Intelligence Report

China's Regional and Provincial Leaders
The Purge of the Military, the Rise of Old Party Cadres

(Reference Title: POLO LII)
CHINA'S REGIONAL AND PROVINCIAL LEADERS: 
THE PURGE OF THE MILITARY, 
THE RISE OF OLD PARTY CADRES

MEMORANDUM FOR RECIPIENTS

This report traces the steady if slow progress of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai in attempting to restore civilian control of the governing apparatus in China, at the regional and provincial levels, after years of dominance by the PLA.

The purge of Lin Piao and other military leaders is seen as part of this effort. At the regional level, where power has been held entirely by career military men, several military leaders have been purged, and the power of others is being diluted. At the provincial level, many Party secretaries are missing, most of whom are career military men; the new secretaries are almost all old Party cadres.

The report speculates on other things that Peking may do in order to establish civilian control at all levels. It finds, however, that there is a considerable distance to go, and it leaves
open the question of whether the aim can be accomplished in the lifetime of either Mao or Chou. Also, it points to the possibility of a civilian-military showdown in the post-Mao period.

In preparing this report, this staff has received constructive assistance from the Central Reference Service and the Office of Current Intelligence, both of which contributed substantially. The report's interpretations are those of the writers, W.P. Southard and John Hickey.

Hal Ford
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CHINA'S REGIONAL AND PROVINCIAL LEADERS: 
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Principal Observations

Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai are moving to restore civilian control of the governing apparatus at the regional and provincial levels, as well as at the national level, although the pace at the regional and provincial levels remains slow.

Even prior to the purge of Lin Piao and other central military leaders, Mao had defined the main issue in Chinese internal politics as the role of the military. At the regional and provincial levels, military domination of the government apparatus was striking. The only regional authorities were the Military Region headquarters, almost all of which were in the hands of apparent proteges of Lin. And of the 29 provincial-level Party committees, 20 were headed by career military men, and almost all were heavily staffed with them; of all provincial-level Party secretaries, about 60 percent were career military men, the great majority of whom held important military posts concurrently. Many of these military men had not been properly responsive to the principle of "Party leadership": too often, decisions affecting local work were being made by military Party committees and carried out without adequate reference to local Party committees or to the civilian members of them.
The decapitation of the PLA central leadership in September 1971 had obvious implications for regional and provincial leaders. Still other conspirators had to be apprehended. Those long associated with the principals had to be re-examined. Those who were unwilling to accept the principle of civilian Party control of the military had to be replaced. This would mean the purge and reorganization of some of the MR headquarters and many of the provincial Party committees and military districts.

The purge in fact moved quickly to the regional and provincial levels, taking two MR commanders and two MR first political officers (out of 22 such positions) and several provincial military leaders -- a group which included several men who were concurrently first secretaries of provincial Party committees. Since that first wave the purge has remained at the provincial and army level, but has included additional military leaders who were concurrently provincial first and second secretaries.

The number of missing secretaries, as of early July 1973, is 31 (about one-fifth of the total number of provincial Party secretaries as of September 1971), of whom four (all PLA men) are or were the first secretaries of their provinces, and 10 (all PLA men) were second-ranking secretaries. In all, at least 17 of the missing secretaries are career military men, almost all known or believed to have held important military posts at the time of their disappearance. Most of these missing military-political leaders have been reported purged or seem to have been purged in connection with the Lin Piao affair: as alleged conspirators or supporters, as longtime associates, or as leaders of military units to which Lin's group allegedly looked for support. At the same time, several proteges of Lin and other purged leaders remain active and in apparent favor. Some have evidently persuaded Mao of their loyalty, while others may have been marked for purging later -- one by one, in order to avoid provoking coordinated resistance.
A few of the missing military-political leaders -- career military men who are or were provincial-level Party secretaries -- have probably been purged or set aside not for actual or alleged involvement in the Lin Piao affair but on grounds of principle: that is, their actual or alleged resistance to civilian Party control. This could mean either their poor responsiveness to directives from Peking or their failure to cooperate satisfactorily with the civilian secretaries of provincial-level Party committees.

There has been a steady if undramatic improvement in the position of old Party cadres vis-a-vis military leaders in the regional and provincial structures of power in the past year. It is true that most of the regional military leaders remain in power, that the military Party committees are still the only known regional Party organs, and that most of the Party committees in provinces containing MR headquarters are still headed by career military men who are active MR leaders. However, old Party cadres are being increasingly installed as senior political officers in those MR headquarters, and may be acting as first secretaries of some military Party committees at that level. Moreover, the known first secretaries of other provinces -- those not containing MR headquarters -- are either old Party cadres or career military men no longer identified in military posts in those provinces. Further, old Party cadres hold the great majority of the identified posts of first political officers of the 27 Military Districts or major Garrisons.

As things now stand, 18 of the first secretaries (or senior secretaries on the spot) of provincial or major municipal Party committees are career military men, while 11 are old Party cadres. However, of the 170-odd secretaries of all ranks known or believed to be active, the balance is now even between career
military men and old Party cadres. Of the 45 identified new secretaries -- added since August 1971 -- the great majority are known or believed to be old Party cadres.

There are other things that Peking is now doing, or is expected to do, or can do, to help to restore civilian Party control at all levels. These include the reaffirmation of the Party chairman's authority over the PLA, the naming of a civilian as chairman (if any) of the regime, the reconstitution of the Politburo standing committee and the full Politburo to assure civilian domination, the addition of old Party cadres to the Military Affairs Committee and its General Political Department, the exclusion of PLA figures from leading positions in the political security apparatus, and the extension of a political security network into the PLA at regional and provincial levels. Some outside possibilities are the naming of a civilian as Minister of Defense, the early re-establishment of Party regional bureaus, and the reorganization of military-dominated provincial committees to separate principals who have long worked together.

Whether civilian Party control of the governing apparatus throughout China can be fully restored in Mao's lifetime, or even in Chou's, is impossible to judge. Although another direct challenge to Mao seems unlikely, some of the military leaders at all levels may be preparing for a showdown, at some point in the post-Mao period, with the civilian Party leaders.
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THE PURGE OF THE MILITARY,
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CHINA'S REGIONAL AND PROVINCIAL LEADERS:
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I. THE REGIONAL-PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP AS OF 1971

One of the most striking features of the Lin Piao affair was that the regional and provincial governing apparatus constructed during the period of Lin's decline and fall was dominated by military figures, many of them Lin's proteges, and that the Party's civilian leaders in Peking in this same period were greatly concerned with the issue of civilian versus military control of that apparatus. As of August 1971, when Mao began the "inspection tour" in which he told regional and provincial military-political leaders something of his plans to carry out a purge and to re-establish civilian Party control, the military's domination of the governing apparatus outside Peking was at its height. There were no regional authorities apart from the 11 Military Region headquarters, all but one of which (Peking) were in the hands of apparent proteges of Lin; these headquarters seemed to be answerable only to the Military Affairs Committee, itself headed de facto by Lin and composed almost entirely of proteges of Lin. And of the 29 provincial-level Party committees -- 26 provinces, three major municipalities, the last of which had just been proclaimed in late August -- fully 20 were headed by career military men, the other nine included career military men in leading posts, and of the 150-odd secretaries and deputy secretaries about 60 percent were career military.
The Issue of Civilian Control: All of the provincial-level Party secretaries of course lost their posts when the Party apparatus was destroyed in 1966-1967; and from January 1967 -- when Mao directed the PLA to intervene to "support the Left" -- the PLA constituted the effectual government of China outside Peking (and to a large degree in Peking itself). The PLA's political role was to be temporary; Lin Piao himself said in March 1967 that the PLA would be removed from its "dominant position in local units" as soon as new leaders could be found. But new leaders -- in the form of old Party cadres -- were not generally available; many of the old provincial-level secretaries had been purged, and most of the rest were undergoing re-education, under the supervision of the PLA.

The PLA's performance in "supporting the Left" in 1967 was uneven. As documented in Red Guard materials and by Western observers, in some provinces and municipalities the PLA did in fact support the "rebels" then or later judged to be Maoist, in others the PLA initially suppressed the groups finally vindicated as Maoist, and in others the PLA split, supporting contending groups.*

*Some of the PLA leaders praised for their performance in this period were later removed from their leading posts in these provinces, while some who performed poorly in this period were later named to leading posts. In general, the record of any given PLA leader in this first confused period was apparently not the main determinant of his later fate.
It was Mao's intention from the start that a reformed Party ("revolutionary cadres") lead the revolutionary committees -- provisional organs of power -- then being formed. And in fact, of the 13 provincial-level committees formed by early February 1968, seven were placed under first secretaries who were old Party cadres.

Continuing disorder, however, apparently led to a decision to place these new committees largely in the hands of military leaders. Of the 16 provincial-level committees formed between early February and September, only two were awarded to old Party cadres, while 14 were given to career military men (nine commanders, five political officers). By September 1968 the pattern had been formed which was to persist until Lin Piao's fall three years later: 20 of the 29 provincial-level committees were led by career military men, and almost all of the most important of them -- in the provinces containing MR headquarters -- were headed by proteges of Lin Piao.

Mao was visibly dissatisfied with the performance of the PLA as China's de facto government outside of Peking. In his speech to the first plenum of the new Central Committee in April 1969, at several points he enjoined the PLA to "work carefully," to avoid arrogance and complacency, and to proceed with particular care in its leading role in rebuilding the Party.* By Army Day (1 August) 1969, these admonitions

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Mao showed some sympathy for PLA leaders who had made "mistakes" in dealing with mass organizations, on the grounds that it had indeed been hard to distinguish friends from enemies. The opaque and sometimes conflicting directives from Peking had not much helped.
had risen to the level of a campaign to ensure that the PLA work carefully and modestly, and under "Party" leadership. People's Daily found it necessary to reaffirm that veteran Party cadres were well qualified to assume leading positions in the rebuilt Party apparatus, and Red Flag charged the leading cadres of the revolutionary committees -- mainly PLA men -- with offenses against the principle of "collective leadership": namely, slighting or even suppressing the views of civilian members (old Party cadres and mass representatives), and conducting "one-man rule". The issue of civilian versus military control of the apparatus, which was to become and to remain the central issue in Chinese internal politics, was shaping up.

The Fact of Military Domination: As is now well known from the Party's massive documentation of the Lin Piao affair, Lin and other central military leaders are charged with having conspired, prior to the Party plenum of August 1970, to make a "surprise attack" during that plenum. Some of these leaders (although not the most important ones) were in fact removed from their posts later in 1970. The Party further contends that Lin by the end of 1970 had concluded that he was to be purged, and that he began in desperation to make his plans for a coup, including a plan for the assassination of Mao if necessary.* It is, one

*It is apparent from the course of Party policy in 1969-70 that Mao was turning increasingly to Chou En-lai, and Chou probably played a larger role in changing Mao's mind about Lin than can be documented -- contending, for example, that the policies agreed on by Mao and Chou would not and indeed could not be carried out by a man as inflexible as Lin. But Mao himself, as he was later to tell visitors, had already formulated the main issue as the role of the military.
basic assumption of this paper that these essentials of the Party's story are true.

But the fact remains that it was just at that time -- December 1970 -- that the new provincial-level Party committees began to surface in the same pattern as had the earlier revolutionary committees and Party core groups in the years in which Lin was clearly Mao's favorite and his designated successor: a pattern of domination of these committees by career military men, and of the most important of them by proteges of Lin.* The considerations that led Mao -- and Chou, as the Party's de facto secretary general from 1970 -- to confirm military leaders outside Peking as concurrently the leaders of most of the new Party committees seem

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*The new Party committees in provinces containing Military Region headquarters were -- in nine of 11 cases -- headed by either the military commander or the first political officer of the MR, or both. There were two exceptions: one (Yunnan) in which the first secretary, although first political officer of the MR, was a career Party cadre rather than military man, and another (Hopei) in which the MR headquarters was not in the provincial capital. Eleven other provincial Party committees (in addition to those nine) were headed by career military men, usually either the commander or first political officer of the provincial Military District. In the nine (of 29) provincial-level Party committees headed by old Party cadres (Hopei, five other provinces, and the three major municipalities), the MD or Garrison commander was almost always among the subordinate secretaries, and in all cases career military men were.
to have been a combination of practicality and prudence. These leaders were in place, and were probably the most experienced and capable at hand. They probably could not yet have been replaced en masse by old Party cadres. Although many old Party cadres were in fact named to the new Party committees, some of them as first secretaries, Peking apparently did not have enough to go around; old Party cadres in general had not been "rehabilitated" in the eyes of Peking or the populace, and only a few of the "rehabilitated" (those few who were in fact named) had the experience in high-level posts to qualify them to be first secretaries. Moreover, a failure to confirm the military in their political posts -- that is, a general sweeping-out of men long accepted as the local leaders -- might have been serious disruptive to public order, still precarious in many provinces. Further, Mao had not completed his preparations for a purge of Lin Piao and his proteges in Peking; he had not yet, for example, got the assurances of the regional military-political leaders that they would support him against Lin and his group in a showdown, and he had apparently not yet fixed the time for a purge. (The 12-13 September date seems to have been precipitated by receipt of information on Lin's plans.) Mao and Chou might understandably have preferred not to move against any of the military leaders outside Peking while they were still seeking assurances of support from important figures among them, and before the purge in Peking had been carried out.

Party briefings have stated the main consideration in terms of self-imposed restraint, of unwillingness to move against Lin and his central proteges -- with all of the implications that would have for military leaders outside Peking -- until Mao and Chou had what they felt to be proof of conspiracy. (In some of those statements, Party leaders are quoted as definit
the possible consequences of action, in the absence of such proof, as "civil war." This was of course an admission of a degree of weakness -- of inability, that is, simply to order a massive purge, on the Stalinist model. It was a position of weakness even as compared with the first year of the Cultural Revolution, when Mao had in fact ordered and carried out the destruction of the Party apparatus. But the PLA was -- as it remains -- a much more formidable antagonist.

These considerations did not deter Mao from intensifying his campaign of "rectification" of the PLA. Military administrators at all levels continued to be criticized for arrogance and complacency, and the Military Regions were directed to conduct self-examinations. The Military Region leaders themselves were the main problem, as there was no civilian Party check on them at their level -- no regional Party apparatus, as in the old days; and in their capacities as first secretaries of the Party committees of the provinces containing MR headquarters they were in a position simply to impose their wills on those committees. At all levels, the leaders of PLA Party committees were too often making the decisions -- not simply "military" decisions but decisions relating to the full range of political and economic tasks of local governments -- and carrying them out either without adequate reference to the local Party committees or in their second hats as the heads of those local Party committees. Moreover, they were sometimes forcing the local Party committees to seek PLA approval of their own actions. Peking's prescription at the time was that PLA leaders should voluntarily correct themselves: that is, accept the subordination of PLA Party committees to local Party committees, or, where PLA leaders themselves headed local Party committees, to give larger roles to the civilian members of those committees. It seemed apparent that the PLA leaders were resisting this counsel; that is, they enjoyed their power, and meant to keep it.
Mao's Talks with Regional Leaders: It is credible reported that in August 1971, as the last of the new provincial-level Party committees was being proclaimed, Mao had a series of talks with regional and provincial military-political leaders in South and East China—talks in which Mao made his case against Lin and other central military leaders, appealed for the support of regional and provincial leaders, and pointed toward a process in which civilian Party control of the military would be re-established.*

Mao's emphasis -- as reported -- was on the need for "unity" (behind himself) and for an end to "conspiracy" (against himself). He reviewed the history of "splits" and conspiracies in the Party, treating the central military leaders soon to be purged as the most recent of such groups. He went into detail on the offenses of these central leaders, beginning with their collusion prior to the August 1970 plenum. Mao expressed disbelief that these leaders could "correct their mistakes even if they tried to do so."

Mao went on -- as reported -- to speak of organizational steps against these leaders that he had already taken. He made clear, however, that these steps were not sufficient, and that he would need the support of other military leaders for a forthcoming purge of the central leaders. He expressed confidence -- judging from other developments, more confidence

*There is no verbatim account of any of these talks. A "summary" of them was circulated by the Central Committee in March 1972. Mao's remarks may have been emended as well as summarised, but the summary looks to be in general authentic.
than he actually felt -- that the central military leaders in disfavor would not be able to command any substantial portion of the PLA to "rebel" against him. Other accounts of these talks report credibly that many of the regional and provincial military-political leaders in Mao's various audiences did indeed assure him of their support.

Mao told these audiences -- as reported -- that they should now be devoting more attention than they had in recent years to strictly military affairs (in other words, they were to think of themselves as again primarily soldiers), and that in their political roles -- e.g. as provincial Party secretaries -- they were to conduct their affairs differently. It is important to recognize that Mao did not tell them that they were to be deprived of their political posts: they were to continue to occupy military and political posts concurrently. But they were to study the Party line, to correct "wrong practices" in their style of work, and to avoid the "mountain-stronghold" attitude. Specifically, local Party committees (now proclaimed in every province), rather than PLA Party committees, were to exercise the coordinating leadership; it was wrong, Mao said, for PLA Party committees to override or overrule the local Party committees.

Mao went on -- as reported -- to make clear that old Party cadres would be playing a larger role in the governing apparatus. He defended the purge of the leaders of the Party apparatus in 1966, but reiterated that the great majority of cadres were good and would be rehabilitated and given posts.

Finally, Mao in these talks -- as reported -- offered the regional and provincial military-political leaders an opportunity to redeem themselves. They had made mistakes, but the fault was not primarily in them
but rather in the group of central leaders who had "deceived" them. They were to undergo criticism and self-criticism and "correct their mistakes."

