Intelligence Report

The International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party

(Reference Title: POLO XLIV)
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THE INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT 
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 

MEMORANDUM FOR Recipients 

This study examines in some depth the International Liaison Department (ILD) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the only one of the Party's central departments on which there is enough evidence to support such an examination. The study finds that the ILD, radically reorganized in recent years, has been given new duties -- particularly in the realm of improving the CCP's relations with governing CP's abroad -- and with these new duties an enhanced status. The ILD is no longer obliged to implement the revolutionary, counter-productive policy of trying to export the Cultural Revolution, but instead is now charged with fostering reconciliation with friendly governing CP's, and a more relaxed line toward the CP's in non-Communist countries. Among these latter, the ILD is reducing its commitments and diversifying its holdings.

This study was prepared by Robert Suettinger, a summer (1971) intern with this Staff. Mr. Suettinger was given much help and valued counsel by other components of the Agency, in particular the Office of Current Intelligence and the Directorate of Plans.

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THE INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

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The International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was probably formed in the early 1950s, possibly after a reallocation of the responsibilities of the United Front Department. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, it remained behind the scenes, responsible for contacts, communications, and coordination with other Communist Parties around the world. It began to be more active with the development of the Sino-Soviet split, when its delegates to foreign Party meetings began to be more vociferous in advancing the CCP cause. As the rift deepened and the Chinese began searching out independent supporters of their position, the ILD's activities became more important.

Organized geographically and working hand-in-hand with Chinese embassies in various countries, the ILD performed the task of finding, investigating and eventually supporting pro-Chinese splinter groups and malcontents, encouraging them to form so-called "Marxist-Leninist" parties in opposition to pro-Soviet "revisionist" parties. In this task the ILD pursued a patient, soft-sell policy, providing funds to keep the promising groups active, and offering political and organizational training on Chinese soil where it
was deemed profitable. The ILD appeared to receive high-level supervision from the two ranking members of the Party Secretariat, Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen, and on occasion from Liu Shao-chi, then Mao's designated successor.

The purges of the Cultural Revolution had a tremendous impact on the ILD, both organizationally and operationally. Its top-level leaders and supervisors were wiped out very early in the Revolution, and those who replaced them, under the guidance of Kang Sheng and a group of PLA officers, were obliged to implement a counter-productive policy of ideological militancy and organizational interference until this "revolutionary diplomacy" was replaced by a new, more flexible line. In 1968 and much of 1969, the ILD remained ideologically and organizationally incoherent, gradually retreating from the policy of giving explicit directions to splinter parties, and trying instead to improve strained relations with ruling Parties in selected countries. Although the department's leadership seemed to be generally in the hands of the PLA, under the overall direction of the civilian Kang Sheng and his wife, one veteran ILD cadre, Shen Chien, continued to make frequent appearances.

It was not until late 1970 that the new ILD really began to take shape, with the reappearance of several veteran members who had been missing during the Cultural Revolution. Shen Chien had been identified by Kang Sheng as head of the department in mid-1970, but Kang's own disappearance shortly thereafter left a leadership vacuum. This was filled by Keng Piao, Peking's Ambassador to Albania, who
returned in January 1971 and was named to head the ILD in March. During this period, the military presence which had dominated the ILD was reduced. PLA officer Kuo Yu-feng ceased to appear with ILD personnel and reportedly took up full-time duties with the Organization Department. Another PLA figure, Chu Ta-cheng, disappeared. Yang Yu-heng, yet another PLA man once high in the ILD hierarchy, went out of sight for a time, and has more recently been making low-level ILD appearances. Jen Yun-chung remains the principal visible PLA member of importance within the department. In this regard, the ILD has been an exception to the general course of Party-rebuilding, which has seen PLA domination of most provincial Party committees, of many if not most of the central Party departments, and of the Party committee of the Foreign Ministry.

In addition to consolidating Party control over the ILD, Keng Piao has been expanding the department. Several new members have been added to the small coterie of veteran cadres (who seem to occupy the top leadership positions) listed in the open press as members of the ILD. Division of labor along functional and geographic lines, though not specified in the press, seems to be taking place.

The ILD itself seems to have acquired more importance along with its greater visibility. In any kind of public listing of central regime departments, it is ordinarily the first one mentioned, and its leaders are usually the first ones mentioned in group appearance lists. On such occasions, Keng Piao is invariably the first or second person mentioned after Politburo members, and ILD deputy directors Shen Chien and Jen Yun-chung invariably
appear before vice-foreign ministers and sometimes before even the acting foreign minister, Chi Peng-fei.

In terms of duties performed, the ILD has recently become more active in the implementation of policy toward China's major allies, particularly in the realm of improving government/Party relations. Some observers believe that the ILD, and particularly Keng Piao, plays an active role in the overall formulation of foreign policy, and has supervisory authority over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and all other departments concerned with foreign relations. However, it seems likely that -- as the Chinese themselves have said privately -- the most important foreign policies are formulated by a small group around Chou En-lai (of which Keng is apparently one member).

