Intelligence Report

LIN PIAO AND THE STRUCTURE OF POWER
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WARNING

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This Staff has received constructive comment from the Office of National Estimates and from the Office of Current Intelligence. This paper does not, however, present a coordinated view of Lin's position and prospects. The judgments expressed in the study are solely those of its author, W.P. Southard, and of this Staff.

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LIN PIAO AND THE STRUCTURE OF POWER

MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS:

The frail and enigmatic Lin Piao has seemed to many observers a strange choice as the designated heir to Mao Tse-tung. Many believe that he cannot long survive Mao. The message of this research study is that in view of Lin's apparent organizational strength, his potential for holding power should not be dismissed lightly.

It should be noted that this study concentrates on one factor only in the succession: Lin's position in the structure of power. It considers Lin's relationships with both his proteges and his peers, and the implications of these for Lin's policies. Identifying those who might reasonably be regarded as Lin's proteges, the study traces the striking degree to which military leaders purged in the Cultural Revolution have been replaced with these apparent proteges of Lin's -- who now dominate the military establishment, the most important part of the existing structure of power. It also traces the lines on which Lin seems to be moving to achieve a similar domination over the emerging Party structure. The paper concludes that Lin's heavy reliance on military proteges, and his preference for one type of civilian leader over another, will both tend to deter him from pursuing Maoist policies to the extremes to which Mao has pursued them.

The study's methodology approaches with care the question of what constitutes a protege and whether such a relationship necessarily translates into effective political power. Additionally, the study recognizes that many factors other than organizational structure will come into play in determining succession leaders and policies after Mao.
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LIN PIAO AND THE STRUCTURE OF POWER

Summary

Lin Piao has been completely loyal to Mao. Yet as Mao's designated successor, he has had to look toward the day when he must work without Mao. With Mao's acquiescence, he has indeed been making preparations for that day.

Throughout the Cultural Revolution, the real base of power for both Mao and Lin has been the armed forces (PLA). Lin has not hesitated to purge PLA leaders -- including his own proteges -- who displeased Mao or who, in Lin's judgment, did not meet Mao's standards. Yet in the process of making the PLA reliable both for Mao and for himself, he has been able to install many more of his proteges in key positions in the military structure than have been lost in the purges. Lin now overwhelmingly dominates -- through his proteges -- the central military leadership in Peking and the Military Region headquarters. Thus he dominates the power-system which protects the central leaders and carries out their orders, which supervises many central ministries and is the strongest force in local governing bodies, and which constitutes the main coercive instrument throughout China.

Lin is to be the leader as well of a Communist Party, shattered in the Cultural Revolution but now being reconstructed. Lin has a long way to go, before he can dominate the Party apparatus in the way that he now dominates the military structure. His relations with the other four members of the Politburo standing committee, the top policy-making body, are uneven. He seems still to have the complete confidence of Mao, and is unlikely to forfeit it. And his relations with Chou En-lai seem very good. But they seem less good
with the other two, Chen Po-ta (Mao's writer and trouble-shooter) and Kang Sheng (Mao's policeman). The known officers of the Cultural Revolution Group, said to be the Party's de facto secretariat, are Chen and Kang and some others close to those two, not to Lin. That same group has reportedly had the largest responsibilities in reconstructing the rest of the Party apparatus, in Peking and in the provinces.

But Lin knows which components of the emerging Party apparatus are important, and he seems to be taking steps analogous to those he took in progressively dominating the PLA. It is possible that the composition of the Politburo standing committee is already changing (Chen is missing), and, if so, Lin's protege Huang Yung-sheng, the second-ranking military leader, is a likely candidate. Beyond this possibility, Mao has reportedly given Lin the job of supervising the de facto secretariat in its rebuilding of the Party, and Lin is probably adding some of his proteges to that body. His proteges are expected to appear also in the upper levels of the great Party apparatus subordinate to the secretariat, and proteges of his proteges at lower levels. Still other proteges of Lin's are expected to head many of the new Party committees in the provinces, particularly those provinces which contain the powerful Military Region headquarters.

Lin's prospects for holding power, if his health holds, seem fairly good. He will have Mao's clear mandate, his own impressive record in the Cultural Revolution (in which he successfully purged the PLA at the same time that he was successfully using it as the main instrument of the Revolution), and what seem to be formidable organizational assets and unequalled opportunities to increase them.

The chances seem good that Lin and Chou En-lai will continue to hang together, both before and after Mao's death. There seems only an outside chance that Lin will come to see Chou as a dangerous rival. Lin will probably work well too with most of the military leaders, who have reason to be loyal to him. If Lin
were to make extreme demands on these military leaders and threaten or try to carry out another great purge, he might well be overthrown in a coup; but Lin seems to have no intention of putting the PLA through all this again.

Lin's apparent preference for Chou En-lai and Lin's military comrades, over the civilian radicals of the de facto secretariat, may have implications for Lin's policies as the successor. It may mean that Lin's predispositions are not as radical and militant as Mao's are. This would not mean the abandonment of abiding features of Maoism in practice -- the emphasis on loyalty to the leader personally, on the heavy responsibility of cadres, on the importance of political indoctrination and moral incentive, and on the need for great national campaigns pressing hard on the populace. But it might well mean a willingness to continue on these lines without reaching the extremes that Mao has reached. Those leaders whom Lin seems to like best -- Chou and the military -- are expected to influence him in the moderate direction, the more easily if his predispositions are indeed less extreme than Mao's.
Introductory Note: The Concept of "Proteges"

The term "protege" is used frequently in this paper. It designates, even more in Chinese than in Western society, a man whose career has seemed strikingly related to that of a more powerful figure -- with whom he apparently identifies, and by whom he is advanced and protected. Chinese Communist leaders, as other Chinese before them -- the officers of the Party, and directors of the Party apparatus and of the state machinery, the chiefs of the military establishment, the most powerful regional figures -- have all seemed to have such proteges. These proteges have risen and often fallen with their mentors, have sometimes collapsed under the demands made upon them, and have sometimes deserted or challenged them.

The careers of most of the past and present leaders of Communist China are fairly well known. There are voluminous records on many of them. It is usually possible to discover whether a given leader -- say, one of the officers of the powerful Military Affairs Committee or the General Staff, or one of the top-ranking officers of a Military Region headquarters -- served and prospered under Lin in Lin's early career. (Lin's main assignments, in ascending order, were as a division and army commander, as Mao's assistant in special jobs in Yenan, as the commander of Chinese Communist forces in the Northeast after World War II, and as commander of the 4th Field Army in the Central-South in the late 1940s and early 1950s -- and concurrently Party leader in that area -- until illness forced his withdrawal in the early 1950s.) And it is almost always possible to discover which of those men were then chosen by Lin for key posts in the central and regional military structure after he became Minister of National Defense and head of the Military Affairs Committee in 1959. A Chinese military officer whose record showed both of those features as of 1965 -- substantial early
association with Lin, and later preferment by him -- might reasonably be regarded as an apparent or likely protege at that time. Many of these men were then given additional signs of special favor during the Cultural Revolution -- for example, were taken into Lin's confidence in the first stages; were not punished for their "mistakes" in handling mass organizations (whereas less favored men were often demoted and sometimes purged); were given especially sensitive assignments such as the conduct of the purge in the PLA itself and the supervision of political security work thereafter, or the command of forces moved into troubled provinces; were installed as the commanders and political officers of military regions and districts, and as the heads of local governments, to replace purged leaders; and so on. Such men the study considers fully-established proteges.

There are only a few dozen Chinese leaders -- almost all of them military men, divided about equally between Peking and the military regions -- out of several hundred examined who qualify as proteges in this full sense of early, middle and late association. But these tend to occupy the most important positions in the military structure.

This concept of "protege" is of course open to some objection, on the ground that such bonds -- even where the record of association and preferment is indisputable -- are too fragile to support a projection. One may point to proteges of long standing who have challenged their principals: for example, Peng Te-huai in 1959, or Liu Shao-chi more recently. Peng, the military leader who openly criticized Mao's plans for military and economic development and his attitude toward the Russians, and Liu, who covertly but systematically obstructed Mao in the early 1960s, both had unquestionably been proteges of Mao before questions of high policy led them to become "disloyal." One can point to other instances in which a protege has attached himself to a new principal out of opportunism, or has come to hate his benefactor for no apparent reason.
And from the principal's point of view, there are many proteges who fail to measure up, and are abandoned by their principals. Lin's proteges in the General Political Department were given special assignments one after another in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution and were then purged one after another for failure -- failures which were sometimes seen as "disloyalty."

But such bonds do not in general seem fragile. Peng Te-huai and Liu Shao-chi had served Mao well and faithfully for many years, carrying out policies which were often disagreeable to them, and helping Mao to conceal his mistakes and to minimize the ill effects of them. They turned against him only when his policies seemed so extreme as to pose a question virtually of national survival. Similarly, Lin's proteges -- most of those who fell, as well as those who prospered -- tried hard for him in the Cultural Revolution, doing their best to carry out opaque or conflicting directives, standing firm while the great purge was going on around them and even when they themselves seemed threatened; rather than combining forces against him, they in general conducted themselves as loyal lieutenants and reliable instruments. Those few of Lin's proteges who were purged in the Cultural Revolution -- four or five in the highly hazardous General Political Department, and four or five more outside it -- seem in general to have been men placed in an impossible position. That is, the demands made on them were so extreme that they could not personally survive. Thus, a protege will occasionally challenge or desert his principal out of conviction or to advance or save himself, or he may be crushed by an extreme demand, but a protege is likely to adhere longer and to endure larger demands than a non-protege.

The Chinese Communists themselves seem pretty clearly to take the concept of "protege" seriously. When Peng Te-huai fell, several of his proteges fell with him. When Liu and Teng fell, the proteges with whom they had packed the Party apparatus were almost all swept out with them. Many of the proteges of
military leaders purged in the first stages of the Cultural Revolution were later purged expressly as "their" men. And it does not seem coincidental that so many of Lin's proteges have risen dramatically on the Cultural Revolution, while so few have fallen.

In sum, while it is not possible in any given case to be certain that a principal-protege relationship is stable, Lin's ability to appoint his proteges to key positions testifies to his strength in the leadership, and his strength tends to be increased by the men he appoints. This is of course not the only consideration governing Lin's overall strength and his prospects for holding power after Mao goes; questions of policy are likely to be more important. But the character of Lin's proteges seems to be one important factor in questions of policy too, because principals and proteges are mutually dependent; if, as this paper will argue, Lin's proteges tend to be men of a certain kind, their influence on his policies is likely to be exercised in one direction rather than another.
I. Lin and the Cultural Revolution

The original objective of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was to make the structure of power reliably responsive to Mao Tse-tung -- which it had not been for some years. Lin Piao, completely identified with Mao, had already been secretly chosen by Mao as his successor. It was thus Lin's problem, in the Cultural Revolution, to make the new structure of power reliably responsive to himself as well -- looking toward the day when he, without Mao, would have to use it to direct the activity of 800 million people.

The Party Apparatus: The Chinese Communist Party was, of course, the primary instrument of command-and-control throughout China, and, as such, the principal casualty of the great purge which was central to the Cultural Revolution. When the Revolution began, Lin's position in the Party was not strong. He was one of several vice-chairmen (not the senior one) of the central committee, and thereby a member of the politburo standing committee, the summit of power; but the great apparatus of the Party below the politburo level was directed by two other members of the standing committee, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, the two leaders of those resisting Mao's will. Teng as secretary-general dominated the Party secretariat, charged with managing the daily activity of the party. The rest of the apparatus -- the central departments concerned with all aspects of Chinese life, the powerful regional bureaus
and provincial committees (the first secretaries of which were often the political officers of the PLA commands in those areas), and the network of Party committees in government organs and the military establishment -- was stocked largely with proteges of Liu and Teng. Apart from some of the Party committees in the PLA, the Party apparatus contained very few proteges of Lin Piao.

