Intelligence Report

TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICY

Section I: Policy Toward the U.S. and the Diplomatic Isolation of Taipei

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This is a working paper of the DD/I Special Research Staff. It is the first in a series which will include separate papers on Peking's effort to limit U.S. involvement in countries near China, policy toward Communist regimes, policy toward countries far from China, and Mao's doctrines on war and armed revolution.

Mao's policy toward the U.S. in recent years reflects his willingness to discard shrewd diplomatic behavior and to make it easier for Peking's opponents to demonstrate that he, rather than the American leaders, is the intransigent party preventing any improvement in Sino-American relations. His view that revolutionary elements should dominate diplomatic tactics in foreign policy has retarded Peking's effort in recent years to gain international recognition and has eroded much of the goodwill Chou En-lai had created among Japanese political and intellectual figures.

It is the writer's view that Chou has been, and continues to be, dominated by Mao's general lines on foreign policy. Chou has tried to make Mao's obsessions -- that is, the fetishes of his "thought," "class struggle," and "world revolution" -- appear to be rational by demonstrating remarkable dexterity within Mao's intransigent policy lines. But increasingly since 1964, Chou has had to work within an even more restricted diplomatic framework, has had to give more tactics the third degree to make sure they were "revolutionary," and has had to accept a debasement of diplomacy in which Chinese officials in 1967 mongered Mao's ego-cult from their posts in foreign embassies and when the established practice of diplomatic immunity was discarded. In the periods of revolutionary advance in 1967, Mao apparently permitted fanatics (namely, Wang Li and Yao Teng-shan) to operate rather freely under a general (and, therefore, permissive) guideline, as witness the attacks on British officials and the
burning of the charge's office in Peking on 22 August.
But in the subsequent period of revolutionary retreat,
the area of permissive action was drastically constricted,
as witness Chou's "five prohibitions" on embassy attacks
(1 September) and the Central Committee-State Council
decree specifying that only "competent authorities" are
permitted to carry out and supervise embassy demonstrations
(7 October). Although Chou now presides over a period
of withdrawal from some of the most extreme positions in
foreign policy, he still acts as Mao's subordinate, as
is suggested (among other things) by his sycophantic
speech of 30 September 1967, in which he reiterated, in
the face of foreign diplomats, ludicrous eulogies to Mao's
"thought."

The views expressed in this, the first paper in
the series, are those of the writer and do not reflect
an official position of the Directorate of Intelligence.
The DDI/SRS would welcome comments on this paper, addressed
in this instance to Arthur A. Cohen
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THE BASIC PERSPECTIVE: REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMACY

In attacking foreign policy problems, Mao Tsetung's shrewd behavior—that is, his willingness to act dexterously on the basis of an informed calculation of the probable effects of a political move—seems to have been gradually changed. More than ever before, he seems to have contempt for the idea that a wise leader must be alert to everything his aides tell him about the consequences of major foreign policy moves. As a result, there are more irrational elements in Chinese Communist foreign policy than ever before.

Comparing Chinese Communist foreign policy of the mid-1950s with that of the mid-1960s, the most fundamental change in Peking's effort against Washington is Mao's significantly increased willingness to expose himself to the charge that he is the unreasonable and intransigent party. Whereas in the earlier period he and Chou En-lai had worked to put the art of diplomacy at Peking's service, to make it a sharply pointed political weapon in the international struggle against the United States and the Chinese Nationalists, in recent years Mao has become less concerned with the matter of avoiding diplomatic blunders. He apparently is annoyed by the diplomatic road because it has led to small advances rather than complete victory on the issues of control of Taiwan, admission to the UN, and universal diplomatic recognition. Beyond that, the diplomatic road has cut across the grain of his revolutionary compulsion. It had required a significant downgrading of the pre-1952 appeal for international revolution (especially in Asia) and a significant upgrading of the tactful effort to create pro-Peking and anti-Washington sentiment in various countries. It had required practical expediency and maneuvering room, and Mao showed good sense in the mid-1950s by permitting his chief foreign policy adviser, Chou En-lai, to exercise his remarkable diplomatic skill. Whenever Mao has permitted Chou some leeway to maneuver, the Chinese premier has proven to be
the most effective opponent of U.S. policy in the Chinese leadership. Increasingly in recent years, however, Mao has acted more on his revolutionary compulsion and has provided Chou with less maneuvering room than ever before.

Chou has had to comply with Mao's increasing concern with world revolution even at times when diplomatic fence-mending was the immediate problem. For example, in the final days of his African tour of winter 1963-64, Chou had been on the brink of ending effectively a major effort to refurbish Peking's international image which had suffered from Chinese Communist attacks on Indian forces (October-November 1962) and criticism of the partial test-ban treaty (summer and fall of 1963). Chou had also made some advances in competing with the USSR and the U.S. for increased influence in the area, in moving some regimes closer to formal recognition of Peking, and in arguing for the convening of a second conference of Afro-Asian countries. Even Ethiopia's prime minister, who had disputed with Chou on several points, told the U.S. ambassador (on 6 February 1964) that the Chinese premier had made an "excellent impression" primarily because his behavior indicated he was "cultivated, subtle, intelligent, and conciliatory--not at all like Molotov." When, however, Chou in Somalia in early February described Africa as an area "ripe for revolution," the phrase raised deep suspicions among relatively moderate African leaders regarding Peking's subversive goals on the continent and Chou's motives in making the trip. Even when, at a later period, the Chinese Communists acted to reassure African leaders that they were not trying to bring down their governments, they seemed to be saying: not now trying. For example, People's Daily on 28 October 1965 stated that the common enemy "at present" is the West and that Peking does not call for "socialist" (i.e., Communist-led) revolution in the present historical stage. But this qualification as to the timing of a Communist revolution defeated the diplomatic intention to give reassurance and to dispel suspicions. Mao's revolutionary compulsion does not mix well with Chou's diplomatic skill. Nevertheless, Chou has been willing to comply with this self-defeating incongruity in order to retain Mao's favor.
Chou continued to defend Mao's global strategy, and by December 1964, he declared that Mao's speeches and statements "reflect the revolutionary will of the people of the world in a highly concentrated form." By the fall of 1965, following a series of international setbacks, Chou had to insist that these developments would not force Peking to change the policy of supporting revolutions everywhere. On the contrary, Chou En-lai declared that in connection with supporting the "just causes" of revolution:

We will never retreat a single step from this principled stand, whatever storms may arise on the international scene and however much the U.S. imperialists and their partners may curse and threaten us, even to the point of imposing a war on us... At present, an excellent revolutionary situation lies before the people of the whole world. The revolutionary struggle of all peoples against U.S. imperialism has never been so vigorous as today. (Speech of 30 September 1965)

Although he claimed that Peking was also adhering to the five principles of "peaceful coexistence," Chou's emphasis was decisively on world revolution and he listed the various national struggles Peking was supporting, including those for "national liberation." Mao clearly was in no mood to concede to domestic and foreign critics that his militant foreign policy had been wrong, and his aides subsequently persisted in giving revolution precedence over diplomacy.

Lin Piao was chosen to state the kind of revolution Mao preferred; on 3 September 1965, Lin's extensive statement on all aspects of Mao's "people's war" strategy was depicted as a major pronouncement relevant to global policy. This statement completed the two-part global
strategy that Mao had been developing ever since the intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the period 1960-1963. Mao had emphasized the first part—the anti-U.S. "united front"—in a series of five major pronouncements on "revolutionary struggles" in 1963-64. Lin Piao's statement was the second part. The two parts were depicted as "the two magic weapons" for defeating the U.S. in the international arena—"people's war and the united front against U.S. imperialism"—by Liao Cheng-chih on 26 April 1966.

In a basic sense, the formulator of Peking's foreign policy strategy is Mao, and it is to his basic strategy that Chou En-lai must respond in implementing a revolutionary foreign policy. But Chou's troubles have been increased. Since 1965, Mao has been making it difficult for him to work effectively even within the confines of the "united front" part of the strategy. By abusing government leaders of underdeveloped and capitalist countries, Mao has violated his own dictum to "unite all the anti-U.S. forces that can be united." He has also acted against his own concept of a second intermediate zone—i.e., the capitalist countries, excluding the U.S.—by maligning the leaders of Britain and Japan. The forces that can be united in either the underdeveloped world (the first intermediate zone) or in developed countries (the second intermediate zone) have been reduced drastically in number.

Mao is an unregenerate Stalinist who believes in and acts on the dictum that "class struggle" is also an international conflict and that the struggle against the U.S. is irreconcilable. "With U.S. imperialism, peaceful coexistence will never be possible" (Chou En-lai's speech of 29 March 1965). Unlike the post-Stalin Soviet leaders, Mao's view of American presidents has been impervious to change and there has been no amelioration in his hostile image of them, as witness Chou's undifferentiated condemnation of "Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson" in his report of 21-22 December 1964 to the National People's Congress. On the contrary, each successive president since President Truman has been depicted, in a ritualistic formulation, as being worse than the previous one. Further,
Republican and Democratic presidential candidates have been depicted as equally wicked and as similarly representative of U.S. monopoly capital and hostile motives. In contrast to Khrushchev and certain post-Khrushchev Soviet leaders who have conceded that some American statesmen are "sober-minded," Mao has had his propagandists reject the concept and attack the Soviets for expressing it:

In the U.S., whether in power or out, the ruling cliques consist of wolves....Whether Kennedy or Johnson, are they not 'beasts of the same pack?'....Have not the modern revisionists long been shouting that there are also 'clear-headed elements' in U.S. imperialism? (Peking Red Flag article of 23 September 1964)

Mao's code of undifferentiated hostility to American presidents is retained with a curious intensity and continuity, reflecting his determination to sustain Sino-American tensions so long as Washington does not surrender to his demands on the Taiwan issue.

Mao has been aware that a series of foreign policy defeats in 1965-66--e.g., in Burundi, Tunisia, Kenya, Indonesia, Ghana, Dahomey, and the Central African Republic and in connection with Peking's line on the Japan-ROK treaty, the second Afro-Asian conference, and the Pakistan-India war--exposed his global strategy to international and internal criticism. Although certain of these setbacks were not specific reactions to Chinese Communist initiatives--e.g., the coups in Indonesia, Dahomey, the Central African Republic, and Ghana--others took place in countries and on issues where the Chinese had tried to make gains. Mao made an effort to dispel the general impression that he was in any way responsible for any of these setbacks. In the course of this effort, he has tried (1) to shunt the blame onto scapegoats, (2) to deny that Sino-U.S. hostility reflects a basic policy failure, and (3) to deny that international isolation is detrimental to Peking's interests. Regarding (1), Mao pointed on 26 October 1965...
to Chen Yi and foreign ministry officials and said: "I have to watch out for them. They never tell me the whole story. I can't be sure what is going on." There may be some truth in this declaration, inasmuch as his foreign policy aides may tell him less of the "whole story" of a defeat than of a victory. He has had his propagandists try to demonstrate that a mysterious "natural" process, rather than Mao personally, has been responsible for defeats. "Marxists...regard the great international upheaval as the natural outcome of the sharpening of the international class struggle." (People's Daily article of 1 March 1966) Regarding (2), after his propagandists declared, in the winter of 1965, that the U.S. was gradually shifting the "focus of its global strategy" from Europe to Asia, centering it on the mainland, Peking implicitly denied that this reflected a fundamental failure of foreign policy. But the argument was weak and, at points, not credible. It was strained, and it contained an implicit demand that one of Mao's characteristically self-defensive dictums should be taken as literal truth: "To be opposed by our enemy is not a bad thing; it adds to our honor" (People's Daily Observer article of 20 February 1966 commenting on Assistant Secretary Bundy's speech of 12 February). Regarding (3), Mao privately lectured a Japanese Communist party official in March 1966 that "one should not fear isolation," contradicting Chen Yi's effort of January 1966 to deny that very condition of isolation.

Mao's genuine confidence in the prospect of advances against the U.S. has changed. In contrast to the hardline period of 1957-58 when Mao and his foreign policy aides really seemed to believe that the Communist bloc could significantly reduce U.S. influence in various countries by a more aggressive political strategy and make "the east wind prevail over the west wind" (Mao's statement in Moscow in November 1957), in recent years their confidence appears to be more contrived. This ersatz confidence is a result of Mao's split with the Soviet leaders (destroying the concept of an "east" wind) and setbacks in 1965-66 (destroying the concept of a receding "west" wind). Viewed in the context of coups among pro-Peking revolutionary governments and of failures in
"national liberation movements," Chou's statement of 30 September 1965 that "an excellent revolutionary situation" now exists in the world does not carry the same conviction as the ringing Peking declarations in 1957-58 that the U.S. will be rolled back "with the force of millions." Mao's foreign policy aides had to "explain" that, regarding the Communist bloc, first of all it has to be reconstructed because "a new process of division will inevitably occur in the revolutionary ranks, and some people will inevitably drop out; but at the same time, hundreds of millions of revolutionary people will stream in" (Red-Flag-People's Daily joint article of 11 November 1965). They also had to "explain" that, regarding the revolutionary struggle, "a great upheaval, division, and realignment is taking place in the world...If the imperialists, revisionists, and reactionaries get the upper hand in some places and retrogression sets in temporarily, that would be a mere twist or turn in the advance of history" and the tide would "eventually" turn in Peking's favor (People's Daily article of 4 April 1966). These "explanations" take the line of Mao's old procedure of trying to convince his cadres (and the populace) that while his forces may be in the process of retreat before an advancing enemy and have lost a battle or two--"To ask the revolutionary army to win every battle it fights is asking the impossible" (People's Daily article of 11 April 1966)--they will win in the future by pugnacious adherence to Mao's strategy. The intensity of the 1965-66 articles, in which Mao's foreign policy aides tried to justify his world strategy as correct (especially after the coups in Indonesia and Ghana), apparently reflected their awareness that these and other setbacks had created an extreme and unprecedented decline in Peking's international prestige.

Mao's aides apparently convinced him that the general impression gaining credence among other countries was that Peking was (1) encircled by its opponents, was (2) aggressive and Intransigent, and was (3) isolated. Mao's willingness to try to dispel this general impression was only temporary. He apparently permitted his aides in late March 1966 to begin to stress the almost defunct idea of the Bandung spirit and to downplay the idea of stimulating
revolutions everywhere. This was a drastic change from the previous emphasis on global revolutionary strategy. Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Burma were selected as the best countries for Liu Shao-chi and Chen Yi to visit in the effort to demonstrate that Peking was not (1) encircled, inasmuch as at least one significant arc around the mainland remained open, (2) was not aggressive, inasmuch as its policy was peaceful coexistence of the Bandung type, and (3) was not isolated, inasmuch as it still had important friends and international respect. The People's Daily editorial of 27 March 1966, published at the start of the Liu-Chen trip, revived the dictums of the Bandung era of the mid-1950s and placed the trip in the context of an "unending flow" of contacts between Peking and its neighbors. The editorial attributed this policy of "peace and amity" to Mao's October 1949 view of friendly relations, declaring it to be part of his "socialist foreign policy" which the PRC has "steadfastly pursued." Only secondary importance was given to world revolution and to Mao's statement on the need to support revolutionary struggles.

Significantly, however, Mao's statement on supporting revolution was described in this editorial as a policy which will be "immovable under any circumstances." This apparently reflected Mao's inability to resist reasserting and defending his revolutionary strategy even at a time when his aides had convinced him that such a reassertion would be detrimental to Peking's immediate interests. Later in the trip, Chen Yi shattered the image of moderation which he and Liu were projecting in the earlier part of the trip in West Pakistan and Afghanistan, and he reasserted Mao's militant view of global strategy, making no references to peaceful coexistence (speech in Dacca of 15 April 1966). Although the Liu-Chen trip was finally appraised as "a major victory for China's foreign policy of peace" in the People's Daily editorial of 21 April 1966, elements of the Bandung spirit were gradually displaced in May by comments on the revolutionary strategy. In mid-May, the Chinese ambassador to France privately emphasized to NCNA officials there that the "general opposition to the imperialists" must be even stronger than before and that intellectuals who formulate "unorthodox ways to break China's so-called isolation" were being
denounced as "allies of the Americans." By 1 June 1966, the revolutionary line was forcefully reasserted in a People's Daily article, which insisted that Peking would "side with the revolutionary people of all countries," would never abandon its "revolutionary stand," and had never felt isolated and "never will be." In short, the return to Bandung image-building in March and April 1966 was a temporary change of course, an aberrant shift, and it was followed by the adamantly revolutionary line, the line of mobilizing a "united front" against the U.S. and struggling with "the revolutionary people of all countries" against the U.S. and USSR "to the end" (Lin Piao keynote speech of 1 October 1966).

Mao's revolutionary compulsion has led to self-isolation. Although he does not want to concede that he is the leader of an internationally isolated regime, his revolutionary compulsion has become so dominant in recent years that he is unwilling to act tactfully for any extended period in order to avoid isolation. This incongruity was demonstrated in his statement to the Albanians in November 1966 that "we are not afraid of being isolated and we shall never be isolated." In the past decade, shifts to the left in Peking's basic foreign policy seem to have been products of Mao's own refusal to allow the rational political calculations of his aides to dominate the fanatical elements in his revolutionary view of the international process.

Mao's purge of many of his lieutenants, and his effort to revolutionize those he has retained, was reflected in foreign policy in early 1967 by a radical shift to the left. In order to make the instruments of his militant diplomacy more revolutionary, he has applied a form of organizational shock treatment to the Foreign Ministry and all of its officials. Artificial convulsions were produced in the Ministry shortly after the establishment within it of a "Revolutionary Rebel Liaison Station" on 18 January 1967. "Rebels" and Red Guards sent into each Ministry department or individually assigned to the Foreign Minister and his deputy ministers, began to subject the professionals to criticism and surveillance to ensure that revolutionary vigor dominated their daily routines.
A number of ambassadors and part of their staffs, who were recalled in late 1966, were subjected to special indoctrination courses in Mao's "thought," and diplomats who returned to their foreign posts in the spring of 1967 were impelled to preserve their political future by disseminating the symbols (quotations and buttons) of Mao's ego-cult. This tactless ritual practice, carried out in Burma, Nepal, and Cambodia (among other countries) immediately aroused nationalistic indignation and created major disputes with foreign leaders who previously had been designated as "friendly," and even with notorious sycophants of Peking, e.g., Sihanouk. That this ritual practice, reflecting an extension to diplomacy of Mao's insatiable craving for adulation, was encouraged by Mao himself is suggested by Chou's decision to swim with this tide of irrationality. Chou in mid-August 1967 asked Cambodia's foreign minister to permit Overseas Chinese "to show their love for Mao Tse-tung and Communism." Chou's attitude still seems to be that of a subordinate who prefers rational policies but is constantly impelled (even in relatively sane periods) to comply with the fits of self-love which seize Mao's mind.

His willingness to comply with irrational policies and, at the same time, to establish a rational procedure for these policies was reflected in his handling of the revolutionization of foreign affairs machinery in 1967. On the one hand, following formation in January of a "liaison station" and Mao's directive in March that Red Guards and rebels "should not only be internal revolutionaries, but should also be international revolutionaries," Chou stated that he gave "full support, come what may, to the liaison station set up by the revolutionaries to lead revolution and supervise business operations" in the Foreign Ministry. (Chou speech of 26 May) On the other hand, he criticized outside Red Guard units which had stormed into the Ministry on 13 May and invaded the State Council's foreign affairs staff office on 29 May. He has also presided over retreats from the extremes of fanaticism in certain aspects of foreign policy in 1967. For example, he tried to deny Red Guard revelations about Peking's real contempt for the Pyongyang regime in January, made the fallback speech ending the siege of the Soviet embassy in February, acquired direct responsibility for running the Foreign Ministry on 23 August (the same day Red Guards were ordered to stop their activities within it under the guidance of Yao Teng-shan), and formulated five prohibitive regulations regarding demonstrations against embassies on 1 September.
The basic source of Mao's current view of foreign policy strategy is primarily doctrinal, thus by definition more impervious to change than a less dogmatic and militant view of the world would be. Increasingly in recent years, Mao seems to have acted on the following warning of Stalin against losing the international revolutionary perspective:

The distinctive feature of that danger is the lack of belief in the international proletarian revolution; the lack of belief in its victory; skepticism with regard to the national liberation movement of the colonies and dependent countries; the failure to understand that, without supporting the revolutionary movement in other countries, our own country cannot cope with world imperialism; the failure to understand that the victory of socialism in a single country cannot be final because no country can be guaranteed against intervention until the revolution has triumphed at least in a certain number of countries; the failure to understand the basic demand of internationalism, that the victory of socialism in a single country is not an aim in itself but a means for developing and supporting revolution in other countries. (Stalin's speech of 9 June 1925)

These propositions have appeared, in various forms, in Chinese Communist statements on world revolution in recent years. However, Stalin soon became much more conservative in pushing international revolution, and he was attacked by Trotsky for his cautious approach to the needs of foreign revolutionaries. Mao seems to pride himself on sustaining and stimulating the world revolutionary process "uninterruptedly," as Peking puts it. Nevertheless, he prefers that revolutionary wars be fought by others and that Chinese military aid should be given in such a form as not to invite U.S. retaliation against the mainland.
In the immediate future, tactical shifts in Mao's foreign policy almost certainly will not dilute this revolutionary compulsion. The pattern of the past decade suggests that Mao, so long as he lives, will permit Chou (who "implements" his foreign policy, as Madame Mao told Red Guards in September 1967) to return to reality, to policies calculated to make diplomatic advances, only for short periods. The worst aberrations probably will be moderated temporarily, and the prospect for the immediate future seems to be (1) for caution rather than aggressiveness in exporting Mao's ego-cult, and (2) for reduced harassment of foreign embassies and diplomats. These gauche policies probably will not be abandoned entirely, however. In every case in which a new hard line has been imposed toward a foreign country in recent years, the line probably will be retained, because Mao's dominant practice has been to wage "blow-for-blow" struggles rather than to retreat from tensions once they have developed in inter-government or inter-party relations. Expedient policies (primarily the need to revive trade) probably will be advanced and the extremes of violent strikes and harassment of personnel will be reduced, but the new hard line will be sustained, as witness the crude polemical attacks on Tokyo and Hong Kong government officials. Because the moods of Mao's mental caprice and his craving for international adulation defy rational inquiry, judgments about the duration of the relatively rational periods in policy toward various countries are not worth much.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Policy toward the U.S. has always been adamantly hostile, but in the mid-1950s, Mao had permitted Chou to use his diplomatic skill to deflect from Peking the real responsibility for intransigence. Chou performed effectively. However, Chou's leeway for maneuver was reduced following the interdiction effort against the offshore islands in the fall of 1958. The overall Taiwan Strait situation—the main Sino-American issue for many years—was placed thereafter in political limbo as a result of two basic shifts in line. First, Mao retreated from a policy of using limited-military means to attain the offshore islands, to a policy of avoiding any new military interdiction effort. Second, he moved from the relatively flexible political tactic of temporarily separating the offshore islands issue from the Taiwan issue to the political strategy of combining them as territorial claims to be settled simultaneously.

On the island of Chinmen there are only 80,000 people, and it is now known to the world that the U.S. does not object [sic] to returning the islands of Chinmen and Matsu to us, but in exchange they want to keep Taiwan for themselves. This would be a disadvantageous deal. It will be better if we wait. Let Chiang Kai-shek stay on Chinmen and Matsu and we will get them back later together with the Pescadores Islands and Taiwan. (Mao's statement of 3 March 1959 to Latin American Communists)

Using this argument, Mao has converted conquest of the offshore islands into a distant goal and the entire Strait situation into a political struggle.

Mao has been convinced that Washington is determined to support the Nationalists on the islands. Further, he has been forced to accept the consequences of the Sino-Soviet dispute for his Taiwan Strait policy. The dispute
has deprived him of the Soviet deterrent statements (which implied a nuclear shield in defense of the mainland)—statements which, in 1954 and 1958, Mao had considered necessary for going to the brink of war against the American military capability in the Far East. In the period from 1958 to 1963, Chinese Communist officials privately complained that Khrushchev had asked them not to embark on any new military action in the Strait and that he had placed the Taiwan issue in "cold storage." The post-Khrushchev leadership has adhered to this non-support policy.

The controlling formulation for the military aspect of the Taiwan Strait situation—namely, in the Strait "our war is political war" (PLA General Tu Ping's statement of 10 June 1959)—has become dogma. As for Peking's military strategy of 1962 in handling a hypothetical Chinese Nationalist attack on the mainland, there apparently was once a dispute over the alternative plans of luring the invader in deep or blocking him at the Fukien Front beaches. People's Daily on 7 September 1967 claimed that Liu Shao-chi and Lo Jui-ching preferred the latter strategy, and it implied that Lin Piao was the advocate of absorbing the attack farther inland. Regarding Peking's strategy of handling a U.S. nuclear attack, Khrushchev seems to have been convinced that Mao was talking "rubbish" when, in the summer of 1958, Mao told him that the PLA could retreat inland and fight alone, without Soviet intervention. The implication of this complaint is that Khrushchev was aware that Mao was talking only of a U.S. ground forces invasion (the unlikely event) and avoiding the real issue of how to handle a U.S. nuclear weapons attack.

This real issue is a sensitive matter, which is usually avoided by Mao and his aides because detailed discussion of it would clearly expose the disparity in the military capability of Washington and Peking. Chou En-lai commented on it briefly in the context of escalation of the Vietnam war, differentiating between an air (or naval attack) and a ground attack.

Once the war breaks out, it will have no boundaries. Some US strategists want to
bombard China by relying on their air and naval superiority and avoid a ground war. This is wishful thinking. Once the war gets started with air or sea action, it will not be for the U.S. alone to decide how the war will continue. If you can come from the sky, why can't we fight back on the ground? That is why we say the war will have no boundaries once it breaks out. (Chou's four-point statement on Peking's policy toward the U.S. from his interview with Pakistani correspondent of the paper Dawn on 10 April 1966. NCNA version of 9 May 1966) (emphasis supplied)

Chou emphasized the PLA's capability to overrun countries in Indo-China but remained silent on whether the PLA could interdict, cripple, and turn back a U.S. nuclear weapons air (or naval) attack on the mainland.

The intensification of the Vietnam war seems to have made it even more necessary for Mao to keep the struggle in the Strait a political matter. The war apparently has increased his fear that the Chinese Nationalists would use any resumption of heavy shelling against the offshores to try to induce Washington to support a major attack against the mainland (or an airstrike against Mao's nuclear weapons development facilities). Further, another unsuccessful military interdiction effort against the offshore islands would again draw attention to the disparity between the American and the Chinese Communist military capabilities. Much of the verbal aggressiveness, so long a standard feature of Mao's demand for the "liberation" of the Nationalist-held islands, has been reduced in Peking's propaganda in recent years.

The unsuccessful interdiction effort of 1958 increased Mao's intransigence on the matter of Sino-American contacts. Shifting from the pre-1958 period, when the matters of release of U.S. prisoners and visits of Americans (e.g., dignitaries and newsmen) were discussed, Mao has had his diplomats insist that a complete surrender in the Strait must precede discussion of all other matters.
In the Sino-US talks, we have insisted on a settlement of the Taiwan issue before other discussions can proceed—a reversal of our previous strategy of handling details before the matter of principle. (Foreign Ministry Review document of January 1961)

In recent years, Mao has become less concerned than ever before about deflecting international criticism of himself as the intransigent party in Sino-American relations. In contrast with the earlier policy, which was centered on a major effort to avoid publicizing the crude fact that the start of even low-level contacts required first of all a U.S. surrender on the Taiwan issue, the People's Daily declared on 29 March 1966 that:

So long as the U.S. government does not change its hostile policy toward China and refuses to pull out its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations is entirely out of the question and so is the solution of such a concrete question as the exchange of visits between personnel of the two countries. (emphasis supplied)

Mao apparently is determined to insist on this obdurate policy indefinitely, that is, until his death. In attacking Liu Shao-chi, he has had his propagandists adopt an even more intransigent position, implying that a U.S. withdrawal would not lead to the "development of friendly relations." (People's Daily article of 16 October 1966)

Regarding participation in the UN, Mao's policy has been encrusted with an incongruous duality. From the time of the establishment of his regime, he has insisted on entry only on his own conditions, and he has added to these conditions, making them even more difficult for other countries to accept. Since January 1965, revolutionization of his UN policy was expressed in his shift from a simple demand for the eviction of the Nationalists prior to Peking's entry, to an entire series of demands, all of which militate against the effort to attain that eviction. Mao has become more contemptuous of the opinion and political goodwill of member countries, as witness his demand of March 1965 that "a new organization" should be established. Chen Yi's ludicrous demands of 29 September
1965 for the UN to submit to various forms of self-disparagement and Chou En-lai's reiteration of the idea of "a new, revolutionary UN" on 24 June 1967 indicate that intelligent foreign policy aides have been impelled to work within the confines of a self-defeating policy. If Mao, in his lifetime, were to succeed in expelling the Nationalists from all UN bodies, the victory would be less a product of diplomatic skill than an expression of the view of some national leaders that it is good policy to mollify the Chinese dictator by handing to him gratis China's UN seat.

