Intelligence Report

MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION": ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

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MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION": ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

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MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION": ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

This working paper of the DD/I Special Research Staff is an attempt to reconstruct the history of China's "great proletarian cultural revolution." It presents the thesis that China's "cultural revolution" is in reality a "political revolution" designed by Mao Tse-tung to test the entire apparatus of power (party, government and army) in Communist China and to purge it of all found guilty of opposing his leadership and his programs.

Central to this thesis is the view that the origin of the "cultural revolution" must be traced to the "three years of economic hardships" from 1959-1962 when large numbers of Chinese Communist party, government and military leaders became disillusioned with Mao's leadership following the collapse of his radical "great leap forward" and commune programs. The failure of the "socialist education" campaign in the ensuing three-year period to achieve its objectives of ferreting out opposition to, and arousing mass support for, his policies and programs served to heighten Mao's suspicions of the loyalty and efficacy of his top party lieutenants and, indeed, of the party apparatus as a whole. The launching of the "great proletarian cultural revolution" in the fall of 1965, then, is viewed as essentially a continuation of the "socialist education" campaign in pursuit of the same goals, but under new management (Lin Piao and others on Mao's new team), employing new methods (systematic terror and violence) and directed primarily at "old revolutionaries" and "high-level" cadres held responsible for the failure of Mao's programs.

Following a discussion of the background, this study then traces the development of the "cultural revolution" through several stages from the fall of 1965 to the summer of 1967. At each stage, Mao is seen as taking the initiative and, moreover, as succeeding in eliminating an ever-widening circle of "old comrades" adjudged guilty of opposing his will, many found guilty of opposing the "cultural revolution" itself. Despite success in this destructive phase, the continuing turmoil and disorder in Communist China makes clear that Mao is still far from achieving
the basic goal of his "cultural revolution"--the creation of a revitalized Chinese Communist party, government and army staffed by devoted and trustworthy "revolutionary successors."

This paper presents a working thesis against which other analysts may test their own; it does not reflect an official position of the Directorate of Intelligence. The conclusions expressed, some of which are controversial, are solely those of the author, Philip L. Bridgham. The DDI/SRS would welcome comments on this paper, addressed to either the author or the Acting Chief of the Staff,
MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION": ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

Summary

With the recent publication of the 16 May 1966 central committee circular attacking Peng Chen, the Chinese Communists have provided a document of fundamental importance for understanding the nature and objectives of Mao Tse-tung's "cultural revolution." Hailed as a "great Marxist-Leninist document...[which]...put forward the theory, line, principles and policies of the great proletarian cultural revolution," it reveals what subsequent events have already made abundantly clear—that the "cultural revolution" is in reality a "political revolution" designed to test and purge the entire apparatus of power (party, government and army) in Communist China of all found guilty of opposing Mao Tse-tung. As this document makes clear, Mao anticipated from the outset that the purge would be both comprehensive and large.

Disloyalty, disaffection and opposition to Mao Tse-tung's thought—these would be the basic charges hurled against the victims caught up in the mammoth purge known as the "great proletarian cultural revolution." It follows, then, that any attempt to reconstruct the history of Mao's "cultural revolution" must concern itself with two separate but related themes: (1) the causes for the disillusionment in Mao's policies and programs of large numbers of Chinese Communist party, government and military leaders; and (2) the progressive awareness by Mao (and a small coterie of trusted advisers) of the extent of this disillusionment, culminating in the decision in the fall of 1965 to initiate the most extensive and violent party purge in the history of the world Communist movement.

In brief, the main conclusions of this attempt to reconstruct the history of the "cultural revolution" are as follows: (1) that its point of origin was the Lushan central committee plenum in mid-1959 when the whole range

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of Mao's radical domestic and foreign policies was subjected to attack by the then Minister of National Defense Peng Te-huai; (2) that the events of the ensuing three year period (featuring the Soviet withdrawal of technicians and the collapse of the "great leap forward" and commune programs) largely demonstrated that in this great debate Peng had been right and Mao had been wrong; (3) that the resulting crisis of confidence in Mao's leadership, first reflected by China's intellectuals, permeated the ranks of the Chinese Communist party up to and including the standing committee of the politburo; (4) that the "socialist education" campaign initiated at the Tenth Plenum (September 1962) for the purposes of ferreting out opposition to, and arousing mass support for, Mao's policies and programs was adjudged a failure by Mao in the winter of 1964-65; and (5) that the "cultural revolution" is essentially a continuation of the "socialist education" campaign in pursuit of the same goals, but under new management (Lin Piao and the others on Mao's new team), employing new methods (systematic terror and violence), and directed primarily at "old revolutionaries" and "high level" cadres held responsible for the failure of Mao's programs.

Mao Is Attacked (July 1959)

The Chinese Communist regime confirmed in mid-1966 what had already been credibly reported in the West—that in mid-1959 Peng Te-huai had mounted an across-the-board attack on Mao's radical domestic and foreign policies at the Lushan Plenum, advancing in their stead programs featuring Soviet military, economic and technical assistance. The great significance of the Peng Te-huai affair for the "cultural revolution" lies in the fact that for the first time since 1935 Mao's personal leadership and programs had come under attack by a long-time, trusted "comrade-in-arms" who, moreover, had managed to muster support within the top leadership.

The origin of the "cultural revolution," it is believed, must be traced to the shock and sense of betrayal
experienced by Mao Tse-tung at Lushan. It is here that seeds of doubt concerning other "close comrades-in-arms"
must have been planted, producing an incipient distrust which in time would become the "sickly suspicion"--as Khru-
schev said of Stalin--which recently has characterized Mao's attitude and behavior toward his long-time comrades.
As is now well documented, it was Mao's conviction that Wu Han's play "Hai Jui's Dismissal" constituted a defense of Peng Te-huai and therefore an attack on him personally which prompted the launching of the "cultural revolution" in the fall of 1965.

Mao Retreats (1959-1962)

Developments in the three-year period following the Lushan plenum (1959-1962) demonstrated that in important respects, in the great debate over domestic and foreign policy staged at this historic meeting, Peng Te-huai had been right and Mao Tse-tung had been wrong. The combined effect of irrational economic policy, successive bad harvests and the Soviet withdrawal of technicians in the summer of 1960 dealt Mao's "great leap forward" program of economic development a shattering blow. Confronted with the threat of economic and political collapse, the Chinese Communist regime responded with a series of urgent corrective measures in the winter of 1960-1961 and then, reluctantly and painfully, with even more drastic remedies in a period of further retreat from mid-1961 to mid-1962.

Intellectual dissidence, as the voluminous record of the "cultural revolution" has made clear, was rife in China during this time of troubles in 1961-1962. Disaffected by the widespread suffering caused by the disastrous "great leap forward" program, a number of China's leading intellectuals went well beyond the limits of permissible criticism to commit the most unforgivable act of all--criticizing Mao Tse-tung himself.

Well aware of the outcome of the earlier experiment with "liberalization," Mao's critics in 1961-1962 were careful to cloak their criticism by the use of
historical allegory, of pseudonyms and of Aesopian language. As is now well known, Wu Han's play "Hai Jui's Dismissal," the debate over which precipitated the "cultural revolution," has been adjudged (and, it is believed, rightly so), as an example of "using ancient things to satirize the present"--in this instance, likening the case of Peng Teh-huai to that of a Ming Dynasty official who had been unjustly dismissed by the Emperor.

Recent Red Guard reporting of intra-party discussion in the winter of 1961-1962 reveals, moreover, that this crisis of confidence in Mao's leadership extended into the ranks of the politburo. As these reports show, there were basic differences of opinion within the standing committee of the politburo at this time concerning the gravity of China's domestic problems and the methods that should be employed to cope with these problems. On one side stood Mao and Lin Piao breathing "revolutionary optimism," and advocating intensification of "political and ideological work" as the solution to these problems.

