Intelligence Report

MAO'S RED GUARD DIPLOMACY: 1967

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For several months during 1967 Communist China's diplomacy was characterized by an extraordinary degree of irrationality. In Peking, foreign embassies were violated and their personnel abused. Abroad, Chinese diplomatic personnel staged provocative demonstrations and went out of their way to insult host governments. The purpose was to bring the benefits and therapeutics of Communist China's "cultural revolution" to foreign policy and the foreign policy establishment. It was as though the Chinese, in their dealings with foreigners, were seized by a kind of madness; for a time Peking's usual non-diplomacy--or at best semi-diplomacy--gave way to outright anti-diplomacy.

The injection of this aspect of the "spirit of Mao" into the foreign ministry and onto the foreign scene was resisted by Foreign Minister Chen Yi, a man of remarkable courage, outspokenness, and style. No other ranking official has stood so openly and stubbornly against Mao's "cultural revolution" and survived. Only the support of his long-time, close colleague Chou En-lai, seems to have saved him for the time being. Although partially bent to Mao's will, Chen, with Chou's backing, won his struggle, at least for the present, to eliminate the irrationalities of the "cultural revolution" from the main stream of foreign policy.

This Intelligence Report, produced solely by the SRS, reviews and analyzes these and other extraordinary aspects of Communist China's conduct of foreign affairs during 1967. Arthur Cohen is the research analyst responsible for the study.

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MAO'S RED GUARD DIPLOMACY: 1967

Contents

Conclusions ........................................ i

I. Foreign Policy Immunized from Mao's Purge ...... 1
A. The Issue of Exporting Mao's Thought .......... 1
B. The Issue of Protecting the Foreign Ministry ........................................... 3
C. The Taming of the Foreign Minister:
   Stage One .......................................... 5

II. Foreign Policy and Mao's Purge Coalesce ....... 9
A. Mao's "Thought" Exported ......................... 9
B. Embassies Harassed .................................. 12

III. Foreign Policy Restored to Normalcy .......... 19
A. Chou's Major Role .................................. 21
B. The Taming of the Foreign Minister:
   Stage Two .......................................... 23
C. Prospects ........................................... 29
MAO'S RED GUARD DIPLOMACY: 1967

Conclusions

The aberrations which appeared in Peking's foreign policy tactics in 1967 reflected Mao's desire to project his will to pragmatic subordinates in order to make them revolutionary diplomats. The diplomacy they implemented had a revolutionary logic or rationality. It apparently was viewed by Mao as a means to apply pressure to certain "unfriendly" governments to attain concessions or to retaliate for anti-Chinese actions. Beyond Mao's special view, however, this diplomacy was in fact illogical and irrational. The beatings of diplomats, invasion of embassy grounds, and export of Mao's cult aroused nationalistic sensitivities abroad, and the adverse international reaction has been as harmful to Peking's foreign policy as Mao's 1958 blunders had been to domestic policy.

Mao's motives in exporting his cult were political as well as egoistical. He tried to prove to domestic critics that his "thought" was used everywhere. In one respect, the burgeoning of the cult in 1966 was roughly similar to the intensification of Stalin's cult when the Bolshevik Old Guard was being purged. The purpose was to focus universal attention on the dictator and national leader as the only source of supreme power at a time of crucial hierarchy realignment. But Mao's export of his cult went well beyond Stalin's practice. It engaged the energies of Chinese diplomats including the Foreign Minister for months, detracting from their professional image. Molotov and his foreign affairs establishment had never been put through such a simplistic routine, and Mao's projection on the international scene of his cult was a kind of peasant ultra-Stalinism which was an innovation on the domestic practice of the former Soviet dictator.
Dissemination in foreign countries of Mao's cult was opposed by Chen Yi in 1966. In that year, Mao was willing to support Chen Yi's rational view that foreign policy should be immunized from the effects of the domestic purge. But Chen had to retreat early in 1967, when Mao apparently changed his mind and dispatched newly indoctrinated diplomats overseas to proselyte his doctrines.

Partly because he resisted irrationalism in foreign policy and partly because he disagreed with the methods of the purge as it was applied to the Foreign Ministry, Chen Yi has been subjected to a dialectical policy of criticism and protection. He is still under criticism, inasmuch as Mao's real aim is to break his will and make him accept the methods of the purge "voluntarily."

Chen Yi and the Foreign Ministry have had in Chou En-lai a high-level defender. Although Madame Mao, Chen Po-ta, and Kang Sheng have also defended the Foreign Minister, Chou has been his primary defender and has, in his own words, supported the Foreign Ministry "more than anyone else" in the leadership. Chen's hostility to the activities of the Red Guards in his Ministry and to the export of Mao's cult have been tantamount to open conspiracy against Mao's "cultural revolution." Other leaders have been purged for less, and only Chou's ability to attain a special exemption for Chen can plausibly explain his political survival.

The main consideration for Chou is that Chen is his most important and loyal supporter. Chen apparently has a sizeable following throughout the foreign affairs establishment. If Chen were to be purged, a significant number of his subordinates would be brought down with him. Such an extensive purge would be a clear loss of political power in Chou's government balliwick. It is primarily for this reason that Chou has run the risk of antagonizing Mao by defending an opponent of his domestic purge. Chou's prestige is now committed to the survival of Chen, and the downfall of the Foreign Minister in the future would be an ominous sign for the stability of Chou's own position in the hierarchy of leaders.
Mao personally sanctioned the return to a degree of diplomatic caution in foreign policy in the fall of 1967. Only the Chairman himself had the authority to reduce the emphasis given to exporting his cult and to censure an ambassador for gauche ("revolutionary") behavior. He was persuaded, almost certainly by Chou En-lai, that governments should be influenced only gradually and at a rate of advance carefully adjusted to what the traffic of foreign national pride will bear.

The partial return to more restrained and flexible tactics is only the beginning of a long road back to refurbishing Peking's influence overseas. It is being undertaken against a background of considerable resentment in some of those countries whose governments were gratuitously antagonized. Chinese diplomatic crudities probably will be resisted more promptly and vigorously than they had been prior to 1967. In this sense, Red Guard diplomacy may continue to have an "irreparable influence upon our country's international reputation and foreign relations work," as a Red Guard newspaper put it in September 1967 in an attack on foreign policy fanatics.

Only by contrast to the wild fanaticism of 1967 can Mao's present foreign policy be characterized as rational or normal. In relations with other countries, a residue of militancy remains in Peking's revolutionary policy and it will be a constant source of government-to-government frictions.
I. Foreign Policy Immunized from Mao's Purge

In 1966, Mao Tse-tung seemed to be willing to wall off Peking's foreign policy from the effects of his domestic purge. Chen Yi was permitted to argue against the view that Mao's cult, primarily his "thought," should be disseminated by Peking's diplomats. He was also permitted to keep his Foreign Ministry personnel in their posts. His rationality was to be tolerated only until Mao's "revolution" moved to the left at the end of the year.