Chou En-lai has performed brilliantly in the long-term effort to displace the representatives of Taipei in various countries and establish Peking's missions. At an earlier time, temporary flexibility had been tolerated (and even encouraged) by Mao in order to initiate official activities with countries which also maintained diplomatic relations with the Chinese Nationalists. In Laos (1962) and France (1964), tactical "two Chinas" situations developed. But Mao would not permit these to become permanent. Mao has permitted only the UK to maintain a charge in Peking while an official representative, a consul, is accredited to the "provincial" Taiwan government. The successive steps in the effort to induce De Gaulle to make the final move to break relations with Taipei (January 1964) suggest that Chou was acting within a guideline from Mao. This guideline permitted him to remove France from the doctrinal category of a colonial power. Mao participated in the effort, and centered his attention in 1964 on De Gaulle's anti-American obsession. Toward the conclusion of the successful effort, Mao established an identity between himself and the French leader as two soldiers, and Mao in January 1964 urged a visiting delegation to ignore "slippery' diplomats (so that formal relations could begin). Since that time, De Gaulle's aggressive anti-American attitude has been the principal factor preserving the thin glaze of political restraint in Mao's view of relations with Paris. He apparently hopes that De Gaulle will remove West European countries from close ties with the U.S. and will pull together a second "intermediate zone" of capitalist countries.
China is well aware of British slipperiness, but it will only be when France pulls together Europe, including Britain, and concerts with China and Japan that we will be able to stand up to the American and Soviet empires. Japan is headed in that direction. (Mao's statement to the French National Assembly Delegation visiting the mainland in the spring of 1964)

But Mao's refusal to accept permanent "two Chinas" situations continues to deprive his diplomats of the opportunity to gain recognition for Peking from other capitalist countries and then work to displace Chinese Nationalist representatives from their capitals. Since the beginning of his purge in 1966, Mao's willingness to violate the convention of diplomatic immunity has further hampered the long-term effort to isolate Taipei among the nations. As of August 1967, the number of countries which had diplomatic relations with Peking and Taipei was 47 and 62, respectively. Subsequently, Tunisia (in September) and Indonesia (in October) have suspended relations with Peking.

Japan, unlike France, has been a difficult country to move toward recognition, and in the past decade the prospects for success have been dimmest when Mao's revolutionary compulsion has dominated policy. The policy over the years has run a zigzag course because Mao has permitted Chou to maneuver freely in some periods but only within narrow limits in other periods.

After Mao in the fall of 1955 insisted that the establishment of diplomatic relations "first" was necessary for the solution of smaller concrete issues, he permitted Chou to begin a general step-by-step policy of non-official political contacts and semi-official trade exchanges. However, the boycott on trade with Japan in May 1958 impeded this gradualistic policy. Chou had to use his remarkable dexterity to remain within Mao's hard line while working out a formula for non-governmental trade with "friendly" firms in 1960. This hard line made advances in overall policy toward Tokyo difficult for Chou and for Communists and leftists in Japan. Mao apparently was
defending the self-defeating aspects of this hard line when he warned Japanese visitors in October 1961 that "a tortuous road of struggle" lay ahead of Japanese leftists.

The intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the need to recuperate economically impelled Mao to return to a softer line, permitting Chou to work out a semi-governmental trade relationship in October 1962—the Liao-Takasaki agreement—which facilitated Peking's advance beyond limited trade with "friendly" firms. In 1964, the softer line remained dominant in policy toward Tokyo, and doctrine was partly discarded to clear the way for possible diplomatic recognition of the Peking regime. Chou in May transgressed doctrine to blur the line between Japanese businessmen and big capitalists, and Mao himself in July included them in his anti-American camp: "I cannot believe at all that Japanese monopoly capital would lean forever toward US imperialism." However, the Chinese leaders failed in this effort to cultivate a wider spectrum of Japanese opinion to press Tokyo to follow De Gaulle's example, and when, in November 1964, Prime Minister Sato upset their calculations by acting more openly against Peking than former Prime Minister Ikeda had acted, Chou and Chen Yi were impelled to attack the new government and to impose an unprecedently hard line.

This new line became increasingly crude in mid-1965, and Peking's hectoring statements included vague (but unmistakable) military threats against Tokyo for supporting the U.S. effort in Vietnam. The primary reason for this unprecedented political cudgeling of Tokyo was implied in Liao Cheng-chih's complaint of 24 December 1965: Sato is not willing to be the "De Gaulle of Japan." Peking's attacks took on the aspect of a series of ultimatums to Sato to comply with Mao's view on a wide range of international issues, the intention being to supply pro-Peking Japanese (and businessmen who desired mainland business) with a reason to press Tokyo to modify its China policy.

Mao's line had been changed from a gradual step-by-step approach to an all-out political attack. More
Importantly, it was shifted to the left as Mao rejected former allies, including the JCP, which would not associate itself with his view of Moscow or with his unrealistic plan for the revolution in Japan. Liu Shao-chi emerged most prominently as a participant in policy when that policy became increasingly militant. In August 1965, Liu and Chou asked JCP officials to start a "resistance movement" in Japan, reflecting Mao's apparent view that the JCP might resort to violence to assist Peking to prepare for a possible war with the U.S. In November 1965, Mao personally instructed Japanese leftists visiting Peking to mobilize the "youth" and make them play an "important role" in attacking Sato's policies. In March 1966, Liu Shao-chi and other Chinese leaders outlined an even wilder program for the JCP, requesting that the Japanese Communists prepare for "armed struggle."

Mao's personal responsibility for the open split with the JCP, after his meeting with its leaders in late March 1966, indicated once again that, like Stalin, he dominates his chief aides and has the authority to reject their advice whenever irrational caprice seizes his mind.

After discarding the JCP central leadership and supporting only pro-Peking elements among the Japanese Communists, he apparently has insisted that in recruiting new allies in Japan, his officials require that they will be obsequiously pro-Peking and will militantly oppose the government. This shift to the left, partly influenced by his purge on the mainland, has been applied to business firms trading with Peking. More than ever before, trade is being revolutionized and tied openly to political matters. When, therefore, Liao Cheng-chih, who was under attack for being too willing to trade with non-political Japanese businessmen, signed a trade protocol with "friendly" Japanese traders in February 1967, Liao made the protocol a written, formal appeal for an all-out revolutionary "struggle" against the government. The pro-Peking Tokyo Overseas Chinese Association is now used as an indoctrination center for Japanese who want to trade with Peking. However, Peking has stopped short of demanding overthrow of the government (which it has called for in Indonesia and Burma). Japanese officials confirm that Mao's new
revolutionary line, which includes vague military threats against Japan, abuse of some visiting businessmen and newspaper reporters, and a demand that his "thought" be disseminated beyond Overseas Chinese to native Japanese in the country, has provided Tokyo with one of its easiest periods in resisting pressures for recognition of the Peking regime.

Chou En-lai must now work in the narrowest political framework ever in policy toward Tokyo, especially at a time when Mao is training "red diplomatic fighters" who will "never praise the bourgeoisie in an unprincipled way or curry favor with them" (People's Daily editorial of 28 June 1967). Because most Japanese leaders, intellectuals, and businessmen are now undifferentiated members of "the bourgeoisie," the prospect is that Mao's policy of reducing the categories of acceptable allies will further erode pro-Peking sentiment in that country. Trade and non-official contacts will take place against the backdrop of political hostility and the effort to attain formal diplomatic relations will be handled by Peking-controlled leftists (excluding most members of the Japan-est Communist party), who will also work to establish a base for future revolution in Japan.
Mao's foreign policy in the past decade has reflected his obsession with a few basic concepts, the most fundamental being enmity for the U.S. This obsession caused him to direct Peking's entire foreign policy strategy, prior to the intensification of his dispute with the post-Stalinist Soviet leaders, against Washington:

In our international struggle, our strategic policy is to unite all the forces which can be united and to point the tip of our sword at U.S. imperialism. This is the whole and also the core of our strategy. All our work should evolve around this general strategy. (PRC Foreign Ministry Review document of January 1961)

He has had his aides conduct this strategy in such an uncompromising way as to indicate that he is neurotically obsessed with a desire to make advances against this enemy. For many years in the past decade, governments which have been willing to accept a hostile view of Washington, or something close to this view, have been treated as partners in a common cause. Fragments of this attitude remain in the ruins of Mao's foreign policy in 1967.

Mao's policy toward the U.S. had centered on two basic goals, namely, to destroy the Nationalist regime on Taiwan and, as a necessary prerequisite for this, to weaken Washington's determination to defend it. He has failed to attain either, however, and has been forced to accept a less decisive goal, namely, that of reducing Taipei's international prestige.
The Taiwan issue is also an obsession, a vestige of the enmity developed during the civil war.* Mao has even made it the basic reason for rejecting Khrushchev's policy of improving relations with the U.S. On 23 Novem-
ber 1961, he stated privately to a JCP official that

The Soviets advocate peaceful coexistence because they do not have any immediate and pressing problems with the U.S. But China cannot go along with it because she has an immediate and pressing problem with the U.S. --namely, the Taiwan issue.**

Khrushchev's footdragging on this issue since late 1958; and, subsequently, his depiction of Peking as the real culprit in sustaining tensions in the Taiwan Strait has been deeply resented. Maoist Malayans in London reflected this resentment by complaining that

Throughout the course of U.S. imperialist armed occupation of Taiwan, the Tito clique [i.e., the Khrushchev leadership] blames not the U.S. imperialists but the PRC for causing 'tension' in the region. (NCNA's 3 February 1962 broadcast of a Malayan Monitor commentary)

*Mao has drastically shifted his position. In July 1936, he had told Edgar Snow that he favored "independence" for the Taiwanese. When, however, Chiang took refuge on the island in 1949 from the military blows of Communist forces, the destruction of this Nationalist government in exile became a revolutionary compulsion. Peking began to insist on "liberation" as an absolute necessity and obscured the revolutionary compulsion by using a legal and historic argument--i.e., Peking has "rights" to this piece of Chinese territory.

**The PLA Political Department's Work Bulletin of 25 April 1961 had stated Mao's principle as follows: "The USSR cannot adopt our policy towards the U.S., nor can we adopt Soviet policy toward the U.S."
This charge distorted Khrushchev's early record of support, and it concealed the warning he directed toward President Eisenhower in two strong letters in September 1958. Nevertheless, it reflected the change in the nature of Soviet support after the offshore island crisis in the fall of 1958 and after the Sino-Soviet dispute intensified in 1960. The Soviet shift was from propaganda support for the right to acquire Taiwan to propaganda support only for the defense of the mainland. This shift in policy is reflected, on the one hand, in Khrushchev's speech of 30 September 1954—the Chinese Communist desire to "liberate Taiwan...is dear and entirely understandable to the Soviet Union"—and, on the other hand, in his speech of 2 July 1962, which supported only defense of the mainland.* Khrushchev's successors now are silent on the "liberation" aspect and even on defense of the mainland.

By demanding a complete American surrender—i.e., withdrawal of all support from Taipei—Mao has set Peking's policy in a mold of inflexibility, closing off all avenues for an improvement in relations with Washington. His seizure of some, and probes against other, offshore islands have been initiatives which strengthened rather than weakened Washington's determination to support the Nationalists. An account of his initiatives may give precision to an understanding of Chou En-lai's maneuvering within an inflexible policy. And Chou's brilliant maneuvering emerges as only a device to conceal Mao's obsessively sustained demand for an American surrender.

*"He who dares attack the PRC will meet with a crushing rebuff from the great Chinese people, the people of the Soviet Union, and the entire socialist camp." (For a discussion of this deterrent statement, see pages 31-32.)
I. Military Conquest of Taiwan Converted to Political Struggle

Mao's obsession with Taiwan-conquest is in fact a distant goal, but he has tried to sustain it as a live issue. Mao was impelled to make seizure of the island a distant goal when President Truman on 27 June 1950 ordered the Seventh Fleet to be used as a blocking force in the Taiwan Strait area. Earlier, in the spring of 1950, Peking's public statements had made seizure of the island a "task" for the same year. Preparations went forward as U.S. statements convinced Mao and his advisers that Washington would not intervene against a PLA attack.* But President Truman's action, triggered by Communist aggression in Korea, surprised Mao; Peking never again publicized a precise timetable for conquest. Postponement of conquest was attributed to a decisive change in the balance of opposing forces, reflecting Mao's respect for the U.S. Seventh Fleet's military capability:

Before 27 June 1950, the problem of liberating Taiwan pitted the strength of the PLA against the Chiang remnants, with the help of the U.S. imperialists in a background position. Since 27 June, the problem...pits the strength of the PLA against the U.S.

*The task was estimated to be extremely difficult even without the presence of U.S. forces and in the situation of a direct military showdown with only Nationalist forces. "I must first of all point out that the liberation of the islands along the southeast coast, especially Taiwan, is an extremely big problem and it will involve the biggest campaign in the history of modern Chinese warfare.... Only when we have fully prepared the material and technical conditions for overcoming these difficulties can we smoothly carry out this tremendous military assignment and thoroughly eradicate the Kuomintang remnants." (General Su Yu's speech to troops of the Third Field Army published in People's China on 16 February 1950)
imperialists, with the KMT bandit remnants moving into the background. (Article in Peking World Knowledge of 7 July 1930)

The Chinese Communists later indicated that the island could have been "liberated 10 years ago if Chiang had been unprotected" (Chen Yi's statement to newsmen in Geneva on 23 July 1962). Given the presence of a U.S. military force which Peking had no capability to destroy without disastrous results to itself, the problem for Mao became political. That is, the U.S. had to be induced or intimidated to withdraw. Only after that event could the problem once again become military.*

*"As soon as the U.S. withdraws its Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait, the problem immediately will be simplified. What is left will be the settling of accounts between the Chinese people and the Chiang traitorous group." (Tientsin Ta Kung Pao editorial of 20 November 1954)

But even if the U.S. were to withdraw from the Strait, Peking would have an extremely difficult military problem in taking Taiwan. When, during an April-May 1963 visit to the mainland, senior Indonesian army officers in General Jani's delegation asked Chinese Communist officials how they would assault Taiwan, in the hypothetical event of an American withdrawal, the Chinese expressed some initial uncertainty. They reportedly stated that they were not sure how much military muscle would remain on the island. They finally stated that the operation would be conducted against Taiwan in two steps. First, large stocks of POL would be accumulated in Fukien Province and then troops would be massed in the same area; jet fighters and bombers would then be moved in to Fukien airfields. This first step would take several months. Second, the assault would begin with action against and occupation of Chinmen and Matsu, and then the attack on Taiwan would follow. The Chinese estimated that this second step would be completed in about two weeks. General Jani and his delegation later commented on the serious POL deficiency on the mainland, which the Chinese acknowledged, and its importance as an impediment to an attack in the near future.
A. Maneuvering Against a Washington-Taipei Treaty (1954)

Mao apparently gave Chou the major role in the political effort to annex Taiwan. Chou stayed within Mao's concept of an obsessively held goal: "The Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan from the grip of the US aggressors and will never relax until they have achieved that end" (Chou's speech of 23 October 1951). Chou later devised an ostensibly flexible formulation, but did not explicitly renounce the use of force against the island. In the spring of 1954, he stated that "the Chinese people are willing to strive for the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means so far as possible," bringing Mao's position closer to the Soviet line on negotiation and coexistence. Even when, in the summer of 1954, the Chinese Communists stepped up their clamor for Taiwan and intensified the military threat to the offshores, Chou tried to maintain two lines simultaneously and declared in August 1954: Peking "must take determined action on the liberation of Taiwan," but also "the achievements of the Geneva conference demonstrate that international disputes can be settled by the peaceful means of negotiation..." In October, he introduced a refinement, stating privately that Taiwan would be seized by an "internal revolt" in conjunction with a PLA invasion.*

Chou tried to prevent the indefinite postponement of conquest from being understood as abandonment of Mao's goal. He insisted on Peking's right to possess all Nationalist-held territory, and in January 1955, he publicly rejected any "so-called cease-fire" with Chiang and reaffirmed that the conquest of Taiwan was an "internal affair in which foreign interference" would not be

*Shortly afterward, the Chinese Communists surfaced the idea of subverting the Nationalists without a concomittant invasion. This line did not apply to prospective military operations against the offshores, however.
tolerated. In the same month, during a conversation with a diplomatic intermediary, he insisted that Peking would not agree to any "bargain" over the offshores, and that an easing of tension in the area could be attained only by a U.S. withdrawal.

The Chinese Communists, in one important period, used limited military measures to try to prevent a military alliance from being formalized between the U.S. and the Nationalists. In July 1954, a Washington-Taipei mutual security treaty was under consideration. Following the Geneva conference settlement on Indochina, the Chinese Communists increased their forces on the coast opposite Taiwan and sharply increased their shelling of Chinmen on 3 September, calculating that this tension would impel Western and Asian governments to press Washington to withdraw its protection of the Nationalists, or at least decide against making a treaty with them. But Peking's limited military actions (shelling) stimulated, rather than deterred, Washington to act formally to conclude the mutual security treaty, agreement on which was announced on 1 December 1954. Failure to prevent the conclusion of the treaty led to resumed shelling of the offshores and further military preparations on the East China coast. The Chinese Communists apparently decided to accept a slightly greater risk by taking some other form of limited military action in the hope of spiking the internationally held view that the treaty had stabilized the status of Taiwan as a second, and safely protected, China.

As the PLA prepared to attack the Tachen Islands, Chinese Communist spokesmen exploited the deterrent value of the Sino-Soviet treaty of February 1950, declaring that "we are firmly linked with our great friend, the USSR, in an unbreakable alliance which stands for peace but which commands such strength as to spell doom for anyone who tries to violate our rights or borders" (Madame Sun
Yat-sen speech of 28 December 1954).* PLA units took I Chiang Shan on 18 January 1955 and forced the Nationalists to withdraw from the other Tachen Islands. This action (which included the use of Communist tactical airstrikes) reduced Nationalist holdings to the island complexes of the Matsus and Chinmen. Politically, it rebuffed Western efforts to ease tension and attain a cease-fire. Peking kept alive the political issue of Taiwan by claiming that the Tachens had become "stepping stones" to the large island. Sporadic artillery duels with the defenders of Chinmen continued, the political intention being to remind the world that Mao would not accept the continued existence of his revolutionary war enemy in the Strait area indefinitely and would not accept any compromise formula to ease tension which did not recognize his "right" to seize the island.

But once again, the Chinese Communists had entered on a course which strengthened rather than weakened the U.S. commitment to Taipei. President Eisenhower asked Congress for authority—which was granted on 28 January 1955—to employ U.S. forces in the Strait to defend Taiwan and "related positions"—i.e., the offshores. The Communist leaders' anxiety almost certainly was increased by U.S. statements regarding the possible use of atomic weapons in the Far East.** Mao's spokesmen invoked the

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*Madame Sun referred several times to the treaty's anniversary date as "almost" arrived, suggesting Peking's intention to exploit its deterrent value at least two months before its fifth anniversary at a time of crucial need.

**Reflecting considerable concern, the Chinese Communists picked up and cited Admiral Radford's statement of 2 January 1955 that the U.S. would use atomic weapons if the Korean war were resumed and that the use of these weapons in other parts of the Far East would depend on the actual situation. They interpreted it to be a U.S. threat intended to deter further PLA operations against the Nationalists. Chou En-lai directly attacked the U.S. for "brandishing atomic weapons" (statement of 24 January 1955), but he probably was a leading proponent of caution in advising Mao to settle, at least temporarily, for the Tachens and to avoid further island seizures.
the Soviet atomic deterrent more openly and fully than ever before:

We thank the Government of the Soviet Union. In his speech at the session of the Supreme Soviet on 9 February, Marshal N.A. Bulganin stated clearly that 'in this noble cause [to liberate Taiwan] the Chinese people can count on the help of their true friend, the great Soviet people.'

The American generals and atomaniacs... should understand that blackmail with atomic weapons frightens no one but themselves. The production of these weapons has long ceased to be a monopoly of the U.S. They cannot be used without consideration of the retaliation this will incur.

The USSR and China are vast in size and the density of their population is not very great. But the U.S., Britain, and France are in a different situation. In the U.S. the industrial areas are primarily in the north and 65 percent of its industry is concentrated in areas totalling 9 percent of its whole expanse. Thus the American maniacs may well become the first victims of their own policy of atomic blackmail....

Here we must express our sincere thanks especially to our great ally, the USSR.

The USSR, our great ally, is the strongest bulwark of peace. The superiority of her socialist system and the unity and concerted efforts of her people not only provided the Soviet Union with atomic and hydrogen weapons, which checked the adventurist, unscrupulous tendencies of the atomaniacs, but also resulted in the completion of an atomic power plant on July 1, 1954. (Kuo Mo-jo's speech of 12 February 1955) (emphasis supplied)
Mao himself, in an unprecedented speech stressing Sino-Soviet "cooperation" at five points on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the treaty, utilized the Soviet deterrent to imply that Moscow was committed to fight with Peking "should the imperialists start a war" (speech of 14 February 1955).* Behind this screen of deterrent statements, which came more from Chinese than from Soviet leaders, Mao retreated from the risk of a possible Sino-American military clash to the safer ground of political maneuver.

The Soviet leaders in early 1955 were even more anxious than Mao to move the Taiwan issue away from limited military and toward political forms of action, unwilling to become involved in any military venture in which Chinese interests were paramount, and Soviet interests were only marginal. Bilateral talks initiated by the British ambassador in Moscow, Molotov on 28 and 31 January 1955 expressed "alarm" over the offshore island operations and directed the Soviet delegate at the UN to propose the Taiwan item for Security Council discussion. He apparently had not attained Peking's concurrence. On the contrary, the Chinese in effect rejected this Soviet initiative by rejecting a Security Council invitation to participate in discussion of the New Zealand ceasefire resolution on 3 February. On 4 February, Molotov, reversing his position of the previous week, proposed to the British ambassador a form preferred by the Chinese Communists, namely, a 10-power conference (the Big Four, Communist China, and the Five Colombo powers), thereby by-passing the UN (and the Nationalist delegate there) and elevating Peking to the status of a major power. The concept of negotiations increased in importance as Mao retreated from the risk of a military clash.

*On the same day, one regime spokesman was even more explicit in underscoring the "special significance today" of the Sino-Soviet treaty "at a time when the U.S. is openly interfering in China's internal affairs by encroaching on her territory of Taiwan."
B. Sino-US. Talks: Stress on Political Maneuver (1955-57)

The result of Mao's retreat was to be Sino-American talks begun in the summer of 1955, but the Chinese leader remained obsessed with his view of Peking's "right" to use force in the future. Prior to the start of those talks, Chou En-lai had made it clear that the only topic for discussion would be an international one—i.e., tension created by the U.S. "occupation" of Chinese territory—and not a domestic one—i.e., a Communist-Nationalist cease-fire. Peking's "right" to seize Taiwan was a domestic matter which could not be debated. Chou set forth this position at Bundung in April 1955 and later made Peking's formal definitive statement on Taiwan and the American role. In his report to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) on 13 May 1955, Chou stated that

Taiwan is China's territory, the people living in Taiwan are Chinese people, and the liberation of Taiwan by the Chinese people is China's domestic affair. The U.S. occupation of Taiwan has created tension in the Taiwan area, and this constitutes an international issue between China and the U.S. The two questions cannot be mixed up.

There is no war between China and the U.S., so the question of a so-called ceasefire does not arise. The Chinese people are friendly with the American people. The Chinese people do not want to have a war with the U.S. To ease tension in the Taiwan area, the Chinese government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the U.S. government.

As to the form of negotiations, the Chinese government supports the Soviet proposal for a 10-power conference and is also willing
to consider other forms. However, no negotia-
tions should in the slightest degree affect the Chinese people's exercise of their sovereign rights—their just demand and action to liberate Taiwan. At the same time, the Chinese government can at no time agree to participation by the Chiang Kai- shek clique in any international confer-
ence.

The Chinese people have two possible means of liberating Taiwan—namely, by war or peaceful means. The Chinese people are willing to strive for the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means so far as this is possible. (emphasis supplied)

This position meant that Peking would agree to talk about inducing the U.S. to withdraw ("ease tension") but would not negotiate a cease-fire or a renunciation of the use of force against the Nationalists on Taiwan. In order to avoid international criticism for not suppressing his desire to conquer the island, Mao tried to gain credit for a willingness to talk about (rather than take) Taiwan, remaining silent on the decisive fact that Peking had already conceded his forces could not take it. This was a sophisticated line which probably reflected, in part, Chou's thinking and advice.

At that time, Mao showed sufficient moderation and good sense to permit Chou to gain credit among Asian neutrals for advancing a flexible and "reasonable" policy and to depict Washington as the inflexible party. It is a tribute to the diplomatic skill of Chou that he succeeded in convincing many Asians (and some influential men in the West) that Peking was moderate (without having jettisoned Mao's obsessively held goal). Whenever Mao has permitted Chou some leeway to maneuver, the Chinese premier has proven to be the most effective opponent of U.S. policy in the Chinese leadership.
Chou's task was to move Sino-U.S. talks from the consular to the ambassadorial level, and finally to the foreign minister level. The U.S. was to accept this political ascent, or appear to much of the world to be unreasonable in refusing. Chou used a conciliatory line on detained nationals to induce the U.S. to move negotiations to a higher level. By the start of the talks (1 August 1955), of 51 Americans known to have been held on the mainland, 10 were released; by mid-January 1956, 28 more were freed as a result of the agreement reached in mid-September 1955. Chou had said that "first of all" the ambassadorial level talks would reach such an agreement, but as negotiations bogged down on the major issue of renunciation of force, some Americans were retained as hostages to induce Washington to raise the level of the talks, or at least to sustain them.* [In October 1956, Mao is said to have told Japanese visitors that he would be willing to visit the U.S. if invited and Chou is said to have told the Japanese that he was eager for talks with the Secretary of State.] Peking declared publicly on 18 January 1956 that "it is obvious that only through a Sino-American conference of foreign ministers will it be possible to settle the question of relaxation and elimination of tension in the Taiwan area." Chou was aware that such a conference would greatly exacerbate Washington-Taipei relations and induce other governments to move toward formal recognition of the Peking regime.

Chou's position on the renunciation of force was slippery. In his speech of 30 July 1955, his formulation left him free to renounce force without modifying his previous position. That is, he was free to renounce force under a clever formulation which would permit him to demand an American withdrawal but would not oblige the

*"Let's face the facts," one high Chinese Communist foreign ministry official told an American in 1957. "Suppose we release your people today. What guarantees are there that you won't immediately break off the talks which the two governments are having in Geneva?"
Communists to desist from attacking Taiwan if military force were necessary.

...there are two possible ways for the Chinese people to liberate Taiwan, namely, by war or by peaceful means. Conditions permitting, the Chinese people are prepared to seek the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means. In the course of the liberation by the Chinese people of the mainland and the coastal islands, there was no lack of precedents for peaceful liberation. Provided that the U.S. does not interfere with China's internal affairs, the possibility of peaceful liberation of Taiwan will continue to increase. (emphasis supplied)

Chou went on to hint of circumventing the U.S., expressing a willingness to begin negotiations with "the responsible local authorities of Taiwan..." This suggested negotiations below the level of Chiang.* However, after several months of discussions at Geneva of the concept of renunciation of force, the Chinese Communists declared (on 18 January 1956) that they "absolutely cannot accept" any formula which would permit the U.S. to defend Taiwan against attack.

To sum up, "negotiations" was conceived by Mao and Chou as a procedure to improve Peking's chances of attaining international recognition and a withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan. Following such a withdrawal, "negotiations" would be attempted with the Nationalists

*In 1959, this level was raised to include Chiang and/or his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who in fact received several Chinese Communist bids to defect or "negotiate." Chiang himself was promised a place in the central or "local" (Taiwan) government in the course of several facetious statements made by Chou and his aides, and later, in September 1964, by Mao himself.
who, being undefended, would have the choice of simple surrender or surrender after a major military assault from the mainland. By no means would 'negotiations' be permitted to freeze a "two Chinas" status: "It should be made clear that these would be negotiations between the central government and local authorities. The Chinese people are firmly opposed to any ideas or plots of the so-called "two Chinas."" (Chou's speech of 30 July 1955)

C. Sino-U.S. Talks Interrupted: Stress on Military Pressure (1958)

Sino-American talks moved into a complete stalemate, and were interrupted in December 1957, when Ambassador Johnson was transferred to Bangkok. Mao refused to accept further talks between Peking's ambassador and a U.S. representative of lower rank.* Major internal developments had impelled him to return to hardline Stalinist policies by early 1958, and he began to dispute with Khrushchev, demanding a more aggressive global strategy for the bloc against the U.S. During discussions with Khrushchev in Moscow in November 1957, Mao apparently recognized that the Soviet ICBM and earth-satellite successes could be exploited to make the Soviet deterrent apply to an interdiction effort against the offshores. On 23 August 1958, the Chinese began their interdiction effort against the Chinmen and Matsu island

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*In the first years of the Sino-American ambassadorial meetings, the Chinese often proposed that they be raised to the foreign minister's level (in order to suggest at least partial U.S. recognition of Peking). But during the temporary suspension of these talks (December 1957 to September 1958), the Chinese denied that they had ever desired acceptance: "The Chinese people...have never been concerned about U.S. 'recognition.'" (People's Daily editorial of 18 August 1958) Mao's anti-U.S. obsession had deepened in the interval.
complexes, and on 1 September, Chou, trying to frighten neutrals into demanding a U.S. retreat, insisted to the Indonesian ambassador that the PLA would take both complexes by invasion. But Secretary Dulles' speech of 4 September, in which he implied that the U.S. would regard an attack on Chinmen as preparation for an attack on Taiwan and therefore a reason for war, convinced Mao and Chou that the U.S. commitment to Chiang was solid. In their apparent view, it became necessary to convey to Washington a sign that Peking was willing to avoid a direct clash with U.S. military forces. But, short of that, Mao had PLA artillery keep the pressure on the Chinmen garrison, and he had his diplomats retain the atmosphere of war crisis, the latter being a form of international pressure on the U.S.

In order to avoid a direct Sino-U.S. clash, the Communists officially declared (on 4 September) that Peking's territorial waters extend 12 miles from a base line drawn to include all coastal islands. The intention was to deter the Seventh Fleet from convoying Nationalist resupply vessels to the island garrisons. The 4 September declaration warned the U.S. that "no airplane or military vessel of any foreign country" shall "enter the territorial waters of China or the skies above" without Peking's permission. Mao and his aides also required a Soviet statement to keep the U.S. from supporting a Nationalist counterattack and attained this from Khrushchev when the American convoying activity began on 7 September.

