Intelligence Report

COMMUNIST CHINA: THE POLITICAL SECURITY APPARATUS

II. Destruction and Reconstruction, 1965-1969

(Reference Title: POLO XXXVII)

28 November 1969
RSS No. 0037/69
WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
COMMUNIST CHINA: THE POLITICAL SECURITY APPARATUS

II. DESTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1965-1969

MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS:

This is the second staff study to consider the fortunes, role and shifting structure of the political security apparatus in Communist China. The first volume, published 20 February 1969 as POLO XXXV, recapitulated the story of the political security apparatus from its primitive origins in the 1920's to the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1965. This volume attempts to trace the story from the autumn of 1965 through the Ninth Party Congress in April of 1969. Like Volume I, it is a detailed analytical chronology, published and circulated for desk level analysts who may be interested in a nuts and bolts recapitulation of what is known about the political security apparatus today. There are many gaps in our knowledge of the subject; these are identified and filled in with conjecture based on historical precedents, fragmentary reports, and needs seemingly apparent in the situation.

The preparation of this study was aided by analysts from the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of National Estimates, and the Clandestine Services. The Central Reference Service was helpful in locating and making available certain basic research materials. However, the paper was prepared entirely in the Special Research Staff.

John Kerry King
Chief, D/1 Special Research Staff
COMMUNIST CHINA: THE POLITICAL SECURITY APPARATUS
II. Destruction and Reconstruction, 1965-1969

Contents

| The Political Security Apparatus as of Autumn 1965. | 1 |
| The First Convulsion, Winter 1965-66: The Purge of Leaders of the Political Security Apparatus | 5 |
| The Third Convulsion, November 1966 - April 1967: The Purge of the PLA Leadership and the Destruction of the Public Security Apparatus | 21 |
| More Reorganization, May 1967 - February 1968: Dissolution of the General Political Department and PLA/CRG, Formation of the 'Support the Left' Group and the Political Work Group | 32 |
| Purifying and Rebuilding, Autumn 1968 - Spring 1969: The Purging and Slow Reconstruction of Lower Levels of the Party | 60 |
| The Ninth Party Congress, April 1969: The Prominence of Leaders of the Political Security Apparatus | 71 |
| Postscript | 90 |
The Political Security Apparatus as of Autumn 1965

As of September 1965, on the brink of the Cultural Revolution, the entire political security apparatus in Communist China was in Mao's disfavor and therefore in deep trouble. Since 1962, as a result of Mao's increasing dissatisfaction with the party apparatus as a whole, the political security apparatus had undergone a number of personnel and organizational changes which reduced other leaders' ability to use the apparatus against Mao. The trend toward compromising and weakening this apparatus as a party instrument had been particularly marked in 1964 and 1965, as Mao had come to distrust party leaders who were also the supervisors of or key figures in the political security apparatus--such as Teng Hsiao-ping and Lo Jui-ching--and had installed a personal security apparatus inside it. Apparently by late summer 1965, Mao had also come to distrust Peng Chen, whom he had earlier placed at the head of the first special organ of the Cultural Revolution--a five-man group to investigate cultural leaders under suspicion. By September 1965 Mao was determined at least to purge the party and its security apparatus, and if necessary to smash them both.

As of September 1965, the party secretariat, which had long supervised the political security apparatus, was in great danger. Compromised since 1962 by the installation of Kang Sheng, the secretariat's secretary-general (Teng Hsiao-ping) was under suspicion and its next-ranking leader (Peng Chen) already marked for purging, and several of its other officers were under suspicion or already marked. And many of the political security organs which would normally be responsive to it had been deactivated or made ineffectual by the assignment to them of officers who--like Kang--were responsive to Mao personally.

The central committee staff office, essentially an administrative organ for the secretariat, had long had a key role in political security work as the custodian of the central committee's records, including such sensitive documents as verbatim accounts of party meetings and the personnel records of party leaders (the raw material
for investigations and purges), as the office charged with the physical protection of party leaders, and possibly as the office assigning cadres to the political security apparatus. As of September 1965 it was apparently being radically reorganized as a result of both Maoist and anti-Maoist initiatives; its chief, Yang Shang-kun, was apparently to be named to a regional post, there had been several recent changes among Yang's deputies, and Yang and several other recent or current officers (including Madame Liu Shao-chi) were under suspicion. This was also true of two important ancillary bodies, the Committee for Party Organs Subordinate to the Central Committee (a committee which supervised the party committees in these organs, and which had the power to order and conduct investigations of any person in them), and the State Archives Office, both of which had always been headed by officers of the Staff Office.

The Social Affairs Department had long been at the center of political security work as the principal and most powerful organ charged with investigating the loyalty of party leaders. However, by September 1965 this department—which in recent years had been more often reported as the Political Security Department or simply Security Department—had almost certainly been put out of business. While it was uncertain whether Teng Hsiao-ping or Lo Jui-ching had been the most recent director of this department (there is additional fragmentary evidence—since the time of writing the first paper—that a party "security" department under Lo Jui-ching existed until sometime in the 1963-65 period), Teng was under suspicion and Lo was marked for purging, others of its old officers had been reassigned or had disappeared, and Mao had apparently not attempted to make use of this organ for some time. The political security bureaus of two sensitive departments—the Organization Department, and the General Political Department—which had worked with the SAD (or its equivalent) in investigating party members were known to be in existence as of September 1965, but their directors had apparently been changed and
it was not clear whether there was still any central organ (like the old SAD) to which they were still responsive.*

The Central Control Commission, which from 1955 had been charged with examining the discipline (i.e., obedience) of party members, had been reorganized and expanded in 1962 and had been moving in on the area of concern of the SAD or its equivalent, owing to the lack of a clear distinction between loyalty and obedience. However, the Control Commission and its subordinate bodies attached to party committees throughout China may have been directed in 1964 to stand down, and in any case seemed to be inactive as of September 1965. Several of the Commission's officers too were under suspicion.

The Ministry of Public Security, the most visible portion of the political security apparatus, had long provided a supplementary apparatus for the investigation and arrest of party members, but from the start it had been concerned mainly with non-party people. As of September 1965 it was still active and its Minister was in good favor, but it had been undergoing further reorganization and some deputy ministers were under suspicion. So, probably, were the leading figures of the other two principal organs of the public security apparatus, the Procuratorate and the Supreme Court.

*The General Political Department may have already come to be responsive entirely to the Military Affairs Committee (MAC), under Lin Piao. It was soon identified as a department of the MAC, rather than of the central committee. The MAC for many years had had great authority over the military establishment—viz., Peng Te-huai had reportedly complained that his job as Minister of Defense was empty, because the MAC held "all the real power"—but the MAC had previously shared with the rest of the party apparatus its authority over the political security apparatus in the armed forces.
As of September 1965, the most important of those components of the political security apparatus set up or reactivated in recent years as supplements or alternatives (to the principal components discussed above) were the Political Research Office, Peng Chen's special "five-man group," and the central Political Departments (for government organs). The main Political Research Office under Chen Po-ta, which had apparently been used to conduct "research" (investigations) to support policy changes which Mao favored and thus had been used to investigate those carrying out existing policies, was still in favor; however, the leaders of some subordinate offices--those attached to party committees in disfavor, like the Peking committee--were under suspicion. Peng Chen's group, set up sometime around January 1965 as a special organ outside the party apparatus to investigate "cultural" leaders under suspicion, continued to exist as of September 1965 but had been compromised by Kang Sheng--one of its five members--and was apparently already discredited in Mao's eyes. The central Political Departments, set up in 1964 and 1965 to direct the work of the political offices proliferating in economic organs, were very active as of September 1965 and continued to give Mao an alternative to the Central Control Commission for examination of the behavior of party members; however, the probable supervisor of these departments also had been Peng Chen, already in disfavor, and some of the directors of these departments were probably under suspicion.

By September 1965, the only secure leaders of organs of the political security apparatus were those who had been working for Mao personally--constituting his de facto apparatus inside the apparatus. Mao's personal apparatus possibly included: Kang Sheng of the secretariat; Wang Tung-hsing of the central committee staff office; Lo Ching-chang and Yang Chi-ching of whatever remained nominally of the old Social Affairs Department or equivalent (Lo was an SAD man assigned to Chou En-lai's Secretariat); Chang Yun-i and/or Hsiao Hua of the Central Control Commission; Hsieh Fu-chih and Yu Sang of the Ministry of Public Security, backed again by Wang and Yang; Chen Po-ta of the Political Research Office; Kang Sheng again
of the "five-man-group"; the presumed successor (never identified) to Peng Chen as the supervisor of the central Political Departments; and as an unattached, free-floating, doubly dangerous figure, Mao's wife, Chiang Ching.

The First Convulsion, Winter 1965-66: The Purge of Leaders of the Political Security Apparatus

The Cultural Revolution began unofficially in September 1965 at a party conference, where Mao denounced a playwright whose earlier work had implicitly criticized Mao's policies. Calling for an investigation, Mao again (as in 1964) pointed to the existence of "revisionism" in the party apparatus. Mao's action was a sharp rebuke to Peng Chen, whose "five-man group" had been charged since 1964 with investigating and policing the "cultural" sector, and had ominous implications for the first-line supervisors of the party apparatus, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping.

In early November 1965 Mao took another step by planting in the Shanghai press--through Madame Mao--an article by Yao Wen-yuan attacking the playwright-critic. Those who were apparently cut in on the scheme from the start--and knew that a massive purge of the party lay ahead--were Lin Piao, who had replaced Liu Shao-chi as Mao's favorite, Premier Chou En-lai, long the third-ranking leader, Chiang Ching, Mao's wife, Chen Po-ta, Mao's longtime ghost-writer, and Kang Sheng, the presumed chief of Mao's personal security force.

The purge began in late November 1965 with the arrest of Lo Jui-ching, the PLA chief-of-staff, and Yang Shang-kun, director of the central committee's staff
office.* Mao left Peking at the same time, probably because he felt insecure there until the purge had gone further. He apparently took with him to his East China retreat at least one security specialist--his old bodyguard

*The essential charge against Lo was that of resisting Mao's line on building the PLA (with its emphasis on political indoctrination and productive labor),--resistance which included a different concept of Chinese relations with the USSR; secondary charges related to Lo's attempts to gain power at Lin Piao's expense, and his opposition to any Cultural Revolution (purge) in the PLA. The essential charge against Yang was that of using his position--as a custodian of sensitive records--to aid Mao's enemies at home and abroad (i.e. giving the Russians and Mao's domestic opponents materials to use in building their case). There is no independent evidence of "conspiracy" between the two. The striking common feature of their cases is that both were in a position to obstruct the further purge of the party which Mao was determined to carry out. Whether as chief-of-staff (his known post), as secretariat-level supervisor of the political security apparatus (a possible post), as head of the party department which succeeded the Social Affairs Department (another possibility), or as supervisor or head of the political security bureau of the General Political Department (yet another), Lo was very dangerous to Mao; and Yang as director of the central committee staff office (his known post), or as secretariat-level supervisor of some part of the political security apparatus (a good possibility), was hardly less so. Mao was later reported as having seen Lo precisely as an obstacle to the purge. While Lo's political security post at the time of his purge is unknown, the Red Guard press quotes Hsiao Hua as having extolled Lo as the "best director of the Political Department"--perhaps meaning either the Political Security Department or the political security bureau of the General Political Department (which Hsiao headed), and perhaps referring to a time as late as 1965.
Wang Tung-hsing (who also replaced Yang Shang-kun as Mao's link to central party organs), and he may have taken two others: Yang Chi-ching of the Ministry of Public Security, and Hsu Tzu-jung, who was or had been, like Wang, an officer of the staff office, and was or had been, like Yang, a leading figure in the core organ of the political security apparatus, the Social Affairs Department or its equivalent.

The arrest of Lo and Yang sent a shock through the entire party apparatus, and in particular the political security apparatus, in which they had been key figures for more than 20 years. The shock was of course greatest to the organs in which they had served and in which they had close associates and proteges: the party secretariat (both Lo and Yang were still secretaries at the time of their arrest), the staff office and its ancillary organs, whatever remained of the SAD, the political security organs of the Organization Department and the General Political Department, and the Ministry of Public Security. There is reason to believe that several key figures (to be discussed later) of these components of the political security apparatus were arrested soon after the arrest of Lo and Yang.

Mao in January 1966 began to construct another special organ of the Cultural Revolution before it officially began—to replace Peng Chen's five-man group. He called together Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng (the only party secretary still in favor) Chiang Ching, and Ai Ssu-chi (a theorist who was to die in March). This group, less Ai, was soon to become the core of the central Cultural Revolution Group, the principal instrument of the purge and—by the end of 1966—the de facto secretariat.

In the same month (January 1966), a PLA political work conference made it pretty clear that at least a small additional purge of the PLA was coming. The conference report sharply criticized "senior cadres" for insufficient exertion in the study of Mao's thought. Hsiao Hua, director of the General Political Department, expressly criticized the idea that the PLA should be controlled by the "party of the Army"—i.e., its own party committee system—rather than by the "party of the whole.

-7-
Ironically, as it proved, the party committee system in
the PLA, while hit hard, survived better than did the
"party of the whole".

In the following month, Mao, Lin Piao, and Madame
Mao began the process which was to end in the formation
of an analogous group for the conduct of the purge in the
PLA. On Mao's order Madame Mao conducted a symposium on
the "cultural" state of the PLA, found that it was not
exempt from "class struggle," and wrote up a report which
was endorsed by Lin Piao. Several months later, the
formation of the central CRG was followed by the forma-
tion of the PLA/CRG, dominated for most of its life by
Madame Mao.

In the same month (February 1966), Peng Chen pub-
lished a report on the Cultural Revolution--possibly ap-
proved by Liu Shao-chi in Mao's absence--which minimized
class struggle and the offenses of other right-wing
writers. It was not clear whether Peng thought that he
could deflect Mao by this means, or calculated instead
that the party apparatus would mobilize the support neces-
sary to defeat Mao. Shortly thereafter, Mao expressed
his displeasure with this report and with Peng, and,
having already put together a four-man group to send into
action in place of Peng's five-man group, warned Peng
that he might devise new instruments for the conduct of
the Cultural Revolution.

In late March, Peng Chen and Lu Ting-yi--director
of the propaganda department and a member of Peng's five-
man group--were arrested (i.e., relieved of their posts
and placed under house arrest).* Prior to mid-April, the
existing party secretariat was convened to receive Mao's
"instructions" from Chou En-lai and the leaders of the emerg-
ing Cultural Revolution Group, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng.
Chen and Kang both discussed Peng's "crimes," and possi-
bly Lu's as well. The offenses of all four of the big

---

*This was done while Liu Shao-chi was out of the coun-
try, on a tour of Asian capitals. Liu was under the
escort (guard) of Wang Tung-hsing, Mao's security man.
names caught in the first convulsion of the purge—Peng and Lu, both members of the politburo, and Lo Jui-ching and Yang Shang-kun, both members of the central committee—were "fully" unveiled at an expanded meeting of the politburo on 4 May:

Many key figures of the political security apparatus disappeared during this first convulsion and were later denounced; at least some of them were almost certainly arrested in this period. These were not men well known to the outside world like Lo and Peng, but had been known for years by party members in China and China-watchers as men holding sensitive and important posts. They included: Kung Tzu-jung, second only to Yang in the central committee staff office; Tien Chia-ying, probably third-ranking in the staff office; Hsu Tzu-jung, long a high-ranking officer of the staff office and of the Social Affairs Department (or its equivalent), who had been taken by Mao to his Hangchow headquarters or had been sent there on a special mission, and who was later denounced for an illegal "inspection" of that headquarters in February 1966; Tseng San, of the staff office and concurrently chief of the State Archives Bureau, and possibly also the head of the Committee for Party Organs Directly Subordinate to the Central Committee; Hsiao Hsiang-jung, director of the staff office of the Ministry of National Defense, who had probably worked closely with both Lo and Yang; Wang Tsung-wu and possibly Liu Hsi-wu (not seen since 1964), two of the five secretaries of the Central Control Commission; Wu Leng-hsi and Hsu Li-chun, the other two members of Peng's "five-man group" and both deputy directors (under Lu Ting-yi) of the Propaganda Department; Liang Pi-yeh and possibly Shih Chin-chien (Shih never appeared publicly before his denunciation in 1966) of the General Political Department; in addition to Hsu Tzu-jung, Wang Chin-hsiang and Liu Hsi-wu of the SAD, Feng Chih-ping and Feng Hsuan, long high-ranking officers of the SAD; and in addition to Hsu Tzu-jung and Wang Chin-hsiang of the
Ministry of Public Security, Ling Yun and Liu Fu-chih also deputy ministers.*

Thus, by the end of April, before the Cultural Revolution officially began, the party apparatus and the political security apparatus in particular had already been hit very hard. The secretariat was still functioning, but under Teng Hsiao-ping, possibly already marked for purging. The staff office had lost almost all of its top officers, and was now probably being run by Wang Tung-hsing, assisted by Tung Hsiao-peng (not Teng Hsiao-ping), the onetime director of the Premier's office and probable SAD official who was identified later in 1966 as a deputy director of this staff office. Most of the top officers of the SAD over the years had been arrested -- as had, perhaps, the unidentified directors of the political security bureaus of the central departments which had worked most closely with the SAD; these central departments themselves were of course threatened. The Central Control Commission leadership had been cut in half: although its subordinate commissions (or supervisory groups) continued to exist, few of them had appeared to be active since 1964, and they were later charged with having resisted the Cultural Revolution from the start -- in other words, with having sympathized with the leaders of the party committees to which they were attached. Most of the deputy ministers of Public Security had been brought down, and the ancillary bodies of the MPS (e.g. the procuratorates and the courts) were threatened; this three-way apparatus of the public security system throughout China, like the control commissions, was later charged with having identified from the start with the party leaders of their areas. Finally, Peng Chen's "five-man group" had been unofficially abolished, with most of its members

*Tsou Ta-peng, generally accepted as the director of the Investigation Department (foreign intelligence), last appeared in April 1966, although he is not known to have been denounced. Kung Yuan, another possibility as director of the ID, last appeared in November 1966, and was dropped from the central committee in April 1969.
facing the judgment of other special small groups assembled to try each of them and to make recommendations to higher levels.

