done in partnership with regional research stations for informing analysis of management actions and generating monitoring and research questions/protocols for institutionalization of mechanisms to incorporate adaptive management principals into the decision making processes.
3.4 3.5. I have worked with both NIMOs and area commands and it is my impression that we do not need both - they seem to duplicate each other.
From Question 4.08
Why is it a given that Area Command Teams are not needed?
Someone needs to look at some of these issues for Area Command as well. One example is it would be a good idea to build in performance elements into their pef evals for them if that is done for folks on IMTs. Just like IMTs, there are some good AC teams and some not so good.
Cut Costs. If people really want to fight fire, make it be there job with no more incentive than standard wages. Don't make it so that a seasonal fire fighter can make more than a full time professional. Good luck with a standard workday to eliminate excessive OT

Table 49. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Role of Area Command.

I would also like to comment on the use of Area Commands (AC). AC’s are a natural progression of the ICS. But I feel their effectiveness has been mixed and that some new approaches to managing multiple incidents in small geographic areas during campaign years should be explored. Shortages of IMT’s, national caterers, Type 1 aircraft, etc. should have us thinking “outside the box” in how we manage and support multiple-incident situations; like around Missoula, Montana in the summer of 2003.

3.6 – Contract Teams - *What do you see as the role for Type 2 contract teams?*

The most frequent--but still minority (48%)--response was that there is *No Role* for contract teams in incident management (Fig. 46, Table 50). When ‘*Surge Capacity*’, ‘*All Years’* and relevant *Other* comments are combined, there are nearly as many respondents who do see a role for contract teams in incident management (n = 364) as those who don’t (n = 423).

Figure 46. Number and distribution of responses to Role of Contract Teams.



Table 50. Text provided as 'Other' choice for the Role of Contract Teams.

Grouping (n)	Exact Comment
All years (1)	Available in all years for management of wildland fires, Serve in national emergencies.
Functional role (13)	All Hazard Assignments
	All risk and fire if fully qualified
	Available for All Hazard incidents
	Boost Logistics, Finance, Plans
	Consider logistics, planning as potential contract opportunities
	contract modules for type 3 team expantion could be benificial if expertise are needed occasionally but not signatory to local area operating plan
	Difficult question- how different form External Capacity model? role is to augment T1 and T2 teams but not a sfull team; could be filling roles of duntional modules for those teams.
	Modules, not full teams w/out authorities
	mop-up
	Only certian modules should be contracted if they meet needs cheaper in specialty areas.
	Possible natural fire ignitions, Helitorch Module, FEMO's, Planning, oversite
	Shadow and training.
	support NIMO teams instead of agency teams supporting NIMO teams.
No Role (8)	No role, Available in all years for management of wildland fires
	No role, Contract teams would raise the cost of fire suopression enormously. How can contractors carry out agency policy?? Impossible.
	No role, No preference
	No role, Remain available to fill open positions on deployed IMTs
	No role, Require Agency Acability
	No role, What kind of lessons have we learned about contracted firefighters? More expensive and less productive? Yep!
	No team role, but team member role
	preferably 'no role' (see comments at end) but if used should only be for surge capacity
Surge Capacity (17)	I select "surge capacity" - but take over in mop-up phase, or low-risk incidents. They will be much rustier than even our current teams, and the regular teams need all the experience they can get.
(4)	No role, Surge capacity in busy years
	Only consider during peak years. We need to cosider the impacts of increasing contractors. Just like the military knows we may loose our brightest and best as contracting can be very lucurative
	Support to Type 1 and 2 teams in busy years
(3)	Surge capacity in busy years and for FEMA assignments that extned well beyond traditional length-of-assignment timeframes (hurricanes, etc.).
	Surge capacity in busy years, Available for long term management assignments with little anticipated change in complexity but needs for long term management.
(4)	Surge capacity in busy years, Available in all years for management of wildland fires
	Surge capacity in busy years, Available in all years for management of wildland fires, Mainly for transition from Govt Type 2 to Contract Type 3 organization.
	Surge capacity in busy years, These need to be All Hazard.
Miscellaneous (20)	An all contract team? Seems like a nightmare. Liability? Cost? Acability? If they are only used in surge capacity, you would have a lot of resources tied up, waiting to be called for the big dollars, that would no longer accept single resource assig

	Beware of this, you are establishing soldiers of fortune, do not do it.
	contract teams are not cost effective and will not be available during busy due to a loss of business during lean years
	Contracting is always a danger
	depends on make up of teams- if they are made up of natural resource managers, maybe
	Geriatric firefighting clubs are a good idea for the Boomer generation but no substitute for recruiting and retaining younger employees with or without previous experience.
	I see the benefit of contracted modules, but not entire teams.
	If you only use Contract Teams during heavy fire years it will be extremely costly to activate a team. How would a contractor keep a team together with out some promise of work? Contract Teams could be used to manage long term incidents. This might af
	Limited use to large fires with ?? decision space (cost, length & duration, resource management concerns). * Liability concerns long-term.
	need more info
	not enough info on contract teams
	Not in favor of contracting
	Quality Dependent
	Smells like a conflict of interest
	To fill in on existing Federal Teams
	Too expensive
	unk
	Unsure
	use the current type 2 teams
	worth exploring, as NIMO-like option

Although *No Role* was the most frequent choice, there are significant differences in distribution of responses in the following demographic sub-groups (Table 51):

- *Functional Area:* A highly significant difference in responses indicated a difference of opinion: those in a *Fire* function were less likely to prefer contract team use in *All Years* and more likely to prefer *No Role*, whereas those in *Other Agency* functions were less likely to say *No Role*= and more likely to indicate a preference for use as *Surge Capacity* than expected. Those with *Other* functions were more likely than expected to have *No Preference*.
- *Incident Qualifications*: A marginally significant difference in response distribution is driven by those with no current incident qualifications (*None*), more of whom than expected preferred either *No Preference* or see the use of Contract Teams in *All Years*.

Table 51. Cross-tabulations and significance of responses to Role of Contract Teams by demographic sub-group. [Note: Most frequent response indicated by **bold**; significant difference in distribution by * at end of Table title. Cell counts significantly higher than expected are in *italics*; counts significantly less than expected are also enclosed in *()*.]

(a) by Agency.

	BIA/ Tribe	BLM	Contractor	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Total
All years	3	22	2	10	10	2	6	0	44	3	102
No preference	2	4	1	8	10	0	3	0	18	2	48
No role	8	**67**	2	**30**	**28**	1	**32**	0	**230**	**14**	412
Other	3	9	0	4	5	0	5	0	32	1	59
Surge capacity	**9**	31	0	23	27	1	20	2	111	8	232
Null	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	5
Total	25	134	5	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	858

(b) by Organizational level.

	Contractor	Federal-Local	Federal-National	Federal-Regional	Local Govt/Fire	No professional role	State Govt/Fire	Total
All years	**8**	58	7	7	12	6	4	102
No preference	1	25	3	7	9	0	3	48
No role	4	**248**	**30**	**60**	**29**	6	**35**	412
Other	0	32	8	7	4	3	5	59
Surge capacity	2	120	18	38	23	**10**	21	232
Null	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	5
Total	15	488	66	119	77	25	68	858

(c) by Functional area*.

	Dispatch	Fire	Fuels	LO/AA	NIMO	No role	Non-agency fire	Other agency	Other fire	Total
All years	5	*(25)*	6	13	2	0	16	29	6	102
No preference	5	10	2	9	1	2	2	13	4	48
No role	**22**	***191***	**37**	**36**	**4**	3	**17**	*(64)*	**38**	412
Other	3	26	1	9	0	1	4	9	6	59
Surge capacity	5	77	13	28	1	**5**	14	***67***	22	232
Null	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	5
Total	40	332	59	95	8	11	53	184	76	858

(d) by Incident qualification*.

	FEMA_DHS	IMT – Type 3	IMT-IC	IMT_C_G	None	Other	Total
All years	0	14	9	28	*14*	37	102
No preference	2	6	2	9	*7*	22	48
No role	0	**52**	**39**	**139**	**17**	**165**	412
Other	0	4	8	20	3	24	59
Surge capacity	1	27	20	81	12	91	232
Null	0	1	0	2	0	2	5
Total	3	104	78	279	53	341	858

(e) by Age range.

	21-30	31-40	41-50	< 20	> 50	Total
All years	1	10	26	1	64	102
No preference	1	7	18	0	22	48
No role	**13**	**74**	**139**	1	**185**	412
Other	1	9	20	0	29	59
Surge capacity	10	38	58	0	126	232
Null	0	1	2	0	2	5
Total	26	139	263	2	428	858

Many respondents expressed the view that fire management is an inherently Governmental function (i.e., not-for-profit), with some citing poor experiences during Hurricane Katrina to support their impression, and others noting that contract teams will draw from the same pool of people, charge overhead, and require expertise to administer (Tables 52, 53). Comments pointed out this is likely a short-term fix (i.e., provides mechanism for accessing retired Federal employees) but does little to assist with succession. A number of comments expressed concern that contract teams have no tie to agency missions; may have difficulty staying current with qualifications, policy, and procedures; and will be more expensive than agency-based teams.

Table 52. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Role of Contract Teams.

From Question 2.12
It will be very expensive to contract out incident mgt. AD's are great to supplement but if adequate incentives are provided, people will participate.
From Question 3.17
IMTs need to NOT be contracted out. Also avoid using FEMA teams to substitute for Wildland Fire organizations. Both

configurations are problematic.
I think the AD system is adequate at includeing contract resources. If we had contract teams, how would we fill those without using federal resources too?
First call for team members and incident response should be federal fire/emergency response employees and not local departments which have exorbitant costs and reduce training opportunities that could help agencies build capacity. Too much of the "Good Old Boy" network with retired fire personnel named requested and or dispatched through local departments. If city and or state fire agencies are used on federal incidents then they should be paid anything above actual hours worked through their base funds.
Has anyone determined if there is any availability to obtain Contract IMTs? Is there an assumption by this group that there are or will be contractors that will be capable and willing to supply IMTs? *Same comment as with 2.12 The questions are skewed to support "New Models".
I have no use for contract teams. They will never be able to respond to local agencies appropriately. Some of the State teams are useful, but many are so consumed with their own agendas, I find them useless, and would never invite them to a federal fire.
Totally against C&G contractors. Would not work.
I believe that fundamental even radical changes have to be made within agencies to be able to continue having IMTs in the future. That being said I believe contract teams is the single worst idea - to have a team in it for profit is a terrible idea - just look at Cal-Fire as an example. There are no incentives for them to manage effciently, safely, etc. At minimum it will rob the available AD ranks making it harder to staff federal IMT's or hard to find single resources.
Curtail the use of local government employees on IMT's, curtail all the "other" costs that come along with using local government employees(portal to portal, admin fees, etc.). Assistant chiefs shouldn't be check in/status recorders. NO CONTRACT IMT's.
And please for goodness sake don't create contract teams! If they start having contract teams I will quit Teams and you will have one less future Team IC. Teams should be encouraged to turn back fires with higher complexities when Team resources are scarce, instead of contracting them out.
Use of contract teams would provide the appearance that a contract team has an incentive to prolong an incident. This is potentially strongly damaging to resource agencies.
If we go with contract teams--must ensure that cost is no greater than current model. Actually more like years ago where at least 90% of team members were federal and state employees. Cost of teams has really increased in recent years due to using local fire district employees at a pretty high contract rate through departments. We need to be more fiscally responsible, so, providing incentives or some combination of minimal active requirement to serve on teams as federal employees would be more cost effective and appropriate.
3.6- I do not understand how this would work. To maintain access to former agency employees expertise hire them under the AD authority.
I have been on a Type 2 team for 11 years now both in Norcal and the Great Basin and I used to work for a career fire dept that I have retired from 7/1/10. I am now an AD with BLM. There are alot of people in the local FD that are going to classes and traing on there own to get quals for different positions and they keep getting denied. I know alot has to do with the cost but if we are suffering on an incident for poeple to fill spots that are qualified then lets use them and it doesnt matter what GACC they are from or if they are fed or local.
3.6 contract type 2 contract modules could be helpful in expanding type 3 and ramping down type 1 organizations. these would be especially effective for situations when you need 10 division supervisors in short order, or when you need 4 type 3 - 2 teams under the management of one short NIMO or NIMO type organization to handle multiple complex's on the same landscape.
3.6 I am concerned that with contract teams their expertise would have a shelf life as i would imagine they would primarily be retirees and currency would be an issue. More importantly who is going to take on the liability issues-any contractor is going to want that answered.
3.6: Type II contract teams performed excellently during Katrina. However, they need to have a reasonable expectation of being utilized. Without utilization, they will not be a viable commercial activity to keep ready by contractors.
3.6 I do not believe using contract TIIs for "surges" will work. People will not "sit on a shelf" and wait for a severe season in the hope of being called up. They will move on to other things.
I do not believe that private contractors should be involved as IMT's. The incentive (profit motive) for doing such work is incompatable with emergency services.
Use of contract teams has been tried in the past and the cost of the team and oversight far exceeds the current cost of agency teams.
3.6) The idea for a "contract team" is a disaster. Incident Management is something inherently governmental. If there were contract teams, cost will go up. Remember Halliburton. It's an invitation to corruption & profit driven objectives vs

the prudent use of public funds. It's already bad enough in communities after large fires where you hear of proud stories of how contractors stuck it to the government for pay as a contract resource. Imagine how a team will interact.
3.6 What do you see as a role for Type 2 Contract Teams?A solicitation was recently sent out for competition for finance, logistics, and planning modules. Vendor responses were that they proposed charging 25 percent above the current AD rate, a 35 percent OH and Profit rate, and an estimated $1500 per person per dispatch for travel expenses. Surge Capacity – the vendors proposed drawing from the "same" resource pool (ADs and Supplemental Resources) that we are currently drawing from, but they would be charging us another 55 percent above current AD rate, plus travel for each dispatch. An award was not made since the prices were determined to be unreasonable and vendors would be drawing from the same resource pools. One can only assume that we may encounter similar responses if we contract out for these types of resources and it could be a very costly investment. Serious complications arise when contractors are asked to oversee/supervise other contractors and/or federal employees. Don't see a role for contract teams.
DO NOT USE contractors -- aren't we in a budget deficit? Contract anything has incredible costs -- they are too expensive for what you get. Better to put your money into agency folks for incentives and training, add in those DHS and FEMA teams, use ADs -- but no contractors! The militia has been staffing teams! We have done an excellent job when trained properly and given experience. Keep the militia in all positions -- we know what we are doing!
From Question 4.08
I would like to see the Agencies groom from within. Contractors are expensive and have no real tie to Land Management objectives.
Contract expertise is likely to be expensive but helpful when there is a surge. Staying current is always difficult when not working in the field on a regular basis such as when retired.
Having contract teams avaiable for surge/hig-season needs is a good concept, but conflicts with the concept of retirees mentoring and sharing their wealth of knowledge with newer/developing individuals. I don't believe we should 'isolate' retirees and other ADs to contract teams.
No contractors - higher cost, no accountability (can not even hold many of our own folks accountable), less available resources (AD, state, county, city) - negative not positive impacts on staffing IMTs.
The business of running fires is fundamentally a role for government employees and not contractors.

Table 52. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Role of Contract Teams.

One thing that has been tried before and hasn't work is the use of "Contract IMT's" and contract sub staff. This really first came to life in 2005 after Hurricane Katrina. A lot of contract positions were utilized in the south, and they did work to a point. It was realized that contract IMT's could not administer any of the National Contracts due to contracting regulations. You still need a current Federal employee to over see these contracts since that delegation hasn't or cant (as far as I know) been passed down to a contractor. An AD can do more with contracts than a contractor can. This has not changed so you need to keep this in mind while assessing this type of option. I know some of the AD's that served on these contract IMT's or went to serve as a Contractor to assist with Katrina. By the time those folks had to pay for their own Social Security wages, self employment taxes, federal taxes, state taxes, they lost money and said they would never do it again. And now those participating on a contract IMT or any other contract position would most likely have to be bonded, which to most is so cost prohibitive that you will never get many people to participate on these IMT's. Besides, they made less than if they had just been hired as an AD. In addition, the cost of the contract IMT's became so expensive that comments have been made that it was unfeasible to use this kind of service contract again. And I believe it is still the philosophy of many contracting officers that it is still cost prohibitive. But, the Government thinks contracting is wonderful and will do what ever it takes to make it happen, but, with the emphasis on cost containment these days, how can you ignore this high cost of doing business? I don't think you can.
There is no place for contract teams in the IMT matrix. Incident management is a true role of government. Turning this role over to a contract organization is abdicating governments' proper role. This is a huge watch out. Turning over incident management could put us in a state of operations much like the present health care HMO situation. Even with contractual sideboards, a commercial organization has far different priorities and goals.
What do you see as a role for Type 2 Contract Teams? A solicitation was recently sent out for competition for finance, logistics, and planning modules. Vendor responses were that they proposed charging 25 percent above the current AD rate, a 35 percent OH and Profit rate, and an estimated $1500 per person per dispatch for travel expenses. Surge Capacity – the vendors proposed drawing from the "same" resource pool (ADs and Supplemental Resources) that we are currently drawing from, but they would be charging us another 55 percent above current AD rate, plus travel for

each dispatch. An award was not made since the prices were determined to be unreasonable and vendors would be drawing from the same resource pools. One can only assume that we may encounter similar responses if we contract out for these types of resources and it could be a very costly investment. Serious complications arise when contractors are asked to oversee/supervise other contractors and/or federal employees. Don't see a role for contract teams.
Contract: Don't go there. It is a proven fact that it is expensive and we don't have the expertise in place to develop or administer those types of contracts. Would we not be better to put that expertise on the teams instead?

3.7- FEMA/DHS - What do you see as the role for FEMA/DHS T3 teams and agency all hazard teams in supporting/managing wildfires?

While the most frequent choice was *No Role* (29% of all respondents; Fig. 47, Table 54), 62% suggested there is some role for FEMA/DHS Type 3 teams to play (combining *Surge Capacity*, *Routinely Support*, *Routinely Manage*, and *With Type 1 or 2 Teams*). The question seems to be: what is the best role for FEMA/DHS Type 3 teams?

Figure 47. Number and distribution of responses to the Role for FEMA/DHS Teams.



	No role	Surge capacity	With Type 1 or 2 Teams	Routinely support	Routinely manage	No preference	Other	Null	Total
Number of Responses	243	175	172	117	64	33	48	6	858
Percent	28%	20%	20%	14%	7%	4%	6%	1%	100%

Table 54. Text provided as 'Other' choice for the Role for FEMA/DHS T3 teams.

Grouping	Exact Comment
Functional role	Could be used with Operations Section all being qualified in Wildland Fire
	Logistical support
	Logistical support
	Used as surge capacity in busy years to support local fire management in logistics and finance roles.
If . . .	depends on how incorporated into local area operating plans
	If qualified, they might be used as a short team, or as a type 3 team.
	If they have wildland fire experience and knowledge, then good to support wildland fire, if they are coming out of urban/non-wildland fire setting with no wildland knowledge (i.e. FDNY - nothing against FDNY) then have no role other then shaddowing to see how ICS works.
	Match their qualifications and experience to the complexity of the incident. Don't put a type 3 IMT on a Type 1 Incident
	MAYBE Surge capacity in busy years, however I would caution to use EXTREME caution in using FEMA. They are good at writing checks but that's it.

	need quals on forest to address-none at present
	Only If they have a full 50 person team that is used to working together, then put them into National Rotation.
	Use only if they meet fire training and qualifications.
	Used if fully qualified.
	used in conjunction with Type 1 and 2 teams on surge years
Specific Need	all hazard
	All Hazard Assignmetns
	Assistant Forest Type 3 organizations (fill holes)
	blend more with agency type 3 teams to increase ability with wildland and increase our ablity with all-risk
	Cross train with and support fire IMTs
	for Type 3 complexity
	local short term fires/WX related emergencies/HazMat/Law Enforment issue/planned events,etc
	Mentorship
	Scalable resource to add when needed to NIMO.
	surge capacity in busy years for logistical support
	Trainees only
	used in conjunction with T1 and T2 teams to fill gaps, primary teams are our T1 and T2 teams. Will not opeate as a separate team; used to build FEMA/DHS capacity on wildland fires.
	Used rarely in extreme situations
	Used routinely to manage Type 3 complexity wildland fire incidents
	Used routinely to support wildland fire incidents, especially incidents within an incident. Allow tema members to train with Type 1 & 2 fire teams and become "fire" certified, then able to work in all positions, including Command and General Staff.
	Used to support wildland fir incidents or manage wildland incidents when national capacit is taxed.
	used very sparingly to support wildfire incidents in conjunction with T1 or T2 IMT's
	used when needed for fires in urban areas; number of teams dependent on history over last 10 years.
	utilze on the new non typed teams, and for support
	Would be used for surge capacity on busy years with the perminent teams.
Miscellaneous	#2 or #4
	Caution on of their use due to their experiance
	different missions or no role
	FEMA/DHS T3 members integrated into the greater IMT pool.
	I don't think we have exlpored all the in-house T3 team possibilitities that could fill the gap when needed.
	Members should be eligible and encouraged to apply to our teams.
	phase in but provide for intense training
	Possibly use in support functions, but not wild about the idea
	Put all of our $ and efforts into supporting the teams we have now
	skeptical on FEMA/DHS-more info needed
	Unknown

There were significant differences in distribution of responses in the following demographic sub-groups (Table 55):

- *Incident Qualifications*: A high degree of variation among and between sub-groups and response categories resulted in a highly significant difference in response distribution. *IMT-Type 3* qualified respondents were more likely than expected to select *Routinely Manage,* whereas *IMT-ICs* were more likely than expected to select *Other*. Those with *No Current Incident Qualifications* were more likely than expected to choose *No Preference*.
- *Organizational Level:* The most frequently selected response for all Federal respondents was *No role*, while *State Government/Fire* respondents were significantly less likely to select this response. Significantly more *State Government/Fire* respondents than expected selected *Routinely Manage*, whereas significantly fewer respondents than expected in the *Federal-Local* sub-group chose this response.
- *Agency:* Respondents had sharply different responses distributions regarding the role of FEMA/DHS teams, with more *Local Government/Fire* and *State Government/Fire* respondents preferring *Routinely Manage* than expected.

Note, however, that the most frequent response for both sub-groups was *With Type 1 or 2 teams*. *Local Government/Fire* respondents were also less likely to select *No Role* than others.

Table 55. Cross-tabulations and significance of responses to Role of FEMA/DHS Teams by demographic sub-group. [Note: Most frequent response indicated by **bold**; significant difference in distribution by * at end of Table title. Cell counts significantly higher than expected are in *italics*; counts significantly less than expected are also enclosed in *()*.]

(a) by Agency*.

	BIA/ Tribe	BLM	Contractor	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Total
No preference	2	7	1	1	6	0	0	0	14	2	33
No role	5	**40**	1	*(12)*	**22**	1	11	0	**144**	7	243
Other	2	12	0	4	2	1	4	0	22	1	48
Routinely manage	2	6	0	**14**	4	1	*13*	0	23	1	64
Routinely support	3	18	0	**14**	12	0	8	1	60	1	117
Surge capacity	**7**	27	1	10	16	1	10	0	93	**10**	175
With Type 1 or 2 teams	4	24	2	20	18	0	**18**	1	79	6	172
Null	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	4	0	6
Total	25	134	5	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	858

(b) by Organizational level*.

	Contractor	Federal-Local	Federal-National	Federal-Regional	Local Govt/Fire	No professional role	State Govt/Fire	Total
No preference	1	22	2	6	1	1	0	33
No role	2	**160**	**17**	**33**	*(13)*	**8**	(10)	243
Other	2	23	7	7	4	1	4	48
Routinely manage	1	*(24)*	3	7	14	2	*13*	64
Routinely support	0	65	8	17	13	3	11	117
Surge capacity	2	108	14	25	12	4	10	175
With Type 1 or 2 teams	**7**	83	15	24	**20**	5	**18**	172
Null	0	3	0	0	0	1	2	6
Total	15	488	66	119	77	25	68	858

(c) by Functional area.

	Dispatch	Fire	Fuels	LO/ AA	NIMO	No role	Non-agency fire	Other agency	Other fire	Total
No preference	0	10	1	5	0	3	3	5	6	33
No role	**13**	**98**	**22**	17	2	1	15	**51**	**24**	243
Other	2	23	2	7	0	1	2	8	3	48
Routinely manage	3	23	4	10	0	0	2	16	6	64
Routinely support	8	43	4	16	2	2	5	25	12	117
Surge capacity	10	72	18	14	0	3	7	40	11	175
With Type 1 or 2 teams	4	62	8	**25**	**4**	1	**17**	38	13	172
Null	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	1	1	6
Total	40	332	59	95	8	11	53	184	76	858

(d) by Incident qualification*.

	FEMA/DHS	IMT-Type 3	IMT-IC	IMT C&G	None	Other	Total
No preference	0	2	1	6	*9*	15	33
No role	0	21	17	**83**	9	**113**	243
Other	0	5	*11*	12	2	18	48
Routinely manage	1	*15*	5	14	2	27	64
Routinely support	0	22	11	36	9	39	117
Surge capacity	0	**23**	14	57	10	71	175
With Type 1 or 2 teams	2	16	**19**	68	**12**	55	172
Null	0	0	0	3	0	3	6
Total	3	104	78	279	53	341	858

(e) by Age range.

	21-30	31-40	41-50	< 20	> 50	Total
No preference	1	5	11	0	16	33
No role	9	**38**	**77**	1	**118**	243
Other	0	6	17	0	25	48
Routinely manage	1	11	22	0	30	64
Routinely support	2	27	28	0	60	117
Surge capacity	**10**	26	58	0	81	175
With Type 1 or 2 teams	3	25	50	1	93	172
Null	0	1	0	0	5	6
Total	26	139	263	2	428	858

Concerns expressed by respondents focused on training, experience, and roles. Some respondents cited the need to clarify training, cross-training requirements, and responsibilities. Others noted that currently similarly named key positions actually differ significantly in their responsibilities, and that fire has a very specialized operational and planning environment requiring fire specific skills and experience (Tables 56, 57). Clarifying the similarities and differences of roles between an IMT Type 3 and a NIMS Type 3 was also said to be important.

Table 56. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Role of FEMA/DHS Teams.

From Question 2.12
Finally.....DHS / FEMA are offering grants to state OEM's at a rate we can't compete.....so we need to embrace these partners.
From Question 3.17
IMTs need to NOT be contracted out. Also avoid using FEMA teams to substitute for Wildland Fire organizations. Both configurations are problematic.
FEMA and DHS can be equals on teams, but they need to go through some training so they don't arrive not knowing the lingo and some of the main differences between what fire does and what they are used to. Same goes for us going to their incidents. Xover classes need to be finely tuned and I propose that they go as a trainee in their positions to at least one incident of LONG duration so they get the process down. It's a huge impact right now to take over from a FEMA team - like the one a NIMO team was coaching on a huge fire incident. Took forever to unscramble everything in every
Question 3.7 would need to address the quilifications of the team, most positions need to have come up through fire to be quilified for fire assignments.
I see FEMA's role as the Finance section.
Need more info on all questions ie I am not comfortable with FEMA, DHS or contract teams; frame what their use would be.
Going back to quals I see the intergration of the All HAzard teams a possible with the Operations Section being fully qualified for wildland fire response. A core C&G would be nice as well but again is there a full time workload.
FEMA has done such a bang up job so far with natural disasters why would anyone want them or DHS to try and oversee a changing environment such as a wildfire. This is one of those areas where the specialized knowledge of the fire environment is critical to the success. Sure, anyone can "organize" a group of people to perform tasks, but we wouldn't ask a NIMO team to oversee a military operation (although there are organizational similarities between military ops and large fire ops); the specific mission knowledge just isn't there.
Part of the problem during surges have been hurricane assignments using up availability. Let the states manage those.
Keep flexibility local and only involve FEMA/Milita/State on an as-needed basis. If these other entities are involved, who pays? who's in charge of the fire? budget fire costs? This gets complex fast; involve only when needed. Set up framework to use these resources at a higher level; not local.
FEMA needs to figure out what its role is going to be, however I do think that FEMA integrating could be a positive outcome if managed correctly.
All Hazard interests
With reducing federal budgets, we are going to have to use all our resources: federal, state, NIMO, contract, all hazard teams to figure out the best way to come together when the country needs us, so I understand that change is coming to

how we do some of our business.
3.7- Agency T3 teams should be used before FEMA/DHS. T3 teams should be used to suppliment the capability of the NIMO/T1/T2 teams.
Need to use Fire IMT's in more All Risk assignments. This is a perfect match. All Risk (FEMA) teams are not a good match for Wildland due to the unique complexities involved.
NATIONAL ALL HAZARD / ALL RISK. The larger issue of fire vs. all hazard national incident management needs is extremely unclear.
I believe individuals who are trained in wildland fire suppression incidents can also adapt to participating in all hazard incidents. Not all individuals involved in incident management came up through the fire organization. Some questions are directed specifically to wildland fire incidents and yet we also respond to all hazard events and incidents. IF we are looking only to wildland fire suppression or wildland fire management then my responses might be more focused but unless I'm missing something I foresee us being utilized in the National Response Framework and supporting all hazard events or incidents, and when I say us I mean NWCG agencies and employees.
FEMA/ DHS T3 teams - if they have wildland fire qualifications, they should not be excluded from use. May provide additional resource for training.
3.7 There are a number of local all risk teams which have been pulled together in the last 3-5 years. They appear to be on parallel tracks with federal teams. Why not build on what we have now by drawing in more people from the all risk teams?
While there is a need for the fully staffed rosters of our existing Type 1 and 2 IMT's, these are only practical for the largest events. There is a much bigger need for smaller IMT rosters to cover the Type 3 level of incident. DHS is quickly moving in to fill in this need, and I have to think that this will ultimately work to the detriment of the NWCG efforts. A great example of this is what is happening in Texas right now. DHS is actively lining up local Type 3 IMT's to come in and fill roles and gain experience for the current Texas fire response. As State Forestry Fire Manager, I would love to have this same opportunity for my own agency personnel, yet it remains a DHS effort. Unless NWCG wakes up to the fact that incident management in this nation is no longer just a big western fire federal deal, DHS is going to leave the NWCG efforts in the dust over the long term.
Land Management is too sophisticated these days to reduce IMT participation to the status of city fireman or paramedic, which is what would happen if you made team participation a job. IMTs need to be staffed by practicing managers, ecologists, resource specialists, timber. I don't believe that you can separate fire management from land management, which is effectively what you are doing by professionalizing teams, embracing all-risk, and opening up to DHS. Fires are always natural resource events and occasionally national emergencies. With that said, I understand that staffing teams is challenging. However, in my experience, this isn't because people don't want to help. Folks want some assurance that they are going to get used if they participate, and we have created too many training barriers that prevent young people from participating.
3.7: Most of the FEMA/DHS T3 teams are not currently qualified to manage complex wildland fire incidents. However, this is a huge untapped resource. There should be an effort to groom this resource to participate - either individuals or as teams - in wildland fire management.
Type 3 all risk teams should be called on wildland incidents for training, experience and recruitment. Type 1 and 2 teams should be called to all hazard incdients for the same reasons- so predominate wildland teams can increase their capacity to manage all risk.
3.7 I instruct a number of the L courses and based on my experience we are a very long ways from having competent team members that could manage a complex incident. These people do not have the experience to make them viable incident managers.
3.7 not familiar with these teams. i could see needing surge capacity assistance as well as FEMA/DHS funding to assist in paying portions of local partnership type 3 team positions
Full time NIMO or FEMA IMT's are not necessary.
Do not ever involve FEMA Teams - from personal experience as a DAE, FEMA, at best, has made feeble attempts to implement ICS - currently no position qualification or certifications are effectively in place. One never knows the abilities / experience of FEMA personnel assigned to incidents.
Current Best practices used in other gov civilian emergency response organizations (DHS, FEMA, Intel Agencies, etc)
3.7 What do you see as the role for FEMA/DHS Type 3 teams and agency all-hazard teams in supporting wildfires?Duplication of resources since most all hazard incidents require a team larger than at the Type 3 organization. FEMA/DHS teams, under their qualifications system are not qualified nor do they have the training/experience to manage Type 1 or Type 2 wildland fire incidents. They have had very limited exposure to the NIIMS. They understand and work within NIMS (they understand the ICS organization) however, the cross-walks for key positions have been significantly changed and are competency driven, being primarily boiler-plate responsibilities and are not task-driven responsibilities.These teams do not have wildland fire behavior specific knowledge as it relates to operations and

planning. The implications of not understanding fire behavior as it relates to operations and planning will cause injury or death on incidents. Logistics within NIMS functions completely differently then Logistics within NIIMS. NIMS Logistics deals with mitigating infrastructural issues, whereas Logistics within NIIMS provides support and services to the other functional units. These are not equal in scope or duties, and are not necessarily interchangeable positions.See no role they can play in wildland fire at the Type 1 and Type 2 levels.
From Question 4.08
I do have a problem with "all hazard" teams as currently configured. Many teams do not have the capability or expertize to handle the complexity and danger of a wildland fire situation. This MUST be addressed before these teams are allowed to manage a wildland fire at any level.
I DO NOT believe the States or All-Hazard, or contract teams will meet the needs of Federal agencies, and I strongly disagree with their FULL participation as teams. Their current status is appropriate.
The organizational structure of non-fire incidents (all-hazard) should be left to agencies such as FEMA. (However, there's room/need for standard/common position classification/certification, following the principles of ICS, to alow for better cross-utilization of resources/assets -- efficiency.)

Table 57. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Role of FEMA/DHS Teams.

I also like the idea of having FEMA-USFA type 3 teams being able to work on fire assignments. I know some may feel these teams do not have the special knowledge to manage fires. That may or may not be true, but they could order up a wildland fire model to assist them. This would be no different than when a Type I fire team is called on to work on a hurricane or incident in an urban environment and they might order a module or individuals with special expertise to help them. And there is this. It is not specifically stated in the over arching principles or in the models themselves, but I think all teams should be willing/able to respond to all risk incidents
I do like the idea of having FEMA-USA Type 3 teams being able to work on fire assignments. Not sure what the “reservist” concept is, but would like to hear more about it.
These teams can be used in a support role. I question their abilities in the realm of fire operations but they can and should be incorporated to support other functional areas of managing wildfires (logistics, liaison, planning, etc.). If a module system is developed the FEMA/DHS teams can bring expertise in the all hazard realm.
What do you see as the role for FEMA/DHS Type 3 teams and agency all-hazard teams in supporting wildfires? Duplication of resources since most all hazard incidents require a team larger than at the Type 3 organization. FEMA/DHS teams, under their qualifications system are not qualified nor do they have the training/experience to manage Type 1 or Type 2 wildland fire incidents. They have had very limited exposure to the NIIMS. They understand and work within NIMS (they understand the ICS organization) however, the cross-walks for key positions have been significantly changed and are competency driven, being primarily boiler-plate responsibilities and are not task-driven responsibilities. These teams do not have wildland fire behavior specific knowledge as it relates to operations and planning. The implications of not understanding fire behavior as it relates to operations and planning will cause injury or death on incidents. Logistics within NIMS functions completely differently then Logistics within NIIMS. NIMS Logistics deals with mitigating infrastructural issues, whereas Logistics within NIIMS provides support and services to the other functional units. These are not equal in scope or duties, and are not necessarily interchangeable positions. See no role they can play in wildland fire at the Type 1 and Type 2 levels.
As for contract Teams, this should really be looked at very closely, as it does not work well with FEMA. We should be very careful using some practices that FEMA may use, as there are many inherent failures with in FEMA's own system that do not work. I can speak directly about this as I am on a FEMA working group for developing All Hazard Task Books, and I work direct with FEMA daily. Some of the solutions and alternatives are just not thought through. The section about modules and scalability was not clear as to how we would implement it and when. It was also very confusing from the way we currently manage most incidents. It looked like USCG ICS ! This is a disappointment as many of us were looking forward to a much better product. We have many issues out there, and because of the MS Canyon Oil Spill which I have been managing since April 20, it is very clear with in DOI that we have serious issues to address with incident management and have qualified personnel.

***3.8 –Militia** - What do you see as the role of the militia - people who voluntarily participate in large fire incident management off of their home units - in staffing teams?*

There was strong support for a continuation of significant non-fire (Militia) involvement in incident management (Fig. 48, Table 58). This was one of only three Building Blocks that garnered more than 50% for any selection. Two-thirds (66%) of respondents expressed that the Militia can and should serve in any IMT role.

Figure 48. Number and distribution of responses to the Role of the Militia* in staffing teams. *The militia here is defined as people who voluntarily participate in large fire incident management off their home units.

	Single Resources	Any except C & G	Any IMT role	None	No preference	Other	Null	Total
Number of Responses	115	94	578	26	30	10	5	858
Percent	13%	11%	67%	3%	3%	1%	1%	100%

Table 58. Text provided as 'Other' choice for the Role of the Militia in staffing teams.

Exact Comment
All positions including C&G mixed in with suppression folks.
as a targeted group to ensure participation
As single resources and all team positions. Limiting how you use them will reduce the total number available for assignments.
As SR with current quals
For any position on IMTs that they are qualified to fill and there is a need, locally, for them.
For any position requested by an incident.
for any positon that is needed and they qualify to serve locally identified needs
I don't like to see GS-11 driver or Radio Operator, when I could pay a GS-02 to be doing, so until we have position based pay, I see not role, they are just using fire dollars to keep there jobs and rake in the overtime.
it is a must to use them, they are the future if not already line officers and natural resource managers we need em on board.
minimal
Non Command Role
None -- The percentage of resources into fire is already greater than needed when compared to all requirements to manage a FOREST. Local government needs to pick up its' share of the load.
Not for NIMO C&G, but for any other position on IMTs
only on unique events for public and incident staff safety; major evacuation, major event
Primarily logistics, finance, some plans. No Ops or Command.
Should be in their PDs.
Single resource and any position on the IMT
Support only, not used in operations
The militia is a thing of the past. Fire needs to take care of fire.
Until the agency supports militia and forces supervisors to support them, I see no change.
We would not make it curretnly without militia, as incentive based pay, details, and PD come into play, their probably will be less of a demad for militia.
What kind of question is this? Militia always have and maybe always should be a huge percentage of Teams. Unless we can double our workforce- is that at all likely in the near future? Come on...

Significant differences in distributions of responses (Table 59) are as follows:

- *Functional Area: Line officer/Agency Administrators* were more likely than expected to have *No Preference* and less likely than expected to prefer *Any Role Except Command and General*. Those in *Fire* functions were less likely to select *Single Resource*.
- *Incident Qualifications*: *Incident Commanders* were less likely to select *Any Except Command and General* and more likely than expected to select *Any IMT Role*. While those with *Other* incident qualifications were more likely than expected to select *No Role*, this choice was ranked fourth of five. Those with *No Incident Qualifications* were more likely than expected to be neutral.
- *Organizational Level: Local Government/Fire* respondents were more likely than others to select *None* and *Single Resource*. *State Government/Fire* respondents were more likely than expected to view the militia's role as *Single Resources*.
- *Agency:* While the vast majority of respondents see the militia serving in *Any IMT Role*, those in *Local Government/Fire* and *State Government/Fire* were more likely than expected to view the militia's role as *Single Resources*.
- *Age Range:* Although all sub-groups most frequently selected *Any IMT Role*, there was a marginal distinction in distribution of other responses: those *31-40* were more likely than expected to select *Any Role Except Command and General*, whereas fewer than expected of those *Over 50* did.

Table 59. Cross-tabulations and significance of responses to Role of Militia by demographic sub-group.
[Note: Most frequent response is indicated by **bold**. Significant difference in distribution is indicated by * at end of Table title. Cell counts significantly higher than expected are in *italics*; counts significantly less than expected are also enclosed in *()*.]

(a) by Agency*.

	BIA/Tribe	BLM	Contractor	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Total
Any IMT role	**15**	**91**	**3**	**39**	**48**	**2**	**44**	1	**303**	**20**	566
Any except C&G	4	11	0	3	10	0	5	1	56	2	92
No preference	2	7	1	4	5	0	0	0	9	2	30
None	0	3	0	*5*	1	1	1	0	12	2	25
Other	3	6	0	1	2	1	1	0	13	0	27
Single resource	1	15	1	*23*	14	0	*15*	0	*(43)*	2	114
Null	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	4
Total	25	134	5	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	858

(b) by Organizational level*.

	Contractor	FedLocal	Fed.National	Fed-Regional	LocalGovt /Fire	No professional role	StateGovt /Fire	Total
Any IMT role	**10**	**331**	**45**	**80**	**39**	**16**	45	566
Any except C&G	2	57	10	13	*(3)*	2	5	92
No preference	1	18	1	5	5	0	0	30
None	0	15	0	3	*6*	0	1	25
Other	0	17	5	3	1	0	1	27
Single resource	2	49	5	14	*22*	6	*16*	114
Null	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	4
Total	15	488	66	119	77	25	68	858

(c) by Functional area*.

	Dispatch	Fire	Fuels	LO/AA	NIMO	No role	Non-agency fire	Other agency	Other fire	Total
Any IMT role	**21**	**241**	**46**	**60**	6	**7**	**35**	**108**	**42**	566
Any except C&G	7	43	4	*(4)*	2	1	5	16	10	92
No preference	4	5	1	*9*	0	1	1	6	3	30
None	0	4	1	3	0	0	1	*10*	6	25
Other	0	11	0	2	0	0	1	10	3	27
Single resource	8	*(26)*	7	17	0	2	8	*34*	12	114
Null	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	4
Total	40	332	59	95	8	11	53	184	76	858

(d) by Incident qualification*.

	FEMA/DHS	IMT-Type 3	IMT-IC	IMT C&G	None	Other	Total
Any IMT role	**2**	**64**	***68***	**200**	**27**	**205**	566
Any except C&G	0	14	*(2)*	26	6	44	92
No preference	0	4	1	*(6)*	*9*	10	30
None	0	2	0	5	1	*17*	25
Other	0	5	2	4	1	15	27
Single resource	1	15	5	35	9	49	114
Null	0	0	0	3	0	1	4
Total	3	104	78	279	53	341	858

(e) by Age range*.

	21-30	31-40	41-50	< 20	> 50	Total
Any IMT role	**15**	**88**	**166**	1	**296**	566
Any except C&G	3	*23*	*(35)*	1	30	92
No preference	1	3	14	0	12	30
None	0	3	7	0	15	25
Other	1	8	6	0	12	27
Single resource	6	13	35	0	60	114
Null	0	1	0	0	3	4
Total	26	139	263	2	428	858

Comments suggested there is a need to work with supervisors to ensure militia have access to training and, once trained, are allowed opportunities to serve (Tables 60, 61).

Table 60. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Role of the Militia.

From Question 2.12
Recognition and use of AD personnel in order to meet incident needs after RG personnel are expended or overcommited should be considered and structured.
As an AD, it is important that I have the opportunity to participate in the fire teams and have access to training that I need.
From Question 3.17
Why not an option for all NWCG federal agency personnel required to participate in fire.
Teams working together for several years tends to provide for a more effective and efficient outcome. Use of militia personnel for any and all positions provides for a much larger pool to draw from. Emphasis needs to be placed on encouraging and mentoring malitia and young fire funded folks by Line and Staff...like they did when I started with the militia...to get qualified for individual and team positions.
We need Single Resource type positions frequently such as Logs, Plans, Finance at the Type 2 level. Folks with teams do not respond to these requests. That leaves militia still willing to play.
Leadership comes or can come from many sources. The skills for IM lie in many "day jobs". The militia model can tap this resource. However, the militia concept needs renewed and better support to meet its potential What is especially missing from the militia model is training support (time and travel funding). There should also be mandatory orientation for all new employees on militia opportunities for line or IM work Given good support, the militia provides a valuable and very flexible resource.
Line officers need to be sure that their training investment (sending militia to fire classes etc) will pay off in fire IMT assignments.

I believe the militia works, but more emphasis should be placed on the fire funded personnel to support and other staff areas could maybe have some kind of incentive?? We need better overall marketing within the federal agencies for all employee supporting this mission.
As a regular (non-fire) employee who has progressed to an AOBD position with ORCA during my 33 years of government service, I believe that there is an important part of the militia that the agency is losing by giving preference to only those in fire and fuels positions. A prime example is the helicopter CWN program which is being slowly phased out and replaced by the exclusive-use helicopter program. There are a lot of highly intelligent regular government employees (biologist, foresters, soil scientist, etc.) that can become very effective leaders if given the opportunity and encouragement to progress up the ranks in the wildland firefighting community. Put the expectation to participate in fire fighting back in the PDs of those physically fit and use them.
I think there is a need to look at the need for taskbooks for non critical operational (fire line) jobs and search for people with expirence in that function. It seems to be bottle necking folks in planning, logistics , and finance.
Also, to get the militia involved some key things need to change. First, more education and outreach needs to occur. Most of the time the applications never even make it to them. FMO's at all level need to increase the outreach. Second, and most important, Supervisors and especially Line Officers need to be on board with their people being on Teams and/or doing single resource work. This needs to come from the Chief as a mandate with METRICS for Forest Supervisors, otherwise this will never ever change. Militia people are just too overwhelmed with their regular jobs and supervisors don't see it as a priority. The culture of helping on fires is being replaced with fires being an annoyance to managers.
It has been an honor and a privlage to have been on a type 1 team for 15 years. It saddens me to see the younger generation turn their backs of the opportunity & responsibility to contribute to the fire organization. All natural resource specialists have a responsibility to contribute to the extent that they are able.
I was in fire for 7 years and then moved to timber. I would like to help in any way, but timber targets usually keep me from fire opportunities.
Militia use - as more people retire, critical C&G positions will be vacant if fire leadership does not actively promote/ push middle managers and field personal to participate on IMTs. There needs to be a bridge that will phase in these new people as vacancies open. Many times, because a militia member holds a spot on a team - no one is looking for a of PFT to fill it in turn. For example, a militia member holds the lead PIO2 position on the team I'm on. Under him is a fully qualified PFT and another PFT trainee. While he serves as the lead, he doesn't allow the other, less experienced PFT to get experience because he's in the primary leadership position.
.3.8 the more local forces that assist in the management of fire the better. unfamiliarity with terrain in some landscapes is what puts firefighters in jeopardy. we need to initiate the process of enabling agencies, tribes, local governments, and NGOs, or "communities" to address the fire management issue and let it become an organized social structure that works towards getting ahead of the problem while knowing what to do and where, when fire comes.
3.8 If a "militia" member has the skills and is good, why should they be limited in assignments? If the real goal of Fire Leadership is to make good use of talent and reduce staffing shortages - DO NOT create barriers - which, in my opinion is one reason for our staffing problems today. After all, citizen soldiers answered the bell and won this nation's greatest victories - the Civil War, and WW II. A small professional military could not have done it.
3.8 and 3.13: Participation on IMTs should remain voluntary. Mandatory participation would reduce the quality of participation. However, participation in fire management should be made mandatory by the employing agency.
Where is the discussion of AD's. Throughout the IMTs there is increased usage of AD's despite efforts to limit AD participation. Will we create standards for AD participation that ensures a more professional AD workforce?
I believe it is critical for the future success of IMT's that we create the enabling legislation and support to being non-traditonal agenicies and individuals into the mix.
3.8 militia current management support of any militia is lip service and the type of people the are currently hired do not know / want to work fire!
You need to include ADs in your thinking. We've got experience, we're eager, and we're a true militia!
AD's have full opportunity to participate in fire and receive the training that we need.
(3.8)The militia group must not be forgotten, th
3.8 What do you see as the role of the militia in staffing teams?Continue to use militia concept since it brings a diverse pool of IQCS qualified individuals and does not place an undue burden on the fire organization to support year-round positions that would be paid out of suppression funds. Make fire team support part of individual vacancy announcements and performance standards (e.g. acquisition, engineering, etc.). Educate supervisors in the need to support fire and adhere to management's requests for "let your people go" during peak fire seasons. Make managers responsible by putting support of wildfire into their position descriptions and on vacancy announcements. Militia should be in any position on IMT's.
From Question 4.08

Integrating firefighting as part of federal employees "every-day" job is more efficient and practical as all of you babyboomers retire. We worked better as employees and agencies when everyone could do everything. Making things more complex and more expensive is not practicable in today's personnel or fiscal environment.
Militia people who are being denied fire assignments because of existing workload aren't helped by adding more requirements. They are more likely to simply not get qualified.
Emphasis on getting militia involved.
Unless you use the malitia and fire people of the agencies you are implementing a model that does not grow people. Contracts and permanent people will make a carreer out of IMT management. This will lead to little turn over and less training. Currently with mandatory participation you can train a lot of people and would have the ability to create more teams when conditions require more.

Table 61. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Role of the Militia.

What do you see as the role of the militia in staffing teams? Continue to use militia concept since it brings a diverse pool of IQCS qualified individuals and does not place an undue burden on the fire organization to support year-round positions that would be paid out of suppression funds. Make fire team support part of individual vacancy announcements and performance standards (e.g. acquisition, engineering, etc.). Educate supervisors in the need to support fire and adhere to management's requests for "let your people go" during peak fire seasons. Make managers responsible by putting support of wildfire into their position descriptions and on vacancy announcements. Militia should be in any position on IMT's.
The home unit. Don't forget the home unit. We have to keep the units staffed with duty officers, engines and crews. It may be really great to write we are going to require everyone to be on a team, but is that really feasible? Some units are short handed with overhead, you cannot strip the district of its overhead to make a team commitment and then who takes care of the district? Same with the crews and engines, we cannot strip the crews and engines of there overhead completely, we have to keep people safe and take care of the home unit.

Team Coordination

Team coordination covered team configuration and dispatching

3.9 – Team Configuration - What is the best way to configure Teams?

Nominally, the current 27 plus trainees (*Large as per Mob Guide*) choice was the most frequent selection (Fig. 49, Table 62), although there was more support for medium sized teams (36% when *Medium with Modules* is combined with *Medium with Single Resources*). Small teams, by comparison, were selected by 166 respondents. Despite the negative response to modules and service centers (overarching principles), modules are a more popular option than augmenting teams with single resources. The reason would seem to be the benefits of cohesion gained by consistent membership.

Figure 49. Number and distribution of responses to Team Configuration.



	Small - modules	Small - single resource	Medium - modules	Medium - single resource	Large - per Mob Guide	No preference	Other	Null	Total
Number of Responses	106	60	192	116	271	39	66	8	858
Percent	12%	7%	22%	14%	32%	5%	8%	1%	100%

Table 62. Text provided as 'Other' choice for Team Configuration.

Grouping	Exact Comment
Combination	A combination of small, medium, and large configurations (even within the same team) augmented by service centers, modules, or single resource orders depending on the complexity of the fire and the resources threatened..
	A combination of the\ 2 medium options presented
	adaptable sized teams based on incident complexity
	All must be considered, expect very little will change on sizes except for infrequent specific local agencies
	Any of the above depending on the situation.
	any of the above without service centers. When we lose the militia we will fail big time just look at CA
	Combination of Medium options
	Combination of small, medium and large configurations
	mix as needed
	Mix of the three
	Multiple
	Range of configurations.
	should a mix of core team state and standard roster
	Some of everything as determined by local coordinating groups
	Some sort of combination of the 2 medium options. Standard 27 roster, with the option to use modules or order single resources.
	Stop trying to use the current models, create two (Small/Large) that fit the current needs environment and then add 6-10 trainees/mentees to each

	You will need a combination of teams. Given we currently have 45 teams which in my opinion is about right. There should be a blend of the three types of teams. This would include the ten member permanent teams which could be augmented by service centers and modules. We will still need the Medium sized teams which would look like the current type 2 team configuration. There will always be a need for ten or so Large Configurations which should be at the type 1 complexity level.
Large	I believe the Large configuration is the best. The team must be scalable to meet the needs of the requesting unit. Team members need to be accepting of the fact they may not get to go everytime, or may be sent home early if necessary.
	I would go with large, but need flexibility to grow or shrink as situation dictates.
	Large –Per National and GACG Mob Guide Standard 27 + 17 negotiated + unlimited trainees based upon team determination
	Large Teams and service centers to support 20 NIMOs
	Large, but that doesn't mean that every person has to be dispatched to every incident.
Medium	If you can support it with resources/rosters to fill the sections, Medium, 27 roster, filling single resource orders, otherwise Large
	Medium - Standard 27 roster + an appropriate number of mentees i.e. 6
	Medium – Standard 27 roster augmented by service centers and modules (such as planning, operations, aviation, and logistics), include single resource orders for specific incident needs, retain option for just the Command and General Staff
	Medium - standard 27 roster, but augmented by single resource - I think service center/module concept is disastrous.
	Medium + trainees
	Medium permanent roster with Flexible and dynamic
	medium size plus need modules, service centers, and single resources capability
	Medium w/service centers, modules and single resources
	Medium, but no augmentation be service centers or modules.
	Medium/Large - standard 27 with expanded team positions pre-identified for large team
	Option 3 and 4 (Medium -- Standard 27 roster augmented by service center and modules and other needs filled by single resources centers).
Scalable	Can be scaled to the incident but should always include mentees to continue to develop new IMT members
	Flexible teams that can grow or contract to the needs of the incident.
	Make the configuration fit the need.
	Scalable, depending on incident complexity
	scalable; roster as large, scale back as needed
Small	I'm on a small team already--we grow as needed.
	Short team (10 person), service centers and/or single resource orders.
	small- command and general supported by partners identified in local area operating plan that is augmented as additional needs arise
	Small team that is built up to match the need
	Small-C&G augmented by service centers, modules and single resource orders if needed.
	Small-Command and general staff, with a requirement that the home unit have employees with mandatory quals that would be assigned.
Misc.	27standard+13 negotiated
	32 + single resource orders
	as is but not the modules or service centers
	Between Medium and Large
	Come on! So, what kind of dog is your favorite pet? What if I like cats? This is entirely based on current stove piping of the fire org and is not useful in the rapidly changing world. Which so-called all risk IMT could have handled Fukujima?
	I don't have expertise in this
	I have read the .ppt on NWCG site, but hard to conceive all implications of module/service center concept. This does seem to be a concept with much promise and advantages. At the same time, the current Large team configuration has the distinct advantages for training experience of pre-season selection/identification of promising trainees (negotiated) and apprentices(mentees). The teams can always be dispatched in "short" teams, as is currently done. The 2 options for Small teams seems vulnerable to loosing critical team continuity/cohesion, reducing effectiveness. However, the service centers/modules would have cohesiveness of their own (I assume) and depending on how that concept is developed, there may possibly be more opportunity for trainees to move up ladder than the current system (which sometimes gives too much impression of being a "country club/good ol'boy" atmosphere)
	I see the use and configuration into more type 3 teams with a strong Logistics section needed.
	Incident Dependent
	Let IC Decide.
	like current configuration with option of negotiation.
	No augmentation by service centers!

	No change
	Not sure where you think you are going to get all these people from Service Centers and Modules. One of the benefits of having local teams is the lower cost of mobilization. Your budget is going to be a huge factor in putting these teams together. The advantage of having a team that is together is their ability to get right to work. Trying to integrate modules into a team can be time consuming.
	Something between medium & large. Teams should include positions form IC down to Unit Leaders.
	standard 27 + 10 mentees; less negotiated; service center support; NO MODULES (waste of money); other needs filled by single resource with emphasis on closest appropriate resource & without agencies being territorial
	Standard 27 with a roster to augment when more are needed
	Standard 50 person team that has proven so well to work with the Type II team I have been with.
	the larger IMT Pool is comprised of a 300-500 person resource pool within a defined area. Rosters for IMT rotations are established based on anticipated area need and adjust to meet anticipated incident characteristics.
	This question needs to consider all of the existing team typing levels (1-5). By focusing solely on the Type 1 and 2 level, you are missing the very reason ICS was developed. The bigger issue for most Type 1 and 2 Teams is how to effectively ramp up with enough resources to meet all of the various requirements imposed on large fire performance. Consequently, they many times more than even the "large" staffing levels to meet agency expectations. The problem isn't staffing - the problem is the number of performance requirements within each function.

There were several significant differences in the distribution of responses (Table 63):

- *Incident Qualifications*: *IMT-Type 3* qualified respondents far preferred *Medium* sized teams (45% combining both *Medium* options) over their next most frequent selection (*Small,* 24% combining both *Small* options); this was distinctly different from IMT-*ICs,* 40% of whom preferred the existing configuration, followed by 28% who preferred a *Medium* configuration, and for whom frequency of *Other* configurations exceed those of *Small*. *IMT-C&G* respondents fall between those two, with slightly more preferring *Medium* over *Large*. Those with *No Incident Qualifications* strongly preferred one of the *Small* configurations, followed by one of the *Medium* configuration*.* Those with *Other* incident qualifications preferred the existing *Large* slightly over one of the *Medium.* These data translate into significant differences in distribution.
- *Organizational Level: Federal-National* respondents selected *Small* most frequently, and *Local Government/Fire* respondents selected *Large*, as opposed to the other sub-groups, for whom the ranking by frequency was *Medium, Large,* then *Small*.
- *Agency: Local Government/Fire* respondents were the only sub-group to prefer the status quo *Large* most often (56%). All other sub-groups selected *Medium* most frequently, with *Large* ranking second and *Small* ranking third. *Local Government/Fire* respondents were more likely than expected to choose *Large*. The difference in distribution is noted when one considers that a much greater proportion of *Local Government/Fire* respondents desire this than *BLM* respondents. A higher than expected number of *BLM* respondents selected *Small-Single Resource*, and fewer than expected *Local Government/Fire* respondents selected *Small–Modules*.

Table 63. Cross-tabulations and significance of responses to Team Configuration by demographic sub-group. [Note: Most frequent response indicated by **bold**; significant difference in distribution by * at end of Table title. Cell counts significantly higher than expected are in *italics*; counts significantly less than expected are also enclosed in *()*.]

(a) by Agency*.

	BIA/ Tribe	BLM	Contractor	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Total
Large - per Mob Guide	5	***(30)***	1	***42***	**23**	2	**24**	0	**138**	6	271
Medium- modules	**6**	27	0	16	16	0	17	2	96	**12**	192
Medium- single resource	2	22	**2**	7	13	0	12	0	56	2	116
No preference	*3*	2	0	4	7	0	0	0	20	*3*	39
Other	3	14	0	2	4	0	4	0	36	3	66
Small - modules	5	23	1	*(2)*	11	0	5	0	59	0	106
Small - single resource	1	*16*	1	2	5	2	4	0	27	2	60
Null	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	7	0	8
Total	25	134	5	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	858

(b) by Organizational level*.

	Contractor	Federal-Local	Federal-National	Federal-Regional	Local Govt/Fire	No professional role	State Govt/Fire	Total
Large - per Mob Guide	**5**	**141**	*(11)*	**34**	***43***	**12**	**25**	271
Medium- modules	2	111	15	28	15	3	18	192
Medium- single resource	4	66	6	14	8	7	11	116
No preference	0	27	1	6	5	0	0	39
Other	0	42	8	9	2	1	4	66
Small - modules	1	60	***16***	20	*(2)*	1	6	106
Small - single resource	2	35	8	8	2	1	4	60
Null	1	6	1	0	0	0	0	8
Total	15	488	66	119	77	25	68	858

(c) by Functional area.

	Dispatch	Fire	Fuels	LO/AA	NIMO	No role	Non-agency fire	Other agency	Other fire	Total
Large - per Mob Guide	**11**	**91**	**16**	**28**	1	**5**	**26**	**61**	**32**	271
Medium- modules	9	87	13	21	0	2	7	42	11	192
Medium- single resource	6	45	5	11	0	0	13	25	11	116
No preference	2	9	3	8	0	3	0	9	5	39
Other	1	29	4	9	1	1	2	15	4	66
Small - modules	5	41	14	13	**3**	0	3	21	6	106
Small - single resource	6	27	3	5	2	0	1	10	6	60
Null	0	3	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	8
Total	40	332	59	95	8	11	53	184	76	858

(d) by Incident qualification*.

	FEMA/DHS	IMT-Type 3	IMT-IC	IMT C&G	None	Other	Total
Large - per Mob Guide	1	*(17)*	**32**	**101**	(2)	**118**	271
Medium- modules	1	***35***	12	65	11	68	192
Medium- single resource	0	13	10	42	4	47	116
No preference	0	7	1	7	*7*	17	39
Other	0	7	*15*	22	4	18	66
Small - modules	0	17	5	23	***13***	48	106
Small - single resource	1	8	3	15	*12*	21	60
Null	0	0	0	4	0	4	8
Total	3	104	78	279	53	341	858

(e) by Age range.

	21-30	31-40	41-50	< 20	> 50	Total
Large - per Mob Guide	6	**34**	**81**	1	**149**	271
Medium- modules	**7**	**34**	63	0	88	192
Medium- single resource	5	15	30	0	66	116
No preference	2	8	17	0	12	39
Other	2	9	15	1	39	66
Small - modules	3	25	35	0	43	106
Small - single resource	1	11	20	0	28	60
Null	0	3	2	0	3	8
Total	26	139	263	2	428	858

Comments fell into two camps: (1) familiarity and cohesion as benefits and "group think" as a risk of the modules or teams options; and (2) fresh and diverse thinking as benefits and loss of social benefits (ranging from purely social, to organizational efficiency, and potentially to safety) as risks for the single-resource option (Tables 64, 65). Several comments suggested that modules might be valuable on smaller incidents or for specialized tasks (such as for Plans modules and assist local Type 3 teams and units on non-typical fires, such as long-duration, multiple objective fires), but that Teams should be maintained for use on larger, more complex incidents. The module concept for logistics met with some skepticism, mostly due to concern that LOGS do more than simply set up and dismantle camps. The module concept, which puts small units of subject matter experts on site, has greater acceptance than does the service center concept, which was interpreted to mean off-site.

There is support for rostering and initially ordering fewer people for an incident and making additional positions negotiable. Several respondents noted that *Agency Administrator*s are the ultimate decision-maker regarding how many people get ordered to an incident. Smaller IMTs, it was noted, would allow those currently committed to long-roster teams more opportunities to gain assignments as single resources. A major theme was the value of team cohesion for safety, performance, and personal reward.

Table 64. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Team Configuration.

From Question 2.12
Making the teams smaller will result in higher capacity for support of assigned teams. We have plenty of qualified personnel, it's just that there tied up on long teams or local govt without a method/dispatch method to support.
Do away with the large IMT structures and teams, it cost to much is very inefficient, too much burocracy politics, not functional, units should build up their local resources to handle incidents. ICS is good for small fire and all risk incidents, but overall IMT's are a luxury we can't afford in this budget tightening environment.
From Question 3.17
Unrelated, smaller core teams should help fill the shortage gaps of IMT members. I believe that agency IMT members have more connection with regional management units than NIMO or contract IMTs. I would like to see other options used before adding more NIMOs or contract IMTs.
3.9 - what is a service center (DOI term)?? This question needs to be better explained. I wasn't quite sure how to answer this one so I chose the status quo answer
At the same time -- we need to look at beefing up T3 orgs. The majority of incidents are T3 and they usually need just a little more organization around them to get the job done -- usually in logs, maybe finance and plans. Direct more attention to T3 teams so that there might not be a need for more complex teams.
3.9 C&G only teams have no worker bees! C&G will still not be able to get anything done until the Unit Leaders show up so why not order them with the C&G. C&G can hardly find paper and pencils, run ISuite, get an office put together, etc. It's the ULs that get things spooled up and going. Teams need to be the 27+- a few positions. Some positions need to be changed based on today's needs. Take out the COMP and add COST, take out one DIVS and add STPS, add GISS, add another PIO1/2, add another SOF1/2, add LOFR. Beef up the MIMIT concept nationally and have the CTSPs travel with that system -- that can be one of your GACC modules. They beat us to the fires sometimes. So CTSPs don't need to be included in the team configuration IF they come with MIMITs, otherwise teams will need to carry them -- and computer trailers! Add COMT. With the complex commo systems these days with all the interagency mismatch of systems the COML is tied up with that and needs a COMT to pay attention to the needs of the fire -- and the team. Add the second ATGS. If you want anything to get done you need to keep the 2 RESLs -- they are also doing DMOB, SCKN, and DOCL until or when those positions are needed. RESLs are the key to everything else -- if the ISuite data isn't put in CORRECTLY --then no one has anything to work with. One needs to focus on data entry while the other gets

works with OSCs to get the 215 and planning process done so there can be an IAP ASAP. A 'normal' SCKN is not knowledgeable enough to play that role. It really takes 2 RESLs to multi-task to get things rolling. No data - no workee! So the team I see is about 32 people for all the reasons and positions I outlined above. You can get a lot of work done immediately with ULs ordered at the same time as the C&G. THEN if you find out you don't need that many people -- then send them home. This is the part we are not good at -- we always keep everyone that shows up then we feel bad about releasing them. Don't need them -- send them home. From my 35 years, I would say that 95% of the time a team as I outlined ends up staying and ordering what else they need. So it is not a waste of time or money to bring in that many people initially.
The question isn't how many teams do we need it's how many positions should be on them. We have too many positions on teams.
We need to get back to leaner, more efficient teams and if the type 1's & 2's were classified as a "National" team who still had a GACC rotation we could get by with less teams without so many vacant positions. There might be a need for a couple NIMO teams, but the national standard roster of 27 supplemented as needed seems pretty efficient to me.
Not all questions really covered all the options. I would not call the 27 position configuration with negotiated positions and mentorees "large". Maybe refer to as "standard size". If we are to increase interest in team participation training means participation in team roles.
The concept of team use is basic: come together, provide a response to the emergency at hand and dissolve back to regular jobs. Isn't this cost effective?
Teams have become bloated, over-staffed. Very little opportunity exists anymore for a single resource at or below Unit Leader level to go on fires. Teams now order and name-request down to the level of SCKN, RADO, PTRC, when local people can be trained on-the-spot for these types of positions. Going on fires as a single resource is FUN. And the fire pays your salary, so there is a benefit of salary savings (P-code savings) for your home unit. Teams should be minimal and less job specific, and they should order single resources to augment as necessary. Young fire personnel can be groomed to move up in a functional area by starting at the lower levels on local incidents and gaining experience by going out as a single resource to fires in other parts of the country. We already have in place an efficient national dispatch system which can provide qualified single resources, available to mobilize for any incident. If all these people weren't committed to teams, they could make themselves available at their convenience and go staff whichever fire needs them. Not necessarily with "their buddies" but where the fire situation dictates.
Teams have grown too large and bureaucratic in recent years. The majority of firefighters I talk to prefer the smaller more 'intimate' Type 2 and 3 teams. Decisions are made quickly and without forming a committee. More efficient and cost effective also. Some of the Type 2 teams have become just slightly smaller versions of their 'Big' brothers. You see the same people on the same teams year after year. They seem a little stale at times.
My answers are based on my experiences working in the Finance Section. I think the FS should have a FSC1/FSC2, TIME & COST. There are too many situations that on incidents that need to be addressed at the incident in a face to face discussion concerning finance. I believe Service Centers could be used for entering time into I-Suite & processing claims. Most all purchasing is being handled by Buying Teams and local unit individuals with small purchasing authority. This would drop the standard team size to 26. I am currently working on a FSC2 task book.
Again...the operative in IMT is TEAM! Modularization will compromise that inter-team dynamic that only comes from training and working together.
Develop short and long teams expandable and flexible to meet administrator needs
Personally, I like the current model. I know the people I'm going out with, the equipment that is available, if the equipment is working and any associated quirks, local personnel and the geographic area where we will be deployed. If the team configuration changed too drastically, I don't think I would want to be a part of it. The part that I love is working really hard for 2 weeks with people I like working with and are like family to me. I've tried other teams and had bad experiences. When you're on an incident that's pushing you to your limits, you want to know the person standing next to you. Know their limits and be confident that they know yours. I'm tired of training so called 'qualified' people who come in as a single resource. How can you be qualified if you can't even start the application you're supposed to use? If I need a back-up, that person needs to be qualified and having an existing working relationship helps things go more smoothly. Additionally, the way the teams are set-up currently, there are people from different agencies and specialties through out the team. They bring different skill sets, ideas and knowledge which give a broader view of issues and can help out local units.
The service center/module concept seems like it would fail the first time we hit PL 3... teams are going to get the good people and I doubt people would have enough loyalty to their module to not take an assignment with a team/leader

they already have a relationship with.
I was an acting Forest FMO in R5 during 2008 and personally inbriefed 16 IMTS/AC/NIMO that fire season. I have a lot of experience in managing large, long duration fires. There are pitfalls to having IMTs with a lot of people -- "group think." I've seen it over and over. There is something to be said for cohesion, but I think the negative aspects of group-think far outweigh the cohesion issue.
Team call-out has failed. Teams that are oversized for the incident muster. So a way to trigger smaller teams or modules for deployment is needed.
The use of scalable teams is essential in the future of imo's. With NIMO type-c&g, the remainder of the team can be filled out with militia. The c&g are critically important in the successful mngt of an incident, and the NIMO-type structure allows for scalability and also provides for the mentoring of up and coming personnel.
Team size - as mentioned above the IC can decide what they need to accomplish the job. More folks needed at the front of the incident and hold IC's accountable for scaling back as the duration increases.
Flattening to 1 type and shrinking the number of team members would be a good thing. On the other side, it can be really hard to get support members, so developing support modules would be helpful.
Section modules are an important part of team cohesion especially as it pertains to operations. I think the concept of module configuration should be maintained but should not be encumbered for more than 3 years. Really need to provide opportunities for up and comers to step into these modules with good leadership.
The type two teams would be held to 27 member rosters and all training positions would be organized and dispatched on a sub-geographic area basis. Surge capacity modules for finance, logistics and plans would be created to compliment the permanent teams, type 2 and type 3 teams as needed.
Smaller and more mobile modules. The good ol' boy syndrome needs to disappear. Our friends in Victoria, Australia have shown this to me a good model that is efficient and effective.
Do not think service centers are efficient.
NEGOTIATED 17 / INCIDENT WITHIN AN INCIDENT / MULTIPLE QUALS – “WILD CARDS”. The extra positions on team rosters need to be evaluated. They may need to be more versatile through cross-training / multiple quals, esp. in planning and logistics. One immediate critical justification for them is they provide greater capacity to respond to an incident within an incident by creating an organization within the organization. EVENT MODELS. NWCG should describe Event Models separate from Team Models then project #s of events relative to # of organization deployments needed (10-person Team + functional modules vs. 27-person Team)
The current teams are too large.
In my opinion teams in the future will need to be smaller and more mobile. Doesn’t under-estimate type 3 organizations in the future.
3.9 It is very important to maintain the flexibility of expanding or downsizing a team depending on the situation
Somewhere in this process I keep feeling that "team" carries little value. Just throwing individuals with skills together doesn't make a team and performance will not be the same as a group that has worked and experienced learning moments together. Professional, military and sport endeavors all realize the benefits of established teams. Happy talk about succession planning as cover for $$$ wont replace effectiveness of teams allowed to learn, grow and develop additional future team members. Teams currently respond to developing situations and waiting to fill positions or negotiate positions can cost more than sending full teams and downsizing if possible afterwards. Where is the accountability for understaffing an incident that ends up "going big" because of delayed response?
In my opinion, the best model for the most practical use on a national level is to establish IMT's with the basic Command and General Staff positions and then let these teams order the additional resources necessary for the given incident. While there is a need for the fully staffed rosters of our existing Type 1 and 2 IMT's, these are only practical for the largest events. There is a much bigger need for smaller IMT rosters to cover the Type 3 level of incident. DHS is quickly moving in to fill in this need, and I have to think that this will ultimately work to the detriment of the NWCG efforts.
The use of service centers, modules, and single resources with small (C&GS) teams will have some performance degradation in the early phases of the incident compared to standing teams. It will also place a greater level of responsibility and stress on the C&GS members. However, the “plug and play” model meets all of the other criteria established above. It is important to note that the service centers and modules will still have to be staffed by the same limited number of experience personnel and could be overwhelmed during busy fire periods.
Team size has been debated for my entire career. When workloads are honestly evaluated, a large team is necessary to accomplish the expectations of the agencies. You either can have a pre-established team that works very well together or you can have a similar sized group of individuals that are ordered as single resources or modules that really do not function as a team do the work. It should be obvious that a preselected team would be a better choice. Let the I.C's decide size based upon the mission assignment.
3.9 expandable type 3 should be organized based on local capacities and augmented based on needs. in some areas

your initial incident commander could be type 1 qualified while in others there would be 3 type 3 qualified incident commanders that serve other purposes but retain the capability of organized initial response to multiple complexes locally.
Lots of complex issues here. I think that team size should be no more than the 27 with additional positions filled as needed, and a small team configuration should also be an option. Perhaps the best way to insure the availability of a short team is to start all teams as short teams and order additional positions as dictated by assignment.
Larger teams are more desirable primarily because of the team concepts that build and grow over years. People are very proud of their membership in the various Type 1 and Type 2 teams. A small central core of leadership would largely do away with that very important characteristic of the current environment.
3.9: Large Configuration works ALOT better. The team mission is to be able to hit the ground running, and relieve the requesting agency. It is inefficient, and counterproductive to enter any incident, and then have to WAIT for "backfilling" of critical positions. (Been there done that too many times).
GACCs should have the flexibility to form modules if they choose to support core IMT structures or fill needs with single resources either assigned to team or not.
IMTs should be dynamic and scalable. the use of modules or single resources to fill in behind the C & G allows Teams to be scalable as need increase and decrease.
THE CURRENT SYSTEM IS NOT WORKING FOR SUCESSION AND A LOT OF WHAT YOU ARE PROPOSING IS NOT GOING TO WORK IF YOU DO AWAY WITH THE " TEAM CONCEPT"
3.9 if you are a team member you are ordered as a team ! no exceptions ! NO SHORT TEAM, LONG TEAM, ENTIRE TEAM !! (I AM SHOUTING) o
3.9 -- it's not a "team" if most of the people have not interacted with the C&G. The synergy is lost.
Support short team with GACC modules, fill holes local before ordering
I feel you are way off base in two very critical ways. First from a safety standpoint, you are depending on blind luck that a short team can come in a get up and running quickly. This will only happen if there is a functioning type three team or well-trained local force running the fire as they come in and the players needed to fill out the team get there quickly and are competent and compatible. Otherwise you will just prolong the transition which is listed as a watch out situation already. If we are really trying to improve we should be shortening this at all cost. Second, the short team concept seems to be politically correct way to save money (cost containment) but when teamed with Work Rest guidelines, it falls from reality to fantasy. It is nearly impossible for a IMT with 27 plus 17 plus 10 to come and get up and running for the first 3 days working only 16 hours per day. Turning a blind eye will not make it work. Mixing and matching 7 plus will not make this better. Anyone who thinks it will has been out of the game too long and should not be on this panel. Again fix the problem – there are not enough players in the game. The reason is that there is no support from the agencies. The chief of the FS can say as often as he wants, “they know what to do”. But the sad truce is most do not have a clue. Fire and emergency response is no longer a main part of our mission to most of these people, it is something we are allowed to do if it does not interfere with their priorities.
3.9 What is the best way to configure teams? The structured pre-identified team model is proven to be successful and helps build core values, trust, professionalism, continuity and efficiencies. The enormous success of Japan’s automotive and electronic manufacturing is due to their structured and established team models. The strength of our military structured team models are indicative of the direction we should be going with our own teams. There will be a loss in efficiencies under the rotating member concept—other than for trainees. The proposal for the “Core Team Model” is 35+ years old (old Interior and FS Fire Teams) and proved that long teams with designated positions needed to be established. The “Core Team Model” was not an efficient management structure. Over the last 25 years, the current team structure has been proven to be an efficient model. The current long team model can be sized, both reduced and enlarged dependent upon direction from the agency administrator and the needs of the incident. The number of team members dispatched to an incident is negotiated with the agency administrator. Agency administrators need to understand their responsibilities and authority for determining what their particular needs are, and to assert that authority. There may need to be an improvement in the education process for agency administrators (currently Fire Training for Agency Administrators) in order for them to fully understand the scope of their incident, the potential for size and complexity, and the working relationships with fire management professionals. They should be familiar with the decision making tools developed for wildfire (WFDSS etc.) so they can negotiate the size and scope of the IMT they need. Agency Administrators need to understand they should be engaged closely with the IMT’s to maximize efficiency and results. This principle is currently in place courses for administrators, however, these courses are outdated and need strengthening and should be reengineered. Configuration: Ensure that all 27 team members are rostered at the beginning of the season. Do not have “fill at

dispatch" positions. Folks are freelancing for several teams and NIMO so there may not be a true accounting of how many people are really needed for workforce development. Although accountability is outlined within the proposal, the edict for accountability already exists. Just saying it will not make it so. Management has a responsibility to ensure people are accountable. Large per national Mob Guide Standard 27+17+10 negotiated +10 mentees
From Question 4.08
I think smaller core IMTs with modular options and service centers will greatly contribute to the concerns behind this study.
2) The complexity and type of complexity can vary from incident to incident therefore one size does not fit all in order to be successful upon arrival to the incident. At the same time a team of 56 or more individuals is not necessary on every type 1 incident.
I think the biggest question is how to get enough qualified people to fill teams, not how the teams are configured.
The more centralized and formal the team the less new individuals can join and be effective, more top down approach and loss of working together for a common goal. Will end up with a ranking of positions some more important than others with a result of stifling improvement.
Consider the Safety Officer on a team from a pool of Safety Officers. There are good reasons to use this model.
Want to see more of as-you-need team build up. It would be nice to clarify what you need rather than getting a 60 person Type 1 team. Match the team size to what you need.
The larger teams are stronger in (1)Team Cohesion--working relationships-- and (2)Capacity to respond to Incident within an Incident. When I look at the "Negotiated 17" on our roster, most of them seem extremely essential including several C&G deputies. Incident within an Incident is a huge contingency, risk management issue. IWI preparedness should be the focal point for making the Negotiated 17 more purposeful. NIMO teams invite huge accountability issues in my mind. How to deal with workplan in between incidents? What about the years when fire occurrence is relatively light? I think details for fire season as part of certain PDs makes more sense financially.
Teams need to be teams down to at least the Unit Leader level. effectiveness is lost otherwise
No need for large IMT teams get rid of them put money back into I/A and local resources.