A. The Issue of Exporting Mao's "Thought"

The idea of reducing one's basic views on politics to their core elements and presenting them as a capsuled body of doctrine (an "ism" or "thought"), imbued with an aura of immutable truth, was the creation of Stalin. He had to demonstrate to superior men that he was not an intellectual "mediocrity" (Trotsky's word). Beyond that, he had to demonstrate during his purge of former colleagues that he was the dominant leader as well as the only theoretical genius. In the mid-1930s, during the first wave of repression which followed the assassination of Kirov, the adulatory tone of public references to Stalin was greatly intensified and Stalin's image began to take on divine attributes. A similar correlation between the beginning of a major purge and the burgeoning of the leader's cult took place in China in 1966. Mao's craving for adulation demanded it. But he also seems to have recognized a political axiom: in the course of a realignment of power relationships among top leaders, it is important to focus attention on the dominant man as the only center of supreme power.

The idea of encouraging foreign tribute to a charismatic leader's cult was conceived by Stalin, and
his official biography stated in 1947 that "Millions of workers from all countries look upon Stalin as their teacher, from whose classic writings they learn how to cope with the class enemy..." But Mao apparently was considering a cruder and more open foreign dissemination of his classic works. In 1966, the idea of using the diplomatic establishment to take Mao's "thought" overseas apparently was debated in the foreign affairs establishment. Foreign Minister Chen Yi reportedly said that Mao Tsetung's "thought" was a mental "strait-jacket," and in early 1966, he argued against the suggestion that it should be proselyted overseas.

Chen believed that nationalistic sensitivities would be aroused against Peking, and he insisted in February 1966 that it was an internal Chinese phenomenon. He told members of the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries that it would be rejected:

Don't we want to make everyone love Mao's thought? Mao's thought is a completely Chinese thing. We do not want to take it abroad. If we do, people will say that this is not our thing and we do not want it. In that case, what can we do?

Mao's cult continued to burgeon and even after the editors of the Peking People's Daily on 1 June 1966 declared Mao's "thought" to be the guide for "all oppressed peoples and nations," Chen in the same month told a meeting of Afro-Asian writers that "We cannot force them to accept all this Mao thought and Cultural Revolution stuff." Significantly, the writers' communique of 10 June did not refer to the "thought" or the Cultural Revolution.

Mao's willingness to keep the effects of his purge from damaging Peking's relations with other governments continued into the fall of 1966. Chen told foreign visitors on 6 September that although the Red Guard movement is "correct," not every demand would be accepted and foreign policy would not be changed. Two days after Chen declared, in his speech of 23 October, that Peking's enemies would not have the satisfaction of using mainland
developments to "sow discord" in China's relations with friendly countries, Mao seemed to sanction this line by including Chen and Chen's wife among officials who were present at the Chairman's meeting with Pakistan's visiting foreign minister. In late October, Chen refuted Red Guard criticism of Peking's friendly policy toward "reactionary" governments "such as Pakistan and Cambodia."* On 30 November, Chen was introduced to a mass meeting of workers by Chou personally, and he rejected the idea of establishing Red Guard units in foreign countries, implying that the best way to proselyte Mao's "thought" to foreigners was to work on visitors to the mainland rather than taking it overseas. In mid-December 1966, when Chinese envoys were recalled and Red Guards were permitted to "make revolution" in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Chen had to retreat. After personal harassment in January, he told visiting students on 6 February that "Mao Tse-tung's thought applies to underdeveloped countries...and I say it applies to Australia [as well]."

B. The Issue of Protecting the Foreign Ministry

Chen's first effort to wall off the Ministry from the effects of Mao's purge was in the period from May to July 1966, when work teams were sent to each unit of the foreign affairs establishment. He is accused of having received orders from Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping and to have protected the party committee of each unit. According to later charges, in early June 1966, he reassured leading cadres that they would be permitted to retain their posts. In late June, he directed cadres to seize their young militant opponents and he protected

*According to a poster in Shanghai, Chen had rebutted criticism in a speech on 28 October 1966. He also insisted that he was not to be placed in the category of Mao's political opponents. "I am on the side of Mao, Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, and Kang Sheng, and not with those who oppose them."

-3-
deputy foreign ministers and other professionals. Chen was also criticized for having suppressed militants in the Foreign Language Institute by sending to the Institute work teams directed by the former vice director of the State Council's Foreign Affairs Staff Office, Chang Yen. He is said to have subsided only when Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng, in mid-July and Chou En-lai, in late July, visited the Institute and encouraged the young fanatics to denounce the work teams.

Another major "mistake" of Chen's in this period was his desire to maintain a degree of personal integrity by not attacking Liu Shao-chi. When he had to face Institute fanatics on 4 August, he courageously declared himself against opportunism: "Chairman Liu's instructions have my full endorsement. Comrade Shao-chi has put it very correctly... he is my teacher.... I sent the work teams... and the Central Committee nodded its approval." (Red Guard Combat Bulletin, 13 April 1967) It was to be the primary reason for Chen's political survival that Mao, Madame Mao, and Chou En-lai apparently made a distinction between this expression of personal honesty and allegations of disloyalty.

Chen Yi's foreign affairs machine was moved a step closer to a major overhaul of personnel when Mao, on 9 September 1966, declared that in all foreign affairs offices abroad there should be a "revolutionization." The immediate consequence of Mao's ambiguous instruction was an increase in study sessions, concealment of signs of "luxury" living, and more anti-social behavior during diplomatic functions for personnel of all Chinese Communist overseas missions. It was later to lead to the recall of large numbers of Peking's diplomats for testing and reindoctrination. It provided the atmosphere for the protracted self-criticism rituals which were imposed on professional foreign affairs personnel. Liao Cheng-chih, the former chairman of the Commission for Overseas Chinese Affairs, was subjected to criticism and self-criticism in October 1966 and subsequently has not been rehabilitated. Chen Yi had to engage in a similar ritual of self-disparagement, but he seems thus far, to have retained his political health because of high-level leadership support.
C. The Taming of the Foreign Minister: Stage One

Chen had not willingly accepted the disgrace of former colleagues, and he had had the courage to defend Liu Shao-chi to the face of young fanatics. In late summer 1966, Mao apparently decided to destroy his ebullient spirit and make him slavishly obedient to the methods of the purge. The first stage of this process was to extend from August 1966 to January 1967.

Mao imposed a dialectical policy toward Chen, on the one hand encouraging criticism against him and, on the other hand, protecting him from a political death. On 25 August, Chen was aware that he would be the target of Red Guard criticism, and he told visiting students that he might even be replaced. On 16 September, he spoke to personnel of the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries—the same Commission he had told in February that he disagreed with the idea of exporting Mao's "thought." He accepted personal responsibility for "20 mistakes" in foreign policy. That is, he had to act the role of scapegoat for policies which his superiors, especially Chou En-lai, had formulated and implemented. On 21 October, in the course of a general assault on the operations of government ministries and the behavior of ministers, Foreign Language Institute Red Guards pasted posters opposite the Foreign Ministry building appealing for young fanatics to "bombard the Party Committee of the Foreign Ministry and burn Chen Yi to death." Nevertheless, as a protected person, Chen told Red Guards on 11 November that there was "a limit to the object of revolution when you come to Chung Nan Hai" where government offices are located. "You cannot charge into a place just because you want to. You cannot expect that a person will see you just because you want to see him, and you cannot refuse to leave just because you have not seen the person you want to see..." Chen still had the authority to demand that the fanatics keep out of his Foreign Ministry.