With the onset of the Cultural Revolution, ILD policy incoherence seemed to parallel the condition of China itself. The export of radical excesses to foreign countries caused China's Party relations to decline along with its overall international prestige. Ideological militancy, as well as obeisance to the thought of Chairman Mao, was demanded of China's Party allies, large or small. Those who had the independence and will to do so, resisted this type of activity. The result was that China's only allies were the Albanians, who had already burned all other bridges, and a smattering of insignificant "Marxist-Leninist" splinter groups. Upon these latter, the ILD made further demands, such as the creation of clandestine
organizations, which added up to requiring a duplication of the Chinese experience. These demands often caused serious internal difficulties for the parties concerned.

With the decline in "revolutionary diplomacy" after mid-1967 and the perceived military threat from the Soviet Union after autumn 1968, ILD policy began to reflect the change in the thinking of the CCP leadership. In late 1969, the ILD, although still in a state of organizational disorder, began to implement a policy of reconciliation with the CCP's various potential allies. This included a gradual warming of Party relations with North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, North Korea, the Laotian Patriotic Front, and Rumania. As the ILD has itself consolidated, it has continued to play a major role in maintaining these good relations.

With a new, less militant ideology in hand, the ILD has put into effect a more relaxed policy towards smaller Party friends, much to the relief of some of them. Organizational as well as ideological requirements have become much more flexible and realistic, and the Chinese have admitted that earlier policies were sometimes wrong. On the other hand, it appears that some loyal Party allies which offer insignificant help to the Chinese have been downgraded in order to pursue bigger game at the government level. Stressing Maoist principles of "self-decision and self-sufficiency," the ILD has basically terminated financial support for some "Marxist-Leninist" (pro-Chinese) parties, leaving them to flounder. Consonant with this, Peking has sometimes shown as
much (or as little) interest in other pro-Chinese groups as in the proven, loyal "Marxist-Leninist" parties.

There are further indications that, even while continuing to support Communist-led armed struggle in Asia, the furthering of diplomatic relations may have some effect on the type of Chinese support given to such rebel groups outside Indochina. Though it is unlikely that the CCP will terminate support to rebel movements in Malaysia and Burma, it is not as yet clear how it will handle the problem of maintaining good relations with both sides in a civil war. The final policy stance will probably be more the result of considerations of Chinese national interest than of ideological consistency.
THE INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Functions, Organization and Status

One organizational feature that appears to be common to nearly all Communist Parties of any size is a department of the Party set up to deal with relations with other Communist Parties and countries. In the Soviet Union, this function is divided between an International Department (for non-bloc parties) and a Bloc Department (for Communist Parties in power). In the People's Republic of China, these functions are united in an International Liaison Department (ILD). It is the purpose of the first part of this paper to trace the organizational development of the ILD* from a relatively obscure and clandestine branch of the Party to its present status as an open, active participant in the implementation of Chinese foreign policy.

Prior to 1971, the existence of the ILD was not officially acknowledged. It may have been

*The translation International Liaison Department is technically incorrect: The official name given to the department by the 9th Central Committee is Chung Yang Tui Wai Lien Lo Pu, which more accurately translates as "Central Foreign Liaison Department." However, NCNA and FBIS translate the term as International Liaison Department, so this paper will do the same. It is important to (continued on page 2)
formed in or about 1951-52 when the United Front Department was split in two, though this is uncertain.

Prior to and during the Cultural Revolution, the functions of the ILD were limited. The ILD, although a Party department, was of a status comparable to numerous branches of the State Council (the government), all under the direction of Foreign Minister Chen Yi. Its primary responsibility was to maintain contacts with friendly Communist Parties in Communist-ruled countries, and to find, nurture and develop pro-Chinese sentiment wherever it was found. In this capacity, it often worked hand-in-glove with overseas MFA personnel in the embassies.

At the same time, it is clear from the available evidence that the MFA and ILD kept their functions carefully separated. Although messages were sent from the missions to the ILD through the MFA in Peking, they were passed on without being opened, and there was mistrust of MFA officials by ILD leaders. ILD personnel were of a "higher status" and better paid than were those of government bodies, because the ILD was a Party organization.

(continued from page 1) note, however, that this is a new name; prior to the 9th Central Committee meeting, the official name for the department was Chung Yang Kuo Chi Lien Lo Pu, which does translate accurately as "Central International Liaison Department."
The first head of the liaison department was Wang Chia-hsiang. This was surmised from his frequent attendance at foreign Party Congresses and his greeting of Party delegations to Peking, and has more recently been confirmed by [ ] and Red Guard posters. Wang got into trouble in the Peng Te-huai affair of 1959, and, although his fall was not formally ratified at that time, and he remained nominally the department head, he did go into eclipse; de facto leadership of the ILD passed into the hands of Wu Hsiu-chuan, with Politburo-level supervision apparently provided by Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen. With such principals, it is not surprising that the ILD was in trouble early in the Cultural Revolution.