The PLA: The PLA was in better shape, from the point of view of Mao and Lin, than was the party apparatus. Mao and Lin had been industriously indoctrinating it -- and on a small scale, purging it -- from the time of Lin's assumption of command of the PLA in 1959, and Mao had in fact transferred his own true base of power from the Party to the PLA in the years before the Cultural Revolution began. It was Mao's intention to use the PLA as his reserve force while he prepared to purge the Party.

Lin had been the dominant figure in the PLA since 1959, as de facto chief of the Military Affairs Committee which directed the entire military establishment and as Minister of National Defense, and he had installed some of his proteges in key positions. Neither the central nor the regional leadership of the PLA, however, was dominated by Lin's proteges at the outset of the Cultural Revolution in 1965, and Mao and Lin did not regard the PLA as fully reliable. Many of its ranking political officers (regional and district) were primarily functionaries of the disloyal Party machine (rather than career PLA men), and much of the indoctrination of the PLA had been carried out by these men. From the start, it was the intention of Mao and Lin to make the PLA the secondary target of the great purge.
Mao and Lin had concluded that one of their joint proteges, Chief-of-Staff Lo Jui-Ching -- currently secretary-general of the MAC and probably the principal supervisor of political security work in the PLA -- was disloyal. They were also suspicious of certain other central military leaders, of senior officers of the powerful regional military headquarters whom they believed to be closer to Party-machine leaders than to themselves, and of the entire political officer network responsive to the Party secretariat. It seems, however, that when the Cultural Revolution began, comparatively few career PLA leaders (as distinct from Party leaders) were already marked for purging; most of those who finally fell appear to have been purged for resistance to features of the Cultural Revolution as it developed, for inability to meet the sometimes impossible demands made of them, and for being proteges of military leaders who fell in the first stages.

Lin as Mao's Confidante: Throughout the Cultural Revolution, Lin has been Mao's principal confidante. Late in 1965, the PLA newspaper took the lead in making an anti-Mao play the symbol of all opposition to Mao and thus the touchstone of loyalty. Lin then went into retreat with Mao to plan the campaign. In early 1966, Lin wrote and spoke on the need for an ideological revolution. He then made the key speech at the May 1966 Party conference which officially launched the Cultural Revolution and confirmed that a great purge was underway. In early August, at the Central Committee plenum which approved Mao's plans for the Cultural Revolution, Lin again made the main speech, defining the criteria for judging all Party cadres -- fidelity to Mao's thought, devotion to political work, and militancy. In mid-August Lin spoke
for Mao at the rally which unveiled the Red Guards -- organized and indoctrinated students -- as Mao's chosen instrument for attacking the Party apparatus throughout China. At another top-level Party meeting in October, Lin outlined Mao's plans for continuing the Revolution. Continuing to speak for Mao in private meetings in 1967, he also made the main speech on National Day (1 October), defining the tasks of the next stage. Again on National Day in 1968 (after spending the summer with Mao) he did so, and in the same month summarized the gains and losses of the Revolution for a Party plenum. And he made the main report at the Party's Ninth Congress in April 1969.

Purging and Reorganizing the PLA: Lin's organizational activity during the Cultural Revolution has understandably centered on the PLA: first, to make it a reliable reserve force, and, since January 1967, to make it a reliable instrument of Mao's will in its complex task as the principal executor of Mao's policies.

Lin took the lead in purging the first high-level victims, who included his Chief-of-Staff, in December 1965. He began soon thereafter to reorganize some of the central military organs and some of the regional and provincial commands, at first slowly and quietly. In August 1966, he gathered a small group of central and regional military leaders in whom he had special confidence and told them his plans for purging the PLA, making clear that the PLA was to be judged by the same harsh standards applied to the Party. In October, he set up a special organ to conduct the Cultural Revolution in the PLA itself (that is, to examine, purge and reindoctrinate it), a group of PLA officers with Madame Mao as their militant (if
not paranoid) "advisor." Shortly thereafter, Lin encouraged this group to purge his own senior deputy in the Military Affairs Committee and several high-ranking officers of the central military leadership and the regional commands.

In January 1967, following the collapse of the Party apparatus throughout China under the assaults of the Red Guards, the PLA was ordered into action to "support the Left," and it quickly became a de facto governing apparatus in the name of the Left.* In the prolonged period of dependence on the PLA which followed -- a dependence that continues today -- Mao and Lin continued to purge the PLA, but in smaller groups, not risking a general revolt. They also continued methodically to reorganize the military region and district commands, and moved armies around China, sometimes with the apparent intention of putting especially reliable armies in sensitive places. At the same time, showing the same deep suspicion of his associates that Mao had shown, Lin installed his wife as the chief of his staff office. He also added to the leadership of the MAC several younger military men -- of the comparatively few he was prepared to trust -- who were playing important roles in the Cultural Revolution. Further, he reorganized the PLA's special cultural

*Lin himself was the first to admit -- in March 1967 -- that it was very hard to tell "left" from "right" in the early months of 1967. That seems to be the main reason why few PLA leaders were severely punished for their "mistakes" in dealing with mass organizations.
revolution (purge) group around his own proteges -- his wife and several military figures long close to him.

Lin continued in 1968 to reorganize both the central and regional military structures. He replaced the PLA's special purge group with a more nearly orthodox Political Work Group, still composed of his proteges, and charged it with investigating every PLA leader to support a judgment as to his trustworthiness. (He has said again and again that nobody is to be completely trusted, that everyone must be under surveillance constantly.) Soon thereafter (in March), Lin felt obliged to purge one of his most important proteges, his chief-of-staff and concurrently the MAC secretary-general and senior supervisor of political security work in the PLA; this person was charged with challenging him by building his personal power and with offending Madame Mao. Lin replaced the purged protege in all three posts by another protege even closer to himself, Huang Yung-sheng, a regional commander.* Finally, he again reorganized the MAC; he set up, under Huang, an Administrative Unit composed of seven proteges who had had key posts in the various special organs for the conduct of the Cultural Revolution in the PLA, and gave this unit supervisory authority over all political security work in the PLA -- that is, the entire process of screening, investigating and purging PLA leaders, subject to review by himself. This group, perhaps surprisingly, has remained stable.

*There is a fuller treatment of Huang on page 22.
Lin has continued in 1969 and 1970 to purge and reorganize the PLA, on a small scale. Since the Ninth Congress, a few PLA leaders have fallen out of sight and are thought to have been purged. A few regional and provincial commands have been given new top leaders. The General Political Department is again operating, under a new director who had been a career military commander, and this department will probably recommend other changes.

Constructing "Revolutionary Committees": Lin has also been concerned with the operations and staffing of the "revolutionary committees" throughout China, which have been sharing power with the PLA while the Party is being rebuilt. Mao in February 1967 called for the formation of "revolutionary committees" -- composed of PLA officers, acceptable Party cadres, and representatives of mass organizations -- as provisional organs of government. From the start, these committees, especially at the highest, provincial level, have in general been dominated by military men.

The spring and summer of 1967 were periods of great disorder in China, as mass organizations competed for position in the emerging structure of power and denounced and attacked PLA leaders, the existing "authorities" in China after the collapse of the Party apparatus. Mao and Lin at first gave the PLA substantial authority to deal with this violence, then withdrew it, then gave some of it back. The problem of the shifts in line was complicated by the consideration that some of the attacks on PLA leaders may have been encouraged -- were at least not discouraged -- by some of the civilian leaders of Mao's team, causing a tension between those leaders and Lin's military comrades which has probably persisted to this day. Many PLA leaders, under attack or at best confused, handled
the mass organizations roughly, dragged their feet in implementing orders from Peking to carry out permissive policies, and declined to admit the young revolutionaries to important positions in the revolutionary committees shaping up. The few PLA leaders who actually defied Peking's orders were purged, while the many more who had made "mistakes" were summoned to Peking for Mao-study.

The young militants resumed their large-scale violence in late 1967 and the early months of 1968. Mao and Lin together, possibly taking counsel from PLA leaders, cracked down hard in July 1968. The provincial revolutionary committees then unformed were quickly shaped up, in orderly conditions, in the summer and early fall of 1968. Lin in his report to the Party Congress in April 1969 was to associate himself with Mao's general exoneration of those military leaders who had made "mistakes" (and then self-criticisms), on the ground that it had indeed been very difficult to distinguish friends from enemies. (Lin himself had made this point earlier.)

These revolutionary committees have continued to be very troublesome for Mao and Lin, largely because they operate on the "three-way alliance" principle. This has in fact institutionalized conflict, even among the leaders themselves of these committees, and Peking is still purging and replacing these leaders. Moreover, Mao himself was responsible for re-emphasizing (at the Ninth Party Congress) the role of the revolutionary masses, an intervention which led to renewed violence. Even where violence is avoided, the revolutionary committees are inherently unstable, poor instruments for the implementation of Peking's policies and directives. The rebuilt Party apparatus is expected to be a much more stable and responsive governing structure.
Purging and Rebuilding the Party: Lin has played a large role in the massive purge, and a lesser role (until recently) in the slow rebuilding, of the Party in the Cultural Revolution. He stood with Mao in the May 1966 Party meeting which purged the first of the top-ranking Party-machine leaders. At that time, Mao unveiled a new instrument -- called the central Cultural Revolution Group -- for the conduct of the Cultural Revolution as a whole and for the coordination of the work of smaller such groups. Lin in May was the first to tell Party leaders that the Cultural Revolution was to be directed primarily against them, and in August Mao and Lin turned the Red Guards loose against the Party apparatus.

At the August 1966 Party plenum, Lin was revealed as Mao's choice as "deputy supreme commander of the entire party," and Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, the two principal leaders of the Party apparatus, were removed from power. The Politburo and (more importantly) its standing committee were reorganized accordingly. The new standing committee consisted of Mao, Lin, the long third-ranking Chou En-lai, and three leaders of the central CRG: Chen Po-ta (Mao's chief writer and trouble-shooter), Kang Sheng (Mao's political security specialist), and a promising regional leader brought from South China. By the end of 1966, the Politburo standing committee, dropping the regional figure, had assumed essentially the shape it was to keep throughout the Cultural Revolution, at least into 1970: Mao, Lin, Chou, Chen, and Kang, with Madame Mao as a possible de facto member from time to time.* Also by the end of 1966,

*There is some question as to whether Chen Po-ta, missing since 1 August 1970, is still a member.
the leadership of the central CRG, dropping the same man dropped by the Politburo standing committee, became stabilized: Chen, Kang, and Madame Mao. By this time, the CRG had replaced the Party secretariat at the center of the work of what remained of the Party apparatus -- had become, that is, a de facto secretariat. Although Lin as vice chairman had authority over this CRG, it included no proteges of his.

Following Mao's call in January 1967 for the destruction of the regional and provincial Party committees, constructive efforts were concentrated on the "revolutionary committees" which were to replace them. By autumn 1967, after purging several second-level figures of the central CRG, Mao issued instructions to certain officers of the CRG -- Kang Sheng and two younger ideologues who had served Mao well in setting up the Cultural Revolution -- on preparing for a party congress and rebuilding the Party. The CRG -- already active in handling mass organizations like the Red Guards, and in helping the MAC with the reindoctrination of regional PLA leaders brought to Peking -- was now to play the central role in reconstructing the Party. In December, the central Party organs called for rebuilding the Party structure, outside the Party center, within the revolutionary committee structure.

