Intelligence Report

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND EDUCATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA

(Reference Title: POLO XXXVI)
WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND EDUCATION
IN COMMUNIST CHINA

MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS:

For three years the educational system in Communist China has been totally disrupted and out of production. University and middle school students closed their classrooms or converted them into revolutionary headquarters to spend their time in Red Guard activism. The school system was scorned, administrators and teachers humiliated, and intellectuals deprived of status and respect. It appears likely that the "radicalization" of curriculum, faculty, and students will continue for some time, to the detriment of objective research and teaching.

The findings of this study, in broad terms, are that "educational revolution" is basically a function of Mao's distrust of the intellectual and his desire to create a New Chinese Man. This new man, the "revolutionary successor," is primarily a product of his education. Mao believes that in the past Liu Shao-chi and others distorted and emasculated educational reforms designed to create the New Chinese Man. This belief of Mao's, to some extent true, led Mao to launch a wholesale assault on the educational system as part of the Cultural Revolution.

In the past, Mao's search for fanatical devotion has led to a compromise of academic quality in favor of political reliability. The same is likely to be true in the present instance, because the educational system is asked to serve conflicting goals. The main thrust of the current reforms is to cut down the time spent in formal education and to revise the curricula to produce more narrowly trained specialists. If the emphasis on ideological purity is maintained as the primary purpose
of education, then the new policies could be disastrous, coming on the heels of three years with practically no education whatsoever. If, on the other hand, emphasis is placed on the concrete application of revised curricula and their substantive content, then the impact of the Cultural Revolution could be somewhat mitigated.

This study was produced solely by the DD/I Special Research Staff. The research analyst in charge was Paul H.B. Godwin.

John Kerry King
Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND EDUCATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Contents

| Introduction | 1 |
| Prologue: Mao and the Intellectuals | 4 |

I. EDUCATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA: THE PRELUDE TO THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

| Introduction | 7 |
| Education and Politics: The Great Leap Forward | 8 |
| Education and Politics: 1960-1962 | 9 |
| Education and the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee: September 1962 | 11 |
| The Socialist Education Campaign: 1962-1965 | 12 |
| A. "Fewer But Better" | 13 |
| B. "The Construction of a New Socialist Countryside." | 14 |
| C. Half-Work, Half-Study Schools | 16 |
| Half-Work, Half-Study: A Model County | 18 |
| Half-Work, Half-Study: The Industrial Model | 19 |
| Half-Work, Half-Study: The University Model | 20 |
| Half-Work, Half-Study: Summary | 21 |

Political Control of the Full-Time Education System | 22 |

| A. Political Control: The University | 22 |
| Summary | 25 |
| B. Political Control: The Middle School | 26 |
| Summary | 28 |
| C. Political Control: The Primary School | 29 |

| Entrance Requirements and Fees | 31 |
| Job Assignments | 33 |
| Student Morale and Political Attitudes | 34 |

The Prelude to the Cultural Revolution: Conclusions | 36 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II. THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Closing of the Schools ..................</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Red Guard Reign of Terror ...............</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Reinstatement of Authority ..............</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. The Worker Peasant Propaganda Teams ......</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The Thought Reform of the Intellectuals</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The Exodus ................................</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Reform .........................</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Educational Reform: Higher Education .</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tungchi University: The University Model</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary .....................................</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Shanghai Machine Tool Plant: The Factory Model</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary .....................................</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Shanghai Institute of Mechanical Engineering and the Peking Aviation Institute: The Research Factor</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary .....................................</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Educational Reform: Primary and Middle Schools</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and Middle Schools: The Rural Experiment</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half-Work, Half-Study Schools ................</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Schools: Summary ......................</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and Middle Schools: The Urban Experiment</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Schools ................................</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Schools ................................</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Half-Work, Half-Study Schools ...............</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Schools: Summary ......................</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| III. CONCLUSIONS AND SPECULATIONS .......... | 83   |
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND EDUCATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Introduction

The effect of the cultural revolution upon education in China has had two major facets, each with its own specific outcomes. First, the cultural revolution has thus far denied three years of formal education to all school-age individuals, and it has shattered the educational system. The denial of education to students and potential students means that some 340,000 students will graduate from an institution of higher learning without completing a formal course of study, and approximately half a million students will either enter such institutions without adequate high school preparation (by Chinese standards), or will fail to enter at all. Many more thousands of students will "graduate" from high school without completing their formal training.

Second, the student-teacher relationship at all levels of the educational process has been effectively destroyed by a combination of Red Guard terrorism and the deliberate downgrading of teachers by the regime through the so-called take-over of education by workers and peasants. Curriculum reform, of which we have but a few glimmerings at this time, will undoubtedly round out the destruction by seriously reducing the amount of basic information and systematic analysis of information disseminated through the educational process. Thus the core of China's educational system has been deliberately sacrificed to the ideals of Mao Tse-tung's particular utopia.

The nullification of the educational system was, and is, a deliberate political act demonstrating one of Mao Tse-tung's most immutable values: that intellectuals have proclivities that make them suspect as members of Mao's ideal society. Mao's long-standing distrust of the intellectual is based upon the realization
that the core of China's intelligentsia was educated in the West. Thus the intellectual is either the product of a "bourgeois" society or, for graduates since 1949, the product of an educational system dominated by the "bourgeois" intellectual and therefore probably contaminated by non-proletarian ideology. Students educated in the Soviet Union are, for obvious reasons, equally suspect. Mao's deep-rooted suspicion of the intellectual comes into conflict with another of his major goals: the rapid industrialization of China in order to achieve great power status for the People's Republic. To achieve this goal China needed to develop the technical and managerial skills upon which the modern industrialized state is built. Such skills are the product of the educational system of the society that seeks to create them, and are held and manipulated by individuals whose values tend to be pragmatic and universalistic. Such values are anathema to Mao Tse-tung.

The long-range goal of Mao was [and remains] to politicize the intellectuals who were a product of the West, and to educate a new Chinese intellectual who was both politically reliable and professionally expert—the ideal-type of the intellectual has been defined by the regime as "Red and Expert." As the educational system was dominated by Western-trained minds, the politicization of the older intellectuals and of the next generation of intellectuals had to be carried out by agents external to the educational system. Prior to the cultural revolution, this agent was the Chinese Communist Party which attempted to assert absolute control over all facets of the educational system.

The Party's control of the system extended from the Ministries of Education and Higher Education down to every school in the nation. The representatives of the Party in a given school wielded more influence over the institution's processes than professional educators. The Party controlled curriculum content, faculty appointments and promotions, student activities, and all other phases of education and related programs. Beyond this, political indoctrination permeated the content of the curriculum, with specific periods set aside for small group discussions of political affairs, ideological training, and
current problems. The student daily regimen, from dawn until dusk--literally--was under the strict control of the Party.

To the extent that Mao believed the educational system had failed to achieve his goals, the Party had failed. The story of the cultural revolution is the history of a Party purge, and the interaction between the cultural revolution and China's educational system is primarily one of a struggle to achieve political goals.
Prologue: Mao and the Intellectual

In his address to the Yenan Conference of Writers and Artists in May of 1942, Mao Tse-tung gave a clear expression of his attitude toward the intellectual. Furthermore, in describing his personal experience as a student, Mao stated clearly the contempt he felt (and still feels) for the elitist attitudes of the intelligentsia:

Let me tell you of my own experience; let me tell you how my feelings toward the people changed. I was once a student, and in school I acquired student habits and manners. For instance, I was embarrassed when I had to carry my bags on a bamboo pole in the presence of my fellow students. They were so refined that they could not stand having any weight press upon their shoulders and disdained the very thought of carrying anything in their hands! At that time I was convinced that only intellectuals were clean, that workers, peasants, and soldiers were unclean. I would therefore readily borrow clothes from an intellectual, but never from a worker, or a peasant, or a soldier because I thought that their clothes would be unclean.

During the revolution I began to live among workers, peasants, and soldiers. Gradually I began to know them, and they also began to know me. Then, and then only, did the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sentiments inculcated in me by bourgeois schools change fundamentally! Ever since then, whenever I compare unreformed intellectuals with workers, peasants, and soldiers, I realize that not only were the minds of those intellectuals unclean but their bodies were also unclean. The cleanest people in the world are the workers and peasants. Even though their hands may be soiled and their feet
smeared with cow dung, nevertheless they are cleaner than the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie. That is what I mean by a transformation of sentiments—a changing over from one class to another.

Mao's concern with the elitist attitudes of the Chinese intellectual stems not only from his goal of achieving an egalitarian society and his basic distrust of the "bourgeois" background of the intellectual, but also from the status accorded the intelligentsia in Imperial China. Traditionally, the scholar-gentry formed the backbone of the imperial political system, and the value structure of Chinese society established the scholar-gentry as the ruling elite. Mao is convinced that if his revolution is to succeed, the legitimacy granted to the scholar-gentry has to be transferred to the Chinese Communist Party.

Social revolutions are directed against elites which function as a ruling class, and the value structures that legitimize them. Mao knew in 1942 that the political power of a leadership group does not automatically guarantee prestige—the esteem and respect of the members of the society. Certainly the Party can rule without prestige, but without prestige another stratum of society can either explicitly or implicitly challenge the ruling group for authority within the society. The intellectuals in China form a social elite that carries with it, by definition, prestige. Mao's consistent distrust of the intelligentsia is based upon his understanding that traditional values still exist in the society, and that esteem for the intellectual constitutes an implicit challenge to the authority of the Party.

The challenge to the Party is located in the society's esteem for the intellectual, but it is in the functions the intellectual performs for the society and the state that his leadership role becomes explicit. Apart from his obvious role as the managerial and technical expert, the intellectual also functions as the specific agent transmitting systematic knowledge to the society through the educational process. Thus the intellectual, regardless of the suspicion and fear with which
he is viewed by the political leadership, is performing critical functions for the state and the society. The significance of the intellectual and his role in society can be seen by members of the society from the primary school to the specialized institutes for research and development.

Mao has attempted to curb the influence of the intellectual by establishing the Party as an independent politicization and control agent in the educational system, by attempting to recruit intellectuals into the Party, and by establishing a "watch-dog" organizational structure in industry. Similarly, since the earliest days in Yenan, the Party has engaged in campaigns designed to inculcate political reliability in the intellectual while attempting to downgrade his status in the society. The events of the cultural revolution, however, are the clearest indication that 26 years after Mao's speech at Yenan the intellectual has yet to become a trusted ally in the continuing social revolution, and that Mao's basic fear of the intellectual is still one of his most deeply-held convictions. Furthermore, it appears that the impact of the cultural revolution upon the intellectuals will be greater than Mao's punitive reaction to the period of "blooming and contending" in May of 1957.
I. EDUCATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA:
The Prelude to the Cultural Revolution

Introduction

The fear and suspicion that characterizes Mao's view of the intelligentsia as a stratum in China's society has had a marked effect on the regime's policies for education. The value conflict between the necessity of developing a society capable of creating a modernized, industrialized state, while at the same time producing a politically reliable citizen imbued with the proper "revolutionary spirit" has led to considerable variation in educational policies. The basic goal of combining professional expertise and political reliability is not beyond the capacity of most educational systems; all societies use the educational system as a major agent of political socialization. China, however, like many other modernizing states, is faced with the problem of imbuing its citizens with values significantly at variance with those of the pre-industrial and pre-revolutionary period. As the parents of the new generation were schooled under the pre-Communist regime, their ability to politically socialize their children into the new value structure is not high. The primary responsibility for political socialization is therefore placed in the hands of the schools.

The distinct problem for China, however, is that the degree of political socialization required goes far beyond that which is necessary for simple loyalty to the state. It requires a commitment to Mao and the Party that can best be described as a requirement for fanaticism; thus, the Chinese educational system is charged with producing citizens with both specific levels of expertise and a fanatical commitment to Mao Tse-tung.
In many ways, the educational "reforms" introduced during the Great Leap Forward of 1958-60 reflect the more extreme views of Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese leadership and were definite harbingers of the reforms introduced during the cultural revolution. Indeed, current reporting in the Chinese press and radio broadcasts refer consistently to this origin of the present policies. In 1958, the educational system was instructed to expand its facilities to accommodate a 45 percent increase in the number of students in the academic year 1958-59—a "leap" from 441,000 students enrolled in colleges and universities in 1957-58 to a projected 800,000 in 1958-59. The number of students with worker-peasant backgrounds was also to be significantly increased, and to aid in the development of an egalitarian society, students were to combine formal academic training with productive labor. Manual labor had been the lot of Chinese students for some time, but the new emphasis placed by the regime on this aspect of its policy indicated that once more the distinction between mental work and physical labor, and the elitist attitudes fostered by the former, were to come under attack. The attack was to take the common form of glorifying manual labor and those who performed this labor. Furthermore, by sending students to the communes and factories to participate in manual labor under the direction of the peasant and worker, the industrial and agricultural worker was given official status as a "teacher." A State Council directive of September 1958 described the policy this way:

The Party line in educational work seeks to make education serve the proletariat politically and to unite education with productive labor. In order to implement this line, educational work must be led by the Party. Marxist-Leninist political and ideological indoctrination must be carried out in all schools to indoctrinate the teachers and students with the class
view-point of the working class: the mass view-point, the labor view-point, or the view-point calling for the integration of mental labor with physical labor, and the dialectical materialist view-point. The future direction is for schools to run factories and farms, and for factories and agricultural cooperatives to establish schools...

In accordance with this directive and others, the educational system not only sent millions of students to the fields and factories, but also began to develop "part-work, part-study" schools. In a parallel development during 1959 and 1960, schools and universities created ancillary factories and work-shops, while the larger factories established general education facilities. The communes began to establish "part-farming, part-study" schools where the students would spend part of the day studying and the other part laboring in the fields. These programs suffered severe cutbacks after 1960 when the extremes of the Great Leap Forward combined with administrative ineptitude and natural disasters to create an economic and political crisis.

Education and Politics: 1960-1962

Following the disaster of the Great Leap Forward and the withdrawal of Soviet technicians in 1960, there was a short period of retrenchment in educational policy as the Chinese attempted to lift themselves up by their boot-straps. The extent to which Mao's more extreme views were being modified can be seen in an article written by Kao Chih-kuo, 1st Secretary of the Party Committee for Yunnan University, and published in the Kwangming Daily of 7 April 1961. This same article was reprinted in the People's Daily a week later. Kao wrote:

To say that education must be combined with productive labor is not to mean at
all that work in schools need not center on teaching, for it must. In the midst of great leaps forward, all undertakings are required to leap forward. Everybody wants to forge ahead. Manpower is needed everywhere. Schools are required to send students to take part in labor. How are we to deal with this? Obviously, this question needs serious consideration. In the first place, we must not forget that our schools are schools, in which the normal order in teaching and learning must not be disturbed at random. Those students who should be sent to take part in labor outside must do so without failure. Those who should not be sent must remain. Fewer students should be sent if fewer are required. Wherever possible, the sending of students to take part in labor outside must be delayed.

To enable students to digest and consolidate the knowledge they have acquired and to train their ability of independent contemplation, they must be assured of adequate time for private studies and exercise.