The purges of the Cultural Revolution hit the ILD very early. Among the first to be disposed of was Wang Chia-hsiang, and by early 1966, Wu Hsiu-chuan and much of the rest of the top leadership were also out of power, if perhaps not yet purged. Leadership
duties were taken over in March 1966 (according to later Red Guard posters) by Liu Ning-i, former head of the ACFTU, assisted by Chao I-min, a veteran ILD member with much experience. These two carried on the majority of the visible work of the ILD during 1966 and early 1967, with Liu himself attending a New Zealand party congress in April 1966. As the Cultural Revolution expanded and grew more violent and disruptive, the ILD, like nearly all other components of the Chinese bureaucracy, ceased to function effectively. Following the standard pattern, younger members of the department engaged in vicious criticism of the higher cadres, and the department became almost completely paralyzed. A 1968 bulletin reported that fierce ideological quarrelling had broken out between "heaven" and "earth" factions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ILD, with the result that work came to a virtual standstill. Nobody was willing to take the responsibility for writing reports or signing papers, and almost all work was passed on to the highest levels of leadership, which were also under heavy ideological fire. Sometime during this period, Wang Li, former radical journalist and member of the central Cultural Revolution Group, was brought into the ILD as a deputy director in charge of combatting "revisionism" within the department. Much of the middle-level leadership was apparently brought down during this early 1967 period. In late 1967, things went from bad to worse. In September, Wang Li himself came under intense criticism from his superiors, who curtailed his duties and informed the ILD to do likewise; he was later purged. Chao I-min, although he claimed to be a member of the "revolutionary" faction of the department, was reportedly investigated on the basis of early
1967 Red Guard evidence, and was declared a "renegade" in September 1967 and imprisoned. His fate is unknown, but he was dropped from the CCP Central Committee in 1969 and was presumably purged. Liu Ning-i also came under heavy attack. He was apparently defended by Kang Sheng for a time, but the attacks continued and Liu disappeared in early 1968.

In May 1968, a Canton Red Flag supplement carried a speech made by Kang Sheng to the "Military Control Group" of what was clearly the ILD, indicating that as far as internal organization was concerned, things were entirely in the hands of the PLA. External functions of the ILD, such as greeting foreign Party delegations, holding talks with them, and such other publicly reported activities, were handled by Kang Sheng and his wife, Tsao I-ou. The PLA figure Kuo Yu-feng was also brought up to Peking and elevated by Kang Sheng during this period.

Little information exists on what happened to the ILD during the rest of 1968 and much of 1969.

In April 1969, apparently the head of the ILD was a man named Sung Hsu-chien and that the deputy head was Chang Tsang; neither of these had ever been heard of before, and neither has been mentioned by anyone else since. These two were said to be responsible directly to a PLA officer named "Ko Yo-fang" (probably Kuo Yu-feng), and there were reportedly numerous other PLA members. Apparently the ILD was still in a state of limbo, in spite of its new name and its official status under the 9th Central
Committee. Public appearances were handled mainly by Kang Sheng and his wife, along with Kuo. In late 1969, the triumvirate of Shen Chien, Yang Yu-heng and Chu Ta-cheng, which was to remain in evidence all through 1970, began to appear. Shen was a veteran cadre, Yang a known PLA officer, and Chu believed to be a PLA officer. During late 1970, other veteran ILD members, such as old Party cadres Chang Hsiang-shan and Tang Ming-chao, began to make reappearances.

With the disappearance of Kang Sheng in November 1970 and the recall of Ambassador Keng Piao from Albania in December, the ILD apparently began to move toward stability. Chu Ta-cheng and Kuo Yu-feng made their last appearances in ILD roles in January 1971 (Chu reappeared in November), and Yang Yu-heng seemingly went into decline. Keng Piao began to make ILD appearances in February, and was identified as head of that department in March 1971. Since then, several other members of the department have been publicly identified, indicating a new public status and prestige for a formerly unpublicized organization. In addition, the staff of the ILD seems to be expanding considerably, with several new faces appearing since May 1971. Keng's rising status may eventually lead to a Politburo or revamped Secretariat position, though this is pure conjecture.