Chou En-lai seems to have worked with Madame Mao to defend Chen's position as a minister loyal to Mao.
When, on 10 January 1967, a Red Guard publicly claimed that Mao had said that Chen was too pleased with himself and not loyal to the party, the Premier denied that the Chairman had said anything like that. Chou said that he had not heard it. Chou also said, incongruously, that even if Mao had, it did not mean that Chen was not trusted by Mao. Madame Mao personally defended the Foreign Minister on the crucial matter of non-involvement in anti-Mao intrigue:

Chen Yi... has said some wrong things, written a few verses, and said some incorrect things, but he is not two-faced. Strictly speaking, he has made mistakes, but we have told him this to his face...

Chen Yi has carried out the Chairman's line. He has fought some good battles, and fought extremely well in the capture of Shanghai. All the same, he has said some incorrect things. He is not, however, a plotter, and when he has made mistakes, he has corrected them a bit...(Madame Mao's speech to Red Guards on 10 January 1967)

It was in the context of defenses of Chen's loyalty that Mao permitted the critical half of his dual protect-criticize policy to proceed. On 17 January, Foreign Language Institute Red Guards put up a poster, in the form of an open letter to Mao, attacking Chen for having incorrectly believed that certain leaders, such as Ben Bella of Algeria, Keita of Mali, and Toure of Guinea could guide their countries toward "socialism." (Actually, reports indicate that Chou had conducted all the important talks in Algeria in December 1963 and had personally agreed to a compromise wording in the Sino-Algerian communique which conceded that "Algeria has engaged herself on the road to socialism." ) Chen was impelled to make a self-criticism at a rally of "revolutionary masses" held on 24 January and presided over by Chou. At the same time, however, Chen complained that this self-criticism was made "under duress."
Chen said that he had made a mistake in following the "bourgeois line" of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping at the start of the "cultural revolution." He had been, he said, responsible for sending out 15 work teams to suppress revolutionaries in the foreign affairs departments. He also had to say that he had applied pressure to "mass movements" in trying to retain "order" in China's diplomatic activities. Chou and Chen Po-ta appraised his self-criticism as "exceedingly good," and the implication was that Chen had been exonerated. It may be conjectured that Chou and Chen Po-ta had in fact assisted the Foreign Minister in drafting his confession in the knowledge that Mao would permit Chen to survive politically only as a contrite minister.

Chen seemed to be leaning heavily on Chou for protection. On 28 January, Chen spoke to a meeting of foreign experts about a regulation governing their participation in the "cultural revolution" and Mao's initial instruction of 8 September 1966 concurring with the suggestion of such participation. Chen said that the regulation, based on Mao's instruction, had been drafted in the State Council's Foreign Affairs Office on 15 September, that it had been shown to Chou who suggested that it should be simplified, and that it had been redrafted and shown to Chen. It finally had been sent to Chou En-lai's office and there it remained for over three months and it was not until 14 January that Premier Chou En-lai saw the document. He suggested that no regulations be made at all and that the draft be put to the foreign experts so that they could study it and make their own regulations. In other words, this matter has been delayed. It is my mistake and I wish to apologize.

Chen's presentation makes it clear that it had been in fact Chou who had been foot-dragging and delaying implementation of Mao's instruction. By making clear Chou's central role in this process of delay, Chen indicated to
his listeners—the "representative of the rebel group" in the State Council's Foreign Affairs Office was present—that any criticism of this "mistake" directed at Chen would in effect be an attack on Chou.

The apparently deliberate foot-dragging of Chou and Chen on the matter of permitting foreign experts in China to participate in Mao's domestic purge reflects a basic difference between their caution and the Chairman's rashness. The Premier and the Foreign Minister, as administrative veterans, were aware of the complexities and risks inherent in carrying out a policy of struggle-participation among experts from different countries who have varying political views, traditional ways of living, and contract obligations. In his speech of 28 January, Chen had indicated that there might occur "situations where foreign experts are struggling against foreign experts" partly because among the men from 60 countries who might participate, there were "different trends of ideologies among them." Chen, and Chou indirectly, had calculated correctly. On 29 May 1967, the first issue of Red Star, a paper of the Marxist-Leninist Activists working in China as experts, was devoted mainly to a dispute which had developed between the French-speaking Activists and another group of foreign experts, the Rebel Bethune Yenan Group. That is, the administrators had made a pragmatic advance calculation and had been right, while the revolutionary all along had been unconcerned with pragmatic calculations about matters which satisfied his ego, in this case the ego-gratification of encouraging foreigners, even on a voluntary basis, to participate in his "cultural revolution."

Chen Yi's apology of 28 January for delaying such participation was made after he had clearly failed to keep Mao's purge from radically affecting foreign policy. By the time he had spoken, two irrational elements had been inserted into the implementation of foreign affairs, namely, the export of Mao's "thought" and the harassment of embassies. At the same time, an organizational excrescence was grafted onto the Foreign Ministry to provide revolutionary supervision of veteran professionals: "the
revolutionary rebel liaison station."* More than ever before, Mao's internal policies were to be directly reflected in foreign policy actions.

II. Foreign Policy and Mao's Purge Coalesce

Mao may have decided to purge some officials of the diplomatic ranks in December 1966 if not earlier. A message sent to one embassy in mid-December (and probably representing a circular directive to all overseas installations) had stipulated that between one-third and one-half of all mission personnel should return for re-training and direct participation in the "cultural revolution." Some of the returnees never returned to their overseas posts. The influx to Peking reached its peak by 17 January 1967 when approximately 600 of 2200 personnel in residence in 58 foreign missions had returned. At the same time, the first re-indoctrinated group was dispatched to Burma, and other groups went back out in a staggered exodus throughout the spring to other countries.

A. Mao's "Thought" Exported

Mao innovated on the practice of Stalin. Whereas the Soviet dictator had concealed the role of his overseas envoys in disseminating his writings, Mao openly used

*The "revolutionary rebel liaison station" was established in the Foreign Ministry on 18 January and it began to supervise the work of veteran professionals. Its activities extended to each section of the Foreign Ministry. At the same time, a "rebel group" was set up in the State Council's Foreign Affairs Office." The British charge reported in early February that "ignorant" Red Guards were supervising individual Chinese officials including deputy foreign ministers.
his entire diplomatic establishment in various countries to distribute his booklet and the buttons of his cult. A sort of peasant simplicity marked the practice of impelling trained ambassadors to repeat aloud quotations of remarkable banality and irrelevance. Red Guards later reported Chen Yi's attitude. "Even as late as 1967, Chen Yi said: 'I do not agree with reading Mao quotations abroad and presenting Mao buttons.'" Molotov had not been impelled to implement any absurdity of a similar nature by Stalin, and this policy of Mao's may be characterized as ultra-Stalinism—that is, the cult carried to an irrational extreme.