Kuo's article was strongly worded, but its republication by People's Daily indicated the extent to which educational policy was being modified in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward. The over-emphasis on manual labor and intensive political indoctrination that accompanied the Great Leap Forward drastically lowered China's academic standards, but the years 1960-62 were marked by attempts to tighten academic standards, close questionable and inefficient schools, and restore the dignity of teachers and college faculties. By the end of 1962, however, the regime—or at least Mao Tse-tung—began to feel that the pendulum had swung too far the other way.
Education and the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee: September 1962

At the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee held in August-September 1962, Mao began to reassert the attitudes and positions that were so apparent during the Great Leap Forward. Of particular significance to this analysis was the concern Mao expressed for the problem of "revolutionary successors" and intellectual dissidence.

Concerning youth and revolutionary successors, Mao said:

This country of ours must grasp well, know well, and study well this question. We must acknowledge that classes and class struggles will exist for a long time to come, and that the reactionary classes may stage a comeback. We must heighten our vigilance and successfully educate the young people, the cadres, and the masses...

...If our sons go revisionist and take the opposite course, then although ours is still called a socialist country, it is actually a capitalist one....Therefore, from now on, we must discuss the matter every year, every month, every day. We must discuss it at every general meeting, every Party Congress and every plenary session, so that we may take a more sober Marxist-Leninist line on this question.

Mao's obvious concern with regard to the young successors to his revolution was complemented by a remark later in the same speech directed at anti-Party dissidence among the intellectuals:

Isn't the writing of novels the fashion of the day now? The use of novels to carry out anti-Party activities is a great invention. To overthrow a political power, it is always necessary first of all to create public
opinion, to do work in the ideological sphere. This is true for the revolutionary class as well as for the counterrevolutionary class...

Mao clearly demonstrated both his concern over the youth who would inherit the revolution and his apprehensiveness about the political reliability of the intellectuals. These two thoughts were intimately connected, though, in that China's youth were being educated by the same stratum of society that was producing anti-Party novels. Mao was clearly concerned, as his later policies demonstrated, over the probability that the students, as they progressed through the educational system, would be infected by "bourgeois" intellectual attitudes. Mao's concern was far wider than just the students, and the aftermath of the 10th Plenum was a general tightening of political controls at all levels of the state and society. Within this general tightening, however, the student--as a specific target--was to receive particular emphasis.

The Socialist Education Campaign: 1962-1965

The 10th Plenum gave birth to the Socialist Education Campaign, a movement that, in Mao's words, was aimed at "educating man anew and reorganizing our revolutionary ranks." In application, the Socialist Education Campaign was an attempt to re-indoctrinate the Chinese people and reorganize the structures of the state. With such an ambitious goal, and given the state of disillusionment and cynicism that afflicted China in 1962, such a campaign would of necessity be rigorous to the point of cruelty and many-faceted to reflect the complexity of a state and society in the middle stages of modernization and industrialization. Within this campaign, China's youth, especially the educated youth, were to be a specific target.

In fact, the Socialist Education Campaign among youth was a continuation of a program that had come into existence in the latter half of 1960. By January 1962,
the press had begun to stress an ideological education campaign through which China's youth were to recall the hardships of pre-1949 China and study the "revolutionary traditions" of the new. Mao obviously believed that this campaign was far from successful, but the Socialist Education Campaign was to prove equally unsuccessful. In July 1963, China Youth could still report that, when asked to recall the suffering of the old society and not to forget the source of good in the new society, cynical youth could yet reply, "There is no source to forget."

Mao himself was equally aware of the basic failure of the Socialist Education Campaign, and in his July 1964 polemic "On Khrushchev's Phony Communism and its Historical Lessons for the World," he again raised the question of "revolutionary successors." This question, Mao wrote, "...is a matter of life and death for our Party and our country." Mao set forth five criteria for the selection of successors, but most significant was that they "come forward in mass struggles and are tempered in great storms of revolution." Later events have demonstrated that Mao had every intention of giving China's students the opportunity to be tested in mass struggles, but for the moment he was to settle for a less ambitious program.

The year 1964 was marked by the continuing emphasis on ideological training, the mobilization of youth to take part in the "construction of a new socialist countryside," and a renewed emphasis on the half-work, half-study approach to education. Within these three basic approaches to the solution of the problem of revolutionary successors, however, there appeared definite signs of an attempt to soften what for Mao were almost certainly seen as the essentials for revolutionizing education. The basic outline of Mao's policies was put forth in a series of concurrent campaigns.

A. "Fewer But Better"

The "Fewer But Better" campaign was introduced in 1961 as part of the program designed to cut away some of
the excesses of the Great Leap Forward and was applied broadly to the ad hoc experiments introduced during this period, but in education this campaign focused on producing specific skills necessary for economic development. This policy was described in the press at the time as one of "adjustment, consolidation, filling out, and raising standards." Following the 10th Plenum of August-September 1962, the slogan of "Fewer But Better" became more and more involved with questions of ideological training. By early 1964, the problem of intensifying the ideological training of youth was being discussed under Mao's directive ordering the lightening of the "students' burden and improving the quality of teaching, so that students can develop their moral, intellectual, and physical qualities in a brisk and active way." The key word here is "moral." In July 1964, Kwangming Daily described "moral education" as consisting "principally of socialist and communist education, class education, and labor education." The editorial stated:

In our view, in the socialist new China, people's teachers not only have the job of spreading knowledge but, more important, have the task of fostering the moral qualities of their students.

In the discussion of the "Fewer But Better" campaign in the press, it was quite evident that the central issue was that the heavy academic load was causing the students to either neglect politics or take a bored and indifferent attitude toward political training. Thus the "Fewer But Better" approach was to be used in formal political classes and in political meetings. The intent was that by reducing the number of hours spent in political classes and meetings, and by careful preparation, political training would be more effective.

B. "The Construction of a New Socialist Countryside"

Concurrent with the discussion of ideological and political training in the schools, the national press
was discussing the mobilization and organization of young urban intellectuals to be sent to rural areas to "take part in the construction of a new socialist countryside." A People's Daily editorial on 4 February 1964 stated:

Several million students graduate annually from middle and primary schools in the urban areas. With the exception of a handful of students who will continue to study at high-level schools or be employed in urban areas, the majority will take part in various socialist construction tasks in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production, and fishery in hilly and rural areas.

Whereas in 1961 the students had been urged to go to the countryside on the grounds of commitment to the revolution and loyalty to Mao, in 1964 it was clearly stated that such motivations were insufficient. China's youth were questioning their assignments on the basis that the state was wasting their talents, and that before the modernization of agriculture educated men have no place on the commune. Furthermore, many students were questioning the purpose of spending years in school only to end up as farm laborers.

The regime apparently paid serious attention to the questions raised by the students, and insisted at the time that before students were sent to a specific rural assignment, careful planning should be undertaken to assure proper and productive use of their talents. Although the press commentary stated that one of the purposes of the rural assignments was to enable youth to learn about "past evils" from the peasants, considerable space was given to discussing how to make commune life more attractive to urban intellectuals. Youth League organizations were instructed to assure that the youths had sufficient reading materials and that they were given time for study, recreational, and sports activities. To what extent such preparations were made, and whether or not they reduced student opposition to their assignments—they probably
did not--is, for the purposes of this analysis, not as important as the response of the regime to the problem.

Peking recognized that the basic ideological commitment of the students was not strong enough to motivate them to the kinds of sacrifices demanded of them. Furthermore, it is quite evident that in the process of implementing one of Mao's strongest beliefs, a realistic appraisal of the actual response of China's youth overrode the ideological purposes behind the campaign.

C. Half-Work, Half-Study Schools

The third component of the program to create "revolutionary successors" was the renewed emphasis on another Great Leap Forward innovation--the half-work, half-study schools. In October 1964, Ou Meng-chueh, a member of the Secretariat of the CCP Kwangtung Provincial Committee, wrote in the People's Daily:

The adoption of the half-work (farming) and half-study educational system has a very far-reaching significance for the present and future of our country. Such an educational system is a basic educational system under socialism and communism. Following the development of the socialist enterprise, this system will gradually develop to become the principal educational system in our country.

The half-work, half-study system was a method by which the students devoted half their time to classes, and the other half to "productive labor." As the concept was applied in 1958, the schools were generally "agricultural middle schools" and primarily created to provide junior middle school (7th through 9th grade) education for children who were to become agricultural workers. The schools were to be established and run by the agricultural cooperatives and financially supported by the "productive labor"
of the students on plots of land set aside, or reclaimed for their use. As the concept was applied in the urban areas, the factories organized schools of their own designed to create technicians in the specialization of the plant. There was some experimentation with higher education using the half-work, half-study method, and these schools were also attached to plants, but usually to relatively large and advanced factories. Similar experiments were conducted on rural communes. During the initial experimentation stage there were to be two systems of education—half-time and full-time—existing side by side, existing under the rubric of "walking on two legs." The thrust of educational reform in the middle 1960's was to reintroduce this experiment, an experiment that had been pushed aside in the retrenchment period following the Great Leap Forward.

The Kwangming Daily of 6 January 1965 carried a discussion entitled, "On Experiment With the Part-Work and Part-Study Educational System." The ideological goals of the system were:

To prepare in particular for the elimination of differences between mental and manual labor as one of the important conditions for the realization of the communist system, the testing and gradual implementation of the part-work, and part-study or part-farming and part-study educational system...

Throughout 1964-65 the press was replete with reports concerning the application of the policy of "walking on two legs." Typically, such reporting regularly stated that "experimentation" with half-work, half-study schools began in 1958, thus indicating a continuation of Mao's commitment to the Great Leap Forward and his particular utopia. As the current "educational revolution" draws from the experience in 1962-1965 and similarly states that its origin was in 1958, an analysis of the system as it was described in 1964-1965 will prove useful for analyzing continuity and change in the current policies.
Half-Work, Half-Study: A Model County

Articles in the People’s Daily and the Nanfang Daily (Canton) in September 1964 gave a reasonably clear picture of the system as it was to be applied in a rural county (hsien). Hsin-hui County in Kwangtung began its experiment in 1958. By September 1964, it had created three levels of half-work, half-study education. The county had 14 commune-run agricultural (forestry) middle schools, one of which had senior middle school classes, one intermediate agro-technical middle school, and one "labor university."

The agricultural middle school recruited from senior primary school graduates and produced literate peasants with a basic knowledge of agricultural production techniques. Essentially, the agricultural middle school produced junior middle school graduates with basic information geared to the needs of a specific commune. The curriculum of the school focused on politics, Chinese language, mathematics, abacus training, rural financial accounting, land surveying, agricultural biology, fertilizer techniques, and general farming techniques. The future role of the agricultural middle school graduate would be to assist the peasants on the commune and generally raise the level of agricultural expertise in the production teams. They were assigned after three years of half-time study.

The intermediate agro-technical school recruited from "young intellectuals" (not further defined) and junior middle school graduates who had "tempered themselves through labor in the countryside." The school was designed to produce senior middle school graduates with specific skills related to agricultural production in their particular geographical area. The stated purpose of the curriculum (not described) was to produce "intermediate and elementary grade technicians needed by the commune for production teams." It may be safely assumed that these graduates would become the technical managers of production teams.
The "labor university" recruited from "outstanding" graduates of state-run middle schools, agricultural middle schools, and intermediate agro-technical schools who had been recommended by the commune authorities and their particular production teams. Graduates of the "labor university" were assigned by the county governments to become technical managers wherever they were needed in the county.

The model county described above attempted to expand education while at the same time structuring its educational system toward selective recruiting into the several levels. Thus even though there would be greater educational opportunities, the specific needs of the county were the overriding criteria for curriculum and recruiting.

Half-Work, Half-Study: The Industrial Model

The same principle of training specific skills applicable to a specialized situation or a specific need was also applied in industry. A Kwangming Daily report of August 1964 described a half-work, half-study school attached to the Tientsin Photographic Film Plant. This experiment, of course, commenced in 1958. The school appears to have been designed to produce middle-level technicians capable of communicating easily with engineers—an attempt to solve a familiar problem that exists in developing countries. By 1964, according to the report, over 40 percent of the workers in the plant had graduated from the school run by this factory. It initially recruited some 300 junior middle school graduates. The course materials were compiled by engineers at the plant and "elsewhere." The course ran for three years and produced essentially specialized senior middle school graduates.

The students were divided into two groups that alternately worked in the plant and studied at the school on a weekly basis. According to the report, the curriculum was divided into politics (11 percent), "cultural
subjects" (42 percent), and specialized technological training related to the factory's products (47 percent). The Kwangming Daily noted that the plant was aware of the necessity of "walking on two legs" in that it recognized the need to rely on ordinary full-time schools for some of its recruiting needs. Similarly, in a nod to the ever present slogans, it was noted that the plant's school fulfilled the "three-in-one" curriculum requirement in its combination of politics, culture, and technology. The report also stressed the narrow ("Fewer But Better"), specialized nature of the curriculum and the economy resulting from running such a program. This particular half-work, half-study school's operating costs were said to be only 60 percent of those of a full-time school, while at the same time the students were contributing to production. The mix of politics, specialized training, and economy made this particular school a model for all other industrial enterprises.

Half-Work, Half-Study: The University Model

The experiment in specialized education included in its goals the creation of individuals who achieve university-level skills on a half-work, half-study basis. The Peking Workers Daily on 16 August 1964 published a report on the Shanghai Municipal Spare-Time University, describing it as a "new type of university" that came into being in 1960 at the suggestion of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee. It recruited from individuals who had worked in industry, on the average, for ten years, including "industrial workers, engineers, technical personnel and business administration cadres." Its five-year curriculum was designed to bring students with a junior middle school background up to the level of a university graduate "in specialized engineering techniques." At the time of the report the institution had 4,300 students, including 1,000 in the class of 1964. The school was structured to provide "specialties in technology and equipment for building machines, electrical machines and appliances, radio electronics, organic synthesis, scientific instruments and meters, textile
engineering, silicate, chemical fibers, casting, electrification of factories and enterprises, and automation."

The curriculum was evidently designed to bridge the gap between production experience and basic scientific and theoretical knowledge. The school was clearly not designed to create research engineers, but production engineers capable of solving production line and design problems. Thus once again the concept of narrow, specialized training designed to meet specific needs was the operational goal of the school.

Half-Work, Half-Study: Summary

In the three levels of half-work, half-study schools (the Shanghai institution was actually a cross between half-work, half-study and spare-time schools) there was an observable attempt to experiment with a complementary system of education supporting the full-time educational system. This application of the policy of "walking on two legs" was a subversion of Mao's goals for the system, for he envisioned some form of a half-work, half-study system as ultimately replacing the full-time system and, what is more important, as a source of the new Chinese man. By replacing the formal academic process with a system designed to integrate the student with the workers and peasants, Mao hoped to over-ride the predominant influence of the intelligentsia in the educational system, and at the same time create the optimum conditions for avoiding the development of elitist attitudes among the students. Thus the educational system would produce "worthy revolutionary successors." As the policy was actually implemented during this experimental stage, it is evident that the system was being developed to produce narrowly trained specialists, at best higher technicians, who could fill the gap between research oriented university graduates and the peasant and industrial worker. Thus a basic pragmatism over-rode Mao Tse-tung's ideological goals.
Political Control of the Full-Time Education System

The pragmatism so evident in applying Mao's three basic components of a revolutionized education system* was not so strongly reflected in the normal or full-time educational system. Political control of the curriculum and the student's daily life was very much in evidence. The Chinese leadership attempted to make political control of the education system absolute, and Party control of education was designed to be complete in both organization and content. From the Politburo down to the village, there was a specified, functional responsibility for the Party to perform. Political control was present in both decision-making and the implementation of policy within the school itself, which had its own Party branch down to the junior middle school, or by the responsible Party faction(s) at the commune, production brigade and production team levels. At each level of government there was a corresponding Party structure functioning as the alter-ego of the substantive ministries or governmental structure.