There is now a striking scarcity of PLA men within the ILD. Almost all of its apparent leaders and supervisors come from civilian backgrounds. Until he was recently purged, Politburo member and head of the PLA Air Force Wu Fa-hsien showed up
occasionally at small ILD functions, but the Politburo members most frequently seen in connection with the ILD in 1971 have all been civilians: Chou En-lai, Yao Wen-yuan, Chang Chun-chiao, and Chi Teng-kuei. As for actual department membership, Jen Yun-chung (possibly the senior deputy to Keng Piao) and Yang Yu-heng are the only known PLA figures seen often in ILD roles; Kuo Yu-feng has been transferred out of the ILD, Yang Yu-heng seems to have declined in influence, and Chu Ta-cheng's current post is uncertain. This has contrasted markedly with increasing PLA participation in other sections of the Chinese Party and government.

Before the Cultural Revolution, the ILD was reported by different sources to have between 1000 and 1100 members, many of them engaged in research activities. After the Cultural Revolution, Kang Sheng reportedly put the number remaining at 200-300, Recent indications are that the department, under Keng Piao, is again rebuilding its numbers.

Formerly, the ILD was organized hierarchically and geographically, and to a degree, functionally, with the majority of the work being done in the geographic bureaus, of which there were nine. These bureaus were:

1st -- Soviet Union & East Europe
2nd -- Korea & Vietnam
3rd -- India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Nepal, Indonesia, Malaya
4th -- Japan, Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos
There was also a separate general (administrative) office.

The leadership was conventionally hierarchical: a director of the department, several deputy directors, a secretary general and several deputy secretaries-general, all above the bureau chiefs.

It is presumed that this organizational structure was entirely destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. Other events, such as the heightened importance of the Vietnam conflict, and increasing hostility with the Soviet Union, have probably also brought about changes in the organization. At present, there is no information about the new organization, and the chart below is entirely conjectural, based upon appearances in public with various delegations. It seems likely that, for functional and liaison reasons, the organization is somewhat similar to that of the MFA.
DEPARTMENTAL LEADERSHIP

Politburo Supervision

YAO Wen-yuan
CHANG Chun-chiao
CHI Teng-kuei

Department Director

KENG Piao

Deputy Directors (?)

JEN Yun-chung (senior?)
SHEN Chien
YANG Yu-heng (?)
CHANG Tsang (?)
CHANG Hsiang-shan

BUREAU LEADERSHIP

Soviet Union and East Europe Section

LIU Ke-ming -- section head
PENG Hsuan -- section leader, with a political security background

Western Europe, North America and Australia Section

TANG Ming-chao -- section head (until assigned to UN)
CHAO Hsueh-li -- 'leading member' perhaps Western Europe subsection
LAO Yuan-hui -- interpreter, English
TAI Sheng-pu -- interpreter, English
LI Mei -- interpreter, English
Bureau Leadership (continued)

Latin American Section
SHEN Chien -- section head (?)

Asian Section

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHEN Chien</td>
<td>section head (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANG Hsiang-shan</td>
<td>head of Korea/Japan sub-section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIEN Shu-chien</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YANG Chun-cheng</td>
<td>interpreter, Korean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIN Hui</td>
<td>interpreter, Korean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO Pao-chung</td>
<td>head of Indochina sub-section (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSIAO Huang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUANG Chun</td>
<td>interpreter, Vietnamese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNG Tso-chun</td>
<td>interpreter, Vietnamese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHENG Kuo-tsuai</td>
<td>interpreter, Laotian</td>
</tr>
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<td>LI Wen-kun</td>
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<td>SHIH Yung-lu</td>
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West Asia and African Section
CHANG Tsang (?)

Reception Section

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<tr>
<td>LIU Chun-fa</td>
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<td>MA Te-chuan</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIN Hsien-nung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAO Shih-ken</td>
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<td>CHANG-Chen-hai</td>
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There is some disagreement as to present and past responsibilities of the ILD. Basic policies are of course formulated in the Politburo standing committee. Below that level, it is possible to argue -- as some observers have -- that the ILD as a Party organ is responsible for the next level of formulation of foreign policy, superior in power to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is subordinate to the State Council. In other words, it is conceivable that the ILD is the focal point of supervision of the entire foreign affairs apparatus, including the MFA, the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, and other departments.*

There is some information to support this view. First, Keng's own Party position is apparently quite high; he has been listed on many occasions as the first Party dignitary after Politburo members (although he has begun to follow Kuo Mo-jo), and always ahead of Chi Peng-fei, acting Foreign Minister of the PRC. Further, Keng was mentioned by name (along with Chou En-lai) in a recent Mao directive on foreign policy; no other Party members were mentioned. Further, in contrast to previous custom, ILD personnel are now given pride of place in the Chinese media. Not only

*There is some speculation that Keng is a member of a possible de facto secretariat under Chou En-lai, responsible for the day-to-day running of China's affairs.
is the department always listed ahead of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but ILD deputy directors now are consistently mentioned ahead of deputy foreign ministers, and on occasion ahead of the acting foreign minister. Further, members of the ILD have recently been appearing regularly at functions which they previously would not have attended, for example, greeting economic or government study delegations from allied countries, attending various protocol functions and receptions at foreign embassies (from socialist countries) and other affairs usually handled exclusively by the MFA. Further, Keng Piao has been giving numerous briefings to foreign Communists, at which he has spoken with authority on international affairs and Chinese relations with non-Communist nations, as well as on international Communist relations. For example, shortly after meeting with Keng and other ILD personnel, in July 1971 a sympathetic American, William Hinton, wrote an apparently authoritative article for a Chinese newspaper concerning the rationale for China's recent initiatives toward the United States, defending those actions against anticipated leftist criticism.