In order to continue pressure on Chinmen and the Matsus, Chou En-lai, in agreeing on 6 September to a resumption of ambassadorial-level talks with the U.S.--reaffirmed Peking's "absolute right" to take the "necessary military action" against Nationalist forces on the offshores (even after the talks began). Artillery fire was sustained, hampering the Nationalist resupply effort--the necessary pressure preparatory to the 15 September Sino-American meeting.

In order to retain a tense atmosphere of war crisis, Chinese Communist statements claimed that convoying activity
by American forces would place the U.S. in a "most precarious situation involving direct armed conflict with China at any moment" (People’s Daily editorial of 9 September).* Privately, they warned worried neutrals that Peking had decided to put Nationalist forces on Chinmen and the Matsus "out of action" and that "war" depended on the U.S. reaction to this.

Careful to control the risk of a clash with the U.S., the Chinese Communists used the leeway they had to continue military pressure on the Nationalist garrisons and psychological pressure on Washington. They clearly intended to use the general international atmosphere of apprehension to try to force a U.S.-supported withdrawal from the offshores. Peking’s propaganda in early, middle, and late September made a distinction between acquiring the offshores immediately and acquiring Taiwan later, the line having been that Chinmen and the Matsus were the "immediate threat" to the mainland while Taiwan was in the category of territory which would be "restored, sooner or later."

Mao’s effort became less risky but was not scrapped after Chou (on 6 September) had agreed to negotiations. On the contrary, the Warsaw talks became the venue for trying to attain an American surrender. As the day (15 September) when Sino-American talks would begin moved closer, the Communists sustained their artillery interdiction effort against Nationalist re-supply vessels and the island garrisons. Mao apparently still viewed the

*Convoying of Nationalist resupply vessels by U.S. Navy ships, which began on 7 September, had impelled the Chinese Communists to be more careful about provoking U.S. retaliation, but convoying did not make them back away from the interdiction effort. Shelling of Chinmen was stopped for one day, but was resumed on the following day, targeted against Nationalist re-supply vessels within the three-mile area not covered by the U.S. convoying operation.
situation as containing a small degree of risk, particularly after American convoying activity began on 7 September, and he may have asked for a Soviet statement of warning to Washington. In his first letter to President Eisenhower, Khrushchev on the 7th warned the U.S. against direct involvement which would lead to an American attack on the mainland: "An attack on the PRC...is an attack on the Soviet Union." The Chinese Communists exploited this statement extensively. American naval convoying continued up to the three-mile limit while Nationalist supply vessels dashed for Chinmen's beach, occasionally receiving hits at the offloading area. The bombardment of Chinmen during a re-supply effort on 11 September was one of the most intense delivered during the crisis, the intention being interdiction while, on the same day, the U.S. was given Peking's "fourth warning" against convoying in mainland-claimed waters. Heavy and accurate artillery fire harassed Nationalist re-supply vessels on 13 and 14 September, and Mao apparently still believed that the U.S. might be induced in the Sino-American talks at Warsaw to apply pressure to Chiang for a withdrawal.

Accommodation to Mao's demand was in effect the line advanced by Chou En-lai to worried neutrals after Wang Ping-nan on 15 September had probed Washington's willingness to retreat. Chou told the Indian ambassador that Peking can accept nothing less than the evacuation of the offshores as a condition for ending the crisis and, in line with the Chinese Communist emphasis on the "immediate threat" from the offshores, Chou stated that his government would be willing to consider Taiwan as a "separate issue," subject to negotiation after settlement of the immediate offshore island situation, or after an interval of perhaps "five years." Wang Ping-nan at Warsaw reiterated Peking's refusal to agree to a cease-fire, the calculation being that this should be reserved as the price for a Nationalist withdrawal.

Further pressure was required as well as a statement warning against a major American military action, and this was supplied by Khrushchev in his letter of 19 September to President Eisenhower. The Chinese Communists
had already extensively exploited Khrushchev's first warning that an attack on the mainland was an attack on the USSR and they went on to deny that Washington could impel Peking to back away from its effort by means of "atomic blackmail." Regarding his warning of the 19th--namely, that an atomic or hydrogen weapons attack on China would trigger "at once" a rebuff "by the same means" and "May no one doubt that we shall completely honor our commitments" under the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty--they used it as psychological-political support for their interdiction effort, warning the U.S. of retaliation "as Comrade Khrushchev" said in his letter. The People's Daily editorial of 21 September asserted that Chimen and the Matsus are "situated in China's inland sea" and that attacks against Chimen were part of a "civil war," implying that the U.S. should discontinue convoying activity. It distinguished between the immediate issue of the offshores and the long-range goal of seizing Taiwan. Khrushchev's letter of the 19th had been intended not only to deter a possible U.S. attack if a clash occurred, but also to bolster Peking's demand for a U.S. concession. It tried to convey the impression that accommodation to Peking's demand provided the only alternative to a major clash--the U.S. must withdraw its forces from the area, and if such action were not taken, Peking "will have no other recourse but to expel the hostile armed forces from its own territory."

There was a real possibility that the Nationalists would attack mainland artillery emplacements with air-strikes, and the Communists noted that Chiang and his lieutenants were trying to convince U.S. officials of this necessity in mid-September. Peking viewed this prospect as leading to eventual American involvement in, or support of, the air-strikes. Khrushchev's warning, therefore, while specifying only U.S. military action against the mainland, was also intended to impel Washington to restrain Chiang from expanding the scope of hostilities. Moreover, the continuation of U.S. naval convoying activity and night air cover had confronted Mao with a military challenge he had been unwilling to meet with direct action, and the political-psychological fiction he had created of the American "paper tiger" was being exposed as just that--a fiction intended to conceal Peking's real military
inferiority and American superiority. Incongruously, the Chinese Communists leaned heavily on Khrushchev's deterrent statements to dispel the idea of their relative military weakness, and it is unlikely that they would have so conceded their reliance on Moscow if they had not been worried about a possible U.S.-Nationalist attack.

Despite the increasing success of the Nationalists in resupplying their garrisons in late September, the Chinese Communists apparently hoped that temporary compliance with the U.S. request for a cease-fire might get them the islands. Defense Minister Peng Te-huai issued a seven-day cease-fire order (on 6 October and extended on 12 October) and ambassador Liu Hsiao told the Norwegian ambassador in Moscow on 7 October that Peking was ready to shelve its claim to Taiwan temporarily if it could gain its "main objective"--a Nationalist withdrawal--and looked for "satisfactory results" at Warsaw. Militarily, Peng's order was intended to disengage the U.S. from any active support of the Nationalist garrisons. Cessation of the shelling on condition that the U.S. discontinue convoying activity provided a convenient way for Peking to further reduce the risk of a Sino-American clash. On 8 October, Peking issued its 24th "serious warning" against U.S. naval and air "intrusions."

However, Washington's determination to support Nationalist garrisons (despite Khrushchev's letter) and a new move by Asian and African neutrals to debate the situation in the UN apparently convinced Mao that the interdiction effort not only had failed, but had created a new problem. This new problem was the appearance of neutral-initiated proposals for a "two Chinas" settlement, using Peking's own distinction between the offshores and Taiwan as two separate issues. Chou En-lai and Chen Yi were given the task of keeping the issue out of the UN, insisting that Sino-American bilateral talks required no mediation by third parties.

As the Chinese Communists retreated, they returned to their pre-September 1958 position, blurring the distinction between the long-range demand to acquire Taiwan and the "immediate" demand to get the offshores. By early
October, Taiwan and the offshores were wrapped together in an undifferentiated package, the message to neutrals being that the large island could not be separated from the offshore island issue and considered as a second China.* Khrushchev, aware of the retreat and the beginning of the end of Mao's effort, tried to dissociate Moscow from the charge of intervention, making (in a speech on 5 October) his most explicit statement on the precise nature of the Soviet commitment. He had viewed the crisis as a "civil war," he said, and had committed the USSR only to defense of the mainland: "The USSR will come to the help of China if the latter is attacked from without; speaking more concretely, if the U.S. attacks China." By implication, he was also saying that American "interference" had not constituted a sufficient provocation to trigger his commitment of defense.

Nevertheless, the Chinese Communist leaders had viewed his September letters of deterrence as important and necessary, and on 15 October, Radio Moscow broadcast the text of a letter signed by Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, and Chou En-lai to Khrushchev and Voroshilov. Dated 10

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*This concept of an undifferentiated offshores-Taiwan package was also used by Mao to justify his retreat from the effort to interdict the offshores. He told leaders of various Latin American Communist parties in an interview on 3 March 1959 that "You know of the events of last year. On the island of Chinmen there are only 80,000 people, and it is now known to the world that the U.S. does not object to returning the islands of Chinmen and Matsu to us, but in exchange they want to keep Taiwan for themselves. This would be a disadvantageous deal. It will be better if we wait. Let Chiang Kai-shek stay on Chinmen and Matsu and we will get them back later together with the Pescadores Islands and Taiwan. We have a vast territory and we can live for the time being without these islands." (Interview extracts reprinted in Izvestiya of 18 June 1959 as taken from article by Costa Rican Communist leader Eduard Moro Valverde) (emphasis supplied)
October, the letter expressed official gratitude for Soviet support and, specifically, for the statement by Khrushchev that "an attack against China was an attack against the Soviet Union." The letter referred to "U.S. military provocations" and suggested that Khrushchev's statement had been "very effective" in "forcing the aggressors to think hard about their fate." When, therefore, during intense Sino-Soviet polemics in the fall of 1963, the Chinese leaders sarcastically stated that in 1958 there was no possibility that a nuclear war would break out and "no need for the Soviet Union to support China with its nuclear weapons," they omitted their use of Khrushchev's statements to try (1) to deter the U.S. from convoysing activity and (2) to warn the U.S. to restrain Chiang from initiating airstrikes against mainland artillery emplacements.* The Chinese leaders also remained silent on their quick action to extensively exploit Khrushchev's letters, particularly at a time when they were still demanding a major U.S. concession regarding the offshores.

*The Maoist distortion of events was expressed in Peking's polemical government statement of 1 September 1963: "In August and September of 1958, the situation in the Taiwan Strait was indeed very tense as a result of the aggression and provocations by the U.S. imperialists. The Soviet leaders [Khrushchev] expressed their support for China on 7 and 19 September respectively. Although at that time the situation in the Taiwan Strait was tense, there was no possibility that a nuclear war would break out and no need for the Soviet Union to support China with its nuclear weapons. It was only when they were clear that this was the situation that the Soviet leaders expressed their support for China." This version failed to mention the fact that the interdiction effort was sustained, and on some days intensified, after Khrushchev's letter of the 7th, that the Chinese Communists were not absolutely certain of immunity from Nationalist counteraction, and that Khrushchev had made the strongest and most explicit commitment to defense of the mainland ever articulated by a Soviet leader.
Mao's hope for a U.S. surrender further declined when the cease-fire orders of 6 and 12 October "to see what the opposite side was going to do" at Warsaw (quote from Peng Te-huai's shelling-halt order of the 12th) resulted only in sustained U.S. support for Chiang's desire to hold the offshores. Peking began to complain that the U.S. and Nationalist China were playing "a duet," with the U.S. expressing its desire to "reduce the Chiang army on Chinmen and the Matsus," while the Nationalists re-emphasized the importance of maintaining troops on these islands (People's Daily editorial of 21 October 1958). Moreover, the Nationalists were claiming that the two cease-fire orders represented a "victory" for them. The Chinese Communists changed course temporarily to try to demonstrate that Peking was not acting from weakness (Peng Te-huai ordered resumption of shelling on the 20th), but then reduced the entire situation to a low-boil with an announcement on the 26th (clarifying Peng Te-huai's limited-shelling order of the 25th) to the effect that Chinmen would not be shelled "on even dates" on the calendar. This was a political formulation of Mao's intended to (1) give credence to the claim that the Nationalists on Chinmen could maintain their garrison only by Communist sufferance, (2) retain flexibility to fire or not to fire without appearing to accept U.S. proposals for a de facto cease-fire, and (3) reduce tension in order to avoid the risk of expanded hostilities such as Nationalist counteraction supported by the U.S.

D. The Retreat to Political Struggle (1958-62)

Mao's effort was concluded. The problem became more political than ever before.* As on previous (and

*Mao himself apparently marked out the general line of retreat by describing the matter as political and by pretending to be merely reducing the level of shelling (rather than retreating), as witness his egregious concept of shelling on odd days of the calendar. The guideline determined by Chairman Mao last fall [i.e., (footnote continued on page 24)
later) occasions, Chou was assigned the task of minimizing the true scope of Mao's failure, which he tried to do at a hastily convened meeting of CCP propaganda officials in November 1958, establishing a new line by using the retreat half of Mao's dialectical formulation that the U.S. as a "paper tiger," should be disparaged strategically, "but taken into account tactically." Only privately would they admit their failure. Peking's military attache in East Berlin, in a private remark on 15 October, conceded that "We miscalculated in believing that the U.S. would not defend the offshores and thought several weeks of bombardment would force Chiang to withdraw under American pressure."

To conceal the extent of their loss of initiative, the Chinese Communists sent private letters to Nationalist officials, through a channel in Hong Kong, asking them

(footnote continued from page 23)
1958] regarding the military struggle on the Fukien Front is an outstanding example of military struggle subordinated to political struggle. At first, many foreign military experts simply could not understand our method of fighting. They said that China's method of fighting is unprecedented in military history. They never heard of not shelling on even days, but shelling on odd days and, on no-shelling days, permitting the enemy to replenish ammunition. Later, they came to understand that our war is political war." (General Tu Ping article in New China Semi-Monthly of 10 July 1959) Typically, Mao's formulation became a ritualistic concept and mere mention of an alleged breach of the policy it implied is now considered to be a major offense against Mao's strategic view. When, therefore, Lo Jui-ching was under attack for a whole range of "mistakes," included in the charges was that of a breach of discipline on this matter. Lo, it was claimed, failed to recognize that "the struggle in the Taiwan Strait is not simply a struggle against the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang, but primarily one against U.S. imperialism. It is not simply a military problem, but primarily a political problem." (Peking Combat News article of 30 January 1967)
in various ways to engage in "negotiations" with the Communists—an empty exercise intended to convey the impression that Peking was still exercising some degree of action. According to one report, Chou En-lai told a Hong Kong Communist newspaper editor in mid-October 1958 that "with the passing of time, the Nationalists might come around to the idea of negotiating" a settlement and that Peking did not want to use force to capture Taiwan or to press the Nationalists "too hard," as the reaction would be adverse to Peking's international prestige. The self-serving aspect of Peking's statements during retreat was also indicated by the changes made in the text of the 30 October interview that the free-wheeling Chen Yi had given a Canadian reporter. Before release to the West, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' information department made the following changes:

(1) less emphasis than in the original draft on the idea that Peking was ready to take the Taiwan issue "slowly";

(2) stress on the idea that Taiwan and the off-shores were indissolubly linked and that the future of Chinmen would not be settled until Taiwan was "liberated";

(3) deletion of Chen's statement that if the U.S. fired on the mainland, Peking would retaliate;

(4) toning down of the refusal to renounce the use of force and also of the insistence on Communist China's right to use "all suitable means" to take Taiwan, and

(5) toning down of sharp references to Chiang Kai-shek.

Peking disseminated the view that "real" negotiations with the Nationalists were in progress and that the Communists were merely using a benevolent policy, not retreating. The Chinese Communist ambassador in Cairo told \[\text{told}\] that some elements on Taiwan are in favor of accepting Peking's proposal for direct talks concerning the island; the Generalissimo's
son, Chiang Ching-kuo, reported a Chinese Communist letter to him dated 22 November, offering him control of Taiwan if he would negotiate "reunification" of the island with the mainland. Although Peking in this way had some hope of stimulating suspicions among Nationalist leaders (and between Taipei and Washington) that a sell-out was under secret consideration, the real purpose was to retain an element of prestige for Mao following the failure of his interdiction effort.*

The failure of this effort was for Mao the signal to become more intransigent and to drop the step-by-step approach that had marked the Warsaw talks during the period from August 1955 to December 1957. He and his aides formulated a new line, insisting that no real Peking-Washington discussions (at Warsaw) could be held on small matters—that is, on the release of U.S. prisoners, exchange of newsmen, and visits of prominent Americans—until the basic matter of U.S. withdrawal from the Strait area was first agreed upon. On 9 January 1959, Wang Ping-nan insisted that the talks concentrate on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Strait.** This new line was confirmed in the

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*Mao later (on 11 September 1964) told the French ambassador, with a laugh, that regarding Chiang Kai-shek "We have invited him to come to China, but he always refuses." Mao was referring to the fallback period in late 1958 and early 1959.

**As for the inability of the Communists to take military action—or, Mao's unwillingness to risk such action—the Chinese leaders rationalized this weakness by stating privately that they really wanted to use moderate methods. Mao in February, Chou in May, and Chen Yi in October 1959 privately stated that Peking's real policy was to hope for "peaceful liberation"—that is, an internal Taiwanese rebellion, a sell-out by some Nationalist leaders, or even a U.S. political surrender. Events in the fall of 1958 in the Strait had significantly reduced the credibility of Peking's earlier threats that it would take the offshores by force.

(footnote continued on page 27)
Foreign Ministry's directive for diplomats which was issued in January 1961:

In the Sino-U.S. talks, we have insisted on a settlement of the Taiwan issue before other discussions can proceed—a reversal of our previous strategy of handling details before the matter of principle.

Chou had had a major role in formulating and implementing the previous strategy. He had depicted the purpose of Sino-American talks to be: "settling the matter of the repatriation of civilians of both sides, and to facilitate further discussions and settlement of certain other practical matters now at issue between both sides" (speech of 30 July 1955).

But in contrast with his gradual and piecemeal approach (1955-1957), Chou told Edgar Snow in October 1960 that Washington must accept the "principle" of withdrawal and that once the principle was agreed upon, the specific steps as to "when and how" withdrawal would take place could be settled later. The principle involved was not

(Footnote continued from page 26)

Another justification for avoiding a new confrontation was the apparent unwillingness of Khrushchev to support one again. Following Khrushchev's visit to Peking in October 1959, Chen Yi told a Japanese visitor (in November 1959) that Khrushchev had strongly requested, during a conversation with him (Chen) that the Chinese Communists should not embark on any new military action in the Taiwan Strait in the coming period. Chen said that the Chinese Communists had given the Soviet leader assurances on the matter, and Chen added (still professing that this was more Khrushchev's idea than Peking's) that they had told the Soviet leader they were patient people and could wait five years, or even ten, for Taiwan because they knew eventually they would have it.
one of diplomatic give-and-take, but rather one of total surrender without compromise. Mao had started on the road to taking even the pretense of flexibility out of the Chinese Communist negotiating position, and Chou had to discard the step-by-step approach.*

E. Fear of Nationalist Attack (1962)

In 1962, disillusionment in the party, PLA, and populace and economic dislocations disturbed the Chinese Communist leaders as they continued to tidy up the mess left by Mao's leap forward and commune policies. Their anxiety was augmented by the appearance of a small threat from India—firefights along the Sino-Indian border in the spring of 1962—and a larger assumed threat from Taiwan, i.e., Nationalist plans for an invasion of the Fukien coast.** They viewed both threats as real and acted on

*Of the few words Mao permitted Edgar Snow to quote from a long interview of October 1960, the following were included in his remarks on policy toward the U.S.: "Taiwan is China's affair. We will insist on this."

**Chiang Kai-shek had in fact planned an increase in small-scale operations against the mainland. On 30 May, he told an American official that he had ordered Nationalist intelligence agencies to make intensive efforts to infiltrate agents onto the mainland. He said that the Nationalists should make repeated infiltration efforts, including numerous small airdrops, regardless of the cost. About a week before the Communists began their buildup in the Foochow Military Region, Chen Yi stated privately (on 29 May) Peking's estimate that Chiang would airdrop some forces in this coastal area.

The Communist leaders apparently were not clear regarding the size of the prospective Nationalist operations, but they adopted the strategy of expecting the worst--namely, big ones.
the view that the larger one could prove disastrous. They tried to deter the anticipated Nationalist invasion by building up a deterrent force in Fukien and by seeking assurances from Washington that Chiang's plan would not be supported by the U.S.

They later stated that they believed Chiang was gearing up for "an invasion" in early April 1962 (Chou En-lai's statement to the Swedish ambassador on 15 September 1962). In early June, they began an air, sea, and land buildup of military forces in the Foochow Military Region opposite Taiwan. At the time, Chou En-lai and Chen Yi expected an attack from the Nationalists and Indians "soon," claiming that both were to be supported by the U.S. They were described as being "rattled and frightened." These men, both callous and with military backgrounds, had never previously been so described. They were looking for aid from another quarter, and stated that Peking was "now" trying to prevent a further deterioration of relations with Moscow. They tried to deter the Nationalists by their buildup and by bluster, warning that an attack would be "suicide" in the face of the "overwhelming superiority of Chinese Communist armed forces" (broadcast to Taiwan of 13 June). The main deterrent effort, however, was directed toward the U.S. reflecting their view that a major attack would require considerable U.S. logistic support.

Washington was urged to prevent Chiang from acting, at first in ambassadorial talks at Warsaw on 15 June, then
in a broadcast of the 23rd, and again in a major speech by Chen Yi on the 25th. Chen declared that if the U.S. persists in using the Nationalists "to impose war" on the Communists, Peking will have "no alternative but to go along with it to the very end." He implied that the Communist buildup in Fukien was defensive in intent: Peking had been trying "to ease tension in the Taiwan area," had been engaged in talks with the U.S. for more than six years, and had been striving to attain "by peaceful means" a U.S. withdrawal from the area.* Despite Washington's initial assurance that the U.S. had no intention of providing Chiang with support (conveyed to the Chinese ambassador in Warsaw privately on 15 June), the Communist leaders were not yet entirely convinced and continued to underscore U.S. responsibility for any invasion (Chen Yi and Tao Chu speeches of 1 July). By late June, they apparently believed that they had a sufficient number of forces in the region to deter an attack or to handle it if it came.

The Chinese Communists, still angered by Khrushchev's anti-Albanian (read, anti-Chinese) performance at the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961, nevertheless implied Soviet support for their cause. No force on earth "can disrupt the great socialist camp" was Chen Yi's

*The Chinese leaders' concern with their internal situation and their fear that the U.S. might move troops from Thailand into Laos while supporting a Nationalist invasion on the mainland impelled them to take an unprecedentedly soft line. In the Wang-Beam talks from March to June 1961, they invited frank, off-the-record discussions and said they wanted a reduction of Sino-American tensions. Through mid-July 1962, they continued to state privately to U.S. officials their desire to reduce tensions, pointing with satisfaction to the settlement in Laos and suggesting that "further understandings" could be attained with the U.S. But regarding a real "improvement" in Sino-American relations, Chen Yi suggested to Malcolm MacDonald in a conversation on 20 July 1962 that it was only the U.S. side which would make the concessions.
way of hinting at international support (speech of 25 June). But the Chinese leaders were not provided with a Soviet deterrent statement until after Washington had assured them of non-involvement in any Chiang invasion. In his speech of 2 July, Khrushchev tried to gain credit in the Communist movement at no real risk to Moscow for support of Peking, while in fact his warning was vague. In sharp contrast to the two letters he sent President Eisenhower in September 1958 regarding Soviet nuclear retaliation, Khrushchev, avoiding use of his old formulation that an attack on the mainland was an attack on the USSR, stated ambiguously that China would be supported by the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc in administering a "crushing rebuff" (unspecified) to any attack on the mainland.* He did not refer to the Sino-Soviet treaty and used another weak locution: "united Communist parties "reliably guarantee each socialist country from encroachments by imperialist reaction." Aware of the absence of a specific Soviet nuclear threat to deter the U.S. and Nationalists, the Chinese Communists nevertheless tried to exploit his statement, giving it front-page coverage in People's Daily on 4 July. The Chinese not only tried to squeeze some deterrent value from Khrushchev's vague statement, but also tried to put the best face on strained Sino-Soviet relations, going so far as to imply praise

*His exact words were: "He who dares attack the PRC will meet with a crushing rebuff from the great Chinese people, the peoples of the Soviet Union, and the entire socialist camp." Khrushchev's failure to mention the U.S. as the attacking party or as the ally supporting the prospective attackers contrasted sharply with the practice of the Chinese leaders in specifying the U.S.: "I must warn the U.S. government again that any military adventure undertaken by the Chiang gang, regardless of when it starts and on what scale, would be a responsibility of the U.S. government" (Chen Yi speech of 12 July). In Khrushchev's letters to President Eisenhower in September 1958, there was no blurring of the reference to the U.S. as the prime target of hypothetical Soviet counteraction.
for Khrushchev—an unprecedented action after the behind-the-scenes showdowns in June and November 1960 and the polemics at conferences in 1961 and 1962. Mao Tun, the Chinese delegate to the Moscow World Peace Congress, was quoted in Pravda on 8 July as saying that the Chinese people had received Khrushchev's speech "with great joy" and "are grateful to the Soviet people for their aid." Mao Tun represented Khrushchev as stating that the USSR is ready, if necessary, to come to the assistance of the Chinese people" and went on to warn that "The war gamblers will have to think twice after Nikita Khrushchev's speech." Peking's "joy" in receiving Khrushchev's speech was a line so contradictory to the internal Chinese line on Khrushchev that it was not carried in any Chinese Communist media. Mao Tun went on to pledge, by way of a reciprocal friendly action, "close cooperation" of his delegation with the Soviets at the Moscow World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace, although the Chinese had attacked Soviet disarmament policy earlier (in December 1961 at Stockholm). In a statement at that time unprecedented in Pravda, Mao Tun openly referred to "alleged differences between China and the USSR," implying falsely the existence of a working alliance. (This same delegation leader earlier had led a Chinese group in a clash with Soviet delegates over disarmament in Cairo at the Afro-Asian Writers Conference in February 1962.)

Never again were the Chinese leaders to profess such goodwill to Khrushchev, as the mutual bond between Mao and Khrushchev continued to deteriorate into a relationship of inveterate hatred. July 1962 was the last time Mao permitted a degree of flexibility to be used in relations with him, the final favorable reference to him having been made by Chen Yi, who quoted Khrushchev on a "crushing rebuff," mentioning him by name—a reference, however, which was carried only to international audiences but not in the domestic version of Chen's 12 July speech.

By that time, the Chinese leaders were resting somewhat easier and did not view an attack as imminent. Chiang Kai-shek had been strongly impressed by the major buildup in Fukien, and by mid-July, the Nationalists were moving at a slower pace in preparing operations. A cabinet member
told U.S. officials that Taipei's position was that any "counterattack" on the mainland would be in response to a Communist military initiative. Chen Yi implied a lesser degree of concern when he mentioned U.S. responsibility for any Nationalist attack, whether it takes place "sooner or later," or on "a big of small scale" (speech of 12 July); in mid-July he told newsmen at Geneva that if the U.S. "restrains" Chiang, "a dangerous situation" will not develop, although "sporadic shelling will take place in the accustomed [low-level] way;" on 23 July, despite obvious Soviet ambiguity on the USSR's military alliance with China, he stated: "We can have differences with the Russians, but we are both Communist and if someone tries to touch one of us, we will stand together."*

It was in this general defensive context that Peking made private statements resembling a renunciation of the use of force in the Taiwan area.** However, at the 15 June Sino-American ambassadorial talks, Wang Ping-nan had stated that Peking would not (meaning not now)

*A Soviet official told a diplomat on 29 June that the USSR does not have a commitment to defend the mainland if U.S. forces were not involved. He pointed out that unlike the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet-North Korean treaty of 1961, which commit the USSR to act if any third power attacked the countries concerned, the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 is directed against Japan or an ally of Japan (i.e., the U.S.)--the implication being that although Peking was tying the U.S. with the Nationalists in every mention of a prospective invasion, Moscow was not, and an invasion by Chiang's troops alone would not automatically require Soviet intervention.

**Publicly, Chen sustained the standard position: Peking reserves the right to use force because Taiwan is "an internal Chinese affair and it is Peking's responsibility to determine its future;" the recent military buildup on the mainland "can be, therefore, termed neither defensive nor aggressive." (Press conference of 23 July)
press its claims to Nationalist held territory by the use of force and that Peking had not thus far sought a settlement of the Taiwan issue by force, but the "whole situation would change" if the Nationalists attacked. On 20 July, Chen Yi told Malcolm MacDonald that Peking would not attack Chiamen and the Matsus (meaning not now). This amounted to a renunciation of a temporary nature, being somewhat more explicit on not using force than Chou's major formulation of May 1955 (China is "willing to strive for the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means so far as this is possible"), and repeated by him, Mao, and Chen in 1959. It was also in this general context of anxiety that the Chinese leaders for the first time made statements about U.S. policy regarding Taiwan in a vein of qualified approval. Chen Yi told newsmen at Geneva in late July that the U.S. had assured Peking at Warsaw it would not approve or support a Nationalist invasion: China appreciated this gesture "to a certain extent." "It is not bad of them." He later said: this U.S. assurance was "most welcome." (Chen Yi speech of 1 August; this favorable reference to the U.S. was not carried in Peking's domestic broadcast of his speech.)

In short, Mao and his lieutenants were more concerned and uncertain about the regime's security in the summer of 1962 than at any other time in the post-Stalin period. He was impelled to sanction favorable references to Moscow (Khrushchev) and Washington, his two major enemies. This unusual behavior again indicates that Mao's irrationality on the issue of a war to annex Taiwan does not extend to a death wish and that he believes an American nuclear weapons attack against mainland targets would be disastrous and must be prevented by avoiding a direct provocation to U.S. military power in the Far East. And the Maoist position, expressed since the fall of 1958, exclusively in terms of absorbing a hypothetical U.S. invasion by falling back to the interior and conducting guerrilla warfare, is rhetorical "rubbish" (Khrushchev's depiction of it in his speech to the June 1963
CPSU plenum), as it omits his main fear of U.S. nuclear weapons.* Mao has long held, and the PLA has absorbed his view, that the object of war is "the preservation of oneself and the destruction of the enemy" and that the party should fight no engagements—particularly not a "strategic decisive engagement"—in which victory could

*In this speech, Khrushchev reported that Mao had told him (apparently during the July-August 1958 discussions) that in the event of a U.S. attack, the USSR should not intervene. The Chinese, Mao continued, would fight alone and retreat as the Soviets had done when attacked by Germany. According to Khrushchev, Mao was talking "rubbish" in an effort to rebut Marshal Zhukov's assertion that the USSR would defend China. Mao's statement was "rubbish" apparently because he deliberately avoided the real issue of a possible nuclear weapons attack (in which case, the Soviet nuclear deterrent was necessary for the defense of the mainland) and discussed only on a possible U.S. ground invasion (in which case the PLA could handle the purely conventional man-for-man battles).