A. Political Control: The University

A university was usually subordinated to the Ministry of Higher Education, the provincial-level government's Higher Education Bureau, and its alter-ego--the Culture and Education Department of the provincial Party committee. Specialized institutions, such as the Chungking Architectural Engineering College, were subordinated to both the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry responsible for the industry or area supported by the specialized institution. The Chungking Architectural Engineering College was subordinated to the Ministry of Construction and Engineering

*That is, (1) "Fewer but better," (2) "the construction of a new socialist countryside," and (3) half-work, half-study schools.
as well as the Ministry of Higher Education. Similarly, the Huanan Agricultural Institute in Canton was subordinated to the Peking Academy of Agricultural Sciences. Real power in the school, however, was held by the Party branch. Usually the President or Chancellor of a given institution was concurrently the 1st Secretary of the institution's Party committee. In those cases where the head of the school was not also the head of the Party branch, students at the school stated unequivocally that his deputy, who would be the head of the Party branch, was the de facto head of the school.

Although there were variations in the specific political structure of the institutions, it is possible to create a model that contains the essential organizational form.

Overseeing the affairs of the University would be the Party Committee, headed by the 1st Secretary who would also be the Chancellor. Each academic department of the school would have a Party branch, frequently known as the Educational Research Committee (ERC). As the heads of the departments were usually academics and not Party members, the ERC chiefs were the deputy department heads. The educational methods, policies, and curriculum were determined by the ERC in close conjunction with the institution's Party committee. Once a decision was made, the department head--usually an expert in his field--was informed, and he and his staff were expected to implement this policy.

At the student level, political work was conducted by the Party branch through regular political meetings, the Communist Youth League, and the Student Association. As many as 90 percent of the student body of a given institution may have been members of the CYL. The existence of such a high percentage can be best explained by the selection process of students for higher education where a major criterion was political reliability. Being a student activist in middle school would establish the bona fides of a given individual, and would be especially useful when his academic qualifications were middling.
The CYL itself was structured along functional lines, and contained committees such as the Organization Committee and the Student Work Committee, but its general function was to assist in the political indoctrination of the students and to serve as a watchdog over their political behavior. Each class and university department had its own CYL branch, and many of the CYL activities were carried on from, and within, the classroom.

The specific arrangements for extra-curricular political meetings varied from institution to institution, but the basic format was to have one mass meeting a week presided over by the 1st Secretary of the Party committee or his representative. The topic for discussion was selected from the People's Daily, Red Flag, or some other national publication. The presiding CCP member would lecture for an hour or so, after which there would be some discussion. Following the general meeting, the students would break up into small groups, led by a CYL member, and would conduct further discussion of the topic(s) for the day. Apart from these general meetings and the resultant small group discussions, the CYL would conduct one or two meetings a week on a departmental and class level in which the students would discuss their "daily life." Small group discussions of "daily life and studies" were in fact self-criticism sessions in which the individual student would confess his errors. Such errors were usually related to his attitudes toward his personal goals and his attitude toward the society and the Party.

Apart from criticizing his own errors in motivation and behavior, and outlining his plans for correcting these errors, the student was also expected to criticize the shortcomings of his comrades. Frequently these criticisms had to be put in writing and submitted to the group leader.

It is difficult to estimate the number of hours an individual would be involved in extra-curricular political activities. If, however, the weekly mass assemblies and small group or section meetings are included, the range would be from eight to twenty hours per week.
In addition, formal political classes took from four to eight hours a week, giving a total time of 12 to 28 hours per week. If one further includes the requisite manual labor as "political training," the total reaches 16 to 32 hours per week. By way of comparison, the average American student's class load is 12 to 15 hours per week.

This intensive political training and indoctrination was in addition to the student's heavy academic schedule. Classes in Chinese institutions of higher learning run from 40 to 45 minutes per hour, and are held six days a week. Weekly class hours in the 1963-1965 period ranged from 20 to 36 hours, excluding formal political training. The greatest number of class hours were being taken by medical students, the lowest by fine arts students. Accurate aggregate data are difficult to present for the curricula reported were not uniform.

Summary

The Chinese student in the mid-1960's was following a rigorous, if not exhausting, regimen that began at 6:30 a.m. and concluded at about 9:00 p.m. The student knew that there were two basic ladders of success in Communist China—the either developed skills that were essential to the regime, or he became known as a political activist and worked his way primarily up the ladder set by the CYL and the Party. Climbing up either ladder usually required some knowledge and sophistication about the other, with the most pressure being applied and felt by the academic, rather than political student, who recognized the Party's "Red and Expert" goals.

The academically inclined student soon recognized the basic "rules of the game" and attempted to formally accept the heavy political program, while at the same time he personally perceived it as a boring waste of time. During periods of specific political campaigns he knew what was expected of him and participated with an outward fervor. The politically oriented student used the political
campaigns to put another feather in his cap; he used them to convince his superior that he was indeed the political activist that he appeared to be in more relaxed times. No matter what the motivation of a given student was, however, they all recognized that power in their institutions was held by the Party and most tried to adjust to this fact of life.

B. Political Control: The Middle School

Prior to the cultural revolution, there were three kinds of full-time state supported middle schools in China: junior middle school, senior middle school, and combination junior-senior middle school. A junior middle school taught only the first three grades of the total six-year middle school course; a senior middle school taught the final three years; a combination junior-senior middle school (usually referred to as a senior middle school) taught all six years in one program. In a rural county there were usually several junior middle schools, a couple of senior middle schools, and one combination junior-senior middle school located at the county seat. This latter school would be the most prestigious and the most difficult to enter. In urban areas the same situation probably existed, with one senior or combination middle school recruiting from the several junior middle schools.

Political control of the middle school system followed the same basic pattern as that devised for higher education, but there were variations designed to recognize the unique role of the middle school. The middle school was at one and the same time the base of recruits for higher education, the source of social, economic, and political leaders at the county-municipality level, and a director of the primary school system. Dual control of education at this level was in the hands of the Propa-ganda and Education Department of the county-level CCP Committee, and the Culture and Education Bureau of the county-level government. As in all areas of dual control, the Party held the upper hand. In a rural county there were usually two educational branches of the Propaganda
and Education Department. One committee was composed entirely of teachers from the county senior middle schools, and, probably, the principals of the junior middle schools in the county. The other committee was composed of the principals of the commune level primary schools.

The senior middle school would form its own Party branch, with the 1st Secretary of the Committee functioning as the school principal. Each section or academic department of the school would be run by a member of the Party committee; one section or department would be the Political Department, and was responsible for the political education of both the teachers and the students. Political activities among the students were in part a function of the Communist Youth League and the Young Pioneers. Pioneers were recruited from the younger students, and the Youth League from students and teachers aged 16 to 25. Following the standard hierarchical pattern, the school Party committee would control the Youth League through its Youth League Committee, and the Youth League would control the Pioneers through its Young Pioneers Committee. The Youth League and the Pioneers were organized on a class basis, and ran their political activities from the classroom.

Junior middle school faculties may not have had enough CCP members to form a Party branch, but the principal of the school would be a CCP member, and the school would have a Political Department or Section responsible for the political education of the students and teachers. Junior middle schools probably came under dual Party supervision, for the middle school section of the Propaganda and Education Department and the Party branch of the local combination senior middle school both appear to have exercised some responsibility for them.

Urban middle schools in all likelihood followed the same pattern of political control, but it is also likely that urban junior middle school faculties had a sufficient number of Party members to form their own Party branches. These Party branches, along with those of the senior middle schools, came under the direct supervision of the municipal Party committee's Propaganda and Education Department.
Middle school curricula normally contained three or four 45-minute periods of formal political education per week out of a total of 24 to 26 periods. Manual labor, another form of political training in the eyes of the regime, normally absorbed another four periods a week. Thus seven to eight periods per week, more than 25 percent of the total class time, were spent in scheduled political training.

Political meetings for the students were arranged by the Party branch and the Youth League, and took place approximately three times a week. The first meeting took place early in the week and was presided over by the Principal/1st Secretary who discussed the political purpose of being a student. Later that week, the teachers presided over classroom discussion of the "central assignment," which consisted of the specific political topic designated for that week. Finally, the class committees, led by the Youth League class committee chairman would lead a discussion of the earlier meeting. As the political discussion moved down to smaller and smaller groups there occurred the concomitant closer supervision. Similarly, "political" discussions of "central" topics concerned not only the substance of the topics, but also confessions of one's own errors in motivation and behavior. As in the university, criticism and exposure of the errors of fellow students was also a stringent requirement of the process.

Summary

The primary goal for students in middle school was to achieve a place in a university or other institution of higher education. Middle school students recognized, especially when they were in senior middle school, the two ladders of success. They knew full well that a combination of academic success and acceptable political "reliability" was necessary to gain a seat. Similarly, an activist and student leader with a good record in the Youth League could also achieve a place in a university. Recommendation from the school,
essentially the Party, was as necessary for entering the university as an acceptable academic record. Ideally a combination of both virtues was required, but in application one or the other was sufficient, with the proviso that academic qualifications could be neutralized by a record of political unreliability or "backwardness." In fact, the individual who chose the academic ladder set as his minimum political goal avoiding the reprobation of "politically backward" from his political overseers.

There were periods of time when academic studies were emphasized more than political activism. The cycles of emphasis, however, did not completely negate the necessity to appear politically active. Furthermore, the alert student, especially in senior middle school, recognized the cyclical pattern of emphases and strove to maintain a balance in his behavior at all times. One of the outstanding characteristics is the level of political sophistication, of knowledge of the "rules of the game," demonstrated by middle school as well as university students.

C. Political Control: The Primary School

Full-time state-run primary schools were divided into three categories according to the extent to which they taught the full six-year primary school course. Thus junior primary school taught the first four years, senior primary school taught the final two years, and some schools were combined junior-senior primary schools teaching the entire six years.

The pattern of political control was basically the same as for middle schools, but the administrative unit to which they were attached was one or two steps below the county level. All full-time primary schools were financed by the county, but administered by the commune-level Education and Culture Bureau. Political control at this level was exerted by the commune's Party Propaganda committee member. In a rural county, each commune would have several senior primary schools. Below the
commune, each production brigade would have at least one junior primary school. The number of production brigades in a commune varies considerably, but in southern China 10-15 is not an unusual number. Political control at the brigade level was structurally differentiated, but in fact the merger of Party and government cadres was often total; therefore, the distinction between government and Party responsibility was usually rendered meaningless. Party responsibility, however, rested with the Education and Culture committee man.

As with middle and higher education, the principal of the primary school would ideally be a Party member, but at the very least he or she would be a political activist appointed on the basis of political criteria. It is probable that the senior primary school principals whose schools were the central primary school for the school district (usually the commune) were Party members. These principals met once a month at the county seat for their Party branch meeting. There were three other weekly meetings held at the commune level, where they would meet with Party officials from the commune Party branch to coordinate their activities with the other commune programs.

There was little formal political education at the primary school level, and no student organizations beyond the Young Pioneers. Reporting on curriculum content and the role of political education varies. Some of the elite senior primary schools and combination primary schools attended by the children of Party cadres seemingly did have three to four periods of formal political education per week, but for the most part there was no formal political education. It should be understood, however, that the content of primers, grammar texts, and even arithmetic texts contained an extremely high level of political information. Similarly, the games organized by the Young Pioneers would have political themes central to the purpose of the game.
Entrance Requirements and Fees

For a nation that has set modern agriculture, modern industry, and a modern defense system among its highest goal priorities, entering the educational system was made excessively difficult. Some of the problems, of course, could not be avoided. There was a serious shortage of teachers at the primary and middle school level, and it was costly, in terms of one view of national development, to use trained graduates of higher education institutes for the purpose of teaching. Certainly a number of graduates were used as teachers in universities and colleges, but the shortage of college and lower-level teachers is clear from the data. Essentially, the shortage of teachers and facilities at all levels of Chinese education meant that the number of candidates far exceeded the number of seats available. In one sense, the Chinese reduced the pressure on full-time and part-time study schools by maintaining political criteria for entrance, and by charging basic fees at all levels of the system. These criteria and fees, however, tended to reduce, rather than improve, the quality of students that the system produced.

The two most significant impediments to entering and moving up through the educational process were the political criteria and the competition for seats. Close to these hurdles in significance was the financial cost of starting and continuing one's education. The financial pressure is most noticeable at the primary school level in the rural areas. It appears that primary school education was not required by the state, and that many children did not receive even a junior primary school education. There were, however, no political requirements for entering primary school—only children who were mentally or physically handicapped were barred from the lowest levels of the system.

Entering middle schools, however, especially the major middle schools, was a different matter. Political criteria were, apparently, as forcefully applied as academic excellence. Priority was given to the sons and daughters of "poor and lower-middle peasants" and the
children of the "working class." It is also quite evident that the children of Party and government cadres received special attention. Thus competition for seats that would normally skim off the cream of the youth resulted, probably, in excluding many children from homes which had the intellectual atmosphere and basic family training that contributes to a successful academic career. Undoubtedly, many children who did not come from the favored class backgrounds entered middle school, but there is enough reporting to indicate that class background was an enforced criterion, albeit somewhat unevenly enforced. The children of cadres were favored in yet another way, in that elite combined primary and middle schools were created that recruited primarily from kindergartens run for the children of Party and government cadres. These schools had a ten-year curriculum, instead of the usual twelve, and gave superior instruction to this elite group.

If a student was successful in clearing the political, intellectual, and financial hurdles from primary school through senior middle school, he or she attempted to enter a university or its equivalent. The political, intellectual, and financial problems were complicated at this stage by the necessity of choosing an institution and area of academic concentration. Every middle school student hoped desperately to be admitted into an institution of higher education, but he was equally aware that the number of candidates for the prestigious schools in Peking, Shanghai, Canton and elsewhere would be excessive. Thus many students would select smaller, lesser known local schools in order to increase the probability of being selected for higher education. Similarly, a student would have to choose his area of examination carefully. He knew that some fields, such as languages and the hard sciences, were of greater significance to the nation than others. Many students would thus choose to be examined in fields where there was a greater demand. The Ministry of Higher Education which set the national examinations and ultimately decided which school and what field a student should enter could override the choice of an individual, but the student knew that his choice of schools and fields would greatly affect his assignment.
Choice, politics, academic excellence, and financial costs were intertwined in a tight and, for the student, desperate combination of factors.

The financial cost of education was in part alleviated by the possibility of receiving state subsidies. It appears that at least some assistance was available at all levels of the system, even for primary school education. Yet indicates that government subsidies were difficult to obtain, with the exception of schools related to industry and science. The Peking Iron and Steel Institute, the Peking Petroleum Institute, and the Hua Chung Polytechnic Institute all subsidized students, the latter even reportedly supplying pocket money to students receiving full subsidies. Students attending agricultural middle schools could finance their education through working on the commune, and the richer production brigades apparently supported any student whose family could not afford to send him to primary school.