However, most of the ILD's public appearances have been with friendly Communist delegations, and that aspect of foreign policy is clearly its main concern. It does not seem to have the scope to act as the focal point for the shaping of all foreign policy below the politburo standing committee level. On balance, it seems likely that MFA personnel have been telling the truth in insisting that important foreign-policy decisions are made by a small group around Chou En-lai. Keng Piao is probably one member of that group.
Any discussion of policy pursued by the ILD is based upon scant information and bound to be speculative. Moreover, there would necessarily be a time lapse between the actual formulation of policy by the standing committee of the Politburo and its correct implementation and reiteration by the liaison department -- which makes for further imprecision. For the purposes of clarity and convenience, the discussion of policy herein is divided into two topics, that of relations between the CCP and other Communist state parties (e.g., CPSU, Korean Workers Party), and that of relations between the CCP and clandestine or opposition parties in countries not ruled by Communist governments. In terms of information available, most of the discussion of the former is based upon open source information.

Relations with Communist Government/Parties: By 1963, the Sino-Soviet split and its world-wide repercussions in the Communist movement had significantly cut down the number and frequency of the CCP's party contacts and functions with other Bloc countries. Not that the ILD was out of work, but there was probably much less overt work for it to do in this field than in earlier periods of international Communist amicability.

With the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, China's Party relations decreased even more. Like most capitalist and neutral nations, China's few Communist
'allies' generally reacted very coldly to Maoist "Red Guard diplomacy," with the result that both Party and state relations with other socialist countries declined steadily. If -- as seems likely -- the appearance of ILD personnel at various public functions is an indication of the state of relations between the CCP and other Parties, the only Bloc Party which remained on good terms with the CCP by early 1967 was the Communist Party of Albania. Relations with the North Korean Workers Party (KWP) and the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP) or Lao Dong Party were outwardly correct, but strained. While delegations from the DRV still visited Peking on occasion, receptions were not attended by Kang Sheng, Liu Ning-i or Chao I-min, the known ILD leaders during this period. The KWP was treated even more coolly by the CCP in the press, on important anniversaries, and on those few occasions when delegations from the DPRK came to Peking during the Cultural Revolution. By February 1967, the strains in relations with the KWP were particularly severe, as a result of Chinese dissemination of Red Guard attacks on Pyongyang. Relations with the CPSU and with the strongly pro-Soviet Parties of East Europe and the Mongolian People's Republic were totally ruptured, and reflected open hostility. In contrast, Albania basked in the warmth of grand Party receptions, often attended by the entire CCP Politburo, numerous celebrations and receptions at embassies, and lengthy press coverage. Enver Hoxha, Albania's Party and government leader, became the foreign leader best known in China. The CCP maintained relations with the Rumanian Party, but they were only moderately better than with other East European Communists.
Mao ordered a pullback from "revolutionary diplomacy" in August 1967, but it was only gradually that this policy began to be reflected in improved relations with various Communist regimes. In the wake of the Sino-Soviet border clashes of March 1969, and in line with new ideological and policy formulations adopted by the new 9th Central Committee in April, improvement was marked. Judging by press coverage, length and wording of Party communications, and frequency and attendance at receptions, Chinese relations with Albania were still the most amicable, but relations were clearly better with the DRV and the NLFSV. The ILD, represented by Kang Sheng and a few others, played an increasing role in these public demonstrations of improved relations. In June 1969, China dispatched to the DRV one of the first post-Cultural Revolution ambassadors, and also gave embassy status to the NLFSV, which now became the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRGSV). In the summer of 1969, Chinese overtures for improvement of Party relations with the Communist Parties of Rumania and North Korea also became evident. The CCP's posture toward Cuba's party, however, appeared to remain cool and distant. The Soviet Union continued, of course, to be an object of scorn, while its East European allies were only slightly less disparaged. The few delegations from these latter countries that did visit Peking received quiet, unheralded receptions, strictly in accordance with formal protocol, and attended only by a few government and military personnel.