Mao's strategy—to fight alone and retreat—is relevant only to a situation in which the Chinese Nationalists invade and are not supported by the U.S. nuclear capability. Strategy to meet a purely conventional-forces invasion apparently was discussed in the Chinese leadership in the spring and summer of 1962 during the Chinese Communist buildup for a possible large-scale Nationalist attack. Lo Jui-ching apparently argued for a plan to engage the Nationalists on the Fukien Front beaches—referred to as "blocking the water"—and Liu Shao-chi seems to have supported this view by arguing that "It will be bad if the enemy comes in." (People's Daily article of 7 September 1967 attributes these strategic views to Lo and Liu in order to contrast them with the Mao-Lin strategy of luring the invader in deep and then enveloping his forces.) The probability that some form of argument took place along these lines in 1962.
not be definitely guaranteed.* (Problems of Strategy in the Guerrilla War Against Japan, May 1938)

Mao is still (as in 1958) unprepared and unwilling to venture an assault against the Seventh Fleet, and although the PLA could seize some of the offshores after

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*In On Protracted War (May 1938), Mao laid it down that the CCP's policy for "decisive engagements" should be "to fight resolutely a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle when victory is certain; to avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle when victory is uncertain; and to avoid absolutely a strategic decisive engagement which stakes the destiny of the nation." This and other key passages in Mao's military writings (which are themselves summations of the military thinking of his field commanders, such as Chu Te, Peng Te-huai and Lin Piao) place a high value on caution and reluctance to take big risks. Although it can be argued that involvement in the Korean war was such a major risk, Mao and his lieutenants apparently believed that the U.S. would keep the war limited to the peninsula and would not use its atomic weapons. That is, they calculated, rightly, that the big battles would be fought by conventional armies with World War II tactics, providing them with an advantage in manpower to make up for superior U.S. firepower. Mao did not take a great risk in October 1962 when he unleashed the PLA to sweep Indian units back from their border positions because in that assault the calculation was to make the enemy lose a quick-decision engagement, decisively, before the major powers (the U.S. and the UK) could decide on the best means to help in the remote Himalayan border area.

Reckless ("adventurist") attacks and fighting-without-preparation are two sins constantly criticized by Mao in his military writings. It is part of PLA military doctrine.
absorbing heavy losses, he seems to be unwilling to take the risk of a major U.S. military response against the mainland.

F. Sino-Soviet Differences on "Renunciation of Force" Issue (1954-64)

It has always been a glaring contradiction in Sino-Soviet foreign policy that the Taiwan issue was crucial to Peking's goals but only marginal (or of no importance whatsoever) to Moscow's goals. Even at an early date in the 1950s when relations were friendly, the Soviets were not enthusiastic, at one time expressing understanding and "support...for the liberation of Taiwan" (Khrushchev's speech in Peking on 30 September 1954) while avoiding support for the use of any means to seize the island, merely "recognizing the rights of China to the island" (Bulganin's statement at Geneva on 19 July 1955). The strongest Soviet statements of support, made by Khrushchev in September 1958, had centered on defense of the mainland and may have been solicited (if not demanded) by the Chinese leaders rather than freely given by the Russians. Their primary purpose--namely, to sustain the Sino-Soviet relationship as a meaningful alliance--was no longer compelling after Mao began to attack Khrushchev's policies in 1959-60.

Mao, obsessed with the need to sustain rather than reduce international pressures on Washington, had rejected Khrushchev's temperate policy of 1959. His rejection was converted to hostility when, in October 1959 in Peking, the Soviet leader made a strong plea for compromise, suggesting that the Taiwan issue should be settled by negotiations or shelved. The Chinese subsequently have claimed that in the talks, Khrushchev stated that the issue was "an incendiary factor" on the international scene which could lead to "a great war" because of the conflict between U.S. support for Taipei and Soviet support for Peking. According to their account, he went on to say that
there is more than one way to solve every complicated question, depending on what basis you took. For example, after the October Revolution, there was established in the Soviet Far East the Far Eastern Republic, and Lenin recognized it at the time; this was a temporary concession and sacrifice, but later on it was united with Russia. (Quoted in the Chinese government statement of 1 September 1963)

For Mao, there was only one way (eventual seizure), and to be told that "concession and sacrifice" was another way was tantamount to asking him to accept the Nationalist regime permanently. The Chinese complained that Khrushchev, by taking this stand, in effect had asked them to agree to a "two Chinas" situation. The Soviets did not deny that Khrushchev had raised the Taiwan issue, but they did deny he had suggested a "two Chinas" settlement. Nevertheless, their version--namely, that he merely touched on possible ways to solve the matter, these being not only military, but peaceful, too (Soviet government statement of 21 September 1963)--was an evasion. Khrushchev was aware that a "peaceful" solution necessarily included a pledge to renounce the use of force, that is, to accept the status of Taiwan. The Chinese government statement warned that the CCP "has not forgotten and never will forget" this plan for "two Chinas."

*Accepting the status quo indefinitely had been attacked as a view of "some people" in private Chinese Communist materials prior to publicizing Khrushchev's suzerainty formula in 1963. An internally disseminated PLA publication stated that "Now 'one and a half Chinas' has been suggested, and some people are saying that if half of Taiwan is conceded [to Peking], China may stop there!... 'One and a half Chinas' is in reality a crystallization of the plot of 'two chinas'; it is a cup of poisonous wine, sweet in taste but strong poison, which we can never drink." (Work Bulletin issued by the General Political Department, People's Liberation Army, No. 17, 25 April 1961)

(footnote continued on page 39)
On the other hand, Khrushchev would not forget that he had been dragged into the morass of Mao's Taiwan policy in 1958, and he told Communist delegates at the November 1960 conference that he would not support Peking's "war policy" and that shelling of the offshores had not been necessary. Non-support of the Taiwan issue was one of the many deprivations which Mao suffered as he disputed with the Soviet leader on basic international strategy. In April 1963, Chinese officials stated privately that Khrushchev was unwilling to take the "risks" (unspecified) necessary to help Peking attack Taiwan, the clear implication being that the Soviet deterrent was essential to any Communist effort on a major scale in the Strait. Khrushchev tried to undercut the general basis of Mao's position on his "right" to capture Taiwan; his proposal of 31 December 1963 to heads of states calling for a peaceful settlement of all "territorial" disputes was an implicit rejection of the Chinese leader's refusal to renounce the use of force.* (At the same time, it exposed the

(footnote continued from page 38)

In October 1961, Khrushchev is reported to have told the Indian Communist party delegation to the 22nd CPSU Congress that the Chinese charges against him included the complaint that he had put the Taiwan issue in "cold storage."

*The contrast between Peking's and Moscow's position is sharply revealed when viewed in the context of a struggle for U.S.-defended territory. Chen Yi told Japanese newsmen in November 1960 that "The U.S. occupies Taiwan but no island off the Soviet coast," implying that unlike Soviet-U.S. interests, Sino-American interests clash directly on a territorial matter. Khrushchev in 1962, on the other hand, seemed to be arguing that Washington-Moscow relations should not be as tense as Washington-Peking relations primarily because territory was not an issue. "Our interests do not clash directly anywhere, either territorially or economically." (Quoted in Pravda, 27 April 1962)
inflexibility of Mao's position to the ridicule of other national leaders.) Mao responded by having his cleverest lieutenant declare, on 24 April 1964, that "boundary questions" can be solved peacefully, but questions of "imperialist occupation" are different. Chou En-lai insisted that countries whose territories were occupied naturally have every right to recover their lost territories by any means. To ask those countries...to renounce the use of force in any circumstances is in fact to ask their people...to submit to imperialist enslavement. (emphasis supplied)

G. Future of the Taiwan Issue and Sino-American Relations

This pugnacious insistence on the right to use force against Taiwan probably will not be dropped or moderated so long as Mao lives. Only a less stubborn and more moderate man than Mao would be willing to renounce force on this issue, or act as if such a renunciation is implicit in his position. Mao's pugnacious view has set the pattern for his aides thus far. Rejecting any mutual concessions, they apparently see no change in the status of the island at least for "10 or 20 years" (Chen Yi's statement to newsmen on 23 July 1962). They have only a very faint glimmer of hope that a Nationalist or Taiwanese insurrection will occur, and they discuss the matter in a long-range and very indefinite historical perspective. Chou En-lai stated privately on 1 November 1962 that if Nationalist officials did not "come over" to the mainland (either by defection or following a revolt on the island) they would have no future and would "die off one by one." Liu Shao-chi, too, reflected Mao's apparent estimate of an indefinite deadlock; in a conversation with the Swedish ambassador in April 1963, he said that a "solution" to the Taiwan issue is far in the future, inasmuch as Peking could not "solve" the matter by use of force against the U.S. troops and the Communists would "never" promise to renounce the use of force.
Mao learned in the fall of 1958 that any move to seize the offshore might work against his effort to demonstrate the "unity" of Taiwan and the mainland because seizure of the offshore might again be viewed by some neutral governments as the price of Peking's renunciation of claims to Taiwan. The Communist editor of a Hong Kong newspaper told his staff in September 1958 that Peking will not accept a compromise, such as taking the offshore in return for a pledge not to attack Taiwan. Chou En-lai duplicitously told a group of Japanese in January 1963 that he "agrees" with Chiang Kai-shek on the need to sustain the idea of Taiwan's unity with the mainland and that, because he "agrees," Peking will desist from taking the Chinmen and Matsu complexes, preventing any international recognition of Taiwan as an "independent state," cut off from the Communist offshore and the mainland.*

For the future, use of force against the offshore--primarily by shelling from the mainland--will continue to be a political matter. Mao apparently is aware that he cannot make it a real military matter--that is, by again trying to interdict the islands--because the U.S. has indicated its intention to prevent a takeover and because Soviet help with deterrent statements is no longer available. At the most, he can still use the offshore to serve as the basis for a synthetic crisis whenever he decides to terrorize Western and neutral leaders with the threat of a China-U.S. war, but even this leverage appears now to have been reduced.

Regarding the future of Sino-American relations, it will remain bleak while Mao lives. He will continue

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*This policy of professing no desire to seize the offshore because of the need to prevent the freezing of a "two Chinas" status in the Taiwan Strait is directly attributed to Mao in Peking New China Semi-Monthly, No. 13, 1959, and indirectly to Marshal Peng Te-huai by A.L. Strong in Moscow New Times, No. 46, November 1958.
to insist on a U.S. surrender and will continue to reject any American initiatives which fall short of indicating willingness to withdraw from the Taiwan Strait area.* Chou En-lai made this clear to Edgar Snow in October 1960.** He made it clear again in his report to the National People's Congress on 21 December 1964: all U.S. armed forces should withdraw from Taiwan; prior to the settlement of this "fundamental problem, the settlement of concrete problems in Sino-American relations is out of the question." The Chinese Communists had already acted on this line, rejecting U.S. overtures (in 1960) for visits to the mainland of prominent Americans.

We have received bids from Americans to visit our country. We have welcomed leftist Americans, but we have no interest in American leaders. We reveal this to you for the first time. We were notified of the wishes of Democrat Stevenson, Mrs. Roosevelt, former New York Governor Harriman, and five Republican senators to visit our country....

U.S. imperialism still occupies our Taiwan and adopts an unfair attitude toward China. If we were to welcome them, it would be tantamount to yielding to U.S. imperialism. (Chen Yi interview of 21 November 1960)

*Regarding the possible expansion of Sino-American talks, he has had his spokesmen reject it: talks will continue but "We will not have talks other than those in Warsaw." (Chen Yi statement to Japanese Diet members in the first week of September 1966)

**In addition to Chou's own remarks, his secretary, Chiang Hsiao-mai, told Snow that it was true that Peking had not provided U.S. policy-makers with a rear exit. "The Chinese are not interested in building any bridges out of Taiwan for the Americans. They will eventually get out on our terms."
The Chinese Communists have also refused entry to less prominent Americans, particularly when there has been publicity on their pending visit which reflected favorably on Washington. For example, following a renewed invitation by Peking to ear specialist Dr. Samuel Rosen of Columbia University in March 1964, publicity in December regarding official validation of his trip for humanitarian reasons rankled the Chinese leaders, who demanded that he cancel his trip, the implication being that it might make the U.S. look good. ("Washington is trying to make use of friendly contacts between Chinese and American scientists to gain political benefits." NCNA dispatch of 20 December 1964) Nevertheless, to gain "political benefits" for themselves, the Chinese leaders had previously insisted on a formal agreement for exchange of newsmen because this would imply official U.S. recognition of their regime and create strains in Washington-Taipei relations.

Peking has made clear Mao's reason for remaining inflexible on exchanges. They can begin only after the U.S. surrenders on the Taiwan issue. Peking's public comment on the State Department's announcement of 27 December 1965, which eased passport restrictions against the travel of doctors and public health specialists to the mainland, reflected sensitivity to having been depicted (rightly) as the intransigent party. ("Nauseating hypocrisy" was the charge hurled at Washington in the People's Daily editorial of 1 January 1966). Nevertheless, the inflexible Maoist position was reiterated by the Chinese Communist ambassador in Warsaw when informed in advance at the Sino-American meeting on 15 December 1965: "it will not do only to settle minor problems" because the U.S. must first settle "basic problems" (the Taiwan issue). Mao's position is so extreme that it is easily exposed, and when Washington in March 1966 (following testimony given in Washington by academics) spoke of a desire to improve relations, his spokesmen were compelled to search for arguments to discredit this position. They tried to make Peking appear justified in its hard line by denying goodwill on the U.S. side, but they were discomfited by the apparent fact that "there are some in Hong Kong who feel that there are signs of flexibility in the
American policy," (Wen Wei Pao editorial of 16 March 1966), and their commentaries reflected concern that this view might prevail in neutral and some Western countries: "Surely nobody will allow himself to be fooled" was the defensive comment of People's Daily on 29 March 1966.

The party paper on that date also reflected concern over the reception that this U.S. line might get among Chinese on the mainland, the sensitivity displayed reflecting Mao's suspicion that there might be a reduction of anti-U.S. sentiment internally at a time when he was trying to wall-off the PLA, CCP, and populace from the Western idea of a possible "peaceful evolution" in the attitudes of mainland officials. Although the 29 March article stated that Washington's desire to increase contacts could not change the hostile attitude of Chinese, it seemed to be warning as well that this attitude should not change: "The U.S. imperialists think that by making some 'contact' and 'visits' they could weaken the revolutionary will of the great Chinese people and shake their firm stand of combating U.S. imperialism and supporting the revolutionary struggle of all peoples....The Chinese people are sober-minded. Neither will they be intimidated by U.S. imperialism's threats, nor will they believe in 'find words.'" Another article seemed to be directed precisely at reminding Chinese that they had a "high degree of hatred, scorn and contempt for the U.S.," and had completely wiped out ideas of admiring, pleasing, and fearing" the U.S. (Liberation Army Daily editorial of 6 April 1966). In short, Peking's reaction to Washington's statements and the testimony of academics was remarkably irritable and seemed to reflect Mao's morbid anxiety that the combat zeal and self-sacrificing mentality he was trying to sustain among Chinese on the mainland would be diluted if young Chinese officials and cadres were to begin to view the U.S. with any degree of moderation and reasonableness. He was well aware that fanatical hostility is an attitude very difficult to sustain over long periods of time, and that this is particularly true if it has to be sustained artificially (through propaganda and the exclusion of external influences).
The article of 29 March made a distinction between big and small issues. Continued strains in Sino-American relations did not stem from disagreement on exchanges of doctors or newsmen, but rather "primarily from U.S. occupation" of Taiwan. It reiterated the basic line of the post-1958 period: "So long as the U.S. government does not change its hostile policy toward China and refuses to pull out its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations is entirely out of the question and so is the solution of such a concrete question as the exchange of visits between personnel of the two countries." (emphasis supplied)

On 16 April, Peking attacked the State Department's announcement on inviting Chinese scientists to visit U.S. universities, making it clear that small steps were rejected (while, in doing so, further exposing itself as the intransigent party). On the matter of possible exchanges in the future, it seems clear that only more moderate leaders, who, by Mao's death, have been released from the restrictions of Mao's Taiwan obsession, might be willing to change the obdurate policy. Mao apparently will not in his lifetime, and in an attack on Liu Shao-chi, his propagandists have implied that even a U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan would not lead to the "development of friendly relations." (People's Daily article of 16 October 1966)*

*Regarding possible Sino-American trade, Chen Yi publicly attacked the idea: "Frankly speaking, some Chinese democrats maintain that the improvement of Sino-U.S. relations will prove advantageous to China. They are right, because we would be admitted to the UN, be able to import machines, and obtain American loans; but we do not seek such petty profits. Our political stand is to oppose imperialism and colonialism in the world. Political value outweighs economic value." (Interview of 21 November 1960)

Regarding possible U.S. aid to Peking, Chen Yi stated that "Even if we receive aid from somewhere, we will refuse American aid. The American plan to utilize food for peace [President Kennedy's expressed willingness to send food as stated on 25 January 1961] is a plan for subversion and designed to open the way for American occupation." (Press conference of 29 May 1962)
II. The Issue of UN Entry

A. The Demand for Prior Expulsion of the Nationalists (1950-64)

Mao has been aware of the prestige which a place on the Security Council reflects, and he has complained about the "theft of China's UN seat" (interview with Mitterand as reported in TASS dispatch of 23 February 1961). But his obsession regarding no compromises with Chiang has impeded, at certain times, his effort to attain the expulsion of the Nationalist representative from the UN. He seems to have become more adamantly opposed to any "two Chinas" situation in the UN as his obsession developed further. In November 1950, he had permitted his aides to accept an invitation to participate in the UN debates on Korea, but in 1955, his aides had to refuse another UN invitation to participate in Security Council debate over the Taiwan Strait crisis.* Mao seems also to have become more deprecatory of the value of the UN. At an earlier time, his spokesmen had conceded the importance of the international organization.** But UN discussion over the years of issues related to Peking's interests,

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*On 3 February 1955, Chou En-lai stated that "only when the representative of the Chiang clique has been driven out from the Security Council and the representative of the PRC is to attend in the name of China, can the PRC agree to send a representative to take part in the discussions of the Security Council..." This was Chou's reply to Secretary General Hammarskjold's invitation of 31 January 1955, reflecting Mao's anti-"Two Chinas" obsession.

**"Although the UN, as a result of US manipulation, has time and again been used to serve American policy, it still has an important position in international affairs. It is possible to make the UN play its role in benefitting world peace." (People's Daily editorial of 2 December 1955)
and criticism of Peking's abominations on the international scene, have impelled Mao and his aides to profess lack of interest in pressing for the seat which they say is lawfully theirs. Following the vigorous Maoist suppression of the Tibetan rebellion in the spring of 1959, and anticipating UN criticism of this suppression in the fall meeting of the General Assembly, Chou En-lai in August 1959 told a Hong Kong Communist editor that he should not emphasize India's action in placing the matter of representation before the UN, as Peking "is not now overly anxious to join." When General Assembly censure was publicized, Peking's response was to deprecate the UN: the resolution on Tibet "will only further lower the prestige of the UN in the eyes of the Chinese people..." (PRC government statement of 23 October 1959)

Mao's obsessive refusal to accept any "two Chinas" representation situation in the UN--an acceptance which might force Chiang to withdraw his representative--has led to an immobile policy justified only by the long-range calculation that obduracy will pay off eventually.* He has suggested the setting up of a rival UN, as had Khrushchev. Mao told Edgar Snow on 22 October 1960 that he could form his own UN.

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*Most UN members favor a "two Chinas" resolution, and if one were introduced, it almost certainly would receive a majority or even a two-thirds vote. Chiang probably would not accept entry of Mao's representatives and would withdraw his delegation if Mao's were permitted to sit in the UN. However, Mao is also unwilling to accept even a temporary "two Chinas" situation in the international organization and refused to join until Chiang's men are expelled. He will not permit his aides to use flexible tactics because, unlike bilateral relations with some individual countries, he cannot be certain that Chiang will withdraw his representatives. He cannot risk a temporary "two Chinas" situation because his attitude toward the organization would receive far more international publicity than his action toward individual countries.
But he has had his aides work to defeat U.S. efforts to exclude Peking from the organization. Even after the setback forced on him by the "important question" tactic,* his aides have worked to gain support from such countries as Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Nigeria. But they have insisted on Mao's obsession. Deputy Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung stated privately in mid-November 1964 that although the U.S. was "secretly" planning to bring Peking into the UN while the "Taiwan gang also remained a member," the Chinese Communists would never accept membership this way—i.e., by recognizing a "two Chinas" situation in the international organization. "Give us time and there will be only one China." As for the neutral nations' hope that Peking would accept a seat and then work to have the Nationalists evicted, the Chinese Communists called this falling into the "U.S. trap of two Chinas...China will under no circumstances accept this" (People's Daily editorial of 4 December 1964).

B. Additional Revolutionary Demands (1965-67)

The revolutionization of various aspects of Mao's foreign policy in the fall of 1964 and the wild "revolutionary" action of Sukarno at a time when this process

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*In 1958, as new members joined the UN, the vote in favor of putting off debate of the Chinese representation question (i.e., the procedural device known as the moratorium) began to decline. This took place primarily because the new, Afro-Asian members actively worked for Peking's entry. The voting margin on the moratorium in 1960 was so slim that in 1961 it was found advisable to abandon the moratorium device and for the first time to deal directly with the substantive question itself. This "important question" of changing the representation of China in the UN required the approval of two-thirds of those present and voting, and use of the "important question" tactic since 1961 has set back Mao's effort to gain admission on his own uncompromising terms.
was developing combined to encourage Mao to press other countries to withdraw from the UN. Sukarno's move in pulling his delegation out of the UN on 7 January 1965 provided Mao and his aides with the opportunity to attack the organization openly and to demand that it should be "thoroughly reorganized." (PRC government statement of 10 January 1965) Mao personally seems to have fired the first shot in Peking's open attack, as witness the rusticisms published in the major deprecatory documents.* He insisted that other countries must view Sukarno's action as a precedent:

If a country throws off its blind faith in the UN, recognizes its true essence, and dares to fight against U.S. imperialist control of the organization, the latter can do nothing about it. Don't you see that U.S. imperialism was seized with panic the moment Indonesia announced its withdrawal from that organization? ...This is a courageous, just, and revolutionary precedent. (People's Daily editorial of 10 January 1965) (emphasis supplied)

*Only the barnyard phrases of Mao would have been printed on the front page of the People's Daily and in major official statements. The party paper on 10 January front-paged his distinctive scatological style. "Some people say that the UN is something formidable, and that the buttocks of a tiger must not be touched: But President Sukarno has touched the buttocks of this tiger. This greatly helps liquidate the blind faith in the UN," (PRC government statement of 10 January) "In their efforts to overawe and attack Indonesia, the US and British imperialists have militarily massed a heavy force and turned 'Malaysia' into a bridgehead, and, have politically thrust it into the UN Security Council to raise its status. This is like sh----g on one's head while pointing a sword at his throat." (People's Daily editorial of 10 January)
Mao attacked the argument that withdrawal is wrong and implied that the newly independent countries might want to follow the Indonesian precedent: "think it over: what has this so-called world organization been reduced to after all!" (PRC government statement of 10 January)

He insisted that "now is the time" to end U.S. influence ("control") and to effect "a thoroughgoing remolding of this so-called world organization" (People's Daily editorial of 10 January). He did not immediately surface his idea—expressed in 1960 to Edgar Snow—of forming his own UN.

By late January, however, Chou En-lai apparently was directed to float it as a trial balloon. Mao and Chou were aware that Sukarno held a similar view.* Chou was impelled to use arrogant ("revolutionary") language—which was tactless and harmful to Peking's image on the international scene—expressing Mao's desire to create a rival organization:

The UN must correct its mistakes. It must be reorganized....Another UN, a revolutionary one, may well be set up so that rival dramas may be staged in competition with that body... (Speech of 24 January 1965)

Chou was thus authorized to go beyond the demand for a "reorganization" to a demand for consideration of a new

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*The Chinese leaders believed that support for a new UN would improve their position in Djakarta to the disadvantage of that held by the Soviet leaders. Ambassador Mikhailov in early January 1965 had spent seven hours with Sukarno trying to dissuade him from withdrawing from the UN on the grounds that this played into the hands of the Chinese Communists, but came away discouraged. Sukarno held to his idea of CONEFO (Conference of New Emerging Forces) as an alternative to the UN and the Chinese were later to string him along by sending construction personnel to build the structures for the project. He was supported by Aidit.
UN, and Chen Yi sustained the new line.* By February, in the course of making, to Afro-Asians, a thinly veiled demand for withdrawal, Chou complained that some African and Asian countries believe that it is better to carry out the struggle inside the UN by making corrections. Let us invite them to do so. Indonesia has tried to do the same thing, without results, and therefore has withdrawn from the UN. Also, we Chinese have tried to do so, without results. Indonesia and the PRC have experience in this matter. We now no longer have trust in the UN. (Interview with Indonesian journalists published in Harian Rakjat and broadcast on 3 February 1965)

He went on to try to mollify these countries by professing non-interference with their refusal to withdraw—"We are not going to obstruct them"—and then invited them to choose one of "two roads." Chou suggested that they either "reorganize and retool" the UN or consider the formation of "a revolutionary UN outside the existing

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*"Indonesia's withdrawal from the UN is the first step that will promote such a reorganization. Consideration can also be given to the setting up of a revolutionary UN which will differ from the one manipulated by the U.S." (Chen Yi speech of 26 January 1965) Chen had been impelled by Mao's new line to go beyond mere support for Afro-Asian efforts to increase their seats in major UN organs on "a fair and reasonable basis" (Chen's speech of 2 October 1963) to a more hectoring position which suggested withdrawal and forming a rival UN. (In December 1963, the Chinese Communists had been anxious to cultivate Afro-Asian opinion and even informed Moscow that they agreed to a separation of the issues of expanding the Security Council and ECOSOC prior to the PRC entry into the UN.)

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UN." But regarding a Chinese Communist initiative to call a conference with the intention of establishing a rival UN, Mao apparently was advised against it. Chen Yi told an Italian news reporter in mid-March 1965 that "For the time being China will abstain from taking such a step" because "it is necessary to secure the agreement of all"—a clear sign of Chen's awareness of significant international opposition to Mao's new obsession. Short of acting to try to set up a rival UN, Chen said that countries in the UN "should lead a campaign from within to reorganize it, while China and the countries that are not in the UN should foretell, from without, its reorganization." Wary of adverse international criticism which had developed, Chen concluded by suggesting that pullouts would occur in the future, not because of pressure from Peking, but because "it is natural."

In sum, Chou and Chen had implied that Peking was not seeking entry and they had stated that Peking would remain outside and would demand a reorganization.** Thus Mao's basic position on the UN had become more adamant, and he was far out of step with international

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*A variant formulation implied but did not state the demand for a rival UN. It declared that either the UN "corrects its mistakes and is thoroughly reorganized with the desire of the peoples, or it continues to submit to the dictates of the U.S. and thereby commits suicide; there is no other way." (People's Daily article of 15 February 1965) (emphasis supplied) Chinese Communist comment had not yet defined the word, "reorganized," which was in fact a euphemism for the process of expelling the Chinese Nationalists.

**Regarding Mao's intention to stay out, Chou hinted at it in an interview on 3 February 1965: "Indonesia has withdrawn from the UN. Is it thinkable that the PRC will join the UN?" It is important that Chou did not say what Mao would do if Peking were voted in on his own uncompromising terms—i.e., voted in at the same time that the Nationalist delegation was expelled.
opinion. But he persisted, typically, in trying to impose his view and in displaying arrogant ("revolutionary") contempt for all opposition. In an interview on 24 March 1965 with a Palestine Liberation Organization delegation, Mao complained that the UN was "an illegal organization," and told the delegation that "You Arabs are the nucleus of a new organization which will be better and more representative than the present UN organization. We shall all together create such an organization." The idea expressed in the final sentence was contemptuous of conditions in the real world.