Regarding neutral countries, the first group of reindoctrinated Chinese diplomats returned to the Chinese embassy in Burma in mid-January 1967, and in February and March, the symbols of his cult were being disseminated in Rangoon and northern Burma. Proselyting Chinese diplomats were active in Nepal and Ceylon starting in March, and in Cambodia starting in May. Their actions provoked the leaders of these neutral countries to engage in an unprecedentedly vitriolic exchange of mutual recriminations with Peking in the spring and summer, in some instances merely adding to already existing tensions and in other instances creating new antagonisms. For example, diplomatic relations with Indonesia and Tunisia were suspended, all Chinese aid programs in Burma were closed down, and frictions were increased with Cambodia, Ceylon, and Nepal.

Regarding friendly countries, neither Pakistan nor North Vietnam were made exceptions. Mao's "thought" was disseminated in Pakistan from the Chinese embassy as early as January 1967. This policy cut directly across the grain of Chen Yi's continuing efforts to placate the Pakistanis, at first in the summer of 1966 when he tried to mollify the Pakistan ambassador regarding the closing of the mosques in Peking after Red Guard rampages, and again in his speech of 23 March 1967 when he pledged that Peking's enemies would not succeed in using the "cultural revolution" to "sow discord" in Sino-Pakistani relations. The Pakistanis were so anxious to sustain a working relationship with the Chinese that they did not publicize such Red Guard outrages as the depredation of Muslim religious symbols. For their part, the Chinese leaders had made
an unprecedented military-aid investment in the non-Communist government and they continued to accord the enemy of India with a special status. For example, Pakistan's commercial counselor had been used as an emissary to deliver a Chinese warning to the Canadian correspondent, David Oancia, who had been beaten by Red Guards in Peking on 23 July, the message having been that things could have been made worse for the already bruised Canadian. Peking's interests in Tunisia were turned over to Pakistan in September 1967 when Chinese diplomats were expelled from Tunis, partly because they had been mongering Mao's "thought."

The North Vietnamese acted more vigorously to prevent proselytizing in their country. They kept NCNA accounts of Vietnamese popular love for Mao out of their own propaganda media and they implicitly rebuked the Chinese Chairman by writing their criticism of his cult between the lines of an article in the May 1967 issue of the theoretical journal, Hoc Tap. In early July, they reportedly set up a discreet cordon of police around the Chinese embassy in Hanoi, and although free access to the embassy was permitted, they reportedly confiscated Mao buttons and booklets from departing visitors. Overseas Chinese refugees, who fled to Canton from North Vietnam, indirectly confirmed Hanoi's policy of censorship when they complained that they had not been permitted to study the Chairman's writings there. Chou En-lai had to deny this: on 14 November, he told Red Guards that nonpermission to study Mao's "thought" had been an excuse of the refugees who were really afraid of being killed by U.S. air strikes. Nevertheless, the Chinese-language newspaper in Hanoi, controlled by the Chinese embassy, continued to publish praise of Mao's writings in articles intended for local Chinese personnel and overseas Chinese.

Mao apparently believed that the purge of his former lieutenants required a demonstration that his doctrines were not simplistic or archaic and that they in fact had validity for other countries. Mao used Peking's propaganda media and his entire diplomatic machinery to act out an international charade and to make believe that his "thought" was accepted in all countries. High-level
sanction for this policy was implied in Hsieh Fu-chih's speech of 18 May (he complained of British efforts to restrict "the growing influence" of Mao's doctrines in Hong Kong) and in Mao's own statement (he complained in mid-summer of 1967 that internationally "there is fear of the influence of China, of Mao Tse-tung's thought, and of the Great Cultural Revolution"). Mao's persistence, throughout the summer of 1967, in trying to demonstrate that his doctrines were acceptable everywhere suggests that he not only was unconcerned about foreign ridicule, but also that he was obsessed by the desire to attack domestic disparagers of his "thought." Only after Mao's policy had created considerable tension in relations with Nepal and Cambodia (among other countries) was the Chairman willing to permit Chou En-lai to send personal letters of reassurance to King Mahendra in mid-August and Prince Sihanouk in late September.

B. Embassies Harassed

The policy of harassing embassies with mass demonstrations and temporary strikes by Chinese employees was not unprecedented in Communist China. However, in the years prior to the "cultural revolution," diplomatic immunity of embassy grounds and personnel had been respected. In the fall of 1966, the old practice of abiding by diplomatic restraints seemed to prevail.* Madame Mao, carrying out Peking's reaction to Moscow's 26 August protest demanding protection of Soviet embassy grounds and personnel, told Red Guards on the 28th that "You should not enter foreign embassies and consulates, but you can legitimately demonstrate outside." Demonstrations in front of "unfriendly" embassies continued within the limits of this guideline into 1967 and during the siege of the Soviet embassy from 26 January to 11 February. The temporary

*However, in the fall of 1966, some foreign diplomats were being abused by young fanatics in the streets.
lull in embassy harassment which followed the retreat from the siege of the Soviet mission corresponded roughly with the duration of a conservative period in Mao's domestic purge.* Embassies of "friendly" countries (e.g., Albania, North Vietnam, and Pakistan) were kept free from the policy of harassment in all periods.

However, in the period between April and September 1967, "unfriendly" embassies and their personnel were brought under attack. Diplomatic immunity was transgressed in the course of a deliberate procedure and foreign diplomats were beaten and mission grounds were invaded. But envoys from "unfriendly" countries who were beaten were protected from dismemberment or death by special guards assigned to them.

Most of the harassment incidents were planned in nature and probably had the ultimate sanction of Mao. Demonstrations against the Indonesian embassy were supplemented by Red Guard beatings of two expelled Indonesian diplomats in late April in violation of the usage of diplomatic immunity. Planned harassment was invoked against

*The failure of Peking Radio, NCNA, and the press to carry Chou En-lai's speech which ended the siege on 11 February may have been a reflection of Mao's displeasure with Chou's line of justification. Following a passage in which Chou had declared that "there is no need to intrude into the embassy" and that "we have also permitted their diplomatic personnel to engage in normal activities," Chou provided a Maoist rationale. He said that Chairman Mao had "taught us in each and every class struggle we must slight the enemy strategically and take full account of him tactically...This is what we have been doing in the current struggle against the Soviet revisionist leading clique. But this by no means illustrates that we are weak..." Mao apparently refused to permit further dissemination of the view that he had taught Red Guards how to retreat in the struggle with the Soviet leaders. There was no justification for, or indication of, a retreat in the solidly hard anti-Soviet speeches of Chen Yi which were publicized internationally on 11 and 15 February.
the British on the mainland in May in connection with Hong Kong, and this was followed by protests against alleged British support of Israel in the war with the Arabs. On 16 May, the British consulate in Shanghai was invaded by Red Guards and the charge, Hopson, was besieged on the same day in his office in Peking. The two Shanghai consulate diplomats were beaten by Red Guards on 24 May. Mao's speech criticizing Britain during the Arab-Israeli crisis on 6 June was followed the next day by a Red Guard entry into the Peking embassy. It was at this time in June that Kang Sheng was reported to have complained to Red Guards that not enough people had demonstrated outside the British embassy, and it is not likely that Kang was acting on his own initiative and in a more militant way than Mao wanted him to act at the time.

