Intelligence Report

The Failure of Maoist Ideology in Foreign Policy

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WARNING

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THE FAILURE OF MAOIST IDEOLOGY
IN FOREIGN POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR RECIPIENTS

This study examines the causes and course of the fairly dismal attempt of China, during the height of its Cultural Revolution, to export Maoist radicalism abroad. The study concludes that this advance found its source in domestic conflict, its retreat in foreign affairs concerns -- especially the rising Soviet threat. The study also finds that radical Maoism has won its greatest support not, as anticipated by Peking, as a guide to the practical problems of various underdeveloped societies, but as simply one article of mystical faith among certain revolutionary extremists in the world's advanced industrial states.

The study has met general agreement among China specialists within the Directorate of Intelligence. The study's author is [name redacted] of this Staff.

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THE FAILURE OF MAOIST IDEOLOGY
IN FOREIGN POLICY

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THE FAILURE OF MAOIST IDEOLOGY
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Summary

If Maoist ideology is defined loosely as a body of ideas derived from Marxist-Leninist doctrines and shaped by half a century's experience of the Chinese Communist revolution, it is the international impact of the more extreme version of Maoism which culminated in the Cultural Revolution with which this paper is primarily concerned. Although the international impact of this appeal to continue the revolution both at home and abroad provides the central theme, this paper also discusses the reciprocal impact of developments abroad upon Maoist ideology.

It is a thesis of this paper that the more extreme Maoism which began to appear in the fall of 1962 was intended primarily to justify and legitimize Mao's rule in the face of domestic opposition within China. But while this particular variant of Mao's ideology and the claims made for it as the acme of Marxism-Leninism in the present era may have performed a positive function in enhancing the authority of Mao within China, the increasingly radical character of this ideology and its claims resulted externally in (1) affronting foreign Communist Parties intent upon following their own "national roads" to socialism; (2) alarming national bourgeois governments of Asia, Africa and Latin America; and (3) reducing China's international prestige to its lowest point in two decades.
The strategy employed in the first stage of this swing to the Left (1963-1964) was, in retrospect, relatively flexible and pragmatic. Mao's revolutionary doctrines appealed, moreover, to the leadership of a number of Communist Parties who, viewing the Soviet emphasis on "peaceful coexistence" as harmful to their own revolutionary interests, were attracted by the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and anti-American core of Maoist strategy.

Mao's decision in the winter of 1964-1965 to intensify the struggle against Khrushchev's successors, however, had profound consequences. It dictated the adamant refusal to join the Soviet Union in any form of "united action" in aid of North Vietnam, a refusal justified by the unconvincing and paradoxical argument that in order to oppose successfully "United States imperialism," it was first necessary to oppose "modern revisionism." Reflecting an unrealistic and distorted view of the outside world, this was a policy of opposing simultaneously and with equally acute antagonism both the United States and the Soviet Union, a policy so extreme that within a matter of months China's only ally in what Peking described as "the broadest possible united front" was mighty Albania.

If the primary purpose of the Cultural Revolution (formally initiated in May of 1966) was to restore Mao's political and ideological authority within China, an important means to this end was a concerted effort to demonstrate that Mao's thought, as the highest form of contemporary Marxism-Leninism, was held in high esteem throughout the rest of the world. This undertaking to transform the Cultural Revolution into "a revolution of an international order" embroiled China in controversy with nearly every important government in the world. Within two years time, the extremism, violence and utopianism of the Cultural Revolution left China almost completely isolated, dependent for visible signs of support from the outside world on Albania, an
ill-assorted group of "Marxist-Leninist" splinter parties, and student revolutionaries of the New Left.

The issue of the exportability of Mao's thought lay at the very heart of the struggle between the "revolutionary Left" and the professional diplomats within the Foreign Ministry throughout the Cultural Revolution. With the Left firmly in command, China's foreign relations in the spring and summer of 1967 were characterized by a series of developments repeated with little variation in a number of countries: the transformation of the Embassy and New China News Agency into centers for the propagation of Mao's thought, and the distribution of badges and other symbols of Mao's personality cult; an ensuing clash when local government authorities moved to curtail or prohibit these practices; various forms of retaliation by Peking ranging from sponsorship of Communist armed revolt (as in Burma) to, more commonly, Red Guard harassment of, and physical attacks against, the embassies and diplomats of the offending governments; and, in some cases, suspension of diplomatic relations. Reflecting the claim of universal validity for Mao's thought, this missionary effort encompassed hostile, neutral and friendly countries alike, the latter exemplified by North Korea and North Vietnam, both of which protested in Party publications against this attempt to impose Maoist ideology on their own national movements.

One of the many ironies of the Cultural Revolution is that the effort to propagate Mao's thought and thus promote revolution abroad should have its greatest impact not in the countries of the Third World (developing the national liberation movement), nor in the countries of the socialist camp (strengthening the "Marxist-Leninist" forces) as predicted, but rather in many advanced industrialized countries of the world where the Chinese Communists had seen little or no chance for revolutionary uprisings. Attracted by the elements of
utopianism, anarchism and student elitism in Mao's Cultural Revolution, the rebellious students of the New Left in France and Japan who rose up to seize control over their university campuses as a first step toward "revolutionizing" society were protesting what they considered to be serious defects in the organization and functioning of their highly complex societies.

It is easy to exaggerate the influence of Maoist ideology on the student revolutionaries of the New Left. In searching examinations of the intellectual roots of the New Left, Richard Lowenthal and other knowledgeable observers have traced the principal characteristics of this new type of revolutionary movement (a faith in utopia and a cult of violent action) as much to the writings of Che Guevara and Regis Debray (the theorists of "Castroism"), and of Herbert Marcuse (the American ideological critic), as to those of Mao Tse-tung.

If the turn to the Left in Maoist ideology which began in 1962 was basically a response to domestic political pressures, the turn to the Right which began hesitantly in the fall of 1967 and has proceeded through several fairly well-defined stages up to the present appears to have been stimulated to a significant extent by external pressures, specifically the growing military threat to China posed by the Soviet Union. The realization that, as a result of the provocative and self-defeating foreign policy of the Cultural Revolution, China stood isolated in the face of a major threat to its national security has had a particularly sobering effect on the Chinese leadership.