Soon thereafter, Mao was to return to Peking, in circumstances which apparently precipitated the flight of the Lins and some lesser conspirators. On the same night (12-13 September), a meeting of Party leaders was convened, and continued for several days. (There is independent confirmation of this.) Charges were made in this meeting against other Politburo-level military leaders, who were formally arrested and charged later in the month.
II. THE PURGE SINCE SEPTEMBER 1971

The decapitation of the PLA leadership in September 1971 left Mao and Chou and their supporters with still a lot to do, outside Peking. The conspirators' papers (the "571" document) which reportedly came into loyalist hands at that time had to be evaluated. On this and other evidence, other conspirators would have to be apprehended as quickly as possible. Others who had had long and close association with Lin and other conspirators had to be re-examined and re-evaluated, and if necessary removed, as opportunity permitted. And those who seemed to be unwilling to support Mao and Chou on what had become the central policy issue in that struggle -- that of civilian Party control of the apparatus -- would also have to be replaced. But Mao on his own showing could not afford a confrontation with the PLA as a whole or with a large number of PLA leaders simultaneously. He could move only in stages, against small groups, taking care not to provoke coordinated resistance. The questions were open as to how rapidly Mao and Chou would move against any group except the identified conspirators, whether there would prove to be some groups (e.g. powerful regional leaders) against whom Mao would lack the confidence to move, and whether there might be successful resistance at any point.
The First Wave of the Purge:* Soon after the flight of the Lins and the arrest of C/S Huang Yung-sheng and other top-level military leaders on 12-13

*Portions of this Memorandum overlap substantially, and update, a Directorate of Intelligence Research Aid of August 1972, "Missing Chinese Military Leaders (POLO XLIX). Because many of those missing military leaders were concurrently Party secretaries, some 30 of them discussed in the earlier paper appear again in this one, but with later information and considered from another point of view. Of the 107 missing military leaders noted in the earlier paper -- those regarded as the most important of the roughly 200 who dropped out of sight in 1971-72 -- some 32 have reappeared (as well as some who dropped out earlier). With one possible exception (Chen Li-yun, who reappeared without his titles), none of the 32 was among those named Party documents and briefings as "conspirators." The most important returnees have been Liu Hsing-yuan, as of early 1972 the 1st political officer of the Canton MR and concurrently 1st Secretary of the Kwangtung Committee of the CCP, who has reappeared in the same roles in Szechuan, and Chou Hsing and Wang Pi-cheng, respectively the first political officer and command of the Kunming MR and concurrently first and second secretaries of the Yunnan Committee of the CCP; the rest have been deputy commanders and deputy political officers of the MRs, and commanders and political officers of MDs. More than 32 have been added to the "missing" list. These include a Deputy C/S, one of the two known deputy directors of the General Political Department, some leaders of service arms, some deputy commanders and deputy political officers of MRs, and several commanders and first political officers of MDs (some of whom have been reported under arrest). The purge of the PLA has apparently not been completed.
September 1971, a Special Investigation Unit was reportedly formed to explore the ramifications of the affair. Most reports identify Chou En-lai as the head of the unit. Its membership has been variously reported, but seems to have included Madame Mao, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan, Li Te-sheng, Chi Teng-kuei and Wang Tung-hsing -- all of them people tied closely to Mao himself. It reportedly included Yeh Chien-ying and some other military figures in addition to Li and Chi. Soon after this special unit was formed, Party, military and governmental organizations at all levels were reportedly instructed to send to this body -- specifically, to Li and Chi -- all information bearing on the Lin affair.

The Special Investigation Unit is said to have had, from the start, the "571" document, allegedly drafted by Lin's son and other military figures, which as reported was an outline of the rationale and plans for the coup, including a plan to assassinate Mao if necessary. The document (according to incomplete accounts of it) named only two important figures of the regional and provincial apparatus (Chou Chih-ping, the apparent 1st Political Officer of the Foochow MR and 2nd Secretary of the Fukien Committee, and Chen Li-yun, the 1st Political Officer of the 5th Air Army -- a unit named in "571" -- and the second-ranking secretary in Chekiang) as among the conspirators, but it spoke of the conspirators' holdings among, or hopes for support from, various armies led by men who were concurrently provincial Party secretaries and from elements in various Military Regions led by men who were likewise provincial Party secretaries concurrently.*

*The "571" document as received is probably in part fabricated, and some observers have regarded it as (footnote continued on page 14)
The document, which pointed in so many directions that it might have justified a move against almost all of the MRs and thus almost all of the provincial Party committees at once, seems to have served as one basis for a fairly limited purge in the first stage, extending roughly through January 1972.

Some very important military-political leaders at the regional and provincial levels were apparently removed from their posts in that first wave. Among them were Liang Hsing-chu, the acting 1st Secretary in Szechuan and Commander of the Chengtu MR, Lung Shu-chin, the 1st Secretary in Sinkiang and Commander of the Sinkiang MR, Liu Feng, 2nd Secretary of the Hupei Committee and 1st Political Officer of the Wuhan...

(Footnote continued from page 13)

Largely or even wholly fabricated. In this connection, such observers point to the post-Lin appearances of persons named or indicated in the "571" document, e.g., Chen Li-yun of the 5th Air Army, who appeared in public as late as January 1973. However, there is evidence that the Maoists did move at once or almost at once against at least some of the persons named or indicated in the document (probably including Chen, who was evidently removed from his posts and is now missing).

The view taken here is that, while the papers originally captured were very probably embellished in order to discredit Lin from all possible directions, those papers were taken seriously by the Special Investigation Unit, which also took its job seriously and made a thorough investigation before actually purging some of those who disappeared in this first wave.
MR (who was soon replaced in both posts), and the afore-
mentioned Chen Li-yun and Chou Chih-ping. All were
proteges of Lin Piao's group, and all have been named
in Party documents and briefings either as actual
conspirators with Lin or as his supporters, and as
under arrest.

Others who disappeared in this same period
included Wang Chia-tao, 1st Secretary of the
Heilungkiang Committee and Commander of that MD,
Kang Chien-min, 1st Secretary of the Ninghsia Com-
mittee and perhaps concurrently a PLA leader there,
and Chen Ming-i, the second-ranking secretary of
the Tibet Committee and Commander of that MD.
However, all three have returned to view in recent
weeks.

Several provincial Party secretaries had been
absent from the news for some months before the Lin
affair broke, but it seems likely that some of them
were actually taken out of circulation in the first
stage of the purge. These may have included Lan I-
nung, 1st Secretary of the Kweichow Committee and 1st
Political Officer of that MD, and Chang Jung-sen, the
second-ranking secretary of that committee and deputy
commander of the MD; both were later reported purged
as supporters of Lin Piao's group. Another such may have
been Chang Chao-jen, second-ranking secretary and poli-
tical officer in Kirin.

The Second and Third Waves: The second wave
of the purge, roughly from February through May 1972,
again struck hard at men who were both military leaders
and provincial Party secretaries. Unlike the first
wave, this wave did not reach as high as Military Region
commanders and first political officers. It struck (a) at associates of regional and provincial leaders already in trouble -- especially in Chekiang and Ningh (b) at the leaders of another province, Kiangsi, head by a longtime protege of Lin Piao; and (c) at an apparently random handful of others.

The most important figures who disappeared in this period and are still missing are Nan Ping, the 1st Secretary of the Chekiang committee and 1st Political Officer of the MD; Hsiung Ying-tang, the third-ranking secretary, Commander of the MD, and possible Commander of the 20th Army (named in the "571" document); Kao Jui, the 2nd Secretary in Ninghsia and a possible military leader there; Chang Kuei-chin, the third-ranking secretary in Ninghsia and political officer of the MD; Cheng Shih-ching, 1st Secretary of the Kiangsi Committee and 1st Political Officer of that MD; Yang-Tung-liang, the second-ranking secretary of the Kiangsi Committee and Commander of that MD; and Hsieh Chia-hsiang, fourth-ranking secretary in Szechuan and deputy political officer of the Chengtu MR.

Most of the members of this group too have been named in Party documents as conspirators with or supporters of Lin Piao's group, and reported under arrest. Most of these are men previously regarded as proteges of Lin or Huang Yung-sheng. Others of the missing could be tied to the conspiracy -- rightly or wrongly by virtue of their posts, e.g. as leaders of military units named in "571." Still others could have come unprolonged investigation as a result of the offenses of their principals or associates.

As was the case in the first wave, however, there are several others who disappeared in this period whose absence is hard to find a reason for. This is particularly true of the few provincial Party secretaries who were
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purely Party cadres, without concurrent military posts -- although it is conceivable that some of those too were thought to be involved.

The third wave of the purge, roughly the rest of 1972 and the first two months of 1973 (as those who have failed to appear only since March have not been out of sight long enough to qualify for a "missing" list), seems on present evidence to have been a smaller and weaker wave than were the first two. It still struck at some military-political leaders, however, charged with supporting Lin Piao's group. The previously-mentioned two ranking secretaries on the Kweichow committee, who had not been seen since April 1971, are said to have been actually purged in summer 1972; and Pu Chan-ya, the second-ranking secretary of the Hunan Committee and 1st Political Officer of that MD, last seen in late 1972, has since been reported purged as one of the conspirators.

Some other important figures dropped out of sight in this period and are still missing: These include: Wei Tsu-chen, second-ranking secretary in the Kwangsi Committee and probably a military leader there as well; Juan Po-sheng, an old Party cadre and fourth-ranking secretary in Kirin*; Cho Hsiung, an old Party cadre and third-ranking secretary in Fukien; and Liu Hsing, an old Party

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*Four Kirin secretaries are missing. It is not clear why the Kirin Committee has -- apparently -- been hit so hard. It was Heilungkiang, not Kirin, that was named in Party documents as a possible fallback-and-regrouping area for Lin Piao's group.
cadre and secretary in Sinkiang who was said to be an important power there after the purge of the 1st Secretary. (Wang Hsin, second-ranking secretary and political officer in Honan, has reappeared, but at the bottom of the list, and may be on his way out. Except for the first-mentioned Wei Tsu-chen, who spent many years with Lin Piao and other disgraced military leaders and may have been caught up in that case, these absences are inexplicable.

Some Figures and Propositions: The total number of missing provincial Party secretaries as of early July -- a figure which does not include those missing only in recent months, or those who are just possibly secretaries, or those demoted and fading -- is 31, out of about 200 identified secretaries. Several of them are members or alternate members of the Central Committee, but, of much greater importance, four of them (all PLA) were the first secretaries in their provinces, and ten of them (all PLA) were second-ranking secretaries. In all, at least 17 of the missing 31 secretaries are career military men almost all of whom are known or believed to have held important military posts concurrently with their positions as provincial Party secretaries.

Some 14 (at most) of the missing secretaries are career Party cadres, mass representatives, or unknowns. None of these was a first or second secretar

The 17 (or more) missing provincial secretaries who are career military men who had active military posts concurrently are clearly a much more important and interesting lot. The striking common feature among the largest number of these missing military/political leaders -- among, in fact, 13 of them -- is their reported association with the Lin Piao affair. Others have been less firmly associated. The conclusion seems...
justified that Mao and Chou and other leaders in power and favor genuinely believe that Lin Piao's group was conspiring against them, and that they believe, further, that the original "571" document genuinely reflected the plans and hopes of the conspirators. An alternative explanation, that Mao and others are simply playing off old scores -- from the Cultural Revolution -- and have fabricated the "571" document to justify this, cannot be disproven but does not seem to hold up; it does not seem to explain either the timing or the targets of the purge.*

It is also a striking fact that at least a dozen provincial Party secretaries, all of them career military men with concurrent military posts, who had been regarded as proteges of Lin Piao and other purged leaders are not missing and appear to be in favor and prospering. These include several commanders and first political officers of Military Regions, some of whom are the first secretaries of the Party committees of the provinces in which their MR headquarters are located. These dozen or so are men who, in general, were not as close to Lin as the purged central leaders or the regional and provincial figures named in Party documents as fellow conspirators, but who were proteges in the conventional sense: records of substantial early

*This is not to deny the possibility -- even probability -- that some Party and military leaders in Peking are exploiting the Lin Piao affair, even fabricating evidence against old antagonists, and that some of the missing can be explained on this basis. But this would be a secondary feature of the current purge. The central feature is the Mao-Chou effort to identify those who were engaged in conspiracy or were prepared to support the conspirators in either victory or temporary defeat.
service with Lin, preferment given them by Lin after he became Minister of Defense, additional favor shown them during the Cultural Revolution, and, in some expression by themselves of loyalty to Lin. Good examples are Liu Hsing-yuan, as of early 1972 1st Political Officer of the Canton MR and 1st Secretary of Kwangtung Committee of the CCP, who has re-emerged 1973 in the same roles in troubled Szechuan, and Hsien-chu, Commander of the Foochow MR and 1st Secretary of the Fukien Committee of the CCP. It would not have been surprising to see both purged. But both appear to have found the key to survival: to have persuaded Mao that they are loyal to him personally, despite their past ties to Lin. Liu is credited to have assured Mao of his loyalty, in terms, even prior to Lin's fall, and Han is credibly reported to have spent some months in Peking after Lin's fall, engaged in clearing himself. Some of the other Lin proteges who survive have evidently taken the same path, while others may yet fall when Mao and Chou get around to them.

The missing military-political leaders whose absence cannot be explained by the Lin Piao affair probably men who have been purged or set aside -- under prolonged investigation -- on the issue of civilian-versus-military control of the governing apparatus. This could mean either their lack of responsiveness to directives from Peking or their failure to cooperate satisfactorily (a matter which has itself been the subject of a number of directives from Peking) with civilian secretaries and other civilian members of provincial-level Party committees.

With respect to both groups -- the conspirators and the resisters -- there is as yet no good evidence that any military-political leader has been spared because Mao and Chou have been afraid to move against him, or that anyone has put up successful resistance.
n after or shown some cases, Good 1st Poli- ary of the erged in and Han t Secre- would But : to person- credibly in these redibly after e of the taken Mao whose ffair are e -- perhaps of civil- apparatus. veness cooperate n the ) with rs of pro- spirators evidence pared against instance to his purging. In the simplest terms, it is doubt- ful that any given leader has been actually summoned to Peking and has refused the summons. From the first days of the Cultural Revolution, powerful military leaders have repeatedly been summoned to Peking -- sometimes in large groups -- and have obediently gone. It would seem that only the most desperate leader -- someone in a state of mind like that of the desperate Lin Piao planning his "coup" -- could calculate that his best chance of survival would lie in trying to hold his area of command against all the military force that could be brought to bear against it, rather than going to Peking to attempt to clear himself. Those who have failed to satisfy the leaders in Peking have normally if not always been brought to Peking and held there, just as simply as Mao and Chou in September 1971 convened a meeting of military leaders and arrested Lin's central and closest proteges on the spot.

But the possibility that Mao and Chou are even now not yet ready to move against certain military leaders has to be regarded as genuine. It is possible, that is, that Mao and Chou are still secretly worried about some of the Military Region leaders, and would like to get rid of them, but have chosen to wait. This is possible despite the fact that four very important MR leaders were removed in the first wave of the post- Lin purge, and despite the fact that all or almost all of the remaining MR leaders have apparently spent some time in Peking since Lin's fall. In other words, it is possible that some of the military leaders summoned to Peking, and then returned to their posts apparently cleared, were secretly judged to be unreliable, and have been marked for later purging. It seems likely that Mao and Chou are still taking great care to avoid provoking coordinated resistance by a substantial number of the remaining MR leaders (the only way that
prolonged resistance by any one of them could be successful), and it is possible that they will move aga
some of them, with deliberation, one by one, in month
to come. In some cases, however, e.g. the above-men-
tioned Liu Hsing-yuan in Chengtu, and the Nanking MR
Commander Hsu Shih-yu -- there is at hand what seems
to be good evidence that MR leaders have not only
cleared themselves but are being given credit for
playing important roles in bringing down Lin Piao's
group or at least for preserving good order in their
commands while this was being done, so that their
positions look to be as secure as positions ever are
in Mao's China.
III. THE RISE OF OLD PARTY CADRES

It was apparent in Mao's talks with the regional and provincial leaders in August-September 1971 that he intended to enhance the position of old Party cadres vis-a-vis career military men in the regional-provincial structure of power. This has in fact been happening, although slowly. The power of the Military Region leaders is being diluted by the installation of old Party cadres as political officers in those headquarters, and there is a higher proportion -- than at the time of Lin Piao's fall -- of old Party cadres among the first secretaries and all other secretaries of the provincial Party committees.*

*The public media have spoken more precisely than did Mao (whose pronouncements are sometimes rambling and opaque) about the principle of the Party's "absolute leadership," the need for a center and obedience to that center, the need for "collective leadership" in Party organs at all levels (entailing a reduction in the importance of the first secretaries), the enhancement of the role of old Party cadres vis-a-vis the military, and the subordination of military Party committees to local Party committees. Provincial broadcasts from all of Lin's onetime regional centers of power have dutifully joined in repudiating Lin (although still not by name) and reaffirming Mao's principles. Some recent provincial broadcasts have been unusually specific and frank about actions taken to subordinate the military. For example, one states that it is time for the provincial Military District to shift its emphasis to its "main peacetime task..." (footnote continued on page 24)
The Military Regions: The Lin Piao affair has not visibly led the central Party leaders -- meaning mainly Mao and Chou -- to repent of the system under which the Party committee of a province containing a Military Region headquarters is headed by a career military man who is either the commander (usually) or the first political officer of that MR. Mao and Chou may indeed have repented of it and may intend to change it, but there are still no solid indications of this. Of the ten provinces involved (Hopei being excluded, as the MR headquarters is in Peking, not in the provincial capital of Shihchiachuang), the Part) committees of nine were so headed -- by six MR commanders, three MR first political officers -- at the