Table 65. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Team Configuration.

I do like the idea of decreasing the standard team size. Somewhere between 12 and 27 seems about right, but the exact number is not important at this time. The important piece here is that we have one team type designation, and that each team has a reduced configuration at the beginning of an incident. We can always spool up if necessary.
I do like the idea of decreasing the standard team size. Somewhere between 12 and 27 seems about right, but the exact number is not important.
What is the best way to configure teams? The structured pre-identified team model is proven to be successful and helps build core values, trust, professionalism, continuity and efficiencies. The enormous success of Japan's automotive and electronic manufacturing is due to their structured and established team models. The strength of our military structured team models are indicative of the direction we should be going with our own teams. There will be a loss in efficiencies under the rotating member concept—other than for trainees. The proposal for the "Core Team Model" is 35+ years old (old Interior and FS Fire Teams) and proved that long teams with designated positions needed to be established. The "Core Team Model" was not an efficient management structure. Over the last 25 years, the current team structure has been proven to be an efficient model. The current long team model can be sized, both reduced and enlarged dependent upon direction from the agency administrator and the needs of the incident. The number of team members dispatched to an incident is negotiated with the agency administrator. Agency administrators need to understand their responsibilities and authority for determining what their particular needs are, and to assert that authority. There may need to be an improvement in the education process for agency administrators (currently Fire Training for Agency Administrators) in order for them to fully understand the scope of their incident, the potential for size and complexity, and the working relationships with fire management professionals. They should be familiar with the decision making tools developed for wildfire (WFDSS etc.) so they can negotiate the size and scope of the IMT they need. Agency Administrators need to understand they should be engaged closely with the IMT's to maximize efficiency and results. This principle is currently in place courses for administrators, however, these courses are outdated and need strengthening and should be reengineered. Configuration: Ensure that all 27 team members are rostered at the beginning of the season. Do not have "fill at

dispatch" positions. Folks are freelancing for several teams and NIMO so there may not be a true accounting of how many people are really needed for workforce development. Although accountability is outlined within the proposal, the edict for accountability already exists. Just saying it will not make it so. Management has a responsibility to ensure people are accountable. Large per national Mob Guide Standard 27+17+10 negotiated +10 mentees
In the end it looks like the agencies have a high desire for short teams, or shorter long teams Maybe they should eliminate a few long teams and establish some short teams and try that first before looking at all of these concepts that have difficult to implement concepts like mandatory availability and temporary promotion. It may not be better than the current model (Much like NIMO may not be better than the current model)
Regardless of what approach is taken, holding the teams to a set number of people is a good idea and will save money. All the teams have gotten too big, which drives up large fire costs. We need to get back to the basics.

*3. 10 - **Dispatching** - How should Teams be dispatched?*

There is a high level of support for Geographic Area dispatching--66% prefer GACC level dispatching moving to national dispatching during scarcity over other options (Fig. 50, Table 66). Still, 29% of respondents felt otherwise and 5% had *No Preference*.

Figure 50. Number and distribution of responses to Dispatching.



Table 66. Text provided as 'Other' choice for Dispatching.

Exact Comment
As directed by State or Federal Organizations
closest resource
Combination of 1 and 2; national level dispatch rotation for all teams and GACC level dispatch rotation with nation level triggered by scarcity.
Depends on how you configure the teams. NIMO and Type I nationally, others regionally
I agree with the gacc level dispatch rotation for local events but for international events should be on a rotation not just people hanging around boise
I think IMTs should not be region specific. Teams with members from various GACCS would have varied experienced. Then they could be dispatched either by the GACC where the IC is or at a national rotation.
I think there would have to be GACC for local issues and Nationally for Larger Scale Multi GACC incidents
leave the same
Nat'l & GACC rotations, like Type 1's now
Regional rotation
small and local dispatch
through regional dispatch centers like COIC; the larger; the more regional; the more potential to be ineffective; bigger is not better

State (agency and organizational level) officials seem somewhat less enamored with national rotation than either their Federal or local colleagues, while nearly one-third of Type 3 respondents preferred dispatching by national rotation.

While the vast majority of respondents prefer local, Geographic Area dispatch except during national scarcity, there were a few notable differences in distribution of responses by sub-group (Table 67):

- *Functional Area:* Those serving in *Other* functions were more likely than expected to select *GACC at all times* and *Other*.
- *Incident Qualifications*: Only *Command and General staff* and those with *No Incident Qualifications* selected dispatching by the *GACC At All Times* as the second most frequent selection; all others selected *National* second.
- *Organizational Level: State Government/Fire* respondents were more likely than expected to select *GACC at all times* as the second most frequent choice, whereas other sub-groups selected *National At All Times*.
- *Agency:* More NPS respondents than expected selected *Other,* and *State Government/Fire* respondents were more likely than expected to select dispatch by the *GACC At All Times*.

Table 67. Cross-tabulations and significance of responses to Dispatching by demographic sub-group.
[Note: Most frequent response indicated by **bold**; significant difference in distribution by * at end of Table title. Cell counts significantly higher than expected are in *italics*; counts significantly less than expected are also enclosed in *()*.]

(a) by Agency*.

	BIA/ Tribe	BLM	Contractor	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Total
GACC at all times	2	16	**2**	12	4	2	*14*	0	39	3	94
GACC, nat'l during scarcity	**17**	**89**	1	43	**43**	2	**41**	1	**301**	**21**	559
National rotation	2	17	2	17	*19*	0	9	1	65	3	135
No preference	2	5	0	3	*9*	0	*0*	0	22	1	42
Other	2	4	0	0	2	0	*0*	0	7	0	15
Null	0	3	0	0	3	0	2	0	5	0	13
Total	25	134	5	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	858

(b) by Organizational level*.

	Contractor	Federal -Local	Federal- National	Federal- Regional	Local Govt/Fire	No professional role	State Govt/Fire	Total
GACC at all times	4	50	*(1)*	11	*13*	1	14	94
GACC, nat'l during scarcity	**6**	320	**43**	**83**	**45**	**19**	**43**	559
National rotation	5	69	14	18	15	5	9	135
No preference	0	31	4	3	4	0	0	42
Other	0	9	4	2	0	0	0	15
Null	0	9	0	2	0	0	2	13
Total	15	488	66	119	77	25	68	858

(c) by Functional area*.

	Dispatch	Fire	Fuels	LO/AA	NIMO	No role	Non-agency fire	Other agency	Other fire	Total
GACC at all times	*13*	34	2	9	1	0	5	18	12	94
GACC, nat'l during scarcity	***(16)***	**229**	49	**56**	**6**	***(6)***	**36**	**114**	**47**	559
National rotation	7	47	6	19	1	1	11	31	12	135
No preference	0	9	1	10	0	4	1	14	3	42
Other	*3*	8	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	15
Null	1	5	1	1	0	0	0	3	2	13
Total	40	332	59	95	8	11	53	184	76	858

(d) by Incident qualification*.

	FEMA/DHS	IMT-Type 3	IMT-IC	IMT C&G	None	Other	Total
GACC at all times	0	12	6	31	8	37	94
GACC, nat'l during scarcity	**2**	**57**	**59**	**199**	**27**	**215**	559
National rotation	1	*30*	9	*(29)*	7	59	135
No preference	0	2	2	8	9	21	42
Other	0	1	1	*6*	2	5	15
Null	0	2	1	6	0	4	13
Total	3	104	78	279	53	341	858

(e) by Age range.

	21-30	31-40	41-50	< 20	> 50	Total
GACC at all times	3	10	31	0	50	94
GACC, nat'l during scarcity	**17**	**94**	**169**	**2**	277	559
National rotation	3	22	40	0	70	135
No preference	2	7	14	0	19	42
Other	0	2	6	0	7	15
Null	1	4	3	0	5	13
Total	26	139	263	2	428	858

Comments provided some additional detail and depth to reveal specific reasons for supporting either geographic or national level dispatching (Tables 68, 69).

Table 68. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Dispatching.

From Question 2.12 None
From Question 3.17
We need to think of how to steer fire employees towards non operational positions. This is my own opinion, but it seems that fire employees, because of our operational jobs are forced/steered towards gaining operational qualifications. We should take a good look at finding those individuals that want and can do logistics, planning, finance, etc. We have to find a way to shift peoples thinking to wanting to do more than just operations. I can use myself as an example, I would love to do planning or finance, but it is unrealistic for me to pursue these qualifications right now because in order for me to move up in the fire organization I need to finish my ICT3 and DIVS, once those are complete then I will start looking at getting into those other qualifications. How many years is that going to be though? What is our outlook/need in these positions? I want to get into other positions, you have your work cut out for you to figure out how to get others to want to fill those positions that aren't operational.
I believe that team management needs to be strengthened at the GACC level.
Can NWCG manage the IMT system yet? I say leave them at the GACCs/NICC for closer direction. NIMO teams shouldn't turn into defacto Area Command teams and then the "type 2 teams" are left working for them fighting the fires.
I also think that the team rotation needs to stay geographic with local areas. Travel costs should be a consideration as well as knowledge of the local area. Only if local teams are not available should out-of-area teams be brought in.
Local management of teams has failed. ICs do not select members based on what is best for the Federal Agencies. So the selection criteria & oversight should bump up to the national level.
3.10 local type 3 short teams should be rotate at the district level to ensure fires are not initially suppressed when resource benefits are to be achieved (like a completed fuels project, or a recent burn, etc.). this may in some cases be a fire that starts on public land, private land, or tribal land, and/or within a restored landscape condition that has not missed its specified return interval, so having the diverse local representation on the initial team can expedite these decisions and consistency can be achieved instead of being based on changing perceptions (i.e. constantly changing District Rangers, Forest Supervisors, incident commanders, etc.).
3.10: GACC's need to dispatch their teams. GACC's know their readiness, have a more personal knowledge of their readiness, fatigue level, etc. Going Nationally will reduce this efficiency.
A national rotation should be maintained to provide opportunity to work for all teams.
3.10 How should teams be dispatched? GACC's should still be allowed to manage their own workforce. Teams assigned to GACC's can be available for nation rotations as the Type 1 teams are now. A national team rotation should be established. When all the GACC teams are committed, the national roster is activated. GACC's should not be "standing down" their last available team. All teams should be used then the national roster activated.
3.10 GACC teams have great expertise in their area -- leave them there to work that -- the national rotation that T1s have should be used for all teams if they are combined into 1 type. So you would have current GACC rotations and then

a national rotation by GACC -- not by number of teams -- when it's that GACCs turn as #1 then they send their #1 team on the GACC rotation. Once a GACC has used all their teams (EA, SA, AK, SW) then those with lots of teams would just keep recycling. This way all teams would get a chance at getting out of their home territory once in a while. Keep the system where once a team goes out on national assignment, they get *** so everyone has a equal chance -- at least a round one.
From Question 4.08 None

Table 69. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Dispatching.

How should teams be dispatched? GACC's should still be allowed to manage their own workforce. Teams assigned to GACC's can be available for nation rotations as the Type 1 teams are now. A national team rotation should be established. When all the GACC teams are committed, the national roster is activated GACC's should not be "standing down" their last available team. All teams should be used then the national roster activated.

Workforce Succession

Workforce succession includes how to manage trainees and what the overall strategy should be for ensuring successful workforce development.

3.11 –Managing Trainees: *What is the best way to manage trainees?*

Although the *status quo* response of continuing to roster trainees with teams was the most frequent single choice, more respondents would prefer to manage trainees in some sort of central pool with national and/or GACC control (n = 408, as compared to n = 371 for team rostering; Fig. 51, Table 70). More of the GACC supporters selected *GACC with a Central Pool* over a national pool. An additional 30 respondents suggested managing with both rostering with teams and GACC involvement.

Figure 51. Number and distribution of responses to Managing Trainees.



	Rostered with Teams	GACC - local pool	GACC - national pool	No preference	Other	Null	Total
Number of Responses	371	309	99	28	45	6	858
Percent	43%	36%	12%	3%	5%	1%	100%

Table 70. Text provided as 'Other' choice for Managing trainees.

Grouping (n)	Exact Comment
Combination (30)	a combination of team rostered and central GACC pool
	A combination of Trainees rostered with Teams, Trainees managed as central pool by local GACCs and at at national level
	All of the above plus we need to inform line officers that trying to manage costs by limiting trainees is a shot right through the foot. How do we ever expect to maximize team succession when we tell line officers they are doing a good job by not training
(3)	Both 1 and 2
	both w/ teams and GACC
	combination of 1 and 2
	Combination of both--standing trainees on roster plus pre-identified number of positions filled with central pool (GACC/Local).
	Combination of managed by GACCs and national level. Trainees should be able to be trained up outside of their local GACC area.
	combination of rostered and pool
(2)	Combination of rostered with Teams and managed by GACCs.
	combination of rostered with Teams, but with oversight of the GACC if necessary to fill in with additional assignments in slow years
	Combination, scarce positions managed as a pool to get these trained up quicker, abundant positions rostered with teams.
	Combination of rostered and GACC pool by priority.
	GACC level priority pools feed into a National level priority trainee pools
	Limited rostered with teams and majority in central pool by GACC.
	Option 1 and 2 (rostered with Teams and manage as central pool by local GACCs)
	Rostered with teams and accelerated development programs for shortage positions.
(2)	Rostered with teams and managed as central pool by local GACCs
	Trainees can be rostered and have a pool managed by the local GACC.
	Trainees managed by local GACCS with national level triggered by scarcity, each trainee should be rostered on a home team.
	Trainees rostered with a team & have a central pool at the GACC to supplement as needed.
	Trainees rostered with teams but available in a national pool
	trainees rostered with teams but combined with a pool of trainees managed by local GACC's. Small pool set up with the most critical trainee positions and the trainees closest to certification included.
	Trainees rostered with Teams, but available for dispatch with other teams
	with teams and local GACCs
	X # per team, the remainder pooled at the GACC
Miscellaneous (16)	By those desiring to move up and take initiative in their career.
	Federal, State or Local?
	Local/GACC/National ordering process. Local fires should provide training to local personnel first.
	managed by local level (forest, park or BLM district) with a minimum number of trainee on team incidents including C&G positions
	mix as needed
	Negotiation w/unit hosting incident
(2)	See comments 3.17
	Stay with current system
	Trainees need to be put on teams once fully qualified. They must, or they will go to a different open position.
	Trainees managed at the region level. Trainees need to go out with more than just one team!
	Trainees need a wide range of experience so working with a wider variety of people/teams is critical so not assigned to teams but there needs to be equity among trainees not favorites or buddy system trainees
	Trainees rostered with team with a pool of scarce skill positions
	trainees rostered with teams but allow for flexibility so share trainees among all teams
	unk
	What is determined to be best value

Local organizational levels more strongly leaned towards rostering with teams, though the *GACC-Central Pool* option was favored by *Federal-Regional* and *Federal-National*, *Line Officer/Agency Administrator*, and *Type 3* respondents. Significant differences in distribution of responses follow (Table 71):

- *Functional Area:* Although the *Line Officer/Agency Administrator* respondents were the only group to more frequently select *GACC-Local* trainee management over *Rostering with Teams*; the difference was not significant. Those respondents were, however, more likely than statistically expected to select *No Preference*.
- *Incident Qualifications*: The highly significant difference in distribution was driven by the high number of respondents with *No Incident Qualifications* (*None*) selecting *NoPreference*.

Table 71. Cross-tabulations and significance of responses to Managing Trainees by demographic sub-group. [Note: Most frequent response indicated by **bold**; significant difference in distribution by * at end of Table title. Cell counts significantly higher than expected are in *italics*; counts significantly less than expected are also enclosed in *()*.]

(a) by Agency.

	BIA/ Tribe	BLM	Contractor	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Total
GACC- local pool	**9**	48	0	27	22	1	26	1	165	10	309
GACC- national pool	3	18	0	8	11	1	5	0	49	4	99
No preference	1	4	0	2	5	0	1	0	14	1	28
Other	5	7	0	3	3	1	5	0	21	0	45
Rostered with teams	7	**57**	**5**	**35**	**38**	1	**29**	1	**185**	**13**	371
null	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	5	0	6
Total	25	134	5	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	858

(b) by Organizational level.

	Contractor	Federal-Local	Federal-National	Federal-Regional	Local Govt/Fire	No professional role	State Govt/Fire	Total
GACC- local pool	2	168	**25**	**48**	27	11	28	309
GACC- national pool	3	53	14	16	8	1	4	99
No preference	1	18	1	4	2	0	2	28
Other	0	20	8	9	3	0	5	45
Rostered with teams	**9**	**223**	18	42	**37**	**13**	**29**	371
Null	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	6
Total	15	488	66	119	77	25	68	858

(c) by Functional area*.

	Dispatch	Fire	Fuels	LO/AA	NIMO	No role	Non-agency fire	Other agency	Other fire	Total
GACC- local pool	15	123	25	**41**	1	4	19	56	25	309
GACC- national pool	*(1)*	38	5	11	**4**	0	4	29	7	99
No preference	1	5	1	8	0	2	1	8	2	28
Other	1	23	*2*	3	1	0	0	14	1	45
Rostered with teams	**22**	**139**	**26**	32	2	**5**	**29**	**76**	**40**	371
Null	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	6
Total	40	332	59	95	8	11	53	184	76	858

(d) by Incident qualification.

	FEMA/DHS	IMT-Type 3	IMT-IC	IMT C&G	None	Other	Total
GACC- local pool	1	**43**	**32**	97	18	118	309
GACC- national pool	1	17	5	27	6	43	99
No preference	0	3	0	4	9	12	28
Other	0	4	8	13	1	19	45
Rostered with teams	1	37	30	**136**	**19**	**148**	371
Null	0	0	3	2	0	1	6
Total	3	104	78	279	53	341	858

(e) by Age range.

	21-30	31-40	41-50	< 20	> 50	Total
GACC- local pool	7	44	100	1	157	309
GACC- national pool	3	19	30	0	47	99
No preference	2	2	10	0	14	28
Other	0	9	10	0	26	45
Rostered with teams	**14**	**62**	**113**	1	**181**	371
Null	0	3	0	0	3	6
Total	26	139	263	2	428	858

Comments suggested that the interest in GACC involvement comes from those who are interested in participating but can't get traction with a team (Tables 72, 73). Relevant and frequent comments pointed out that training opportunities should not be based on who a person knows, but on qualifications and need.

Table 72. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Managing Trainees.

From Question 2.12
Also, for training successor IMT members, having cadre's or qualified individuals is desirable.
From Question 3.17
I have been an incident business management specialist for the past 4 years, but have been to only 3 fires. The ROSS system doesn't work. No one wants a trainee. Orders are filled by name requests. With no contacts or experience, I never get out, and am not made aware if there is a fire. Teams have the same members every year. Recent attempts to incorporate trainees by my NWCG committee has resulted in the same yearly team members with one trainee. The next year is the same team members with one trainee. There is no way for a trainee to become a regular member, maintain a taskbook, or advance to section leader. There should be a mandatory rotation of ALL team members to allow a trainee to advance in the section. For example, a buying team member must advance to buying team leader within 3 years else their participation is relinquished. The buying team leader must be rotated out every three years. I am very passionate about succession planning if you ever want my input.
3.11 Trainees -- all trainees 620-520-420 etc. -- need to be in a national pool. The point is to get training, get the PTB done -- this is the fastest way to do that. Always has been, always will. When we started to assign trainees to specific teams, we screwed the process -- now trainees wait and wait and wait for "their" team to go out -- which hasn't been good the last 3 years. It's put us way behind the power curve -- STOP IT! National trainee pool -- they get more diverse training and more of it -- also make them have at least 3 different assignment sign offs on their PTBs so that they are forced to get a variety of experiences -- signing people off on one fire is WRONG no matter how long that fire has been going.
I feel we need to have more T2 training teams as we do in R8. It's very successfully and we seen positive results. We can't wait for the 5 year plan, we can incorporate this now. We have some very knowledge retired team members in key roles, why haven't we put a trainee's with them? We need to use are retired folks as trainers not just as team members.
Trainees should be attached at the hip to any team until they complete the taskbook. We've fallen short on trainees due to cost containment and that one of the issues were dealing with right now. In the past five years I have only one trainee for my position on my team.
I like the ideas of a National Train Plan & a National pool of trainees.
3.11 I think the Gacc should have control of trainees but the current way that the teams are configured is fine with 6 trainee position that way the C&G can look to there succession for the team and filling positions that are scarce compensation would be good and would help with participation does not matter which way you did it
As someone who was assigned as a trainee to a specific team, that was the BEST way for me to gain expertise.
I hate the good ol boy system that evolves in/on IMT's we put many people in these positions not due to ability or experience but more about who some one can go drink beer with afterwards pretty disgusting. This promotes fast tracking and weakens the whole organization that is why we need smaller teams with more true professionals that can work with a wider variety of people.
Trainees need to be roster on teams. Cohesion Build the team
I think one of the bottle necks is the limited number of trainees slots on incidents. To fill anticipated needs, trainee opportunities should be increased.

The opportunity to share IMT positions should also be allowed/encouraged.
Current team configuration seems most responsive to the critical needs for trainees and succession planning. There is no substitute for the efficiency and facilitated learning experience that comes with working with an established (not a pick-up) team.
Trainees need concentrated assignments to get signed off quickly in critical positions/shortages. Current system is somewhat the buddy system and reliant on being with a team to get signed off.
Again, teams with strong trust levels and working relationships self-govern. People are recruited who can both do the job required AND train others-then people are always available for call outs and to staff other teams as this system continually produces more who have full capabilities.
Use the gray haired personnel to train the younger personnel. Actively recruit team members in the off season by paying for training and picking up base 8 savings. This is a cheap way to grow your worker base. With younger personnel normally not being paid as well as older personnel (due to GS levels, etc) the incentive to drop the kids off at a sitter, etc is not as strong due to monetary reasons. Use certain incidents as a training site. This will allow in the field experience which is better than going to a workshop.
Trainees are the key to the whole program. Trainees rostered with teams tend to become qualified quicker and tend to stay within the teams so its a win win. As far as compensation goes people participate on teams because the like the continuity it provides knowing sho you are working with there strengths and weaknesses. We need to ensure all personnel working for the agency have gone to basic fire school and have participation in fire from the first day on board with the agency. We fund too many folks for days and get nothing in return in regards to service. This needs to change. Develop a strategy to get all personal into the fire program and then fund it so we can make it happen.
I think we have a lot of teams, they are supplemented with casual hires a lot. Why don't we create less teams and utilize the Fed work workforce more and work on training other current Fed employees and then utilize AD's to fill in when needed. Or if using an AD then it should be a requirement they take a Fed trainee with them to teach them the position so we are not so reliant on our AD work force as much. I see a lot of the buddy system and I want my friend to work so the incident is not being managed whether the position is really needed on the incident or not, but more on hey I want my friend here. I have seen seen a few teams that come through and over half the camp is just sitting around "B.S.ing".
Local and GACC level priorities for trainees are not meeting the needs of the Nation. This is evident by the lack of candidates for S520 and S620. National level goal setting (targets) assigned to GACCs could help funnel employees into needed positions. Develop C&G trainee modules that can be mobilized with established IMTs and receive in-the-field S420/S520/S620 certified training. Develop apprentice modules of individuals who have an interest in exploring various functional positions, although they have no formal position specific training. This model was successfully tested by NIMO team with a hotshot while on assignment in 2007 at the Greensburg Tornado. Half the crew chose to continue with their operational assignment while the others accepted an opportunity to train and work in plans, finance, safety, logistics, etc. Apprentice modules could be formed from Apprentice Academy, smokejumper, corporate university, prescribed fire academy personnel.
Create a NIMO type team in every Region (or GACC) with the responsibility to provide coordination and mentoring to the C&Gs on the IMTs in the respective regions. The NIMO type teams should promote standardized protocols throughout the regions (or GACCs). This not only occurs during the fire season assignments but through winter coordination and training sessions. It is really important at this time because many IMTs are made up of retirees (ADs) that don't have the opportunity to stay up to date on the latest policy and technology developments during the year. There needs to be an Air Operation Branch Director on the NIMO type teams and more emphasis needs to be given to the use and management of aircraft on all incidents (it's usually the highest cost and risks associated with fire suppression). Most IMTs have an AOBD on the C&G these days. If the NIMO type teams traveled around the region as experts and respected leaders in their field assisting and mentoring the existing incident management teams then those teams would less likely be threatened by the NIMOs existence and welcome the concept.
The use of trainees must be increased. We cannot complain of a lack of qualified firefighters and then allow the Unit/GACC to not allow a reasonable number of trainees. Cost containment must be balanced against future needs. If this problem is as severe as we say that it is, supervisors must be forced to allow employees to participate in fire and off-agency dispatches.
Young people in fire positions need to get involved with incident management teams at a much earlier time in their career and not wait until late 40's and 50's before they become section chiefs and IC's. This will no doubt take more coaching of young people due to lack of experience through no fault of their own. Maybe some of the old school would be willing to coach and provide leadership training to the new school.
The type two teams would be held to 27 member rosters and all training positions would be organized and dispatched on a sub-geographic area basis.
Trainees should be identified, prioritized and developed with some consistency, rather than leave to individual IMT personalities.

To me "Team" means a group of people who work together consistently to achieve a cohesive team. Cohesion typically takes 6 weeks to achieve on handcrews and engine modules. Trainees rostered with a team receive a structured experience that provides a well rounded set of opportunities. Groom all employees with potential to excel instead of the good old boy system where you have to know someone to get ahead, or get on a team.
TRAINEES. Trainee pool vs. assigned trainees. Like “team cohesion” there are developmental benefits to more in depth relationships. Cross training with other teams would be good for the long term training experience, but trainees should have a primary team. Regarding “academies” and 420/520 back log – please consider that training on real incidents is more important than classroom training.
Training and personnel succession management need to be an incident objective on all fires. We must manage incidents to train for future events, increase our capacity and experience.
Take a hard look at FINANCE, and the fact that they are dwindling like an endangered species. Finance is an INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL function....
3.11 A pool of trainees might help them get out more. There should also be some rostered with the teams.
Trainees should be rostered by GACC, with priorities identified due to lack of candidates qualified. Currently trainees are not being "qualified" by their trainers because most trainers are retired federal employees or local government employees and if qualified federal employees existed, the trainers would lose their positions on the team (where they're getting portal-to-portal pay, making up for all those years they were "screwed" by the federal government.) The lack of 7 day effective suppression modules to 5 day effective has eliminated the best source of trainees, captains or engineers, because if they leave their module, it is not available, due to no flexibility in staffing.
3.11. trainees rostered with teams will be good if we can achieve the local management scenario this whole commenting effort is based on. when this is identified in local area operating plans that include all local partners, then community priorities can be achieved. however, in the interest of expediting training assignments there should be an avenue for getting single resource assignments through GACCs when needed, but who gets assignments should be prioritized on time till task book currency expiration, not position served or agency they work for.
Trainees should be rostered with teams but when a team has trouble finding a trainee for a position then a national pool should be available of people who have open taskbooks and are striving to increase their skill levels.
3.11: Trainees must be rostered with each team. This ensure mentoring, and assures the C+G that a TRUSTED individual is responding. Not just someone who MAY actually be interested in a position.3.12:
Most trainees are recruited and affiliated with an individual team. They should be then allowed to be assigned to that team. Others should be assigned or allowed to freelance as they prefer.
3.11 What is the best way to manage trainees? Trainees and mentees should be identified in a centralized pool. There is benefit for these folks to work with different teams.
From Question 4.08 - No responses

Table 73. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Managing Trainees.

This brings me to one of my pet peeves in all this. It is very hard to be selected for team assignments. Team selection is a very closed process and you have to be part of in crowd to become part of team. You go through the training, start a task book and sit, because you are never sent to an assignment to complete the task book to become qualified to be on the team. Do you see the never ending circle as to one of the reasons why the current system is broken? The people on teams say that team cohesion is important (and it is) but that cohesion cuts off new people that want to work on the team. Another hurdle that cuts off potential new team members is the limit of trainees on an incident. You cannot learn the job unless you do it. The only way to learn how to “do it” is as a trainee, and incidents limit the number of trainees—mainly to keep costs down. No trainees, no one to fill the slots later on. Can you see the illogical logic at work here?
What is the best way to manage trainees? Trainees and mentees should be identified in a centralized pool. There is benefit for these folks to work with different teams.
I'm a PIO2 single resource. I want to comment that IMTs need to get more trainees out with them, and that "western fire" needs to help get "eastern folks" including trainees, out. In the northeastern US, it has been extremely difficult for PIO trainees to get out on assignments to work toward obtaining their quals. Folks here know we are the furthest resource, but when fire occurs and when availability matters more than distance because other resources are already committed, it would be better to have folks who've been able to get out on other incidents. People here want to participate, but there has been little encouragement - there needs to be more "pull" from western area agency fire organizations, as there is little "push" from here to encourage folks to participate in fire since it’s a relatively small local issue/program. thanx

3.12 – Workforce Development - What is the best workforce development strategy?

The 'as is' option attracted just 9% of respondents (Fig. 52, Table 74). Respondents were slightly more inclined to desire a national strategy than building on the existing, but both options garnered more than 35% support.

Figure 52. Number and distribution of responses to Workforce Development.



Table 74. Text provided as 'Other' choice for Workforce Development.

Grouping	Exact Comment
National strategy	A national strategy that incorporates enhanced and expedited training to include academy's with multiple priority trainee assignments for critical positions.
	Build a national strategy that is inclusive of all agencies, not just the federal agencies.
	Build a national strategy that includes what folks do every day of the year, not just while assigned to something that CNN might cover
	Develop a national INTERAGENCY strategy. Fund implementation.
	Develop a national interagency, partnered strategy.
	Develop a national strategy and engage individuals whose primary position is not within fire or fuels management.
	It's time for a national strategy to be set in place. It's pathetic that we have talked and talked about some idea and yet nothing has occurred. There are a handful that are willing to step up and there is no plan in place to develop employees for type 2 and 1 IC's
	Single federal interagency strategy
Need Mgmt. support	As is with Line Commitment
	Make fire the priority it should be and hold Line Officers accountable
	Make management accountable for workforce development see 2.12 above
	None successful without real agency mgmt. support
	Until agencies are willing to FORMALLY commit to team participation, none of these strategies will work.
	We need more support from current supervisors to allow all willing federal employees to volunteer for fire assignments and allow training dollars to go to that and along with current "day" job training needs
Misc.	Until agency
	combination 1 and 3
	combination of first two
	Develop PDs for IMT and center module positions at different grades for different complexities.
	Develop regional Type 3 teams
	Do Not fast track
	Drag the new kids in from the ranks before they know they had a choice and expect them to choose a line of work other than their major. For example, at orientations, make a pitch to recruit them and then hand them a form on which they must choose a calling.
	Each Unit on the 5 wildland agencies should have a percentage of employees it develops for these teams to be augmented with state and local government
	Experience on real incidents rather than classroom is the best training.

	Find a way to accept current job skills to qualify employees for IMT's. Lose all but necessary training specific to fire. Many people are turned off by having to requalify for skills they already possess. Make it easier to participate!!
	fire part of Gov. Employees duties
	I dont care what strategy is followed as long as there is no fast tracking
	Integrate training and education through universities, start early career
	Interface with agency line officers in workforce succession planning, career pathing and individual development
	Invite all Agencies to become part of the IMT concept. You do not have to be in "fire" to run logistics, etc.
	It seems as though the desire by this study is to get more FS (and other Fed) participation. If that is what they want, then the cure is simple--it is written into all employee job descriptions that they in some manner, support incident management. Personally, I don't see this happening, because even if the W.O. agreed to it, OPM never would. That being said, the next best thing in my opinion is to start taking advantage of all the Type 3 AHIMT's that are currently forming and training. Most of them don't get much work and they would welcome a chance to assist on wildland fires. Costs may rise some, but if you take away the California Departments, the issue is probably not as big of a concern.
	Keep thing as local as possible
	Land Management Agencies are full of talented and hard working employees. Since the last 5-6 years when the fire organization seems to be "stove piped" we have lost the opportunity to foster new leaders for all hazard situations. Many timber, wildlife,
	local knowledge
	localized need and community capacity building
	More common sense qualification system with options to qualify recognizing all experience and training. Also need to recognize retirees and private entities
	National strategy which takes into consideration state and local participation in a meaningful way
	Need combo of AD use and better interagency development
	Need to get incidents to accept trainees so we can get more people trained and qualified
	Not convinced the current approach isn't meeting our needs (# of qualified personnel meets needs, ability to fill teams is a different issue).
	Offer incentive --> they will come.
	Only if the national strategy is any good.
	Review current training curriculum and eliminate redundancy and create bridge components to facilitate cross qualifications.
	seek employees w/ multi resource background
	Send trainees as filling the position under a qualified unit leader
	Strategy that includes nonfire career path. Not eveyone who goes on fires should have to have a fire position.
	Streamline the system for training people are retiring faster than their replacements are trained
	Stress and support the system already in place to bring individuals up through the ranks.
	support local efforts
	Train new employees outside of fire, especially those with an ecological background.
	use GAs with some National where practical and affordable

The only significant difference in distribution of responses by sub-category was for *Incident Qualifications* (Table 75). The marginally significant difference in distribution was driven by more *Incident Commanders* than expected selecting *Other*, and more *Other Incident Qualified* selecting *No Preference.*

Table 75. Cross-tabulations and significance of responses to Workforce Development by demographic sub-group. [Note: Most frequent response indicated by **bold**; significant difference in distribution by * at end of Table title. Cell counts significantly higher than expected in *italics*; counts significantly less than expected enclosed in *()*.]

(a) by Agency.

	BIA/ Tribe	BLM	Contractor	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Total
As is	1	13	0	6	2	1	8	0	50	0	81
Build on existing	10	49	**4**	28	30	1	**24**	0	159	10	315
Develop nat'l strategy	**11**	**59**	1	**36**	**41**	2	21	2	**173**	**17**	363
No preference	1	6	0	0	4	0	5	0	20	1	37
Other	2	7	0	4	3	0	6	0	28	0	50
Null	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	9	0	12
Total	25	134	5	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	858

(b) by Organizational level.

	Contractor	Federal-Local	Federal-National	Federal-Regional	Local Govt/Fire	No professional role	State Govt/ Fire	Total
As is	1	51	3	8	7	4	7	81
Build on existing	**9**	176	24	46	29	6	**25**	315
Develop nat'l strategy	5	**204**	**34**	**51**	**35**	**11**	23	363
No preference	0	25	2	3	1	1	5	37
Other	0	24	2	11	4	3	6	50
Null	0	8	1	0	1	0	2	12
Total	15	488	66	119	77	25	68	858

(c) by Functional area.

	Dispatch	Fire	Fuels	LO/AA	NIMO	No role	Non-agency fire	Other agency	Other fire	Total
As is	3	27	7	3	0	1	8	25	7	81
Build on existing	16	123	17	**40**	2	**6**	**21**	62	28	315
Develop nat'l strategy	**18**	**148**	**31**	38	**4**	3	19	**73**	**29**	363
No preference	2	13	2	1	0	1	1	11	6	37
Other	1	18	2	12	0	0	3	10	4	50
Null	0	3	0	1	2	0	1	3	2	12
Total	40	332	59	95	8	11	53	184	76	858

(d) by Incident qualification*.

	FEMA/DHS	IMT-Type 3	IMT-IC	IMT C&G	None	Other	Total
As is	0	*(4)*	7	31	2	37	81
Build on existing	2	39	26	98	**25**	125	315
Develop nat'l strategy	1	**50**	**33**	**122**	20	**137**	363
No preference	0	5	0	8	2	22	37
Other	0	6	*10*	14	4	16	50
Null	0	0	2	6	0	4	12
Total	3	104	78	279	53	341	858

(e) by Age range.

	21-30	31-40	41-50	< 20	> 50	Total
As is	0	11	26	1	43	81
Build on existing	**10**	45	94	0	166	315
Develop nat'l strategy	**10**	**62**	**112**	1	**178**	363
No preference	3	10	17	0	7	37
Other	2	10	12	0	26	50
Null	1	1	2	0	8	12
Total	26	139	263	2	428	858

Narrative comments indicated that stove-piping of the fire workforce has harmed the fire community's ability to develop an IMT workforce, and that in the future, the fire community should work to recruit beyond fire and fuels programs (Tables 76, 77). Related to that was an expressed desire to streamline training requirements, including recognizing equivalency (competency gained in the course of doing something else).

Table 76. Open-ended comments relevant to Workforce Development.

No Responses from Question 2.12
From Question 3.17
520 is a failure. It build to fail students, not advance them. 520 should be an advance training. type two participates should attend the class an then mentor on a type one team as a trainee.
Every effort at the local, GACC, and National level should be made to incorporate/facilitate trainees with IMT's. I do not

see any regard to maintaining local initial attack capabilities...if federally funded personnel are collateral duty IMT members, this will impact our ability to properly staff or be prepared for an aggressive initial attack program on a forest/unit. We spend more money on preparing for large fires, training for large fires and effort in developing personnel for large fire actions than we ever have at the initial attack level. What do we as a federal agency provide our local resources in regards to initial attack funding and training? After S-200.....???....then what? We put it on the local districts/units who are underfunded to maintain FFT production capabilities and then we are expected to support the IMT effort nationally. I'm merely suggesting we need to not forget about our I.A. success and the resources who make that happen. It seems a wise investment strategy would be to invest in your successful programs first.....this becomes your "base" for succession planning.
Support local training efforts. Academies are historically high cost, low output. We can do it better locally.
3.12- Workforce development strategy that "builds on existing academies to streamline"... This language seems dangerous to me. I interpret streamlining as fast tracking. We need to focus more on Leadership Development. Once we provide more access to leadership training and quality mentoring experiences workforce development wont be as much an issue. Developing a more inclusive mentoring program would be much more effective.
There needs to be areas where personnel from parks that don't do fire can receive training to assist with IMT's or be on IMT's. I have been in the nps and if you work at a park that doesn't really do fire then there is little to move up with the ICS.
There needs to be a national initiative for trainees, at a minimum I propose that the critical C and G and substaff positions should be a national priority for training so if the NW is in heavy fire season and Great Basin receives an order for a DIVS, GB should have the option of attaching a trainee to the order. This helps the sending unit and relieves the receiving unit of trying to fill trainees during critical times. I propose rotating C and G positions on a 3 year basis for example C and G trainees and Finance one year Operations and Plans the next and Logistics and Buying unit the next for example. Trainees need be non negotiable and business costs are what come with a strong organization.
A good combination of the old CDF model and the common sense approach of the Southern Region shows how succession planning can work; year-round open roster for applications. We have more people than ever that are willing and able to participate on assignments. The pay seems to be the only inconsistency.
3.12 BUILD FROM THE BOTTOM. Institute IMT3 training for non operations positions. Rethink or eliminate GS-401 requirement for fire management position descriptions. Redesign IFPM away from strictly operations and RX, requiring skill in finance, logistics and plans tiered with the operations qual.
I do not support fast tracking in the Finance section. I have seen too many failures and lack of knowledge for complicated decisions.
Workforce Strategy - If there is no workforce strategy in place, the governing leadership of the fire community needs to develop one. If there is a national strategy, there needs to be better understanding/ training to teach current and new employees on how to plan implement strategy. What's in place is clearly not effective (and judging by the amount of "younger people" able to participate in this questionnaire, due to the time of season this was implemented, this may not be a priority for leadership???)Workforce development means looking at the next people in line and creating avenues for them to take the leadership roles. Fireline leadership courses don't teach how to be the next level manager.
The reason type III teams are so popular right now is that youngsters can actually participate with few quals. The general consensus on the ground right now is that we overvalue quals and undervalue the ability of people. Type III is an environment where PEOPLE can shine. Let's not kid ourselves...you don't need ten seasons of fire to be one of the most useful people on an IMT. So, my perspective on improving participation on IMTs is to tackle the training bureaucracy and get pro-active in workforce development. Make it easy for the people who want to participate to actually help. I think this is why the citizen militia approach to fire management evolved the way it did. It just wasn't efficient to have a large fire-specific workforce...I would argue that it never will be efficient. If you have team members with idle time (which is most of the time), they are going build bureaucracies and rules, training empires, and new SOPs, that will make it more difficult for the rest of us to get our work done. With regard to workforce development, fire should embrace partners who specialize in workforce development (e.g., junior colleges, colleges, and universities). Training and education doesn't all have to come from fire itself. The current model is that fire hires a workforce, then figures out how to develop it. An alternative model is to work collaboratively with external partners to select and build a workforce through education, training, and seasonal employment.
As noted in Section 2 comments, I fail to understand the compelling reasons for the sole focus of this study to be on increased development of interagency personnel. There is a vast resource of persons outside the typical fire world who would see working on an IMT as both a public service and employment opportunity. Your focus seems to be on compensation for the hardships associated with fire duty. If it is indeed a hardship, then it is not personally satisfying and these individuals are less likely to remain in the fire world, regardless of whether you pay them year round.
3.12 in keeping the focus local in workforce development, training can be tailored to local situations. some areas it makes sense to tailor the workforce to full suppression tactics and structure suppression while having intimate knowledge of local influences (i.e. santa Ana winds, structural triage). while other areas the workforce should be

tailored towards low impact anthropogenic fire utilization with intimate knowledge of local influences (i.e. diurnal wind fluctuations, seasonality of burn, pre-treatment needs, etc.).
3.12 Natl strategy should be based on what the different agency, non-agency players can bring to the table.
The required work for an IMT member, regardless if it is a Unit Leader or C and G, requires year around learning and training. Especially as an All-Risk IMT. The funding for SAFER Grants and other funding should be redirected to consolidate IMT training and succession plan training of personnel.
From Question 4.08
National level slow in coordinating Type 3 teams into operational status. A concerted effort is needed at the federal level for position training availability with shadowing follow up for class participants.

Table 77. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Workforce Development.

S-520/620 course structures require entire teams to be present to conduct the course. The format should be modified to the Field 420 model to allow individuals to receive the training in an individual field setting under the leadership of an existing team. Compromising training standards and qualifications to get a quick fix should be avoided. A lot of the proposal and rationale does not consider the concept, components, definition, or requirement of teams as taught in leadership courses and in S-420 and S-520.
Training. This one is a huge issue in my eyes. The reason people are not getting qualified for the teams is the large amount of training required. We have a large quantity of training but in many cases if is lacking in quality. In the old days 1980s-1990's to become an FBAN you had to go to S-390, S-490 when it became a national class and S-590. That is no longer the case. You know have to take S-290, S-390, S-490, The Ltan stuff and S-590, and be mentored on a team by an FBAN and complete a task book. How many other positions have a added classes to become qualified for a position? Are all these classes really necessary? Are they accomplishing what we need? From what I have seen the old S-390 class (before 290/390) was the better class. Someone once figured it out it took over 20 years to become a Type I or Type II IC, we need to change that. Task books: I lost an ops chief task book because it expired in 3 years (it was 3/4's done). The reason I lost the task book was due to personnel turn over on my district and not being available to go on assignments which was not my fault. What about slow fire seasons? We seem to have had slow fire seasons the last couple of years, how many task books have been lost due to the 3 years to finish it or it expires? This needs to be looked at. Task books need to be redone again! Each time they get longer and longer (which takes more time to complete) they need to get shorter. The length of the task book to become a FFT2 (squad boss) is ridiculous. I could go on and on about training, but that is the true issue of the teams not having enough people get discouraged trying to get the training and assignments and give up! Our whole training system needs to be overhauled, maybe that is what should be looked at hard before we come up with another type of team arrangement.

Management Framework

Management framework concerns whether incident participation should be voluntary or mandatory, and whether and how incident participation should be integrated into position descriptions and performance reviews.

3.13 – Participation - *Should incident management participation (at some level, not necessarily holding an Incident Qualifications Card, including Initial Attack through Area Command, Agency Representative to Multi Agency Coordination Group) be voluntary for employees of NWCG member agencies?*

Respondents said they want all public land management employees to participate in IMTs but are divided about whether that should be mandatory (Fig. 53, Table 78).

Figure 53. Number and distribution of responses to Participation*.



*Refers to participation at some level, not necessarily holing an Incident Qualification Card, including Initial Attack through Area Command, Agency Representative to Multi Agency Coordination Group.

Table 78. Text provided as 'Other' choice for Participation.

Grouping	Exact Comment
Combination	a combination of voluntary and mandatory for some.
	All employees should participate, it should be mandatory for fire funder personnel unless extenuating circumstances.
	Combination of 1 & 3
	combination of first two
	Combination of mandatory for all fire and fuels funded personnel and voluntary for all other employees. I would like to qualify that if voluntary employees accept fire training dollars they need to participate.
	Mandatory for fire funded folks and all employees should participate in some manner.
	mandatory only for fire funded personnel, voluntary for the rest, but SUPPORTED BY LINE OFFICERS
	mandatory only for fire funded personnel, voluntary for the rest, but SUPPORTED BY LINE OFFICERS
	Should be mandatory for most employees, but there are some that should remain voluntary.
	Some fire funded personnel such as management personnel could be mandatory but asking every employee to do it would not work out very well, (disgruntled employees, employees removed from critical work, and module supervisors should not be mandatory, they have a higher calling (safety)
	Some involvement should be mandatory (i.e. fire funded); the problem is voluntary participation would probably work better if managers and supervisors were REQUIRED to support the fire program in the federal agencies.
encouraged	All should be encouraged to participate and supervisors to let employees participate
	Maybe not mandatory, but emphasis for fire funded personnel
	More support from management
	Not full out mandatory but we need to include more of the militia, like in the past, these folks were good DIVS, LOGS, PLANS and misc. support members
	Only a volunteer group will perform these demanding duties. Don't make people sign up. The motivated are volunteer. And we need only motivated personnel.
	Participation highly recommended for all employees
	Participation should be encouraged, but be voluntary.
	Should be encouraged, this is not happening
	Should be voluntary but supported and encouraged.
	Voluntary with strong encouragement from line and fire management. Forced participation will likely get someone killed at some point in time.
	We should expect employees to participate in fire at the local level. It should not be mandatory for people to leave home to participate.
	Yes with strong endorsement vs voluntary
Mandatory	All employees REQUIRED to participate as per aptitude and personal life availability, clearly spelled out on IDP and perf eval how they're going to contribute.
	Incident management participation would be integrated into NWCG Agency position descriptions as a requirement for non-fire personnel at National PL 4 and 5. "Participation" would include the requirement for IMT participation, for backfilling of an IMT participant's day-job, or to provide other support for incident management. Managers

	would have performance standards that encourage incident management, and triggers for relief from Targets.
	Mandatory for all member agencies
	mandatory for all qualified individuals, consistent with their quals
	mandatory for all wf (fs prefix, 28 for blm, etc.) prefix job-codes
	Mandatory for career employees for a 3 year period of service
	Mandatory for Fed. Agency Fire, Forestry & Range Folks
	Mandatory for fire and LE (all risk) voluntary with incentives to participate for others
	mandatory for fire funded personnel and other emergency services personnel (like law enforcement) to continue to gain skills in emergency management.
	Mandatory for people who hold qualifications, and appropriate training certificates, and for those who are in trainee status. Otherwise, government money has been spent on training someone for a job they may never do. Applicable to all employees, not just "fire funded" personnel.
	Mandatory for response personnel: LE, fire, EMS, special skill
	Mandatory only for fire funded personnel to participate at some point in their career
	Mandatory. If your taking fire retirement you should have to participate.
Should	A percentage as stated above, should be a mix of fire funded and non fire funded,
	All employees should be encouraged to participate and be rewarded for doing so. That said, no one wants a workforce of conscripts who don't want to be there.
	all employees should participate as long as work is complete at the home unit
	all employees should participate at least at the local level
	All employees should participate at some level or in some way.
	All employees should participate in some capacity.
	All employees who have completed training funded by the agency should participate.
	Current employees: volunteer (as is). New hires should be required to contribute to incident management to the best of their ability within 2 years
	Each unit should contribute a set amount of team members.
	Incident Management should be part of the job description and performance evaluations. However, there needs to be a mechanism to weed out those that underperform. Someone with a poor attitude being forced to work on an incident they don't want to be on can lead to a dangerous situation.
	Should getting work done on a district or a Park or a refuge be voluntary? Isn't this the PRIMARY responsibility of our shrinking agency workforce?
	Voluntary but with the Expectation that all SHOULD participate at some level
Voluntary	Incident management participation should be voluntary but incident visits should be (as appropriate based on the position held)
	It should be voluntary, but active participation should be part of the culture.
	participation should be voluntary, but all employees should be encouraged to participate, with the understanding that if they choose not participate, that they will be expected to cover overflow work at the home unit by others who are participating.
	Participation should be voluntary, but much more active recruitment for participation is needed across all the non-fire employees
	Participation should be voluntary, but there must be support for individuals. Many are not allowed to participate.
	Vol for all employees with Fire Funded personnel it should be mandatory
	voluntary but add incentives
	Voluntary with incentives
	Voluntary with incentives for both fire folks and militia
	voluntary with incentives and encouragement from home unit (relief from workload)
	Voluntary, but funded and supported.
	volunteered mandatory
Miscellaneous	Keep it agency specific
	Local Units decide
	Not sure I understand question wording "not ... holding and I.Q. Card". My agency (USFS) job description includes ".. participates in wildfire suppression as qualified.." or something to that effect. Participation should be Mandatory for fire-funded personnel (ie qualify for FF retirement) at the Single Resource Boss and ICT4 level and above. All others should be Voluntary , as not all are capable physically, mentally or personally. However, the Voluntary militia should be STRONGLY and PROACTIVELY developed, and MADE AVAILABLE, to their highest potential based on skills/experience etc.
	Position based pay is the key here, it gets old seeing a GS-5 fire fund person doing the same job as the GS-9+ is doing on the fire.
	Select mostly fire funded and some agency funded personnel. Select a target number of participants per unit and central office and let the units and offices determine the personnel.

	Take priority over other work and personal responsibilities with recognition that temporary unavailability may occur.
	Teams should be intergovernmental to get the best & brightest.
	There aren't enough team positions to make it mandatory for all fire funded personnel. Many positions (logistics, finance esp.) are not necessarily aligned with fire careers

Interestingly, agency fire personnel seemed to favor a voluntary system over respondents from outside of fire and the agency. For instance, looking at break-down by *Functional Area*, all non-fire functions (*Line Officer/Agency Administrator*, *Other Agency*, *Non-Agency*) selected *No, all should participate* most frequently while the fire function respondents all selected Y*es, voluntary for all*. By incident position, IC's felt most strongly that participation should be mandatory for all, with Command and General staff split almost evenly between voluntary and mandatory for all personnel.

Significant differences in distribution of responses were found in all sub-groups (Table 79):

- *Functional Area:* Fewer than expected *Line Officers/Agency Administrators* and *Fire* respondents selected *No Preference*.
- *Incident Qualifications*: While most sub-groups were evenly split between *Voluntary* and *All should participate*, *IMT-ICs* were much more likely to prefer the latter. Interestingly, *IMT-Type 3* and *No Incident Qualifications respondents* both selected *No Preference* more frequently than expected. Those with *Other Incident Qualifications* were more likely than expected to select *Voluntary for all*.
- *Organizational Level:* The highly significant difference in distribution was driven by the lack of preference by *Local Government/Fire*.
- *Agency:* Although the *USFS* respondents were about evenly split between the *Voluntary* and the *All should participate*, more than expected selected the latter. Fewer than expected *Other DOI* respondents selected *All should participate*, and more than expected selected *Mandatory for Fire*.
- *Age Range:* The significant difference in distribution differentiates the *over 50* group from others in their preference for *No, all should participate* over *Yes, voluntary for all*, whereas both the *41-50* and the *31-40* respondents prefer a voluntary system.

Table 79. Cross-tabulations and significance of responses to Incident Participation by demographic sub-group. [Note: Most frequent response indicated by **bold**; significant difference in distribution by * at end of Table title. Cell counts significantly higher than expected are in *italics*; counts significantly less than expected are also enclosed in *()*.]

(a) by Agency*.

	BIA/ Tribe	BLM	Contractor	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Total
Mandatory for fire	***10***	30	0	9	21	1	8	0	77	*10*	166
No preference	3	7	0	*15*	4	0	1	0	*(11)*	2	43
No, all should participate	*(2)*	29	1	19	18	0	23	1	*140*	(3)	236
Other	4	17	0	4	6	**2**	4	0	32	2	71
Yes, voluntary for all	6	**50**	4	**26**	**29**	1	**30**	1	**150**	**11**	308
Null	0	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	29	0	34
Total	25	134	5	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	858

(b) by Organizational level*.

	Contractor	Federal -Local	Federal-National	Federal-Regional	Local Govt/Fire	No professional role	State Govt/Fire	Total
Mandatory for fire	3	93	15	27	10	**9**	9	166
No preference	0	18	4	4	*16*	0	1	43
No, all should participate	6	134	**24**	24	19	6	23	236
Other	0	41	8	12	4	2	4	71
Yes, voluntary for all	**6**	**180**	*(15)*	**43**	**26**	8	**30**	308
Null	0	22	0	9	2	0	1	34
Total	15	488	66	119	77	25	68	858

(c) by Functional area*.

	Dispatch	Fire	Fuels	LO/AA	NIMO	No role	Non-agency fire	Other agency	Other fire	Total
Mandatory for fire	4	76	13	12	1	**6**	13	27	14	166
No preference	3	*(8)*	0	*12*	0	1	2	11	6	43
No, all should participate	12	81	15	31	**4**	3	**18**	**61**	11	236
Other	1	30	5	8	1	0	2	22	2	71
Yes, voluntary for all	**19**	**117**	**24**	**28**	2	1	17	58	42	308
Null	1	20	2	4	0	0	1	5	1	34
Total	40	332	59	95	8	11	53	184	76	858

(d) by Incident qualification*.

	FEMA/DHS	IMT-Type 3	IMT-IC	IMT C&G	None	Other	Total
Mandatory for fire	0	18	11	62	15	60	166
No preference	1	*13*	1	8	*9*	11	43
No, all should participate	0	24	***42***	90	*(4)*	76	236
Other	0	9	8	20	4	30	71
Yes, voluntary for all	**2**	**39**	*(10)*	**92**	**21**	***144***	308
Null	0	1	6	7	0	20	34
Total	3	104	78	279	53	341	858

(e) Age range*.

	21-30	31-40	41-50	< 20	> 50	Total
Mandatory for fire	7	21	53	1	84	166
No preference	2	3	15	0	23	43
No, all should participate	4	31	*(56)*	1	***144***	236
Other	2	14	24	0	31	71
Yes, voluntary for all	**9**	***64***	**109**	0	*(126)*	308
Null	2	6	6	0	20	34
Total	26	139	263	2	428	858

To paraphrase one respondent, "the option should be voluntary, but once someone has volunteered (and received training), participation should be mandatory" (Tables 80, 81). Respondents expressed concern that making any system mandatory is likely to result in challenges of interest and capability. Formalizing this expectation is thought to provide support to both employee and supervisor, similar to performance. Comments in opposition to mandatory participation generally revolved around wanting only those who are truly interested and the potential safety and efficiency concerns with staff who are less than fully engaged. Other respondents noted that incident management involves more than just incident management teams, and that there are many ways to participate. Who pays for training was another consistently raised issue; if the fire suppression program pays, it might make it easier for others to participate.

Table 80. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Participation.

From Question 2.12
The requirement to be available either in direct or indirect support of incidents should be in all fire-funded position descriptions.
Requiring fire to maintain some level of qualification is essential in keeping the bench strong.
From Question 3.17
We do need to make fire folks be on IMT's unless they have personal issues that keep them out of it. We also need to make it part of EVERY federal employees job to work on incidents, whether at the home unit or on an IMT.
Require fed employee participation in incident response or support combined w/ more local interagency type 3 teams would get us more than enough IMT capacity. Obviously that has to be combined w/ much greater target flexibility, which means that fire incident management has to trump targets and other work. We can't be held to producing widgets that are not time critical when there's a fire to manage, and you can't just call someone else to come deal with it, and you can't keep putting them all out while they're small. We have to see it as integral to what we do, and as an activity that is time critical and necessarily shifts the priorities and work activities of our entire org as a logical response.
I am not sure about the compensation, Fire Staff fall into regular duties but we do need to "sweeten the pot" for more militia. I think a lot of militia types have lost interest based on higher priorities set by local supervisors. It seems to me the Agencies have gotten away from everyone being qualified for some fire duty. Even a clerk can help out and the OT alone is great compensation.
How will we have succession if people don't get on the job training. Classes can give us an idea of how to deal with fire but nothing replaces on the job experience.
We do need to ensure we can supply those teams so setting expectations for employees involved in fire is good.
Participation in firefighting and all-hazard incidents is voluntary at present. Firefighting used to be a condition of employment when I started. This is not the case and hasn't been for many years. Few people express interest in participating on teams. This is a cultural shift. I don't have an answer.
Most of this treats symptoms of the problem. Require people to take part early in their careers and we will end up with enough volunteers to manage incidents
All employees should have a role in supporting fire/emergency incidents. In the Marines, everyone is a rifleman...why not a similar concept in the land management agencies?
In fire mgt for the past 24 yrs, I have seen the generational change. The PR funded folks are the majority involved, the non-PR funded folks have had a switch in culture. They are more inclined to want to stay home in a 8-1630 job with weekends off to do things with their families and really have no desire to go out except maybe on local IA fires. You can't change that culture(in my opinion) those retired AD's right now came from that generation that everybody participated in fire whether in fire or not. Its just not there now.
Needs to be volunteer based with incentives. If base 8 are not covered they will not go. District work loads can limit the militia and will continue to do so unless Rangers get direction that fire is the priority. OT is normally the incentive and the fact that the Districts are saving base 8 money while on fires. Counting time spent on fire towards fire retirement would give incentive to militia folks that are under other retirement plans.
We need folks to participate in fire. A combination of money, challenge, ALL EMPLOYEES being required to have a section of fire in yearly performance until physically unable to participate. All FS employees need to be trained to make a positive contribution in the bad years.
I believe that ALL personnel should participate in fire/all hazard incidents in some aspect. This was expected of personnel years ago and agencies/personnel shifted away from it. Everyone and every program on districts/refuges/parks can benefit from this experience. In recent years, all programs have separated themselves into a "stand alone" existence. We are developing line officers, specialists and technicians with no experience other than in their specialty. We have, between all the 5 land management agencies, 40,000 + employees and we are having problems filling 1000 positions? I believe line officers need to have had experience in every aspect of district operations before they take that command. Experience on an IMT could be one of those "checks" before they get to that point. It needs to be a balanced experience with fire operations included. Same could hold for anyone that wants to be promoted above the GS-5 level into any type of leadership position, be it professional or technical.
As for militia and other folks who go out on fire if they want to go on fires and call themselves fire fighters they should join the fire crew or fire organizations to contribute not just go out to supplement their regular salaries this would make the imts more efficient and less headaches for the guys on the ground.
I hate to see the agency phase out the "militia" firefighters who used to be the backbone of the teams. There has been no effort to recruit/retain these folks in recent years, for those who have been so important in staffing teams in the past, especially in the non-line team positions. I would like to see more emphasis put on making fire a requirement of all agency personnel like it used to be. Everyone can contribute at some level, and should be required to do so, even if it's to hold down the fort to free up other personnel for line duty.

More on 3.13: In the recent past (20+ years ago...) all FS employees participated more readily in fire management during the fire season than is expected today. We as a agency, should go back to that practice or make fire participation mandatory for several reasons: 1) may resolve our successional dilemma; 2) fire is an important disturbance on the landscape and we have wildlife biologists that have no idea what fire can/cannot do for wildlife because they have never participated in wildland fire, much less prescribed burning actions (it is stunning how many younger employees in R1 FS that are agency administrators or GS11/12 that have never gone thru guard school....
I think if all fed employees were required to support incidents like it use to be, and they are their supervisors were held accountable for that, we would not be having this problem with staffing IMTs. It's not that militia don't want to be on IMTs or support incidents, it's that supervisors aren't allowing them.
Mandatory participation (written into PD and performance standards) on incidents either on IMT's or in support positions/modules by all fire-funded personnel.
A program to get fire funded folks to participate is needed to provide incentive but the current IFPM only provides the stick. There are greater work loads placed on the field than ever before and fewer people to do this work.
I do believe many of these other ideas - or portions thereof have some merit. For example mandatory participation is a good thing to strive for - at least a job expectation clearly lined out to all new hires, but tempered with fitting folks into the right positions and not forcing them into a bad fit capability wise or physically.
Again, I don't see a tie to militia in current positions with skills that directly overlap with the needs of IMT's. Find a way to make participation easier. Why the shift to dedicated teams instead of making it easier for other employees to assist. I do not feel an active move to engage militia.
National oversight is often out of touch and difficult when we are trying to implement locally. I am not a fire person but feel if you make participation mandatory it will create morale issues, forcing participation when for whatever reason someone does not want or can not participate. Mandatory participation will not necessarily have the most qualified person in the positions.
There needs to be a standard where people on fire crews (as their day-to-day position) are encouraged to be members on teams, if they are so qualified, instead of needed to maintain availability solely for the crews.
We are headed down a dangerous path if we start forcing people to participate on teams.
Militia used to be encouraged to participate with fire work. Currently their seasonals don't even go to Fire School. That has become the norm so we lose that generation building into the incident response pool. Put fire back into everyone’s job. Then when the seasons over, fire employees can support the other functions in their work. ITs the way it used to be. Why do we all have to be so specialized that we can cross over to help each other anymore as Forestry Technicians. Geez, not everyone has to be like California.
All federal employee--not just fir--should have a minimum fire supporting duty within their PD.
Why would we choose line officers who have no clue about emergency management? Require rangers and managers to complete basic fire school.
Team participation needs to be an expectation. Local knowledge is still vital despite what models are out there.
We should use our agency folks before going to contractors or AD's for the modules and support centers. We also need to become more strict about folks participating ie: the militia should participate in other roles besides just line going personnel... ie: support BAER teams, resource advisor, drivers, leo 2, logistics, time/finance... etc there are many positions and methods they could assist with for incident management
Making fire-funded people obligated to be on Teams sounds ok, expect that you force people into doing something they may not feel prepared to do, or can't do because of family obligations, etc. You can't make a voluntary job and give a mandatory aspect to it.
Militia is just that - non-fire people that support fire. There no longer exists a culture within the Forest Service that the militia needs to participate. Unless that changes, expecting the militia to act like the fire organization would be expecting too much.
The bottom line is the recruiting "strategies" of the federal agencies are highly flawed. You have GS - 11's and higher in the leave category 4. How much do you think these fresh out of college recruits know about anything other than their chosen specialty? They don't know a damn thing and don't care! The federal agencies have become too specialized. The other problem is that the FS makes it so difficult to obtain and maintain qualifications that people give up. I am an FMO and I have asked "the militia" why they don't participate in fire more OR have the desire, (trying to recruit) the answer is always I don't have the time to spend outside of my day job to jump through all the hoops required! The light at the end of the tunnel is not even visible - the goals are way too far out of reach. So, you have the FS making it more difficult for the people who might be interested and they are recruiting leave category 4 brats who don't have a clue and don't care because there is no expectation for integrating and learning anything out of their "specialty". Also, the line officers to provide the expectations for participation in fire and "other areas" are also leave category 4 brats who don't have a clue! Wow, now that I have vented - I don't have the answer to the problem I just described. But, I can tell you that IS the problem in the FS.

Must start first with making fire people available and obtain more militia. Operations with fire people are well staffed. Logistics and finance are shortage positions staffed by militia. Target this group specifically and teams will be maintained.
Establish mandatory participation in emergency management.
3.13 You can strongly encourage people, but you can't afford to force people into going and then doing a sloppy job--thereby tearing down team moral.
This system can only work with a staff that wants to exist on an IMT. If you force employees to participate on IMT's performance quality will drop and incident safety will become a huge factor (negative).
IMT includes the word "Team". Pretty big word because IMT's working environment usually is at an emergency scene, often sleeping in Smokey, hot, noisy environments, one should be a volunteer. Having a person at an incident who really does not want to fully participate could be counter productive perhaps dangerous depending on the position. What I'm saying it is likely and predictable that those people required to mobilize would not be willing to give their all for the "Team" if they are compelled to participate. All IMT positions should be fully voluntary and accountable to the IC and section chief for performance. Because positions below C & G actually do the work, It would seem that to achieve predictable performance and accountability one would desire the same players each time a "Team" is mobilized. Having a complete team would seem to reduce the IC's liability exposure if he/she is knowledgeable about their team members experience and performance. There is interdependence between team members as well as patience towards each other especially after long deployments because they are team mates and have a personal relationship that allows better open communication. That would be lacking if one worked with new people every incident.
3.13 participation should be voluntary, but once volunteered should be made mandatory for participation. if all employees are required to participate then we will end up with individuals that don't want to be there and that can cause chronic complacency and potentially unsafe situations. there should also be a mechanism for mandatory non participation in some or all aspects of fire management for situations where individuals are not capable of implementing locally identified principles and practices in a safe, effective, and ecologically appropriate manner.
I strongly believe that participation on teams should be voluntary- people who participate should want to participate. Mandating team participation and providing monetary incentives will produce a workforce not responsive the needs of land management. It would be like making your city fire department responsible for managing your city...e.g., a workforce adept at organization, safety, tactics, but a rigid one that can't easily respond the dynamic needs of land managers.
Although I am not a Federal Employee, I think those funded by fire dollars should be required to participate. It is too easy for supervisors to deny requests and fires to go unstaffed. Perhaps more importantly, it makes it too easy for a person to become a line officer and have no idea about large fire.
I served on the Blue Team for a number of years but I was assigned to an administrative function outside the suppression organization. Incident management is an integral part of the agency culture and should remain a primary function for all employees to engage in.
3.8 and 3.13: Participation on IMTs should remain voluntary. Mandatory participation would reduce the quality of participation. However, participation in fire management should be made mandatory by the employing agency.
Personnel employed by land management/conservation agencies should be required to participate as needed on assignments regardless of their day to day job. Not all positions require direct knowledge of suppression.
.2) Build a carrot & stick approach to participation. Mandatory support for fire functions (all agencies-state and fed) with pay enhancements to compensate for participation.
Agencys should require participation of all employees. This is a fundamental part of "National Service" and should be required of all full time government employees.
We have to maintain and improve the militia format now, perhaps with mandatory service expectation on the part of all participating and user agencies.
YOU CAN'T FORCE THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE THAT WOULD BE NEEDED TO PARTICIPATE.
All personnel should be required to be involved.
3.13 Should incident management participation be voluntary for NWCG member agencies? Participation in incident management should be mandatory for NWCG member agencies and with specific exceptions – individuals who have special needs, etc. NWCG agencies must commit to support fire management by a certain percentage of their personnel.
Voluntary participation is important to ensure all who want to be there are and those who dont will not bring that attitude to the incident.
Employees should have the choice on whether or not they participate on management teams and on incidents.
Forcing militia and even fire-funded folks to involuntarily participate with IMTs? Wow, watch our efficiency and professionalism melt away due to our own undoing! Again, we need folks that want to be a part of the team- not forced to be. If we go this route not only will the transition period (20 + years) produce accidents and a lack luster organization,

but perhaps even after that period. Universal Truth - voluntary with incentives always produces a better product.
From Question 4.08
We will fail at managing FOREST fires if we don't embrace all those that work in a forest - biologists, hydrologists, recreation specialists, foresters, etc. A forest is the sum of its parts - it's not just fire, like it's just not a flood. Thinking about the evolution of ICS, I would hate to adopt any model that is not inclusive, adaptive, and flexible. We must keep all our parts, or risk being severed apart. Rather than look for the easy way, we (line officers) must return to being responsible for providing a trained, seasoned workforce from across all disciplines to manage wildland fires; i.e. it should be the responsibility of all that manage forests to manage fires. Let us not use "specialization" as an excuse to exclude - diversity, inclusion, and opportunity must frame our future.
I think that agencies need to make fire management on federal lands a part of every federal employee's job. Through agreements that federal employees need to be available to assist states and local gov't for the same purposes.
All agency staff should be strongly encouraged to participate in fire (all hazard) mitigation efforts at some level through EPAP and management directives.
Require assignments for everyone. Like the National Guard, but one assignment a year instead of one weekend a month. Supervisors must allow.
Mandatory fire incident participation for personnel who are not full-time fire personnel is an organization-breaking idea. Militia people who are being denied fire assignments because of existing workload aren't helped by adding more requirements. They are more likely to simply not get qualified. Funding pay IMT organization level encourages movement to higher organizational levels, but lower levels are just as necessary (sometimes more so) to the functioning of the incident team as Command and general staff positions.

Table 81. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Participation.

Should incident management participation be voluntary for NWCG member agencies? Participation in incident management should be mandatory for NWCG member agencies and with specific exceptions – individuals who have special needs, etc. NWCG agencies must commit to support fire management by a certain percentage of their personnel.
Barriers to IMT participation by natural resource employees: • Fire 'service' now dominates the vernacular --- with local exceptions, militia are neither encouraged or recruited to participate • Training courses are offered and well attended by 'fire service' participants that are somehow unavailable to train or serve in the position --- yet natural resource employees are often not funded to participate except when funded by their resource budget (no fire budget for training "non-fire" personnel) • Agency Administrators held too tightly to targets in an environment they have not control over --- except to keep people home and discourage IMT or wildfire participation Suggestions for improving participation and increasing the militia skill pool: • Require all employees (except hardship cases) to be prepared to participate in fire suppression at least to a minimum level (logistics, planning, finance...) --- provide fire suppression funding to develop/maintain skill levels • Manage trainee participation toward target positions/responsibilities (not all soldiers can be generals, not all firefighters should be 'allowed' fill out two pages of a redcard --- focus, prioritize) • Recognize (document performance, reward and acknowledge to per groups) both employees and AAs for participating and promoting involvement in fire suppression in a natural resource management world ... • AA's need to be vetted to wildfire management as a condition-of-hire (qualified to apply) to the position

3.14 – Performance Standards - Should position descriptions and performance standards reflect the expectation for incident participation (applies only to Federal employees)?

Survey responses and narrative comments indicated a widely held desire for PD and performance measures to reflect an expectation for incident management participation (68% noted yes in some form; Fig. 54, Table 82). The question raised by many is: who should this apply to--only fire (27%), only full-time fire (9%), or all who respond (35%)?

Figure 54. Number and distribution of responses to Performance Standards.



NOTE: Applies only to federal employees.

Table 82. Text provided as 'Other' choice for Performance Standards.

Grouping (n)	Exact Comment
No (2)	No we have some good people in our agencies that will never be good team members, why punish them for it.
	not all pds are equal
Yes (37)	Again, the question is somewhat confusing/conflicting. Answer: YES for all fire funded personnel, and for those capable and trained for incident positions, as well as Tech. Specialists (Archeologist etc. for fireline, or BAER teams). Employee position d
	all employees regardless of funding
	All employees should be expected to participate in fire when needed.
	All federal employees in land management agencies
	All federal personnel, not just fire
(2)	All land management agency employees should have duties in PD.
	All new hires should be willing and able to participate in incident management.
	EVERY federal funded position regardless of whether funded in fire or not!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
	For all Federal Employees
	For full time incident management personnel (NIMO or NIMO like) plus staff services centers and modules.
	Incident response duties in PD for all federal resource/land management agencies. (like FEMA now requires all employees be able to respond to disasters)
	Mandatory Fire Overhead/Crew Performance ratings for all participants in wildland fire, tied to performance evaluations
	Yes all employees, not just fire funded- see answer to 3.13: For those employees who hold training certificates, qualifications, or in trainee status.
	Yes all federal employees should be required to participate at some level
	yes for all fed employees
	Yes for all federal employees
	Yes for all federal employees who receive at least some fire funding, and most employees should be at least partially funded by fire.
	Yes for all federal land management agencies

(2)	Yes for all fire funded personnel and feds who have red card quals.
	yes on a flexible timeframe that changes as careers and level of management change
	Yes!! Yes!! But not just for the feds! State and local government participants as well
	Yes, for all employees (fire funded or not) in an NWCG agency
	Yes, for all employees of Federal Land Management agencies
	Yes, for all federal employees
	Yes, for all federal employees (those that do not currently respond should be trained in support roles). Widespread involvement results in less impact on individuals.
	yes, for all federal employees who work for land management agencies.
	Yes, for all federal employees. All will either respond to incidents or support local incidents.
	Yes, for all federal employees. They can do support functions at their local district/SO
	Yes, for all federal fire funded personnel but they should be more like a drop box that can be pulled from based on the type of incident and be able to reflect growth and development within a position; they shouldn't be prescriptive.
	Yes, for all federal personnel.
	Yes, for all federal resource management agencies, regardless of funding source.
	yes, for all wf (fs prefix, 28 for blm, etc..) funded personnel
	Yes, for federal employees who respond to incidents voluntarily
	Yes, for fire-funded employees, and ALL employees who participate in incidents should be evaluated at each incident
	Yes, should apply to state agencies also
Misc (7)	Again, drop the additional training requirement and accept current job functions to qualify for incident positions. Kill the double standard.
	Agency administrators should have performance standards that address supporting incident response.
	Keep as is. This is a huge can of worms that will only worsen supervision and leadership problems overall.
	Participation , must be defined as local involvement also,, we cannot expect every fire funded employee to be expected to participate on a agency wide basis, local support of incident mgmt, (IA) would need to be included in this definition of incident pa
	position descriptions should identify the expectation of participation. The evaluation should be based upon Fire Overhead/Crew Performance ratings
	Something in militia PDs to encourage (stick) participation. Certainly, at a minimum, for all federal fire personnel.
	why does this only apply to federal employees?