The emergence in Peking of a "nationalist model" approach to foreign policy in the past two years constitutes a sharp turn away from the "revolutionary model" which had dominated China's
foreign relations during the Cultural Revolution. Instead of a policy proclaiming the need to promote revolution abroad in imitation of the Chinese model of armed struggle, Peking now poses as the champion of national sovereignty. Instead of a policy directed at a largely fictitious constituency of "revolutionary Leftists" throughout the world committed to the Maoist goal of violent revolution, Peking has now reverted to the pre-Cultural Revolution Maoist concept of developing a broad international united front composed of governments and peoples against what it likes to call the "superpower hegemony" of the United States and the Soviet Union. Instead of a policy relying heavily on ideology (the export of Mao's thought) to promote China's revolutionary objectives, Peking now relies on the more conventional weapons of great-power diplomacy, including such material incentives as economic aid and trade, to project its influence abroad.

The shift to the Right in domestic and foreign policy had become so pronounced by the fall of 1970 that it was necessary to explain to both domestic and foreign audiences why this shift had taken place. In time-honored fashion, it was decided, apparently at the Second Plenum of the new Central Committee held in late August and early September, to explain the excesses and violence and attendant policy failures of the Cultural Revolution as the work of an "ultra-Leftist group" headed by the leading Chinese Communist ideologue and long-time confidant of Mao, Chen Po-ta.

It was symbolic that Chen Po-ta (the ideologue exemplifying the forces of the "revolutionary Left") was now replaced by Chou En-lai (regarded as the foremost exponent of pragmatism and moderation within the top Chinese leadership). It was also indicative of the extent to which Maoist
ideology, having veered sharply to the Left during the Cultural Revolution in an attempt to revolutionize Chinese society and in time the world, has once again (as it had a decade earlier) been forced to swing back sharply to the Right in adjusting to reality.

The basic cause for the failure of the Leftist ideological offensive which Mao had initiated in 1962 was the complexity and intractability of the real world. Although all the returns are not yet in, the end result of Mao’s attempt to revolutionize his own society by intimidation and coercion appears to be, as one observer has put it, a "utopia... run by the army." Although again all the returns are not yet in, the end result of the concurrent attempt during the Cultural Revolution to revolutionize the world appears to be that the outside world, by exerting a moderating influence on that ideology, has triumphed over the utopian version of Maoism.
THE FAILURE OF MAOIST IDEOLOGY
IN FOREIGN POLICY

Introduction

Actually the situation within the socialist camp is quite simple. The sole question is one of class struggle -- a question of struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, a question of struggle between Marxism-Leninism and anti-Marxism-Leninism, a question of struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism.
-- Mao Tse-tung, Speech at Central Committee Plenum, 24 September 1962.

The question of class struggle in [China] is [also] a question of struggle between Marxism and revisionism... It seems that it is better to rename Right opportunism as revisionism in China.
-- Mao Tse-tung, Speech at Central Committee Plenum, 24 September 1962.

If Maoist ideology is defined loosely as a body of ideas derived from Marxist-Leninist doctrines and shaped by half a century's experience of the Chinese Communist revolution, it is the international impact of
the more extreme version of Maoism which began to emerge in the fall of 1962 and which would culminate in the Cultural Revolution with which this paper is primarily concerned. In common with other ideologies, this more extreme variant of Maoism consisted of (1) a theory of the nature of society (which explained human conduct as largely determined by "class nature"); (2) a program of social and political change (featuring, as suggested by the quotations cited above, "class struggle"); and (3) a call to action (a call addressed, in addition to the domestic audience, to a foreign audience composed variously of governments, Communist Parties, revolutionary groups and other "revolutionary Leftists" presumed receptive to this more militant version of Maoism). Although the international impact of this appeal to continue the revolution both at home and abroad provides the central theme, this paper will also discuss the reciprocal impact of developments abroad (the reaction of this diverse foreign audience) upon Maoist ideology.

It is a thesis of this paper that the more extreme version of Maoism which began to appear in the fall of 1962 was intended primarily to justify and legitimize Mao's rule in the face of domestic opposition within China. But while this Leftist variant of Mao's ideology and the claims made for it as the acme of Marxism-Leninism in the present era may have performed a positive function in enhancing the authority of Mao within China, the increasingly overt and extravagant nature of these claims had the negative effect externally of affronting foreign Communist Parties intent upon following their own "national roads" to socialism. While the accompanying ideological and organizational challenge to the Soviet Union for leadership over the international Communist movement may have aroused a patriotic response and thus strengthened Mao's political position at home, the extreme lengths to which Mao was prepared to carry this challenge had the negative effect abroad of alienating friends and neutrals until China stood virtually alone among her former Communist allies.
Similarly, while the widely publicized view accompanying this challenge that a revolutionary upsurge featuring armed struggle and employing Maoist strategy was imminent in the underdeveloped world of Asia, Africa and Latin America might again have been functional in the sense of elevating Mao's prestige in China, the net effect of this more militant revolutionary posture abroad was to alarm the national bourgeoisie governments in these areas, especially in Africa, dissipating the assets and goodwill built up laboriously over a decade by means of economic assistance, trade and conventional diplomacy. Finally, although the utopianism and violence of the Cultural Revolution could be justified as essential to overthrow Mao's opposition entrenched within the Party bureaucracy at home, the overall effect abroad of this spectacle of licensed anarchism was to reduce China's international prestige to its lowest point in two decades, with only the student radicals of the New Left responding favorably to this anarchic element in Mao Tse-tung's thought.

If Mao's obsession with "class struggle" in the fall of 1962 (e.g. his statement at the Tenth Plenum: "From now on, we must discuss classes and class struggle every year, every month, every day.") reflected also a genuine concern for continuing the revolution both at home and abroad, the opposition engendered by this simplistic and distorted view of the nature of human society drove him further and further to the Left in search of allies. By drawing ever more rigid and restrictive lines of demarcation based upon a metaphysical concept of class nature, Mao and his supporters found themselves increasingly isolated within the international community, the international Communist movement and within China itself. To correct this "ultra-Leftist" deviation, it was finally deemed necessary to point out (at another Central Committee plenum held eight years later in September 1970) that, in addition to its "class nature," an equally important characteristic of Mao's thought was its "practicality."
The discussion which follows, then, is an attempt (1) to explain why Maoist ideology has changed (moving first to the Left, then even further Left during the Cultural Revolution, and finally back toward the Right) over the past eight years; (2) to assess the international impact of the more extreme version of Maoist ideology which has prevailed throughout most of this period; and finally (3) to estimate the extent to which recent developments outside China (principally the Soviet military threat) have in turn influenced Mao's ideology.
The Turn to the Left: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution

It is wrong to make peaceful coexistence the general line of the foreign policy of the socialist countries. In our view, the general line...[must also include]...proletarian internationalism...and support and assistance to the revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed peoples and nations.


To deny the existence of class struggle in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the necessity of thoroughly completing the socialist revolution on the economic, political and ideological fronts is wrong, does not correspond to objective reality, and violates Marxism-Leninism.