Job Assignments

Youth growing up in China are completely aware (the adjective "desperate" springs to mind again) of the absolute necessity of achieving at least a middle school education if they are to avoid the endless toil of a farm or industrial laborer. Even those who achieve a middle school education are subject to being sent out to the countryside. The better middle schools often send their graduates to the rural areas to assume a "higher position" as a state cadre or statistician; others were undoubtedly assigned middle level technical and managerial positions in industry. But reporting leaves no doubt that the threat of lifelong physical labor was constantly in the minds of middle school graduates, especially those who failed to enter senior middle school.

Graduates of universities had a better chance of receiving assignments commensurate with their skills, especially if their skills were deemed to be of critical national importance. But for many students, there was
a basic fear that their skills would be used in remote rural or virgin areas. Furthermore, in the post-Great Leap Forward period, even as late as 1964, there was the impression that prior to receiving their assignment, they would be required to perform a year's manual labor. The problem that arose after the Great Leap Forward was simply that there were not enough openings in industry and agriculture to absorb the number of graduates with skills applicable to modernized agriculture and industry. In the narrow vocational sense that prompted the development of the half-work, half-study schools, there was a need for middle and lower level technicians and managers, but for many of the graduates with higher levels of education there were not enough suitable positions. China, in common with many other developing nations, was producing more trained personnel than the level of development could utilize. This left a significant gap between the level of expectation generated by the educational system and the level of skill application the nation and society could use. For the students, especially in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, this was a very depressing discovery.

**Student Morale and Political Attitudes**

The political attitude of students in the middle 1960's correlates with the studies made by Alexander L. George of the People's Liberation Army, and to some extent with the findings of Robert J. Lifton. Students and teachers at both the middle school and university level were characteristically demonstrating clear indications of dissimulation, and, in the area of politics at least, the atomization of group relationships. It was common practice to control one's behavior and simulate correct attitudes. The processes of political socialization, especially small-group criticism, led to a level of anxiety and fear about one's own political beliefs. Dissimulation led to an unwillingness to discuss politics outside formal classes and "daily life" self-criticism sessions. Unwillingness to
discuss politics and the obvious anxiety about one's own motivation and behavior led to the atomization of group relationships and deprived the students of even the possibility of creating organized resistance to their overseers. Thus there was a definite behavior pattern evident in which self-preservation was the common reference.

The ability of the regime to force dissimulative behavior upon the students is quite obviously a function of the students' awareness that their future depended to a large extent upon an acceptable political as well as academic performance in school. Student observations that the political sessions were boring and irrelevant were accurate descriptions of their response to them, but their personal goals overrode any predisposition they may have had to resist.

The political authorities in the schools were undoubtedly aware that dissimulation was the characteristic student response to the process of politicization, but at the very least this response achieved the minimum threshold demanded by the system: the mobilization and control of student behavior. The more ambitious goal of changing the basic attitudes of the student to the extent that they internalized the values being thrust upon them was probably rarely achieved. Furthermore, in all likelihood this higher threshold was not even sought, except by the most ambitious or convinced political cadre. Certainly the core values of loyalty to the state and to some extent the Party were learned and internalized long before the student reached the university, but the more extreme values of the cult of Mao were probably only rarely internalized.

Dissimulation was a function of self-protection and of self-seeking individuals. There was a high level of resentment, not so much of individuals but of a system that forced students to "waste" so much of their "valuable" time in irrelevant political studies, humiliating and dangerous self-criticism sessions, and arduous physical labor. One student, discussing the extent to which students would respond to political campaigns and demands,
stated that some students actually appeared to have a switching mechanism in their minds that enabled them to assume, almost unthinkingly, excessive political behavior whenever the political cadres called for an exhibition of loyalty through specific responses.

The Prelude to the Cultural Revolution:

Conclusions

The educational system in 1964-1965 was in the process of becoming a dual system of half-work, half-study and full-time education. Although the half-work, half-study system was still in an experimental stage, as it was being developed it would have become a vocational training oriented system complementing the full-time system. There were to be, in fact, two educational systems. Mao's view of the new educational system was not based upon the economic and general developmental problems of China, but rather upon an ideological base in which the creation of "revolutionary successors" was the preeminent value. Mao's goals were essentially political, but the implementation of his policies was pragmatic in that an obvious attempt was made to respond to some of China's developmental realities as well as Mao's own views.

The charges made against Liu Shao-chi during the course of the cultural revolution demonstrate Mao's awareness of the manner in which his policies were being implemented. Liu is charged with subverting Mao's educational policies from as early as 1949, and having continued his opposition until he was purged in August, 1966. The state of the educational system in 1964-1965 indicates quite clearly that Mao's perception that his political considerations were being subverted by a pragmatic implementation of his policies was essentially correct. Liu Shao-chi and his cohorts have been charged with the emasculation of Mao's policies in the following ways:

---

SECRET

---
a) Basing the half-work, half-study system upon economic considerations--essentially that this was a cheap way of expanding education.

b) Violating the political principles upon which the system was based by stressing the educational-vocational values of the system.

c) Intending to create a dual system of education rather than ultimately planning for a conversion of the entire system to half-work, half-study.

d) Using the dual system to produce "aristocrats" from the full-time system and managerial and technical staff from the half-work, half-study system. This particular charge is often stated by indicting Liu for producing "bourgeois revisionists and intellectuals" from the half-work, half-study system.

e) Deliberately slowing down the development of the half-work, half-study system by invoking a policy of gradualism and experimentation.

In the full-time system Liu and his supporters are charged with subverting Mao's policies in curriculum reform, particularly with using the "fewer but better" watchword to reduce, rather than intensify, political training.

It is evident that since 1960-61 there has been a consistent, pragmatic strain running through the implementation of Mao's policies toward educational reform. Furthermore, there is evidence that Mao was aware at the time that his particular goals and conceptualizations were not shared by all of the Party's leadership. Mao's references to the absolute necessity of creating true "revolutionary successors" were too much in evidence for any politically alert individual to have missed their import. Indeed, Mao addressed his views to a group of visiting French officials in September 1964, and twice during his conversation with them referred to Peking National University as "not a good" university and indicated that the products of China's universities were not reliable
material for revolutionary successors. The visitors at-
tempted to reassure Mao by referring to the loyalty and
political fervor expressed by the students in their con-
versations with them, but Mao expressed frank skepticism
over the depth and conviction of the views expressed by
faculty members and students. Mao had good reason to doubt that the stu-
dents and teachers had achieved the level of fanaticism
his goals call for.

By early 1966 Mao had evidently decided that yet
another "revolution" had to occur, not only in education
but in the society, as a whole. The entire society was
to be subjected to a new revolutionary spasm as Mao
sought to achieve his goals, and in the process his op-
ponents were to be purged. This new spasm was called
the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution."
II

THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION

The Closing of the Schools

The educational system was following its normal processes in the early months of 1966. The Kwangtung press in January was announcing preparation for postgraduate enrollment, and listing the universities where examinations for graduate schools across the country would be administered. On 16 January NCNA broadcast an article lauding the accomplishments of students who had completed their studies in the previous three years, taking note of their assignments to various universities, research institutions and industries.

Soon after NCNA's laudatory broadcast, however, a discordant note began to appear in the press. On 20 January, the People's Daily published an article praising the ingenuity of the Chinese worker and decrying those who complained that China had too few scientists. The article proceeded to discuss a model scientist, who had come from the ranks of the workers and had only completed primary school prior to embarking on his scientific career. Similarly, on 24 January, People's Daily reported on the significance of Mao Tse-tung's thought in guiding scientific research, citing sixteen scientific and technical achievements directly attributable to the correct application of Mao's thought. These initial commentaries were but harbingers of the immediate future.

On 11 April, People's Daily published a report on a symposium held in Shantung of "leading cadres of institutions of higher education directly under the Ministry of Higher Education." A major part of the discussion centered on the significance of politics in
institutions of higher learning and reflected the general tenor of the provincial and national press since the end of January. The conference observed that:

...schools of higher learning served as points of concentration for intellectuals, a great number of them got a bourgeois education in the old society while as many made constant contacts with the cultural legacy of feudalism and capitalism. As a result, they were constantly influenced by bourgeois ideology.

The symposium concluded that:

In spite of numerous ideological reform movements which had been conducted among higher schools in our country and despite some measure of progress made by intellectuals, as far as the majority of the people were concerned, the problem of establishing the proletarian communist world outlook remained basically unsolved.

In order to solve this problem, and especially because these centers educated China's youth, the educators themselves should be re-educated. If this were not done, the symposium averred, the centers of higher learning would produce revisionists. It was decided, therefore, that a movement for studying Mao's works should be turned into "a mass rectification campaign on the higher education front." Thus, within three months, higher education's status had shifted from that of a system producing properly politicized graduates to that of a center of bourgeois intellectualism breeding revisionism. In effect, the attack of the educational system had begun.

On 13 June 1966, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council directed that the enrollment of students into institutes of higher education be postponed, and that the system of entrance examinations be completely revised. According to a front page editorial of the People's Daily of 18 June, the purpose of the directive was to "ensure the thorough
and successful carrying through of the cultural revolution and to effect a thorough reform of the educational system." This directive, and the processes of the cultural revolution, effectively closed down the entire educational system until the summer of 1968, and ended all meaningful education in China for at least three academic years.

The Red Guard Reign of Terror*

The closing of the schools on 13 June freed millions of students across the nation to participate in Mao's cultural revolution. The first Red Guard recruits, generally in their late 'teens and early twenties, were handpicked by local Cultural Revolution Groups at certain schools in the late spring and early summer. These handpicked groups were to become the core of Red Guard organizations when their ranks were expanded in August and September of 1966.

Peking's campuses became the training group for Red Guards in the spring and early summer when certain future Red Guards were sent to Peking for classes in "cultural revolution tactics." Ultimately, the Red Guards were to receive directions which permitted them to by-pass the Party apparatus and assault the existing political structure. On 18 August, the Red Guards were publicly consecrated as the shock troops of the cultural revolution at a mass rally in Tienanmen square in Peking. Mao reviewed his troops, and Lin Piao and Chou En-lai spoke to them, launching them on their violent course.

*For an analysis of the Red Guards and their role in the cultural revolution see: Polo XXXIV, The Role of the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels in Mao's Cultural Revolution, December 1968 (Secret) RSS No. 0034/68.
The educational system with its centers of "bourgeois intellectualism" was among the first of the Red Guard targets. Their instructions from Lin Piao, speaking on the behalf of Mao, called for a "general offensive" against "bourgeois ideas and all other exploiting classes;"

The great proletarian cultural revolution is aimed precisely at eliminating bourgeois ideology, remolding people's souls, revolutionizing their ideology, digging out the roots of revisionism, and consolidating and developing the socialist system.

The targets for the assault--"those in authority who are taking the capitalist road, reactionary bourgeois authorities, bourgeois royalists, ghosts and monsters"--designated by Lin were both broad enough and narrow enough, given Mao's statements about revisionism in the educational system, to permit an extensive attack on the faculties and political authorities in the schools at all levels of the system.

All of China's universities were to suffer complete disruption, and some of China's most prestigious educators were to be removed from office or commit suicide, as a result of the Red Guard onslaughts. Describe suicides and removals from office. In Peking when the body of a professor was found, "authorities" herded the students onto trucks and had them driven to the location of the body. The students then stoned the corpse. A member of Canton's prestigious Medical College jumped from the fifth floor of the school's administration building. In Futan University, Shanghai, one of China's most renowned institutions, all of the Western trained or "oriented" members of the faculty were subjected to continuous pressure. They were "dragged out" by the students and subjected to intensive and brutal questioning. Futan is a center of science and engineering, and therefore contained a large number of faculty who could easily be identified as having a Western orientation.
From across China in the summer of 1966 came reports of purges and suicides. Among the dismissals were the Presidents or Chancellors of Peking National University (Peita), Tsinghua University, Wuhan University and other major academic centers.

The teachers at middle schools were also subjected to Red Guard terrorism. As in the universities, teachers were required to attend "struggle sessions" in which they had to defend themselves against charges made by Red Guards. It was common for the accusers to use force in order to extract the proper answers. The intensity of the pressures upon the accused teachers can be seen in the campaign. Following the pattern used in "daily life" sessions, the initial accusations were made in small group meetings. Frequently, the individuals who initiated the attacks were friends, relatives, students, or even spouses of the accused. The logic behind these attacks was simple; knowing that he or she would be identifiable as closely connected with the accused, a personal friend would lead the attack in order to defend himself. Not to do so would immediately focus attention on the failure, and the personal relationship would become sufficient cause for a "struggle session."

At both the university and middle school level the initial response of the students to the demand from their leaders they attack the faculty and administration was one of reluctance. Initially they feared revenge in the form of bad marks or poor recommendations. The Red Guard core group or local Cultural Revolution
Group explained to them, however, that to advance to the next rung on the academic ladder required a combination of recommendation and selection. The political criteria for selection, it was made clear to the students, would be measured by their performance in the cultural revolution. Apart from this motivation, there is considerable evidence that many students used the campaign against the faculty and staff as an opportunity to revenge themselves for past poor grades or other experiences.

Red Guard rampages were to continue with few quiescent periods for the following two years. Attempts were made to return the students to the campuses and classrooms in the spring, summer, and fall of 1967, but at no time was any return to meaningful education intended. The attempts to return the students to their classrooms in 1967 were essentially designed to bring the students under control. The most successful effort was made in the fall of 1967, and by November a substantial number of Red Guards had returned at least to their own localities. However, not only were many of the students unwilling to give up their intoxicating independence and political power, but teachers were fearful of the students who had only recently been empowered to terrorize them. Students who did return to school were instructed to "conduct revolution in the classrooms", which led to more struggle sessions with teachers. The ability of the students to terrorize the teachers this time, however, was restricted by the presence of PLA soldiers in the classrooms.

The authority of the PLA in the educational system was established by Mao Tse-tung's letter to Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, and the central Cultural Revolution Group of 7 March, 1967, in which he wrote:

...The army should give military and political training in the universities, middle schools and higher classes of primary schools, stage by stage and group by group...

Nevertheless, in many cases the return to the classrooms
merely turned the campuses and schools into battlegrounds as rival Red Guard factions fought, literally, for political dominance. To all intents and purposes, Red Guard terror continued into July 1968 when Mao was finally convinced that he would have to sacrifice his Red Guards and replace them with a more responsive and reliable extra-legal political force: the Worker-Peasant Mao Tse-tung's Thought Propaganda Teams.

The Reinstatement of Authority

A series of central directives designed to stop the fighting generated by conflicting Red Guard groups led, finally, to the use of force by the Army. By the middle of July, authorities in several provinces were using the PLA to forcefully suppress the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels. The new attitude toward the Red Guards was also reflected in press reporting. Throughout July and August there was considerable emphasis placed on a quote from Mao's 1939 article commemorating the 20th anniversary of the May 4th Movement:

How should we judge whether or not a youth is revolutionary? How can we tell? There can be only one criterion, namely, whether or not he is willing to integrate himself with the broad masses of workers and peasants and does so in practice. If he is willing to do so and actually does so, he is a revolutionary; otherwise he is non-revolutionary and counterrevolutionary.