Demographic break-downs suggest that any who respond would like to see their participation formally recognized, and those who are not part of the Federal system or don't respond don't care (Table 83). Based on this, *All who respond* captures the broadest segment of incident responders. Significant differences in distribution of responses are described below:

- *Functional Area: Fire* respondents were more likely to prefer *All Fire*, whereas all other functions, particularly *Other Agency* and *Line Officer/Agency Administrator* respondents, were more likely to select *All who respond*.
- *Incident Qualifications*: Following the pattern, *IMT-IC* respondents significantly prefer *All Fire*, while *Other* respondents preferred *All who respond*, and *IMT-Type 3* were more likely than expected to respond *No Preference*.
- *Organizational Level*: The significant difference in distribution of responses was between non-Federal and most Federal respondents, the former selecting *No Preference* more often than expected.
- *Agency: Other DOI* (BIA/Tribe, USFWS) respondents were more likely to prefer *All fire funded* than other, and there was a high degree of *No Preference* among non-Federal respondents.

Table 83. Cross-tabulations and significance of responses for Performance Standards by demographic sub-group. [Note: Most frequent response indicated by **bold**; significant difference in distribution by * at end of Table title. Cell counts significantly higher than expected are in *italics*; counts significantly less than expected are also enclosed in *()*.]

(a) by Agency*.

	BIA/ Tribe	BLM	Contractor	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Total
No preference	3	5	2	***23***	2	0	*17*	0	*(18)*	1	71
No, eval as current	*(1)*	17	1	11	8	0	5	0	62	*0*	105
Only for full time	2	15	0	2	12	0	*(1)*	0	41	2	75
Other	1	6	0	1	1	0	4	0	*34*	0	47
Yes, all fire funded	*8*	35	0	*(11)*	22	0	**19**	0	123	**17**	235
Yes, all who respond	**10**	**55**	2	20	**33**	**4**	15	**2**	**154**	*8*	303
Null	0	1	0	7	2	0	5	0	7	0	22
Total	25	134	5	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	858

(b) by Organizational level*.

	Contractor	Federal -Local	Federal- National	Federal- Regional	Local Govt/Fire	No professional role	State Govt/ Fire	Total
No preference	2	*(20)*	*(1)*	6	***23***	2	*17*	71
No, eval as current	1	67	4	12	12	4	5	105
Only for full time	0	55	5	11	2	1	*(1)*	75
Other	1	32	2	7	1	0	4	47
Yes, all fire funded	2	141	22	36	12	4	**18**	235
Yes, all who respond	**7**	**168**	**32**	**46**	21	**12**	17	303
Null	2	5	0	1	6	2	6	22
Total	15	488	66	119	77	25	68	858

(c) Functional area*.

	Dispatch	Fire	Fuels	LO/ AA	NIMO	No role	Non-agency fire	Other agency	Other fire	Total
No preference	3	*(17)*	2	*15*	0	2	6	13	13	71
No, eval as current	7	37	3	13	0	1	6	24	14	105
Only for full time	5	35	10	5	0	0	1	14	5	75
Other	1	17	4	7	1	0	3	14	0	47
Yes, all fire funded	10	***138***	12	*(14)*	**4**	3	8	*(26)*	**20**	235
Yes, all who respond	**14**	(81)	**28**	**38**	3	**4**	**26**	***90***	19	303
Null	0	7	0	3	0	1	3	3	5	22
Total	40	332	59	95	8	11	53	184	76	858

(d) by Incident qualification*.

	FEMA/DHS	IMT-Type 3	IMT-IC	IMT C&G	None	Other	Total
No preference	1	*17*	2	14	4	33	71
No, eval as current	1	13	5	26	9	51	105
Only for full time	0	12	4	18	5	36	75
Other	0	5	*9*	11	1	21	47
Yes, all fire funded	0	26	***32***	87	15	*(75)*	235
Yes, all who respond	1	**30**	25	**112**	**19**	**116**	303
Null	0	1	1	11	0	9	22
Total	3	104	78	279	53	341	858

(e) by Age range.

	21-30	31-40	41-50	< 20	> 50	Total
No preference	1	11	26	0	33	71
No, eval as current	1	19	31	0	54	105
Only for full time	2	15	26	1	31	75
Other	5	6	11	0	25	47
Yes, all fire funded	6	42	75	0	112	235
Yes, all who respond	10	**44**	**89**	1	**159**	303
Null	1	2	5	0	14	22
Total	26	139	263	2	428	858

Concerns expressed included the need for supervisors and line officers to make participation a priority for their staff, particularly given that performance standards alone rarely change behavior or interest (Tables 84, 85). This was the major reason provided in comments in support of including incident participation in PDs and tracking in performance measures. The sentiment was that formalizing these allows both employee and supervisor the opportunity to formally acknowledge and track participation and trade-offs. On the other hand, some respondents noted that most since most fire qualified people are trained and interested in operations and employed in vegetation management, the requirement to participate on formal teams might lead to cannibalization of local capacity and an inability to meet fuels targets.

Table 85. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Performance Standards.

No responses for Question 2.12
From Question 3.17
If you are funded by fire then you should participate in fire in a role that suits your talents. Does no good to TELL someone they will be a FSC if they have no competency for numbers. Find a fit and tell them that is what they will work towards. They can be ops if they want -- BUT they will also be working towards something else too!!!!!
3.14 All individuals working for the federal resource agencies (IE: USFS and DOI)should be required to maintain an Incident Qualification Card for some position, even if it is only a driver, or a clerk. They should be encouraged and rewarded if they participate, not chastised as some are now. The line officers should be held accountable to make people available to fire in a busy season and make fire a number one priority from the top managers down. Similar to how the organizations operated in the 1940's through the 1970's.
We do have problems staffing finance and planning, but question 3.14 could help with this situation. All federal agencies that manage fires should have the expectation that all employees will participate to the extent that they can and managers are accountable to make sure employees are available when needed.
The last few years in my region, it has been tough to get assignments. I also like the idea of Performance Measures included in Employee Evaluations.
It is also important for federal employees to recognize and participate (mandatorily) in all hazard incidents. With our current lack of funding and downsizing trends we seem to forget that large big picture - that as federal employees - our very first duty is our customers (the citizens of our country) their safety and well being should be a priority for all federal employees - mandatory requirements in our PD's may be a way to reemphasize the importance of this in every individuals daily position. When I started with the agency 28 years ago - participation in fire was simply a given - everyone participated - as an agency we have trended away from that - we now contract out the positions that many of us did routinely - driving, support for finance, logistics, road guards, operations, line positions, field observers, etc. I truly feel that if we once again emphasize the importance at the national line officer level that "EVERYONE" who receives a federal paycheck needs to be actively involved in our local emergencies - flood, earthquakes, hurricanes, and fires...that as an agency we will gain a huge amount of respect with our taxpaying constituents and amongst ourselves increase our pride of being federal employees.
Putting fire requirements in performance standards, especially for militia, is a minefield. Some years a member of the militia may not be able to participate and should not be penalized for that.
All federal should be expected to participate in fire and other incidents even if by remote and therefore should have a portion of position description for rating.
The permanent team members and C&G for the large type one teams would be compensated year round through SU funding and their performance ratings and PD's would reflect their full time commitment.
It seems to me if the agencies want to have employee participation in IMT's, then we should provide better incentives and support. If appears that we "grow" enough Ops types, but Plans, Logistics and Finance run short on support people. We use to have a lot more resource (foresters) types that would go out and play, but now with mainly "ogists' types working for land agencies they don't "play" as much. some of this is also due to physicals and pack testing vs the the old step test. There is a lot of expectation for federal non-fire folks to be on teams anymore. When I was with state forestry, my PD had 5% fire support in it.
From my perspective, militia staffing has served us well, however there has been within the agencies a reluctance on managers to make participation in incident management Teams a part of all position descriptions.
If fire duty participation, at some level, is not mandatory, there needs to be 1) and incentive for employees (both fire and non-fire) to want to participate and 2) an incentive for supervisors/managers to allow participation by employees in

fire suppression/support duties.
I don't want someone there who doesn't want to be... However, if they have received training, because they volunteered for it, they should have to respond to an incident. Supervisors agreed to let them have the training, it should be required that they then allow them to take assignments and question it when they don't. IDP's are required, but Supervisor's and employees are not doing their jobs.
As it stands now I'm expected to meet my assigned duties in my daily job even if I'm dispatched with the IMT. Making sure that I can keep my job is more important than assisting the IMT. I don't get a higher rating on my performance evaluation if I support the IMT. The only financial compensation is overtime and hazard pay for taking on additional duties.
Guiding my choices: Primary Division Supervisor Type2 team 5 years ICT3 3 years on a high fire forest USFS FIRE 20 years We have a need for: incentives, position based pay, PDs reflective of IMT work, detail opportunities, filling gaps, professionalism.
If participation on IMTs are required, Agencies need to define who it's required for and include in performance evaluations. Not all agencies have a base in natural resources and getting individuals from the agency to participate when they don't have appropriate knowledge, skills and abilities may not be realistic.
Don't think you should include requirement in everyone's PD. We're a land management agency, not a fire department. Need to develop standard teams not as long as current Type 1 with C&G, unit leaders, and trainees.
All federal employee's need to have fire part of their position descriptions like in the past. There are not enough federal employee's to fill all of the needed positions on teams. Unfortunately a person cannot become an IC or Ops overnight, it takes many years to develop the skill and experience to fill these positions. My believe is that the federal govt. is trying to move individuals up the system to fast, which will cause liability issues in the future.
All personnel should be told that doing work in other functions including fire is a condition of hire. should have their PDs reflect that and then let the creme come up through organization. Otherwise - may be getting the same wishy washy lack of decision making skills in fire as your are in leadership positions throughout the federal agencies.
I spent 20 years as a FS line officer. Line officers have the ability to recruit and motivate employees into the fire organization. This process was successful in the past. I suggest a performance standard for line officers to recruit and motivate employees into the fire organization.
3.14 this should provide a mechanism to promote those that are progressive, identify strengths and weakness of those that should have a different focus, and create a mechanism for addressing liability and accountability for the actions of federal employees.
Consistent use of more specific performance standards for all IMT members and the IMT as a whole needs to happen regardless of what occurs with succession planning.
I support the idea of position descriptions or performance standards for IMT positions to maintain high standards.
Make emergency response a requirement of hire, period. Then, you will have sufficient participants.
Make emergency response a requirement of hire, period. Then, you will have sufficient participants.
3.14 Today most people would fail physical and mental requirements. non workers
No responses for Question 4.08

Table 85. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Performance Standards.

Performance Standards Some of the IMOSP thinking makes good points about performance standards. But performance standards could be developed and used with the current team configurations. We better change this very quickly, because if NIMO teams are around long enough we will see the same problems with performance standards. I have worked for the Federal government for 38 years, in 5 branches, and too many offices to count. I have worked under more than 10 performance standard procedures. They work or do not work depending upon the supervisor, manager, and employee. A performance standard is not the solution to any problem. I have seen very few employees correct their behavior or production based upon performance standards alone. Specific Feedback to IMOSP Organizational Models
Requiring IMT participation in Position Descriptions for Fire Staff On the surface, this is one of the more logical suggestions. However, the vast majority of firefighters are trained in Operations. Each IMT has 9 Ops positions counting the Air Group. The Rocky Basin zone alone has several thousand firefighters. When is each of these individuals ever going to be able to meet the requirements of their PD and serve on a team? Even if this requirement was limited to more senior fire staff there would still be hundreds competing for a spot. Without a massive effort to train these individuals in other IMT roles, which most Ops folks don't care for, requiring IMT

participation on an IMT in a PD is window-dressing.
Implications from requiring fire funded personnel mandatory participation on incident management teams. Generally fire funded personnel are partially funded from hazardous fuels and other budget line items. A requirement for mandatory IMT participation could negatively affect hazardous fuels accomplishment. Hazardous fuels planning and implementation are accomplished year long, and provide training and experience that is useful in developing high quality fire suppression personnel. This has the potential to create a stove pipe fuels or fire organizations which do not facilitate skill sharing and rapid fire skill development by practicing on prescribed burns. Fuels management planning skills, including advanced fire behavior, NEPA, contracting and other skills more commonly associated with vegetation management programs need to be recognized. Accelerated development programs which are being considered as one tool for workforce development could have an adverse impact on hazardous fuels accomplishments if resources are not available for hazardous fuels treatment planning and implementation
Part of this current problem with not enough people is beyond the configuration of the teams. It goes back to pay, liability and the lack of hiring that was done from about 1980-1990 and current hiring practices. We need to require all FS employees to participate in fire not just fire employees.

Compensation

The survey queried stakeholders on two aspects of compensation--how individual team members should be rewarded or compensated, and how organizations should fund participants while on incident.

3.15 – Compensation - *How should team participants be compensated?*

The most frequent selection being *Other* (25%, Fig. 55a, Table 86), the relatively high percent of *No Preference* (21%), and the lack of any consensus among respondents suggest that this question is poorly scoped (i.e., the full suite of acceptable answers were not provided in the survey), that this may not be an important issue, or that more discussion is needed. About 11% of respondents chose as is, or *No Additional Compensation Needed*. The numerous variations submitted under *Other* indicate that more discussion is needed within the community to better assess the issue, solutions and priority of solutions. Re-categorization of the survey data (using comments submitted under *Other* to create an *As Is* response and parsing suggestions for other types of details, grade-based pay, and cash or pay awards to their respective bins; Fig. 55b) indicates that the largest segment of respondents, just over 25%, think *Provide Cash Awards* or *Provide Pay Incentives* would be a beneficial path forward.

Figure 55. Number and distribution of responses for Compensation.

a. As reported.



b. Reclassified.



Table 86. Text provided as 'Other' choice for Compensation.

Grouping (204)	Exact Comment
As is (97)	As currently compensated
(3)	as is
	AS is , make supporting fire a condition of hire...
	As is present.
(2)	as is, but AD's should be able to receive overtime compensation
	As is.
	As it is done now. I honestly don't think participation on teams is driven by compensation equity.
	As it is now
	as they are now- no special incentives
	as they are now, or less
	Compensated through pay & OT
	compensation as currently provided
(2)	Current compensation
	current means
	don't change things
	Full Overtime Pay
	Greed shows. Each employee receives a paycheck and has the opportunity to promote based on merit.
	I think OT wage is sufficient. Agency support is much more important than money.
	I wasn't aware that there was a compensation issue with IMT members.
	IMT participation is already rewarded by OT. Reluctance to participate is due to lack of relief of day job work requirements and concerns about liability.

	In many ways those participating in wildfire assignments are compensated through OT and H-pay. I think asking for higher levels of comp would not go over well within the rest of the agencies.
	It's called overtime, they are being compensated
	Keep as current
(2)	keep as is
	Keep as-is. Personnel mobilized on incidents generally receive 2-3 times their normal base pay. In an average fire season, that can amount to many thousands of dollars above their regular salary rate. I would be very concerned with cash awards, because
	keep it how it is now
	Keep it the way it is.
	Leave as-is
	Like any other employee. It's a privilege to be here. If you think it's a hardship, go flip hamburgers. Nobody made you be a Marine.
	Maintain status quo
	NO - Current Funding of
	NO - Funded at current levels of pay at home unit. We have to keep cost down, not continually rewarding ourselves with higher pay. If you don't like the pay, don't participate.
	No additional pay should be needed, duty should be part of every employees job.
	No change just Line support and we will be fine
(4)	NO Compensation
	No compensation if they like fire then that is their job for the detail either go or don't go
	no compensation, participation is enough, that’s part of the job
	No compensation, we already have good paying jobs and when we are on fire assignments we make our awards through hard work and many long hours worked!
	No extra, they get the time they work which is lots of overtime. Uncap the OT as is routinely done on fire that is a significant amount of money
	No incentive - we make enough money in OT on incidents. There is no need to increase incident costs and perpetuate greed. Plus, who would cover base salary expense in a slow year???
	No special compensation
(3)	none
	None of the above
	None, they already receive a paycheck and OT
	Not much evidence that compensation is a problem
	Nothing, expect it.
	Paid at current grade
	paid for their time at incidents
	Pay at regular ot rate
	pay normal wages funded by incident only when on incident
	Pay them at their home unit grade level
	Pay them for the time they are out and allow liberal overtime at their regular rate, nothing special other than that
	regular pay scale
	regular pay, with overtime
	Retain current arrangement, overtime helps address compensation issue
	same as current
	Same as is but remove OT cap (the cap seems it would discourage participation during the busiest years)
	Same as is now
	same as now
	Service at current pay rate.
	Should be part of our jobs and the compensation is the overtime and hazard differential we receive for participation.
	Special compensation for team participation is a slippery slope. Employees are already paid. Details...maybe. But let's not make mercenaries out of fire folks. Team participation needs to be honored and encouraged in the federal agencies. The culture
	Status Quo - compensation of this sort will bring out those who really shouldn't be C&G
	Stay with current process
	Team participants already receive overtime as compensation. Perhaps consider portal to portal.
	The current compensation structure is very adequate.
	The overtime they receive is not enough?? None of the above.
	The way they are now should remain incentive enough, with OT Promotions would be a nightmare
	there shouldn't be extra compensation.
	They already are.
	They already make overtime. No comp. It's part of there job and elect to do it.
	They get overtime!!!! Travel to beautiful wilderness areas that are burning up!!! All expense paid camping trip!!!

	Why should they be compensated any further than that? GS-13 rate of $60+ per hour is not appropriate.
	they have a job already
	They should be paid as worked. No extra pay beyond what we get now.
	They should be paid at their normal grade and level.
	They should get paid at their normal rate
	This is a loaded question. People should not be rewarded for fulfilling basic expectations, seeing how they're getting paid. This is greedy; agencies' budgets are flat and declining, and the more we give to fire, the less we give to other resource areas
	We already get paid to do our job & being part of IMT's is our job.
	We get paid an hourly wage plus OT and hazard for the jobs we do.
	What is wrong with how it is now?
	Why do they need extra compensation? They are being compensated at a higher rate if exempt and working on a fire assignment.
	why is additional compensation needed if people are just doing their jobs?
	With the current process
	You get paid your current grade.
	You have got to be kidding, Getting paid overtime after 8 hours should be sufficient, Why try and deplete fire funding anymore than you have to.
	You should be happy with a paycheck. Get rid of Hazard pay and overtime too.
	Your paid when your IMT goes on the assignment through the P-code.
Detail (11)	120 day details during peak fire months (based on team location). Example: IC's and Deputy IC's receive the greater of a GS-14 or their current grade. Section Chiefs receive the greater of a GS-13 or their current grade. States determine on a state by st
	120 day details for all 50 team positions, 120 days need to days of work not calendar days.
	90-Day details at their home unit
	details for season makes most sense; some years there is very little fire.
	I like option 1 above but why 90 day details? Do this for all management positions but only while on the fire.
	I would have picked the 90 day in item one but I think with the increasing length of fire season it should be a minimum of 120 days plus-at least for some GACC's
	mix of year round, 90 day, 120 day, and some way to raise individuals more than 1 grade; other incentives, like time off considered - consider all
	Not sure, but something along the lines of the first option.
	Option of the detail during peak fire season and/or cash/time off awards
	Short term details when actually working as Command and General Staff /Section Chief positions on incidents.
	the detail concept is right on, but include unit leaders, check in recorders as well.
Grade (13)	C&G staff should be compensated at the GS 12 level while on assignment of doing IMT business. Beyond that, cash awards for others.
	compensate at the GS 13 or GS 12 level only while on assignment.
	employees paid @ their grade
	existing pay grade
	Grade bump should be during incident only; if the employee goes down (ie. District Manager is a Safety Officer on a team), then their grade on the fire & pay should go down as well.
	Grade increase if employee is lower than a GS-12 or 13, and some kind of award for employees that are already GS-12 and 13s.
	GS9/10 level
	I like the grade based option for people who accept greater responsibility. Cash incentives for participation would be nice. Make overtime compensation towards high-three for retirement calculations.
	I like the idea of IMT position grades but only while on assignment versus detail or full time.
	Modify Paycheck 8 to raise pay grade when on fire assignment.
	NIMO has set the standard. Follow to standard for like positions by typing duration temp details (fire assignments).
	Pay at commensurate GS level while on an incident only.
	Pay C&GS at appropriate grade while assigned with an additional 10% for IMT duty related prep
Incentive (22)	16 hour "guaranteed standard" per day for all, regular OT rules, hourly based on your regular salary, exception process for shifts that exceed 16. Eliminate portal to portal scam. Eliminate any fire participants that demand contractually longer days or
	5% of salary increase incentive for primary IMT commitments
	All Federal team members be given a pay differential all year for participation
	All fire personnel should be compensated for double their regular salary rate per hour for 12 hours per day 7 days per week for 90 day details during peak fire season (based on location). Outside this period regular pay rules would apply.
	all positions are paid at the current rate plus the employee is allowed to keep all overtime pay and apply earrings to career retirement benefits

	Establish an hourly rate increase, similar to H pay, for work on incidents regardless of incident status. There also needs to be a better, more seamless, way to fund IMTs and staff working on non-fire all hazard incidents.
	extra retirement incentive
	Garmented minimum hours - 16
	incentive pay and cash awards
	Incentive pay for team participation.
	Incentives based on performance
	Incentives from Line Officer's
	increased compensation while assigned to incident
	Pay enhancements for qual maintenance and availability
	Percentage of wage increase while engaged.
	Premium Stipend per Day Pay. i.e. IC = $50 Chief = $40 Unit Ldr = $30 No personnel actions required, initiated in T&A system, Applied to Suppression/All Hazard Codes Only, as Base for Retirement/TSP/etc, easy to audit
	Provide cash awards based on performance rating
	Provide cash awards for incident participation and other financial incentives such as time off with pay, unlimited tax credits, etc.
	Provide cash awards for incident participation and provide standby pay for on call time.
	Rewards (cash or ?) for both the participating IMT member and the Agency Administrator sponsoring the participant
	Set standard cash award by level of position per incident response
	should be some incentives
Misc. (22)	based on agency wage differential, cash etc
	C&G compensated year-round by PREPAREDNESS funds.
	Compensated as utilized and when deployed
	Compensated based on actual time worked, no additional special compensation is needed.
	Compensation should be given only for the time they are on the incident.
	fairly
	fed state and y should be paid the same
	fire retirement for non primary
	Good question-Need to resolve the militia's responsibilities for their normal duties. Would not want to offer people cash awards for not completing their normal EPAP responsibilities.
	Need incentive other than cash
	Our retired Logs chiefs need paid a good deal to get out. They are very experienced and allow us younger folks to learn from there years. Consider their higher pay as an AD training for those below them, because they lead and teach every step of the way
	overtime & to retirement
	pay per use
	Prioritize participants for training positions with the team (would require additional positions on team)
	Resource order activates increase in GS incentive
	support from Line
	This is bigger than fire. C & G [but larger than the traditional 8, more like 15-20 that can go on 2-8 hrs notice] on year around for their base 8 for about half of the teams and are available to respond to anything.
	Time Off award
	Use AD pay plan for basis of equity across the board
	We should provide incentives to folks who work through NEPA and partner with neighbors to treat landscapes on a FIXED budget with no TV cameras rolling
	What about existing GS-13 that takes on additional work and risk -- cash awards or % increase in salary while on fire time.
	while performing duties on incidents
Portal to Portal (8)	change to 24 hr pay status during incidents
	Higher GS compensation while on the incident and portal to portal
	Options 1 and 3 and Portal-Portal
	Options 1 and 3 and portal-portal.
	OT w/ portal to portal
	Portal to portal
	portal to portal at current grade
	portal to portal of some sort, I'm sorry but sleeping in a loud fire camp, working 16 hr shifts, peeing in a hot out-house, eating powdered eggs, this list could go on and on but you get my drift, its not a vacation.
Position responsibility (31)	% of salary increase determined by position for duration of assignment (and) workload off-set at home unit.
	All IMT members compensated by duties (positions) based on national recognized (all the same across the nation) scales; i.e., supply unit leader is GS-9 or person's real grade (whichever is greater).
	All incident personnel should be compensated at the greater of their current grade or position determined scale.

	based on job duties and performance
	Based on position held
	By position on NIMO team or NIMO like team, regular pay for single resource overhead regardless of positions
	Command & General Staff should not be compensated year-round from fire funds. However, fire positions ought to have some mechanism to reflect their complexity/pay scale while working in them.
	Command and General Staff compensated year-round by fire acs at a grade based on IMT position (IC GS-14; C&G GS-13)
	Command and General Staff positions for permanent and type 1 teams should be compensated year round. All other type 2 team C&G would be compensated utilizing details.
	Compensate for the fire position held. I.C's should be paid $200/hour with lesser pay for all other positions.
	Compensate participants by their assigned position (item 1 without the 90-day detail bias)
	Compensated by position responsibility
	Compensated year-round...assuming the positions are full time positions dedicated to that Command and General Staff position.
	Compensation based on assignment
	Compensation based on working in qualified position on fire and for fire training per diem.
	Compensation during assignment based on complexity of position; similar to the AD scale, but better recognizing complexity, skill set, and supervision requirements.
	Compensation by IMT position is good but perhaps it should be for the time people on fire plus 50% of their fire service after they return to the work force. So if they spent 30 days on fire during a season the Fire Ac would pay for 45 days salary.
	Determine appropriate pay scale by IMT position. Receipt of higher pay should only occur while actually performing in those duties.
	Develop a fire pay scale that pays the personnel commensurate for the job that they are doing. Right now a GS 5 can do the same job that an 11 does with the same responsibility. Difference between state and fed is large.
	For incident participation, at appropriate grade.
	Grade based on position during incidents
	I like the idea of compensation for duties performed but not just at the IMT level what about crew boss tfld engb??
	If added duties performed classify the position with them included
	If most staff positions on a Ranger District, are a GS 11 why should a Section Chief be higher Might be worth exploring bring everyone up to the same pay schedule but compatible with pay schedules used for people in management positions on Ranger District
	increase pay by position but limited by availability
	Pay employees on an incident based on the position they are filling. The more complex, the higher the pay.
	Pay them extra based on complexity and grade when it amounts to more than 20% of year.
	Standard for ICS position, but this would be challenging for state/local organizations
	Temporary promotions while on fire duty, commensurate with position on fire
	The answers provided seem exclusive of other options. Retain current tour-of-duty policy due to work/rest guidelines, and to prevent non-participation. However, when on assignment, be compensated at a pre-determined position pay scale appropriate to
	Use of differentials, based on position.

Significant differences in distribution of responses by demographic sub-group using re-classed data reveals there are only differences among *Incident Qualifications* (Table 87). *IMT-ICs* provided a higher than expected number of *Miscellaneous* responses and were the only sub-group to slightly prefer *Details* over *Cash Awards* as the most frequent selection. *IMT-C&G* respondents were also more likely than expected to prefer compensation based on *IMT grade*.

Table 87. Cross-tabulations and significance of responses to Compensation options by demographic sub-group. [Note: Most frequent response is indicated by **bold**. Significant difference in distribution is indicated by * at end of Table title. Cell counts significantly higher than expected are in *italics*; counts significantly less than expected are also enclosed in *()*.]

(a) by Agency.

	BIA/ Tribe	BLM	Contractor	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Total
90 day details	6	15	1	15	15	2	12	0	84	6	156
C&G at IMT grade	3	17	0	13	11	0	3	0	52	3	102
No preference	**9**	25	1	17	**24**	0	**20**	2	75	5	178
Other	4	**43**	1	8	14	2	17	0	**120**	4	213
Provide cash awards	3	33	2	**21**	16	0	14	0	98	**10**	197
Null	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	10	0	12
Total	25	134	5	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	858

(b) by Organizational level.

	Contractor	Federal-Local	Federal-National	Federal-Regional	Local Govt/Fire	No professional role	State Govt/Fire	Total
90 day details	3	88	13	18	17	4	13	156
C&G at IMT grade	2	59	12	10	13	3	3	102
No preference	**4**	84	12	31	17	**9**	**21**	178
Other	2	**132**	13	**37**	8	4	17	213
Provide cash awards	4	114	**16**	23	**21**	5	14	197
Null	0	11	0	0	1	0	0	12
Total	15	488	66	119	77	25	68	858

(c) by Functional area.

	Dispatch	Fire	Fuels	LO/AA	NIMO	No role	Non-agency fire	Other agency	Other fire	Total
90 day details	5	68	9	13	2	1	11	34	13	156
C&G at IMT grade	5	37	11	13	3	2	6	16	9	102
No preference	5	62	8	**24**	2	**6**	**15**	40	16	178
Other	**13**	**85**	15	**24**	0	1	10	**50**	15	213
Provide cash awards	12	75	**16**	21	0	1	11	41	**20**	197
Null	0	5	0	0	1	0	0	3	3	12
Total	40	332	59	95	8	11	53	184	76	858

(d) by Incident qualification*.

	FEMA/DHS	IMT-Type 3	IMT-IC	IMT C&G	None	Other	Total
90 day details	1	23	17	47	6	62	156
C&G at IMT grade	1	13	6	*48*	8	*26*	102
No preference	1	17	13	50	***18***	79	178
Other	0	24	**27**	**71**	9	82	213
Provide cash awards	0	**27**	14	57	12	**87**	197
Null	0	0	1	6	0	5	12
Total	3	104	78	279	53	341	858

(e) by Age range.

	21-30	31-40	41-50	< 20	> 50	Total
90 day details	1	27	48	0	80	156
C&G at IMT grade	4	13	27	0	58	102
No preference	6	21	**65**	2	84	178
Other	6	**40**	61	0	**106**	213
Provide cash awards	**7**	36	59	0	95	197
Null	2	2	3	0	5	12
Total	26	139	263	2	428	858

The relatively high number of comments (almost as many as for the *NIMO/NIMO-like* question), suggests there is both energy and lack of consensus about how best to proceed (Tables 88, 89). The overall sense was that while additional compensation might assist with recruitment, the issue is more with making changes to minimize

barriers to incident participation. Several comments suggested that establishing position-based pay and providing details would enable incident participation to become true developmental opportunities.

Table 88. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Compensation options.

From Question 2.12
Believe all including agency personnel should go be paid portal to portal when actually on the ground at the Fire (not referring to Motel fires)
agree...IMT participation needs to compensated to the level of its complexity.
From Question 3.17
Regarding pay and incentives, I believe that incident response should be required as a collateral duty of federal employment for many positions. That said, I recognize that this will never happen. The best way to get people into incident management is through incentives to participants, and by requiring supervisors to support employee involvement. I would not advocate a separate pay scale for regular employees when on fire assignments as you might wind up with individuals dropping out of incident participation due to having to take a down grade in pay to support fire. However, I do believe that IMT participants who's fire duties are above and beyond their pay scale in their regular job should be paid according to the work they perform on incidents.
3.15 If compensation was regular there would be more opportunities for attrition. When compensation for being on an IMT is higher than any other detail opportunity those opportunities are less likely to be shared.
Pay is the greatest incentive to keep team/personnel/trainees current and ready. Insure that top dollar is available when these highly skilled people are called on.
3.15 More pay during fire season probably would entice more people to be militia. More pay all year long is a waste of tax payers money. The real issue is personal time for people. MANY people don't want to be away from their personal lives. There is no way you will get those people to commit for very long no matter what you do. That's why we have so many SHARED positions. People are unwilling to commit EVERY time. There needs to be provisions for SHARING positions and making that work better than it does.
3.15: Although. I understand a need to compensate lower graded employees working in higher-level ICS positions, I'm reluctant to construct an entirely new pay grade for ICS assignments. Doing so might jeopardize interest from ALL levels of federal agencies to be involved. While it might benefit a GS-8 Engine Captain that happens to be an Ops. Chief, it could discourage or prevent a GS-12 program manager from becoming more involved, especially while they work their way up. I think we must retain the variability of professional perspectives that comes from using a militia concept. Some of the best Dozer Bosses I've worked with just happened to be bios. or archy or hydrologists in their full-time capacity. We would lose more than dozer boss quals, if we installed additional barriers to having those folks work on wildfires. As FOREST managers, we must never forget the complexities of managing the whole forest, not just the part that's on fire on any particular day…
I hear all the time that the only reason why fire and non-fire folks are involved with fire is due to hazard pay and overtime. If we didn't have overtime, but rather straight time for 24 hours or hazard pay would we have as many folks participate? Why does money always have to be an incentive?
I am not sure about the compensation, Fire Staff fall into regular duties but we do need to "sweeten the pot" for more militia. I think a lot of militia types have lost interest based on higher priorities set by local supervisors. It seems to me the Agencies have gotten away from everyone being qualified for some fire duty. Even a clerk can help out and the OT alone is great compensation.
I think it is undesirable to ask a GS-7 or GS-9 to fill a role on an IMT in the Command or General staff and not receive fair wages that match the stress and complexity of the position.
We need to provide incentive based funding to people who choose to take on more responsibility, and liability. I think if teams had a detail opportunity for all of the positions like Division Supervisor GS-09 then you would get more of a commitment. Especially if it is an upgrade to the applicant. It would be easier to sell to the boss, and the boss would know what they are committing their star employees to. It is very difficult to be a primary team member, because the homefront gets lots of fires, I can not commit to the team. Now if it was a detail and I could get a temporary promotion, my boss could fill in behind me, and wouldn't say no.
No comment on pay structure other than incident based incentives should help with militia participation?
Providing incentives to participate is a very good idea.
Pay and power have become the motivators for wildland fire participation. What happened to the love of wildland

firefighting? Having said that, I realize that today the individual motivation has changed. We need to implement a system that fairly compensates without bastardizing the pay system. We must stop the practice of falsifying timesheets and claiming hours worked when individuals are sitting in camp or disengaged in the field.
As far as compensation, keep in mind the whole IMT is not just Command and General Staff...The question 3.15 seemed to suggest looking at the C&G and not the other players. To be fair to all there are many other positions that are very hard to fill. Logistics is getting very slim and other areas. As long as we don't box ourselves in with C&G and reward all IMT members with something based on assignment award or complexity of their position similar to determining complexity in the AD pay process.
My current grade for my local unit position is a GS-8. When my task book is complete, how would I be able to be promoted to a GS-12? I appreciate the organization realizing the true grade level of the C&G staff positions but wonder if regulations would need to be changed.
If a non-fire person supports a fire, the local unit should be able to bring in additional people to accomplish work. Compensate fire assignments with incentive pay and true overtime for all!!!
Come on...pay people for the complexities and liabilities they're exposed to. Emergency service should be voluntary, if you want dedicated individuals, but you have to offer the reward for the complex KSA's you expect them to possess.
We need to entice the best to participate. Our best employees need to see an advantage to sleeping on the ground and being away from their tec toys for awhile. Incident wages could also be included when figuring high 3 wages.
I think IMT members should compensated at the same level as NIMO, not less.
I like the idea of 90 day details, they could assist the fire org or their home unit in a variety of ways, or even do their normal job during this time frame.
IMT members need to be compensated by a grade increase to encourage them to become C&G. We need to provide trainees with incentives through cash awards or performance based incentives.
The key to boosting participation is to show the employees a benefit for participation. Currently employees at a Journey (GS-9 up) on the units where I have worked (6 Forests in 3 Regions in 5 States) are working way over 40 hrs / week without participating in fire. The capacity of the Agency is going down due to the loss of employees and the workload is going up, this is without fire. Many employees are not willing to give more time to the agency, they cannot be blamed the reality is increasing workloads and decreasing capacity have many operating in overload. Add to this the ever increasing administrivia and the workforce cannot give more, reference the job satisfaction surveys to validate this opinion. Employees must have an incentive to participate on teams, to try and put team participation into a PD for a Biologist or Silviculturist that can't meet the expectations of their current job would be a disaster. ALSO, having been on teams and in Fire Management for over 30 years the thought of having people participating only because the "Boss told me I have to" would not serve anyone well. We also must recognize and provide some incentive to those that stay home to get the day-to-day work done so that others can participate on teams. These folks are often the forgotten heroes, without them many of our team members would not be available.
Personal choice as to be on a team or not. Do not support the current system at Type 2 or above as I do not want to be involved in the excessive waste of funds that is evident on a lot of fires. Extra compensation to encourage participation seems a bit much. Is the pocketbook the only reason people participate? Shift of base 8 should be the same among all agencies so all are on the same playing field.
I think it is outrageous that proposing GS increases or cash awards to federal employees who participate on teams. We are funded with tax payers dollars with the expectation that we perform our jobs, that we all accepted, at the pay/GS scale that was determined. Overtime, Hazard pay, Night Differential and other premiums are our awards.
Compensation is becoming more of an attractant with current employees, and not providing increased compensation for the IMO position is part of the reason for reduced participation. IMO compensation should be based on the current NIMO model for C & G positions.
There is no effort made anymore to recruit new employees into the fire organization or to offer training or incentives for fire participation for non fire funded personnel.
Compensation while on fires should be consistent with fire position held. If in a supervisory position, you should be paid as such. The higher the position held, the higher the grade level for pay. This would provide incentive for folks to continue to move up and increase red card qualifications, and for those who are not in fire to want to go on fires and receive more training.
I feel our wage is already compensation to be on a IMT. The ability to get overtime is a huge part of why we do what we do! Sure I would love to get paid more to be on a fire assignment, but I don't think that is the solution.

Compensate fire positions for AD's adequately, as when they were in permanent federal employment.
It is critical to pay OT and base 8 (or backfill) to non-fire funded staff to encourage home units financially to allow staff to be released to incidents.
Pay should be commensurate with responsibility-- no way a GS-13 should be paid the same for doing FOBS as a GS-13 doing IC.
I believe most FIRE people don't need a lot of incentive to participate if their Line Officer/Supervisor is supporting them. Non Fire personnel should be motivated by extra compensation and the support of their Line Officer. I wish I could say something other than Pay, but I don't know what that is besides Performance based review maybe. That however is a form of forced compliance. ??!!
I really don't think a fire assignment should turn out to be a lucrative program. This is what it is now for many people on fire assignments.
Pay the position or the GS level, whichever is greater.
there are a lot of AD team members who are not compensated appropriately especially when compared to some non-agency people who are being paid portal-to-portal. AD's should be able to accrue overtime just like everyone else.
I do not feel temporary promotions should be given; employees need to participate because they want to, not for the temp promo. It would be nice to receive some type of reorganization for participation, even if it is a non-monetary award like team shirts/sweatshirts/jackets.
Need to fairly pay people for the work they do.
It is also dangerous for us to compensate people just to push more into command and general staff positions. Just doing things to get the up-grade will cause some people to try and step into those roles that have no business being there.
People need to be fairly compensated based on the depth and complexity of the position they are performing (e.g. GS-13 should not be compensated at this rate for serving as a SCKN. In contrast, an IC should receive pay commensurate with the responsibilities deleted to them by an Agency Administrator).
If we are going to compensate a GS7 or GS9 employee for taking on a GS13 IC role at a fire, then the opposite should be true too. If a GS13 or GS14 or GS 15 employee wants to participate on an IMT in a less challenging role, then their compensation should reflect the lower grade. Too many high graded individuals are perceived to coast/vacation on a fire and suck up lots of high graded OT for a lower graded role. So the compensation needs to balance both ends.
I believe the militia works, but more emphasis should be placed on the fire funded personnel to support and other staff areas could maybe have some kind of incentive?? Don't think funding should extend to salary per what their position on an IMT is, but there could be some other kind of incentive.
Cash Awards for participants would need to have a cap that is fiscally responsible.
There needs to be incentives for supervisors to push employees to participate in fire during fire season. Incentives can be in the form of relief to base resource funding (current FS model), as well a performance based (built into annual performance appraisals as a critical element). A stronger militia will be required to fill behind a large number of retirees and the results of downsizing that seems unavoidable at this time.
For most of the questions in this section---the person taking the survey was "locked into answering the question".....some of these should be "essay" type, not radio button. Example---compensation or Team Members should be: and there was not options to say "they should not be compensated...they chose to do this....we are opening a giant can of worms by creating compensated positions. People will be obtaining qualifications that do not have the right characteristics for that level of job. More of these should be open-ended questions.
Pay incentives are needed for Feds. People do not want the extra responsibility without being compensated. The volunteer system is not working anymore.
Why should compensation for team participants change to the greater of that associated with their IMT duties or their "day job" duties (Question 3.15)? I can live with each of these changes, but I'm troubled with the nature of the questionnaire. In 3.15, for example, there are no choices for "Compensate according to the grade of their day job (current FS practice)." I am not convinced that IMT participants are under-compensated.
Agencies need incentive to commit, train and develop non-fire staff IMT members.
Pay has always been a problem. Exempt vs. non-exempt has always been a problem, with Command/Staff personnel making less than a ground support truck driver on an incident. Be fair, but going overboard is uncalled for. Portal-to-Portal is no good. GS-supergrades could cause issues, especially when a T-1 team with a GS-14 IC is working with an Agency Administrator that's a GS-12 District Ranger.....think about it..... Who's got more responsibility?
Incentives such as cash awards will draw more people into Team membership. We are asking people to basically take on what amounts to another job, yet there is no additional compensation for it. To say that the OT associated with being on a Team is compensation misses the fact that usually you can make more OT as a single resource. The only way to attract more people, especially the militia, is to make a financial incentive, say 5000 a year for being on a team. Take 45 teams with 50 people, thats just 11 million a year. How much would getting rid of all the portal to portal locals save compared to that? Want to get more Feds on teams? 1. Incentives, incentives, incentives. And the only incentive that

works is money. 2. Outreach - educate people how they can participate. Help them get the paths open to positions, especially the non-fireline positions. 3. Mandate - the Chief has to make this a FS-wide problem with metrics for performance given to Forest Supervisors and Rangers. If this fails, then the USFS needs to stovepipe, and then make the system mandatory for fire funded people.
See question 3.15. Retired old guys are worth more. They teach use young ones great skills. Their grey hair is worth more, so pay them more. My chief is in his 60's. I am mid 30. He has taught me more patience, skills, and allowed me more opportunity than the younger ones because the young are to proud to delegate in most cases. They just do without teaching.
I personally feel that it is important to recognize individuals whom are willing to devote a period of their lives to All Hazard Incident Management - cash awards or promotions.
It is appropriate to pay an IC the commensurate grade level while they are acting in that capacity. Given current budgets, it is not reasonable to pay for that position when the person is not acting in that capacity.
I believe you are on the right track when you look at some way of compensating people for their work on teams. What is the best way I don't know. One thing that would help is all team members getting some discretionary money to purchase needed items like boots, team shirts, other necessary gear that they can not purchase with the normal funding.
I advocate paying for detailed positions only with the small leadership team of 9 core members during peak fire season. Otherwise these individuals go back to their real job.
Good leadership should be rewarded higher than anything else – peer review section chiefs to determine good customer service, ability to teach and train apprentices, ability to effectively communicate with peers, supervisors etc.
I think the detail concept at 3.15 is a great idea, this would incent IMT members to move up. I also think it should work on the lower end, e.g., an EQTR should not exceed a GS-9.
90 day details could be utilized to compensate the type 2 C&G members paid by SU. The balance of the base funding for type 2 teams would flow through the position program area and all time on incidents whether base or overtime would be charged to SU.
Working on IMTs should be part of all fire funded positions. Great learning practice that benefits the agency as well as the participant.
The federal agencies involved should develop a succession plan that includes the following: 1. Incentives to employees to participate (5% of salary increases) or 2. Require fire program positions to participate at the unit leader or C&G level based on position and grade in the program for a determined minimum period of time.
The federal agencies involved should develop a succession plan that includes the following: 1. Incentives to employees to participate (5% of salary increases) or 2. Require fire program positions to participate at the unit leader or C&G level based on position and grade in the program for a determined minimum period of time.
It seems to me if the agencies want to have employee participation in IMT's, then we should provide better incentives and support. If appears that we "grow" enough Ops types, but Plans, Logistics and Finance run short on support people. We use to have a lot more resource (foresters) types that would go out and play, but now with mainly "ogists' types working for land agencies they don't "play" as much. some of this is also due to physicals and pack testing vs the the old step test. There is a lot of expectation for federal non-fire folks to be on teams anymore. When I was with state forestry, my PD had 5% fire support in it. We should use retirees (great experience, lots of time and many want to help) and I think retirees will enter and leave the workforce as they age, similar to a regular employee career. Agencies also could help with non-fire employees getting some of their work load forgiven, especially going into reduced budgets.
With declining budgets all we need to do is put the 90 day base as part of their total funding and we will have agency folks tripping over themselves to get qualified and participate. Need LEADERSHIP in the federal side of the organization.
If fire duty participation, at some level, is not mandatory, there needs to be 1) and incentive for employees (both fire and non-fire) to want to participate and 2) an incentive for supervisors/managers to allow participation by employees in fire suppression/support duties.
The great untapped militia is being ignored. Incentivize them How about a bonus if you go to training and then go on a certain number of assignments? With resource budget cuts, the time for this may be ripe...folks are unfunded.
Providing incentives should be in the form of encouraging participation and balance of normal target achievement.
3.15 Base 8 for militia funded from suppression. Funding positions year round from suppression is institutionalizing corruption at a grand scale. Shame on those who suggested it.
There is little to no incentive for team participation.
In the past I was assigned a trainee division supervisor making $800 a day while I was making around $200 a day, he came from a 2 engine city fire department (how he got past strike team leader??), I am not sure why we were paying to train non federal employees on a federal fire. Basically he didnt know a rock from a hole in the ground when it comes to wildland fire fighting, I my opinion he didnt have the basic skills a squad boss is required to have. I see this happening alot in these team settings, especially when the local government employees get in the command and general staff

positions.
Badly need non-fire position fills - Logistics , Finance need to encourage and help forest with back fill rather than pulling employees from team to complete "real job" Forest deserve to be given kudos rather than dinks
Guiding my choices: Primary Division Supervisor Type2 team 5 years ICT3 3 years on a high fire forest USFS FIRE 20 years We have a need for: incentives, position based pay, PDs reflective of IMT work, detail opportunities, filling gaps, professionalism.
I believe additional compensation such as 90 day details for team members would create a nightmare for personnelists and open the door for abuse! It would also provide the wrong incentive and create ill feelings when someone does not get the team position they want based on pay incentive.
AD's should be compensated comparably with agency personnel, this includes 1.5x base rate for time over 40 hours/week. It's not fair to go to California and be assigned as the trainer for a Kern County or Cal Fire employee, and they say "It's great, we get paid $60/hour while working and $50/hour while sleeping." And the AD employee is there making $28.16/hour for all working hours.
Consider portal to portal as an incentive.
Team members are elected so it would be unfair to pay them more and especially when you are not allowed to participate due to line officers. We do need to remove state office employees from teams. They are at the state level for a reason. They should be there to answer the phone not on assignments. They are paid a high GS level and compensated to do that. It is taking away opportunities from people in the field that do it daily and need the experience.
The pay inequity is a big problem. A GS-5 timber marker might be working side by side with a District Ranger doing a status-check-in recorder job on an incident. There is no good way to equalize the discrepancy. Giving both a cash award for participating doesn't help the situation and may exaggerate it. Discouraging participation of the DR by forcing them to qualify for a more complex position doesn't help the cause of increased participation. Establishing a pay scale based on the complexity of the ICS position held would also likely decrease the participation of the DR. There is no easy solution. The training approval model should encourage employees to develop skills to perform in positions similar in complexity to their normally assigned duties or above, not below. Compensation cannot be considered separately from organizational models.
Team compensations - It’s important to hold individuals accountable for their work and provide opportunities for individuals to exceed in their job by performing well. Providing these compensations should have employee participation. Some may want money, some may want time off. This should be a decision between the supervisor and employee at the time of evaluations (granted the evaluation is part of their PD, which I am a proponent of).
Need a way to backfill on the home unit that is supporting the participation and/or training development of the individual that participates on the team. If the home unit's work will not get done, the home unit will not allow voluntary participation. I do not think participation should be mandatory. I'd rather get people on the fireline that want to be there.
3.15. - 3.16 Teams identified in operating plans should be compensated based on partner policies, but covered by the responsible agency by percentage of landscape jurisdictional coverage. One cannot expect an agency, local government, tribe, volunteer fire department, or NGO, to operate an effective collaborative program with no base funding mechanism. An integrated wildland fire management fund needs to be created to cover the full base cost of team members that implement processes identified in local area operating plans. this will enable the local teams to manage prescribed fires, fuels treatments, fire suppression, pre-planning etc., without creating an undue burden on low income and minority populations or other community partners. Suppression specific funds should cover base 8 and OT when on incidents, so other program areas can progress unimpeded.
If you are wanting more federal personnel to participate in IMT's, they need to be compensated. As a former federal employee I understand the need for compensation. The reason there are more local agencies involved in IMT teams, is that they are compensated to go to training and better themselves. If there was an incentive I think you would see more fed's apply for teams. Even if it were minimum wage for the hours that they are off the line.....
The current pay system penalizes federal employees. There is no incentive to leave your happy home and go out to a fire and sleep in the dirt for your normal salary. You would be willing to take assignments if you received fire pay that would put new shoes on the baby. Supervisors would be willing to let employees train and accept fire assignments if they were compensated for letting their folks respond to fires. It is all about incentives.
Because service is voluntary, fire assignment should be held to the employees current wage plus over time or current wage for the entire shift. The reason several state employees are allowed to participate on Federal deployments is to remove them from state payrolls, gain experience, participate in the succession of the wildland fire organization and earn extra pay in the form of OT.
Pay: The incentive (required participation) to send forces off unit will not work when units have to backfill via overtime, contract resources or details. The requirements to maintain home unit staffing work against full participation. Bottom

line is that if you wish to work for a federal agency you need to be trained and current in emergency management, not just fire.
Equitable pay and using portal to portal should serve to reduce the scams in present vogue. The transitions that occur after weekends, such as Monday or Tuesday should be looked at so as to either reinforce, or negate my opinion. Small 'short teams' provide the most flexibility and are in line with cost effective configurations.
If you have a detail for 3 months - the individual may be there just because their district can't pay their salary and so it is a way for the district to save money and then you have a person there that shouldn't be.
IMT graded compensation could be a good idea to get more participation, but I think it should be per assignment versus details or year round.
Compensation issues need to be standardized for all personnel (ie, portal-to-portal, base-eight, exempt and non-exempt).
3.15 Please, no cash rewards, OT and hazard pay for most should be high enough compensation for federal employees.
Encourage Feds to participate on teams with normal pay. Give year end cash awards directed at their participation.
All should be compensated by normal salary and H pay and OT as conditions warrant.
Consider AD compensation as to H or OT for parity with RG.
Shift away from overtime as the only incentive to participate in fire assignments. The current system encourages unsafe working hours and inefficient productivity.
Like I said earlier we cant afford these political based highly in efficient high cost white collar folks our money should go to local folks and folks who actually fight fire or work on the ground.
Some teams are more active than others and some team members contribute more than others, hence the cash awards rather than increased pay determined by participation.
Also, there is a lack of individual incentive to be a team member, ie no freelancing, grief from managers, coworkers and families.
However, more incentives need to be made to participate (portal to portal-especially where the firefighter is spiked out).
3.15-3.16) We need to keep cost down. With rising cost of engine modules (Now GS-8's), Higher IHC grades, Higher Dispatch Grade, and Everyone else filling suit, we need to say stop. We can't all be GS-13's even if we think we should be. It's a reality that we need to think about governments duty to the people, and it unfortunately doesn't mean we are going to come close to private sector pay, or city FF pay. Sorry, that's a reality we are going to have to deal with or the Nation/ local units will suffer.
3.15 How should team participants be compensated? Years ago, some agencies gave cash incentives for participation on wildfires. Any individual who participated received a $2,000 cash award at the end of the season. Possible incentive packages are as follow: Individuals could be compensated at a rate higher than their grade and commensurate with the NIMO compensation package without the problems inherent to the 90-day detail outlined in the proposal. This would have to include Unit leader and Manager positions. Create a pay system similar to the AD pay scale that compensates for the duties performed. Scarcity positions would be compensated at a greater rate to provide an incentive. For young people we'd like to bring into wildland fire, access to social media may very well be a motivating factor. A survey geared to various age groups should be performed to find out what incentives work for each age group. The temporary positions and 90/120-day detail concept would cause an undue burden to the Forest Service HR system that is already overburdened and has difficulty even filling regular positions – this approach would need to be closely coordinated with the interagency community in order to avoid duplication of selections. Some people may not be able to qualify for GS-13 level positions if they are currently at a lower grade – this would limit the pool of qualified candidates and unduly tie manager's ability to successfully meet project work demands during slow fire seasons. The temporary positions and 90/120-day detail concept may conflict with the FLAME Act because suppression funds were used to fund year-round employees. Liability insurance cost reimbursement by the agencies needs to cover all fire and non-fire personnel who participate in pre and suppression activities.
From Question 4.08
Why just incentives for fire personnel? For instance, if fire could use preparedness funds to pay for training (salary, etc.) for militia to get involved, more militia would play. Incentives for fire and not others causes resentment.

Table 89. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Compensation Options.

Team members generally are compensated well via the amount of overtime and hazard pay that are earned on incidents. I do think there needs to be any additional monetary incentives. On a busy fire year there is significant financial gain for participation on teams.
NIMO pay rates/Temporary Promotions One of the other positive attributes of IMTs is that nobody cares what your day job is or what you get paid. You are

taken at face value as a team member because you have earned your position through training and experience just like everybody else.

The inflated NIMO GS 13 and 14 positions can only lead to an “us” and “them” situation when everyone does the same work. How is it possible to even afford or justify this with the current budget? How could the agencies fund this, you can only play with “emergency” funding so long before you get caught and when it happens everyone will suffer.

Even more ludicrous is the suggestion that C&G members get 90 day temporary promotions annually to equal the NIMO rates. Are you really suggesting that several hundred persons will get temporary promotions not because of the work they are doing but because of the work they may need to do, if there are fires? I for one would not want to explain to the bean counters in D.C. why several hundred temporary promotions were approved when it turns out one year there is no fire season or why a person had a temporary promotion for 90 days but only worked (14?) days that actually justified the higher pay grade. AND, what about the rest of the IMT members or the modules? They aren’t important enough for temporary promotions? Will substitute C&G members get a promotion for the length of the incident?

And worse of all, these temporary promotions, of individuals who by seniority are most often some of the higher paid base salary individuals on an incident anyway, would be an insult to the firefighters who are actually in harms way yet at the bottom of the pay scale.

How should team participants be compensated?

Years ago, some agencies gave cash incentives for participation on wildfires. Any individual who participated received a $2,000 cash award at the end of the season.

Possible incentive packages are as follow:

Individuals could be compensated at a rate higher than their grade and commensurate with the NIMO compensation package without the problems inherent to the 90-day detail outlined in the proposal. This would have to include Unit leader and Manager positions.

Create a pay system similar to the AD pay scale that compensates for the duties performed. Scarcity positions would be compensated at a greater rate to provide an incentive.

For young people we’d like to bring into wildland fire, access to social media may very well be a motivating factor.

A survey geared to various age groups should be performed to find out what incentives work for each age group.

The temporary positions and 90/120-day detail concept would cause an undue burden to the Forest Service HR system that is already overburdened and has difficulty even filling regular positions – this approach would need to be closely coordinated with the interagency community in order to avoid duplication of selections. Some people may not be able to qualify for GS-13 level positions if they are currently at a lower grade – this would limit the pool of qualified candidates and unduly tie manager’s ability to successfully meet project work demands during slow fire seasons. The temporary positions and 90/120-day detail concept may conflict with the FLAME Act because suppression funds were used to fund year-round employees.

Liability insurance cost reimbursement by the agencies needs to cover all fire and non-fire personnel who participate in pre and suppression activities.

You are aware that the proposed models are a downgrade for much of the federal C&G. Leaders in all our organizations will rise in both incident management as well as their day jobs. The reason we are good at our jobs in extreme situations is based on our experience and contacts in both worlds. If you attempt to fill C&G with staff level compensation, you will not interest the majority. I also understand some say this is rationale for a new model (we make too much money and outrank some AAs), but when it hits the fan I would contest that most AAs are thrilled with high-level folks coming to assist. My recommendation is this a factor of your scalability.

3.16 – Team Funding - How should team participants be funded?

There was strong consensus about how individuals should be funded while on incident (Fig. 56, Table 90). Two-thirds of respondents feel that both *Base 8 and Overtime* hours should be charged against suppression accounts.

Figure 56. Number and distribution of responses for Team Funding.



Table 90. Text provided as 'Other' choice for Team Funding.

Grouping	Exact Comment
As is	As Is
	As is
	Don't change things
	Fund as is
	Just as it is now "day jobs" required, but the IC should be base funded out of Emergency Funds, year round, and only the IC, who heads standard 50 person all risk teams.
	Same as current
	The way it is now, minus NIMO teams.
Base 8 and OT	Additional funding to support training and equipment to participants; base 8 and OT to suppression account while on incidents
	Base 8 & OT shifted to suppression plus 10% of base paid for by fire preparedness.
	Base 8 and ot fire funded a % of the rest of the annual salary based on the off season part of their IMT workload
	Base 8 and OT from fire account plus 50% of fire assignment length after they return to their regular position
	base 8/ot shifted plus some funded for minimal nimo teams
Portal to Portal	Portal to Portal during incidents
Year round	Permanent team members and type 1 C&G would be base funded year round through respective agency suppression funds. All other positions would be base eight funded from the position program area, however while on assignment their base 8 and overtime funding would shift to suppression accounts.
	Year round base funding through respective agency suppression funds. Take PR funds from field units and make commensurate reductions = MEL capacity.
	year-round funding...assuming C&G positions are full time positions. If not full time, then Base 8 from full-time position, OT from suppression.
Miscellaneous	90-120 day details, appropriate Grade level pay for all key fire participants. Including Division Supervisors, and some of the Logistical positions.
	Agency base funds with federal grants to fund qual maintenance and participation
	Agency Specific
	coop agreements
	Day job by day pay and fire while on incident
	Emergency funds when they are with their team.
	Federal team differential be funded by a GACC account while not on incident. Base and OT as is...

	Funded fire season from WFSU for C&G positions on teams.
	If fire is not there primary duty they should be funded out of their regular job code until on a fire then on the fire code
	Incentive pay should be given for supervisors and employees getting training and maintaining fire quals.
	incident pays otherwise its collateral duty
	not funded at all
	participants should be funded from suppression for all time they spend (including training out of season - so if employee is year-round they should be funded year round; others should be funded for all training & on incident time (base & OT)
	Same as 3.15
	Same as selection 3 above, but with financing for fire trainings and team meetings provided.
	see comment 3.15 - 3.16 below
	Shifted to suppression during incidents and training. The training funding is an important measure missing from support of the militia model
	Use AD pay plan as basis for equity across the board
	Value to the people

DOI employees are particularly supportive of this option, which represents the status quo for the Forest Service but a significant change for DOI agencies. The two most frequent comments concerning this preference were the need for consistency in procedures across Federal agencies, and the recognition that paying Base 8 hours from suppression in a small way compensates the local unit for the short-term loss of an employee.

For statistical testing by demographic sub-group, the *Year-round suppression* option was collapsed into *Other* due to the small response. Significant differences in distribution of response follow (Table 91):

- *Functional Area: Line Officers/Agency Administrators* were more likely to have *No Preference*, perhaps due to the high proportion of non-Federal employees in this sub-category; whereas *Fire* respondents were less likely to have *No Preference*.
- *Organizational Level:* As with agency break-down, non-Federal respondents were less likely to select *Base 8 and OT on Suppression* and more likely than expected to have *No Preference*.
- *Agency:* Respondents from *State Government/Fire* responded quite differently than other sub-groups, with far fewer than expected selecting *Base 8 and OT on Suppression*, more selecting *Base 8 position, OT on suppression*, and more with *No Preference*. Similarly, *Local Government/Fire* respondents were also less likely to select *Base 8 and OT on Suppression*, even though this was also the most frequently selected response category for both groups.
- *Age Range:* Those in the *31-40* age range were less likely to have *No Preference*.

Table 91. Cross-tabulations and significance of responses to Team Funding by demographic sub-group.
[Note: Most frequent response indicated by **bold**; significant difference in distribution by * at end of Table title. Cell counts significantly higher than expected are in *italics*; counts significantly less than expected are also enclosed in *()*.]

(a) by Agency*.

	BIA/ Tribe	BLM	Contractor	Local Govt	NPS	Other	State Govt	USFA/ FEMA	USFS	USFWS	Total
Base 8 and OT suppression	**16**	**89**	3	*(31)*	**63**	1	***(29)***	0	**301**	**23**	556
Base 8 position, OT suppression	3	17	0	8	11	1	*15*	1	55	2	113
No preference	2	12	1	*24*	*(1)*	1	*14*	1	*(31)*	0	87
Other	2	7	0	4	2	1	3	0	17	0	36
Year round suppression	2	6	1	6	1	0	4	0	29	2	51
Null	0	3	0	2	2	0	1	0	6	1	15
Total	25	134	5	75	80	4	66	2	439	28	858

(b) by Organizational level*.

	Contractor	Federal -Local	Federal- National	Federal- Regional	Local Govt/Fire	No professional role	State Govt/Fire	Total
Base 8 and OT suppression	**8**	**344**	**43**	**84**	***(31)***	**16**	***(30)***	556
Base 8 position, OT suppression	0	59	12	15	10	2	*15*	113
No preference	4	*(29)*	5	6	*24*	3	*16*	87
Other	0	19	2	6	4	2	3	36
Year round suppression	2	30	4	4	6	2	3	51
Null	1	7	0	4	2	0	1	15
Total	15	488	66	119	77	25	68	858

(c) by Functional area*.

	Dispatch	Fire	Fuels	LO/ AA	NIMO	No role	Non- agency fire	Other agency	Other fire	Total
Base 8 and OT suppression	**28**	**235**	**39**	**47**	**3**	**9**	**33**	**120**	**42**	556
Base 8 position, OT suppression	4	52	12	13	1	0	4	16	11	113
No preference	4	*(17)*	3	*18*	2	2	8	23	10	87
Other	1	10	1	7	0	0	1	12	4	36
Year round suppression	1	16	3	6	2	0	6	11	6	51
Null	2	2	1	4	0	0	1	2	3	15
Total	40	332	59	95	8	11	53	184	76	858

(d) by Incident qualification.

	FEMA/DHS	IMT-Type 3	IMT-IC	IMT C&G	None	Other	Total
Base 8 and OT suppression	0	**63**	**47**	**184**	**36**	**226**	556
Base 8 position, OT suppression	**2**	15	12	38	5	41	113
No preference	0	14	7	26	4	36	87
Other	0	4	6	10	4	12	36
Year round suppression	1	6	6	17	2	19	51
Null	0	2	0	4	2	7	15
Total	3	104	78	279	53	341	858

(e) by Age range*.

	21-30	31-40	41-50	< 20	> 50	Total
Base 8 and OT suppression	**16**	**98**	**176**	1	**265**	556
Base 8 position, OT suppression	5	22	34	1	51	113
No preference	3	*(4)*	27	0	53	87
Other	1	6	9	0	20	36
Year round suppression	1	7	11	0	32	51
Null	0	2	6	0	7	15
Total	26	139	263	2	428	858

Comments submitted (Tables 92, 93) run the full spectrum, from the value of Base 8 and over time *("If Fire pays the base 8 and OT then the other staff areas will be more willing to let their folks help out in fire."* and *"We budget for base salary so there is no need to "save" when someone is on a fire. Sends the wrong message to make folks go to fires to save salary."*) to admonition that most fires are paid out of local suppression resources *("Remember 98% of all wildland fires are suppressed with the local suppression resources. Don't drain the all fire funding to support IMTs when they only suppress 2% of the fires occurring nationally.")*.

Table 92. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Team Funding.

From Question 2.12
And agencies should be able to charge base 8 for all incidents, not just wildland fire.
From Question 3.17
We should have consistent base-8 funding between the agencies. Charging base-8 salaries to incidents provides incentive for abuse. However, non-fire militia personnel could be base-8 compensated for more incentive to fill IMT positions with less impact to their home units.
Currently in shrinking budgets the fire should deliver the Base 8 and OT this would get more mangers on board willing to help out their bottom lines. Cash awards should be on sliding days served scale like 1-5 days x$ 6-10 2x$ 11-15 3x$...
There are several factors affecting the fielding of teams. The primary one is the retirement of people with substantial fire backgrounds that were gained when the organization was larger and budgets more flexible. There is a lack of fire funding to pay for training of "non-fire" personnel time for training and travel which makes managers cautious about sending limited staff on limited budgets to such training. This has reduced the pool of candidates substantially. Lack of fire assignments has also hampered many who like to improve qualifications or renew lapsed qualifications to move up into IMT positions. When bringing in a retiree or consultant to fill a position on an IMT there should be a requirement that a trainee is also brought onto that assignment to be trained by the consultant. Continuing to rely on retirees will further deplete the pool of available personnel. Funding an additional 50% of a persons fire time when they are in their "regular" position will encourage managers to allow them to go to training and to take other fire assignments. Fire as the benefiting sub activity should pay for their share of the costs for IMT and other suppression related activities. In general agency staffs are a fraction of their former size and resource activates that generate capital are a fraction of historic levels so there are fewer people to do more work and less time available with fewer dollars to support it. Funding fire meetings, training, travel and offering incentives to workers and managers is the best way to restructure the necessary teams to meet the growing fire (all hazard) assignments. Preference in fire assignments should go to those who have demonstrated a need for the assignments to progress up through the ladder into team positions through an Individual Development Plan for fire. Little steps like ICT4 or Sataus Check-in hold people with previous experience from moving back up to Resource Unit or Situation Unit positions before they can become Plans Chiefs. The operations side is hampered by fear of reprisal for decisions made under pressure and many have decided not to become ICT3 for liability reasons which reduces the pool for ICT2 and ICT1.
Remember 98% of all wildland fires are suppressed with the local suppression resources. Don't drain the all fire funding to support IMTs, when they only suppress 2% of the fires occurring Nationally. I would suggest FEMA emergency funds be used in all risk emergency except for fire.
I think if local units were able to 'keep' the costs savings when staff are assigned to fires, this would be one more incentive to have local managers support participation on IMTs.
Depends on other legislation such as portal to portal pay. Would we want all these GS 12s and up to get PTP? talk about costs! However, if I'm a GS7 doing the same job in C&G as a GS13, I would want to get paid more.
Base 8 should be charged to incident.
If Fire pays the base 8 and OT then the other staff areas will be more willing to let their folks help out in fire. We need to get back to the old way of doing business and that is having all the folks working on the District working toward a common goal. I see too many specialists that will not do anything outside of their regular job. This creates them vs us.
Also, I think you would see a lot more participation in fire and emergencies if the fire/emergencies picked up the base and OT funding.
Full time teams funded from suppression accounts while call-when-need base 8 and OT are funded only during assignments.

By funding participants from outside of their "normal" funding to cover currency and developmental training as well as equipment would provide a strong incentive for Federal agency personnel to participate.
If Base 8 is paid by full time position funds, supervisors have no incentive to send employees on fires.
Also you need to fund all resources base 8 and overtime from suppression accounts while on incidents. (Yes this includes nps fuels crews who need to be more available for suppression roles on IMT positions). We should be able to grab local fuels crews when needed and not have to wait for a certain preparedness level to be reached in order for them to be available to us. When suppression resources are needed and you have the training and experience to help out then you should have the option to do so fuels or suppression funded.
The permanent team members and C&G for the large type one teams would be compensated year round through SU funding and their performance ratings and PD's would reflect their full time commitment.
90 day details could be utilized to compensate the type 2 C&G members paid by SU. The balance of the base funding for type 2 teams would flow through the position program area and all time on incidents whether base or overtime would be charged to SU.
Providing base 8 helps incentives for non fire participation. Similarly, with large fire workforce we should be working to reinforce our stewardship mission as land management agencies, not just fire suppression resources.
We budget for base salary so there is no need to "save" when someone is on a fire. Sends the wrong message to make folks go to fires to save salary.
Guiding my choices: Primary Division Supervisor Type2 team 5 years ICT3 3 years on a high fire forest USFS FIRE 20 years We have a need for: incentives, position based pay, PDs reflective of IMT work, detail opportunities, filling gaps, professionalism.
* If base and 8 can be shifted to a fire account, perhaps more participation from non-fire funded staffs will occur.
3.16 Go back to Base pay coding and fully fund home units. I'm sick of hearing about "P code savings" and the Regions under funding the forests fire staff.
We have a tragedy of the commons, when it comes to fire management. Everyone envisions the suppression accounts as a big, endless pot of money. This has led to unacceptable waste and the decline of budgets in other resource areas. Use an insurance model.
Base 8 funding - If bases funds come out of program budget, what is the supervisor’s incentive for allowing employee to go on fire assignments? (why pay for a service they aren’t going to receive?)
Question 3.16 seems to omit the militia where they have other day jobs.
3.15. - 3.16 Teams identified in operating plans should be compensated based on partner policies, but covered by the responsible agency by percentage of landscape jurisdictional coverage. One cannot expect an agency, local government, tribe, volunteer fire department, or NGO, to operate an effective collaborative program with no base funding mechanism. An integrated wildland fire management fund needs to be created to cover the full base cost of team members that implement processes identified in local area operating plans. this will enable the local teams to manage prescribed fires, fuels treatments, fire suppression, pre-planning etc., without creating an undue burden on low income and minority populations or other community partners. Suppression specific funds should cover base 8 and OT when on incidents, so other program areas can progress unimpeded.
AD rates should be increased substantially to encourage retirees to stay current with their red card quals and continued participation on the teams. I'm aware of many retirees who have signed with local government because of the much higher pay rates they offer. I feel AD rates are too low and local government rates are too high. Hopefully a common ground could be reached to: 1. Save agency $$$'s (high rates charged by local government) and 2. Make AD rates more competitive nation wide.
being from a local agency, reimburse at daily wage rate of local agency to be requested while on incident and reimbursement for training opportunities to bring up quals. this funds would come from suppression funds.
YOU CAN'T FORCE THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE THAT WOULD BE NEEDED TO PARTICIPATE. YOU ALSO CAN'T AFFORD TO FUND THEM YEAR AROUND. WHAT INCENTATIVE IS THERE TO PARTICIPATE BOTH FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AND HOME UNIT?
I have seen no advantage to year-round funding positions or IMOs. Funding should be tied to training and participation on incidents.
I am looking at skills, knowledge and commitment. Keep the best available even if it means paying small salary during off-peak times.
Full time teams are a huge waste of money.
over time should be used in retirement.
From Question 4.08
With budgets the way they are I think we need to take advantage of all the current employees that have experience in IMT functions. If we don't have fires those employees are doing and charging to their "day jobs" and if they go on a fire they charge to the fire. It is a win win, we get experience and their programs save base funding when they go on the

fires. We should look at doing this for BLM fire employees also. Right now if I go on a fire I still charge my base to my home unit and OT to the fire. Why does a wildlife biologist that is also logistics on a team get to charge his base and OT to the fire? It would have to be looked at because then suppression costs would go up, but we would have more money maybe to make engine captains 18/8 instead of 13/13, maybe.
IF the Agencies (federal and state) could rely on fire funds to pay a higher portion of base salary and travel costs for staff, there might be more opportunities for job sharing of resource staff with fire responsibilities. Partially funding full time positions or extending seasonal positions into full time positions with fire funds may help programs and the fire preparedness substantially

Table 93. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Team Funding.

To entice management support for IMT involvement, team funding of base 8 should be shifted to suppression account while on incidents and the base 8 saving left with the home unit to be used at the local level. There is little incentive for line managers to promote IMT participation under the present DOI system that excludes base savings. There should also be a mechanism where line officers can back fill behind an individual during an active season and charge travel/costs off to a suppression account.

Results – By Alternative Organizational Model

As indicated in Fig. 57, none of the alternative organizational models received resounding support, and the two organized around External Capacity fall into negative grounds. The following tables, figures, and discussions provide specific and detailed results. Readers are encouraged to peruse the comment tables to enrich understanding of the rationale behind respondent support or opposition.

To facilitate interpretation and improve statistical analysis, several types of data were collapsed.

- All Likert-scale response data was collapsed into three categories: *Negative* combines '*1-Highly Unimportant*' and *2-Somewhat Unimportant*, *Neutral* captures *3-Neutral*, and *Positive* combines *4-Somewhat Important* and *5-Highly Important*.
- Where the number of responses in sub-groups was small (<25), categories were either combined, or dropped as follows:
    - *Organizational Level*: Responses in the *Contractor* and O*ther, No Incident Role* categories were dropped from statistical analysis.
    - *Incident Qualifications*: *FEMA/DHS* responses were dropped from statistical analysis due to lack of similarity with other categories;
    - *Functional Area: NIMO*, *Fuels*, and *Non-agency Fire* responses were combined into *Other Fire*, and those selecting *Dispatch* and with *No Role* were combined into a new category of *Other*;
    - *Agency: USFWS* and *BIA/Tribe* responses were collapsed into a new *Other DOI* category; and
    - *Age Range: Less than 21* and *21-30* were collapsed into *Less than 31*.

Figure 57. Comparison of ratings for Alternative Organizational Models.



Current Situation

Overall, the most frequently selected rating for the Current Situation was *3-Neutral* (Fig. 58).

Figure 58. Desirability of the Current Situation as an Organizational Model.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Undesirable	41	5
Somewhat Undesirable	168	21
Neutral	291	37
Somewhat Desirable	218	27
Highly Desirable	77	10
Total:	795	100

missing = 63

Demographic break-down indicates that only the Type 1 and Type 2 Incident Commanders (*IMT-IC*) stand out as most frequently selecting an *undesirable* response. There were no significant differences in the distribution of responses among demographic sub-groups (Fig. 59).

Figure 59. Desirability of Current Situation Model by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level.



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age range.