Militants in the Cultural Revolution Group were permitted to act in an extreme leftist way following Mao's directive of March 1967 that Red Guards "should not only be internal revolutionaries but should also be international revolutionaries." According to a Red Guard newspaper, after a detailed examination by the Cultural Revolution Group, Kang Sheng, on 6 June, "formally termed the Liu-Teng foreign affairs line as 'three surrenders and one annihilation.'"* Wang Li, on 7 August, made an inflammatory speech which encouraged fanatics such as Yao Teng-shan to stir up the extreme leftist attitude among the Red Guards regarding foreign affairs.

It was in the context of this sanctioned leftism that embassy entry--prohibited by Madame Mao in August 1966--was permitted. The entry of British missions in May and June by Red Guards was not criticized by regime leaders. On the contrary, it seems to have been a sanctioned policy from May to late August, correlated with specific regime efforts to apply pressure on London and Hong Kong authorities. Red Guard entry into the Indonesian

*"Surrender to imperialism, revisionism, and reactionary ruling classes; annihilation of [support to] revolutions."
embassy on 5 August seems also to have been a regime-planned affair in retaliation for an earlier invasion—on the same day—of the Chinese embassy in Djakarta. The regime tried to control the policy and succeeded in preventing Red Guard spontaneous initiatives from becoming unauthorized entries. For example, following the 13 August release of a Soviet ship as a result of Kosygin's protest over its detention in Dairen since late July, Chinese troops on 14 August sealed off the Soviet embassy and kept stone-throwing Red Guards from breaking in.

The policy of controlled invasion was implemented against the "unfriendly" Mongolians. Following the humiliation of a Mongolian embassy chauffeur (who was badly beaten in mid-day on 9 August for having closed the ambassador's car door on a photo of Mao thrust at him by Red Guards in Peking), young fanatics sped in lorries to the Mongolian embassy. Before PLA troops or police were dispatched, they entered embassy grounds, climbed up to the second story of the mission building, and painted anti-Mongolian slogans on it. But by early evening, PLA and public security forces moved in, surrounded the compound, closed the gates, and forbade anyone to enter or leave. Subsequent protests by the Foreign Ministry on the 10th and demonstrations on the 11th and 12th were more restrained affairs.

Invasion of the Soviet embassy seems to have been sanctioned by the regime's leaders. On 17 August, PLA troops, which had been surrounding the embassy for several days, apparently acted on an order to led the Red Guards through their cordon. The Red Guards stormed into the consular office building, smashed furniture, and set fire to records. In the center of Peking, a Soviet embassy car was attacked and burned.

Invasion of the British embassy also seems to have been planned. It was part of the leadership's retribution against London's failure to capitulate to an ultimatum. When, on 17 August, the Hong Kong authorities suspended the publishing permits of three major pro-Communist newspapers and arrested important staff members, Mao apparently was angered by this evidence that he had failed to cow the "imperialists." On 20 August, the
British charge was summoned to the Foreign Ministry and handed a protest note containing an ultimatum demanding cancellation of the publishing ban and dropping of the lawsuits against the arrested newspapermen "within 48 hours." On 21 August, "revolutionary journalists" were used to launch a demonstration in front of the charge's office, and the Chinese leaders made the point clear that the British embassy was their primary target by reducing the size and virulence of the demonstrations in front of the Ceylonese, Mongolian, and Kenyan embassies. After the British rejected the ultimatum and began prosecuting the arrested newspapermen, Mao was confronted with the choice of backing down from or carrying through the threat to subject the British to "serious consequences." Shortly after the expiration of the 48-hour deadline at 10:00 PM on 22 August, Red Guards were let into the embassy compound by PLA troops and police who had surrounded it.

Subsequent denials by Chou En-lai and Madame Mao (among others) that the Chinese leaders had been responsible for the invasion and the burning of the charge's office failed to mention the crucial matter of the ultimatum committing them to some form of retribution against the British. Nevertheless, the Red Guards apparently exceeded their authority by burning the charge's office and beating members of his staff, including women.

The subsequent de-escalation of the policy of harassing embassies probably reflected Mao's acceptance of Chou's view that several governments were seriously considering a drastic reduction of their missions in Peking, and that some were even prepared to suspend diplomatic relations. A Danish embassy official dates the easing of tensions among worried diplomats in Peking to 29 August. On that day, a large-scale and carefully organized Red Guard demonstration near the Soviet embassy was in progress when PLA troops suddenly rolled up in trucks and dispersed the crowd with loudspeakers. From that time on, according to the Dane, diplomatic missions felt a definite easing of tension. Chou En-lai's "five prohibitions" of 1 September had a further effect of relaxing
the atmosphere among the foreign diplomatic community.* In early September, a Chinese Foreign Ministry protocol officer began to express "regrets" regarding the harassments of the spring and summer.

Developments suggest that Mao had permitted the Cultural Revolution Group to continue on a leftist course against the embassies and that Chou reluctantly had accepted this course. That is, Mao had tolerated the rampages stimulated by such Group militants as Wang Li and Chi Pei-ku, who used Yao Teng-shan to stir up an extremist attitude throughout the foreign affairs establishment in August. Wang Li's speech of 7 August was made, and acted on by Yao, only because these militants believed they had Mao's sanction to be "revolutionary." When Chou intervened later in August, it was Mao who had to be persuaded to withdraw his sanction. The burning of the British charge's office provided Chou with the outrage to use in arguing Mao back to rationality at a time when he was willing to return to reason. More importantly, Wang Li was a Cultural Revolution Group militant who had just committed Mao to a greater danger on the internal scene. In the wake of the July Wuhan incident, Wang apparently had helped to incite a nationwide attack on the army, creating a real possibility of PLA disaffection. The retreat from the fanaticism on this internal matter made it easier for Chou to justify a retreat on the external scene.

*Following the 1 September meeting of the enlarged Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee, wall posters in Peking carried Chou's "five prohibitions," which were (1) do not beat diplomats, (2) do not stone embassies, (3) do not burn embassies, (4) do not enter diplomats' houses, and (5) do not violate the boundaries of the diplomatic missions.

On 7 October, with the issuing of a joint Central Committee-State Council directive, Red Guards were warned and embassies were reassured that Chou's prohibitions had become national law.
There is some evidence that the immediate target of Wang Li was Chen Yi, and that the ultimate target was the prestige and position of Chou En-lai. Wang's attack on the Foreign Ministry was made at a time when Chou "more than anyone else" had been supporting the Ministry. (Chou's speech of 2 September 1967)

Kang Sheng, however, seems to have joined in the defense of Chou and Chen after the internal and external line moved to the right. On 1 September he told Red Guards that they must make a distinction between the formulatoirs of the "three surrenders and one annihilation" foreign policy line—namely, Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and Wang Chia-hsiang—and Chen Yi: "If Chen Yi has errors, he can make a self-examination." In this speech, Kang's ominous remark—"it is certain that foreign relations circles have enemies; I have evidence, but I shall not publicize it today"—suggests that the information later cited by Red Guard posters and newspapers in attacking Yao Teng-shan were supplied by Mao's foremost party policeman. Kang may also have supplied the materials which were later used to disgrace Wang Li and finally Chi Pen-yu.