Aligned on the other side of this debate were Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Chen Yun and others who (to use the metaphor Mao would subsequently employ) stood in the "first line" and were thus charged with the actual responsibility for coping with this domestic crisis. Disparaging the efficacy of political indoctrination during this period of crisis, Liu instead advocated, or at least approved, a number of "emergency measures" in domestic policy which Mao would subsequently attack as "right deviationism" once the crisis had passed.

As Chou En-lai would subsequently tell the Red Guards, the "three years of economic hardships" from 1960-1962 were a "key period" for testing the "performance" of Communist China's leadership in terms of its loyalty and devotion to Mao's policies and programs. Lin Piao's success in restoring order and discipline and ensuring the loyalty of the People's Liberation Army during a time of national emergency goes far to explain why five years later Mao Tse-tung would select him as his deputy to head up the "great proletarian cultural revolution." The record indicates that Chou En-lai also loyally defended Mao against
both domestic and foreign critics throughout this "key period." On the other hand, the performance of some leaders (most notably Liu Shao-chi) was such as to raise serious doubts in Mao's mind as to their loyalty and fitness to serve as his "revolutionary successors."

Mao Counterattacks (1962-1964)

Although Mao's important speech to the Tenth Plenum in September 1962 has not been published in full, enough is known from extracts to identify the major problems addressed in his speech—problems which remain as central, motivating concerns of the "cultural revolution." Since Mao's domestic and foreign policies had suffered obvious and severe defeats in the preceding three-year period, it was imperative that a rationale be advanced to explain past failures and silence future criticism. This rationale was to explain failures and criticism of party policies as largely the handiwork of "foreign and domestic class enemies" against whose poisonous influence (revisionism) it was necessary to inoculate all classes of Chinese society by means of a massive "education" campaign. Of particular interest is the fact that Mao singled out China's "leaders...even old leaders" as a special target for this campaign—in effect, serving notice on his old comrades in arms of the Long March that they were no longer exempt from the painful process of "rectification" and "thought reform" which previously they had inflicted on their subordinates.

The first stage of this "socialist education"—"class struggle" campaign initiated in the fall of 1962 and extending to mid-1964, was relatively moderate, with the main focus in China's rural areas where the "spontaneous tendency to capitalism" had developed to an alarming degree. Held responsible for this resurgence of capitalism, rural cadres were now subjected to a "five anti's" campaign, charged with permitting "individual farming" and engaging in corruption. The appearance of a new "anti's" campaign signified a shift from ideological to political struggle, from persuasion to coercion.
At the same time that the "socialist education" campaign in the countryside began to focus on iniquitous party cadres, a new campaign inaugurated in the urban, modern sector of Chinese society reflected the same distrust of the reliability and efficacy of party cadres in China's towns and cities. This was the campaign initiated by Mao's call in December 1963 to "learn from the PLA," with all political, economic and social organizations in China now directed to study and emulate the organizational, operational and ideological training methods of the People's Liberation Army. As subsequently revealed, Mao at this time ordered all departments of the national economy "to study the methods of the PLA, establish and strengthen political work and thus arouse the revolutionary spirit of the millions and tens of millions of cadres and masses on the economic front." This injunction was followed literally, beginning in the spring of 1964 with the establishment in industrial, transportation, trade and finance and all government departments of a political commissar system modeled on that of the PLA.

Although it was difficult at the time to grasp the purpose of this new political network, that purpose is much clearer in retrospect. As an early, vivid expression of his distrust of the conventional party apparatus, it strongly suggests that Mao had already decided that his party was shot through with incompetents, at best, or dissidents, at worst, and required a thorough-going purge. In fact, it was just at this time in the spring of 1964 that Mao issued a general directive criticizing party cadres for "conceit, complacency and conservatism," a critique which would be widely publicized in ensuing stages of Mao's "cultural revolution" and applied increasingly to "veteran revolutionaries" (i.e. the "old leaders" referred to in Mao's Tenth Plenum speech) in the upper echelons of the party. As this new political network came to be staffed increasingly by political cadres recruited from the PLA in 1964 and 1965, the groundwork was being laid for the emergence of Lin Piao and the PLA as dominant forces in Mao's "cultural revolution."
Mao Steps Up The Attack (1964-1965)

The purposes and strategy of the "great proletarian cultural revolution" were intimated publicly by Mao Tsetung three years ago in the 14 July 1964 polemic "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World" and revealed privately in much more candid form in secret party meetings at the time. Reflecting anxiety over the present status and future course of the Chinese revolution, Mao at this time unveiled a 15-point program designed to root out revisionism and prevent a restoration of capitalism in China. The product of Mao's twilight years, this theoretical pronouncement purported to be an authoritative Marxist-Leninist explanation of such assaults on the dictatorship of the proletariat in recent years as the Hungarian counter-revolution in 1956 and the rise of Khrushchev revisionism in the Soviet Union. The message was clear—unless extraordinary measures were adopted, the same thing could and would happen in China too.

The first of these extraordinary measures was acceleration and intensification of the program of "cultivating revolutionary successors." Whereas previously he had appeared to envisage the principal threat to the integrity and continuity of his revolutionary doctrines as arising when a "new generation" assumed positions of leadership in the future, Mao now began openly to depict this threat as one posed by the current generation of older party cadres. According to a briefing by a Chinese Communist official in early 1965, it was at just this time that Mao, alarmed by the general state of "ideological bankruptcy" of "older cadres" within the party who had lost their "enthusiasm and devotion," decided upon a "new policy of rejuvenating the corps of cadres" with younger men.

The signal for a general rectification and purge of the Chinese Communist party at all levels had been given. It was this signal, together with other signs of the beginning of a new, deeper "inner-party struggle" which led Liu Jen (second secretary of the Peking municipal committee) in the fall of 1964 to predict a coming "Stalinist phase" in China.
As he would reveal in talks with the French emissary Andre Malraux in the summer of 1965, Mao had come to the conclusion that the Chinese Communist party not only had failed to cope with "revisionism" but was itself largely responsible for "revisionism" in China. When queried by Malraux just what he meant by the term "revisionism," Mao replied that "as a practical matter" he meant "corruption among the cadres and disregard of state directives by the people." Mao was already blaming a defective party apparatus for the failure of his policies. Hence, the need to reorganize and rejuvenate the party by the addition of younger, more militant elements from the People's Liberation Army.

Two developments in the winter of 1964-1965 suggested that Mao blamed not only the rank and file but also the top leadership of the Chinese Communist party for the growth of "revisionism" in China. First, in a major work report to the Third National People's Congress in December 1964, Chou En-lai denounced publicly a number of the emergency policies and programs instituted following the collapse of the "great leap forward" in 1960-1962 as the handiwork of "class enemies." Although not revealed at the time, it is now known from Red Guard materials that most of the policies which Chou criticized in his report had either been advocated or approved by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping in this earlier period. The second development occurred at a central committee work conference held in January 1965, at which Mao Tse-tung criticized views which Liu Shao-chi had presented to an earlier party meeting, denouncing them as "not Marxist-Leninist."

The unwillingness of Liu and Teng to accept and act upon Mao's criticism then produced a situation of tension and stalemate within the central committee. When this tension reached an acute stage at a crucial meeting of the party center in September 1965, the "great proletarian cultural revolution" would begin.
The Revolution Begins (Autumn 1965)

According to an authoritative Chinese reconstruction, the "great proletarian cultural revolution" originated at a central committee work conference in September-October 1965 when Chairman Mao issued "instructions regarding the criticism of Wu Han." There is good reason to believe, moreover, that Mao had already decided to use Wu Han as a stalking horse for much larger game in the party, government and military, including Peng Chen (the first secretary in Peking), Lo Jui-ching (the PLA chief-of-staff) and quite possibly Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping as well.