Many of the comments directed toward this model indicate respondents do not perceive a problem (*"If it ain't broke...don't fix it!"*); others suggest modification as opposed to complete replacement (*I believe the current structure can be built upon."* and *"Let's not through the baby out with the bathwater!"* (Tables 94, 95).

Table 94. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Current Situation model.

From Question 2.12
Current Situation: 1.NIMO team undesirable because NIMO has no team, a team is a group of members working together. We don't need another plans person or a different IC, or OPS, or Logistics coming in to work with ours, we already have those positions filled, where is the rest of your people? 2. NIMO, team now seems like a waste of $ 3. Undesirable that PD's and detail opportunities do not exist. 4. Undesirable that trainees are a who you know, need a better system.
I think there does need to be accountability and consistency; however I would like to see most of the principles of the current team structure and method of operation maintained.
From Question 3.17
I serve on a Type I team that is functioning very well, and praised for good performance, without all of the proposed changes we heard about at our team meeting. I cannot speak for other teams or their performance. I guess I just think, "If it ain't broke...don't fix it!"
From Question 4.08

The Overarching Principles and proposed Organizational models rely on a somewhat unjustified conceptual leap, which is that the current system is irreparable broken and has to be replaced. That is emphatically not the case. Three primary factors have contributed to the appearance that the current system is unsustainable: (1) lack of trainees funneling into 420/520/620; (2) lack of interest in fire on the part of employees who have come into the agencies over the past 15-20 years; and (3) a lack of understanding and support for the fire program on the part of line managers. These issues can be and should be addressed by IMOSP. Instead, the project appears to be willing to throw the baby out with the bath water and make wholesale changes to incident management. The NWCG should understand that reinventing the wheel is going to take massive amounts of time and investment. If the NWCG is willing to go to those lengths to reinvent the wheel, why not invest in fixing our current system?? Don't start making a new wheel. Fix the wheel we have.
The Type I and II team concept works fine. Leave it alone and scrap all 6 options. Focus on streamlining our training and qualifications system to "feed" our teams, and develop a national strategy that will compel line officers to support these teams. Fix what is broken, don't break what is already working.
A lot of current team members will quit if they can not be working with the people they want to work with. I think the current system where people volunteer to be on teams has worked all of these years and will continue to work. Funding 20 NIMO teams is such a waste of tax payers dollars. There is not enough work now for the 4 teams we have currently. Adding 16 more to sit around and wait for fires/incidents is not cost effective. We have people in place now who do their normal job and still able to go when the bell goes off.
I like the way it is now with a few minor adjustments. I'm not on a committee so I'll leave that up to someone who is.
Current with Overarching Principles: IMT tenures are limited to single terms? What is this supposed to accomplish? What is the incentive to stay qualified then? Why would you want to recruit and train trainees who would then take your position on the team? Also there would be no continuity on teams with this requirement. And no guarantee that you would get fire assignments as a single resource to keep up your qualifications if you have to "freelance" every time. Also if not "assigned" to a team, less chance of being "available" for dispatches if left up to the home unit each time. It "may not be a good time" for your supervisor to have you gone if you are not "required" to respond each time the team is called. I think this would result in a loss of qualified individuals being available if they are not assigned to teams, and provided some incentives to stay with the team. This alternative also provides for performance elements for fire-funded personnel on teams, but not for non fire-funded personnel.
I like the current situation but am open to change. It would be best if there continued to be opportunities for ADs and agency personnel to be trained to help in various positions.
Current org with trainees assigned to increase qualified available responses. There needs to be a strong push to get trainees out and qualified.
4.1 - worsening over time
The system isn't broken, it need rational support. Many of the suggestions and principles for enhancing IMT participation are morally suspect. NIMO or NIMO like IMTs are not the correct answer. IMT members MUST be tied to resource management as close to the unit level as possible. Being controlled by (one assumes) WO staff has not and will not improve incident management. Contract teams made up of retirees is not the correct answer. If you want older more experienced IMT members' get the firefighter retirement age raised to 60!
Let's not through the baby out with the bathwater! Consider: the existing IMT structure has been successful for decades, and is a model FEMA and other countries reference (but often still a long way from being there). Just because we do not have the desired participation from the militia et al....does not mean we should throw up our hands and give up on other options for obtaining the requisite # of participants. Pay and career incentives (as proposed, and others), utilization of other/local agency personnel (overcoming legal and fiscal constraints), agency personnel mandates for participation (given lip-service in the past, but nothing seriously done by the heads of agencies), amongst other strategies (many addressed in the proposal) should be more fully addressed before going to one type of IMT/small modular concept etc. If NWCG selects the latter, then at least go slowly, and test the concepts in a small way, then expand if successful. The one type of IMT (combining Type 1 and 2) particularly fails to recognize the variation in complexity that our wildland fire business addresses. How would NWCG go about this? I've asked primary IMOSPT members, and this has not been thought through yet, apparently.....one suggested adding some Type 1 qualified members to an IMT2 level team (????). What will this do to the NWCG 310-1 Quals System....and at what point do we lose the higher-level quals? Seems to me we run the risk of "dumbing down" our capabilities very quickly here. Better do a MUCH better job of thinking these BIG, long-term issues out before implementing. Overall, I think we're running the risk of trying to "fix or replace" agency/management issues (relative to IMT participation and assignments), with total incident mgt organization overhauls...that are neither truly necessary or advised. Fix the agency/management issues, and keep the good parts our long-term successful IMT organizations, that are looked up to by most others in the all-hazard and international wildland fire communities.

I believe the current situation works well - I don't believe we need full time NIMO teams funded year round. The IC's are very aware of the need to right size for each incident. Type 1 teams are not being kept well trained as NIMO and Type 2 teams get most of the assignments now. I heard many complaints from Type 2 team members who do not like being second in command under a NIMO team. I believe all of us are well trained - and very concerned about training our replacements. The problem is management support for team members and trainee's.
Retention of Type I & II teams is vital in order to scale up or down. Type 3 teams should be established with corresponding Type 3 positions developed for wildfire response as with all risk. (OSC3, PSC3, LSC3, FSC3. All risk teams should not be expected to handle Wildfire unless Ops and C & G are Wildfire qualified.
The current structure has a proven track record of being highly reliable, while the stove pipe version and top down model would be expected to be not highly reliable. The only source for contracting would be the current AD pool. It would not build a future long term program.
I feel the current IMT structure works well. There is a need for a few minor improvements but if it works why fix it. We need to provide entry level training and maybe make fire a part of every employees duties.
Current system has worked and would not require an entirely new organizational structure. I do not believe contacting and external support would be good and would significantly add to costs. Dedicated and committed people are a great asset and I believe agency employees are some of the best. Standardizing the support system and pay schedules would make IMOs more effective and efficient. Integrating these duties into all agency missions and providing methods for all employees to participate in such duties along with expectations of duties and pay should help in getting non-Fire people involved. Emergencies happen everywhere and a national workforce should be trained and available to deal with these. A combined state and federal workforce should be encouraged and recruited to staff IMOs.

Table 95. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Current Situation model.

My choice is number 1 with incentives for employees to join IMTs.
Who oversees it now and who has accountability at this time? Have they been asked to “fix” the system? Where they held accountable and what was that result?
The short answer is yes the current IMT system needs to be revised The other part of the short answer is that none of the models currently proposed are the BEST direction for change. But I would like to go back to the beginning – literally. I think it was wrong for the ODE to put out these models with so little input for the field. And also think there should be more time for ODE to meld the field input into the round two models. I think there should be a longer time span for input and model revision. This iterative process should continue, with perhaps other/better choices put out again in June, and then again in October. There needs to be a lot more back and forth in the planning process. By their own statements NWCG says this is a multi-year process – I urge people to not short change the developmental part of the planning stage; do not jump too fast into implementing something that does not fix the problems. Specific comments on these models/options:
I prefer the current model element of people having a day job and working on teams as ancillary/collateral duties. I think it can lead to a broader perspective of fire issues if all types are part of teams.
I support organizational model #1, with some caveats. This will require support from State Directors and National BLM management to implement. In addition with the suggestions in the paper, I think that support of wildland firefighting should be included as a duty in all position descriptions for all employees of the BLM. That does not mean that they all need to be able to wield a pulaski, however provide some sort of support to wildfire fighting. It should be a condition of employment. So not only for IMT type duties but for on the ground wildfire fighting as these are the folks that, as they gain experience, will feed into the imt ranks.
The current IMT organizational model is recognized as one of the most Highly Reliable Organizations in the country. Request that NWCG embrace, enhance, protect, and not change it. Alternatives 1 and 7 best meets the definition and intent of teams.
Viewed from my experience that has spanned 34 years, two things about the IMOSP effort are noteworthy. First, the existing team model has some issues that need to be resolved. Second, I do not see any of these IMOSP alternatives solving the real problems. I’ll discuss these two points, then provide my feedback on the incident management organization models presented by the IMOSP project team.

1. The existing IMT system has some significant issues.

Issues with the Current Training System

When I came into the Federal employment, you did not have to go on the fire line, but you were expected to get training in a fire position and be prepared to participate for at least one 2-week assignment each year. With large fire years we still had some shortages, but for the most part, a sufficient work force was available. BUT we are such a kinder, gentler organization now. We have failed to see the overall picture, and managers fail to even encourage participation. These plans will continue to fail to address the basic participation which is declining due to the culture of the employees we are hiring, and the agency's culture. Heaven forbid we would grow a backbone! If physically able, every employee should be expected to participate in fire as part of his/her collateral duties. We need managers with fire backgrounds and adequate training in managing a fire program. I know this has improved recently, but we remain way short of at least providing and maintaining the training and experience our BLM managers need to oversee project fires with all that entails.

Task books are the first step to being competent to function in a fire position, not the last step. Those who are getting trained and completing task books and then going on to the next task book are not experienced enough to proceed. Employees should work on one position at a time, and agencies should require multiple fire assignments for certain positions before a trainee can progress to another trainee position. I have even seen some in camp qualify for up to three positions on one fire!

Dispatching as a trainee on a fire when he/she has not taken the training course for their position on the fireline places huge responsibility on the trainee's supervisor at the fire. Course participation should be required prior to assignment as a trainee.

The teams will have more buy-in by their trainees under the current model than some of the models presented. Who is going to make the other models accountable for the trainees? It becomes a larger organization, which makes it easy to lose the accountability so that the 'good old boy' system of training and accountability for availability after training is lost. The control by GACG and the local configuration of the team did not occur by accident or because someone just wanted to be in charge of a larger team. These practices were developed based upon need, history, and successes.

Operating procedures are going to vary from one NIMO team to another. Why? Because every team is made of individuals with different personalities, training, experience, attitudes, skills, etc. The same is true of the situation in each region, state, or office. That is not a bad thing; that is a good thing. We take advantage of the strengths of each individual on our teams or in our offices. Otherwise we would just hire computers to do the work and forget about the people.

The current system could be flexible if GACGs, agencies, etc. were engaged in all of the issues. I have seen flexibility in the teams especially with a trained, experienced, agency administrator who is fully engaged. Increasing NIMO teams should not be implemented unless the models clearly state how NIMO teams will be more accountable to the agency administrator during incidents. I see how that works. Look at law enforcement in the land management agencies. Stove pipe thinking fails to address local issues, concerns, and flexibility.

I would agree that the current model is not good for workforce strategy/training and needs a major overhaul. The local fire community, supervisor, and manager have such a huge impact on the individual. As I mentioned, I have fought this for years as a non-fire staff. My experience is that once you are on a regional training list, your opportunity is equitable to get out on training assignments, assuming dispatch can get you dispatched and notified correctly--which is more often an issue. The current shortages have only made this more important. If you are interested and supported by those above you, you have a good chance of getting out on a trainee assignment.

Of the 7 models presented in the IMOSP document numbers one and six I feel are the best solution. Particulars for each are addressed in the following:

• Current Situation with Overarching Principles:

I believe the current structure can be built upon. Cohesion is greatest with the current situation of a complete filled out team. A standard team size of 27 can work. Additional positions and resources can be filled as needed dependent on the complexity of the incident. To address some of the overarching principles:

1. Module and Service Centers: The module concept is an excellent idea. It can effectively create small cohesive teams

of functional experts. The modules will fill the void in those functional areas where we have trouble filling positions (finance, plans etc.). I can see the concept extending into operations to create modules that have specific skill sets associated with the various components of all-hazard, hurricane module, earthquake module, flood module HazMat module etc. I am less optimistic about the use of service centers. In a perfect world all your support services are on site at the incident. That optimizes work flow and accountability. The further removed generally the less responsive. I'm not saying centers couldn't work, but there is a tendency towards slow and unresponsive service when things get centralized 2. Succession Planning I: As we put "term limits" on our type 1 and 2 Incident Commanders, we should also have them for command and general staff positions. This would promote the development of more key personnel. For example an individual can be an operation section chief for up to 4 consecutive years and then must step down for a couple of years. During the 4 years he/she is tasked with mentoring a trainee. At the end of his/her term there is a new available Ops Chief. The old Ops chief can move into another position. Possibly that person would remain in the operations section and take a division supervisor position. That would enhance the entire organization, providing cohesion and keeping expertise available to mentor while unplugging the stagnation often seen in C&G. 3. Succession Planning II: New agency hires should be expected to participate at some level with fire management activities. This should be included in job descriptions, and employee evaluations. Participation doesn't necessarily need to be in an IMT, it can be at a local or state/region level and negotiated on an individual basis. Some level of participation and exposure to ICS and fire will promote recruitment.
Current Situation: I agree this is unsustainable and we need to change.

Current Situation with Overarching Principles

"The theme of this organizational model is improved oversight and accountability. It is a modification of the current incident management organization. The adjustments are a series of measures to improve oversight, tighten governance, standardize team size and provide uniform guidelines for team management. The model proposes incentives to increase participation. The measures are found under Overarching Principles.

- *Team membership is drawn from all the NWCG member agencies and state and local fire departments. This organizational model utilizes Type 1 and Type 2 teams in the 27/17/12 configuration found in the 2010 National Mobilization Guide.*
- *This organizational model could be implemented immediately.*
- *IMT succession is accelerated under this organizational model through better oversight from coordinating groups. IMT tenures are limited to single terms in positions when trainees have been certified and are ready to move into fully qualified positions. Priorities for training assignments on teams are developed based on needs for staffing all teams and a long term approach to team succession linked to agency workforce management goals.*
- *Participation is encouraged through the inclusion of a performance standard for incident management participation by fire funded employees, better monitoring of IMT tenure to allow trainees to move into fully qualified positions and the use of incentives described in the Overarching Recommendations section.*
- *The four NIMO teams continue to be funded and managed by the USFS using emergency funds.*
- *Outcomes of the model are a cultural change in how IMTs are managed and some improvements in availability of single resources to meet orders from incidents.*
- *The incident complexity analysis is used by agency administrators to request IMTs in the configuration appropriate for incidents. Standardization of team roster size and more oversight from GACCs provides some*

With the highest number of responses (800), this alternative model might be construed as having the most support. However, the most frequently selected rating was *3-Neutral* (Fig. 60).

Figure 60. Desirability of the Current Situation with Overarching Principles Model.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Undesirable	24	3
Somewhat Undesirable	81	10
Neutral	312	39
Somewhat Desirable	280	35
Highly Desirable	105	13
Total:	802	100

missing = 56

This perception was consistent across demographic sub-groups; there were no significant differences in the distribution of responses among demographic groups (Fig. 61).

Figure 61. Desirability of Current Situation with Overarching Principles Model by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level.



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age Range.



Comments (Tables 96, 97) provide greater detail on specific facets of proposals and rich depth for understanding the positions of stakeholders. Most are in line with the comment *"Fine tuning of our current situation seems to be the most economical and safest approach,,* with most also further describing their highest priority alterations in greater detail (such as, more incentives for individuals or for supervisors to encourage participation, support for adding service centers and modules, unified qualifications standards, etc.)

Table 96. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Current Situation with Overarching Principles model.

No Responses from Question 2.12
No Responses from Question 3.17
From Question 4.08
The more you go to permanent full time team configurations, the more you will burn people out and alienate non-primary fire personnel. The current situation is not too far off from where it needs to be. We just need to find better ways to encourage team participation, and require supervisors to support team participation. Any of the other options move the agencies further towards exclusive fire organizations. I believe that integration of resources between primary fire and non-primary fire personnel is the strongest approach. We need fewer walls between these two groups of individuals, not more of them.
I have been involved in wildland fire since 1970 and believe that the current situation with overarching principles and increased oversight and accountability will yield us the best results for wildland fire succession planning.
If the overarching principles were in practice, I think they would alleviate many of the challenges we face today in incident management. I think many of the aspects of wildland fire management are specialized and for the sake of safety and efficiency should be managed by people trained in wildland fire management.
Fine tuning of our current situation seems to be the most economical and safest approach. FEMA teams are not the answer because of a lack of fire experience. 20 NIMO teams seems like a lot of people wondering what to do for a large part of the year when incidents are not occurring (over exaggeration by I think you get my point). I feel that incentives to the current federal workforce that relieves them from their current job codes with addition to slight bonuses is a positive step to strengthening teams that could reduce AD's and make AD's available as individual resources versus tied with teams. It may also promote the functions on teams that are "other than" operations. To go out and dedicate a bunch of money to NIMO teams (which I have gained a lot of respect for the last two years) with limited work at times of the year is taking away from what can be done at a local level of fire management and protecting and improving natural resources.
Work with the current system first. Do not forget the current federal workforce. That should be the backbone to any emergency response organization.
4.2 Current situation with Overarching Principles - I do not support that only fire funded employees are supported, unless there is also a management goal that those fire funded employees are engaging in other Command & General Staff positions outside of Operations. Employees other than those who are fire funded need to be considered, whether they be on paid details by fire or supported some other way, because employees who have the desire to participate are as valuable as the fire funded employees. I like this model because it can be implemented immediately.
Combination of current w/OPs and single standard.
The system we have basically works. I could see collapsing Type 1 and 2 teams into one. I believe all team members should have day jobs. No NIMO teams, at least not paid year round, as they are now. I feel all federal employees of land management agencies should be expected to participate in firefighting efforts. Firefighting is generally not a year round job. It would be a waste of taxpayer money to fund any teams year round. Teams can be quickly pulled together in the off season as it is now. I think the focus should be on making it easier and rewarding for employees to participate on teams and in firefighting efforts in general, and stressing the importance of that.
*Single type of team *Less than 30 nationally *Ordered as "long" (56+ roster) for incidents with 750+ assigned and 10+ days needed to meet objectives. *Ordered as "normal" (27+ roster) for incidents with 300+ assigned and less than 10 days to objectives being met. *Ordered as "short" (less than 27) for incidents with less than 300 assigned and less than 5 days to objectives being met. (+) Incentives
I don't have a "new model" to create. I am interested to know what NWCG will do with data they have learned through this process and put it to use when remodeling the system/ training they have. The current system we have works, and

works well. It just wasn't built to be used/ abused how it has been. Remodel the system to include the overarching principles, build in individual & agency administrator accountability infrastructure; credit employees who volunteer their time and compensate with how they want/ need - it will mean more to them and be a better incentive for keeping employees involved over the long haul - has anyone done research on what the next generation wants/ values? Need to think outside the box on how to keep them engaged b/c in this age of technology and competing resources, need to tap into their values to provide effective incentives. * create policy that makes it mandatory for line officers to attend classes that teach what kind of critical wildland fire decisions they will be faced with and how best to make these. In the BIA, line officers are lawyers and they don't want to stick their necks out by not having full coverage. Often time they will default to a team simply because that's what they know, not because that's what's right for the landscape or cheaper for the agency. Teach how to make these decisions and make it mandatory. In BIA, fire management is a speck of the responsibilities line officers have to worry about. Need to make training mandatory as part of their PD. *WE need better cohesion between the state resources and feds. (seeing the pics and learning what is taking place on the Tx fires is a big eye opener on how the states and feds do things differently.) * Haven't we learned that when we contract things out, it becomes more expensive over time and the agency eventually loses? I thought we were looking at containing costs? I do not agree with contract teams. , develop an *Typing is hurting our organization. There are strong teams and there are weak teams. If you order a team, a team should be able to expand as needed and contract as needed. Breaking it down to Type 1 and Type 2 adds additional layers of training that takes a LONG time to get through. Is this necessary if all teams are able to break down to meet the highest and lowest complexity fires? *Develop an interagency organizational succession strategy. Interagency because in this day, no person spends their whole career in one agency. We become stronger when we share our resources and our knowledge. It's a huge struggle for DOI and DOA not being on the same page in their budget and policy organization. Don't re-invent, streamline! We need to honor our agency missions, while working harder to see where our similarities are and leverage the strengths we already have. We don't need to complicate matters further by each agency going off and "doing their own thing" when in reality, the fire community is already heading in the same direction. (This last piece needed to be addressed somewhere because we can't have IMT succession planning without also having a conversation about how our individual agencies are going to support it.
Our current system works well and we are successful. I fully understand the need to boost IMT participation and I believe we can do it by maintaining our current IMT organization structure with participation from all agencies, states and fire service organizations. Service centers and modules can play a role to fill non G&C or chief positions but many of the support positions. NIMO teams are too costly, and too small to generate a productive and well organized team. Agency Administrators are going to have to let people participate and they should be rewarded, not penalized for doing so.
The current system is not broken. Addressing the needs found in the Overarching Principles coupled with clearing a path to non-traditional partners to support the system is a formula for success. Without addressing the underlying issues identified in the Overarching Principles, this effort will end in failure regardless of the model chosen. Provide incentives for Agency Administrators to support IMT's and reduce the risk of not meeting other targets. AA's should be rewarded for supporting IMT participation. All PD's need to include the support of the firefighting mission. Excellerate the certification process to increase the field of applicants.
I think the Overarching Principles are very good and implementing them would go a long way to solving many of the problems in INO structure and performance. I do not think moving to a more national approach would be cost efficient or effective. A "one size fits all" approach does not work for all and the more national the structure gets the less effective it will be.
The current system works well for the most part. However there needs to be a unified standard of qualifications and training recognition between FEMA All-Hazard and NWCG. There is a number of well qualified or nearly qualified potential IMT members that could be called upon if there was not the current disconnect between FEMA and NWCG.
Need to respond to incidents appropriately by incident complexity, this needs to be into practice.-The current situation of team makeups does work very well, this system can use some "fine tuning" , particularly the compensation of IMT members, and succe

Table 97. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Current Situation with Overarching Principles model.

There appears to be very little, if any, difference in capability between Type 1 & 2 teams members. Has there been an honest, unbiased, review as to what the real differences are, if any? Logic would seem to indicate that you eliminate Type 1 & 2 and NIMO team differentiation. You have a single team standard and that standard is a "national team". No need to have three standards to accomplish the same job, which is incident management.
I agree that this alternative seems to solve a lot of the current team issues. One troubling issue that this entire process fails to address is team involvement. Yet this alternative suggests that you get qualified, get on a team for 3 years, and then you are off. This means you have to train to go up or you fall to the cadre. I see plenty of the "Peter Principle" at work already without heading in this direction. The most experienced individuals are lost or we have completed all of this training and experience and then are letting it go if people do not advance or move to another position. This alternative does push the current fire employees to the forefront as they are already funded by fire. I know many of them. They get by on local fires. Project fires are a cat of a different color. Being a fire employee does not make you a better team member or firefighter. Attitude has a big impact. Many of the local fire staff folks are functioning at the location and level that is best for them and the organization. A national strategy does not guarantee a solution to training issues. We all work for the Federal government. I could fill pages with examples of how that does not work at the local level.
The preferred option from my perspective and based on over 20 years of incident management experience would be the "Current Situations with Overarching Recommendations". As part of the implementation of this option if it is selected the lessons learned on team configurations should be seriously considered. For this model to succeed, incentives for employees and for supervisors /managers must be re-incorporated into the culture of the land management agencies. Supervisors are responding to increased workloads while simultaneously dealing with reduced budgets and full time staff support. This is true throughout all agencies and levels of the organizations. For them to actively support their staff participation in incident management teams we must give them support and financial incentive and then implement requirements and accountability throughout the organization. Currently, many supervisors are punished for their incident support through reports of poor performance because of missed deadlines or through management's perception that they can do with a smaller staff if they can "afford to have staff members absent for long periods of time supporting incidents". Additionally, state resources and AD resources should continue to be used to support the teams. Contracts and agreements should be evaluated to ensure that pay to these resources is equitable and competitive with contractor costs. If they are not in par with private contractor costs then the model that calls for external capacity should be incorporated into this model to fill critical gaps. In conclusion, I believe that the current model has been highly refined and has been very successful for emergency incident response. Careful consideration of the long term success of this model should be given before it is replaced.
Organizational Models 2 through 6 shifts the decision-making and control even further from the field unit and firmly establishes the expectation that local units and remaining IMT's will only be "RESPONSIVENESS TO FEDERAL FIRE POLICY" as directed by National Leadership, WFDSS service centers, and NIMO. These models also suggest that field decision makers and personnel are not capable of implementing the policy without this support. This develops a top down organizational models that is not highly reliable. This model does not support the change in the planning rules currently advertised in the federal register.
Current Situation with Overarching Recommendations: After reading the details, I am not as excited about this model as I was when reading the summaries. For this to be truly viable alternative, more emphasis needs to be placed on incentives for both C&G as well as other positions. We need to make it worthwhile for younger workers to join the militia and for current members to stay engaged. For some, the "bug" will be enough but for others, the only real tool available is a financial incentive. The biggest issue I have with the current model for C&G is that is becoming more difficult each year to stay on top of policy, technology, and expectations on an incident while still doing a regular job. This may not be so bad for the IC and Ops positions which are usually full-time Fire, but for other C&G positions, I think there is a real sense of frustration. There is simply not enough time allowed for non-Fire personnel to feel comfortable in the IMT role. Our current model seems to be a webinar here, a team meeting there, a few conference calls (if you can get away), and then you show up on a tough incident. Such an approach is shortchanging those that do the work and the people we serve.
I have carefully evaluated the Case for Change, the Overarching Principles and the proposed Organizational Models

presented by the NWCG IMOSP Project Team. As a stakeholder, I want to advocate for Current Situation with Overarching Principles. My rationale is as follows:

I. The lack of sustainability of our current incident management business model is not a given. It's my opinion that the current incident management business model is not broken to the point where it should be tossed on the scrap heap. It does need attention, but discarding our current business model and starting with something new would be unnecessary, expensive and short-sighted. Our current business model can be improved to make it sustainable well into the future.

[It is regrettable that Case for Change, the Overarching Principles and the proposed Organizational Models have been developed without the opportunity for stakeholder involvement until after the analysis has been completed. The changes envisioned by the NWCG will potentially affect a lot of lives and careers; for that reason, the process used to determine the case for change, etc., should have been accomplished more slowly and in a more open, transparent manner.]

A. Though several reasons for the decline in IMT participation have been suggested, the supposed "lack of sustainability" boils down to a shortage of qualified people to fill command and general staff positions for Type 1 and 2 incident management teams. If this is a true observation, then the Overarching Principles and Organizational Models should address the problems implicit in our training and qualification systems, as those systems are the means for growing new talent and skill needed to fill teams.

Problems and Suggestions:

1. It is difficult to get into S-420 and S-520 courses. Suggestions: (1) For one thing, too few course opportunities are offered, making gaining entrance into these courses mostly a function of availability, not skills, experience or acumen. Federal agencies need to start sponsoring four to six cheaper, shorter 520 courses annually, not one every two to three years. One way to accomplish this would be to make the planning and delivery of at least one Field S-520 course annually a performance requirement for each NIMO team. Each geographic area should sponsor an S-520 course. (2) End the requirement to sign a commitment letter as a condition of entrance into 520. This requirement has created a harsh and unintended consequence of further restricting the creation of new Type 1-qualified employees. The more Type 1 command and general staff qualified personnel we produce, the easier it will be to fill requests and team slots.

2. S-520 remains unreasonably tied to the classroom learning environment. One big reason that S-520 is not offered enough is that it is expensive and logistically difficult to put on.

Suggestions: (1) Get 520 out into the field and away from centralized classroom-based training centers. S-420 has successfully been reconfigured to be offered in conjunction with a real incident, and this has helped alleviate difficulties in gaining entrance into that course. A similar approach to S-520 would help get more people through that barrier. (2) Revamp the 520 course to make it shorter, driven by measurable learning objectives, and more oriented to learning a job, rather than passing a simulation.

3. Managers need incentives to allow more employee involvement in incident management activities. Suggestions: Work plans, performance targets and budgets need to reflect an agency value that participation in incident management is a normal and expected part of the job. Agency/bureau/department leadership needs to get on the same page. It is absurd to hold two contradictory viewpoints at the same time—that we need to engage in and support fire management, and that non-fire work targets must be achieved no matter what else is going on.

II. We have created conditions that lead to IMT member burnout, low morale, and lack of participation. Here's what I mean: the shrinkage of IMT participation has coincided with the expansion of the traditional IMT role to include responding to a plethora of incidents other than wildfire. Suggestion: Perhaps it is time for the five federal land management agencies to return to a policy of responding only to emergencies associated with public land management (fires, floods, etc.) and leave "all-risk" response job to FEMA and other entities more suited to that role. Tasking Type 1 and Type 2 IMTs with assignments ranging from urban hurricane support to hazmat spills to managing a federal agency presence at the Super Bowl simply leads to employee burn-out and managerial reluctance to continue to make employees available for team positions.

III. Incidents on federal land require federal responsibility. I also support the Current Situation with Overarching Principles because of the role that federal agencies should play in incident management. Professional land management

agencies understand that fire in wildlands is an ecological process. It is part of the natural landscape. Fire management is and should continue to be integrated into the other professional and scientific disciplines used in land management. Fire management should not be extracted from the overall praxis of land management, but that is what would happen if non-land management organizations (like FEMA and private contractors) are given fire management responsibility.

The federal land management agencies with responsibilities for wildland fire need to address the flaws in our business model. State fire organizations, county and city fire departments, and other cooperators are an important and significant part of the wildland fire community, but federal agencies need to execute their responsibilities for managing fire on federal lands. The federal militia model has served us quite well for many years—until it has been allowed to fall into disrepair, so to speak.

Summary

The 'case for change' does not appear to rely on analysis so much as opinion and anecdotal evidence, which makes the lack of sustainability of the system largely an opinion, not necessarily a fact. At the least, further analysis, done in an open, deliberative and transparent way, is necessary to arrive at an accurate assessment of the health and sustainability of our training and qualification system. There is too much at stake for too many dedicated people to rely on poorly supported analysis performed by a small group of people without widespread and simultaneous involvement from the wildland fire community.

The Current Situation with Overarching Principles could be tailored to address the flaws of the current system without spending the tremendous amounts of money necessary to create a new system. It would be less expensive and faster to address the needs of our current system, as opposed to reinventing the wheel. Therefore, if the NWCG decides to adopt a new organizational model, the Current Situation with Overarching Principles should be selected.

Thank you for considering my feedback.

Organizational Models: I favor the Current System with (modified) Overarching Principles. With the diversity of agencies and regions of the country that now participate in the incident management system, it will be difficult to change the system very quickly. We are a bureaucratic Titanic. It has taken a long time to get nationwide standards for training in place and get the system up. I have previously here made the argument that there is a very real need for teams of various skill levels to be identified as such (T1-2-3). To attempt to simplify this will bring problems (and disasters) in the future. But that being said, there may be ways to gain efficiencies in the current downsized and diluted personnel environment. The idea of having support modules has merit, especially when looking at non-traditional team roles (all-risk) or lopsided incidents (such as a backcountry fire with lots of spiked out resources but the team in town). The module concept would fit with the use of 'short teams' to tailor a team to the task. But this has agency morale consequences when a full team is configured and in the availability schedule, and then half is left home when the short team goes out. This is a case for team participation compensation besides just the potential for overtime.

The growth and use of the IMT system in additional agencies and applications (FEMA, US Coast Guard) tells us it is a good model. Perhaps these agencies should be more integrated into the fire incidents on a single resource basis to broaden the pool and "spread the pain". This will enhance cross-pollination of ideas and methods that could benefit all participants. (The Coast Guard has really cool resource tracking!) And participation by non-fed agencies with these other teams (considering it is often off-season) should be encouraged. But this will take agency commitment and (probably) federal funding targeted to keep people involved in both federal and state/local agencies.

The models I feel are most viable are #1 and #2. Combining some of the aspects of the "Current w/Overarching Principles" with the "Single Standard" is my thought. I actually feel that pulling some of the better features out of both models and combine into one is what I would support.

I like that in option #1 it would standardize and reduce the roster size from 76 to 56 max positions. Have the 27 core and 12 trainees/mentees be the standard and negotiate the remaining 17 positions. I would like to see more GACC oversight in teams responding in the configuration requested by the host unit, not by what the IC decides he wants to bring. I don't know how many times I have seen requests for a short team turned into long teams because the IC didn't want to bring just a short team. Not all fires are the same and don't always need a 65 person IMT, therefore the teams need to be more adaptive to the incident and not assume they need everyone on their roster. I honestly believe that is why you see more and more local type 3 teams.

Single Standard

"The theme of the single standard organizational model is efficient use of interagency incident management teams. Efficiency is enhanced through a standard team configuration, team typing and a single national dispatch rotation for interagency teams.

- *This organizational model collapses Type 1 and Type 2 teams into a single type of team and reduces team size to the 27 member configuration described in the 2010 National Mobilization Guide. The teams are supervised by the geographic areas. Interagency teams (including NIMO) are dispatched on a national rotation.*
- *This organizational option could be fully implemented within 2-5 years.*
- *IMT succession is accelerated under this organizational model through management of a single national pool of trainees that are rotated between teams as assignments become available. Priorities for training assignments on teams are developed based on needs for staffing teams and a long term approach to team succession linked to agency workforce management plans.*
- *Participation on IMTs is improved because fire funded employees are required to participate as a condition of employment, performance standards are linked to participation on IMTs by fire funded employees and militia with fire qualifications, and there is better use of employee development tools to create a balance of positions needed to manage incidents. The highest priority for assignment of teams is given to early to mid-career employees of agencies rep resented on NWCG (Federal, state and local government). Incentives for team participation are 120 day details to standard grade level linked to team position during fire season Federal employees, funded out of emergency funds.*
- *The NIMO feasibility and implementation plan is fully applied over the next 10 years so that there are 20 interagency NIMO teams in existence by 2020. NIMO teams continue to be base funded year round out of emergency funds. The agency contribution of emergency funds for base is guided by the NWCG split if needed.*
- *Outcomes of this model are a larger pool of individual resource s that can be assigned when ordered by NIMO and interagency teams. Several characteristics (one team type, single set of IMT guidelines, and geographic area oversight of tenure in position on teams) promote accelerated development to the command and general staff level.*
- *The incident complexity analysis is used by agency administrators to request IMTs in the configuration appropriate for incidents. This determines whether NIMO teams or interagency teams are assigned, whether the team rosters are adjusted to meet incident requirements and what additional single resources are ordered.*
- *Changes in laws, guidance or policy needed for this model include new training for command and general staff and adjustments to 310-1. The use of incentives requires development of performance standards for fire season details to include participation in incident management.*
- *Additional charges to emergency funds include year round salaries for new NIMO teams as they are added. There would be a shift from base to emergency funds for DOI employees as base salaries for preparedness funded employees are shifted to fire accounts during incidents. Some increases in personnel cost result from temporary promotions during 120 day fire season details." (NWCG 2011a: 21)*

The most frequently selected rating for this model was again 3 – *Neutral* (Fig. 62).

The significant differences in distribution of response were driven by differences in incident position and organizational day-job (Fig. 63):

- *Incident Qualifications:* There was a significant overall difference in distribution of responses. The most frequent response by all groups except those with no *Incident Qualification*s (*None*) was *Positive*; *IMT-IC's* made significantly fewer *Neutral* responses than expected; and those with *No Incident Qualification*s (*None)* selected *Neutral* more frequently than expected.
- *Functional Area:* There were significant differences in the distribution of responses among these groups. Those occupying a day-job position *Other* than in fire or in an Agency, were significantly less likely to choose *Negative*, whereas those in *Other agency* positions were significantly less likely to choose *positive*.

Figure 62. Desirability of the Single Standard Model.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Undesirable	83	11
Somewhat Undesirable	97	12
Neutral	267	34
Somewhat Desirable	215	27
Highly Desirable	125	16
Total:	787	100

missing = 71

Figure 63. Desirability of the Single Standard Model by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level.



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age range.



Quite a few positive comments were submitted for this alternative model (Tables 98, 99), with many including caveats or additional considerations. Examples are:

- *"I think a single type of team is a good thing. However this alternative also only requires fire-funded personnel to participate, and I think it should be for all employees. By giving highest priority for assignments to early and mid-career employees, you will squeeze out the longer-term employees with tons of experience. I agree that early and mid-career should be encouraged to participate, but don't discourage those with years of experience to continue to participate."*
- *"The 'Single Standard' option has many key points that could be incorporated into the 'Current Situation with Overarching Recommendations' model. Primarily, the collapsing of the teams into one model and the requirements of fire funded positions to participate on IMTs."*
- *"After reading through the different options suggested, I really am most impressed with the Single Standard option, but I do not believe it is necessary to have 20 NIMO teams. "*

Table 98. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Single Standard model.

From Question 2.12
Single Standard: 1. Desirable to collapse Type 1 and Type 2 teams into a single team. This seems to be more efficient, and a larger pool of resources available.
No comments from 3.17
From Question 4.08
Keep Type 1 and Type 2 IMT intact.....Fund for more training out of special code, more exercises and IMT meetings yearly instead of only C&G every year. Fund incentives!
The Federal fire programs have the personnel and qualifications to fill teams. If they were all standardized to 1 team type there would be a lot of simplification in the way teams function. Bringing in contractors and state would add to the confusion of functionality unless they were full time wildland fire personnel and kept up with and followed the NWCG

standards.
it is important to have Type II teams as training grounds. however, the perception of type IIs is that they are less qualified and not very good at their positions. This can be helped by ensuring single standard training and expectations. This is done to some point now, however, not enough.
I like a lot of elements of the single standard, but believe it discriminates on the basis of age, giving team assignment priority to early and mid-career employees. I don't like the idea of increasing contract capacity because I think adding more contractors to the mix increases costs. It provides a systematic way for retirees to participate, but contractors and retirees can be out of the loop on federal fire policy. I don't see how giving retirees more of a role helps to recruit newer folks into incident management. I don't like the external capacity option. I think many of the aspects of wildland fire management are specialized and for the sake of safety and efficiency should be managed by people trained in wildland fire management.
There is very little difference between type 1 and 2 teams and the incidents they are managing. I would suggest combining the 2 into one full team and developing several short teams like the Fire Use Teams that we previously had. Districts often need help managing a fire for resource benefits (short team) for short durations. They often need the flexibility to use the short team for a week or so let them go and bring them back when things pick up again (something that I think is missing). We need to keep the teams responding to highly complex long duration fire a cohesive group. If we make the type 1 and 2 teams short (just command and staff) and the team roles out and leaves others behind than what is the point of being on a team? If a DIVS gets left behind on a regular basis they are likely to start free lancing and go where the work is, doing away with the original idea of having a highly cohesive team to respond to complex incidents.
Single Standard: I think a single type of team is a good thing. However this alternative also only requires fire-funded personnel to participate, and I think it should be for all employees. By giving highest priority for assignments to early and mid-career employees, you will squeeze out the longer term employees with tons of experience. I agree that early and mid-career should be encouraged to participate, but don't discourage those with years of experience to continue to participate. Under the value added section, I think the assumption that "more availability of resources as single resources" is flawed. I think if left to freelancing, many folks will no longer be available for assignments, and the number of single resources will actually decrease.
Again do not support the NIMO model. I do think some things have to change nationally though. More standardization, one standard appeals to me, but I also think there’s an experience gap there for the super complex incidents or ALL Hazard where the Type 1 theme is advantageous. Seems like that could be worked out though.
Combination of current w/OPs and single standard.
4.3 - do not agree with single national dispatch except at PL3 and above
I believe standardizing teams would be highly beneficial particularly at a national level.
I see value in standardization and development of skills in consistent manner. Also see the value in flexibility. I have concerns about building upon separate set of employees with a single mission and emphasis (more NIMO emphasis). I have been involved in a few instances with NIMO since their inception. There have been positive and not so positive outcomes from my perspective. I think there is value in having NIMO teams to help support standardization, build skills etc. (even take on role that Area Command has in past). But a model that creates more separation of IMT from local resources has too much potential to malfunction. A highly efficient team still needs cooperation and support from local resources. The model to move forward should strive for efficiencies and skill development without becoming so specialized that they are perceived as outsiders by the people they come to help.
4.3-20 NIMO Teams in their present form just doesn't seem workable! Keep NIMO at around present level...not 20! doesn't make sense....what are 20 NIMO teams going to do during the off season?
4.3 You will never be successful unless you bring state and local government with you. There are a lot more local government out there than all the feds together! All Hazard is here to stay as long as DHS is in play. We need to integrate them at all levels. Core Teams must be multi-disciplinary in nature and meet the needs of the jurisdiction(s) they are working for. It doesn't matter if they are local, state or Fed.
Single Standard With the ever increasing involvement of DHS, NFA and EMI in ICS and NIMS based emergency training and response, any changes in the current Type 1 and 2 IMT approach should be well coordinated with them to insure it is in concert with their vision of their future roles.
Single Standard•With the ever increasing involvement of DHS, NFA and EMI in ICS and NIMS based emergency training and response, any changes in the current Type 1 and 2 IMT approach should be well coordinated with them to insure it is in concert with their vision of their future roles.
I don't like what is attempted to be done here. yes there should be 1 single standard and not have the FS doing something different or states with doing less. 1 standard that all qualify under.all the rest - stinks
2) Single Standard won't work because there is a need for capability to manage higher complexity incidents-experience matters.

Table 99. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Single Standard model.

There should be no contract teams…period. Allowing the contract management of an incident is abdicating the proper role of government. In retrospect, can anyone make a logical case to have contracted out the incident management of Hurricane Katrina? Any incident can be managed better; but, contracting incident management is turning a true government role over to a commercial organization that may well have far different priorities and goals.
I really like the single standard but with fewer NIMO teams. I am not really sure that there are or would be enough C&G type employees who would qualify for the NIMO teams you want to implement as you have stated. I would encourage you to look at fewer NIMO teams and the single standard team combination. I make the above statement based on your own assessment that you can't get enough employees to participate in the 520 classes, so how can you get enough employees to fill the needed NIMO positions. Yes, ROSS or the incident qualification system used to maintain fire qualifications may show enough qualified individuals, but how many will really commit to a NIMO team? That is like the current number of qualified FACL's and FDUL's, There are about 500 qualified individuals in each one of these positions in the system, yet, many times you can't get any one to fill a request for that position on an incident. Many individuals get as many quals on their red cards and in the "system" as they can, but they are not willing to fulfill requests for certain positions. So you may not have as many people qualified or willing to fill the higher NIMO slots as you think.
If I had to choose one of these non-modified team concepts it would be the Single Standard. However, I believe that the shortfalls of the current situation could be resolved within the current configuration. It appears that the fire funded staff get a leg up in this process under this model. This model fails to recognize that they may not be the best for the job; it just says that they are fire funded. I know fire staff who have bragged for years how they have never camped and always found a way to allow staff to stay in a motel while on fire assignments. Now that was efficient! I hate to say it, but a lot of our local fire staff do not participate in project fires. This is actually a benefit to the fires and teams. They function well on small local fires and not so well on large fires. I fought too many fires with them because we were on their unit. The "Single Standard" configuration is not going to solve safety and efficiency issues, but will reduce cost until someone is hurt. The 120-day detail is going to reduce staff for teams as most non-fire positions will be unable to get support for these assignments. This will further reduce participation not increase it. So, early and mid-career staff still gets preference. Sounds like age discrimination to me! Get them trained, experienced, and knowledgeable and then get rid of them. Now there is efficiency! Accreted development is where we came from in the 60's, 70', and 80's. That is why we changed then. Accreted development is not your problem except for the current baby boomer generation. Additional NIMO teams are NOT the solution, as NIMO teams with their current approach fail to address the real issue. Not their fault. If you are in mid-career, this looks great so you can get a permanent position on a NIMO team. What will be the local effect by losing all of these local resources? They are permanent team members. Performance standards will not help this situation. Heaven forbid someone questions their ability, judgment, skill, etc. After all they are NIMO teams. I am not sure how the current situation fails to understand Federal fire policy. More often than not, local fire resources provide little assistance to non-fire functions at the field level. They stay in shape, polish the trucks, drive around, polish the trucks, and train. Seldom are they currently tied to activity at the local level. This model is not going to improve that situation. They have failed to train local fire fighters even how to run engines if extra help is needed which use to be a standard. The targeted training would be GREAT. Then why not do that under the current situation? Same comment for performance, is that the solution?
The "Single Standard" option has many key points that could be incorporated into the "Current Situation with Overarching Recommendations" model. Primarily the collapsing of the teams into one model and the requirements of fire funded positions to participate on IMTs. With the extreme fire seasons over the past two decades the complexity models between Type I and Type II incidents have become very blurred and have led to confusion with agencies on whether an expensive transition should be implemented. However, Type III complexities should be re-evaluated and local units should not be putting Type III Incident Commanders in the dangerous position of exceeding their scope and qualification levels. The drawbacks to the single standard option as I see them are that while this would increase the potential number of people available in operations positions it will not address the shortages in Plans, Finance and Logistics. A thorough review of the requirements for training and experience of the Logistics positions, Finance positions and Plans positions should be considered.

Many of the Unit Leader and Chief positions in these areas have succession requirements that need to be re-validated. Unit leader positions have additional position requirements that must be met and most of them have several years of experience before they become qualified. An evaluation of whether a section chief candidate could meet the S520 requirements and become a section chief trainee by being fully qualified in any of the lower level unit leader positions should be conducted. A gap analysis should be included in the evaluation to determine if there is training that could be developed to give section chief candidates the broad familiarity of the other unit lead positions in their section without requiring them to be signed off in multiple unit leader positions. The Logistics workshops that have been conducted over the years are a good example of the training that could fill this gap.
Organizational Models 3 and 4 would be dependent upon existing retirees and the pool of AD resources. There is no other source for this level of qualified personnel in the private sector. If sustainability is the paramount objective of these organizational models then retirees and AD resources should be an integral component of any alternative. Organizational Models 2, 4, 5 and 6 appears to be trying to create a team that can "do it all" at all complexity levels and staffing needs. These models shift control from local and geographic level management to national teams furthering the top down management model. Organizational Models 2 through 6 shifts the decision-making and control even further from the field unit and firmly establishes the expectation that local units and remaining IMT's will only be "RESPONSIVENESS TO FEDERAL FIRE POLICY" as directed by National Leadership, WFDSS service centers, and NIMO. These models also suggest that field decision makers and personnel are not capable of implementing the policy without this support. This develops a top down organizational models that is not highly reliable. This model does not support the change in the planning rules currently advertised in the federal register.
Single Standard: This model reads as if we essentially take the Type I C&G staffs and make them NIMO teams while strengthening the current Type II teams with unit leaders and single resources that were part of the Type I teams. Since incident complexity analysis will determine whether NIMO or interagency teams are ordered, we do not quite have a single standard, but have effectively renamed Type I teams as NIMO and Type II teams as just a plain IMT. Under this model, it is likely NIMO teams will cultivate resources needed to staff out an incident and you will have a Type I team in all but name. So, in sum, it looks as if this model does away with fully configured Type I teams, empowers Type II teams a bit, and creates a large number of unattached resources that will loosely be aligned with individual NIMO teams. There is a certain appeal to this configuration, but if enacted, it is questionable whether this model would really be as big a change as it appears. The national pool of trainees is a great idea and has the potential to make a tremendous difference. I think it is important for trainees to get assignments with as many different teams as possible. This strengthens the trainee and creates the mechanism for exchange of best practices between teams and even GACCs. It will also help solidify the IMT culture and provide fresh ideas to the IMT the trainee eventually ends up with after becoming fully qualified. Will requiring fire funded employees to participate on IMTs damage the capacity of local initial attack or the ability of a unit to host a large incident? I support creating IMT performance requirements for militia who want to be involved, but I suspect line officers and up will be reluctant to see a requirement for all of their fire folks. In the project report, there's a chart that shows NIMO members at the current grades, yet in the Expanded Analysis the C&G staff are dropped down to GS-12s. Regardless, the precedent has been set on NIMO pay. You either also roll back the ICs to a GS-13 or keep the C&G at GS-13. To have a model where a GS-14 is supervising a C&G of GS-12s seems unjustified, unfair, and frankly, it looks like a proposal written by a bunch of ICs. I know we're in treacherous budget waters, but considering what is asked of C&G members on incidents, from the professional responsibilities and exposure to the personal costs (not to mention comparison across other parts of government), a GS-13 should be easily justified for C&G even if we field 20 teams.
Current Situation w Overarching Assumptions vs. Single Standard What is being gained here? The change is from 41 Type 1&2 IMTs and 4 NIMO teams to 25 Single Standard IMTs and 20 NIMO teams all still with 27 members. Where is the real change? If the change is supposed to be the difference of IMTs negotiating for the additional 17 positions versus the Single Standard teams bringing in modules as listed, all you are doing is playing a word game. Same number of people. What is being lost here? There is often little difference between Type 1 & 2 teams as members rotate back and forth. There have been type 2 teams with far more abilities that some Type 1 teams. BUT, the lower complexity of the normal

Type 2 incident allows an individual to gain experience and transition up from Type 3 without being put into a situation that he/she is not ready for. If the first listed Primary Focus, Firefighter and Public Safety, is properly considered, short cuts to training and experience will not be adopted.
After reading through the different options suggested, I really am most impressed with the Single Standard option, but I do not believe it is necessary to have 20 NIMO teams. An increase in the number of NIMO teams may be necessary, but going from 4 to 20 teams seems excessive. How about 7-10 teams, as suggested in the other models?
Single Standard, this model is workable but comes with caveats. Single typing does not necessarily improve response; more complex incidents will get the same response as less complex incidents. Operations with great complexity will be supervised by new operations section chiefs. This could end up with less efficient operations, it may be hard to predict. It doesn't add any more availability either, NMAC will send any team to any fire already but when teams are available the appropriate team gets the nod. But it is an option. This option also includes some assumptions that may be far from reality, mandatory team availability may not be a good idea or a workable idea. Some Fire funded positions have critical responsibilities such as duty officer or module supervisor, some are more available than others. Same in the natural resource areas, folks stopped going to fires as the targets and demands of their position rose. Fire can not be made more important without making something else less important, and those folks are not at this table to agree to this. NIMO is not the answer for everything either. The 4 that exist have not been highly successful, they rarely get ordered because they have no back up (they are short), take too long to get resources, have to name requests a bunch of folks to get up to speed (despite the rest of the teams being excluded from using name requests) The short team has to become a standard across the board or agency administrators will order long teams (one stop shopping). Historically, teams developed into long teams to meet this demand for long teams. Giving a job to folks as a NIMO team member seams to waste talent. Part of the shortages of team members is the migration of talent to NIMO. If NIMO was a really good plan there would be more NIMO's already, this plan forces a still unproved concept on many agencies not ready for it yet. They might as well be filling needed overhead jobs on forests when they are not on fires. In addition to team shortages there are talent shortages across agencies in management positions. NIMO robs from the pool of talent available for this part of the mission. Additionally this standard team configuration is built around old standards. As technology improves two RESL's are not necessary and as we manage more fire rather than suppress we need a SOPL and a LTAN. But those needs are not addressed. I'm not convinced this model is any better than existing models. It controls the size of teams which enables controlling initial response size which seems desirable to the agencies but it does not say how it intends to make enough folks available for the full response that is necessary at times, other than the ideas about mandatory availability of fire funded and other people. Additionally how do you justify a temporary promotion for team members at a lower grade than established for the NIMO teams. Complexity is complexity.
The models I feel are most viable are #1 and #2. Combining some of the aspects of the "Current w/Overarching Principles" with the "Single Standard" is my thought. I actually feel that pulling some of the better features out of both models and combine into one is what I would support. I also like option #2 as it would standardize the Type 1 and 2 IMT's into just a single National IMT (not NIMO's) using the roster configuration from option #1 and they would be governed by the GACC's following both a GACC and National rotation. This would allow for the consolidation of type 1 and 2 teams and maybe reduce the number of teams but have a stronger team in the end. If I recall from the Redbook the biggest difference between Type 1 and Type 2 is the need for "branching" in a Type 1 and the increased number of people at a Type 1 incident. The other thing in option #2 that I liked but didn't seem to benefit fire folks is the incentive program. Being on a 120 detail to match your IMT responsibilities would be a significant incentive. I don't think you can force someone to be on a team but the incentive would help or you could put it in the job announcement so people would know what is expected of them when they apply for fire jobs.
With the ever increasing involvement of DHS, NFA and EMI in ICS and NIMS based emergency training and response, any changes in the current Type 1 and 2 IMT approach should be well coordinated with them to insure it is in concert with their vision of their future roles.

External Capacity - Contract

The theme of this organizational model responds to declining Federal, state and local government capacity to staff interagency IMTs. The contract workforce is expanded in size and scope to meet peak capacity in busy years.

- *Geographically managed interagency Type 1 and Type 2 teams are augmented by contract Type 2 teams to provide surge capacity during peaks in demand for incident management teams. This organizational model acknowledges that Federal and state agencies are expected to continue to shrink in size and funding. Demands on agencies and fire departments will continue to increase. We will continue to field interagency IMTs but will be challenged to meet increasing demand in busy years. A contract workforce will be developed to meet this demand.*
- *No change in IMT succession is expected under this organizational model. The model is expected to make better use of Federal and state retirees, since they are likely to provide the bulk of membership on contract teams.*
- *Implementation of this model would be delayed until policy can be reviewed and a contracting process for teams can be developed. In addition, changes to law s or policy are needed to include the ability of allow Federal employees to be supervised by contract employees.*
- *The NIMO feasibility and implementation plan is fully applied over the next 10 years so that there are 20 interagency NIMO teams in existence by 2020. NIMO teams continue to be base funded year round out of emergency funds. Agency contribution of emergency funds for base will be guided by the NWCG split if needed.*
- *Outcomes of this organization model include the ability to scale up and down depending on fire season activity. It provides a systematic way for skilled retirees to be incorporated into the contract workforce. The contract teams provide a workforce easily utilized by NIMO teams to expand to meet incident needs.*
- *Changes to policy, business practices and regulations are needed to take advantage of this organizational model.*
- *Additional use of emergency funding is needed to fully implement the NIMO feasibility and implementation plan. Additional funding for contracting administration staff is also needed. "(NWCG 2011a: 22)*

This alternative model was rated the most undesirable, with the most frequently selected rating of *1 – Highly Undesirable* (Fig. 64).

Figure 64. Desirability of the External Capacity— Contract Model.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Undesirable	273	34
Somewhat Undesirable	203	25
Neutral	194	24
Somewhat Desirable	112	14
Highly Desirable	18	2
Total:	800	100

missing = 58

Significant differences in distribution were driven by the Federal/non-Federal split and age (Fig. 65):

- *Organizational Level:* There was a significant differences in the distribution of responses among these groups (p=.007). *Local Government/Fire* respondents were significantly less likely to choose *Negative* and more likely to select *Positive*.
- *Incident Qualifications:* There was a significant overall difference (p=.01) in distribution of responses, with respondents with *No Current Incident Qualifications* (*None*) selecting *Neutral* most frequently.
- *Functional Area:* There was a highly significant difference in the distribution of responses among these groups. Those in *Fire* positions were significantly

more likely to choose *Negative*, and less likely to choose *Neutral* or *Positive*. Those in *Other Agency* positions were more likely to select *Positive.*

- *Agency:* There was a slightly significant difference in the distribution of responses among these groups, with *Local Government/Fire* respondents significantly less likely to choose *Negative* and significantly more likely to select *Positive*.
- *Age Range*: There was a significant difference in means or distributions of responses across age groups, with those aged *31-40* less likely to be *Positive.*

Figure 65. Desirability of the External Capacity— Contract Model by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level.



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age range.



The vast majority of the comments indicate opposition to this alternative model due to cost, perceptions of lost training opportunities, lack of accountability, etc. (Tables 100, 101) The few who indicated support also provided caveats: *"I feel that having a couple of contracted teams could be very beneficial in a busy season. If we keep them at an IMT3 or IMT2 level, write the contract correctly and we wouldn't have to pay for them, their vehicles, insurances, or office space year round, as we do with agency personnel"* or *"Focus on contract teams for surge capacity."*

Table 100. Open-ended survey comments relevant to External Capacity – Contract model.

From Question 2.12
External Capacity: 1. I witnessed a Grey Back team and saw it work successfully on an incident several years back. I would rather see other options because of cost and would like to give our own a chance first.
No comments from Question 3.17
From Question 4.08
The business of running fires is fundamentally a role for government employees and not contractors.
4.4 I feel that having a couple of contracted teams could be very beneficial in a busy season. If we keep them at an IMT3 or IMT2 level, write the contract correctly and we wouldn't have to pay for them, their vehicles, insurances, or office space year round, as we do with agency personnel. The key is to write the contract similar to a call when needed engine contract. If we aren't using them we are not paying. I do know companies that have recommended this same idea and would have enough qualified, experienced people to make it work. The problem would be non-agency people making agency financial decisions, however, I am guessing that this occurs with military contractors.
Contract teams will need to meet the same qualifications as the present teams. The experience and years to get to this level are not gained in substantial numbers by young upwardly mobile fire fighters in stable full time positions. Many time the IMT contractors are retired Federal or State workers who have skills and abilities to continue past their fire retirement age. but this does not help the future generation of IMT staff get the experience required to do the same job. When bringing in a retiree or consultant to fill a position on an IMT there should be a requirement that a trainee is also brought onto that assignment to be trained by the consultant. Continuing to rely on retirees will further deplete the pool of available personnel. Consulting firms can only provide a fraction of the necessary talent to fill IMT positions unless there is stable year around employment.
Contractors have no incentive to put the fire out quickly, the longer it burns the longer they are paid. Keep them out of fire management.
4.4 and 4.5 - Huge issues here with the contract option... contractors overseeing contractors..... potential conflict of interest. What insurance company is going to provide liability insurance to a contract "team" that makes potentially life or injury decisions. Comes down to who has who's best interest in mind. As contractors, what is the incentive to put out a fire.... the only leverage we have now is the evaluation process which plays into either renewal of contract or cancellation.. who is the contract administration for a team (i.e. COR, inspector, etc.)....now you have more admin overseeing a fire op (increased cost?), as well as the possibility of longer duration operations (no fire, no pay..... increased cost).
If we turn to contract teams, there is no going back. The managers at the home units will never allow their employees to begin to go out again if it ceases. We are in a more safe position if we augment the lack of cooperative members with ADs like we do now rather than to go to contract teams. Further, if we have contract teams, we will encounter problems finding persons to "sit in ready" while attempting to enjoy retirement. I feel it is a poor choice all around. I like the core team concept except where do we find new inductees if we only have core teams? It is difficult now. I think that the

"year round" team concept is best. It solves the extended season, training of new and potential inductees, and encourages participation because there is no competition from the home office managers. The only remaining problem I can see with the year round teams is that there would be fewer teams, so planning and prioritization would be difficult.
External Capacity, Contract: I don't see contract teams as the answer. Costs are always more with contracts no matter what we are doing. And who would do the monitoring, inspecting, certifying, etc. that would be required? and what about liability? Also the assumption that retirees would make up the bulk of the membership on contract teams is a BIG assumption, and I don't see this as being true in the long term. Many retirees are still active as ADs in the fire organizations, doing their old jobs while still under the government umbrella or safety net. Most only do this for a few years and as a side line during retirement. I don't think that most would want to set up businesses under contracts to do this full time. Under the value section, the assumption that "less money would be spent on fires due to higher quality decisions" is a stretch. And how does this alternative "help to build capacity in the rest of the organization" by contracting out the work?
I don't like the idea of increasing contract capacity because I think adding more contractors to the mix increases costs. It provides a systematic way for retirees to participate, but contractors and retirees can be out of the loop on federal fire policy. I don't see how giving retirees more of a role helps to recruit newer folks into incident management. I don't like the external capacity option.
One size fits all rarely does. External capacity is fine if there are not competition and shortages. If we depend on external help then the currency requirements for qualifications is going to be more difficult to maintain. I am old school and do not consider contracting as the answer in most situations.
Several of these models could work, but I think an increasing reliance on contractors would be a serious mistake.
The Overarching Principles should reflect consistent and robust federal responsibility for incidents on federal land. The incident management organization adopted by the NWCG needs to reinforce this responsibility. It is unacceptable for the federal agencies to hand over their responsibilities for land management (i.e. fire suppression) to state teams, contractors, or non-land management Federal agencies. Federal land management agencies have the skills and the responsibility for this role."
One issue that I'd like to highlight is that if we use the external capacity model, utilizing retirees, what happens when they can no longer serve? Isn't that an even worse scenario than we now face? At least now, we can try and fix some of the issues with development - if we put it off, there will be even fewer opportunities to help address the problem. The other issue is to ensure that agency personnel are accustomed to dealing with agency issues, and the use of state or retired personnel represent (at least in fire) a culture that is not sustainable. In the "danger/opportunity" world, this is an essential opportunity to change the way fires are managed, and that the smallest fire is not necessarily the best fire.
External Capacity- Contract and All-Hazard and Contract models both seem more like political views than effective models for IMTs. Incident Management is an inherent government responsibility. It will remain more cost effective and standards for safety and workforce protection won't be compromised. I see a need to have access to retired and other "contract" resources but passing the responsibility of entire teams to be run like a business is a horrible idea. The experiment with contracting fire fighting services to engines and crews has proven to be a failure. Sorry but certain things the government does (whether this be Local, State, or Federal) do better than just allowing free markets to function freely.
It is hard for me to envision the successful use of contract overhead teams, especially in circumstances where the contractor will supervise the feds. I do, however, like the idea of encouraging retirees with red card quals to participate.
Contracts and contracting are forever driving up our costs and the individuals occupying the positions are not fully qualified despite what the contractors are saying. If we utilize Federal employees, we can insure that quals are solid and that any deficiencies on the part of an employee can be addressed.
This contract concept is a bad idea; it will further distance regular agency folks in addition to isolating potential new recruits. How will contractors obligate the government to spend money?
Contractor supervising Government Agency personal. do this and you can kiss any training opportunities good bye. If this is the route we go better to do full service agreement top to bottom give them the fire they hire they own resources and give them a bonus early completion of management activity. This takes care of any liability and team performance they either are successful get paid allot of they fail and perhaps receive a partial payment. Mixing Gov. and Contract oversite is a sure path to extinction of the fire leadership we need to develop. Interagency teams work well since most incidents are multiple jurisdiction fires. We need to develop a system that allows IMTs to manage fire as a n agency sees necessary but the Agency Administrator needs to have a clue what the fire program is and is not. This is not the current situation. All line officers should have fire experience and have attended basic fire school this would fix many of the problems we face.
Huh! let's see, if I was a contractor why would I be in a hurry to put out any fire and reduce my income?
I do not believe that contracted IMTs or NIMOs are the answer. What about the accountability of the agency? What

about successional organization challenges with contracted IMTs or NIMOs? How would the agency trainees be incorporated in the bigger picture? I have yet to hear of a successful NIMO-managed fire --- with all the WO budget cutting/management, why are NIMO teams exempt? They're made up of higher GSs than are typical of T1&2 IMT C&G personnel. Team cohesion is critical! IMTs made up of all-Agencies (feds, state) personnel/representation is critical, especially to our publics, which is who we're working for to begin with! Contractors, I fear, would not have the same ownership or responsiveness that current IMTs do...
Again we do not need contractors to do our job for us. IMT's are not broken.
I think the contract teams are unnecessary, give we can already hire this pool of employees thru the AD program. More emphasis should be placed on the incoming/existing employees rather then the outgoing.
4.4 External Capacity, I do not see how a contractor/vendor could be sustainable and support itself if it was only working during the peak season or in a surge capacity.
Paying contractors to control an incident-sounds like having the fox watch the chicken coop.
I feel federal employees should have priority on these teams and be trained. We need to stop the use of non-federal employees on teams.
4.4 - augment T1 and T2 teams; contract teams are viable to build surge capacity while federal workforce succession is reestablished; must these teams in IMO somehow but not as primary.
Creating more teams particularly contract teams would create problems during slow or moderate fire seasons. These teams may go several years without an assignment, then there would be an urgency to get them out on any fire to maintain skills and qualifications. In an era of cost containment we would be making decisions that are less than fiscally responsible.
I am hesitant to support moving to the majority of IMT's under contracts -outside agency personnel. Yes, we have a declining workforce, but should keep majority of IMT's interagency.
NEED MORE QUALIFIED CONTRACTORS AND VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENTS.
Contract teams without oversight and adequate performance measures scare me, as I have seen from working with other fire contractors a lack of incentive to end the incident.
The relationships are what makes working on an IMT as opposed to single resource something people want to do. Expectations are known and established rather then having to establish them with each assignment and revolving team around you. I do not like the idea of modules, I feel while this might be implementable it will be at the cost of the relationships and the section and team continuity. I think it is important to bring in more participation, but I do not see modules or contracts as the method to best accomplish that objective. An AD workforce would be much more cost-effective and more knowledgeable then a contract. Also with all the emphasis on COST it is not one of the core positions, but will be an add-on. If the expectation is that the FSC will do COST I think that is a bad assumption. An FSC has a full plate and will not have the time IF they have the expertise to do both jobs, and not all FSC's have the expertise or desire to also do COST. The relationship of the team needs to be maintained. It appears maintaining these relationships are not highly valued in most of these proposals.
Contract teams - currency issues if slow seasons, not developing our own personnel.
Contract T2 teams are not as necessary as T3 for transitioning out of an incident without having to use either team T1 or T2 personnel. It is always a "who can we get for this job" search.
The concept of contract teams ignores the value of having team experience when working on one's home unit. A system needs to encourage the development of leadership within an organization and incident participation needs to be used as a way to cultivate critical thinking and decision making. This cannot be farmed out.
4.4 Contract teams may be useful for back fill or surge capacity, but if you can't do it any better than the implementation of the "Best Value", give it up. The federal regulations and requirements are enough to choke a horse, I don't think they can be effective give the conditions we work under today.
1) contracting won't work for long because of attrition in ranks of retirees as the baby-boom bubble passes on.
It is hard to analyze all the ramifications of the different models. In general I am concerned with contract teams--hard to hold them accountable and to make sure they are doing what should be done. Have to develop trust that they are doing the right thing and not just trying to make more money by not putting the fire out. We would need lots of help for agency administrators to administer contracts. How would liability for accidents, claims, mistakes, cost-overruns, resource damage, fatalities, and other unpredicted outcomes be assigned between the agency and contractors? I think it is critical to allow retired federal and state employees who still have lots of skills, and more time than when they were working a regular job in addition to helping with fire suppression, to participate in whatever organizational model is selected. Contractors with federal land management interdisciplinary backgrounds can be valuable partners, whereas those without these background can be liabilities. I have been equally unimpressed with FEMA contractors I have worked with--hard to imagine them responding appropriately to anything as complex and fast moving as a wildfire.
keep contract teams out of the mix.. you think its expensive now? go to contract teams.

Table 101. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to External Capacity – Contract model.

I like parts of options 4, 5 and 6 but it is hard to compare them since all include more NIMO teams which is a negative.
All hazard teams make perfect sense and is the logical extension of ICS. Actually, it is a primary principle of ICS & NIMS. As we learn in all ICS classes, the nature of an incident (wildfire, hurricane, earthquake, etc.) really makes very little difference; the incident management principles stay the same. Sure, the operational side may/will change but that can be addressed very easily through the Operations Section and the use of subject matter experts. I see no decline in the participation of state and local personnel in IMT's; actually quite the opposite, more teams have non-federal agency personnel on their rosters now than they did 10-15 years ago. By all means the use of Type 3 Teams should be encouraged and expanded. But, the concept of FEMA/USFA teams is just as inappropriate as the designation of NWCG teams. There should be Incident Management Teams…not agency or governmental level designators. Teams can either manage an incident or not, it should not matter what their moniker is. The "all hazards" part was addressed two paragraphs above. As mentioned above, there is no apparent or logical justification to expand NIMO teams.
I do not see how the External Capacity model is going to supply people who are qualified, experienced, and competent to support teams. After all, they are only called on when needed. How will they maintain their qualifications? Where will they get their qualifications and experience? We are having enough difficulties with the contract type II crews, let alone attempting this with outside contractors for teams. It might work in the short term with those currently retiring. But when this group (retirees) is no longer able to participate, where is this experience and capability coming from? Once the retirees are out of the picture, what kind of contract team is going to be available? And relatively few qualified contract individuals will be around once baby boomers are out of the picture. The reduction in the number of teams will not increase the quality of the teams. Remember, three years and you're off of the team. You are always working with new people. It is assumed that performance standards are going to solve the problem and this will occur on the NIMO teams. More training/practice time would be an improvement. But then the question is why are we not doing that now with the current teams?
Organizational Models 3 and 4 would be dependent upon existing retirees and the pool of AD resources. There is no other source for this level of qualified personnel in the private sector. If sustainability is the paramount objective of these organizational models then retirees and AD resources should be an integral component of any alternative. Organizational Models 2, 4, 5 and 6 appears to be trying to create a team that can "do it all" at all complexity levels and staffing needs. These models shift control from local and geographic level management to national teams furthering the top down management model. Organizational Models 2 through 6 shifts the decision-making and control even further from the field unit and firmly establishes the expectation that local units and remaining IMT's will only be "RESPONSIVENESS TO FEDERAL FIRE POLICY" as directed by National Leadership, WFDSS service centers, and NIMO. These models also suggest that field decision makers and personnel are not capable of implementing the policy without this support. This develops a top down organizational models that is not highly reliable. This model does not support the change in the planning rules currently advertised in the federal register.
External Capacity (Focus on contract teams for surge capacity): Looking at the recent history of contracting out functions from DOE to Iraq, I would be shocked if this approach actually saves money in the long run and not surprised if it ends up costing us a great deal more than estimated. Not to mention it would ruin esprit-de-corps, needlessly complicate communications issues between Feds and contract personnel, detrimentally affect the safety mentality, and place a reliance on resources that are not as dependable as agency personnel. One also has to question the reliance on contractors when we are entering a period of reduced fuels dollars and other means to keep a contractor workforce employed for the better part of a year. A reliance on contract retirees or part-time contractors does not seem to be a good solution to our current problem. Also, I am very much against shifting some of the training burden to contractors. Training classes are important to our culture and help establish the organization's expectations. To entrust such a vital task to contractors who will be motivated in part by profit margins and not entirely invested in our culture will negatively affect our organization over time. The public perception of a contract team running a "bad" incident would be tough to deal with and would probably hurt

our political standing, values, attitudes, and public perception. Finally, I know a number of Feds who would not be thrilled with an assignment to a contract team.
I have no doubt there is a limited role for expanding the use of contractor IMTs. This is an obvious solution for the problem of integrating ADs into federal emergency pay schemes. However, it is politically unrealistic to expect that high-visibility, high-liability decisions that could result in death or extensive property damage can be delegated to "hired guns." In addition, public employee unions will probably fight the growth of contractor IMTs.
Contract Teams I don't get it. The NIMO teams are not working that well but now we are going to contract for them. I don't get how this is an improvement in response. I guess it might be cheaper than NIMO but so is doing without NIMO. I would only contract to avoid more NIMO. NIMO costs a lot of money to have sitting around, the Forests and BLM Districts could use that money more than the agencies need NIMO. If we got rid of NIMO we'd have more talent to go around to the regular teams. Some one needs to take a hard look at NIMO before it expands. If it expands it is another drain on talent available on Forests and BLM Districts. External Capacity, or contracts this model does not look like a cheaper model, and it looks like bringing in a lot of folks to do something they may not understand.

External Capacity – All Hazard and Contract

"The theme of this organizational model is mitigation of declining Federal, state, and local government capacity to staff interagency IMTs. The model responds to the decline in internal NWCG agency capacity with increased utilization of agency all-hazard and FEMA-USFA Type 3 All-Hazard Incident Management Teams to manage wildland fire. All-hazard agency teams are expected to be expanded. The contract workforce will also be expanded in size and scope to meet peak capacity in busy years.

- *Implementation of this model would be delayed until the policy can be reviewed and a contracting process for teams can be developed. This model also requires changes in laws to allow the use FEMA-USFA Type 3 All-Hazard Incident Management Teams to manage wildland fires through reciprocal agreements. This model requires that the reservist workforce concept used by FEMA be expanded to other Federal agencies.*
- *Agency IMT Succession would be the responsibility of the 20 NIMO teams. The transition from Type 3 level assignments to participation on NIMO or all hazard teams would require a re-thinking of our current training and succession practices. A higher percentage of training assignments would be on all hazard incidents.*
- *The NIMO feasibility implementation plan is fully applied over the next 10 years so that there are 20 interagency NIMO teams in existence by 2020. The size of NIMO teams would need to be expanded. NIMO teams will continue to be base funded year round out of emergency funds. Agency contribution of emergency funds for base will be guided by the NWCG split if needed. " (NWCG 2011a: 23)*

This alternative model was ranked second lowest. There was a virtual tie between *2-Somewhat Undesirable* and *3 – Neutral* as the frequently selected rating (Fig. 66).

Figure 66. Desirability of the External Capacity— All Hazard and Contract Model.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Undesirable	193	24
Somewhat Undesirable	216	27
Neutral	217	27
Somewhat Desirable	128	16
Highly Desirable	42	5
Total:	796	100

missing = 62

Responses were consistent across demographic sub-groups, except *IMT-IC's*, who strongly dislike this model (Fig. 67): *IMT*-ICs most frequent response was *Negative*; whereas all other sub-groups were neutral.

Figure 67. Desirability of the External Capacity/All Hazard and Contract Model by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level.



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age range.



Comments on the All-Hazard version of the Contract model are voluminous, rich, and detailed providing both general and specific information likely to be useful during implementation (Tables 102,103). Many of the comments echo themes raised for the previous Contract model and raise the key issues concerning all-hazard, examples of the spectrum are: support *("Yes to increasing utilization of FEMA/US Fire Admin all-hazard Type 3 teams."*), opposition *("No more NIMO teams .No contract teams. Please god no FEMA type 3 teams managing our fires. Why do we have to take on all-risk more?"*), and measured *("All hazard - unless we cross train both ways should not happen. They need to follow fire quals and we need to be versed in all hazard."*).

Table 102. Open-ended survey comments relevant to External Capacity – All Hazard and Contract model.