Chou seemed to be protecting a base of personal power. In his speech of 2 September, Chou not only complained that Yao Teng-shan had interfered in the work of the foreign policy specialists, but also he was angered by Yao's effort to "topple" Chen. As for Yao's behind-the-scenes champion, Chinese officials later told visiting Japanese political figures that Mao had personally administered the setback to Wang, who had been disputing Chou's right to reinstate—rather than purge—certain administrative officials.

Regarding the temporary seizing of power in the Foreign Ministry by the rebel "liaison station," Chou castigated the Peking Foreign Language Rebel Regiment for having instigated the attempt. He also attacked Yao Teng-shan for certain wild actions in various sections of the Foreign Affairs establishment, but the subsequent Red Guard accusation that Yao had become the Foreign Minister for four days between 19 and 23 August is exaggerated. The context of his remarks suggest that it was
in August, after Wang Li had made his militant speech on the 7th, that he (Chou) had been the strongest voice raised in defense of Chen's ministry. "I supported the Foreign Ministry in the Central Committee more than anyone else and I shall be responsible to the Central Committee."

(Quoted in Red Guard Newspaper, 15 September 1967)

III. Foreign Policy Restored to Normalcy

The end of the embassy harassment policy in late August was abrupt. At least one Chinese employee of a foreign embassy was reported to be unable to understand "why the government so quickly changed its policy." But Mao frequently has reversed a major line drastically.* Not only Chinese employees of foreign embassies, but also important Chinese diplomats were surprised by the sudden reversal of line on the matter of exporting Mao's "thought" and revolutionary doctrines.

*He is the only leader with sufficient power in the regime to be able by fiat to change a basic policy. This despotic and dictatorial power and this tendency to switch to new lines suddenly had been criticized privately in the CCP. Mao reported this criticism of his Stalinist peremptory style of leadership: "I have 'come to the declining years like Stalin.' I am 'despotic and dictatorial' giving you neither 'freedom' nor 'democracy.' I am 'craving for greatness and success' and being 'partial.' I have 'set a bad example to those under me.' I am also one who 'would not change direction until he comes to the end of his wrong course,' and 'once he turns, he turns 180 degrees.'" (Mao's comment of 15 August 1959, presumably quoting from statements made at the time by Peng Te-huai or his allies)

In late August 1967, the "end of his wrong course" was reached partly because of the prospect that foreign embassies would engage in a large-scale exodus from Peking.
For example, the Congo (B) had been a target of Mao "thought" export and of a new revolutionary line carried by re-indoctrinated Chinese diplomats to Brazzaville in May 1967. They told certain Congolese leftists that the present government in Brazzaville was only lukewarm in revolutionary fervor, that a new revolution in a violent form was necessary, and that aid to the Congo might be suspended until "truly" revolutionary men were moved to the top leadership of the country. The ultra-revolutionary line was sustained into late September, when the Chinese ambassador, uninformed about the real meaning of developments in the Foreign Ministry in Peking since fanatics were ousted on 23 August--or uninstructed as to what his general attitude should be--refused to change the draft of a Chinese National Day speech. The speech attacked a third power (the USSR), praised only the Prime Minister, and made no reference to his political superior, the President. As a result, no Congolese officials appeared at the Chinese embassy reception, and relations became tense. Within one day, however, Peking had apparently advised the ambassador to end his revolutionary fanaticism. On the day after the abusive speech, the ambassador informed Congolese officials that Peking would grant their government a big loan. At the same time, Mao personally intervened.

Only Mao could change the policy on the export of his "thought." On 3 October, he told the visiting Congo (B) Prime Minister that the Chinese embassy had emphasized certain things, such as his quotations on reception-invitation cards, and this was part of an erroneous policy. Chou on 5 October tried to reassure the Prime Minister that the Chinese ambassador had been wrong and that friendship with Peking "can stand all tests." There is little doubt that the change in line on export of Mao's "thought" and revolutionary spirit had taken the Chinese ambassador by surprise. He apparently had not received any new instructions prior to October.
A. Chou's Major Role

As a consequence of a top leadership conference held in Peking from 21 to 27 October to discuss ways to bolster their damaged image overseas and improve their hegemony over the world revolutionary movement, reassuring messages were sent out to certain friendly countries. In addition, Chou was permitted by Mao to be realistic about proselyting revolution and Mao's "thought" abroad, and in two speeches in late December 1967, he reasserted a degree of pragmatic realism into Peking's tactics.

Speaking to workers in the foreign affairs field in late December 1967, Chou invoked the name of Mao to underscore the authority of the new line.

In foreign affairs, we have to concentrate on revolutionizing ourselves and not others. In international relations there are certain norms which we must respect. [A] majority of the countries we deal with are imperialist, revisionist, or reactionary, and not leftist. Chairman Mao said: 'Our embassy in the Congo (B) praised the Premier of the Congo (B) and not the President. Again our embassy has emphasized certain things such as on invitation cards they have written Mao quotations. As a result, relations have become tense.' Therefore, Chairman Mao, while meeting with the Prime Minister of the Congo (B) [on 3 October] personally told him: 'Your President has acted correctly [in boycotting the Chinese embassy reception on National Day]. He has corrected for us our Great Power Chauvinism.' Chairman Mao said this three times.

The export of Mao's "thought" was to be carried out in a more tactful manner and Red Guards need not be organized in foreign countries. Speaking to an Afro-Asian Writers' Conference in late December 1967, Chou stated that Peking did not desire slavish imitation of China by other countries.
Referring to Japan, Chou laid it down that such actions as forced readings of Mao's quotations by the Chinese-oriented friendship association was excessive and unnecessary. This retreat from the gauche aspects of export of Mao's "thought" was to be a temporary victory for Chen Yi.

But before Chen was to resume his Foreign Minister duties, Chou worked with a small ad hoc staff in the Ministry. He apparently set up a "Supervisory Sub-Committee," probably to restrict the role of the "liaison station" while it was engaged in "rectification." He apparently restored the authority of the Ministry's Party Committee. The "Supervisory Sub-Committee"—which stressed supervision rather than operational control—and the Party Committee were directed by Chou on 18 October to inform his Private Office and the Peking garrison in the event that Ministry archives "both official and personal should be touched." This was a warning against any repetition of the invasion of the Ministry and pilfering of some of its confidential files by militant members of the Foreign Language Institute or by any other unauthorized persons. Chou temporarily seemed to be depending on these two committees to send along all major foreign policy matters for decision to his personal office. That is, they assumed the Foreign Minister's functions prior to Chen Yi's return to political and physical health. They also seem to have acquired a watchdog function over personnel during the "cultural revolution."