On 27 July the first Worker-Peasant Thought of Mao Tse-tung Propaganda Team (henceforth propaganda team) arrived on the campus of Tsinghua University accompanied by soldiers of the PLA. On 5 August Mao presented this propaganda team with a gift of mangoes that Mao had personally received as a gift from Pakistan. This gift was described as a "token of the greatest faith in, and
attention, support, and encouragement to the revolutionary masses from Chairman Mao." If there was any doubt as to the future role of the propaganda teams and their PLA supporters it should have been dispelled by Mao's "instructions" broadcast on 25 August:

In carrying out the proletarian revolution in education it is essential to have working class leadership; it is essential for the masses of the workers to take part and in cooperation with the liberation army fighters, bring about a revolutionary three-in-one combination, together with the activists among the students, teachers and workers in the schools who are determined to carry the proletarian revolution in education through to the end. The workers propaganda teams should stay permanently in the schools (emphasis added) and take part in fulfilling all the tasks in the schools of struggle-criticism-transformation, and they will always lead the schools. In the countryside, the schools should be managed by the poor and lower middle peasants -- the most reliable ally of the working classes.

By the end of August, or the middle of September at the latest, every major university in the country was under the sway of propaganda teams and their PLA allies. Propaganda teams were not restricted to the schools and universities; they were empowered to enter "all leading organs at all levels, literary and art organizations, scientific and research units, publishing houses, hospitals" etc. Mao's intention was, and is, to take the new phase of the cultural revolution into all formal structures of the society.

A. The Worker-Peasant Propaganda Teams

Yao Wen-yuan, a member of the central Cultural Revolution Group and an authoritative source of Mao Tse-tung's intentions, published an article in the
Party journal Red Flag that was subsequently reproduced in the Peking Review (#35), 30 August 1968, describing the role of the propaganda teams. Entitled "The Working Class Must Exercise Leadership in Everything", the article laid down the basic form of reform in a factory, but which in fact also described the process as it was to take place in the educational system.

The struggle-criticism-transformation in a factory, on the whole, goes through the following stages: establishing a revolutionary committee based on the "three-in-one" combination, mass criticism and repudiation, purifying class ranks, rectifying the party organization, simplifying organizational structure, changing irrational rules and regulations and sending people who work in offices to grassroots level.

Referring specifically to the educational system, Yao wrote:

Worker propaganda teams should systematically and in a planned way go to universities, middle schools and primary schools, to all areas of the superstructure and all units in which the struggle-criticism-transformation has not been carried out well.

In the educational system, the working class was given the mission of "remolding" the intellectuals in order to eliminate the "traditional influence" of the bourgeoisie in "cultural and educational units." Thus the propaganda teams were given the authority to oversee the thought reform of the intellectuals, including students, and the reformation of the educational system.

The status of the Red Guards and their future role was made undeniably clear by Madame Mao on 7 September in her speech at a rally celebrating the successful formation of revolutionary committees at the provincial level throughout China. Her address was clearly sympathetic to the Red Guards and reflected her concern over the treatment they were to receive at the hands of
the PLA and the propaganda teams:

We must not forget that the revolutionary youth have made tremendous contributions at the initial and middle stages of the revolution.

Chiang Ching continued, saying that "a small number" of Red Guards had made mistakes, but that "We have the duty to help them correct these mistakes." Finally she asks the Red Guards to accept the leadership of the working class as commanded by Mao on 27 July.

The propaganda teams that entered the educational system in the summer of 1968 were organized by the appropriate revolutionary committee. In the urban areas factories formed the propaganda teams, or formed components of the larger teams. In the rural areas peasants were selected from the communes and production brigades to form teams. In addition, many of the teams had PLA-men as members of the team, or attached to the team. Reporting from across China indicates that at least initially, the leadership role in the propaganda teams was performed by the PLA. Reporting on the teams does not clearly indicate their structure, but it appears that under the command of the PLA representative the team was broken down into companies, with each company assuming the responsibility for a particular university department. In other cases, particularly in the larger universities, there appear to have been several propaganda teams with hundreds of members.

Once on the campus, the team(s) restored order by forcing the Red Guards to form alliances. Having achieved a semblance of order, the team completed the final purge of the faculty, administration, Party structure, and Red Guard organizations if the municipal or provincial revolutionary committee deemed further purge necessary, which it often did. In the process of restoring order in Canton's Chungshan Medical College, for example, the propaganda team organized the "dragging out" of the former President and First Secretary of the college's Party Committee.
The disgrace of Chungshan's President Ko Lin occurred on 24 August, with 11,000 persons reportedly attending his "struggle session."

The new authority structure built by the propaganda teams and their PLA allies was the "Revolutionary Committee." The revolutionary committee is a product of the cultural revolution and is designed to take the place of the apparatus shattered by the purge. Within the educational system, each unit (primary school, middle school, college, university, research center etc.) will have its own revolutionary committee. The three-in-one combination of the forces that structure the revolutionary committee in schools is generally interpreted to provide for a revolutionary committee composed of workers or peasants, "revolutionary" teachers and students, and "revolutionary" cadres—primarily Party cadres. The essence of the design is to integrate the principal functional components of the pre-cultural revolution organization into one structure. The purpose of the design is to permit maximum possible control over the functions of the structure.

It is evident that the building of revolutionary committees in the universities is a very difficult process. Tsinghua University in Peking announced the formation of its revolutionary committee fully six months after the propaganda team entered on 27 July 1968. The fact that the propaganda team which entered Tsinghua was a model team operating under personal mantle of Chairman Mao, and that it took six months for even this team to form a revolutionary committee, is indicative of the intensity of the conflict engendered on the campus by the cultural revolution. The establishment of revolutionary committees at the secondary and primary school level was not as difficult as their creation at the university level, but undoubtedly problems existed.

The formation of revolutionary committees, however, was only one technique used by the regime to re-establish its control in the educational system. The second aspect of control introduced a more traditional aspect
of Mao Tse-tung's political style: the reintroduction of the campaign to "build a new socialist countryside". This involved, as in the past, transferring millions of students to the communes, state farms, and PLA farms and land reclamation projects. This campaign was, and is, combined with the process of administering job assignments for middle school and university students who "graduated" in 1966, 1967, and 1968 but who, due to the cultural revolution, either had not been assigned or had their assignments deferred.

In both of these actions it is possible to assert that control was the primary purpose, but in fact the ideological dimension was almost certainly uppermost in Mao Tse-tung's mind. This difficulty presents itself in analyzing much of the data relating to Mao's cultural revolution. Certainly it was absolutely necessary to bring the Red Guards under control if the regime was to restore a semblance of order to the state and the society, but Mao himself was obviously intent on using the restoration of authority to proceed with his basic socio-economic reforms. Among the most salient of these reforms is the creation of a New Chinese Man, and within this goal the educational system and its products play a central role. The propaganda teams in the educational system assumed the dual responsibility of conducting the thought reform of the intellectuals and assuring the exodus of the students and teachers from the schools and campuses.

B. The Thought Reform of the Intellectuals

The transformation of the intellectual's value structure has always been the principal target of Mao Tse-tung's policies toward the intelligentsia. The transformation or remolding of the intellectuals during the post-Red Guard phase of the cultural revolution would involve, as in the past, two distinct but related processes: struggle-criticism-transformation sessions and physical labor. In both cases the "teacher" would be the workers and the peasants who have been defined often enough as the "basic revolutionary forces", but particularly the workers who are defined
as the "class which leads the revolution." From the very beginning of the current campaign, however, Mao's instructions have contained the caveat that the majority of the intellectuals can "integrate" with the workers and peasants, and that during the struggle-criticism-transformation sessions the intellectuals must be given "a way out." The early stages of "transformation" are noted for the apparent neglect of this caveat.

Data from July and August indicate that "transformation" in many schools was a grisly process. It is highly probable that the process of "cleansing the revolutionary ranks" of revolutionary committees formed prior to the arrival of the propaganda teams was quite brutal. Once the propaganda teams had established the new authority structure, education and transformation of the intellectuals became more regularized.

A report from the Central China Normal College describes the process of transforming the attitudes of the students and faculty. The propaganda team organized "...from top to bottom, a complete rigid system of holding discussion-application meetings on the living study and application of Mao Tse-tung's thought." Meetings were held once every three days in the classes, once a week in the departments, and once a month in the entire college. The reduction of the meetings to small group discussions followed the now standard pattern, as well as the normal procedure of suggesting that students "encourage one another and educate one another" as well as "supervise the work of others." The small group sessions would be the most intensive, and the "transformation" of an individual would be measured primarily by his performance at these meetings.

A report from a worker-PLA propaganda team in the Microbiology Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences demonstrates the pervasive application of this technique:

In the study class the more progressive individuals were given opportunities to demonstrate their initiative in order to encourage and lead others to advance.
The result of this particular class, and undoubtedly most others, was that some of the scientific and research personnel expressed the "desire to be criticized and repudiated by the masses so they can transform themselves." Others "asked" to be sent to the countryside to engage in physical labor. The ultimate demonstration of loyalty to Mao would, of course, be the desire to go to the countryside and physically "integrate" with the peasants, or to go to the factories to "integrate" with the workers. The participants in the thought reform sessions would soon recognize that one of the principal functions of the propaganda teams was to mobilize the intellectuals -- teachers, students, and scientific and technical personnel -- to "go to the rural and mountain areas, and go to make revolution in places where the motherland needs them most and living conditions are most difficult." Recognizing this, the intellectuals, especially the older, more politicized faculty members and researchers, would undoubtedly accept their fate and urge that they be sent out.

The deportation of students, teachers, and other members of the intelligentsia was part of a grander scheme in which all adults not fully employed in the urban areas were to be sent to the rural areas, including the families of those not fully employed. Also sent were many Party and government cadres who had been removed from office as the administrative structures of the Party and government were "streamlined." By the middle of March an estimated 20 million persons had been removed from the urban areas and sent to the countryside.

C. The Exodus

It is very necessary for educated young people to go to the countryside to be re-educated by the poor and lower-middle peasants. Cadres and other city people should be persuaded to send their sons and daughters who have finished junior or senior middle school, college or university to the countryside. Let's
mobilize. Comrades throughout the country should welcome them.

Mao Tse-tung

Once again, the Chinese student was ordered to leave the school and university campus, and his home, to seek ideological transformation through manual labor and association with the peasant and worker. Parents were told that their children are the property of the state and people, and were urged to welcome the opportunity given to their sons and daughters to demonstrate their worthiness, their dedication to become genuine "revolutionary successors." Press reporting, however, as early as June indicated that the students were objecting to the demands made upon them. Nevertheless, NCNA on 29 June reported that "thousands upon thousands" of students were leaving Peking and other cities, including Red Guards who were characterized as the "pathbreakers" in the cultural revolution. This exodus was depicted as demonstrating their loyalty to Mao Tse-tung and his thought.

Parallel to, and complementing, the struggle-criticism-transformation policy and the campaign to send the students and teachers to the countryside, was the assignment of jobs to the secondary and university level graduates. The order of assignment was established by the year of graduation. The first to be assigned were the graduates of 1966, following which the "graduates" of 1967 and 1968 were assigned. Peking decided that, even though the schools had been essentially closed since 1966, the students who should have graduated in 1967 and 1968 would be graduated regardless of their failure to complete their course work. The basic pattern of assignments was that graduates from scientific and other technical and engineering courses would be assigned as far as possible to positions related to their fields. For the most part, all other graduates were assigned to farms, factories and other laboring positions. In addition, many students were to report to their assignments and then be sent to a farm or factory for six months to three years of manual labor.
Two basic categories of university graduates were apparently established prior to the actual assignment of students: graduates in the hard sciences and other fields that would relate to critical areas of national defense and industrial development, and graduates in other, less critical fields. A report from Wuhan states that graduates from Wuhan's technical colleges were sent to the factories while graduates from other colleges were being sent to the rural areas. In November 1968, a graduate from Tsinghua University observed that because Tsinghua was a school of engineering, most of its graduates were assigned to factories. Very few, he reported, were being sent to large urban areas such as Peking or Shanghai, and most were being assigned to factories in small towns in the interior. Another report states that eight graduates from Tientsin University, Futan University, Wuhan University, Peking University, and Kirin University were assigned to this institute, and all of them were graduates in fields of chemistry or biology. The source described his particular function as "to tackle technical reform and create machines to replace human labor."

The reporting, however, is not definite enough to permit a categorical statement that all students with specific sets of critical skills were given appropriate assignments. Some graduates report that after arriving at their posts, they were assigned to manual labor. A physics major from Futan University was assigned to the Shanghai Metallurgical Bureau, but first he had to go to the Nanking area for six months manual labor. A 1967 "graduate" from Nanking University said that every college graduate must report to his skill assignment and then go for one year to a farm or factory for manual labor. A Peking University graduate who had been assigned to the "Geological Headquarters of Coalfields in Hunan and Kiangsi" to work with a drilling machine wrote that all graduates were to undergo two or three years manual labor prior to their skill assignment.
The overall impression from the sources is that the vast majority of university graduates were being sent to perform manual labor, even though a large number may be receiving assignments that will ultimately relate to their particular areas of expertise. It is not clear, however, how many university graduates will be assigned skill related assignments following their tour as laborers. Many will probably never be given roles related to their particular training.

Middle school graduates appear to have been assigned wholesale to the countryside and factories to perform manual labor, with the exception of some 20%-25% of the junior middle school graduates who have been permitted to continue their education. Among the middle school graduates there is the distinct impression that they have been sent to the countryside to settle there permanently. Such a vast exodus of youth from the urban areas has not been without considerable objection from the parents and the students. Reports from Canton describe mothers hanging onto the trucks as their sons and daughters are herded into the countryside. A Cantonese student in October 1968 writes that the students are very confused. He complains that Mao has ordered them to go to the countryside to be re-educated because they were educated under the "bourgeois revisionist" system of education. "However, he has never given even the slightest thought to the contribution made by us during the period of the cultural revolution." A letter from a Kunming student written on 8 January 1969 reflects another common reaction to Mao's instructions. He writes that 30,000 students from Kunming's middle schools are to be sent to the rural areas of Yunnan:

To go down to a village and settle there means that I will have to live the life of a yokel for the rest of my life. My God, what a miserable and hopeless situation. The more I think about my future, the more despondent I become.

It is clear that the students understand the "instruction" that they are to settle in the countryside to mean just that.
The students are essentially powerless to resist their deportation, but resistance in the form of avoiding assignment is quite common. A typical report comes from a graduate of the Shanghai College of Chinese Medicine who requested that his assignment be changed. He was charged by the authorities with "bourgeois" thinking, his residence permit was cancelled, and his food ration coupons were withdrawn. Furthermore, he was informed that his status as a college graduate had been cancelled and that he would never be employed by the state in any manner in the future. The student comments: "In fact, I have been given a death sentence."

Reports from Canton describe large numbers of students who have gone into hiding to avoid deportation. As their ration cards are cancelled when they are assigned, they have to sneak out at night to the surrounding villages to buy blackmarket food. The Workers Provost Corps, a paramilitary police force established by the Canton Municipal Revolutionary Committee and supported by the PLA, was conducting raids in the city to arrest these dissidents. Other reporting describes Investigation Groups formed in all city and factory units, and all neighborhood associations in Canton. The Investigation Groups are charged with investigating their parent unit, and the families of members of the unit, to determine who should be sent to perform manual labor and, very likely, to ascertain that such people have in fact gone.