No comments from Question 2.12
No comments from Question 3.17
From Question 4.08
Don't feel that NIMO has helped, it took qualified C&G personnel form the existing 45 IMT's. What does NIMO do, what complexity calls for NIMO?? There is no set process for use of NIMO. IMTs have evolved to manage wildland emergencies of the Fed & State agencies. The IMT system can use some tweaks, but it isn't broken if you don't try to make them All Risk. Use NIMO and FEMA for All Risk and IMT's can assist where their current skills can be used for support.
4.4 and 4.5 - Huge issues here with the contract option... contractors overseeing contractors..... potential conflict of interest. What insurance company is going to provide liability insurance to a contract "team" that makes potentially life or injury decisions. Comes down to who has who's best interest in mind. As contractors, what is the incentive to put out a fire.... the only leverage we have now is the evaluation process which plays into either renewal of contract or cancellation.. who is the contract administration for a team (i.e. COR, inspector, etc.)....now you have more admin overseeing a fire op (increased cost?), as well as the possibility of longer duration operations (no fire, no pay..... increased cost).
External Capacity, All Hazard and Contract: same comments as above, plus I don't think that all-hazard teams should be relied on for wildfire suppression, which is a fairly specialized situation. And how does "reducing the # of teams" result in "quality of the teams goes up"? I don't buy this. I think that reducing the number of teams would result in an overall loss in skills across the agency and would not result in higher quality teams. And again, how does reducing the number of teams result in helping to build capacity in the rest of the organization? Sorry to be so long winded. Hope some of this is useful.
The Overarching Principles should reflect consistent and robust federal responsibility for incidents on federal land. The incident management organization adopted by the NWCG needs to reinforce this responsibility. It is unacceptable for the federal agencies to hand over their responsibilities for land management (i.e. fire suppression) to state teams, contractors, or non-land management Federal agencies. Federal land management agencies have the skills and the responsibility for this role."
External Capacity- Contract and All-Hazard and Contract models both seem more like political views than effective models for IMTs. Incident Management is an inherent government responsibility. It will remain more cost effective and standards for safety and workforce protection won't be compromised. I see a need to have access to retired and other "contract" resources but passing the responsibility of entire teams to be run like a business is a horrible idea. The experiment with contracting fire fighting services to engines and crews has proven to be a failure. Sorry but certain things the government does (whether this be Local, State, or Federal) do better than just allowing free markets to function freely.
Again do not support the NIMO model. I do think some things have to change nationally though. More standardization, one standard appeals to me, but I also think there's an experience gap there for the super complex incidents or ALL Hazard where the Type 1 theme is advantageous. Seems like that could be worked out though.
This contract concept is a bad idea; it will further distance regular agency folks in addition to isolating potential new recruits. How will contractors obligate the government to spend money?
I have had enough situations on "Short" teams in all management levels to realize that we need to staff to the unit leader position - the local level cannot provide the support staff at the current time to support incident teams. If it once again became a requirement in all federal PDS' maybe - but until that happens - we need to be able to roll fully functional. It is also imperative that ALL FEDERAL agencies are all hazard - we need to be working closely with FEMA/DHS to integrate all entities of incident management. I still hear in the "Wildfire" community - oh that is a FEMA/DHS class not NWCG -- we need to come together....and everyone participate equally. It is very important for us to be successful in the future that we are integrated with our partners in all the Federal Agencies, State, and local levels. My only other comment on the models - is that in the charts we have all the teams being managed by the GACC's - I really truly feel that we need to be doing this at a National Level - with the GACCS providing the support - 45 (27 member) teams is less than 1,000 individuals - large companies employ that many people - we should be able to manage that group out of one national pool.
No more NIMO teams No contract teams Please god no FEMA type 3 teams managing our fires Why do we have to take on all-risk more? The FEMA teams should be doing Hurricanes, etc., not wildland fire Teams. Making team involvement mandatory will only result in resentment and work-arounds. And likely retention issues. And people on Teams who shouldn't be. How teams are dispatched (national, GACC, etc.) does not seem to influence whether people join teams or not. Everything could pretty much stay the same if more incentives, outreach, and metrics were applied to the agency.

4.5 External Capacity - all hazard & contract - I like this concept, I in the fact that if wildland fire personnel can respond to an all hazard incident, with the proper coaching and support from the host agency, then why would the wildland fire community not reciprocate. What I do not like about this model is the realistic implementation time, and I agree it will take many changes.
4.5 - as modules
4.5 Yes to increasing utilization of FEMA/US Fire Admin all-hazard Type 3 teams. How are you going to keep the momentum going for contract teams when you have several low fire seasons and they don't get called out?
Teams should remain at the Type 1 and 2 levels and be split by skill base. Provide greater flexibility to integrate FEMA Type 3 teams into current Type 1 and 2 teams. Remove barriers for cost agreements that federal agencies currently have to encourage more participation by State and Local governments.
With dwindling Budgets we are going to have to be all hazard all risk interagency from local state and fed including the military.
All hazard - unless we cross train both ways should not happen. They need to follow fire quals and we need to be versed in all hazard.
External Capacity (Focus on contract teams for surge capacity) and External Capacity (Focus on all hazard teams and contract teams) The statement that “a contract workforce will be developed to meet this demand” must involve new and nontraditional thinking by NWCG agencies and their contracting departments to be successful in accomplishing this statement. The contracting of Type 2 IMT’s would need to be based on a business model that would make it worthwhile for the private wildland fire services companies to enter this new area. Two contracts and draft RFP’s were developed during Katrina in 2005 with the oversight of our Area Command Team. One of these was given to FEMA and used during the FEMA response to Katrina and Rita. The other was given to the NWCG agencies. To my knowledge, it never resulted in a RFP. A better quality and more robust RFP was issued by FEMA in 2006. It seemed to be well thought out and based on common business practices, risks, costs and profit margins that a company bidding this kind of a RFP would need to address. FEMA pulled the RFP the week before awards were to be made and to my knowledge, it was never tried. The notion that the bulk of the membership of the contract IMT’s will be made up of federal and state retirees needs to be evaluated. Today, the bulk of the federal and state retirees who have a desire to be involved in IMT’s are either members of NWCG Type 1 and 2 IMT’s, DHS or local Type 3 IMT’s or FEMA or Medical/Health ICS Type response organizations. If the AD’s who are on these organizations today were to participate in contract IMT’s, have we really increased the total number of qualified and available people in our ICS response organizations or are we just moving folks from one organization but leaving a hole in another? To increase the number of people who are available and qualified to fill complex incident management Command and General Staff, Unit Leaders and Managers positions, we need to review our current processes and procedures to see if they encourage or discourage emergency responders from outside the fire services to participate. Today, the AD system, because of the workload it adds to the dispatch community, is not open in many areas to non NWCG agency retirees. This is overlooking an ever expanding pool of public works, law enforcement, medical/health and county/city Office of Emergency Management responders who are being trained through ICS and EMI position courses. Many of these agencies and employees want to be involved with the wildland fire services to gain quality experience to apply to their all hazard responses. A smaller but significant number want to continue on beyond the Type 3 level. We have talked about this for at least fifteen years. Yet, when these people try to be entered in ROSS, they are told that it is not open to them. The use of a MOU or agreement between NWCG agencies and local government non fire response agencies hasn’t seemed to work for many reasons. The number of local government response agencies in the Portland/Vancouver 12 county UASI area alone who are now doing ICS and position training is well over 130 agencies. The development of multiple county/city/district/ and multiple function single MOU’s or agreements seems to be beyond their capability or interests. Many of these local government departments may only have one to five employees who are interested in being statused in ROSS and involved in assignments. The feedback I have received from the agencies is for a few employees, it isn’t worth the effort to try to establish a legal agreement with the federal agencies. Again, if we want to expand over time our pool of “overhead”, especially in non-operations positions, do we (NWCG) need to become proactive and seek how we can involve these folks? To develop qualified Command and General Staff, Unit Leaders and Managers in the private wildland fire services, NWCG again needs to look at processes and procedures now being practiced by Type 1 and 2 IMT’s, GACC’s and the dispatch community. Development may need to be through the use of a contract for single position assignments (both as qualified and as trainees) or as AD’s to meet this need, especially at the start of the program. Today, the use of private qualified folks or as trainees for development does not seem to be supported based on the experience of the wildland fire contractors and their employees. We have talked for almost 20 years about either private companies or local government involvement in wildland fire personnel shortages. If we are really serious about having this become reality, we need to look at how much effort we are willing to put into it and if we can make the systems use as user friendly as possible. The FEMA reservist model would solve some of these issues.
The T3 all-hazard team members could significantly increase the pool of resources and make a valuable contribution if they are integrated into the wildland teams early as trainees. Many of them have significant experience in non-tactical

(wildland) positions. This produces a win-win situation where the national/state wildland IMTs have a deeper pool of personnel and the T3 members can invaluable experience they can utilize in their local jurisdictions.
Current situation is not sustainable as fewer people from Federal Agencies are involved in emergency management. There should be more outreach to other fire agencies like state and municipal who may have excellent personnel willing and able to get involved but who know nothing about IMT's, are concerned about funding, position back fill, etc. MT's need to train with all risk teams and all risk teams need to train with IMT's.
To battle the challenges of decreased workforce and cost containment goals, the real answer is to take advantage of the external capacity option which would mitigate both significant challenges dramatically. The large retirement pool consisting of large numbers of highly qualified, experienced people would be utilized allowing for more fluent transition. Additionally, modules could be used to supplement Agency teams.
Interagency IMT's have functioned very well in fire/all-risk environments for nearly 50 years now. Every fire assignment I have been on since 2000 has been an all-risk incident. We need to maintain this model and integrate some of the recent models into this time-proven model. It appears that some of the newer models are re-inventing the wheel and incurring greater costs for less services.
4.5 If you embrace All Hazard you will have enough depth, now you just have to work on the training and experience documentation. The mechanisms are out there like Recognized Prior Learning and crosswalks, you just have to embrace them and implement them.
AHIMT process is not ready for use in fire roles on type 1 or 2 incidents as most of their positions are C and G. they do not have experience or depth of training to perform. NIMO team folding into existing IMT needs would solve many gaps.
I believe there needs to be integration of all jurisdictions Feds, locals and state personnel on teams. This is a way of building stronger unity among agencies for future incidents.
3) Creation of a national standard for training & participation; and bringing FEMA teams into fire activity will cross-pollinate personnel and widen the experience base.
Development of a contracting process may be problematic. I think integrating Federal, State and Local government personnel is the best approach.
The more integrated the teams the better coordinated activity.
Integration of all levels of government will provide a great experience level of personnel, which can be beneficial for the outcome of complex incidents outside of the wildland arena. However, the interface of local, state and Federal members will allow for a better interoperability when deployed to floods, oil spills, terrorist events, etc.

Table 103. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to External Capacity – All Hazard and Contract model.

I like parts of options 4, 5 and 6 but it is hard to compare them since all include more NIMO teams which is a negative.
This option makes the most sense, or at least parts of it do. Creating a single national team standard, eliminating NIMO teams, and creation of a core team is logical. However, pre-identifying "9 core members" makes little sense. A serious needs analysis needs to be done to identify which team members would be part of the core. The majority of Planning, Logistics and Finance/Admin would logically be part of the core. At the same time only the Operations Section Chief position would make sense in the Operations Section. And the justification for the OpsChief would only relate to their familiarization with the team and planning cycle. The Operations Section would be the most obvious "module" since it would flex with the nature/hazard of the incident the team would respond to. Example: Creating wildfire operations modules would then make sense. Place a wildfire team leader in charge of the group. It would consist of leader (Operations Section Chief qualified) and some number of Division/Group Supervisors, aviation, and maybe even Task Force Leaders. When a team would order a wildfire operations module you get an organized cohesive operations team. The wildfire team leader could then become the Deputy Operations Section Chief and they would be responsible for the field operations; the team's Operations Section Chief could retain overall supervision of the Operations Section or they could become the Deputy. The same would be true for a hurricane operations module, earthquake module, HazMat module, etc. Again, there is no justification to increasing the number of NIMO teams. Actually, elimination of NIMO teams would be a great way to fund IMT training budgets.
I have had sufficient experience with this effort. "A division supe is a division supe," or so goes the saying. If you think so then go on a wildfire and get a division supervisor that is from an urban area and their only experience is urban

structure fire using our current ICS. You can order them up and get them, but be prepared for some wrecks. Some of these people are great and make good adjustments, but it is no solution.

There needs to be an adjustment in the thought process under the current situation for training and experience, as going from task book to task book without further experience is dangerous for those actually fighting the fire on the fireline.

I have worked on several all-risk assignments with FEMA. They are not responsive, insensitive to the local situation, and are overly legalistic. Anything involving FEMA is doomed from the beginning. They lack an understanding of flexibility. Performance standards sound like we are back to a 'fire staffs only' viewpoint. If NWCG selects this model, we are going to lose a lot of Federal employee participation.

I continually see the emphasis on speeding up training. This is a sure exchange for a lack of efficiency and getting someone killed. Unfortunately, those pushing this nonsense are not the ones that are at or going to be at risk from this direction. Speeding up training and reducing experience on the fireline will send an employee or crew into danger.

In several of these concepts as has been demonstrated, the NIMO teams function as Area Command. We already have a functional Area Command organization. It has the same problem that this will have. They are not on the ground dealing with the fire situation. They struggle to properly manage the decisions that make sense for the team on the ground. If they are committed to a Type II team effort, they keep putting stress on the team and making decisions that put the firefighting resources at risk on the fire line or cause tactics that are not as safe nor efficient as they should be.

Organizational Models 2 through 6 shifts the decision-making and control even further from the field unit and firmly establishes the expectation that local units and remaining IMT's will only be "RESPONSIVENESS TO FEDERAL FIRE POLICY" as directed by National Leadership, WFDSS service centers, and NIMO. These models also suggest that field decision makers and personnel are not capable of implementing the policy without this support. This develops a top down organizational models that is not highly reliable. This model does not support the change in the planning rules currently advertised in the federal register.

Organizational Models 2, 4, 5 and 6 appears to be trying to create a team that can "do it all" at all complexity levels and staffing needs. These models shift control from local and geographic level management to national teams furthering the top down management model.

Organizational Models 5 and 6 that address core teams and the concept of collapsing teams, and implementing service centers and modules is expected to compromise team cohesion and effectiveness.

External Capacity (Focus on all hazard teams and contract teams): Again, the contracting concerns are relevant. This alternative would also have a substantial effect on morale and organizational culture. We have a few decades working with ICS and FEMA only a few years. I think the assumptions and expectations would clash on incidents and needlessly complicate issues. Regarding the state teams, many states are so bad off financially that their personnel will likely decline in numbers. I do not see how this alternative is viable as written. That said, I would not be opposed to phasing in some FEMA personnel to work with IMTs as long as it was done with a primary goal of furthering their exposure to ICS and a secondary goal of building our capacity for tough years.

in terms of which of the alternatives seem workable, there are a few options that should be eliminated immediately. The first is ANYTHING modeled on what FEMA is doing. FEMA is the joke of the incident management world and nothing they do ever seems to work right. I agree that the fire world needs to get more flexible in dealing with all hazard situations, as the DOI found out to our dismay in dealing with MC252 (the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.) However, the answer is not to make the fire world as screwed up as the all hazard world, but rather to use the expertise of the fire world to help improve all hazard response.

The statement that "a contract workforce will be developed to meet this demand" must involve new and nontraditional thinking by NWCG agencies and their contracting departments to be successful in accomplishing this statement. The contracting of Type 2 IMT's would need to be based on a business model that would make it worthwhile for the private wildland fire services companies to enter this new area. Two contracts and draft RFP's were developed during Katrina in 2005 with the oversight of our Area Command Team. One of these was given to FEMA and used during the FEMA response to Katrina and Rita. The other was given to the NWCG agencies. To my knowledge, it never resulted in a RFP. A better quality and more robust RFP was issued by FEMA in 2006. It seemed to be well thought out and based on common business practices, risks, costs and profit margins that a company bidding this kind of a RFP would need to address. FEMA pulled the RFP the week before awards were to be made and to my knowledge, it was never tried.

• The notion that the bulk of the membership of the contract IMT's will be made up of federal and state retirees needs

to be evaluated. Today, the bulk of the federal and state retirees who have a desire to be involved in IMT's are either members of NWCG Type 1 and 2 IMT's, DHS or local Type 3 IMT's or FEMA or Medical/Health ICS Type response organizations. If the AD's who are on these organizations today were to participate in contract IMT's, have we really increased the total number of qualified and available people in our ICS response organizations or are we just moving folks from one organization but leaving a hole in another?

• To increase the number of people who are available and qualified to fill complex incident management Command and General Staff, Unit Leaders and Managers positions, we need to review our current processes and procedures to see if they encourage or discourage emergency responders from outside the fire services to participate.

o Today, the AD system, because of the workload it adds to the dispatch community, is not open in many areas to non NWCG agency retirees. This is overlooking an ever expanding pool of public works, law enforcement, medical/health and county/city Office of Emergency Management responders who are being trained through ICS and EMI position courses. Many of these agencies and employees want to be involved with the wildland fire services to gain quality experience to apply to their all hazard responses. A smaller but significant number want to continue on beyond the Type 3 level. We have talked about this for at least fifteen years. Yet, when these people try to be entered in ROSS, they are told that it is not open to them.

o The use of a MOU or agreement between NWCG agencies and local government non fire response agencies hasn't seemed to work for many reasons. The number of local government response agencies in the Portland/Vancouver 12 county UASI area alone who are now doing ICS and position training is well over 130 agencies. The development of multiple county/city/district/ and multiple function single MOU's or agreements seems to be beyond their capability or interests. Many of these local government departments may only have one to five employees who are interested in being statused in ROSS and involved in assignments. The feedback I have received from the agencies is for a few employees, it isn't worth the effort to try to establish a legal agreement with the federal agencies. Again, if we want to expand over time our pool of "overhead", especially in non-operations positions, do we (NWCG) need to become proactive and seek how we can involve these folks?

• To develop qualified Command and General Staff, Unit Leaders and Managers in the private wildland fire services, NWCG again needs to look at processes and procedures now being practiced by Type 1 and 2 IMT's, GACC's and the dispatch community. Development may need to be through the use of a contract for single position assignments (both as qualified and as trainees) or as AD's to meet this need, especially at the start of the program. Today, the use of private qualified folks or as trainees for development does not seem to be supported based on the experience of the wildland fire contractors and their employees.

• We have talked for almost 20 years about either private companies or local government involvement in wildland fire personnel shortages. If we are really serious about having this become reality, we need to look at how much effort we are willing to put into it and if we can make the systems use as user friendly as possible.

• The FEMA reservist model would solve some of these issues.

For at least 20 years we (NWCG agencies) have stated in numerous reviews, reports and IMT studies that there is a critical need to increase the use of local government and private responders to not only increase the qualified and available pool of responders for IMT's but also to fill the need for miscellaneous overhead that supports these teams.

Today we (NWCG) are again undertaking a study (Incident Management Organizational Succession Planning) to develop alternatives to insure we have enough qualified Type 1 and 2 IMT's and available and qualified overhead support to respond to the increasing workload and the shrinking pool of available traditional fire service agency personnel.

Today, an increasing number of emergency responders other than from the fire services (such as EMS, Public Works, Law Enforcement, Public Health, private health/medical and other private organizations) are being trained through excellent DHS supported training such as the AHIMT course, "L" position courses and "I" courses. Many of these individuals want to gain real world experience beyond the Type 4 level either to go beyond the Type 3 IMT level, support the Type 1 and 2 level, support ECC's and MAC Groups or to better respond with their local private organizations.

During the past twenty four months I have been trying to find "customer friendly" processes, agreements or methods which are available to help the non fire services responder participate in the opportunities NWCG Type 2 or 1 IMT's, Area Command Teams or local government Type 3 IMT's have for these responders. I have not found common

processes, agreements or methods where we (NWCG) encourage and seek out the involvement our emergency management partners to not only help their skill growth but to also help us (NWCG) grow a future larger pool of qualified responders. Of course one of the barriers for these non fire service responders is even with the training and if they are qualified in some ICS positions, they can not be accessed unless they are in ROSS.

Most interagency dispatch centers are not able to enroll new AD's who are out of the traditional federal NWCG retiree pool. In some cases they are not able to even accept new NWCG retirees.

I have been directed to the NWCG and geographic area web pages for simple agreement templates for local government agencies to use. All I have been able to find are templates for county, city or fire district fire services agencies.

I have talked to coordination centers and dispatch centers, agency chief officers and multiple agencies who have tried to find a way to either work with the issue or at least agree that it is a problem. The most common responses are that the problem is understood but "they" need to fix it or "just have the people sign up with a local fire service agency as a CWN employee".

Even if an agreement was available to use with non fire service public agencies or private organizations, the local NWCG agencies would need to be willing to take the time to introduce them to the culture and processes of dealing with the wildland fire service agencies and the agreement process.

Two of the alternatives in this years study of IMT succession looks at increasing the response capability either through contract IMT's or increased involvement of non traditional resources. My belief is unless new processes are put in place, neither of these alternatives are reality.

My hope is that we can find user friendly processes before this upcoming western wildland fire season to start to bring these folks into our available pool of resources. My hope is we don't have to wait until the current study is finished to determine if we really want folks from the emergency response community outside of the fire services to begin to participate with us. My hope is the next time our team orders a PIOF, we don't have to have one dispatched from Vermont instead of being able to access the ones trained and qualified in the Portland/Vancouver area, as an example, that has more than 120 emergency response agencies with many trained PIOF's who just are not in ROSS or with a fire service agency with an agreement with NWCG.

This is a formal comment on the Incident Management Organization Succession Planning Team proposals for organizational models for the future. Specifically, there are five issues I would like to address related to the “External Capacity (Focus on all hazard teams and contract teams)” model.

With a few minor changes to this model, I believe it could be the best option. However, without the indicated changes, this could be politically detrimental to NWCG as a whole and perhaps the individual agencies and their partners as well; and could cause confusion and safety issues throughout the national emergency response community.

Issue #1
First, the model specifies the utilization of FEMA-USFA Type 3 All-Hazard IMTs, instead of identifying the standard to which the Type 3 IMTs should meet. The FEMA National Integration Center, working closely with NWCG, wildland agencies, and State and local agencies through the Incident Management Working Group, has developed qualifications for Type 3 command and general staff, unit leader, and other positions as part of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The qualifications listed in this All-Hazards Qualification Guide mirror those used in the FEMA USFA program, and while not yet formally released by FEMA, these qualifications are being used extensively across the country to develop State and local Type 3 IMTs.

While the idea of using local and State Type 3 IMTs is excellent, specifying teams trained under only one program would exclude all of the other Type 3 IMTs that have been developed and are currently under development utilizing the same standards. NWCG has always based their qualifications on standards and have allowed certifying agencies to recognize equivalencies in training programs; why should this be the opposite? The FEMA-USFA program is excellent and has been a leader in the development of Type 3 IMTs; however, many of these local and State Type 3 IMTs are not using USFA’s program and instead are being developed by, or with support from, FEMA regions and/or State forestry agencies utilizing the draft NIMS standards. How can NWCG justify excluding these teams without alienating their State partners?

Similarly, the Forest Service has had agreements for providing shadowing opportunities for IMT personnel from U.S.

Coast Guard (USCG), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and is in the process of developing an agreement with FEMA each of these agencies. As written, members of these IMTs could not be considered as a possible solution to the Succession Planning issue. If agency All-Hazard IMTs can be used, shouldn't IMTs from other Federal agencies meeting the same standards be included in this model?

It is also important to note that a new national organization, the All-Hazards IMT Association (AHIMTA), has formed within the last year and is receiving considerable support from various parts of FEMA and other Federal agencies. The organization was formed, in part, because of the lack of input and recognition being afforded to State and local IMTs by FEMA, USFA, and NWCG. The AHIMTA has grown to over 400 members in its first three months, a large number of whom are from non FEMA-USFA IMTs. This organization has the potential to be very vocal in expressing their views to the Federal government, including Congress.

I believe if the wording of the this model was changed to state that it would "utilize members of Federal, State, or local Type 3 IMTs meeting FEMA NIMS qualification standards," it would solve these all of these issues without changing the scope or intent of the model. This (or similar) wording would allow personnel from the FEMA-USFA AHIMTs and the other State and local IMTs meeting the same standards to be considered as members of wildland fire IMTs. An added benefit would be that personnel from Federal IMTs meeting those same standards, such as IMTs coordinated by EPA, USCG, and APHIS, as well as FEMA Incident Management Assistance Teams and Urban Search & Rescue Task Forces, would also be able to be considered. This would significantly expand the pool of qualified personnel to draw from, and would enhance the coordination between NWCG and these other Federal agencies and the IMTs represented by them. This, in turn, could make response to major disasters and emergencies where these agencies are working together more effective and efficient.

Issue #2
A second potential issue with this model involves the term "all hazard." This term is under review by FEMA because of its multiple connotations. The term "all hazard" (now officially "All-Hazards", per FEMA) in some cases refers to meeting core ICS competencies – required of all response disciplines – without reference to any type of discipline-specific qualifications. In other cases, an "All-Hazard IMT" requires Command, Operations, and Planning personnel from multiple disciplines so they can handle all types of incidents (structure fire, law enforcement, public health, hazmat, etc.). An explanation of the All-Hazard terminology issue developed for the FEMA National Integration Center (NIC) and previously shared with NWCG is attached to this comment.

All of the teams in question must meet FEMA NIMS Type 3 qualification standards, which are different than NWCG type 3 requirements. I suggest this model refer to the Type 3 IMTs (rather than All-Hazard IMTs) so that future clarification of the term "All-Hazards" does not inadvertently exclude some discipline-specific Type 3 IMT (such as a structure fire IMT) meeting those standards.

Issue #3
A third potential issue with this model involves the statement that a FEMA reservist workforce would be required for this model to be implemented. This is completely false. The issue of using personnel from local or State All-Hazards IMTs is simply an interagency Issue – if the local or State Type 3 IMT has an agreement with their State forestry agency, then they (the IMT or individual personnel) can be used. This is already in place in many States. However, a minor change in law would enable the Forest Service and/or Department of Interior to enter into agreements with entities to respond to non-fire and non-Stafford Act emergencies and disasters. This draft legislation has been developed by the Forest Service and is currently in Forest Service Legislative Affairs (it is unclear when this will go to congress). The reference to needing a change in law to allow for use of FEMA reservist workforce should be removed from this model.

I suggest any reference to a FEMA reservist workforce be removed from this model.

Issue #4
A fourth issue, related to the third issue but from a different aspect, is the negative impact that a FEMA reservist workforce would have on NWCG and the emergency response community. As mentioned above, no FEMA reservist workforce would be required to implement this model. Further, establishment of a FEMA reservist workforce to supplement fire response would create many additional problems for NWCG, FEMA, and response agencies across the country; and would cause potential confusion, inefficiency, and safety issues during mobilization. This issue has been reviewed and considered by the U.S. Forest Service Fire & Aviation Management relative to a separate proposal by the FEMA-USFA and found that the Forest Service cannot support the idea of a separate FEMA reservist workforce for fire response for several reasons:

• Establishment of such a workforce would result in dual mobilization system, dual sets of standards and requirements for the personnel to follow, confusion about who the responders are agents of and who they report to.
• It would create confusion and considerable for dispatch centers and coordination centers, and would create extra work and potential problems for incident business practice for Finance/Administration Sections.
• As we know from experience, considerable confusion and conflict result during incidents where fire resources are ordered through both the wildland system and the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC); utilizing a FEMA reservist workforce would create a third system that resources would be ordered through.
• FEMA reservist workforces are currently only permitted to be activated for Stafford Act responses (Presidentially-declared emergencies and major disasters), and may be used only to support FEMA operations; use of them for non-Stafford Act fire response to serve independently on an IMT may require a significant change of law, U.S. Code, and FEMA policy.

As with the third issue, I suggest any reference to a FEMA reservist workforce be removed from this model.

Issue #5
This model could be implemented immediately, without waiting for full implementation of the NIMO feasibility implementation plan. Obviously, capability for training assignments would expand as the number of NIMO teams increases.

I suggest ensuring that the wording of the model does not depend on the implementation of the NIMO program; rather, it should begin immediately and grow as the NIMO program grows.

Recommendation

Below is my suggestion for a rewording of the “External Capacity (Focus on all hazard teams and contract teams)” model (my recommended text additions/changes highlighted):

External Capacity (Focus on All-Hazards teams and contract teams)

The theme of this organizational model is mitigation of declining Federal, State, and local government capacity to staff interagency wildland fire IMTs. The model responds to the decline in internal NWCG agency capacity with increased utilization of members of Federal, State, or local Type 3 IMTs meeting FEMA NIMS qualification standards to manage wildland fire. Type 3 agency teams are expected to be expanded. The contract workforce will also be expanded in size and scope to meet peak capacity in busy years.

• Implementation of this model would be delayed until the policy can be reviewed and a contracting process for teams can be developed. This model also requires changes in procedures and development of agreements between local and/or state agencies to allow the use of members of Federal, State, or local Type 3 IMTs meeting FEMA NIMS qualification standards to manage wildland fire through reciprocal agreements.
• Agency IMT Succession would be the responsibility of the NIMO teams. The transition from Type 3 level assignments to participation on NIMO or Type 3 teams would require a re-thinking of our current training and succession practices. A higher percentage of training assignments would be on non-fire incidents.
• The implementation of this model would begin immediately, ramping up as the number of NIMO teams increases. The NIMO feasibility implementation plan is fully applied over the next 10 years so that there are 20 interagency NIMO teams in existence by 2020. The size of NIMO teams may need to be expanded. NIMO teams will continue to be base-funded year-round out of emergency funds. Agency contribution of emergency funds for base will be guided by the NWCG split if needed.

"All-Hazard" does not mean "Any Hazard" In the early days of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the term “all hazard” referred to those processes, qualifications, systems, etc. that were the same across all disciplines and all types of incidents. It was never intended to be used in the many ways it is commonly used today.

Many entities inappropriately use the term "all hazard" synonymously with “any hazard;” others use it to mean “any hazard other than the one(s) we typically deal with.” When applied to qualifications, the term “all hazard” is often inappropriately used to mean “individuals and/or teams that meet the ICS core competencies.” This inconsistent, inappropriate use of the term has created considerable confusion in the emergency response and management fields.

The "ICS core competencies" developed under the NIMS effort were never intended to be stand-alone competencies. They were developed with the understanding that persons meeting these core competencies must also meet discipline-

specific requirements being developed by the various NIMS Working Groups. While in certain disciplines some ICS positions may have minimal or no additional requirements beyond the core competencies, it is still up to each individual discipline to identify and establish supplemental measurements of behavior, such as tasks, to effectively demonstrate competencies in specific hazard environments.

Similarly, some entities currently working to develop an “all-hazard qualification system” are really developing a “core competency qualification system.” A qualification system must be able to differentiate personnel who meet the core competencies AND discipline-specific qualifications for the various ICS positions. The corresponding credentialing system must also accommodate those differences so that the proper resource can be requested, mobilized, tracked, and verified throughout an incident.

To identify someone as "qualified" (i.e., in the Incident Qualification System, or IQS) and entering them in an automated resource management system (i.e., Resource Ordering and Status System, or ROSS) based solely on core competencies alone defeats the purpose of a qualification/credentialing system, as these persons would actually be only partially qualified. Resources identified as “all hazard” resources by adding the letter “A” to the ICS mnemonic used in the system creates the possibility of an inappropriate resource being mobilized for an incident. For example, an epidemiologist meeting Operations Section Chief (OSC) qualifications but with no firefighting or law enforcement experience could be mobilized to manage operations at a high rise fire or a hostage situation if they are listed in a ROSS-type system simply as an “A-OSC.” This highly-specialized resource might also be overlooked for a very appropriate OSC position when identifying resources in ROSS to mobilize for a disease outbreak.

Similarly, to call a person or a team “all hazard qualified” is actually a misnomer. This is demonstrated by the confusion about what an All-Hazard Incident Management Team (AHIMTs) really is – are these teams truly “all hazard” (multi-discipline) teams? Many AHIMTs are made up of responders from only one or possibly a few disciplines who meet ICS core competencies. However, the ICS core competency requirements only set the ICS framework for the makeup of a team; they do not in and of themselves identify the full qualification requirements for a team. For example, a Type 3 IMT made up of all structure fire personnel is not really an “All Hazard IMT,” but rather is a “structure fire IMT.” Similarly, there can be law enforcement IMTs, public health IMTs, public works IMTs . . . all meeting the same ICS core competencies. All of these can be highly skilled, capable teams, but that doesn’t mean they are “all hazard” teams. Only when appropriately-qualified personnel from all appropriate disciplines are included in the proper command and general staff positions on a team would that team truly be an All-Hazard IMT.

Additional guidance may be needed to help minimize this confusion. This guidance should explain the difference between “all hazard” and “core competency,” and should encourage that Federal, State, local, and tribal entities re-evaluate their identified resources to differentiate between an all-hazard resource (such as an AHIMT) and a resource that simply meets ICS core competency requirements. Efforts should continue among FEMA NIMS Work Groups to develop discipline-specific requirements and resource typing definitions, and systems such as IQS and ROSS should be enhanced to accept appropriate discipline-specific requirements.

Core Team

"The theme of this organizational model is a flexible, modular approach to incident management. It responds to the need for teams to have incident specific configurations and to shrink and grow over the life of an incident based on complexity. Core Teams are funded by emergency funds and are engaged in incident management year-round. It is envisioned to adapt to the needs for flexibility under the Federal fire policy.

- *This organizational model emphasizes increased, direct supervision of command and general staff by agency administrators. Command and general staff are in position descriptions that include IMT duties and responsibilities. The model explores options for funding all or a portion command and general staff base salaries from emergency funding.*
- *This organizational model collapses Type 1 and Type 2 teams into a single type of team and reduces team size to a nine member core team. Interagency teams (including NIMO) are dispatched on a national rotation. Other incident needs are met through organized Functional Area modules dispatched and tracked by the geographic areas. Service centers provide incident business and finance functions and analytical support to planning.*
- *This organizational model could be implemented in five to ten years. It would require a lengthy phase in period during the transition from current IMTs to the modular approach.*
- *IMT succession is accelerated under this organizational model because of a single level of qualification for IMTs.*
- *Seven interagency NIMO teams are in existence by 2020. NIMO teams will continue to be base funded on a year round basis out of emergency funds. Agency contribution of emergency funds for base will be guided by the NWCG split if needed.*
- *This model increases capacity for incident management overall and would require either additional use of emergency funds to pay personnel costs or base increase to fund salaries of core teams assigned to Federal units.*
- *Changes in laws, guidance or policy needed for this model include new consolidated training for command and general staff and adjustments to 310-1." (NWCG 2011a: 24)*

The most frequently selected rating was *4-Somewhat Desirable* (Fig. 68).

Figure 68 Desirability of the Core Team Model.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Undesirable	86	11
Somewhat Undesirable	109	14
Neutral	196	25
Somewhat Desirable	264	33
Highly Desirable	139	18
Total:	794	100

missing = 64

The few significant differences in distribution of responses seem to correlate with immediacy of position to the proposed changes (Fig. 69):

- *Incident Qualifications:* There were highly significant overall differences in distribution of responses. Those with *No Incident Qualification* chose *Negative* less frequently than expected, *IMT-ICs* responding more N*egative* and less N*eutral*, and *IMT-Type 3* responding less *Neutral*.
- *Functional Area:* The significant difference in the distribution of responses among functional groups was driven by those in *Other* positions who responded less *Negatively* than expected.

Figure 69. Desirability of the Core Team Model by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age range.



Whereas most comments provided rationale for strong opposition to the two Contract alternatives, many comments about the Core option were more muted (Tables 104, 105). Many respondents are concerned about the potential loss of cohesion *("Cohesion is rarely addressed with the MODULES concept. It is an issue, DO NOT ignore it. The transition time for a CORE IMT and assigned modules will easily double-triple, and that effects decision making at the beginning of each incident greatly"*).

Table 104. Open-ended comments relevant to Core Team model.

From Question 2.12
Core Team: 1. Desirable to fund only the IC base salary from emergency funding. The IC would then head the 50 person teams. 2. Not desirable to fund NIMO core teams, teams of what? 3. Desirable to have team work for Forest Supervisors.
From Question 3.17
Integrate state and local Gov. into the mix. They bring expertise to teams that fed only might be lacking. Quit whining about the cost of local/state employees and realize it is a cost of doing business. Not everyone is paid at the fed level and fires are encroaching into their ground, fires don't stay on fed jurisdiction.
From Question 4.08
Many of our state fire organizations have very qualified single resources. Some play by their own rules and have to be guided to the "NWCG standards". Many state IM teams are very good as well. I think we can use them when their local fire season is over. But they respond faster to local disasters than a federal team can. Local incidents need to have priority for them over "out of state" details.
"Core team" breaks up cliques of good-old-boys, and allows the agency administrator to order what they need & demob them when done. Emphasis on allowing people to develop single resource quals and use them once or ten times a year. Fund base 8 using P codes (fire funded) to save the agency money. The motivation should be (1) desire to be involved in fire suppression and all-risk responses, (2) overtime, and (3) increasing qualifications in one or more functional areas. Modules could be opportunities for single resources to go out. Often people are available for only one or two fires per year. They are unable to make a year-long commitment to ta team. Modules can be assembled on the spot, as needed. Here's a new idea: instead of AD's, why don't we create some "intermittent" positions with GS levels corresponding to the complexity of the job. For example, Unit Leader corresponds to GS-9, Section Chief corresponds to GS-11. Then we activate these people when needed to go to fires, and lay them off when we don't need them. FEMA does a similar thing with their Disaster Assistance Employees, many of whom are retired federal employees. The positions are written in such a way that being hired as intermittent employees does not interfere with their receipt of annuities. There would then be a standard method to evaluate these employees, retain and promote them if they are doing a good job, and get rid of them if they're not. Not the "good old boy" system, but an actual performance-based evaluation. Also we need to break away from our dependence on "high tech" equipment and processes. I mean, do they REALLY need Google Earth to suppress a fire???
If the core team concept is used, it should be interagency and not dominated by one agency.
Sorry-Questions 4.6 and 4.7 - I would have to review .ppt and NWCG info more closely to understand what is being asked. 4.7- obviously, state employees are already integrated into the individual ICT, some more heavily than others. But I don't think that is what is being asked. I do think (see previous responses in Comment sections), that NIMO teams could be of great assistance in training and advising the State-sponsored ICTs (if they are nice about it and develop amiable working relationships, ie don't act like FEMA)
Teams working together for several years tends to provide for a more effective and efficient outcome
Core Team and Core Team with State Integration: I think that anything we do should be integrated with our cooperating state and local governments. We all have values at risk and would benefit from shared and cooperative efforts. I guess of all the options, I tend to like this one the best, as I think it takes us in the right direction.
Core Teams appear to have the most flexibility to meet the need of the incident and Agency Administrator.
I have had enough situations on "Short" teams in all management levels to realize that we need to staff to the unit leader position - the local level cannot provide the support staff at the current time to support incident teams. If it once again became a requirement in all federal PDS' maybe - but until that happens - we need to be able to roll fully functional. It is also imperative that ALL FEDERAL agencies are all hazard - we need to be working closely with FEMA/DHS to integrate all entities of incident management. I still hear in the "Wildfire" community - oh that is a

FEMA/DHS class not NWCG -- we need to come together....and everyone participate equally. It is very important for us to be successful in the future that we are integrated with our partners in all the Federal Agencies, State, and local levels. My only other comment on the models - is that in the charts we have all the teams being managed by the GACC's - I really truly feel that we need to be doing this at a National Level - with the GACCS providing the support - 45 (27 member) teams is less than 1,000 individuals - large companies employ that many people - we should be able to manage that group out of one national pool.
Bringing in "retirees" has drawbacks, they are not up to speed on current policy/practices-stuck in the "good old days". Having a core group, augmented with highly trained accountable single resources is ideal.
Cohesion is rarely addressed with the MODULES concept. It is an issue, DO NOT ignore it. The transition time for a CORE IMT and assigned modules will easily double-triple, & that effects decision making at the beginning of each incident greatly.
I like the Core Team models, but thought needs to be put into those "service centers" before something like the first few years of the HR centralization for the Forest Service happens. I do like the module idea for certain functions.
Need national accountability & oversight. If GACGs or NIFC or FS can provide that ok, otherwise NWCG needs to provide oversight. So Core or Core-State works. Need to build in line support for fire as aspect of career paths in Fed Agencies. Need performance measures in non-fire positions to reflect militia support & needs.
4.6 Core Team, I support this model because of the accelerated training opportunities. I believe it could be implemented quicker than the 10 year outside but it has more to do with the shift in culture and the sooner it is accepted the quicker it will be implemented.
Not enough background to answer questions at this time. Concept: GACCs would manage the historic number of teams that work in their area over the last five years. Each team will have their core group and fill the remainder of positions from receiving unit (including local and GACC trainees). Offer details for team positions during each season. Incentives: For those folks exceeding the salary cap, have the amount over the cap tax deductible on line 37 of the fed tax form.
I question time used to redesign ICS (scaleable). I think we've just grown too greedy when we staff teams. I really think plug and play modules will work. That way we can have SMEs serve in "OPs" modules. Think of the possibilities! SME OPs=Aphis, GPA, Transportation. And the Plans, Logistics, Finance stays the same. This is the way to transition into all risk hazard.
I find that team cohesion to be very important just like crew cohesion. I think that the diversity of different agency and state personnel brings a lot to the team process, especially in all hazard incidents. The more that you use a "plug and play" approach, the longer it will take for team to come together as a single unit for the IC. For some service a "plug and play" module or service center can work (like a long term fire projection module), but we need to be very careful with "arm chair computer model" calls from a distance that are far removed from what's really happening on the ground. Our modeling, databases and scale finess are not that good yet in most cases!
Cost... use type 3 teams for many long lasting incidents. Augment logistics as needed.
Longer teams have the advantage of team cohesion/knowing how others work/function that is important to smooth/efficient operations. Shorter (Core/NIMO) teams will likely take a longer period of time to be fully operational because filling positions from pools of individuals who are not on a call schedule with a mandatory report/availability time frame will take longer to arrive on incident. NIMO teams should not be considered unless ALL agencies participate; why were they not embraced previously except by the FS? What do NIMO team members do during the off-season? Current budgets are declining: how can we afford NIMO teams on a year round basis? They can't function w/o support of other positions and therefore the shortest team developed should include other positions that we all know will be ordered to accompany them. Having contract teams available for surge/high-season needs is a good concept, but conflicts with the concept of retirees mentoring and sharing their wealth of knowledge with newer/developing individuals. I don't believe we should 'isolate' retirees and other ADs to contract teams.
The relationships are what makes working on an IMT as opposed to single resource something people want to do. Expectations are known and established rather then having to establish them with each assignment and revolving team around you. I do not like the idea of modules, I feel while this might be implementable it will be at the cost of the relationships and the section and team continuity. I think it is important to bring in more participation, but I do not see modules or contracts as the method to best accomplish that objective. An AD workforce would be much more cost-effective and more knowledgeable then a contract. Also with all the emphasis on COST it is not one of the core positions, but will be an add-on. If the expectation is that the FSC will do COST I think that is a bad assumption. An FSC has a full plate and will not have the time IF they have the expertise to do both jobs, and not all FSC's have the expertise or desire to also do COST. The relationship of the team needs to be maintained. It appears maintaining these relationships are not highly valued in most of these proposals.
Core team - might lose the cohesiveness of having full teams that work together, know their strengths and don't have to do the mating dance at the start of an incident. I think we (IC) need to manage the number of people better and downsize as needed. Figure out the number of teams needed and go to one team Type 1 like CalFire

Core teams will be harder and take more time to fill out expanding positions as incident grows and experience level will be all over the board. Red flag here for highly complex and fast moving incidents with personnel not use to working with/as team dynamics which are very often ingrained/learned from past large incidents.
The core team concept is fine, but I agree with folks … who point out that you need to make a commitment to IMT members if you want them to participate. The point is, having a small core team is great if the team can get access to the other folks it needs. [some ICs] would argue that he needs to be able to tap into 25-30 people- and they need to be able to count on the work. No one wants to spend a bunch of energy with an IMT if they can't count on getting used. My guess would be that over time, the core teams will evolve into larger teams similar to what we have now. The core will call the same folks every time (this is probably a good thing) to do the same things...good teams are built on relationships, after all. We may still call them core teams, but in reality, they won't be a lot different from a medium sized type II team. I already mentioned above, but will mention again, that I am strongly opposed to any changes that encourage full time teams (e.g., NIMO, DHS, All Risk). Land management does not need and can't afford an emergency service. They need natural resource management services- fire management is a part of that. Fire is rarely an emergency. It is always a natural resource issue.
Having been on an assignment that was basically an instance of the "Core Team" model, I am a bit leary of expanding that approach. I found that key positions went unfilled for too long. The team was also understaffed, leading unit managers to fell quite frustrated since they knew the operation should have been functioning in a much more efficient manner. But possibly the most troubling is the lack of team cohesion. I'm not talking about the Core, but the whole team. If I was to make the analogy to a sports team, all the players through their experience working with one another, know were the other members are and what they can expect at the other end of a pass. To some extent you are always going to lose that edge with a cobbled together team. And in a run and gun situation, that could very well result in a death.
Building from a Core Team that builds a team on an incident is not the most cost effective way to run an incident. A team that has been working together and knows how to be efficient is not only a cost savings but is also the best way to take care of firefighetrs/emergency workers. With having a full team dispatched there is also the benefit of "hitting the ground running" and not waiting for a team to build from the "Core Team" out. To have a full team built from a pool of single resources that have to learn how best to work together smoothly is costly and can create safety concerns while operating at an incident.
4.6-7 If you use core teams that their base pay is funded by the ICS system you will get more local and state agencies to play, because they are getting an employee salary paid for and the use of that person when they are not on incidents or training. that provide incentive for all agencies to get their people to participate.
I do not see how you can have a "core" team and then bring in an operations module. By doing this you no longer have a team you have Mann Gulch when the Supervisor (IMT) knows nothing about the men on the ground. I can tell you if that is where we are heading I will no longer participate because there will be no team.
The concept of the core team does not support team management and development principles and does not match the identified workload expected for each incident and complexity.

Table 105. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Core Team model.

Organizational Model I fully support and in my opinion works to meet identified objectives: Core Team Concept.....utilizing area modules dispatched and tracked by the geographic areas One final note - The good old boy network is still strong it will take discipline and enforcement or else: Core teams will expand with behind the scenes ordering
I like parts of options 4, 5 and 6 but it is hard to compare them since all include more NIMO teams which are a negative.
mirrors my response to “5” (This option makes the most sense, or at least parts of it do. Creating a single national team standard, eliminating NIMO teams, and creation of a core team is logical. However, pre-identifying “9 core members” makes little sense.) and is far preferable. There are a large number of talented folks at the state and local level that are excluded from team participation due to government cultural barriers (i.e. bias, preferences, etc.). Another good source for that information would be GACC’s as well.
The “core team concept” or modular concept does not meet the objectives stated in my opinion. The travel costs will still be there for mobilization and it will certainly not encourage team participation of the unit leaders when they are being assigned as a module to “setup camp and then leave” as was suggested in the feedback session. Additionally, it does not allow for rapid response to changing conditions on the incident. If the majority of your Logistics section departs camp after initial setup then it will limit the team’s ability to order and issue additional supplies; supply spike camps; change communications systems and plans to meet new requirements; ensure that the contract engines, dozers, showers and food unit are in compliance; deal with vehicle repairs and the list can go on and on. It would also

inhibit the team from taking additional action on new starts and support initial attack in the teams designated response area.

This concept also does not allow for any of the team cohesion that I believe you would find is very high on the priority list of most incident team members. Just as crew cohesion has been found to be critical to the safety and success of crews, team cohesion allows for the trust and efficient response that is necessary in high stress situations.

Organizational Models 2 through 6 shifts the decision-making and control even further from the field unit and firmly establishes the expectation that local units and remaining IMT's will only be "RESPONSIVENESS TO FEDERAL FIRE POLICY" as directed by National Leadership, WFDSS service centers, and NIMO. These models also suggest that field decision makers and personnel are not capable of implementing the policy without this support. This develops a top down organizational models that is not highly reliable. This model does not support the change in the planning rules currently advertised in the federal register.

Organizational Models 2, 4, 5 and 6 appears to be trying to create a team that can "do it all" at all complexity levels and staffing needs. These models shift control from local and geographic level management to national teams furthering the top down management model.

Organizational Models 5 and 6 that address core teams and the concept of collapsing teams, and implementing service centers and modules is expected to compromise team cohesion and effectiveness.

Of the 7 models presented in the IMOSP document numbers one and six I feel are the best solution. Particulars for each are addressed in the following:

Core Team-State: The NIMO concept cam work for future IMT configuration but not in its present form. As an organization we either commit to a current modified traditional team approach or to the NIMO concept. They don't mix well. NIMO in its current form should not be expanded. If any NIMO teams are retained I see their role as more of an area command. If the NIMO concept is adopted as the national standard, suggest the following:

1. Teams are interagency and can include state and local government membership.
2. Retain Typing for a trail period. Have a single Type 1 Team per GACC
3. Retain GACC level dispatch rotation with national level rotation triggered by scarcity
4. They are not stand alone incident management teams but are made up of multi-agency members with fire or other "day jobs" in their respective GACCs
5. Team members must live in the GACC where their IMT is located.
6. Expand the operations section in the core team. The nature of NIMO structure is less cohesive then that of our traditional teams. Operations is the area on an incident with the highest probability for injuries and fatalities. To build better cohesion in operations have an Ops Section Chief, 3 or 4 Division/Group Supervisors and a couple of aviation positions.
7. To entice management support for IMT involvement, team funding of base 8 should be shifted to suppression accounts while on incidents. The base 8 saving should be left with the home unit for use at the local level. The Forest Service and DOI agencies need to be the same page regarding charging base salaries.

Core Team Concept: An interesting approach that does not go quite far enough. To have IMT support as part of a position description of C&G is well and good, but as noted above, when filling out the organization below C&G, the pressure to keep people at home will be greater than the desire to allow them to go on fire assignments. I see no reason why qualified personnel, particularly those in hard to fill positions like Finance or a HECM, should not also have IMT support as part of their position description.

Also, among a lot of the militia, there is a bias against teams simply because some folks do not want to be tied down to a set rotation where you may not get a call-out at all. They like to freelance, or perhaps their regular jobs/supervisors provide uncertain windows of availability. Tying these people to a set rotation of modules could affect morale, team cohesion, availability, and depth; especially in years where there is not much activity. However, I do like the temporary promotion idea, which might help with some of the other issues.

I do not think you can eliminate the distinction between Type I and Type II teams. As much as Type II teams have successfully dealt with difficult and complex incidents in recent years, there is still a substantial difference, not only in C&G but also in critical unit leadership and certain individual support positions, SITL and FBAN for example. While on paper, a NIMO team on top of a Type II team is perfectly adequate, if you had that configuration on a kicking Type I incident it would be problematic. I say this as someone who has been on Type I and II teams as a C&G member. Also, it took me years to get into 520, and I suspect there will probably be some lingering resentment if those that struggled to

achieve a Type I qualification find themselves at the same level as a Type II.
Core Team Concept The description says this is a 9 person team (see below). Nowhere below are the 9 positions listed. Which are they? Obviously not Logistics since the LSC is listed as part of a module. If the intent of this effort it to destroy the IMT organization, this is the model to pick. This model eliminates any possibility for team cohesion and maximizes the mating dance that would occur on every incident delaying the IMT's (or NIMO's) ability to take over and manage an incident. Again, one of the advantages of organized teams is the knowledge the team members have of each other's styles and quirks. The Logistics Section learns what tactical resources the Operation Chief usually employs and has these ready. Conversely the Operations Chief understands the limits and timeframes that Logistics and Supply operate under. Knowing this, both can adjust to whatever situation presents itself. These are not something that Standard Operating Procedures can provide or overcome the lack of. At present the IMTs are responsible for making sure they are staffed and finding substitutes when needed. What organization is going to oversee the modules? Do you really propose for 45 LSCs to independently manage 45 Logistics modules? Since the Plans Chief is not part of the Plans module who manages them? And what Plans Chief wants to be left in a situation where on any incident he/she has no idea who is going to show up? Will 45 ICs, 75 Operations modules, 45 Air Ops modules, 45 LSCs, 45 Plans modules, 20 Finance modules, etc. etc. all be going through NICC for substitute requests?
Core Team This model has merit, much like the standard model it is not a whole lot different from things we have done before. The nightmare of all the temporary promotion and who get's picked for what might be a big problem scenario. HR programs across all agencies have already been reduced to barely working.
Same comment as with Single Standard model about DHS/NFA/EMI involvement

Core Team with State Integration

"The theme of this organizational model is a flexible, modular approach to incident management. It responds to the need for teams to be configured to match incident complexity and to shrink and grow over the life of an incident. It responds to the need for flexibility under the Federal fire policy. This organizational model continues the militia approach to staffing the teams and modules. Team members will have "day jobs" in agencies in fire or other disciplines and respond to fires as members of teams. This feature enhances the interagency characteristics of teams through inclusion of state and local government membership on core teams.

- *This organizational model collapses Type 1 and Type 2 teams into a single type of team and reduces team size to a nine member core team. Interagency teams (including NIMO) are dispatched on a national rotation. Other incident needs are met through organized modules dispatched and tracked by the geographic areas. Service centers provide incident business and finance functions and analytical support to planning.*
- *This organizational model could be implemented in five years. It would require a phase-in period to transition from current IMTs to the modular approach.*
- *IMT succession is accelerated under this organizational model because of the single type of team.*
- *Seven interagency NIMO teams are in existence by 2020. NIMO teams will continue to be base funded on a year round basis out of emergency funds. Agency contribution of emergency funds for base will be guided by the NWCG split if needed.*
- *This model increases capacity for incident management overall and would require some balancing of base funding vs. emergency funding so that agency land management objectives could be accomplished.*
- *Changes in laws, guidance or policy needed for this model include new consolidated training for command and general staff and adjustments to 310-1. " (NWCG 2011a: 31)*

Responses to this alternative model were quite similar to the previous, with the most frequently selected rating being 4-*Somewhat Desirable* (Fig. 70).

Figure 70. Desirability of the Core Team with State Integration Model.



Rating	# Responses	Percent
Highly Undesirable	87	11
Somewhat Undesirable	106	13
Neutral	209	26
Somewhat Desirable	245	31
Highly Desirable	144	18
Total:	791	100

missing = 67

As might be expected, non-Federal respondents were more *Positive* about this model than Federal respondents (Fig. 71):

- *Organizational Level:* There was a highly significant difference in the distribution of responses among these groups. *State Government/Fire* chose less *Neutral* and more *Positive* than expected. *Local Government/Fire* respondents were similar but also had fewer *Negative* responses than expected. In contrast, *Federal-Local* respondents were more *Neutral* and less *Positive* than expected.
- *Functional Area:* There was a slightly significant difference in the distribution of responses among these groups; those in *Other* day-job positions were less likely to select *Negative*.

- *Agency:* The highly significant difference in the distribution of responses among these groups was driven by differences between Federal and non-Federal respondents. *State Government/Fire* respondents were less likely to be N*eutral* than Federal respondents.

Figure 71. Desirability of the Core Team with State Integration Model by Demographic.

a. by Organizational level.



b. by Incident qualification.



c. by Functional area.



d. by Agency.



e. by Age range.



While many comments are positive (Tables 106, 107), there is considerable variation, from:

- *"I like this model the best mainly because of its flexibility under the Federal fire policy and I believe it fits nicely with the Cohesive Strategy. I also like it because the day jobs include other disciplines which helps balance fire management with natural resource management. This model also offers the dynamics of Federal and state employees, who bring different perspectives, into a place where they complement each other. ",*
- to *"The state teams need to be left out of the Federal issues. The current utilization of Type 3 IMTs and the success of CIMC training for the states has shown the states they don't need to be under the S-520 shadow. The states are beginning to be more and more successful in managing their own wildland fire situations without having to call in the feds to bail them out." ,*
- and *"I am so glad to see folks finally move this tough program forward - will certainly be painful for some but very welcome by many more!! Good luck and thanks for allowing field input and comments"*

Table 106. Open-ended survey comments relevant to Core Team with State Integration model.

From Question 2.12
I have included some points from two or more options on the table in which to consider. Overall the Core Team State is my favored option with the following additions: 1. Standard grade levels associated with positions of function on IMT's. I believe this will assist with participation especially in the militia area. 2. Encourage local type 3 team organizations that will transition to the core team leadership should an incident evolve in complexity. 3. Keep core teams to the limited 9 member leadership roles and have multiple teams available and on rotation in GACC.
From Question 3.17
LOCAL-STATE PARTICIPATION. State and local government resources have played an important role. Seems that only Model 7 includes them. Have the pros/cons been fully analyzed? Consider expertise in local gov't liaison, evacuations, structure protection, emergency medical, and certain kinds of logistics experience that local/state resources can add to teams. COST. Cost of teams regardless of models must be small compared to cost of incidents. It is deceptive to show reduced cost if some current "team positions" are going to be used anyway through single resource ordering rather than team ordering. Do comparative costs include costs of "modules and service centers"?
From Question 4.08
The States are great partners that have a lot to offer.
Because it should not just be up to the feds to work on the nations problem. States must be integrated, involved and supportive of the outcome.
We need to ensure working with state teams and team members that we have ethic rules. I personally had a problem several years ago with a state team member. If it was someone else or from another region they would have lost their job. I feel education of federal ethic and discrimination laws is needed. We need to ensure everyone is successful.
I love the idea of using more state folks on IMTs and using more state team. I think it's a bad idea to keep those teams small. If your going to most type 1 or 2 incidents you can't hit the ground running without at least the current level of members.
Core team with state integration would be preferred when it comes to contract I think there is a way for them to be players but the IC should be a federal or state employee and an AD would be ok if they where once a state or fed employee. The IC should in no way be working for a company
Because it should not just be up to the feds to work on the nations problem. States must be integrated, involved and supportive of the outcome.
Sorry-Questions 4.6 and 4.7 - I would have to review .ppt and NWCG info more closely to understand what is being asked. 4.7- obviously, state employees are already integrated into the individual ICT, some more heavily than others. But I don't think that is what is being asked. I do think (see previous responses in Comment sections), that NIMO teams could be of great assistance in training and advising the State-sponsored ICTs (if they are nice about it and develop amiable working relationships, ie don't act like FEMA)
The Overarching Principles should reflect consistent and robust federal responsibility for incidents on federal land. The incident management organization adopted by the NWCG needs to reinforce this responsibility. It is unacceptable for

the federal agencies to hand over their responsibilities for land management (i.e. fire suppression) to state teams, contractors, or non-land management Federal agencies. Federal land management agencies have the skills and the responsibility for this role."
Core Team with State Integration is in my opinion the best model. The module idea makes a lot of sense and would allow us as a wildland fire community to bring our expertise to all-risk/all-hazard incident management. We already participate in these incidents and would serve the need better than FEMA.
The current situation does not work. You could see this coming years ago when we implemented taskbooks and the old school was grandfathered into command and general positions in their 30's. Now that we have a very linear qualification progression OJT on the home unit has little to no weight when determining an employee's ability to function and adapt to command and general staff positions. Yet an employee who works on a less complex unit, has a reduced workload, has little to no supervision is able to advance their qualification more rapidly than someone who works in fire year round as their main job. Core team with state integration I believe is highly desirable especially when the feds want the states to take more ownership and responsibility in dividing the costs equitably between the two. I think if you end up with all feds you will alienate our state partners. The states should have a significant financial stake in the outcome and accountability of all wildland fires, prescribed fires and fuels. Without them at the table the feds are getting their just desserts. PS - I am so glad to see folks finally move this tough program forward - will certainly be painful for some but very welcome by many more!! Good luck and thanks for allowing field input and comments. We now feel part of the process of helping define our future.
Need national accountability & oversight. If GACGs or NIFC or FS can provide that ok, otherwise NWCG needs to provide oversight. So Core or Core-State works. Need to build in line support for fire as aspect of career paths in Fed Agencies. Need performance measures in non-fire positions to reflect militia support & needs.
We have to do things interagency. Its the way things are. We are not an island unto ourselves in any fire situation. Fire doesn't stop at a jurisdictional boundary.
If we incorporate state/local government entities, there needs to be a set standard in training, skills, and qualifications.
ICS is best filled with subject matter experts. This means having some combination of State/Local government integrated into federal teams is desirable and needs to be addressed. Federal policy does not allow our employees to be subject matter experts during most all risk scenarios.
4.7 Core Team - State: I like this model the best mainly because of its flexibility under the federal fire policy and I believe it fits nicely with the Cohesive Strategy. I also like it because the day jobs include other disciplines which helps balance fire management with natural resource management. This model also offers the dynamics of federal and state employees, who bring different perspectives, into a place where they compliment each other. Another item I like about this model is the implementation time. Again, this time can be shortened if individuals accept the fact that this change is needed and move forward with the decision, instead holding back and fighting against change and in my opinion improving the existing situation. Thanks for the opportunity to provide input and perspective.
Teams should be composed with a true interagency mix of members, BLM,FS,BIA,NP,F&WL State, county with a single training standard.
Get rid of the city employees. They cost too much.
4.7 - undesirable because of militia, use, not the best. Area Command - the statements about Area Command in each model do not follow any state logic so we feel that the ARea Command discussion should be table until an organizational model is selected. The roles and responsibilities or Area Command need to be continued and fulfilled somehow. This may or may not be in the form of past Area Command teams but needs to be fulfilled. This response prepared by the S-520/620 Steering Committee which represents both federal and state members, is made up of multiple agency personnel who possess IMT quals across the full range of possibilities, and have a variety of regular positions within their respective agencies.
Having state and local representation on our current IMT's has proven valuable when dealing with multi-jurisdiction incidents and should be retained.
Teams need to integrated with state/local Gov. personnel - they bring a wealth of knowledge to the fire ground and have personnel willing to do jobs the feds don't want to do.
The core team model is a bigger change and that is good. Smallest or C&G teams supported by modules / service centers is the way to go. Long teams basically cost too much, and some position descriptions are still pre-computer-age.... How ridiculous to hope to call out a 26-person team without acknowledging host unit needs / expectations! Using electronic communications, host units should be able to specify exactly what they want/need, and get that ordered, rather than bowing to preconfigurations. Small team or dispatches need a position IN CHARGE of keeping tabs on staffing and availability of personnel, modules and resources. That is always the weak link in efficiency/effectiveness. Can you imagine getting the resources you NEED to an incident, no more, no less? Integrating state and local resources

with requirement of full training/competencies is a decent way to continue public support... they certainly need the training and to not feel left out, and "fed" teams sometimes not as appreciated as state/local.
see all comments and selections above. I believe that Core team with state integration is closest to the comments above that were formulated prior to reading the organizational model outlines. I believe it can achieve the community capacity that is needed with potential to be varied based on local situations can be tailored appropriately in in local area operating plans. these plans however must be integrated and comprehensive, coordinating the plans and workforce of other collaborative partners in the interest of guiding entire scope of wildland fire management. it is critical that the people currently working on these issues within these communities are included in the succession training opportunities so we can get the appropriate mix of individuals engaged in the initial implementation and adaptation of this important paradigm shift.
The state teams need to be left out of the federal issues. The current utilization of Type 3 IMTs and the success of CIMC training for the states has shown the states they don't need to be under the S-520 shadow. The states are beginning to be more and more successful in managing their own wildland fire situations without having to call in the feds to bail them out.
4.6-7 If you use core teams that their base pay is funded by the ICS system you will get more local and state agencies to play, because they are getting an employee salary paid for and the use of that person when they are not on incidents or training. that provide incentive for all agencies to get their people to participate.
Core Team - State The description includes the statement "This feature enhances the interagency characteristics of teams through inclusion of state and local government membership on core teams. “I presume this means that the other alternatives do not include state and local government participation as part of the core team.
While the core team insures consistency, we need to integrate State players to build the relationships we need for the very large incidents, when integration will be necessary

Table 107. Comments submitted to Gmail relevant to Core Team with State Integration model.

Generally speaking it is very difficult for non-federal personnel to break into the “club mentality” of the federal level incident team environment. It is obvious that there is a federal agency bias against state and local personnel. I have seen qualified state and local resources not be given responsibility, and/or treated differently, simply based on not being a fed and the perceived lower training standards. There is also interagency bias as well; and there is no need for me to explain the obvious.
Alternatives 1 and 7 best meets the definition and intent of teams. Because of the above comments, I would like to recommend the preferred Organizational Model 7, and add the number of positions proposed to be added with NIMO teams to the existing field organization. Organizational Model 1 would be the second option but only if principles are modified to better reflect the goals of the IMT succession.
Core Team Concept with State Participation: Similar concerns as expressed in the Core Team alternative. Praise for the inclusion of state employees. We need state and local participation as much as possible and there are a lot of good reasons to encourage such an approach. However, I do not want to get in a position where state and local participation is relied upon to respond to incidents. The Federal agencies need to take the lead and be augmented by state and local resources.
Core Team with State Participation That this model is even proposed as an alternative rather than accepted as current reality is another example of either the bias shown by the team (We, the Feds, will do it ourselves) or a lack of understanding of the current reliance on State, and local, government participation. I doubt there is an IMT today that doesn’t already have State and local government members. Are we so arrogant as to ignore their participation? It should be assumed that we would actively recruit, and train, State and local firefighters at every opportunity, for every model.
Same comment as with Single Standard model about DHS/NFA/EMI involvement

Additional Comments on Models and Succession Planning

Tables 108 and 109 present comments associated with many models, or none in particular.

Table 108. Open-ended survey comments associated with Alternative Models, in general.

From Question 2.12 (see Individual Alternative Model)
From Question 3.17
As a Forest Service line officer for the last 15 years, it is apparent to me that the people in our agency at the Washington Office and Regional Office level who are talking about workforce planning have very limited experience in managing organizations, particularly ones where there is a multiple-use mandate. As a result, the dialogue is occurring only within the fire program staff, when in fact organizational decisions need to be made within the context of the inter-disciplinary framework within which we work. There is no fire organization at the field level (i.e. national forest level) in the Forest Service; all field level fire staff are part of an integrated organization, regardless of which branch of the agency their "day job" is located. I strongly believe that in order to be successful, workforce decisions need to be made by line officers not fire management staff.
My comments are guided by my belief that the executive board does not have a fact-based understanding of why we are having a problem with lack of staff in the fire program. Until this understanding is gained, I am very reluctant to support any changes. Changes are going to be very disruptive to the organizations & if there is not a good understanding of the underlying problems, we are likely to be back talking about these problems again & making more disruptive changes.
The other issue I have from reading the models comes from the statement that it would or should be expected that an SRB to an OSC2 in 4 years or less. Thats an unacceptable push through the system with out gaining the necessary experience for each position moving up. I recently heard the conversation that you can become a brain surgeons faster a type 1 IC. The difference is the brain surgeon does that everyday probably does 4 or 5 surgeries a week. The still have 4 years of school, 4 years residency and then 3 or 4 years of surgical residency. around 12 years. roughly they do around 20 surgeries a month for say 10 months thats 120 a year. What is the avg days out for any of the teams a year I'm guessing its not close the 120 days. My point being is that they work on and perfect their craft many times over than we have the opportunity to do. We all are multi tasked in the work place right now being asked to do more with less money.
I actually find the limited range of options for answers to suggest pre-decisional bias, invalidating this portion of the survey instrument. I smell "stove piping" and am frankly a bit ashamed of the inter-agency fire organization I was a part of for over 20 years with the above compensation questions. I've participated in IMT's for over 15 years now because I loved doing it, not for the compensation or any "prestige". Recently, I've grown increasingly disturbed by an emerging "elitism" from the ranks of the fire community. We need to be good at what we do. We do not need to be viewed as good because of what we do or how much we are paid.
From Question 4.08
I'd like at least some option that doesn't include addition of numerous unfunded NIMO teams that have an unclear role, mission, and haven't shown tangible positive results.
We don't need to change what we already have folks. If you go the NIMO route or something like it you will still have holes to fill in the staffing because there ARE NO QUALIFIED FOLKS OUT THERE. Hence, it stands to reason that we need to be doing something about training folks and making folks available for team assignments and NWCG can help with that. Streamline task books and training courses. It shouldn't take someone 20 years to get to the DIVS level. There are lots of folks out there that want to be on teams but due to training budgets and supervisors who won't let them go they can't participate. Changing the team configuration won't help this, we'll still have folks who want to participate but can't. Fix this first and then we'll have folks to fill teams!! Don't look for an easy way out, help the folks who want to participate.
None of them do a blessed thing to improve the current situation. They are all top down approaches. None of them address the problem of getting employees interested, trained and qualified in the positions required to staff IMTs. Suggestions: Once an employee gains single resource boss qualification they MUST begin qualification in a non-operations branch qualification before they can advance in operations. All unit leaders must have skills in at least one other unit. The foundation of our future type 1/2 teams will come from local type 3 experience. Build from the bottom up!!!
I think all agencies and jurisdictions would be better served if the org model is one that includes employees from all programs, not just full-time fire. Single purpose teams will be very good at the nuts and bolts of incident management, but lose touch w/ their bosses (agency administrator hosting the team) and w/ the jurisdiction's issues. See comments in 3.17
I fail to see how any of these options are adding to our capacity as agencies. The use of contract teams is a detriment to our workforce and the quality of work with everything we have ever contracted for incident management is lower than when we do it ourselves. The increase of full time teams is a cost I don't think we can afford. If we'll allow our line officers the ability to make decisions and the direction from the top is clearly identified that all employees will participate when there is a need then we will always have enough resources to deal with our emergencies. When we don't provide good directions and then we have our current situation. We have to have the heads of the agencies send out a letter that everyone needs to participate. Why would a leader have to send out such a request in the middle of a crisis? We have allowed our workforce to become too specialized and given each and every employee the ability to choose whether they want to participate. The last time I checked the entity that provided the paycheck made the rules. We are constantly trying to fix problems that will satisfy the most people instead of the most cost effective way. If people aren't willing to do the work that is expected and required of their employer then they can hunt another employer.
Team, Team, Team! Emergency agency mgrs. (State and Fed) know it best and do it best.
Look to IMT3's to build a model and apply to regional and national levels. Flexibility, adjust to size and scope of incident, modules that

could come in if the incident increases suddenly, pay that reflects the duties you perform while on the incident, utilize our interagency partners whenever possible.
We must boost the capabilities of Type III IMTs. WE must provide employees some incentive to participate on these teams and perhaps some of them will then go on to be on Type II Teams. Speaking of Type II Teams, to me it is ridiculous that an ICT3 requires an arduous WCT. We have lost many of our most experienced ICT3's because they can no longer take the arduous test. Many of these folks pass Moderate and would continue as ICT3 (I might add this is a hard position to fill). An FBAN is to be at the hottest part of the line at the hottest time of the day and is Moderate. An ICT3 has to keep their eye on the big picture and they are arduous!!! This is a hold-over from the 80's when we were IC Multi-Resource - Extended Attack and should be changed.
Refer to comments in 3.17. It remains valid to keep the Type 1 and 2 teams separate, with the Type 1 teams taking on the more complex fires. what should occur is the trend to have Type 1 and 2 teams working on the same fire, as appropriate. The funding differences between these two fire teams need to be reviewed; not made the same if valid differences exist for funding higher at the Type 1 team level. Contract teams may be valid if the commitment is there and the liability and pay parity issues are resolved. There also may be validity in having a State agency team, if the same issues are resolved as contract teams, plus the questions of budget and agency coordination. Local/regional team control is better than national control; too complex and not responsive; too remote. FEMA/Militia/NIMO involvement should be on an "as-needed" basis. Incident Team/NIMO coordination on fire incidents....probably work to do on that subject.
None of them do a blessed thing to improve the current situation. They are all top down approaches. None of them address the problem of getting employees interested, trained and qualified in the positions required to staff IMTs. Suggestions: Once an employee gains single resource boss qualification they MUST begin qualification in a non-operations branch qualification before they can advance in operations. All unit leaders must have skills in at least one other unit. The foundation of our future type 1/2 teams will come from local type 3 experience. Build from the bottom up!!!
I think all agencies and jurisdictions would be better served if the org model is one that includes employees from all programs, not just full-time fire. Single purpose teams will be very good at the nuts and bolts of incident management, but lose touch w/ their bosses (agency administrator hosting the team) and w/ the jurisdiction’s issues. See comments in 3.17
Get rid of expensive local govt. members on teams so that Federal employees can be trained and qualified without being caught up in the games that local govt. folks play once they gain a Unit Leader or C & G position. How can you provide solid growth in IMT's when the retirees and local govt. folks are holding you back? What happens when the retiree's finally die off and there is no one to replace them because the Fed folks were denied the opportunity to move up and get qualified. Why not try fielding two all Federal teams for two years and then compare with two mixed teams with similar fire responses. I guarantee cost will be way down and getting new Fed trainees qualified will happen much faster and with better results in their decision making. Just my two cents!
The more you go to permanent full time team configurations, the more you will burn people out and alienate non-primary fire personnel. The current situation is not too far off from where it needs to be. We just need to find better ways to encourage team participation, and require supervisors to support team participation. Any of the other options move the agencies further towards exclusive fire organizations. I believe that integration of resources between primary fire and non-primary fire personnel is the strongest approach. We need fewer walls between these two groups of individuals, not more of them.
We don't need to change what we already have folks. If you go the NIMO route or something like it you will still have holes to fill in the staffing because there ARE NO QUALIFIED FOLKS OUT THERE. Hence, it stands to reason that we need to be doing something about training folks and making folks available for team assignments and NWCG can help with that. Streamline task books and training courses. It shouldn't take someone 20 years to get to the DIVS level. There are lots of folks out there that want to be on teams but due to training budgets and supervisors who won't let them go they can't participate. Changing the team configuration won't help this, we'll still have folks who want to participate but can't. Fix this first and then we'll have folks to fill teams!! Don't look for an easy way out, help the folks who want to participate.
Every option has Area Command, NIMO, or contractor or all short teams. The option I suggest has approx. 32 members, no Area Command, no contractors, yes to state integration, and yes to possibly a few core teams premade for obvious incidents which only require those. Probably need about 35-40 teams nationally. Then work on beefing up T3 teams needs.
Incident Management Organization Planning Team (IMOPT), In reviewing the EVOLVING INCIDENT MANAGEMENT An Analysis of Organizational Models for the Future, I found there to be six models for consideration. I believe there is no one solution to solving the problem to IMT succession planning. To this end, my operational experience tells me ALL options provide a solution, therefore no option should be eliminated because in moments of complex chaos, human ingenuity and creativity often prevail. Edward Pulaski showed us this in 1910. Unfortunately, this line of thinking may NOT be an acceptable option based on the objectives the IMOPT was given, so I have included some recommendations I would like the IMOPT to give serious consideration as they move forward with the process to provide an organizational model recommendation back to NWCG by May of 2011. 1. Many variables make up the complexity of an Incident and to identify as Type 1 thru Type 5 is unnecessary beyond the IC and

OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEF.

2. The majority of risk occurs in the field under the Operations Section and any risk that does not occur within the Operations Section (i.e. planning, logistical and financial) should be understood and managed appropriately by a qualified IC.

3. Current direction in the Red Book gives the greatest operational flexibility to an IMT3 organization. To better prepare and plan an organization for surviving a worst case scenario this operational flexibility should be expanded to the Type 2 and Type 1 ICs. Operational flexibility keeps things SIMPLE and FLEXIBLE, two key components needed to be successful when operating in a complex environment.

4. Remember, Operations is the KING in the ICS model and all other functions but the IC are there to support Operations. Therefore, so long as support is provided Type 1, Type 2, and / or Type 3 should not matter to these support functions.