October 1969 was a very active fence-mending month for the Chinese Communists, in which the ILD, even in its tenuous state of organization, appeared to be an active participant. Two future leaders of the emerging
department, Shen Chien and Yang Yu-heng, attended the
2 October soiree given by the Politburo for high-level
Party/government delegations from the DRV, the PRGSV,
Albania, DPRK and Rumania, which were attending
National Day celebrations in Peking. In December 1969,
the ILD was also represented at a reception given by
the central Cultural Revolution Group -- just prior to
the CRG's disappearance -- for friendly Communist and
"Marxist-Leninist" parties from Albania, France, DRV,
Burma and Australia.

During the early part of 1970, Communist China,
with the ILD still playing an active if minor role,
continued to improve Party relations with its chosen
allies. In April 1970, Sino-Korean relations took a
great step forward with the visit of Premier Chou En-lai
to Pyongyang. Thereafter, the DPRK received much more
Chinese press coverage, expanded the 'social' activities
of its embassy in Peking, and generally began to receive
more high-level treatment by the CCP, including more
frequent appearances at Sino-Korean functions by ILD
members. WWP First Secretary Le Duc Anh's May 1970
visit to Peking and Mao Tse-tung's 20 May statement of support
for the Vietnamese cause appeared to reach a new high
point of Sino-Vietnamese amicability. The warm, high-
level reception given to Rumanian Communist Party
leader Emil Bodnaras on his June 1970 visit to China
also gave evidence of improved relations. Kang Sheng,
still reported by various sources to be supervising the
ILD, began to make more frequent appearances with various
delugations from these countries, and even made an
occasional public speech.

It is, however, unwarranted to conclude -- on
the basis of more frequent, friendly high-level gatherings
between the CCP and other Communist Parties -- that these
Parties have become close in all respects. In spite of
protestations of everlasting "militant and revolutionary friendship" or similar sentiments, there is evidence of serious mutual suspicions between the Chinese and various friendly parties. Only the fanatically anti-Soviet Albanians seem to be fully trusted. For example, in the summer of 1969 one visiting Communist was told by ILD official "Chang Tsang" that indications of close Sino-Vietnamese relations were misleading. According to "Chang," the Chinese were very disappointed in the VWP for agreeing to negotiate with the US in Paris, and considered the talks "hopeless." Furthermore, there were strong elements of "revisionism" within the VWP, which even Ho Chi Minh, though a good revolutionary, could not cope with or understand.* Kim Il-sung's vacillating flirtations with the CPSU and the JCP must also make his ideological purity suspect in Chinese eyes, and indeed, Keng Piao, as late as June 1971, has expressed CCP reservations about the internal workings of the KWP. The Rumanians, too, must appear as ideological fence-straddlers.

It would appear, then, that pragmatism began to take precedence over ideology during the post-Cultural Revolution period, and particularly since the Soviet

*This type of briefing is an example of the tenacity of the kind of attitude which had proven so counterproductive to Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution, and from which the CCP was apparently able to pull back only gradually. Today it would be branded as "ultra-Leftist." Chang Tsang, though identified here as an ILD official, has never made a public appearance. If, as seems possible, he is no longer part of the department, expressions of this type of opinion may explain this.
invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the bloody Sino-Soviet clashes of early 1969. China needed allies, if only to exert opinion pressure on the Soviets to dissuade them from what the Chinese may have considered as impending military action. In view of this need for political support, ideological differences began to be downplayed. The ILD leadership, consisting mainly of civilian cadres, veterans of the old ILD or the diplomatic corps, would seem to be particularly well-suited to the performance of this type of task.

After the decline of Kang Sheng, the ILD became even more active in its relations with established governing Communist Parties. However, it still seemed to take a back seat to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on public occasions, perhaps mainly due to the fact that its leading members at that time, Shen Chien and Jen Yun-chung, lacked the Party or government status to properly display the growing importance of the department. This lack was eliminated with the return to Peking of Keng Piao, who had been serving as ambassador to Albania. Keng returned in January 1971, appeared at various foreign affairs functions the next month, and was finally publicly identified as head of the ILD in early March, when he accompanied Chou En-lai on an important trip to Hanoi. Since that time, the ILD has been significantly more active in the maintenance of good Party/government relations with selected Communist nations.

Asia has appeared to be the area of primary concern in this regard, and the ILD has apparently played a major role in continuing the warming trend of relations with North Korea, North Vietnam and other Asian Communist Parties (with the notable exception of
the JCP). Le Duan, the First Secretary of the VWP, visited China enroute to, and immediately upon his return from the 24th Congress of the CPSU in May 1971. Keng Piao was a regular participant in the talks that ensued, and accompanied Le Duan on his tour of China. Keng and other members of the ILD, Shen Chien in particular, have been conspicuous participants in a variety of functions and receptions for DRV delegations, at which, previously, ILD members were not present. These have included the greeting of government, economic, and youth delegations to Peking, as well as attendance at numerous receptions in the DRV embassy.