Communes have protested the influx of students, teachers, and other urban dwellers and complain that their food supplies are not sufficient to feed the newcomers. Commune authorities are also disturbed by the influx of unskilled and angry students who have become a source of friction. Students were frequently physically incapable of performing a hard day's work, and often went on "go slow" strikes or deliberately broke their implements. This combination of attitudes and attempts to disrupt the daily life of the commune led to frequent fights between the peasants and the students.
The degree of resistance from the parents, at least in attitude, to the deportation of their sons and daughters can be seen in the campaign to muster their support. Parents became the target in late 1968 of propaganda teams urging them to "educate" their children and to explain to them the necessity of contributing to the "building of a new socialist countryside."

The Tsingtao Municipal Revolutionary Committee in Shantung Province on 14 February 1969 broadcast a "Comfort Letter" to the parents, thanking them for taking "the lead in sending your own children to the countryside." The broadcast announced the decision of the revolutionary committee to mobilize more youth, and urged the parents of those students who had already gone to "educate" other parents whose children had yet to go.

Educational Reform

On 8 August 1966, the "16 Points" of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution were adopted by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The 10th Point was concerned with educational reform:

In the great proletarian cultural revolution a most important task is to transform the old educational system and methods of teaching.

In this great cultural revolution the phenomenon of our schools being dominated by bourgeois intellectuals must be completely changed.

In every kind of school we must apply thoroughly the policy advanced by comrade Mao Tse-tung, of education serving proletarian politics and education being combined with productive labor so as to enable those receiving an education to develop morally, intellectually and physically and to become laborers with a socialist consciousness and culture.
The period of schooling should be shortened. Courses should be fewer and better. The teaching material should be thoroughly transformed, in some cases beginning with simplifying complicated material. While their main task is to study, students should also learn other things. That is to say, in addition to their studies they should also learn industrial work, farming and military affairs, and take part in the struggles of the cultural revolution as they occur to criticize the bourgeoisie.

This "Point" lays out quite succinctly Mao's basic attitudes toward educational reform:

a) Destroy the dominance of Western trained or oriented intellectuals.

b) Combine formal education with physical labor.

c) Shorten the period of formal education.

d) Combine academic training with actual work experience.

In January 1967 these basic views were expanded through the distribution of a "Discussion Draft" of the "Views of the Central Government on Reformation of the Educational System."* This lengthy document consists of twenty-one sections and lists fifty-three proposals. The proposals indicate the general trend of reform and correlate highly with the experiments now being conducted. The document lists twelve basic proposals:

*The actual origin of this document is unknown, but its correlation with current educational reforms indicates an authoritative source.
1) Enrollment in all schools should be based upon "recommendation and selection", with primary emphasis on enrolling the children of workers, peasants and soldiers. Furthermore, financial assistance to these children should be expanded and increased.

2) Academic terms should be reduced. Primary schools should be reduced from six to five years; middle school from six to four or five years; university level institutions should reduce their courses to two to four years.

3) Examinations should be abolished along with graduate theses. Academic results should be determined by group discussion.

4) Half-work, half-study programs should be expanded quickly, utilizing a policy of one year of experimentation and two years of expansion. All schools and universities should be on a half-work, half-study basis. Schools and universities should be established within factory premises, or moved to the frontier provinces. Urban universities and colleges should be moved to the farming villages and PLA farms. Faculties of arts should be moved to the rural areas first.

5) Supervision of the schools should be under the Party. Students should be organized into squads, platoons, and companies on a military model. Following this model, the student units should have a political comissar attached to them. Administration of the schools should be through committees composed of representatives of the teachers and students under the direction of the Party branch.

6) Educational fees and expenses should be higher in urban areas than rural areas, more
in full-time than* half-time schools, and higher in institutions of higher education than in general schools.

7) Faculties of science and engineering should be merged.

8) Academic titles should be abolished.

9) Distinctions between major and minor institutions should be abolished, and the special privileges granted to the more important schools taken away, along with the appellations "1st Class" and "2nd Class."

10) Vacations as such should be abolished, and the academic year structured so that students will be free during the busy farming seasons.

11) While students are in middle schools, they must go to the farms or factories, or join the PLA for one year of training.

12) Students should no longer be permitted to state their personal preferences for particular job assignments.

Although this draft contains a broad set of proposals for discussion, there are no specific proposals for curriculum reform nor are there any concrete suggestions for the division of time between formal academic studies and work experience. Nevertheless, the document does demonstrate the basic thrust of reform goals which is to reduce the probability of the creation of an intellectual elite divorced from the goals espoused by Mao as he seeks to create his own particular

*The recommendations of 4) indicate that the full-time educational system will be modified on the half-work, half-study model, but the half-work, half-study system will also be retained. The distinction between the systems will probably be blurred, but they will have separate functions.
utopia. In essence, Mao would like to use the educational system to neutralize, if not eradicate entirely, the value structure that leads to the self-perception of an individual as being a member of a particular elite, and, furthermore, to neutralize the attitudes that lead others to view an educated man as a member of an elite. Within the Chinese culture, this latter goal will be as difficult to achieve as the former goal of changing self-perceptions.

A. Educational Reform: Higher Education

Mao's attitude toward university level education was most recently stated in his directive of July 1968:

"It is still necessary to have universities, here I refer mainly to colleges of science and engineering. However, it is essential to shorten the length of schooling, revolutionize education, put proletarian politics in command, and take the road of the Shanghai Machine Tool Plant in training technicians from among the workers and peasants with practical experience and they should return to production after a few years study.

Thus far we have only two examples of experimentation in higher education: Tungchi University in Shanghai, and the Shanghai Machine Tool Plant's "Worker University." Both experiments have been used as examples by the regime, and it is quite likely that they are representative of the future shape of China's scientific and technical training. We shall first discuss the "university" model and then the "factory" model.

Tungchi University: The University Model

Peking radio on 2 November 1967 broadcast the plans for Tungchi's experiment in higher education. The name of the university was changed to the "7 May Commune" in honor of Mao Tse-tung's directive of 7 May
1966, in which he said:

> While their [the students] main task is to study, they should in addition to their studies, learn other things; that is, industrial work, farming and military affairs.

Tungchi University was originally a German foundation, established in 1907. Under the communists it became a major center of civil engineering. On 1 June 1967, Tungchi established a revolutionary committee composed of representatives of the militia, "revolutionary" cadres, and "revolutionary" students. The 2 November broadcast described Tungchi's plans as a tentative program combining academic and practical work, and the "experience gained during the revolution in education in 1958."

The "plan" for the university commune was designed around a functional entity composed of the university (education), the Shanghai Municipal Building Construction Bureau (production) and the East China Industrial Design and Research Institute (research and design). The initial members of the commune were reported as 220 teachers and students from Tungchi, 30 designers from the Institute, and three engineering teams of 900 men from the construction bureau. The commune was governed by two three-way alliances: the first, and probably the most dominant, was an alliance of "revolutionary leading cadres" (probably Party and government cadres), leaders of the revolutionary masses (Red Guards), and "militia-men." The second three-way alliance was composed of educational, designing, and construction personnel. The first alliance was probably responsible for administering and overseeing the commune, while the latter was probably responsible for conducting education.

The academic departments of the university were abolished, and in their place a number of "Special Committees" were established. Each of these committees was composed of members of the university, and members of the production and design units forming the commune.
Within each committee there were a number of "tuition classes," each containing teachers, students, workers, and engineers, all of whom were organized into "military teams." At each level of the commune, the plan called for a "Political Work Department" within each Special Committee there was to be a "political instructor," and in every tuition class there was to be a "political officer."

Although the commune was designed to assure control by the political structure built into the organization, there are indications that the curriculum reform discussed was describing a program less politically oriented than other data have led us to anticipate. The length of schooling was reduced from five or six years to three years, and the preliminary discussion of the reforms duly emphasized Mao's writings and militia training. The description of the new curriculum, however, demonstrated a somewhat apolitical content. The plan stated that "academic courses will be devoted more and more to theoretical studies from year to year in a proportionally progressive manner." The plan outlined the following three year schedule:

1st Year.
"Each student should devote his time to building and construction."

2nd Year.
"Under the guidance of technical personnel or teachers concerned, he should devote two thirds of his time to mastering basic knowledge about designing through participation in practical designing work."

3rd Year.
The student "should strengthen the study of special courses selectively, while devoting part of his time to productive labor."

In implementing this design, the commune established three experimental centers attached to construction sites, each with two classes of more than thirty teachers and students. On each of the construction sites being used as "experimental points" there was one engineering team composed of about three hundred production workers and some designers.
Summary

Tungchi University, as the "7 May Commune," combines all of the basic elements of Mao's educational revolution while at the same time its planned three-year curriculum describes an acceptable program for producing narrowly trained civil engineers. To this somewhat vocation-oriented training has to be added the presence of the East China Design and Research Institute as a possible source of postgraduate training. The plan for the commune called for progressively more theoretical work in each year, and in the third year a student could select courses. It is, therefore, entirely possible that a student attending the new Tungchi could in fact obtain effective preparation in the specialties that make up the training of a civil engineer.

The control apparatus, composed of the three-way alliances, the Political Work Departments, and the political instructors, commissars, and officers, reflects the traditional watch-dog system that was part and parcel of the educational system prior to the cultural revolution. The effect of this apparatus on the process and content of education will be determined by the extent to which political training is inserted into the students' daily schedule. It is possible that the combination of an abbreviated curriculum, physical labor, Mao-think sessions, small-group "daily life" discussions, and military training will effectively narrow the students' preparation to the bare essentials of a civil engineer, or any other field of specialization. At the present time it is impossible to judge whether or not unduly emphasized political training will undercut even the truncated program prepared by Tungchi's commune. The formula presented, however, contains the essence of Mao's reform goals, but implementation of the policies will be the final test of the new system.
The Shanghai Machine Tool Plant: The Factory Model

Although Tungchi's commune was touted as a national model as late as September 1968, Mao's July directive on universities and colleges of science and engineering referred specifically to the Shanghai Machine Tool Plant. Thus this factory became another national model.

The "investigation report" broadcast from Shanghai on 22 July discussed at some length this plant's experience with both college graduates and technicians "promoted from among the ranks of the workers." Following the style established by practically all investigation reports illuminating national models, it was determined that the formal academic training of the college graduates attached to the plant had not equipped them for production roles in the factory. The worker technicians, on the other hand, were among the most valuable assets of the plant. The Shanghai Machine Tool Plant, drawing on Mao's thought and its experience since the 1958 reforms, proposed that future technical and engineering students should be recruited from among junior and senior middle school graduates who had two to four years experience in productive labor. Furthermore, in order to assure commitment to Mao's egalitarian values, the college students should participate in manual labor while attending school, and following graduation they should work as laborers for a period of time and win "qualification certificates" from the workers before receiving job assignments.

Some two months after making the above proposals, the Shanghai plant established the "21 July Workers University"—named in honor of Mao's directive on colleges and universities of science and engineering. Although this "university" was obviously designed to be a national model, few details on its organization or the content of its curriculum were given. Essentially, this model follows the pattern of advanced half-work, half-study programs set up in the middle 1960's. The course will last from eighteen
months to two years, and will produce individuals trained in the design and manufacture of industrial grinding and cutting tools. The various parts of the curriculum will be taught by workers, technicians, and engineers at the factory, and the students will be recruited from among workers with actual production experience. The initial enrollment of fifty-two students all, reportedly, have a minimum of five years experience in production.

Summary

The Shanghai Machine Tool Plant's "university" was established as a model for future factory based, college level, vocational courses. To a certain extent, middle school graduates could be trained to assist in the design and modification of machine tools by working with the production of existing models. This Shanghai plant is an appropriate base for such training, for it is recognized as one of the most advanced production plants in China. Prior to the cultural revolution, the plant was reportedly conducting classes at the junior middle school, senior middle school, and college level. Yet this experience was referred to only elliptically. For example, one of its model workers, rather than being a graduate of its own schools, was a graduate of the Shanghai Institute of Mechanical Engineering.

Even assuming the capacity to produce skilled technicians, and to some extent engineers, unless a factory has an extensive research capacity it will not be capable of producing the necessary basic research involved in its own products. The Tungchi commune data indicate the possibility of a research capacity, but the reporting on proposals affecting science and engineering research facilities--proposals that ideologically drew on the Shanghai Machine Tool Plant's experience--has given somewhat firmer indicators of the future form of China's research establishments.
The Shanghai Institute of Mechanical Engineering and the Peking Aviation Institute: The Research Factor.

The research institutes of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and its various branches, as well as all other research centers, with the possible exception of national defense related centers, have been seriously effected by the cultural revolution. Propaganda teams have been variously reported as entering research institutes, and individual examples of the process of reform and revolution have been described in the press and broadcasts. Even though there are very little data on the universities and colleges, even less have appeared relating to research centers. Nevertheless, there have been two reports that refer specifically to the problem of research within the new educational system.

An "investigation report" on the Shanghai Institute of Mechanical Engineering published by Red Flag (#3) on 10 September 1968, and a proposal put forward by the Revolutionary Committee of the Peking Aviation Institute discussed the role of research. The Shanghai school's recommendations discussed research in general, and the Peking Aviation Institute's proposal's referred to research centers related to national defense projects.

The Shanghai Institute of Mechanical Engineering, bowing to the "road shown by the Shanghai Machine Tool Plant," proposed that following their "transformation" colleges of science and engineering should become "factories and research units" as well as schools. It was recommended that actual production and research units should propose research topics to the colleges. The stated purpose of this suggestion was that by dealing with problems set by production units and research units, the students would be able to relate their studies to actual problems rather than become involved in "empty theorizing and scholasticism." It should be emphasized that the proposal stressed the contribution such a system
would make to the students' problem solving and analytical powers, thus making education serve productive labor. The stress on developing analytical powers contradicts the basic format of "simplifying" scientific and engineering courses, for in fact research requires the discrete separation of components of a problem. Nevertheless, the ideological statement of purpose fulfills the political requirements of the current campaign.

The Shanghai engineering school's recommendation did not include any specific proposals for structurally relating or integrating the university with production and research units, but the concept developed dove-tails with a proposal made by the Peking Aviation Institute in March 1968. The aviation institute's recommendations referred specifically to the design of a "new kind of" national defense research institute, and proposed that research laboratories combine with school factories and shops of "various departments to form a unified teaching, scientific research and production base." The task of this new structure was defined as "national defense research and trial manufacture." In addition, this new organization would "meet all the practical teaching requirements" of the new educational system.

It will be noticed that the two proposals are very similar, conceptually, to the three-part "commune" of Tungchi University in which production, research and educational facilities were combined into one administrative structure and integrated functionally. Assuming that the "research units" are the various institutes of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and other research organizations, and that the role of the "production units" can be filled by the plants under the administration of the various central ministries, it is possible that a cumbersome but functioning research capacity could be developed along the lines sketched out by the proposals. Where production units, research units, and universities are located physically close to one another, the research factor could in fact be made a functional aspect of the new educational system. Students could be trained in the classroom, the laboratory, and the production line while engaged in their formal education.
Summary

With the entire structure of research facilities undergoing "transformation" at the hands of the propaganda teams, it is quite difficult to project the future form of China's research capacity. However, it is evident that in the process of developing and experimenting with a new educational system, the need for research capabilities has a very special place in the discussion. The image of current developments now being projected indicates that the reforms will not irreparably damage Chinese research capacity. There is a definite pattern appearing in which institutions of higher education will complement their production of narrowly trained technicians with research-oriented products. The present atmosphere, nonetheless, is not conducive to producing the number of advanced research personnel that the state could profitably use in both its special weapons and other defense related research, let alone the number that could be used in basic research related to industrial and agricultural development. Clearly China can use the technicians that will be produced from the abbreviated curricula now being contemplated, but for continuing development it is essential that these products be complemented by the development of individuals capable of engaging in basic research.