ITEMS NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT:

1. Allow IC's to select Command and General Staff.

-Anyone who has ever been associated with a TEAM knows a TEAM is a group of Individuals brought together to pursue a common goal. Each TEAM has a leader and each TEAM is only as good as the individuals in which the leader commands. Therefore, it is only fair the leader be allowed to select the Command and General Staff of the TEAM he / she will command. Any other model does not meet the definition of a TEAM. And one must not forget the human factors (forming, storming, norming and conforming) involved in building a TEAM are a harsh reality and will often be the difference between success and failure. In a true High Reliability Organization (HRO), failure is not an option.

2. Allow the Operations Section Chief to select three primary Division Supervisors (same reasons the IC needs to choose C and G).

3. A single qualification system for IC's and OPERATIONS will ensure not only are the individuals qualified for the position, but the individuals should be experienced enough to know when operations are exceeding the complexity level of the incident regardless of the level of government he / she works for; Federal, State or Local Govt.

4. Require IC's to have Operations experience to at least the Type 2 level to ensure full understanding of all the risks associated with wildland fire incident management.

5. Keep AD and EFF authority for all positions but IC and OPERATIONS, this will allow operational flexibility through the contractor and retired agency workforce if needed.

6. Get crosswalk in place so we can use local government and individuals who have experience in a certain support functional area but may not have the ICS qualifications in the support functional area.
CONSEQUENCES OF NOT CONSIDERING THIS RECOMMENDATION:
An organizational pitfall will be created and the burden will be on IC's and OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEFS to battlefield promote individuals on a case by case basis in order to survive the situation of a dramatically shrinking IMT workforce. Battlefield promotions have been a common practice during the not so long ago fire seasons of 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2007 and 2008. We get away with these battlefield promotions so long as nothing goes wrong, however if something does go wrong the IC is ultimately responsible and legally liable for the situation. The IMOPT could mitigate this situation by considering the recommendation of: ELIMINATE THE TYPING OF ALL ICS POSITIONS EXCEPT INCIDENT COMMANDERS AND OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEFS.

CREATE A NIMO MODEL AT THE GEOGRAPHIC LEVEL IN ADDITION TO THE NATIONAL LEVEL.
1. The current NIMO model is effective and meets the needs of the National Level. A Geographic Area NIMO model could be more effective meeting the needs of the Geographic Areas.

ITEMS NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT:

1. Allow local IMT3's to be the anchor point of the future Incident Management Organizations and handle the majority of incidents at the local level. Use Geographic Area NIMO Teams as force multipliers to move around Geographic Areas and enhance, support and train local IMT3s as opportunities present.

2. Fund the Geographic Area NIMO Teams in a way so the burden of making every incident like an in the field S-420 does NOT fall on the shoulders of the Agency Administrators responsible for the Incident, this would enhance training flexibility exponentially and mitigate having to redo this exercise in 10 years.

3. Position these NIMO TEAMS at the Geographic Area.

4. Require NIMO members to hold virtual offices within agency locations within the Geographic Area they represent to ensure a strong connection to the ground level.

5. Program of work needs to come from the Geographic Area Coordinating Group.

6. Allow Geographic Area NIMO Teams to be first out in the GEO Area before a National NIMO team comes into GEO Area. (i.e. only makes sense that team that has been working on issues be first team out when it comes time to implement their work.)

7. Fund and supervise Geographic Area NIMO Teams through Geographic Area Coordinating Groups. (i.e. All entities, not just the Forest Service)

8. Require Geographic Area NIMO Teams to build and train operating capacity in the off season at the ground level within their GEO Area and ensure surge capacity is prepared for worst case scenario events (i.e. workshops for local govt. retired agency members, contractors, etc.) (Similar to how FEMA games out Hurricanes).

9. Utilize Geographic NIMO Teams as the consistency force throughout the life of an Incident. (i.e. bracket transitions to ensure objective consistencies and operational risk management amongst Type 3 IMTs is in place, think of like a mini Area command overseeing multiple Type 3 IMTS but Geo NIMO doesn't rotate, they take days off in place)

CONSEQUENCES OF NOT CONSIDERING THIS RECOMMENDATION:

National Level NIMO TEAMS have their place, however to continue to stand up and fund only more National Level NIMO TEAMS will further perpetuate the loss of key fire management leadership where it is needed most: the ground level. Geographic Area NIMO Teams would

keep key fire management leadership in Geographic Areas working on issues that are specific to the Geographic Areas and be a key conduit from the Geographic Area Coordinating Groups to the ground level fire managers and firefighters. A key component we are currently missing in our organizational model. The IMOPT has an opportunity to mitigate this situation by considering the recommendation of: CREATE A NIMO MODEL AT THE GEOGRAPHIC LEVEL IN ADDITION TO THE NATIONAL LEVEL.

These recommendations all fall within the scope of the OVERARCHING PRINCIPLES and therefore should be given the utmost consideration as the IMOPT moves forward with their recommendation back to NWCG. Thank you for the opportunity to comment. If you have any questions, please feel free to call me.

The current situation is not sustainable with the existing participation and lack of broad IMT support through the various agencies. However, many of the proposed alternatives can not be sustained financially, and do not make sense when one looks at the percentage of time that teams have actually been deployed the past 10 years. FEMA and local government is gaining the skills to deal with all hazard incidents so there is likely less need to have wildfire IMTs' deal with hurricanes, etc., except for surges. And they can help provide surge capacity for wild fire-perhaps beefing up type 3 incidents.

There is strength in diversity in terms of skills and backgrounds (IMT positional, inter/intra-agency, multi-resource backgrounds, public/private sector)... diversity improves understanding and sensitivity to manage natural resources and serve public interests. Specialized, fully funded IMTs diminish that diversity and reduce trust and understanding, while costing taxpayers for "down time" between wildfire incidents. I recently had a NIMO person tell of having $65,000 in travel expenses in FY10!

The models I feel are most viable are #4.2 and #4.3. Combining some of the aspects of the "Current w/Overarching Principles" with the "Single Standard" is my thought. I actually feel that pulling some of the better features out of both models and combine into one is what I would support.

There are some elements of each model that I like and some that I do not like. My limited experience with NIMO teams has not been positive. I do not know why we would ever need 20 of them. I think contract teams would be beneficial if you could control the cost. The ones I have dealt with have been extremely expensive. I do not like the idea of service center modules. Teams need to have the cohesion of working together.

Highly desirable: A Team
Less desirable: A Pretend Team

Major Concern: The word "TEAM" is worth reflecting on in terms of synergy of our discipline. We are actually functioning as interdependent teams: no significant task can be accomplished without the help and cooperation of any of the members; within that team members typically specialize in different tasks; the success of every individual is inextricably bound to the success of the whole team.

An interdependent team benefits from getting to know the other team members socially, from developing trust in each other, and from conquering artificial challenges. In practice we function more like an interdisciplinary team. In an interdisciplinary team approach, there can often be role blending by members of the core team, who may take on tasks usually filled by other team members. We pick each other up, improvise adapt and overcome. This is derived from trust and sheer "I want to help you out" because I not only care about my job but I care about you personally and I choose to go the extra mile even though it is not required.
Not all groups are teams

Some people also use the word "team" when they mean "employees." A "sales team" is a common example of this loose or perhaps euphemistic usage, though inter dependencies exist in organizations, and a sales team can be let down by poor performance on other parts of the organization upon which sales depend, like delivery, after-sales service, etc.. However "sales staff" is a more precise description of the typical arrangement.
From groups to teams

Groups develop into teams in four stages. The four stages are: dependency and inclusion, counter dependency and fighting, trust and structure, and work. In the first stage, group development is characterized by members' dependency on the designated leader. In the second stage, the group seeks to free itself from its dependence on the leader and groups have conflicts about goals and procedures. In the third stage, the group manages to work through the conflicts. And in the last stage, groups focus on team productivity.

As the reader may undoubtedly guess, for me, the word "Team" has meaning. A true team is productive; maintains communication; has synergy; continuity and the ability to overcome artificial challenges.

Consider these two teams as a quick case study: The LA Lakers and the LA Clippers. Both use the word team but what are the real differences. The Lakers are perennial champions and the Clippers are usually the worst team each year. Why?

Are we going to be a Group of employees forced to work together? Are we going to be a team like the Lakers or something else like the Clippers? My choice is to remain a "Team"…I will not work for a jerk, or the jerk will not receive my 120% effort.

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a mixture of all models is best

The theme of this organizational model is improved oversight and accountability. It is a modification of the current incident management organization. The adjustments are a series of measures to improve oversight, tighten governance, standardize team size and provide uniform guidelines for team management. The model proposes incentives to increase participation. The measures are found under Overarching Principles.

•Collapsing Type 1 and Type 2 teams into a single type of team and reduces team size to a nine member core team. Interagency teams (including NIMO) are dispatched on a national rotation. Other incident needs are met through organized functional area modules dispatched and tracked by the geographic areas. Service centers provide incident business and finance functions and analytical support to planning.

• This organizational model could be implemented immediately.

• IMT succession is accelerated under this organizational model through better oversight from coordinating groups. IMT tenures are limited to single terms in positions when trainees have been certified and are ready to move into fully qualified positions. Priorities for training assignments on teams are developed based on needs for staffing all teams and a long term approach to team succession linked to agency workforce management goals.

• Participation on IMTs is improved because fire funded employees are required to participate as a condition of employment, performance standards are linked to participation on IMTs by fire funded employees and militia with fire qualifications, and there is better use of employee development tools to create a balance of positions needed to manage incidents. The highest priority for assignment of teams is given too early to mid-career employees of agencies represented on NWCG (federal, state and local government). Incentives for team participation are 120 day details to standard grade level linked to team position during fire season federal employees, funded out of emergency funds

• IF we are required to have NIMO teams, then the positions should be NTE 3 years. This would minimize stagnation and encourage upward mobility.

• Outcomes of the model are a cultural change in how IMTs are managed and some improvements in availability of single resources to meet orders from incidents.

• The incident complexity analysis is used by agency administrators to request IMTs in the configuration appropriate for incidents. Standardization of team roster size and more oversight from GACCs provides some improved ability to respond in the configuration requested.

The 2011 Redbook states that The National Wildfire Coordinating Group has adopted the Organizational Needs Assessment to assist managers and firefighters with determining the type of organization necessary to manage an incident. Personnel should utilize the Organizational Needs Assessment in addition to this complexity analysis. The Organizational Needs Assessment can be found at: http://www.wfmrda.org/policy.php

• No changes in law and policy are needed for implementation of this organizational model. Budget procedures for funding base salaries from emergency funds while on incidents are standard among federal agencies.

These models all have good and bad suggestions. It would be desirable to mix and match these concepts. What's up with NIMO?

The value of the NIMO concept is yet to be proven and most models increases the number of these teams. Are there success stories and proven cost saving when using NIMO teams? I would suggest that at least another round of options is developed from this comment period. We should not be in a hurry. Spend some extra time and develop options that are flexible and can evolve with a very fast and ever changing incident world and increased funding challenges. Thanks for developing these concepts they promote an atmosphere of thought and new ideas.

Overall Comment: Need to look at ways to get the militia more involved in some of these positions. That will take a solution to the issue of what to do with their normal duties while serving on a team.

1) The NIMO team configuration has seen mixed results.
Need to raise the mandatory retirement age.
Honestly, who do you think you'll get to contract IMT? you've already alienated retirees with the flimsy AD rates? Why don't you look at all the previous studies done on IMTs? It's pretty obvious that small core groups don't cut it, especially when you're not going to be able to pick up folks at the local unit to help out - they are too busy dealing with the incident. Are you sure you have the right mix of folks on your development team? I think you need to involve more folks with IMT experience - I'm not sure they really know what's going on out in the field.
See earlier comments on organization. It's not fiscally responsible to go with so many NIMO teams or dedicate sole source funding for teams. Need to utilize all Agency employees, make good use of retirees and contract employees, and include State and Local Agency employees to the maximum extent possible. Diversifying teams strengthens them; making the IMT a full time job reduces employee effectiveness and isolates them from reality.
You can't really rank these so simply because there are nuances and issues with each proposal. This part is too simplistic and I hope you don't use the results from this to buttress support for the final model. The ultimate solution needs to be a mix of a number of tweaked proposals.
All IMT's should be T-1/2 mix, medium-staff, all-risk management groups. Bring the ops resources from wherever they are available. Develop multiple layers of militia at the local/state/GACC level, this is where inter-agency, state/fed/local agreements come into play. Make it really an inter-agency world. I also support a National Fire Service. Fire should be everyone's job, just like it was in the hay-day of the land management outfits. It was a source of camaraderie, of pride and really developed trust and espirit de corps. We seem to be lacking that these days, for some reason...
The introduction of the NIMO teams in 2005 has been highly disruptive and has yielded little tangible benefit to our customers (remember them?) The only group that seems happy with the NIMO concept are those individuals who are employed by a NIMO team. This IMOSP exercise appears to be an under-handed attempt to expand the NIMO sphere of influence/empire. IMTs have a core competency in the 'business' of fire. The organizational structure of non-fire incidents (all-hazard) should be left to agencies such as FEMA. (However, there's room/need for standard/common position classification/certification, following the principles of ICS, to allow for better cross-utilization of resources/assets -- efficiency.) The introduction of NIMO teams in 2005 is a textbook illustration of scope creep. None of the options presented here considers the reduction of NIMO teams, and, in fact, most of them call for an increase. I believe this will only exacerbate the problems, not resolve them. We need to have an honest, frank discussion about the efficacy of NIMO teams (from the customer's perspective), and the courage to revisit the decision and ask ourselves if we got the results we anticipated. This IMOSP effort appears to have an underlying agenda: to increase the influence of NIMO teams. Let us not forget who our customers are and prioritize our effort/focus around their needs, not ours. Thank you for the opportunity to comment.
The Overarching Principles should reflect consistent and robust federal responsibility for incidents on federal land. The incident management organization adopted by the NWCG needs to reinforce this responsibility. It is unacceptable for the federal agencies to hand over their responsibilities for land management (i.e. fire suppression) to state teams, contractors, or non-land management Federal agencies. Federal land management agencies have the skills and the responsibility for this role."
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As proven by most sports teams, the more the same individuals practice and play together, the better the team gets. Add a new player and it takes time to "gel" together. On wildland fires often the most critical times are the first few days when a team takes over an incident. This isn't the time to try to "gel" with others. A highly reliable organization is made up of people that know and trust each other. That's why it's important to promote team cohesiveness before, during and after fire season. You won't get this by throwing individuals together from a "pool." Thanks for the opportunity to provide comments. Any questions feel free to contact me. Ted Hass, Medford District BLM (541-941-1743) (ted_hass@blm.gov)
I believe local agencies have ample experience available to fill the majority of roles associated with the IMT concept. People do not play the game due to many different reasons such as Liability concerns, Commitment requirements and lack of availability being made by their supervisors. I urge management to look locally to keep incidents ran by local people first and add the oversight and leadership needed when called upon by local resources due to increased complexity. Our mission is not to keep adding requirements to our employees it is to keep them safe and provide them with the tools to do their job. Fire will always cause some unfavorable results, all we can do is prepare. What better knowledge and know how to draw from than the locals themselves. If there are any questions associated with the above survey please contact me at 530-595-6172 Thanks for this opportunity, Douglas J. Young
I have had enough situations on "Short" teams in all management levels to realize that we need to staff to the unit leader position - the local level cannot provide the support staff at the current time to support incident teams. If it once again became a requirement in all federal PDS' maybe - but until that happens - we need to be able to roll fully functional. It is also imperative that ALL FEDERAL agencies are all hazard - we need to be working closely with FEMA/DHS to integrate all entities of incident management. I still hear in the "Wildfire" community - oh that is a FEMA/DHS class not NWCG -- we need to come together....and everyone participate equally. It is very important for us to be successful in the future that we are integrated with our partners in all the Federal Agencies, State, and local levels. My only other comment on the models - is that in the charts we have all the teams being managed by the GACC's - I really truely feel that we need to be doing this at a National Level - with the GACCS providing the support - 45 (27 member) teams is less than 1,000 individuals - large companies employ that many people - we should be able to manage that group out of one national pool.
Current interagency teams of volunteers have served us well over all. Issues with insufficient numbers of teams has more to do with bottlenecks in the training flow than in the configuration of the teams. Teams can be reconfigured an almost infinite variety of ways but there will only be a finite number of ICT1s and ATGSs and PLSC or other high demand, advanced skill individuals. This leads to two

options: reduce the number of individuals required to meet team needs or increase the pool of qualified individuals to meet the requirements. Several of the options in this survey seem to be aimed at reducing the requirements. Some such as contracting and mandatory participation are aimed at increasing the pool. I firmly believe that the issues and problems that this proposal purports to address are poorly defined or understood. Meeting the need of having highly skilled and motivated people who can work together to manage large complex incidents under intense scrutiny and pressure should be a primary responsibility of the resource agencies. I submit that the shortage of personnel for these assignments is a symptom of past personnel and policy decisions that resulted in both an increased need for teams due to longer assignments and to a smaller pool of potential "players". I would urge the NWCG to look at the whole "ecosystem" of resource agency planning and response to incidents. Any changes to team organization would be to "band-aid" deeper more systemic issues that should be addressed such as increased personal liability, increased training requirements, cultural changes within the workforce, and changing expectations for how incidents should be managed. Ultimately NWCG does have the capability to address at least how to decrease training requirements and address the role of teams in the incident management "universe". Feel free to contact me. Boyd Turner Modoc National Forest Type I team member for 10 years.
Don't expect retirees to sit around waiting for requests for contract teams once in a while - it takes a lot of $$ to obtain and maintain the technology used and stay up with rules/regs/etc. Who is going to spend their money doing that with no guarantee of anything coming from the investment? Noted in the comments were the statements that money would be saved on training. IMTS, whether contract or not, don't need any training?? Also, regarding the "modules", do you really think that all that Logistics does is set up and tear down camps? How about the needs of the on-going incident? This is the biggest thing that bothers me right now - try to make all the teams the same with the same make-up and same SOPs and you're going to have a bunch of mediocre folks who have no imagination and can't think outside the box because they've been put in one. teams gain strength from the talents and knowledge of the individuals on the team, and base how they do things on that. Some teams require setting up a little differently than others because of how they work together and who does what - the "micro" stuff that makes a difference in how things go. Having just a core group of 9 or less without other regular team members means that the mating dance has to be done every time they go out. Don't even try to tell me that a short team is effective by themselves, and to have a NIMO team suck up a type 2 team to work under them is insulting the C&G of the type 2 team and underutilizing the NIMO teams. I've not at all been favorably impressed with any of the existing NIMO teams or what they have done. Much of it has been half-baked. Last year we had a NIMO team and all kinds of trainees on a type 3 fire!! What kind of quality training did the trainees get???? I'd hate to see NIMO promoted in the form it is in. The last study - where we were going to have 20 some NIMO teams kind of went out the window with no explanation after all the hype about it.
There obviously is a need for more of the younger talented people to be focused on and moved up the team ladder. Teams do not need to be all Feds. It is scary to think that we would try to strong arm people into positions on teams. Have we not learned anything from poor decisions that have been made on fires before. We have had people burned over and killed because of people being in positions that they were not suited for. After Saddler a type 1 team was dis banded for bad decisions. Please be careful with your assessments and strategy to move forward with this.
I do not believe any of these models are sustainable as written. I will submit an IMT Organizational Model: Realignment of Incident Management Capability. The theme of this organizational model embraces all eleven of the IMOSP Overarching Principles and offers a flexible, modular approach to incident management by realigning current capability to respond to the need for teams to have incident specific configurations, and to shrink and grow over the life of an incident based on complexity. It also responds to the need for flexibility under the federal fire policy. This organizational model continues the use of collateral duty and militia to staff the teams, modules and service centers. Team members will have “day jobs” in cooperating agencies in fire or other disciplines and will respond to incidents as members of teams. This feature enhances the interagency characteristics of teams through inclusion of state and local government membership. In this model, all existing IMT personnel would be reorganized into cohesive “IMT Pools” within each geographic area (GA) or sub-GA collectively referred to as “Geographic Context” (GC). The key distinction of this model is that the Team is defined as the IMT Pool within the GC. Some IMT Pool Members have collateral responsibilities to manage pre-incident elements of the IMT. Those IMT Pool Members may or may not be the ones assigned to the next incident.
There is a reason the IMTs are called "TEAMS" and it is that team camaraderie that facilitates the handling of an incident. It takes time to build relationships and cohesion within the team. And teams that have been together for a long time work like a well-oiled machine. Modules or contracting do not support the "team" concept (although there may be exceptions, like possibly finance). Nor does the "Core Team" model, unless they always end up ordering the same fill-ins, which then operates like a full team. Did not see anything in this questionnaire about switching from the current 3 year rotation/commitment to 1 year, but OPPOSED to that option as well. We apply for these teams because we are successful (and happy) in our teams. Not knowing from year to year what your team will be comprised of negates the whole concept of the team and virtually eliminates the ability to build relationships, etc. Not to mention the fact that lots of us may just completely drop out of the whole fire support arena if this proposal is implemented. And last, but not least.....none of the proposed models get at the core issue of successional planning. The teams (as they are now) are not broken -- leave them alone. The fact that there are fewer and fewer folks coming up the ranks is largely associated with FS budget (having to do more and more with less and less) which makes it difficult for people to get away from their day jobs to support fire. Not to mention the fact that their SUPERVISORS ARE NOT ALLOWING THEM TO GO. Those are the two major issues that need to be addressed and should be the focus of these efforts.
We need to build upon and support existing team structure. It seems like greater emphasis needs to be placed on the T3 teams. Also past Fire Use Teams filled a good void with extended duration fires that exceeded local units capacity. NIMO Teams really do not seem to be cutting it. With decreasing budgets it seems hard to support additional NIMO teams let alone the ones we have. Perhaps some level of funding should be provided for T1 & T2 ICs for their time away from their home unit and jobs they were hired to do.
Desirable: 1. Collapsing of Type1 and Type 2 teams into a single type of team, because type 1 teams are getting called less frequent than type 2 teams, because combining means everyone gets out more frequent, keeping skills sharper. Desirable: 2. Filling positions by incentive based 120 day details, because then you get compensated, recognized for the job you are doing. Because then the agreement to do a job gets people paid at a correct $ amount. Because my boss would buy into me being

more committed to a team because it helps get time in grade, furthering development. Because it will be looked at as career development rather than just trying to make some quick money. Desirable: 3. Standardize team sizes to a 50 personnel roster. Because then the teams have the ability to respond to all risk. Because this size has proven to work for many years. Because then you are a team that is working used to working together. Because this makes you more capable and have the ability to adapt to changes. Desirable: 4. 5109.17 and 310-1 training qualifications be one in the same and followed by all participants. Because then we have everyone playing by the same rules. Because then this is a step towards cooperating with each other to work together, better than we do now. Desirable: 5. All teams be on a National rotation. Because then we have better ability to cover more ground, and have more teams available to help out. Desirable: 6. Only the Incident Commanders becomes a full time Nimo funded position. Because right now their is a shortage of people wanting or able to do it, and hold a "day time job" too. Desirable: 7. A goal of having most every Forest Supervisor having at least one Full time Incident Commander with a team to supervise. Because then the Forest Supervisor has a team of their own and the power stays with where it is intended to be. Desirable: 8. Fire funded employees required to participate on IMT as a condition of employment. Because then the job of IMT work, gets to be part of your job, not just a distraction. Desirable: 9. Trainees on a National rotation. Because we need to not miss training opportunities, and be able to get a trainee anytime we have a job to do. Desirable: 10. A training goal of one trainee for every position. Because we need to take advantage of every opportunity. Desirable: 11. Team membership is drawn from all agencies, state and local fire departments, militia. Because we are all public employees, and in the publics eye we are the same. Desirable: 12. No longer than 3 years to start implementing. Because retirements, AD, shortage of solving the problem of replacing skilled employees has been talked about, over and over and over, way past time to do something about it. Desirable: 13. A smokejumper type rotation is used to determine which team is up first second third, etc. Because currently some geographic teams get 5 rotations and the neighboring team gets 1, if they are lucky. We need to share the work load. Desirable: 14. Position Descriptions be developed for all 50 team positions. Because the jobs we do on IMT need to be recognized as a job we are doing on an ongoing basis, not just something we reacted to. Because this makes us more professional. Because we need to figure out how to pay people for position based pay, when they do the job. Because their needs to be some incentive to become the IC, or the OPS Chief. Right now I get paid the same either way, and obviously not as many people as we should have are raising their hand and volunteering. Desirable: 15. Savings generated, team members are not on an Incident their base funding is covered by their "day jobs" except the Incident Commander, base funded year round out of Emergency funding. The rest of the team members should continue to have "day jobs" because we need to save money, because we give the public more for their money, because we don't have enough incidents to justify a full time team. We should fund the IC full time because no one wants to do it and hold a "day job" too.
Before we identify what type of team configuration is needed, we should identify needs. What is the national need for IMTs? What kind and how many? I have a dozen or more years of career left with the FS and I am worried. The current IMT model is not sustainable nor is it as effective as it once was. The teams are clinging to the 10 am model for which they were designed. The shift in the implementation of Fire Policy requires a shift in strategic thinking. That has yet to occur in all of our current IMTs. The concept of danger or opportunity is the basis for "two-kinds of fire". In order to act upon one or both, decision makers must have flexibility. IMTs must demonstrate that flexibility. ICS was designed to expand/contract. Today's 50 person team is a design based on little oversight. It is based on the Type 1 WUI fire not the traditional wildland fire event. Unfortunately, due to pay discrepancies, availability and a host of other issues, there is no alternative than the creation of a professional, full-time C&G/IMT. The number of those teams needed should be based on some realistic research. The typing (1 or 2) then becomes irrelevant under a full-time organization. Organizations can expand and contract as needed. One IMT can manage a number of incidents if it is designed to do so. Increasing local capability at the extended attack level ICT3) is essential and not recognized as being closely related to whatever change is made at the T1/T2 level. Reliance on ICT3s has increased over the years with a number of standing IMT3s appearing. There is a logical link here; a system designed to incorporate local talent into a IMT/C&G with greater experience should be our standard. Agency Administrators want an integration of their personnel not an isolation. There are a number of options available for enhancing/expanding a small C&G into large organization (IMO), few of those options are ever attempted due to our traditional model that relies on the same people year after year.
Most Forests have more fire staff than they need to protect the assets on federal DPA. We need to reduce that staffing; require local government to resume their authority on private property within federal DPA as well as extra suppression costs triggered by poor planning (no private defensible space, no local fire safe construction code, etc.) WFPR funds from reduced Forest staffing used to fund full time IMT positions with their own PDs at different grades based on complexity, all available to scale to events under NIMO.
There seems to be no concern for safety in the majority of your models. There is something to be said about team cohesiveness
I view several of the proposed models to be highly undesirable because I either don't agree with the use of contracted teams or their incentive packages, i.e. I think offering temporary promotions will encourage employees to serve on IMT's for the wrong reasons. Professionalism and service should be the guiding reasons that encourage people to serve on IMT's, and performance reviews should be required of all incident personnel. I've heard AD's openly share that the reason they like to go out on assignments is because of the money. I find this very disheartening, especially since I know of a handful of agency trainees on my unit alone (including me) that are truly interested in serving on IMT's, with or without a promotion. My experience has been that under the current model, AD's are given priority over agency employees (particularly agency trainees) for assignments, which is stifling succession. As a whole, agency employees (federal and state) are dedicated and have the ability to demonstrate leadership for the public during times of uncertainty and fear that contractors do not.
My comments on the seven organizational models of the Incident Management Organization Succession Plan are shown below. They are tempered by my seven years on Type 2 IMT's, ten years on Type 1 IMT's and 26 years on Area Command Teams. My time on teams

through 2001 was as an agency employee. From 2002 through this year my involvement has been as an AD or rehired annuitant on Area Command Team 3. I was a member of the last IMT organizational study which resulted in NIMO. Many of my comments are based on my experience as an Associate of Organizational Quality Associates, a private emergency services consulting and training company. The majority of the ICS and position training and organizational development our company provides are at the Type 3 and 2 level and 300 and 400 level classes. Most of these services are provided to state and local government agencies and the private wildland fire services.

Current Situation with Overarching Recommendations
•No comments.

External Capacity (Focus on contract teams for surge capacity) and External Capacity (Focus on all hazard teams and contract teams)
•The statement that "a contract workforce will be developed to meet this demand" must involve new and nontraditional thinking by NWCG agencies and their contracting departments to be successful in accomplishing this statement. The contracting of Type 2 IMT's would need to be based on a business model that would make it worthwhile for the private wildland fire services companies to enter this new area. Two contracts and draft RFP's were developed during Katrina in 2005 with the oversight of our Area Command Team. One of these was given to FEMA and used during the FEMA response to Katrina and Rita. The other was given to the NWCG agencies. To my knowledge, it never resulted in a RFP. A better quality and more robust RFP was issued by FEMA in 2006. It seemed to be well thought out and based on common business practices, risks, costs and profit margins that a company bidding this kind of a RFP would need to address. FEMA pulled the RFP the week before awards were to be made and to my knowledge, it was never tried.
•The notion that the bulk of the membership of the contract IMT's will be made up of federal and state retirees needs to be evaluated. Today, the bulk of the federal and state retirees who have a desire to be involved in IMT's are either members of NWCG Type 1 and 2 IMT's, DHS or local Type 3 IMT's or FEMA or Medical/Health ICS Type response organizations. If the AD's who are on these organizations today were to participate in contract IMT's, have we really increased the total number of qualified and available people in our ICS response organizations or are we just moving folks from one organization but leaving a hole in another?
•To increase the number of people who are available and qualified to fill complex incident management Command and General Staff, Unit Leaders and Managers positions, we need to review our current processes and procedures to see if they encourage or discourage emergency responders from outside the fire services to participate. oToday, the AD system, because of the workload it adds to the dispatch community, is not open in many areas to non NWCG agency retirees. This is overlooking an ever expanding pool of public works, law enforcement, medical/health and county/city Office of Emergency Management responders who are being trained through ICS and EMI position courses. Many of these agencies and employees want to be involved with the wildland fire services to gain quality experience to apply to their all hazard responses. A smaller but significant number want to continue on beyond the Type 3 level. We have talked about this for at least fifteen years. Yet, when these people try to be entered in ROSS, they are told that it is not open to them.
oThe use of a MOU or agreement between NWCG agencies and local government non fire response agencies hasn't seemed to work for many reasons. The number of local government response agencies in the Portland/Vancouver 12 county UASI area alone who are now doing ICS and position training is well over 130 agencies. The development of multiple county/city/district/ and multiple function single MOU's or agreements seems to be beyond their capability or interests. Many of these local government departments may only have one to five employees who are interested in being statused in ROSS and involved in assignments. The feedback I have received from the agencies is for a few employees, it isn't worth the effort to try to establish a legal agreement with the federal agencies. Again, if we want to expand over time our pool of "overhead", especially in non operations positions, do we (NWCG) need to become proactive and seek how we can involve these folks?
•To develop qualified Command and General Staff, Unit Leaders and Managers in the private wildland fire services, NWCG again needs to look at processes and procedures now being practiced by Type 1 and 2 IMT's, GACC's and the dispatch community. Development may need to be through the use of a contract for single position assignments (both as qualified and as trainees) or as AD's to meet this need, especially at the start of the program. Today, the use of private qualified folks or as trainees for development does not seem to be supported based on the experience of the wildland fire contractors and their employees.
•We have talked for almost 20 years about either private companies or local government involvement in wildland fire personnel shortages. If we are really serious about having this become reality, we need to look at how much effort we are willing to put into it and if we can make the systems use as user friendly as possible.
•The FEMA reservist model would solve some of these issues.

Core Team Concept and Core Team Concept with State Participation
•Same comment as with Single Standard model about DHS/NFA/EMI involvement

I find it interesting that the problem we are dealing with is succession and money. The teams are allowed to carry trainees, most large Type 1 incidents in CA have average of 15% trainees and 15% trainers, yet the Training Specialist (TNSP) position is not listed in the long NWCG long team configuration. I suppose the inability to fill certain IMT positions comes down to employees evaluating for themselves that it is simply not worth it. Not worth the pay, not worth the liability, not worth the lack of support from the home unit, not worth the working conditions. To attempt to solve problems such as the ones identified above by a "re-org" "reconfigure" or what ever you want to call it is doubtful. Good luck with this but until other federal agency issues are resolved or addressed in some meaningful way, success will be hard to come by. The team concept is a good model. One is invited to become a IMT member by past performance on incidents, one remains on the team at the pleasure of the IC and Section Chief. To be a "Team" there should be commitment both ways. If the IMT wants me to commit to mobilizing with them for 3 years by keeping my name off the ROSS availability list (possibly reducing my opportunity to mobilize) then it seems fair and reasonable to be able to mobilize when the team is called up. I do think that if one is close to timing out or fulfilling their participation obligation, they should be training a new person for the position. That costs money and no one wants to spend money on training. Hiring contractors to manage emergency incidents? Please, you have got to be kidding? Fix your problems at home, you have educated and dedicated employees already, take care of

them. I'm not a fan of NIMO teams. Not enough bang for the buck. Train up Area Command capability and let the NIMO's go. Save the money and use it to better employee benefits. Offer all-hazard training to IMT's who's federal members have minimal exposure with issues beyond wildland fire.
I have difficulty explaining my answers for this section, perhaps because of insufficient institutional knowledge. Do I understand that there are less IMTs than in past? Yes. Do I understand the need for succession/recruitment of new members for IMTs? Yes. Do I believe the current IMT model needs vast revision? Not so much. I somewhat like the idea that fire complexity should drive the number of IMT personnel initially ordered for a fire, and perhaps a module approach could work, but I believe only time will tell. I have worked a lot of Type 3 incidents where I wore many "hats" in the logistics section, thus reducing the need for more personnel, but was this really efficient or effective--not sure. Fire personnel costs are about third on the list of cost drivers--if you have a big airshow or use a lot of equipment the financial impact of more overhead is negligible in comparison. Yes, I know perception is reality, but perhaps there really has been legitimate reasons for the growing size of teams and the agencies should do a better job of explaining why, instead of focusing on wholesale change.
I feel (as a state employee looking in to the fish bowl) the quite often state, local, and even contract personnel are looked down on or even dismissed as unqualified, the network system within the federal program seems to keep this going. Believe it or not quite often these people are actually the most qualified fire folks on the incident. the only difference is the training on the task book and imt system. If they have reached the level that they are actually nwcg qualified then they have overcome past differences in training and terminology and should be looked at for their quals, not for the agency they came from to be on the team. The bottom line should be how well we manage the incident for the greatest good. This means protection of life, property, and tax payers money and trust. Do not tie the hands of the teams by saying only a fed can do this job, or no AD's need apply, or contractors are only out for money and can't perform as well as us. Look at the bottom line (life property money and trust) and pick the best make up of all these choices that fits.
I feel that it makes little financial sense to establish more than the current 4 NIMO teams. I just don't see where the incident workload has justified this model, up to this point. As such I have trouble with any organizational model that promotes a large NIMO build-up. The existing system of established Type 1 and 2 teams meets the basic needs of this nation in terms of the largest incidents. The real need is for IMT personnel at more of the Type 3 level, as smaller and less costly IMT resources that can come to supplement, rather than take over the incident needs on a state and local level. DHS is slowly filling this void and I do feel that this is not good for NWCG in the long run. NWCG needs to actively become involved with the DHS Type 3 IMT effort. The type 3 DHS teams should be regarded as the training grounds for our future Type 2 and 1 IMT personnel. Single training efforts across jurisdictions, a uniform credentialing and ordering process and better integration of already existing Type 3 personnel are what is needed to make this happen.
None of these quite match my vision of a team comprised of feds, state and local government, with participants having a job description and performance rating recognizing their participation. Pay commensurate with their duty and complexity while working on the IMT. 27 or so core members with a roster of additional folks for more complex incidents, and a team that is scalable. we have a long way to go culturally to do this. Please contact me if I can better explain any of the above or be of some help and service to you in regard to this complex subject (I communicate better verbally than with my writing and composition). I appreciate you all taking this on. I bet it is alot of work with your day job responsibilities not going away. Just Like it is for folks on the IMT's. Thanks Sincerely,[ ]
I believe the problems with succession are not met by limiting team size. The term team implies a group that trains together and works together. they know each others strengths and weaknesses. Unit cohesion, Plays together - fights together. We have this now. We need to attract and reward team participation, not threaten members with lawsuits and continue to place obstacles in their path. MORALE. "We trained hard....but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization." From "Satyricon" by Petronius Arbiter (died 66 AD)
Any discussion of teams should take in to account that we went to the current configuration of teams in the early 90's because of the difficulty of filling positions once we got to the incident. If that could be resolved by increasing capacity on the receiving units or GACC's the IMT's could go back to the short team configuration.\One reason for encouraging personnel to be on teams and AA's to support their participation is that when an incident occurs on your unit there are people with the experience to manage incidents at a high level and able to make solid decisions about complexity. Going to a NIMO or similar takes away local expertise and makes each unit reliant on off-unit resources.
If no team types, then members need to be qualified at current Type 1 in order to meet any situation. Each organizational model has merit, but also have items I can't support: full-time NIMO teams, national rotation only. If certain people are used only during "peak times" how do they necessarily keep their quals up? I think more people would participate, or perhaps their supervisor would allow them to participate with job-sharing so they have more flexibility. I like the AK organizational model better.
All of this is mumbo jumbo without people being trained and people available to do the work. The fact is fire is less popular among the rank and file. Who wants to give up a chunk of summer to camping on a fire? I do, but many don't! Keep the pay attractive, actively recruit people to "join the militia"! Frankly after wading through all your verbiage, I'm not sure what's new here. The budget will be squeezed, so setting up standing teams seems like a dumb idea.
Looking at the models it appears that NWCG has set up core teams but really has not integrated the State and Local government individuals into the mix - it is extremely important that NWCG become more "ALL HAZARD" and involves more individuals from the State and Local entities - we are the individuals that will be "first on scene" and last to leave - to be truely beneficial we all need to be under one model and participating together on the teams.
All Risk Incident Mgmt. varies from State to State, GACC to GACC and Agency to Agency. Flexibility in IMT configurations is therefore essential. Although the present situation is hit or miss with development of cadre, a national level mandate will meet with another generation of local resistance. Feds can set a prudent standard of emergency service pay using the formula for AD compensation nationwide, with the regional adjustments.
All of your alternatives keep or add to the number of NIMO teams. I could not disagree more against this Federal bias. All of your alternatives expect teams to understand and "be responsive" to misguided policy. I could not disagree more with this notion. As such, I

think you have missed an opportunity to be "out of the box" and have squarely placed yourself directly in the middle of the box.
I am a fire incident veteran of 37 years, both as fed employee and state agency employee. I have served in operations branch on both type 1 and type 2 teams for over 12 years to present. Our (myself and colleagues) fire staff experience with NIMO teams so far has been extremely negative. Their cost and attached superior attitude is way in excess of their value to our agency.
Flexibility for people to move between several teams they have worked with would free up some of the shortages and have little impact on primary teams if they communicate with their section chiefs or the IC. There was no place to indicate in the demographics section to indicate my AD positions on IMTs and past experience of 32 years in Federal fire program management.
The more you can integrate the type III interagency teams, the broader the participation in the building and sustaining of future type I and type II teams. Wildland fire provides the most opportunity, but limits participation by those not from fire from pursuing team membership because of standard quals for positions becoming harder to fill with each year.
Use of teams (by type) and Area Command teams are, and will be reduced with multiple objective fire management. Teams are still very important but will probably be used less, or only during campaign fire seasons. Type 3 IMTs will be used at the local zone level and need better definition of position quals. and configuration requirements.
Team is a team. Dispatched as a team. and adjusted as the team needs and the assignments increase or decrease. This is NOT an agency administrators call it should be the IC. IC is the most knowledgeable of what is required to meet the requirements each assignment! Lose all NIMO teams
The relative exclusivity of the current teams does not take advantage of very talented and capable people in all levels government. Current trends often favor retired individuals thereby nullifying the ability to mentor or provide for a succession.
The current method works very well. The lack of participants is the issue. Fix that. make participation a requirement of hire. Give cash incentives. Line officers with zero fire experience another issue, big issue. They do not support the "effort."
The current method works very well. The lack of participants is the issue. Fix that. make participation a requirement of hire. Give cash incentives. Line officers with zero fire experience another issue, big issue. They do not support the "effort."
For the past four seasons I have been with the Blue Mtn. team. It has been a very rewarding experience because I have had good training and I have enjoyed being on the team. I want the opportunity for AD's to continue working on the teams.
WE MUST UTILIZE LOCAL QUALIFIED INDIVIDUALS IN CORE POSITIONS TO SUPPORT THE FIRE MISSION. OUR TEAMS NEED TO BE ABLE TO SUPPORT ALL MISSIONS
Currently all models/alternatives miss the big picture of evolving incident management. IAFC alternative is forthcoming.
What about the locals
The NIMO concept has not been a success. The prejudice of the proposed alternatives favoring 20 NIMO teams is, however, evident. NIMO teams should be utilized on long term non fire incidents. Today, as I write this, there should be a NIMO team in Joplin Missouri. When they move in to take over a fire they have to incorporate another team or all of the qualified alternates in an entire GACC in order to function. In other words it takes two teams to make one. Cost effective? The idea of building a team as the fire builds will always keep the team 2 days behind the power curve as the fire escalates. If a 44 person team catches a fire quickly, then the team can be downsized as the complexity goes down. The only way to utilize short teams is to reduce the products that a team is expected to produce. When I have suggested this in the past, no one wants to talk about it!
Crew cohesion is as important off the fire line as it is on the fireline. Without a cohesive core group things get missed; information doesn't get communicated- or at least to the right people. Having an IMT where participants are familiar with each other is critical in an emergency situation. Flexibility is great so long as you have a core Team of agency people, familiar with each other and focused on the mission.
Solutions: First tie availability to the national preparedness levels: PL 1 – up to the employee and supervisor. PL 2 - up to the employee and supervisor. Unless in critical shortage positions. PL3- available unless supervisor puts reason in writing so can be reviewed during performance review. PL-available unless FS puts reason in writing so can be reviewed during performance review. PL 5 – all available except for personnel or medical reasons. Second make it clear where priorities are. Make people accountable. If you have skills and are never available or have employees you supervise and you never let them be available until PL 5, you should be downgraded on performance. Yet in the end it's the ones who go who get downgraded for failing to get aglearn training done or who's credit card did not get reconciled. We also do not get credit for our efforts in considerations for line officer jobs. I just spent, 23 days helping to protect Fort Davis Tx from fires. That works out to 552 hours away from home. Or 6 hours per week for 92 weeks. Yet when applying for line officer positions, I get told I do not do enough community service. Yet people who stay home and have the time to volunteer get the jobs. No wonder the last 4 line officer we hired on this unit, not one has a qualification higher then FFT2! Last reward people for stepping up. Your grade level for positions is a good idea but may not be doable for all positions. An annual bonus for positions may be more acceptable. It needs to start at $500/yr for a FFT2 and be enough to be worth being a ICT1 or 2Once we start supporting those who are willing, and award them most of this problem will go away. The problem is we started way too late and we still let the REMF (to borrow a military term) are running this place. I see a lot of similarities between the post-Vietnam military and the Fire agencies today.
To begin, this questionnaire was far too long. A brief examination of the literature on opinion gathering would show you that you've tried to ask too many questions, and your results will suffer for it. I applaud the effort that has been applied to this critical area of operations and shared agency responsibility. However, when is it that we will look to apply the same attention, focus and effort to our day jobs? More specifically: when will agencies acknowledge that the world in which we do our day jobs is vastly different than that world that existed when the IMTs first evolved. Did the term "hazardous fuels" even exist when the first IMTs came together? How much time was spent on NEPA analysis when IMTs first evolved? How many "Fuels Specialists" existed when the first IMTs formed up? The critical connection between these questions and the IMT succession planning is this: how can you expend effort planning an area of work that may represent less than 50% of an employees work life when NO EFFORT has been expended on what that employee does November through April, and then tries to keep afloat during fire season? How much analysis, planning and training has focused on those folks who manage the prescribed fire and fuels programs that are absolutely critical to the resilience of our ecosystems and

to the protection of our communities at risk? Is the answer ZERO? I think it is, and until we take a look at what folks actually do today, while not assigned to emergencies, where budgets and NEPA and cooperation all take a back seat to air tankers and news cameras, we can't succeed in trying to plan the future of incident support. After all, why are you talking about adding IMT duties to position descriptions? Because of course, those responsibilities currently essentially fall under the "other duties as assigned" catch all. Which, by the rules of PDs, can be no more than 20% of an employee's duties. This effort will fail until we look at succession planning in a more holistic way, and acknowledge that our systems for managing land have failed to keep up with the pace of land change, and that those hardworking folks who get the good work done while not assigned to emergencies, are at least as important as those who chip in on costly IMTs. The attention to Teams, while warranted, pales in comparison to the attention that is needed to be paid to our day-to-day responsibilities. When this effort looks at who we are in a totally inclusive fashion, and recognizes that Incident support CAN'T and will never be the primary function of our folks in the field, and that getting to work done without an emergency code paying the bill, is where the real challenges lay. Once we attend to these issues, which are clearly the core of who we are in the agencies, is when we can focus on these secondary duties associated with Team participation.
While there are elements in several of the alternatives worth considering, all the alternatives offered seem more expensive and fail to consider how the structures proposed would be integrated into the main missions of the agencies involved. These ideas represent a fire department, not land management agencies with wildfire responsibilities. If this represents "out-of-the-box" thinking, perhaps what is needed are ideas from people who were never in the box. If we use the Core Team concept, why is NIMO needed at all? No case has been presented for retention of the existing NIMO teams, much less expansion. The modular/service center approach seems most viable, but the need for lengthy phase-in seems unwarranted. As the old FUM teams demonstrated, lengthy phase-in often means no phase-in. I could support implementation in stages, however (1 or 2 geo areas at a time) to highlight and iron out procedures and unforeseen problems in implementation.

Table 109. Comments submitted to Gmail associated with Alternative Models, in general.

The answer, this old firefighter that has been close to this on several fronts for years believes, is in the middle somewhere. If we acknowledge the aforementioned evolution and support local Teams (We now call them Type 3), and Regional Teams (a combination of present Type 1 and Type 2 Teams), as well as several, maybe no more then we now have, National mega incident Teams (some version of the present NIMO Teams), we should find some measure of balance between a successful past model, and an obviously needed future model that is practical, affordable, and still affective in these austere times. A wholesale change at this time seems a recipe for a potential train wreck. Change is needed. I think we all agree. Let's not get so caught up in that need, that we not give some serious consideration to a far more affordable "remodel of a proven past success. That would be my 2 cents, along with a thank you for the opportunity to offer it.
Why are there limits to the potential model or modifications? I would think that a good "needs assessment" followed by a comment/response period would allow for a natural process to allow for the development of a model that met the actual and documented needs. Framing the problem(s) at different levels would seem to be a more logical approach. Then people could be tapped to generally respond to those issues. That would validate, or invalidate, the problem(s). Additionally, it could well clarify what the real problems are vs. what the perceived problems are. That being said…has there been a "needs assessment" for the use of incident management teams to begin with…or lately updated? By that, I mean a clear statement of need by the clients? The clients are the local agencies (NOT their national representatives) that use, or could use, IMT's. If IMT members or their national agency reps conduct that assessment or participate in it, then the results could be skewed since natural bias and pre-conceptions could take place. But an honest needs assessment would give clarity to the issues/problems. It seems as if there is this big "rush" to fix the problem when it appears little effort has been applied to what the actual problem really is. This problem didn't appear overnight. Wouldn't it be prudent to analyze the situation in both depth and breadth using independent folks NOT agency personnel? The folks in Washington and Boise might be great federal workers and might be good fire people as well…but…they all have both a vested interest in, and a bias for, a particular outcome. Shouldn't that be considered?
If the NWCG wants to fix the system, I would suggest the following: Encourage management to be fully qualified, even participate in fire and I do not mean by walking around camp as a Big Wheel strutting their stuff. They need to get dirty and be on the fire line for more than one shift and if possible in more than one position. Management needs to get formal and continually updated training on management of project fires. When we look at the challenges the non-fire staff face when they participate, of course we are getting less federal participation! Their program pays for the training, they still have the same amount of work to do, the fire culture degrades their involvement, and they have to fight to participate in training, testing, qualifications, and team membership. If non-fire employees make a team in spite of all the barriers, then they are on standby two weeks out of three with no compensation or recognition. When the culture is changed, non-fire staff will show an interest in participation. If not, it should still be part of their job to participate to some extent. 2. The IMOSP alternatives do not address the real problems. In reviewing the Organizational Models, I have the following responses: Costs versus safety and efficiency Cost is the driving factor until someone gets hurt or we are (as I have seen often) under staffed. Once the fire gets away, no one wants to look at what that would have cost if a full team or the proper configuration had been ordered to start with. Look at some of the fires

in the California bust a few years ago when resources were not available. Assigning equipment, supplies, and manpower right out of the box would have made a considerable difference.

When I read the IMOSP materials, I did not see safety concerns, efficiency, function, etc. I saw an effort to reduce cost at any cost. Those of us that have been in the team game a few years have seen this cycle before and the results. Why do you think teams are the size they are?

Gaining experience needs to be built into models

As I have explained, I do not believe training is the entire story. Experience plays a significant part. We would be better trained if additional dollars and time were provided. Time will prove that experience is more important than training. What training is missing and what better training is needed? Who is getting it? I am going to suggest the NIMO teams are getting it because they are full time. Time will prove that is not the answer in and of its self. And the SUPER NIMO teams are not going to fully function to solve the problem because they are just the heart of the team. Some dynamics are going to prove that the SUPER TEAM mentality will backfire down the road.

The Primary Focus and Initial Incident Strategy is phrased as if to suggest that what is being done now is far below the bar in analysis, thinking, and documentation. Risk informed strategies will result in better outcomes. This is stated as if what is being done now is not risk informed strategies.

A missing but obviously viable organizational model would be to add the number of positions proposed to be added with NIMO teams to the existing field organization, creating more depth and reducing agency administrators concern about IMT participation. Sustainability of the existing teams would be assured.

As already stated current budgets are stretched thin and in light of a 14 trillion dollar debt, it is unlikely that any option that increases costs and bureaucracy will be smiled on at the Washington level. A budget reducing or budget neutral solution needs to be incorporated as a goal of this exercise.

Thank you for the opportunity to express my views on this important planning effort.

First, thanks to the Incident Management Organization Succession Planning Team. The alternatives obviously have a lot of thought and consideration behind them and this is a difficult subject to grapple with as it involves everything from politics and policy to performance and emotions. These proposals are a good first step towards redefining our place and purpose in the realm of incident management.

One caveat on my comments: I am doing this quickly and in short bursts between regular assignments and do not have the time to get as comfortable with the proposals as I would like. It seems the Team went to great lengths to simplify the presentation of the alternatives, which is commendable. However, there does appear to be some detail behind the language and I may not be drawing from the same set of facts the Team analyzed. Plus, I am likely to be responding to the proposals through my own biases. So, given that, I offer my comments with the best of intentions.

(I'll follow the general order of the Expanded Organizational Models.)

I would first recommend seeing how many of the overarching principles, particularly in the realm of compensation/incentives and agency accountability can be addressed before we make any drastic changes as the outcome of those efforts will greatly influence the final configuration.

Second, I would argue that what has made the current model successful has as much to do with culture as any organizational construct. You never hear an AD say they came back because they enjoy sleeping on the ground or working 16 hour days. They come back for the people, the camaraderie, and the satisfaction gained from working with others to deal with extremely difficult incidents. Regardless of where we go in the future, we must recognize and identify ways to preserve and enhance this culture. Additionally, as the incidents become more complex and stressful, it is ever more important to have that team grounding to help individuals make it through the tough assignments.

The current trend seems to be moving away from a team culture to one of individual competence and professionalism. Not necessarily bad, but if we go too far in that direction and diminish the team culture, I fear it will hurt us in the long run. I would enlist experts in group psychology or organizational culture to help us through this process and assist us in understanding the unquantifiable values we may be tinkering with as we change. We should also endeavor to identify areas where unintended consequences might occur, and I definitely think the culture we work in is one of those areas.

If we absolutely have to move forward while simultaneously addressing the overarching principles:

Ø 20 permanent NIMO teams. Policy and incidents have become infinitely more complex since our current model began. It is increasingly difficult to be a C&G member with a regular job outside of Fire. You must keep up with your IMT knowledge as well as meet expectations for your regular job. Having a core of permanent teams would allow members to devote themselves fully to the intricacies of incident management. It would also help in training and spreading our culture to other agencies.

Ø NIMO Teams should be supervised at the national level. Off-incident assignments should focus on training both wildfire agencies and other agencies at all levels in ICS. Such training should be coordinated with FEMA. We need to build much greater capacity in ICS and change the culture in other agencies from one where they overlay their current organization on top of an ICS org chart to one where

the ICS concepts are truly second nature. Policy analysis, training, and implementation for the wildfire community would also be a priority.

Ø Teams should be renamed. To simplify for the public and to reflect the new organization, I would suggest National Incident Management Team and Regional Incident Management Team. This keeps a distinction between NIMO/Type I and Type II, but does away with the confusing (for the public and media) "Types" for teams and gives you NIMT instead of NIMO. NIMO seems kind of odd considering we always say "NIMO Team" anyway. Also, the word "NIMO" has some baggage with a fair amount of IMT personnel.

Ø Allow performance on a Type I team to substitute for experience at the next lowest grade level when hiring for the National teams.

Ø For Regional teams, implement pay equity for C&G staff while on assignment.

Ø Offer financial incentives to younger employees who participate in incident management and personnel who are qualified in difficult to fill positions.

Ø Look for opportunities to partner with non-Fire agencies to provide positions that are not mission critical. USGS, NARA, PHS, GSA, and probably others have skills that could be used on incidents and which would free up current qualified personnel for other positions.

Ø Require liability insurance for ICs and Ops at a minimum and cover total cost of premium.

Ø Establish a national pool of trainees and make an effort to get them assignments with different teams from different regions.

Again, thanks for letting me offer comments and thanks for the hard work on succession planning. There are no obvious answers but I trust we will be able to figure it out and make it work.

I was on either Type 1 or Type 2 teams most years from 1987 to 2005 and my current qualifications are as an LSC1. As a non-fire "militia" I have watched from the sidelines as what has been, AND IS, a first rate organizational model be chipped away at and marginalized by its own users. The current issues related to team participation and agency support are not new. As early as 1994 cracks were being seen in the system as that summer several teams were unable to take assignments due to missing C&G members. As a result, a Type 1 team was disbanded and eventually the Rocky Basin structure created.

From my perspective the study prepared by the working group reads very strongly like a report done by fire people, for fire people, about fire people. Most of the recommendations – accelerated training, an element in Position Descriptions, temporary promotions, etc. – are focused on the fire staff. I find a near total lack, other than a few anecdotal comments, of recognition of the very large percentage of IMT members that come from non-fire positions and of what can be done to attract and retain these individuals.

I also think that the study has missed or at least downplayed three factors that are equal to if not greater factors than the aging workforce that everyone seems to focus on.

1) Lack of Management support

2) Recruiting IMT members is everyone's responsibility, and no ones

3) Staffing multiple types of management teams erodes capabilities

What exactly is the end game this process is looking for?

The study presents several organizational models for consideration. In order to pick an organizational model, you need to know what the organization is going to be tasked with doing. Even though many people still consider them to be just fire teams, over the last two decades the IMTs have successfully adapted to an All Risk response mode responding to 9/11, hurricanes, floods, fuel spills, natural disasters, and shuttle crashes. Perhaps there are some that don't think this is appropriate.

The report in unclear on what tasks the new organizational model is expected to meet. On the one hand it appears that it is oriented to just meeting the fire suppression needs. But then there is a model proposed that focuses on All Hazard Teams (must be the new PC term). Are you looking for an organization that can be All Risk or just fire suppression (that would be used for All Risk anyway)? Without knowing the ultimate goal it is going to be hard to develop an organizational model to meet it.

It also seems like the report mixes organizational models with tactical issues and it even appears that you may be trying to solve tactical and administrative issues with an organizational model. That won't work. You'll never be able to develop an organizational model that at the same time satisfies every concern over right sizing the number of resources and responding to different strategies. You would ultimately end up with a model that works in some situations and is tweaked and bastardized in all other situations just to make it work.

General comments on the models presented

Where's the 27th position?

I've counted numerous times because I was sure it would have been caught in editing and I was missing something, but in every model

where you list the 27 members of the standard team configuration, there are only 26 positions listed. The Short Team Configuration (Total of 10 positions), only lists nine.

All models contain NIMO teams

Is it a given that NIMO teams must continue to exist? If there are sideboards to this process then they need to be stated up front. If this is truly a complete look at future organizational models then there has to be at least one model that makes a change from present and has no NIMO teams but integrates those individuals back into the larger IMT organization. Is this one agency rather than NWCG making the call? NIMO teams are expensive to maintain. I have heard that they almost invariably order a team to support them or all the individuals that make up a team. If NIMO teams are considered short teams then build that model but an IMT can function the same way.

Is there really an issue with retirements?

Yes, some very well-known and colorful individuals have and will soon be retiring. They all get replaced. Their predecessors all retired. There are probably more permanent/career seasonal firefighters now than at any time in history due to funding and position increases over the last 5-10 years. Is this a body count issue or an interest and recruitment issue?

Core Team with State Participation

That this model is even proposed as an alternative rather than accepted as current reality is another example of either the bias shown by the team (We, the Feds, will do it ourselves) or a lack of understanding of the current reliance on State, and local, government participation. I doubt there is an IMT today that doesn't already have State and local government members. Are we so arrogant as to ignore their participation? It should be assumed that we would actively recruit, and train, State and local firefighters at every opportunity, for every model.

Straight up here are three elements I would like to see in the selected option:

1) Blending type 1 and type 2 teams so that you would have one 'national team' category.

2) Smaller 'core' team size.

3) Emphasis on team members having day jobs (i.e. less emphasis on full time teams like current NIMO teams). If fire teams go to all hazard incidents, is it in the works to have all hazard teams from other organizations go to fire management incidents?

I think it needs to be clearer if these teams will be all hazard teams - I am assuming they will but it is not in the Overarching Principles.

I would be interested in hearing what current ICs and C and GS people think about these options. How would they fix the system?

As per our conversation this morning in which you asked me to provide some feedback regarding IMT and Incident Management Succession Planning here are a few bullets;

1. Review and amend the Legislative authorities regarding responsibilities and authorities for the fed agencies and ensure that they address the use of our state and local interagency partners to respond to, support and manage fire and non fire incidents

2. Review and amend the agreements between the federal fire agencies and our state and local partners authorities, responsibilities and liability issues are addressed in regards to their use at fire and non fire incidents in response, support and management of these incidents

3. Ensure we have an effective use of state and regional Administrative and Coordination networks to identify, status, mobilize our partner state and local interagency partner resources

4. Ensure that state and local interagency partner resources are identified and status in ROSS

5. NWCG and NIMS NIC to work towards a single NIMS incident qualification system

6. We will need to continue to have need for multiple incident management tools in the future; Type 3,2,1, NIMO and ACTs the real issue is how many, what configuration and where will they come from. I suspect that we will find most of these answers in the previously written reports. We do not need to re-invent the wheel rather dust the reports off, verify the facts, prioritize and implement the recommendations

7. Utilize NIMO to staff project teams to enhance Incident Management Capacity

Utilize a NIMO Team to coordinate and facilitate input into there view of Legislative

Incident management authority, responsibilities and liability issues and provide input to WO Legislative staff Utilize NIMO to review and provide input into NRF and NIMS working groups Utilize NIMO to work with NEMA and IAFC on review and update of EMAC for fire and non fire support Utilize NIMO to develop, instruct and evaluate 400, 500, 600 level and advance incident management and line officer leadership training Utilize NIMO as Incident Strategic Planning Teams to work with WFDSS staff and IMT's on incidents requiring long term Strategic Assessments Use NIMO as Incident management option for long duration fires with high complexity requiring continuity of strategy and with low to moderate resource commitment.
Last week I was present at NWCG presentation of Succession Planning and [] asked us to comment on the overall presentation. I must say, it was a very poor presentation and really offers no insight in to the issue of succession planning. This was not due to []ability to present the subject, as she did as well as one would expect with a very poorly written, poorly done power point presentation, and without much understanding of the issues. It was clear that NWCG really has no ideas on succession planning as it looks like to me the intent is to "stove pipe" the fire organization. Some of the alternatives covered in last the presentation included outsourcing, stovepiping, and creating a federal fire service. The problem I have with this is in the presentation this was never said, other words and phrases were used. People at the Type One level are smart, and figured this out right away. It would appear that the presentation was an insult to all of us on the ground with a bunch of mumbo jumbo, and in the end I still do\not see how we are going to address our Succession Planning issue. In all the options NIMO was selected as being part of that option. I find this a bit troubling, as DOI has not and is not planning on supporting the NIMO concept. So really this is not NWCG but USFS. I feel the presentation skated around this point. Other alternatives included "outsourcing" with the use of State and contract Teams. Really, the States can not support IMT's as it is currently, and being on stand by with semi- dedicated personnel. No amount of money that you throw at the states will change the fact that the primary focus is to support their State, not using their people to be on stand by for any Regional incident. We have tried to do this in the Southern Region and it does not work.
Although all the alternatives seemed different, they all included NIMO. Ms. Kalifeh used the metaphor of building a house to describe the process of choosing different elements of the various alternatives to come up with a new organization, but the audience needs to know right off the bat that every possible floor plan is built around NIMO. The next version of the presentation needs to explain the rationale for putting every element of the existing system "on the table" EXCEPT for NIMO.
Stove piping and the creation of a federal fire service are two goals that many wildland firefighters have long sought after. The problem is integrating them with resource management agencies. As employees in the forestry technician and biological technical series, wildland firefighters must have a basic grasp of fire ecology because they are often used in resource management actions such as prescribed burning. Stove piping also creates an accountability issue because firefighters would no longer be subject to line officer supervision on a particular unit.
The FS is pursuing an evolving policy on fire suppression or management. In many cases there is little or no active suppression in one area and only work as necessary to limit spread in another. The public has mixed reactions to this. Most state agencies have a mandate to control fire and act accordingly. So the need for personnel with the state-oriented methods is important in the mix of IMT personnel to keep the teams flexible to what may be faced on any given incident. And even though many state agencies are experiencing some budget cuts, they are not to the depth the federal agencies have been hit. State agencies have always been more lean and focused, but they are still out there. In conclusion; the most critical problem the IMT system faces is a general shortage of personnel available for assignments, with critical shortages for certain positions, and this should be the primary issue being addressed here. The potential for reconfiguring the IMT system is an interesting exercise, but distracting from the most critical problem which must be addressed; regardless of future team configurations
My recommendation is for a combination of the options making all T1 and T2 teams all risk teams, and the reworking of the limitations for all IMTs to stay in place to avoid demob-remob costs, and the dismantling of all current NIMO teams. I believe the options listed in the current briefing paper should be combined and not implemented as listed. In example, the combining of all Type 1 and Type 2 teams to function as "all risk" teams I believe is the way to go. In addition to the creation of these teams, it will allow the removal of the existing NIMO teams and therefore a huge cost savings to our agencies without a loss in capabilities to respond. I feel the option of backup State or AD teams could be an option, but this is also an avenue for abuse of the use of AD's over agency teams and I feel this should not be done. The use of AD's now is currently abused with many AD's filling primary team positions that are NOT critically short positions such as Operations, Liaison, SOF2, and a host of others. The use of AD's to train our agency is a HUGE waste of agency dollars when we have the capability internally as well as any use of AD's as permanent IMT members.

Also, the use of AD's in ANY positions of either IMT participation or the training of our agency employees should ALWAYS be a last resort for cost containment unless they are being used in a position that CANNOT be filled by an agency employee.

If cost containment is truly what the agencies are looking at, the addition of anywhere from 7 to 20 NIMO teams would be the complete opposite of cost reductions.....

Incident Management Organization Planning Team (IMOPT),

I am currently an Operations Section Chief Type 2 in the Northern Rockies and will be working on my Operations Section Chief Type 1 this fire season. Eventually I plan to consider moving to the role of Incident Commander, therefore I have a very strong interest in the recommendation the IMOPT makes to NWCG.

In reviewing the EVOLVING INCIDENT MANAGEMENT An Analysis of Organizational Models for the Future, I found there to be six models for consideration. I believe there is no one solution to solving the problem to IMT succession planning.

The solution may or may not come through this process. However, when we have a fire season that exceeds anything we have ever seen before, the American Public will demand we deal with the situation at hand whether we have a solution or not .

To this end, my operational experience tells me ALL options provide a solution, therefore no option should be eliminated because in moments of complex chaos, human ingenuity and creativity often prevail. Edward Pulaski showed us this in 1910. Unfortunately, this line of thinking may NOT be an acceptable option based on the objectives the IMOPT was given, so I have included some recommendations I would like the IMOPT to give serious consideration as they move forward with the process to provide an organizational model recommendation back to NWCG by May of 2011.

ELIMINATE THE TYPING OF ALL ICS POSITIONS EXCEPT INCIDENT COMMANDERS AND OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEFS.

1. Many variables make up the complexity of an Incident and to identify as Type 1 thru Type 5 is unnecessary beyond the IC and OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEF.

2. The majority of risk occurs in the field under the Operations Section and any risk that does not occur within the Operations Section (i.e. planning, logistical and financial) should be understood and managed appropriately by a qualified IC.

3. Current direction in the Red Book gives the greatest operational flexibility to an IMT3 organization. To better prepare and plan an organization for surviving a worst case scenario this operational flexibility should be expanded to the Type 2 and Type 1 ICs. Operational flexibility keeps things SIMPLE and FLEXIBLE, two key components needed to be successful when operating in a complex environment.

4. Remember, Operations is the KING in the ICS model and all other functions but the IC are there to support Operations. Therefore, so long as support is provided Type 1, Type 2, and / or Type 3 should not matter to these support functions.

ITEMS NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT:

1. Allow IC's to select Command and General Staff.

-Anyone who has ever been associated with a TEAM knows a TEAM is a group of Individuals brought together to pursue a common goal. Each TEAM has a leader and each TEAM is only as good as the individuals in which the leader commands. Therefore, it is only fair the leader be allowed to select the Command and General Staff of the TEAM he / she will command. Any other model does not meet the definition of a TEAM. And one must not forget the human factors (forming, storming, norming and conforming) involved in building a TEAM are a harsh reality and will often be the difference between success and failure. In a true High Reliability Organization (HRO), failure is not an option.

2. Allow the Operations Section Chief to select three primary Division Supervisors (same reasons the IC needs to choose C and G).

3. A single qualification system for IC's and OPERATIONS will ensure not only are the individuals qualified for the position, but the individuals should be experienced enough to know when operations are exceeding the complexity level of the incident regardless of the level of government he / she works for; Federal, State or Local Govt.

4. Require IC's to have Operations experience to at least the Type 2 level to ensure full understanding of all the risks associated with wildland fire incident management.

5. Keep AD and EFF authority for all positions but IC and OPERATIONS, this will allow operational flexibility through the contractor and retired agency workforce if needed.

6. Get crosswalk in place so we can use local government and individuals who have experience in a certain support functional area but may not have the ICS qualifications in the support functional area.

CONSEQUENCES OF NOT CONSIDERING THIS RECOMMENDATION: An organizational pitfall will be created and the burden will be on IC's and OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEFS to battlefield promote individuals on a case by case basis in order to survive the situation of a dramatically shrinking IMT workforce. Battlefield promotions have been a common practice during the not so long ago fire seasons of 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2007 and 2008. We get away with these battlefield promotions so long as nothing goes wrong, however if something does go wrong the IC is ultimately responsible and legally liable for the situation. The IMOPT could mitigate this situation by considering the recommendation of: ELIMINATE THE TYPING OF ALL ICS POSITIONS EXCEPT INCIDENT COMMANDERS AND OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEFS.

CREATE A NIMO MODEL AT THE GEOGRAPHIC LEVEL IN ADDITION TO THE NATIONAL LEVEL.

1. The current NIMO model is effective and meets the needs of the National Level. A Geographic Area NIMO model could be more effective meeting the needs of the Geographic Areas.

ITEMS NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT:

1. Allow local IMT3's to be the anchor point of the future Incident Management Organizations and handle the majority of incidents at the local level. Use Geographic Area NIMO Teams as force multipliers to move around Geographic Areas and enhance, support and train local IMT3s as opportunities present.

2. Fund the Geographic Area NIMO Teams in a way so the burden of making every incident like an in the field S-420 does NOT fall on the shoulders of the Agency Administrators responsible for the Incident, this would enhance training flexibility exponentially and mitigate having to redo this exercise in 10 years.

3. Position these NIMO TEAMS at the Geographic Area.

4. Require NIMO members to hold virtual offices within agency locations within the Geographic Area they represent to ensure a strong connection to the ground level.

5. Program of work needs to come from the Geographic Area Coordinating Group.

6. Allow Geographic Area NIMO Teams to be first out in the GEO Area before a National NIMO team comes into GEO Area. (i.e. only makes sense that team that has been working on issues be first team out when it comes time to implement their work.)

7. Fund and supervise Geographic Area NIMO Teams through Geographic Area Coordinating Groups. (i.e. All entities, not just the Forest Service)

8. Require Geographic Area NIMO Teams to build and train operating capacity in the off season at the ground level within their GEO Area and ensure surge capacity is prepared for worst case scenario events (i.e. workshops for local govt. retired agency members, contractors, etc.) (Similar to how FEMA games out Hurricanes).

9. Utilize Geographic NIMO Teams as the consistency force throughout the life of an Incident. (i.e. bracket transitions to ensure objective consistencies and operational risk management amongst Type 3 IMTs is in place, think of like a mini Area command overseeing multiple Type 3 IMTS but Geo NIMO doesn't rotate, they take days off in place)

CONSEQUENCES OF NOT CONSIDERING THIS RECOMMENDATION:

National Level NIMO TEAMS have their place, however to continue to stand up and fund only more National Level NIMO TEAMS will further perpetuate the loss of key fire management leadership where it is needed most: the ground level. Geographic Area NIMO Teams would keep key fire management leadership in Geographic Areas working on issues that are specific to the Geographic Areas and be a key conduit from the Geographic Area Coordinating Groups to the ground level fire managers and firefighters. A key component we are currently missing in our organizational model. The IMOPT has an opportunity to mitigate this situation by considering the recommendation of: CREATE A NIMO MODEL AT THE GEOGRAPHIC LEVEL IN ADDITION TO THE NATIONAL LEVEL.

These recommendations all fall within the scope of the OVERARCHING PRINCIPLES and therefore should be given the utmost consideration as the IMOPT moves forward with their recommendation back to NWCG. Thank you for the opportunity to comment. If you have any questions, please feel free to call me.

Hello, I attended the National Logistics meeting last week and one of the presenters asked us to send in our comments on the IMT updates. I like the current format but if we must change, here are my comments and concerns. As a taxpayer, funding more NIMO teams than we have already seems like a waste of major dollars. The current setup all have people in place doing other duties while waiting for fires. The NIMO folks are getting paid to do things that people in fire positions can do now without paying the big bucks. Having said that, I am on a Type 2 team and know a lot of section chiefs who are on Type 2 teams, the current NIMO system is only for Type 1 Log Chief, Planning Chief's etc. The only difference from a Type 1 and a 2 is 40 hours of 520. If any Chief has been on a Type 2 team for any time at all, they have experienced anything that the class of 520 can offer, my opinion anyway. Having just talked to someone who went to 520, they had 3 days of instruction and 2 days of exercise, are those 2 days of exercise that important that the Type 2 folks will get overlooked in the next NIMO process. If we do go to 20 NIMO teams, I feel that all Chiefs should get consideration, not just folks who happened to go to a 40 hour class. A lot of the Type 2 have been on team for a long time and have enjoyed their

team and had no desire to leave to join a Type 1, we should not get discriminated against if we happened to be a Type 2 Chief. 5-10 years of being a section Chief on many fires should be comparable to those 40 hours of class, again my opinion, thanks

NIMO Teams appear to increase from the current number in most models. NIMO position descriptions are graded at GS-12 and higher. If there is a need to fill these positions, are there enough militia with C&G quals that could apply at the GS-12+ level or can some of these jobs be upward mobility with mentoring, i.e., GS-9, GS-11, GS-12?

I suggest that we should utilize IMT3 Teams to encourage and sustain local relationships by being an interagency for all hazard and fire incidents. That we should develop "Training" for others to serve on a local type 3 teams. These positions would include SOF3, OPS3 and PSC3. This would enable a small team to operate from two to ten plus days and give the appropriate support to the ground resources. Right now, this does not exist. It could be for instance if you are qualified task force leader that may also qualify you for OPS3. Similarly, for other positions for PSC3 and SOF3. The training for the type 3 overhead would be valuable for reduced costs, improved safety, appropriate use of professional level and would help with community and local relationships in the event of an incident for positive coordination efforts.

Another suggestion is that S-520 graduates should be given priority nationally to complete their trainee experience/task book. This does not seem to be happening and as budgets decrease along with qualified personnel there should be opportunities for those to gain experience and grow at this national level. Also, to sustain the national level organization.

All, attached is my input to the analysis of future organizational models for the interagency IMO. It is anchored principally to the findings and recommendations of the USDA-OIG audit of March 2010 and the recommendations in the National Incident Management Organization Feasibility and Implementation Plan of 2005. One other comment I have (not in the attached) is that the case for change is not evident to many current IMT members. Although the business case for change is fairly evident from a reading of the UDSA-OIG report of 2010, it is not readily available at the NWCG web (or other) sites... As you all can imagine, there is a fair amount of resistance (from current IMT members) to any change to the status quo.... Communication of a clear and compelling case for change would help this situation. Please see second document below about my earlier comments concerning the USFS draft (August 2010) of its business case.

USDA Forest Service
Region 2 – Safety, Fire and Aviation Management
Briefing Paper

August 10, 2010

Topic: R2-SFAM Comment on Draft “Case for Change” – IMT Succession Planning
Background: R5 DRF Pena prepared a draft Case for Change – Why IMT Succession Planning is needed after the summer NLT meeting in Madison, Wisconsin. This will represent the USFS input to NWCG’s efforts to document an interagency case for change which is to be completed late summer 2010.

Objective: To add value and strengthen a case of change for IMT Succession Planning.

General Comments:

• A relatively clear statement of why the current model is unsustainable is offered. However, it needs to be strengthened.

• The statement on AA dissatisfaction is straightforward. However, it focuses on the negative aspects of employee participation on IMTs and not on a stated desired condition.

• The 520/620 discussion is about symptoms and not underlying causes for shortcomings.

• Summary of OIG audit is very succinct and does not capture the weight of the business case offered therein.

• Discussion on organizational and environmental changes does not capture the impact of the evolution of federal fire policy and its implementation.