*Footnote continued from page 33* of militia work" (in other words, nothing much), two others hail the advancement of an old Party cadre over a military man as the head of a county's Party committee, and another says that the military should deal with military affairs and even in this sphere should accept the leadership of the local Party committees. Moreover, as noted by the U.S. Consulate General at Hong Kong, the current (1973) annual circular on military-civilian relations "writes off" the PLA's role in political affairs, omits past references to the PLA's roles as the main support of the proletarian dictatorship and as the supporter of the "Left" and as a great contributor to the Cultural Revolution, and introduces an instruction that the indoctrination campaign on this relationship is to be conducted under the "centralized leadership" of Party committees -- all of which, the Consulate General remarks, "further points up the intention to reassert civilian authority."
time of Lin's fall, and the tenth by an old Party cadre acting as first political officer. (The other principal military leader was normally the second secretary.) Eight of the ten still appear to be headed by career military men, and the other two (with the recent appointment of Saifudin in Sinkiang) by old Party cadres doubling as first political officers. Nine of these dual leaders -- in Liaoning (Shenyang MR), Shantung (Tsino MR), Kiangsu (Nanking MR), Kwangtung (Canton MR), Hupei (Wuhan MR), Szechuan (Chengtu MR), Yunnan (Kunming MR), Kansu (Lanchow MR), and Urumuchi (Sinkiang MR), the leader in the first five cases being the commander of the MR headquarters there and in the other four the first political officer -- have been explicitly confirmed in the past year as both the MR leader (i.e. one of the two principal leaders) and the provincial Party committee's first secretary. (However, some have not been confirmed as both during 1973, and may conceivably have lost one post.) In one other case -- Fukien (Foochow MR) -- the MR commander, while not identified in any particular post, has made appearances suggesting that he holds both the military and the political posts. (Again, he may conceivably have lost one post.) In other words, while Peking has apparently purged two of the MR commanders who were concurrently provincial first or acting first secretaries at the time of Lin's fall, and two MR first political officers who were provincial second secretaries, there has been no marked change in the pattern, apart from naming another old Party cadre (Sinkiang) to replace a career military man as first secretary (concurrently first political officer).
There are no longer self-evident reasons for retaining career military men who are MR leaders as concurrently first secretaries of the provinces containing their headquarters. Old Party cadres are now available in sufficient quantity, although perhaps still not enough with sufficient prestige. There is no apparent threat to public order -- not, at least, on a scale large enough to justify what is in effect a military government in those provinces (with the possible exceptions of Szechuan and Fukien, among the MR provinces). One possible reason is that it is simply more efficient to concentrate military and political authority in these provinces if reliable men can be found -- that is, to streamline the system of command-and-control. Another possible reason is hierarchical: that is, in the nature of the case the MR leaders are the most important persons in their provinces and it could be thought impracticable to subordinate them to merely provincial figures (although in fact one alternate member of the Politburo is concurrently a subordinate secretary in Honan). In view of Mao's own emphasis on the importance of re-establishing civilian Party control, however, and the obvious fact that the problem of re-establishing this control outside Peking is primarily the problem of controlling the MR leaders, the main reason for not depriving at least some of these MR leaders of either their military
or their political posts may well be that Mao and Chou are simply not yet prepared to do this.*

There has, nevertheless, been some additional movement toward diluting the power of career military men in the MR headquarters, by assigning old Party cadres as first or second political officers. (The first political officer is the principal check, at the regional level, on the MR commander, and the second political officer is the principal check on the first.) This process in fact began in 1967, with the assignment of Chang Chun-chiao as first political officer of the Nanking MR, a post in which he has recently been confirmed. It continued when Chi Teng-kuei, an old Party cadre from Honan, was (reportedly) named first political officer of the Peking MR in or about 1970. The above-mentioned old Party cadre Chou Hsing has apparently been the first political officer of the Kunming MR since 1971. Old Party cadre Li Ta-chang was installed as second political officer in the Chengtu MR early in 1972, and he may become the first political officer if Liu Hsing-yuan gives up that role to become the new commander. Hua Kuo-feng, an old Party cadre

*It must be emphasized that these MR leaders are powerful figures, not merely "administrators," as it is sometimes put. They are genuine regional authorities, key figures in a chain-of-command, men whose power is the sum of the power of all the commanders subordinate to them, commanders of regular armies, regional forces, and production-and-construction corps. Although Peking can and does issue orders directly to armies disposed of the MRA, the MR commander is normally their commander, within the limits of the orders he himself has had from Peking. Moreover, these armies are immediately available to the MR commander, just as the Peking Garrison is the immediately available force in Peking.
from Hunan (still the first secretary there) has been assigned as political officer in the Canton MR -- evidently the senior man -- replacing Liu Hsing-yuan. And Saifudin, an old Party cadre, has just been named as first political officer of the Sinkiang MR (as well as first secretary of the Sinkiang provincial Party committee). Moreover, an old Party cadre may have been assigned (without publicity), or may soon be assigned, as first political officer in the Foochow MR, where the first is missing and believed purged. Even the apparently secure career political officers now serving as first political officers in the Shenyang, Tsinan, Wuhan, and Lanchow MR's (like Chengtu) could be replaced by qualified old Party cadres in those areas if Peking should choose to be thorough-going about this. Moreover, some of these old Party cadres may be acting as the first secretaries of the military Party committees of these MR headquarters, and would thus be the principal regional authorities.

Of these ten provinces containing MR headquarters being considered (still excluding Hopei as a special case), eight are coterminous with Military Districts (Szechuan and Sinkiang are not MDs). In recent years these have normally had career political officers as the first political officers of their MDs, but it is not known whether this is still the case. The only certain identification of a first political officer in this group of MDs (in Hupei) is in fact an old Party cadre. Career political officers are probably still the first political officers in two other of these MDs. The situation in the other five is simply unknown. The same thing may be happening here that is happening in the MR headquarters -- the displacement of career political officers by old Party cadres.

The Other Provinces: In the 19 other provincial-level Party committees, the picture is mixed, but seems to show an enhancement of the position of old Party
cadres. Whereas in the ten provinces with MR headquarters in the provincial capitals, eight of the provincial Party committees appear to be headed by career military men who are still active MR leaders (although some may not be), in the other 19 provincial-level committees the military men are barely in a majority: of ten to nine.

In one of these 19 cases, Tsinghai, the picture is quite confused: the nominal first secretary, a career military man, is apparently not active in the post and is not even in the province. The senior secretary on the spot, however, is also a military man.

The provincial-level Party committees of this group of 19 which are headed by old Party cadres are Peking, Hopei, Tientsin, Shanghai, Chekiang, Kwangsi, Hunan, Honan, and Shensi; the nine (of this group) which are headed by career military men who are on the spot (six commanders, two political officers, one mixed) are Shansi, Inner Mongolia, Kirin, Heilungkiang, Anhwei (where Li Te-sheng shuttles from Peking), Kiangsi, Kweichow, Tibet, and Ningsia. Three of these are new first secretaries: two career military men, one old Party cadre.

The picture is not really clear, however, as to whether the career military men who head provincial Party committees in this group of provinces are still active as military men. Of the nine, at least one (Hsieh Chen-hua in Shansi) had apparently been replaced in his military post by 1971, and only one of the others has been identified in a military post since August 1972 (and in that instance a post in Peking, not in his province). It may be that military identifications have been withheld for reasons of public relations, as part of the overall effort to give the PLA a lower profile, but on the other hand it may be
that some or even most of these men are in fact no longer active military leaders.

In the 16 MDs and three major municipal garrisons associated with the above-cited 19 provincial-level Party committees, old Party cadres hold the great majority of the identified posts of first political officers. In the six provinces and three major municipalities in which the first secretary of the Party committee is an old Party cadre, the first political officers of seven are known to be old Party cadres, in six of the seven cases the first secretary acting as first political officer concurrently; and in an eighth case this is probably true. In the ninth of the nine cases, the first political officer was a career political officer, but he is missing and reported purged, and may well have been replaced by another old Party cadre.

In the other ten cases, in which nine provincial committees are headed by career military men and the tenth has a career military man as the senior secretary on the spot, only three of the first political officers have been identified. Two are career political officers, both concurrently the provincial committees' first secretaries; the third is an old Party cadre. The chances are that in at least some of the other seven provinces, the acting first political officers are old Party cadres.

New Secretaries: About 45 additional provincial Party committee secretaries and deputy secretaries (not counting transfers) have been identified since the last of the original committees was proclaimed in August 1971. There are probably many more of these new secretaries, as yet unpublicized, as some of the provincial committees have as few as three identified secretaries, whereas others have as many as 12.
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those committees are headed by military men. As the new secretaries are overwhelmingly civilians, the aim here as elsewhere seems to be to dilute the power of the military leader. This will be a trend to look for, in other committees headed by military men. It may also occur in certain provincial-level Party committees, whether headed by military men or old Party cadres, which look to be still too heavily-staffed by military men: e.g., Peking (4 to 2), Inner Mongolia (3 to 1), Kirin (3 to 0 at the moment), Kiangsu (4 to 2), Szechuan (3 to 1 at the moment), Kansu (3 to 2 at the moment), and Ninghsia (where only two secretaries are appearing).

Some Overall Figures: As previously noted, at the time of Lin Piao's fall in September 1971 career military men were the first secretaries of 20 of the 29 provincial-level Party committees and comprised about 60 percent of the 150-odd provincial secretaries of all ranks (first secretaries, second secretaries where named, and plain secretaries).

There are now 27 identifiable active first secretaries, and two acting firsts. Of these, 18 are career military men, eight of whom head the Party committees of provinces in which Military Region headquarters are located, and another of whom (Li Te-sheng of Anhwei) reportedly heads another MR (Peking) in which his province is not located. The other 11 are old Party cadres, two of whom (in Yunnan and Sinkiang) head the Party committees of provinces in which MR headquarters are located, six of whom are in less important provinces, and three of whom head the committees of major municipalities (two of these, Peking and Shanghai, being as important as an MR province). Again, 18 to 11 in favor of the military, as against
There now seem to be about 170 identifiable active secretaries of all ranks, a somewhat larger number than in August 1971. Of those whose backgrounds are known (the great majority), the balance is now even between career military men and old Party cadres, as against the earlier 60-40 split in favor of the military. Here the trend is clear, and emphasized by the character of the identifiable new secretaries. However, as noted, some of these career military men may have lost their military posts (in one case, almost certainly), so that the figures may be misleading. Although the evidence is very soft, it may be that old Party cadres occupy about as many of the first secretaryships as do active military men -- and just conceivably even more of them.

Of the approximately 45 new secretaries (added since August 1971), the backgrounds of 24 are known. Of these, 20 are old Party cadres, and only four are career military men. It seems highly probable that this trend will continue.

In the 11 MR headquarters, old Party cadres are known or reported to hold five of the posts as first political officers, while career political officers hold five; an old Party cadre may hold the unpublicized post in the Foochow MR. In the 27 MD-level posts (including three major municipal garrisons), old Party cadres hold the great majority (9 or 10 to 2) of the identified posts of first political officers; and it seems likely that old Party cadres will turn up in several of the unpublicized positions.
IV. OTHER POSSIBLE ACTIONS

In addition to the organizational steps already taken at the regional and provincial levels -- the purge of a substantial number of military leaders and the strengthening of the relative position of old Party cadres -- there are other actions which the civilian leaders in Peking are taking or can take to reassert civilian Party control of the still-evolving regional- and-provincial-level structures. Some of these relate to the central leadership organs, both Party and military, and some to the political and military structures outside Peking.

The Chairman, the Politburo, the MAC: Even before the purge of Lin Piao's group, Mao, as part of his preparations for the purge, was reasserting his position as the "leader" of the PLA as well as of the Party, and this continues. Whether the formulation speaks of leadership by Mao alone, or by Mao and the Central Committee, or by the Central Committee and Mao, the point is the same: the Chairman of the Party has supreme authority over the PLA. If the post of Chairman of the regime is restored, and if it carries with it again the title of commander-in-chief of the armed forces (thus far a nominal authority), the new Chairman will almost certainly be a civilian.

The Politburo Standing Committee, the core of the Party's organizational power, still consists officially of only two active members, Mao and Chou. If and when it is formally reconstituted, it will probably include a military member, Yeh Chien-ying, but the civilians can be expected to dominate it. (Yeh is now the only career military man among the eight top-ranking active members of the Politburo from whom any
new Standing Committee will presumably be drawn. It is conceivable, however, that the new Standing Committee will reach down to the ninth-ranking active member of the Politburo, Li Te-sheng, in order to take in a younger military leader.)

Just as the present Politburo as a whole includes several career military men, including three MR commanders, so the reconstituted Politburo is expected to include several. There are several good candidates among the central leaders now being treated by the media as ranking just below the level of the known Politburo members, and several in the MR headquarters. The MR commanders on the new Politburo will probably be more than balanced, however, by old Party cadres who are concurrently MR -- or Garrison -- political officers (e.g., Chang Chun-chiao, Chi Teng-kuei, Wu Te, Hua Kuo-feng, Wang Hung-wen). The new Politburo is expected too to set the pattern for the provincial-level apparatus by taking in additional relatively young men.*

*The Chinese Party leadership has already done pretty well in this respect. While the leadership is sometimes regarded as consisting of a few old men who will leave China leaderless when they die in the near future, only the top three men -- Mao, Chou, and Yeh -- are past 70. The other active members of the Politburo, and of the group treated as just below that level and likely to join it, average about 56 and include three men under 45. This compares favorably with the profile of the provincial Party first secretaries, who average closer to 60. There are of course many young people among the provincial secretaries, but the proportion is not as high as it is at the top levels in Peking itself, and the media, in calling as it does for "good young comrades" to be brought into "leading positions" at all levels, is in effect telling the provincial-
Mao's leadership of the PLA has been more than symbolic. He has been and remains the chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, and delegates this authority. Just prior to the purge of Lin Piao's group, Mao criticized the work of the MAC and stated his intention to add some people to it -- probably meaning, to its Standing Committee. The Standing Committee has been and probably remains composed largely of career military men, but old Party cadres with concurrent military (political officer) posts or with political security backgrounds are credibly reported to have been moving into it. There will surely be no repetition of a MAC Standing Committee composed almost entirely of career military men who are proteges of a single military leader. The chances are that more regional military leaders will also be placed on this Standing Committee, and will be more actively involved in its work.*

(Footnote continued from page 36)
level apparatus to follow the good example already set by the Party center. More young people can be expected to appear in the provincial-level Party committees.

*Unfortunately, this paper must evade the question of the Party Secretariat. Another possible means of controlling the MAC would be to make it responsible to a civilian-dominated Secretariat as the principal executive organ of the Party, but nothing is reliably known of the present status of the Secretariat. Only one Chinese official source has confirmed that the Secretariat again exists and is operating. It is credible that, as reported, the civilian Chou En-lai has been the de facto secretary-general since about 1970, but no other member of the Secretariat has been
The Security Apparatus: The infusion of old Party cadres may be happening as well to the MAC's General Political Department, charged principally with indoctrination of the PLA. (With more old Party cadres in the MAC Standing Committee, the GPD can probably be safely left in its present direct subordination to the MAC, rather than placed directly under Chou En-lai or any other de facto secretary-general.) The GPD is presently headed by a career military man -- Li Te-sheng -- close to Mao, but only one of the active deputy directors is known (the other, a Lin Piao protege, is missing). This very active and important Department would seem to require several deputies, and it would not be surprising if some of them turned out to be old Party cadres rather than career political officers.

The very sensitive political security function -- investigation and evaluation of Party leaders, including military figures, and provincial-level leaders -- will probably be placed more securely in civilian hands. PLA figures are known to have had important roles in this work -- in both investigating and evaluating -- during the Cultural Revolution (and in the Lin Piao affair), and some PLA leaders may well have been among

(footnote continued from page 37) reliably reported. The problem may be artificial, in that the apparent candidates for vacancies on the Politburo standing committee and for the principal posts in the Secretariat look to be generally the same people, and mainly civilians, so that it may not matter greatly whether the MAC reports directly to Mao and Chou, to a Politburo standing committee headed by Mao and Chou, or to a Party Secretariat headed by Chou and staffed by Mao's and Chou's men.
the officers of the central political security office (whatever it was called). There may now be a formal, although unpublicized, Political Security Department or Special Investigation Department to which the lesser ad hoc units report, but nothing is solidly known about the organization of any such department. The coordinator of political security work is generally believed to be Mao's man Wang Tung-hsing, an old Party cadre, who could handle this work from his post as Director of the Central Committee's Staff Office, if no separate department exists.* Wang's deputy in the Staff Office post, Yang Te-chung, who is believed to be one of his deputies in political security work, is a career political officer but in recent years has been appearing only as a civilian. There is some evidence (most recently, in the Lin affair) that political security work is now supervised by Chou En-lai, although Wang and others in this field may also report directly to Mao on occasion.