A "revolutionary" anti-Western UN had become an obsession; like his other obsessions, this one reflected his image of himself as a super-revolutionary who will fight all existing odds and who is buoyed up in the fight primarily by the unwarranted belief that the odds will fall his way in the future. Further, this obsession influenced his foreign policy toward neutrals. In this sense, his mood was one of irrationality because he was willing to injure his current policy (by harassing and even insulting certain friendly neutral governments which insisted on remaining inside the organization) in the hope of an illusory future advance. For example, in mid-April 1965, Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika complained to the U.S. ambassador in Algiers that the Chinese Communists were trying to muster support for the idea of a "revolutionary" UN, but Bouteflika, reflecting his government's increasing disenchantment with Mao, told the Chinese that instead of trying to take countries out of the UN, they should work with others to get the PRC into that organization.*

*But Mao was controlled by his obsession. Rather than adjust and jettison his idea, he persisted. On 11 May, the Chinese Communist delegate to the 4th AAPSO Conference in Ghana set forth the entire arrogant Maoist position on the UN's "crimes," "mistakes," and need for "reorganization," warning that "it may be necessary to consider the establishment of revolutionary UN as a rival drama." This gaucherie provided the Soviets with the opportunity to join with delegates from several African countries to attack Mao's idea.
Chou En-lai, who probably took a calmer and more balanced view of the UN issue than Mao, was impelled gradually to harden his position. He probably was more aware and concerned than Mao that it would be irrational to discard the former position (already inflexible and injurious to Peking's interests) and implement a new position (even more inflexible and injurious). He seems to have held to the former position, namely, that Peking would join the UN if the Nationalists were expelled from it, and he affirmed this in a private talk with a Western diplomat on 15 March 1965. The former position was retained in April, and as late as 1 September Peking's public position suggested that expulsion of the Nationalists was still the only real precondition for joining.* Chou had been equivocal on the matter of Peking's desire to join, on the one hand assuring the Indonesians in April that he would not insist on entry, and on the other hand assuring Andre Malraux in July that his government was mildly interested in joining the UN if it were reorganized; he

*The only explicitly stated precondition for entry had been expulsion of the Nationalists. "...the Chinese government declared long ago that China will have nothing to do with the UN as long as the latter, under the thumb of the US, refuses to restore to China its legitimate rights in it and to throw out the representative of the Chiang Kai-shek gang from all its organizations. This firm stand of ours is unshakable...." (People's Daily editorial of 12 April 1965) (emphasis supplied) As late as September, Chinese commentary still centered on one "mistake" made by the UN: "One of the serious mistakes it has committed is that the PRC...has long been deprived of its legitimate rights in the UN, whereas the Chiang Kai-shek clique, repudiated by the Chinese people, has up until now usurped China's seat there....The UN must correct this serious mistake by ousting the Chiang Kai-shek clique and restoring to the PRC its legitimate rights." (NCNA "Statement" of 1 September 1965) The other "mistakes" were not articulated. Although the still vague concept of UN "reorganization" was reiterated, it was not made a precondition for entry.
also had stated Peking's preference (similar to Sihanouk's view) for moving the UN from New York to a neutral site, such as Geneva. Peking praised Ne Win's call for the "urgent restoration" of PRC rights in publicizing the Sino-Burmese communique of 1 August. However, after the French weekly, Le Nouvel Observateur, on 24 August claimed that Malraux had been told by the Chinese leaders that if Peking were reinstated as a full member of the Security Council, there would be an appropriate framework for discussing Vietnam within the UN—after this claim, Chou moved to the harder position. On 12 September, Chou, after trying to clear his name with Mao and to mollify Sukarno by attacking the idea of "linking" restoration of Peking's "legitimate rights" in the UN with the settlement of the Vietnam war, demanded (in replying to questions of a news agency editor) the voiding of the UN resolution condemning Peking for its attack in Korea. However, he did not say that this was a precondition for Peking entry.* The only explicitly cited precondition, as precondition, continued to be expulsion of the Nationalists and restoration of the Communists' claimed seat.

Despite the fact that Chen Yi, in his important press conference of 29 September 1965, raised new demands, he did not say they were preconditions for Peking's entry into the organization.** He downplayed the idea of a

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*Chou said that the UN's "slander of China as an aggressor" was "one of a series of grave mistakes committed by the UN...that must be thoroughly corrected, and no bargaining can be tolerated."

**Chen said that "The UN must rectify its mistakes and undergo a thorough reorganization and reform. It must admit and correct all its past mistakes. Among other things, it should cancel its resolution condemning China and the DPRK as aggressors and adopt a resolution condemning the US as the aggressor; the UN charter must be reviewed and revised jointly by all countries, big and small; all independent states should be included in the UN; and all imperialist puppets should be expelled" (new demands are emphasized). Aside from expelling the Nationalists, (footnote continued on page 56)
rival UN by saying that conditions would "no doubt gradually ripen" for a new UN if the present one failed to be reorganized. He also continued the practice of remaining imprecise on what Peking meant by "reforming" or "reorganizing" the UN, reiterating that the aim of such an overhaul would be to end U.S. "control." However, he hinted that Peking would not agree to enter even if the Nationalists were expelled and Peking's "rights" were restored because the matter of U.S. "control...would still remain unsolved," and "today" the organization has become a place where "two" big powers, the U.S. and USSR, predominate despite the entry of many smaller Afro-Asian states.*

(footnote continued from page 55): Of course, which is the absolute prerequisite for Peking's entry, the Maoist position is ambiguous on when the abovementioned demands must be implemented. The Chinese Communists themselves might rationalize any future act of joining by arguing that they would work to reorganize the UN from within, as they had suggested, from time to time, that other countries should do just that. They published Sihanouk's statement of 24 September 1965 that Cambodia had not withdrawn: "It remains there so as to wage a struggle of non-cooperation for the reorganization of the UN, turn it into a universal organization, and thus fulfill the mission laid down by the UN Charter."

*Soviet public and private statements began gradually to downplay the standard line of expelling the Nationalists following Gromyko's New York press conference of 12 October 1962, when he failed to call for expulsion in commenting on the representation issue. This reflection of Khrushchev's dispute with Mao was carried over into the post-Khrushchev period, but for tactical reasons, the new Soviet leadership has not replaced the standard position with a "two Chinas" position. The most explicit and sharpest Peking complaint regarding declining Soviet enthusiasm attacked Gromyko and Federenko for their critical and perfunctory speeches in the 1965 UN sessions, and the conclusion was drawn that, in contrast to Khrushchev's open "cooperation" with the U.S., the new leaders (footnote continued on page 57)
Mao seems to have taken the position (through his aides) that he desires membership less than ever before, but that he still desires it a little. His supporters for admission had misread the statements of his spokesmen to mean that, because Peking had raised impossible demands, Mao no longer desired entry at all. When, therefore, a high-level Cambodian official visited Peking in August 1965 and asked Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien if Peking still wanted to join, Li replied that there was no question of Peking not wanting to be admitted, since membership in the UN was the "legitimate right" of the PRC, which intended "to maintain this position." Sihanouk, who had earlier given instructions that Cambodia's UN delegation was not to intervene in 1965 on behalf of Peking, was "surprised" to learn of the real Chinese Communist position. Sihanouk had to change his instructions by late August 1965. The Chinese did not give up on the tactic of encouraging member nations to withdraw, as witness their encouragement of the Pakistanis to do so in mid-September 1965, but they played down the suggestion of pulling out.

While Mao insisted that his aides surface additional demands, he did not try to stop the eleven sponsoring countries from introducing the customary UN resolution calling for Peking's admission and Taiwan's ouster in early November 1965. He continued to demand a hard wording of the resolution, i.e., explicit reference to the need to expel the Nationalists.* He may have felt that this

(Tootnote continued from page 56)
"have drawn lessons from Khrushchev's downfall and now increasingly arrange their deals with the U.S. through the UN." They prefer to arrange "deals" with the U.S. in UN corridors where they can "hide themselves among the hundred-odd countries of the UN." (People's Daily editorial of 27 December 1965)

*On 14 November, one day before the resolution calling for seating the Communists and expelling the Nationalists was introduced in the General Assembly, the Chinese Communists were reported to have informed the Albanians, Algerians, and Pakistanis that language calling explicitly for expulsion of Chiang's representatives must be carried in the document.
obduracy had not hurt his cause, and the People's Daily editorial of 19 November claimed that there had been slippage in the U.S. position as a result of the General Assembly vote, which it depicted as a "humiliating setback" to efforts aimed at keeping Peking from taking its "rightful place."* The editorial set forth the significant distinction basic to Peking's position, namely, the difference between the absolute prerequisite of expelling the Nationalists, on the one hand, and a series of demands, on the other hand.

To return to the path of its purposes and principles, the UN must free itself from the control of the U.S., rectify all its mistakes, and undergo a thorough reorganization and reform. To expel the elements of the Chiang Kai-shek clique from the UN and restore its lawful rights to China is an indispensable step for the UN to rectify its mistakes and undergo a thorough reorganization.

But merely doing this is far from enough. The UN must also resolutely condemn U.S. imperialism, the biggest aggressor of contemporary times, and cancel its slanderous resolutions condemning China and the DPRK as aggressors and all its other erroneous resolutions. The UN Charter must be reviewed and revised by all countries of the world.

*On the procedural vote—i.e., on the ruling that the issue is an "important question" and thus needs a two-thirds vote for approval—56 favored the procedural ruling, 49 opposed, and 11 abstained. On the substantive vote—i.e., the vote on the resolution calling for expulsion of the Nationalists—taken in the General Assembly on 17 November, the U.S. failed to attain a plurality for the first time. The vote was 47 for admission, 47 against, and 20 abstentions; Peking gained eight new African supporters and lost two while Taiwan won two and lost nine.
Its membership must include all independent countries to the exclusion of all imperialist puppets. (emphasis supplied)

While Mao has adopted a posture of indifference, and even contempt, for joining—"As a matter of fact, the U.S. may keep China out of the UN for 1,000 or even 10,000 years without harming China one iota." (People's Daily editorial of 19 November)—he has permitted his spokesmen to sustain a distinction which could be used as justification for entry at some future date.*

As with other foreign policy positions which have been predominantly irrational, Mao has permitted a small part to be rational. He has permitted his aides to stress the rational part when Peking seemed to be gaining new votes. For example, still exuberant over the increase in General Assembly support, Chou stated that "of late, during the 20th session of the UN General Assembly, Albania and Cambodia, together with many other countries, persisted in the fight to expel the Chiang Kai-shek clique and to restore to China its legitimate rights in the UN" (Speech of 29 November 1965). The ideas of withdrawal for other countries and a rival UN were drastically soft-pedalled in subsequent months, and no mention was made of the specific series of demands raised by Chen Yi on 29 September. Indonesia returned to the UN in 1966, and this

*Regarding disparagement of the idea of entry while the UN is still under U.S. "control," one Chinese Communist has stated that as long as such a condition exists, "China will not accept the invitation to join the UN even if 100 UN planes come to Peking with invitations" (Liao Cheng-chih interview with Japanese journalists published in Tokyo Mainichi on 25 December 1965). Liao failed to say what Peking's reaction would be if the Nationalists were expelled, that is, whether this very act would not be used by Mao and his aides as the opportunity for declaring that U.S. "control" was slipping away, permitting Peking to take its "rightful place."
down-playing procedure was carried through to the time of the General Assembly meetings in 1966. It was sustained even when Peking, in a commentary on 22 November 1966, denounced the Italian "study committee" proposal and, in a commentary on the 24th, denounced Canada's "two Chinas" plan; Chen's demands were not revived. Peking demanded only the expulsion of the Nationalists and, vaguely, called for an end to American and Soviet use of the UN as a political "marketplace." This practice was retained even after the Albanian resolution, calling for expulsion of the Nationalists and seating of the Communists, was rejected on 29 November 1966 by a 57-46 majority. (Peking did not acknowledge the magnitude of the defeat, and the silence maintained by its media for two days thereafter strongly suggested that Mao and his aides had anticipated a favorable vote and were exasperated by their setback. Peking's greatest loss of supporters was among the African countries, where leaders had been angered by Chinese Communist appeals for "revolution" on the continent and by Peking's political interference in the war over Kashmir territory.) Peking on 1 and 2 December 1966 broke silence, but merely repeated the old demands for ending U.S. "control" and for reorganizing the UN and rectifying its "mistakes." The commentaries did not raise all of the demands that Chen Yi had publicized on 29 September 1965, and they did not say, as he had, that Peking "may as well stay out of a UN like this."

Privately, the Chinese were not so delicate in concealing their anger in having been kept out of the organization and, on the one hand, they made it clear to the Canadian trade commissioner in Hong Kong that Canada's "two Chinas" plan during the General Assembly debate made it "inconvenient" for Peking to receive his request for a tour of the mainland, and, on the other hand, they accused the USSR (through the PRC counsellor in their embassy in Cairo) of having worked behind the scenes to bar them from entry.

Although Peking thus far has not returned to the fanatically adamant series of demands set forth by Chen Yi on 29 September 1965, Mao's obsession of a rival UN
has been revived. Chou En-lai, in his speech at a 24 June 1967 reception in Peking for visiting President Kaunda of Zambia, repeated what he had said (on 24 January 1965): regarding the struggle of Afro-Asian nations inside the UN if the goal of reorganization is not attained, "then the possibility that a new revolutionary UN will be set up will increase." This act of revival suggests that the Chinese Communist leaders will continue to reassert various parts of the adamant Maoist position at various times while Mao lives, professing only a qualified desire to enter the UN. However, when General Assembly voting is about to begin every fall, they will probably continue to agree to have one of their supporters--most likely, the Albanians--introduce the standard resolution calling for the restoration of their "legitimate seat" and expulsion of the Nationalist representative from the organization. They may well agree to join if voted in, provided that the Nationalists are expelled from all UN bodies, their justification being that they would then be able to join with other nations inside the organization to struggle to reorganize it.
III. Diplomatic Isolation of Taipei

A. Breaking Relations With Taipei

Even before the Seventh Fleet was positioned as a blocking force against Communist invasion, Mao had begun his effort to isolate Taipei among the nations by denying it was in any sense the government of China, insisting that other governments make a similar denial. He did not, however, say when this denial must be made and his ambiguity on this point was deliberate, reflecting one of the most flexible (in a tactical sense) aspects of his entire foreign policy. Chou En-lai was the man who carried out this policy.

Chou's partial success in isolating Taipei was due to the leeway he had in applying a principle. Any country desiring diplomatic relations with Peking was required, on principle, to sever diplomatic relations with the Nationalists. But major statements regarding this principle—e.g., those in the Common Program of 1949 and in Chou En-lai's report of 1959—were significantly ambiguous on the matter of when relations with Taipei must be broken, providing Chou with maneuvering room in moving governments toward the Communists and away from the Nationalists.* In this way, countries willing to

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*"Article 56. The Central People's Government of the PRC may negotiate and establish diplomatic relations on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty with foreign governments which sever relations with the KMT reactionaries and adopt a friendly attitude towards the PRC." (Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, 29 September 1949) (emphasis supplied)

"No plot to carve up Chinese territory and create 'two Chinas' can be tolerated by the Chinese people. In accordance with this principle, any country that desires (footnote continued on page 63)
break away from Washington's apparent position (that is, opposing recognition of Peking but, if unavoidable, accepting dual Chinese representation) were not rebuffed immediately. Chou counted on the Nationalists to play a key role in preventing an indefinite dual representation situation (Taipei's position being against recognition of Peking and against acceptance of an unavoidable dual representation arrangement).

It appears that Mao's opportunism and flexibility --reflected in his willingness to tolerate a "two Chinas" situation (not in name) temporarily in order to force the Nationalists to withdraw their diplomatic representatives-- were greater than Chiang's, as witness the leeway he permitted his advisers in moving toward the UK and Laos in response to their moves toward Peking. Chiang, however, made a better showing regarding France's move toward recognition.

Formal recognition of Peking by the UK on 6 January 1950 opened the way to Sino-British negotiations by a "Negotiating Representative"--an anomalous situation for London, which was seeking an ambassadorial exchange. It permitted the Chinese Communists to hold up their reply to the British recognition initiative until after the tensions stirred up by the Korean war subsided while continuing to press London's representative for the closure of British firms on the mainland. Although diplomatic

(footnote continued from page 62)
to establish diplomatic relations with our country must sever so-called diplomatic relations with the Chiang Kai-shek clique and respect our country's legitimate rights in international affairs. We are willing to enter into contacts and cooperation with other countries in international organizations and conferences, but we will not participate in any international activities in which a situation of 'two Chinas' may arise." (Chou En-lai's report on government work to the National People's Congress given on 18 April 1959) (emphasis supplied)
relations were established on 17 June 1954 (after Eden had chided Chou En-lai at the Geneva conference for not having a diplomat in London), the Communists did not permit the British to send an ambassador, limiting representation to the level of charge d'affaires in order to remind London of their irritation with (1) the continued presence of a British consul on Taiwan (accredited to the "provincial," rather than the Nationalist, government) and (2) the distinction the UK maintained between diplomatic relations with Peking, on the one hand, and support for the U.S. position—not to permit the Communists to seize Taiwan—on the other hand. Nevertheless, Mao and his advisers did not make withdrawal of the consul on Taiwan a condition for the exchange of charge-level diplomats in 1954. Subsequently, they tolerated a "two Chinas" situation in fact—that is, with a British charge in Peking and a consul in Tamsui (north of Taipei), which was tantamount to recognition of the independent status of Taiwan—in the hope of eventually splitting the British from the Americans.

Mao apparently will not agree to an ambassadorial exchange until the UK consul is withdrawn and London changes its position on the status of Taiwan. Chou En-lai told visiting Japanese political figures on 1 November 1962 that he had met with Malcolm MacDonald (on 31 October, after the PLA attack on Indian border forces) and refused MacDonald's suggestion that Peking and London exchange ambassadors. Chou said that Britain's attitude toward Peking was "half good and half bad," the good part being British support for the Soviet proposal to seat Peking's representative in the UN and the bad part being London's proposal to handle the Taiwan issue separately, thereby ignoring "the fact" that Taiwan is a part of China. Chou also described as "bad" London's depicting Peking as the aggressor in the Sino-Indian border dispute. Chou claimed that for these reasons he had decided against MacDonald's proposal. Later, the Chinese Communist leaders indirectly (i.e., using the Hong Kong Wen Wei Pao on 13 October 1964) criticized Harold Wilson's campaign proposal to exchange ambassadors with Peking by
stating that so long as Britain follows a "two Chinas" policy and supports international trusteeship for Taiwan, "she is blocking her own ambassador's way to China."*

The policy to accept temporarily a "two Chinas" situation with countries showing some degree of goodwill or amenable to pressure to cut ties with Taipei at an early date opened the way for the Chinese Communists to "work over" friendly governments prior to the establishment of full diplomatic relations. Chou En-lai had referred not only to "full," but also to "partial" diplomatic relations in his report to the NPC on 18 September 1959, suggesting that Mao had made it a policy to get what could be had (such as a trade office, an NCNA office, or just an agreement to exchange individual visitors) despite the existence of relations between a particular government and Taipei.** This opportunistic departure from the anti-

*Despite occasional requests, London has not been permitted to raise its mission in Peking to ambassadorial level, and the status of its charge has been qualified and insecure. Statements from high-level British officials regarding the Taiwan issue have usually provoked a hot Maoist reaction, and the charge has had to acquiesce from time to time in verbal "floggings" from Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry officials. For example, the charge was "flogged" in this way in May 1964 after Foreign Secretary Butler had depicted the Taiwan issue as "an international problem," and when he declared that Britain "would be glad to take part in any conference on the future of Taiwan, provided it took into account the wishes of the inhabitants of Nationalist China," the People's Daily on 12 May thundered that Britain had thus far only "partial diplomatic relations with China."

**Even countries which have not been disposed to cut ties with the Nationalists have been approached, and Peking has not broken off contacts until signs of complete intransigence have become clear. For example, the Chinese Communists began a step-by-step approach to Beirut in 1956, but when, in April 1960, this flexibility had not gained them any advantage, they gave up their four-year effort to obtain recognition, closing their trade office following clear signs of increasing Chinese Nationalist influence in Lebanon.
two Chinas "principle" (a "principle" rigorously held to in Sino-American matters) and this use of flexibility to gain eventual formal recognition was authoritatively sanctioned in the Foreign Ministry directive of January 1961:

In the case of "two Chinas," we oppose firmly the conspiratorial activities of the US and Chiang Kai-shek for the creation of 'two Chinas.' We do not carry on any official activities with countries which recognize Chiang.

Having made this categorical statement of "principle," the directive proceeded to shelve it in the name of the "tactic of flexibility" in actual conditions:

Nevertheless, in consideration of the actual conditions in Africa and Latin America and the special relations Chiang and the U.S. have in these countries and for the purpose of seeking a right opportunity for establishing our beachhead in Africa and Latin America and of preventing the U.S. and Chiang from carrying out their conspiracy, our strategy adopted in Africa and Latin America is different from that adopted in Europe and Asia. While Cuba still had diplomatic relations with Chiang, we established official contacts with Cuba. When Guinea was receiving Chiang's envoy from Libya, our ambassador reported for duty. We understand the predicament of those countries in Africa which express their wish to have friendly relations with us but previously had established diplomatic relations with Chiang only because of the pressure from imperialism.*

*The Chinese Nationalists also showed tactical skill, and they moved their ambassador to Senegal in 1960 and kept him there despite Dakar's announced intention also to recognize Peking. The Chinese Communists reversed their earlier decision to send representatives to the (footnote continued on page 67)
Although the directive stated that this flexibility was a strategy for approaching countries in Africa and Latin America rather than those in Asia and Europe, the cases of Laos and France indicate that even this distinctive limitation was dropped in the name of expedient diplomacy.

1. Two Examples

a. Laos (1962)

At a time when the Nationalists maintained consul-level relations with Laos, Souvanna Phouma agreed to sign a joint statement with a Chinese Communist delegation on establishing diplomatic relations (25 April 1961). Chou En-lai thereupon started an exercise to exploit this newly acquired consul-level opportunity to force the Nationalists to withdraw, but did not appoint an ambassador while the Nationalists remained. On 14 November, the Chinese Communist ambassador to Hanoi presented his credentials to Souvanna only as Peking's "economic and cultural representative" and took up his new post in the Plaine des Jarres; on 17 November, Peking's consul general took up his post in Communist-held Phong Saly. Chou apparently was anxious to establish higher level representation following the 11 June 1962 agreement to form a coalition government (Chou En-lai's telegram on that day to Souvanna expressed conviction that relations would be "further strengthened") and when, on 2 July, the Souvanna government announced that it had recognized the Peking regime (among others), the Chinese Communists moved quickly to displace the Nationalist representatives. They sent their "economic and cultural representative" from the

(footnote continued from page 66) independence celebrations because Senegal had rejected their demand that the Nationalist ambassador should be ejected. Senegal today has recognized both Peking and Taipei, but has ties with neither.
Plaine to Vientiane (accompanied by Communist leader Souvanna Phouma) on 11 July and presented him, Liu Chun, as the new charge d'affaires with "a letter of appointment" to Souvanna's acting foreign minister. Angered by the higher level to which Peking had moved the "two Chinas" situation in Laos, the Nationalists, who prior to the establishment of the coalition government had agreed with Vientiane for an exchange of ambassadors, at first were reluctant to have their ambassador (sent from Thailand to be concurrently ambassador to Laos) present his credentials, but finally did (after the Chinese Communist charge had presented his own).

The Chinese Communists made the Nationalist ambassador the target of gauche maneuvering. On 3 August 1962, as Souvanna stepped off his plane on returning to Vientiane, the unaccredited Chinese Communist charge rushed up and inserted himself just in front of Taipei's ambassador in the reception line, seized Souvanna's hand, and said that he represented the only legal government of China and thousands of Chinese in Laos. After he and another Chinese Communist diplomat completed their maneuver, Souvanna brushed them aside and shook the hand of the Nationalist ambassador in order to demonstrate to Taipei that he desired the "two Chinas" situation to continue.

But he also continued to move toward Peking on the diplomatic level. Although his government had recognized Peking on 2 July and made known its intention to establish relations, formal approval from the cabinet of the coalition government was not given until 4 September (and publicized on the 7th). This formal action was viewed by Taipei as the last insult, and Chiang apparently decided not to endure any others. His lieutenants indicated privately that the Nationalists would remain in Laos only until Peking's ambassador was actually accredited. On 7 September, the Nationalist government announced its decision to withdraw the ambassador and his embassy staff and formally broke off diplomatic relations with the angry statement that "we cannot allow Laos to become a testing ground for a 'two Chinas' arrangement." (Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of 7 September 1962) Yet this is precisely what the Chinese Communists had "allowed,"
having anticipated that Chiang would not play the opportunist after Souvanna had informed him, indirectly, that his (Chiang's) representative would have to share an uncommon responsibility with a common enemy.*

b. France (1964)

Chou En-lai calculated correctly again in 1963 that the operative factor in inducing a Nationalist withdrawal from France would be a temporary "two Chinas" situation. Mao personally participated in the effort. De Gaulle's anti-American attitude was viewed by the Chinese Communist leaders as providing them with an opportunity to turn Paris irrevocably away from Washington's ally (Taipei). Their operation demonstrated that Mao (as well as Chou) was more willing than Chiang to be duplicitous about "two Chinas" and as opportunistic as the Soviet leaders in friendly dealings with a Western capitalist government.

Cutting across the strong revolutionary and anti-imperialist line they themselves had arrogantly advanced in the series of "open letters" in 1963, the Chinese Communist leaders had to climb down from a doctrinal high horse and cast about for some idea--almost any idea--which would indicate a common Sino-French goal or grievance. They had hinted cautiously in the spring of 1963 at "certain new developments in the capitalist forces of France, which are beginning to be bold enough to stand up to the U.S." (Red Flag article of 4 March 1963; this important article placed "all" capitalist countries in a large front against the U.S.) But they held back in providing a

*The Chinese Communists have tried to eliminate all aspects of the Chinese Nationalist presence and in late August 1967 their protests to Souvanna Phouma impelled the Prime Minister to ask the head of the unofficial Nationalist "economic mission" to leave Laos.
basic, doctrinally coherent rationale for their policy of flexibility in maneuvering for French recognition. They acted first, leaving their doctrinal position, which had been rigid in the wake of their advance, to be adjusted later.

France is "China's greatest ally," Chou En-lai had declared (in a speech of 29 January 1963, unpublicized, to scientists in Shanghai) because it was "also struggling for independence," while Peking was opposing the U.S. from the left, Paris was "digging at the bottom of the American wall from the right." By the spring of 1963, the Chinese began to probe De Gaulle's attitude on recognition in a series of steps, starting with economic matters. In May, Peking's vice minister of Foreign Trade met with French officials in Switzerland; in October, the Georges-Picot mission was encouraged to explore the matter of an exchange of technical missions and data. When Georges-Picot discussed Sino-French trade, the Chinese leaders insisted that a serious exchange could not develop without diplomatic relations. Ex-Premier Edgar Faure, during a visit following up the trade delegation in October, stated privately that in discussions with Chou En-lai in Peking and Mao in Shanghai, he had complied with De Gaulle's personal request to "sound out" the Chinese leaders regarding conditions for Paris-Peking diplomatic relations with Taipei. Faure later (in November) told the AFP correspondent in New Delhi that these Chinese leaders had specified "no conditions" regarding French relations with Taipei.*

*Faure took this line in his article in Figaro on 9 January 1964, declaring that France would accept "no preconditions" to recognition and that, in his opinion, Paris would have no obligation to withdraw recognition from Taipei. However, he reflected some sensitivity on the matter of whether recognition would impel the Nationalists to break off relations: he dodged the issue of what French representation in Taiwan should be and denied that he had told the Chinese Communists that the problem of French relations with Taipei was academic because the Nationalists would break immediately upon French recognition. In (footnote continued on page 71)
But Ambassador Bohlen's report of what Faure told him in Paris after his trip to the mainland seems to be the most plausible. That is, the Chinese leaders, while "basically" insisting that there would have to be a complete rupture with Chiang, nevertheless were somewhat taken with Faure's suggestion to set aside the whole question of French representation on Taiwan. He also told Bohlen that in reporting to De Gaulle, he suggested three possibilities for action: (1) do nothing and leave things as they were; (2) start at an intermediate step with the appointment of a permanent trade mission to Peking; or (3) go the whole way and extend recognition to the mainland regime. He recommended the third course to the General, was not sure which he would decide on, and then ventured the conjecture, as a student of the General's psychology, that he would go "whole hog" and recognize the Communist government.

For their part, the Chinese Communist leaders tried to induce De Gaulle to make the recognition leap by acting as moderate and reasonable men, less anxious to discuss world revolution than the independence of all nations, particularly those nations advancing anti-

(footnote continued from page 70)
short, Faure made it an open boast that the French had not accepted conditions detrimental to the Nationalists, hypocritically concealing the true nature of the situation: he and De Gaulle's advisers had calculated that the Nationalists themselves would break relations, relieving Paris of the blame and making De Gaulle appear to have been high-minded throughout the maneuver. Faure's duplicity can be documented. After the Nationalists broke off relations, Faure privately contradicted one statement he had made in the Figaro article and said, on 3 March, that in earlier discussions with the Chinese Communist leaders, he had secured their promise to send an ambassador even if the Nationalist ambassador remained and convinced them that the presence of Peking's representative would impel the Nationalists to break off relations.
American policies.* They even tried to depict France as having discarded colonial policies (and as having become acceptable as a good imperialist country), but were careful to use a formulation which did not touch on the embarrassing matter of French colonial possessions. Chen Yi, who had joined Chou in Africa, told the Algerian foreign minister in late December 1963 that "We believe there is an important and positive role which France could play in Asia, now that France is no longer engaged in any colonial war." (emphasis supplied) At the same time, Chou was quoted as stating to President Ben Bella that De Gaulle's independence contributed to a healthy balance of power in the world, which Peking believes is in the interest of world peace. Chou continued his exposition: "In this contest, it may not be unthinkable that France would like to redress the unjust discrimination that has befallen some of the nations of the world because of the policy of atomic monopoly which prevails today." These tributes to French independence and goodwill, intended as pragmatic justifications for Mao's drive for recognition, did not contain an adequate explanation of how a capitalist leader could suddenly develop a benevolent aspect. The "explanation" was to come at a time when Peking was vulnerable to attack by the Soviets on the

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*Chou En-lai stressed this mutuality of interest at the farewell banquet for Edgar Faure in Peking on 31 October 1963: "We...both suffered from foreign occupation in the anti-fascist war and carried out protracted resistance to this occupation. Now both our people are striving for the sovereignty and independence of their countries. This is what we have in common and is a tie making for friendly exchanges." (emphasis supplied) This was Chou's subtle way of aligning De Gaulle with Mao in a common cause, first against the fascist powers and then against the U.S. Chou flattered De Gaulle personally in Conakry in a statement to Edgar Snow on 23 January 1964: he is "courageous in facing realities and dares to act accordingly"--a characterization which contrasts with earlier imagery depicting the General, in Peking media, as the representative of "big finance" rather than a daring statesman.
matter of opportunistische maneuvering with a major capital-
list country for purely national interests.