The functioning central apparatus of the political security system, as of April 1966, consisted of the remains of the party secretariat under Teng Hsiao-ping, the new leaders of the staff office, the directors of the party's Organization Department and General Political Department, the coordinator and directors of the central Political Departments (for government organs), the Minister of Public Security and two or three deputies, and the special "work groups" assembled to deal with the cases of arrested party leaders.

Of these organs, the secretariat and the Organization Department were probably paralyzed, afraid to move without Mao's orders; the remaining leaders of both were soon to be purged.* The other organs may also have been afraid to move without orders, but they at least were getting orders. The General Political Department was active, and Hsiao Hua was in high favor. The coordinator of the central Political Departments and most of their directors remained unidentified, but at least some of these departments were active (there was one in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by this time); among other things,

*An Tzu-wen, the director of the Organization Department, was in deep trouble. He had long worked closely with at least three of the big four arrested in this first stage (Peng Chen, Lo Jui-ching, and Yang Shang-kun). He had also worked closely with the political security apparatus as a whole; there is evidence from Red Guard sources that he had conducted some investigations of party members jointly with Yang Shang-kun, and he may have been for some time (may still have been) the head of the political security bureau of the Organization Department which worked very closely with the SAD. Moreover, he is said to have made an effort in autumn 1965--blocked at the last moment--to get Yang assigned to a regional post (and thus away from the heat).
in early 1966 political offices in the provinces were conducting investigations of party members of a type very similar to those previously conducted by the control commissions.* Hsieh Fu-chih was also active and in good favor, having accomplished the remarkable feat of dissociating himself from his longtime sponsor Teng Hsiao-ping, and his MPS apparatus in Peking was being used to make arrests of party leaders.

The most interesting of these political security organs were the special "work groups." There was plenty of precedence for these, in the "five-member groups" set up in the mid-1950s to direct the campaign against counter-revolutionaries, and of course in Peng Chen's "five-man group" of 1964-66. This latest version was a system of blue-ribbon juries, composed of the accused man's peers, which were sometimes operating under directed verdicts ("guilty"), but which were obliged to consider all of the evidence presented in sessions "criticizing" those arrested and accused, which were also charged with eliciting new evidence, and which presumably had some voice in the final sentencing.** They were, in other words, doing many of the things that the old Social Affairs Department had done, although not as an integrated department. Integration and coordination of the work of these groups was probably provided by the as-yet-unproclaimed central

*This work was distinct from that of the Political and Legal Departments of party committees in the provinces. The latter apparently supervised the operations of all three parts of the public security apparatus, concerned with non-party people.

**Lo Jui-ching's examiners, for example, were credibly reported to be Yeh Chien-ying, Hsieh Fu-chih, Hsiao Hua, Yang Cheng-wu, and Liu Chih-chien, all fellow officers of the PLA and fellow members of the MAC. Red Guard sources assert that An Tzu-wen was originally a member of this group and tried to protect Lo, a remarkably foolish thing to do.
Cultural Revolution Group led by Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, and Madame Mao, by some organ of the MAC, and by a de facto political security directorate consisting of Kang again, Hsieh Fu-chih, and Wang Tung-hsing, the political security specialists who had risen in the preparatory stages of the Cultural Revolution. All three groups were of course responsive to the politburo standing committee.

The Second Convulsion, May-October 1966: The Formation of New Political Security Organs

On 16 May, a central committee work conference chaired by Mao confirmed the fall of Peng Chen and made clear that a large-scale purge of the party lay ahead. It also confirmed that the PLA was to be purged as well.

The 16 May circular spoke of the "present struggle" to carry out Mao's line on the Cultural Revolution, without stating clearly what Mao's line was. (This refusal to provide clear directives was to be a continuing feature of the Cultural Revolution.) The circular assigned to party committees—the conventional party apparatus under Liu and Teng—the task of carrying out Mao's line, but it concluded in advance that they would not be able to do it ("most party committees...have a very poor understanding...and their leadership is far from conscientious and effective"). The circular in fact confirmed Mao's intention to continue to carry out the Revolution by special instruments; it officially abolished Peng Chen's "five-man group" and set up another such special group, the central Cultural Revolution Group.

The new central CRG was built around three of the people—especially close to Mao—whom Mao had called together in January as unofficial advisors on the Cultural Revolution. The chairman was Chen Po-ta, the first deputy was Madame Mao, and the "advisor" was Kang Sheng. A second advisor was soon identified—Tao Chu, first secretary of the party's Central-South Bureau, transferred to Peking on 1 June to replace Lu Ting-yi as director of the Propaganda Department. Three more deputy chairmen (ranking after Madame Mao) were also soon identified:
Chang Chun-chiao, a party secretary in Shanghai who had worked closely with Madame Mao in reforming the arts and in planting the criticism of Wu Han the previous November; Liu Chih-chien, Hsiao Hua's most important remaining deputy in the General Political Department, who was to be the first chief of the PLA/CRG; and Wang Jen-chung, one of Tao Chu's deputies in the Central-South Bureau who had long seemed close to Mao personally. Soon identified as members (not officers) were Yao Wen-yuan, the principal writer of the November article; Wang Li, an editor of Red Flag; Kuan Feng, another writer; Mu Bsin, a young editor; and Chi Pen-yu, another journalist who had also worked closely with Madame Mao. Another possible member from the start--identified some months later as the director of a sub-group of the CRG--was Wang Tung-hsing of the staff office and the MPS, Mao's old bodyguard.

The new central CRG was overwhelmingly Mao's personal group. It was not yet, however, the de facto secretariat; the regular party secretariat played a leading role in the next stage of the Cultural Revolution in June and July (the central CRG in fact did not even surface until July), and the secretariat is said to have continued to direct the routine work of the party through 1966, apparently under Tao Chu as de facto secretary-general. Neither was the CRG intended to replace those parts of the apparatus which directed the armed forces and the work of the government; the MAC and its subordinate organs continued to control the PLA, and the work of the government continued to be divided by Premier Chou En-lai among a number of functional specialists supervised by the central party departments which in turn were supervised by secretaries of the secretariat (as always). The new central CRG was in its early months just what its name implied: a special group charged with the conduct of the Cultural Revolution.

In late May and early July, party committees in cultural and educational institutions (i.e. the conventional party apparatus there) were attacked and discredit by revolutionary teachers and students, almost certainly incited by CRG figures primed by Mao. The central party apparatus, under Liu and Teng, then sent
work-teams (used before in mass campaigns) to the campuses to restore party control. The revolutionaries were incited to attack these too, and the end came quickly after Mao in mid-July personally criticized the operations of the work-teams; the teams were withdrawn, and the party apparatus which had assigned and instructed them was in disgrace. Mao on 5 August told the militants to go ahead and "bombard the headquarters"--the party apparatus itself.

In the first two weeks of August, the central committee met to approve Mao's design for the Revolution and Mao's rearrangement of the hierarchy. (A large minority—or even majority—was opposed, but, with PLA and Red Guard units in attendance, was overridden.) During the plenum, the central committee issued a 16-point decision which—like Mao's 5 August poster—incited the young revolutionaries to attack party leaders throughout China, and confirmed that they would be directed by new instruments, special "cultural revolution" bodies. The stated aims—persisting to this day—were to bring down those "in authority who follow the capitalist road" (i.e., were not loyal Maoists), to criticize and repudiate bourgeois ideology (any shade of anti-Mao thought), and to radically reorganize the structure of Chinese society on Mao's lines:* The revolution was to be carried out in the PLA too, but under the direction of the MAC and the General Political Department.** At the end of the plenum, Peking revealed the new arrangements.

*This 8 August decision classified party cadres as:
the good and the comparatively good (together, a majority);
those who had made "serious mistakes" but could be rehabilitated; and the "handful" of willfully evil "anti-party, anti-socialist" (anti-Mao) elements who must be exposed and purged (although even they would be given an opportunity to "repent").

**Lin Piao in the same period provided a further directive for the purge of the PLA. The criteria for all PLA cadres—criteria obviously hard to use—were whether they supported Mao or not, gave priority to politics or not, and had revolutionary enthusiasm or not. He gave the task primarily to the General Political Department (Hsiao Hua) under the supervision of the MAC and of Yang Cheng-wu in particular.
The most important of these were of course the demotion (purge) of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, and the naming of Lin Piao as the sole vice-chairman and thus the designated successor to Mao. Other important changes brought Tao Chu, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng into the politburo standing committee ranking fourth, fifth, and seventh behind Mao, Lin, and Chou. (Teng was nominally sixth.) Madame Mao may have become a de facto member of the standing committee at this time.

The Red Guards had been shaping up (surreptitiously) under the CRG since May, and now in mid-August they made their first appearance. In late August they burst out, commencing their "bombardment" of the party apparatus and whatever else got in their way. While their general directives came from Mao and Lin, it was soon clear that their principal sources of continuing guidance were to be Chou En-lai—a comparatively sober voice—and the officers of the central CRG.*

The Red Guards who fanned out over China apparently had a standard operating procedure: they demanded the reorganization (purge) of party committees everywhere, and, when local party leaders declined to put themselves out of business, the Guards physically attacked them. These attacks were often effectively resisted by local leaders who organized and supported their own Red Guards. In addition to these clashes, there was also much conflict between Maoist Red Guard groups—specially-favored Peking groups, local groups which had visited Peking, and local groups which had not—and within Red Guard groups. Beginning in the early autumn, Mao and Lin, surprised by the resistance, made a tactical retreat in order to regroup the Red Guards for another wave of assaults.

Meanwhile, looking toward the purge of the PLA, in or about September Mao's new team set up a central

---

*For example, Chou in September, explaining Mao's "bombard the headquarters" exhortation, told the Red Guards that it was not the intention to destroy the party apparatus utterly, and that even some (a few) first secretaries were acceptable. The Guards were told by several spokesmen that they themselves were to "investigate" and sort the good ones out.
Cultural Revolution Group for the PLA alone. Its first director was Liu Chih-chien, the deputy director of the General Political Department who was concurrently the senior military figure on the central CRG. At the same time, the MAC reportedly followed up Lin Piao's statement of early August—that the first criterion was whether one demonstrated support of Mao or not—with a directive ordering all PLA personnel who encountered statements or actions counter to Mao's thought to report this to higher levels.

During October the central committee held another work conference, this one to condemn Liu and Teng and to hear their self-criticisms (rejected as unsatisfactory), and also to hear important speeches by Mao and Lin as to how they planned to deal with the remaining opposition and how party leaders might save themselves. The two top leaders warned the assembled regional and provincial leaders—apparently regarded as the principal opposition—that the Red Guards were going to hit them hard again, and that they must try to "pass the test." Red Flag soon stated publicly what the "test" would involve for them: self-abasing self-criticism (including denunciation of others), correction of errors (offenses committed against the militants), and support of the revolutionary masses (who wanted to bring them down). The "tests" were, of course, Mao's judgments as to whether these officials were loyal to himself.

As of autumn 1966, then, the conduct of the Cultural Revolution was the party's central (almost exclusive) concern, the purge of the party was the central feature of the Revolution, and new political security organs were at the center of the reorganized central apparatus under the politburo standing committee of which their leaders were members.

At the top of the party, Mao and Lin Piao, with Chou En-lai as their principal executive (sometimes giving a different emphasis), were now providing "first line" direction and supervision of the party's affairs. Just below them were the other working members of the politburo standing committee, Tao Chu, Chen Po-ta, and Kang Sheng, in that order. The staff office was now the staff office of the politburo standing committee, with the same apparent functions, but with entirely new leadership.
Although the central CRG was now the most important party organ under the politburo standing committee, the party's routine work apparently continued to be directed by the party secretariat. As previously noted, after mid-August (from the time of Teng Hsiao-ping's fall), the secretariat was very probably under the direction of Tao Chu, the de facto secretary-general and the party's fourth-ranking leader from that time until his fall. The division of responsibilities among the various secretaries seemed in general clear, but the party departments which they supervised presented a mixed picture which may or may not have been accurate. For example, the Propaganda Department under Tao himself (and his protege Chang Ping-hua) was visibly active, as usual, while the Organization Department—which Tao apparently kept for himself as well—was as usual not visibly active but may have been so. Some of these departments were staffed by proteges of Liu and Teng, and thus were among the objects, rather than the instruments, of the purge.

The Military Affairs Committee, still in good repute, remained the central military organ of the party and was to supervise the promised purge of the PLA. Implementation was given to the General Political Department (now subordinate only to the MAC) and to the PLA/CRG. This picture may have been seriously misleading, however, as it is possible that Madame Mao was the PLA/CRG's "advisor" and effective leader from the start; as it proved, the Madame was to clash with almost all of the officers of the MAC, the General Political Department, and the PLA/CRG—and was to prevail.

Chou En-lai retained authority over the government structure, but this authority was increasingly precarious. The work of much of this structure was supervised by the political departments, which in this period were "mobilizing" the workers for the Revolution, and government organs were also hard hit by the Red Guards.*

*Perhaps the political departments in effect displaced the party committee system in government organs, as the heads of party committees were usually under attack.
What had once been the party's principal organs for the investigation of the loyalty of party leaders and the discipline of party members--first the Social Affairs Department or Political Security Department or Security Department, and, second, the Central Control Commission and its subordinate bodies--now played no role at all. The first no longer existed even nominally, and the second existed only nominally; the control commissions were clearly paralyzed, and were to be denounced later for failing to assist in the purge of the party committees and themselves. A third, the Committee for Organs Directly Subordinate to the Central Committee, was not mentioned in this period.

There appeared to be, however, as previously suggested, a de facto political security directorate reporting to Mao and Lin--composed of the political security specialists Kang Sheng, Hsieh Fu-chih, and Wang Tung-hsing.* This directorate presumably worked closely with the other new political security organs and supervised the work of what remained of the conventional security apparatus.

*The word "directorate" is arbitrary (for lack of a better word), and it must be emphasized that the existence of this group as a group--as distinct from the operations of its various presumed members in other, known party organs--is conjectural. The conjecture is based on (a) the presumption that the very few political security specialists who survived the early stages of the Cultural Revolution did so because they (or most of them) had been working for Mao personally before the "revolution" began, (b) the belief that Mao would wish to have, as he had always had before, some organ to coordinate political security work, (c) the occasional reports of a political security group like the old Social Affairs Department at the top of the party apparatus, reported under various names, and (d) the association in Red Guard reporting of Kang Sheng, Hsieh Fu-chih and Wang Tung-hsing (the key figures of the conjectured group) with political security work and with one another, as if they worked together some of the time. Kang and Wang were hard-core Maoists; Hsieh seemed different.
Each of the three key central organs—the central CRG, the MAC, and the political security directorate—presumably had a role in naming the members of the special "work teams" assigned to examine the case of each arrested party leader, and a role in examining the additional evidence elicited in the course of these examinations—evidence which led to fresh arrests and kept the machine running. Additional information would of course be fed in from the subordinate bodies of the CRG and the PLA/CRG, from the political departments, and from those members of other party departments, party committees, and military and government organs who listened to instructions and who therefore tried to save themselves by denouncing others.

It seems reasonable to believe that final judgments were reached much as they had been before, although in the hysteria of the Cultural Revolution there were many more adverse judgments than there had been before. That is, final judgments on low-level people could be made by middle-level organs, and judgments on middle-level people could be made by high-level organs such as the central CRG and the MAC and the political security directorate (perhaps acting together in the special "work groups"), but judgments on top-level people could be made only by Mao and Lin.

Only a few key figures of the old political security apparatus, apart from Teng Hsiao-ping, were purged in this period. Of the members of the secretariat who had survived the first stage and the new secretaries added in the early part of the second, only Kang Sheng was a security specialist (some others were concerned marginally), and he remained active and in high favor. Of the staff office, former deputy director Li Chieh-po made his last appearance late in this period (in Tientsin) and may have been seized soon thereafter. Of the control commission, the two surviving secretaries, Chang Yun-i and Hsiao Hua, remained active in this period, although in other roles. Of the political research office, the only known survivor, Chen Po-ta, had been absorbed by the central CRG, together, presumably, with his function. Of the directors of central party departments, An Tzu-wen and Li Chu-li of the Organization Department hung on (barely) through this
stage; Hsiao Hua and Liu Chih-chien of the General Political Department were both flourishing in this period (although Liu was soon to fall), while Shih Chin-chien, director of the GPD's political security bureau, was either soon to fall or had already fallen; and Hsu Ping of the United Front Department also hung on through this stage. Minister of Public Security Hsieh Fu-chih was a key figure of the new team, as were at least two of his surviving deputies (Wang Tung-hsing and Yu Sang), and the other deputy held on at least through this stage. So did Chang Ting-cheng of the Procuratorate, while Wu Te-feng of the People's Court made his last appearance in August.