Mao has never allowed political security work in the PLA itself to be conducted solely by PLA organs, and it seems certain that the Lin Piao affair has strengthened this disposition. Whatever the arrangements were as of 1971, the early-warning system was not working as well as it should have been, or the conspirators of Lin's group could not have come as close

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*It could be argued that Wang's role as simply one member of the Special Investigation Unit handling the Lin Piao case means that he is not the principal coordinator of political security work. However, the Lin case was of such importance that it seems only reasonable to assign it to a broadly-based committee of Lin's peers, rather than to keep it within the political security structure.
to assassinating Mao as they apparently did. (And there had earlier been some successful assassinations.) The political security specialists may now be working to make the political security apparatus pervasive, as it once seemed to be, in the military establishment, in the form of separate offices outside of the political officer system. (There is an unconfirmed report that this is being done, and that Wang Tung-hsing heads a "Security Department" of the MAC.) This system could be set up to be directly responsive to Peking, or, if Peking wishes to reinforce the career Party cadres against the military at the provincial level, could be placed under the control of first secretaries of provincial Party committees not headed by military men or of subordinate civilian secretaries of the military-led committees, who themselves would report to Peking. There are fragmentary indications that this latter arrangement has been made in some cases.

The less sensitive public security function -- dealing in general with the populace at large rather than with political and military leaders -- has reportedly already been returned to civilian hands, largely if not completely, at all levels.* (Severely troubled provinces might be exceptions.) The new Minister of Public Security, Li Chen, is a career security specialist, engaged in such work since at least 1945. The senior deputy, Yu Sang, is also an

*Provincial media have spoken of "Chairman Mao's thesis that particular stress should be put on Party leadership in security work," meaning here public security work, although the dictum holds even harder for political security work.
old Party cadre long in security work, and the other apparent deputy is the above-mentioned Yang Te-chung, also a civilian now.

Some Outside Possibilities: There has been some speculation that Peking might make a striking move toward tighter civilian control of the military by naming an old Party cadre as Minister of Defense for the first time. (Chang Chun-chiao has been mentioned.) This would indeed be a striking symbolic act, but the Ministry itself is probably still controlled by the MAC, already headed by a civilian (Mao). A younger career military man seems more likely, when old Yeh Chien-ying dies or tires.

Another idea that might look attractive but seems unlikely to be acted on in the near future is the reconstruction of the Party's great regional bureaus. These existed from 1949 to 1954, at which time the Kao Kang case apparently made these regional concentrations of power seem threatening to the central leadership, and again from 1960 to 1966, at which time they were again abolished, as a part of destroying the Party apparatus in the first stage of the Cultural Revolution. The principal benefit to be gained from such bureaus would lie in their role as a regional control over the Military Region headquarters, on the principle of subordination of PLA Party committees to "local" Party committees. The principal disadvantage would lie in their potential for combining with the MR headquarters in opposition to Peking, as charged in some cases in 1966. The latter consideration has evidently impressed Mao and Chou more than the former. (A simpler means to the same end is to name old Party cadres, concurrently political officers, as first secretaries of the military Party committees of the MR headquarters.) Should they change their minds, the career Party cadres now being assigned as
first or second political officers in the MR headquarters -- known or reported to be in place in several of them -- might be named as first secretaries of regional Party bureaus concurrently, as in the 1960-66 period, with MR leaders and provincial Party leaders named as subordinate secretaries. This would again place authority at the regional level primarily in the hands of old Party cadres, who would occupy two or three of the four most important posts -- first secretary and first political officer, and perhaps first secretary of the military Party committee -- in each region or in most of them.*

Another possible step would be to divide authority in the provincial Party committees between the military secretaries and the old Party cadre secretaries, in effect restricting the military men to military-related affairs and giving the old Party cadres the responsibility for everything else. This has already been reported from two provinces (Kwangtung and Szechuan). The reporting is cloudy, however, and such an arrangement would seem impossible to carry out in precisely

*Peking is still a long way from solving the problems inherent in the relationship between a Military Region Party committee and a provincial Party committee. While in general terms military committees are to work under the "leadership" of local committees, when the Regions are explicitly discussed it is sometimes delicately said that they are to "respect the views" of the local committees. The old Party cadres assigned as senior political officers in these MRs are presumably, as part of their work, to observe whether the career military men of the MR headquarters do in fact "respect the views" of the lower-ranking civilians.
those committees in which it might seem an answer to
the problem of assuring civilian control -- those in
which an active military leader is the first secretary
(as in Kwangtung and Szechuan). It would seem simpler
to replace the military man as first secretary with
an old Party cadre; it would not be enough at the provin-
cial level to name an old Party cadre the First Secretary
of the military district Party committee, as the pro-
vincial committee ranks it.

Yet another possible step would be to break up the "family"-type provincial committees, those in
which the principal secretaries have worked together
(with occasional interruptions) for many years and
whose bonds with one another might be thought to be
stronger than their loyalty to Peking. This might be
done despite the fact that some of the current Party
committees that give this appearance (e.g., Shantung,
Kiangsu), are headed by military men in whom Mao seems
to have particular confidence. Almost all of these
"family" committees are dominated by military figures,
and their dissolution or dilution -- the reassignment
of either the first secretary or his deputies -- would
course reduce one kind of threat to Peking. This
consideration, however, seems unlikely to be the main
factor in the reorganization of any provincial com-
mittee. The threat is not large enough at the provin-
cial level. Reorganizations which have the effect
of breaking up "family" committees are likely to be
aimed primarily at reducing the power of regional
military leaders, the level at which the real threat
is posed.
V. PROSPECTS

The methodical purge of the regional and provincial leaders -- which is predominantly of PLA figures among them -- can be expected to continue, but, probably, in waves of diminishing force. Indeed, there may be no more "waves" -- simply the purge of individuals, one by one, over the course of the next year or two. Some of those now missing can be expected to return (as have some of those missing in the past), as investigations are completed and they are cleared, but a substantial number -- probably more than half of the now-missing provincial secretaries -- will prove to have been removed from their posts, along with many other military leaders who are not provincial secretaries. Moreover, some of the military leaders now in place -- including some of the MR leaders concurrently first secretaries of provincial Party committees -- may be purged as opportunity permits, although Mao and Chou will probably move cautiously against MR leaders in disfavor. Others, less clear-cut cases, will probably be reassigned.

Most of the purged military leaders, among the provincial Party secretaries, will probably be replaced as secretaries by old Party cadres. Most of the first secretaryships will probably come to be held by old Party cadres, and veteran cadres will probably come to constitute a substantial majority of all provincial secretaries. Old Party cadres will probably continue to move increasingly into the MR headquarters as senior political officers, and, eventually, may constitute the majority of first political officers of both the MR's and the provincial MDs.
The reassertion of civilian Party control of the Party's central leading organs, the Politburo and the MAC, will surely proceed. Old Party cadres will probably be assigned larger roles in those portions of the security apparatus not already controlled by civilians, and the entire apparatus will be strengthened.

All of this will take time. The removal of Military Region leaders would be a particularly delicate operation, probably requiring substantial intervals between removals, in order both to avoid provoking the formation of regional alliances and to find reliable replacements, men who will not constitute new threats to the center.

The message which Mao has been sending to the regional and provincial levels is that he is steadily re-establishing civilian control of the central Party apparatus, that he means to establish it as well at the regional and provincial levels, and that this is inevitable and had better not be resisted. In harsher terms, the message to any given leader outside Peking is that he is isolated and vulnerable, that in recent years hundreds of regional and provincial leaders have been summoned to Peking and purged, without a single known case of effective resistance.

Whether civilian Party control of the governing apparatus throughout China can be fully restored in Mao's lifetime, or even in Chou's, is impossible to judge. No Western observer can know how many names, how many things to do, are on the list, and not even Mao and Chou can know how many years remain to them. Moreover, Mao and Chou may not be using the same list. Although Mao has been working carefully, Mao's list may be such -- may be perceived to be such -- that another little band of conspirators will shape up (in order to save themselves from purging), a band that
might be more intelligently led than was Lin Piao's. On balance, the history of the past ten years would seem to discourage another such challenge to Mao. A better possibility is that some military leaders -- national, regional, and provincial -- will conclude that they should take care to avoid offending Mao and to retain their positions and as much as possible of their powers, in preparation for an eventual showdown with the career Party cadres in the central leadership and in the regions and provinces. In any case, this question of the balance of power between the civilian and the military leaders at all levels is one which must be periodically recalculated.
ANNEX:

REGIONAL AND PROVINCIAL LEADERS
This MR comprises the North China provinces of Hopei and Shansi and the nominal 'autonomous region' of Inner Mongolia, and includes the major municipalities of Peking and Tientsin (both in Hopei). The MR is credibly reported to be commanded -- Peking is silent about this -- by Li Te-sheng, an alternate member of the Politburo and Director of the General Political Department of the Military Affairs Committee; Li appeared "on behalf" of the Peking MR in November '72. Like other MR commanders, Li has a concurrent provincial political post, but his is not in his own MR. The 1st Political Officer of the Peking MR is reported -- unconfirmed -- to be Chi Teng-ku'ai, also an alternate member of the Politburo, also with a provincial post outside of this MR. The only known key figure of this MR Hqs. who is not concurrently a provincial Party Secretary is Chen Hsien-jui, a leader of this MR for many years and now probably the second-ranking PolOff.

**Peking Municipal Committee CCP**

(1) Wu Te, 1st Secretary, probably 1st PolOff of the Peking Garrison concurrently. (An old Party cadre, about 60 now, with some Party police background. By '56, 1st Sec'y of Kirin Ctte CCP, transferred to Peking in '66. Elevated from alternate to full member of the new Central Ctte of the Party in '69.)
Became 2nd Secretary -- under a new 1st Secretary, Hsieh Fu-chih -- when new Peking Ctte CCP was proclaimed in March '71, and officially succeeded Hsieh, for whom he had been acting, on latter's death in early '72. Appeared in uniform as of '71, but has not been identified in a military post. Is grouped with Politburo members in turnouts, and seems marked for Politburo. No obvious patron, but occupancy of two very sensitive posts in the capital -- 1st Sec'y of municipal committee and 1st PolOff of Garrison -- must mean that Mao Tse-tung regards Wu as his own man.)

(2) Yang Chun-sheng, Secretary, perhaps concurrently either 1st PolOff of the Artillery Force or a senior officer of the Peking Garrison. (A career political officer, probably about 60. Early service with Lin Piao, most of career with others. Was 1st PolOff of Artillery by '69, when named an alternate member of new Central Ctte. Was appearing in unspecified PLA role as recently as June '72.)

(3) Wu Chung, Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Peking Garrison. (A career military commander, probably in his 50's, who rose under leaders other than Lin Piao's group. By '68 with Peking Garrison, possibly concerned with Mao's bodyguard, and in '69 was named an alternate member of Central Ctte. Sometime after the purge of the Peking Garrison commander -- a Lin Piao protege -- in summer '70, Wu became the new commander, and appeared publicly in this role in early '72. Party briefings portray him as playing a key role in Mao's actions against Lin's group. No apparent career patron, but his occupancy of this very sensitive post -- in Party leadership crises perhaps the most important military post -- and his role in the Lin Piao affair indicate that Mao regards Wu Chung, like Wu Te, as his man.)
(4) Huang Tso-chen, Secretary, probably 3rd PolOff of Peking Garrison as of early '72. A career political officer, probably in his 50's. Peking for the past ten years or so, assigned to the Garrison early in the CR, was named an alternate member of Central Ctte in '69. No recent military identification. Reappeared in April '73 after absence of several months.)

(5) Liu Shao-wen, Secretary, perhaps still 3rd PolOff of Peking Garrison as of early '72. (A career military man, reportedly in his 60's. Career mostly as a political officer, but with security and intelligence posts; 3rd PolOff of Garrison by '67; may still head Intelligence Department of General Staff of PLA. However, has been appearing in Government rather than PLA lists.)

(b) Ting Kuo-yu, Secretary, no known concurrent post.* (Probably in his 50's, has had a mixed career as a political officer, diplomat, and Party cadre. Has had posts in Peking since about '66.)

*The phrase "no known concurrent post" is used throughout this paper to mean no known important Party or military post other than stated; purely governmental or ceremonial posts are not regarded as important, at the provincial level.
Hopei Provincial Committee CCP

(1) Liu Tzu-hou, 1st Secretary, conceivably Commander or 1st PolOff of 38th Army concurrently. (An old Party cadre, in his early 60's. Long a Party secretary in both Hupei and Hopei, was 2nd Sec'y in Hopei when CR began. Criticized and dropped from sight in early stages of CR, but re-emerged in '68 and was elevated from alternate to full member of Central Ctte in '69. Named 1st Sec'y of new Hopei Ctte CCP in May '71. An unconfirmed report that Liu in '72 was named Commander -- perhaps meaning PolOff -- of the 38th Army, a unit apparently beheaded after it appeared in the "571" document as one of those to which the conspirators were looking for support. Not publicly identified in military post.)

(2) Cheng San-sheng, 2nd Secretary, possibly an Army Commander concurrently. (A career military commander, probably in his 60's. Early with Lin Piao but later with other leaders, by '65 the DepCdr of an army, by '67 Commander of Tientsin Garrison. Named alternate member of Central Committee in '69. No military identification in recent years.)

(3) Ma Hui, Secretary, Commander of Hopei MD concurrently. (A career military commander, about 50. Early with Lin Piao, later with others; by '64, Commander of Hopei MD, identified as recently as April '73. A fulsome Maoist, but no apparent patron.)

(4) Liu Hai-ching, Secretary, possibly Commander of the 38th Army concurrently as of early '71. (A career military commander, probably in his late 50's, long with 38th Army. As noted above,
Lin's group of conspirators allegedly looked to the 58th Army for support, and Liu apparently came under suspicion. Reappeared in May '73 after absence of two years.)

(5) Ma Chieh, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (A career military man, but age unknown. In Kiangsu by '60, in Hopei by '68, perhaps as PolOff of an army, but not identified in a military post in recent years. Missing between June and December '72, active in '73.)

(6) Lu Yu-lan, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (A mass representative, female, about 32, the Party secretary of a production brigade in '69, when named a full member of Central Ctte. Now used in international liaison.)

(7) Ma Li, Deputy Secretary. (An old Party cadre, in Hopei since c. '51. An economic specialist. Disappeared in '66, when a Sec'y of Peking Ctte CCP, reappeared in '70.)

Tientsin Municipal Committee CCP

(1) Hsieh Hsueh-kung, 1st Secretary, concurrently 1st PolOff of Tientsin Garrison as of '71. (An old Party cadre, probably in his 50's. Long in Hopei, the top man in Tientsin since '67, 1st PO of Garrison by '69, named full member of Central Ctte in '69, named 1st Secretary of new Tientsin Ctte CCP in May '71, apparently as a protege of Mao himself. Has not been identified in military post in recent months.)
(2) Wu Tai, 2nd Secretary, concurrently a UPO of the Peking MR as of '71. (A career political officer, possibly about 60. Long with Lin Piao's forces, in Peking by '65, to Tientsin in '71. No explicit reference to military post since '71.)

(3) Liu Cheng, Secretary, perhaps concurrently Commander of the 66th Army. (A career military commander, probably in his late 50's. Long service with 66th Army, in Tientsin by '66. No explicit reference to PLA post since '71.)

(4) Wang I, Secretary, Commander of Tientsin Garrison as of '70. (A career political officer, probably in his 50's. Commander of Tientsin Garrison by '70. Missing from several turnouts after September '71, a date which suggests that he came under suspicion in Lin Piao affair. However, he returned in late '72. Not identified in Garrison post in '72-'73.)

(5) Wang Man-tien, Secretary, with some concurrent governmental post. (A female, possibly young, believed to be a relative of one of Mao's oldtime teachers.)

(6) Hsu Cheng, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Apparently a career military man, age unknown. Was a PLA leader in Tientsin, 1964-71, but no recent identification in military post.)

(7) Fei Kuo-chiu, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Unknown before appointment, and still unknown apart from this; possibly a mass-representative. Recently reappeared after absence of almost a year.)
Shansi Provincial Committee CCP

(1) Hsieh Chen-hua, 1st Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Shansi MD as of late '70. (A career military commander, probably in his 60's. Long in Shansi, an army commander there c. '58, Commander of Shansi MD by early '70 but apparently replaced in '71. Named 1st Sec'y of new Shansi Ctte CCP in April '71, and has been appearing in that role.)

(2) Tsao Chung-nan, Secretary, probably Commander of Shansi MD concurrently. (A career political officer, probably in his 50's. Long in Shansi with 69th Army, reportedly reprimanded by Lin Piao and others during CR, but reported as a leader -- perhaps 1st PolOff -- of 69th in '69. Reported as a DepCdr of the MD in '70, and apparently succeeded Hsieh Chen-hua as MD Cdr sometime in '71, but not identified in any military post in '72-'73.)

(3) Chen Yung-kuei, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Both a Party cadre and a mass representative, possibly young. Party secretary of a Tachai production brigade from '68, praised by both Lin Piao and Chou En-lai during CR, named full member of Central Ctte in '69, employed since as a regime spokesman in mass campaigns.)

Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Ctte CCP

(1) Yu Tai-chung, 1st Secretary, concurrently Commander of Inner Mongolian MD. (A career military commander, about 60, rising under leaders other than Lin Piao's group, was an army commander by '55.)
Commander of another army during the CR, was praised by Kang Sheng for "political work," and was named an alternate member of Central Ctte in '69. A DepCdr of Peking MR by '71, in May '71 was named 1st Sec'y of new Inner Mongolian Ctte CCP, and probably became Cdr of Inner Mongolian MD at about the same time. As recently as July '72, was identified in both posts.)