It is in this sense, then, as a final test of the loyalty and trustworthiness of his old "comrades-in-arms" that Mao's "cultural revolution" can best be understood. His earlier suspicions of disloyalty strengthened by the display of further resistance by top leaders at this central work conference, Mao apparently decided at this time to initiate a rectification-purge campaign of a new type--directed at "old comrades" and "high-ranking cadres" holding positions of authority--designed to make the Chinese Communist party, the government apparatus, the military and ultimately the Chinese people once more responsive to his will.

The first target of the rectification-purge campaign initiated by Mao in November was Peng Chen who, as mayor and first secretary, personified "the problem of Peking" and, as head of the first "cultural revolution group" established in mid-1964, symbolized the continuing resistance in both the party and government to Mao's demand for rigid control over China's intellectuals. As is now known, Mao through his wife directed officials in the Shanghai party committee in November 1965 to launch a political attack (in an article by Yao Wen-yuan appearing in the 10 November issue of the Wen Hui Pao) on Wu Han (a deputy mayor of Peking) and, by extension, on Wu Han's boss, Peng Chen.

A second and equally important target of the campaign initiated by Mao in November 1965 was Lo Jui-ching who, as Communist China's second-ranking military leader,
personified continuing resistance within the PLA to Mao's views on army-building (featuring political indoctrination and productive labor at the expense of military training). As a member of the party secretariat and Vice Premier, Lo, alone among high-ranking Chinese leaders, held important positions of authority in all three branches of the control apparatus—the party, the government and the military. Occupying a uniquely powerful and strategic position in the Chinese Communist hierarchy, it is not surprising that Lo, once Mao's suspicions had been aroused, was the first casualty of this purge, disappearing in late November 1965.

The third target of the rectification-purge campaign initiated in late 1965 was, as opposed to select individuals within the party, government and military, the party apparatus as a whole, especially the "leading cadres" who controlled the apparatus at all levels of the party. According to the text of a Chinese Communist party county committee report dated January 1966, a recent central committee directive had called upon all party members to "expose" and "struggle against...Khrushchev revisionists in the party" with the objective of "eliminating the old and corrupt revisionist group from our party and founding a revolutionary political party instead." The central committee directive went on to characterize "leading cadres" as generally "conceited," "corrupt," and "bureaucratic," and to charge that this "loss of the high qualities of revolutionaries and the superior traditions of the PLA" had both "affected the close relationship between the party and the people and seriously hindered the development of the socialist revolution."

The occasion for exposing and denouncing Peng Chen and his alleged conspirators was, as we now know, a central committee work conference held in mid-May. It was at this conference that Lin Piao, in the key speech, first charged that Peng and his fellow conspirators had "wanted to stage a coup d'etat in Mao's lifetime, to destroy Mao Tse-tung." Lauding Mao as "the most brilliant and greatest personality...[whose]...experience is much more profound than that of Marx, Engels and Lenin," Lin then warned that "Whoever opposes him will be denounced by the whole party and the entire nation."
Mao Sets a Trap For Liu (Spring-Summer 1966)

That this warning was directed at a number of those attending this central committee work conference—that in fact it was directed at such top-ranking party leaders as Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping—is suggested by the central committee circular issued 16 May on the conclusion of this conference and by developments in the two-month period which followed. Moreover, there is evidence at the time that, just as he had set a trap for Peng Chen the preceding November, Mao was now engaged in setting a similar trap for Liu Shao-chi.

Mao's strategy of entrapment was to incite "revolutionary teachers and students" in June and July to rise up against the "work teams" sent by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping to reassert the authority of the party control apparatus over Mao's "cultural revolution" in China's cultural and educational institutions. Once this was done and the party apparatus counterattacked, its leaders could then be indicted for the same crime charged against Peng Chen—that of attempting to suppress "the proletarian left."

In early June, Peking disclosed the results to date of Mao's "cultural revolution," transforming it at the same time into a massively publicized, nation-wide campaign. In keeping with this new phase, Peng Chen's dismissal was publicly revealed in a 3 June announcement that the Peking municipal committee had been reorganized and was now headed by a new first secretary, Li Hsueh-feng.

In a series of important editorials beginning 1 June, People's Daily proclaimed the objectives of the new public phase of the "cultural revolution" and the methods necessary to achieve them. The ultimate goal (as outlined in the 2 June editorial entitled "A Great Revolution That Touches People to Their Very Souls") was presented as positive and constructive—"to arouse the enthusiasm of the people and broaden their horizon about the future by means of the great thought of Mao Tse-tung and our great
just cause, so that they will unswervingly march ahead."
Before this could happen, however, it was necessary to
"Wipe Out All Monsters and Freaks" (the title of the 1
June editorial), to purge all those in Chinese society
who had been opposed to Maoist policy and thought.

The main thrust of the campaign at this stage was
directed at China's educational system, especially the
universities which Mao considered a major breeding-ground
of dissident thought in China. In order to cleanse
thoroughly these Augean stables, a six-month vacation
was decreed for all students, and new criteria for the
selection of students were announced which stressed class
background and political reliability. The time had come
to provide China's youth with the "combat experience"
which Mao had previously termed essential for "cultivating
revolutionary successors." In the ensuing struggle waged
not only against university administrators and professors
but against the party "work teams" as well, the "revolu-
tionary leftists" would receive Mao's blessing and become
China's Red Guards.

The New Heir and the Red Guards (Early Autumn 1966)

The Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China was held in
Peking from August 1 to 12, 1966. In a series of historic
decisions, this plenum ratified Mao's choice of a new
successor leadership headed by Lin Piao; adopted a 16-
point decision concerning the "great proletarian cultural
revolution;" and issued a communiqué approving all of
Mao's domestic and foreign policies in the four-year in-
terval since the Tenth Plenum. Six days later, on 18
August, Chairman Mao publicly revealed the new heir-ap-
parent Lin Piao and the new organization created to carry
out his "cultural revolution"--the Red Guards. The time
had come to initiate a massive rectification-purge of the
Chinese Communist party as a whole, a purge more extensive
and violent that any since the founding of the Chinese
People's Republic in 1949.
After 17 years in power, why did Mao Tse-tung feel compelled to undertake such a drastic purge? The answer to this question comes through clearly in the keynote speech made by Lin Piao at the Eleventh Plenum. As reported subsequently on a Red Guard wall poster, Lin Piao on this occasion demanded "a general examination, a general alignment and a general reorganization of the ranks of party cadres" directed at (1) "those who oppose the thought of Mao Tse-tung;" (2) "those who upset political-ideological work;" and (3) "those who have no revolutionary zeal." In addition to these (rightists) who were "to be dismissed from their posts," there were those in an "intermediate state" (the center) who, through fear or incompetence, had made mistakes but who, "provided they accept education and resolutely repent," would be retained in their posts. The third category (the leftists), those who eagerly studied Mao, attached great importance to political-ideological work, and were filled with revolutionary zeal, were to be "promoted." This "general organizational adjustment" was necessary in order to "break the situation of stalemate."

As revealed in Lin's speech, Mao had decreed a general testing and purge of the entire party in order to overcome widespread resistance to his policies and programs, opposition which had produced a "situation of stalemate." The primary function of the Red Guards, then, was to administer this test, providing the element of compulsion necessary to convince party cadres that they had to submit to the testing process. By means of wall posters and investigation meetings, the Red Guards were to carry out "a general reorganization of the ranks of party cadres" (in the words of the 8 August 1966 central committee decision governing the "cultural revolution") by "exposing and criticizing thoroughly" the rightists; by encouraging those in the center (the great majority) to "make serious self-criticism...accept the criticism of the masses...and join in the struggle;" and by discovering the leftists who would "stand in the van of the movement and dare to arouse the masses boldly." For those cadres who still resisted, who still refused to submit to this examination process, thereby revealing their "anti-party, anti-socialist" nature, the directive to the Red Guards (again in the 8 August central committee decision) was clear--they were to be "fully exposed, hit hard, pulled down and completely discredited and their influence eliminated."
It is important to note that Mao believed or professed to believe at the outset that the great majority of party cadres would pass the test of the "cultural revolution"; even allowing for lack of candor, it seems clear that Mao grossly underestimated the extent of the opposition which his conduct of the "revolution" would engender. It is also important to note that the "cultural revolution", as a vehicle for testing and purging those held to be in opposition to Mao, was intended from the outset to apply to the army and government as well.