The Third Convulsion, November 1966-April 1967: The Purge of the PLA Leadership and the Destruction of the Public Security Apparatus

In early November, Lin Piao called on the masses (not just Red Guard students) to attack the party and government at all levels. At the same time, a "workers' revolutionary rebel" headquarters was established in Shanghai—a new organizational form for an early "seizure of power" in party, governmental and economic organs which continued to resist Mao's new team. In early December, a 12-point directive of the central CRG described the working-class as the "leading force" of the Cultural Revolution, extended the revolution into factories and mines, and called on the workers to set up their own mass organizations, supplemented by Red Guards as necessary.

During December, in Mao's reported absence, Madame Mao appeared to be directing the Cultural Revolution, and she did so aggressively. In a single incendiary speech in mid-December, she (a) set off the purge of top-level military leaders by attacking Ho Lung, then second-ranking only to Lin Piao on the MAC, (b) marked several second-level party leaders (including a deputy chairman of the CRG) for Red Guard attacks, in the first known instance of explicit targeting, (c) described the regime's public security apparatus (the organs subordinate to the Ministry of Public Security, and the Procuratorate and
Supreme Court) as a group of "bourgeois" organs and called on radical Red Guards to "take them over" by force, and (d) while criticizing Red Guard excesses, called for the dissolution of the Red Guard "control squads," the only organs charged with preventing those excesses.

Following the Madame's speech, Ho Lung and several other high-ranking officers of the central military leadership and the regional commands were soon brought down. One of them was a key figure of the political security apparatus: Yang Yung, commander of the Peking Garrison. The charges against these officers of a long-standing and elaborate conspiracy to seize power were not credible, but all of them had apparently resisted the impact of the Cultural Revolution in their areas of responsibility.

Madame Mao in her speech had exempted Minister of Public Security Hsieh Fu-chih and his Ministry (i.e. the central office in Peking) from her general denunciation of the public security apparatus, and indeed specified that persons arrested by the Red Guards should be handed over to that Ministry (as distinct from its subordinate organs). The thrust of her remarks, however, was an encouragement to the Red Guards to destroy the public security apparatus throughout China.* Beyond this, the Madame's

*As others have noted, Hsieh bought his own political survival at the cost of destruction of his apparatus. He was later quoted as "admitting" that "probably all" political security personnel during 1966 had tried to protect local party officials and to suppress Red Guards. The anger of the Maoists at this behavior was evident in the 13 January directive (of the central committee) on public security work which threatened to punish the security organs themselves. This directive at the time of its publication was really a directive to the PLA, which was about to take over the security organs; it reiterated certain directives given the PLA, e.g. any written or spoken criticism of Mao or Lin Piao was a counter-revolutionary act, and anticipated others, e.g. revolutionary mass organizations and their representatives were not to be assaulted or detained. Madame Mao at the same time commented again on Hsieh Fu-chih, whose Ministry and person were then under heavy Red Guard attack; this time she was more candid, describing Hsieh as loyal but "weak."
speech set off the movement to "seize power" from below in all surviving organs of the party and government.

It was apparent by late December that Tao Chu, the de facto secretary-general of the party since August, was about to fall—the first member of Mao's new team to do so. There is persuasive evidence that Tao was guilty—essentially as charged—with having tried to "restrict the scope" of the Revolution (the scale of the purge) in the party, and in particular, in his old Central-South Bureau. From this time, the de facto secretariat of the party seemed to be the central CRG.*

In early January Madame Mao denounced Liu Chih-chien, the chairman of the PLA's Cultural Revolution Group, which had been designed to be the main instrument for the purge of the PLA. Liu was credibly charged with having resisted just such a large-scale purge as had been carried out in December. Immediately thereafter, the MAC announced the reorganization of the PLA/CRG under Hsu Hsiang-chien, a high-ranking officer of the MAC and (unlike Liu) a professional military man. His principal deputies were to be GPD director Hsiao Hua and acting C/S Yang Cheng-wu, the officers who had been charged with supervising Liu Chih-chien's work in the previous stage. Lesser figures of the reorganized group were Wang Hsin-ting, a deputy C/S and onetime protege of Teng Hsiao-ping, some other officers of the GPD, and Lin Piao's wife, Yeh Chun. The reorganized PLA/CRG was to carry out its

---

*As Madame Mao put it, the central CRG was the "secretarial team" of the standing committee of the politburo, a standing committee composed of Mao, Lin, Chou, and the two (or perhaps three) ranking figures of the CRG, and one more leader (Li Fu-chun) later to be dropped. More precisely, the CRG (she said) "put forth views" for Mao, Lin and Chou "to consider." Although Chen Po-ta was still chairman of the CRG, it was Kang Sheng—the only one of the lot with previous experience on the party secretariat—who reportedly replaced Tao Chu as the de facto secretary general.
work under the "direct leadership" of the MAC and the central CRG, subordinated to this latter body for the first time. Madame Mao was still its dominant figure.

The call to "seize power", continuing into January, led to a violent assault on the party and governmental apparatus throughout China. The collapse of the control function of this apparatus in turn resulted in anarchy and chaos, as those who had seized the seals of power were in fact incapable of performing any of the functions of the apparatus they had displaced. Thus on 21 January Mao personally directed Lin Piao to order the PLA into action to "support the Left"—meaning, apparently, the genuine leftists as Mao saw them. He did not give the PLA much help, however, in determining which organizations were truly Left and in practice the PLA generally moved to restore order and to become a de facto governing apparatus in the name of the Left. Mass organizations which challenged the PLA's decisions as to which of them were truly Left, and those which refused to accept what was really a military occupation, were put down hard. (The central CRG later reversed a number of these decisions.) Those willing to cooperate with the PLA were treated well. As part of the effort to restore order, the PLA moved quickly to take over the public security organs rendered ineffectual by "seizures of power."

*The public security bureau in Peking itself—a bureau being fought over by two Red Guard organizations trying to "seize power" in it—was put under military control in early February, after which the Red Guards were told to stay out of security organs. The young revolutionaries were a threat even to the reorganized political security apparatus; in mid-February, a central committee directive revealed that a number of the party's confidential documents and files had been stolen, and it instituted measures to protect such holdings (e.g. transferring them to military control, giving custody to previously-cleared personnel only, and forbidding anyone to touch top secret material such as code-word documents without authorization from higher levels).
At the end of January, a MAC directive signed by Mao as chairman modulated the conduct of the Cultural Revolution in the PLA itself—clearly in the interest of not disrupting the PLA further while Mao's new team was dependent on it to restore and maintain order. The MAC directive placed restraints on revolutionary activity at higher levels (e.g., there was to be no more "dragging out"), and it in effect exempted line units from the struggle.

At the same time (late January), Peking called for the formation of "revolutionary committees" composed of PLA officers, party cadres, and representatives of mass organizations to act as provisional organs of power at all levels. These were to replace the conventional party committees and government organs which had been destroyed. Although the PLA component was clearly in a position to dominate most of these committees in their early stages, Peking's commentaries emphasized that the other two components were to have equally important roles, and that, if anything, the party component was primary. (By March, Red Flag was prepared to describe the party component as the "core").

During February 1967, in an atmosphere of strong official approval for the PLA's efforts to restore order,* an "adverse current" was allegedly set in motion by Tan Chen-lin, the secretariat's specialist in agriculture and the supervisor of government organs concerned with agriculture. Tan later became the symbol of all of those in the government bureaucracy—like Tao Chu of the party apparatus and the purged leaders of the PLA—who wished to reduce the scale of the purge. During March several high-level bureaucrats (mostly economic specialists, some

*Lin Piao clearly supported these efforts at the time. In a deathless sentence which probably indicates what kind of "revolutionary successor" to Mao he will be, he said: "To use my customary language, I would define political power as the power of suppression."
of them politburo members) were heavily criticized, reportedly on the authority of the central CRG; and it was later repeatedly asserted that the "adverse current" aimed at overthrowing the CRG. Chou En-lai, the principal officer of the government, himself first publicized (in March) the "adverse current" and stood with the others of Mao's new team in calling on the masses to beat it back. (Chou may have been protecting himself.)

In the same month (March), Mao and Lin looked again at the state of the Cultural Revolution and did not like it. Order had been restored, but the new "revolutionary committees" were in general not Left enough, and the PLA had acted too vigorously against the mass organizations --especially (and necessarily) against the most militant of them, some of which were particularly favored by the CRG. With regard to the committees, the PLA was ordered to exercise (continue to exercise) power temporarily through the military control commissions, until genuine Maoist revolutionary committees could be assembled. With regard to the mass organizations, Lin himself in a March speech told PLA leaders they would henceforth be restricted in their use of coercion against mass organizations and that PLA units would not be allowed to take any action on their own initiative. A 10-point MAC directive soon forbade the PLA to fire on mass organizations, to make mass arrests, or to classify mass organizations as counter-revolutionary without the MAC's authorization.

With this second swing to the left, Mao's team again changed the leadership of the PLA/CRG. In mid-April Madame Mao reportedly "dismissed" Hsu Hsiang-chien and gave the leadership to two of his deputies, Hsiao Hua and Yang Cheng-wu (who had both now survived two periods of "rightist" errors), and to Hsieh Fu-chih. At about this time, these three men and Su Yu were reportedly added to the standing committee of the MAC. Although the old marshals remained nominal members, these younger men, with Lin Piao, were now the military leaders of Mao's headquarters. Neither Hsieh nor Su seemed a hard-core Maoist.
At the same time (April 1967), Peking launched what was to be a new stage of the Cultural Revolution, one concentrating on "criticism and repudiation" of Liu Shao-chi—i.e., all of the anti-Mao concepts and practices of which Liu was now the principal symbol. Related to this—using Liu as the negative example—was a massive campaign of "struggle-criticism-transformation" (meaning, interpreted narrowly, criticism by others, self-criticism, and reform) in every organization in China. Revolutionary mass organizations, like others, were to subordinate their activities to these ends. However, Lin's late March speech, the early April directive putting the PLA on the leash again, and criticism of some PLA commands by Mao himself, combined to encourage the mass organizations to unprecedented violence in the months ahead.

As of April 1967, the political security organs formed during the Cultural Revolution remained at the center of the party apparatus. The traditional apparatus—of the secretary-general, the various secretaries supervising government organs, and the regional and provincial party structure—seemed to be, in general, out of business. Kang Sheng was said to be the de facto secretary-general, but he appeared to operate out of the central CRG, which sent out a range of directives of the sort previously signed by the secretariat. Almost all of the other secretaries were under Red Guard attack, and so were almost all of the known directors of the central departments; the one known exception, Wang Li, who had succeeded Tao Chu as director of the Propaganda Department, also operated out of the central CRG, of which he was a member, and gave orders to the propaganda apparatus in his capacity as a "secretary" of the CRG. (The government organs which the central departments supervised were themselves comparatively inactive; there is much testimony to the chaos and then paralysis in them in early 1967.) And while the regional and provincial bureaus, together with their control commissions, still existed nominally, Chou En-lai's remark at the time that they had "virtually disintegrated" was if anything an understatement.
The central apparatus, as of April 1967, continued to be dominated by Mao, Lin, Chou, and the surviving leaders of the CRG, Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, and Madame Mao. These five or six (the formal status of Madame Mao was uncertain) continued to comprise the standing committee of the politburo.* The staff office under Wang Tung-hsing continued as the administrative organ for the "central committee," meaning this group, and continued to have important political security functions. The central CRG was the de facto secretariat, with the most important "secretaries"—in addition to Chen, Kang, and Madame Mao—being Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan, Wang Tung-hsing, Wang Li, Kuan Feng, and Chi Pen-yu. To replace the regional party apparatus, regional responsibilities were reportedly divided among these CRG figures, each taking primary responsibility for one part of China.

The Military Affairs Committee under Lin Piao continued to direct the military establishment, although its active officers were virtually identical with the directors of the political security organs: Hsiao Hua, Yang Cheng-wu and Hsieh Fu-chih of the PLA/CRG, and Hsiao Hua again of the General Political Department. Political security decisions were announced in the name of the MAC as a whole: e.g., both reorganizations of the PLA/CRG itself, and the order of solitary confinement until trial for a provincial deputy commander charged with conspiring against his commander (the deputy was later reported shot, the only important figure reported as executed through 1968). The MAC had apparently not yet organized a central "Support the Left" Group to handle the PLA's relations with revolutionary mass organizations, although individual military men in the provinces were described as being in charge of such work.

*Li Fu-chun was still nominally a member, but seems not-to have had the same status as the others.
Conceived narrowly—that is, apart from the central CRG and the MAC, both of which had other concerns—the political security apparatus as of April 1967 consisted of:

(a) the de facto political security directorate of Kang Sheng, Hsieh Fu-chih, and Wang Tung-hsing, who were involved in the work of all the parts of the security apparatus;

(b) the central committee staff office, also heavily involved in the work of other components;

(c) the PLA/CRG and the political security bureaus (or equivalent) of the General Political Department, down the line;

(d) the special "work groups" examining the cases of arrested party leaders and acquiring information on those involved with them;

(e) other ad hoc teams, composed of or appointed by officers of these central organs, investigating the cases of party and military leaders under suspicion and not yet arrested, or sent out to gather additional material on those arrested;* and

(f) the security departments (sometimes called the "committee for proletarian dictatorship") of the emerging "revolutionary committees," which seemed to

---

*One reported investigation team was composed of low-level members of the central CRG and a high-ranking member of the "security department" (probably political security bureau) of the political department of a regional military command; another was composed of Ting Chun of the central committee staff office, the political officer of a regional military command, and a deputy commander of a provincial military district.
be taking on responsibility for both political security work within the committees and public security work outside it; and, probably,

(g) some of the central political departments, presumably responsive to an unidentified coordinator, which through their subordinate political offices conducted political work in government (mainly economic) organs and examined the conduct of government officials --although some or perhaps even most of the political offices had been too closely identified with the old party apparatus and had ceased to function.

The traditional public security apparatus was no longer a part of this picture. The Ministry of Public Security remained in Peking as a ghost, but its subordinate apparatus had been taken over by the PLA, as had the procuratorates and the courts.

Many of the key figures of the political security apparatus as it had existed in autumn 1966--most of whom had been in favor at that time--were purged by April 1967. Whereas the purge when it began in spring 1966 was supposedly to affect only a "handful" of party leaders, by April 1967, in the security apparatus as well as in the central apparatus as a whole, there was just a handful of trusted leaders left--a handful which was to become smaller yet.

The most important casualty of the period was of course the de facto secretary-general Tao Chu, who took some others down with him (see below). Of other secretaries of the secretariat concerned marginally with political security work, Tan Chen-lin had been removed by the end of April and Yeh Chien-yin (liaison with the MAC) was under heavy attack.

Of the now inactive central departments with political security components: An Tzu-wen and Li Chu-li of the Organization Department, in disfavor from the start,
were both purged in this period;* Ku Mu of the Industrial and Commercial Political Department barely lasted through this period, and then disappeared; Hsu Ping of the United Front Department was apparently purged in this period (inter alia for saying that Lin Piao's health was not good, which was true); and Chang Yen of the Foreign Affairs Political Department, a new department first identified in this period, was probably purged by the end of this period. (The Propaganda Department fell with Tao Chu and his deputy Chang Ping-hua, and was absorbed by the central CRG.)

The central CRG, which had become the de facto secretariat by the end of 1966, lost three of its seven ranking figures in this period: its senior advisor Tao Chu, his protege Wang Jen-chung, and Liu Chih-chien (both deputy chairmen).

The Military Affairs Committee, supervising the political security apparatus in the armed forces just as the secretariat had been the overall supervisor of the apparatus, was substantially altered by the purge of Ho Lung and the decline (in varying degrees) of other old marshals, Nieh Jung-chen, Hsu Hiang-chien, and Yeh Chien-ying. None of the latter three was purged but all were under attack and were apparently set aside in favor of the younger men who directed the political security organs subordinate to the MAC. Of these organs, the PLA/CRG lost both of its directors in this period, first Liu Chih-chien (purged) and then Hsu Hsiang-chien (set aside). The General Political Department lost this same Liu Chih-chien and, if he had not already been purged, Shih Chinchien, onetime director of its political security bureau. Yang Yung, the commander of the Peking Garrison—the immediately available troops to enforce political security decisions—was also purged in this period.

*The Political Security Bureau of the Organization Department presumably became inactive when the Department did.

-31-
As for the public security apparatus taken over by the PLA, the leaders of the inactive Ministry of Public Security in Peking all remained in favor, but in other posts. Hsieh Fu-chih and Wang Tung-hsing, two of the three key figures of the de facto political security directorate at the center of the work, may have taken into the directorate in this period the two other deputy ministers who had survived, Yang Chi-ching and Yu Sang. (The directorate may conceivably have been given official status in this period, as Yu was soon identified as an officer of an "important department.") But the principal figures of the ancillary public security bodies, the Supreme Court and the Procuratorate, all fell in this period: Yang Hsiu-feng a suicide, and Wu Te-feng and Chang Ting-cheng purged.

More Reorganization, May 1967-February 1968: Dissolution of the General Political Department and PLA/CRG, Formation of the 'Support the Left' Group and Political Work Group

In May and early June there were renewed calls for order, and on 6 June a CCP central committee directive called officially for an end to various offenses by revolutionary mass organizations (assaults, destruction, looting, arrests) and gave the PLA the responsibility for enforcing the order. It did not, however, authorize the PLA to use force, and mass violence of course continued. A decision was soon made to send delegations around China to negotiate agreements between contending Red Guard factions.