In proclaiming his own "general line" for the Communists of the world in the summer of 1963, Mao Tse-tung issued an across-the-board indictment of Soviet "revisionism" as manifested in both foreign policy (peaceful coexistence) and domestic policy (the elimination of class struggle as a basic motivating force in socialist
society). In place of the false "revisionist" line of Khrushchev, Peking offered an authentic "Marxist-Leninist" general line for the international Communist movement embodying what Benjamin Schwartz has called Mao's "optimum global vision" -- a world Communist movement reconstituted under Chinese leadership and dedicated to promoting revolution based on China's "revolutionary model" in the underdeveloped and oppressed areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Implicit in this polemical attack was Mao's prescription of the proper way to build socialism after the seizure of power, a prescription also based in large part on China's own revolutionary experience in Yenan featuring class struggle, heroic poverty and collective enthusiasm. This attempt to recast Marxism-Leninism in the image of Mao's own revolutionary experience in both revolution and construction would, by provoking further opposition at home and abroad, lead in time to the violence, extremism, and pariah-like isolation of China during the Cultural Revolution.

The strategy employed in the first stage of this swing to the Left encompassing the years 1963-1964 was, in retrospect, relatively flexible and pragmatic. In its ideological and organizational challenge to the Soviet Union for leadership over the international Communist movement, Peking throughout this period championed the national independence of Communist Parties, offering in place of Soviet domination a more benign organizational model for the movement in which China's leading role would be recognized voluntarily by the other parties. The same, at least nominal, reliance on persuasion characterized the Chinese approach to "the great debate on Marxism-Leninism" with the Soviets throughout this period, viewed by Peking as an international rectification campaign designed to convince "the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to correct its errors and return to the path of Marxism-Leninism..."

Mao's revolutionary doctrines appealed, moreover, to the leadership of a number of Communist Parties who,
viewing the Soviet emphasis on "peaceful coexistence" as harmful to their own revolutionary interests, were attracted by the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and anti-American core of Maoist strategy. This was particularly true in Asia, where by the end of 1964 the great majority of Communist Parties (including the important Parties in Indonesia, North Vietnam, North Korea and Japan) had opted for Peking's more aggressive revolutionary strategy, in which United States "imperialism" was the main enemy and in which elimination of American power and influence from Asia was the common goal. Despite a number of problems -- logistical (distance), organizational (the pro-Soviet complexion of existing Parties) and ideological (the competing revolutionary doctrine of "Castroism"), some progress in setting up pro-Chinese Communist Parties (e.g. in Brazil and Peru) was also achieved in Latin America during this early period.

In Africa, however, even in this early period, Peking's attempt to project its influence abroad by advocating revolution based on the Chinese model received its first setback. As the second most important area of Chinese foreign policy, the newly independent nations of Africa had, up to this time, been cultivated by a broad-gauged program combining political blandishment, economic and technical assistance and cultural diplomacy. But Peking's ideological pronouncement in late 1963* that "socialist countries were duty bound" to serve as "base areas" in support of "armed struggle" in "the extremely favorable revolutionary situation [which] now exists in Asia, Africa and Latin America," followed shortly by Premier Chou En-lai's observation on completing a tour

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*In the article by the editorial departments of People's Daily and Red Flag, "Apologists of Neo-Colonialism."
of 10 African countries that "revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout the African continent," could only be regarded with suspicion by Africa's new leaders.** It was a natural reaction for leaders of national bourgeois governments (e.g., the leaders of the government of Kenya) to question whether they themselves were the object of the "armed struggle" emphasized in China's revolutionary model, the more so since that model called for "proletarian" leadership of the revolution at some point. In addition to this perceived threat of subversion, the new leaders of Africa were increasingly suspicious of Peking's efforts at this time to form a Chinese-led international "united front" directed at both the United States (imperialism) and the Soviet Union (revisionism) when their own national interests dictated non-alignment and the acceptance of economic aid from both.

Paralleling this undertaking to promote revolution abroad, the first stage of a "socialist education" campaign within China -- a campaign designed to persuade the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people once again (after three years of privation and ignominious retreat from the original goals of the Great Leap Forward and commune programs) of the validity of Mao's approach to building socialism -- was also relatively moderate. As revealed

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**At a 3 February 1964 mass rally in Somalia.

*It is interesting to note that Foreign Minister Chen I (in analysing the reasons for a number of international setbacks encountered by Peking) subsequently characterized this visit by Chou En-lai to Africa in the winter of 1963-1964 as a watershed in China's relations with the Third World. Before Chou's visit, according to Chen, these nations thought of China as "a comparatively mild Communist country," but after Chou's visit and the accompanying shift of the "revolutionary center of Communism" from Moscow to Peking, these countries now thought of China as "a comparatively violent Communist nation."
in Mao's speech at the Tenth Plenum in September 1962, it was agreed that for a time economic reconstruction would take priority over political and ideological reform ("We must not allow the class struggle to interfere with our work."). In this interim period extending throughout 1964, the "socialist education" campaign was focused on the countryside in a joint effort to re-instil a "revolutionary spirit" of self-sacrifice in the Chinese people and to re-establish control over agriculture as a prerequisite for new economic development.

Two developments in the winter of 1964-1965 fore-shadowed an impending shift further to the Left in both domestic and foreign policy. As Lin Piao would subsequently point out in his political report to the Ninth Party Congress, the first of these occurred "at the end of 1964 [when] Chairman Mao convened a working conference of the Central Committee...[at which]...he denounced Liu Shao-chi's bourgeois reactionary line...[and]...clearly showed the orientation for the approaching great proletarian cultural revolution." Convinced that the "socialist education" campaign had failed, Mao then began to plan a Cultural Revolution in pursuit of the same goals, but under new management (Lin Piao and others) and employing new methods (coercion and violence).

The second development was the confrontation in Peking between Chairman Mao and Premier Kosygin on 11 February 1965, during which Mao asserted that if necessary China would continue the struggle against the Soviet Union for 10,000 years." Perhaps based on the assumption that his previous ideological assault had (as a subsequent Chinese editorial of 11 November 1965 put it) "hastened the bankruptcy of Khrushchev's revisionism and...[driven]...its founder into the grave," Mao's decision at this time to intensify the struggle against Khrushchev's successors would have profound consequences. It dictated the adamant refusal (announced the following month in the joint People's Daily and Red Flag editorial article, "A Comment on the March Moscow Meeting") to join the Soviet Union in any form of "united action" in aid of North Vietnam, a refusal
justified by the unconvincing and paradoxical argument that in order to oppose successfully "United States imperialism" it was first necessary to oppose "modern revisionism."