Recruited primarily on the basis of militancy and revolutionary zeal (membership was largely restricted to representatives of the "five red classes" of workers, poor and lower-middle peasants, revolutionary cadres and revolutionary martyrs), the Red Guards were in certain respects well suited to discharge the most important task assigned them, that of serving as a combat force, as the "army" of Mao's "cultural revolution." The very same qualities--of pugnacity, naivete and fanaticism--of its youthful members, however, would soon split the Red Guard organization, gravely impairing its effectiveness as an instrument for purging the party.

Following a short-course in the strategy and tactics of "cultural revolution", contingents of Red Guards were sent out to all provinces and major cities to transmit and apply the advanced revolutionary experience of Peking. Instead of revolution on the Peking model, a new pattern of large-scale violence featuring bloody clashes appeared in nearly all the major cities of China. As spelled out in numerous wall posters subsequently, the precipitating factor in nearly all cases was the peremptory demand by Red Guards from Peking on arrival that local party committees "reorganize along the lines of the Peking committee." When this demand was not met, Red Guard leaders then ordered their detachments to "bombard the headquarters," launching a violent attack against both the premises and leaders of the local party committees. To defend themselves, local committees then mobilized their own Red Guards, together with workers, peasants and soldiers. The result was a rash of violent "incidents" throughout most of China, in some cases involving thousands of combatants and producing hundreds of casualties, including many dead.
The "Revolution" Retreats (Late Autumn 1966)

Although the 8 August decision had predicted "relatively great resistance" once the Red Guards were unleashed to attack the party, the extent and effectiveness of this opposition was clearly beyond expectation. The response of Mao and Lin and the new team of leaders to this crisis was one of tactical retreat, a regrouping of forces which would extend throughout October and much of November. It was at least tacitly admitted that the Red Guards had gone too far too fast, the classic definition of "leftist" error. At the same time, and it was a vitally important proviso, it was made abundantly clear that the provincial and municipal party committees had also erred in resisting the Red Guard attacks.

At the appropriate time, once the Red Guard students had been reinforced by militant detachments of young workers, the truce would be lifted and the onslaught against the party apparatus in the provinces renewed. At that time, the pretext would be at hand for purging nearly any leader at the regional bureau, provincial or municipal level whom the Maoists in Peking might select.

Opposition to Mao's "cultural revolution" and how to cope with it constituted the central theme of an important central committee work conference held in Peking from October 9 to 26, 1966. The nature of the opposition to Mao's "cultural revolution" in the two-month period following the Eleventh Plenum was analyzed and explained by Chen Po-ta in two major speeches at this conference. Chen's discussion contended that much of the "opposition" had come from those who had been misled or had misunderstood the purposes and objectives of the "cultural revolution."

First, Chen revealed that most of the "cultural revolutionary groups, committees and congresses" (described in the 8 August central committee decision as the "organs of power of the proletarian cultural revolution") established in China's universities and schools during August and September had been taken over by a "conservative majority."
Even more surprising was the admission that "conservative majorities" had seized control of two of the three Red Guard headquarters established in Peking in late August.

The principal opposition to Mao's "cultural revolution" throughout August and September, however, came from provincial party secretaries who, "afraid of losing their positions and prestige...instigated workers and peasants to fight against the students." In so doing, they "made themselves out as people who were supported by the majority" (as they undoubtedly were) and pretended that "the organs they managed were the headquarters of the proletarian class." They also claimed, according to Chen, that "the cultural revolution obstructs production," especially that the "large-scale exchange of revolutionary experience" (in which millions of Red Guards traveled to and from Peking) disrupted planning and production.

Having acknowledged the existence of considerable opposition, Mao, Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta in speeches concluding the October work conference on 25 October revealed what the next stage in the "cultural revolution" would be. In brief, party leaders were to be given another chance to pass (in Chen's words) "the severe test of the cultural revolution." One reason for this second chance, as Mao explained, was that the first test in some respects had not been fairly administered. After the Eleventh Plenum, local party committees "in some places did not have time to hold proper meetings" in which to make necessary "political and ideological" preparation before "the Red Guards charged." What is more, as the important 31 October Red Flag editorial summing up the results of this party conference admitted, there had been "some excesses in words and actions by the masses" in the course of administering the first test. Having successfully beaten off the physical attacks launched by Red Guards in late August, local party leaders were now given the opportunity to surrender peacefully. Thus instructed, these local leaders throughout China convened cadres' meetings in November to decide on a course of action.

The signal for a renewed onslaught against the party apparatus was given by Madame Mao in a militant speech on
28 November at a literature and art rally in Peking, a rally described subsequently as a "pledge of a general offensive." The time had come to ask party committees a second time "for a review of their work," to test party leaders a second time on their understanding of, and willingness to comply with, Mao's "cultural revolution."

The "January Revolution" (Winter 1966-67)

The provincial party and government apparatus had been able to repulse the first attack by Red Guards in August and September by mobilizing workers and peasants in their defense. To prevent this from happening again, it was necessary for the Maoists to infiltrate and take over these opposition strongholds. This campaign began immediately after the October work conference, with the formation of new "revolutionary rebel" organizations in industrial and mining establishments, party and government organs, and, to a lesser extent, among the peasantry. The expansion of the "cultural revolution" into the government and the economy would engender increasing resistance which, in turn, would lead to a final test of strength when Mao would exhort his supporters to "seize power" in all those party, government and economic organizations which continued to resist. Erupting in Shanghai under the name of the "January Revolution", this drive to "seize power" would initiate a period of widespread violence and disorder which persists to the present day.

Explaining why the "January Revolution" produced so much violence and disorder, Chou En-lai was to compare this "seize power" movement to the first Red Guard attempt to "bombard the headquarters" of the provincial party apparatus in August and September. Like the earlier campaign, this one had gone too fast and had got out of hand--"those engaged in the seizure of power...went all-out in revolution and the movement spread to every part of the country at one stroke." In fact, there is good reason to believe that the original plan had called for a more orderly and systematic attack against the party opposition.
A major feature of the original plan was, it is believed, experimentation with the new organizational forms and techniques of the "seize power" formula in a few key areas preparatory to launching the movement on a nation-wide basis. Of these key areas, the most important was Shanghai where the first "Workers Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters" was established on 8 November. On 22 November, Madame Nieh Yuan-tzu arrived in Shanghai at the head of a large contingent of Red Guards with the express purpose of organizing a "revolutionary headquarters" in China's largest city. In early December, the mayor and the entire municipal council, together with the party first secretary, were subjected to long public struggle and criticism meetings and on 4 December the combined forces of the "revolutionary left" took over the Shanghai municipal office building. Then, after this initial test of strength, there was a lull of several weeks while the contending forces in Shanghai regrouped for the showdown in late December which would precipitate the "January Revolution."

If the expansion of the "cultural revolution" in November and December to cover industry and the countryside directive of 15 December extended the revolution into the villages was intended primarily to re-establish Mao's control over the provinces, there was a parallel escalation and extension of the revolution at the center encompassing the party, government and military control apparatus in Peking. In a major speech to a Red Guard rally on 18 December, Madame Mao charged that the municipal public security bureau had been largely responsible for recent bloody clashes in Peking. Describing the bureau, along with the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Supreme People's Court, as "bourgeois" in nature, she then called upon the Red Guards in her audience to "rise up in rebellion" and "take over" these government organs. The movement to "seize power" from below by calling upon the revolutionary Left to take over government and party organs had begun.