Hsieh Fu-chih of the PLA/CRG (and political security directorate) was chosen to lead the first of these touring delegations, accompanied by Wang Li of the central CRG and by Yu Li-chin, political officer of the CCAF (and perhaps a member of the PLA/CRG too); representatives of mass organizations were included. This group seems to have been the prototype for the "central committee investigation teams" soon identified in especially troubled areas. At an unspecified time thereafter, Mao Tse-tung --reportedly accompanied by Yang Cheng-wu, Chang Chun-chiao, and Wang Tung-hsing--began a tour of several provinces of eastern and central China. To help Hsieh with
his mission, Mao in mid-July called for a reconciliation of contending mass organizations everywhere.

A few days later, one of the large mass organizations in Wuhan refused to accept an adverse ruling from Peking (transmitted through the Maoist radical Wang Li), refused to join an alliance, and, supported by some military and public security units in Wuhan, beat and kidnapped members of Hsieh's delegation. The Wuhan MR Commander (Chen Tsai-tao) and political officer—to some degree responsible—were summoned to Peking and purged within the week, together with some lesser figures from the Wuhan command.

Mao's team reacted very strongly to the Wuhan Incident. Following a speech by Madame Mao, two days after the Incident, in which she told mass organizations that they had the right to "defend" themselves, some mass organizations were given arms, and others were permitted to "steal"—or really stole—arms from the PLA, still forbidden to use force. Madame Mao's speech was used to justify increased attacks on PLA leaders and units and increased fighting among mass organizations.

Shortly thereafter (late July) other leaders of the regional military commands—whether by order, or on their own initiative—assembled in Peking. At that time, Red Flag was calling for the "overthrow" of the bad "handful" in the PLA. This call, using the locution that had preceded the purge of three-fourths of the leaders of the party apparatus, in effect withdrew the reassurances which had been given the PLA in January 1967. Then on 9 August, in a very harsh speech to PLA leaders—including the regional leaders—Lin Piao criticized the past mistakes of the PLA in dealing with mass organizations, told them emphatically that they were not to take action of any kind in this respect without orders from Peking, defined the standard for "supporting the Left" as that of whether a given mass organization supported Mao (not whether it attacked or did not attack the PLA), and instructed them to seek guidance in handling mass organizations from Chou and the central CRG (the sources of guidance to the young revolutionaries as well). As word of these speeches—the
Madame's and Lin's--was sent out, there was a great increase in violence.

At the same time--in the period between 22 July and mid-August--Mao's team carried out a radical reorganization of those organs charged with carrying out the Cultural Revolution in the PLA and with guiding the PLA as an instrument of the Revolution. There was some confusion in this process--for example, Hsiao Hua was reportedly named as one of the leaders of one new organ a few days before he was purged--but when the dust had settled in mid-August Hsiao and others were out, the General Political Department was on the shelf, a new 'Support the Left' Group was in motion, and the PLA/CRG had a new leader.

Hsiao Hua, director of the General Political Department (and long close to Lin Piao), was criticized by Lin himself (in his 9 August speech) for having "made one mistake after another."* Soon thereafter, Hsiao and two of his remaining deputies (Fu Chung and Hsu Li-ching) were purged. The General Political Department was set aside at the same time (it has existed since only as a ghost), ** and at the same time a new organ called the 'Support the Left' Group was reported.

*Hsiao's case is complicated. He may have been charged both with "rightist" errors (expressed at Wuhan) and also "ultra-leftist" offenses—that is, held responsible for the actions of some political officers in the MRs who took advantage of the new atmosphere to intrigue against military commanders in favor. For example, two political officers of the Nanking MR were later purged for organizing mass demonstrations against Hsu Shih-yu--demonstrations which, according to one 'unconfirmed' Red Guard report, Mao acted to protect Hsu against.

**The GPD's political security bureau presumably went out of business at the same time.
The principal functions of the General Political Department were now to be divided between two groups—the PLA/CRG and this new 'Support the Left' Group. The PLA as an object of the revolution—that is, the purge of the PLA—continued to be the responsibility of the PLA/CRG, which had taken this role from the General Political Department early in 1967. But the PLA as an instrument of the revolution—in particular, the PLA's relations with revolutionary mass organizations—was now the concern of the 'Support the Left' Group, and the General Political Department was out of business.

The new 'Support the Left' Group was placed under the direction of Hsieh Fu-chih, who had been one of the principal officers (with Hsiao Hua and Yang Cheng-wu) of the PLA/CRG. Others in this five-man central group were at first reported to include Hsiao Hua himself (already under attack by Lin Piao and others), and, then and later, Li Tien-yu, a deputy C/S long associated with Lin Piao and more recently one of Hsiao Hua's deputies, Cheng Wei-shan, commander or acting commander of the Peking MR, and Teng Hai-ching, who had taken over Ulanfu's posts in Inner Mongolia. The new group reportedly got to work at once, directing the organization of 'Support the Left' teams in all military regions and districts.

The main role of the new 'Support the Left' organs was presumably to be that of assisting local PLA commands in handling their relationships with revolutionary mass organizations, interpreting directives from the central 'Support the Left' Group and then assisting the military commands to carry them out. Fragmentary reporting on their activities in subsequent months emphasized their role as propaganda teams, subordinated to the party committees of local PLA commands and charged principally with indoctrinating mass organizations. Another important role, from the start, was probably that of serving as one steady channel of information—for leaders at the center—on the suitability of military units (mostly low-level units) for their political missions. The 'Support the Left' units were known to be charged with investigating local situations. And local 'Support the Left' groups were also known to make assignments of low-level military units—e.g., to factories.
At about the same time, by mid-August, the PLA/CRG was reorganized. This action freed Hsieh Fu-chih for his new 'Support the Left' role, and replaced Hsiao Hua and several second-level figures of the PLA/CRG who had been under attack (Hsu Li-ching, Hsieh Tang-chung and Li Man-tsun). Sometime prior to mid-August, Wu Fa-hsien, commander of the CCAF, was reportedly named to head the reorganized PLA/CRG, to be assisted mainly by Chiu Hui-tso, the Director of Rear Services who had survived heavy Red Guard attacks, Chang Hsiu-chuan, director of the Navy's Political Department, and Yeh Chun, Lin Piao's wife. Yang Cheng-wu was now out of the group, but, judging from his reports in September and October, was given the main supervisory responsibility--from his MAC post--over both the PLA/CRG and the new 'Support the Left' Group.*

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the reorganization of the PLA/CRG was the apparent failure to rename Madame Mao as its advisor. She was never again identified in a PLA/CRG role, and was definitely not taken into the Political Work Group which replaced the PLA/CRG some months later. The Madame was evidently held in part responsible--one presumes, by Mao himself--for the great increase in disorder in late July and early August, and was quietly dropped, perhaps with her acquiescence.

Responding to the great increase in violence by mass organizations in late July and August, on 5 September Mao's team finally gave the PLA a weapon for limited purposes. A joint directive at the central committee, MAC, central CRG, and State Council--endorsed by Mao--prohibited seizure of arms, demanded the return of those

*It is not clear how authority was divided between these organs over the surviving political departments at lower levels, which were not abolished when the GPD was set aside. These departments were later subordinated--apparently--to the Political Work Group set up by the MAC in the winter of 1967-68.
already seized, forbade the disruption of transportation, and authorized the PLA to fire upon those who refused to surrender their arms, resisted arrest, or attempted to seize more arms. This directive was not, however, a heavy-duty weapon which could be used aggressively to restore order.

On the same day (5 September), Madame Mao in a speech to mass organizations reversed and repudiated the line of late July and early August which had been harsh and threatening toward the PLA. She withdrew both the call for the overthrow of a "handful" in the PLA and her own call for Red Guard groups to arm themselves; and she praised the PLA and criticized mass organizations for attacking it.

It is possible to conclude from the events of August and early September that Mao and Lin (and the officers of the central CRG) fully intended to carry out another large-scale purge of the PLA but were forced to retreat—forced, that is, by very strong representations from military leaders. This view is not inconsistent with the facts, and is not demonstrably incorrect. There is not, however, persuasive evidence that Mao and Lin intended to carry out another large-scale purge of the PLA; in the first one, in the winter of 1966-67, spokesmen for Mao's headquarters had denounced a large number of military leaders by name and had gone on to purge the great majority of those denounced, whereas in August and early September 1967 there was no repetition of this targeting. Beyond this, in taking a number of conciliatory actions toward the PLA in September 1967 Mao and Lin seemed once again—as in January 1967 when they moderated the Cultural Revolution in the PLA at the same time they ordered it into action—to be recognizing their dependence on the PLA to control disorder, and thus to be avoiding action which would antagonize the PLA. This recognition probably
reflected also the conclusions reached by Mao and others on their tours of China and good counsel from Chou En-lai and some of the central military leaders. It also, finally, probably reflected counsel from the regional military leaders assembled in Peking, who could reasonably have argued that favoritism and leniency toward mass organizations would make it impossible for the PLA to form and guide "revolutionary committees" and carry out other constructive activity.

A dramatic decrease in disorder soon followed the 5 September directive and speech, and in mid-September Peking began to publish Mao's "instructions" (given on his extended tour). Mass organizations were to undergo further "rectification," in order to eliminate self-interest and factionalism, to deter them from attacking the PLA and seizing arms, and to speed the formation of "alliances." The PLA was also to undergo further rectification, in order to improve its performance in dealing with the revolutionary masses.* The process of forming

---

*Yang Cheng-wu, who had accompanied Mao on his tour, reportedly conveyed Mao's "instructions" to the MAC in a 20 September speech, and in so doing he indicated his own supervisory role over such special organs as the PLA/CRG and the 'Support the Left' Group. Discussing the overall situation with great assurance, Yang went on to specify military units which had handled the task of supporting the Left properly, others which had made "mistakes," and a few others (division-level or below) which had been unresponsive and would be dealt with. Yang also affirmed Mao's intention to bring to Peking for reindoc-trination the leading figures of all of the military region and military district commands, a program to be carried out by the leaders of the central CRG (Chen Po-ta and Xang Sheng) and the principal supervisors of the PLA/CRG and the 'Support the Left' Group (he specified himself, Wu Fa-hsien, and Chiu Hui-tso).
provincial "revolutionary committees" was to be speeded, aiming at completion throughout China by February 1968. The military press echoed Mao's instructions to the PLA, telling it to stay out of factional struggles, and Chen Po-ta improved on Mao's instructions to the young revolutionaries--criticizing them harshly and telling them that they were not fit to lead a revolution.

In this context in late September, three second-level leaders of the central CRG were purged, both as scapegoats for their superiors who had encouraged excesses by mass organizations, and for offenses of their own (political maneuvering against others). Wang Li, Kuan Feng and Mu Hsin were all charged with "ultra-left" mistakes of both kinds: that is, for instigating armed struggle among mass organizations, and for inciting those organizations to attack PLA leaders and to seize control of government organs (only "supervision" was permitted).* The purge was apparently meant to illustrate Peking's intention to halt all kinds of offenses by mass organizations, and clearly contributed to the objective of placating the PLA in this second period of heavy dependence on it.

The fall of these second-level figures of the central CRG could be taken as top-level criticism of some of the officers of that organ who had enunciated basic policies, but--apart from Madame Mao's removal from the PLA/CRG--all of them apparently continued to prosper. It was at that very time (September) that Mao reportedly

*These disgraced figures were accused inter alia of having encouraged and supported a mass organization which tried to bring down Chou En-lai. Some observers believe that Kang Sheng himself--although among those denouncing the organization--was the principal sponsor of this organization, meaning that Kang may have tried and failed to dislodge Chou as the third-ranking party leader. But Mao apparently did not believe that, as he is very hard on "double-dealing."
directed Yao Wen-yuan of the CRG to begin making preparations for the Ninth Party Congress; and it was in the next month or two that Mao gave additional instructions on the rebuilding of the party to Kang Sheng and Chang Chun-chiao, two other leaders of the central CRG. In other words, Mao was protecting the central CRG—which had played the central role in the "destructive" stages of the Cultural Revolution—and calling on it to play the central role in the "constructive" stages ahead. (However, the non-radical Hsieh Fu-chih soon emerged as another important spokesman on party-building.)

By October 1967, many of Mao's recent "instructions" had been collected as a "great strategic plan" for the Cultural Revolution. The Revolution (which had begun officially in May 1966) was envisaged as lasting about three years; in its latter stages, the workers and peasants would become the "leading force," and the mass organizations would "recede to a subordinate position"; the Revolution was not (in autumn 1967) coming to an end, but was developing "more intensively" (in fact, it was not); and, while it was not necessary to fear "unrest" and "turmoil," a vehicle going too fast "may overturn."

*Kang at this time (late September) showed himself to be sensitive to charges that he and other central CRG leaders—not only the three just purged—were competing for power with PLA leaders. Speaking at a reception for PLA cadres, Kang accused unspecified persons of trying to damage the relationship between the CRG and the PLA by accusing him of hostility toward the PLA and of purging it more than was necessary, and by asking such questions as "whether we still want" the PLA. On the same occasion, Chou En-lai derided those who were always looking for the signs of division among the top leaders. It was apparent, however, that relations between civilian and military leaders were tense, and it seemed likely that there were indeed the serious differences among top leaders which Chou denied.
so the present task was to form alliances, discover remaining enemies, stabilize the revolutionary committees, and gradually rebuild the party.*

Mao's team soon moved swiftly to get the mass organizations under control. In early October, Chang Chun-chiao of the central CRG criticized some of their actions and told the workers that they were now the "main force" and should act like it. In mid-October, a joint circular of the State Council, the MAC, and the central CRG called for reorganization of mass organizations along functional lines--thus reducing the size and power of individual organizations and helping to reduce violence. A week later, Hsieh Fu-chih told the young revolutionaries to cease their activity. He said that the time had come to rebuild the party, and affirmed an intention to hold a Party Congress. He confirmed that the six-man group of Mao, Lin, Chou and--at a lower level--Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng and Madame Mao, held "ultimate power" and stood above the central committee and its politburo. (Madame Mao may still have been a de facto member of the politburo standing committee; she continued to behave with great self-assurance.)

Throughout October, there was an intensive organization of "Mao-study" classes in Peking. In the interest of reconciling contending mass organizations and forming provincial "revolutionary committees," representatives of mass organizations, PLA commanders and party cadres from many regions and provinces were brought to Peking to attend these classes.

*Some party organizations--e.g., in Shanghai--dated the beginning of their "rectification and rebuilding" from the following month (November 1967); in general, however, the process did not appear to get underway until the following spring or later.
Certain Maoist "instructions," however, were subversive of the effort to control mass organizations. Such instructions, continuing to warn of dangers from the right, were taken by militant mass organizations as justifying a resumption of violence and of attacks on authority. Madame Mao's speeches of early and mid-November—which were officially disseminated—were especially susceptible to this reading.

By this time (late November) Mao had carried further his plans for the Ninth Party Congress. He had reportedly heard from Yao Wen-yuan to the effect that the congress could be successfully controlled by Mao's team, and he reportedly had given to two other leaders of the central CRG the task of assisting with this management. Kang Sheng was to be principally charged with reorganizing the party in advance of the congress and Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan were to be responsible for writing the party "program" and revising the party constitution.

In early December, a joint directive of the central committee, the MAC, the central CRG and the State Council called for the rebuilding of the party apparatus—outside the center—within the new "revolutionary committees." But by the end of December it was apparent that party rebuilding—or any other "constructive" activity—was going to be delayed again by the indiscipline and violence of mass organizations; by this time, serious disorders were again being reported from almost every province. (The Red Guard press was declaring openly that "more and greater disturbances are needed.")

At about this time—the end of 1967 or the beginning of 1968—the PLA/CRG, dominated by Yang Cheng-wu since the removal of Madame Mao in August, was dissolved and was replaced by another special instrument, also to
be dominated by Yang. This latter was the "political work group" of the MAC, also known as the "work group" or "operations" group.*

Actually three groups were set up under the MAC at this time. The other two were to be concerned with literary and art matters in the PLA and with the military press. The literary and art organ, like its predecessor, was to be responsive to Madame Mao and Chi Pen-yu (soon to be purged), and the military press organ, replacing one which had been dominated by second-level figures of the central CRG purged the previous September, was to be responsive to Chen Po-ta and Yao Wen-yuan.

But the most important of the three by far was the Political Work Group. Charged like the other two, with saturating the PLA and its organs with Mao's thought, it was charged additionally with investigating PLA leaders from the army level up—in order to support a judgment, presumably by the MAC as a body and perhaps by Lin Piao himself—as to their political reliability. Whereas the 'Support the Left' Group continued to have the responsibility for investigating the suitability of military units for their political roles and of assisting those chosen to perform those roles, the Political Work Group took over from the PLA/CRG the investigation...
of leaders and the conduct of the purge. It apparently also took over—from the 'Support the Left' Group and/or the PLA/CRG—the supervision of the network of political departments remaining in the PLA.* The PLA/CRG disappeared from the news and has not been heard of since.

The Political Work Group, now by early 1968 the most important of the special organs concerned with the PLA, was to be supervised by the "administrative unit" of the MAC. In other words, it was not to be responsive to the CRG—as the PLA/CRG had been in part—as well as to the MAC. (But other information indicated that the CRG's joint supervisory role was assumed by the political security directorate.) It was not clear whether the "administrative unit" was identical with the active officers of the MAC's standing committee (notably Hsieh Fu-chih, Yang Cheng-wu, Su Yu, and Wu Fa-hsien), or meant simply the office of the secretary-general of the MAC, Yang Cheng-wu. In either case, the principal supervisor of the Political Work Group was apparently to be Yang, who was the speaker on the work of that body at a meeting held in early 1968; Yang would thus have continued in the supervisory role which he had played throughout the Cultural Revolution.** The chief of the new group

*The division of responsibility in the work of indoctrination, however, remained unclear. Both the 'Support the Left' Group and the Political Work Group had roles in indoctrinating the PLA itself; the 'Support the Left' Group had the sole or main responsibility for indoctrinating mass organizations on behalf of PLA commands.