Early in 1968, Lin apparently lost a round in his presumed effort to keep the reconstructed Party apparatus from compromising his own control of political security work in the PLA. Mao -- who had never allowed the PLA, even under Lin, to answer completely for its own security -- is reported to have said that supervision of this work in the PLA was now to be undertaken jointly by the MAC secretary-general (a Lin protege) and by Kang Sheng, either in his central CRG post or in a possible second position as the head of a political security coordinating body. Shortly thereafter, Chou En-lai was apparently also assigned some role in
supervising this work, meaning that the work has in effect been supervised since 1968 by the entire Politburo standing committee.

In October 1968, Lin defined the main tasks of the next stage of the Cultural Revolution as those of consolidating the revolutionary committees and rebuilding the Party in accordance with Mao's call to "take in new blood." This proceeded slowly, owing in large part to Mao's insistence on the "three-way alliance" principle -- already established in composing the revolutionary committees -- in Party-building as well. The principle was apparent in the selection -- reportedly by the central CRG -- of a new Central Committee at the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969.

That Congress approved a new Party constitution which provided for Lin to become Mao's successor without any nonsense of a Party election, and reaffirmed the principle of Party control of the PLA. Lin in his report to the Congress called on the Party to ensure that leadership of Party organizations at all levels "is truly in the hands of Marxists" -- meaning Maoists, although it seemed doubtful that there were enough hard-core Maoists at hand to occupy all key posts even at the upper levels of the Party. In any case, a plenum following the Congress elected (reappointed) the Politburo's five-man standing committee of four Left-inclined Maoists (including Lin) and Chou En-lai.

Since the Ninth Congress, Party-building has continued to move very slowly. For most of this period, the central CRG has reportedly continued to play the central role. During the late summer of 1970, however, the Party press suggested high-level dissatisfaction with the course of Party-building, and shortly thereafter it was reported that Lin himself had now been assigned the central role in this process.* If this is true, Lin has taken a large step in his effort to construct a Party apparatus reliably responsive to himself.

*This report is discussed more fully in Part VII, concerned with the emerging Party apparatus.
The Big Seven: The super-elite consists, strictly, of Mao, Lin, and the other three members of the politburo standing committee, Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng. The standing committee is the core of power, the body which makes those decisions that Mao and Lin have not reserved for themselves, or which passes matters on to appropriate party organs (e.g., it calls meetings of the full politburo), and which sets up and supervises the entire party apparatus (including the powerful MAC). Those five members among themselves answer (if not always expertly) for the full range of Peking's political, military and economic concerns. It seems necessary, however, to consider also Madame Mao, who has been less visible since 1968 but who may still be a de facto member from time to time when the standing committee operates as a discussion group, and has been as important in the Cultural Revolution as some of the official Big Five; and also Huang Yung-sheng, another possible de facto member and in any case the second-ranking military leader, whose position in the structure of power seems stronger than that of some of the foregoing six.

Lin and Mao: Lin's relationship with Mao has been discussed at length in an earlier SRS paper (POLO XXXIX, "Lin Piao and the Great Helmsman"). In sum: Lin was long Mao's favorite military leader,
has had Mao's confidence as a political leader for many years, has been Mao's closest comrade since about 1962, was designated officially in 1966 as Mao's successor, and throughout the Cultural Revolution has been given every sign of Mao's continuing trust, reliance, and high favor. This high favor will not necessarily continue: Mao is unstable, and he may recently have set aside or even purged another of his lieutenants with a record of fidelity almost as impressive as Lin's. Yet the probability seems strong that Mao will not arbitrarily change his mind about Lin as the most willing and able of his lieutenants to carry on with Mao's essential policies, and that Lin will not do anything to give Mao reason to change his mind. The practical question then seems to be that of Lin's relationships with those with whom he will have to work after Mao's death. Even in the small politburo standing committee, the picture is mixed.

Lin and Chou: Apart from the father-son type of bond with Mao, Lin's best relationship appears, surprisingly, to be with Chou En-lai, the leader temperamentally least like himself. Lin began as a student and protege of Chou's in the mid-20s, and there is reliable testimony that the two worked closely and well in the early years of the movement. Chou took Lin with him to Chungking for negotiations in 1942-1943, and, although the two were largely separated for the next 15 years, party documents suggest that very friendly relations continued. They have been close again since 1958, and Chou, if consulted, probably genuinely favored Mao's choice of Lin over Liu Shao-chi. Despite rumors of bad feelings and even conflict between them, Lin and Chou have seemed to work well together in the Cultural Revolution. Mao and Lin as a team have entrusted Chou

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with many delicate missions in expounding and enforcing the Mao-Lin policy, including the defense of Lin's military proteges under attack by mass organizations. Chou has apparently been careful to consult with Lin when necessary (even on foreign affairs), and has done whatever he was asked to do. Chou may have reservations about Lin; for example, during the Cultural Revolution, Lin at one time made contemptuous remarks about the old "state machine" which Chou had put together, remarks which probably contributed to Chou's inability to save certain of his friends and proteges under attack. And Lin may have mixed feelings about Chou, as the constitutional provision for Lin to succeed Mao without an election is an indirect admission that the very popular Chou (the only Chinese leader regularly described by non-Communists as "charming") would probably win any such election. But the overall record seems to support the view of diplomatic observers in Peking that Lin and Chou are fairly close and have thus far been a good team.*

Lin and Other Hard-Core Maoists: Lin's relations with the other two members of the politburo standing committee, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng, and with their close associate, Madame Mao, have seemed to be more troubled and less friendly than

*It is only fair to admit that some observers, while not disputing the record, believe that the evidence is simply too thin to support any judgment on the Lin-Chou relationship.
his relations with Chou. This has been true despite the fact that all three have the same apparent record of simple-minded, whole-hearted allegiance to Mao that Lin himself has. (Chou too has been loyal, but has often indicated reservations about some of Mao's policies; the other three have not done this.) The four have managed to work together passably well -- under Mao's guidance and with Mao as arbiter -- during the Cultural Revolution, but in an erratic, abrasive fashion that has suggested a potential for serious conflict.

Lin did not work well with any of these three in the early years (although Chen was with Chou and Lin in Chungking in 1942-1943). Lin had little to do with any of the three in the years 1945-1958. From 1958, he was forced into a closer association with all three -- first Chen, then Kang, then the Madame -- as each was given special assignments by Mao (preparing rationales for Mao's policies and identifying Mao's opponents). During the Cultural Revolution, these three have been the principal leaders of the central Cultural Revolution Group (said to be the de facto party secretariat), and in this role and other special assignments have seemed to cut into Lin's territory and put Lin himself in an embarrassing position. Red Guard and other mass organizations -- either incited by the CRG leaders or permitted by them to get out of hand -- attacked many of Lin's proteges and friends. While Lin was apparently strong enough to protect all of these military leaders (e.g., the military men now on the politburo) who were not in disfavor with Mao as well as with the CRG, he may well have resented the way in which the CRG leaders handled their jobs. Such resentment could not be openly expressed; Kang Sheng, reflecting Mao's position, described all criticism of the central CRG as "enemy activity." It is suggestive,
however, that Madame Mao was dropped from the PLA/CRG when it was reorganized in the late summer of 1967. Moreover, the continued important roles of Chen and Kang in the PLA's affairs after that time -- Chen and Kang were made responsible, together with MAC officers, for the reindoctrination of PLA leaders, and Kang was reportedly made responsible, together with the MAC secretary-general, for supervising political security work in the PLA -- does not necessarily indicate that they had Lin's confidence. Both of those tasks were given the CRG leaders by Mao, not Lin.

Kang Sheng might be the hardest of the three for Lin to handle. It is Kang, not his nominal superior Chen Po-ta, who has reportedly been functioning as the party's de facto secretary-general and who has reportedly played the central role in party-rebuilding. And it is Kang who chiefly compromises Lin's control of political security work in the PLA. There is some possibility that Lin is moving against Kang as a man whom he does not like or trust and regards as dangerous to him. The recent report that Lin himself is now playing the central role in party-building -- that indeed he has taken "personal charge" of it -- may mean that Lin himself took the initiative to induce Mao to put him in a position to control and restrict Kang, or even ease him out. Moreover, Chou En-lai's participation in the task of supervising political security work in the PLA may represent another Lin initiative; that is, Lin, forced to accept Kang's interference in that work, may have asked for Chou in the interest of diluting Kang's role. Two of the three figures known or believed to exercise this supervision are now
responsive or close to Lin -- Huang Yung-sheng and Chou.* And the recent appointment of a career military commander (the natural enemy of a Kang Sheng) to head the General Political Department may also make it harder for Kang to operate in the PLA's political structure.

In sum, the evidence does not compose a clear picture of a hostile relationship between Lin and Chou on one hand and Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng and Madame Mao on the other, but there seems an important difference between the kind of relationship Lin has had with Chou and the kind he has had with the other three.** There is as yet no solid evidence that Lin is moving against any one of the three, but it will not be surprising if he does so move.

*Chou would probably support Lin in any initiative against any of these three civilian radicals which would not risk a collision with Mao. Chou has reason to dislike all three, for attacks on policies with which he has been identified and on his proteges and friends, attacks which fell just short of Chou himself. Chou is rumored to detest Kang Sheng, and there have been some indications that he dislikes Madame Mao.

**Again, it must be admitted that some observers regard the evidence as too scanty to support any judgment.
Lin and His Protege: Lin's relationship with the seventh and last putative member of the super-elite, Huang Yung-sheng, seems of critical importance. Huang at least appears to be the model protege. The same age as Lin, he served under Lin throughout the 1930s, served under another Lin protege elsewhere for a few years, was back with Lin in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and by 1952 was Lin's chief-of-staff in the Central-South. With Lin's transfer to Peking in 1955, Huang was named (almost certainly on Lin's recommendation) to succeed him as commander of the Canton MR, and kept the post for many years. Attacked by Red Guard groups early in 1967, Huang was twice defended by Chou En-lai as a close comrade of Lin's (he may be an old friend of Chou's too), and Huang's record in the Cultural Revolution was praised even by Madame Mao (perhaps under pressure, as her young friends had attacked him). Attacked again later in 1967, Huang was given a vote of confidence by Mao himself. When in March 1968 Lin was obliged to find a new chief-of-staff, secretary-general of the Military Affairs Committee, and supervisor of political security work in the PLA, he brought Huang up from Canton to fill these posts. There has been every indication since that time -- including his addition to the politburo in April 1969 -- that Mao and Lin have been pleased with Huang's performance, and that Lin has a very close and friendly relationship with him.

Lin seems to need a man of his own, in addition to himself and his friend Chou, on the Politburo standing committee -- if not now (which would be best), then as soon as he succeeds to Mao's position. Although Huang does not appear to share Mao's ideological positions to the degree that Lin does (Huang seems more representative of professional military men, a relatively conservative class), it is believed that Huang would be Lin's first choice for this small group at the summit of power.*

*Some observers, while agreeing that Huang is the leading candidate for the standing committee, would regard his appointment not as evidence of a strengthening of Lin's hand but as evidence that the regional military leaders had succeeded in placing their own man -- not Lin's man -- on the standing committee.
III. Lin and the Politburo

The importance of the full politburo (21 voting members, four non-voting) is conjectural. It probably plays an important role in decision-making when Mao and Lin do not know what they want to do and put the question up for a wider discussion than is possible in the five-man standing committee. It is a voting body, but is not known ever to have actually voted; if it has, it seems most unlikely that Mao has ever (since 1935) lost a formal vote. Mao's troubles of the early 1960s -- in effecting his will -- came not from reversals in the Politburo but from obstructionism in the Party apparatus below the Politburo. Nevertheless, if the Politburo is used by Lin in any way -- as a voting body or as a body of consultants or as a deliberative body -- its composition might be of much importance.