What is more, since in Chinese eyes Mao was now the fountainhead of authentic Marxism-Leninism, it was incumbent upon "all Marxist-Leninist parties," as emphasized in the major editorial of 11 November 1965, to accept this position -- "to draw a clear line of demarcation both politically and organizationally between themselves and the revisionists, who are serving United States imperialism, and to liquidate Khrushchev revisionism in order to welcome the high tide of revolutionary struggle against United States imperialism and its lackeys."

Reflecting an unrealistic and distorted view of the outside world, this was a policy of opposing simultaneously and with equally acute antagonism both the United States and the Soviet Union, a policy so extreme that within a matter of months China's only ally in what Peking described as "the broadest possible united front" was Albania.*

If this constituted a clear-cut example of "Left" deviationism in "united front" theory, the intensified effort at this time to promote revolution abroad patterned after the Chinese revolutionary model constituted a form of "Left" adventurism -- namely (as defined by the Chinese
themselves), an attempt to encourage "launching of a revolution before the objective conditions are ripe." The assertion in Lin Piao's famous treatise on people's war published on 3 September 1965 that "today the conditions are more favorable than ever before for the waging of people's wars by the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America" was followed within a month by the disastrous coup attempt by the Indonesian Communists (in which Peking apparently was not directly involved), resulting in the virtual liquidation of the largest non-bloc Communist Party in the world. It was just at this time, moreover, that the Chinese Communists began to insist that their revolutionary model be followed not only in underdeveloped areas, but also in such advanced industrial nations as Japan. As the Secretary-General of the Japanese Communist Party has recently charged (at the 11th Party Congress in July 1970), the Chinese Communist Party was guilty of "ultra-Left opportunism" when it attempted in 1965-1966 to impose a strategy of "armed struggle" on the Japanese Communist movement.

The final instance of a turn to the Left in foreign policy in 1965 was the Chinese resort to arm-twisting and threats against Asian and African heads of state in an effort, first to hold a Second Bandung Conference from which the Soviet Union would be excluded, and then to cancel this conference when it was discovered that the Soviet Union could not be excluded. In this attempt to coerce foreign governments in the summer and fall of 1965, there was a hint of the violence and extremism of Red Guard diplomacy soon to appear as the hallmark of the Cultural Revolution in China's foreign relations.
The Left in Command: The Cultural Revolution

Chairman Mao has...developed Marxism-Leninism to a brand new stage...Chairman Mao commands the highest prestige in the nation and the whole world...If we don't see this, we won't know that we should elect such a great genius of the proletarian class as our leader.

Let us have a revolutionisation...of foreign affairs offices abroad; otherwise, it would be dangerous.
-- Mao Tse-tung, Comment on a Red Guard Letter, 9 September 1966.

In the past...you never carried out the Cultural Revolution. Things to which you had never given any thought have now happened to your Ministry of Foreign Affaires...Let these things happen, for they will do us good.

If the primary purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to restore Mao's political and ideological authority within China, an important means to this end was a concerted effort to demonstrate that Mao's thought, as the highest form of contemporary Marxism-Leninism, was held
in high esteem throughout the rest of the world. This undertaking to transform the Cultural Revolution (a distinctively Chinese phenomenon reflecting a domestic power and policy conflict) into "a revolution of an international order" would embroil China in controversy with nearly every important government in the world. Within two years time, the extremism, violence and utopianism of the Cultural Revolution would leave China almost completely isolated, dependent for visible signs of support from the outside world on Albania, an ill-assorted group of "Marxist-Leninist" splinter parties, and student revolutionaries of the New Left.

With the unveiling of the Cultural Revolution at an expanded Politburo session in May 1966, it was revealed that the main source of Mao's "revisionist" opposition within China was located at the highest level of Party leadership. Addressing a number of these top leaders in July, Mao disclosed that revolutionary students and teachers (the precursors of the Red Guards) were going "to impose revolution on you people because you did not carry out the revolution yourselves." In this sense, then, the Cultural Revolution can be understood as Mao's last desperate attempt to seize by force what he could not gain through persuasion from his Party and society at large.

In carrying out this new type of forcibly imposed rectification campaign, the principal criterion differentiating "genuine" from "sham" revolutionaries and "Marxist-Leninists from revisionists" was "one's attitude towards Mao's thought." As spelled out by Lin Piao in his keynote speech at a Central Committee plenum in August 1966, the Cultural Revolution was conceived as "a general examination, a general alignment, and a general reorganization of the ranks of party cadres" directed at (1) "those who oppose the thought of Mao Tse-tung"; (2) "those who upset political-ideological work"; and (3) "those who have no revolutionary zeal."
In addition to these (Rightists) who were "to be dismissed from their posts," there were those in an "intermediate state" (the center) who had made mistakes but who, "provided they accept education and resolutely repent," would be retained in their posts. The third category (the Leftists), those who eagerly studied Mao, attached great importance to political-ideological work and were filled with revolutionary zeal, were to be "promoted." As also indicated by Lin Piao, this undertaking to "revolutionize" the Party apparatus by promoting Leftist cadres loyal to Mao to positions of leadership would be supervised by a newly formed Cultural Revolution Group composed of such top-level Leftist Party leaders as Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, and last but not least, Mao's wife, Chiang Ching.

With this background in mind, it is easier to understand the momentous consequences which Mao's decisions (noted above) to "revolutionize" the foreign affairs apparatus would have for China's foreign relations during the Cultural Revolution. The decision to "revolutionize" the foreign affairs apparatus within China would lead to the establishment of a "revolutionary rebel liaison station" within the Foreign Ministry assigned the dual function of investigating the loyalty (i.e. their "attitude towards Mao's thought") and supervising the work performance of veteran cadres and diplomats, including nearly all of China's ambassadors recalled at the end of 1966 to take part in the Cultural Revolution. As the principal spokesman for the career diplomats (e.g., his complaint in February 1967: "Look what has happened to the ministry; there is no order, no organization and foreign affairs secrets have been taken away."), Foreign Minister Chen I would be subjected to a year-long campaign of Red Guard denunciation and attack for his courageous but unavailing effort to limit the authority of the "revolutionary Left" within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Of far greater import for China's foreign relations during the Cultural Revolution, however, was Mao's second decision to "revolutionize" the foreign affairs apparatus abroad.* The effect of this decision, at least during the more extreme phases of the Cultural Revolution, was, in somewhat simplified terms, to convert China's embassies into centers for carrying the Cultural Revolution abroad. This concept of "revolutionary diplomacy," in itself a contradiction in terms, is so extraordinary that it deserves further discussion.