**There were signs of ill feeling between Yang and Madame Mao at this early 1968 meeting. Yang in his speech implied that the Political Work Group had too few members—reported by another source as nine—for its many tasks; the Madame—who ranked Yang in the party apparatus—immediately countered that a few were enough if they were good.
was not identified, but, judging from later materials, was probably Wu Fa-hsien, who had been the chief of the PLA/CRG.

Peking reiterated throughout January 1968 that one of the main tasks for the coming year was to "rectify party organizations and strengthen party building," to be carried out concurrently with "struggle-criticism-transformation" in all units. This purification had again just struck or was again about to strike Mao's team itself. In mid-February, posters announced the purge of Chi Pen-yu, another scapegoat for the kind of "ultraleft" mistakes which had got the team into trouble before and were to blame for the latest round of difficulties. Again higher-level leaders could reasonably have been held responsible; but it had never been Mao's way to accept the blame himself, or to let his favorites take it. Among these top leaders, face was saved for Madame Mao by attributing the initiative in Chi's purge to the Madame, and by blaming Chi for conspiring against her among others. In this connection, Chi was charged with being the principal organizer of the revolutionary mass organization which had tried to bring down Chou En-lai in 1967.

As of February 1968, the central committee, the secretariat, the central departments, the central control commission, and the regional bureaus had all "rotted" (as the Red Guard press said) and were out of business, as they had been for more than a year. The "central committee" remained a euphemism for the standing committee of the politburo, and the central CRG remained the de facto secretariat, with Kang Sheng reported to be the de facto secretary-general. The central CRG appeared to hold its primacy over the MAC, owing to the assignment to CRG officers (Kang, Chang, and Yao) of responsibility for reorganizing the party and preparing for a party congress. The Military Affairs Committee continued to dominate the military establishment, remained the only party organ which was or could become a rival of the central CRG, and had apparently made some gains vis-a-vis the CRG as a result of the reorganization of the PLA/CRG excluding
Madame Mao, the organization of the 'Support the Left' Group, and the replacement of the PLA/CRG by the Political Work Group responsible to the MAC. The political security directorate continued to exist, possibly with official status, and Mao was quoted as declaring that political security in the PLA was joint responsibility of Kang Sheng (of the directorate) and Yang Cheng-wu. But the directorate did not have an apparatus throughout China of the size and strength of those subordinate to the central CRG and the MAC; that is, while the network of subordinate CRGs had been reduced by the dissolution of party committees to which they were attached, others were forming in the revolutionary committees responsive to the CRG, and the MAC had the party committee network in the PLA and also the network of political departments; the political security directorate appeared to have the primary supervisory role only with respect to the emerging security departments of the revolutionary committees.

All three of these key central organs had roles—in a division of responsibility impossible to define precisely—in supervising the work of the very active "work groups" examining the cases of arrested party leaders and equally active central investigation teams looking into other cases or acquiring additional material on those arrested.* The leaders of all three also had important roles in providing guidance to revolutionary mass organizations, although the central CRG apparently continued to have the largest role. And the party apparatus outside Peking was being rebuilt in the emerging "nuclei" (party core groups) of the revolutionary committees.

---

*It was noted that in some—meaning perhaps all—cases of arrests of party leaders, the arrests required the "approval" of Kang Sheng and Hsieh Fu-chih; a third whose approval was necessary was apparently the principal figure of the hierarchy in which the arrested man was an official, e.g. Chou En-lai for the arrest of a leader of an important governmental organ. The arrests themselves were apparently made by the PLA, which then (e.g. a garrison command) took custody. These arrests did not normally mean prison and torture, but house arrest.
The public security apparatus remained in the hands of the PLA. Hsieh Fu-chih, wearing all three of his hats as a leader of the political security directorate, an officer of the MAC, and Minister of Public Security, periodically announced that Mao had told him to "smash" the public security apparatus, and that he was determined to exterminate the influence of its former leaders (Peng Chen, Lo Jui-ching, Hsu Tzu-jung) from the wreckage and from whatever apparatus was reconstructed. Mao was also quoted as telling Hsieh that "the majority" of public security cadres were "good," but Hsieh himself said emphatically that most public security organs throughout China were not. The picture was confusing; in some areas, the PLA maintained direct control of public security work; in others, it worked through "people's security offices" apparently staffed by acceptable cadres of the former public security apparatus; in others, the revolutionary committees (generally dominated by PLA leaders) were handling public security work through their security departments. The first auxiliary bodies--e.g., "workers' provost corps," and 'Attack With Reason, Defend with Force' units--were reported in this period.* The essential conclusion of a speech by Hsieh Fu-chih in February 1968 (and of one by Pan Fu-sheng at the same time) seemed to be that, while the PLA was generally in control of the old apparatus and its work, former public security officials were needed for the work and the apparatus would be rebuilt on that foundation, although most of the personnel in the new apparatus would come from the PLA.

*Mass trials of "counter-revolutionaries," like the mass trials of 1950-52 and 1955, reappeared in summer 1967--trials followed by exemplary executions. These were held under the auspices of the military control commissions or mass organizations of public security organs, and executions were apparently carried out by the PLA. After autumn 1967, no role at all was played by the procuratorates or the courts.
In this period of May 1967 to February 1968, the purge struck most of the handful of leaders of the old political security apparatus who had survived to spring 1967, and several of the principal figures of the organs formed during the Cultural Revolution.

As noted above, the central CRG lost three of its top nine members: Wang Li, Kuan Feng, and Chi Pen-yu. The MAC lost Hsiao Hua. The General Political Department lost this same Hsiao Hua and three deputies, and went out of business. The PLA/CRG (of which Hsiao was also a leader) was also abolished, but its leading personnel were reassigned to the new organs. The inactive control commission lost one of its two surviving officers, Chien Ying. Of the key figures of the old SAD/MPS apparatus Yang Chi-ching and Yu Sang, who survived through summer 1967 in positions (apparently) of exceptional trust, both disappeared thereafter, with no word as to their fate (Yu reappeared in good favor at the Ninth Congress in April 1969; and was named to the new central committee); and Li Tien-huan, long associated with Lo Jui-ching and recently reported to be political officer of the Second Artillery Corps (missiles), also dropped from sight and was later reported purged; but old-timer Chou Hsing reappeared in Yunnan. There was a striking impression, by this time, of the smallness of the circle of central leaders whom Mao and Lin believed they could trust; and this circle was soon to shrink further.

Disorder, Spring-Summer 1968: The Purge of the MAC-Level Supervisor of Political Security Organs, and the Decline of the Red Guards

In the first week of March, Yang Cheng-wu and two other military leaders--Yu Li-chun, the political officer of the CCAF, and Fu Chung-pi, commander of the Peking Garrison--allegedly attempted to arrest some staff members of the central CRG on the CRG's premises, and were heroically prevented from doing so by Madame Mao. Whatever the facts
of the case, it was used for a showdown between the
Madame and the person (Yang) who had benefited most
from the reduction of the Madame's role in the PLA's
affairs. Mao and Lin Piao immediately backed the Madame.

The Yang case is still very puzzling. Yang had
almost certainly been in good favor with Mao and Lin as
late as February, when Lin had confirmed Yang in one of
the most important and sensitive posts in Mao's headquarters,
and he had seemed much more of a Maoist than many of the
military leaders who survived his fall.

Yang and his associates were accused of a range
of "rightist" offenses, especially that of plotting
against other military leaders such as Hsieh Fu-chih and
Wu Fa-hsien of the central leadership and Huang Yung-sheng, Hsu Shih-yu and Chen Hsi-lien of the regional
commands. The charge of conspiring against these lead-
ers, however—as distinct from performing his political
security job, which was that of supervising the investiga-
tion of all senior officers—seems to have been devised
after Yang had fallen from favor for other reasons. The
reasons are conjectural. It may be that the military
leaders named above conspired against him and had the
combined weight to prevail, or that Mao and Madame Mao
decided for political reasons that the Revolution required
another high-level example of the "rightist" threat, or
that the affair was simply personal (the offense to
Madame Mao). In any case, Yang's opponents stood to
benefit by appearing as true leftists like the Madame.
The five named above were praised by Lin and others (as
some of them had been earlier) as good comrades, one of
them was immediately named to replace Yang as C/S, and
the two regional figures among them were returned to
their commands with good names; all five were to be named
to the politburo a year later, although none of them
seemed to be true Maoists.
The call was made by Kang Sheng and Madame Mao to find Yang's "black backer." This was quickly dropped, presumably because Yang's only real superior was Lin himself. There was later a half-hearted effort to put Nieh Jung-ch'en—who was "troubled" by the purge of Yang—in this "black backer" role.

Yang had to be replaced as the second-ranking military man on Mao's team: the ranking member of the MAC standing committee, acting chief-of-staff and head of the General Staff's party committee, and principal supervisor of the new political security apparatus in the PLA. He was replaced first in his capacity as C/S. In late March, Lin Piao informed lower levels of the PLA of Yang's downfall and announced (a) Mao's appointment of Huang Yung-sheng—the Canton commander once closely associated with Lin but a "non-radical" as the new C/S, and (b) the appointment of Wen Yu-ch'eng—long associated with Huang and more recently a deputy C/S—as the new commander of the Peking Garrison. At this meeting, both Lin Piao and Chou En-lai, who had probably been pleased by the Madame's removal from the PLA/CRG in August, now showed great deference to the Madame.

At the same time (late March), the press began a national campaign against a "rightist resurgence," similar to the early 1967 campaign against the "adverse current." One specific (and well-founded) fear was that the new provincial "revolutionary committees" would not be sufficiently Maoist in composition and orientation. Acting on the call to "purify class ranks" and on a reported directive (approved by Mao) on the purge and rectification of the party, throughout the spring of 1968 these committees purged newly discovered "rightists." As these committees were inherently unstable anyway, owing to competition for position among their elements, it was rarely clear whether those purged were genuinely rightists or instead the victims of this competition. Of greatest importance, in this period, was the steadily increasing factional violence among revolutionary mass organizations, encouraged by the new atmosphere and by a continued emphasis in Peking's propaganda on the need for revolutionary struggle and on the importance of the role to be played by these organizations.
During the spring of 1968, the elite list of Mao's team began again to display itself as a body superior to the party's politburo, in a hierarchy of 14 persons which was generally consonant with the top of the de facto structure of power. At the very top, still, were the Big Three of Mao, Lin, and Chou. Following were the key figures of the central CRG, Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, Madame Mao, Chang Chun-chiao, and Yao Wen-yuan, with the economic planner Li Fu-chun inserted incongruously between Kang and the Madame. Next were other key figures of the MAC and its special organs, Hsieh Fu-chih, Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien and Madame Lin Piao.* Last was Wang Tung-hsing of the Staff Office. Included in these 14, not grouped separately, were the three key figures of the political

*The Red Guard press soon--by early summer--reported the "reorganization" of the "administrative unit" (aka "executive unit") of the MAC, the unit which supervised the political work department concerned with evaluating military leaders. The names given were Huang Yung-sheng, Wen Yu-cheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-peng, Chiu Hui-tso, Yeh Chun, and Liu Hsien-chuan. This was a credible list, as Huang as C/S would probably be the secretary-general of the MAC and thus the head of the "administrative" or "executive" organ, and four others (not Wen or Liu) had been officers of the old PLA/CRG replaced by the political work department. The possibility persisted that this "administrative" or "executive" organ was really the standing committee of the MAC, but counter-indicators to this were the omission from the list of Hsieh Fu-chih and Su Yu, both clearly in good favor, and some of the old marshals who while not in high favor were nevertheless still believed to be nominally members of the MAC standing committee. In either case, Huang Yung-sheng had replaced Yang Cheng-wu as the principal person reporting to Mao and Lin on the loyalty and reliability of military leaders, and the central military leaders had again managed to keep Madame Mao out of the special organs of the PLA, although she remained dangerous owing to her post on the central CRG and her easy access to Mao.
security directorate: Kang, Hsieh, and Wang. With the subsequent dropping of Li Fu-chun and addition of Wen Yu-cheng, the elite list was to be complete until the Ninth Congress.

On 13 June, in the face of still rising violence, the central committee issued a directive on ending the fighting in Kwangsi—ordering the mass organizations to stop fighting, to return all seized material destined for Vietnam, and to return all weapons stolen from the PLA. After this directive had been ignored, on 3 July a joint directive of the central committee, State Council, MAC, and central CRG, endorsed by Mao, took note of the recent large-scale, disruptive violence in Kwangsi, and repeated in more detail the 13 June order. Those who resisted, and the "chief culprits," were to be dealt with harshly. This directive was soon said to have nation-wide application.

In late July, Mao, Lin Piao and several other leaders met in Peking with leaders of revolutionary mass organizations. Maorreportedly complained in strong terms of their poor compliance with directives, and he issued then or soon thereafter a nation-wide order forbidding armed struggle; attacks on the PLA, and various crimes against people and property. He warned that those who continued to disobey would be dealt with very harshly. Lin reportedly made some supporting remarks along the same lines.

The PLA acted immediately and aggressively on Mao's directive, suppressing and dismantling many mass organizations. In mid-August, in accordance with a prophecy made a year earlier, the party and military press declared that the working-class as the "leading class" must now play the "leading role" in the Cultural Revolution. The press followed by telling the young to accept the workers as their teachers and to welcome the new "worker-peasant-soldier Mao Tse-tung thought propaganda teams." These teams were even then fanning out through the universities, establishing control over mass organizations and preparing to purge the faculties and to revolutionize education on Mao's radical lines. Yao Wen-yuan of the central CRG
was chosen to underline the point, in a long article, that the worker/PLA teams were to replace the Red Guards as the vanguard mass organizations. Yao's article and subsequent propaganda indicated that these worker/PLA teams were being told to take control of—and carry on the revolution in—not only schools but also factories, stores, cultural bodies, newspapers, scientific research units, and party and government departments. These worker/PLA teams—composed of large numbers of workers and undisclosed but smaller numbers of PLA men as enforcers—were organized, directed and led by local "revolutionary committees," and there is some evidence that they were answerable also to the PLA 'Support the Left' teams attached to local military commands. The committees and the two kinds of teams clearly worked together in indoctrinating mass organizations and carrying out public security work.

There may have been a reorganization of the central 'Support the Left' Group at about this time. Wu Fa-hsien was reported to have taken it over from Hsieh Fu-chih. If so, Wu then directed both of the MAC's special organs concerned with the PLA as an object and instrument of the Cultural Revolution—the Political Work Group and the 'Support the Left' Group. Thus the key figures in the political security apparatus of the PLA, as of late summer 1968, would have been Huang Yung-sheng as chief of the "administrative" or "executive" unit of the MAC and Wu Fa-hsien as the director of these two special organs, with Hsieh Fu-chih exercising some degree of supervisory authority from his post on the MAC and from the political security directorate.

The party press continued in late summer to emphasize the need to "rectify the party" as a part of the nation-wide process of "struggle-criticism-transformation." By early September the process of setting up provincial revolutionary committees was completed with the establishment of such committees in Sinkiang and Tibet. Of the 29 such committees, the majority were dominated by military commanders and/or political officers. (Of the 29 chairmen, 12 were military commanders, seven were political officers, and 10 were civilians.) One rally celebrating this completion added Wen Yu-cheng,
commander of the much-praised Peking Garrison, to the elite list.

In sum, by September 1968, Mao was well into the "constructive" stage of his Cultural Revolution. His main aim in the earlier, primarily "destructive" stage had been to remove his identified opposition from all sectors of the old apparatus of control. He had done this, although his method of operation had ensured the creation of new opponents at every stage. Now in this later, primarily "constructive" stage he intended gradually to reconstruct the party apparatus in some form and then to employ this new apparatus to reconstruct Chinese society in accordance with his long-standing concepts—notably those of unremitting political indoctrination, the instillation of moral and the removal of material incentives, and the mobilization of the masses on a colossal scale—looking toward the creation of a new, selfless Chinese man.

As of September 1968, the conventional central apparatus of the party—the central committee, politburo, secretariat, central departments, control commission, and so on—continued to exist nominally. But it was apparent that the old party leadership, below Mao's level, had been replaced by another team, the elite members of which were given pride of place over the surviving members of the old politburo, and that the apparatus itself was being rebuilt only slowly.

The central CRG, which lost no additional leaders in this period, remained the de facto secretariat, or the nearest thing to it, under the likewise stable politburo standing committee. Kang Sheng apparently remained the de facto secretary-general. The importance of the central CRG was affirmed in this period by the assignment to its officers of responsibility for supervising the purge and rectification of the lower levels of the party, to go along with its responsibility for reorganizing the party and preparing for the congress.

Portions of the regional and provincial party apparatus, like the central apparatus, continued to exist
nominally through or into this period. For example, surviving organs—including the control commission—of the "Central-South Bureau" were said to be taken over by the PLA as late as July 1968. But the real apparatus was of course that of the revolutionary committees. Just as the former central apparatus of the party had directed the regional and provincial apparatus, so now the central CRG may have been the main source of guidance for these revolutionary committees, and in particular for their emerging political departments. They continued throughout this period to "rectify party organizations and revive party life," beginning to set up party core groups to revive "organizational life," in turn defined mainly as studying Mao's thought, repudiating Liu's line, making self-criticisms, and purging bad elements.

These revolutionary committees apparently had the main role in shaping up the worker/PLA propaganda teams. These teams were furiously active along lines previously indicated—going into schools and many other kinds of organizations to take control and direct their work, and assisting in public security work. In addition, political departments began to appear in provincial revolutionary committees, and sometimes, with the simplification of administrations, became one of the three or four surviving components.* Alongside them, or perhaps subordinate to them, were the new security departments.