A week later, addressing the newly-organized "All China Red Workers General Rebellion Corps," Madame Mao (together with Chen Po-ta) endorsed the recent "seizure"
of the Ministry of Labor by this "revolutionary rebel" organization, as well as its intention to take over the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. With this call to the "revolutionary Left" to seize control of China's labor organizations, the stage was set for the outbreak in Shanghai of what has come to be known as the "January Revolution"—the Maoist drive to "seize power" in the party and government apparatus on a nation-wide scale.

The "January Revolution" in Shanghai resulted in a Pyrrhic victory. Instead of winning over Shanghai's million-odd workers, it antagonized a large proportion of them, precipitating a large-scale strike which for a time crippled the economy of Shanghai. This in turn resulted in the complete paralysis and breakdown of local government and necessitated a premature, disorderly "seizure of power" in Shanghai for which Mao's "revolutionary rebels" were ill-prepared.

It is important to understand the nature of the "opposition" generated in Shanghai at this time for it was to be duplicated in nearly all major cities and provinces, becoming so widespread and tenacious that by mid-1967 the "seize power" movement in China would grind to a halt. Although depicted in every case as the product of "base and sinister tricks" played by the "handful" of Mao's enemies, the actions of the "opposition" at this time were in most cases taken by organizations and groups who considered themselves to be loyal supporters of Mao and the "cultural revolution." This was true even of the general strike carried out in late December by Shanghai's railroad, harbor and public utility workers, now known (from observers on the spot as well as from Chinese Communist publications) to have been motivated primarily by political grievances directed not at Mao but at the violence and radicalism of young "revolutionary rebel" workers in that city.

The Maoists were confronted with a number of serious problems as they took stock of the "cultural revolution" in mid-January 1967. First, more than a million workers had descended on Peking to protest their "exploitation" by local party and government cadres. Next, there were
reports of wide-spread disorder and bloody clashes in a number of cities and provinces where "revolutionary rebels" were rising up to "seize power" in response to Mao's call to emulate the example of Shanghai. Also, the preliminary results of the "new stage" of extending the "cultural revolution" into factories and mines were at hand, results which showed that both revolution and production in the industrial sector had been adversely affected by sending in "revolutionary students" without adequate preparation. Finally, reports on the progress of the "seize power" movement in Shanghai revealed growing chaos following the breakdown of party and government controls in that city--much of it explained by the inability of the leftists to achieve "unity."

Efforts to Restore Order (Early 1967)

The havoc created by Mao's "revolutionary rebels" in their frenzied drive to "seize power" during the "January Revolution" required immediate and drastic countermeasures. The first of these was the decision of 23 January ordering the People's Liberation Army to intervene in the "cultural revolution", ostensibly to support the "revolutionary left" but actually to restore order. The second was a shift in policy toward party cadres, emphasizing more humane treatment and rehabilitation to make use of their administrative skills. The third was an effort to overcome the pronounced tendency toward "anarchism" which had characterized the behavior of the "revolutionary left" during the "January Revolution", an effort to reorganize, retrench and rectify the ranks of the "revolutionary rebels."

Finally, the decision was taken by Mao personally to jettison the Shanghai example in favor of a new model for emulation in the "seize power" movement throughout China--that provided by the "formation of a three-way alliance to seize power" in the province of Heilungkiang. Whereas the "revolutionary rebels" had played the dominant role in Shanghai, they were now to share their power (in fact, the greater part of their power) with two new "allies,"
the People's Liberation Army and "revolutionary party cadres." The vicissitudes in the relationship between these three uneasy and, in some ways, incompatible "allies" were to provide the dominant theme in the unfolding of the latest stage of Mao's "cultural revolution" extending from February 1967 up to the present.

The new, dominant role of the military in the government and administration of China would be revealed in discussions of the course of the "seize power" movement in February. In those provinces (the great majority) where for various reasons the "seize power movement" had bogged down, the PLA was directed to establish military control commissions charged with maintaining law and order. As the only remaining nation-wide organization still intact, the PLA perforce had to step in to replace the largely defunct party and government control apparatus.

For the same reason, the PLA was soon deeply involved in administering China's economy. On 22 February, the Army was directed to restore order in the countryside by supervising the organization of peasants and rural cadres to carry out spring planting. A month later the central committee directed workers and cadres in factories and mines to "cooperate effectively with the comrades from the PLA" who were being sent to "support their work in industrial production." The further disclosure in March that PLA personnel had been set in large numbers to conduct military and ideological training in universities and schools showed the extent of influence and control exercised by the military in China in the early months of 1967.

The problem of finding "new leaders" or "revolutionary leading cadres"--the second component of the "3-way alliance"--was an acute one, described by a leading member of the Cultural Revolution Group (Wang Li) in early February as "the biggest problem now." In successive Red Flag editorials of 3 and 23 February drafted under the personal supervision of Mao himself, the problem of "treating cadres correctly" received priority attention. The new policy of leniency applied as well to those who had committed "mistakes," even "very serious mistakes." In accordance with Mao's dictum of "curing the sickness to save the patient,"
these cadres were to be given another opportunity to atone for their errors by "self-criticism" and by staying on the job to perform "good deeds" in the service of the "cultural revolution."

Meanwhile, the time had come for the young militants of the "revolutionary left" to take their lumps, now blamed for the chaos of the "January Revolution" which they had been incited to carry out. They were attacked and criticized from all directions, not just by the relative moderates (like Chou) but also by the zealots in the Cultural Revolution Group and even by Mao himself. In addition to these verbal attacks, a number of measures were instituted at this time in a concerted effort to retrench, reorganize and rectify the unruly ranks of the "revolutionary left."

The Resurgence of The Left (Spring 1967)

As a result of the urgent need to restore order and maintain production, the "seize power" movement in China at the end of February was in a state of suspended animation. In Mao's view, the pendulum had swung too far in the direction of order and stability imposed by the PLA and party cadres from above, and it was necessary once again to stress the role of the revolutionary masses.

The first target of attack by militant Red Guards and "revolutionary rebels," unleashed again in early March, was what was termed the "countercurrent of counterrevolutionary restoration" in central government organs. This referred to the practice of "false power seizure" whereby senior party cadres or revived party committees had exploited, so it was charged, Mao's "mild cadre policy" to reinstate all or most of the old officials and systems of control, at the same time ignoring and suppressing the opinions of the "revolutionary left." The concurrent disclosure that there had been "false power seizures" in the provinces as well was related to the earlier admission that the PLA might commit (in fact, already had committed) "temporary mistakes" in identifying and supporting authentic "revolutionary leftists" while administering the "cultural revolution." Indicating the nature of these mistakes, the Military
Affairs Committee on 6 April issued a ten-point directive which sharply circumscribed the authority of local military commanders in dealing with "revolutionary organizations", forbidding them to fire on rebel groups, to make mass arrests, to classify rebel organizations as counter-revolutionary without central committee approval, or to use force to extract confessions or to punish.

The combined result of leashing the PLA (the 6 April directive) and unleashing the "revolutionary left" was, predictably, renewed violence and disorder. Although Lin Piao (in his 30 March speech to the central committee introducing this new phase) had praised "disorder" as necessary to achieve the goals of the "cultural revolution," the character and extent of the "disorder" which ensued was clearly beyond expectation. Serious, large-scale clashes were soon reported not only in the provinces but in Peking as well.

Calls For Order Again (May-June 1967)

The extent of the new disorder in Peking was revealed by the Minister of Public Security and concurrently chairman of the new Revolutionary Committee Hsieh Fu-chih in a speech on 14 May. Hsieh's frank discussion of the extent of violence and disorder in Peking was for the purpose of justifying a new get-tough policy by the Peking Revolutionary Committee as spelled out in a six-point directive of 14 May. Citing instructions by Chairman Mao prohibiting "armed struggle" and demanding an end to the "anarchy existing in many areas," this directive declared such practices as striking people, interfering with the PLA and going on strike to be "strictly prohibited" and ordered the PLA Peking garrison to enforce this directive.