Principal-Protege Groupings: When Mao is not included, the 20 full members, considered in terms of principals and proteges, seems to fall into three groups.* One group consists of Lin and seven other active military leaders, every one of whom is a protege and close associate of Lin, plus Madame Lin, making a formidable bloc of nine. Another consists of the five civilian leaders of the central CRG -- Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, Madame Mao, and two younger persons -- every one of whom is a protege of Mao or Madame Mao. And the third, a much looser group of six, consists of government leaders and inactive old-timers, all believed closer to Chou En-lai than to any other principal. In these terms, a Lin-Chou coalition could of course control the voting, if there were any.

*The two members who have not appeared in public for some months -- and may have fallen -- are included in this figure.
Radical-Conservative Groupings: The Politburo can also be divided along "radical" and "conservative" lines -- that is, between those on one hand closely identified with radical and disruptive initiatives in the Cultural Revolution, and those on the other hand whose roles were more concerned with maintaining or restoring order. This is a less satisfactory division, because most Politburo members were concerned with the implementation of both advances and retreats, depending on the phase of the Revolution. It is true, however, that some leaders have seemed to show a predisposition to radical policies, like Mao himself, and others have seemed to prefer if not conservative than at least more nearly moderate policies, like Chou and most military figures. In these terms, the "radicals" make a group of nine, including Lin and his wife, all five central CRG leaders, and two other central military leaders; the "conservatives" total six, Chou and the other five active military leaders; and the "neutrals" (inactive or impossible to assess) total four. Expressed in these terms, the "radicals" would not necessarily dominate a vote.

The Politburo in Action: Thus Lin Piao, whether standing with the military leaders or with the "radicals" in a given vote in the Politburo, would need to put together a coalition in order to prevail. There is a question, however, as to whether it is realistic to expect the Politburo to vote Lin down on a matter of importance to him. Those Politburo members more closely associated with central CRG figures or with Chou En-lai than with Lin would have to recognize that, in a showdown on those lines, the means of coercion would be almost entirely in the hands of Lin's group. (Mao successfully employed this stratagem -- displaying the armed force at his command -- at the August 1966 plenum which approved his plans for the Cultural Revolution.) Similarly, those disposed to vote against a "radical" initiative by Lin would have to recognize that the Politburo standing committee -- which is in the hands of the "radicals" -- could simply nullify an adverse vote and decide the matter among its five members.
The true importance of the Politburo seems to lie in its potential as a sounding-board and discussion group, which could provide Lin with counsel on those matters on which he might feel a need for several points of view. In such cases, the various backgrounds, predispositions, and particular experiences of the Politburo's members might be honestly reflected in the discussion and might be truly helpful to Lin. The range of knowledge and competence on the present Politburo is considerable, although a non-Maoist would think that Lin would do well to have on his Politburo fewer radical ideologues and agitators of the CRG type and more specialists in sectors of the economy -- fewer "reds," more experts. Apart from the omniscient Chou En-lai, there is only one Politburo member (Li Hsien-nien) with substantial experience in economic management, and he seems to be concerned now with other things.
IV. Lin and the Central Military Leaders

The PLA does not dominate the "national" government: that is, the group of leaders, all in Peking, who make the fundamental decisions on such large matters as national defense, foreign policy, development of the economy, and the conduct of nation-wide political campaigns. As previously seen, such decisions are made by Mao, by Mao and Lin, or by the five-man Politburo standing committee, who may or may not consult others first. The PLA has been, however, the base of power for Mao (in recent years) and for Lin (since 1959), the "enforcer" of those decisions that need to be enforced, the protector of Mao and Lin and other central leaders, the supervisor of many central ministries, the de facto government outside Peking for most of the Cultural Revolution, the dominant force within most of the local governing bodies charged with carrying out Mao's policies, and (in the field armies) the coercive power throughout China. The central leadership of the PLA power-system in recent years has come to be strikingly dominated by Lin Piao and those regarded in this paper as his proteges.

The MAC Standing Committee: The most important organs of the central military apparatus are: the Military Affairs Committee (MAC), which has authority over the entire military establishment and can send orders directly to any component; the administrative unit of the MAC, which handles its daily work and supervises all political security work in the PLA (including the work of the General Political Department); and the General Staff or Joint Chiefs-of-Staff -- i.e., the Chief-of-Staff and his deputies, the planning organ of the MAC and the source of most of the orders going to the PLA. It is in these three key organs that Lin's proteges are most heavily clustered.
When the Cultural Revolution began, Lin was (as he remains) the de facto chairman of the MAC, but its key posts -- officers of the MAC and members of its standing committee -- were divided about equally between (a) old-timers who had made their careers independently of Lin and (b) a small group of Lin's proteges. During the Cultural Revolution, Lin purged or helped to purge several of them (including four who were his own proteges or joint Mao-Lin proteges), and has set aside others.* The MAC leadership is now composed almost entirely of Lin's proteges. The MAC leaders, who hold many other key posts in the central military apparatus, are: (1) Yeh Chien-ying, the only vice-chairman known to be active, Lin's deputy in the old Central-South command and a spokesman for him in recent years, although believed to be closer personally to Chou En-lai; (2) Huang Yung-sheng, Lin's "model" protege previously discussed, who as secretary-general and chief of the administrative unit is second in importance only to Lin; (3, 4, 5) three leaders with a common profile, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-peng, and Chiu Hui-tso, each of whom long served with Lin, was named by Lin to a key military post in the 1959-67 period (respectively Commander of the Air Force, 1st Political Officer of the Navy, Director of Logistics), and has been given key posts in political security organs of the PLA in recent years; (6) Yeh Chun, Lin's wife and the head of his staff office; (7) Wen Yu-cheng, commander of the Peking Garrison, a joint Lin-Huang protege from the Central-South**; (8) Liu Hsien-chuan, who long served with Lin

*The most recent to fall seems to be Hsieh Fu-chih, not a Lin protege but a protege of the disgraced Teng Hsiao-ping, who, surprisingly, was added to the leadership of the MAC and even to the Politburo, but has now been missing for many months.

**Wen has been missing since 1 June, together with some of the political officers of the Garrison.
and was brought from a district command in 1968 to a key central post, possibly with Second Artillery (missiles); (9) Su Yu, not a Lin protege, an oldtime field army commander with a spectacular combat record who in recent years has headed the Office of National Defense Industries, and who is believed to be close to Chou En-lai; and, finally, (10) Li Te-sheng, not a Lin protege but the protege of a protege, recently brought from an army command to be Director of the General Political Department. (Seven of these persons -- the first six, and the last -- are also members of the Party Politburo.)

The MAC Administrative Unit: The composition of the administrative unit of the MAC -- the equivalent of a Party secretariat -- has been reported only once (in 1968); it has probably added at least one officer. The seven reported officers as of 1968 were secretary-general Huang Yung-sheng and six others (all discussed above) from the standing committee -- the seven regarded (among MAC officers) as closest to Lin, every one of them a Lin protege in every sense.* Lin was obviously determined to have political security work in the PLA controlled by people he could trust, because, as he told them, it was to be their job to decide whom else he could trust. The officer probably added is Li Te-sheng, the General Political Department director noted above.

The General Staff: Although Lin himself is Minister of National Defense, this Ministry appears to be a superfluous echelon, largely bypassed in recent years, between the MAC and the General Staff.** It is

*The seven are Huang, Wu, Li, Chiu, Yeh, Wen and Liu, numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 in the previously-given list of the MAC leadership.

**Lin may plan to name Huang Yung-sheng to this post and make it once again important.
the Deputy Chiefs-of-Staff, not the Deputy Ministers of Defense, who are members of the Politburo and of the MAC standing committee and administrative unit; the MAC has not even bothered to replace the deputy ministers who were purged, and those still identified have not been close to Lin in recent years.

The General Staff is clearly the most important organ below the level of the MAC. Under C/S Huang Yung-sheng, who represents the ground forces, are 10 or 11 deputy chiefs who are concurrently the commanders or political officers of other service arms (Air Force, Navy, possibly Second Artillery), the heads of at least two of the three known general departments (Staff, Political, Logistics), the probable heads of certain key sub-departments of the General Staff Department, and two or three other key figures.

Again the clustering of Lin's proteges, and the occupancy of several key posts concurrently, is striking. Of the 10 or 11 military leaders who comprise this group (depending on whether Li Te-sheng has been added to the deputies), four or five -- Huang, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-peng, Chiu Hui-tso, and Li Te-sheng if added -- have been encountered above as concurrently members of the Politburo, of the MAC standing committee, and of the MAC administrative unit; and another, Wen Yu-cheng, on the MAC standing committee and the MAC administrative unit. Five of those six (all but Li) are Lin's proteges. Of the remaining five deputy chiefs-of-staffs, two are Lin proteges, and three are not.

Other Central Military Leaders: The other key figures of the central military leadership are the other leading officers of the principal service arms and the three general departments, other specialized service headquarters (artillery, armored, engineers, railway engineers, signal, public security, etc), the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission (research and development of advanced weapons), the Office of National Defense Industries (production of advanced
weapons), and the Peking Garrison. The picture is less striking at this level. Whereas Lin's proteges occupy the great majority of posts at the very top level discussed above, at this second level they occupy fewer than half. At this level they fill more than half of the leading posts only in certain arms and headquarters and offices which Lin presumably regards as especially sensitive -- the Air Force, Artillery, and 2nd Artillery (missiles). On this reasoning, an abundance of Lin proteges would be expected too in the General Political Department and the Peking Garrison, but this is apparently not the case at this time.*

*As of 1968-69, the General Political Department was inactive, and its work of indoctrination and surveillance was being handled by two special bodies, the Political Work Group and the Support-the-Left Group. The more important of the two, the Political Work Group, charged with investigating PLA leaders from army-level up, was apparently led by the Lin protege Wu Fa-hsien; the other was a mixed group. The Political Work Group may still exist, as yet another supervisory authority over the reconstructed General Political Department, but this seems unnecessary, as the MAC administrative unit, composed of the same Lin proteges, already exists for this purpose. The Political Work Group has not been heard from in the past year, and probably faded away as the General Political Department began operating again late in 1969. However, the Political Work Group very probably assembled the new General Political Department, which means that hard-core Lin-men were satisfied as to the reliability of the GPD's new leaders, even though most of those identified in the GPD do not seem to be Lin proteges themselves. Lin's control over the GPD is put into question not by the GPD leadership but by the fact that supervisory authority was divided -- as of 1968 -- between the MAC and Kang Sheng's political security apparatus. The latter may, as before, work through special political security groups in the political departments at all levels. However, as previously suggested, Chou En-lai's role in supervising political security work at least dilutes Kang's role.
There is a large group in the central military leadership -- several dozen people -- in unidentified posts of sufficient importance to rate a mention of their occupants on ceremonial occasions. Many of these are military positions at lower levels than those discussed above -- e.g., junior deputies in the service arms and headquarters, the directors of unpublicized military organs (e.g., intelligence), and the leaders of military schools. Many others, however, are the chiefs and deputy chiefs of Military Control Commissions in central government ministries, unspecified key figures in ministries from which the MCCs have been withdrawn, and key figures in the central Party apparatus now being constructed. There are several of Lin's proteges in this group, but they seem to be a small minority.