(2) Wu Tao, Secretary, concurrently 1st PolOff, Inner Mongolian MD. (A Mongolian, about 55. A career political officer, long in Inner Mongolia, 1st PolOff by '67, named full member of Central Ctte in '69. As recently as July '72, identified in both Party and military posts.)

(3) Hsu Hsin, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Possibly a career military man, age unknown. With PLA in Hopei in late '60s. Named to Inner Mongolia Ctte CCP in '71, not much illuminated since.)

(4) Teng Tsun-lun, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in 50's. Several posts as an economic administrator, 1949-65. Disappeared in CR, reappeared in '71.)
II. SHENGYANG MILITARY REGION

This comprises the Northeast China provinces of Liaoning (with the MR headquarters at Shenyang), Kirin, and Heilungkiang (the latter bordering the USSR). This MR is commanded by Chen Hsi-lien, a full member of the Politburo, and concurrently 1st Secretary of the Liaoning Ctte of the CCP. The MR's 1st PolOff, Tseng Shao-shan, is 2nd Secretary of that Ctte. The only known key figure of this MR's Hq, who is not concurrently a provincial Party secretary is Chiang Yung-hui, a Lin Piao protege who appears to be the senior DepCdr.

Liaoning Provincial Committee CCP

(1) Chen Hsi-lien, 1st Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Shenyang MR. (A career military commander, probably about 60. Outstanding record, rising under leaders other than Lin Piao. However, soon after Lin's appointment as Minister of Defense in '59; Chen was named Commander of Shenyang MR and a secretary of the Party's Northeast Buro, and in subsequent years was given other signs of Lin's favor. Elevated from alternate to full member of Central Ctte in '69, named to Politburo at same time, and named 1st Sec'y of new Liaoning Ctte CCP in January '71. Although one of the MD's (Heilungkiang) of Chen's MR was reportedly envisaged by Lin Piao's group as a possible fallback and staging area, Party briefings have not linked Chen with Lin's group. Identified as recently as June 1973 as MR Commander and 1st Secretary.)
(2) Tseng Shao-shan, 2nd Secretary, concurrently 1st or acting 1st Political Officer, Shenyang MR. (A career military man, almost 60, posts both as commander and political officer, good record. Long with Chen Hsi-lien, was a DepCdr of Shenyang MR under Chen by '60, and apparently shifted to become acting 1st PolOff by '68. Named full member of Central Ctte in '69. As recently as June '73 has been identified as PolOff -- acting 1st or 1st -- and 2nd Secretary.)

(3) Li Po-chiu, Secretary, concurrently a DPO of the Shenyang MR and/or Liaoning MD. (A career political officer, probably in his 50's. Early with Lin Piao's forces, but for many years now with Chen Hsi-lien and Tseng Shao-shan. Identified in both Party and military posts in March '73.)

(4) Chen A-fen, Secretary, no known concurrent post; MISSING since January '73. (Background and age unknown; first appeared in December '72.)

(5) Huang Ou-tung, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, in early 60's. Made Long March; a regimental commander in Sino-Japanese war. To Northeast after WWII, 1st Secretary of Liaoning Ctte CCP by '54, AltMemb Central Ctte in '56. Demoted in '58, disappeared in CR, dropped from Cent Ctte in '69. Reappeared in early '73 as a Liaoning secretary. Fourth-ranking in June '73 appearance.)

(6) Yang Chun-fu, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in his late 50's. Long in Liaoning, 1st Sec'y of Shenyang Ctte CCP by '65. Survived criticism in CR, named full member of Central Ctte in '69. Promoted to full Secretary in '72. Presumed to be close to Chen and Tseng.)
(7) Kao Wen-chung, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Background said to be in foreign affairs, at national or provincial level; age unknown. First identified as a secretary in Liaoning in March '73.)

(8) Mao Yuan-hsin, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (A propagandist, probably relatively young. Said to be a nephew of Mao Tse-tung, presumably named to this Ctte to please Mao. Reappeared in November '72 after long absence. He too was recently promoted from Deputy Secretary.)

(9) Hu I-min, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in 50's. With Liaoning Ctte CCP as far back as '58, and a deputy secretary by '62. Out of sight during most of CR, reappeared as a Secretary in March '73.)

Kirin Provincial Committee CCP

(1) Wang Huai-hsiang, 1st Secretary, concurrently 1st PolOff of Kirin MD as of '71. (A career political officer, probably in his 50's. Early career unknown, but perhaps included Korean War. In Kirin at least since '62, and de facto the top man in Kirin since '68. Named full member of Central Ctte in '69, and 1st Sec'y of new Kirin Ctte CCP in March '71. Not been identified in PolOff post in '72-'73. No apparent patron, but presumably close in recent years to Chen Hsi-lien and Tseng Shao-shan.)

(2) Chang Chao-jen, Secretary, concurrently a DPO of Kirin MD as of early '71; MISSING since July '71. (Possibly a career political officer, age unknown; has appeared only once since his appointment as a secretary of Kirin Ctte CCP.)
(3) Ho Yu-fa, Secretary, concurrently Commander of Kirin MD as of June '72. (A career military commander, about 55. Early career with Lin Piao's forces, long in Northeast with 64th Army. By '68 was Cdr of Kirin MD. Identified as both a secretary and the MD commander as late as June '72, missing for several months before reappearance in May '73.)

(4) Hsiao Tao-sheng, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Apparently a career military man, age and specialty unknown. In Kirin in PLA posts since '60 at latest. Has not been identified in a military post since named to Kirin Ctte.)

(5) Juan Po-sheng, Secretary, no known concurrent post; MISSING since January '73. (An old Party cadre, probably in his 70's. In North China in '50s, in Kirin by '59, where he was a secretary of the Kirin Ctte CCP under Wu Te for several years; following Wu's transfer to Peking, remained with Wang Huai-hsiang. Named alternate member of Central Ctte in '69. Is probably too old to be of much importance.)

(6) Cheng Chi-chiao, Secretary, no known concurrent post; MISSING since January '73. (An old Party cadre, probably in his late 50's. With Kirin Ctte CCP at least since '62. Specialty is Mao-line propaganda.)

(7) Sun Chi-hua, Secretary, no known concurrent post; MISSING since August '71. (An unknown, has made no appearance since first identified.)
Heilungkiang Provincial Committee CCP

(1) Wang Chia-tao, 1st Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Heilungkiang MD as of '71. (A career military commander, probably in his 50's, rising under other leaders than Lin Piao's group. Long in Northeast, was Cdr of Heilungkiang MD by '63. Engaged in struggle for dominance with another provincial leader, prevailed by '69, was named alternate member Central Ctte. August '71, named 1st Secretary of Heilungkiang Ctte CCP, last one to be proclaimed. Gave "instructions" to a meeting -- which he did not attend -- in December '71. Reappeared in Heilungkiang in June '73.)

(2) Liu Kuang-tao, 2nd Secretary, perhaps concurrently 2nd PolOff of Heilungkiang MD. (A career political officer, possibly under 50. Long in Northeast, 2nd PolOff in Heilungkiang by '70, also a DPO of the MR. No reference to military posts in '71-'72. Missing for several months in '72, reappeared in early '73 as the ranking Secretary, then dropped out again, then reappeared.)

(3) Fu Kuei-ching, Secretary, perhaps 1st PolOff of 23rd Army concurrently. (A career political officer, about 60. Long with 23rd Army, long in Northeast. Not identified in a PLA post since '71.)

(4) Chang Lin-chih, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in his 60's. In Heilungkiang since early '60; with Heilungkiang Ctte CCP '66-'67, disappeared, re-emerged as a Secretary of new Ctte in '71, and continues to appear.)
(5) Chang I-ho, Secretary, no known concurrent post; MISSING since February '72. (Not a secretary of this Ctte when originally formed. Background and age unknown, possibly an old Party cadre brought in to replace as secretary an old Party cadre who died.)

(6) Jen Chung-i, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, long in Northeast, first secretary in Harbin for many years. Disappeared during CR, reappeared in '73, a new Sec'y of this Ctte by May.)

(7) Yang I-chen, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in 60's. Was DirOrgDept Honan Ctte CCP by '49, DirOrg Dept of South China Subburo by '52. Various economic posts in Peking in '50s, named alternate member of Central Ctte in '58. Demoted in early '60s, not renamed to Central Ctte in '69. Reappeared in Heilungkiang in January '73, soon identified as a new Sec'y.)

(8) Lu Chi-fan, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Background and age unknown, first appeared as a new Sec'y here in '73.)

(9) Wang Ting-wen, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Background and age unknown, first appeared as a new Sec'y here in '73.)

(10) Li Li-an, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Probably the old Party cadre, once a DepDir of OrgDept of Central Ctte in Peking, who disappeared in CR, reappeared in '73.)

(11) Wang I-lun, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in his 50's. A secretary of this Ctte since late '50s, disappeared during CR, reappeared in '73.)

(12) Yu Hung-liang, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (First identified in June '73; an unknown.)
III. TSINAN MILITARY REGION

This MR is virtually coterminous with Shantung province on the Yellow Sea. The MR is commanded by Yang Te-chih, concurrently 1st Secretary of the Shantung Ctte CCP. The senior PolOff of the MR, Yuan Sheng-ping, is 2nd Secretary of that Ctte. Materials prepared in this MR in the campaign against "arrogance and complacency" were used by Mao as part of his case against Lin Piao's group, which may help to explain why none of the secretaries of the Shantung Ctte CCP is missing.

Shantung Provincial Committee CCP

(1) Yang Te-chih, 1st Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Tsinan MR. (A career military commander, about 60. Early with Lin Piao's forces, later with other leaders; Cdr of Tsinan MR by '58, preceding Lin's appointment as Minister of Defense. The winner in a dispute for dominance in Shantung, Yang was named a full member of Central Ctte CCP in April '71. Has been identified as both 1st Secretary and MR Commander as recently as April '73.)

(2) Yuan Sheng-ping, 2nd Secretary, concurrently 1st or acting 1st PolOff of Tsinan MR. (A career political officer, probably in his 60's. Spent many years with Lin Piao's forces and was regarded as a onetime Lin protege. In Shantung since '61, thus has been with Yang Te-chih more than ten years. Named full member of Central Ctte in '69. By early '70, had displaced as senior PolOff the man who lost out in the dispute with Yang Te-chih, and in this post Yuan must have had a leading role in preparing the material useful to Mao in purging Lin's group. Has been identified as both 2nd Sec'y and ranking PolOff as recently as April '73.)
(3) Chang Chih-hsiu, Deputy Secretary, a DepCdr of Tsinan MR concurrently. (Apparently a career military commander, age unknown. Long in Shantung, therefore long with Yang and Yuan above, a DepCdr by early '71, still in that post in late '72. May be concerned now mainly with agricultural production.)

(4) Pai Ju-ping, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, about 65. A secretary of the Shantung Ctte CCP by '58, therefore long with Yang, Yuan and Chang above. Disappeared for years during CR, but re-emerged in favor in '70. May now specialize, as sometimes before, in economic management.)

(5) Su I-ian, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in his 50's, with background in public security work. Long in Shantung, therefore long with Yang, Yuan, Chang, and Pai above. May be the Shantung Ctte's security specialist.)
IV. NANKING MILITARY REGION

This MR comprises the East China provinces of Kiangsu (which itself contains the MR Hq. in Nanking and the major municipality of Shanghai), Anhwei, and Chekiang. The MR is commanded by Hsu Shih-yu, a member of the Politburo and 1st Secretary of the Kiangsu Ctte CCP. The MR's 1st PolOff is Chang Chun-chiao, also a member of the Politburo and 1st Secretary of the Shanghai Ctte CCP. It was in this MR that Lin Piao's group allegedly attempted to assassinate Mao Tse-tung in September 1971, and many military/political leaders in this MR are missing, some of them expressly linked with the central conspirators. However, Party briefings give Hsu an important role in frustrating the plans of the conspirators, and describe Chang as one of those targeted by the conspirators; both have continued to prosper. Possible key figures of this MR Hq. who are not concurrently provincial Party secretaries are Hsiao Yung-yin, who may be the senior DepCdr, and Chou Kuan-wu, who may be the senior DPO.

Kiangsu Provincial Committee CCP

(1) Hsu Shih-yu, 1st Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Nanking MR. (A career military commander, about 65, most of whose early service was with Lin Piao. After WWII, an army commander under other leaders, and by '57 was Cdr of the Nanking MR. In '59, named a DepMin of Defense by Lin Piao. During CR, Hsu was protected by Mao and praised by Chou. In '69, elevated from alternate to full member of Central Ctte and named full member of Politburo. In January '71, named 1st Sec'y of new Kiangsu Ctte
CCP. Out of sight for some months before and after the purge of Lin Piao's group, but Party briefings have presented him both as being recognized by Lin's group as a hard-core loyalist and as in fact playing that role in protecting Mao. Since February '72 he has appeared frequently, identified in all of his posts as Politburo member, MR Commander, and 1st Sec'y Kiangsu.)

(2) Tu Ping, Secretary, concurrently 2nd PolOff of Nanking MR. (A career political officer, about 65. Much early service with Lin Piao. After WWII, a series of important political officer posts under other leaders, mainly in the Northeast. By '63 was a DPO in the Nanking MR, and thus has spent about ten years with Hsu Shih-yu. Praised by Kang Sheng, on behalf of Party Center, in '68, and named full member of Central Ctte in '69. De facto 1st PolOff of MR for most of time since, as 1st PolOff Chang Chun-chiao has spent most of his time in Peking. Has been identified in the PolOff post in recent months. No apparent patron, apart from long close relationship with Hsu.)

(3) Wu Ta-sheng, Secretary, concurrently 1st PolOff of Kiangsu MD. (Probably a career political officer: age and early career not known. Was a leader in the Nanking MR by '66, and was an activist in the CR. In April '69 was named a full member of the Central Ctte, and by late '69 was 1st PolOff of Kiangsu MD. Not identified in the PolOff post in '72-'73. No obvious patron, but might be either Hsu or Tu above.)

(4) Peng Chung, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in his 60's. Long a secretary of Kiangsu Ctte CCP and
1st Sec'y of Nanking Ctte CCP. Denounced in CR, he came back, and in '69 was named an alternate member of the Central Ctte. Had been last-ranking secretary of Kiangsu Ctte CCP until recently, when listed for first time ahead of Yang Kuang-li.)

(5) Yang Kuang-li, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (A career political officer, possibly under 50. Has been in East China in PolOff roles since at latest '57. By '65, in Nanking under Hsu and Tu, and by '69 was DepDir of the MR's PolDept. He may also have been -- may still be -- 1st PolOff of the 60th Army, but has not been identified in a military post for years... No apparent patron, but might be either Hsu or Tu.)

(6) Chang Jui-yang, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Female, age unknown. Active in Shanghai Women's Federation from '65. First appeared as DepSec'y Kiangsu Ctte April '73.)

Shanghai Municipal Committee CCP

(1) Chang Chun-chiao, 1st Secretary, concurrently 1st PolOff of Nanking MR. (A career propagandist, about 60. By '64 a secretary of Shanghai Ctte CCP, taken up at that time by Madame Mao in her reform of arts, helped to fire opening gun -- attack on the writer Wu Han -- in the CR. In '66 became the de facto leader in Shanghai, and was taken into the central Cultural Revolution Group in Peking. Named 1st PolOff of Nanking MR and of Shanghai Garrison in '67; no recent references to latter post. A leftist activist close to Mao and Madame Mao throughout CR, Chang was named a full member of Central Committee and of Politburo in '69. Named 1st Secretary
of new Shanghai Ctte CCP in January '71. Early '72, the Shanghai host for President Nixon's party. Identified as 1st PolOff Nanking MR as recently as November '72. Clearly a protege of Mao and Madame Mao.

(2) Yao Wen-yuan, 2nd Secretary, concurrently a supervisor of central propaganda organs in Peking and editor of People's Daily. (A career propagandist, about 45. "Discovered" and taken up by Madame Mao in '57, with Shanghai Ctte CCP by '62, in '65 wrote the attack on Wu Han which launched the CR. In '66 became de facto second-ranking leader in Shanghai, and was taken into central Cultural Revolution Group. A leftist activist close to the Maos throughout the CR, was named full member of Central Ctte and of Politburo in '69, and 2nd Sec'y of new Shanghai Ctte CCP in '71. In late '71, described by Chou En-lai as "in charge" of Party propaganda, identified by Chou in '72 as editor of People's Daily, and acknowledged -- not singled out -- by Chou as an example of a rising young leader. Now spends almost all of his time in Peking. Clearly a protege of Mao and Madame Mao.)

(3) Wang Hung-wen, Secretary, concurrently a PolOff of Shanghai Garrison. (A young man, c. 31, a worker at the beginning of the CR, was a leftist activist in the CR, and was named a full member of the Central Ctte in '69. The de facto leader in Shanghai during frequent absences of Chang and Yao. Named a PolOff of Shanghai Garrison, conceivably 1st PolOff, in April '72. Has been appearing frequently in Peking in leadership groups just below Politburo level, and may be marked for important post in Peking and even for Politburo. Presumed to be a protege of Chang and Yao.)
(4) Chou Chun-lin, Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Shanghai Garrison. (A career military commander, probably in his 50's. In the Nanking MR by '58, by '70 -- perhaps from '68 -- was Cdr of Shanghai Garrison. Has been identified in both Party and PLA posts as recently as March '73.)

(5) Hsu Ching-hsien, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Another young propagandist, possibly under 40, an activist in Shanghai during CR, in '69 named full member of Central Ctte. Presumably a protege of Chang and Yao.)