Not long after, on 6 June, a joint circular of the central committee, State Council, Military Affairs Committee and Cultural Revolution Group directed the PLA to restore order throughout the country as a whole. It was necessary once again, as had happened in September 1966 and in February 1967, to apply the brakes to Mao's "cultural
revolution." Unlike the earlier efforts, however, it was an open question in mid-1967 how effective this new attempt to restore order in China might prove to be.

Prospects

In view of the record of the "seize power" movement in the past six months, the prospects for Mao's "cultural revolution" in the short term are not bright. Since February, only one new area, Peking, has been "liberated" by Mao's revolutionaries, an achievement soon negated by the worst outbreak of violence and anarchy yet seen in China's capital city. Reports from the pathetically small group of other areas where officially approved "revolutionary committees" have been set up (four out of 26 provinces, plus the city of Shanghai) must be equally worrisome to the Maoist leadership in Peking. Demonstrating anew the corrupting effects of power, the Shantung Revolutionary Committee has recently issued a 10-point directive which reveals that some or all of the ruling committee members, by means of self-glorification, acceptance of gifts and extravagant living, have already within a few short months "become divorced from the masses."

With the fragile unity of the "three-way alliance" already crumbling in the "liberated" areas, it was not surprising that the movement to "seize power" had bogged down in the great majority of China's provinces. Paradoxically, one of the main reasons the "seize power" movement has foundered is the collapse of the party apparatus in the provinces. Lacking a powerful, readily identifiable enemy before whom it was necessary to submerge differences and lacking clear-cut guidance from the center, the component elements of the "three-way alliance" in most provinces have taken to fighting among and between themselves.

The most egregious offenders in this respect, of course, have been the militant leaders of the "revolutionary mass organizations." As the creators of the chaos which Mao has periodically ordained, they perform an indispensable role in the destructive phases of the "cultural revolution."
Given this broad mandate (e.g. they are constantly assured that, despite some mistakes, "they embody the general orientation of the revolution"), Red Guard and "revolutionary rebel" zealots have become so contemptuous of authority that, in a number of well-documented cases, they no longer heed directives from the central committee or the Military Affairs Committee or the Cultural Revolution Group, or, indeed, from any leader other than Mao himself.

As the second component of the "three-way alliance," the PLA has also been assigned an indispensable, if exceedingly difficult, role in the carrying out of Mao's "cultural revolution"—that of restoring order when the chaos caused by the "revolutionary left" threatens to get out of hand. At the same time, it is supposed "to actively support the revolutionary leftists" in their struggle to "seize power." The trouble is, as Lin Piao admitted in addressing a central committee work conference on 30 March, "sometimes it is difficult to find out the difference between left and right," in which case "scientific Marxism-Leninism must then be used to decide the question." Supplementing this not very helpful instruction, Lin then directed that in these situations Army units must never take any action on their own initiative but rather first "give a detailed account of the situation to superior organs" and then "only act on command from above."

The contradictions inherent in this role assigned to the PLA go far to explain the continuation of wide-spread violence in China today long after the 6 June decree directing the army to intervene once again to restore order. Unable to distinguish clearly between "leftist," "conservative" and "rightist" mass organizations and forewarned by the fate of those charged earlier with "brutal suppression" of the "revolutionary left," many commanders of army units in China today are evidently refusing to intervene in the fighting until "commanded from above." Tending to support this view is the fact that Peking in recent months has sent an increasing number of high-level government and military delegations to investigate and provide guidance in the provinces.
Despite these setbacks which have progressively extended the original timetable, Mao is determined to persevere with his concept of the "cultural revolution." By his own reckoning, Mao now expects the revolution to last until mid-1968. The outlook for the next year, then, is for continuing turmoil and disorder, with no guarantee that even then Mao will be satisfied that he has achieved the first goal of his "cultural revolution"—the creation of a revitalized Chinese Communist party staffed by devoted and trustworthy "revolutionary successors."

But what are the prospects for success in achieving Mao's ultimate goal of employing a revitalized party to arouse the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses for a new "leap forward" in economic and social development? In answering this question, there is no need to equivocate. The underlying premise of the "cultural revolution"—that it is possible to cultivate a new "socialist" or "Communist" man who voluntarily subordinates individual to collective goals and enthusiastically participates in collective production—appears clearly to be based on a utopian view of human nature. When methods of persuasion fail to achieve the utopian objective, it becomes necessary to rely increasingly on methods of coercion and suppression. This appears to be the prospect in Communist China as long as Mao Tse-tung continues to dominate his government and his people.
MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION": ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

"The aim of this great struggle... is to criticize and repudiate Wu Han and the considerable number of other antiparty and antisocialist representatives of the bourgeoisie. ... in the central committee and in the party, government and other departments at the central as well as at the provincial, municipal and autonomous region level." -- Circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 16 May 1966.

"Those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the party, the government, the army and the various spheres of culture are a bunch of counter-revolutionary revisionists... Some of them we have already seen through, others we have not. Some we still trust and are training as our successors. There are, for example, people of the Khrushchev brand still nestling in our midst." -- Mao Tse-tung, Statement in Above Circular.

With the recent publication of the 16 May 1966 central committee circular attacking Peng Chen, the Chinese Communists have provided a document of fundamental importance for understanding the nature and objectives of Mao Tse-tung's "cultural revolution." Hailed as a "great Marxist-Leninist document... [which]... put forward the theory, line, principles and policies of the great proletarian cultural revolution," it reveals what subsequent events have already made abundantly clear—that the "cultural revolution" is in reality a "political revolution" designed to test the entire apparatus of power (party, government and army) in Communist China and to purge it of all found guilty of opposing Mao Tse-tung. As the above quotations suggest, it was anticipated from the outset that the purge would be both comprehensive and large.
Disloyalty, disaffection and opposition to Mao Tse-tung's thought--these would be the basic charges hurled against the victims caught up in the mammoth purge known as the "great proletarian cultural revolution." It follows, then, that any attempt to reconstruct the history of Mao's "cultural revolution" must concern itself with two separate but related themes: (1) the causes for the disillusionment in Mao's policies and programs of large numbers of Chinese Communist party, government and military leaders; and (2) the progressive awareness by Mao (and a small coterie of trusted advisers) of the extent of this disillusionment, culminating in the decision in the fall of 1965 to initiate the most extensive and violent party purge in the history of the world Communist movement.

In brief, the main conclusions of this attempt to reconstruct the history of the "cultural revolution" are as follows: (1) that its point of origin was the Lushan central committee plenum in mid-1959 when the whole range of Mao's radical domestic and foreign policies was subjected to attack by the then Minister of National Defense Peng Te-huai; (2) that the events of the ensuing three-year period (featuring the Soviet withdrawal of technicians and the collapse of the "great leap forward" and commune programs) largely demonstrated that in this great debate Peng had been right and Mao had been wrong; (3) that the resulting crisis of confidence in Mao's leadership, first reflected by China's intellectuals, permeated the ranks of the Chinese Communist party up to and including the standing committee of the politburo; (4) that the "socialist education" campaign initiated at the Tenth Plenum (September 1962) for the purposes of ferreting out opposition to, and arousing mass support for, Mao's policies and programs was adjudged a failure by Mao in the winter of 1964-65; and (5) that the "cultural revolution" is essentially a continuation of the "socialist education" campaign in pursuit of the same goals, but under new management (Lin Piao and the others on Mao's new team), employing new methods (systematic terror and violence), and directed primarily at "old revolutionaries" and "high-level" cadres held responsible for the failure of Mao's programs.
II. THE BACKGROUND (JULY 1959-AUGUST 1965)

A. Mao Is Attacked (July 1959)

"At the Lushan meeting of the party in 1959, a handful of ambitious bourgeois careerists and schemers... who had the support of the Khrushchev revisionist clique launched a ferocious attack on the party's central committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung." --People's Daily Editorial, "Long Live Mao Tse-tung's Thought," July 1, 1966.