In the course of what seemed to be a routine discus-
sion of U.S. troubles with its allies, the People's Daily
editorial of 21 January 1964 made several statements which
were strikingly moderate (and unprecedented) when compared
to earlier Chinese Communist attacks on the Western demo-
cracies. Because leaders of these countries allegedly
want to free themselves of U.S. control,

They therefore have something in common with
the socialist countries and the various
peoples.

The editorial went on to establish a new position that
rulers in these countries have a "dual character"—that
is, they are on the one hand exploiters, but, on the
other hand, opponents of the U.S. (This is strikingly
similar to the tactical formula Mao had employed during
the Chinese revolution, which depicted the national
capitalists as allies of the CCP because of their "dual
character"—that is, as exploiters, but at the same time
as opponents of foreign imperialism.) In extension of
the latter point, the editorial stated that "there is
not a single country or people in the world today which
is not subjected to the aggression and threats of U.S.
imperialism." In this way providing room for the French,
it also served as "the objective basis for the establish-
ment of the broadest united front against U.S. imperial-
ism."

Mao's move toward the French required a minor modi-
fication in his own concept of 1946 on the "intermediate
zone" in the world. This concept, advanced by Mao in
August 1946 to Anna Louise Strong, already had been re-
fined, in the 4 March 1963 Red Flag article, to include
not just "many" but "all" capitalist countries in a large
front against the U.S. The 21 January editorial stated
that there really were two intermediate zones (not just
one), the first including countries of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America and the second consisting of "the whole of
Western Europe, Australásia, Canada, and other capitalist
countries" (other than the U.S.). This separation into two zones enabled the Chinese to argue that the under-developed countries (zone one) are in the forefront of the anti-U.S. struggle while the capitalist countries (zone two) are not far behind even though exploitation of the worker is a feature of their governments by definition.

Mao personally seems to have sanctioned this doctrinal innovation—namely, that leaders in major capitalist countries have a "dual character," the good half being anti-U.S.—a more radical revision of basic doctrine than Khrushchev's Leninist description of some of these leaders as "sober-minded." On 30 January 1964, Mao personally departed from a dogmatic doctrinal line: which placed all "imperialists" in one camp and all bloc countries in the other camp. He also lifted France out of the category of "colonial" power. He explained to visiting French parliamentarians his view of the second intermediate zone, called the "third world" by the French.

France can regain all of its influence in Asia. It has completed its decolonization and we know quite well that it does not want to come back here just for commercial purposes. France itself Germany, Italy, Great Britain (provided it stops being the courtier of the U.S.), Japan, and we ourselves—there you have the third world. (emphasis supplied)

He avoided saying that France still maintained colonies. He placed Peking in the same camp of the major democracies (excluding the U.S. and USSR on non-doctrinal grounds). In his conversation with the French ambassador and officials from Paris on 11 September 1964, Mao again said two zones existed in the intermediate area and again praised De Gaulle for his "policy of independence" from Washington and for criticizing Bonn, asking that this criticism be extended to London. However, in that conversation, he did not conceal his views on supporting small wars, particularly in Asia, and spoke at length about how the U.S. was "educating people so that they will rise up and fight"
against Americans abroad and how Chiang "did a good thing in massacring" Communists during the civil war because it taught such men as himself (Mao), Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-chi, and Chen Yi "the art of waging war." Ambassador Paye later remarked on Mao's morbidity, saying that Mao's whole attitude and assumptions had been pervaded in the talk by a strange sort of "intellectual cruelty", which the Chinese leader seemed unable to repress.

In short, Mao in two conversations with French officials (in January and September 1964) was very much his own man--he said what he wanted to, ranging over a variety of issues and coming back eventually to De Gaulle's alleged good sense in not following in the wake of American policy.

To return to developments regarding the problem of establishing Sino-French relations, the Chinese Communist plan to avoid insisting explicitly that the French must break off relations with the Nationalists (holding such a demand in reserve until after Paris announced its intention to establish diplomatic relations) apparently did not begin to worry the French until January 1964. On 21 January, a key French official told a U.S. embassy officer that Peking might reject a "two Chinas" arrangement, and this prospect seemed to be presaged by a Chinese Communist attack on the concept emanating from their embassy in Mali. He reiterated the French position--namely, De Gaulle had accepted "no conditions" (meaning no conditions explicitly stated) on recognition which required that Paris rupture relations with Taipei. His attitude reflected official French concern that Chiang might not take the initiative to break off relations (Paris and Peking had calculated he would). American officials were encouraged by this sign and acted to persuade Chiang to avoid such an initiative, hoping to deter an exchange of missions or, failing in that, to place the responsibility
for any Paris-Taipei rupture clearly on De Gaulle, the real instigator of the rupture.

Chiang was alerted to De Gaulle's plan to cast the first stone to shatter Paris-Taipei relations and then to deny that such a result had been intended. "When De Gaulle's announcement comes, it will not include termination of relations with the Government of the Republic of China (GRC). . . . Our cue is to sit tight and force De Gaulle or the Chinese Communists to make the next move . . . . Maybe in the long run we cannot keep our own embassy in Paris comfortably, but we should stay there as long as we can" (Taipei China News editorial of 22 January). De Gaulle still hoped Chiang would act, and, on the 22nd, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville reportedly told the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Commission that relations with Peking would be "without conditions"—that is, without
any prior pledge to break with Taipei and expel the Nationalists. On 26 January, a Nationalist spokesman publicly declared Taipei's opposition to any "two Chinas" arrangement, but then proceeded cautiously: "Should France announce recognition of the Chinese Communists, we will decide to break relations with France in principle, but the question of when to break relations involves a subtle technique and must be considered carefully."

When, therefore, on the 27th, Peking and Paris simultaneously announced their "mutual agreement to establish diplomatic relations" and to "appoint their ambassadors within three months," Taipei condemned it (in the same evening), rejected any "two Chinas" formulation, but did not sever relations with Paris. Chiang had been persuaded to allow De Gaulle the privilege of taking the responsibility for his own action rather than passing it off on others.

Both De Gaulle and Mao apparently were taken by surprise by Chiang's restraint, and Mao lost no time in applying pressure on Paris by having commentators make explicit what had been implicit in Sino-French discussions of the mechanics of recognition:

...recognition of the government of the PRC by any country implies that it ceases to recognize the Chiang Kai-shek group,... and naturally it cannot permit the representatives of this group to be present side by side with representatives of the PRC in that country or in any international organization. (NCNA's 28 January account of People's Daily editorial of the 29th) (emphasis supplied)

However, De Gaulle kept to his plan to have Chiang make the final break and on the 28th, a French spokesman rejected the Maoist demand, declaring that "France has no intention or desire to break relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek." Responding specifically to the statement of Peking's Foreign Ministry
French spokesmen were quoted by AFP on the 28th as reiterating the line that recognition was extended "without any condition" and that the Peking statement commits only "the Peking authorities," not the French. The spokesmen also declared that Peking's position had not been reflected in the Sino-French communiques announcing the establishment of relations and "if the government of Peking sees things thus, that's its business." AFP also reported on the same day that a French spokesman conceded that the Communists might be demanding expulsion of the Nationalists from Paris, but "this is out of the question." France, he said, was recognizing Peking as the effective government of the territory which it governed--i.e., the mainland--while the GRC continued to be recognized as the effective government of Taiwan.**

Regarding De Gaulle's maneuvering to impel Chiang to make the break, the AFP account had French spokesman asserting that if Taipei rejects the line taken by Paris, "it is up to them to take their responsibility, not France." As the Taipei China Post noted in an editorial on the 28th, "By biding his time, De Gaulle hopes to goad Free China into breaking off ties to keep his own hands lily white."

*Maol's flexibility in earlier French-Chinese discussions on recognition was to avoid making a specific demand for Paris to break with Taipei until he had De Gaulle's statement of recognition in his pocket. His spokesman later insisted that it was with the "understanding" that France would cease to recognize Chiang's government and would not permit his representatives to be present "side by side" with Peking's representatives that the agreement was reached to establish diplomatic relations. (Peking Foreign Ministry statement of 28 January).**

**This part of the statement was detrimental to the Nationalist position and provocative, as it was made in full knowledge that this formulation previously had been unacceptable to Taipei.
Nationalist restraint* led to a situation (described by Ambassador Kohler as "a game of diplomatic mah jong between the Emperor of the West and the twin Emperors of the East"). De Gaulle had to walk a rougher road than he had planned, and his dilemma demonstrated to other governments that Peking would not permit them to sustain a "two Chinas" formula after they had extended recognition. (Japan, for example, was warned against using De Gaulle's procedure as an example, against "establishing relations with Peking while keeping the French consulate in Taiwan intact"—Peking broadcast to Japan on 26 January.)

Mao personally had played an active role. He had flattered De Gaulle for his anti-Americanism in the interview on 30 January with visiting French parliamentarians, who were later described (by Paris journalists) as having been thoroughly exposed to all the power of seduction of this great historic figure. The seducer began the interview by displaying his admiration for French culture—"I have read Diderot and in fact all of your encyclopedists...I have read Fourier. But above all, I am a great admirer of Napoleon. I know every one of his works." Mao then employed his favorite political style—that is, a rusticism—to attack the U.S. and USSR for the partial test ban treaty: "Have they consulted General De Gaulle? The Moscow Treaty is a fraud. Those two countries must not come and sh on our heads." Having in this manner defined the common ground (or barnyard) on which he and De Gaulle stood, he asserted (incorrectly) that France had "completed its decolonization," and then indirectly asked that ambassadors be exchanged as soon as possible

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*On 29 January, Reuters quoted Nationalist Economic Minister Yang as saying that "We are waiting for France to initiate the break. If France does not break relations with us, we will still maintain relations as long as it suits us." On the same day, the Nationalist charge in Tokyo stated that his government would not immediately withdraw its embassy from Paris.
without troubling over diplomatic maneuvering:

General De Gaulle is a soldier; I too am one—I served under arms for 12 years. Not one of you is a diplomat, correct? Then I can freely say, let us distrust diplomats; they are too slippery. (Interview with French parliamentarians, printed in the Gaullist daily paper, Paris-Presse-L'Intransigent, 21 February 1964)

Mao was at the very center of the effort to make De Gaulle take steps that would lead Chiang to withdraw his representatives, and the overall effect of Chinese Communist pressures was to make the General move faster than he had desired in cutting ties with Chiang.

The French on 29 January released information which was designed to anger Chiang and provoke him into withdrawing his diplomats immediately. AFP was informed in Paris that Peking had designated its charge and that the French would soon name their charge; on the 30th, De Gaulle was reported to be planning to send a note to the Nationalist charge in Paris stating directly that his government could not claim to represent China, but the General was still willing to maintain relations with Chiang through him in a unique status. Thus De Gaulle maintained the fiction that he was not forcing a break—even as he took steps to exchange charges with Peking—and in his press conference on the 31st, he praised Chiang's "worth, nobility of soul, and patriotism" while remaining silent on the behind-the-scenes steps he was taking to destroy future relations with Taipei. Having implied that Chiang was an honorable soldier but not the head of the government of China,* having stated that Peking controlled "almost

*De Gaulle's effort to soften the blow as it fell on Chiang apparently irritated Mao and his advisers, who were already vexed by what they considered to be dilatory tactics. NCNA reported on 1 February from Paris that De Gaulle had "honored" Chiang (who really was a "traitor (footnote continued on page 81)
the whole of China" (taking account of the fact that Taiwan was not under Mao's control), and having rejected the "two Chinas" formulation (opposed by both Mao and Chiang), he prepared to inform Chiang that recognition of Peking would be implemented by sending the French charge to the mainland.

De Gaulle may have thought he could attain and sustain a "two Chinas" arrangement, but the Chinese Communists had dispelled that idea with Peking's statement on 28 January. As for Chiang, he could tolerate a situation where Paris ambiguously declared it would recognize both Chinese governments without defining what this meant, but he was unwilling to accept the implication of the General's statement: The Chinese Communist representative would be accredited from "almost the whole of China," implying that the Nationalist charge would be henceforth accredited from Taiwan only. On 6 February a Foreign Office official in Paris told Ambassador Bohlen that the French had not recently talked with the Nationalist charge and that "if he doesn't draw the obvious conclusions" they will have to inform him that France has ceased to recognize Taipei as the government of China. Nevertheless, Chiang did not withdraw his charge and embarrassed the French by having the Nationalist UNESCO delegation transferred to the Chinese embassy, complicating French plans for acquiring real estate reciprocally in Peking.

Mao's advisers sustained the pressure, and Chou En-lai declared at a press conference in the Somali

(footnote continued from page 80) repudiated long ago by the Chinese people"), referred to Peking's "implacable control of the masses," and even asserted that French recognition implied no approval of "the present Chinese regime." De Gaulle was considered to be, therefore, a partial friend only, whose loyalties were mixed and whose eulogies (unlike Sihanouk's) were misdirected. This 31 January news conference detracted from Mao's earlier professed view of the General as something like a comrade-in-arms.
Republic on 4 February that "From the day France announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, the personnel of the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Paris lost their qualifications as Chinese diplomatic representatives." When, however, at the same press conference, Chou used a mild diplomatic formulation intended to suggest no Chinese Communist pressure—the intention "attributed to France" not to break relations with Chiang was "a mere procedural question or a question of courtesy" (AP and Reuters version)—NCNA did not report it because it implied that the matter concerned only the French government, which might do as it desired. Chou's diplomatic language was intended to deflect criticism that Peking was interfering in internal French matters. But Mao apparently was concerned at that point only with the need to force De Gaulle to get on with the job of expelling the Nationalist officials.

As the Nationalists continued to hold their position in their Paris embassy and Vice President Chen Cheng declared that they would "fight to the last man" (statement of 8 February), De Gaulle prepared to concede to Mao by making the crucial move to "break" (preparation was reported in Le Monde of 7 February). On 10 February, De Gaulle informed Chiang—an oral communication from the French charge—that he would receive a charge from Peking and would consider him as the representative of China.

This message, Chiang told Ambassador Wright, ended the period of maneuver, and now every effort would be made to assure that in the eyes of the world the onus for the break rested with the French. Early in the morning of 11 February, Chiang's Foreign Ministry referred to the crucial message and asserted that by this action Paris "has damaged beyond repair" Taipei-Paris relations, which were severed on the 10th as a consequence.* The French

*The Nationalist embassy was closed on the 20th, but the Nationalist UNESCO delegation remained as occupants of their building. Peking's charge, who arrived with his staff on the 23rd, was impelled to purchase property elsewhere for Ambassador Huang Chen (a Long March veteran and former Major General) who arrived in June.
worked hard to deny that De Gaulle had capitulated to Mao's demands, and De Gaulle was left in the position of a man who had rejected a former ally for a new one (and one about whom he had not expressed a favorable opinion) -- all this to parade his contempt for Washington. \[\]

Mao's diplomats moved quickly to make Paris' recognition snowball into a campaign in other countries. In February 1964, Peking and the Congo (B) agreed to establish diplomatic relations and PRC diplomats arrived even while the Taipei diplomatic mission was still there. Chiang finally withdrew his mission in mid-April 1964. This and earlier activity pointed up the fatuous nature of Mao's professions to be above "soliciting" recognition of his regime. He had bragged to French Senator Mitterand in 1961 that

If we are not wanted here or there we can wait ten years, thirty years, one hundred years. China will always be China. It is not soliciting anything. In one hundred years it will be even more difficult to ignore it. No, we are not in a hurry. Time is our good ally. China must above all
devote itself to the building of socialism. (TASS dispatch of 23 February 1961)

But the almost Taoist possessiveness suggested by Mao in that interview had never been part of his foreign policy. And in 1964, he tried vigorously to gain recognition. One tactic was to send a "goodwill" delegation led by Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Lu Hsu-chang (accompanied by their ambassador to Mali and the Vice Chairman of the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries) to west and central Africa, starting in late July 1964. They made no headway in visits to Niger and Nigeria. But other governments, influenced partly by the French action and partly by pressure from sister governments, complied: Tunisia in January, the Congo (B) in February, the Central African Republic (CAR) in September, Tanzania and Zambia in October, Dahomey in November, and (after clear signs of ground preparation in November) Mauritania in July 1965.* Recognition from these seven states represented a considerable success and a blow to Taipei's prestige.

*Mao's principle of rejecting any "two Chinas" or dual representation situation after relations have been established was demonstrated by Peking's demand to have the government of the CAR expel Nationalist representatives. Within a few days after the issuance of the joint communique announcing the establishment of formal Peking-Bangui relations in late September 1964, the People's Daily on 3 October insisted that "from the day of the release" of the joint communique, Taipei's officials in Bangui "can no longer pass themselves off as diplomatic representatives of China."

However, in countries where the government has continued to drag its feet on expelling the Nationalists, the Chinese Communists have accepted a temporary situation (which would be construed as dual representation although Peking rejects the concept). For example, following Dahomey's recognition of Peking as the "sole legal government" of China in early November 1964, the Chinese Communist charge presented his credentials (in late December) despite the continued presence of Taipei's charge.

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in Africa which might have led to an overall deterioration of its position on the continent. Such a disaster was averted, however by (1) sustained and firm support from Washington and (2) suspicions among some states that the presence of a Chinese Communist diplomatic mission would open the way to subversive activity. Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and the Cameroon did not move with the current, although some of their officials had been tempted. By early January 1965, Ethiopia had made no additional moves* and Niger's President Diori told U.S. embassy officials that the presidents of Chad and the Cameroon had agreed with his view that no Chinese diplomatic missions should be accepted at that time. Diori had cited the speech with which the Chinese Communists had moved into the CAR and the extent of Peking's activities elsewhere in Africa as factors promoting increased caution. By the close of 1965, Taipei came away from its encounter with Peking in Africa with some prestige remaining and with a position of ties with roughly one-half of the continent's countries, the other half having established relations with the mainland regime.

As of August 1967, the number of countries which had diplomatic relations with Peking and Taipei was 47 and 62, respectively, and 18 countries did not have relations with either. Djakarta "suspended" its relations with Peking in October 1967.

De Gaulle's recognition had paid off handsomely for Mao, who again had permitted tactical flexibility to guide his diplomats as they developed contacts with countries which already had official relations with Taipei. Once contacts were established, they worked on the host government to reject "two Chinas" by expelling the...
Nationalist representatives. Mao did not score a success with Western European governments in 1964, but established some footholds by way of trade and NCNA offices (or agreements looking to setting up of such offices) in Austria, Italy, and West Germany.

Yet his strategic inflexibility—that is, his dictum that no temporary "two Chinas" situation will be permanently accepted—made it clear to Western governments that the French example had not solved the dual representation dilemma for any of them, and their hopes of seizing upon a breakthrough in the "two Chinas" tangle were quickly dispelled. Were Mao to accept a more nearly permanent dual representation policy, he might eventually score heavily in Africa, Europe,* Japan, Austria, New Zealand and the Americas, but such prolonged acquiescence in a tandem situation with diplomats of his civil war enemy and continuing opponent is more than his revolutionary animosity will permit him to bear.

In Moscow, De Gaulle's recognition action, which impeded the Soviet effort to isolate Peking and restrict the spread of its influence, was not enthusiastically received. Short and uninspired commentaries in Pravda and Izvestia on 28 January 1964 underscored French "realism" but avoided any reference to Mao's realism, except to imply that his maneuvering conceded the validity of Moscow's position in the Sino-Soviet polemic on improving international relations and on "peaceful coexistence." The Soviets denied they were "displeased" (Pravda commentary of 28 January) with De Gaulle's action, but in fact, they were considerably piqued. A Soviet embassy official in New Delhi conceded in early February that Moscow was "most upset" by De Gaulle's move; at the same time, his

*Recognition by France was the only act of establishing relations by a Western power since the Netherlands announced recognition in March 1950, American support and Chinese Communist belligerency having been the major factors deterring other powers from breaking with Taipei.
counterpart in Peking was implicitly critical of the Chinese Communists, who would make it their "prime objec-
tive," if they were to gain admission to the UN as a consequence of recognition "very soon" by other countries, to carry on the anti-Soviet struggle rather than cooperate as reasonable staff members in the Secretariat.*

Mao's new tie with Paris left him open to the charge of opportunism and hypocrisy, and the Soviet leaders attacked his chauvinistic diplomacy as inconsistent with his revolutionary preaching. Presidium member M. Suslov, speaking against the CCP on a wide range of issues, made a direct attack on the Chinese leaders at the CPSU central committee plenum on 14 February 1964 (precisely on the 14th anniversary of the Sino-Soviet treaty). Sus-

lov started by likening the Chinese leaders to a "bour-
geois" statesman, Palmerston, whose principle of foreign policy was, "We have no eternal allies and eternal enemies; only our interests are eternal for us." He then implied that Mao's preaching had been insincere because it did not correspond to the practice of the preacher:

The CCP leaders themselves, when the subject is practical steps in the international arena, prefer to act not at all from positions of revolutionary struggle with imperialism.... Chinese propaganda boils down its struggle with imperialism to a struggle with the U.S., by-passing its allies--Japanese, West German, and French imperialists.... Great suspicion is aroused by the so-called theory put forward by the Chinese leaders of an intermediate zone, which regards West Germany, Britian,

*On 21 March, the Soviet delegate to the Afro-Asian meeting (held in Algiers) exclaimed in Paris en route to the USSR, that, regarding recognition: "Do the French understand that the Chinese want to unite the yellow and black races against the Europeans, against the whites, whoever they are? Do they see the danger?"
France, and Japan as countries enslaved to US imperialism. This embellishes the imperialists of Britain, France, Japan, and especially West Germany... One must say that the ruling circles of the imperialist power have given away the secret of Chinese policy. They understand that the revolutionary phrases of the Chinese leaders are not directed against imperialism at all.

This strong Soviet polemical position exposed Mao's opportunism in moving toward Paris, and Chinese Communist materials in March 1964 reflected considerable sensitivity in arguing that the Soviets do not see the "growing divisions within imperialism" and have "a wrong theory of dealing with imperialism as a monolithic whole" (NCNA version of speech by New Zealand Party Secretary General Wilcox).

*To defend Mao's non-revolutionary willingness to accept De Gaulle's gesture of recognition and act on it, a People's Daily article of 7 March 1964 very defensively suggested that support for Paris was necessary because the "U.S.-French struggle is the focal point of the realignment of forces now underway." While at this time the concept of "realignment" was used to justify a successful Chinese effort, this same concept was later used (in late 1965 and early 1966) to try to rationalize the series of major Chinese defeats. The "realignment" concept was used on both occasions--first to defend a non-revolutionary opportunistic success and later to defend a series of revolutionary failures--because it implied the working out of "natural" forces, incapable of being controlled by even the best revolutionary leader. In defending a series of foreign policy failures, various Chinese leaders probably were quoting from a high-level party formulation which may have been produced in September and October 1965 to justify reverses. "...all kinds of political forces are now going through a process of drastic differentiation and regrouping." (Liu Ning-yi statement of (footnote continued on page 89)
the Soviet leaders have been as opportunistic as the Chinese in dealing with Western governments, but they have not professed to be unalterably anti-imperialist with the same frequency, intensity, and explicitness as have the Chinese.

The Chinese leaders have continued to justify their official contacts with Paris by centering their commentary on De Gaulle's anti-American obsession. They have even tried to portray him as being more anti-American than the Soviet leaders:

There are a number of questions over which China and De Gaulle have conflicting views -- De Gaulle advocating the neutrality of Vietnam -- but our measure of the good and the bad is based on the degree of one's opposition to the U.S. By this standard, President De Gaulle is greater than Brezhnev, first secretary of the CPSU, and Premier Kosygin. (Liao Cheng-chih interview with Japanese correspondents on 24 December 1965)

(Footnote continued from page 88)
5 November 1965) "The world is going through a process of great upheaval, great division, and great reorganization." (Chou En-lai statement of 29 November 1965). In each case, the Chinese indicated that the reverses would not force them to revise Mao's policy of pushing forward the revolution in various countries. On the contrary, Liu and Chou, using the same formulation, insisted that the world revolutionary struggle "is developing in depth" and that "new" revolutionary storms are rising against the U.S. Chou probably had personal doubts about the policy of pushing revolution even before the defeats of the summer and fall of 1965, but his statement suggests that it was necessary for him to comply with Mao's sustained revolutionary compulsion in foreign policy.
Despite the frictions which developed in Peking-Paris relations in the wake of the aberrations of Mao's purge in 1966, the Chinese leaders continue to point to the justification of De Gaulle's anti-Americanism.

B. Failure of a Major Effort: Japan (1952-67)

When Japan's sovereign status was established in the peace treaty effective in April 1952, Mao and his aides had already established their policy of eroding U.S. and Chinese Nationalist influence in Tokyo. While seeking to gain recognition from Tokyo, the Chinese Communists tried to prevent the expansion of treaty relations with Taipei (which had been established in April 1952 on the basis of Premier Yoshida's December 1951 letter to Secretary Dulles) and to destroy support for the bilateral security treaty (which permitted continued stationing of U.S. forces in Japan). Chou En-lai, entrusted with the major role in planning and implementing Japan policy, seems to have been at his natural best when permitted to advance a policy of maneuver and finesse. Chou apparently has coped with the hardest aspects of this policy and seems to have implemented Mao's will in every shift.

Chou has applied indirect pressure on Tokyo by a massive flanking maneuver. He has encouraged various political figures—including "friendly" members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), businessmen, and intellectuals—to sign unofficial agreements with Peking on trade and "cultural" matters.* Thus he has had to subordinate

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*Peking's first private (non-official) trade agreement with Japanese businessmen was signed in June 1952. The left-socialists used it to demand a reduction of restrictions on trade with the mainland, as did the JCP. The Chinese Communists tried, in the fall of 1953, to get Tokyo to sever relations immediately with Taipei as a precondition for expanded trade, but when this hard line proved unsuccessful throughout 1954, it was downplayed and replaced by a gradual, "step by step" approach.
doctrinal to pragmatic considerations in expanding Peking's allies in Japan well beyond the confines of the JCP, trying to generate massive pressure on the government for recognition along a broad front, which included even "monopoly capitalists." Mao was willing to accept advice to be politically prudent and, except for the period between 1958-60, Chou had room for maneuver. However, when Mao changed this policy in 1965 to one of demanding preparations for revolution in Japan, Chou--after downplaying such a policy for many years--complied with the shift and joined Liu Shao-chi in the new line.

Chou worked to attain de facto relations as the necessary preliminary to formal (de jure) ties. One month following his direct contacts with Japanese officials at Bandung in April 1955, a third private trade agreement was signed with Japanese businessmen calling for the exchange of permanent trade missions and inter-governmental agreements on trade and payments. Mao, however, seems to have preferred to push directly for de jure ties. In his first interview with a Japanese visitor, Mao (in October 1955) suggested that Tokyo send an ambassador to discuss establishment of formal relations. The implication of the initiative was that Mao was preparing to make settlement of specific issues (such as repatriation of Japanese war criminals and expanded trade) a reward for prior establishment of formal ties. Later, in the fall of 1955, Mao again insisted that the establishment of diplomatic relations "first" was necessary for the solution of concrete issues. But his uncompromising, high-price approach failed to budge Tokyo, and Mao apparently permitted Chou to continue with more conciliatory efforts.

By May 1956, Chou was again smiling upon Japanese visitors, assuring them that "war criminals" would be repatriated. By June, the NPC was reported to have taken up a new policy of leniency, and in August, most of the "war criminals" had been returned to Japan, where Peking's prestige was given a new lift at a time when Moscow's was being tarnished in discussions about Soviet retention of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. Chou was conciliatory in private discussions on the fourth trade agreement; at first he refused to move ahead because of Tokyo's
intolerable requirement that Chinese trade officials must be fingerprinted, but he circumvented the obstacle by extending the third trade agreement, sustaining Japanese interest and good will. Chou's efforts led to the signing of the fourth agreement in March 1958, and he persisted in maintaining a Chinese Communist trade mission despite the Japanese government's refusal in April to recognize the mission's right to raise the PRC flag. However, when that flag was torn down from the PRC trade office in Nagasaki in May, and when the incident was publicized internationally, Chou had no recourse but to drop his conciliatory line. Probably reflecting Mao's decision to retaliate, Peking's actions thereafter suggested no nuance of restraint: all trade was suspended, Japanese firms were boycotted, the Sino-Japanese fishing agreement was not renewed, some Japanese fishing boats were seized, and Chen Yi (on 9 May) was permitted to exercise his vituperative powers, denouncing Premier Kishi as an "imperialist" and an "idiot."

The crude Maoist acts of boycott and suspension of existing contracts angered political and business leaders in Japan, impeding the widely anticipated advance of the JSP in the elections and whittling down the good will Chou had been building in Japan. This policy, combined with appeals beyond the government to the "Japanese people" to abrogate the security treaty with the U.S., had the net effect of backfiring on Mao, making it easier for Tokyo to sustain close relations with Washington and Taipei.

Policy toward Japan was further frozen in this peculiarly Maoist period of revolutionary fanaticism, internally expressed in the aberrations of the commune and "leap forward" programs, and externally expressed in rejecting Soviet strategy toward the U.S. and in the interdiction effort against the offshores. In August 1958, Peking, in a hectoring way, raised six conditions for resumption of Sino-Japanese relations: the government of Premier Kishi must (1) change its hostile attitude toward China, (2) stop promoting the "two Chinas" concept, (3) stop interfering with efforts to restore diplomatic relations, (4) apologize for the Nagasaki flag incident,
(5) openly declare its intention to restore formal relations, and (6) send a delegation to negotiate differences. The final three demands were unrealistic, vindictive, and arrogant. They apparently reflected Mao's intervention (in the same way that Peking's November 1964 demands on the post-Khrushchev leadership later reflected his personal style).*

After Chou's conciliatory line was reinstituted in August 1960 (almost simultaneously with Khrushchev's withdrawal of Soviet technicians from the mainland), the final three demands were dropped. Mao apparently was convinced of the need for some trade with Japan and permitted Chou to begin to climb down from the limb on which Mao had placed him following the Nagasaki flag incident.