(6) Wang Hsiu-chen, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (A young female worker, c. 31, a "revolutionary rebel" activist in CR, named a full member of Central Ctte in '69 as a mass representative. Presumably of little importance.)

(7) Ma Tien-shui, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in his 50's. In East China since at latest '50, a secretary of Shanghai Ctte CCP from about '55, caught on with the dominant forces in Shanghai during CR, and in '69 named an alternate member of Central Ctte. May be a production specialist.)

Anhwei Provincial Committee CCP

(1) Li Te-sheng, 1st Secretary, concurrently Commander Anhwei MD as of 1970, since 1970 Director of the General Political Department of the Military Affairs Ctte in Peking and -- probably -- Commander of the Peking MR. (A career military commander, about 60, rising under leaders other than Lin Piao's group, including Chen Hsi-lien and Hsu Shih-yu. By c. '52,
with the Nanking MR, and by '59 Commander of the 12th Army. Two Mao-line articles on military strategy in '66, and by '67 was Cdr of Anhwei MD as well as 12th Army. Praised by Mao in '68, and named a full member of Central Ctte and an alternate member of Politburo in '69. In '70, brought to Peking to head the reactivated General Political Department and, then or later, to command the Peking MR, according to two good sources -- both of these moves being part of Mao's effort to restrict and reduce Lin Piao. In same period, he appeared occasionally in Anhwei, and in January '71 was named 1st Sec'y of new Anhwei Ctte CCP, although Anhwei is not in the MR which he is reported to command. Has been identified as 1st Sec'y Anhwei as recently as December '72, and has made recent appearances in PLA roles. Li's very sensitive positions indicate that Tse-tung regards him, like Wu Te and Wu Chung, as Mao's own man.)

(2) Sung Pei-chang, Secretary, concurrently the ranking PolOff of Anhwei MD and possibly of 12th Army, the ranking figure in Anhwei during Li's prolonged absences. (A career political officer, probably in his 60's, risen under leaders other than Lin Piao's group. In '50s, assigned to Nanking MR, and during CR was a DPO of Anhwei MD and possibly a PolOff with 12th Army, working well with Li Te-sheng in all his roles. Not identified in military posts in '72. Out of sight from June through November '72, reappeared with Li Te-sheng as a secretary in December, active since.)

(3) Li Jen-chih, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent posts. (An old Party cadre, probably in his 60's, a secretary of the Anhwei Ctte CCP in the '50s. Dismissed from posts during CR, re-emerged in favor, and apparently worked well with Li Te-sheng
throughout CR. Reportedly in some PLA role in '70-'71, but no reference to military posts since. Missing for several months before reappearance in December '72.)

(4) Liang Chi-ching, Deputy Secretary, apparently a senior PolOff under Sung concurrently. (Probably a career political officer, possibly about 60. With East China forces since '50s. Appeared as a provincial DPO in '65. Had a good record in CR, and was a PolOff in Anhwei by '70, apparently junior only to Sung. Identified as both Dep Sec'y and PolOff in September '71. Missing for several months in '72. Reappeared in early '73.)

(5) Kuo Hung-chieh, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Possibly young, secretary of the Party branch of a production brigade in Anhwei during CR, was industrious in propagating Mao's Thought; in '69 named an alternate member of Central Ctte as a mass representative. Has made few appearances.)

(6) Wang Kuang-yu, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in his 50's. Was a secretary of Anhwei Ctte CCP as far back as '58; disappeared during CR, returned in '72 as a member of Standing Ctte of new Anhwei Ctte CCP, identified as a new Secretary in June '73.)

Chekiang Provincial Committee CCP

(1) Tan Chi-lung, 1st Secretary, concurrently 1st PolOff of Chekiang MD. (An old Party cadre, about 60, a secretary of the Chekiang Ctte CCP in the '40s and '50s, and 1st Sec'y of the Shantung Ctte CCP in early '60s. At first hit hard in the CR, was reportedly praised by Mao himself for defending
his Thought, and was renamed an alternate member of the Central Ctte in '69. Named a secretary of the new Fukien Ctte in April '71, Tan was transferred to the Chekiang Ctte CCP in early '72, and quickly became ranking man with disappearance of 1st Sec'y Nan Ping. Nan Ping, MISSING since April '72, was a career political officer who spent many years with 20th Army, one of units named in "571" document as those to which conspirators were looking for support; Nan has been reported purged.)

(2) Tieh Ying, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An unknown when named a secretary to the Chekiang Ctte CCP in early '72, is now the second-ranking secretary, replacing Chen Li-yun. Chen, MISSING since January '73, a CCAF leader and Althemb of CentCtte, was named in Party documents as one of Lin Piao's group of conspirators; he reappeared in a PLA list in early '73, but has evidently lost his post as a secretary of this committee and may yet be purged.)

(3) Lai Ko-ko, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, about 60, with connections with Kang Sheng. A Secretary of the Shantung Subburo of the Party in the early '50s, and a secretary of the Chekiang Ctte CCP when the CR began. Has apparently replaced Hsiung Ying-tang as the third-ranking secretary. Hsiung, MISSING since April '72, was sometime Cdr of the 20th Army, involved in the Lin Piao affair; presumed purged.)

(4) Hsieh Cheng-hao, Deputy Secretary, concurrently a leader of the East China Fleet. (A career military man, probably in his 50's, for at least two years C/S of the East China Fleet. Missing after May '72, reappeared in May '73.)
(5) Chai Chi-kun, Deputy Secretary, possibly a leader of the East China Fleet concurrently. (Probably a career political officer, possibly in his 50's. Reported to be a leader of the East China Fleet since '58. Missing after April '72, reappeared in early '73.)

(6) Chen Wei-ta, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, in his 60's. A full secretary of the Chekiang Ctte CCP '59-'65, was hit hard in the CR by Chou En-lai and Chen Po-ta. Re-emerged as a Dep Sec'y in late '72.)
V. FOOCHOW MILITARY REGION

This MR comprises the Southeast China provinces of Fukien (containing the MR headquarters at Foochow) and Kiangsi. The MR is commanded by Han Hsien-chu, one of several military leaders clearly favored by Lin Piao who is still an MR Commander. (The MR's former senior PolOff has apparently been purged.) Han is concurrently a Deputy C/S and 1st Secretary of the Fukien ctte CCP. Many of Han's associates are missing, but at least through 1972 Han seemed to continue to prosper. The current 1st PolOff of this MR is unknown, but might be either Wang Chien-an, who is not known to be a provincial Party secretary, or She Chi-te, the ranking secretary of the Kiangsi Ctte CCP. The one-time commander of the Wuhan MR, Chen Tsai-tao, and the onetime 1st PolOff of CPV Korea, Li Chih-min, were moved into this MR in '72.

Fukien Provincial Committee CCP

(1) Han Hsien-chu, 1st Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Foochow MR and Deputy C/S of the PLA. (A career military commander, in early 60's; earlier service with leaders other than Lin Piao's group but after World War II with Lin's forces. Commander of the Fukien MD by c. '55, was named by Lin as Commander of the Foochow MR by '60 and as a Deputy C/S by '65. The principal leader in Southeast China throughout the CR, he was elevated from alternate to full member of the Central Ctte in '69 and was named 1st Secretary of the new Fukien Ctte CCP in January '71. In his public speeches thereafter, Han seemed to show a strong sense of personal loyalty to Lin Piao as well as to Mao, and
was regarded as a Lin protege. Han reportedly spent some months in Peking, after Lin's fall, being examined and evaluated. Since then, he has repeatedly appeared as the ranking figure in Fukien, although in the late months of '72 and in '73 not expressly identified in either his Party or military posts. Because he had seemed to close to Lin Piao, it is possible, despite his apparent ability to clear himself, that he will yet fall.

(2) Chu Shao-ching, Secretary, perhaps Commander of 31st Army concurrently. (A career military commander, probably in his 60's, rising under leaders other than Lin Piao's group, has been with Han Hsien-chu in Fukien for many years. Said to be a DepCdr of the Foochow MR and Cdr of the 31st Army there as of '68. Appears to be a protege of Han. Has apparently replaced as second-ranking secretary Chou Chih-ping, MISSING since April '71. Chou, a career political officer, 2nd Secretary of the Fukien Ctte CCP, 1st PolOff of the Foochow MR and a full member of the Central Ctte, was very close to Lin Piao; he was named in Party briefings as one of Lin's conspiratorial group, and is presumed purged.)

(3) Huang Ya-kuang, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Apparently an old Party cadre, probably in his 60's, was an officer of the People's Bank of China through the '50s, returned to his native Fukien in '60s, was named a secretary of the new Fukien Ctte CCP in '71. Perhaps an economic specialist. May have replaced as third-ranking secretary Cho Hsiung, MISSING since August '72. Cho, an old Party cadre with experience as a political officer and in Party police work, may have had connections with Lin Piao's forces in the Northeast in the '40s but has not visibly had them since, and his absence is inexplicable.)
(4) Ni Nan-shan, Secretary, possibly 1st Po10ff of Fukien MD concurrently. (A career military man, probably in his 50's, with commands in Kiangsi for more than 20 years before being transferred to Fukien and named to the new Fukien Ctte CCP in '71. Apparently named concurrently 1st Po10ff of Fukien MD. Missing for several months in '72, has recently reappeared, but with no PLA identification.)

(5) Kuo Shao-ching, reportedly a new Secretary, no known concurrent post; MISSING since August '72. (An unknown, first appeared in Fukien in '70, reportedly added as a secretary to Fukien Ctte CCP by mid-'72 to replace the transferred Tan Chi-lung. Was identified in Foochow on Army Day '72, but was missing from the large National Day turnout on 1 October.)

(6) Wu Hung-hsiang, Secretary, possibly a concurrent military post. (An old Party cadre, probably in late 50's. Said to have been with Red Army in Fukien in '30s, possibly with underground there in '40s. With Fukien Ctte CCP since c. '50, head of OrgDept by '54, a secretary under Yeh Fei by '56. Out of sight for years, reappeared as a Sec'y of this Ctte in May '73. May have a concurrent post in the MD.)

Kiangsi Provincial Committee CCP

(1) She Chi-te, Secretary, probably an important concurrent military post. (A career military man, but not known whether as commander or a political officer; unknown before first appearance in Fukien in '70. Current military post may be as DepCdr, Po10ff, or DPO of the Foochow MR. Has apparently dislodged as the ranking secretary 1st Sec'y Cheng Shih-ching, who was concurrently a DPO of this MR and 1st Po10ff of the Kiangsi MD, and a full member of the Central Ctte.
Cheng, MISSING since February '72, was a longtime protege and personal friend of Lin Piao; missing after Lin's fall, he returned only briefly, and has since been credibly reported as arrested.

(2) Pai Tung-tsaï, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in his late 50's or early 60's. Was with the Shensi Ctte CCP as far back as '46, by '49 with the Kiangsi Ctte CCP, by '54 its 3rd Deputy Secretary. Reportedly heavily criticized early in the CR, he reappeared in favor in Kiangsi in '70. With by far the longest experience in Kiangsi of any current Kiangsi leader, he was named the junior deputy secretary of the new Kiangsi Ctte CCP in '71, but during '72 was elevated to full secretary and has apparently replaced Yang Tung-liang as the second-ranking secretary. Yang, MISSING since February '72, was a career military commander with early service with Lin Piao; like Cheng, he disappeared after Lin's fall, reappeared only briefly, and his fate may be linked with Cheng's.)

(3) Wen Tao-hung, Secretary (apparently), perhaps concurrently a DPO of the Kiangsi MD. (Probably a career political officer, age unknown. First appeared in '67, in Kiangsi, as a DPO under Cheng, whose protege he may have been. Has fallen behind Pai Tung-tsaï, whom he used to rank, but appears himself to rank two identified full secretaries, so presumably has been elevated from Dep Sec'y to full secretary himself.)

(4) Huang Chih-chen, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, a DepSec of Kiangsi Ctte CCP in early '60s. Became a Secretary of this Ctte c. August '72. Appeared to be the de facto 1st Sec'y of this Ctte before She Chi-te was brought in.)
(5) Chen Chang-feng, Secretary, probably concurrently a DepCdr of Kiangsi MD. (A career military commander, about 58. In '30s, was Mao's personal orderly, later with his bodyguard. A DepCdr of this MD by '71, identified as a new Secretary of this Ctte in early '73.)
VI. CANTON MILITARY REGION

This MR comprises the South China provinces of Kwangtung (containing the MR headquarters in Canton, and including Hainan Island in the jurisdiction of the provincial Party committee), Kwangsi (nominally an 'autonomous region'), and Hunan (Mao's native province). The MR is commanded by Ting Sheng, who, following the transfer of the original 1st Secretary of the Kwangtung Ctte CCP, became the new 1st Secretary concurrently. Ting in his early career had substantial service with Mao, Lin Piao and Huang Yung-sheng. The 1st PolOff appears to be Hua Kuo-feng, recently transferred from Peking. The three provinces of this MR are more saturated with apparent proteges of Lin and Huang than are the provinces of any other MR in China. This MR has been specified in some Party briefings as one in which Lin Piao's group was especially confident of finding high-level support, and in other briefings as one in which Lin's group was actually able to find only low-level support. Key figures of this MR Hq. who are not concurrently provincial Party secretaries are Huang Jung-hai, a Lin-Huang protege who is apparently the senior DepCdr of this MR and also 1st Sec'y of the Canton (municipal) Ctte CCP, and Jen Szu-chung, another Lin-Huang protege, who looks to be the third-ranking PolOff of this MR but has no known Party post.

Kwagtung Provincial Committee CCP

(1) Ting Sheng, 1st Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Canton MR. (A career military commander, about 60. Was reportedly an early bodyguard for Mao, then had some 10 to 15 years of service with the forces of Lin Piao and Huang Yung-sheng. With other
leaders from '52, was a DepCdr of the Sinkiang MR by '66. Criticized in the CR, he was apparently defended by Mao and Lin, and was transferred to the Canton MR in '68, at about the time of Huang's transfer to Peking to be C/S. He was de facto Cdr of the MR from '68, and was named a full member of the Central Ctte in '69. He was named a Secretary of the new Kwangtung Ctte CCP in December '70, under lst Secretary Liu Hsing-yuan, the 1st PolOff of the MR. Soon after Liu's transfer to Szechuan in or about March '72, Ting became the 1st Sec'y of the Kwangtung Ctte CCP, and has since been identified in both the Party post and the military post.

(2) Kung Shih-chuan, Secretary, concurrently the apparent 2nd PolOff of the Canton MR and possibly Commander of the Canton Garrison. (A career political officer, about 55, long associated with Lin Piao and Huang Yung-sheng, and regarded as their protege. Transferred from the Canton MR to Peking in '54 for a long tour with the PLA's Political Academy, he was transferred back to Canton in '67 as a high-ranking political officer, and was named a full member of the Central Ctte in '69. As of winter '70-'71, he was known to be a secretary of the new Kwangtung Ctte CCP and reported to be concurrently Commander of the Canton Garrison. Has not been identified in military posts in recent months.)

(3) Chen Yu, Secretary, no known concurrent ppst. (An old Party cadre, about 80. A secretary of the Central-South Bureau of the CCP when the CR began. Criticized in CR, but defended by Chou En-lai, renamed a full member of Central Ctte in '69, and renamed a secretary of the Kwangtung Ctte CCP in '71. Possibly too old to play much more than a ceremonial role, but has been said to be active and important.)
(4) Wang Shou-tao, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, about 65, with some police and governmental background. A secretary of Central-South Bureau CCP when CR began. Made a successful self-criticism in CR, was renamed full member of Central Ctte in '69, and to new Kwangtung Ctte CCP in '71.)

(5) Chao Tzu-yang, a Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in his late 50's, a secretary of the Kwangtung Ctte CCP since the '50s, and by '65 its 1st Secretary. Denounced by Madame Mao and others in '66, Chao disappeared, but surprisingly re-emerged in May '71 as a secretary of the new Inner Mongolian Ctte CCP. Transferred to Kwangtung by early '72, identified in '73 as a secretary.

(6) Lin Li-ming, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, a secretary of this Ctte since c. '58. Denounced in first years of CR, reappeared in favor in '68, and again a secretary by late '72.)

Kwangsi Autonomous Region Committee CCP

(1) Wei Kuo-ching, 1st Secretary, concurrently 1st PolOff of the Kwangsi MD as of '71. (An old Party cadre, about 65. Long in Kwangsi, by '61 the 1st Sec'y of the Kwangsi Ctte CCP, by '64 1st PolOff of Kwangsi MD as well. Made a successful self-criticism in the CR, and from '68 was de facto the top man in Kwangsi. In '69, elevated from alternate to full member of Central Ctte. In February '71, named 1st Secretary of new Kwangsi Ctte CCP, the first former provincial 1st Sec'y to be so restored. Has appeared frequently in his Party role, but was not identified in his military post in '72.)
(2) Wei Tsu-chen, Secretary, concurrently a senior PolOff as of '71; MISSING since February '73. (A career military man, probably about 60. Early service with Lin Piao's forces, later with other leaders. A CCAF leader in Chekiang through most of the '60s, was with the Fukien Front forces by '69 and was named an alternate member of the Central Ctte. Transferred to Kwangsi by early '71, he was named at that time a secretary of the new Kwangsi Ctte CCP. Not identified in military post since '71.)

(3) Liu Chung-kuei, Deputy Secretary, concurrently a PolOff of Kwangsi MD. (Apparently a career military man, probably in his 50's. Liu was a DepCdr of Kwangsi MD from '64, but in '70 was identified as a PolOff of this MD, and in February '71 was named to the new Kwangsi Ctte CCP. Again identified as an MD leader in January '73.)