To the extent that there is a reasoned, coherent explanation for this practice of revolutionary (or Red Guard) diplomacy, it appears to be integrally related to the rationale underlying the Cultural Revolution within China. That rationale, as suggested earlier, was to explain opposition to Mao's thought and policies within China in terms of its "revisionist"/"capitalist" class nature, opposition which was therefore both illegitimate and, in the nature of things, bound to fail. By analogy and extension, the opposition to Mao's revolutionary goals and ideological pretensions outside China (an opposition which by the fall of 1966 included practically every major government in the world) was explained in terms of its class nature as "capitalist," "revisionist" or "reactionary" and as therefore also illegitimate and bound to fail. Both contributing to and resulting from China's position as an outcast in the international community, Mao's view of the world more as an arena of

*Even before the Cultural Revolution was formally initiated, this decision was reflected by Chen I when he stressed (in a February 1966 speech to an ambassadorial-level conference in Peking) the need to indoctrinate Foreign Ministry personnel so that they would "remember that they are sent abroad to bring about world revolution."
"international class struggle" than as a community of nation states would dominate China's foreign relations during the Cultural Revolution.

The new militancy of China's foreign policy stance was revealed in the 12 August 1966 communique adopted by the Central Committee plenum which formally initiated the Cultural Revolution. In contrast with the more pragmatic and flexible formula advanced by Peking in June 1963 as the "general line for the foreign policy" of all socialist countries (a formula which in featuring "peaceful coexistence" as one of three "interrelated and indivisible" principles represented an adjustment to the realities of the nation-state system), this communique emphasized that "China's foreign policy" would be "guided" thereafter by the one "supreme principle" of "proletarian internationalism" (defined as "support for the revolutionary struggles of the people of all countries."). That the new leadership selected at this Central Committee plenum favored a more active policy of promoting revolution abroad was also suggested by the central charge brought subsequently against Liu Shao-chi in the field of foreign policy --- that prior to the Cultural Revolution he had advocated a "pacifist line" in foreign policy of "extinguishing the national liberation movement."

The major premise underlying China's foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution --- that it would be possible by means of the extensive dissemination of Mao's thought to stimulate and promote revolution abroad --- reflected a basic idealistic tendency in Maoism to overemphasize the role of consciousness and the subjective factor in the unfolding of history. This emphasis on "the active role of the ideological factor in the progress of history" was hailed by Chinese propagandists during the Cultural Revolution (e.g., the editorial in Red Flag, No. 15, 1967) as one of Mao's great contributions to the development of Marxist-Leninist theory. Lin Piao, in his paean of praise to Mao Tse-tung's
thought ("Marxism-Leninism at its highest in the present era") on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution, proclaimed that -- "once grasped" Mao's thought would lead to "liberation" of "oppressed nations and peoples" in Asia, Africa and Latin America, to delivery of the peoples living in socialist countries from their "revisionist" rulers, and, in fact, to revolution in all countries. In this revolutionary manifesto, Lin did not discuss, however, the practical problem of how to persuade the peoples of these countries to "grasp" Mao's thought.

The issue of the exportability of Mao's thought lay at the very heart of the struggle between the "revolutionary Left" and the professional diplomats in the Foreign Ministry throughout the initial stages of the Cultural Revolution. The record indicates, moreover, that the outcome of this struggle was a clear victory for the Left.
With the Left firmly in command in the Foreign Ministry, China's foreign relations in the spring and summer of 1967 were characterized by a series of developments repeated with little variation in a number of countries -- the transformation of the Embassy and New China News Agency into centers for the propagation of Mao's thought and the distribution of badges and other symbols of Mao's personality cult; an ensuing clash when local government authorities moved to curtail or prohibit these practices; various forms of retaliation by Peking ranging from sponsorship of Communist armed revolt (as in Burma) to, more commonly, Red Guard harassment of, and physical attacks against, the embassies and diplomats of the offending governments (e.g., the Soviet Union, Mongolia, Indonesia, Ceylon, Kenya, and Great Britain); and, in some cases, suspension of diplomatic relations.* Reflecting the leftist view that national sovereignty must give way to Maoism, People's Daily on 10 July 1967 asserted: "To propagate Mao Tse-tung's thought is the sacred and inviolable right of Chinese personnel working abroad."
Reflecting the claim of universal validity for Mao's thought, this missionary effort encompassed hostile, neutral and friendly countries alike, the latter exemplified by North Korea and North Vietnam, both of which protested publicly in Party publications against this attempt to impose Maoist ideology on their own national movements.

Expressing the same inner logic of the Red Guard movement within China, Peking's resort to Red Guard diplomacy appeared in essence to be an attempt to secure by intimidation what could not be gained through persuasion -- namely, acknowledgement by the international Communist movement and the revolutionary peoples of the world of "Comrade Mao Tse-tung" as "the greatest teacher and most outstanding leader of the proletariat in the present era" and of "Mao Tse-tung's thought" as "Marxism-Leninism at its highest in the present era."

The unfolding of Mao's Cultural Revolution had brought China by the summer of 1967 to the brink of anarchy. A sharp turn even further to the Left in foreign policy (blamed subsequently on an "ultra-Leftist" seizure of power in the Foreign Ministry) culminated in the ransacking and burning of the British Chancery and the manhandling of the British Charge on 22 August. In domestic policy, the damaging effects of the new militancy of the revolutionary Left were equally if not more serious, threatening the unity and stability of the People's Liberation Army. There was no choice in late August but to apply the brakes, pull back, assess the damage and initiate a trend toward moderation in the Cultural Revolution.

One of the many ironies of the Cultural Revolution is that the effort to propagate Mao's thought and thus promote revolution abroad had its greatest impact
not in the countries of the Third World (developing the national liberation movement) nor in the countries of the socialist camp (strengthening the "Marxist-Leninist" forces) as predicted, but rather in the advanced industrialized countries of the world where the Chinese Communists had seen little or no chance for revolutionary uprisings. Still another is that the period of greatest influence of Maoist ideology on the student revolutionaries in West Europe and Japan came at a time (the spring and summer of 1968) when most of the radical elements in this ideology which particularly appealed to the forces of the New Left in the West had already been repudiated as "ultra-Leftist" and cast aside in China.

Attracted by the elements of utopianism (the attacks on functional specialization, inequality, and the pursuit of self-interest), anarchism (symbolized by the slogan "to rebel is justified"), and student elitism (the vanguard role assigned to youthful Red Guards) in Mao's Cultural Revolution, the rebellious students of the New Left in France and Japan who rose up to seize control over their university campuses as a first step toward "revolutionizing" society were protesting what they considered to be serious defects in the organization and functioning of their advanced industrial societies. It was of little consequence to the leaders of the New Left that Mao's radical prescriptions were addressed not to the solution of these problems but rather toward solving a constellation of political, economic and social problems (in particular, the problem of restoring his own political and ideological authority) within China.