Lin's Domination: In sum, Lin Piao seems to dominate the central military leadership to the degree he wants to -- overwhelmingly (on this reading] at the top level, to a degree never before seen, largely through a small number of proteges in concurrent posts in the three most important organs; and selectively at the second level, although this may increase as new leading figures are identified. He does not seem to concern himself much with lower levels of the central leadership: he is content with a mixture of old-timers, proteges of other top-level and second-level leaders, and promising young people.
V. Lin and the Regional Military Leaders

The headquarters of the 11 Military Regions (MRs) have been in effect China's regional governments since the destruction of the Party's regional bureaus in 1966-67. The commander and political officer of each of these MRs are powerful figures, with authority (unless Peking chooses to exercise it directly) over the armies disposed in them; moreover, one or the other always heads the "revolutionary committee" (government) of the province in which the MR headquarters is located. The commanders and political officers of the 36 or more armies disposed in these MRs are also powerful figures; while subject to orders from the MRs or directly from Peking, they command the forces on which the leaders in Peking primarily depend for the imposition of their will outside Peking. The commanders and political officers of the 24 Military Districts (MDs) are normally less important, in that they normally control only PLA security forces, garrison commands, and the militia; but some have been concurrently (and first) the leaders of armies sent into sensitive areas, some have been given command of major tactical units in emergencies, and many have been important in the Cultural Revolution as the heads of "revolutionary committees" in those provinces not dominated by the MR leaders.

The Purged and the Proteges: When the Cultural Revolution began, the 11 MRs were dominated by the Party's regional bureaus (generally coterminous), which were of course parts of the Party machine directed by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. The regional first secretaries, stronger in their own right than the military commanders of these regions, were also the first political officers of all of these MRs, thus doubling their strength, and usually the first secretaries of the Party committees of the MRs. Most of the military commanders of the MRs, unlike the secretary-political
officers, were apparently not marked for purging when the Revolution began; however, a few were under suspicion, others came under suspicion with the purge of certain central military figures to whom they had been close, and others ran afoul of the Revolution itself.

All 11 of the Party-machine figures who were regional first secretaries and first political officers were brought down in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. At the same time, however, Lin Piao strongly expressed his confidence in several of his regional military commanders. At least four of them -- Huang Yung-sheng of Canton, Chen Hsi-lien of Shenyang, Hsu Shih-yu of Nanking, and Han Hsien-chu of Foochow -- were summoned by Lin in August 1966, together with a few central military leaders, to be told about Lin's plans for the conduct of the Cultural Revolution in the PLA. A fifth apparent favorite of Lin's, Yang Te-chih of Tsinan, may also have been present.*

*Four of these five had been pretty firmly established as protégés of Lin Piao long before the Cultural Revolution began. All five, the same age as Lin or a little younger, had served under Lin in their early careers and had gone on to important regional posts in the 1950s. Lin had probably arranged for Huang to succeed him as commander of the Canton MR in the early 1950s, and, soon after becoming Minister of National Defense in 1959, had named Chen, Hsu and Han to key posts (respectively commander of the Shenyang MR, deputy minister of national defense, and commander of the Foochow MR). The fifth of these figures, Yang Te-chih, became commander of the Tsinan MR soon after Lin returned to action in Peking in 1958, but it is not known whether Lin recommended him for the post; Yang's status was in some question for a time after the fall of Peng Te-huai in 1959, owing to his close association with Peng, and he may have been on probation in Lin's mind; by spring 1960, however, he was confirmed as the Tsinan commander, and from early 1962 seemed clearly in good favor. As it turned out, Yang was to have the easiest time of any of the regional commanders in the Cultural Revolution. Again, it must be admitted that some observers see these men -- and other MR leaders -- not as Lin's protégés but as independently powerful figures with whom he must "compromise."
In the course of the Revolution, Lin has continued to show great confidence in those five, but has replaced the military commanders of the other six MRs. The Peking MR was reorganized in 1967; Chengtu twice, in 1966 and 1967; Kunming in 1966-67; Wuhan in 1967; Sinkiang in 1968; and Lanchow in 1969. In each case but one (Lanchow), the replaced commander was purged.

The leaders of the armies disposed in the MRs and MDs, and the commanders and political officers of the MDs, were also a problem for Lin. The armies were in better shape than the MRs and MDs, but their political departments were responsible to the MR political officers (that is, Party-machine figures); and most of the MDs, like the MRs, were dominated by Party-machine types who were concurrently first secretaries and first political officers. In the course of the Revolution, Lin has changed the commands of several of the armies,* and has replaced 20 of the first political officers of the MDs and 19 of the military commanders of the MDs. Several of the MDs have been reorganized twice.

In these various reorganizations, many of Lin's proteges have moved into key positions, or have been promoted from key positions to higher and dominating positions. It seems apparent in these reorganizations, just as in the reorganizations of the central military structure, that Lin has been concerned to get his proteges -- men he has good reason to trust -- into the top-level positions, not into the second-and-third level positions: that is, to place them as commanders of MRs, for example, rather than MDs. Nevertheless,

*A precise figure for the armies cannot be provided; most of their leaders, when the Revolution began, were not known. There is general agreement that the purge of the armies has been substantial, but on nothing like the scale of the MR and MD headquarters.
he has not installed in these top positions as many proteges as he might have; he could, if he chose, have placed them in every top-level post in each MR, by taking some from other MRs saturated with them (Canton and Foochow), or -- probably -- in command of every army, by moving up some deputy commanders of other armies. But he has not done this, he has often been content with the man in place, and has sometimes assigned proteges of other leaders (even disgraced leaders) to key positions.

The Four Most Important MRs: The generally-accepted "strategic areas" of China -- so defined for a combination of political, military and economic regions -- center on Peking, Shenyang, Nanking and Canton. Peking too regards them as the most important. The largest numbers of armies are in these four MRs. Both the commander and the first political officer of one of these (Nanking) are on the Party politburo, the commander of another (Shenyang) is there, the political officer of another (Peking) is there, and the ex-commander of the fourth (Canton) is there. No other MRs are represented on the politburo.

The Shenyang MR, the center of the Northeast region once commanded by Lin, seems secure under Chen Hsi-lien, named to the post by Lin in 1959, shown to be in Lin's confidence during the Cultural Revolution, and added to the Politburo in 1969. (The first political officer is an old Party cadre restored by the Revolution.) The senior deputy commanders are also Lin's proteges. Most of the known army commanders in this MR are Lin-men or at least out of Lin's old forces. The military districts subordinate to this MR are apparently still being reorganized, and may or may not show the same pattern.

The Nanking MR is commanded by Hsu Shih-yu, another named to a key post by Lin in 1959, whose troops protected Mao and Lin in their winter retreat of 1965-66, who was working with Lin on his plans for the Cultural Revolution even prior to mid-1966, was protected by Mao
and Lin during the Revolution, and was added to the Politburo in 1969. (The first political officer, an old Party cadre who helped Mao to launch the Revolution, spends little time here and has apparently been replaced de facto by a Lin protege.) Most of the leading figures of armies and MDs here seem to be proteges of Hsu himself, presumably thought reliable for that reason.

The Canton MR, commanded until 1968 by the model Lin protege Huang Yung-sheng (then brought to Peking as Lin's first deputy), is commanded now by Ting Sheng, also a Lin protege from the 4th Field Army but not as close to Lin over the years as several others who were available. Ting was promoted from another area, apparently for exceptional service. Virtually all of the leading figures -- military and political -- of this MR, of the armies disposed in it, and of the subordinate MDs, are proteges of Lin and/or Huang. This MR seems to be just as solid as Shenyang and Nanking.

Among the four key MRs -- and now in fact among all 11 MRs -- Peking is the curious and inexplicable exception. Neither the acting commander nor the political officer is a Lin protege, nor are their senior deputies*; and in the Peking Garrison -- the immediately available coercive force -- only the commander is known to be a Lin man, and he is missing. However, some of the armies in this MR are commanded by men who are Lin's

*Lin began the Cultural Revolution with one of his long time proteges -- Yang Yung -- in the key post of commander of this MR. Purged in 1967, Yang is the only Lin protege among the 60-odd regional military leaders known or believed purged. There are several Lin proteges among the missing, but some of these have been reported under rehabilitation (perhaps saved by their ties with Lin), and most are expected to show up eventually.
proteges or out of his old forces, and his proteges are beginning to appear in the MD commands.

The Seven Lesser MRs: The seven other MRs all seem to be in generally good shape, from Lin's point of view. The Tsinan MR is commanded by a Lin favorite, Yang Te-chih, the acting political officer is a long-time Lin protege, and there may be others in the armies there. The Foochow MR under Han Hsien-chu is a model, with all of the leading posts in the MR, and others in the armies and the MDs, held by proteges and personal friends of Lin's. The Wuhan MR is commanded by Lin's protege and friend Tseng Szu-yu and has some other Lin-men in the MR headquarters. The Chengtu MR is commanded by two figures described by Lin as "old friends," one of whom is in fact his protege, the other apparently favored by Mao for his support at a critical time; the subordinate Tibet MD is dominated by Lin's proteges, and there may be others in the armies. The Kunming MR has also been led by two men described by Lin as his "old friends," who have apparently been reorganizing the armies and MDs; that one of the two who fits the pattern of a Lin protege has just now died; and the other may replace him in the top post. The Sinkiang MR, troublesome until 1968, has been stable for the past two years under two of Lin's proteges, one of whom may have been transferred recently to the less satisfactory Peking MR.

The Lanchow MR, as of summer 1970, was an exception, and an important one, because it contains the ancillary PLA headquarters (at Sian) and a number of China's most sensitive military facilities. Neither the commander nor the political officer was a Lin protege, and the senior figures throughout the MR were old-timers in the area who had had ties with two purged military leaders. In recent months, however, Lin has sent into this MR a strong army commanded by his longtime protege, Pi Ting-chun, as the new commander of the MR. (Pi's profile resembles that of Ting Sheng in Canton.)
He was serving with Lin as early as 1937, but has been closer over the years to other Lin proteges -- Hsu Shih-yu, Chen Hsi-lien, and Han Hsien-chu -- than to Lin himself.) Pi seems to have become the head of the MR Party committee, a post reportedly held previously by the first political officer. Lin may increasingly arrange for his proteges to get these key Party posts.*

In sum, Lin's position with respect to the Military Regions seems very strong. Almost all of the MR commanders are his proteges. So are several of the first political officers, and the others have seemed also to serve him well in the Cultural Revolution. Many other leading figures in the MRs, and in the armies disposed in them, are Lin's proteges. Only the Peking MR still seems to require reorganization. Lin's proteges do not dominate the relatively unimportant military districts to anything like the degree that they dominate the powerful military regions, and Lin does not seem to feel a need for this degree of domination at the lower level. But Lin's men are still reorganizing the MDs, and additional proteges of Lin's are expected to appear in them as well.

*In the past, the first political officer was almost always the first secretary of the Party committee of the military region or other organization. Lin may be changing that, making the military commander normally the dominant figure. Evidence is inconclusive. Only two first secretaries -- or untitled heads -- of Party committees in the MRs had been credibly reported earlier: Chang Chun-chiao in the Nanking MR, who is the first political officer, and Lung Shu-chin in the Sinkiang MR, who is the military commander. If Pi is now the head of the Party committee in the Lanchow MR, two of three would be military commanders.
VI. Lin and the State Machinery

As Lin himself observed, the PLA in 1967 was forced to take over the state machinery, regarded by Mao and himself as being almost as unsatisfactory as the Party apparatus which controlled it. Lin said at the time that the PLA did not intend to remain in the state machinery longer than necessary. But it is still there, and is evidently to stay.

The Central Government: The Military Affairs Committee had control of the National Defense Scientific & Technological Commission (research and development of advanced weapons) long before the Cultural Revolution began, and in spring 1967 it took over the Office of National Defense Industries (production of advanced weapons), which directs the work of the important ministries of heavy industry. The MAC was apparently to keep control of these organs permanently. Those organs -- staff offices, other ministries and commissions, bureaus and special agencies -- which were to be supervised only temporarily by the PLA were placed under Military Control Commissions. These MCCs were apparently installed in almost all central government organs, including the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Many of the PLA leaders in the state machinery have been identified, but only a few have been tied to particular posts. Some of them are proteges of Lin Piao -- e.g., the head of the ministry believed to be concerned with nuclear weapons -- but most of them are not. Lin has apparently not been interested in establishing himself strongly -- through proteges -- in the state machinery across the board.