(4) An Ping-sheng, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in his 50's. In Kwangtung in the '50s, in Kwangsi since. One of the principal leaders in Kwangsi since '68. May have been a protege of one of the purged South China leaders, but survives.)

Hunan Provincial Committee CCP

(1) Hua Kuo-feng, 1st Secretary, a senior PolOff of the Canton MR. (An old Party cadre, probably in his 50's, a secretary of the Hunan Ctte CCP by '59. Apparently untouched in the CR, he was named a full member of the Central Ctte in '69, and in December '70 was named 1st Secretary of the new Hunan Ctte CCP, which -- representing Mao's birthplace -- was the first to be proclaimed. In '71, transferred to Peking,
where he apparently had some key post in the Party apparatus; in the past year he has been listed at the Politburo level, and appears to be marked for it. As late as July '72, still held the title of 1st Sec'y in Hunan, and in November '72 was identified as political officer -- probably 1st PolOff -- of the Canton MR, believed to be a recent appointment, replacing Liu Hsing-yuan. Is a fulsome Maoist, and may be a Mao protege.)

(2) Pu Chan-ya, Secretary, concurrently a DPO of the Canton MR and 1st PolOff of the Hunan MD; MISSING since late '72. (A career political officer, believed under 50. In the Canton MR by '68, a DPO of the MR and 1st PolOff of the MD by mid '70. Named second-ranking Secretary of the new Hunan Ctte CCP in December '70, was the ranking secretary on the spot in Hua's absence, but was not named 1st Secretary to replace the absent Hua. Missing in 1973, has been reported purged as a conspirator with Lin Piao's group.)

(3) Chang Ping-hua, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, almost 70, was 1st Secretary of Hunan Ctte CCP before CR, transferred to Propaganda Department in Peking in '66, then apparently purged; dropped from Central Ctte in '69. Surprisingly re-emerged as a secretary of new Shansi Ctte in spring '71, soon dropped out of sight again, reappeared in late '72, apparently transferred to Hunan in early '73 to be ranking secretary on the spot in the periodic absences of Hua Kuo-feng, who spends much time in Peking and Canton.)

(4) Yang Ta-i, Deputy Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Hunan MD. (A career military commander, probably in his 50's. Long service with Lin Piao and Huang Yung-sheng, regarded as their protege. In Hunan by '68, became Cdr of its MD in '69, and named
the only deputy secretary of the new Hunan Ctte CCP in December '70. Has been identified as both DepSec'y and MD Cdr as recently as April '73.)
VII. WUHAN MILITARY REGION

This MR comprises the Central China provinces of Hupei (with the MR headquarters at Wuhan) and Honan. The MR is commanded by Tseng Szu-yu, a longtime protege of Lin Piao. The former 1st PolOff of this MR was purged in the Lin affair, and a new 1st PolOff, Wang Liu-sheng, brought from Nanking. Tseng is concurrently the 1st Secretary of the Hupei Ctte CCP, and Wang is 2nd Secretary. Key figures of this MR Hq. who are not concurrently provincial Party secretaries are Li Hua-ming, a Lin-Huang protege who appears to be the senior DepCdr of this MR, and Fang Ming, sometime Cdr of the Wuhan Garrison and 1st Sec'y of the Wuhan (municipal) Ctte CCP (but who has apparently lost both posts).

Hupei Provincial Committee CCP

(1) Tseng Szu-yu, 1st Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Wuhan MR. (A career military commander, about 65. Early service with Lin Piao. In the '50s was Commander of the 64th Army, in period '58-'67 a senior officer in Northeast, in August '67 named by Lin the new Commander of Wuhan MR to replace a purged leader. Regarded as a Lin protege. In '68, praised by both Lin and Chou, and in '69 named a full member of Central Ctte. In March '71, named 1st Secretary of new Hupei Ctte CCP. Identified as recently as June '73 as both MR Cdr and 1st Sec'y Hupei Ctte.)

(2) Wang Liu-sheng, 2nd Secretary, concurrently 1st PolOff of the Wuhan MR. (A career military man, with posts as both commander and political officer, possibly about 60. Early service apparently with leaders other than those purged in '71. With Nanking MR
by '56, served there for many years under Hsu Shih-yu, with a tour in '64-'65 with Shanghai Garrison. Undamaged in the CR, was named an alternate member of Central Ctte in '69. In late '71, turned up in the Wuhan MR as the new 1st PolOff, and on Army Day '72 was identified as the new 2nd Sec'y of the Hupei Ctte CCP; appeared again as 1st PolOff in December '72; and as both in June '73. In both roles, dislodged Liu Feng, MISSING since August '71; Liu had early service with Lin Piao and extensive CCAF connections, was named in Party briefings as one of the conspirators, and is credibly reported as purged.)

(3) Chang Ti-hsueh, Secretary, concurrently 1st PolOff of Hupei MD and a DPO of Wuhan MR. (An old Party cadre, about 60, with the Hupei Ctte CCP since c. '50, and 2nd Sec'y by '65. Criticized severely during CR, but defended lightly by Mao, and praised by Chou for model self-criticism. In '69, named full member of Central Ctte. By '70, was 1st PolOff of Hupei MD, in '71 named third-ranking secretary of Hupei Ctte CCP, and by '72 identified as a senior DPO of the MR. Identified in both Party and PLA posts during '72.)

(4) Chang Yu-hua, Secretary, concurrently a DPO of Wuhan MR. (A career political officer, about 50. Long with the Shenyang MR, he came to Wuhan from Shenyang in '67 with the new Wuhan MR commander, Tseng Szu-yu, to be a DPO under the new 1st PolOff, Liu Feng; may be a protege of Tseng's. Identified as a DPO of MR as recently as December '72.)

(5) Kung Ching-te, Secretary, concurrently a DepCdr of Wuhan MR. (A career military commander, about 60. Long with Wuhan MR, by '57 a DepCdr. In '67, made self-criticism and remained a DepCdr of this MR, and in '71 named to new Hupei Ctte CCP. Identified as DepCdr of MR as recently as October '72.)
(6) Chiang I, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, age unknown, a secretary of the Hupei Ctte CCP by '65. Survived criticism in CR, named to new Hupei Ctte CCP in '71.)

(7) Pan Chen-wu, Secretary, concurrently a DPO of Wuhan MR as of '71. (A career political officer, probably over 60. Long with Lin Piao's forces, by '54 a PolOff in Wuhan, by '56 in Canton; a tour as Military Attache in Moscow, by '63 with General Office of Ministry of Defense. Returned to Wuhan as a DPO in '69. Not identified in his PLA post since '71.)

(8) Han Ning-fu, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Old Party cadre, in Hupei in mid-'50s. Reappeared as a secretary of the Wuhan Ctte CCP in '72, then as a new secretary of the Hupei Ctte CCP in '73.)

(9) Wang Ko-wen, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Background and age unknown, but apparently a civilian. First appeared in '73 as a secretary of the Wuhan Ctte CCP under Fang Ming, apparently replaced Fang as lst Sec'y in early '73 and became at same time a new secretary of the Hupei Ctte CCP.)

(10) Chao Hsiu, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Old Party cadre, in Hupei in mid-'50s. Reappeared in early '73 as a new secretary of the Hupei Ctte CCP.)

(11) Hsieh Wang-chun, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (A female, named an alternate member of Central Ctte in '69, apparently as a mass representative; appeared in early '73 as a new secretary of the Hupei Ctte CCP.)
(3) Keng Chi-chang, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in his 50's. Was a cadre in Honan in the '50s and '60s, 1st Sec'y of a District Ctte by '67. Had a good record in the CR, and in '69 was named an alternate member of the Central Committee. In March '71 named a secretary of the new Honan Ctte CCP, and on National Day '72 was listed second only to Liu, with Wang Hsin missing and Chi in Peking.)

(4) Chang Shu-chih, Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Honan MD. (A career military commander, about 60. Early service with Ho Lung. Commander of the Sian Garrison in Shensi by '50, served there and in Korea for some years, was Commander of the Honan MD by '64. Notorious for harsh suppression of unruly mass organizations during the CR, was passed over for Central Ctte, but named a secretary of the new Honan Ctte CCP in '71. As late as December '72, identified both as a secretary and as Cdr of Honan MD.)

(5) Tung Chuan-chun, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An unknown, appearing as a new DepSec'y of Honan Ctte CCP in April '73. Possibly former or current C/S of Honan MD.)

(6) Chung Chang-hsin, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Age and background unknown; first appeared as a new DepSec'y of this Ctte in spring '73.)

(7) Wang Wei-chun, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Known only as a member of the Standing Ctte of Honan Ctte CCP in '72, appeared as a new Deputy Sec'y in April '73.)
(8) Tai Su-li, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Background and age unknown. Criticized Liu Chien-hsun, then and now 1st Sec'y Honan Ctte CCP, in RG press in '67. Appeared as DepSec'y in May '73.)

(9) Wang Hsin, Secretary (?), concurrently 2nd PolOff of the Honan MD as of '71. (A career political officer, probably in his late 50's. By '50, a leader of the 15th Army, later redesignated the 10th Air Army, which served Peking well in the Wuhan Incident of July '67. In August '67, named 2nd PolOff of Honan MD, and in '69 named an alternate member of the Central Ctte. In March '71, named the second-ranking secretary of the new Honan Ctte CCP, also under Liu Chien-hsun. Made appearances after the fall of Lin Piao's group, but not in military role. Recently demoted from second to last-ranking, may no longer be full Secretary.)
VIII. KUNMING MILITARY REGION

This MR comprises the Southwest China provinces of Yunnan (with the MR headquarters at Kunming) and Kweichow. The Commander, Wang Pi-cheng, and 1st PolOff Chou Hsing, respectively 2nd and 1st Secretary of the Yunnan Ctte CCP, returned to view in late '72 after a long absence. Both provinces have apparently been put in relative order, after prolonged periods of trouble.

Yunnan Provincial Committee CCP

(1) Chou Hsing, 1st Secretary, confirmed as 1st PolOff of the Kunming MR concurrently. (An old Party cadre, about 65, a security specialist for most of his career. Early service with Mao in the security apparatus, similar posts in Peking in the '50s, transferred to Yunnan in early '60s, by '65 was a secretary of the Yunnan Ctte CCP and 1st PolOff of the Yunnan MD. With purge of 1st Sec'y in '67, Chou became the ranking secretary in Yunnan, and in '69 was named full member of Central Ctte. With death of Tan Fu-jen in December '70, Chou apparently became the 1st PolOff of the MR, and in June '71 was named 1st Secretary of the new Yunnan Ctte. Recently confirmed as both 1st Sec'y and 1st PolOff.)

(2) Wang Pi-cheng, 2nd Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Kunming MR. (A career military commander, about 60, rising under leaders other than Lin Piao's group. By '61, a DepCdr of Nanking MR under Hsu Shih-yu. Praised by Kang Sheng during CR for a good self-criticism. By '70, transferred to Kunming MR as senior DepCdr, and in '71 named to new Kunming Ctte CCP. Identified as Cdr of this MR and 2nd Sec'y as recently as April '73.)
(3) Chen Kang, Secretary, concurrently a DepCdr of the Kunming MR, perhaps Cdr of the Yunnan MD concurrently; MISSING since January '73. (A career military commander, in his 50's, who rose under leaders other than Lin Piao's group. Apparently in security work in the '40s, but since '50 in various military command positions in Yunnan. A DepCdr of the MR and Cdr of the Kunming Garrison in the '60s, engaged in factional struggle with Chou Hsing during the CR. In favor by '69, named a full member of the Central Ctte, and in '71 named to new Yunnan Ctte CCP under his old rival Chou. Was the only secretary making appearances for some months in '72, but his last appearance was in Peking, and there is some reason to believe that he may have died, unpublicized.)

Kweichow Provincial Committee CCP

(1) Lu Jui-lin, acting 1st Secretary, probably a DepCdr of the Kunming MR concurrently. (A career military man, in both command and political officer roles, risen under leaders other than Lin Piao's group; now about 65. Early study in USSR. A commander of Public Security Forces in Southwest in early '50s, was with Armored Forces in Peking in mid-'50s, back in Kunming by '57 as a DepCdr of MR. Out of sight for some years, re-emerged in favor in CR and in '69 was named a full member of Central Ctte. Named a secretary of new Yunnan Ctte CCP in June '71. In late '72, apparently transferred to Kweichow, a province long in disarray, by April '73 appeared to be acting 1st Secretary. In this role, displaced Lan I-nung, MISSING since May '71, a career military man and alternate member of Central Ctte, reportedly purged in summer '72 for ties with conspirators of Lin Piao's group.)
(2) Kuo Chao, apparently Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in his 50's. A secretary of the Yunnan Ctte CCP in years '59-'62, then disappeared, unless he reappeared as a military man of the same name. The military man, however, is believed to be a different person, connected with Artillery Forces; to confuse matters completely, the military Kuo Chao was reportedly purged with Lin Piao's group, but the same name turned up in a group of PLA leaders after the time of the reported purge. In any case, the Kuo Chao in Kweichow has apparently displaced, as second-ranking secretary, Chang Jung-sen, MISSING since May 1971, a career military man reportedly purged with Lan F-mung and for the same reason.)

(3) Chia Ting-san, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in late 50's. A member of Peking Ctte CCP in '56, he helped to purge Peng Chen, and was rewarded with Kweichow post in '71. Apparently remains third-ranking figure.)

(4) Ho Kuang-yu, Deputy Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Kweichow MD as of '71. (A career military man, probably in his 60's. Long service under the disgraced but rehabilitated Yang Yung. A DepCdr of Kweichow MD, became its Cdr in '65. Apparently sailed smoothly through the CR, named to new Kweichow Ctte CCP in '71. Has apparently moved up to replace, as fourth-ranking figure, Li Li, MISSING since May '71, an old Party cadre who was named an alternate member of Central Ctte in '69 and has not been reported purged but has been missing too long.

(5) Wu Hsiang-pi, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Background and age unknown, first appeared as DepSec'y spring '73.)
(6) Chin Feng, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Background and age unknown, first appeared as Dep Sec'y spring '73.)
IX. CHENGDU MILITARY REGION

This MR comprises the far Southwest China provinces of Szechuan (the most populous in China, containing the MR headquarters at Chengtu) and Tibet (nominally an 'autonomous region'). The last-known Commander of this MR is missing. Liu Hsing-yuan, from the Canton MR, is now 1st Secretary in Szechuan, and 1st PolOff of the MR. Important military figures not identified as secretaries are Chen Hung (tentative), the acting Cdr of the MR, and Yen Cheng, third-ranking PolOff.

Szechuan Provincial Committee CCP

(1) Liu Hsing-yuan, 1st Secretary, concurrently the 1st Political Officer of the Chengtu MR. (A career political officer, in his late 50's. A longtime protege of Lin Piao and Huang Yung-sheng, also closely associated with Liang Hsing-chu below. Succeeded Liang as de facto 1st PolOff of the Canton MR in '67, named full member of Central Ctte in '69, named 1st Secretary of new Kwangtung Ctte CCP in December '70. Soon after post of 1st Secretary in Szechuan was vacated by death of Chang Kuo-hua in February '72, Liu was apparently transferred to Chengtu. As of February '73, was both 1st Secretary and 1st PolOff.)

(2) Li Ta-chang, Secretary, concurrently 2nd PolOff of the Chengtu MR. (An old Party cadre, about 60, with long service in his native Szechuan. A secretary of the Szechuan Ctte CCP when the CR began, he was at first attacked, then vindicated, and revealed to be a longtime friend of Madame Mao's. In '69, named
a full member of the Central Ctte, and in August '71 named the third-ranking secretary of the new Szechuan Ctte CCP. Appeared in February '72 as both Secretary and 2nd PolOff of MR. Dropped out of sight at that time. Reappeared in favor in November '72, apparently displacing Liang Hsing-chu, MISSING since October '71. Liang, a career military man and full member of the Central Ctte who had long served with Lin Piao and was regarded as a close protege, was 2nd Sec'y of the Szechuan Ctte CCP as of '71, but was reportedly purged after the fall of Lin's group.)

(3) Tuan Chun-i, Secretary, no known concurrent post; MISSING since January '73. (A career Party-government cadre, about 60. From '52 to c. '66, with the 1st Ministry of Machine Building, and from '60 the Minister. Seized by Red Guards in the CR, he was successfully defended by Chou En-lai, and is one of the few provincial leaders who might be regarded as a Chou protege. Out of sight for some years after '67, was named to the new Szechuan Ctte CCP in '71, unaccountably absent in recent months. Had apparently replaced as fourth-ranking Secretary Hsieh Chia-hsiang, MISSING since March '72; Hsieh, a career military man and a full member of the Central Ctte, was a onetime protege of Huang Yung-sheng, and Party briefings have suggested that Hsieh has either been purged with Liang Hsing-chu or has been under prolonged examination.

(4) Hsieh Cheng-jung, Secretary, a senior DepCdr of the Chengtu MR concurrently as of '71. (A career military commander, probably in his 50's. Long service in the Northeast, transferred to Szechuan -- possibly as Cdr of the 50th Army -- by '69, and named to the new Szechuan Ctte CCP in '71. Reappeared in April '73, after a year's absence, as Sec'y, DepCdr of MR.)
Hsu Chih, Secretary, no known concurrent post; MISSING since November '72. (A career government official, probably in his 60's. Had a number of important government posts in the '50s, and '60s -- as an industrial manager -- and was named an alternate member of the Central Ctte in '69. In August '71 was named to new Szechuan Ctte CCP, and in November 1972 was the ranking figure in a small turnout.)