Further illustrating the fortuitous nature of the influence of Maoism on the New Left, the anarchistic element in the Cultural Revolution which the revolutionary students found so appealing as an inspiration and justification for their own rebellion was directed not against bureaucratism and established authority as such, but against a specific example of bureaucratism -- namely,
the unresponsiveness of the Chinese Communist "party machine" to Mao's revolutionary policies and programs. Also, the vanguard role which Mao assigned the Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution was both temporary and controlled, an example of directed "revolution from above" rather than of spontaneous "revolution from below." Once they had performed their assigned function of exposing, criticizing and intimidating Mao's opponents within the Party (and had got clearly out of hand), Mao then ordered the Red Guards to be packed off unceremoniously to the countryside.

Indeed, it is easy to exaggerate the influence of Maoist ideology on the student revolutionaries of the New Left. In searching examinations of the intellectual roots of the New Left in the West, knowledgeable observers have traced the principal characteristics of this new type of revolutionary movement (a faith in utopia and a cult of violent action) as much to the writings of Che Guevara and Regis Debray (the theorists of "Castroism") and of Herbert Marcuse (the American ideological critic) as to those of Mao Tse-tung.* Analysis of the radical student movement in Japan, which resembles in many ways that of the New Left in the West, reveals, moreover, that its ideology has been influenced by Trotsky as much as or more than by Mao.**


**See, for example, the article by Ichiro Sunada, "The Thought and Behavior of Zengakuren: Trends in the Japanese Student Movement," Asian Survey, Vol. IX, No. 6 (June 1969), pp. 457-474.
The most exaggerated estimates of the influence of Maoism on the New Left have been made by the Chinese themselves, eager to claim credit for the student rebellions in France (and elsewhere) as both confirming Mao's prediction that "a great new era of world revolution" was at hand and validating their undertaking during the Cultural Revolution (according to the People's Daily editorial, "A Great Storm," 27 May 1968) to "spur the development...of the contemporary world revolution...[through]...the extensive dissemination of Mao Tse-tung's thought..." But these claims, accompanied by a series of mass demonstrations in which 20 million Chinese participated, reflected the continuing effort by the revolutionary Left to use foreign events and the reaction of peoples abroad to help legitimate and support Mao's (and their own) claim to power within China. It was at this low point in the international prestige of China and of Maoist ideology (its influence confined to Albania, a conglomeration of "Marxist-Leninist" splinter parties and a portion of the New Left) that, as subsequently revealed, the Chinese leadership first gave serious thought to remedying what had become an intolerable position of isolation and weakness for China in a hostile world.
The Turn to the Right: Postscript to the Cultural Revolution

[They say]...I am also one who 'would not change direction until he comes to the end of his wrong course' and 'once he turns, he turns 180 degrees.'
-- Mao Tse-tung, Comment at the Lushan Conference, 15 August 1959.

Chairman Mao teaches us: 'The Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism has two outstanding characteristics. One is its class nature...The other is its practicality.'

The turn to the Left in Maoist ideology which began in 1962 was basically a response to domestic political pressures. The turn to the Right which began hesitantly in the fall of 1967, and which has proceeded through several fairly well-defined stages up to the present, appears to have been stimulated to a significant extent by external pressures, specifically the growing military threat to China posed by the Soviet Union. Although mounting pressure to solve a host of domestic political, economic and social problems no doubt played a more important part, the realization that, as a result of the provocative and self-defeating foreign policy of the Cultural Revolution, China stood isolated in the face of a major threat to its national security has had
a particularly sobering effect on the Chinese leadership. As a result, Peking's propagandists in their interminable discourses on doctrine no longer emphasize the revolutionary, class-struggle aspect of Maoist ideology but rather (as noted above) its "practicality."

The first stage in this painful and protracted process of retreating from Left to Right extended from the fall of 1967 through the summer of 1968 and was marked by the return of Premier Chou En-lai to a dominant role in foreign affairs. Speaking to workers in this field in December 1967, Chou reminded his listeners that, like it or not, Peking had no choice but to deal with other countries primarily as sovereign states and governments. "In international relations," Chou said, "there are certain norms which we must respect. A majority of the countries we deal with are imperialist, revisionist or reactionary, not Leftist." Chou also quoted Mao as admitting (in a conversation with the Prime Minister of the Congo [B]) that China during the preceding summer had in its foreign relations been guilty of "great-power chauvinism."

Peking Review discontinued publication of its weekly column entitled "Mao Tse-tung's Thought Lights the Whole World." Still another sign of Peking's growing sensitivity to foreign opinion was the admission not long thereafter in a National Day editorial (instead of insisting on the universal validity of China's revolutionary model) that it was necessary to "learn from the experience of revolutionary struggles of the peoples of all countries."
The second stage in the trend toward moderation in Maoist ideology lasted from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to the first Sino-Soviet border clash in March 1969. Peking's initial response to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia was, in fact, in the extreme ideological and confrontationist tradition of the Cultural Revolution, consisting of an intensified attack on the Soviet leadership (now excoriated as "social-imperialist and social-fascist") and a solemn declaration (subsequently identified as Maoist) of the arrival of "a new historical stage of opposition to United States imperialism and Soviet revisionism." At the same time, betraying apprehension that this Soviet military action in the name of safeguarding the interests of the "socialist commonwealth" set a precedent which might later be used against China, Premier Chou En-lai asserted (in a 2 September 1968 speech) that "the socialist camp" no longer existed and that it was therefore no longer possible to "talk about the defense of 'socialist gains' and the 'socialist community.'" Peking's expression of willingness not long after this (in a 26 November Foreign Ministry statement) to resume talks with the United States at Warsaw, though tentative and later withdrawn, also revealed concern about the possibility of a military confrontation with the Soviet Union and the desirability of adopting a more flexible foreign policy stance at a time of national danger.

The third stage, extending from the spring of 1969 to the spring of 1970, encompassed a series of border clashes with the Soviet Union which appeared to confirm Peking's worst fears that a general military showdown with its powerful "revisionist" neighbor was at hand. More than a decade earlier, Communist China had sought to persuade Moscow as leader of the socialist bloc to adopt a more militant policy against the United States (the main enemy). This was followed by the increasingly Left extremist line of the Cultural Revolution, which had elevated the Soviet Union to a position rivaling the United States as China's principal enemy. Now the Soviet Union had replaced the United States as
China's number one enemy, with up to a million men arrayed menacingly (as the Chinese would publicly protest) along the Sino-Soviet border.