The MAC, changed in this period by the loss of Yang Cheng-wu and (probably) two lower-ranking members purged with Yang, remained less important than the central

*In many if not most cases, these political departments had evolved from Cultural Revolution Groups. One such PRC political department defined its task as that of "providing leadership to political, ideological, and educational work for all revolutionary organizations in the province." Such organizations included mass organizations. These political departments may have been the organizers of the worker/PLA teams.
CRG as a director of the Cultural Revolution, but it retained authority over the PLA, still the most important element of the structure of power. The special organs subordinate to the MAC were all very active in this period. The most important of them, the Political Work Group and its subordinate groups, which kept control of the political departments of the PLA, were reportedly engaged in the work envisaged for them when they were set up--investigating the loyalty and reliability of PLA leaders and reporting up to Lin Piao and the MAC. "Support the Left" units were carrying out a range of activities in support of local PLA commands (dealing with mass organizations, inciting the masses to dig out traitors and agents and those simply hostile to the PLA and local revolutionary committees, helping revolutionary committees simplify administration, going into the factories to stimulate increases in production, organizing Mao-study classes, and so on); their most important activity probably remained that of investigating the suitability of PLA units (normally low-level units) for their political missions, and they reportedly had authority to conduct these investigations as widely and deeply as they chose. The MAC also had some responsibility--working with the revolutionary committees through the 'Support the Left' groups--for the worker/PLA teams.

The picture was not clear with respect to the party committee system of the PLA--that is, whether the MAC as the highest-level party committee in the PLA had sole authority over this apparatus. It may have shared this authority with the central CRG and/or with the political security directorate. There was at least one known instance of this; in the powerful Nanking MR, Chang Chun-chiao of the central CRG was the head of the party committee of the MR.

One of the most important responsibilities of the MAC--although shared with other central organs--was for public security work. The public security picture remained somewhat confusing in this period, but, with the increasing disorder of the spring and the concurrent call for "cleaning up class ranks," there seemed to be a shift in Peking's thinking about the need for rapid reconstruction of the public security apparatus. As late as June
1968, Madame Mao and other spokesmen for Mao's team continued to call for the "smashing" of this apparatus, but in July the emphasis seemed to shift to the need to strengthen all organs of the "dictatorship." Early in the spring Hsieh Fu-chih announced Peking's decision "to impose military control on all organs of the dictatorship"--which was already the case--and it seemed clear that the PLA did maintain control of public security work throughout this period. The forms taken by public security bodies assisting the PLA commands varied widely. By early summer, many or most of the former public security personnel were in re-education camps, and most of the public security offices had become "former" security offices. However, some were re-emerging as "people's security offices" or "protective groups," now staffed mainly by PLA men. Since 1967, the PLA commands--whether controlling public security work through MCC's or through such offices--had been assisted in some places by auxiliaries (organized on military lines) under various names, of which the 'Attack with Reason, Defend with Force' unit in Shanghai was one of the prototypes. During the summer of 1968, there seemed to be a systematic effort to develop these auxiliary forces, most often reported as "workers' provost corps," which were themselves assisted by "mass dictatorship committees" (alley vigilantes) with smaller areas of jurisdiction. This apparatus was given heavy reinforcement in the late summer with the formation of the worker/PLA teams, which from the start assisted in carrying out public security work. By September, with the formation of revolutionary committees throughout China, these auxiliary forces were subordinated to the committees, but, like the worker/PLA teams, were also answerable to the PLA. It still seemed the intention of Mao's team to rebuild the public security apparatus on the foundation of rehabilitated public security officials, to staff it mainly with PLA men, and to rebuild it now with a greater sense of urgency.

The presumed third of the powerful central organs --the de facto or possibly for some time now the official
political security directorate--continued to be less important than either the CRG or the MAC.* However, Red Guard accounts of the responsibilities and activities of its principals--Kang Sheng, Hsieh Fu-chih, and Wang Tung-hsing--indicated that it had a hand in almost everything the other special organs were doing. It was tempting to believe that this group had the main role in forming and directing the ad hoc special "work groups" examining the cases of arrested party leaders and the ad hoc central investigation teams looking into these and other cases--both of which continued to operate in this period. However, the bulk of the information continued to suggest that these bodies were answerable to all three of the principal central organs--the central CRG, the MAC, and this political security directorate--and the division of authority among the three was impossible to assess. Fragmentary Red Guard materials did suggest that this group may have had complete authority to deal with the cases of leaders of the old political security apparatus who were in disgrace or under suspicion. And in this connection and in connection with all arrests of party leaders, this group had a close relationship with the Peking Garrison, which normally took custody.

*The central political security organ did indeed exist as an official department of the party--named, of all things, the Social Affairs Department. The SAD had been last reported in 1961, although a similar department under a different name--the Political Security Department or Security Department--had been reported to exist as late as the 1963-65 period. It seems likely that it is possible that the SAD had been resurrected as one department of what is called throughout this paper, for lack of any official name, the de facto political security directorate.

-58-
There continued to be no identification of a once-presumed fourth central organ—the body coordinating the work of the central political departments. Perhaps the central CRG handled whatever coordination was still necessary, through one or more members of the old secretariat still in favor (e.g., Li Hsien-nien). At least some of the political departments and offices in government organs were still active in this period, but PLA officers continued to be heavily represented in these offices. The political department of the disrupted and sorely troubled Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reportedly displaced by or subordinated to a group composed entirely of PLA officers, and the operations of other central political departments were reported to be greatly compromised by other political security organs.

Of the key figures of the old political security apparatus who had survived this long (very few), and of the leaders of the new apparatus formed during the Cultural Revolution, only three were known to be purged in this period, the three who fell together in March: Yang Cheng-wu, the principal supervisor of the apparatus in the PLA, Yu Li-chin, political officer of the CCAF, and Fu Chung-pi, commander of the Peking Garrison. Chang Yun-i, believed to have been Mao's man in the disgraced Central Control Commission, went out of the news and was regarded as possibly purged; he was to reappear, however, at the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969, when he was again named to the central committee. Lo Ching-chang, the onetime officer of the SAD and concurrently an officer of Chou En-lai's secretariat, who had been regarded as a possible member of Mao's personal security group in the period just prior to the Cultural Revolution but who had been out of the news for a long time, reappeared in favor in the spring of 1968 as one of the deputy ministers of Foreign Affairs; Lo, who was one of the very few one-time officers of the SAD known to have survived the
Revolution (Kang Sheng and three more were the only known others), may have been heading the Investigation Department (foreign intelligence) by this time, as others reported before the Revolution in leading posts in that Department remained out of sight and may have been purged.

Purifying and Rebuilding, Autumn 1968 - Spring 1969: The Purging and Slow Reconstruction of Lower Levels of the Party

Lin Piao in his National Day (1 October) speech defined the "central task"—that is, what was to occupy Mao's team for the next six months, until the convocation of the Ninth Party Congress—as that of carrying out the various aspects of "struggle-criticism-transformation" of all organizations. This meant, Lin said, the consolidation and development of the revolutionary committees, and performing well such related tasks as "mass criticism and repudiation" (of the ideological positions attributed to Liu Shao-chi), purifying class ranks, rebuilding the party, and revolutionizing education. The most important of these tasks—the one for which Mao had begun to beat the drum a year earlier—was to be that of purifying-and-rebuilding, whether in two stages or concurrently.

The National Day joint editorial supporting Lin's speech implied strongly that the purging of lower levels of the party would be carried out on a large scale (not just a "handful"), and it called for the recruitment of new members among all "tested" proletarian revolutionaries, especially industrial workers. This implied that most new members would come from those already active on worker/PLA propaganda teams, while new party leaders—the dominant figures of the "core groups"—would come mainly from the PLA men and good party cadres who already dominated the revolutionary committees.

In mid-October Red Flag provided appropriate recent "instructions" by Chairman Mao. The party had to get rid of its "waste" and take in "fresh blood" in order to keep its vigor. ("Fresh blood" was again defined as taking in "outstanding rebels," primarily workers, and as selecting outstanding people from those who were already
party members for leading positions at all levels.) As for this process of selection, it was a basic principle of the party—just reaffirmed by Mao—to "rely directly on the revolutionary masses," a principle repudiating "the formalism of blind faith in elections." In other words, Mao's team already had its mandate from its masses, so party organs—including party core groups of revolutionary committees—would be named from above.

From 13 October to 31 October the "central committee" met in an enlarged 12th "plenum." Mao presided, and he and Lin Piao each made an "important" unpublished speech. Probably fewer than one-third of the members and alternate members of the central committee—the survivors—attended the plenum, but the communique emphasized that "all" members of the central CRG and many leaders of revolutionary committees and of the PLA attended (that is, the new leaders of the party). This Maoist-dominated meeting found that Mao's leadership (his line, his "great strategic plan," and his series of "instructions") and Lin's exegeses had been "entirely correct." It also found that adequate preparations had been made for the Ninth Congress, and it ratified a report on the "crimes of the renegade, traitor and scab Liu Shao-chi" which had been submitted by the special work group examining his case. (Liu was dismissed from all posts and expelled from the party, and the communique promised to "continue to settle accounts with him and his accomplices.") The plenum endorsed the "shattering" of the "adverse current" (resistance to the purge) of early 1967 and of the similar rightist threat of early 1968, and the communique called for the continued prosecution of Maoist programs relating to mass criticism and repudiation, simplifying administrations, assigning cadres to manual labor, "purifying class ranks," rectifying the party and taking "advanced elements" into it, and re-educating the intellectuals. Finally, the plenum prepared a draft constitution, and promoted at least a few alternate members of the central committee (e.g. Huang Yung-sheng) to full membership.

An apparently authentic text of this draft Constitution committed the party to be guided forever by "Mao's
thought", whereas the 1956 Constitution had not mentioned either Mao or his thought. The draft quickly made clear why the party had repudiated "blind faith in elections": that is, it named Lin Piao as Mao's successor (not chancing an election) and went on to specify that party organs at all levels—including the central committee, the politburo, and its standing committee—would be "produced" by a joint process of "consultation" and "elections" (meaning, would be named from above).* There was to be only one vice-chairman, thus leaving open the question of what party title to give Chou En-lai. The central organs of the party were again to have full authority to handle the "daily work" of the party, and also of the government and the armed forces; thus they were once again to be the dominant components of the structure of power, and perhaps even more so, as the provision about the work of the government suggested that party organs would take over much of this work (rather than just "guiding" it) and that the governmental structure would be simpler and weaker. While the party remained committed to "democratic centralism" (obedience by lower organs to higher), one particularly interesting provision—theoretically raising the possibility of reproducing in the party apparatus the destructive insubordination of the Red Guards—authorized party members who disagreed with a directive from above to appeal directly to the chairman and the central committee without (as before) being bound to obedience in the meantime. Violations of discipline were to be punished by warning, removal from post, probation (supervision), or expulsion, and really bad elements were to be purged; the party organs charged with dealing with violations of discipline and with political security cases—that is, the successors to the Central Control Commission and the Social Affairs Department—were not identified.

*As for Lin Piao, the naming of him as successor contravened the draft Constitution itself, as the chairman and vice-chairman were to be "produced" by a plenum of the central committee not yet named.
It soon became apparent that Mao's team in Peking intended to proceed methodically with party-rebuilding, and slowly with recruitment. It wanted "class ranks" to be purified, party organizations to be "rectified," revolutionary committees to be stabilized, and core-groups to be assembled, before any large-scale recruiting was undertaken. Revolutionary committees which in early autumn had hurried their recruiting—or had presented Peking with accomplished facts, i.e. lists of recruits who were in fact the friends and supporters of the leaders of the committees—were reportedly ordered by Peking to cease and desist, and their lists were not validated.

Yao Wen-yuan, said to have a large role in party rectification, had said in August that "purification of class ranks" would create the "best conditions for party rectification." This "purification of class ranks" was the generic term for the cleansing of society as a whole (including the party) whereas "rectification" was the term for the cleansing of the party specifically. The targets of "purification" were described as enemy agents, renegades, die-hard capitalist-roaders, landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists, both outside and inside the party—the targets, in sum, of a conventional public security campaign and of a purge of the lower ranks of the party. Despite complaints from the populace in both city and countryside that after so many campaigns the class ranks might reasonably be thought to be purified, revolutionary committees throughout China organized small "leading groups" which again organized "investigation teams" composed of workers and peasants and demobilized servicemen.* These

*It is possible that these "leading groups" worked through the political and security departments of the revolutionary committees, but information is lacking. The teams had the authority to "examine" the worker/PLA teams believed to be named by the political departments.
vigilantes often or usually had the assistance of PLA 'Support the Left' teams, and there is some evidence that PLA 'Support the Left' men were taken into the "leading groups." Leaders of the "leading groups" were told to "personally handle the special cases"--meaning, presumably, the few genuine political security cases, the disaffected Communist or true enemy agent or plotter against Communist officials. Throughout the campaign, new "instructions" from Mao provided up-to-date versions of Mao's long-standing injunction to make careful investigations, not to arrest too many, and to re-educate where possible, but also not to let any guilty person escape. It is safe to conclude that the final injunction, as always before, was the operative one; although no hard figures are available, provincial accounts indicate that many thousands were killed or driven to suicide; and the campaign was stopped just as it was beginning to continue.

Party "rectification," which like the 'purification of class ranks' had begun to move in or about the spring of 1968, picked up sharply after October. Party organizations which had not already done so were told to form "leading groups" for this work too. (As in the "purification campaign, PLA 'Support the Left' men were sometimes members of these "leading groups.") The leading groups were told to conduct a discriminating purge--using class analysis to separate the bad people from the good, carefully assessing the degree of guilt, and judging whether the guilty man had sincerely changed his attitude. (Those guilty of very serious offenses had to be purged, but it was again said that the majority of party members were good.)

This was "open door" rectification, in which party members criticized themselves and were criticized by others in the presence of the "masses," and were subject to additional criticism by the masses. In carrying this out, the "leading groups" were assisted both by PLA 'Support the Left' personnel and by worker/PLA propaganda teams stationed in the unit (factory, mine, whatever) being rectified. In the later stages of rectification, these worker/PLA teams included party cadres who were
being re-educated through their participation in this process. Various accounts of the process indicate that, just as Peking had predicted, the majority of party members were found to be "good."*

The relationship between the "leading groups" and the "party core groups" is not at all clear. In some cases, the two groups may have been identical. However, in some instances in which "leading groups" have been identified below the provincial level, they have been identical or very similar to the standing committees of the revolutionary committees--groups presumably too large to qualify as a 'party core group.' It may be that the usual or frequent practice was to try to stabilize the revolutionary committee and to select the party core groups (and thus meet the other two requirements for the less immediate matter of large-scale recruitment) in the course of rectification. In other words, the relatively large "leading group", while conducting the rectification of party organs and members in its area of jurisdiction, may have been conducting rectification of itself too.

*There is a detailed account of a model "rectification and rebuilding" process in a Peking factory, apparently completed by fall 1968. First the factory set up its revolutionary committee. The committee formed a "leading group" from party cadres and worker party members in the factory and 'Support the Left' personnel from the military unit stationed in the factory--dominated, presumably, by the leaders of the revolutionary committee. The leading group studied Mao on party-building and analyzed the behavior of party members in the Cultural Revolution. The leading group then conducted "ideological rectification." After this, it put party members on the "first line" for mass criticism, purification of class ranks, and administrative reforms. Party members had to make self-criticisms before the masses, often many times, until accepted. A "handful" of party members were purged, those who had made "mistakes" were handled according to individual circumstances, "advanced elements" of the proletariat were drawn into the party, and a new party branch committee "came into being."
shaking itself down while adding a little "new blood" to itself, so that a relatively small group could be submitted to Peking for approval as a party core group. (If so, one can imagine the bitterness of the process.)*

Peking's approval of the proposed party core groups at the provincial or major municipal level was not automatic, and many observers believed that various interests or even factions in the central leadership in Peking were in dispute on the composition of these provincial and municipal leaderships, which were to constitute the party-government-and-military leadership of their areas. It seemed possible that some central organs—say, the MAC—were pressing for greater military representation, while others—say, the central CRG—were pressing for greater representation for mass organizations. Whatever the possible complications and delays, it seemed likely that Mao and Lin Piao themselves had decided some time earlier to rest content with a new party structure resembling pretty closely the de facto structure of power at that time: meaning that military commanders and political officers (often oldtime party cadres) would in general dominate the party core groups just as they had dominated (and could continue to dominate) the revolutionary committees, that re-educated cadres from the old party-machine (not concurrently political officers) would be next in importance, and that the workers and other "proletarian revolutionary representatives" would be a poor third. Many "proletarian revolutionaries" were, however, said to be included in these core groups.

*This conjectured process may have been what one of the leaders of the Shanghai revolutionary committee, a model, was referring to when he said that in forming core groups it would not do simply to prepare a namelist; in the course of repudiating Liu Shao-chi's line and searching for enemies—in the context of "struggle"—the list was to be put together, and it had then to be approved by a superior core group.
Throughout this period of fall 1968 to spring 1969, while the ranks were being purified and the party rectified and slowly infused with new blood, Mao's team was pressing on with a range of radical Maoist policies. As others have noted, these programs were designed to prevent the new China from backsliding into revisionism, a China based on the vision—stated in Mao's May 1966 letter—of self-supporting rural bases in the Yenan style: rural, simple, virtuous, super-politicized, and revolutionary. These programs included: the forced migration to the countryside—on a large-scale, eventually to be an estimated 40 million—of students and the urban unemployed; the sending-down of cadres, and the radical simplification of administrative structures; the simplifying and revolutionizing of education; and organizational and policy changes in the countryside such as the tightening of communal discipline, increasing the size of production teams, reducing private plots and private enterprise, instituting a new supply system, transforming rural towns, and putting a new emphasis on decentralization and frugality and an even heavier emphasis on moral incentives. Some of these programs were experimental, but all testified to the intention of Mao's team to continue with the Cultural Revolution until it was embodied in a new China on the lines of Mao's vision.