In the spring and summer of 1971, the ILD has become increasingly active in developing and maintaining relations with the two other Southeast Asian Communist Parties in control of a large part of their countries: The Laotian Patriotic Front (LPF) or Neo Lao Hak Xat, and the Cambodian People's Revolutionary Party. The CCP has generally expressed firm support for the activities of these embattled Parties, and recently their visiting delegations have received public, high-level treatment in Peking. LPF leader Kaysone Phomivane visited Peking in April 1971, and was received by high-ranking officials of the CCP, including Keng Piao and other members of the ILD. Keng recently commented also on the fact that the Chinese were highly impressed by the military success and mass appeal demonstrated by the Cambodian Communists since the 1970 anti-Sihanouk coup, and, perhaps as evidence of that growing interest, appeared prominently at an August 1971 reception for a Cambodian rebel hero, the first time that any ILD personnel had had any public association with Cambodian delegations.
Keng Piao and Shen Chien were particularly active, during the summer of 1971, in improving Chinese relations with North Korea. Keng was a member of the delegation, headed by Politburo member and Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien, which visited Pyongyang in July to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Sino-Korean treaty of friendship and mutual assistance, and was one of the main Party members consistently present at the departure and return of various student, journalist and worker delegations to the DPRK. Other ILD members were frequent participants in Sino-Korean functions, and it would appear that earlier criticisms of Kim Il-sung's Korean Workers Party were laid aside.

Outside of Asia, the Chinese have seemed particularly concerned with maintaining good Party relations with Rumania. The June 1971 visit of Rumania's government and Party leader Nicolae Ceausescu was the culmination of a warming trend that had brought ever more important Rumanian leaders to China since early 1970. The August 1970 stopover in Bucharest of a high-level PLA delegation and the extension of a large loan provide indications of China's interest in consolidating this relatively recent friendship. The ILD has seemingly been quite instrumental in pursuing this policy. Keng Piao, for example, was one of Ceausescu's escorts on his recent tour of China. Again, ideological issues have been consistently played down, the main virtue of the Rumanian Party being its independence of and resistance to its Soviet neighbor. Although the Chinese appraisal of the Rumanian ideological position is mixed, Rumania's anti-Soviet tendency has provided sufficient assurance for the Chinese to develop Party relations.
There has been considerable speculation that China is developing relations with Rumania and Yugoslavia with the intent of consolidating an anti-Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe consisting of these two new friends and Albania. Ceausescu reportedly communicated Chinese support for such an idea in a 1970 visit to Yugoslavia's President Tito. Along similar lines, the Chinese have reportedly been encouraging the Albanians to try to repair their historically bitter relations with Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs appear to have been quite willing to do this, and even Tirana has taken grudging steps in the last two years to improve state relations with Belgrade. Thus far, however, the ILD has done nothing to restore relations with the Yugoslav Party. Presumably, the ideological gap is still too wide for the Chinese to pretend that Party relations can be maintained with a Party which they had so recently denied even the name of "socialist." However, in contrast to 1970, the Chinese in 1971 have not published any messages from renegade Yugoslav "Marxist-Leninist" party groups, reinforcing other evidence that the Chinese are at least letting ideological disagreements with the once "arch-revisionist" Tito government cool for the sake of improved state relations.

Albania's special relationship with China, including the closest of Party relations, has frequently been exploited by the Chinese. Tirana has cooperated closely with Peking's policy of searching out and supporting ideological allies, particularly in Europe. Not only have Albanian embassies in various countries been involved in financial support for various pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist parties disposed in Western Europe, but they have been entrusted by the Chinese,
through the ILD, with the task of political and ideological training of numerous pro-Chinese elements which find it either impossible or impolitic to go to China. Information exists on Albania's funding, through its embassies, of "Marxist-Leninist" parties or factions in Italy, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, Austria, and some Latin American countries. Some sources have noted the existence of training courses sponsored and arranged by the Chinese Communists but carried out in Albania, with Albanian instructors. The recipients of this type of instruction have been primarily Western European Communists, though some reports have placed Indonesians in training camps near Tirana. Training itself has consisted of ideological indoctrination, along with the techniques of secret Party work, as is necessary in the hostile environments in which many pro-Chinese Parties exist.

The task of consolidating and reassuring political, if not ideological, allies has become particularly important in the light of China's new tactics vis-a-vis the United States. These tactics have not been warmly received amongst China's Party allies; the only open endorsements have come from the Rumanians and North Koreans. The North Vietnamese, in spite of China's reassurances given both publicly and privately, have remained very cool to the idea in public and strongly hostile in private. Although the LPF has remained silent on the issue, the NLFSV has shown some confusion over the matter, and has ended up reaffirming its independence, asserting that it will never succumb to any other Party's leadership, including that of the CCP. Other sources have reported that the Albanians, too, are uncertain of the wisdom of these Chinese moves, and that the Chinese themselves are aware of the sensitivities of their allies. This awareness has
manifested itself in repeated reassurances to the North Vietnamese and others that China will not sell out its principles, nor its allies. Here again the ILD has seemed to play an important role.