Ministry professionals were still subjected to criticism, but they were protected from personal abuse. Chou's directive of 18 October specified that the Ministry's "four great movement"—i.e., "struggle against self, criticize revisionism, pay attention to affairs of the nation, and carry out the Cultural Revolution to the end"—was "permissible" provided that officials were subjected only to reasoning rather than "beating, dragging out, or 'plucking out.'" Some old professionals were exonerated and re-established official contacts with foreign embassies. Others, including Liao Cheng-chih of the Commission for Overseas Chinese Affairs, were beyond redemption. His Commission may have been absorbed by the Foreign
Ministry. Some Deputy Foreign Ministers resumed a fair degree of their former daily functions, but others, such as Wang Ping-nan, who was "struggled" but not exonerated on 18 October, may still be in trouble.

B. The Taming of the Foreign Minister: Stage Two

Mao’s dialectical policy of protection-criticism toward Chen Yi reflects a special concern of Chou En-lai to sustain Chen in his post. Mao and his wife apparently have sufficient trust in Chou to accept his sympathetic view of Chen. The second stage of the criticism of Chen extended from April to September 1967.

Only the hypothesis that Chou is the leader most concerned with preserving Chen in his posts can account for the fact that Mao has not purged a man who had at one time derided his "thought," who defended the integrity of men after they were condemned, and who criticized the methods of Mao’s creatures, the Red Guards.

Chen’s resurgence within the Foreign Ministry against the "liaison station" in the conservative period of February and March 1967 was made at a time when Chou had complained (mid-February) that the ignorant fanatics in the Ministry had gone "too far" in their supervision of professionals. Chen later admitted that on 12 February, he had "openly scolded the rebels." Red Guards later revealed that in the conservative period Chen, at a Foreign Ministry cadres' meeting, banged on the table and shouted: "In the past, you have put up many big character posters about me. Now I am going to have my say." Chen proceeded to criticize the "liaison station" during its temporary retreat ("rectification") within the Ministry and to put "pressure on the revolutionary masses" so that high-level Ministry officials could "recover their
posts." Chen's basic goal was to protect Foreign Ministry personnel.* When the conservative period was reversed and Chen was again brought under attack, starting on 2 April, Chen Po-ta—who had defended the Foreign Minister on the same platform with Chou on 24 January—acted to keep criticism within limits. On 16 April, Chen Po-ta replied to the request of the "liaison station" for a face-to-face confrontation with Chen Yi by saying that Chen, as the Foreign Minister, is representing the state, that they must not come to "drag out" Chen, and that they should give him a chance to correct his errors. Chen Po-ta then evoked the name of Chou En-lai as the leader who was "presently and directly" in charge of the Foreign Ministry to deter the young fanatics from abusing Chen. The unmollified "liaison station" nevertheless persisted, and on 19 April demanded that Chen be brought down.

Under the dual policy of leadership protection and Red Guard criticism, Chen was permitted to participate in diplomatic functions in April. Criticism was sustained throughout May, a French embassy official reported the exultation of an "ignorant" young diplomatic guide who declared that Chen's influence in the Ministry had been reduced, and the British charge noted at the end of the month that Chen was constantly surrounded by "aides" and had a "haggard appearance." Chou had to swim with the tide of anti-Chen criticism. He apparently believed that Mao continued to approve of the existence of the "liaison station" within the Foreign Ministry: he gave "full support, come what may, to the liaison station set up by the revolutionaries to lead revolution and supervise business

*In general perspective, a primary crime of Chen Yi was his desire to preserve the veterans in his Ministry: "To sum up, Chen Yi wants to protect all the 'old revolutionaries,' all the old staff, all the old diplomats, all who have professional ability, regardless of their political coloration, and this is not a proletarian approach at all." (Article by the Revolutionary Rebel Committee of the Foreign Affairs and Political Departments of the CCP Central Committee in Foreign Affairs Red Flag, 8 May 1967)
operations (Chou speech of 26 May). On the other hand, he apparently believed that Mao did not approve of Red Guard attacks on the Foreign Ministry: in the same speech, he criticized outside Red Guard units for invading the Ministry's confidential files on 13 May and for storming the State Council's Foreign Affairs Staff Office on 29 May.

Dialectically, Mao continued to protect Chen. The Chairman had Chen join him and Lin Piao during talks with the visiting president of Zambia on 24 June. The protective half of Mao's policy was sustained, and a wall-poster put up in Peking on 1 August stated that the CCP Central Committee had ascertained that "Vice Premier and concurrently Foreign Minister Chen Yi" as well as Li Hsien-nien and Yu Chiu-li "are men of Chairman Mao's command."

The critical half was kept within limits in early August, primarily because Chou En-lai had laid down general guidelines for it. But in late August, the young fanatics temporarily exceeded these limits. In August and September, Chen was subjected to seven criticism meetings.

Chou and Hsieh Fu-chih on 6 August had told the Rebel Faction Members of the Struggle Headquarters to Drag Out Foreign Minister Chen Yi that two struggle rallies would be permitted, one at the Foreign Ministry on the 7th and one at the Great Hall of the People on the 11th. Chou is reported, however, to have demanded a promise that criticism of Chen must be limited to certain errors previously stipulated by the Cultural Revolutionary Group (presumably, that Chen had made mistakes in sending out the work teams, in permitting luxury in Chinese missions overseas, and in implementing the foreign policy line "formulated by Liu Shao-chi," but not that Chen had been disloyal to Mao and should be toppled). Chou also raised a prior condition that the rebels must behave properly (presumably meaning that they refrain from any physical abuse of Chen such as Mao had encouraged against disgraced and discarded party officials). Chou and Hsieh were at the "self-criticism" made by Chen on 11 August, and the Premier at that time reportedly stated

-25-
that struggle-sessions on a smaller scale would be permitted, at which he would personally appear. A smaller-scale "self-criticism" rally was indeed held on 27 August, but Chou did not attend. His place was taken by Li Fuchun, who had cautiously defended Chen both prior to the rally (on 22 August) and at the rally, almost certainly on Chou's instructions. Chen Po-ta also spoke to the rally and after he left, he telephoned Li and told him to defend Chou against efforts by unspecified persons to "sow discord" between the Premier and the Cultural Revolution Group. Nevertheless, Chen was exposed to the physical humiliation of being forced to bow his head and receive an order from a Red Guard stating that there was a time-limit (10 days) for presenting an acceptable self-criticism. Another struggle rally took place on 7 September, but Chen, who was scheduled to be there, did not appear.

Almost certainly with Chou's sanction, Chen instead sent a written criticism, which was read to the still-unmollified Red Guards and revolutionary rebels. A new procedure was introduced to shield Chen from face-to-face confrontations. Packets of Chen's past writings, reportedly prepared by the Cultural Revolution Group, were sent to various cultural revolution groups at certain colleges and universities associated with the Ministry of Culture so that written criticism only could be prepared. These packets, called "black materials" (presumably containing approved charges against Chen), were sent with instructions stipulating that Chen Yi was a "protected person" and was not to be subjected to further public criticism.