In this quotation, the Chinese Communist regime has confirmed what had already been credibly reported in the West—that Peng Te-huai mounted an across the board attack on Mao's radical domestic and foreign policies at the Lushan Plenum in mid-1959, advancing in their stead programs featuring Soviet military, economic and technical assistance. The great significance of the Peng Te-huai affair for the "cultural revolution" lies in the fact that for the first time since 1935 Mao's personal leadership and programs had come under attack by a long-time, trusted "comrade-in-arms" who, moreover, had managed to muster support within the top leadership.

The origin of the "cultural revolution," it is believed, must be traced to the shock and sense of betrayal experienced by Mao Tse-tung at Lushan. It is here that seeds of doubt concerning other "close comrades-in-arms" must have been planted, producing an incipient distrust which in time would become the "sickly suspicion"—as Khrushchev said of Stalin—which recently has characterized Mao's attitude and behavior toward his long-time comrades. As is now well documented, it was Mao's conviction that Wu Han's play "Hai Jui's Dismissal" constituted a defense of Peng Te-huai and therefore an attack on him personally which prompted the launching of the "cultural revolution" in the fall of 1965.

Other elements of what would become to be known as the "great proletarian cultural revolution" also
originated at this time, at least in rudimentary form. First, it is believed to be significant that Mao, at a time when he felt personally threatened, should have turned to Lin Piao for support and protection. In his first published article as the newly appointed Minister of National Defense, Lin Piao responded with a declaration of personal allegiance pledging "the unconditional loyalty of the People's Liberation Army to the party and Comrade Mao."

Of equal importance was the appearance in the fall of 1959 of a nation-wide "cult of Mao Tse-tung." For the first time Mao was acclaimed publicly by a high-level party spokesman as "the most outstanding contemporary revolutionary, statesman and theoretician of Marxism-Leninism." Also of interest was the appearance at this time of a tactic which would be central to the carrying out of the "great proletarian cultural revolution"—testing the loyalty of party leaders on the basis of their devotion to, and understanding of, Mao's thought. This tactic was implicit in the formulation: "The yardstick to judge whether any individual is a genuine Marxist is his comprehension of Mao Tse-tung's ideology."

The purposes of this nation-wide campaign in glorification of Mao Tse-tung in 1959-1960 appear to have been three-fold: (1) to repair Mao's self-esteem, which must have been badly scarred to the confrontation with Peng Te-huai at Lushan; (2) to restore confidence, badly shaken by the failure of the "great leap forward" program, in Mao's leadership; and (3) perhaps most important, to substitute "the ideology of Mao Tse-tung" for the false "revisionism" of Khrushchev as the true expression of contemporary Marxism-Leninism. These objectives remain important, motivating factors in the "cultural revolution" today.

B. Mao Retreats (September 1959 – August 1962)

"What does emphasize performance mean? It means that we should not concentrate only on a person's background...we must look at his performance during key periods,
such as during economic hardships or during the cultural revolution. We must look to determine if he is revolutionary, non-revolutionary or counterrevolutionary. These key periods are very important. Three years of economic hardships (1960-1962) caused some evil persons to expose their true face." -- Chou En-lai Speech to Red Guards in Peking, 10 September 1966

Developments in the three year period following the Lushan plenum (1959-1962) demonstrated that in important respects, in the great debate over domestic [and foreign] policy staged at this historic meeting, Peng Te-huai had been right and Mao Tse-tung had been wrong. The combined effect of irrational economic policy, successive bad harvests and the Soviet withdrawal of technicians in the summer of 1960 dealt Mao's "great leap forward" program of economic development a shattering blow. Confronted with the threat of economic and political collapse, the Chinese Communist regime responded with a series of urgent corrective measures in the winter of 1960-1961 and then, reluctantly and painfully, with even more drastic remedies in a period of further retreat from mid-1961 to mid-1962.

As Chou En-lai would subsequently tell the Red Guards, this was a "key period" for testing the 'performance' of Communist China's leadership in terms of its loyalty and devotion to Mao's policies and programs. The performance of some of these leaders (most notably Liu Shao-chi) was such as to raise serious doubts in Mao's mind as to their loyalty and fitness to serve as his "revolutionary successors." For this reason, the record of this period is also of fundamental importance in assessing the origin and motivation of the current "cultural revolution."

Although the immediate Chinese response to the Soviet withdrawal of technicians was one of defiant optimism, Peking's view of its domestic problems in the winter of 1960 suddenly changed to one of alarm. The basic cause of this alarm was, of course, the severe shortage of food reaching famine proportions in the disaster areas of East and North China. There is abundant evidence of widespread outbreaks of malnutrition diseases and of a sharp jump
in the mortality rate at this time. To cite but one
graphic example from the Bulletin of Activities (the
secret military documents captured in Tibet), the results
of an investigation showed that ten percent of China's
First Army had experienced "unnatural deaths" in their
families during the winter of 1960-1961. There was ample
cause for Lin Piao's warning in January to expect "poli-
tical troubles" and his call for extraordinary measures
"to ensure that the armed forces do not get out of hand."

The successful execution of this mission--ensuring
the loyalty of the People's Liberation Army during a time
of national emergency--goes far to explain why five years
later Mao Tse-tung would select Lin Piao as his deputy
to head up the "great proletarian cultural revolution."
In part, Lin's success was due to initiating such corrective
measures as increasing army rations, giving preferential
treatment to the families of servicemen, and halting all
non-essential work programs. But of greater significance
in tracing the rise of Lin Piao to his present position
of eminence in the Chinese leadership was the successful
campaign of intensive political indoctrination carried out
in the PLA at this critical period.

A major objective of this political indoctrination
campaign was to extricate Mao Tse-tung from responsibility
for the "great leap forward" debacle. According to the
propaganda strategy, Communist China's domestic crisis
had been caused by the deliberate "sabotage" of "class
enemies" and by unwitting distortion of "correct" party
policies. Stated more bluntly, it was designed to show
that "the party central committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung
had all along made clear and correct directives" and that
"the party central committee is not wrong, but rather the
thinking of rural cadres is confused." Above and beyond
this strategy, however, it was the tactics devised by Lin
Piao in successfully implementing this campaign which would
make a lasting impression on Mao and provide important guide-
lines for the "cultural revolution" five years hence.

In the charter of the military rectification cam-
paign of 1960-1961 ("The Resolution of the Enlarged Session
of the Military Affairs Committee Concerning the Strengthen-
ing of Indoctrination Work in Troop Units," October 20, 1960),
Lin Piao set forth and expounded his famous concept of the "four firsts." Hailed as a "creative application of the thinking of Mao Tse-tung," these provided clear-cut directives in handling the relations between man and weapons (man comes first); between political work and other work (politics comes first); between ideological and routine work (ideological work comes first); and between ideas in books and living ideas currently in people's minds (living ideology comes first). Although each of these reflected long-standing Maoist maxims, it was the fourth (the need to get hold of living ideology) which most nearly qualified as a "creative contribution" and which has figured most prominently in the unfolding of the "cultural revolution."

This was a restatement of Mao's famous "mass-line", but with the responsibility for the success or failure of this mass line clearly assigned to party cadres in the middle. Under the slogan "grasp both ends," these cadres in the middle were directed, at one end, to transmit and properly implement the "instructions of the central committee, of Chairman Mao and of the Military Affairs Commission" and, at the other end, to grasp and properly interpret the "ideological condition" of the masses to the leadership at the center. Failure of party policies, then, was the fault of party cadres who had "created a communication block by failing in relaying in time instructions of the party and their superiors on the one hand and failing in submitting reports to their superiors on the other." The utility of this formulation at a time of national disaster was obvious—it exculpated the party leadership from responsibility and provided a fool-proof formula in defense of Mao Tse-tung's infallibility. At the time of the launching of the "cultural revolution," it would provide the rationale for a similar purge of defective party cadres, but with an important difference. At that time, Mao would hold the entire party apparatus as defective and therefore responsible for the failure of his policies.