Specific Recommendations:

• Further elaboration of why the current model is inadequate would strengthen the business case. This could be done by:

o Highlighting key findings and recommendations from the Jacob’s Report that have not yet been fully realized;

o Conducting a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) of external and internal organizational environment (Robbins, S.P. & Coulter, M. 2007). Doing so would uncover:

§ Positive and negative trends in the external environment (e.g., pending legislation, etc);

§ Organizational resources, capabilities, and core competencies.

• A more proactive argument, from an agency administrator perspective, for successfully recruiting, developing, and sustaining, high

reliability Incident Management Teams would strengthen the business case. For example:

o To staff and maintain an optimum number, type and configuration of IMTs to meet national needs.

o To provide for flexibility in the size and configuration of IMTs to allow management of the full range of appropriate management responses.

o To optimize the recruitment, retention, and advancement of available personnel resources to staff and sustain national IMTs in consideration of other management priorities and needs.

• Highlighting the deficit in participation and graduation from upper level Command and General staff training (520/620) is an end result and symptomatic of the findings in the OIG Report on the Forest Service's Firefighting Succession Planning Process (USDA-OIG. 2010). Bringing forward the underlying reasons surfaced by this audit would strengthen the business case such as the underlying reasons for:

o Failure rate of employees attempting certification;

o Difference in Number of Qualified firefighters Versus Trainees ;

o Self-directed, voluntary, and collateral nature of firefighter training.

• Specific organizational and environmental challenges that have and will continue to occur could be cited to strengthen the business case (Bill Hahnenberg. personal communication):

o The agency's attention and investment into providing adequate leadership, now and into the future is not commensurate with the nearly half of the agency's budget that is dedicated to its fire management program (and specifically large fire costs). There is a disconnect between increased investments in and complexity of this program and how the agency staffs and organizes its IMTs.

o Changes in how federal fire policy is implemented (e.g., 2009 Guidance) as a business case for investing in IMT succession planning should be included. For example the amplified opportunity to utilize unplanned ignitions to meet resource management objectives is a strong argument for investing in succession planning.

References: NWCG. (2009, February). Guidance for implementation of federal wildland fire management policy. USDA and USDOI

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Leaning Out Succession

Safety, Fire & Aviation Management
U.S. Forest Service
Rocky Mountain Region

May 1, 2011

The objective of this assessment is to examine an operation that is not lean; specifically the processes that result in a lot of wasted effort. The author has selected the U.S. Forest Service's (USFS) approach to the development of individual employees for command and general (C&G) staff positions that lead incident management teams (IMT). An overview of these IMTs and the existing process for developing these leadership positions will be provided. For this process the author will identify examples of waste and inefficiencies and then describe how it could be leaned out.

Overview of Incident Management Teams

The USFS and its interagency partners sponsor 16 Type 1 IMTs throughout the United States. These are the elite teams of individuals that take on and manage the most complex wildland fires in the country. They are also called upon to manage other disasters (e.g., Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Columbia Shuttle disaster, etc.). The leadership of these teams of 27 individuals is made up of a core of seven key positions which include an Incident Commander (IC), Information Officer, Safety Officer, Logistics Section Chief, Planning Section Chief, Operations Section Chief, and Finance Section Chief. This core team and its subordinate positions typically manage incidents which often exceed 500 operations personnel and may exceed 2,500 personnel (NIFC, 2011a). The process for the training and development of individuals to assume these core positions is the focus of this paper.

A Failed Succession Strategy

As noted by Stevenson (2009) bureaucracies often become bloated "…with inefficiencies and waste, and overtime, these inefficiencies become ingrained in processes" (Stevenson, 2009, p. 716). In the case of providing for the succession of individuals to serve in IMT C&G positions, the original team management program was designed more than 25 years ago and only revisited once (USFS, nd). In 2010 the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an evaluation of the USFS' firefighting succession planning process. Its audit assessed the agency's plans for recruiting, training, developing, and retaining those personnel who will fill critical fire management positions (USDA-OIG, 2010). It found a number of shortcomings in its processes which indicate that the agency's efforts are ineffectual and, in many cases have resulted in a waste of resources (time, money, and personnel). The five year pilot (initiated in 2006) of the National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) is nearing its term. An assessment of whether or not this strategy has achieved the actions associated with the nine key recommendations in the NIMO Feasibility and Implementation Plan (NWCG, 2005) is due. This assessment should be accomplished before committing additional resources to this endeavor. Of particular interest and relevance to succession planning are the action items associated with recommendation No. 1 – improved capacity and capability of the current federal wildland agency workforce and recommendation No. 3 – Streamline wildland fire training and qualifications.

Process Inefficiencies

Projected Demand Exceeds Capacity. The USFS has over 24,000 employees who hold at least one of over 300 different types of firefighter qualifications. Approximately 4,300 of these are qualified for 54 positions that are most critical to fire command and support activities (e.g., incident commanders and section chiefs). In 2009, approximately 26% of these personnel were eligible to retire with the number increasing to 64% and 86% in five and 10 years respectively (USDA-OIG, 2010). These losses come at a time when the USFS is predicting more and larger wildfires to suppress and at a time when federal budgets are declining. In the face of these challenges the agency has not developed a credible workforce plan to ensure that personnel critical to firefighting will continue to be available to meet demand.

Lack of Leadership Oversight. Most USFS employees become qualified to hold firefighter positions through their own initiative and self-direction based on extra training and experience. These employees' primary job is not firefighting. Rather many of them are in occupations such as biologists and engineers with firefighting merely a collateral duty. Oftentimes these employees are not available for firefighting because these duties are not linked to their primary job. This situation represents a lack of leadership in terms of funds that, in many cases, are wasted on employee development (e.g., little to no return on invested training funds).

Inadequate Firefighter Training Program. As noted above, the USFS allows its employees to self-select firefighting courses and to self-determine the pace of their own progress. This is inefficient because the agency does not require these employees to make themselves available for firefighting assignments. Thus, the agency fails to ensure that there is a return on its training investment ($29.5 million in 2005) (USDA-OIG, 2010). As found by the OIG the agency has created imbalances between employee's chosen firefighter career paths

and the agency's needs. For example, the USFS has more qualified firefighters in some critical positions than it has trainees preparing to replace them. The OIG estimated that the USFS has "…11,129 critical firefighters and only 5,199 in training for these positions—just under half of what is needed to maintain current wildfire response levels" (USDA-OIG, 2010, p. 2).

Another finding (USDA-OIG, 2010) is that since employees set their own training pace, it takes an average of 23 years to qualify for C&G positions. This length of time is 12 years longer than the optimal timeframes estimated by the USFS as possible if training was more focused. To make matters worse the agency estimates that 40 percent of employees who take fire training never follow through to qualify for a firefighter positions, a potential waste of $12 million annually (USDA-OIG, 2010).

Lack of Participation in Firefighting. Although the USFS has trained many of its employees to be firefighters it does not require them to actually participate in firefighting, nor does it reward them for doing so. As a result, with each succeeding fire season fewer employees participate in firefighting and the agency continues to experience growing shortages in critical positions even though there is currently sufficient numbers of qualified personnel to perform these functions. The OIG found that, in 2008, only nine percent of the agency's qualified firefighters actually took part in suppressing its largest and costliest wildfires. The rest remained at their home units performing their primary jobs (USDA-OIG, 2010).

Unnecessary Education Requirements for Firefighters. In almost all cases firefighting positions are technical in nature. However, the agency and the federal Office of Personnel Management (OPM) require that fire management staff meet the requirements for a professional natural resource management job series. As such, individuals are required to take academic course work in biology and other sciences required for professional academic degrees. The OIG concluded that there is no connection between these academic requirements and the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed for firefighting. Moreover, it concluded that such educational requirements for professional proficiency beyond that required of a technical job could diminish firefighting effectiveness and safety (USDA-OIG, 2010). In other words, there is little to no value added by this requirement and there is a significant waste of invested resources (estimated to be $15.7 million) in employees taking classes required of a professional job series (e.g., college biology, physics, etc.).

Leaning Out the Succession Strategy

The description of the USFS wildland firefighter succession strategy is of a system that is the antithesis of a lean philosophy. The methodology which has evolved over time is one that is wasteful of precious resources (financial and human capital) and has many requirements that do not add value. Additionally, the strategy is not keeping up with the growing demand for wildland fire (incident) leadership and it belies the agency's espoused cultural values of excellence in public service and continuous improvement. What follows are a number of lean system methodologies that afford the agency an opportunity to eliminate waste and streamline its efforts toward effectively and efficiently entraining employees toward fully qualified, functional, and available IMT C&G Staff leadership positions.

Matching Capacity with Demand. The overarching goal of a lean approach is to achieve a smooth and rapid flow of employees through a training and development system that yields a sufficient number of skilled leaders to assume critical C&G positions. Concurrently, the agency must establish a systematic approach for assuring that these individuals are readily available so as to minimize the number of unable-to-fill (disruptions) orders of leadership positions which cause IMTs to be stood-down (NIFC, 2010b). As described earlier, the inventory of critical leadership positions is declining and, in many cases, those individuals who are in the inventory are effectively unavailable.

The first step in paring down its inventory of leadership personnel is to discard (from the Command & General Staff stock) those employees who, although trained, are unavailable to be mobilized for the reasons (not linked to primary job) stated earlier. By doing so, the agency will have a more accurate count of inventory as well as of the shelf-life left (i.e., impending retirements) of its leadership stock. Additionally, the agency must cease investing training and development resources into personnel at the unit leader level who are either unavailable for mobilization or do not have the personal commitment and/or support from their managers to advance toward C&G leadership positions. Concurrently the agency's leaders must hold its managers accountable for investing in and making the broader inventory of fire personnel (both dedicated and collateral duty) available for fire duty.

Committing Agency Leadership to Lean Systems. For decades agency leadership has taken a hands-off approach to developing and then making employees available for fire leadership positions. This attitude is a hold-over from a time when most agency employees were generalists and all were expected to participate in wildland fire suppression activities. With the onset of specialization in the late 1970s and early 1980s this situation is no longer the case. Yet, management's approach has not adjusted to the current paradigm. As noted earlier, employee training and development is more or less on auto-pilot and very much adrift (e.g., self-selection and self-paced). The case for a lean approach has become more apparent as each fire season passes and management experiences a growing shortage of qualified personnel to assign to it most complex and damaging wildfires. Generally speaking, the case for change from the status quo is unfolding with each passing fire season. The OIG has instructed the agency to prepare a viable succession plan. Its failure to do so runs the risk of the agency forfeiting its responsibilities for wildland fire suppression to others.

USFS leadership must not only engage its interagency partners but also the employees that staff its IMTs. Cooperation amongst federal land management agencies and their State partners will be necessary to leverage scarce human resources and talent. Because existing C&G personnel and those in the developmental pipeline are closest to operations, they have a unique perspective that can be tapped for improving and sustaining a leaner approach to continuous improvement of succession efforts. Moreover, the lean philosophy is predicated on cooperation (Stevenson, 2009).

Value Stream Mapping the Firefighter Training Program. Currently there is no single strategy for succession planning, career pathing, or individual development. Immediate supervisors and each individual determine their respective developmental tracks and pace (NWCG, 2011). The OIG has identified several key issues that will serve as a basis for the agency to further examine the flow of individuals through its training and development cycle as well as what happens to the C&G leadership in inventory (e.g., availability, remaining shelf life, number of individuals by position, etc.). In doing so the planning team that has been tasked with developing a succession strategy will be able to identify wasteful activities in the current system and identify opportunities for improvement. The team will be able to identify process bottlenecks and where waste occurs (investments with no return, non-value added requirements, etc.). For example, by examining the lack of participation in firefighting, the planning team should be able to diagnose the underlying causes for this situation and recommend a changed business model and/or process to resolve this issue. Likewise, eliminating of over-training associated with academic course-work which is irrelevant to the development of C&G leadership should lead to the elimination of processing waste (e.g., using more resources than necessary).

Conclusion

The USFS has an opportunity (as well as direction) to resolve a failed succession strategy for the management of its wildland firefighting workforce. This situation is particular problematic with respect to core C&G leadership positions. By adopting a lean philosophy and associated methodologies it should be able to achieve its ultimate goal of having sufficient personnel in the training and development pipeline to meet the demand for critical wildland fire leadership positions now and into the future. Given the limited participation by trained personnel and the projections of retirements (loss of inventory) the agency is faced with disruptions (unavailability and little to no inventory) of critical C&G personnel. By conducting a critical value stream mapping exercise it should be able to identify process bottlenecks and where waste is occurring in both training and development and under-utilization of its stock of C&G personnel. For example, it should be able to reduce the amount of time required to become qualified from the current 23 years by at least half that time. One way it can do this is by eliminating unnecessary training and by promoting the standardization of training and development requirements.

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Group Responses and Alternative Models

Group Responses
1. USDA Forest Service Line Officer Team
2. Operations Committee of the Northern Rockies Geographic Area Coordination Group
3. NWCG Fire Behavior Subcommittee
4. S-520/620 Steering Committee
5. California Incident Commanders (Interagency and Cal Fire)
6. International Association of Fire Chiefs Fire Policy Committee
7. Montana Department of Natural Resource Conservation (DNRC)
8. National Association of State Foresters Fire Committee
9. Firescope Board of Directors
10. Southwest Coordinating Group
11. State of Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources/ NASF Forest Protection Committee
12. National Incident Commanders/Area Commanders Council
13. Oregon Department of Forestry
14. Southern Group of State Foresters
15. BLM Fire and Aviation Leadership
16. The Northern Rockies Geographic Area Coordinating Group Board of Directors (NRCG BOD)

1. USDA Forest Service Line Officer Team

USDA Forest Service Line Officer Team
Comments and Feedback on NWCG IMT Succession Planning Project
Deliberative Workshop
Wednesday, March 23, 2011

Question 1: What ideas presented in the PowerPoint make you uncomfortable?

- Missing tenets – how does agency mission fit? Are we a firefighting organization or a Forest Service organization?
- Underlying presumption that everyone in agency should have something to do with fire.
- Maintain status quo but just throw $$$ at it. Incentives, portal to portal pay, etc.
- Incentives – what about disincentives? Reluctance to get caught up in politics.
- Provide a true model of involvement for different types of positions & at different levels of involvement. What is meaningful involvement?
- Nexus of Agency Administrator & Line Officer certification.
- Lost quals with implementation of IQCS. How to get these people involved? (Documentation requirements).
- How do quals work with the elimination of team typing?
- Relationship between Incident Commander and Agency Administrator in different models…unified command. Non-local IC's more responsive to DOA & resistant to local govt. pressure.
- Reference point may be wrong (i.e. pre-Storm King) for this project.

Question 2: What concepts are confusing, unclear, or require clarification?

- Who is everybody when we say everybody was involved in fire? Clarify expectation of involvement.
- Look deep at successional planning not just Type 1 and Type 2.
- How NIMO implementation plan coordinates with this strategy?
- How does NIMO implementation plan fit with this (i.e. 20 teams)?
- Younger people – what is being done to reach out, coach, mentor?
- With so many people in fire, we should be able to solve this.
- Could parts of teams be contracted (i.e. Logistics) instead of whole teams?
- Large vet pool with experience in logistics/ties in with USDA priorities/goals.
- State govt. employee reductions, differences in quals between state and federal employees.

- Albuquerque Service Center, Regional Offices, Washington office, how to we engage/keep involved in fire?
- How much demographic analysis has been done versus intuitive information?
- What about Type 3 orgs?

Question 3: What ideas or concepts are most exciting or likely to result in positive change for incident management?

- Modules – logistics, finance
- Contract is worth exploring given the state of affairs in agencies.
- Scalability
- Pick pieces of models to create the best model
- Scalability may decrease need for transitions (less accidents)
- Overarching principles
- Single qual system
- Shift from total voluntary to some level of dedicated positions
- Core team to be supplemented, could explore agreements with DOD for some support? Logistics, Air Ops, Coast Guard, National Guard, other agencies, BOR, USGS
- Scalability tied to risk assessment
- Need for clear text from the Chief re: expectations for implementation. Changes in processes on NFs. Be more deliberative in annual planning.

Question 3: What ideas or concepts are most exciting or likely to result in positive change for incident management? (Continued)

- National view of all hazard responses. IMTs that can respond to all types of incidents. Partnering with other agencies.

2. Operations Committee of the Northern Rockies Geographic Area Coordination Group (NRCG)

Introduction

This paper is a synthesis of the work performed by the Operations Committee of the Northern Rockies Geographic Area Coordinating Group (NRCG) in response to the Incident Management Organization Succession Planning Teams' (IMOSP) report entitled "Evolving Incident Management; An Analysis of Organizational Models for the Future". Following a thorough review of the IMOSP report the operations committee determined that none of the Organizational Models as presented in the report provided either a short term or long term solution to the issues regarding Incident Management organization sustainability or operational viability. While the operations committee found the overarching principles conceptually sound, the lack of an apparent "bias for action" in the report as a whole, led the committee to develop a set of recommendations for the Northern Rockies that could be implemented immediately and that would position the Northern Rockies and its teams for long term success. The operations committee considered the role of Incident Management Teams (IMTs) and how IMTs in the Northern Rockies would best be organized and managed to assure continued delivery of the highest quality service to the public, the agencies, the fire service, and the Incident Management Team Members themselves. The deliberations and conclusions of the operations committee and a task group selected by the committee composed of a NRCG Board of Directors (NRCG BOD) member, the NRCG Operations Manager, the Northern Rockies Geographic Area Training Representative, a Type I and Type II Incident Commander, a Fire Management Team Incident Commander, a dispatcher, a zone representative, and agency representatives are reflected in the recommendations contained in this position paper.

Guiding Principles

The following broad and specific principles form the foundation for the recommendations and concepts contained in this position paper.

The Northern Rockies Operations Committee is convinced that:

1. The current "model" of Interagency Incident Management Teams comprised of "voluntary" participants has served the public, the agencies, the fire service, and the IMT members well.
2. The quality and capability of the Northern Rockies IMTs is a direct result of the Interagency composition of the teams and that Interagency participation on Northern Rockies IMTs is a key element in the sustainability of those teams.
3. The teams and team members have developed relationships with the agencies and publics that they serve and those relationships have resulted in a level of trust and confidence essential to effective and responsive

incident management. These relationships have been developed through IMT members' daily interactions with their own and other agency personnel, the public and local government representatives and are further developed and solidified while on assignment as an IMT member.

4. Incident response must be scalable and incident management organizations must be willing and able to configure appropriate to the objectives and expectations of the requesting agency or agencies and the complexity of the incident(s) to which they are responding. This should not be presumed to preclude the need for large Incident Management Organizations with extended depth and reach.
5. It is both possible and sensible to improve, maintain, and sustain the current model of Incident Management Organizations described in 1 above.
6. There are steps that can be taken immediately within the Northern Rockies Geographic Area that will enhance IMT sustainability and improve the effectiveness of incident response in the geographic area.
7. The Northern Rockies Incident Management teams have been effectively and efficiently managed (governed) by the NRCG BOD and the Sub-Geographic Area Zone BOD's and that management construct should continue.
8. There is a necessary and appropriate distinction in terms of the complexity and the attendant management expectations among Type I, Type II, and Type III incidents.
9. Trainees and training must be viewed as an investment in the future and not a cost and with the realization and understanding that the return on investment benefits all agencies at all levels in the accomplishment of the full spectrum of agency missions and mandates.

Recommendations

1. A short team in the Northern Rockies should be configured with 14 members, and include 6 mentored trainees(S-420 trainees for the Type 2 teams and S-520 trainees for the Type 1 teams). The 20 (14 rostered team members + 6 trainees) member short team would include the Command and General Staff plus additional team members dependent on the host agency administrators' incident objectives/expectations. The incident commanders believe that flexibility in filling positions within the 14 member limit, beyond Command and General Staff members, is critical if the agency administrators' expect a short team to accomplish initial management of an incident. It must be known and understood that additional team members may need to added to meet specific incident requirements but not to the point that a long team is necessary.
2. A long team in the Northern Rockies should be configured with 27 members, and include 12 mentored trainees. The Type 1 teams would generally be mobilized in the long team configuration based on the highly complex incidents they are usually assigned to manage. At the Type 1 complexity level there may be rare cases where Type 1 teams are ordered in the short team configuration. However, based on the complexity of the incidents Type 1 teams are typically assigned to manage, short team configuration would likely be the exception rather than the rule. The 39 (27 rostered team members + 12 trainees) member long team would include the Command and General Staff plus the additional team members necessary to successfully accomplish the agency administrator's objectives and expectations. It is understood that there will be incidents where it is clear that a team with greater depth and reach is required at mobilization, some examples of when this extended team may be required are; assignment of a team to manage a complex of incidents, assignment of a team to manage an incident that spans a large geographic area, and/or assignment of a team to an incident with objectives that require a large commitment of resources.
3. The current remaining rostered team members could be on each teams' "call when needed" portion of the team roster but would/could constitute a pool of qualified individuals to be used when modules were needed.
4. Complete a new analysis of team needs for the Northern Rockies to include Type 3, and those Type 3 All Hazard teams within the Northern Rockies.
5. Consider the current numbers of teams in the Northern Rockies and decide if one less team would provide more folks in the pool to fulfill module and/or support services roles for Type 3 and higher incidents. Also, consider the creation of modules or support services from teams that are not in 2 hour call status. This concept could be valuable for short duration assignments to help a team ramp up and reach or achieve a maintenance level of activity. Modules should be flexible in configuration numbers and types of positions based on the work to be accomplished. Trainees at the Type 2 and Type 1 level could potentially be used in modules or as single resources to enhance the ramp up efforts.
6. Dispatch organizations are and will continue to be the critical link in assuring the success of the recommendations proposed above. Close coordination between IMT's and dispatch during mobilization and the early stages of incident evolution especially as it relates to the ordering of specific individuals for specific incident management needs are an essential component of these recommendation
7. Training for Agency Administrators should convey a clear explanation of the capabilities and limitations in terms of the amount and type of work that can be accomplished by Incident Management Teams in either Short or Long team configuration.

8. Incident Commanders and the requesting Agency Administrators must determine the type and number of team members needed in addition to either the short or long team standard configuration. The discussion required to determine additional needs will be based, at least in part, on the Agency Administrators objectives and expectations for management of the incident or incidents, incident complexity, the agency's ability to commit staff to fill IMT support positions, and the Incident Commander's determination of the staff needs required to accomplish the Agency Administrator's objectives and expectations. The initial discussion should occur soon after the Incident Commander is notified of the assignment but at least within the first 24 hours after notification.
9. The Northern Rockies Geographic Area Operations Manager will assign A liaison or liaisons familiar with Northern Rockies Geographic Area agencies' policies procedures, and protocols to IMTs from outside the geographic area who are assigned to manage incidents in Northern Rockies Geographic Area.
10. The NRCG BOD will apprise the other Geographic Area BODs and NICC of the Northern Rockies position regarding team configurations etc.

The Operations Committee requests concurrence and implementation of these recommendations by the NRCG BOD for the 2011 fire season.

National Perspectives

Actions recommended by the Operations Committee for consideration and submission by the NRCG BOD in response to the IMOSP report:

1. Agencies that provide IMT members must be provided with a mechanism or mechanisms to mitigate the impact to "normal" workload that occurs when those IMT members are on assignment, examples include; backfill authority, authority for the agency to authorize overtime, charged to the incident, for the IMT member to "catch up" on "day job work" not accomplished while on assignment for situations where backfill is not possible or realistic.
2. As an incentive for IMT participation consideration should be given to a graduated differential schedule, with the differential percentage based on the IMT position held. Differential pay would apply only while actually assigned on incident and would essentially be similar to existing differential pay models. Differential pay would be charged to the incident as is currently the case with the existing differential pay options.
3. Consideration should be given to a "standard duty day" while assigned on incident. This concept would follow the logic and method used to establish the standard ___hour day upon which contractors base their daily rates. Presently, while assigned to an incident all days are considered work days, this suggestion is to establish a guaranteed number of hours (beyond the 8, 9, or 10 referenced in the IIBMHB) that more closely reflects the average number of hours worked by individuals while assigned to an incident which suggested to be at or about 15 or 15 1/2 hours (this number could determined based on payroll records from past incidents). This has the potential to eliminate many of the very time consuming and often confrontational disputes surrounding time reporting.
4. Do not expand the number of "full time" teams, instead fully support (fund) actions to improve and enhance the current model.
5. Develop a program to market IMT participation that recognizes, understands, and reflects generational differences, priorities, and employment expectations.
6. Conduct the research necessary to determine, as a minimum, why individuals participate on IMTs, what keeps employees from participating on IMTs and what encourages or discourages agencies with regard to supporting employee participation on IMTs.

3. NWCG Fire Behavior Subcommittee

4/12/11
To: FENC Chair
From: FBS Co-Chairs
Subject: Incident Management Team Succession Questionnaire
Concerns regarding costs

- The financial obligations to provide the required training to personnel to maintain and reach desired competency levels is increasing, in addition to the actual number of various required training to maintain.
- The home unit loses productivity when their employees are supporting fire assignments.
- Backfilling behind IMT positions there is an associated cost to the home unit so that targets and accomplishments can continue to be met.

General

- Mentoring and training new employees - they need to know of the various opportunities that exist to support incident management which includes providing incident support that may or may not be associated with an actual Incident Management Team. In addition, the agencies need to properly mentor these individuals to make sure they truly have the competency skills and training to perform the job so the employee is successful with their support to the incident.
- Departmental Agency Administrators need to strive to be consistent, providing clear expectations for interagency agency administrators at the various unit levels. There are many mixed messages that reach the field and local publics.
- Leaders of the various agencies need to set priorities and then follow through on those priorities. Many times we will have direction provided to the units from the national level but the interpretation at the local level is not consistent. This allows for confusion amongst the field personnel.
- Increase and encourage opportunities for Incident Command System training for folks who aren't necessarily in fire positions, ie: biologists, engineers, frontliners, budget/finance personnel who have the skills to support and participate but may lack the knowledge of the ICS system. Opportunities may include participating on a fire assignment which would then help develop skills for them to participate on other all risk assignments such as Deep Horizon, hurricanes, shuttle, etc. Reference DOI training H337
- All personnel within the agencies should be encouraged/required to participate and support various incident management regardless of discipline or focus area (ologists, planners, etc should participate), this can include participation on an incident management team, or providing support to incidents in various other capacities.
- We should be using agency folks before we continue to extend opportunities for contractors, service centers, or additional NIMO positions to support various incident management incidents.
- Individuals can carry multiple qualifications on their red cards, some positions are high shortage areas (FBAN, LTAN) but many times people with these skills are qualified as DIVS, or other positions and personnel have the options to choose how they want to support the incident. This can create large holes within certain functional areas, despite the trained personnel that are within the roster.
- We should look to other agencies for other various support roles. Some positions do not require actual fireline skills, i.e., time, plans, logistics.

4. S520/620 Steering Committee

520/620 New Model (brainstorming)

- 45 + Teams
- All type 1 teams
- All full-time funded, like current NIMO's, C&G
- AC role & responsibility still needed somewhere
- T2 contract teams: Augment T1 teams but not contract teams on their own, functional models can be used
- FEMA/DHS: Used to fill gaps in Type 1 teams, train & develop skills for Wildfire
- Militia support for any IMT position
- Medium team: 27 rostered augmented by service centers, modules, single resources
- Trainees managed as central pool by GACCS
- Workforce development strategy starts at National level
- No more voluntary system!
- All NWCG agencies expected to participate

5. California IC meeting – Interagency and CAL FIRE ICs

4/20/11
Overall Strategic Goal

What do we want in IMTs?

- Readily available – on site and available 24 hours
- Fully trained and capable of managing a complex incident
- All Hazards capable
- Team sized correctly to fill all necessary positions for incident:, filled with qualified personnel
- Understanding of receiving agency policy, procedures etc.
- One type of IMT. We should have three response levels: Initial attack (Type 4 and 5 incidents), extended attack (Type 3 Incidents) and incidents managed by IMTs
- Succession planning begins with entry into agencies by putting people on career paths

Questionnaire:
What is the best way to govern interagency teams? - NWCG plus GACC with oversight

What type of IMTs will we need in the future? - Type 1s with flexibility and quality. They should be all risk

How many Type 1 and Type 2 Teams? - 35 Type 1 Teams

How should IMTs be typed - Type 1 only

How many NIMO teams? - None

Role of Area command? - Bring them in earlier and keep same role.

Role of Contract Type 2 teams - Limited role: contract logistics function. Contract additional positions, use as mentors.

Role of FEMA/DHS teams - Use on All Hazards for floods, space shuttle etc. Don't use for wildland fire.

Role of Militia in staffing teams? - Very important to both federal agencies and CALFIRE. The term for militia in CAL FIRE is Total Force. Need a financial incentive for participation. Supervisor support is required.

What is the best way to configure teams? - Long team – 56 personnel per national standard.

Should IMT participation be voluntary? - Yes, but it should be mentored, oriented, incentivized (career enhancement).

Should PDs and standards reflect expectation for incident participation? - Yes, once employees should be required to participate if they have received training.

How should IMT participation be compensated? - Standby pay, hazard pay, portal to portal pay, and recognition for participation.. CAL FIRE compensates managers (salaried) with an additional weeks pay while on incidents plus a bonus for team participation.

How should IMT participation be funded? - Incidents and all IMT activities should be funded centrally including training and meetings. This take pressure off local units to make tradeoffs.

How should IMts be dispatched. - Geographically, with some national rotation.

What is the best way to manage trainees? - Pro-active training. Focusing on needed skill sets. .Available for system training. Mentored by team in team environment.

Workforce development strategy for IMTs? - Mandatory team participation with required training in dual tracks. i.e. operations and logistics. Or planning and finance.

6. International Association of Fire Chiefs Wildland Fire Policy Committee

April 2011
To: Chair, NWCG
Thank you for the opportunity to both review the "Draft Incident Management Organization Succession Planning" documents and to provide comments.

In summary we find that even though there has been considerable effort which is appreciated, the following flaws exist:

1. When looking at the concept of Evolving Incident Management and Incident Management Organizational Successional Planning it appears this effort truly only looks at the federal picture. If NWCG is truly going to lead this effort, the results should include the other federal, state and local government agencies that have jurisdictional responsibility.
2. The "problem statement" and subsequent alternatives do not adequate identify or address issues that create barriers for both successional planning and evolving incident management.
3. Many of the issues identified in the 11 Overarching Principles are symptoms of a larger organizational dilemma. The issues of agency administrator accountability, availability, liability for Incident Commanders, using technology for strategic risk assessment, service modules, successional planning and interagency cooperation can only be accomplished with all agencies with both wildland and other incident response capability and jurisdiction can both contribute and be part of the solutions. The larger organizational dilemma for the federal agencies may be balancing the growing demands for managing natural resources while simultaneously managing the growing demands for both wildland fire and other incident response.
4. Since ROSS is the primary mobilization and resource tracking system used by the federal agencies for incidents, the issue of how non-federal partners including private wildland fire services can even access ROSS and contribute to the solution is not addressed.

Please review our in-depth analysis of the issues surrounding Evolving Incident Management and consider our proposed alternative.

To begin we have repeated the direction/purpose from NWCG to the IMOSP Teams as those teams began the deliberation of this task.

National Incident Management Team Succession Planning – Key Messages

"NWCG recognizes that the incident management business model should be updated to reflect today's wildland fire needs. Our current workforce management and succession planning for wildfire response is not sustainable for the future. We recognize that the increasing fire season length is negatively impacting all of our agencies abilities to meet their missions due to personnel serving on teams and having less time to accomplish their normal job duties. We must update our militia based model to better address future incident management demands. NWCG also needs to ensure line officer expectations are adequately addressed for incident management."

Paul Volker, in his address to Council for Excellence in Government stated, "There is a sense…that the time has come for a real change—for not just tinkering around the edges, but for something much more fundamental. We need a model fitting into the 21st Century, a model that will facilitate more flexible management…"

In short both the direction and possible solutions seem to fix yesterday's problems, most just result in "tinkering around the edges" and none really address fundamental IMT Organizational Successional Planning or Evolving Incident Management for the 21st Century. There are portions of three organizational models, with significant modifications, that will address the needs in the future.

It is clear that the IMOSP teams devoted considerable time and energy to both the guiding principles and organizational models. Please thank the members for that effort and making the process transparent. When we reviewed previous efforts, a significant assortment of related reports and findings which addressed these issues, we find that many of those recommendations were either not utilized or not fully considered with this latest effort,

which is symptomatic of a broader cultural issue of continuing to study an issue, using existing "systems" and either partially implementing recommendations or simply starting over when partial solutions did not solve the problem.

We have listed only a partial list of previous efforts that must guide the final product:

1. The National Interagency Complex Incident Management Organization Study 2004: This effort recommended seven NIMO IMT with an excellent implementation strategy. To date only four NIMO IMT exist with no viable plans to move forward with full implementation. The success of this study's recommended option was predicated on two imperative actions: 1) planning and executing an aggressive landscape-scale vegetation management program; and 2) implementing the nine key recommendations of the Study. Many of the recommendations have not been implemented although some have been incorporated in the IMOSP efforts.
2. The USDA Forest Service An Agency Strategy for Fire Management: A Report from the National Management Review Team (Jacobs' Report): "Without making a significant organizational change, the overall ability to manage large wildland fires will be compromised."
3. Policy Implications of Large Fire Management: A Strategic Assessment of Factors Influencing Costs—A report by the Strategic Overview of Large Fire Costs Team (Rains Report): The answer seems so simple: act now, establish wildland fire management as a top priority and begin to implement the recommendations that will ensure we meet our role and responsibility in protecting lives and property from wildland fires."
4. Interagency Management Review Team, South Canyon Fires: "Continued commitment on the part of both management and individuals is key to continued improvements. Each must regularly renew their commitment and become responsible and accountable for their actions.
5. The Federal Wildland Fire Policy 1995, 2001 and 2009: "Finding sufficient personnel within the agencies to meet annual fire season staffing…has been increasingly difficult. An anticipated increase in retirements of fire managers raises a serious question about how agencies will conduct their fire management mission."
6. Additional Actions Required to Better Identify and Prioritize Lands Needing Fuels Reduction—GAO -03-805: "A number of factors, including weather and diversion of resources to fire suppression have hindered the Forest Service's and Interior's ability to complete their annual fuels reduction workloads."
7. Wildfire Suppression: Strategies for Containing Costs, National Academy of Public Administration (2002): …"fire programs could benefit from developing additional locally committed Type 3 organizations consisting of federal and local firefighters who are not committed to serving on Type 1 or Type 2 teams."
8. Large Fire Suppression Costs Strategies for Cost Containment (2004). "The catastrophic fires that have occurred in the past five years provide a sobering look at the impacts on public health and safety. Jobs have been lost, businesses and schools interrupted, infrastructure and environmental damage occurred. Lives, property and natural resources were seriously threatened and often destroyed."
9. Study of the Implementation of the Federal Wildland Fire Policy, National Academy of Public Administration (2000): "The current methods of meeting human resource needs for fighting wildland fire (using professional leadership drawn from a volunteer fire "militia") may not be sustainable in the future."
10. GAO-11-423T; GAO Testimony before the Subcommittee on Interior, Environment and Related Agencies before the House of Representatives: Strategies are still needed to ensure effective use of wildland fire management funds**.** In numerous previous reports, GAO has highlighted the challenges the Forest Service faces in protecting the nation against the threat of wildland fire. The agency continues to take steps to improve its approach, but it has yet to take several key steps—including developing a cohesive wildland fire strategy that identifies potential long-term options for reducing hazardous fuels and responding to fires—that, if completed, would substantially strengthen wildland fire management.
11. The 2009 QFR: "Given the threats and risks of the escalating wildland fire challenge, the path forward must seek to ensure that the efforts of all the stakeholders in fire management reinforce and multiply each other—so the whole will be greater than the sum of the parts." This begs the answer to two questions? Why are we only looking at Evolving Incident Management with options that only consider a majority of federal agency participation? How will the recommendations of the 2009 OFR be implemented with this effort?

In the IMOSP latest efforts we believe the 11 Overarching Principles are in some cases, simply a restatement of the above mentioned studies and reports, while we can't philosophically disagree with the concept, it begs the question of **"will there ever be enough corporate will or courage to implement any of these?"**

When we look closely and honestly at the Overarching Principles, compelling questions arise:

1. Why should this effort only focus on responsiveness to Federal Fire Policy? In reality most IMT mobilizations result in a unified command scenario and consequently private land jurisdictions with State, municipalities and fire districts are involved. We understand that federal agencies sponsor these federal teams but to truly look at IMT's and Evolving Incident Management along with organizational models for the future, why are we not looking at the total picture to include all teams?

2. How does this effort address the forthcoming Cohesive Strategy, specifically wildland fire response and implementation of the FLAME Act? We understand there is much remaining work with Phase II and III, IMT Successional Planning and Evolving Incident Management must be linked to this effort.
3. How does this effort meet the objectives of the National Response Framework? Are we replicating what FEMA and others are doing?
4. How have the federal agencies been held accountable the last decade for implementing the Federal Fire Policy, reducing large fire costs, providing for fire fighter and public safety (human life), values to be protected, training, risk management, programmatic decisions on budgets and staffing by line officers with minimal wildland fire program training or experience? Many times the initial decisions on wildland fires from a strategy and tactic perspective from agency administrators have resulted in irretrievable decision space for incoming IMT's. We understand we have new Risk Management models for these decisions but if the models aren't used, where is the accountability?
5. How will support of incident management team decisions by agency administrators be different? The liability issue must be addressed with immunity for wildland firefighters, end of discussion.
6. How will interagency cooperation/external considerations be improved when many geographic areas (federal agencies) currently as we speak not only discourage and in some cases disband IMT's because of the perception of too many local government members, again based on the perception of cost containment? Why are we not focused on what we are buying versus what we are spending?
7. Where does it say that we want the "best of the best" on IMT's regardless of agency affiliation or color of uniform? Today's challenges in wildland fire will not be met with "simply who is available." IMT members and participation in the future must not be dictated by arbitrary geographic or jurisdictional boundaries if in fact our desired outcome is the "best of the best."
8. How could we possibly entertain any contractual actions for IMT's when currently the federal agencies are woefully understaffed with contract personnel, policy and cultural bias to meet the current demands for both aircraft and the private wildland fire services, why add IMT's to the mix? Did anyone from the IMOSP ever approach a private company and ask the question, "can you do this, are you interested and what might the costs be?"
9. We see no mention in the Overarching Principles of how these teams will be managed and led. We see no mention of Type 3 organizations or "teams" when in reality during Preparedness Levels 4 and 5, Type 3 organizations become a critical resource shortage. For certain the existing management of IMT's including Type 3 organizations are not working well at these Preparedness Levels.
10. We see no mention of the significant organizational conundrum where ROSS is the primary system for identifying, statusing, mobilizing and tracking resources for incident management. If we truly want the help, assistance, expertise and resources available from other federal and state agencies, local government and private wildland fire services this must be addressed. The fact of the matter is ROSS may provide a valuable service for the federal agencies, but if you are an experienced incident management resource from most of the above mentioned entities, good luck in finding your way into the system.

We appreciate the overall philosophy of the IMOSP by providing a range of options for consideration and certainly we have noted the most recent accomplishments identified by the IMOSP teams and while worthy of mention to achieve the Overarching Principles, which organizational model or options do these actions/accomplishment support?

Solutions

If we are going to achieve the stated purposes of the 2009 QFR, implement the Guiding Principles of Evolving Incident Management, and implement most of the recommendations of the previously illustrated reports, reviews, policy and forthcoming efforts i.e. Cohesive Strategy, we simply must not add this to some other group; this effort must have full time attention and both lead and staffed by people "who are the right people, with the right skills at the right time for leadership."

The International Fire Chief's Association, specifically the Wildland Fire Policy Committee recommends the following solutions and combined options: [Editor's Note:: please see section on Alternative Models].

Both Evolving Incident Management and IMT Successional Planning will be forever linked to the constantly evolving larger mission of both wildland fire and all-risk response. We reiterate our appreciation for the efforts and transparency to date and offer our continued involvement and commitment to this effort. It is inconceivable for anyone to believe that this effort is the "fix all" for these subjects. By establishing this truly as our highest priority, organizing with the right leadership, staffing and financial support and with the cultural philosophy of both collaboration and adaptive management, we will address these issues.

Sincerely, Chair, IAFC Wildland Fire Policy Committee

7. Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC)

Following please find the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservations' (DNRC) response to the Incident Management Organization Succession Planning Teams" report entitled, "Evolving Incident Management; An Analysis of Organizational Models for the Future". While we find some aspects of the "Overarching Principles" to be conceptually sound we did not find that any of the "Organizational Models", as proposed, provide an operationally viable or sustainable way forward to the future of incident management organizations. Further, the Department finds that the reports credibility is compromised in that it lacks a clear "bias for action", is unmistakably premised on an overwhelming Federal focus, at a time when most large fires are multijurisdictional, and relies on unsubstantiated assumptions to justify aspects of many of the organizational models.

Against this backdrop the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation provides the following comments for consideration:

1. The current model of Interagency Incident Management Teams (IMT) comprised of members for whom IMT participation is a collateral duty has served the public, the agencies, the fire service, and the IMT members well. It is both possible and sensible to improve, maintain, and sustain this Incident Management Organizational model.
2. The quality and capability of IMTs is in large part a direct result of the interagency composition of the teams and a key element in the sustainability and operational viability of future Incident Management Organizations.
3. While the implementation of incentives for IMT participation at the agency and individual level may assist in the recruitment and retention of IMT members, a more realistic and immediate improvement in recruitment and retention may be realized through the mitigation and/or elimination of the disincentives to IMT participation and/or Agency support for IMT participation which presently exist.
4. Agencies with responsibility for wildland fire management must be required and held accountable to recognize this responsibility as an **essential** Agency function and require, by policy, participation in incident management organizations as a **mission critical condition of employment** for at least those individuals employed in fire funded positions.
5. The lack of substantive evidence indicating a positive cost/benefit ratio for the NIMO or NIMO like model argues strongly against the expansion of the NIMO program beyond its current configuration.
6. IMTs have been effectively managed (governed) by the geographic areas and the geographic areas should continue to maintain a geographic rotation for Type1 IMTs and control the rotation and dispatch for type 2 IMTs.
7. There is a necessary and appropriate distinction that exists within and among Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3 incidents with regard to the complexity and the attendant management expectations for those incidents, as such it is equally necessary and appropriate to recognize and retain the distinction in terms of the management experience and expertise that exists within and among Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3 IMTs.
8. Development of an aggressive Interagency program to market IMT participation that recognizes, understands, and reflects generational differences, priorities, and employment expectations should begin immediately.
9. Implement a single qualification system to encourage and facilitate the involvement of all hazard incident management team members and others from "non traditional" agencies/entities on IMTs.
10. Conduct the research necessary to determine, as a minimum, why individuals participate on IMTs, what keeps employees from participating on IMTs, and what encourages or discourages agencies with regard to supporting employee participation on IMTs.

Successful succession planning for Incident Management requires commitment at all organizational levels to a comprehensive integrated process that moves beyond a focus on replacing individuals to an effort that develops and strengthens leadership at all levels of the incident management organization. Successful succession planning encompasses a variety of development tools used simultaneously including but not limited to: classroom training, individual development plans, mentoring and coaching, on the job training, and rotational work assignments. The keys to any successful succession planning and management program are the commitment and involvement of an agency or organizations' top leadership and the financial support required to implement and sustain the program. Succession planning and management must be viewed as an investment and not a cost.

8. National Association of State Foresters Fire Committee

April 28, 2011
Overarching Principles

- Agencies with responsibility for wildland fire management must be required and held accountable to recognize this requirement as an essential agency function and require by policy, participation in incident management organizations as a mission critical condition of employment for at least those employees funded in fire positions.
- Implement a single qualification system to encourage and facilitate the involvement of all hazard incident management team members and others from "non traditional" agencies/entities on IMTs.
- All Hazard IMT3 competencies should be recognized and crosswalks for wildland fire should be developed. On a larger scale, NWCG should be committed to work with FEMA to develop and implement a complete all hazard qualification program including wildland fire.
- NWCG should place more emphasis on wildland fire IMT3s. IMT3s can provide a national network of quick response teams. Consider adding standards for IMT3s to NWCG 310-1.
- IMTs should respond in configurations as requested or negotiated. Incident organizations should be flexible and scalable based on the incident. Adhere to national mobilization guidelines.
- IMTs must have the ability to implement management responses for all agencies they are assigned not just federal fire policy.
- Further investigation of motivations and incentives should be explored. Several recommendations need to be more conducive to interagency partners. There are questions on how state and local government would fund some of the recommendations.
- Develop an aggressive interagency program to market IMT participation that recognizes, understands, and reflects generational difference, priorities, and employment expectations.
- Time required to obtain incident qualifications is too long. Training and mentoring successes should be shared and expanded. The NWCG Operations Workforce Development Committee should fully explore and describe the latitude currently in NWCG 310-1 to reduce time required for qualifications.
- The interagency participation of state and local agencies strengthens the geographic area sponsored and national IMTs. Some organization models prohibit or restrict interagency involvement.
- National standard operating procedures for IMTs should be developed and implemented by the geographic areas.
- Continue to recognize the contribution of the 34 State IMTs to the national capacity for incident response. Many of these teams are IMT1 qualified and all are at least IMT2 qualified. Utilize these teams when they are available.
- State IMTs are often required to mobilize for all hazards in addition to wildland fire.

Organizational Models

- Expanding the number of NIMO teams does not increase interagency capability. It draws resources from established teams.
- Continue to evaluate the number of IMTs needed. The management of wildland fire by additional IMT3s could reduce the number of IMT1s and IMT2s needed.
- Core Team State and Current Situation with some of the Overarching Principles applied were the most popular preferences by the states.
- There is a need to continue with IMT1s and IMT2s. (Some states like the single standard).
- States reported little or no support for contract teams.
- Develop mentoring programs within specific IMT positions and sections where there is known shortages that are designed to move highly motivated and skilled personnel through the training and experience process in a timely manner.

Contact: NASF Fire Director

9. Firescope Board of Directors

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(Acting) Secretary, California Emergency Management Agency

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Chief, California Emergency Management Agency, Fire and Rescue Division/ **FIRESCOPE Executive Coordinator**

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FIRESCOPE

Cal EMA FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE ADVISORY COMMITTEE/ FIRESCOPE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

3650 Schriever Avenue
Mather, CA 95655

April 25, 2011

Project Manager
Incident Management Organization
Succession Planning Team

Dear

Thank you for the opportunity to review the "Draft Incident Management Organization Succession Planning" documents and share a perspective from the FIRESCOPE Board of Directors.

The Board reviewed the documents and offers the following comments.

1. The effort singularly focuses on the Federal Incident Management Team Picture. State and local Government Incident Management Team involvement in this process is absent. State and local Government employees are involved and have a stake in what form a successful strategy takes. Additionally, nearly every IMT deployment results in a unified command with State, local government, or fire districts. There is no discussion of the involvement of State Type II Teams and Type III Teams in the documents. A complete strategy development effort requires consideration of all IMT's.
2. Liability for Agency Administrators and Incident Commanders will continue to present a significant obstacle to any long-term efforts to sustain quality incident management personnel. This specific item needs to be highlighted as one of the most significant issues facing the future of sustaining Incident Management Teams.
3. A long-term strategy not only needs to look at cost containment, but also at incentives to ensure sustained quality of team membership. Unfortunately, very little incentive exists for the non-Federal Incident Management Team members or their sponsoring agencies to participate. No incentive pay exists for the member or agency to continue to support certifications or qualifications. In fact, the perception exists that cost containment strategies are influencing team make up by reducing the number of non-Federal IMT members.
4. The Board does not see the use of contractual IMT's as a viable alternative to meet future demands.

The approach of the Incident Management Organization Succession Planning Team was thoughtful in providing a range of approaches to consider. The recent accomplishments identified in the documents are also noteworthy. The FIRESCOPE Board looks forward to continuing to partner to pursue the best approach that we believe is incorporated in the following overarching areas:

April 25, 2011
Page 2

1. Continue to support and develop the capacity or incident management organizations (Type I, II and III) to ensure that all team members have the training and ability to address wildfires and other disasters, regardless of jurisdiction.
2. Build the capability for all incident management teams to be able to integrate and work effectively within emergency response – focusing first on local incident management teams working with FEMA All-Hazard Incident Management Type III teams and extending to larger national areas of operation.
3. Continue to work cooperatively at every level to document and remove obstacles that present long-term difficulties in maintaining and sustaining quality incident management teams.

The Board understands this is not a simple undertaking. We reiterate our appreciation for the thoughtful approach to date and offer our continued involvement and commitment to this worthwhile effort.

Very truly yours,

FIRESCOPE Board of Directors

10. Southwest Coordinating Group

Bureau of Land Management: Arizona, New Mexico
Fish and Wildlife Service, Region 2
Bureau of Indian Affairs: Southwest, Navajo, Western Regions
National Park Service: Intermountain Region
U. S. Forest Service, Southwestern Region
Arizona State Forestry Division
New Mexico State Forestry

April 29, 2011

Dear

This document states the Southwest Geographic Area consolidated position on Incident Management Organization Succession Planning (IMOSP). The Southwest Coordination Group has solicited the comments/opinions from the various agencies and the personnel that make up the Southwest Geographic Area to produce this document.

Overall: The consensus view in the Southwest is that the current Incident Management Organization (IMO) model is effective. It is not that the current IMT system is broken regarding on the ground incident management, it's that if cannot be sustained. The first option - Current Situation with Overarching Recommendations was by far the favored alternative. We do not need to re-invent IMTs in its entirety. The current IMT system that has evolved over the last 30 plus years can be refined by addressing those specific areas that need improvement, and developing solutions for those areas. The current already functional structure can be built upon at a fraction of the cost of the other options, and implementation would be expedited as few if any changes to the law would be required.

1. **Any option needs to be budget neutral with no negative impacts to present initial attack capabilities and funding.**

Any option must consider the realities of future federal budgets. With climbing deficits, significant budget increases seem unlikely. Over the past few years' wildland fire budgets have been largely flat or declining. Any option that detracts from initial attack capacities is not supported by the Southwest Area.

2. **Elimination of NIMO.**

NIMO teams in their present state are not interagency entities. They are expensive to set up and maintain. The value of the NIMO concept is yet to be proven. NIMO takes qualified C&G personnel from the existing IMT's and because they do not work at a local level their team members are less connected with local issues and resource management. The consensus opinion in the Southwest Area is to eliminate NIMO

3. Team Typing.

The Southwest GACG was split on this concept. Good arguments were made by both those for typing and those for consolidation. Most agreed that a standard team size of 27 can work where additional positions and resources can be filled as needed dependent on the complexity of the incident. The elimination of team typing would affect position task books, training, qualification standards, and more. How incident complexity is now evaluated and described would also have to be revised.

4. Continue to supervise teams by geographic area on a geographic/national rotation.

The present system of governance works well. The GACGs need to retain control of their respective teams. It is important to the agencies/units of the Southwest Area that the local teams be responsive to the needs of our local areas first. A local team ensures a higher level of familiarity with local fuel types, management issues, politics etc… then one from out of GACG. The national rotation triggered by scarcity and maintained by NICC to supply teams when local capacity is exhausted works well and should be continued. The Southwest Area supports the under taking of an Interagency analysis to determine or validate the number and location of teams needed.

5. Promote the development and use of Zone Type 3 Incident Management Teams.

The Southwest GACG supports expanded use of Type 3 Teams. The Type 3 teams mobilize quickly and provide a local less expensive alternative in fire management. It should be an option and used when appropriate. Participation on Type 3 teams is also a component in developing higher qualifications.

6. Continue to use personnel from federal agencies, state and local fire departments to fill team rosters.

A healthy federal "militia" should be retained and encouraged to participate at all levels/positions of the IMTs. The continued participation of state and local fire departments is also desirable.

7. No role for Type 2 Contract Teams.

There is no place for contract teams in the IMT matrix. Incident management is a true role of government. Turning this function over to a contract organization is abdicating governments' proper role. This is a huge watch out. Turning over incident management could put us in a state of operations much like the present health care HMO situation. Even with contractual sideboards, a commercial organization has far different priorities and goals.

8. Continue to use AD's to fill team rosters.

The use of AD hires to supplement team positions should continue but not at the expense of developing qualified agency individuals. Nationally or at the GACG level criteria needs to be developed that limits the percent of ADs in C&G and favors the use of agency people.

9. Establish formal processes for identifying position shortages and create accelerated paths to higher ICS qualifications for qualifying employees.

Not all ICS positions have shortages, but those positions with scarcity need special attention. The Southwest Area supports the concept of recognition of prior learning for non-operations positions such as finance, logistics, etc. Individuals with the skills in those areas could be tested and fast tracked

into higher positions based on their work/life experience. NWCG standards would be maintained and competent individuals could be used to fill ICS positions quicker if such a system were adopted. Utilizing IQCS and/or merging with IQS should also be looked at as a possible position tracking tool.

10. Develop modules (Finance, Plans, Logistics) and utilize existing service centers to bolster capabilities

The Southwest GACG supports the module concept. The modules can effectively create small cohesive teams of functional experts and fill the void in those areas plagued by position vacancy. Technology exists that make it feasible for specialists to services several incidents from an office or central location. It is preferred to have support services on site at the incident when possible. That optimizes work flow and accountability. A caution with any centralization is the further removed generally the less responsive the service.

11. Provide incentives for organizations, managers and employees that participate on IMTs.

There is little incentive for line managers to promote IMT participation under the present system. To attract management support, provide funding incentives for IMT involvement. At a minimal organizations' should have the ability to charge base 8's to fires, to compensate managers that provide individuals for the IMT's. Another incentive could be a mechanism where line officers can back fill behind an IMT participant during an active season and charge travel/costs off to a suppression account. Some form of target release/reduction for offices that support IMTs and provide manpower during active fire years should be considered.

12. Agency quota for IMT participation; performance element in EPAPs

Once the exact number of IMTs is established each agency should be given a quota for the number of IMT positions each is expected to fill nationally. Agencies can then negotiate how many per GACG each can accommodate. Performance measures should be included into fire funded personnel's EPAPs that direct IMT participation. Employee career paths should be incentivized to enable easier and quicker transition to new qualification requirements. Measures to ensure employee accountability also need to be set in place. There is a large investment from the agencies to train employees. Level of training should correspond to a level of participation.

13. Establish Liaison Officer as an IMT position

This has been a useful position to SW IMTs especially during both type 1 and 2 incidents.

Sincerely,

Chair, Southwest Coordinating Group

11. State of Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources/ NASF Forest Protection Committee

FR:; Chair, NASF Forest Protection Committee
Subject: NWCG Incident Management Team Succession Planning

Dear [ ]:

I would like to start out by saying that with the retirement of a large portion of experienced personnel, both now and in the near future, it is good to know that IMT succession planning is occurring on the national level. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to comment on the project report by the Incident Management Organization Succession Planning Team.

I do have a few comments related to the models that are proposed in the project report. I will group my comments by the proposed organizational model heading.

Current Situation with Overarching Principles: The project report says "IMT tenures are limited to single terms in positions when trainees have been certified and are ready to move into fully qualified positions." While this will accelerate the succession of IMT members, caution needs to be used regarding placing people into positions too quickly. A person may complete all tasks in a task book to be certified, but additional experience may be of benefit before the person is truly able, and comfortable, with working independently in that position. As this varies from person to person, putting the time frame of "limited to single terms" may push people through the system faster than is practical. Discussion should occur between the trainee, their supervisor, and the qualified IMT member who is evaluating the trainee versus establishing an arbitrary time frame. Once they all reach agreement, then the trainee may be placed into a fully qualified position as they open up. Trainee assignments should be encouraged and supported by agencies in order to advance personnel through the IMT ranks. The more opportunities an individual gets, the quicker they will become comfortable with operating independently in that position.

Single Standard: This option creates greater flexibility in obtaining an IMT for an incident. The pool of IMTs is expanded with the single standard. Instead of having 26 Type 1 teams and 56 Type 2 teams, there will potentially be 82 teams to pick from for an incident. This will require determining at what level the teams need to function at, potentially requiring additional training and experience for the current Type 2 teams.

External Capacity (Contract): A strong cost analysis needs to be continually conducted if this is implemented. Many times it has been found that the cost of contracting on some jobs tends to be higher than having employees complete the same job. This philosophy also depends on the willingness of retirees to continue to do the work. At least in Wisconsin, there is a large gap between ages of current employees and our retirees. This would produce a gap in the up coming years between when the current retirees are willing to serve on an IMT and new, qualified retirees are available to replace members of the IMT as contractors. This will bring us right back to where we are today. The other difficulty with this concept is that as the work is contracted out to retirees, the agency people may not get the experience needed to gain qualifications within an IMT. Eventually this will reduce the pool of qualified contractors in the private sector as fewer people will be available to fill positions when the contractors decide they no longer are willing or able to continue to fill the need of an IMT.

External Capacity (All Hazard & Contract): This may require more training and experience for the FEMA-USFA teams before they are ready to step into the role of running a wildfire. Many of these teams (although willing if needed) do not run a wildfire incident because the state and federal agencies are considered the "experts" at this and are much more experienced at it. Locally, these teams are just becoming established and looking to shadow current state agency teams in order to gain experience and get practical, hands-on training on how an IMT functions and ways to manage an incident. Although this is a viable option, full implementation of this is a few years down the road.

Core Team and Core Team - State: This system allows for the flexibility to expand and contract the organizational structure as the incident needs are determined. One thing that should be recognized with this is that part of the reason IMTs are successful is that they function as a team, with the same members, on all incidents. Teams develop their own style and cohesiveness as they grow. By utilizing a core team, and rotating different members into the positions below the Command and General Staff level, the core team will develop as a team, but the rotating members may not develop that same cohesiveness with the core team as they would if they were part of the team as a whole. This concept can still be implemented by establishing a full team (as is done now) to train together and respond

together as needed, but only activating the positions that are required to run the incident at the time. This will allow the teams to develop the cohesiveness that is essential in creating a good IMT, while providing the flexibility that the ICS structure allows depending on the nature of the incident. This flexibility will also allow agencies to reduce costs by only utilizing what is needed to run the incident.

We need to continue to provide support to agency personnel to gain the experience and qualifications needed to fill an IMT. Employees that are members of an IMT need to recognize that it is a commitment and a priority, and they need to do everything they can to meet that commitment. Agencies and supervisors need to be supportive of IMT involvement and recognize that IMT involvement by employees may mean that at times, other work is not completed as employees serve on IMT assignments and training opportunities. The use of trainees needs to be strongly emphasized across all agencies in order to allow personnel to advance through the ranks. Even if the incident does not require the need for a trainee, providing trainees with that experience will pay greater dividends in the future as the need to find qualified, experienced IMT personnel increases.

I would again like to thank you for providing the opportunity to comment on IMT succession planning. These are difficult times facing our IMTs across the nation as qualified personnel retire and agencies have fewer experienced personnel available to fill the gap. I look forward to seeing the outcomes of this study and meeting the challenges forthcoming in the near future to fill the need for IMT membership.

12. National Incident Commanders/Area Commanders Council

April 2011
To: IMOSP Committee and the Chair, NWCG

The National Type 1 Incident Commanders, Area Commanders and National Incident Management Organization (NIMO Type 1 Incident Commanders) want to thank the IMOSP working team and NWCG for the opportunity to voice our concerns, comments and recommendations related to the future of Incident Management, Incident Management Organization Succession Planning, and the complexities surrounding "Evolving Incident Management" with the following document and summary. While our response is a general census from the National IC/AC Council we want to recommend that the communications be maintained and the recommendations be updated and continued input be provided by the National IC/AC Council as we make an attempt to improve the future of Incident Management and find possible answers, solutions and options to this ever growing issue of "Evolving Incident Management" and the future of Incident Management Organizations. The IC/AC Council also supports the "IMT Organizational Model Proposal" submitted by our four Area Command Teams.

Federal Questionnaire: Incident Management Organization Succession Planning
Section 1: Demographics

- While around 60% of the current ACs, ICs are made up of federal employees the remainder is made up of federal retirees, local and state agencies. The current ICs will continue to decline and fall into the retired ranks filling Deputy AC or IC roles seeking employment with a local government agency.
- The Day-to Day job responsibilities for the ACs and ICs consist of Fire Program Positions, retirees, very few Line Officers/Agency Administrators.
- The average age of Type 1 ICs is over 50 years old and the average of ACs is over 55 years old.

Section 2: Overarching Principles

- For effective succession planning for qualified and available staffing of IMTs the current system of "voluntary" participation needs to change.
- The IC/AC Council recommends a Single NIMS Qualification System.
- Agencies need to be accountable for development of employees for IMT positions and provide the necessary training and on the job assignments.
- Incident complexity needs to include all emergencies and all risk incidents not just wildfire. While IMTs are already configured to be scalable depending on the complexity current Team composition has shown to be effective and has evolved because of advances in technology, the need for information, complex multi-jurisdictional incidents. Cohesion of teams is a big draw for participants.
- Current model for service centers (ACS) to provide additional qualified personnel in finance does not work now. However with better expectations and requirements for available personnel Modules and Service Centers could provide essential IMT support in some critical areas like procurement, GIS, medical, predictive services, WFDSS (FS-Pro and RAVAR support), and communications.

- IMTs need to have the necessary knowledge to implement all management responses consistent with the Federal Fire Policy but in the world of evolving incident management IMTs need the necessary knowledge, skills and training to respond FEMA all hazard responses and guidelines under the National Response Plan.
- The IC/AC Council feels that the concept of "incentives" and/or compensation strategies should be considered for IMT members. There need to be an incentive to want to excel to the Type 1 National level in a Command and General Staff position as well all Area Command Positions. For Federal employees we support the recommendations for grade structure identified in the "Overarching assumptions" for Type 1 IMTs. This model however does not address incentives for State, Local Government, and retired federal personnel assigned to IMTs or AC Teams. Other incentives would include time on assignments going towards retirement, a bonus pay system that is used in California for Chief Officers assigned to CAL FIRE IMTs, Grade levels and series similar to the current NIMO structure for Command & General Staff on Type 1 Teams. Savings for federal employees assigned to IMTs or AC teams to home units would be based on fire activity but should also address all hazard incidents for base hours worked.
- The IC/AC Council fully supports Standardizing Operating Procedures for IMTs but again needs to address all hazard incidents as well as the wildfires.
- Root causes of non-participation on IMTs and the shortage of ICs are directly related to liability concerns. This is not address in any of the models. Concerns include agencies expectations, clear and defines policies, protection related to potential liability, as well current procedures related to accident investigations on incidents.
- The IC/AC Council agrees that any model chosen for the future of IMTs and AC Teams should have strong support from Agency Administrators related to IMT decision making regardless of outcomes. Again the model should address personal liability concerns.
- The IC/AC Council recommends for any successful future model of IMTs and AC Teams that there need to be review and amendment of current Legislative authorities regarding responsibilities and authorities for the fed agencies and ensure that they address the use of our state and local interagency partners to respond to, support and manage fire and non fire incidents. The IC/AC council recommends that there be a review and amendment of the current agreements between the federal fire agencies and our state and local partner's authorities, responsibilities and liability issues in regards to their use at fire and non fire incidents in response, support, and management of these incidents. The IC/AC Council recommends a change in the current use of AD authority related to retire federal senior leadership personnel to utilize their expertise, knowledge, experience, and skills to help develop future IMT and AC team members.
- The IC/AC Council recommends the future model for IMTs and AC Teams ensure consistent financial practices for federal agencies regarding charging base salaries to emergency accounts for both fire and non fire incidents
- The IC/AC Council recommends that we have effective use of all federal, state and local partner resources clearly identified and status in ROSS.

Section 3: Building Block of Organizational Models

- The IC/AC Council recommends the following as the best way to govern teams:
    1. Area Command Teams and NIMO Teams: **NMAC**
    2. Type 1 Incident Management Teams: **NMAC**
    3. Type 2 Incident Management Teams: **GACC**
    4. Type 3 Incident Management Teams: **State, Local, DHS**
- The IC/AC Council recommends for "How many Interagency Type 1 and Type 2 teams will need" that we use the **National Interagency Complex Incident Management Organization Study 2004** as a base line for number of teams. The Council also recommends that a study (Team Use Study) be compiled reviewing the actual use of Teams for the past 20 years to help determine the need.
- The IC/AC Council recommends that we maintain Type 1 Interagency Incident Management Teams (including NIMO teams) and Type 2 Interagency Incident Management Teams. Type 3 Teams need to continue to be developed for initial response on fire and non fire incidents. These Type 3 teams would be utilized as the foundation for an extended attack incident (based on complexity) with the expectation they would be the trainees for future succession development of the Type 2 Teams in Command & General Staff positions as well as key Unit Leader positions. The same recommendation for Type 2 Command & General Staff positions with the expectation they would be the future mentee/trainees for the National Type 1 Incident Management Teams.
- The **National Interagency Complex Incident Management Organizational Study 2004** recommends seven NIMO Teams. The outcome of NIMO teams is still unproven. The IC/AC Council feels that the Department of Interior needs to also support the development of NIMO Teams. Clear objectives for our NIMO Teams need to be developed and identified. NIMO Teams need to be interagency for future succession development.

- The IC/AC Council views the role of Area Command as: "Used to oversee the management of multiple incidents that are each being managed by separate incident management organizations or to oversee the management of a very large incident that has multiple Incident Management Teams assigned. Will provide a mechanism for Agency Administrators to reduce the span of control over the incident management teams and improve the effective and efficient use of resources. Area Commands develop broad objectives and strategies for the assigned incidents and coordinate the development of individual incident objectives and strategies that are consistent and complementary between IMTs". The IC/AC Council see the role of Area Command same as the present.
- The IC/AC Council views the future role for Type 2 contract teams for surge capacity in extremely busy years only but recommends that they be more effect at the Type 3 level and that they would not be utilized enough for Type 2 incidents for contractors to maintain training and required qualifications.
- The IC/AC Council views the role of FEMA/DHS Type 3 teams and agency "All Hazard Teams" in supporting/managing wildfire as surge capacity in extremely busy years only but would serve a better role for initial attack into extended attack and as the foundations for future development as mentees/trainees for Type 2 and 1 Teams.
- The IC/AC Council views the role of the "militia" in staffing teams for any position on IMTs with the same requirement for positions either Unit leaders or Command General Staff. There should be an expectation that the "militia" will support fire and non fire incidents and at the very least at their local level or area.
- The National IC/AC Council recommends the Large Team configuration (per National Mob Guide Standard 27 + 17 negotiated + 10 mentees/trainees) for the Type 1 and Type 2 Incident Management Teams. Those teams could be scalable based on need on the incident and complexity. Teams could be augmented within GACCs and a review of the concept being utilized in Alaska is a possible solution with the shortage of qualified personnel of key positions.
    1. Alaska recognized several years ago that they were no longer able to field their Type 1 IMT and their two Type 2 IMTs simultaneously. Additionally, they recognized that they had more IMT practitioners who were willing and able to participate on an IMT, but for various reasons, were unable to commit as a Primary IMT member. The Alaska IMT model evolved because of the necessary realignment of all IMT personnel and recognition of the importance of a deep bench of alternates that included AD IMT members.

       Instead of loosing Type 1 capability as has occurred in other geographic areas, this approach allows Alaska to choose between fielding a Type 1 IMT or two Type 2 IMTs.

       The Alaska IMT model considers the greater 300 personnel pool as "The Team." Depending on the anticipated incident needs, some members go and some do not.

       Alaska establishes a geographic area Type 2 IMT rotation in anticipation of the Alaska fire season from mid April through July. Two Type 2 IMTs share a ten-day rotation. Typically, the Alaska Type 1 IMT is made unavailable on the National Rotation during this window. Alaska retains the capability to supplement one of these IMTs to attain Type 1 capability, or to mobilize its second Type 2 IMT, or two use the capability of the remainder of the IMT pool to supplement incoming L'48 IMTs or Type 3 organizations.

       The pool shares a common SOP as a framework for consistent leadership and procedures, and individuals are interchangeable within the IMT pool.

       If the IMT Pool were configured for Type 2 capability and needed to be recombined to meet increased complexity needs, some personnel may change positions, such as, ICT2 may become OSC1 and LSC2 may become SPUL. Other key positions would be mobilized within the GC Pool, reassigned from Service Centers or modules, or ordered from outside of the GC. IMTs mobilized for another GC would re-roster to meet the needs of that GC.
- The IC/AC Council supports the current format for Dispatching Teams. The National Type 1 Teams maintain the current National Rotation and the GACCs maintain the current rotation for the GACC. GACCs would be responsible for team rotation of the Type 2 teams. NIMO would remain the same based on the need nationally and by the GACCs. Area Command would remain the same.
- The IC/AC Council support the current format to have mentee/trainees assigned and rostered to IMTs but recommend that the mentees/trainees be also part of a pool managed by the local GACCs to ensure opportunities and assignments are available.
- The IC/AC Council recommends the development of academies for Command & General Staff positions (by functional areas with unit leader development) to streamline required training. Early identification of personnel for these functional areas will enhance development of qualified personnel.

- Incident management participation should be part of an employee's development and not just voluntary for all NWCG member agencies. Training should go beyond NWCG course only to incorporate NIMS courses and address non fire incidents.
- The IC/AC Council fully supports the concept of compensation for team participants. While the federal model utilized by NIMO is a good starting point for federal employees it does not address the issue for state, local and federal retirees assigned to incident management teams. Other forms of compensation needs to be studied such as cash incentives utilized for Command & General staff members in Australia or pay incentives utilized by CALFIRE in California for Chief Officers assigned to IMTs, or compensation with retirement benefits as time on incident going towards and employees retirement computation.
- The IC/AC Council supports the concept of funding Team members (starting with the Command & General Staff) year around for base funding through respective agency suppression funds. The Council also support some funding to the team itself in the form of computers and IT support, name tags, team identification (shirts, luggage, etc), communications (sat phones, conference phone).

Section 4: Organizational Models

- Current Situation: **Somewhat desirable**. The IC/AC Council agrees that we need to continue to develop concepts on how to manage the future of Incident Management and the decline of qualified personnel for IMTs as well as the changing complexity of incident management to embrace the non fire incidents. The current situation is not sustainable but the ICs and ACs make it work.
- Current with Overarching Principles: **Somewhat desirable.** The IC/AC Council commends the IMOSP team for laying the foundation to address the issues we face in succession planning. The IC/AC Council would like to continue to be active part of the future development of IMTs and ACs.
- Single Standard: **Highly Desirable.** The IC/AC Council fully supports the single standard for IMT and AC positions. The Council recommends that we incorporate NIMS and well as the NWCG standards with the future of training and incident management.
- External Capacity – Contract: **Somewhat undesirable.** While contracting is valuable it is not realistic that the capacity would come from the contract world. Cost factors, training issues, currency, experience, oversight, etc would all be key factors why this would be "somewhat undesirable".
- External Capacity – All hazard Contract: **Somewhat undesirable.** Fire and non fire incidents would face the same issued addressed above.
- Core Team: **Somewhat desirable**. Cohesion of critical team members is proven to be a successful model. The IC/AC Council recommends integration of training for the core team from NWCG and NIMS courses.
- Core Team with State Integration. **Highly Desirable.** The IC/AC Council recommends the best mix for a core team be a mix of federal and state (including local government) personnel to bring the best expertise together of management of fire and non fire incidents.

Summary: (Bullets Statements)

- Review and amend the Legislative authorities regarding responsibilities and authorities for the fed agencies and ensure that they address the use of our state and local interagency partners to respond to, support and manage fire and non fire incidents
- Review and amend the agreements between the federal fire agencies and our state and local partners authorities, responsibilities and liability issues are addressed in regards to their use at fire and non fire incidents in response, support and management of these incidents
- Ensure we have an effective use of state and regional Administrative and Coordination networks to identify, status, mobilize our partner state and local interagency partner resources
- Ensure that state and local interagency partner resources are identified and status in ROSS
- NWCG and NIMS NIC to work towards a single NIMS incident qualification system
- We will need to continue to have need for multiple incident management tools in the future; Type 3,2,1, NIMO and ACTs the real issue is how many, what configuration and where will they come from. I suspect that we will find most of these answers in the previously written reports. We do not need to re-invent the wheel rather dust the reports off, verify the facts, prioritize and implement the recommendations
- Utilize NIMO to staff project teams to enhance Incident Management Capacity
- Cohesion of team is a big draw for team participants
- This project is NWCG driven. Leaves out state, local government, DHS. Need to involve state and local government partners
- Agency culture issues: Land Management versus Emergency Response
- Need to analyze policy conflicts that already exist and how each module will fix or worsen the conflict
- Final decision may impact OPM, DNS, externals to NWGC, etc.

- Review the "Jacob's Report" related to management of large wildland fires and the need for organizational change
    - Need for review of our roles and responsibilities under the National Response Plan (NRP) related to non fire incidents
    - Review the Federal Wildland Fire Policy 1995, 2001 and 2009.
    - Review the 2009 QFR

13. Oregon Department of Forestry

After a review of the materials available from the Incident Management Organization Succession Planning Team effort to date, the Oregon Department of Forestry would like to provide the following thoughts and feedback. We appreciate the work of those involved in providing the backdrop for this very important discussion, as well as the opportunity to comment.

Recommendations

The following recommendations reflect and are built upon the issues identified in the remainder of this document.

1. Address the overarching issues in a way that increases participation in a cost effective manner.
2. Review and modify qualification process to assure that an adequate number of adequately trained personnel are available for assignment.
3. The militia (ALL employees in the agencies impacted by this effort) should be expected to play significant roles by either being actively involved in providing direct or support to fire and IMT efforts. All agencies leadership should play an active role in promoting and supporting this concept.
4. Place Emphasis on the key role that Type 3 IMTs play in the system, and provide quality support to make them even more effective / efficient.
5. All outcomes should effectively support multiple jurisdiction incidents in meeting the Agency Administrators needs and direction.
6. Identify a 20-30 person team structure as a standard for a combined Type 1 / 2 IMT. Develop modules to efficiently / effectively support these teams.

OVERALL

The ability to provide a well trained organization that can assist in the management of a wide range of wildfire incidents is a significant issue for all. This effort will continue to be a significant issue over time due to ongoing and future changes in fire conditions, the makeup of the current and future workforce, funding mechanisms, and the incidents themselves. This is, and will remain, a very complex issue.

It is very important throughout this effort to maintain the focus on the desired outcome - Meeting *management needs safely and effectively with qualified personnel in a sustainable manner.* To that end, the best outcome may not necessarily involve organizational change, but effective management choices.

While this effort is specifically targeted at the federal Type 2 and above Incident Management Teams, there are numerous potential impacts / areas of concern for state cooperators such as the Oregon Department of Forestry. These are primarily focused on: 1) The ability to meet the needs of multi-jurisdictional incidents; 2) The ability to jointly participate in, and support the selected outcome; and 3) The increased costs associated with the selected outcome.