The policy during the intervening boycott period had been to trade, irregularly, only with small-and-medium-sized firms, rather than with the bigger "monopoly capitalists," which were closer to the government (Chou's statement to a Hong Kong Communist newspaper editor in July 1959). These small firms were designated by Peking as "friendly," thus circumventing the government-subsidized Japan-China Export/Import Association, which had been set up prior to the Nagasaki flag incident as the focal point for semi-governmental trade with the mainland. In August 1960, Chou supplemented his "three political principles" with "three trade principles" to cover Sino-Japanese commerce.** In this way, Chou, who was credited with formulating

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**Chou almost certainly had primary responsibility for formulating the principles which were the guidelines for Sino-Japanese trade. (Chou already had gained credit for formulating the five principles of peaceful coexistence and was later to set forth the eight principles on Chinese (footnote continued on page 94)
the "friendly" firm trade policy, pre-empted any future break in trade exchanges (which had left Japanese firms holding breached contracts and had embittered Japanese opinion), maintained a degree of contact with Japanese business interests, and avoided giving the impression that Mao's boycott against the "government" had been ended. As the NCNA director in Tokyo put it in private discussions with members of the pro-Peking Japan-China Friendship Association (JCFA) members in late August 1961:

Now [after the Nagasaki incident] the situation is different. Japan-China trade has been developing, without any reference to or involvement with the Japanese government. To begin with, Premier Chou invited Suzuki Kazuo to China and, on the basis of an accord between them, friendly firms were designated and trade was resumed. Therefore, even if China comes in conflict with the Ikeda regime, she will not leave the friendly firms in the lurch.

(footnote continued from page 93)

Communist aid to underdeveloped countries. These are among the few pieces of originality which Mao has conceded him.) Chou's political principles are: (1) not regarding Peking with hostility, (2) not participating in the U.S. "plot" to create two Chinas, and (3) working toward the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. His trade principles are: (1) to work toward the conclusion of government-to-government trade agreements, (2) in the meantime, to conclude and successfully carry out private trade agreements, and (3) to give "special consideration" to certain industries and commodities (i.e., Japanese small-medium enterprises). Tokyo was provided with considerable latitude by Chou's loosely formulated requirement that it must always be "working toward" formal ties with Peking.
In this way, easing out of the confines of Mao's punitive boycott policy, Chou was able to devise a means for making trade arrangements, based on "friendship," which could eventually lead back to the establishment of more regular trade and then a Chinese Communist trade office in Japan. In devising this policy, Chou displayed again his remarkable dexterity, his ability to maneuver within the narrow boundaries of an absurdly inflexible Maoist policy and to argue Mao into a little more rationality.

Chou did not take a softer line toward the Ikeda government, but worked out a differentiated approach, which sustained contacts with some businessmen and made new ones with other traders. When Mao attacked Ikeda and defended his hard line, for example by asserting that a "tortuous road of struggle" lay ahead of Japanese leftists (statement to JCPA visitors on 7 October 1961), Chou warned that Japan was taking a "risk" in becoming a war partner of the U.S. (statement to JCP delegation on 22 November 1961).

However, in the fall of 1962, at a time when the regime was still struggling to recuperate economically and competition with the USSR was extended to all countries, Mao apparently was persuaded to move again toward a semi-governmental and regular trade relationship. Chou took a conciliatory line in a series of initiatives. He invited the pro-Peking LDP member, Matsumura, to Peking to increase trade and political contacts on a step-by-step basis. Chen Yi on 19 September 1962 pretended that Matsumura had provided him with a new revelation, namely, that Tokyo would not sever relations with Taipei, and Chen responded to this professed new insight by assuring his visitor that Peking would be diplomatic on Tokyo's behalf and would not raise the matter of severing relations as a condition for increased Sino-Japanese trade. Actually, this was a contorted way of downplaying Peking's embarrassing need to work with a country whose government had relations with Taipei. On the same day, Chou told Matsumura publicly that he envisaged political gains beyond economic progress:

We hold that it should be possible to develop political relations and economic relations...
between the two countries by linking them together, as well as by developing them side by side. Moreover, these relations should influence and promote each other, and not the contrary.

Chou's point was that his policy of "gradual and cumulative methods" of advance should pave the way for Tokyo's recognition of Peking and should not be separated from that crucial goal by a fanciful hope of retaining ties with Taipei indefinitely. He was urging Tokyo to drop its line that politics and trade were separable. He was also implying that a sustained advance had been impeded by Ikeda's acceptance of U.S. policy on the issue of Chinese representation in the UN and should not be repeated in the form of overt opposition.*

*Japan and four other countries including the U.S. sponsored a resolution in 1961 to set the matter of Peking's UN entry as an "important question" requiring a decision by a two-thirds majority. When, on 15 December, this anti-Peking resolution was adopted, the Chinese Communists denounced Ikeda in a sustained campaign which made it difficult for pro-Peking Japanese political figures to increase trade and other relations. When, on 10 May 1962, LDP member, Takasaki, tried to get the Chinese to jettison their anti-Ikeda campaign and told Ambassador Liu Hsiao in Moscow that the Japanese premier could not make "overtures" to the mainland under these conditions, Liu described Japan's action in the UN in 1961 as "unforgivable."

Chou later changed this line to make Ikeda's sin forgivable on the implied condition that he must not do it again. In early November 1962, when discussions with the Japanese for regularized trade were proceeding in Peking, Chou called to his office another member of the LDP, Takeo, and asked that he convey the following message to Ikeda: Japan went "out of its way" to oppose admission of China; the speech of the UN delegate and Japan's vote were "unnecessary and provocative;" admission would have been defeated without any action by Japan; Peking would have been satisfied if the Japanese delegate had remained (footnote continued on page 97)
The Chou-Matsumura "political understanding" (Chou's term) was used as an opening wedge in the effort to return trade to the semi-governmental status it had had in 1958. Next, LDP member Takasaki (who, in October, signed a memorandum for trade from 1963-1967) was used by Chou to underscore the political significance of expanding Sino-Japanese trade. On 4 November 1962, Chou stated privately that he regarded the visit of the Takasaki mission and any eventual Japanese government backing of long-term credit as "thoroughly political," inasmuch as trade and politics could not be kept separate. Nevertheless, rather than force the issue and allow Premier Ikeda's public statement (that trade and politics could be kept separate in dealing with the mainland) to ruin negotiations with Takasaki, Chou professed to see this statement as mere "eyewash for the U.S., which is putting pressure on Ikeda." Although Peking was "displeased" with Ikeda's political attitude, Chou recognized his "difficult position" and for that reason would not allow anything to become an "obstacle to improved trade relations." This dexterity was retained by Chen Yi who, in describing the memorandum and annexed documents on over-all Sino-Japanese trade which had been signed in October by Liao Cheng-chih (with Takasaki), declared that they represented

a private treaty, in one way, and a government-to-government treaty, in another way, because those who signed the treaty for China are responsible Chinese government officials and those who signed for Japan are responsible members of the Liberal Democratic Party or representatives of

(footnote continued from page 96)
silent and abstained when the vote was taken. This was not the last time that Chou was impelled to hint to Tokyo his awareness of Japan's political commitment to the U.S. and his desire that his flexible policy should not be impeded by vanguard opposition to Peking's UN entry.
business circles who have close relations with the government. (Press conference for Japanese reporters on 9 November 1962)

The Liao-Takasaki memorandum specified the items to be exported by each country and agreed that trade would total $500 million both ways during the first five years, beginning in 1963—the first document since the Maoist boycott of 1958 to re-establish a regular channel for trade expansion.

Chou, apparently concerned that the Ikeda cabinet might not approve the memorandum and the deferred payment terms and interest rates stipulated in it, played down the political aspects of the agreement in November and December, while his subordinates pressed Japanese businessmen to begin "concrete" negotiations on the purchase of fertilizer, steel, agricultural machinery, and the vinylon plant. He gradually succeeded in dispelling fears among Japanese traders that high political demands would be raised immediately after government approval, but his reassurance effort had to be carried out well into 1963.

On 11 September 1963, Liao Cheng-chih reassured the Japanese that although Peking would not "compromise" on the "two Chinas" issue—i.e., Japan's relations with the Chinese Nationalists—there was "no alternative at present but to go ahead with the step-by-step formula." By October, visiting Japanese businessmen were told by Chou's assistants that Peking would like to exchange permanent trade delegations—a taboo subject since 1958. The Chinese also formed a China-Japan Friendship Association (CJFA) and prepared to double the number of Chinese political activists ("cultural delegations") to be sent to Japan in 1964. While Premier Ikeda continued to oppose any rapid expansion of trade or credit, other Japanese political figures were encouraged by Chou's conciliatory line to work for an expansion of trade, and his implementation of the September 1962 understanding to expedite Sino-Japanese trade, augmented optimism in Japan. The Chinese Communist goal was long-range, targeted on one fine day in the future: "Chiang's ambassador is in Tokyo. If we sent an ambassador, this would be recognizing
two Chinas. This is impossible for us....[However], if we promote friendly relations, one day Japan will probably expel Chiang's ambassador and conclude relations with us." (Chen Yi statement to Japanese reporters on 28 October 1963)

Chou's assistants continued to work on businessmen privately to reduce their fears regarding a political "trap" connected with future trade contracts. In April 1964, Chao An-po told Japanese businessmen that they need not fear a repetition of the 1958 trade boycott. His remarks reflected continuing Chinese Communist awareness of the detrimental effects this policy of Maoist retribution had had in impeding the political effort to gain Japanese goodwill.

The main development in early 1964--i.e., De Gaulle's recognition of Peking--apparently convinced the Chinese that Ikeda might be influenced by the pressure of Japanese opinion to move toward recognition. Chou tried to exploit De Gaulle's initiative and, apparently with Mao's concurrence, removed purely doctrinal obstacles from the road of recognition. A partial beginning had been made in January, when the Peking Ta Kung Pao on the 28th had laid it down that "part of the big capitalists" in Japan could be included in the anti-U.S. united front. Chou followed this up on 14 May when he told LDP members that he no longer regarded Japanese businessmen as representatives of "monopoly capital," that he welcomed their visits, and that the Chinese had much to learn from them. Chao An-po stated in late March, with some exaggeration, that the demand in Japan for formal relations "has been growing in intensity...since France's establishment of diplomatic ties with China." Chou and his aides tried to convince the Japanese that his step-by-step formula was not a dogma and that "courageous steps" (toward recognition) should be taken. Nan Han-chen on 9 April at first denied that Peking was pressing for an intergovernmental trade agreement, but then declared that the step-by-step trade expansion formula was too "time-consuming." Chen Yi on 7 May stated privately that economic and political relations should improve "at the same time," and on the 14th Nan made the point emphatic during a
visit to Japan.* Chou on 16 May told a Japanese visitor that

Even if there is an increase in the trade volume, personnel travel, exchange of technical and cultural individuals, and goodwill, table tennis matches, the 'step-by-step' formula will be meaningless unless its quality is changed. I urge Japan to change the quality of its policy and at an opportune time, take a step forward.

The "step forward" implied recognition on the De Gaulle precedent, but Chou did not want to be tied to an explicit statement, to an appearance of pushing too hard and setting a precondition for increased trade. He did not want to jeopardize important advances just then in the making.

Chou and his aides in April had concluded two agreements with Matsumura that represented a tactical gain. These were for a mutual exchange of eight newspaper reporters and the opening of trade liaison offices staffed by five men each, the Takasaki office in Peking and the Liao office in Tokyo. The agreements were semi-governmental, as the Japanese government had to approve them.

However, Chou rejected bids for postal, meteorological, and telecommunication agreements because these would have

*Nan said that "The one step forward [in trade] and two steps backward [in politics] is a formula that will not work."

Chen Yi attacked the Japanese formula that "politics and economics are separate." He said: "Quite frankly... the meaning of the thesis... is that politically the attitude of non-recognition of China should be maintained" while limited progress continued in trade. He complained that the Japanese were using the step-by-step formula to maintain the "status quo" in Sino-Japanese political relations. (Interview with Japanese visitor of 7 May 1964)
required a direct exchange with the Japanese government departments concerned (rather than mere governmental approval of non-governmental trade and news arrangements). This exchange would have established a situation which Tokyo preferred—i.e., acceptance of the Japanese concept of "one China, one Taiwan." Chen Yi made the definitive statement on this matter in an interview with Japanese reporters on 7 May 1964:

[The Japanese government] should sincerely settle the big problem of normalizing relations between China and Japan step by step. As soon as diplomatic relations between the two countries are resumed, other concrete issues will easily be solved through friendly negotiations. (emphasis supplied)

"Other concrete issues" referred to concluding government-to-government agreements, settling the issue of war reparations, and permitting the Japan Air Lines to operate across the mainland. From Tokyo's viewpoint, these were not pressing matters, being only second in importance to trade and to sustaining close relations with Washington and Taipei.

Short of formal government-to-government agreements, Tokyo apparently was willing to consider contacts between Chinese Communist and Japanese officials. On 14 May 1964, Chou had used LDP members to convey Peking's interest in establishing such contacts. He suggested that these might start in Hong Kong, informally (between NCNA and Japanese consulate officials), or in Paris; later, formal contacts in other countries could be started between the Japanese and Chinese Communist ambassadors. Ikeda apparently was interested, and on 26 June, he seems to have tried to probe the U.S. attitude by having a Japanese consulate official in Hong Kong inform U.S. personnel there that Tokyo had decided to permit Japanese officials to make contact with NCNA and Bank of China officers in the British colony. But plans for sustaining these contacts and expanding them in other countries were discarded.
following Sato's accession to the premiership in November and the development of the Maoist hard line against him.*

Before Sato took over, however, Chou tried to persuade Tokyo to avoid statements which he would be impelled to rebut. During the mid-May 1964 discussions with LDP members, one of Chou's aides, Chiao Kuan-hua, stressed the Chinese premier's forbearance. Chiao, describing himself as the anonymous author of some editorials in the Peking People's Daily, recounted his editorial criticizing British Foreign Minister Butler for supporting the concept of "self-determination" for Taiwan. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs draft of the editorial, he had also severely attacked Premier Ikeda and Foreign Minister Ohira for defending a similar concept, but "Premier Chou" had deleted the attack.** Chou himself told the LDP

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**At various times, Peking has suggested privately to Tokyo that low-level contacts between Chinese Communist and Japanese government officials should take place outside the mainland. However, low-level officials were not permitted to enter until Tokyo was clearly prepared to recognize the Peking regime. Until Tokyo was willing to take a big step and send the Premier "to the gate of the Peking airport which is always open to him," the policy of rejecting low-level visits will remain "unchanged" (Liao Cheng-chih in interview with Japanese reporters in Peking on 30 August 1965). Chou himself, in 1962, had established this line, declaring that Peking would receive a Japanese premier or foreign minister at the airport---i.e., with publicity indicating formal recognition by Tokyo---but "not petty officials through the back door." On 31 August 1966, the Chinese rejected a Japanese request to permit officials in Hong Kong to visit the mainland "one at a time," insisting that all Japanese visitors must come in a private capacity.

**Chiao also claimed that when Nan Han-chen in April, angered by the Diet's ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty in the presence of Mikoyan, had cabled Chou requesting his own recall as a protest against this anti-Peking action, Chou refused, telling Nan that to return home would be "childish."
visitors that Ikeda's 29 February 1964 statement in the Diet (regarding the "undefined" status of Taiwan) had aroused a "very strong reaction" in Peking, where a decision to lodge a formal protest with Tokyo had not yet been reached. He implied that restraint was still the dominant consideration of the Chinese leaders, but he also indicated that Japanese officials should themselves show forbearance in return. Chou said that Peking didn't care about statements from jurists and journalists regarding Taiwan, but those from government officials were "most important," and he asked Matsumura to stress this view to Ikeda. Although Mao had provided Chou with the leeway necessary for maintaining dexterity in handling policy toward Japan, Chou must have been aware that this relative freedom was a transient matter, allowed to endure only for so long as Mao saw it was creating restraint on Tokyo's side.*

Chou continued to absorb small insults and tried to maintain his moderate course. He remained silent about the visit on 13 August of an important Chinese Nationalist official in Tokyo which coincided with the arrival of the five Chinese Communist trade liaison personnel led by Sun Ping-hua to open the trade office. On 14 August he agreed to implement the Liao-Matsumura agreement of April on exchanging newsmen, and on the 15th he permitted Sun Ping-hua to hint about a higher-level visit of Chinese Communist officials (including Liao Cheng-chih) to Japan in the fall. On 17 October, one day after the Japanese were angered by news of Peking's first atom bomb test and shortly after JSP Secretary General Narita (visiting Peking) had argued with Chang Hsi-jo about his (Narita's)

*Using his global concept of two intermediate zones (see pages 73 and 74), Mao sustained the flexibility Chou needed to advance his policy toward Japan. Mao placed Japan in the second zone, together with other capitalist countries (excluding the U.S.), and stated that "I cannot believe at all that Japanese monopoly capital would lean forever toward U.S. imperialism." (Interview with Japanese Socialist on 10 July 1964)
protest over the test, Chou tried to mollify the JSP
delegation and Japanese opinion-makers generally. He
told Narita that he "understands" their feelings but,
in view of the U.S. semi-circle around the mainland and
the missile base on Okinawa—a dig at the Japanese for
permitting it—he hoped Tokyo would "understand" Peking's
security requirements. Chou also stated that Sino-Jap-
anese friendship could not be advanced if the issues of
Taiwan and Okinawa were left as they were, but his main
theme was the promotion of more contacts. On JSP initia-
tive, Chou permitted a comment on a non-aggression treaty
to appear in the joint statement concluded with the dele-
gation in order to give Narita something to cite as an
"achievement" when he returned to Japan.*

Mao himself, in the summer of 1964, had tried to
use contacts with the JSP to influence Japanese opinion,
not so much against the U.S. as against the USSR. Speaking

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*The wording made formal recognition a pre-condition
for such a treaty: "The Chinese side also states that
under condition that both governments recognize each
other on the basis of equality as the only lawful govern-
ment of their respective countries and conclude a peace
treaty, the Chinese and Japanese governments could, if
the Japanese wished, at the same time conclude a treaty
of mutual nonaggression based on the Five Principles.
The Japanese side expressed heartfelt approval of this."

In late October 1953, Kuo Mo-jo had told visiting Jap-
anese Diet members that a non-aggression pact would be
desirable, but he implied that severance of Tokyo's rela-
tions with Taipei would be the price. In October 1954,
Chou told Japanese visitors that Peking wished to sign a
peace treaty and, after Japan became "truly independent"
—i.e., rejected Washington's policy on China—it would
be possible to conclude a non-aggression treaty. In the
abovementioned joint statement, both a peace treaty and
a non-aggression pact would have to follow formal recogni-
tion of Peking by Tokyo, and this was made more explicit
than in the earlier formulations.
to anti-mainstream leader Sasaki on 10 July, Mao had tried
to make the Soviet leaders look like imperialist land
thieves, while he defended Japan's right to demand the
return of the Southern Kuriles. However, the accusation
backfired when the Japanese press interpreted it, correctly,
as an anti-Soviet ploy and a play for public opinion in
Japan. Chou had to bail out his principal, insisting,
in a conversation with a JSP Diet member on 19 July, that
the press had "erred" because as far back as January 1957,
Chou had told the Soviet leaders they had taken "too much
territory," and Mao's recent statement was not a new charge.*
His defense of Mao was undoubtedly viewed by the latter
as yet another sign of Chou's loyalty.**

Mao and Chou looked for further advances with the
accession of Sato, who had previously established a reputa-
tion for desiring a policy toward Peking which was "inde-
pendant" of Washington's. By 9 November 1964, when Sato
took over from Ikeda, Chou's policy of suppleness and
maneuver had led to a high point of contact with Japan
and it was unprecedented in its moderation toward a coun-
try which did not recognize the Peking regime. Within
two weeks, however, Mao's reaction to Sato's unexpected
hard line cracked the fine glaze which Chou had been so

*The Soviets hammered hard at the Maoist hypocrisy un-
derlying the incident. They pointed out that the Chinese
themselves earlier had said, in a government statement on
15 August 1951, that "the Kurile Islands must be handed
over and the southern part of Sakhalin and all its adjacent
islands returned to the Soviet Union." (Cited in Pravda
on 2 September 1964)

**Mao used Chou's line of defense in discussing the mat-
ter with the French delegation on 11 September 1964 and
asked the group if they wanted "to confirm" the story,
implying that Chou would handle the details for him.
long in perfecting. It is not credible that Chou would have marred his own handiwork if Mao had not directed him to do so.

After having permitted Chou to tolerate small insults from journalists in July and the JSP in October, Mao apparently was not willing to have him tolerate major rebukes from the Japanese government. In his view, that was precisely what had been hurled at his regime in the speeches of Sato and Foreign Minister Shiina to the Diet on 21 November. These men made it clear that Tokyo would maintain official diplomatic relations with Taipei while trading only through private channels with Peking ("separating economic matters from politics"); they rejected the idea of expelling the Chinese Nationalist representative from the UN on the eve of the 1964 session, expressed regret over Peking's first atom bomb test—a "poorly considered" Chinese Communist action—"strongly demanded" that Peking should "refrain from conducting further tests and take the initiative to accede to the partial nuclear test ban speedily," and advocated the strengthening of ties with the U.S. The new government, on the very same day, took concrete action, denying entry to the CCP delegation led by Peng Chen which was to attend the JCP's 9th Congress—on the grounds that, once in Japan, it "would aggravate the conflicts and strife in the country and would be inimical to Japan's interests and security." And this from Sato, a man who, earlier in November, the Chinese Communist leaders believed would be as friendly as, or even friendlier than, Ikeda had been.* Mao apparently decided that careful cultivation of Japanese opinion would

*They had some hope that he would follow the example of De Gaulle in recognizing the Peking regime. Liao Cheng-chih had complained that information received from an LDP official had led Chinese Communist officials to "look forward to the realization" of Sato becoming the "De Gaulle of Japan," but that this had not occurred and that the LDP official had "let us down." (Liao Cheng-chih interview of 24 December 1965) Chen Yi indicated that Sato had been the real source of Peking's miscalculation: "Before he became prime minister, Sato told Nan Han-chen...that he would not separate economics from politics, but as soon as he attained power, he did an about-face. We do not like this." (Chen's statement to LDP visitor on 6 September 1967 printed in Tokyo Yomiuri of 7 September)
have to take second place to a punitive attack against Sato to teach him a lesson in servility. There was a method in this Maoist plan, but madness was its overall effect on Chou's policy.

Maoist shouting began in a Foreign Ministry statement on 21 November 1964; it continued on the 23rd in a People's Daily commentary which "warned" Sato against his "perverted" anti-Peking course; it was sustained on the 25th in a People's Daily Observer article which predicted Japan's involvement in a "nuclear holocaust" if it continued to allow the U.S. to "drag Japan further into its nuclear strategic system." This threat was made roughly one month after the Chinese Communists exploded their first atom bomb and is an early instance of nuclear sabre-rattling. Mao's new feeling of strength--i.e., that Peking had become a nuclear power--may have intensified his reaction to Sato's stand.

Psychological warfare was also started on the trade front, where the Chinese Communists had a real capability to act. They did not revert to the 1958 policy of complete boycott, but rather maintained a policy of selective delays in concluding contracts. On 27 November, Sun Pinghua, head of the Liao trade office in Tokyo, notified the Takasaki office there that he had been instructed not to sign the $80-million dollar fertilizer purchase contract for 1965; a Chinese Communist official in the Liao office "explained" that this was Peking's way of showing "disapproval" of Sato's overall policy of hostility toward China. However, Chou again showed his dexterity, on the one hand attacking Sato's policy as being "full of contradictions," while on the other hand reassuring Tokyo that the Liao-Takasaki trade agreement (for the period 1963 to 1967) would be fulfilled "without fail" (interview with Kyodo correspondent in early December 1964). Chou and his aides apparently were under new instructions (almost certainly from Mao) to hit back at Sato's anti-China moves and statements without permitting any one of them to pass unanswered. This was Mao's "tit-for-tat struggle" concept, representing a shift from Chou's policy of not retaliating for every insult. Despite Chou's maneuvering, the struggle concept significantly hardened the line toward Japan.
Working within the narrow confines of this line, Chou and his aides tried to apply the pressure of Japanese opinion on Sato to make him less outspoken in defending U.S. policy on Taiwan and Vietnam. By 30 December, they threatened a reduction of trade with Japan if Sato should decide, after his visit to Washington, against government-supported credit (through Export-Import Bank funds) for three pending trade agreements. At the same time, they rejected a meeting with Tokyo's Foreign Ministry China Section chief because the Japanese government had refused to allow a Japanese lawyer to defend Chinese Communist officials under arrest in Brazil (Sun Ping-hua's private warning to Takasaki trade office chief, Okazaki, on 30 December 1964). Reflecting defensiveness for having made a basic miscalculation regarding Sato's attitude toward China, Chen Yi on 17 January 1965 told LDP member Ustunomiya that before Sato became prime minister, he had made "good comments" regarding trade and Taiwan, but now his "subservient attitude toward the U.S. is worse than that of Mr. Ikeda." Chen "appreciated" the fact that Sato in Washington had made no decision to align Japan with U.S. nuclear strategy, to arm Japan with U.S. nuclear weapons, or to make the security treaty a permanent pact—all matters of major concern for Peking. But Chen attacked Sato for voting with the U.S. in the UN on the "important question" issue; he attacked him on other grounds—i.e., for reversing his earlier position on not separating trade and politics as rigidly as Ikeda had done. This Chen Yi attack was intended to have domestic repercussions in Japan to the detriment of Sato's foreign policy, and a People's Daily Observer article on 20 January 1965 stated that his pro-U.S. course "will only increase dissatisfaction among broad sections of the Japanese people." Observer was wrong, as this crude cudgeling strategy increased popular distaste for Peking's tactics.

The hardened line on Japan was implemented by Chen Yi in an even cruder way during his 4 February interview with Japanese members of the Takasaki trade office in Peking. Sato's continued refusal to approve the use of government-supported Export-Import Bank funds evoked even more Maoist shouting in an unsuccessful attempt to scare him into a backdown. Chen shouted in a "loud and aggressive tone"
that Sato was "much worse" than Ikeda, particularly because he was "afraid of displeasing Chiang Kai-shek" and was acting in compliance with the Yoshida Letter's promise (made in May 1964, pledging that Japan would not give government credit to Peking to buy plants), refusing to sell Peking the second vinylon plant through loans obtained from the Export-Import Bank. Chen made it clear that obtaining loans from a private bank was not the real issue (it was only "a small problem"); the political point—that is, "whether or not Japan will allow Chiang Kai-shek to be connected with Sino-Japanese relations"—was the "highly important political problem." He warned that there could be no "real progress" in trade if Sato still refused government-sponsored credits. But when, on 9 April, Okasaki told Sato that the Chinese Communists would cancel the contract for the second vinylon plant, Sato replied that it was indeed a "big political problem" and therefore he could not approve Export-Import Bank financing. Peking did not buy the $30-million plant and had to accept a clear defeat of its pressure tactics against the Yoshida Letter and Taipei influence in Tokyo.

Despite Chen Yi's threat implying no further progress in Sino-Japanese trade, Chou acted personally to keep trade from declining. Chou and Matsumura reached a secret verbal agreement in April 1965 that Liao-Takasaki trade would be maintained at all costs. Within the confines of continuing trade, Chou and his aides again indicated (in July) that Sato's support for the Yoshida Letter was causing a delay, this time on negotiations for the fourth year of overall Japan-China trade. On 4 August, Chinese Communist trade officials in Tokyo refused to discuss a long-term fertilizer deal, confining it to a one-year period, the stated reason being Sato's support of U.S. policy on Vietnam.

This last point indicated clear political interference in a domestic matter via the trade channel. Mao apparently wanted trade actively used as a political weapon, and Chou and his aides complied. Chen Yi in late May 1965 asked Utsunomiya to get Sato to stop supporting U.S. policy on Vietnam and when Nan Han-chen, in August, warned Tokyo that if it participated in the Vietnam war,
the future of Sino-Japanese trade would be affected, the Japanese Foreign Ministry openly attacked him for political interference. On 10 September, Liao Cheng-chih tied Vietnam matters with Sino-Japanese trade directly when he discussed Peking's attitude with Okasaki: "The Vietnam situation and possible war with the U.S." must be considered in trade negotiations with Japan. Liao also said that the invitation for an LDP group to visit Peking was withdrawn because of Sato's policy and the possibility of a U.S. attack on China, which Japan presumably would support. Liao indicated a shift toward more politically oriented trade, saying that Liao-Takasaki trade would be limited in 1966 and that "friendly firms" would be used more often, the unstated reason being: these firms do not separate trade from politics and, in return for Chinese Communist orders, they made a point of disseminating Peking's propaganda in Japan.* On balance, although political

*These "friendly firms" were subjected to friendly blackmail. That is, they could maintain their special status in Sino-Japanese trade only by complying with every change of Peking's political line toward Japan in general, and later toward the JCP in particular. For example, the Yokohama Friendly Trade Company (YFTC), set up in November 1965 with as many as 40 members of the JCP in various posts was classified by Peking as a "friendly firm" until the development of the JCP-CCP dispute in mid-1966. As that dispute deepened, the Chinese Communists instructed the YFTC Executive Director to (1) replace all JCP members with pro-CCP members of the JSP, (2) receive, in return, trade valued at $527,777 for a three-month period starting in September 1966, (3) reject all JCP directives, and (4) divide its annual income for use in "friendly trade" and in promoting good relations with China through support of pro-CCP members of the JSP. The Executive Director complied, as to act otherwise would have meant financial death.