In recent months the central government has been briskly reorganizing, consolidating the ministries and
reducing their number, deactivating the Military Control Commissions and appointing top officials. In the process, PLA officers who have presumably been the leaders of MCCs in the ministries are being appointed as civilian officials. For example, in recent weeks a PLA leader has been listed in second place among officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and another has been named the new Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. Many other career military men have appeared in the news in such a way as to indicate that they will be named to similar posts. In general, these men are not well-known figures. This means that they are not Lin's longtime proteges, the sense in which "protege" has been used in this paper. The chances are that they are not even more recent proteges. The appointments of PLA officers at this level are probably handled not by Lin or even by the MAC standing committee but by some lesser body such as the MAC administrative unit in consultation with Chou En-lai's State Council.

Beyond the purview given him by the MAC's control of the NDS&T Commission and the NDIO and by the MCCs in the ministries, Lin apparently relies on Chou En-lai to tell him what he needs to know about the work of the government. There is some evidence that Chou clears with Lin (as the Party vice-chairman with a need-to-know) the important decisions made by Chou himself and by the state machinery.

Provincial Machinery: There is no regional state machinery, and, since 1967, no regional Party machinery outside the MR commands; as noted above, the MR commands have been the de facto regional governments. However, there has been a provincial government machinery, in the form of the "revolutionary committees" in which power is theoretically shared equally by PLA representatives, old Party cadres, and representatives of mass organizations (students and workers). These committees were set up largely by Chou En-lai and the central CRG, but there is much testimony that the PLA has dominated their operations on the spot from the start. This would be expected, as the weapons, the Support-the-Left troops,
and the security departments of the committees themselves are all in the hands of the PLA. This has not, however, been a stable domination, which the PLA figures could impose if left to themselves. Mao intervenes periodically to improve the relative positions of the Party and mass components, telling the military to avoid coercion and work patiently for agreements, a policy which, as noted above, institutionalizes conflict in a novel way.

Of the 26 provincial revolutionary committees, some five to seven are apparently being reorganized, and their present leading figures are not known.* Of the remainder, proteges of Lin Piao are the chairmen of 10, and are the first vice-chairmen of two or three others. Two other provincial committees are headed by Party cadres who worked under Lin in the old Central-South apparatus and who may have been sponsored by him in recent years. Several of Lin's proteges are in positions in yet other committees -- for example, as one of several vice-chairmen -- which are less important but in which they can at least watch what goes on.

It can be argued that Lin is making an effort to dominate these committees through his proteges, but the appearance of this is probably deceptive. Lin does of course have an interest in having reliable leaders in all of the provinces, just as in the military districts. But, just as it was found that Lin felt no need to install his proteges in the Military District commands, he does not appear to be trying to install them in most of these provincial committees, an equivalent

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*The leading figures are the chairman and the first vice-chairmen. In most cases, either the chairman or the first vice-chairman has had long experience in the area; sometimes both have had. In the few cases in which neither has had this history, there are others on the committees who have worked a long time in those areas.
level of power. The exceptions are the provinces in which the MR headquarters are located. There the commanders or political officers of the MRs are concurrently the chairmen of the revolutionary committees. In other words, each holds the provincial post in order to facilitate his tasks in the far more important MR post. In provinces which do not contain an MR headquarters, few of the revolutionary committee chairmen are Lin's proteges. If Lin felt it necessary, he could probably put proteges into almost all of those chairs. Moreover, even if the assumption here -- that Lin does not feel a need to dominate the lower levels to the degree he does the higher -- is mistaken, control of the new Party committees in the provinces would be more useful to him.
VII. Lin and the Emerging Party Apparatus

As noted above, the true base of power for Mao and Lin in recent years has been the PLA, not the Party. While Mao and Lin are both committed in principle to restoring the primacy of "the Party", some years will probably be required to make this actual. The present situation -- in which "the Party" consists largely of the Party apparatus in the PLA -- is presumably agreeable to Lin for the time being, as he is the head of the military establishment, and the military Party apparatus is responsive to the MAC. But he must turn his attention to constructing an overall Party apparatus which, by the time that he becomes the head of the Party, will be as responsive to him as the military Party apparatus is now. He cannot, of course, know how much time he will have to work in.

The Old Central Apparatus: Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the central Party apparatus under the Politburo standing committee -- and apart from the MAC -- consisted essentially of: the Party secretariat, i.e., the secretary-general (the Party's chief executive officer) and several secretaries, each of whom had some large area of concern (e.g., political security, propaganda, agriculture) and supervised one or more of the Party's central departments; the staff office, an administrative organ for the secretariat which had also some sensitive political security responsibilities (records of Party meetings, personnel files, protection of Party leaders); the central departments (e.g., organization, propaganda, political security, foreign liaison, united front work, various political departments for sectors of the economy); the central control commission, which examined and dealt with violations of discipline by Party members; a political research office (under Chen Po-ta) responsible to Mao personally; and a special five-man group, also set up by Mao,
charged with purging the arts. Except for the staff office (the director of which was replaced), this entire structure was destroyed in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, and most of its ranking personnel were purged.

The Cultural Revolution Group: As noted previously, a central Cultural Revolution Group set up in the spring of 1966 had become the de facto secretariat by the end of 1966,* and in 1967 certain of its officers were given the central roles in rebuilding the Party. The Party congress of 1969 did not establish a new Party secretariat, and the central CRG has reportedly continued to function as the de facto secretariat. With Chen Po-ta missing since 1 August and out of action (if not favor), the effective secretariat has seemed to consist of Kang Sheng, Madame Mao, the ideologues Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan, and Wang Tung-hsing (long Mao's bodyguard and since 1966 the head of the sensitive staff office).

These officers -- all of them Politburo members -- have continued to be treated in Peking's media as the most prestigious group below the level of the Politburo standing committee -- more so than the military leaders as a group. This treatment seems to reflect Mao's view of them, all of whom have records of absolute fidelity to Mao. This group would not seem satisfactory to Lin, however, as a Party secretariat. Some of them

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*The special five-man group was abolished and replaced by the CRG, the political research group was absorbed by the CRG (headed by the same person, Chen Po-ta), the central control commission was set aside, the central departments were put out of business one by one, and finally the secretaries themselves -- with a few exceptions -- were purged. The process was complete by early 1967.
have clashed seriously with people close to Lin if not with Lin himself, and in any case there is no person close to Lin in this group. Moreover, these five officials do not have the range of the old secretariat. Kang and Wang can answer for one very important function, political security; Kang, Chang and Yao have been concerned in recent years with organizational work; Chang, Yao, and Madame Mao have had much experience with propaganda work; and Kang is an old hand in liaison with foreign Communist Parties. But this de facto secretariat clearly needs to have someone to handle liaison between the Party apparatus and the Military Affairs Committee and at least one person to coordinate the work of the economic departments.

The previously-cited report that Mao had assigned Lin Piao the central role in Party-building -- the role previously played by Kang Sheng -- has not been clarified and is hard to assess. It may mean that Kang, who apparently remains in favor, retains primary responsibility for the cleansing of the Party -- his career specialty -- while Lin now supervises the central CRG as a whole in the process of "taking in new blood."* The Politburo standing committee as a whole probably reviews the key appointments both in the Party center and in the provinces, and Mao probably keeps for himself the power to resolve disputes.

*Subsequent to his reported appointment to head the Party-building effort, Kang himself, in conversation, emphasized the "investigative" part of his functions. It seems possible that the original report was in error in assigning Kang the central role in the entire process, and that he has really been responsible all along simply for the purging of the Party apparatus, while the other members of the CRG have been responsible for reconstruction.
It is impossible to judge whether Lin is in any way responsible for the current inactivity of Chen Po-ta. However, apart from this, it seems likely that Lin is taking or has already taken action to change the composition of the central CRG. Lin has among his proteges in the PLA structure specialists of the kinds the secretariat seems to require -- men who have acquired considerable competence in liaison with non-military organs and in non-military affairs generally in recent years. It is possible that PLA figures are already working on the CRG, without publicity, in some such status as the alternate secretaries of the old secretariat.

The Subordinate Apparatus: The organization of the central Party apparatus, below the level of the central CRG, is conjectural. Peking has spoken of "central departments" in the old sense, but it has identified only the United Front Work Department as active again. *

It may be that, in accordance with Mao's and Lin's expressed determination to simplify all administrations, the central Party apparatus has been simplified -- at least nominally. It may be divided, as the revolutionary committees in the provinces seem to be, into four large functional areas: administration, political work, production, and security. If so, there are probably various departments within these areas.

As for administration, the chances are that the "central committee" staff office, which for some years has seemed to be subordinate directly to the politburo standing committee, has been taken over again by the

*The General Political Department is subordinate to the MAC, not the CRG.
de facto secretariat. Wang Tung-hsing as an officer of the central CRG would thus supervise himself as head of the staff office.

The political work area would include the work of the old departments of organization and propaganda, united front work, and liaison. Any combination of Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan could supervise this.

The production area would include the work of the several old departments concerned with economic planning, finance and trade, industry and commerce, and agriculture and forestry. No one known to be an officer of the secretariat is qualified to supervise this area.

The security area would be concerned both with political security (the Party, especially the leadership) and public security (the populace). The chances are that the de facto political security directorate, believed to exist in recent years, subordinate at first to Mao directly and then (like the staff office) to the Politburo standing committee, has now been re-absorbed by this de facto secretariat. Kang Sheng and Wang Tung-hsing as officers of the CRG may supervise themselves as heads of the security area, and may concurrently head some of the departments of this area, e.g., a reconstituted Social Affairs Department or (a later name) Political Security Department.

Various PLA officers at the Central Committee level, who are in unidentified posts in Peking, are almost certainly working in the central Party apparatus. These men, including proteges of Lin, appear in the Central Committee lists on ceremonial occasions rather than in the lists of those working in the central apparatus. The latter lists are composed mostly of unknown or little-known figures, all below the Central Committee level, who have risen on the Cultural Revolution. However, many PLA leaders -- both commanders and political officers, when last seen -- have been
identified on these lists; more than one-third of the thus-far identified cadres of the central Party apparatus are known to be PLA officers, and as many as half may be. It seems apparent that Lin means to have PLA men in at least the sensitive departments of the central Party apparatus.

One such department is the reconstructed political security department under whatever name.* Known and suspected political security specialists appear on Peking's lists of those working in the central Party apparatus; some of them are PLA officers. Moreover, the PLA political officers identified on these lists are experienced in similar work and some have probably been assigned to this area in the apparatus. Lin is well aware, from Mao's experience in the years before the Cultural Revolution, of the importance of having one's own men in political security work -- if not directing it, then watching from above and below those who do direct it.

Others identified on Peking's lists for the central apparatus have been specialists in united front work, liaison, and economic organizational work. No cadres from the old organization and propaganda departments have been identified, but, again, the PLA political officers can easily be redirected to these kinds of work, and some probably have been.