As of late March 1969, on the eve of the Ninth Party Congress, the central CRG, which had remained stable for more than a year, may have remained the most important organ of the rebuilding process, and many observers (including this one) expected it to be re-designated as the party secretariat at or after the congress. It was believed to have the main responsibility, throughout this period, for supervising the purification and rectification of the party, and for preparing for the party congress. Closely related to this, it may have had the main voice in approving (or refusing to approve) the party core groups...
being hammered out by the provincial and major municipal revolutionary committees. It was also believed to continue to play the main role in directing the other work of these committees (in particular, their political departments), and reports persisted that its officers divided this responsibility on a geographical basis. It apparently did not, however, have a free hand in any of these tasks, and there were continued reports, rumors, and surmises of disagreement between its officers and other party leaders, notably officers of the MAC.

The provincial and major municipal revolutionary committees also continued to be remarkably stable in this period of autumn 1968 to spring 1969. They were occupied largely with purification, rectification, and the shaping of party core groups, and in this process they underwent some streamlining but without major purges. (The nearest thing was the quiet removal of Wang En-mao from Sinkiang.) Most of those dropped were believed to be troublesome representatives of mass organizations. These committees continued to handle their political security work through political departments and security departments. The political departments seemed to include the functions of the old propaganda departments, and the "political propaganda teams" identified in some factory revolutionary committees appeared to be subordinate to these political departments. They probably shared with the security departments authority over worker/PLA teams (cf. the "investigation teams" examining worker/PLA teams). The revolutionary committees in communes had "revolution and production committees" in their production teams, and these committees apparently assigned the "political duty staffs" composed of peasants taking turns. The security departments (or sub-departments) appeared to have responsibility for at least the less sensitive political security tasks with respect both to party members and the general public. The revolutionary committees (through their political departments) apparently continued to play the main role in forming and assigning worker/PLA propaganda teams. These teams, charged with ensuring working-class "leadership" of all the tasks of "struggle-criticism-transformation," were very active in the "rectification" campaign, in directing the educational system in communes and production brigades (known here as "peasant propaganda teams,"
but with worker and PLA members), in public security work of all kinds, and in guiding and controlling revolutionary mass organizations. The revolutionary committees, through the worker/PLA teams, shared responsibility with the PLA's 'Support the Left' groups for the handling of the mass organizations.

The MAC, like the central CRG, also remained stable in this period, under the leadership of Lin Piao and Huang Yung-sheng, with Haieh Fu-chih, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-peng, Chiu Hui-tso, and Yeh Chun the most important among the other active officers. (Huang and perhaps Haieh continued to supervise the work of the Political Work Group and of the 'Support the Left' Group, while the other four were the apparent directors of these groups.) The MAC probably played a role (if less important than the central CRG's) in selecting the personnel of new central party organs, approving party core groups, and directing the work of revolutionary committees. The Political Work Group, which continued to control the political departments of the PLA, continued to investigate military leaders; the 'Support the Left' groups continued to assist in this work and were very active (assisting the revolutionary committees) in the 'purification of class ranks' and in public security work in general. The MAC continued to share responsibility with the revolutionary committees, mainly through its 'Support the Left' teams, for forming and directing worker/PLA teams and for guiding and controlling mass organizations.

The public security work directed jointly by the revolutionary committees and the PLA apparently remained largely in the hands of the PLA. In some places, military control commissions retained direct control of public security organs, and in others these organs were said to be directly responsive to the revolutionary committees (the latter case presumably being a later stage of development); but in both cases these "people's security groups" were directed and staffed largely by PLA personnel; Communist and other sources agreed that most of the former public security personnel had been sent to re-education camps. While such sources disagreed as to how large a minority of them returned to help staff these offices,
they agreed that they constituted a minority. A small number of worker provost corps (aka worker-peasant group) personnel were reported to be staffing these offices in addition to the preponderant PLA men and the less numerous former public security men, but the worker-provost teams were used largely for patrol and guard duty, i.e., the donkey-work of public security. (Many of these teams reportedly failed even in this work, forcing the PLA to reassign its own men to such work.) These worker-provost teams continued to be assisted by small neighborhood groups. During this period if not earlier the PLA apparently absorbed the former PSF units, as PLA units were reported to be carrying out precisely those duties formerly assigned to the PSF; such forces were believed to be under the command of military districts.

The third and least important of the strong central groups—the de facto political security directorate—continued to have a hand in all political security work through the activities of its principals (Kang Sheng, Hsieh Fu-chih, and Wang Tung-hsing, in that order of importance), if not yet as an official committee or group like the CRG and the MAC. There was fragmentary information to suggest that the "special group under the central committee"—cited in connection with examining and judging Liu Shao-chi—may have been this group, rather than an ad hoc group formed simply for Liu's case. Special work groups continued to be formed for the cases of other leaders, and, like the principal such group, worked by "in-depth probing and special investigation," collecting testimony and evidence and interrogating the suspects (obviously already judged guilty in many cases). At least some of the investigation teams occasionally identified in this period were subordinate to these special work groups, while others may have been operating independently of them. It is possible—but cannot be proved—that the political security directorate by this time had primary or even complete authority over the special work groups and political-security investigation teams, rather than sharing it with the central CRG and the MAC. The nearest thing to a basic-level political security apparatus appeared to be the security departments of the revolutionary committees. It seemed likely that, as party core groups developed,
one member of the core group would be named to supervise security work and would thus reconstruct the basic apparatus of the old SAD.

In this period of autumn 1968 to spring 1969, there were—for the first time in any six-month period since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution—no important changes in the fortunes of key figures of the political security apparatus, or for that matter of the central apparatus as a whole. Mao and Lin held firm to the team that they had put together by spring 1968.

The Ninth Party Congress, April 1969: The Prominence of Leaders of the Political Security Apparatus

The officers of the public security organs formed during the Cultural Revolution were suitably rewarded at the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969. Of the 21 persons named as full members of the new politburo, 11 were officers of political security organs, as was one of the four alternates named. And two of the three men chosen to work with Mao and Lin in the politburo standing committee, at the top of the party apparatus, were the chiefs of the two most important political security organs. It seemed apparent, after the Congress, that the political security apparatus would be playing a critical role in determining whether Lin Piao would be able to consolidate his position as Mao's eventual successor and to carry on along Mao's lines.

A Peking press communiqué announced the opening of the Ninth Party Congress—eight years overdue, and with a much smaller number of delegates than once envisaged—on 1 April. The Cultural Revolution, the communiqué said, had prepared "politically, ideologically and organizationally" for a successful Congress.
Mao presided on opening day and made an "extremely important speech"—probably on the need for "unity." This first plenary session approved a three-item agenda: Lin Piao's political report on behalf of the "central committee" (fewer than one-fourth of its members were present); the revised party constitution; and the election of a new central committee. Lin made his "political report"—the equivalent of the report made by Liu Shao-chi at the Eighth Congress in 1956—on this first day.* In view of Lin's admission that he does not write his own speeches, this political report may have been written for him by one or more of the central CRG figures or by Chou (as one report claims); but it was surely approved by Mao and himself.

Lin's report began with a lengthy defense of the theoretical rationale of the Cultural Revolution, especially the importance of combatting "revisionism," pointing to Mao's effort to halt this by "warnings" and finally his discovery of the right form (the Revolution) to rouse the "masses." He reviewed the struggle in the course of the Cultural Revolution in conventional terms—of interest mainly because, in discussing culture and education, he failed to mention the contributions of Madame Mao. He went on to reaffirm an intention to continue with the "struggle-criticism-transformation"—meaning especially the purge and reindoctrination—of every organization in China, inside and outside the party; of principal interest in this section were the additional indications that the "revolutionary committee" system—combining the previous parallel party and government structures at the provincial level and below—would continue.

*As in 1956, the Party Congress set forth no separate party "program." The program in one sense was embodied in the political report—which set forth the "fighting tasks"; but what was called the "general program" appeared as the opening chapter of the Constitution, which committed the party to carry on along Mao's lines and identified Lin as his successor.
Lin went on to emphasize his determination to carry out Mao's policies "to the letter," while stating them in general terms rather than in detail. These included the policy--reaffirmed many times during the Cultural Revolution--of rehabilitating and reassigning as many party and government cadres as possible, the policy of leniency toward offenders who confess and of "severe punishment" of those who do not, the policy of "purifying class ranks" (the purge of society and of the lower levels of the party underway for about a year but not even begun in some units), and the policy of approaching all economic problems politically in order to bring about "new leaps forward" (not one Great Leap again). He went on to speak of "victory" in the Cultural Revolution but emphasized that this was not "final" victory and that much struggle lay ahead.

Lin then discussed party-building. He praised Mao's ever-correct leadership and issued a strong warning to any remaining opponents of Mao and Mao's thought, quoted Mao on the need to purge and rebuild, denounced Liu Shao-chi's "revisionist" (conventional) concepts of party building, and asserted that party organs and members had "gone through the test in large-scale class struggle" but at the same time called for a continuing fight against revisionism and for a continuing purge of the unfit. He endorsed the revised party constitution and especially praised the enshrinement of Mao's thought (officially "Marxism - Leninism - Mao Tsetung Thought") as the theoretical basis of the party's thought forever.

Lin went on to discuss foreign affairs along familiar lines, intransigently anti-American and anti-Soviet. He concluded with a call for unity in the interest of greater victories, quoted Mao on the great struggles to come in the decades ahead, and echoed Mao's call to fear no sacrifice.

The draft of the revised party constitution was presented to this first plenary session (1 April). The only significant difference between this version and the one prepared at the October plenum was the addition of a provision that the PLA (too) must accept the leadership
of the party. Thus the main provisions were still: the provision for Lin Piao to be Mao's successor without an election; the provision for the leaders of party organs at all levels to be "produced through democratic consultation" rather than elected (the NCNA English gave "produced" as "elected"); and the provision for the standing committee of the politburo to set up the "necessary organs...to attend to the day-to-day work of the party, government and army in a centralized way." (By May Day, Peking was prepared to speak again of "various departments of the central committee," although it identified none.) A United Front Department had been noted earlier.

On 14 April, Peking announced a second plenary session on that date, after "group discussions" since 2 April of Lin's report and the draft constitution. There had also been "discussion" and "study" of Mao's opening-day report, which had apparently been a review of the history of the party, i.e., of the triumph of his line against challenges from the right and ultra-left. It was specified that the "discussion" of Lin's report had been "sentence by sentence" and of the constitution "article by article." There was also the delivery and discussion of several speeches by other party leaders (Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, and Huang Yung-sheng) and by representatives of the "masses." And there was probably genuine discussion of the means of implementing the basic policies stated by party leaders.

This 14 April session "unanimously" adopted Lin's report and the Constitution. The session also heard another "extremely important" (and this time "inspiring") speech by Mao, and an "important speech" by Lin. The same group of 14 presented since autumn 1968 (and, with one exception, since April 1968) as the elite list—the group expected by almost all observers to be the core of the new politburo—appeared in the front row of the rostrum, backed by several less important figures of the old politburo.

As it turned out, the final item on the agenda of the congress, the election of a new central committee, required another ten days. The procedure—the process
of "democratic consultation"—was as follows: the delegations of the Congress nominated candidates; the presidium of the Congress (including many leaders of the de facto structure of power, which was reproduced in the central committee which emerged) then "gathered and collated opinions" from all delegations (this may mean questioning the delegations about any nominees whom Mao's team had not already decided on); the presidium then prepared and distributed a draft namelist; "after thorough consultation," another namelist was produced; at that point a "preliminary secret ballot" was held, which presumably eliminated some names; and finally, an "official namelist" was prepared by the presidium and presented to the Congress for its stamp. With this "election," the Congress was "victoriously concluded."

The 170 full (voting) and 109 alternate (non-voting) members of the new central committee were divided in what seemed to be a reasonable way between provincial and central figures, and among military figures (themselves divided into commanders and political officers), old party-machine and governmental types, and apparently unimportant persons (low-ranking or unknown) who could be regarded as more directly representing the "masses." Military and provincial figures were in greater proportion than before.

There were no major surprises among the 279 names. That is, no high-level purged and disgraced party or military leader was included as a "negative example," and only a few names (e.g., Tan Chi-lung) came from the list of those who had been out of sight for quite a while and had been regarded as purged.

The new central committee held its first plenum on 28 April and "elected" its officers, its politburo, and the politburo standing committee. Mao and Lin were to be the only officers—chairman and vice-chairman—of the central committee, emphatically separated from the other 23 members and alternate members of the politburo, no longer ranked but instead listed in stroke-order. Peking seemed to be making the point that there were two and only two top leaders, Mao and his successor—with Lin a great distance above third-ranking Chou En-lai.
Of the 19 persons named as full (voting) members of the politburo in addition to Mao and Lin, three were long inactive party elders (the chastened Chu Te, the blind Liu Po-cheng, and the senile Tung Pi-wu) and a fourth (Yeh Chien-ying) had seemed to be inactive in recent years after persistent attacks.

Of the 15 full members of the politburo (in addition to Mao and Lin) believed to be active, fully 11 were officers of political security organs formed during the Cultural Revolution:

(a) Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, Madame Mao, Chang Chun-chiao, and Yao Wen-yuan of the central CRG;

(b) Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Chiu Hui-tso, Li Tso-peng, and Madame Lin Piao, of the Political Work Group and the 'Support the Left' Group (in addition to their roles as officers of the MAC); and

(c) Hsieh Fu-chih of the political security directorate.*

The other four full members of the politburo were: Premier Chou En-lai, his close associate Li Hsien-nien (now the only economic specialist on the politburo); Hsu Shih-yu, commander of the Nanking MR; and Chen Hsi-lien, commander of the Mukden MR.

This was not at all to say that the politburo was henceforth to be dominated by a group, coalition or cabal of political security specialists. There was no evidence that these 11 had at any time acted together in opposition to other party leaders. On the contrary, there was evidence of divisions among these 11 themselves, in terms

*The political security directorate was of course also represented through Kang Sheng (listed above in his CRG role), and again among the alternate members of the politburo through Wang Tung-hsing.
both of primary loyalties and of degrees of association with radical policies.

One meaningful way of breaking down the 21 full members of the politburo would be:

(a) Mao's group: Mao himself, and his wife, his successor Lin Piao, and his wife; and the four other Maoist radicals of the central CRG, Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, Chang Chun-chiao, and Yao Wen-yuan.

(b) A "military" group: the four military-political figures of the MAC and the PLA's political security organs, Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Chiu Hui-tso, and Li Tso-peng, and the two military region commanders, Hsu Shih-yu and Chen Hsi-lien.

(c) An "unaligned" group: Chou En-lai, Li Hsien-nien, and Hsieh Fu-chih, and the four inactive leaders (Chu Te, Liu Po-cheng, Tung Pi-wu, and Yeh Chien-ying).

The six active military men (in addition to Lin Piao) named as full members of the politburo (all of them for the first time) constituted a group of special interest, in raising the possibility of a "military" coalition which could effectively oppose the Maoist radicals (including Lin Piao). In other words, these military and military-political men might make common cause with some of the "unaligned" group in the politburo and with other military men outside the politburo, and, if so, would constitute a formidable opposition force.

*The "moderate" group on the outgoing politburo—a group regarded as close to Chou En-lai—did rather poorly in the April 1969 "elections." Chou and Li Hsien-nien were re-elected, but foreign minister Chen Yi, the economic specialists Chen Yun and Li Fu-chun, and the Scientific & Technological Commission chief Nieh Jung-chen, were all dropped. Most had been inactive in recent years or months, but the failure to rename so many of them (when other inactive leaders were named) was the major surprise of the elections.
Some of these six had had poor relations with radical mass organizations and seemed clearly non-radical themselves, but all six apparently stood high with Lin Piao. It seemed likely that Lin was instrumental in bringing them into the politburo.

As noted above, four of these six were military men of a special type: officers of the MAC who (along with Hsieh Fu-chih and Lin Piao's wife) had played key political roles in the Cultural Revolution, supervising and directing the special organs which succeeded the General Political Department. All four--Huang Yung-sheng, the C/S, Wu Fa-hsien, the commander of the CCAF, Chiu Hui-tso, who recently became a deputy C/S, and Li Tsopeng, first political officer of the Navy--had run much the same course. All had been closely associated with Lin Piao for many years, one (Huang) since the 1930s and the other three beginning their careers a bit later as political officers with Lin's forces. All had been named by Lin to their recent or current key military positions: Huang as commander of the Canton MR in or about 1954 (under Lin as the Central-South commander) and as C/S in 1968, Wu as chief of CCAF in 1965 just before the Cultural Revolution began, Chiu as chief of logistics in autumn 1959 soon after Lin became Minister of Defense, and Li as the Navy political officer in 1967 in the throes of the Cultural Revolution. All four had been denounced by Red Guard groups--perhaps incited by some officers of the central CRG--in early 1967; the attacks on three were sharply cut off by word from the top (including praise of all three as faithful to Mao and Lin), and the longer-sustained attacks on the fourth--Huang, who made "mistakes" in handling Red Guard groups--were also halted by strong expressions of confidence, given practical form when Huang was named C/S. At least two (Wu and Chiu) had been among the directors of the program of reindoctrination ("Mao-study") of regional and provincial military leaders in the fall of 1967. All four had been given leading roles in the special organs of the Cultural Revolution: Huang had been one of the few leaders to whom Lin in August 1966 confided his plans for purging the PLA; Li was deputy chief or chief of the Navy's CRG by early 1967; Wu and
Chiu had been named to head the larger and more powerful PLA/CRG when it was reorganized in or about August 1967, apparently in the belief that military men who had themselves been victimized by false charges would be more reliable in assessing the reliability of others; during 1968, Huang had become the MAC-level supervisor of the new Political Work Group which replaced the PLA/CRG and of the 'Support the Left' Group, while Wu apparently became the chief of the Political Work Group and (later) may have become the head of the 'Support the Left' Group as well; and in 1968 all four had been named to the reorganized 'administrative' or 'executive' unit (possibly identical with the Standing Committee) of the MAC, which was to supervise all of the MAC's special organs.