Relations with Opposition and Splinter Communist Parties: The more important of the ILD's tasks in the Cultural Revolution period and for a short time thereafter (as it had been ever since the emergence of Sino-Soviet rivalry) was the identification, instruction, and support of Communist Party groups favorable to Peking in foreign countries. This function, although certainly less important now than is the ILD's participation in the maintenance of state/Party relations with certain countries, is still actively carried out by the ILD today.

Chinese policy in this matter has gone through a number of changes, in response to developments in the real world and different official interpretations of Mao Tse-tung's "thought."

Prior to the Cultural Revolution, it was the responsibility of ILD personnel in some of the larger overseas missions (such as, presumably, the embassies in Paris and Bern), or, more often, the head of mission in the smaller embassies, to identify, contact, analyze, report on, and support pro-Chinese groups -- often small and insignificant. The ILD gave precious little guidance or assistance to the embassy officials whom they charged with this task.
ILD was in no particular hurry about such matters, expecting that prolonged contact, including visits to China, would provide ample opportunity and time to determine whether or not a particular group could be considered "genuinely" Marxist-Leninist and thus qualified for support.

In the pre-Cultural Revolution period, particular attention was paid to: 1) attitudes toward China and mastery of Mao's line; 2) attitudes toward the Soviet Union and opposition to 'revisionism'; and 3) attitudes toward the US and imperialism, in that order.

Operationally, the ILD worked in close cooperation with the foreign intelligence organ of the Party, the Investigation Department (ID), a member of which, has served as a Deputy Secretary General of the ILD. Use of ID information by the ILD was supplemented by a daily NCNA publication, "Reference Material." (Ts'an-k'ao tzu-liao), which was mainly a translation of foreign newspaper articles, and by another NCNA publication, "Brotherly Parties Publications Material" (Hsiung-ti Tang Pao-K'an Ts'ai-liao), which was a compendium of translated foreign Party publications. In addition, reports from foreign embassy personnel on various Parties and groups, and the reports of NCNA 'stringers' (foreign nationals employed overseas by the NCNA) supplemented this information store. In the case of some of the newer, untested groups, the most reliable information was gained when a representative of the "Marxist-Leninist" group seeking Chinese support, usually the leader of that group, came to China for a
visit. Several sources agree that one of the first things required of members of such delegations upon their arrival in China was the writing of a lengthy report and analysis of the political situation in their home countries, and on the background and stand of their own Party or group. This report was then discussed with the individual. This procedure -- which may still stand -- apparently served to discover the attitudes of the individual or group on various issues, and to provide other information useful to the Investigation Department and the ILD.

If the trip to China proved to be successful for the group concerned, in that the ILD found it to be "genuinely" Marxist-Leninist or at least worthy of further cultivation, instructions were passed on to the original point of contact -- either an embassy or NCNA office -- to continue and develop the contact.

There is some evidence that, before the Cultural Revolution, once one particular party or group had received official Chinese approval, contacts with other groups were generally not pursued. It was apparently the ILD's position that, once relations were established with one Party, direct relations with other revolutionary parties or groups would be counter-productive.

This policy and procedure led to reverses during the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. Among the "Marxist-Leninist" parties already cultivated, several seemed reluctant or unable to make the kind of ideological shifts that current Maoist precepts seemed to demand, and these attempted to curtail their relations with the CCP. Some which had
gained official ILD support, such as the Jacques Grippa faction of the "Marxist-Leninist" Party of Belgium, openly declared their distaste for the Cultural Revolution and supported the policies which they attributed to Liu Shao-chi. This, of course, brought about their immediate fall from favor. Although the ILD had always been faced with the problem of discovering the "genuine" Marxist-Leninist parties among a host of competing pro-Chinese groups, the problem became particularly acute in 1966-67, when pro-Maoist groups seemed to proliferate. Additionally, in line with the tougher stance of "revolutionary" Maoist diplomacy, the ILD was responsible for making sure that parties which declared themselves to be pro-Chinese were indeed toeing the correct ideological line. These knotty problems, added to the fact that the ILD leadership was being heavily attacked during the Cultural Revolution, led to general incoherence in policy.

This confusion manifested itself in several ways. First of all, virtually stopped sending messages out to embassy officials, and provided no guidance whatever to field personnel attempting to select the "genuine" Marxist-Leninists from a host of Maoist groups. Further, it seems that, rather than working through their disintegrating ILD apparatus, Liu Ning-i, Chao I-min and (later) Kang Sheng began increasingly to encourage various party and faction leaders to come personally to China, where, they apparently felt, more thorough and reliable judgments could be made of the various Maoist supplicants.

For those who showed promise, or who had already received the blessing of official Chinese recognition for their particular groups, a trip to China could also