Ho Yun-feng, Secretary, perhaps concurrently 1st PolOff of 13th Army as of '71. (A career political officer, probably in his 50's, with long service in the Southwest. Was in Szechuan by '68, as a PolOff of the 13th Army and/or the Chungking Garrison, and in mid-'71 was reported to be 1st PolOff of the 13th Army. Named to the new Szechuan Ctte CCP as the lowest-ranking secretary, Ho was missing for a year before reappearance in April '73.)

Tibet Autonomous Region Committee CCP

Jen Jung, 1st Secretary, concurrently 1st PolOff of Tibet MD as of early '72. (A career political officer, about 60. Some early service with Lin Piao, the '50s in North Korea, in Tibet and a DPO by '65, and de facto top man in Tibet after Chang Kuo-hua's transfer to Chengtu in '68. Named 1st Sec'y of new Tibet Ctte CCP in August '71, and by early '72 -- perhaps much earlier -- was also 1st PolOff of Tibet MD.)

Chen Ming-i, Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Tibet MD as of '71. (A career military commander, about 55, with long service in Tibet. Was a DepCdr of Tibet MD -- at that time an MR -- by '55, and has apparently never
left the area since, except for trips to Chengtu and Peking. By fall '70 was Cdr of this MD, replacing a Lin Piao protege. In August '71 was named second-ranking Secretary of the new Tibet Ctte CCP. Went out of sight immediately, reportedly in connection with Lin Piao affair, but reappeared in June 1973.)

(3) Tien Pao, Secretary, perhaps concurrently a senior PolOff of the Tibet MD, as of '71. (A Tibetan, about 55, in his early career a military man but since '49 largely concerned with managing minority nationalities on behalf of the Party. Assigned to the Southwest since '60, held a number of posts in minority areas and in the governments of provinces with large minorities. In '69, named a full member of Central Ctte, and in '70 identified as the 1st or senior PolOff in Tibet. In August '71 was named third-ranking secretary of the new Tibet Ctte CCP, but by early '72 1st Sec'y Jen Jung had replaced him as 1st PolOff, if indeed he ever had been.)

(4) Yang Tung-sheng, Secretary, perhaps concurrently a DPO of Tibet MD as of '71. (Also a Tibetan, apparently an old Party cadre, probably in his 50's. Was a secretary of the Tibet Ctte CCP by '65, a "responsible person" -- perhaps a DPO -- of the Tibet MD as of '70, and was named a secretary of the new Tibet Ctte CCP in '71. Not identified in military post since '71.)

(5) Feng Ko-ta, Secretary, concurrently a DPO of Tibet MD as of early '72. (Nothing known about him at time of his appointment except that he was a DPO of the MD; was so identified again in '72.)

(6) Kao Sheng-hsuan, Secretary, concurrently a DepCdr of Tibet MD as of '71. (Nothing known at time of his appointment except that he was a DepCdr of the MD; he has not been so identified since.)
(7) Pa Sang, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (A young Tibetan woman, c. 34, concerned with "youth" work since '50s. Named the lowest-ranking secretary of the new Tibet Ctte CCP in August '71 and has rarely appeared. Reappeared in January '73 after absence of several months.)

(8) Kuo Hsi-lan, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in late 50's. Was DepDirOrg Dept Sikang Ctte CCP by '50, in late '50s with Tibet Ctte, a DepSec'y by '62. Disappeared during CR, reappeared in '71, a Secretary again by '73.)
Peking of the Lanchow MR commander, became Cdr of the Lanchow MR. Named second-ranking secretary of the new Kansu Ctte CCP in February '71, and has consistently appeared in the second spot. Has been identified as recently as December '72 as both Secretary and Commander.)

(3) Hu Chi-tsung, Secretary, no known concurrent post but perhaps a DPO. (An old Party cadre, probably in his 50's. With the Hunan Ctte CCP in the '50s, was a secretary of the Kansu Ctte CCP by '64 and "acting 1st Secretary" by '67. Named a full member of Central Ctte in '69, named third-ranking secretary of new Kansu Ctte CCP -- behind the two powerful military figures -- in '71. Reappeared in June '73 after absence of almost a year.)

(4) Chang Chung, Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Kansu MD as of mid-'72. (A career military commander, probably in his 60's. Early service with Lin Piao's forces, rising with other leaders. A senior officer of the Lanchow MR and Cdr of the Kansu MD by '64, was identified in latter post as recently as June '72. A member of the standing committee, but not a secretary, of the new Kansu Ctte in '71, in July '72 he was first identified as a "secretary." He has made further appearances in that role, although not, since then, as the MD Cdr.)

(5) Su Ping, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (A new Secretary, otherwise unknown, who has appeared several times since July '72. Presumably brought up from the standing committee; might be a young person.)
Shensi Provinical Committee CCP

(1) Li Jui-shan, 1st Secretary, probably 1st PolOff of Shensi MD and/or the 21st Army concurrently, possibly senior DPO of the MR. (An old Party cadre, probably in his 50's at least. Was a secretary of the Hunan Ctte CCP from '54 to '66, in '68 was reassigned to be the de facto top man in Shensi and in '69 was named a full member of the Central Ctte. From '69, 1st PolOff of Shensi MD, and a PolOff of Lanchow MR. In March '71, named 1st Secretary of the new Shensi Ctte CCP. In early '72 officially identified as a leader of a PLA unit in Shensi, perhaps meaning 1st PolOff of the 21st Army. Has not been identified in a military role in past year.)

(2) Hu Wei, Secretary, possibly a senior officer of the Shensi MD and/or the 21st Army concurrently. (A career military commander, about 57. Rose under leaders other than Lin Piao's group; in '50s, with 21st Armv, and its Cdr by '60. In Shensi since '67. In '69 named an alternate member of the Central Ctte, and in '71 named second-ranking secretary of the new Shensi Ctte CCP. As of mid-'71, had an unspecified military post in Shensi -- probably MD and/or 21st Army -- but appeared only in his Party role since.)

(3) Huang Ching-yao, Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Shensi MD. (A career military commander, probably in his 50's. A DepCdr in Heilungkiang in the period '54-'67, in '67 was reassigned to Shensi and by fall '68 was the MD Cdr. In '71, named the third-ranking secretary of the new Shensi Ctte CCP. Appeared as MD Cdr as recently as June '73.)
(4) Huo Shih-lien, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in his late 50's. Was a secretary of the Chekiang Ctte CCP by '57, then in '65 transferred to the Northwest as a secretary of the Northwest Bureau and 1st Secretary of the Shensi Ctte CCP. Denounced early in CR, i.a. for trying to discredit Chang Chun-chiao, and disappeared in late '66. Reappeared in June '73 as a new secretary of Shensi Ctte, preceding Hsiao Chun.)

(5) Hsiao Chun, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in his 50's. Was a secretary of the Antung Ctte CCP in the Northeast in '55, its 1st Sec'y by '57, then 1st Sec'y of the Chinchou Ctte CCP as of '60. A secretary of Sian Ctte CCP in Shensi by '64, was its 1st Sec'y by '66. As of '70, was apparently the Shensi specialist in agriculture, and in '71 named the senior deputy secretary of the new Shensi Ctte CCP; in '73, appearing as a full secretary.)

(6) Wu Kuei-hsien, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (A female cotton-mill worker, possibly young, an activist in the CR; named a full member of the Central Committee in '69 as a mass representative. Named as the junior deputy secretary of the new Shensi Ctte CCP in '71. Missing for several months, has just reappeared as a full secretary.)

Tsinghai Provincial Committee CCP

(1) Liu Hsien-chuan, 1st Secretary, concurrently in some unidentified important post in Peking. (A career military man, about 58, with a mixed background of military commands and political roles.
Early career was spent entirely with Lin Piao's forces. Remained in Northeast in '50s, after bulk of Lin's forces moved south, and in early '60s was with the Political Department of the Shenyang MR. In '64, was reassigned as Cdr of Tsinghai MD, and from '67 was the de facto top man in Tsinghai as head of the Party core group, as well as a DepCdr of Lanchow MR. Brought to Peking in '68 and identified there as a PLA leader in '69, he was named a full member of the Central Ctte in '69. Named 1st Secretary of the new Tsinghai Ctte CCP in March '71, he has been, more than Li Te-sheng of Anhwei, the 1st Sec'y in absentia, as he has apparently spent all of his time in Peking. In view of early career and preferment given him during CR, had been regarded as a protege of Lin Piao, but he obviously has other patrons, as he is customarily ranked just below members of the Politburo and may be marked for it himself. Has not been identified either as the 1st Sec'y in Tsinghai or as a military leader since '71.)

(2) Chang Chiang-lin, 2nd Secretary, concurrently Commander of the Tsinghai MD as of '69. (Probably a career military commander, possibly under 50. First observed as a DepCdr in Tsinghai in '65, the de facto second-ranking figure in Tsinghai since '67, and the top man on the spot since '68. Named an alternate member of the Central Ctte in '69, and soon identified as Commander of the Tsinghai MD. Named second-ranking secretary of the new Tsinghai Ctte CCP in '71, has since appeared only in that role.)

(3) Sung Chang-keng, Secretary, concurrently the de facto 1st PolOff of Tsinghai MD. (Unknown before '68, and may be relatively young. Probably a career PolOff, as appeared in that role in Tsinghai in '68, and has been de facto 1st PolOff since late '68. During '72, appeared only in his role as a Party Secretary, until January '73 the ranking secretary making appearances. Recently reappeared after absence of six months.)
(4) Hsueh Hung-fu, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, probably in his 50's. Was in Tsinghai as far back as '49, and was a secretary of the Tsinghai Ctte CCP in the early '60s. Named the senior deputy secretary of the new Tsinghai Ctte in March '71, has been ranking identified secretary in '73.)

(5) Lu Chih-an, Deputy Secretary, concurrently second-ranking PolOff of Tsinghai MD. (Unknown before '68, and may be relatively young. Apparently second-ranking PolOff, under Sung Chang-keng, by '70. Identified as both DepSec'y and PolOff in '73.)

(6) Ta Lo, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, a Tibetan, perhaps relatively young. A Party functionary in Tsinghai by '64, he apparently worked well with Liu Hsien-chuan and was named an alternate member of the Central Ctte in '69. Since being named as the lowest-ranking deputy secretary of the new Tsinghai Ctte CCP in '71, he has made several appearances.)

(7) Yang Yen, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Background and age unknown; first appeared as a DepSec'y here in January '73.)

(8) Wen Tzu-tsai, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Either an old Party cadre, reported as such in Tsinghai in '68, or a PLA man as later reported; first identified as a DepSec'y of Tsinghai Ctte CCP in October '72.)

(9) Hsu Chi-han, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Background and age unknown; first appeared as a DepSec'y here in October '72.)
Ninghsia Autonomous Area Committee CCP

(1) Kang Chien-min, 1st Secretary, concurrently a DepCdr of the Lanchow MR and/or the Cdr of an unidentified military unit as of '69. (A career military commander, probably in his 60's. A divisional commander by '49, to Northwest China in early '50s, was DepCdr of Lanchow MR by '64. De facto top man in Ninghsia throughout the CR, was named an alternate member of Central Ctte in '69 and 1st Secretary of new Ninghsia Ctte CCP in August '71. No military post identified since '69. Reappeared in July '73 after absence since January '72.)

(2) Kao Jui, 2nd Secretary, perhaps concurrently DepCdr of the Ninghsia MD as of early '72; MISSING since March '72. (A career military man, probably in his late 50's at least. Was C/S of 31st Army in '52. Missing for years, turned up as a military leader in Shensi in '65. Missing throughout the CR, in August '71 turned up again as 2nd Sec'y of new Ninghsia Ctte CCP, reported concurrently -- unconfirmed -- as a DepCdr of the MD. Not identified in a military post since appointment as a secretary.)

(3) Chang Kuei-chin, Secretary, concurrently a senior PolOff of the Ninghsia MD as of '71; MISSING since March '72. (Probably a career political officer, age unknown, perhaps young. First appeared in '69, as a PolOff in Ninghsia, and by late '70 apparently 1st PolOff. Made only one appearance after appointment as a secretary, and not identified in military post.)

(4) Wang Chih-chiang, Deputy Secretary, with a concurrent military post. (An old Party cadre, a Hui, probably in his late 50's. Appeared first in Ninghsia in '57, then in Kansu, back in Ninghsia by '58, in trouble in '60, returned to favor by '62. Reappeared
in Ninghsia in '68, and named an alternate member of the Central Ctte in '69. Had some PLA post in Ninghsia in '70, and named the senior deputy secretary of the new Ninghsia Ctte CCP in '71. No identification in military post since that time.)

(5) Shao Ching-wa, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post; MISSING since March '72. (An old Party cadre, perhaps in his late 50's. A trade union specialist.)

(6) Chao Chih-chiang, Deputy Secretary, no known concurrent post; MISSING since March '72. (A female Hui, possibly young. Unknown before being named lowest-ranking deputy secretary of new Ninghsia Ctte CCP in '71. No appearance since Women's Day '72.)
XI. SINKIANG MILITARY REGION

This MR is coterminous with the far Northwest China province ('autonomous area') of Sinkiang, the largest in China, bordering the USSR. The MR Commander as of '71, Lung Shu-chin, concurrently 1st Secretary of the Sinkiang Ctte CCP, is missing. Saifudin has just been identified (early July) as the new 1st Secretary and concurrently 1st Political Officer of the MR. Yang Yung has just been identified as the new 2nd secretary and new Commander of the MR. Important military figures who are not known to be provincial secretaries concurrently are Hsu Kuo-hsien, who for a time was the acting Commander of the MR, and Pei Chou-yu, a senior political officer.

Sinkiang Autonomous Area Committee CCP

(1) Saifudin (aka Sai Fu-ting), 1st Secretary, named concurrently 1st Political Officer of the MR. (A Uighur, a career Party cadre, in his late 60's. Lived in USSR for several years as a young man, returned to Sinkiang in '43, took part in Ili Revolt in '44, moved into important posts in Sinkiang in '49. By '52 a secretary of Sinkiang Ctte CCP, by '56, second-ranking secretary. Rode out the CR with little difficulty, and in '69 elevated from alternate to full member of Central Ctte. Named 2nd secretary of new Sinkiang Ctte CCP in May '71, and has headed the list in Sinkiang, the senior secretary on the spot, since disappearance of 1st Secretary Lung Shu-chin in early '72. In early July '73, identified officially as the new 1st Secretary, replacing Lung. Lung, MISSING since February '72, was
a career military commander, about 55, a longtime protege of Lin Piao and Huang Yung-sheng; from '68 the Cdr of the Sinkiang MR and de facto the top man in Sinkiang, in '69 named a full member of Central Ctte, in May '71 named 1st Secretary of the new Sinkiang Ctte CCP, Lung was reportedly purged in early '72 as a Lin/Huang supporter.)

(2) Yang Yung, 2nd Secretary, concurrently Commander of the MR. (A career military commander, about 67. Early service with Lin Piao, but most of career until '60 under other leaders. Was DepCdr of CPV in Korean war. Named alternate member of Central Ctte in '58. By '60, was Cdr of the Peking MR, and apparently concurrently a secretary of the North China Bureau. In early '60s, was named a Deputy C/S. Remained in both posts until early '67, when he denounced Hsiao Hua, head of the GPD, and was himself denounced for this; Yang was purged at that time, Hsiao later. Dropped from Cent Ctte in '69, was rehabilitated and assigned to Shenyang MR last year. In early July '73, identified in his two current posts. Said to be a close friend of Yeh Chien-ying, now the regime's ranking military leader.)

(3) Tsao Szu-ming, 3rd Secretary, perhaps a senior Po1Off of the MR concurrently. (Background and age unknown. Possibly an officer of the Nanking MR in '68. Identified as a Po1Off of the Sinkiang MR in '71, and as a leader of the MR in '73. Identified as 3rd Sec'y -- only known such post -- in July '73.)

(4) Sung Chih-ho, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (An old Party cadre, in his late 50's. A Secretary of Honan Ctte CCP in the late '50s, was in a government post in Peking in '65. Out of sight during the CR, reappeared in Sinkiang in '71 and was named to the new Sinkiang Ctte CCP.)
(5) Liu Hsing, Secretary, no known concurrent post; MISSING since October '72. (Probably in his 60's, has had a mixed career as a political officer, government functionary, and Party cadre. In '40s and '50s, as a political officer and then in economic planning posts in Peking, seemed to be a protege of Teng Hsiao-ping, the Secretary-General purged in the CR. Out of sight for years, reappeared in Sinkiang in '70, and named to new Sinkiang Ctte CCP in '71. May be the Ctte's production specialist. In October '72, was ranked above Sung Chih-ho -- see above -- but has been missing since.)

(6) Szu-ma-i-ai-mai-ti (sic), Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Another new secretary, first appearing as such in September '72. Presumably a Uighur, but background and age unknown.)

(7) Chang Shih-chung, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (A new secretary; appearing here first in '72. Could be either a Party cadre by this name identified in Northwest in late '60s, or less likely -- a propagandist in Peking at that time who was named an alternate member of the Central Ctte; the man in Sinkiang appears to be a production specialist.)

(8) Ho Lin-chao, Secretary, no known concurrent post. (Another new secretary, first identified as such in July '73. Background and age unknown. First appeared in '70 in Sinkiang, then in a PLA list in Peking in '71, then in Sinkiang again in '72, as a member of the Standing Ctte of the provincial Party Ctte or as an unpublicized secretary.)