**Provincial Party Committees:** As noted previously, all of the first secretaries of the Party's regional bureaus, and almost all of the first secretaries of provincial Party committees, were purged in the early stages

*There may be a separate Public Security Department -- which, according to Red Guard materials, was the case in the early 1960s.
of the Cultural Revolution; the Military Region headquarters became the only regional authorities, while the provincial committees were replaced provisionally by provincial "revolutionary committees." Beginning in early 1967, these committees were directed to form Party "core groups" which in turn were to reconstruct full-scale Party committees. These Party committees, when formed, were to operate within the "revolutionary committees," and were to exercise "absolute leadership" within them. In other words, the Party committee was to use the established machinery of the revolutionary committee, and was to be the stable and controlling element.*

The PLA members of the revolutionary committees have apparently taken the lead in forming these "core groups," which, to judge from the few known examples, have normally been composed of the leaders of the existing revolutionary committees. The composition of the core groups has reportedly had to be approved by the national leadership in Peking -- notably by the central CRG, although it seems likely that the MAC also has a voice. The composition of the Party committees must also be approved by the central CRG -- and again, probably, by the MAC -- before the committee can begin to operate.

Many counties -- more than 100 -- have produced approved Party committees, but as of mid-December only one province had done so. The process of forming these committees has moved very slowly -- in part because Mao and Lin have emphasized that these committees are to be composed of true Maoists, and it is necessary

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*Members of the Party committee can, in general, be expected to take command of the key departments of the revolutionary committee -- certainly the political and security departments, probably the administrative and production departments.
for the three components of the revolutionary committees (the military, the old Party cadres, and the mass representatives) to agree among themselves as to which of themselves are the most true. Beyond this, it seems likely that some agreements have been reached but have then been rejected by Peking. Such rejections may reflect differences in Peking itself, e.g., between the CRG and the MAC.

There are members of the CCP Central Committee in all three categories -- military, cadres, and mass -- in almost every one of the provinces. The selections for the Central Committee were reportedly made (in early 1969) by the central CRG, the body which has to approve the composition of the provincial Party committees. It was apparently the CRG's intention -- approved by Mao and Lin -- to have its selections for the Central Committee serve in the Party core group in each province and to be named then as the core of the full-scale Party committee. In other words, the same people -- the CRG at the top, and the Central Committee members in the provinces -- were to dominate the process from start to finish.

There is no single category which now dominates the provincial revolutionary committees. "Military men" dominate most of them, but these are divided into career military commanders and career political officers. The others are headed, with few exceptions, by career Party-machine men who are now acting as political officers.

In choosing the heads of the provincial Party committees, there are three possible strategies. One is to return to the pre-1954 emphasis, in which men who were primarily military leaders took regional or provincial Party posts as their second posts. (Lin Piao himself, in the period 1949-54, was the commander of the Central-South Military Region and of the great 4th Field Army, and was concurrently first secretary of the Party's Central-South Bureau.) Another is to return to the course of the late 1950s and early 1960s, in which primarily political men -- important chiefly
as leaders in the Party apparatus -- were installed as the first secretaries of Party regional bureaus or provincial committees and took as their second posts those of first political officers of the military regions and districts. Peking could do this now, by naming civilian Party figures (acceptable old Party cadres) to head all of the new provincial Party committees and assigning them as political officers concurrently. The third course would be to name as the heads of the new provincial Party committees -- as the heads of the "revolutionary committees" are now -- a mix of people, some primarily military commanders, some primarily political officers, and some primarily civilian Party cadres.*

This third course will probably be chosen. The first two categories combined will probably be, then as now, much larger than the third. (There may be two or three mass representatives, a fourth category, installed as First Secretaries.) Thus men identified primarily with the PLA will dominate most of the provincial Party committees.

In the present situation, the principle of Party "control" of the military is expressed chiefly as military Party control of the military, through the military Party committees running up to the MAC. This will probably be true for some time to come. If as expected military commanders are chosen to head some of the new provincial Party committees, Mao and Lin may

*It will be impossible in any given case to judge the single dominant figure until the first secretary is identified, as this person will have far more power than anyone else on the committee. This does not mean that he alone will count -- just that this post will dispose of more power than three or four lesser posts as simple secretaries or standing committee members.
choose to improve appearances immediately, and prepare the ground for a transfer of allegiance eventually, by requiring them to divest themselves of their military titles and uniforms.* This would not be necessary, in the cases of men who are to be both provincial Party secretaries and political officers.

One simple solution would be to name the political officer as the first secretary and the military commander as his senior deputy, in which case both could continue as PLA officers concurrently with their Party roles. This arrangement, which would not pose the problem of the military commander as first secretary, has been noted in a few instances at the county level.**

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*Some reporting has suggested such an intention. If it is true, as reported, that military leaders (commanders) named to provincial Party committees will no longer be members of the Party committees of their military units, then presumably they will no longer be military men at all.

**Of the one provincial Party committee thus far announced (Hunan, not the seat of an MR headquarters), the first secretary is an old Party cadre who had been the acting chairman of the revolutionary committee, the next-ranking secretary is a career political officer who has been first political officer of the Hunan MD for the past year or so, and the deputy secretary is a career military commander who has been commander of that MD for the past two years or so. Only this third-ranking secretary is regarded as a protege of Lin's. The three are ranked in the Party hierarchy precisely as they have been ranked -- one, two, three -- in the press for several months, a pattern that may be followed in other provinces.
It is not clear, however, that Mao and Lin are ready to emphasize the primacy of the "civilian" Party apparatus at this time. Some military commanders may simply take over the Party committees concurrently (like Lin in 1949-54) and may wear a third hat as chairman of the "revolutionary committee" and even a fourth as head of the military Party committee. In such instances, these commanders would continue to be responsible to two hierarchies -- the military Party system answerable to the MAC and the "civilian" (really mixed) Party system said to be answerable primarily to the central CRG. Peking would have to take care to ensure that the same orders are passed down the two chains of command. Moreover, in the absence of a regional Party organization, the Party committee of a Military Region headquarters would presumably be superior to all provincial Party committees; so Peking would have to work out some system to prevent conflict between those military Party committees and the provincial committees, the military members of which would have to obey the MR Party organization.

As noted previously, at present the revolutionary committee of every province in which a Military Region headquarters is located is chaired by either the military commander or the political officer of that MR, apparently to facilitate the control of all developments in these critical centers of power. While Lin and other military leaders may feel secure on this point now (with the mass organizations under control), this consideration may persist for a time. If so, the military men chosen as heads of the new provincial Party committees may be mainly from this group. And if so, most will probably be proteges of Lin Piao.
VIII. Lin's Prospects

Mao, now 77, may die or become incapacitated at any time, but he may conceivably last for some years yet (he might decide to live forever), and Lin's own health is not robust. Lin, although only 63, might die first, or might die soon after becoming Party chairman. Assuming that Lin does outlast Mao for a substantial period, his prospects seem fairly good for holding the post as long as his health holds.* He would seem, at least, to have more going for him than any one else has, and more than outside observers have generally been willing to credit to him.

Lin Without Mao: In considering Lin as the successor, one must begin from the recognition of what he has accomplished in recent years. He has transformed the PLA, from its state of uneven competence and low morale in 1959, into a formidable force and instrument. In the Cultural Revolution, he has accomplished the almost incredible feat of massively purging the PLA at the same time that he has used it successfully as the principal instrument of the Revolution. Such a man has got to be taken seriously.

*If his health does not hold and he and Mao both die in the next few years, Chou En-lai and Huang Yung-sheng will probably be the dominant figures. A Chou-Huang alliance might soon lead to the suppression of the civilian radicals of the central CRG. If Chou too dies, the military leaders around Huang will probably dictate the choice of a successor, but there does not seem to be any individual after Chou so outstanding as to be acclaimed the Leader; thus a collective would be likely.
It is true that Lin has never in his adult life been without Mao, the source of his authority and assurance. It is probably also true that Lin, without Mao, would never have dared to make the demands on the PLA that he has made. And it is probably further true that, if Mao had not been standing behind Lin, the PLA would not have responded as it has. In other words, it seems likely that only Mao, among Chinese leaders, can command such awe that heavily-armed men will meekly accept their ruin at his hands, and that other heavily-armed men will try persistently to carry out policies which can result in their own ruin if anything goes wrong or if the great man changes his mind.

But it does not follow from this that Lin will simply come apart when Mao goes, or will soon be blown away. Lin seems to be made of sterner stuff than that, and to have more assets than that. Even if it is Mao's will rather than Lin's which is commanding, Lin will begin with Mao's clear and emphatic mandate. He will also benefit from the common interest of Chinese leaders in appearing at a time of crisis to be unified and to be moving forward with confidence. He will have his record in the Cultural Revolution, which should inspire at least respect and caution. And he will have what seem to be formidable organizational assets and unequalled opportunities to increase them.

Lin and Chou: The most critical relationship would seem to be that with Chou En-lai, if both Lin and Chou last. Lin seems to need Chou badly -- as by far the most intelligent and able man in the leadership, with the best record as a manager of all kinds of affairs. Unlike the other members of the Politburo standing committee, Chou can do many things for Lin that Lin cannot do for himself. (Chen Po-ta could of course be useful, to help Lin to formulate his version of Mao's "thought," and Kang Sheng could of course be useful, to the degree that Lin were willing to let a man not close to himself do his police work for him;
but Chou seems really indispensable, as the only member of the super-elite with any substantial knowledge of the non-Communist world and of the economy.) And Chou would seem at least for a while to need Lin, as the holder of the mandate and as a Maoist protector against those elements of the leadership who may feel now, or come to feel, that Chou is not a true Maoist. Thus it would seem likely that, while their predispositions differ, they would get along the way Mao and Chou have got along: Lin would value Chou for the many reasons that he should, Chou would work within the boundaries set by Lin, and they would be a strong partnership.

It is true that calculations of mutual need have sometimes been mistaken.* And there is a potential for serious conflict in the Lin-Chou relationship. The main reason for thinking so is not that Chou is likely to challenge Lin, but that Lin's tendency is to be suspicious and mistrustful; he seems to trust comparatively few people. Chou has seemed to be established as one of those few, but this could change. With Mao gone, the very popular Chou, believed to be more popular than Lin even with PLA leaders, and the only Chinese leader with the stature to challenge Lin, might be seen increasingly by an insecure and apprehensive Lin as

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*About ten years ago, surveying the visibly troubled Chinese leadership in the wake of the Leap Forward and commune programs and the split with Moscow, the present writer tried to guess which of Mao's lieutenants -- among the many who had reason to wish for another leader -- might be disposed to challenge him. In considering Liu Shao-chi and his proteges, it was concluded that Mao and Liu would need each other for mutual protection against other elements of the leadership whose record in recent years had been better. As is now well known, soon after that time Liu among others began to work against Mao; and Mao, after transferring his base of power to the PLA, did not need Liu. 

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the central figure of a military-moderate cabal working against himself and all true Maoists.

On balance, the probability seems to be for a continuing good relationship between Lin and Chou, who are not expected to divide sharply on policy. The possibility of a deterioration is simply one of the many factors in the picture of the Chinese leadership that require a continuing assessment.*

Lin, Chen and Kang: Lin's relations with the other two members of the Politburo standing committee, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng, will probably continue to be strained in some respects -- at least, less amiable than with Chou. Lin seems more likely, now and in the future, to work with Chou to limit the influence of Chen and Kang, than to work with Chen and/or Kang to limit the influence of Chou. As noted above, however, there is a chance that Lin will come to distrust Chou after Mao's death, and in this event Lin might regard Chen and Kang, if still in place, as the true Maoists at his side.

If Chen, now missing, has fallen from Mao's favor and a vacancy has been created on the Politburo standing committee, Lin will probably do his best to

*Clues might come from developments in the PLA and the government, as each already has a hand in the other's area of primary concern -- Chou in the PLA, Lin in the government. If now, while each has direct access to Mao and thus an opportunity to work against the other, Chou seems to be trying to arrange a purge of Lin's proteges in the PLA, or Lin seems to be trying to surround and bind Chou with unqualified military men, one might reasonably forecast a showdown struggle after Mao goes. There is, however, no present evidence of this.
place one of his own proteges -- one would suppose Huang Yung-sheng -- on it. This would appear to give Lin effective control of the standing committee -- himself, Chou, and Huang or some other protege -- at the time of Mao's death without the need for making changes in the leadership at an already agitated time. If Lin cannot manage this now, he and Chou will probably act together to change the composition of the standing committee soon after Mao's death.