Reacting to this military threat posed by a vastly superior technologically modern army, Lin Piao revealed at the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969 Peking's intention to return to the more flexible, multi-faceted "general line" which had characterized China's foreign policy before the Cultural Revolution. Lin pointed out that, instead of sole reliance on "proletarian internationalism" (the "supreme principle" which had guided China's foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution), Peking was now returning to the more broadly-based foreign policy formula of the June 1963 "general line" comprised of three "inter-related and indivisible" principles. In addition to "proletarian internationalism" and support for the revolutionary struggles of oppressed peoples and nations, the third principle (the one of most immediate importance) was that of "peaceful coexistence" with countries having different social systems. The utility, not to mention flexibility, of this concept of "peaceful coexistence" (based on mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty) at a time of national weakness was soon demonstrated, when in October 1969 the scope of its application was extended to apply generally to all countries and in particular to the Soviet Union.

Thus developments in 1969 support the judgment that the principal consideration prompting the Chinese Communist leadership to shift from a "revolutionary model" (featuring revolutionary armed struggle based on the Chinese model against bourgeois nationalist governments) to a "nationalist model" (featuring an international "united front" with bourgeois nationalist governments against a presumed common enemy) approach to foreign policy was a perceived sense of national weakness. This shift would be completed in the fourth and final stage of what might be called post-Cultural Revolution foreign policy, a stage beginning in May 1970 and extending down to the present time in which the features of China's new "nationalist model" of foreign policy making would be fully revealed.
The emergence of the "nationalist model" approach to foreign policy in the past 18 months constitutes an important respect of a "turn of 180 degrees" from the "revolutionary model" which had dominated China's foreign relations during the Cultural Revolution. Instead of a policy proclaiming the need to promote revolution abroad in imitation of the Chinese model of armed struggle, Peking now poses as the champion of national sovereignty, claiming (e.g. in the 23 January 1971 People's Daily editorial) that it has always in its relations with other nations "faithfully abided by" Mao's injunction (delivered 14 years ago) to "practice the well-known Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each others internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence." Instead of a policy directed at a largely fictitious constituency of "revolutionary Leftists" throughout the world committed to the Maoist goal of violent revolution, Peking has now reverted to the pre-Cultural Revolution Marxist concept of developing a broad international united front composed of governments and peoples (including, as witness the recent venture in "ping-pong diplomacy," even the people of the United States) against what it likes to call the "big nation hegemony" of the United States and the Soviet Union. Instead of a policy relying primarily on ideology (the export of Mao's thought) to promote China's revolutionary objectives, Peking now relies heavily on such material incentives as economic aid and trade to project its influence abroad. Finally, instead of a policy based on such broad ideological considerations as promoting revolution abroad, Peking now pursues a policy defined more narrowly and pragmatically in terms of its own national interest.

Despite the many parallels, it should be noted that China's present course in foreign policy has turned even further to the Right than in the years immediately preceding the Cultural Revolution. It is clear, for example, that Peking has profited from some of the mistakes it made in the Third World, especially in Africa, during
this earlier period, and is now concentrating (as indicated by Kang Sheng in a mid-1970 briefing of foreign Communist Party leaders) more on diplomacy and state relations and less on insurgency and pro-Peking revolutionary groups in these areas.

There are indications, moreover, that Peking in its rapprochement with North Korea and North Vietnam and Romania (not to mention the recent revival of diplomatic and economic relations with that arch-revisionist nation, Yugoslavia) is adjusting to the reality of national Communism and is no longer exerting a major effort, as it did in the mid-1960's, to organize a new Internationale composed of Communist Parties subordinated to the ideological authority of a single center in Peking. Illustrating this new appreciation of the realities of the international Communist movement, Peking no longer characterizes the Cultural Revolution as "a revolution of an international order" but as one largely confined in its application to China. What is more, authoritative ideological treatises on the status of the world Communist movement (e.g., the joint People's Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily editorial, "Long Live the Victory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," 17 March 1971) now stress that for a revolution to be successful every "proletarian party" must make concrete analysis of the present conditions and the history of its own country, and solve the theoretical and practical problems of the revolution independently." (underlining supplied)

Although further to the Right than in the immediate pre-Cultural Revolution period, Communist China's current foreign policy strategy still differs in important respects from the "nationalist model" in what might be called its classic form during the period (1955-1956) when the "Bandung spirit" was at its height. Whereas the original Bandung strategy called for a "united front from above" at the national level (with local Communist Parties instructed to seek a common front with the ruling national bourgeoisie) and thus implied the possibility of a "peaceful transition"
to socialism, Peking continues to insist today (as in the joint 17 March 1971 editorial noted above) that "violent revolution is a universal principle of proletarian revolution." And despite the professed intention to conduct relations with all nations on the basis of "the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence" (which exemplified the Bandung spirit) China still asserts (in the same joint editorial) that its foreign policy is also based upon the contradictory principle of "proletarian internationalism" -- that is, "supporting...the revolutionary struggles of the people of other countries."

The shift to the Right in domestic and foreign policy had become so pronounced by the fall of 1970 that it was necessary to explain to both domestic and foreign audiences why this shift had taken place. In time-honored fashion, it was decided, in late August and early September 1970, to explain the excesses and violence and attendant policy failures of the Cultural Revolution as the work of an "ultra-Leftist group" headed by the leading Chinese Communist ideologue and long-time confidant of Mao, Chen Po-ta. Resembling the political indoctrination campaign undertaken in the early 1960's to extricate Mao Tse-tung from personal responsibility for the Great Leap Forward debacle, a new campaign was initiated at the Second Plenum for the whole Party "to study Chairman Mao's philosophic works." It was pointed out during this campaign (as, for example, in the 1 October 1970 National Day editorial) that "senior cadres" had been guilty of "idealistic and metaphysical" errors in their understanding of Mao's works and as a result had promoted an "ultra-Leftist" line during the Cultural Revolution. This error of "Left opportunism," according to an earlier definition by Chairman Mao, results generally from failure "to start from real life, to link oneself closely with the masses, to constantly sum up the experience of mass struggle and to examine one's work in the light of practical experience." More succinctly and specifically, as indicated in an authoritative 30 October 1970
People's Daily editorial on the "study Mao" campaign, this error of "left opportunism" during the Cultural Revolution had resulted from the failure to realize that "the Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism" (for which read Maoism) is characterized not only by "its class nature" but, of equal importance, by "its practicality."