This did not mean that Chen was permanently to be shielded from semi-public or private criticism sessions. Mao's apparent awareness that more than one year of persecution is necessary to break the will of an ebullient and intelligent man was implied in the statement of Chou En-lai on 16 September that Mao had declared: "Chen Yi has still to be first criticized and then protected." At a private meeting of "thorough criticism and repudiation"
held in the Foreign Ministry on 18 September, Chen was
impelled to say to young fanatics: "Your criticism is
fine and thorough. I bow my head and admit my guilt be-
fore Chairman Mao and before the revolutionary young
fighters." (Quoted in Shumchun Reference News, 17
November 1967)

The formal reassertion of Chen's authority in
the Foreign Ministry followed his self-abasement on 18
September. At some time between 1 and 17 October, he
was reported by a foreign diplomat to have resumed his
full duties. Mao's niece in the Foreign Ministry trans-
mitted the following directive in late November from
her uncle:

The Foreign Ministry and the Commission
for Cultural Relations with Foreign Coun-
tries are to be merged, with Chen Yi as
Minister.*

Also in late November, NCNA referred to Chen as "Foreign
Minister" and he was reported by foreign envoys to be
fully in charge of the Ministry, but working only six
hours a day. On 28 December, Chen told the French am-
bassador that he expected to resume a ten-hour schedule
soon, and he seemed to have regained some of his former
confidence and ebullience.

Mao's sustained persecution of Chen Yi was not
merely motivated by a desire to test his political loyalty
to himself, Lin Piao, and Madame Mao. That matter had
been ascertained earlier, as witness Madame Mao's and
Chou En-lai's 10 January 1967 defense of the Foreign
Minister on the important issue of whether Chen was an
anti-Mao plotter. Mao seems to have been motivated by

*This merger apparently was part of an effort by Chou
En-lai to reduce "bureaucracy" by streamlining various
ministries. Liao Cheng-chih's Commission for Overseas
Chinese Affairs may have been dissolved as a separate
unit and absorbed by the Foreign Ministry in this ration-
alizing process.

-27-
a passion to break Chen's determination to be honest about comrades, rational about foreign policy, and moderate in the prosecution of the "cultural revolution." Chen was loyal to Mao, but he would not willingly accept the purge of professionals. He would not accept willingly the irrationality of imposing a supervision by ignorant young fanatics ("ignorant" as attested to by foreign diplomats in Peking) on intelligent foreign policy veterans. He had to be impelled to accept the egregious policy of exporting Mao's ego-cult. Yet Mao wanted Chen to accept these matters "voluntarily," that is, under terror and psychological pressure. Just how "voluntary" Chen's final submission had been, when Chen "bowed his head" on 27 August and 18 September at private trials, was indicated by foreign diplomats who several times in 1967 commented on signs of Chen's physical fatigue and mental anxiety.

Chen is still to be "first criticized and then protected," as Mao put it. This obviously is a course that Chou does not desire for Chen, but he may believe that it is better to have half of Chen than no Chen at all. Chen is loyal to Chou and is therefore a reliable aide to have in the course of any future maneuvering for position in the hierarchy of leaders. Chen apparently has a sizeable following throughout the foreign affairs establishment and these forces may well represent a reliable source of support for Chou. Nevertheless, Chou has to accept Mao's dialectical protection-criticism policy against Chen and the role of scapegoat for foreign policy "mistakes" that has been imposed on the Foreign Minister.

Chou has had to resort to various flabby arguments to justify retaining Chen. He told young fanatics on 16 September 1967 that "This minister, Chen Yi, is different from other ministers. This is a question affecting China's reputation and prestige in the international sphere." He has also had to use flabby arguments in setting himself apart from Chen's "mistakes"—such as the "serious mistake in the question of Algeria. He held that it was a revolution, but I said it was a coup d'etat." While complying with the policy of using Chen as the foreign policy scapegoat, Chou apparently still
hopes to preserve his political health. Chen's fate will depend on how much Mao is willing to accept Chou's view of Chen as still loyal. But it will also depend on Chen's willingness to demonstrate to the Chairman that he is an obedient captive who will accept the methods of Mao's domestic purge.

C. Prospects

Although selective harassment of embassies subsided in late August, the policy of selective holding of hostages has been sustained as a political weapon to retaliate for anti-Chinese actions abroad or to gain concessions on special issues. The hostage policy is almost certainly viewed by the Chinese leaders as less likely to lead to a break in diplomatic relations than embassy harassment and physical abuse of foreign envoys. Nevertheless, even the more rational Chinese leaders indicated in the directive of 7 October that Peking will carry out demonstrations and other "political expressions of will" in front of the embassies "if it is thought necessary."

Mao may now permit Chou and Chen to try to restore Peking's prestige overseas by using a policy of "dosage." That is, he may now accept their view that gradual and cautious methods must be used to advance revolutionary policies, that advances must be made only with a view to what the traffic in each country will bear. "Friendly" countries once again are feeling the effects of relatively restrained and rational diplomacy. But the list of "unfriendly" countries has expanded since 1966.

Mao apparently has stopped deluding himself that a clear loss of prestige, indicated by Peking's isolation in 1967, is really a clear gain. However, it is not to be expected that he will discontinue his long-term policy of supporting revolutions overseas. His comment on this policy in mid-1967 seems to be an indication of the course he will continue to pursue. As he put it sometime after the Arab-Israeli crisis of June 1967:
Our China is not only the political center of world revolution, but also should become the military and technological center of world revolution. We should give them arms and can now openly give them arms, including clearly inscribed Chinese weapons (except in certain areas). We intend to give open support to become the arsenal of world revolution.

Support of insurrections will be sustained because it is an obsession of Mao's that has not changed. He obviously views himself as the leader of all leftist revolutions.*

The return to a more flexible but still revolutionary policy is only the beginning of a long road back to refurbishing Peking's influence overseas. It is being undertaken against a background of resentment in some of those countries whose governments were gratuitously antagonized. Chinese diplomatic crudities probably will be resisted more promptly and vigorously than they had been prior to 1967. In this sense, Red Guard diplomacy may continue to have an "irreparable influence upon our country's international reputation and foreign relations work," as the Red Guard Newspaper put it on 15 September 1967. Although the paper attributed Peking's impaired overseas image to Yao Teng-shan, the real responsibility for this policy aberration must be Mao's.

*Mao's Stalin-awareness almost certainly is reflected in his desire to surpass the dead Soviet dictator in international prestige as the revolutionary leader par excellence. Mao has had Stalin praised for "greatly assisting the revolutionary struggles of all peoples," but it is necessary that the image of Stalin as an advocate of world revolution should not dwarf Mao's. Whenever Mao permits his aides to defend Stalin, they apparently are required to sustain the pretense of Mao's superiority, pontificating on the merits "and mistakes" of the Russian. (People's Daily—Red Flag joint article, 13 September 1963)
The morale of foreign policy personnel is probably at an unprecedentedly low point. Leadership insistence that Peking's international situation is "excellent" apparently has not been accepted by working-level officials. Signs of disillusionment were reflected in the December 1967 speech of one official:

Some comrades will ask: In what respect can the present situation be described as excellent? Since China is opposed everywhere and setbacks are encountered everywhere, how can the situation be described as good?

In addition to cynicism regarding policy failures, many diplomats are still being subjected to indoctrination and testing, and this process in itself is sufficiently callous to terrorize the ranks. But Mao seems to be less concerned about morale than the perpetuation of his "cultural revolution" in all areas of the Peking regime.