The two military region commanders named as full members of the politburo, Hsu Shih-yu of Nanking and Chen Hsi-lien of Shenyang, also seem favored by Lin. While neither had spent all or even most of his career with Lin, (Hsu may have been Lin's deputy briefly many years ago), two of Lin's first acts as Minister of Defense in autumn 1959 were to appoint Hsu a Deputy Minister of Defense (the only one in a regional post) and Chen as commander of the Shenyang MR. Both were among that small group to whom Lin Piao in August 1966 told his plans for purging the PLA. Like the other four military leaders added to the politburo, both were denounced by Red Guard groups in 1967 (like Huang, they made some "mistakes"), both were strongly defended by spokesmen for Mao and Lin, both went to Peking for "Mao-study" (Hsu may actually have stayed with Mao there), and both were given credit for helping to expose rascals like Yang Cheng-wu (the acting C/S purged as a rightist).

Thus, on the assumption that Mao's group would continue to be responsive to Mao (a safe assumption), and that the six military leaders would prove responsive to Lin (a probability judgment), it seemed that the politburo would continue to be reliably responsive to Mao and Lin as a team. That is, it would probably continue to be responsive even if the seven full members regarded as "unaligned" were so bold as to vote against Mao and Lin.
This was not to deny that there was a high potential for a split among politburo members—as witness the evidence of tension and conflict in the previous three years among some of the civilian Maoist radicals around Mao and some of the military-political figures closer to Lin. But it seemed likely that such conflict would continue to be expressed not as a split in the voting in the politburo but as conflict between the party and military organs which these leaders directed.

In any case, the most important party organ at this time was not the politburo but rather the standing committee of the politburo. The standing committee was to exercise the powers of the politburo when it was not in session (the great majority of the time), and in fact it was the standing committee which was to decide whether a meeting of the politburo was necessary. The principal organs of the party apparatus—the central CRG, the MAC, and the political security directorate—were all responsive directly to the standing committee; and the standing committee had the authority to set up and supervise whatever other party organs it felt it needed. The standing committee thus dominated both the party's decisions and the party's apparatus.

The standing committee "elected" by the Ninth Party Congress was actually re-elected. The same five men had constituted the standing committee since the time (in 1967 or 1968) when Li Fu-chun was dropped from it: Mao, Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta, and Kang Sheng.* Four of these top five leaders of the party—all except Chou—had shown themselves in the course of the Cultural Revolution to be hard-core Maoist radicals, identified with all of the excesses of the Revolution. Whatever the potential of

*As noted previously, Chiang Ching had been regarded as a de facto member of the standing committee, and could still be. But it was interesting that Mao did not add her formally, that there was still some limit to his bizarre behavior.
various combinations of forces at lower levels for opposing or resisting Mao and Lin, the management of the Party's affairs at the topmost level was to be in the hands of Maoist radicals by a margin of four to one. Moreover, whereas there was no military man except Lin in this group, the chiefs of two of the three principal political security organs—the central CRG and the political security directorate—were in it.

The party apparatus subordinate to the politburo standing committee was expected to assume a character not radically different—in its functions and in the relationships among its parts—from the old party apparatus, although the packaging would be different and the central and provincial leaders would mostly be new.

The central committee staff office was expected to remain, and to keep its most important functions, but to be subordinated now to the politburo standing committee. That is, Mao had his personal staff office under Madame Mao, and Lin Piao had his personal staff office under Madame Lin, but the standing committee needed an administrative organ. This would seem especially true if, as believed, the standing committee intended that the most powerful central organs apart from itself—that is, any new secretariat, the MAC, and the political security directorate—all be responsive to itself, rather than handling two of them through the secretariat. This would also mean better control by the standing committee of party documents and personnel records—the raw material for power struggles and purges—and of the physical security component which protected the leaders against attempted assassinations or coups. This office seemed to be in good hands, with the hard-core Maoist Wang Tung-hsing as the head of it and in a position to conduct effective liaison with any new secretariat and with the political security directorate through his concurrent posts in those organs.

Contrary to expectations, the Congress did not redesignate the central CRG as the new party secretariat, and it was referred to as the central CRG during the
Congress. It could be Mao's intention—in line with his "simplification of administration"—to operate without a secretariat, i.e. to have a single body act both as the standing committee of the politburo and as the secretariat; just as the pre-1956 secretariat was redesignated the politburo standing committee in 1956, so now the politburo standing committee might serve concurrently as the secretariat—with the two top officials of the central CRG, the fourth-and-fifth ranking members of the politburo standing committee, playing the roles that Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen used to play as the two ranking officers of the secretariat. That the five-man standing committee would act as a "collective secretariat," controlling government as well as party organs (as did the old secretariat, through the central departments), and that there would be no general secretary but that one member ("probably Kang Sheng") would be responsible for internal affairs (in other words, would be a de facto secretary-general). The new standing committee could begin that way—which would have the great advantage, for some party leaders, of cutting Madame Mao out of the heart of the party apparatus just as she had been cut out of the PLA's political security organs—but it seemed likely that a separate secretariat would sooner or later be found desirable. As witness, in 1956 the party did in fact set up a new secretariat when it redesignated the old one as the politburo standing committee, and the present politburo standing committee had in fact been using the central CRG as its "secretarial team" (Madame Mao's phrase) or de facto secretariat for more than two years.

Whatever the name to be given the anticipated new secretariat, it seemed likely that it would be a political secretariat, as distinct from an all-purpose secretariat which would have authority over the MAC or the political security directorate. (The old secretariat apparently did not have authority over the MAC, and the central CRG had not had it; the old secretariat did have authority over most of the political security apparatus.) The secretariat's authority, in other words would be over the party's central departments, as before: these would
be predominantly, although not exclusively, political departments of one kind or another.* The secretariat would of course have liaison relationships with the MAC and the political security directorate, and perhaps something more with the latter, in that political security bureaus might be established in party departments subordinate to the secretariat.

With regard to the MAC, Lin Piao was expected to take pains to keep the MAC subordinate only to the politburo standing committee. Similarly, he was expected to take pains to continue to dominate the MAC as de facto chairman and through his proteges as the active officers. The only vice-chairmen identified since the Congress were Yeh Chien-ying, Chen Yi, Hsu Hsiang-chien, and Nieh Jung-chen, all of whom had been vice-chairmen when the Cultural Revolution began. Yeh was reelected to the politburo in April and seemed to be in qualified favor, but also seemed to be little active; the other three were dropped from the politburo and seemed to be altogether inactive. The strong figures were probably the six standing committee members below them who were named to the politburo (Huang, Hsieh, Wu, Chiu, Li, and Madame Lin).

The MAC might have only a liaison relationship with the new secretariat, as it apparently had with the old, through an officer of MAC concurrently a secretary. But because the party had never allowed the PLA to assume full responsibility for its own political security, something more than a liaison relationship between the MAC and the political security directorate would be necessary (indeed, probably existed already**). One of the PLA

---

*The anticipated secretariat will probably have to include more people than the known officers of the central CRG, as it will have areas of concern apparently not within the competence of the CRG officers.

**It will be recalled that Mao had reportedly said that, as of 1967, the political security of the PLA was jointly the responsibility of the MAC-level supervisor of political security organs in the PLA and Kang Sheng.
officers concurrently a leading figure in the political security directorate and in the MAC (Hsieh Fu-chih would seem likely) might be chosen to report both to the MAC and to the directorate. (This joint responsibility--of the MAC and the directorate--for political security in the PLA seemed virtually certain, whether Lin Piao liked it that way or not; because Mao liked it that way.)

The political security directorate was also expected to remain responsive directly to the politburo standing committee, rather than being subordinated to a new secretariat. Just as the MAC was represented on the politburo standing committee by Lin Piao, so the directorate was represented by Kang Sheng. It seemed possible that this directorate had become one of the unidentified "departments of the central committee" cited by Peking on May 1969 and would thus be subordinate to a secretariat, but it seemed likely that Mao and Lin Piao, drawing the lesson from the years prior to the Cultural Revolution, would want to keep this a higher-level body than a department and directly responsive to themselves. The directorate would probably have a close liaison relationship with any new secretariat, as Kang was the senior officer of the directorate and expected to be a leading figure in any new secretariat. As with the MAC, the directorate would have more than a liaison relationship if it installed political security organs in sensitive party departments subordinate to the secretariat, but the question would be academic if Kang Sheng were wearing both hats. With regard to the directorate's relationship to the MAC, Mao, Lin and Kang (perhaps against Lin's true wishes) might reconstruct the political security bureau of the General Political Department, which had worked closely with the equivalent of the political security organ had indeed been stabilized as a central department, but it could also be construed as meaning that the old political security bureau of this department had been elevated to become a department and that the old department had higher status. Either way, the report was unconfirmed.
security directorate in the old days—that is, that they would set up analogous organs in the two special groups which had replaced the General Political Department. The directorate might also be given the physical security (bodyguards) component of the staff office, and full responsibility—once possibly shared with the staff office—for the assignment of cadres to political security work.

With respect to these three powerful central organs directly responsive to the politburo standing committee—that is, any new secretariat, the MAC, and the directorate—it seemed that Lin Piao might want to strengthen his position in two of them. In some respects, he had come out of the Party Congress in fine shape, in terms of preparation for the succession. He was to be the uncontested chairman, after Mao. He seemed to be strong in the politburo, as the six military men named to it seemed to be men in whom he had confidence, and most of the rest of the politburo would be expected to transfer their allegiance from Mao to himself rather than to any other leader. Similarly, with respect to the standing committee of the politburo, he himself would be its senior officer after Mao's death and most of the others were Maoist radicals like himself. Nevertheless, Lin might think it prudent to try to get someone very close to himself into the standing committee of the politburo and into the secretariat, and another such person into the political security directorate.

Below the level of those powerful central organs believed to be directly responsive to the standing committee of the politburo, the structure was of course evolving. The MAC's subordinate organs were the most fully developed. While the General Political Department still nominally existed as late as early 1968, the PLA/CRG became the de facto General Political Department after August 1967 and was in turn replaced in that role by the Political Work Group and the 'Support the Left' group, both still thriving. The key figures seemed pretty clearly to be Huang Yung-sheng, Hsieh Fu-chih, and Wu Fa-hsien as the MAC-level supervisors and as
directors of these bodies or a consolidated organ. Mao and Lin might intend to redesignate this apparatus as the General Political Department (again), with one of the officers of the Political Work Group as director of the department, another of that Group's officers as chief of a resurrected Political Security Bureau, another in charge of the work of political indoctrination, and one of the officers of the 'Support the Left' Group as chief of a new bureau charged with evaluating and assisting military units given political missions. The MAC might try hard to keep control of this General Political Department, against possible incursions by a new secretariat and possible attempts by the political security directorate to enlarge its role. There needed be no change in the status of the subordinate political departments of the PLA units, but the relationship of the 'Support the Left' teams with the worker/PLA teams and the revolutionary committee investigation teams needed to be clarified and regularized—as they seemed to overlap considerably in the work of control, indoctrination and investigation.

The organs which were to be responsive primarily to any new secretariat were being put together—the unidentified "departments of the central committee." Some of these departments would probably be very similar to the old departments, although with almost entirely new personnel. These departments, probably again to be supervised by individual members of the secretariat, would seem at least to include—in addition to the identified United Front Work Department—the Organization Department (supervised principally by Kang Sheng), the Propaganda Department (probably Chen Po-ta, but possibly either Chang Chun-chiao or Yao Wen-yuan), a Liaison Department (foreign Communist parties), and several departments to coordinate economic affairs (planning, rural work, industry, finance and trade, etc). The political security directorate was expected to install political security bureaus in some of these, analogous to the onetime Political Security Bureau of the Organization Department. It was conceivable that a new secretariat (if not headed by Kang Sheng) would resist this and attempt to regain
the supervisory authority it once had over the political security apparatus.

The party core groups being formed within revolutionary committees were expected to remain responsive primarily to the anticipated secretariat, although the military members would have a concurrent and perhaps sometimes conflicting responsibility to the MAC. Too few of these party core groups had been identified to show a pattern. There seemed some possibility of serious conflict in shaping up these groups, as Lin might want them to be dominated by military men close to himself. The entire question was complicated by the shortage of experienced party cadres and the fact that these military men were not simply "military" men but party cadres and often political officers, sometimes with backgrounds as full-time party cadres and in most cases backgrounds in political as well as military work.* As these party core groups emerged and the hierarchies in them were made clear, it might be possible to make meaningful distinctions between "party" and "military" representatives and to clarify the lines of authority to and among them. Here again there was a potential for conflict between a new secretariat and the MAC.

The political departments of the revolutionary committees would presumably be responsive to the central

*There is really no such thing as "the military" in China, in the Western usage of apolitical professionals. Even those who are now military commanders (rather than political officers, a very different category) were heavily politicized from the start, most had tours as political officers along the way, most rank high in the party as well as in the military structure, and many perform party, governmental and military functions concurrently.
departments through the party core groups, as would the worker/PLA propaganda teams, then responsive mainly to the committees. It seemed doubtful that Mao really intended, or that Lin agreed, that the worker/PLA teams were to remain in authority "forever" in the organizations in which they were installed, e.g. the schools; the committees would probably set up a regular apparatus. In any case, as previously noted, there should be some tidying of the relationship between these teams and the overlapping 'Support the Left' teams and investigation teams, so that they would not be falling all over one another.

As for the organs responsive primarily or in part to the political security directorate (including the Peking Garrison, responsive to the General Staff but also to the directorate), the most important of them--the special "work groups" dealing with the cases of arrested party leaders and the investigation teams gathering material on these and other cases--could not yet be confidently described as responsive primarily to the political security directorate; the MAC and the central CRG had had roles which might have been equal. However, it seemed likely that these special organs of the Cultural Revolution would become increasingly subordinate to the political security directorate, and that sooner or later they would be given permanent status within the directorate as evaluative and investigative organs, similar to some of those of the old Social Affairs Department and its successors. It seemed likely that the Political Security Bureau of the old SAD would be resurrected, presumably as a full department of the directorate to work closely with the political security bureaus which this directorate was believed to want to resurrect in such sensitive departments as the Organization Department and the General Political Department and to install in other sensitive departments--for investigation and evaluation.
of party members in party, military, and governmental organs. (As noted, this effort might conceivably be resisted.) The security departments of revolutionary committees were expected to become increasingly responsive to the central directorate, through party core group members named by the directorate, forming the equivalent of the basic-level apparatus once enjoyed by the SAD. Similarly, the investigation teams of revolutionary committees would probably be taken into their security departments.

There was no clue as to whether Mao and Lin meant to resurrect the Central Control Commission and its subordinate bodies, as organs concerned with examining obedience to directives—and other behavior—by party members. But common sense seemed to argue against it, at least so long as there remained so many special organs of the Cultural Revolution, both at the center and in provinces, which were doing just that. With the dissolution or absorption of some of these organs, the old control commissions might be resurrected as the supervisory branches of the political departments of the revolutionary committees, under the control of members of the party core groups.

The new party apparatus, including the political security apparatus, was expected to look much like the old apparatus in important respects, but also to differ in important respects. The most important points of difference would probably be: a simpler structure; much tighter control of the key organs of the apparatus by the standing committee of the politburo, in particular by Mao and Lin themselves; less authority than before for a new secretariat; a larger role for a powerful Military Affairs Committee, balancing the secretariat; a larger role for the political security apparatus; and a higher potential for conflict among the secretariat, the MAC, and the political security apparatus, if (as seemed likely) each were to attempt to preserve or enhance its authority vis-a-vis the other two.
Postscript

This paper is being published several months after the close of the Ninth Party Congress. In this period, Peking has told us almost nothing about the key central organs of the party. The central CRG has not been mentioned for months, and was conspicuously absent from the list of party organs offering condolences on the death of Ho Chi Minh in early September; but no secretariat or secretary has been identified, and it is not known whether --as expected--the leaders of the central CRG have been made the core of an expanded secretariat with other kinds of specialists, such as military men. The Military Affairs Committee has been active, and there was for a time a curious emphasis--still unexplained--on the fact that--Mao, not Lin, is the chairman of it; but there has been no identification of the vice-chairmen through whom Lin as de facto chairman actually works, there has been no clarification as to whether the MAC still has a standing committee, the identities of the members of any standing committee are conjectural, and the other officers of secretary-general Huang Yung-sheng's administrative or executive unit have not been recently identified. It still cannot be proved that the political security directorate even exists, and its components--assuming that it exists--cannot be identified. With such central matters as these still obscure, a confident account of the political security apparatus as a whole cannot be offered. After many more facts are in, it will be necessary to prepare a third paper in this series.