While the domestic audience could only piece together what had happened by a close reading of murky ideological tracts, foreign audiences were treated to a much more revealing, if tendentious, account of recent Chinese Communist history in a series of interviews granted Edgar Snow by Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou En-lai in the fall and winter of 1970. In a fascinating discussion of his "cult of personality," Mao described it as functional in origin, created "in order to stimulate the masses to dismantle the anti-Mao party bureaucracy" and thus enable him to regain "effective control" (which he had lost by 1964) over the Party and state administrative apparatus. The cult had "of course... been overdone;" the extravagant claims made for Mao had been "a nuisance;" and he had countenanced some of the more extreme manifestations of the cult (the slogans, pictures and plaster statues), it was implied, only because the Red Guards had "insisted."

In addition to disavowing the excesses of the personality cult, Mao also emphasized that he had "highly disapproved" of the violence, the factional armed struggle and the resulting "great chaos" during the Cultural Revolution, much of it caused by the deceit and "lying" of those around him. Another thing which had made the Chairman "most unhappy" was "the maltreatment" of Party cadres by Red Guards and others during the Cultural Revolution, a practice which among other things "had slowed the re-building and transformation of the party." Since Chen Po-ta, as head of the Cultural Revolution Group, had been entrusted with the task of purging and rebuilding the Party, the implication was clear that he, not Mao, had been responsible for much of the violence and extremism of the Cultural Revolution. This implication was strengthened
by the disclosure in another Snow article that "the task of reconstructing the dismantled state and Party administrative apparatus" had now been entrusted to ("fell heavily on") Chou En-lai.

Although it is hazardous to attempt to assign individual leaders to fixed positions in the Chinese political spectrum, it was symbolic that Chen Po-ta (the ideologue exemplifying the forces of the "revolutionary Left") should now have been replaced by Chou En-lai (regarded as the foremost exponent of pragmatism and moderation within the top Chinese leadership). It was also indicative of the extent to which Maoist ideology, having veered sharply to the Left during the Cultural Revolution in an attempt to revolutionize Chinese society and in time the world, has once again (as it had a decade before) been forced to swing back sharply to the Right in adjusting to reality.
Conclusions

I am not more intelligent than others, but I understand dialectics and its use in analysing problems. If the dialectical method is used to analyse an unclear problem, the problem soon becomes clear.

Lenin often said that Marxism combines the greatest scientific strictness with the revolutionary spirit.

As has frequently been pointed out, there is a basic contradiction between the scientific-analytic element and the revolutionary-activist element in Marxist thought. In addition to these two contradictory functions, there is a third and even more important function of Marxism-Leninism once it becomes the official doctrine of a Communist Party in power -- the function of legitimizing the regime and its authority in the eyes not only of the Communist rulers themselves but of the Party and people as well. Ideology in this sense, then, becomes a self-justifying dogma, with doctrine manipulated to fit practical needs.

If one places those parties in power which stress the scientific-analytic component of Marxism-Leninism on the Right side of the Communist political spectrum, then
the increasingly revolutionary and activist version of this doctrine which culminated in China's Cultural Revolution constituted a sharp swing to the Left. The revival and intensification to unprecedented heights of a "cult of personality" which accompanied this shift to the Left exemplified, according to Chairman Mao himself, the third function of Marxist-Leninist ideology of legitimizing and authorizing Mao Tse-tung's political rule in China.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that Mao in the Cultural Revolution was only manipulating doctrine in order to outmaneuver and discredit his "revisionist" opposition. There were genuine policy differences in the conflict between Mao and his opponents, differences which resulted from a divergent view of the nature of man and human society. At issue was a fundamentally different assessment of the extent to which the human factor (man properly motivated) rather than the material factor (objective conditions) should be relied upon in making revolution and building socialism. Since it is commonly recognized that there is a basic idealistic tendency in Maoism it is fair to conclude that, even though he has shown tactical realism in the face of necessity, Mao in this sense has always been a Leftist.

In domestic policy, the dispute centered on the crucial question of whether it was possible to apply the same "mass line" approach which had proved so successful in the political and military struggles of the revolution to the more complicated task of attempting to modernize the backward economy and traditional society of China. When (as Mao pointed out in a talk with foreign visitors during the Cultural Revolution) his "revisionist" opponents within China criticized this approach in the early 1960's as "anachronistic," Mao responded (in the joint People's Daily and Red Flag editorial article, "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World," 14 July 1964) by reasserting the necessity of "adhering to the mass line, [of] boldly arousing the masses and unfolding
mass movements on a large scale...in both socialist revolution and socialist construction." When carried to an extreme, this Leftist "mass line" became the "ultra-Leftist" line, characterized by violence, armed struggle and near anarchy, of the Cultural Revolution at its height.

In foreign policy, the dispute centered on the feasibility of attempting to promote revolution abroad by, among other means, exporting Mao's thought. The abortive attempt to revive China's "revolutionary model" as a major instrument of foreign policy suggests that this Maoist model, in its failure to account for the basic factor of nationalism in the contemporary world, is also anachronistic.

Although a secondary issue, there also appears to have been a difference of opinion concerning the proper tactics for conducting the Sino-Soviet dispute, with Mao insisting on more extreme measures (e.g. a complete rupture of relations and the establishment of a new Peking Internationale) than his domestic "revisionist" opponents. The failure of this attempt to re-establish a centralized international Communist organization, the result of not recognizing the reality and strength of national Communism, suggests that this Maoist model for organizing the world Communist movement is also outmoded.

The basic cause for the failure of the Leftist ideological offensive which Mao initiated nearly a decade ago was the complexity and intractability of the real world. Although all the returns are not yet in, the end result of Mao's attempt to revolutionize his own society by intimidation and coercion appears to be, as one observer has put it, a "utopia...run by the army." Although again all the returns are not yet in, the end result of the concurrent attempt during the Cultural Revolution to revolutionize the world appears to be that the outside world, by exerting a moderating influence on that ideology, has triumphed over the utopian version of Maoism.
But what are the future prospects in the continuing interplay between the international impact of Maoist ideology and the reciprocal impact of developments abroad upon the substance and political coloration of that ideology? In the short term, there are still opportunities for Chinese diplomatic gains which Peking could achieve rather easily by persisting in its present course in foreign policy characterized by the pragmatism and maneuverability that have been so apparent since mid-1970. In time, however, it should become apparent that these diplomatic victories will not in themselves significantly enhance China's capacity to project its influence abroad in the manner of a major power. In view of the limitations (e.g. economic underdevelopment and domestic political problems) which will continue to restrict China's influence in the international community, there may be yet another turn to the Left (especially if Mao continues to dominate the government and people of China) in an attempt to surmount these limitations and advance once again toward Mao's revolutionary goals.