The Politburo: If the politburo is to be a voting body, Lin will probably be able to dominate it even without changing it. The chances are, however, that it will not be a genuine voting body under Lin, just as it has not been under Mao. Lin will probably make much greater use of it as a discussion group, in which various points of view are heard and considered. Chou En-lai will probably prevail on Lin to add some economic specialists to the Politburo.

The Military Leaders: The Chinese military leadership will continue to constitute Lin's principal base of power, as the men he can call upon to enforce his decisions. Lin will almost certainly continue to dominate the central military leadership through the three critical organs, the Military Affairs Committee, its administrative unit, and the General Staff. This domination will depend on the continued fidelity of a handful of Lin's longtime proteges and close associates, especially Huang Yung-sheng, the second-ranking military leader (who has a share in several of Lin's key proteges and has others of his own). In this connection, Lin is probably right about his military comrades -- that is, that while most of them are not Maoists to the degree that Lin is, they will nevertheless be loyal to him.

It is probably true that most military leaders have mixed feelings about Lin, and that he has alienated at least a few of those still in place. Although a
lifelong military man who is most comfortable with other military men, he has been above all faithful to Mao. This has meant unwavering support of Mao in his periodic purges, humiliations and reindoctrinations of the PLA. However, the surviving members of the central military leadership are for the most part men whom Lin has favored for many years and has advanced and protected in the Cultural Revolution, men who have reason to be loyal to him. So long as Lin does not make demands on these men so extreme that they cannot be met, and does not threaten or attempt to carry out another great purge for failure to meet such demands, a revolt by the central military leadership seems quite unlikely.* If, however, Lin were to make extreme demands and threaten or begin to carry out such a purge -- if, in other words, he were to behave just like Mao -- there would seem to be a strong possibility of a coup by his own proteges. That is to say: there is undoubtedly a limit to what can be demanded of any group of men, and the limit has probably been reached under Mao. If Lin were to attempt to put them all through it again -- men who have

*Lin has given much thought to the possibility of a coup, and (in a 1966 speech justifying a great purge of the Party) has even pointed out to other Party leaders that most of the attempted coups in other countries in the past decade -- most of those of which there is a record -- have been successful. Mao and Lin have constructed an elaborate system of mutual surveillance to prevent such an attempt against themselves, and in normal circumstances this would probably be reliable. That is, a successful conspiracy would probably require the participation of a substantial number of officers -- to seize and hold strategic centers -- and it would be very difficult to recruit these without encountering some who would refuse and who would expose the others. But in extreme circumstances -- e.g. the threat of another Cultural Revolution -- the chances would be better.
served him well, and who are entitled to expect decent treatment in return -- the chances are that he could not get away with it.

The most important military leaders outside Peking are also men who have reason to be loyal to Lin, and to remain so except in an extreme situation. Lin will probably continue to think it important to dominate the 11 Military Region headquarters -- the centers of real power outside Peking -- through his proteges there. He may be acting now, or may act soon, to place more of his proteges in the Peking MR headquarters -- the only one in which neither the commander nor the political officer is a Lin protege -- and in the Peking Garrison, the very sensitive political security force in the capital. There is an outside chance of a rebellion by one of these regional commands, but no regional center could hold out for long against the central authority; regional rebellions would be expected only if some part of the center were to lead the way. More of Lin's proteges will probably appear as commanders of Military Districts as well as MRs, but this level of power is not critical, and Lin will not try to blanket the MDs with his men.

The State Machinery: The state machinery will remain of much less importance in the structure of power than is the military structure. The MAC will probably retain control over the research and development of modern weapons, and of the public security apparatus. PLA officers will probably take over -- whether as PLA officers or as civilians -- a number of the ministries.* In general, Lin probably will not try to install his proteges throughout the state machinery, but will rely heavily on Chou En-lai to keep him informed and on the reconstructed Party apparatus.

*The new Constitution provides for continuing PLA participation in the government.
within the state machinery to supervise and direct it. This will probably be true at the provincial level too; that is, Lin will probably not aim at the chairmanships of revolutionary committees per se, but will seek to place proteges at the heads of the emerging Party committees in the most important provinces, some of whom may head the revolutionary committees concurrently.

The Emerging Party Apparatus: The now emerging central Party apparatus (below the Politburo level) will steadily increase in importance, and within a few years will rival the MAC and the rest of the military Party apparatus as a power system. Lin can be expected to supervise closely the reconstruction of this apparatus. It seems very likely that Lin will try to change the composition of the de facto Party secretariat, if he has not already done so. Those added will probably be PLA figures, now in the MAC and its subordinate bodies, who in recent years have acquired additional skills.

As the central Party apparatus subordinate to the secretariat gets sorted out, proteges of Lin will very probably appear at the top level, while proteges of his proteges (other PLA leaders) will probably appear at lower levels. As a general proposition, the strength of Lin's men in the apparatus seems likely to increase in strength as the apparatus itself increases. Lin will probably make a special effort to get control of the political security department -- as vital to his survival -- or at least to restrict its role in the affairs of the PLA. Lin will almost certainly put his own man at the head of this department after Mao's death.

As the Party committee system in the provinces get reconstructed, proteges of Lin will probably be well represented there too. Most of the new Party committees will probably be headed by men who either remain organizationally a part of the PLA or at least have made their careers in the PLA. Lin may experience some difficulty in bringing such men to identify themselves with, and respond smoothly to, a reconstructed Party apparatus. However, Lin does not seem to see organizational loyalty as the central problem. That is, what
Lin wants is what Mao has wanted -- lieutenants whose allegiance is primarily to himself, not to an abstract "PLA" or "Party."

Lin as a "True Maoist": Lin has been previously been described, in the first paper in this series and in this one, as a "true Maoist." The essential characteristic of the true Maoist -- exemplified by Lin above all others -- has been his loyalty to Mao personally, his identification with Mao in all circumstances, his willingness to subordinate his own interest to Mao's, and in particular his readiness to take the blame for Mao's mistakes. (For many years, those who have attempted to place the responsibility for failure on Mao's policies, rather than on their own misunderstanding or faulty execution, have been purged.) And the Cultural Revolution has been in fact -- rather than in theory -- concerned above all with examining and testing this loyalty to Mao personally, not to any body of doctrine. In this sense, all of the members of the Politburo standing committee, including Chou En-lai, and most of Peking's other current leaders, have been true Maoists.

The term "true Maoist" has also implied, however, a high degree of acceptance of Mao's "thought." (This has been clearly implied in another term used to describe Lin -- "reliable revolutionary successor," which it was the declared purpose of the Cultural Revolution to produce.) At the center of this "thought" has been not so much a set of ideological propositions as a faith -- in the eventual perfectibility of the Party cadre, and in his ability to transform even common men. In practice, the "thought" calls for unremitting political indoctrination, which instills moral incentives and produces the indomitable revolutionary will. The will thus produced in the cadres, and to a lesser degree in the masses, is mobilized in great campaigns -- whether destructive, like the campaigns against counter-revolutionaries, or constructive, like the Leap Forward and "people's commune" programs, or both, like the Cultural Revolution. The aim of these campaigns is to create
a new Chinese society, egalitarian, austere, and self-purifying through class struggle, which is to serve as the model and liberating instrument for other peoples.

Because Mao's own predispositions are radical and militant, calling for maximum advance on a revolutionary line, Mao's "thought" is sometimes equated with just these features of his thought. However, Mao's "thought" does provide for periods of retreat and consolidation, sobriety and caution. His leadership for many years has shown this pattern: of militant advance until such time as the real world (e.g., human nature, or Soviet and American military strength) compels a retreat. He is skilled in retreating: no other head of any Communist Party has shown such an ability to survive as has Mao. Observers who have failed to recognize that retreat and consolidation are also features of Mao's "thought" have sometimes incorrectly concluded, in periods of retreat and consolidation, that Mao was no longer the leader.

The "true Maoists" among Mao's lieutenants -- in the sense of those loyal to him personally, whether in advance or retreat -- have seemed to be divided among themselves in an important way. On one hand, there are those who associate themselves most happily with periods of militant advance, and on the other those who seem to work best in an atmosphere of sobriety and caution. Lin Piao's predispositions have seemed to be, like Mao's, radical and militant. Most other Party leaders, including Chou En-lai and almost all of the military leaders, have seemed to be less so. Chou in particular, and the military leaders for the most part, have seemed to serve Mao well even in periods of militant advance, but their preference has seemed to be for the less glaring colors in the spectrum of Mao's thought.

The first paper in this series concluded that, while Lin might soon be deposed or forced to make substantial modifications in Mao's policies, he would begin as a "true Maoist radical." This formulation has proved misleading for some readers, when taken as implying that Lin accepts only the radical features of Mao's
emphatic association with the most radical and militant features of Mao's thought -- so that he seems clearly in the "radical" camp when the leadership is divided on those lines -- reflects not so much his own predisposition as his sense of what loyalty to Mao entails. That is, when Mao clearly favors a "radical" line, Lin feels obliged to state his own favor in even stronger terms; and when Mao fails to make his position clear, as is often the case, Lin feels obliged to state his own position in terms which he knows to be in accord with Mao's predisposition. This is perhaps the true meaning of Lin's notorious formulations to the effect that he and others will faithfully carry out Mao's policies "even when we do not understand them."

Abiding features of Maoism in practice -- the emphasis on absolute loyalty to the leader personally, the absolute responsibility borne by the cadre, the critical importance of political indoctrination and moral incentive, the imperative of class struggle, the inescapable need for great national campaigns aimed at extracting the maximum from the human material -- can and probably will continue under Lin, as will the examinations and purges which inevitably accompany all of this. But it is possible to continue on these lines without reaching the extremes which Mao has reached in the past 15 years. It is possible, in other words, to follow a Maoist course but to impose less of a burden on the human material, to place less strain on one's personal relationships with other leaders, to begin the periods of retreat and consolidation earlier, and to remain in them longer. Those leaders whom Lin seems to like best -- Chou and the military men -- are expected to influence him in this direction, the more easily if his predispositions are indeed less extreme than Mao's.

It has also been contended in this paper that Lin's self-interest coincides with the course that his friends and favorites are likely to urge on him: that is, that he cannot behave as Mao in his manic periods has behaved, without a high risk of being overthrown.
This does not mean that Lin's policies will not be onerous for the Chinese or offensive to other countries; they certainly will be. Indeed, as other observers have remarked, it may be harder for Lin to make a sudden reversal of a militant policy -- say, Mao's present policy toward the Russians -- than it would have been for Mao, because he will not have Mao's stature and prestige. But even Mao did not pursue his extreme policies to a suicidal end, and Lin seems even less likely to do so.

If the two judgments expressed above are correct -- that Lin will take counsel from Chou and from his own military comrades, and for this reason and others will conduct himself with a decent regard for the real world -- Lin should be able to survive for some time as Mao's successor. The length of time cannot be forecast, because it depends on factors -- and the interaction of factors -- which cannot be assessed at this time.* These include the state of Lin's health at the time of succession, his progress toward solving China's problems through whatever combination of policies, and the willingness of Chinese leaders to be content with something less than total solutions.

*Many observers have concluded that Lin is not credible as a long-term successor. It is not hard to agree with this judgment, because Lin himself does not seem to have the prospect of a long-term; it would be surprising if he were to live out the decade.