In late 1966, many other "friendly firms" disavowed their JCP connection in order to maintain their special status with Peking. They discarded the former policy of providing the JCP with rebates from "friendly trade" and switched these rebates to those JSP members who promoted Sino-Japanese "friendship."
issues were increasingly tied to trade, Sino-Japanese commercial interchange continued to increase. In November 1965, Liao Cheng-chih told visitors that trade would move from $400 million in 1965 to $500 million in 1966.

As suggested earlier, Sino-Japanese relations, which had been on a downward spiral since Sato took over from Ikeda in November 1964, were worsened by Peking's demand that he end his support for U.S. policy on Vietnam. In September 1965, Chen raised the spectre of Japanese collusion with other major powers in an attack on the mainland:

We welcome U.S. imperialism to come and come early; come with the Indian reactionary nationalists, come with the British imperialists, come with the Japanese militarists. We are certain to win even if the modern revisionist leadership in the north combines with them... China is a large country; even if the U.S. and its lackeys send several million troops to the China mainland, it will not be enough. (Chen Yi Press Conference of 29 September 1965)

By casting the Japanese in the light of something more than political opponents, Chen apparently tried to stimulate more anti-Sato opinion in Japan than had yet arisen and to warn implicitly against Diet ratification of the Japan-ROK treaty. He failed on both scores, and when the Lower House ratified the treaty in November, Peking depicted it as part of the military alliance allegedly under construction by the U.S. to serve as the instrument for a major war in Asia which would include an attack against China. (People's Daily editorial of 15 November 1965; the editorial used language from Chen's press conference of 29 September to reiterate the hypothetical prospect of Japanese participation in an attack on the mainland.) Kuo Mo-jo tried to conceal this policy defeat on the Japan-ROK treaty by devising a weak rationalization: the U.S. "had to step up its collusion" with "reactionary forces" in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan because it was in trouble in Vietnam (speech of 19 November).
Developments in the Vietnam war and Mao's apprehension that it might escalate eventually to the mainland impelled him to take a harder line to mobilize all possible international forces against the U.S. and its allies. Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, and Chen Yi in August 1965 reportedly asked visiting Japanese Communist officials

*Before the hard Maoist line had been imposed, Chou had taken a softer position on this matter. On 14 May 1964, he told visiting Diet members that Peking would not insist on Japan's breaking "friendly" ties with the U.S. as a prerequisite for improving Tokyo-Peking relations. He went on to say that Peking wished to improve relations with Japan even while Tokyo sustained close contacts with the U.S.*
to start a resistance movement in Japan in order to assist Peking in the event of a Sino-American war. Liu apparently took the lead and was reportedly displeased when the Japanese demurred.* By the fall of 1965, Mao tried to put a more militant spirit into policy toward Japan. For example, increasingly obsessed with the radical political potential of young people, he stressed the "important role" which Japanese youth must play in the "harsh and tense" situation (interview with Japanese delegation leaders on 25 November 1965).** Other leaders, including Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai and Peng Chen, outlined a four-point action program for the visitors: they were asked to strengthen (1) contacts between the youth of Japan and the mainland, (2) the "common struggle"

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**Peng Chen apparently had had a major role in implementing the Youth Exchange Program with the JCP and other Japanese leftists. On 14 June 1966, as CCP-JCP relations deteriorated and after Peng Chen had been purged, the head of the JCP's cultural department suggested to other leaders that youths "who feel greatly indebted to Peng Chen for his assistance during their visits to China" under the program should not be retained in the Sino-Japanese Friendship Association. Peng was later blamed for taking a moderate line; in fact, he was no more moderate than Chou. On 9 September 1966, a newspaper of the Mao Tse-tung Red Guards of People's University made an "Urgent Proposal for the China-Japan Youth Interchange Program," demanding that it should be warlike—unlike the first interchange program which had been "peacefully conducted by the former Peking Municipal Committee." Among the Red Guard proposals were: instill people's war theory in the minds of Japanese youth, train them to participate in revolution, and require daily study of Japanese editions of Mao's works.
against the U.S., (3) the effort to establish diplomatic relations with Peking, and (4) support for Hanoi in the war. On 12 December, Liao Cheng-chih spoke to the delegations in Shanghai on the need to struggle against U.S. policy in Japan by forming a "people's front", of which the delegations were said to be a symbol.

Mao's shift toward a "people's front"—that is, a more leftist alliance excluding neutrals and conservatives—may also have reflected intelligence he had received of the JCP's new policy of declaring independence from other Communist parties (including the CCP). On 24 November, an NCNA official in Tokyo was quoted as saying that the Chinese Communists believed the JCP was shifting away from its "full support" of Peking's positions and that clear signs of JCP-CCP differences would emerge within six months. The same official was quoted as pointing to the JCP's relative passivity in creating opposition to the Japan-ROK treaty and its failure to incite violent political action against it as a clear example of the JCP's rejection of CCP advice. By early February 1966, as the Miyamoto delegation was preparing to visit the mainland for crucial discussions, Chinese Communist officials privately told a contact in Peking that the JCP "cannot accomplish anything" on "practical matters," leaving him with the impression that the Chinese leaders had already decided to channel their main political action through private organizations and "people's" groups rather than through the JCP.

Sato, however, was still their main target and they suggested that his support of escalation in Vietnam might lead to a China-U.S. war and then a Sino-Japanese war.*

*This line did not hurt Sato politically as much as it helped him to argue for greater recognition of the Chinese Communist potential nuclear threat. His statement to the Diet in late November 1965 reflected his desire to tighten Tokyo's control over shipments to the mainland of goods on the COCOM list which were useful for Peking's nuclear weapons program. He said that Peking "is a threat without being armed with nuclear weapons. This threat to Japan is real, now that China is a nuclear power." It also helped him in gaining ratification in November of the Japan-ROK treaty on the argument that Japan needed alliances directed toward increased security.
Japanese were to criticize this support. On 18 November 1965, Liu Shao-chi urged the Japanese delegations in Peking to make every effort to prevent "a war between Japan and China," and on 6 December, Nan Han-chen told Japanese businessmen to be "vigilant against schemes by the U.S. and Tokyo "to impose war on us." The Chinese also tried to frighten Sato himself into neutrality and into opposition to any escalation in Vietnam. An aide of Liao Cheng-chih in Peking spoke to a key official in the Takasaki trade office in January 1966 as follows:

If the U.S. bombs China, unfortunately the U.S. is out of our reach. We are not able to return the blow. However, it is not impossible for us to reach Japan. The Japanese must consider their position if war breaks out.

In making this statement, he apparently intended it to be passed on to the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Presumably, the Chinese Communist intention was to impel Sato to oppose U.S. escalation in Vietnam and to keep Japanese personnel out of the war. This was one of the first and most explicit threats Peking was to make to Tokyo which implied a nuclear weapons attack on Japan from the mainland. Chou En-lai's later pledge, made on 10 May 1966, never to use nuclear weapons to "blackmail others" could not conceal from Japanese officials the fact that in January one of his aides had done just that.

Sato, however, was not impelled to criticize U.S. policy in Vietnam. Moreover, he prepared to impose more stringent measures to proclude violations of COCOM restrictions on shipments of strategic goods, especially missile guidance systems equipment, to the mainland. These Chinese Communist threats, taken together with Ambassador Reischauer's suggestions in January 1966 and representations made to the Japanese in Washington one year earlier, may have convinced Sato of the need for a harder attitude toward COCOM violations. Nevertheless, Mao's policy of attacking Sato on Vietnam was sustained.
His propagandists apparently were directed to publicize threats implying the use of nuclears:

U.S. nuclear protection cannot protect Japan. Quite the contrary, when U.S. imperialism launches a war in Asia, Japan will be involved in it, whether or not it wants to be, and will bring upon itself grave consequences. (People's Daily Commentator article of 15 March 1966)

Although this article tried to qualify the threat by discussing the defensive nature of Peking's nuclear capability and the Chinese Communist adherence to the doctrine of non-first use, by raising the issue to a Japanese public, Mao was running the risk of creating the opposite effect namely, Japanese criticism of A-bomb rattling. But that risk was disregarded, and on 11 August 1966 Chen Yi used visiting JSP members to convey the following threat: Peking will support the Vietnamese at all costs, even if this results in a conflict with the U.S., in which event all parts of Asia where the U.S. maintains military bases would be drawn in, "and this includes Japan."* According to the account of one of the JSP delegation members, Chen stated that U.S. bases in Japan will become targets of military operations if war breaks out, and Peking will "dispatch military forces to Japan to assist the Japanese people to rid themselves of the American aggressors." The dispatch of PLA troops to Japan is even more unreal and demagogic in substance than the implied threat to use Chinese Communist nuclears, suggesting that the Chinese leaders believed they could

*Regarding the danger to Japan if it were to act unilaterally to become involved in Vietnam, Chen later threatened that "Under present conditions, if Japan involves itself in the war, it will benefit the U.S. and not Japan, and Japan will be hit hard." (Statement made on 7 July 1967 to visiting LDP Diet member Tōma Utsunomiya printed in Tokyo Yomiuri of 8 July 1967)
frighten Japanese opinion-makers without establishing credibility for their threats. Even though opinion-makers had no reason to believe the threat, it may have been intended for use as political pressure on Sato from popular opinion which was more susceptible to ludicrous Chinese threats.

Unrealistic statements outlining a wild program of armed struggle were made to the Japanese Communists at about the same time these crude threats were being made against the government. CCP leaders, including Liu Shao-chi, are reported to have insistend to Miyamoto in March 1966 that he must prepare the JCP for "armed struggle" to oppose the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty in 1970 because the U.S. was preparing for an eventual attack on China. This apparently was Mao's egregious way of dictating a new line to the JCP which would have the main element of the Chinese model in it. This new line was to replace the line of "peaceful transition" and was to be imposed regardless of political realities in Japan. U.S. bases were to be the targets.

According to JCP presidium member Kurahara, the Chinese leaders told Miyamoto that he should be preparing the party to wage "guerrilla warfare against American military bases in Japan" and should "reconsider"—i.e., abandon—the concept of peaceful transition to socialism as defined in the JCP's program. Earlier, in August 1965, Liu Shao-chi had asked two JCP leaders to start a resistance movement in Japan: "Should war (between the U.S. and China) erupt, we are not asking that the JCP start an armed revolution in cadence with China. We request that you consider making preparations for a resistance movement by uniting the democratic forces in Japan."*

*JCP Secretary General Miyamoto confirmed this later as the CCP position as conveyed to him in Peking in March 1966: "China's view was that preparations are necessary for the outbreak of a Sino-U.S. war—a third world war. Imperialism's war strength can be diverted more effectively by tens of thousands of people armed with weapons than by one million party members or mass movements. In other words, they did not say that Japan should immediately launch an armed uprising." (Interview published in Tokyo Akahata on 28 July 1967) (emphasis supplied)
A Japanese government official credits a source close to Miyamoto with the report that at the meeting (on 29 March 1966), when Mao rejected the CCP-JCP joint communique, he (Mao) tried to convince Miyamoto that a China-U.S. war was likely within two years and that the JCP should aid the Chinese by supplying information on military deployments in Japan and by preparing to resist the use of Japan as a base for war against China. Miyamoto's refusal reportedly prompted Mao's veto of the communique. Whatever the cause of the veto--i.e., either Mao's demand that it contain a denunciation of the CPSU or his pique with Miyamoto's refusal to pledge JCP military preparations, or both--it is virtually certain that the line taken in August 1965 by Liu and Chou actually reflected Mao's unrealistic view of the role of the JCP in Japan. Akahata on 13 February 1967 complained that pro-CCP "flunkeys" had always been calling for violent revolution, drawing on the documents of "a certain party," but were "now openly stating that under the present circumstances Japan must have a people's war or armed struggle."

Once again, a hard and unrealistic line had been introduced into Sino-Japanese relations which seems to have gone beyond anything which Chou En-lai would have permitted on his own initiative.*

A new area of concern developed with the rise of a friendly atmosphere between Tokyo and Moscow on Soviet initiative in early 1966, the Russian intention having been to cultivate Japan as a counterforce to Peking in Asia. The Soviets became less anxious than previously to weaken the strength which Japan draws from its security relationships with the U.S. and during Foreign Minister

*Although Liu Shao-chi is now depicted as the man who desired a reduction of Peking's support to foreign revolutionaries, Liu in fact appears to have been as directly involved as Chou in trying to induce the Japanese Communists to act in a revolutionary way and to accept Mao's course of "armed struggle."
Shiina's visit to Moscow in January 1966, Gromyko toned down his statements on the U.S. and declared that the USSR does not wish to harm Japanese relations with "third countries". The Maoist response—to clear signs that the CCP dispute with the CPSU leaders was having a softening effect on Tokyo-Moscow relations—was to attack both governments openly; Japan is "following the U.S. and is aligning itself with the USSR to oppose China" and Moscow wants to "collude" with Tokyo because the Russians oppose Peking (People's Daily Observer article of 4 February 1966). This strategy of cudgelng Tokyo deterred neither the Soviet leaders nor Sato from signing a five-year trade agreement; the Soviets were encouraged by these Maoist complaints, and later made concessions in the talks on fishing matters (in April 1967).

Mao had no real leverage on Sato, who still separated trade from politics. Vituperation did not prevent Sato from refusing (on 29 March 1966) to permit the Chinese to send a delegation, prospectively to have been led by Liao Cheng-chih, to hold discussions with Sasaki and other JSP officials. The grounds for refusal were that previous attacks by Peking's officials in Japan had constituted interference in domestic affairs. Peking reacted with a threat—Sato will "push the Japanese nation again into the abyss of disaster" (People's Daily Commentator article of 5 April 1966), and with the cancellation of some visas for Japanese travel to the mainland. If Mao could see that he was helping Sato, he did not care. Japanese Foreign Ministry China Section chief Hara stated privately on 23 April that the Sato administration appraised Chinese Communist intimidation and threats as "useful" and as the basis for awakening the Japanese public on defense matters and for justifying Tokyo's program to acquire increased funds for the Japanese security and defense forces. Peking's third nuclear explosion (on 9 May 1966) enabled the government and press to play up the potential threat to Japan of a nuclear China.

The Sato government was alert, however, to Peking's failure to reduce or stop Japan-China trade and tried to avoid the impression that Japan was an important link in a containment policy against the mainland. The Chinese
indicated that they had not barred the door. Chen Yi bragged to Matsumura on 13 May that the Chinese were still treating Japan as a "most-favored nation" and that they had more diversified contacts with it than with any other country "despite the lack of diplomatic relations." The hard political line was not duplicated in the field of trade, and, despite the overt Peking position that politics and trade are inseparable, the Chinese Communists in fact kept them separate in most of 1966.

The Maoist purge and the hard line toward Sato did not result in a reduction of trade in 1966.* The Chinese were deliberate in assuring the Japanese that this would not occur. Sun Ping-hua, head of the Liao trade office in Tokyo, was quoted in September 1966 as pledging that the total amount of transactions between Japan and the mainland at the Canton fair would be "double" the highest previous figure. At the preliminary Liao-Takasaki trade talks in mid-September, the Chinese agreed to pay cash for purchases instead of using the deferred payment system, and they acquiesced in most other Japanese proposals. Predicted that Japan's trade with the mainland would reach $600 million, and by the end of the year it totalled $635 million for 1966, a considerable jump over the 1965 total of $470 million and a clear indication of Peking's determination to keep Japan its chief trading partner. Liao-Takasaki and "friendly firm" trade were depicted by a Chinese Communist official in late September 1966 as "the two wheels of the China-Japan trade cart," and the U.S. embassy in Tokyo in October estimated that the 300-350 "friendly firms" accounted for 60 to 65 percent of the total trade. The Chinese on 21 November signed the final agreement on the level of trade under the fifth and final year of the Liao-Takasaki agreement; they did not stall or try to disrupt the negotiations. The Yoshida Letter issue has also been shelved, and the

*In 1967, however, the Japanese became increasingly pessimistic about the future of Sino-Japanese trade which, in the first six months of the year, was about 13 percent below that of the same period in 1966.
Chinese have not used it as a pretext to curtail trade. Chou told LDP members on 12 September 1966 that although restoration of diplomatic relations was "an important problem," the interchange of people and trade at present was "even more important," inasmuch as it is obvious that diplomatic relations "cannot be restored in a short time."

Mao's purge and his ubiquitous demand that revolutionary attitudes must prevail in all aspects of Chinese Communist activity, however, eliminated a different part of Chou En-lai's differentiated policy, namely, the part in which Peking professed non-interference in Japan-U.S. relations. As late as December 1966, Chen Yi was still permitted to profess, privately in a discussion with a Japanese businessman, that Peking had no desire to interfere with these relations. But by 27 February 1967, the line had been shifted, apparently after the Chinese Foreign Ministry and its officials had been opened up to criticism by Maoist Red Guards. On that day, during the signing of the protocol on "friendly" trade, Liao Cheng-chih, who had been subjected to Red Guard criticism sessions in January, urged the Japanese "friendly" trade negotiators "to struggle against Washington, Moscow, the Sato-Kishi-Kaya government, and traitors in Yoyogi [JCP leadership headquarters]."* This formulation reflected the shift

*The protocol replaced the private trade agreement for the promotion of "friendly" trade signed on 15 December 1962 between representatives of the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade. It reflected the hard line: by contrast with the 1962 agreement, it was highly polemical and contained sycophantic praise for Mao's purge and "thought," it committed the newly-favored Japan International Trade Promotion Association (purged of pro-JCP elements) to struggle against "U.S. imperialism, Japanese reactionism, and Soviet revisionism," and it stated Mao's policy to "eradicate" the "evil influence" of the JCP from Japanese-Chinese trade. The comparatively non-polemical 1962 agreement had been arranged and signed by Nan Han-chen.
to a more black-and-white differentiation of enemies (the Sato government must be struggled against rather than cultivated by a step-by-step approach) and a greater desire to put them all in the same camp, the black camp of imperialism and revisionism, which were equally pejorative terms in Mao's vocabulary. Mao had more enemies to fight in Japan than ever before—the result of an uncompromising anti-American, anti-Soviet line and of a demanding temper. But Mao apparently does not pay for his unfulfilled hopes by any proportionate depression of spirit and seems to have an ability to fly over a present policy setback by beginning to hope for a new kind of future.

Mao's new future required new men (or remade old ones). His purge extended into the group responsible for implementing the step-by-step policy. Several men, including Nan Han-chen, chairman of the Chinese Committee for the Promotion of International Trade, fell from favor and were no longer seen by Japanese who negotiated with the Committee.*

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*Nan Han-chen had to accept the benefits of Maoist mental therapy—i.e., Mao's version of the Bolshevik practice of subjecting scapegoats to "criticism and self-criticism." Since January 1967, Liao Cheng-chih, another scapegoat, has had to accept a major part of the blame for the earlier Japan policy, but Chinese officials in the Liao trade office in Tokyo reassured anxious Japanese trade negotiators that criticism of Liao was different from that of men associated organizationally with Liu Shao-chi and that Liao would "pass the test" of loyalty to Mao. Chen Yi, too, has been subjected to the process of accepting blame for Mao's and Chou's earlier policies. He and Liao probably will continue to be subjected to a protracted routine of psychological abasement, but they probably will not be purged.

Red Guard persecution of Liao provides a revealing example of Mao's use of the scapegoat procedure. Liao has had to take the blame for the formulation of policy which was not his main job in dealing with Japanese, namely, (footnote continued on page 123)
Liao's attack on the JCP at the trade session of 27 February took the Japanese delegation by surprise. The Japanese Ministry of International Trade (MITI) and the Foreign Ministry were soon afterward said to be "distressed" over the vituperation in the protocol which stated that the U.S. is the "common enemy" of the people of the world (this had been an earlier formulation which the Chinese had solicited from former JSP leader Asanuma at political meetings in Peking, but which had been kept out of trade matters) and referred to the U.S. as "gangsters." This was embarrassing to men in Japan who hoped for expanded Sino-Japanese contacts, and most of the Japanese press did not report on this anti-American aspect of the protocol. The Japanese government and businessmen were further distressed by the political activity of Sun Ping-hua, chief of the Liao trade office in Tokyo, who was obviously instructed from Peking to attack the JCP for provoking a fight between 20 Chinese students and members of the pro-JCP Sino-Japanese Friendship Association on 2 and 3 March. On 6 March, Sun made a public statement of political protest, declaring that the "Japanese revisionists" were Soviet "pawns" and "betrayers" of the international Communist movement, and, shifting to an attack on the police for inaction, he concluded with a "demand" that the government immediately punish the pro-JCP group. On the previous day, Sun, apparently acting on an instruction from Peking to take a hard revolutionary line, told a meeting of "friendly" firm representatives of the pro-Peking Japan International Trade Promotion Association (JITPA) that all future business with the mainland would depend on their willingness to comply with Peking's policy on the JCP.* After this warning,

*(footnote continued from page 122)*
responsibility for failing to assess correctly the anti-Peking course of the JCP. Other Chinese Communist officials (including Liu Shao-chi, Peng Chen, and Chou En-lai) were directly involved in assessing the attitudes of JCP leaders, but Liao is the main target of Red Guard criticism.

*Mao personally sanctioned JITPA and praised its director on 4 October 1967.*
the JITPA called for a revolutionary "struggle against revisionism"—a campaign to begin on 2 April led by "friendly" firms at the hall where the fight had taken place. Sun was recalled to Peking in mid-April, and his last major act before that time was to demand that photos of the struggle meeting at the hall should be sent to Peking (for fuel in the fight against the JCP and to apply pressure on the government to punish the men who had attacked the Chinese students).* (The students had placed anti-JCP slogans on their dormitory walls, virtually inviting retaliation.) On 6 March, Liao Cheng-chih said that Sato's failure to protect the students was another sign of hostility and that he might reduce the activities of the trade office in Peking or recall senior Chinese trade representatives from Tokyo. Actually, he did not act on this threat and trade was sustained.

The new Maoist revolutionary approach to influencing opinion in Japan required a drastic reconstruction of the CCP's basis of support and a major effort to replace JCP influence in Japan's contacts with the mainland. Once again, the chief "trade" official engaged in political organizational activity. On 23 March, Sun Ping-hua presided at the founding meeting of the China News Agency (CNA)—a replacement for the JCP-controlled Asian News Service—charged with the job of relaying NCNA stories and photographs to Japanese audiences. Sun said that the CNA would "disseminate the great thought of Mao Tse-tung, explain China's socialist revolution and socialist construction, and promote the solidarity and friendship of the Chinese and Japanese people". In early April, Liao told a JSP Diet member that Peking planned to provide maximum support to pro-CCP elements in the JCP, particularly

*Sun told a visiting LDP member at the Liao trade office in Peking in late June 1967 that he was undergoing self-criticism and had to work on a farm in the suburbs. He was reported as being in good health "but subdued."
those in the militant Yamaguchi Prefecture, in order to build their power base, within the JCP.* The intention was to destroy the existing and to create a "new" JCP under CCP influence. Liao confirmed that "friendly" firms were being encouraged, by means of increased trade orders, to provide support for pro-CCP elements in the Yamaguchi Prefecture Committee of the JCP and in other pro-CCP organizations. At the same time, the Chinese Communist leaders were reported to have shifted the handling of trips to the mainland by pro-Peking intellectuals (such as scientists, writers, and university professors) from JCP supervision to a new "Saionji Office" in Tokyo. By 11 April, Chinese-influenced organizations were defending Mao's claims to world revolutionary leadership offering a distorted version of his purge, and praising the new-born charisma of Lin Piao while attacking the CPSU and the JCP by name (joint statement issued by the International Trade Promotion Association of Western Japan and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade on 11 April 1967). Liao and officials of Peking's Ministry of Foreign Trade were at the signing ceremony, and the joint statement clearly indicated that the new requirement for "friendly" firms seeking trade was more open and explicit support of Mao's political attacks on

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*JCP Central Committee secretary Gesu Junkichi reported to the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee in late February 1967 that pro-Peking members of the JCP remain within the party and are increasingly engaging in covert activities, such as disseminating appeals for "violent revolution" and forming committees—the "Anti-Party Anti-Revisionism Committees"—in about 20 prefectures in Japan. Complaining of this boring-from-within tactic (and the physical attacks on JCP members at the Peking airport on 3 and 4 August 1967), a major editorial in Akahata on 21 August 1967 declared a counterattack should be started against "party-wrecking activities" and cited Yamaguchi, Saga, Fukuoka, Hyogo, and Aichi among the many prefectures where pro-Peking Japanese Communists had established "committees."
a wide range of enemies. On 18 April, Sun Ping-hua's deputy in Tokyo demanded that leading members of the Tokyo Overseas Chinese Association should make plans for the possible withdrawal of the Chinese Communist trade office from Japan in 1970 so that they too could withdraw. This demand may have reflected Mao's desire to create the impression that Sino-Japanese trade contacts would deteriorate if the Japan-U.S. security treaty was to be kept intact in 1970. The inference was: Overseas Chinese in Japan must begin immediately to prepare an effective organization to act as a "stay-behind" asset to support Peking. The real intention seems to have been to attain immediate support from the Overseas Chinese community for closer supervision from Peking, to remove Chinese Nationalist influence, and to generate support for Mao, "love of Mao Tse-tung" having been newly stipulated as one of the fundamental principles to guide the thoughts of Chinese in Japan.*

When, on 15 May, an official of Peking's Ministry of Foreign Trade attacked Sato's "new reactionary policy" (i.e., the banning, under COCOM restrictions, of 17 items of scientific equipment from display at the prospective Tientsin exhibition), representatives of "friendly" firms

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*Closer supervision was indicated in statements made by two Chinese officials at the mid-July 1967 discussion meetings of the Tokyo Overseas Chinese Association who declared that Overseas Chinese would be mobilized to support various kinds of Peking's activities in Japan. The center of these activities was said to be the Liao-Takasaki office building which would serve as a "quasi-official embassy" housing trade officials, an Overseas Chinese work unit, and NCNA personnel. Indoctrination of businessmen who were to visit the mainland apparently is one of the work unit's functions, and in late August 1967, the Liao-Takasaki office used the Tokyo Overseas Chinese Association to send out requests to firms expecting to attend the Canton trade fair in the fall, instructing them to send their representatives to preparatory "study sessions."
responded. They held a denunciatory meeting in Tokyo, put forward "demands" that Sato lift the ban and rescind all other COCOM restrictions, and sent a five-man delegation to protest to the Minister of International Trade and Industry, Wataro Kanno. Their activities gained them only a strong rebuff from Kanno, and Peking was left to lament that Sato, after all these years, "still sticks" to the COCOM regulations—an indirect admission of a major defeat for one aspect of Mao's policy toward Japan. (NCNA dispatch of 31 May 1967)

Even in its moderate stages, Mao's policy toward Japan has been a failure. Tokyo continues to maintain close ties with the U.S. and Taiwan and has refused to recognize the Peking regime. The small successes in changing Japanese attitudes, attained by the flexible approach of Chou En-lai, have not been expanded into any major victory. More importantly, Mao undoubtedly is aware of the basic failure and may now believe (more than Chou believes) that there is nothing to lose in advancing the new revolutionary line. But the effect of this new line and the impact in Japan of news of his purge have been making it easy for Tokyo to resist pressures for a conciliatory line toward China. A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated on 22 September 1966 that the Red Guard movement "has had a most deep and profound effect on the Japanese people, particularly the intellectuals, and it has caused them to observe China in a different light." Chou almost certainly has informed Mao that Japanese goodwill is being rapidly dissipated, and Chou has probably been the leader who encouraged Chen Yi to try to reassure Japanese visitors that there was nothing abominable in Red Guard abominations. But such efforts have had no effect, and the change to a critical attitude toward Peking in the Japanese press, among intellectuals and leftists, and in parts of the business community has produced for Tokyo's Foreign Ministry what one official described as "the easiest period in many years on the China question."

The drastic shift away from a step-by-step approach (i.e., exploiting contacts with the JCP and various political and economic interest groups, including conservative
"big capitalists") to a more revolutionary struggle line against Tokyo (i.e., exploiting aggressive pro-Peking leftists and mobilizing Overseas Chinese) required a defense of Mao for previously having sanctioned the gradual approach and alliance with the JCP. The main part of this defense required the use of Mao's scapegoat procedure, which had been employed by the Chinese leader for many years after he had acquired it from observing Stalin's practice.

The scapegoat procedure required (1) suppression or distortion of Mao's own earlier sanction for the policy and (2) attribution of the discarded policy to junior foreign policy officials whose lower position in the leadership hierarchy made them vulnerable to the distorted charges. Regarding (1), although the record indicates that Mao personally included the "monopoly capitalists" in the gradual effort to pressure Tokyo toward recognition, Peking now avoids all mention of the fact. Regarding (2), a Red Guard newspaper on 18 June 1967 attacked Liao Cheng-chih—a Japan specialist, a subordinate of Chou En-lai, and the Deputy Director of Chou's State Council Foreign Affairs Office—for formulating the line which Mao himself had formulated (i.e., that "we must also work on the monopoly capitalists"). In addition to clearing Mao's name by this scapegoat procedure, Chou has used it in an effort to clear his own record, inasmuch as he has been the most active "rightist" (i.e., rational mind) in Japan policy. Chou has continued to be the dominant figure in policy toward Japan, and in March 1967, the final decision on visa renewals for Japanese correspondents in Peking reportedly was made by Chou after Liao and Chen Yi had forwarded the renewal requests to him.

But Chou must now work in the narrowest political framework ever in policy toward Tokyo, especially at a time when Mao is training "red diplomatic fighters" who will "never praise the bourgeoisie in an unprincipled way or curry favor with them" (People's Daily editorial of 28 June 1967). Because most Japanese leaders, intellectuals, and businessmen are now undifferentiated members of "the bourgeoisie," the prospect is that his policy of reducing the categories of acceptable allies will further erode
pro-Peking sentiment in that country. Trade and non-official contacts will take place against the backdrop of political hostility, and the effort to attain formal diplomatic relations will be further impeded.