B. Educational Reform: Primary and Middle Schools

Distinct from higher education, the press and international and domestic broadcasts have been replete with examples of reform and the process of reform in China's primary and secondary education. In the urban areas the immediate catalyst for change has been the Worker-PLA Propaganda Team, and in the rural areas the Poor and Lower-Middle Peasant Propaganda Team has been the tool of reform, usually accompanied by a "representative" of the PLA.
The basic pattern of administrative reform in the urban, suburban, and rural areas has been the same. At least superficially, the schools have been placed within the administrative responsibility of local production units. In urban areas the schools have come under a factory or factories, in suburban areas under the dual control of a factory and a commune or production brigade, and in the rural areas under the control of the commune and the production brigade. There are variations on the basic pattern, but the overall thrust of the reform is to integrate schools with production units.

Mao's attempt to create a mass society with a common Maoist value structure, and his attempt to block a stratification of society based upon levels of education is as apparent at the primary and middle school level as it is in higher education. As in the past, however, the application of policy will finally determine the effectiveness of the original decision(s).

Primary and Middle Schools: The Rural Experiment.

The basic policy is to move the primary and middle schools down one step in the administrative ladder, and to place schools under the direction of production units. Middle schools are to be administered by the communes, and primary schools by the production brigade. This basic policy is subject to modifications designed to meet the requirements of particular kinds of schools (e.g., the agricultural middle school) and more discrete reforms within particular communes and production brigades.

Within the individual commune, the new educational system is designed to provide a five-year general primary school course at the production brigade level, and a four-year middle school course at the commune level. In addition, within each commune a number of "advanced" primary schools have had junior middle school courses added to their curriculum, thereby providing a basic seven-year course within the brigade. The last two
years of the seven-year course are designed to provide basic agricultural knowledge geared to the needs of the brigade. Ideally, under this latter system, a student would enter primary school at age six or seven and complete the course at age 13 or 14 ready to participate in agricultural production as a literate, skilled agricultural worker. There are indications that the commune will also run a central primary school and middle school that will, to all intents and purposes, be the academic center of the commune, as opposed to the brigade primary and junior middle schools, and the general middle schools. These latter are designed to be primarily vocational training schools, whereas the central primary and middle school(s) will probably be weighted more to the academic.

Even though the rural school system will come under the administrative responsibility of the commune, the county level structure—the county revolutionary committee—appears to have general responsibility for the educational system. The county level Party and governmental structures have been functionally abolished, at least for the time being, and the various cultural, educational, and propaganda functions have been integrated into the revolutionary committee. It is possible, although there is no evidence for this, that the various governmental and Party structures that administered and supervised education prior to the cultural revolution still exist and have their own unit-level revolutionary committees. At this time, however, there are no data indicating that such units are involved in educational reform, although individuals from pre-existing structures may be involved.

The process of reform is fairly uniform. Typically, a three-in-one education leadership group, or educational revolution committee, is formed at the commune and brigade levels. The committee is frequently composed of a secretary of the Party branch, the chairman of the poor and lower-middle peasant association, and the unit's militia commander. Other reports describe the three-in-one combination as composed of "revolutionary cadres, revolutionary teachers and students, and representatives of the poor and lower-middle peasants." Each school and each
class in the school will also form its leadership group. The peasants are always described as the core of the leadership group, but it is more likely that control is actually in the hands of Party cadres and the PLA.

The faculty of the rural school is composed of both full-time teachers and part-time lecturers drawn from the members of the commune and brigade. The curriculum now being developed reflects the intent of the new system. Political education takes two basic forms: the history of the village is taught by peasants who "recall the evils of the past;" and cadres of the commune, production brigade and production team lecture on current political issues. In addition to this direct political education, the courses in Chinese language have been completely converted to political indoctrination. Reports of new text books indicate that the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" is the core of the new reading primers. Similarly, "politics" is now taught at the primary school level. One report describes the fifty-six lessons that constitute the political curriculum; thirty-six lessons are devoted to quotations from Chairman Mao, five are instructions from Lin Piao, and the remaining fifteen are ballads praising Mao.

The second focus of the new system is vocational training. Farm technicians and peasants now lecture on farm machinery and agricultural techniques, and brigade accountants lecture on applied arithmetic. In addition to the vocational training, the PLA or the local militia are to teach military affairs and physical training. "Military affairs," however, will include more political indoctrination.

PLA influence in the rural schools is also found in the reorganization of the schools along military lines. The student body is to be organized into squads, platoons, and companies. Similarly, a new student organization has apparently been created to replace the Young Pioneers: the "Young Red Soldiers." This new student organization is not based upon the school but the production brigade, and each brigade will form a battalion of "Young Red..."
"Soldiers" which will be broken down into squads, platoons and companies at the production team level.

The integration of the middle and primary schools into the commune has led to some rather complicated financial problems. Under the new system, the teachers are to be paid on the basis of work-points. This is essentially a process whereby individuals are paid in kind for the work they do. The work of teachers is to be measured by political criteria, but the teachers are also to be subsidized for their professional expenses, and for support of and travel to their families, if the families do not live in the brigade or commune where the teacher works. As the teachers were paid on a monthly basis by the state prior to their integration into the commune, they had not accrued any work-points. Under these conditions, it was decided that the state should pay the commune a lump-sum to subsidize the teachers until they had accrued sufficient work-points to receive food distributed by the commune. As commune and brigade members, the teachers would normally receive food and other allotments on the basis of accrued work points. Similarly, the state will subsidize teachers for their special professional expenses and for support of their families. The amount of the subsidy will be determined by the unit in which they work.

Half-work, Half-Study Schools.

In addition to the full-time primary and middle schools, and even though the new system includes physical labor as part of the curriculum, the half-work, half-study schools are still included in the rural educational system. The agricultural middle school appears to be the administrative responsibility of the commune, but the schools themselves are established at both the commune and brigade level.
The structure of the faculty, curriculum, and control organs follows the same pattern as the "full-time" educational system. Education leading groups or educational revolution committees are set up at the commune and brigade level, and may even be identical to those responsible for the "full-time" system. Once again, it is apparent that the Party cadres are the real source of influence. In Inner Mongolia, for example, a secretary of the brigade Party branch was identified as the chairman of the agricultural middle school under investigation. In Kirin, a report on an agricultural middle school identifies the First Secretary of the commune Party branch as the principal.

As in the past, agricultural middle schools are two-year vocational courses in which the curriculum focuses on the particular needs of the commune or brigade in which the school is located. Distinct from reporting in the middle 1960's, however, is the heavy emphasis now put on political education and indoctrination. A report analyzing an agricultural middle school in Kiangsi describes the curriculum and work experience that the school provides in tea growing techniques, preliminary tea processing, and laying out tea gardens. However, apparently in order to provide time for political education, formal courses in Chinese and political science have been dropped. Chinese language is now taught through Mao's works and his latest instructions, and political science concentrates on Mao's analyses of revolution and his latest instructions. Undoubtedly prior to the cultural revolution these courses contained a significant, if not excessive amount of political indoctrination, but the new system explicitly states that Mao's thought and current political topics are the core of the courses.

Rural Schools: Summary

The reform in rural education at this time is attempting to combine ideological and vocational training in order to assure that Mao's goals for revolutionary successors are not frustrated by the educational system. The production units to which the schools are now attached have
been given the responsibility of assuring that education does not separate itself from production. Regardless of the discussion in the press of half-work, half-study schools, it is quite evident that, as Mao stated long ago, the new educational system is designed to be a half-work, half-study process. The half-work, half-study middle schools, and the two years of junior middle school courses attached to a few selected primary schools in the production brigade, are designed for students whose education will terminate at the junior middle school level. This is indicated by the system of enrollment for the agricultural middle schools which provides that the students be selected by the brigade from among students recommended by the commune. The "full-time" system is designed to continue through senior middle school, but even this process has been abbreviated from 12 years to eight or nine years.

The new system, as it is publicly discussed, contains some elements of common sense. If the new curricula produce literate, trained, agricultural specialists familiar with the particular needs of the area in which they will work, the new educational system would provide a human resource for improving China's agricultural base. The weakness of the system is that it makes no apparent provision for preparing individuals for university work in the agricultural sciences. The necessary background in mathematics, chemistry, and other hard sciences is so far lacking in any reported curricula. Furthermore, the system is obviously designed in part to negate any initiative the student might have to seek a university education.

At this time, it is difficult to determine exactly how the new reforms will be applied. It is quite likely, given past reforms of the educational system, that the central primary and middle schools apparently being established at the commune level will be a source of trained students who have been selected for university training. It should also be noted that, at this time, references to central or commune level combined primary and middle schools are absent from the public discussions of reform, and that references to central primary and middle schools are very rare. The ideal today is to provide
primary and junior middle schools for students in their own villages, or where they will have to walk no further than three li (one mile) to junior middle school. The greatest emphasis has been on the primary-junior middle school combination and the half-work, half-study schools.

Primary and Middle Schools: The Urban Experiment

The urban experiment follows the same pattern as the reforms in the rural areas. Middle and primary schools are placed under the direct control of production units—usually factories—except in suburban areas where the schools are administered jointly by factories and rural production brigades. As in the rural areas, there are no indications that the former government and Party structures responsible for education are functioning in the new system. Control today is in the hands of the revolutionary committees of the municipalities and factories, and the PLA.

One marked difference in the process of establishing control and effecting reforms in individual schools in the rural and urban areas is to be found in the role of the propaganda teams. In rural areas, the propaganda teams move from village to village, perhaps leaving a representative(s) in the brigade. The responsibility for reform is assumed by the "education leading group" or the "educational revolution committee." In the urban areas, the factory would send its propaganda team to a particular school, and it would remain in the school overseeing the reforms. The propaganda team in an urban school conducts the "purification" campaigns, and the Mao Tse-tung thought classes, and leads teachers and students in manual labor. The primary cause of this difference is the role urban middle school Red Guards played in the cultural revolution; it is apparent that the level of violence in the urban schools was significantly higher than in the rural areas. One measure of the problem as it existed, and to some extent still exists in the urban schools, is that reporting on the "revolution in education" began much later in urban schools than it did in the rural areas of China.
Middle Schools

The basic techniques of taking over a school and proceeding with "purification" and reform are similar in all of the reporting. A factory would be assigned the responsibility for a middle school located near the plant, probably under a municipality-wide plan created by the city's revolutionary committee. The factory would then send a propaganda team, with PLA support, to the school and abolish any previous revolutionary committee the school may have established, together with any existing student organizations. The school then became a department of the factory under the direction of an "education leading group" or "educational revolution committee," headed by a vice-chairman of the factory's revolutionary committee, and composed of teachers and students from the school, workers from the factory, and representatives of the PLA and/or the militia. This committee, supervised by the factory's revolutionary committee, would structure a new revolutionary committee for the school. The revolutionary committee thus constitutes the administrative and political leadership of the school, but the propaganda team is evidently responsible for conducting the initial purge and the reforms that follow.

The purge of the teachers and students is the first step taken by the propaganda team. On 2 September a propaganda team from the Tientsin Municipal Cable Factory entered a middle school, and its actions are representative of the role of propaganda teams in most, if not all, urban middle schools. After "cleaning up class ranks," according to the People's Daily of 8 December, 77 teachers were left, 42 percent of whom were from "families of exploiting classes" and/or "old-type" schools. These teachers were required to undergo reeducation by the workers, peasants, and soldiers in order to remove their political blemishes. One group of seven teachers went with "support-the-frontier youth" to Inner Mongolia. Another group of 16 went with the students to engage in manual labor in the countryside and in the factories. The remaining 23 went to the "grass-roots" to perform manual labor.
Once a school's "class ranks" are "purified," essentially a purge of the teachers and the most fractious Red Guards, the structure of the school itself is reorganized. Each grade of the school becomes a military company. A company committee is organized composed of workers, militiamen, and teachers and students. Each company is then broken down into squads and platoons.

The first stage in actual curriculum reform occurs during the establishment of classes in the thought of Mao Tse-tung and daily self-criticism sessions. These classes are conducted by the propaganda team, but the PLA representative is the general overseer of the process. While these intensive Mao-think classes are being conducted and students and teachers are being put through the self-criticism sessions, curriculum reform is undertaken. The initial curriculum reforms reported stayed very close to the model established by the rural schools. PLA or militiamen taught political courses; workers lectured on basic industrial and agricultural knowledge; factory accountants taught basic mathematics. The full-time teachers—those that remained—taught "revolutionary" literature and art, PLA and militiamen taught military affairs and physical education.

This pattern of curriculum reform, if it is followed, would be disastrous in terms of preparation for the university. On 7 March, however, a People's Daily article reporting on the status of the revolution in education at the Canton #61 Middle School indicated that the first blush of reform may not, in fact, reflect the future of China's educational system. The argument presented in the report stated that Mao's directive that, "in addition to their studies, [students] should learn other things," includes the study of "socialist culture." The curriculum of this particular school, under this rubric, was developed to include the Chinese language, foreign languages (not specified), mathematics "beginning with abacus, calculation and survey;" physics, including dynamics, electricity, and "other things;" basic chemistry, industrial chemistry, agricultural chemistry, and national defense chemistry.
The expressed purpose for introducing foreign languages into the curriculum was "to satisfy the needs for the development of science and technology and world revolution." Not only was the need for studying science and technology recognized as a contribution to both industry and agriculture, but the need to study foreign languages to implement such studies was also recognized. The clear implication is that students need to study foreign languages in order to read foreign texts and journals. Since such skills are primarily applicable to college level work, the further implication is that, at least at this school in Canton, students are to be prepared for university work.

The report on the Canton #61 Middle School is, to the author's knowledge, the first and only such report of this kind, and most of the reporting continues to stress the vocational aspects of the new curriculum. Students and teachers as part of the new education process will participate in productive labor, primarily in the factories, but also in nearby production brigades. The manner in which students and teachers will divide their time between manual labor and classroom studies is not yet clear. Kwangming Daily on 5 January described the system being used at the Penhsi, Liaoning Province, #14 Middle School, and this system could become standard practice. The teachers and students were divided into four groups; one group studied in the school while the three other groups went separately to a factory, the countryside, and a local armed forces camp for labor and military training. Each group spent one month in the plant, two weeks on a commune, and two weeks with the local armed forces. The propaganda team divided up responsibility for the students and was responsible for the individual groups.

Primary Schools

Primary schools follow the same pattern of reform as the middle schools, but there are variations designed to meet the particular role and problems of primary schools. The main difference between primary and middle
schools is that many of the former are two-session schools and many of the children are too young to perform physical labor. Administratively, primary schools are being placed under the wings of factories, neighborhood revolutionary committees and street committees. The factory propaganda team admits members of these committees into the primary school education leading group, and cooperates with the neighborhood and street committees in organizing student activities outside the school.