NO BRAINERS

1. Addressing those items identified as "Over Arching" factors appear to be a KEY component of achieving desired outcomes. It would appear that if these factors are not addressed, then any alternative selected to move forward will likely fail. Conversely, if these issues are addressed, the current model will move considerably in the right direction.
2. Getting personnel qualified and maintaining those qualifications are critical. It is likely time to re-assess the current qualifications system to assure that it meets the needs of the system. That being to provide qualified individuals to serve in the positions needed. If the system is too burdensome, has bottlenecks, and/or takes an extraordinary amount of time to become qualified, then it is not meeting the need.
3. Matching incident complexity with the right management structure and resources is critical. This has always been a basic tenet of the ICS. The concept of ramping up and down to match the incident (scalability) must be a basic foundation for any system (including the current one).
4. Personal liability for participation in incident management must continue to be addressed. If not, very few people are likely to show up when needed.
5. There seems to be a mismatch between incident complexity and the typing of Incident Management Teams. This should be resolved, with the goal of matching the capabilities of an IMT with the complexity of the

incident. The proposal to collapse type 1 and 2 incident management teams into one grouping may be part of this effort. Additional emphasis on increasing the effectiveness of Type 3 teams would also increase capacity.

Areas of Concern

1. The focus of much of the effort and discussion seems to revolve around finding the "right" organizational structure, and less on addressing succession management. Emphasis should be refocused on succession management, and how to best meet the needs of fire managers into the future.
2. Many of the over arching items mentioned previously would appear to be management issues, as opposed to structural issues. Emphasis should be placed on addressing management issues. Several examples would include: The need to manage employee expectations of maximizing hours and days on every incident (and portal to portal is likely not an acceptable solution); Address the need for ALL employees in an agency to have a role either directly, or in a support role for fire.
3. In spite of this effort being targeted at the federal IMTs, it will likely have significant impacts on the management of State and Local Government incidents. This would include IMT operations, as well as joint jurisdiction incidents. Depending on some of the outcomes, there is potential to actually increase the need to assign multiple incident management teams on a joint jurisdiction incident, as well as shoulder increased costs.
4. There appears to be a high degree of emphasis on developing compensation strategies that would increase costs significantly. Concerns relate to where this additional funding would come from (i.e.: what are the tradeoffs), as well as how these increased costs would be passed on to other jurisdictions that work with a federal incident management team. In addition, these approaches may reduce the ability of State and Local Government personnel to participate as team members.
5. There is a high degree of emphasis on implementing National Fire Policy. While this may be good on federal lands, it may not align with the needs of State and Local Government. A significant number of large incidents involve multiple jurisdictions. The IMTs should continue to work to meet the needs of the Agency Administrators, and the direction they receive from them. If a federal IMT is going to put emphasis on federal fire policy at the expense of State and Local Government policy, then it becomes more likely that multiple IMTs may become involved.
6. All Hazard IMTs (FEMA and USFA Type 3) used for managing significant wildfires is a concern. IMT capabilities should match the complexity of the incident. By design, many of the teams discussed as All Hazard IMTs are at the Type 3 level. If that's the case, and they have limited wildfire experience, then it wouldn't appear that their capabilities would match the complexity of a type 1 or 2 incident.
7. The smaller the core group of the IMT, the more likely there will be issues that arise related to things like an Operations Section Chief not being aware of the strengths / weakness of individual Division Supervisors, leading to poor assignment and associated outcomes. In spite of our best efforts, a qualified person is not the same as the next qualified person. Knowing who you're working with in critical situations is extremely important.
8. A significant amount of time and effort is being put into the feedback process for this effort. The decision on how to proceed into the future should be based on making good business decisions that meets the needs well into the future. A strong feedback process will assist in finding strengths and weaknesses of various alternatives, as well as assist in the development of new alternatives, but be cautious about using it as a poll, or voting mechanism to decide which way to go.

Remaining Questions

1. Development of more common Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) across IMTs can have both positive and negative outcomes. Positive outcomes could include increased interchangeability, while the negative side could include decreased flexibility to meet the needs of the incident and the jurisdictions involved.
2. Development of consistent financial practices may also have both positive and negative outcomes. This would appear to be a generally a positive outcome, with concerns related to flexibility to meet the needs of a multi-jurisdiction incident.
3. Interagency Cooperation is mentioned throughout this effort, but most of the organizational options discussed may actually make it more difficult for non-federal employees to participate fully.
4. Most of the organizational options maintain NIMO teams as part of the structure. If the system moves to one that focuses on full time 9 member core teams, why would NIMO teams continue to exist?
5. While contracting for surge resources during busy seasons has some appeal, it's safe to assume that the individuals on these contract teams will be the same folks historically used as A D employees in the current system.
6. The emphasis in most of the organizational models seems to shift heavily to oversight at high levels in the federal system, rather than at the Regional, State, and Agency Administrator's level. This could lead to inefficiencies, less support, and less ownership at those levels.

14. Southern Group of State Foresters

I feel that there is a huge need to link the DHS IMT effort with this push by the NWCG. I know that most federal NWCG organizations have thus far given little credit to local and state efforts to develop local Type 3 IMT's; however this is perhaps one of the best answers to solving the personnel shortage issue which is at the heart of this IMO effort.
I also find it interesting that there remains such a "federal" feel to this effort. A majority of the wildland fires in this country are in the SE United States and are managed by State Resources, not federal resources. The federal IMO structure is definitely the best model for the truly large fires of the western US, but resource limitations and a real need for cost containment makes this model impractical for the eastern and southeastern US, at least for local and state wildland response.

The fact that this effort lists Responsiveness to Federal Fire Policy as an overarching principal speaks volumes on the real focus of this effort. Federal Fire is important, but what about the fire policy of State and to a lesser degree local government. This is probably where 75% of the national wildfire load is handled, yet we want to continue to push the federal emphasis. Until that mindset changes, there can really be little or no positive progress with this effort.
In my opinion, the best model for the most practical use on a national level is to establish IMT's with the basic Command and General Staff positions and then let these teams order the additional resources necessary for the given incident. While there is a need for the fully staffed rosters of our existing Type 1 and 2 IMT's, these are only practical for the largest events. There is a much bigger need for smaller IMT rosters to cover the Type 3 level of incident. DHS is quickly moving in to fill in this need, and I have to think that this will ultimately work to the detriment of the NWCG efforts. A great example of this is what is happening in Texas right now. DHS is actively lining up local Type 3 IMT's to come in and fill roles and gain experience for the current Texas fire response. As State Forestry Fire Manager, I would love to have this same opportunity for my own agency personnel, yet it remains a DHS effort. Unless NWCG wakes up to the fact that incident management in this nation is no longer just a big western fire federal deal, DHS is going to leave the NWCG efforts in the dust over the long term.

I feel that it makes little financial sense to establish more than the current 4 NIMO teams. I just don't see where the incident workload has justified this model, up to this point. As such I have trouble with any organizational model that promotes a large NIMO build-up. The existing system of established Type 1 and 2 teams meets the basic needs of this nation in terms of the largest incidents. The real need is for IMT personnel at more of the Type 3 level, as smaller and less costly IMT resources that can come to supplement, rather than take over the incident needs on a state and local level. DHS is slowly filling this void and I do feel that this is not good for NWCG in the long run. NWCG needs to actively become involved with the DHS Type 3 IMT effort. The type 3 DHS teams should be regarded as the training grounds for our future Type 2 and 1 IMT personnel. Single training efforts across jurisdictions, a uniform credentialing and ordering process and better integration of already existing Type 3 personnel are what is needed to make this happen.

General thoughts:

- Established Type 1 and 2 IMT's serve a much needed role in the management of large incidents annually. These IMT's are very experienced and excellent at what they do, however the declining number of developing IMT personnel presents real issues for the continuation of the current NWCG model for IMOs.
- Outside of the larger mostly federally managed western wildfires, there is a real need for smaller IMOs to address the needs of state forestry wildland fire response, especially in the eastern US, as well as to more effectively address a more cost efficient model of all-risk incident management at the federal level. DHS initiatives relating to Type 3 IMT development have really rushed in over the last few years to begin to fill this need.
- NWCG would be very smart to embrace and take a lead role in the further development of the DHS All-Risk Type 3 IMT model. This effort would provide a national network of quick response Type 3 IMT's at the local level, serve as an excellent training venue to develop larger numbers of IMT personnel to fill vacant slots on the Type 1 and 2 IMT's and cultivate a stronger culture of cooperation to more efficiently utilize all of this nations response personnel.
- A basic premise of ICS is that the incident organization is flexible and scalable based on the incident. The incident should drive the IMT resources needed, instead of the current model of force feeding full IMT's in to manage all incidents.

Specific comments – Overarching Principals
"Single Qualification System" – This is an excellent start; however discussion of anything other than a single common nationwide system of **all-risk** qualification falls short of what is really needed. The principal does state that progress

toward an all-risk system should be accelerated, however, NWCG needs to quickly merge all-risk efforts with DHS, or NWCG is going to be left behind as a dinosaur.
"Responsiveness to Federal Fire Policy" – this overarching principal is appropriate for fires on federal lands, but for fires on state and local jurisdictions this principal does not fully apply. This specific principal should be changed to better reflect the true national needs of our IMT's and the jurisdictional authority of where the incident occurs. Most wildfires occur on state and local jurisdictions, the largest number of wildfires nationally occur in the southeastern region of the US and fall under state forestry and local jurisdiction, this principal needs to be restructured to recognize that Federal Fire Policy, although very important, does not drive the largest volume of wildland fire response in this nation.

Specific comments – Organizational Models
"Current" and "Current with Overarching Principals" – The current model works well for the management of the largest wildland and all-risk incidents. A continuation of these models does nothing to really address the various issues related to this discussion.
"Single Standard", "External Capacity (Contract)" and "External Capacity (All-Hazard and Contract)" – all three have similar shortcomings.

- A standard 27 person roster fails to comply with the overarching principal of Scalability, which specifically states that "IMT's will respond in a configuration as requested or negotiated, commensurate with incident complexity." There is no doubt that established rosters facilitate the dispatch process, however one current problem is that IMT numbers have become so high and IMT's in general have become so rigid in their requirements for dispatch, that scalability no longer enters the picture. Developing several preset packages of IMT resources relating to a single IMT would help to address this need, but starting with IMT rosters of 27 personnel misses the mark in my opinion.
- The use of contract IMT's raises a major red flag from a cost containment standpoint. Experience has shown that contract resources are our most expensive fire resource. Contract IMT resources will only run up the already extreme cost of federal IMT use.
- The recognition that the DHS All Hazard IMT's can be a component of this model is the only real positive point in the External Capacity models. Although these teams are not currently ready to step in and immediately fill the void, they are certainly eager for the opportunity. NWCG really needs to work their way into this process and become a more significant cooperator with this effort, I think it becomes a case of leading this effort in the direction that best supports the NWCG agencies, or being left behind as a marginal player. There are now more than 100 national DHS Type 3 IMT's, this is a huge resource with a lot of folks sincerely interested in cooperating with the NWCG.

"Core Team" and "Core Team – State"

- This is the most efficient organizational model, although I do not feel that there is necessarily a need for additional NIMO teams as outlined in the summary document.
- Establishing only Command and General Staff IMT's, which can then be supplemented as necessary to provide the remaining Unit level positions in modular form, has a lot of promise for managing incidents which do not reach the full complexity of a Type 1 and even possibly a Type 2 level. This is a common need now that often is covered by the much more expensive fully rostered Type 1 or 2 IMTs.
- I do feel that under this plan there will continue to be the need for national Type 1 and 2 IMTs, as we know them today, but the overall dependence on them would be reduced thanks to the more efficient use of Type 3 and short Type 2 IMOs responding to and managing incidents to help limit their growth into the larger mega incidents.
- One key to the success of this model will be to better incorporate the state level resources as well as the DHS Type 3 IMTs.

Comments from Florida

- Standardizing rosters can be good, however rigid decisions to deploy a fixed number of positions or pre-identified team component does not adhere to the ICS concept of 'scaleability' and in many cases is not cost efficient.
- Several sections of the of the recent NWCG document *Evolving Incident Management – An Analysis of Organizational Models for the Future* need to be more conducive to interagency partners (e.g. many questions as to how states would fund some of the recommendations and in grade levels for team positions all have GS references)
- Our agency is having success with several established IMT Mentoring Programs (aviation, plans and logistics currently) developed and targeted at ICS disciplines in which we have current or anticipated shortages of qualified personnel. These programs are helping accelerate the development of our IMT

personnel and producing fully trained and qualified personnel. We are more than happy to share our successes with other agencies interested in IMT mentoring.

- When assigning "mentees" to teams why limit it to six/team when you can split the rotation and assist at least double that number during one assignment (e.g. for a two-week deployment assign 6 "mentees" per week)?
- There is a shortage of qualified personnel in many C&G positions nationally especially at the T-1 level so it seems that expanding to 20 NIMO Teams would exacerbate the current challenges in filling positions
- ***Support of IMT Decisions*** – we feel strongly that all agencies with IMTs should promptly address the deep-seated concerns regarding personal liability that can discourage IMT participation by agency personnel.
- ***Current Situation with Overarching Recommendations***
- ***(pg***. 5) – "IMT tenures are limited to single terms in positions when trainees have been certified and are ready to move into fully qualified positions" – what is the length of term?

Comments from Georgia

- NWCG's role is fire. It is not the national incident management coordinating group. It is OK to train and help others but if HS/FEMA decides to finally step up and accept their proper role we should rejoice in success and not feel like they are stealing it from us. Delegate, then focus on unresolved fire issues.
- It is wise to adhere to established standards. Changing standards is OK but don't misdirect standards for selfish reasons. There may be a reason why we have Type 1-3 teams.
- All hazards sounds really good. But when it comes to operations and information someone with expertise in the particular hazard at hand needs to be there. No wonder we have problems defining roles and responsibilities.
- We need to somehow up the stature of Type III IMTs. Should not be a wholesale proposition.

15. BLM Fire and Aviation Leadership

May 12, 2011

This statement reflects the Bureau of Land Management's position on Incident Management Organization Succession Planning (IMOSP).

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Overall, the current Incident Management Organization (IMO) model is effective. It does not need to be re-invented in its entirety. The BLM's preferred option for addressing incident management organization succession planning calls for accurately defining specific areas in our current system that need improvement and developing solutions for those areas. This will improve an already functional system at a fraction of the cost of the other options. The following list of recommendations represents the overarching principles advocated by BLM Fire and Aviation.

- **A budget neutral solution to IMT succession is crucial. Reduction in preparedness and initial attack funding is not acceptable. Federal budget realities must be considered.**
  Context: Over the past two to three years, wildland fire budgets (in preparedness and fuels) have been largely flat or declining. Given the national economic situation and sharply climbing deficits, significant budget increases seem unlikely. Additional impacts to preparedness budgets are not tenable and any option considered must take future federal budget realities into consideration.
- **Consolidate IMT1 and IMT2 into one team type. Keep team roster size the same or smaller.**
  Context: The BLM advocates the consolidation of Type 1 and Type 2 incident management teams for several reasons. In recent years, assigning Type 2 incident management teams to highly complex incidents has become relatively common. Similarly, having completed S-520 is often the only difference between a Type 1 and a Type 2 team member. Many Type 1 and Type 2 position task books are identical, and this training redundancy creates an extra time-consuming step toward qualification at the Type 1 level. Collapsing Type 1 and Type 2 IMTs would simplify the training and qualification process, eliminate time consuming and expensive transitions between teams on incidents, eliminate transition-related safety concerns, and reduce overall costs.
- **Teams should continue to be managed by geographic area on a geographic/national rotation.**
  Context: Undertake an Interagency analysis to determine or validate the number and location of teams needed. Team assignments (under a collapsed, single type team configuration) should be managed in a rotation similar to the method currently used for Type 1 IMTs—a national and geographic rotation.
- **Continue to fill teams from federal agencies, state and local fire departments, ADs, and non-traditional sources such as FEMA, Bureau of Reclamation, etc.**

Context: Individuals from all sources who can meet NWCG training and qualification standards should be allowed to participate on IMTs.

- **Promote the use of shared positions on IMTs. Many employees who cannot commit to an entire season will commit to a shared position.**
  Context: Spreading out the workload will encourage training and development of employees, while negating the burnout that tends to occur during busy fire seasons. It will also help alleviate concerns many managers have when their non-fire employees make a commitment to an IMT.
- **Identify and eliminate barriers within the ICS training system that hinder systematic progression into Command and General staff roles.**
  Context: Some positions on IMTs lack adequate qualified people to meet team needs. National, interagency training programs need to be improved and implemented to ensure specialists are trained and progress in their qualifications. Draw qualified people from all sources to fill gaps on IMTs and help train current employees who are developing red card qualifications.
- **Develop and standardize performance objectives for IMT participation.**
  Context: When certain key jobs are filled, incumbents need to be hired with the explicit expectation that the job entails supporting incident management objectives or organizations. This may include establishing IMT duties in certain Position Descriptions, Individual Development Plans and Employee Performance Appraisal Plans.
- **Develop modules (for example, in Finance and Fire Behavior) that can serve multiple ongoing incidents from a central location.**
  Context: The internet and other methods of sharing data and information make it feasible to create small groups of specialists who could offer their services to multiple incidents without actually having to be at the incident locations. Remote support of incidents will reduce incident support costs.
- **Create organizational incentives for units, managers and employees that participate on IMTs.**
  Context: The organizational models do not address the question of where the candidate pool of qualified, experienced personnel to serve on teams comes from. Incentives should be applied to the organizations that steadily grow a healthy source of qualified and experienced personnel who can perform jobs in the incident command system. Career paths should be incentivized to enable easier and quicker transition to new qualification requirements.
- **Establish processes to provide relief from regular job targets for IMT members.**
  Context: Feedback from the field consistently cites this issue as one of the most critical problems with the current system. Numerous non-fire federal employees possess fire qualifications, as well as significant institutional knowledge, but they are hindered from participation in ICS due to supervisors who are accountable to achieve work targets. Many non-fire employees with regular jobs serve on IMTs, and a formal process that creates flexibility and availability for IMT participation is lacking. This process should go beyond the typical "availability letter" that agency administrators send out when the national preparedness level reaches 5.
- **The BLM does not support the addition of stand-alone, core teams of command and general staff specialists whose only job is incident management.**
  Context: Current stand-alone teams of command and general staff members devoted solely to incident management are widely perceived as inefficient, expensive, and lacking a consistent and productive workload during non-incident periods.

16. The Northern Rockies Geographic Area Coordinating Group Board of Directors (NRCG BOD)

The Northern Rockies Geographic Area Coordinating Group Board of Directors (NRCG BOD) appreciates the opportunity to provide a response to the Incident Management Organization Succession Planning (IMOSP) report. The Board of Directors fully supports the need to evaluate the organizational models currently employed in Incident Management against a generally accepted vision or set of expectations for Incident Management to determine the efficacy of the models and whether or not it is possible and/or desirable to sustain those models. The Board also recognizes that the answers to these and other questions related to Incident Management Organizations will understandably be influenced by Agency and Geographic Area needs and expectations.

However, regardless of Agency or Geographic Area differences that might exist, all Incident Management organizations must; be highly trained, professional in execution of their duties, diverse in the skills and abilities that they bring to the asymmetrical incident challenges that they are expected to manage, reflect the Agencies and publics that they serve, and must be recognized for their importance to the accomplishment of Agency missions and mandates through individual employee and Agency commitment and support. While the NRCG BOD acknowledges that the development and implementation of a comprehensive succession plan for Incident Management

organizations will take time we believe that there are steps that can be taken in the short term that will enhance the current and future viability and sustainability of Incident Management Organizations. Those steps, recommendations, and supporting rationale follow.

- The current "model" of Interagency Incident Management Organizations (IMO) comprised of "voluntary" participants has served the public, the agencies, the fire service, and the IMT members well.
- The quality and capability of current Incident Management Organizations is a direct result of the Interagency composition of those organizations and that same Interagency participation is a key element in the sustainability of those organizations.
- IMOs and their members have developed relationships with the agencies and publics that they serve and those relationships have resulted in a level of trust and confidence essential to effective and responsive incident management. These relationships have been developed through IMO members' daily interactions with their own and other agency personnel, the public and local government representatives and are further developed and solidified while on assignment as an IMO member.
- Incident response must be scalable and incident management organizations must be willing and able to configure appropriate to the objectives and expectations of the requesting agency or agencies and the complexity of the incident(s) to which they are responding. This should not be presumed to preclude the need for large Incident Management Organizations with extended depth and reach.
- It is both possible and sensible to improve, maintain, and sustain the current model of Incident Management Organizations described in 1 above.
- Incident Management Organizations have been effectively and efficiently managed (governed) by Geographic Area and the Sub-Geographic Area BOD's and that management construct should continue.
- There is a necessary and appropriate distinction in terms of the complexity and the attendant management expectations among Type I, Type II, and Type III incidents.
- Trainees and training must be viewed as an investment in the future and not a cost with a clear realization and understanding that the return on investment benefits all agencies at all levels in the accomplishment of the full spectrum of agency missions and mandates.

Recommendations and practices that will be implemented in 2011 in the Northern Rockies.

- A short Incident Management Organization or Incident management Team should be configured with 14 members, and include 6 mentored trainees(S-420 trainees for the Type 2 teams and S-520 trainees for the Type 1 teams). The 20 (14 rostered team members + 6 trainees) member short team would include the Command and General Staff plus additional team members dependent on the host agency administrators' incident objectives/expectations and the incident(s) complexity. It must be known and understood that additional team members may need to be added to meet specific incident requirements but not to the point that a long team is necessary.
- A long team should be configured with 27 members, and include 12 mentored trainees. The Type 1 teams would generally be mobilized in the long team configuration based on the highly complex incidents they are usually assigned to manage. At the Type 1 complexity level there may be rare cases where Type 1 teams are ordered in the short team configuration. However, based on the complexity of the incidents Type 1 teams are typically assigned to manage, short team configuration would likely be the exception rather than the rule. The 39 (27 rostered team members + 12 trainees) member long team would include the Command and General Staff plus the additional team members necessary to successfully accomplish the agency administrator's objectives and expectations. It is understood that there will be incidents where it is clear that a team with greater depth and reach is required at mobilization, some examples of when this extended team may be required are; assignment of a team to manage a complex of incidents, assignment of a team to manage an incident that spans a large geographic area, and/or assignment of a team to an incident with objectives that require a large commitment of resources.
- The current remaining rostered team members could be on each teams' "call when needed" portion of the team roster but would/could constitute a pool of qualified individuals to be used when modules were needed or when needed to provide short term augmentation of a Type 3 team.
- Dispatch organizations are and will continue to be the critical link in assuring the success of the recommendations proposed above. Close coordination between IMTs and dispatch during mobilization and the early stages of incident evolution especially as it relates to the ordering of specific individuals for specific incident management needs is an essential component of these recommendations.
- Training for Agency Administrators should convey a clear explanation of the capabilities and limitations in terms of the amount and type of work that can be accomplished by Incident Management Teams in either Short or Long team configuration.
- Incident Commanders and the requesting Agency Administrators must determine the type and number of team members needed in addition to either the short or long team standard configuration. The discussion required to determine additional needs will be based, at least in part, on the Agency Administrators

objectives and expectations for management of the incident or incidents, incident complexity, the agency's ability to commit staff to fill IMT support positions, and the Incident Commander's determination of the staff needs required to accomplish the Agency Administrator's objectives and expectations. The initial discussion should occur soon after the Incident Commander is notified of the assignment but at least within the first 24 hours after notification.

National Perspectives

- Agencies that provide IMT members must be provided with a mechanism or mechanisms to mitigate the impact to "normal" workload that occurs when those IMT members are on assignment, examples include; backfill authority, authority for the agency to authorize overtime, charged to the incident, for the IMT member to "catch up" on "day job work" not accomplished while on assignment for situations where backfill is not possible or realistic.
- As an incentive for IMT participation consideration should be given to a graduated differential schedule, with the differential percentage based on the IMT position held. Differential pay would apply only while actually assigned on incident and would essentially be similar to existing differential pay models. Differential pay would be charged to the incident as is currently the case with the existing differential pay options.
- Consideration should be given to a "standard duty day" while assigned on incident. This concept would follow the logic and method used to establish the standard day upon which contractors base their daily rates. Presently, while assigned to an incident all days are considered work days, this suggestion would establish a guaranteed number of hours (beyond the 8, 9, or 10 referenced in the IIBMHB) that more closely reflects the average number of hours worked by individuals while assigned to an incident which is suggested to be at or about 15 or 15 1/2 hours (this number could be determined based on payroll records from past incidents). Implementation of this recommendation has the potential to eliminate many of the very time consuming and often confrontational disputes surrounding incident personnel time reporting.
- Do not expand the number of "full time" teams, instead fully support (fund) actions to improve and enhance the current model.
- Develop a program to market IMT participation that recognizes, understands, and reflects generational differences, priorities, and employment expectations.
- Conduct the research necessary to determine, as a minimum, why individuals participate on IMTs, what keeps employees from participating on IMTs, and what encourages or discourages agencies with regard to supporting employee participation on IMTs.

Alternative Models
1. Alaska Fire Service
2. Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group
3. Association of Contract Counties
4. International Association of Fire Chiefs Wildland Fire Policy Committtee
5. Area Command Teams 1,2,3,4
6. Anonymous
7. Individual

1. Alaska Fire Service

IMT Organizational Model Proposal:

Realignment of Incident Management Capability

Executive Summary

The theme of this organizational model embraces all eleven of the IMOSP Overarching Principles and offers a flexible, modular approach to incident management by realigning current capability to respond to the need for teams to have incident specific configurations, and to shrink and grow over the life of an incident based on complexity.

It also responds to the need for flexibility under the federal fire policy. This organizational model continues the use of collateral duty and militia to staff the teams, modules and service centers. Team members will have "day jobs" in cooperating agencies in fire or other disciplines and will respond to incidents as members of teams. This feature enhances the interagency characteristics of teams through inclusion of state and local government membership.

In this model, all existing IMT personnel would be reorganized into cohesive "IMT Pools" within each geographic area (GA) or sub-GA collectively referred to as "Geographic Context" (GC).

The key distinction of this model is that the Team is defined as the IMT Pool within the GC. Some IMT Pool Members have collateral responsibilities to manage pre-incident elements of the IMT. Those IMT Pool Members may or may not be the ones assigned to the next incident.

Section 1: Team Make-Up

Size of this IMT
Under this model, the larger IMT Pool is comprised of a 300-500 person resource pool within the GC. Rosters for IMT rotations are established based on anticipated GC need and adjust to meet anticipated incident characteristics.

Configuration of this IMT
Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3 qualified individuals would attain the capability to combine in required configurations to meet the specific needs of an average complex incident within a specific GC. This configuration would be adjusted up or down in both complexity and team size specific to an incident's needs. (See: Dispatching Patterns below).
The IMT Pool would have the ability to mobilize as a Type 1 IMT with required skill and depth to accommodate our most complex incidents with planned organizational redundancy. The IMT Pool could also be configured as a short Type 1 IMT and a Type 2 IMT, or two or more Type 2 IMTs that respond in incident specific configurations that shrink and grow over the life of an incident based on complexity. Additionally they provide assistance and mentoring for Type 3 organizations.

Governance of this IMT

The GA would establish an initial IMT size and configuration. The GA would take an active role in IMT Pool management. If a GA has the capability to create more than one IMT Pool, then that GA would divide their Pool capability at a sub-GA level to establish their initial GC's IMT Pool.

IMT Governance would be nationally coordinated and actively managed at the GC with a common SOP. This SOP would serve as a framework for consistent leadership and procedures in and between each GC.

Typing of teams
This model retains and enhances Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3 capability by realigning current geographic area IMT structures to create a cohesive and interchangeable "IMT Pool" within each GC that could be nationally assigned in various configurations as determined by complexity.

Number and kind of modules
The number and kind of modules would be GC specific.

A Mobilization Module may be used to establish an ICP and associated infrastructure for an incoming IMT (especially one from another GC). A Demobilization Module may be used to dismantle an IMT presence as an incident wraps up, allowing an IMT to demobilize or be reassigned more quickly.

Instead of an entire IMT moving to another GC, mobilization of all or part of an IMT Section as a Module may occur. For example: If an IMT Pool has the capability to manage an additional incident but they are lacking a Finance Section, another GC's Finance Section (configured for the hosting unit) could be mobilized.

Nearby incidents may consolidate some services in Aviation, Finance, Logistics, Information and Planning functions.

Some functions would consolidate under a Service Center (SC) such as a Mobilization SC (for GC in-briefing, rental cars, etc.), Strategic Planning SC (including predictive services, long-term analysts, geographic information system products, etc.)

Contracts such as Mobile Food Services, Mobile Sleeper Units, Showers, "Camp-in-a-box", mobile copy service, etc. would be examples of contracted modules.

Number of IMTs/NIMO teams
Under this model, NIMO Teams would be eliminated. Forty to fifty IMTs are currently required for a heavy fire year. Each IMT Pool would require between 300 and 500 incident management personnel to be sustainable and each IMT Pool would be able to field two to three IMTs and provide some personnel for Modules and Service Centers. A GC with fewer IMT Pool members would have reduced capability in the model's spectrum.

Management and coordination of modules
Management and coordination of modules would occur at the GC or GA level for location specific recourses (i.e., Mobilization/Demobilization Modules). Modules that are not GC or GA specific would be managed at the GC, GA or National level depending on best consolidation of the effort.

Dispatching pattern for IMTs
Depending on incident need, each IMT Pool would be capable of recombining to scale-up or separating to scale-down. This scalability would be applied at a single resource or a module level. Additional IMT needs would initially come from the Pool – and return to the Pool when identified as excess. Unassigned IMT members would return to their home unit or could be assigned to supporting Modules, Service Centers, or held in reserve for rotation on longer duration incidents. (For example: If the IMT Pool were configured for Type 2 capability and needed to be recombined to meet increased complexity needs, some personnel may change positions, such as, ICT2 may become OSC1 and LSC2 may become SPUL. Other key positions would be mobilized within the GC Pool, reassigned from Service Centers or modules, or ordered from outside of the GC. IMTs mobilized for another GC would re-roster to meet the needs of that GC.

Each IMT Pool would rotate personnel as needed to maintain a roster for mobilization, and when assigned to an incident would continue their ability to rotate personnel while operating interchangeably as a cohesive unit.

This intra-IMT Pool transitioning enables an IMT to manage an appropriate organization commensurate with changes to current and anticipated complexity and Agency Administrator direction. It also allows the IMT to manage length of assignment with minimal incident disruption or loss of critical transition information.

This capability is in part due to the IMT Pool's ability to coordinate the mobilization, demobilization, or reassignment of personnel within the Pool as needed instead of an entirely new IMT transferring command every 14 days.

Section 2: Management Support (Configuration/Typing Teams)

Performance Standards
Incident management participation would be integrated into NWCG Agency position descriptions as a requirement for non-fire personnel at National PL 4 and 5. "Participation" would include the requirement for IMT participation, for backfilling of an IMT participant's day-job, or to provide other support for incident management.
Managers would have performance standards that encourage incident management, and triggers for relief from Targets.

Formal supervision structure
The GC would manage the IMT Pool in coordination with IMT Pool Members. Select IMT members would have responsibilities for parts of the overall management of the IMT Pool. (See Section 5: Incident Capacity/Workforce Development below)

Role of Area Command
In addition to current Area Command functions, Area Command's role would expand to include management and oversight of Service Centers, coordination of Module resources, and assuring that an assigned and scalable IMT structure is appropriate for the complexity of the assigned incident.

How this IMT model provides added value to the agencies represented on NWCG

This model creates an IMT culture of inclusion that fosters the values to accommodate the overall needs within the larger geographic pool and maximizes the overall availability and capability to respond to an incident.

This model also balances the needs of IMT member's personal lives and home-unit responsibilities through "assignment sharing" and other flexibilities that are currently considered detrimental within the IMT rotation system and unacceptable for and IMT roster. (See: How this IMT model generates savings below)

Section 3: Incentives

Grade levels for team positions
Grade levels would be commensurate with IMT member's day-jobs.

How this IMT model generates savings
This model realigns current capability to respond to the need for teams to have incident specific configurations, and to shrink and grow over the life of an incident based on complexity. This realignment increases the efficiency of IMT practitioners within every GC by reducing individual time to proficiency and balancing their use between the requirements of the incident and the home unit.

Section 4: Funding

How this model is funded
IMT position allocation targets, and the required participation to meet them, may be tied to Agency funding or other accountability measures. Backfilling of IMT pool members at the home unit would be funded using the incident funding account.

Standard support cost
Standard support costs would be reduced by granting ROSS (Resource Ordering & Status System) access to each IMT Pool by providing the ability to manage internal personnel rotation from within an incident.

Cost of staffing this IMT
Cost would be similar to the current model with some reductions related from scalable, modular approach to incident management and response to the need for flexibility under the federal fire policy.

Section 5: Incident Capacity/Workforce Development

Trainee/mentee organization
When rostered, IMT Pool members of various-level capability, would be deliberately blended to create an experiential learning environment for mentoring and Pool development, and to increase the overall capability of the IMT Pool and reducing individual time to proficiency.

GC based IMT position allocation of forces process would be used to identify IMT need. As part of a National workforce development strategy, Trainees/Mentees would be prioritized and made available at the sub-GA, GA, and National level to meet allocation of forces targets.

Workforce strategy/training needs to maintain this model

This model increases IMT developmental opportunities by balancing strengths and weaknesses for the overall development and succession planning for the IMT Pool with incident needs and direction from the hosting Agencies. IMT succession accelerates under this organizational model by prioritizing all of the trainees within the GC and coordinating that prioritization as part of a National strategy.

Each IMT Pool would take an active role in their own succession planning as part of an integrated National IMT Succession Plan. At least one C&G member for each functional area would be identified as the Functional Lead within the GC. These leads would be responsible to mentor and assist in succession planning within the functional area. These responsibilities may be provided by a blend of full-time and collateral-duty management.

Section 6: Additional Design Criteria

External Capacity

Expansion of the IMT Pool by integration of non-traditional partners. In addition to all Federal Agencies and most States, local entities such as schools and hospitals, etc., have NIMS compliant employees. Through alignment of qualification competencies and agreements to compensate those entities, some non-traditional practitioners would be available to the IMT Pool.
Make more efficient use of retired employees. Utilize the highly skilled workforce composed of retirees to fill gaps, to mentor and train current employees and explore their use as surge forces rather than permanent team fixtures.

Provide consistent financial practices to enable backfilling of IMT Pool members at the home unit using incident account.

Alaska Incident Management Team Organizational Model

Alaska recognized several years ago that they were no longer able to field their Type 1 IMT and their two Type 2 IMTs simultaneously. Additionally, they recognized that they had more IMT practitioners who were willing and able to participate on an IMT, but for various reasons, were unable to commit as a Primary IMT member. The Alaska IMT model evolved because of the necessary realignment of all IMT personnel and recognition of the importance of a deep bench of alternates that included AD IMT members.

Instead of loosing Type 1 capability as has occurred in other geographic areas, this approach allows Alaska to choose between fielding a Type 1 IMT or two Type 2 IMTs.

The Alaska IMT model considers the greater 300 personnel pool as "The Team." Depending on the anticipated incident needs, some members go and some do not.

Alaska establishes a geographic area Type 2 IMT rotation in anticipation of the Alaska fire season from mid April through July. Two Type 2 IMTs share a ten-day rotation. Typically, the Alaska Type 1 IMT is made unavailable on the National Rotation during this window. Alaska retains the capability to supplement one of these IMTs to attain Type 1 capability, or to mobilize its second Type 2 IMT, or two use the capability of the remainder of the IMT pool to supplement incoming L'48 IMTs or Type 3 organizations.

The pool shares a common SOP as a framework for consistent leadership and procedures, and individuals are interchangeable within the IMT pool.

If the IMT Pool were configured for Type 2 capability and needed to be recombined to meet increased complexity needs, some personnel may change positions, such as, ICT2 may become OSC1 and LSC2 may become SPUL. Other key positions would be mobilized within the GC Pool, reassigned from Service Centers or modules, or ordered from outside of the GC. IMTs mobilized for another GC would re-roster to meet the needs of that GC.

Using the example from the Railbelt Complex in 2009, the Green (Type 2) IMT transferred command to a Type 3 organization when complexity waned. Several members of the IMT remained to supplement the Type 3 origination. When the fire activity increased, the Black (Type 2) IMT, transferred command. Many members of the Type 3 organization were incorporated into the Type 2 IMT. For example, the Type 3 IC, who is on the path toward PSC2, became the Black Team Status Check-in Recorder trainee to attain the prerequisite for RESL. When the Crazy Mountain fire required a Type 2 IMT, The Green IMT IC contacted the Black IMT IC regarding release of a few critical

personnel in order to complete the second IMT. This included a PIO2 who was the Green IMT primary PIO2 and an LSC2 who was being used as a FACL. The Green IMT also needed an OSC2 so the Alaska Type 1 IC became the Green IC so the Green IC could become OSC2. Throughout this period, IMT members on both incidents cycled through on days off or were replaced within the IMT Pool structure or supplemented with L'48 resources. At one point, the Railbelt Complex approached Type 1 complexity. It was determined that in order for the Black IMT to supplement personnel to become a Type 1 IMT, they only required the addition of a qualified FSC2 and LSC2 to provide trainee assignments for the Type 1 trainees that were already in place as FSC2 and LSC2.

IMT Nomination Procedures
Applicants may apply for one or more positions as a primary, alternate, mentee, or trainee for the Type 1 Team, the Type 2 Team, or both. Applicants prioritize their preference when applying for more than one position and/or Team. All nominations must be approved by the applicant's immediate supervisor, and must include any other specific approvals required by the nominating agency. It is the responsibility of the nominating agency to ensure that all applicants meet the position requirements for the position(s) and the qualification level(s) they are applying for. While Primary IMT members are selected annually, applications are available year-round and applicants are added to the Pool as they become available.

All candidates for the Alaska Type 1 & 2 IMTs **must apply annually** in order to be considered in the selection process. Nominations may be submitted at the following qualification levels:

Primary
An applicant who is fully qualified and will be available for rotation every ten days in the case of Type 2, or according to the national rotation list in the case of Type 1. Applicants will be available for incident assignments as described in the National Interagency Mobilization Guide. Supervisors of those nominated as Primary team members should have a plan in place that allows these applicants to fulfill their obligation to the teams should they be selected as primary team member.

Alternate
An applicant who is fully qualified, yet has restricted availability. When available and requested, applicants in this category fill in for absent Primary team members.

Mentee
An applicant who is targeted for a Command & General Staff (C&G) position and needs C&G experience in order to meet S-420 Command & General Staff or S-520 Advanced Incident Management prerequisites.

Trainee
An applicant who has an initiated taskbook and meets NWCG requirements for trainees in this position, and is ready to fill the trainee role on the Type 1 or Type 2
team.

Apprentice
An applicant without an initiated taskbook, but who is committed to developing the skills and competencies necessary to fill the position at a future date. May be ordered by IMTs as Technical Specialists and given a role that will provide training and practical experience toward that end.

Team Selection
By the first week of November, AWFCG Operations Committee Agency Representatives forward their agency lists of IC applicants to the Ops Committee Chair or his/her designate. By the second week of February, agency lists of other team applicants are forwarded to the Ops Committee Chair or his/her designate. Agency lists will be compiled into a single interagency list prior to selection meetings. Selection factors will include past performance and conduct, team commitment, agency priorities (including Interagency Fire Program Management (IFPM) requirements and allocation of forces considerations), and other factors. Nominations, or individuals without a nomination form, received after the deadline will be considered on a case-by-case basis and will be given a lower priority.

IC Selection
The Ops Committee will make recommendations for Type 1 and Type 2 ICs to AWFCG following the Fall Fire Review and prior to AWFCG's November conference call. AWFCG will make final IC selections by their first quarter meeting. IC candidates may be asked to provide a letter of interest and resume, and may be interviewed by AWFCG prior to selection.

C&G Selection

By the second week of February the Ops Committee will meet with ICs to select C&G team members for the Type 1 and 2 IMTs.

Unit Leader & Others Selection
By the third full week of February the Ops Committee will meet with the ICs and Section Chiefs in order to jointly assemble the standing teams.

In 2011, 48 of 56 Type 1 IMT positions were filled by a designated Primary. Of the Type 2 IMT positions (combined between two IMTs) 40 of 66 positions were filled by a Primary. Of those, 27 individuals were designated as a Primary Team Member on both the Type 1 IMT and one of the Type 2 IMTs. The remainders were pulled from the "Alternate" pool for all or part of a rotation or assignment.

Team Configurations
Type 1 Short and Long-team configurations are established in the National Interagency Mobilization Guide. Type 2 Team configuration is Selection for a position does not guarantee that a team member will be included on the roster for every incident. The IC has the authority and responsibility to reconfigure his (her) team at any time in order to maintain an effective and efficient organization. The type and number of rostered positions filled on an assignment may vary based on incident specific factors.

When rostered, IMT Pool members of various-level capability are deliberately blended to create an experiential learning environment for mentoring and Pool development, and to increase the overall capability of the IMT Pool and reducing individual time to proficiency.
Critically short IMT positions are identified to prioritize IMT need. Trainees/Mentees are developed to meet these targets. IMT succession accelerates under this organizational model by prioritizing all of the trainees within the Pool and coordinating that prioritization them.

The IMT Pool takes an active role in their own succession planning. At least one C&G member for each functional area is identified as the Functional Lead within the Pool. These leads are responsible to mentor and assist in succession planning within the functional area. These responsibilities are provided by a collateral-duty management.

IMT Commitment
Primary team members are expected to be available during their team's rotation. Two days prior to the start of each new rotation AICC sends out an email Google Document survey to team members requesting confirmation of availability. This links to an online password protected spreadsheet. AICC and ICs have access to the spreadsheet. Trainees, mentees, and apprentices receive a similar request for confirmation of availability. The IC and Section Chiefs develop a team roster for that rotation based on responses. Rostered team members will be notified, and will be expected to remain available throughout the 10-day period.

Other benefits realized by this model:

- IMT kits are shared amongst all of the Alaska Teams.
- The Alaska IMT Workshop is located in Fairbanks so most IMT members will not require travel. The workshop is scheduled for the same week as the FMO/Agency Administrator Workshop to minimize travel and other impacts on participants.
- The Alaska IMT Workshop will use teleconferencing technology for IMT members who are unable to travel. AFS has a FWS video teleconference system that has been used for meetings and distance delivery of training. **The 2012** Alaska IMT Workshop plans to use this technology.
- IMT succession is accelerated under this organizational model by prioritizing all of the IMT Pool trainees.
- Alaska will continue use of Field Deliverable S-420 to fulfill required training for Type 2 Command & General Staff. The Alaska Master Cooperative Wildland Fire Management Agreement and Alaska Statewide Annual Operating Plan state, "Costs incurred for cadre and students who are participating in Field Deliverable courses including S-420 Command and General Staff will be charged to the incident that the course is hosted by." This agreement language enables this to occur.

2. Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group

To: Incident Management Organization Succession Planning Team
From: [ ] Chair, Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group

Subject: Incident Management Organization Succession Planning Proposal

AWFCG concurs with National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) that the current incident management team business model needs to be updated and that current workforce and succession planning is not sustainable for the future. The request for review and analysis of alternatives for the evolution of the Incident Management Teams is needed.

As encouraged by NWCG, AWFCG proposes a cohesive alternative model for consideration. This proposal meets the intent of the Overarching Principles and is similar to what is currently employed by our Incident Management Teams in Alaska. Furthermore, our proposal has demonstrated flexibility to meet commensurate incident complexity.

Feel free to contact me [ ] should you have any questions.

IMT Organizational Model Proposal:

Realignment of Incident Management Capability

By the *Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group*

[Editor's note: with the following exception, this response replicates that of the Alaska Fire Service. For brevity, only the sentence containing the difference is listed.]

Section 2: Management Support (Configuration/Typing Teams)

Performance Standards

Managers would have performance standards that encourage participation on incident management teams and triggers for relief from assigned project targets during PL4/5.

3. Association of Contract Counties

April 2011
To: Chair, NWCG

Thank you for the opportunity to both review the "Draft Incident Management Organization Succession Planning" documents and to provide comments. It is clear that the IMOSP teams devoted considerable time and energy to both the guiding principles and organizational models. Please thank the members for that effort and for making the process transparent.

Reviewing previous efforts to answer similar questions, we find that previous recommendations might help to solve the current problem. Below is a partial list of these previous efforts:

1. The Quadrennial Fire Report (2009): "Bringing fire management response more in line with the National Response Framework leads to a concurrent approach for reconfiguration of emergency response within fire leadership. Large wildfires and longer fire seasons are not going to be the only natural disasters in the headlines. Fire management must be prepared to go up a step beyond simply fulfilling its role in the national emergency support function. While the federal fire agencies will always make their land stewardship and protection responsibilities the primary objective, what will be needed is a more interactive and robust approach enabling fire agencies to work more effectively with FEMA and state and local community emergency response forces. Fire management must build beyond the strong training and technical assistance roles in national incident management that are already well established and promote stronger interplay and planning for emergency response efforts of all agency and jurisdictional forces."

- Developing the capacity of incident management organizations (Types I, II, and III) so that all team members have the training and ability to address wildfire and emergency response situations, regardless of jurisdictional boundaries.
- Continue to train and assist partners in incident management.
- Build the capability for all incident management teams to integrate and work effectively within emergency response – working first with FEMA All-Hazard Incident Management Type 3 teams and extending to larger national and even international areas of operation.

2. The National Interagency Complex Incident Management Organization Study (2004): This effort recommended seven NIMO IMT with an excellent implementation strategy. Many of the recommendations have not been implemented although some seem to have been incorporated in the IMOSP efforts.
3. The Federal Wildland Fire Policy (1995, 2001 and 2009): "Finding sufficient personnel within the agencies to meet annual fire season staffing…has been increasingly difficult. An anticipated increase in retirements of fire managers raises a serious question about how agencies will conduct their fire management mission."
4. Wildfire Suppression; Strategies for Containing Costs, National Academy of Public Administration (2002): "…fire programs could benefit from developing additional locally committed Type 3 organizations consisting of federal and local firefighters who are not committed to serving on Type 1 or Type 2 teams."
5. Study of the Implementation of the Federal Wildland Fire Policy, National Academy of Public Administration (2000): "The current methods of meeting human resource needs for fighting wildland fire (using professional leadership drawn from a volunteer fire "militia") may not be sustainable in the future."

In addition to acknowledging previous recommendations when formulating our model, we tried to find answers to the following concerns:

1. This effort should focus on state and local needs as well as Federal Fire Policy.
2. This effort must acknowledge the recommendations of the Cohesive Strategy.
3. This effort must meet the objectives of the National Response Framework and be in-line with what FEMA and others are doing.
4. Ensuring that we get the "best of the best" on IMTs regardless of agency affiliation or color of uniform.
5. Considering the staffing shortages and increased demands upon agency workers, why not ask these questions of contractors; "Can you do this? Are you interested? What might the costs be?"
6. IC liability is an issue that has yet to truly be resolved; can this reorganization help provide resolution?

Solutions

The Association of Contract Counties suggests an organizational model that can best be described as a blend between Single Standard, Core Team and Core Team State." Team management and coordination, and would be as follows:

- Number of Teams: 5 Area Command Teams, 75 IMT's.
- Typing: Merge T1 and T2 and recognize T3 as formal Teams.
- Team Size:
  - Area Command as per national standards.
  - Merged T1/T2 - 27 people as per national standards.
  - T3 - 10 people as per national standards.
- Dispatching:
  - Merged T1/T2 on a National Rotation with assignments prioritized based on closest resource concept.
  - T3 - prioritized based on closest resource concept.
- Workforce Development: Central trainee pool which assigns trainees based on national priorities.
- Supervision Structure: Teams supervised by Agency Administrators while on assignment. Home unit supervises team members when not on assignment.
- Efficiency through scalability: Reduced roster and appropriate staffing based on incident specific needs.
- Source of Funding: All hazard response; follow the direction from the National Response Framework.

4. International Association of Fire Chiefs Wildland Fire Policy Committee

April 2011
To: Chair, NWCG
Thank you for the opportunity to both review the "Draft Incident Management Organization Succession Planning" documents and to provide comments.

We recommend the following Organizational Model that can best be described as a blend between Single Standard, Core Team and Core Team State. We recommend the NIWFPF adopt the name "National Response IMT's."

1. Team Management, Coordination, and Workforce Succession would be as follows:
    - Governance by NIWFPF; existing organizations i.e. GACC's, NMAC, NWCG would certainly have representation/membership but ultimately NIWFPF is the decision making organization.
    - Number of Team: 5 Area Command Teams, 75 IMT's which includes all agencies with emergency response jurisdiction and responsibilities.
    - Typing: Merge T1 and T2 (after a suitable transition) and include T3 organizations and recognize as formal Teams.
    - Team Size: Area Command as per National Standards, Merged T1/T2, 27 people as per National Standards, remainder of IMT's 10 people again as a National Standard.
    - Modules/Service Center: We seen how these modules have worked so far with incident management and frankly detract from both team cohesiveness and effectiveness. If agencies want to use modules for programmatic services i.e. personnel, contracting and fiscal that becomes another business decision. We've seen enough of this concept to know this process is neither robust nor responsive enough to meet the needs of evolving incident management.
    - Module Coordination: NIWFPF
    - Dispatching: All teams on a National Rotation with assignments prioritized based on closest resource concept, managed and directed by NIWFPF utilizing existing coordination/mobilization systems.
    - Workforce Development: Central trainee pool managed by NIWFPF which assigns trainees based on national priorities. Module-specific academy concept used to accelerate credentialing.
    - Performance Standards: Incorporation of incident response job duties in all PD's.
    - Supervision Structure: Teams supervised by Agency Administrators while on assignment with direct involvement of NIWFPF. Home unit supervises team members when not on assignment but availability of team members (once committed/statused to teams) is directed by NIWFPF.
    - Position-specific grade levels: Agency Team C&G receive 90-day details during peak fire months (longer in some geographic areas). Area Command Teams receive the greater of GS-14 or their current grade/pay for Area Commanders; Assistant Area Commanders including Air Operations receive the greater of GS-13 or current grade/pay. For merged T1/T2 IMT, IC's and DPIC receive the greater of a GS-13 or their current grade/pay; Section Chiefs receive the greater of GS-12 or their current grade/pay. For T3 IC's, receive the greater of a GS-11 or their current grade/pay, remaining overhead receive the greater of a GS-9 or their current grade/pay.
    - Efficiency through scalability: Reduced roster and appropriate staffing based on incident specific needs.
    - Funding of Teams: Centrally funded for IMT positions description by the respective agency.
    - Source of Funding: Funding and FTE based on NIWFPF split. Fund from suppression consistently across agencies. All hazard response; follow the direction from the National Response Framework.
    - Staffing Cost: Increase to suppression due to temporary promotions. Savings in preparedness (during temporary promotions) and other program areas for other priorities. Potential savings in suppression as teams would be scalable based on incident needs.

Chair, IAFC Wildland Fire Policy Committee

5. Area Command Teams 1,2,3,4

Executive Summary: Area Command fills a vital role when used to oversee the management of multiple incidents that are each being managed by separate incident management organizations or to oversee the management of a very large incident that has multiple Incident Management Teams assigned. Area Command provides a mechanism for agency administrators to reduce the span of control over the incident management teams and improve the effective and efficient use of resources. Area Commands develop broad objectives and strategies for the assigned incidents and coordinate the development of individual incident objective and strategies that are consistent and complementary between the IMTs.

A number of opportunities to improve National Area Command Team service were identified from After Action Reviews with "customers" agency administrators and cooperators during the recent past fire seasons by Area Command Teams (ACT). Many opportunities are internal to the teams and relate to consistency in how business is conducted. A number of these processes have been standardized by the Teams during the past two years. ACT has requested clarification of Area Command's roles and responsibilities by the National Multi-Agency Coordinating Group through a memorandum to the GACCs and Regional Fire Directors and an update of the Interagency Standards for Fire and Aviation Operations, the "Red Book."

Area Command provides strategic leadership, direction, and management oversight.

Section 1: Team Make-Up

Area Commander, Assistant Area Commander Plans, Assistant Area Commander Logistics, Area Command Aviation Coordinator

May include additional positions based upon the requirements of the assignment, i.e. Area Command Information, and normally is supported by a Resource Unit Leader, Situation Unit Leader, and other misc. personnel if required in order to meet the needs of the Agency Administrator

Configuration of this IMT
Same as current situation model for Area Commands with Type 1 and Type 2 IMTs. Engage with DHS to determine a configuration for Area Commands where the Type 3 IMTs are managing multiple incidents within a geographic area.

Governance of this IMT
NMAC

Typing of teams
Area Command, Type 1, 2, 3

Number and kind of modules
Same as the "core team model" for support to IMTs and Area Command. Typically would include technical support, predictive services, etc.

Number of IMTs/NIMO teams
Should be based upon "Team Use Study" examining the actual use of Teams for the past 20 years. The objective for the number of days deployed of non-NIMO Type 1 and Type 2 IMTs of no more than 80 days.

Management and coordination of modules
Area Command: NMAC; NIMO should be interagency, rather than just Forest Service.
Type 1 IMTs: NMAC Type 2 IMTs: GACC

Dispatching pattern for IMTs
Area Command and NIMO: NMAC
Type 1 IMT: NMAC
Type 2 IMT: GACC
Type 3 IMT: Local, or State or DHS

Section 2: Management Support (Configuration/Typing Teams)

Performance Standards

Same as current situation with overarching assumptions model

Formal supervision structure
NIMO: NMAC/NWCG
All other IMTs and Area Command same as current model

Role of Area Command
Used to oversee the management of multiple incidents that are each being managed by separate incident management organizations or to oversee the management of a very large incident that has multiple Incident Management Teams assigned. Will provide a mechanism for agency administrators to reduce the span of control over the incident management teams and improve the effective and efficient use of resources. Area Commands develop broad objectives and strategies for the assigned incidents and coordinate the development of individual incident objective and strategies that are consistent and complementary between the IMTs.

How this IMT model provides added value to the agencies represented on NWCG
Area Commands have demonstrated their ability over 20+ years to manage and provide oversight to complexes of Wildland fires being managed by Type 1 IMTs, large incidents that have multiple IMTs assigned and all-hazard incidents such as Hurricane Katrina and Rita where several Type 1 IMTs were deployed over large geographic areas. The Area Commands know the capabilities of the IMTs and work closely with them to provide the response necessary for Federal or State or local administrators.

Section 3: Incentives

Grade levels for team positions
Same as "current situation" with over arching assumptions model and Type 1 IMTs

How this IMT model generates savings
Through efficient management of IMTs. Assuring that the appropriate IMTs are assigned and released based upon current complexity and projecting reduced complexity and return to local area management as soon as practicable.

Section 4: Funding

How this model is funded
As in current situation with over arching assumptions model

Standard support cost
Interagency personnel by home bureaus, state and local personnel supported by their respective bureaus except when on incident when they are supported by incident project funding.

Cost of staffing this IMT
Current situation, base funds are provided by participant's home bureau plus approximately _____ per year for Team meetings and basic equipment for Team deployment.

Section 5: Incident Capacity/Workforce Development

Trainee/mentee organization
Encourage participation in NWCG Agency position training and accept DHS position training.
Area Command Trainees would be coordinated by NICC in order to assure timely opportunities for deployment with Area Command Teams in the field.

Workforce strategy/training needs to maintain this model
Encourage participation as with Type 1 and Type 2 IMTs: including pay incentives, Bureau Support through local unit incentives from Regional and National Offices, enhanced opportunities for training and acknowledgement of the experiences gained for management application in routine work in home place environments.

Section 6: Additional Design Criteria *[Optional]*

6. Anonymous

Executive Summary

This model combines a combination of approaches from the original six models. The theme of the six combined models plus approach is efficient use of interagency incident management teams. Efficiency is enhanced through a standard 50 team configuration, team typing and a single national dispatch rotation for interagency teams. The 6 combined models plus organization

- The collapsing of Type 1 and Type 2 teams into a single type of team.
- Filling positions by incentive based 120 day details.
- Envisions that Position descriptions be completed and used for all 50 proposed team positions.
- Recommends that the 5109.17 and 310-1 training qualifications, standards be one in the same.
- Envisions that all teams be available for National rotation
- Envisions Incident Commanders becoming a full time position.
- Has a goal of having at least one Incident Commander supervised by most every Forest Supervisor.
- A training goal of one trainee for every position.
- Envisions having trainees on a National rotation.
- Participation on IMTs is improved because fire funded employees are required to participate as a condition of employment.

Section 1: Team Make-Up

Size of this IMT

50 Team Members Configuration of this IMT.

Configuration of this IMT

The 50 team configuration works well for fire and all risk assignments.

1. Incident Commander
2. Deputy IC
3. Safety Officer
4. Information Officer
5. Human Resource Spec.
6. Liaison Officer
7. Operations Section Chief Field
8. Operations Section Chief Planning
9. Operations Section Chief Night
10. Division Supervisor1
11. Division Supervisor2
12. Division Supervisor3
13. Division Supervisor4
14. Structure Protection Specialist
15. Air Ops Branch
16. Air Ops Branch Deputy
17. Air Attack Group Sup
18. Plan Section Chief
19. Situation Unit Leader
20. GIS Tech Specialist
21. Resource Unit Leader1
22. Resource Unit Leader2
23. Training Specialist
24. Fire Behavior Analyst
25. Computer Tech Spec.1
26. Computer Tech Spec2
27. Log Sect Chief

28. Supply Unit Leader
29. Facilities Unit Leader
30. Ground Support
31. Comm Unit Leader
32. Medical Unit Leader
33. Incident Medical Manager
34. Security Manager
35. Food Unit Leader
36. Base Camp Manager
37. Ordering Manager
38. Receiving and Dist Manager
39. Comm Tech
40. Equipment Manager
41. Finance Sec. Chief
42. Time Unit Leader
43. Comp and Claims
44. Procurement
45. Equipment Time Recorder
46. Cost Unit Leader
47. Personnel Time Recorder
48. Interagency Contract Rep.
49. Trainees for every position possible.

Governance of this IMT
Team is supervised by a Forest Supervisor, and they are dispatched on a national rotation.

Typing of teams
Type 1 and Type 2 teams into a single type of team and maintain team size of 50 team members. The configuration described in the 2010 National Mobilization Guide would be revised to reflect this.

Number and kind of modules
Team membership is drawn from all the NWCG member agencies and state and local fire departments. Only the Incident Commander will be using NIMO funding. The Incident Commander position will be staffed year round. The IC will continue to be base funded on a year round basis out of emergency funds.

Number of IMTs/NIMO teams
This organizational model collapses Type 1 and Type 2 teams, and uses the NIMO concept to fund, evaluate, accurately describe, and staff one full time Incident Commander. Collapsing Type 1 and Type 2 teams will give us the same number to respond nationally.

Management and coordination of modules
The incident complexity analysis is used by agency administrators to request IMTs in the configuration appropriate for incidents. Standardization of team roster size and oversight from GACCs provides ability to respond.

Dispatching pattern for IMTs
The teams are supervised by a Forest Supervisor. These single type teams are Interagency teams and are dispatched on a national rotation. A Smokejumper type rotation is used to determine which team is up first, second, third, etc. You stay at the top of the list until you get a fire. Upon returning from a dispatch, the team getting back first goes to the bottom of the rotation list waiting for a dispatch; each team works their way up to the top of the list.

Section 2: Management Support (Configuration/Typing Teams)

Performance Standards
Management Support Performance Standards: Participation on IMTs is improved because fire funded employees are required to participate as a condition of employment, performance standards are linked to participation on IMTs by fire funded employees and militia with fire qualifications. This organizational model continues to use the militia

approach to staffing the teams. Team members will have "day jobs" in fire or other disciplines and respond to fires as members of teams. This new model includes state and local government membership as team members.

Formal supervision structure
Same as it is now, with the exception of the Incident Commander that would ideally be at least one working for most every Forest Supervisor.

Role of Area Command
Same as it is now.

How this IMT model provides added value to the agencies represented on NWCG
All teams would be on a National Rotation, availability. Teams would not be in short supply of positions. Trainees would be on a National Rotation, availability. More standardized type of teams, ready for all risk type of assignments.

Section 3: Incentives

Grade levels for team positions
Incentives for participation are 120 day details to standard grade level linked to all 50 team positions. Participation on IMTs is improved because fire funded employees are required to participate as a condition of employment, performance standards are linked to participation on IMTs by fire funded employees and militia with fire qualifications. Incentives for team participation are 120 day details to standard grade level linked to team position during fire season federal employees, funded out of emergency funds. Continuing on with what NIMO started, position descriptions will be developed for all 48 team positions. Outcomes of this model are a larger pool of resources that will participate when the team is put together by the Incident Commander.

How this IMT model generates savings
Savings when the team members are not on an Incident their base funding is covered by their "day jobs" except the Incident commander.

Section 4: Funding

How this model is funded
During fire incidents team members, detailers are funded out of emergency funds. The exception being the Incident Commander which is a permanent position, base funded out of emergency funds.

Standard support cost
To fill positions by incentive based details will take support. To get the Position descriptions done for all 38 team positions will take some support. To get the 5109.17 and 310-1 to be all in the same will take some support. To get all the teams available for National rotation will take support. To get Incident Commanders to be a full time position will take support. Having at least one Incident Commander working for most every Forest Supervisor will take support. Having every team settle on a 50 team member roster will take support. Having a trainee for every position will take support. Having trainees be on a National rotation will take support.

Cost of staffing this IMT
Less than a NIMO team; Less than a Type 1 team; Little more than a current type II team because of the full time Incident Commander.

Section 5: Incident Capacity/Workforce Development

Trainee/mentee organization
IMT succession is accelerated under this organizational model through management of a single national pool of trainees that are rotated between teams as assignments become available. Priorities for training assignments on teams are developed based on needs for staffing teams and a long term approach to team succession linked to agency workforce management plans. Changes in laws and guidance or policy suggested for this model, 310-1 and the 5109.17 will be one in the same. Only one set of training requirements, across the board for all participants, including but not limited to State, Federal, & Local municipalities.

Workforce strategy/training needs to maintain this model

The implementation plan is fully applied no longer than the next 3-5 years. If Position Descriptions are created, and details that reflect position base pay is offered for the positions then maintaining this model should be indefinite. Build the position descriptions and detailers will come.

Section 6: Additional Design Criteria

No comments.

7. Individual



Survey Considerations

Even though many responses may be interpreted to indicate that stakeholders are divided or ambivalent or perhaps simply cautious, it is important to recognize that few completely different perspectives were voiced in the open-ended online survey blocks or in comments submitted to the email account. A few respondents commented that they felt the issue of succession planning was incorrectly framed and incompletely scoped, but most of these concern a rejection of the Case for Change rather than proposing new options or framing. Two notable exceptions are the numerous *Other* comments received on Building Block 3.15-Compensation, which identified a gap in survey responses (we needed, and got, an *As is* or *No Extra Compensation* category), and consternation expressed that all options seemed to presume expansion of the number of NIMO/NIMO-like teams.

In addition to providing useful information for the IMOSPT and NWCG Executive Board, comments also provided useful feedback on the quality and comprehensiveness of the survey. They indicated that the respondents are not afraid to speak out (e.g., highlighting a couple of specific weaknesses in the survey), yet also support the credibility of the survey in that there were consistently few *Other* categories selected, indicating that the selections provided appropriately cover all options.

The high degree of consistency across the survey responses and comments suggests the effort reached saturation of the responding population–a desired goal in social science research. However, we can only estimate the total population of potential survey respondents; thus it is difficult to quantify the representativeness of survey respondents for their demographic. Because of this, it was not possible to calculate the response rate (an important survey measure) or to conduct a non-respondent bias test. Due to this and the low number of responses in some of the categories (<30), more intensive statistical analysis was not conducted.

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Appendices

Appendix A. Survey Instrument

Identifying the critical "building blocks" and an effective organizational model on which to base evolving Incident Management Organizations

Overview: In 2010, the NWCG Executive Board tasked an interagency group - the Incident Management Organization Succession Planning (IMOSP) Team – to develop a recommendation for future IMO structures, governance, workforce planning and development. The IMOSP Team identified a number of 'building blocks' from which they created a series of 6 new organizational models to provide more concrete examples of how these might be combined. These building blocks explore team management and coordination, workforce succession, management framework, compensation strategies and funding.

The IMSOP Team recommended that the NWCG Executive Board start a conversation with key stakeholders about the role of the IMO and how IMTs might best be organized and managed in the future to meet the needs of the public, the agencies, the fire service and the team members themselves. The Board is interested in taking advantage of the combined knowledge and experience of past, current and future team members, Coordinating Groups, partners and the managers who use IMTs to chart a course for IMT succession over the next decade and beyond.

This feedback form is one of several mechanisms for capturing your thoughts. Feedback will be summarized and presented to the NWCG Executive Board in the spring of 2011. **If you complete this hard-copy, please do not also complete the on-line version.**

SECTION 1: Demographics

Purpose: This section will help the NWCG Executive Board understand different perspectives based on different positions – different Agencies or fire departments and different responsibilities.

1. Please select the position that best represents the bulk of your day-job responsibilities.

a. Organizational Level (Select the one that best applies)
____ Federal - Local (up to and including BLM Resource Area, FS Forest, National Park)
____ Federal - Regional (including BLM State, FS/NPS Region)
____ Federal - National (including Tribal)
____ State Agency or State Fire Department
____ Local Government or Local Fire Department
____ Contractor
____ Other (no professional role in Incident Management)

b. Functional Area (Select the one that best applies)
____ Line Officer/Agency Administrator ____ NIMO team member
____ Fuels Program ____ Fire Program
____ Dispatch/coordination office ____ Other agency position
____ Other fire position (module leader, firefighter, etc)
____ Other non-agency position (contractor, AD, etc)
____ Other (no professional role in Incident Management)

2. Please indicate your *current* highest level of qualification that you serve in on incidents. (Select the one that best applies**)**

____ IMT-Incident Commander (Type 1 or 2)

____ IMT- Command and General Staff (Type 1 or 2)
____ Other incident qualified-position (Agency Administrator, AAR, single resource, etc)
____ IMT – Type 3
____ FEMA/DHS Type 3
____ None/not currently serving

3. Please indicate your primary agency/organization. **(**Select the one that best applies**)**

____ USFS ____NPS ____BLM ____BIA/Tribe ____ USFWS
____ USFA/FEMA ____ Contractor ____ State government ____ Local government
____ Other

4. Please indicate your age-range.

___< 20 ____21-30 ___31-40 ___41-50 ___>50

5. Please indicate your zip code. _____

SECTION 2: Overarching Principles

Purpose: The IMOSPT developed a set of Overarching Principles they deemed essential for the success of a future IMO. These represent the foundation for all 6 of the new incident management organizational models. The NWCG Executive Board is requesting your feedback on this work.

Complete descriptions are found on the NWCG website under Overarching Principles **(**www.nwcg.gov/imosp).

1. How important do you think each of these is to the success of organizing for Wildland Fire response to incidents in the future? Please rate each[1] on a scale of 1-5, with 1 = highly unimportant, 2 = somewhat unimportant, 3 = neutral, 4= somewhat important, 5 = highly important).

____1) **Succession Planning** (Changing the current "voluntary" participation system, and developing an interagency succession system that supplies sufficient staffing for IMTs.)
____2) **Single Qualification System** (Supporting a common wildland fire qualification system and completing the All Hazard qualification system.)
____3) **Agency Accountability** (Interagency needs for target positions and training will be met. Hold agencies accountable.)
____4) **Incident Complexity/Scalability** (IMTs will respond in configurations as requested or negotiated. Incident staffing can be easily adjusted up or down.)
____5) **Modules and Service Centers** (Preconfigured modules in place nationally to augment IMT skill sets managed by the GACGs and Service Centers to serve multiple incidents, i.e. incident finance, incident information, logistics.)
____6) **Responsiveness to federal Fire Policy** (IMTs will have the necessary knowledge to implement all management responses consistent with the Federal Fire Policy.)
____7a) **Compensation Strategies, Incentives** (IMT participants compensated based on complexity and duties while engaged in IMT duties.) *
____ 7b) **Accountability** (IMT participants held accountable for performance as IMT members through measures such as position descriptions and performance standards executed by their direct supervisor.) *
____8) **Standardize Operating Procedures for IMTs** (Standard operating procedures should be developed in a coordinated effort involving the geographic area, states, and national coordinating groups.)
____9) **Support of Incident Management Teams Decisions** (The model chosen should provide for strong agency support of Agency Administrators and IMT decision making, regardless of outcomes. Agencies should address personal liability concerns.)

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[1] Note: There are 12 choices here and only 11 Overarching Principles listed in the background materials. We split the Accountability from Compensation to facilitate analysis.

____10) **Interagency Cooperation/External Considerations** (The model will involve interagency structure with federal, state and local government personnel that make appropriate use of nongovernmental participants.)

____11) **Consistent Financial Practices** (The model will include consistent financial practices among federal agencies regarding charging base salaries to emergency accounts.)

Additional comments to help the NWCG Executive Board to understand why it is that you find a principle highly desirable or undesirable. For instance, you may want to describe one or more additional critical issues not addressed above that you deem as essential for the success of a future IMO. (Optional)

_____

_____

SECTION 3: Building Blocks of Organizational Models

Purpose: Your responses in this section will help the NWCG Executive Board develop the foundation for a future Organizational Model for Incident Management.

Task: Please use the spaces below to indicate your preferences. Please use the comment space after Question 10 for additional thoughts, detail and comments.

1. What is the best way to govern teams? (Select one**)**

____ All teams governed by the GACGs*
____ All teams governed by the NWCG*
____ A combination of the above two
____ No preference
____ Other (please describe) _____
_____

*State teams will still be governed by their respective states

2. What types of Teams will we need in the future?

A. How many interagency Type 1 and Type 2 teams will we need? (Select one**)**

____ 45 (current number)
____ More
____ Less
____ No preference

B. How should interagency Teams be typed? (Select one**)**

____ One type of team (Type 1 and Type 2 combined).
____ Two types of teams (retain distinction between Type 1 and Type 2)
____ No preference
____Other_____

C. How many Teams should be NIMO or NIMO-like (full time teams composed of Command and General staff and funded out of wildland fire emergency funds)? (Select one**)**

____ All ____ Half ____ None
____ No preference ____ Other_____

D. What do you see as the role for Area Command? (Select one**)**

____ Used more than at present ____ Used same as at present
____ Used less than at present ____ No longer needed
____ No preference ____ Other_____

E. What do you see as the role for Type 2 contract teams? (Select one**)**

____ No role
____ Surge capacity in busy years
____ Available in all years for management of wildland fires
____ No preference

____ Other_____

F. What do you see as the role for FEMA/DHS T3 teams and agency all hazard teams in supporting/managing wildfires? (Select one**)**

____No role
____Surge capacity in busy year
____Used in conjunction with Type 1 or 2 Teams (not in Command and General Staff positions)
____Used routinely to manage wildland fire incidents (in Command and General Staff positions)
____ No preference
____ Other_____

G. What do you see as the role of the militia* in staffing teams? (Select one**)**

___ As single resources
___ For any position except Command and General staff
___ For any position
___ None
___ No preference
___Other_____

* People who voluntarily participate in large fire incident management off of their home units

3. What is the best way to configure Teams? (Select one**)**

____ Small – Command and General Staff augmented by service centers and modules (such as planning, operations, aviation, and logistics)
____ Small – Command and General Staff augmented by service centers only, all other needs filled by single resource orders
____ Medium – Standard 27 roster augmented by service centers and modules (such as planning, operations, aviation, and logistics)
____ Medium – Standard 27 roster augmented by service centers only, all other needs filled by single resource orders
____ Large – Per National Mob Guide Standard 27 + 17 negotiated + 10 mentees
____ No preference
____ Other _____
_____

4. How should Teams be dispatched? (Select one**)**

____ National level dispatch rotation for all teams
____ GACC level dispatch rotation with national level triggered by scarcity
____ GACC level dispatch rotation at all times
____ No preference
____ Other _____
_____

5. What is the best way to manage trainees? (Select one**)**

____ Trainees rostered with Teams
____ Trainees managed as central pool by local GACCs
____ Trainees managed as central pool at national level
____ No preference
____ Other _____
_____

6. What is the best workforce development strategy? (Select one**)**

____ As is. No national strategy for succession planning, career pathing or individual development.
____ Build on existing academies to streamline and evolve towards a unified national strategy.
____ Develop a national strategy
____ No preference
____ Other _____

7. Should incident management participation* be voluntary for employees of NWCG member agencies? **(**Select one**)**

____ Yes, participation should be voluntary for all employees
____ No, all employees should participate
____ Mandatory only for fire funded personnel
____ No preference
____ Other _____

* (At some level, not necessarily holding an Incident Qualification Card, including Initial Attack through Area Command, Agency Representative to Multi Agency Coordination Group)

8. Should position descriptions and performance standards reflect the expectation for incident participation (applies only to Federal employees)? **(**Select one**)**

____ Yes, for all federal fire funded personnel
____ Yes, for federal employees who respond to incidents
____ Only for full time incident management personnel (NIMO or NIMO like).
____ No, evaluations should be made using the Fire Overhead/Crew Performance Evaluation
____ No preference
____ Other _____
_____

9. How should team participants be compensated? (Select one**)**

____90 day details during peak fire months (based on team location). Example: IC's and Deputy IC's receive the greater of a GS-13 or their current grade. Section Chiefs receive the greater of a GS-12 or their current grade. States determine on a state by state basis.
____ Command and General Staff compensated year-round by fire accounts at a grade based on IMT position
____ Provide cash awards for incident participation
____ No preference
____ Other _____
_____

10. How should team participants be funded? (Select one**)**

____Year round base funding through respective agency suppression funds
____ Base 8 from full-time position program area. OT from suppression while on incident. ____ Base 8 and OT shifted to suppression accounts while on incidents
____ No preference
____ Other _____

(Note: FEMA/State charged as per National Response Plan and State cooperating agreements.)

Please provide additional comments to help us understand what is guiding your choices. This will help the NWCG Executive Board develop a new model. (Optional)

_____
_____

SECTION 4: Organizational Models

Purpose: Your answers in this section will help the NWCG Executive Board envision how the general building blocks laid out in the last section might be best and specifically configured. They do not expect to select one of the models "as is," so your comments will be important for helping them understand what works and what doesn't from your perspective.

Please refer to the descriptions of the organizational models posted on the NWCG website (www.nwcg.gov/imosp).

A. Please rate each of the following models on a scale of 1-5, with 1 being 'highly desirable' and 5 'highly undesirable' (1 = highly undesirable, 2 = somewhat undesirable, 3 = neutral, 4= somewhat desirable, 5 = highly desirable).

____Current Situation
____Current plus Overarching Principles
____ Single Standard
____ External Capacity - Contract
____ External Capacity – All Hazard and Contract
____ Core Team
____ Core Team with State Integration

Additional comments to help the NWCG Executive Board to understand why it is that you find these highly desirable or undesirable. (Optional)

_____
_____
_____
_____

You have completed the hard-copy version of the IMOSP Questionnaire.
Thanks for participating!

Additional Feedback Opportunities
If you would like to submit additional feedback, you can submit comments or questions to imsuccessionplanning@gmail.com.

If you or your group would like to submit a new IMT model not covered in this Questionnaire, please use the **New Incident Organization Model template** found on the NWCG website (**www.nwcg.gov/imosp**).

Appendix B. IMOSP Team Members and Organizational Structure



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