The children are organized into squads, platoons, and companies according to their residences, and the "Young Red Soldiers" appear to be the successor to the Young Pioneers as the principal student youth organization. The Young Red Soldiers, together with other students, organize Mao Tse-tung's thought sessions outside school, and the neighborhood committee provides space and political instructors. In addition, the Young Red Soldiers are organized into propaganda teams and are regularly sent out into the streets, factories, and rural areas to take part in propaganda activity. Some reports state that the older children participate in manual labor, and when they do they take along the younger children. The teams also have two hours of organized team activity each day, most of which is passed in political song-fests and dances.

There are no details on primary school curriculum reform, but there is no reason to believe that the goals and content differ in any marked way from middle school curricula. Reading and other exercises will be drawn from Mao's writings, and whatever substantive knowledge is imparted to them will undoubtedly focus on industry and agriculture.

Half-Work, Half-Study Schools

Half-work, half-study schools in the urban areas have come under the same kind of criticism leveled at the rural agricultural schools. According to the reports in the press, the half-work, half-study schools established in the 1960's have, "from the very first day," been...
undermined by individuals who taught the students to value the goals of "bourgeois technicians." Mathematics, dynamics, mechanical drawing and other abstract academic subjects took precedence over Mao's thought and politics.

The propaganda teams from the factories administering these schools, with assistance from the PLA, purged the ranks of the teachers and began to return the schools to their original orientation. Curriculum reform involved the restoration of the original vocational classes, and the emphasis of vocational training was complemented by the stated concern of assuring that the student workers who attended the schools would return to their factories when they had completed their training. Usually the course conducted at the half-work, half-study school was cut in half, and modifications were introduced to assure a high level of political indoctrination.

Enrollment for the half-work, half-study schools follows the pattern set when the schools were established. They are to recruit from middle school graduates, or from workers engaged in the same areas covered by the schools' curricula. Middle school graduates, however, must work in the factory to which the school is attached for three to six months prior to beginning their studies.

Primary emphasis in the half-work, half-study schools is on abolishing the deviations that became common prior to the cultural revolution. Essentially, and perhaps naturally, the schools sought better educated students and began to emphasize classroom studies rather than integrating these studies with actual factory production problems. It is even reported that some schools established research departments, and more and more the vocational training focus of the schools began to fade away. This probably is an accurate description of developments in the larger plants, such as the Shanghai Machine Tool Plant discussed above, where advanced courses would be an ideal way to develop technicians capable of contributing to the plant's research capacity.
Urban Schools: Summary

The highly politicized and narrow vocational curricula described in the press and provincial, national, and international broadcasts follow Mao's predispositions toward the type of education most suitable for creating the new Chinese man. His ambitions, according to Mao's fiat, are to be narrowed by creating a system that almost explicitly states that the factory and the commune are to be his ultimate end. Nevertheless, the report on the Canton #61 Middle School provides sufficient cause to speculate that some schools will in fact prepare students for the university.

Prior to the cultural revolution, there is no doubt that many Chinese students sought a university education. Certainly by the time a student had entered senior middle school his sights would be set on a university. Whether or not the new curricula and administrative structure will in fact lower the ambitions of a student is a matter of conjecture, but there is no doubt that one of the functions of the new educational system is to change the aspirations of the student.

If the policies now being applied are implemented with little consideration for the effects they will have on higher education, then even if students are admitted to a university they will be far from adequately prepared, even by Chinese standards. There is the distinct possibility, however, that specialized senior middle schools will emerge whose primary function will be to prepare university students. At the present time, however, the data do not permit us to make any firm judgements.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND SPECULATIONS

The current reforms stem from Mao's longstanding distrust of the intellectuals. This distrust is based upon Mao's perception of the intelligentsia as an elite structure competing with the Party for a leadership role in the society. Traditionally the Chinese intellectual has seen himself as a member of an elite, and in imperial times this elite did administer the state and have the predominant leadership role in society. An enduring value of the society was, and is, to use the academic ladder for social and political mobility.

After gaining control of the mainland in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party set itself the tasks of industrializing the state while at the same time it created a new political system and fundamentally recast the social system. Rapid economic development was an obvious goal, and the new political system was designed to structure the absolute control of the Party. Revolutionizing society, however, was the most difficult goal to achieve because it required the restructuring of some of the major values of the society. It was this goal that was to complicate the achievement of the goals set for the political and economic systems.

The process of education became a major target of reforms, for it was to be used as the principal tool for restructuring the value structure and be the source of "worthy successors" to Mao's revolution. However, the goal of rapid economic development was also to be sought through the utilization of the products of the educational system, and thus the two functions of the educational system resulted in conflicting goals and policies. On the one hand the state needed to produce large numbers of scientists, engineers, mathematicians, administrators, and other professionals to build and supervise an advanced industrial state; on the other hand, the new political leadership was demanding a loyalty to Mao and the Party.
that approached a demand for fanaticism. The result of these conflicting demands was an educational system that compromised academic achievement in favor of intense political socialization.

The intensity of the political demands on the educational system varied, the highest threshold prior to the current period being achieved during the Great Leap Forward of 1958-1960. Indeed, many of the current reforms can be traced back to this period. Following the Great Leap Forward, there was a period of retrenchment in which the educational system was directed to recover some of the ground it had lost during those disastrous years. In 1963-66, however, Mao revived his educational reform goals and nation-wide experiments were conducted in the development of vocational high schools and vocationally-oriented college level courses. During this period preceding the cultural revolution, there was an attempt to create an educational system that essentially divided the students into two groups. The brighter students went through the full-time education process that culminated in advanced university degrees, while the less talented were channelled through a vocational process that combined classroom studies with experience in industrial and agricultural production. This dual system was to become a target of Mao's wrath, primarily because, in Mao's eyes, it still produced intellectual aristocrats of dubious political reliability, and the technicians produced by the vocational system were absorbing "bourgeois" values from their instructors in the classrooms. In Mao's view, the problem of the intellectual elite had yet to be solved.

The reforms introduced by the cultural revolution bear Mao's mark; his fears and perceptions are the source of the current "educational revolution." Once again the academic content of the educational system has been sacrificed to the political goals of creating a new Chinese man. The use of the educational system to restructure the values of China's youth has, as in the past, been combined with an intensive campaign to "reeducate" the intelligentsia. The process of the cultural revolution has struck a severe blow to the intelligentsia, and has made the life of an intellectual a politically dangerous
goal. For the student, even if he should continue to harbor academic excellence and the life of an academic as personal goals, the prospects of achieving a university education are extremely poor. The new system is designed to focus the students' goals on, at best, the role of a technician in a factory or on a rural commune. There is no clear picture evolving of the future Chinese university, but it is quite likely that for a year or so at least, with the exception of some institutions concentrating on specialties deemed essential by the regime, it will produce only higher technicians. Admittance to a university will require very strong political bona fides, and class background will prove to be an extremely important and rigidly applied criterion.

Even assuming progress toward a university degree, the student will find this progress an extremely arduous experience if current reforms are rigidly and systematically implemented. Physical labor in secondary schools will be followed by a period of one, two, or three years of manual labor prior to enrollment in a university. Thus a student's ambitions would have to be extremely strong if he were to attempt to climb the academic ladder of success.

There are, however, some indications that the extreme aspects of the current reforms are beginning to be modified. Articles and editorials in the press since last February have stressed the concept that "intellectuals must be given a way out," and that Mao's teachings on this have always been clear. Kwangming Daily on 27 February wrote:

Chairman Mao teaches us: 'The great majority of the intellectuals of our country are willing to be progressive and to reform themselves, and can be reformed.'

Nanfang Daily of Canton on 27 March editorialized:

Some intellectuals with problems in their academic thinking may not be ostracized so long as they still support socialism
politically and are willing to follow Chairman Mao to make revolution. Their useful knowledge is to be utilized to serve socialism. (Emphasis added)

Stressing the long, drawn out process of "reeducation", the editorial continued:

It is unrealistic to think that their [intellectuals] old ideas and work styles will be completely changed after they have attended a few meetings or gone to rural areas once or twice.

The thrust of the policy is still clearly aimed at "re-education", but the intellectuals are not to be forced into immediate "transformation"; furthermore, it is clearly stated that their knowledge is to be utilized. In view of the cacophony of propaganda praising the inventiveness of the workers and peasants, and their osmotic inspiration from Mao Tse-tung, such observations may presage a relaxation of policy.

Similar currents of propaganda can be observed being directed at the students. The terrorizing of the intellectuals and the frontal assault on the educational system have raised doubts among the students as to the viability of an academic career and the usefulness of education. The press has begun to respond to these doubts. Shanghai's influential Wen Hui Pao on 18 March published an editorial on education directly confronting the student response to the effect of the cultural revolution on education:

In the current educational revolution there is also a need to criticize the concept of 'You will get nothing out of study.' This is but another form of the concept of 'studying to become an official,' and, similarly, it is a bourgeois ideology. Some people, contaminated by Liu Shao-chi's fallacy of 'studying to become an official,' have the single interest
of becoming officials and becoming rich. They use books as the rungs of a ladder to climb upward. Finding that this road has been blocked, they have swung from one extreme to another. Dispirited, they spread such fallacies as 'Attending universities is an error in orientation. Since we will have to do manual work, what is the use of studying.'

The editorial observed that "study is still the thing when we enter a school, but it depends on how you go about doing it." Studies are to serve the proletariat, according to the editorial, but the student should maintain his university oriented goals.

This softening of the policies directed toward education has not been reflected in references to the reform of higher education. Nevertheless, there are indications of dissatisfaction with the lack of progress toward educational reform in the universities. Libération Daily on 30 March published an editorial concerning the universities, telling the propaganda teams that the time had come to:

...boldly explore, courageously implement, and do our best to determine concrete methods on how to run the physics, engineering, medical, and humanities departments of socialist universities.

Evidently the purge of the universities has been slowing down progress toward the development of model universities designed to demonstrate the kinds of programs the new universities should be creating. Wen Hui Pao on 29 March suggested that educational reforms could be "grasped" while at the same time "we are purifying class ranks." The emphasis in these and other editorials is on putting concrete reforms into practice, but thus far we have no indicators beyond the Tungchi University and Shanghai Machine Tool Plant experiments suggesting what modifications will actually be made and how they will be implemented.
The effect of the cultural revolution on China's educational system and the costs of this effect to China are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to measure. By June of this year China's educational system will have been out of production for three full years, and there are indications that the universities may remain closed for an additional two years. Although the classes of 1967 and 1968 have been "graduated"--the status of the 1969 class is unclear--they have not completed their university or high school requirements. Assuming a five year program, the class of 1968 will have completed three years' training, the class of 1967 four years, and the class of 1969, if it is graduated, will have completed only two years' training. For three years the universities have failed to enroll any new students, and it is possible that students will not be enrolled this spring for classes beginning in the fall. China has "graduated" between 340,000 and 510,000 students who have not completed their university requirements, assuming a graduation of 170,000 students from institutions of higher education each year. The number of middle school students "graduated" runs into the millions.

Breaking down the 340,000 base, 131,000 would be engineers, 42,600 would be in medicine, including health sciences and pharmacy, 28,800 would be in agricultural fields, 17,000 would be in natural science fields, 42,600 would be in economics, political science, foreign languages and other fields. Assuming that the institutions of higher education do not recruit students for the coming year, the educational system will have failed to graduate approximately 680,000 students on time, and at a minimum the figure will be around 510,000.

The number of living graduates of higher education in 1966 was estimated to be 1,879,000. Thus the cultural revolution has cost China, temporarily, an addition of one-third to its higher education graduates. The significance of these figures is impossible to evaluate with any degree of precision. It can be argued that China was producing more university graduates than it could usefully employ prior to the cultural revolution; therefore, the numerical cost described above is not too
significant. Furthermore, 55 percent of the scientific and technical graduates were produced in the five-year period 1962-66; therefore, they are quite young and the death rate is correspondingly low. This characteristic, however, has to be modified by the observation that the average age of competent research and engineering leaders is higher than we would expect because of the continuing dependence upon older scientists and engineers trained in Europe and the United States and scientists trained in the Soviet Union. The buffer that the characteristic of youth provides for China is, thus, not as effective as it might appear to be.

The latter question raises one of the more serious costs of the cultural revolution—Ph.D.-level scientists. Data on China's post-graduate training are extremely scanty, but it has been estimated that by 1970 China would have produced some 6,500 Ph.D.-level scientists. The cultural revolution will probably reduce this number to some 3,000. Thus the burden on China's older European and U.S. trained scientists and the Russian trained specialists will not be reduced to the extent that it might have been, and the expansion of China's research capacity has been severely limited.

The overall impact of the cultural revolution on education and its costs to China's national development goals seen in terms of industrial and agricultural growth, and research and development capacity is also difficult to judge. To some extent, this impact will be cushioned by the youth of China's body of higher education graduates. Nevertheless, this cushion will lose its effectiveness, such as it is, if the present reforms are pursued with vigor over the next year or so. It is still possible for China to seek its national defense-related goals by allocating teams of scientists to projects such as special weapons development, but such a decision draws from a pool of scientific minds that is quite small. By allocating resources to nuclear weapons and delivery systems, for example, the regime cannot but avoid reducing the resources applicable to other, perhaps equally significant, developmental problems such as nuclear power sources for industrial use and scientific approaches to agricultural development.
Although it is possible for China to adjust its national defense-related projects to a lower expansion rate of scientists, engineers, mathematicians, etc., at the expense of other areas of national development, the more abstract costs to the educational system may be more difficult to correct. The reign of terror that has been inflicted on China's educational system and its research structure has left a residue of fear among the intelligentsia and serious doubts among the students as to the viability of an academic career. It should also be observed, however, that this is not the first time that the intelligentsia and aspirants for a place in this stratum have come under attack. Mao has never disguised his distrust of the intellectuals, and the intelligentsia has been subjected to intense political socialization for some twenty years. Our sources indicate that this group has developed a psychological defense against the most extreme efforts of the regime, primarily in the form of dissimulation. The campaign style of politics has led to a sophisticated behavior pattern that could easily lead to a perspective of the cultural revolution that permits the individual to await, in his eyes, the inevitable relaxation of the policies, or at least a less vigorous implementation of the policies of reform.

The impact of the cultural revolution on the intelligentsia and the students cannot, in fact, be determined. The national and regional press give indications that the students are disillusioned and question the usefulness of a university education, and have grave doubts about proceeding along the academic path. If the current policies are rigidly administered, China's youth will be reluctant to choose the academic ladder. It is more likely, however, that the current indicators reflect a modification of the policy, and that the students and intellectuals will perceive the current extremes as a short range tactical effort. Nevertheless, it is apparent that Mao's views and objectives have not changed. The political demands on the intelligentsia will continue to be high, but the awareness of the "rules of the game" will tend to reduce the actual impact of the reforms.
Nonetheless, the experiences of millions of Red Guards will reemphasize for them the unpredictability of regime policy. Their new status is considerably below that which they probably expected from their earlier role as Mao's vanguard. Disillusionment with Mao's China will almost certainly become more common as the months pass. Prior to the cultural revolution China's youth had little confidence in a productive life; now they probably have even less. For many of China's youth, the ladder of success was either the Party or the university. The Party has yet to be rebuilt, and the universities and research units are still being revolutionized. Perception of these two structures as career goals will depend to a large extent on future developments within them. For the most part, most students certainly fear a life of servitude on the commune or in a factory with no clear way of avoiding such a fate, except possibly through a career in the People's Liberation Army.