The methods advanced by Lin Piao for carrying out "living ideological indoctrination" would also figure prominently in the "cultural revolution." Among the
diverse forms of political education recommended for use were the shouting of slogans, the use of wall posters, and the printing of large-character bulletins. Cadres were directed to employ extensively such struggle techniques as "big contention, big blooming, big debates and big character bulletins." And, in a directive which would loom large in the early stages of the "cultural revolution," PLA political officers were adjured to carry out "continuous investigation" of those cadres charged with the special mission of transmitting Mao's ideology to the masses—"the workers in propaganda and cultural departments and school teachers."

Although not so well-known, the record of Premier Chou En-lai's performance suggests that he too rendered valuable service in support of the position and policies of Mao Tse-tung throughout this "key period" of economic hardships. On record in October 1960 with a glowing tribute to Mao's thought (an act of obeisance which Liu Shao-chi did not see fit to perform throughout this period), it is noteworthy that Chou is the only civilian leader (other than Mao) mentioned in the Bulletin of Activities, credited in these documents with assisting in the solution of "many complex problems" in the armed forces rectification campaign in 1960-1961. As noted above, one of these problems was to extricate Mao from responsibility for the "great leap forward" debacle, a service Chou helped perform in a series of secret speeches in early and mid-1962 blaming the plight of China's economy on Soviet perfidy and cadre shortcomings. In foreign policy, Chou also demonstrated his loyalty by reacting promptly and vigorously to the attack on Mao's leadership launched by Khrushchev at the Twenty-Second Soviet Party Congress in October 1961, responding to the Soviet leader's "expression of undisguised support for anti-party elements in the Chinese Communist party" (in all likelihood a reference to the purged Minister of National Defense Peng Te-huai) by "frankly criticizing the errors of the leadership of the CPSU." Thus, whatever
his real views on policy (until recently Chou has been regarded as the symbol of moderate forces within the CCP), the record indicates that Chou En-lai defended Mao Tse-tung against both domestic and foreign critics during this period and, by this act of loyalty, demonstrated his fitness to serve as one of the principal leaders in the ensuing "key period" of the "great proletarian cultural revolution."

Intellectual dissidence, as the voluminous record of the "cultural revolution" has made clear, was rife in China during this time of troubles in 1961-1962. It is important to recognize, however, that many of the ideas and suggestions now attacked as dissident were not so considered at the time of their utterance. Along with such other urgent and distasteful measures as the dismantling of the communes in 1961, the Chinese Communist regime felt impelled to inaugurate a policy of "liberalization" (a kind of "second hundred flowers campaign") toward China's intellectuals, especially its scientists and technicians. With this caveat firmly in mind, the fact remains that a number of China's leading intellectuals (both inside and outside the party) utilized this new freedom to go well beyond the limits of permissible criticism of party policies. Disaffected by the widespread suffering caused by the disastrous "great leap forward" program, they committed the most unforgivable act of all--criticizing Mao Tse-tung.

Well aware of the outcome of the earlier experiment with "liberalization," Mao's critics in 1961-1962 were careful to cloak their criticism by the use of historical allegory, of pseudonyms and of Aesopian language. As is now well known, Wu Han's play "Hai Jui's Dismissal," the debate over which precipitated the "cultural revolution," has been adjudged (and, it is believed, rightly so) as an example of "using ancient things to satirize the present"--in this instance, likening the case of Peng Te-huai to that of a Ming Dynasty official who had been unjustly dismissed by the Emperor.
The criticism of Mao by Teng To, a secretary of the Peking municipal committee charged with overseeing the cultural life of the capital city, was much more comprehensive and damning. Writing under cover of a pseudonym in two literary columns in the Peking press, Teng To, together with Wu Han and a third Peking party functionary, (to quote an early broadside in the "cultural revolution") "in the guise of recounting historical anecdotes, imparting knowledge, telling stories and cracking jokes...launched an all-out and venomous attack on our great party, using ancient things to satirize the present, reviling one thing while pointing at another, and making insinuations and oblique thrusts." An examination of the contents of these literary columns, of which sizable excerpts were reproduced in May 1966, leads to the conclusion that this charge is substantially correct.

In foreign policy, Teng ridiculed Mao's famous dictum "The East Wind Prevails over the West Wind" as "great empty talk" and advocated reconciliation with the Soviet Union--"learning from" and "uniting with countries stronger than our own." In domestic policy, Teng directed a number of jibes at the follies of the "great leap forward", characterizing it at various times (indirectly, of course) as "boasting," "indulging in fantasy" and "substituting illusion for reality." Most incriminating of all, Teng insinuated that Mao himself was responsible for the tragic failures of China's domestic and foreign policies, alluding to him as "boastful and conceited" and as suffering from a type of "amnesia" which could be cured by "hitting the patient on the head with a specially made club." What made these charges all the more self-incriminating was the fact, stressed subsequently by the protagonists of the "cultural revolution", that they echoed charges being made at the same time by Khrushchev against Mao and the Chinese party.

Recent Red Guard reporting on intra-party discussion in the winter of 1961-1962 reveals, moreover, that this crisis of confidence in Mao's leadership extended into the ranks of the politburo. As these reports show, there were basic differences of opinion with the standing committee of the politburo at this time concerning the
gravity of China's domestic problems and the methods that should be employed to cope with these problems. On one side stood Mao and Lin Piao breathing "revolutionary optimism," as expressed in Chairman Mao's statement to a January 1962 central committee work conference: "The situation is very favorable. But there are still many problems. The future is bright."

The solution to these problems advanced by Lin Piao (also in January, presumably at this same work conference) was to improve political and ideological work—to study "Mao Tse-tung's thought...the soul and the very life of all work. When one masters it, one becomes proficient in everything." Reflecting this view, key People's Daily editorials in December and January suddenly revived long dormant concepts of the "tremendous revolutionary vigor," the "revolutionary enthusiasm" and the "subjective initiative and creativity" of the masses, and called upon party cadres to "fully mobilize" this enthusiasm for production by carrying out intensive "ideological and political work."

Aligned on the other side of this debate were Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Chen Yun and others who (to use the metaphor Mao would subsequently employ) stood in the "first line" and were thus charged with the actual responsibility for coping with this domestic crisis. Responding pointedly to Mao's optimistic assessment at the January work conference, Liu is quoted as saying: "The very favorable situation the Chairman has discussed refers to the political situation. But the economic situation cannot be said to be very favorable; it is very unfavorable." Elaborating this view (on unspecified occasions, probably at party work conferences in February and July of 1962 which Mao did not attend), Liu is said to have depicted China's economy generally as being "on the brink of collapse;" China's financial difficulties as "very serious;" and the losses in China's agriculture of such magnitude as to require "seven or eight years" to repair. What is more, Liu is quoted in this period as having criticized, obliquely but unmistakably, the optimistic view of China's problems uttered by Mao in January, characterizing "unwillingness to recognize difficulties or recognizing them only partially" as "absolutely not the attitude of a revolutionist, absolutely not the attitude of a Leninist."
The prescription for solving China's problems at this time advanced by Mao and Lin Piao—that of intensifying "political and ideological work"—was viewed by Liu and those responsible officials about him as either irrelevant or futile. In a report prepared in the fall of 1961 by the central committee propaganda department (headed by Lu Ting-i) and approved by Teng Hsiao-ping, the propaganda campaign for workers, peasants and soldiers to study the works of Mao underway at the time was allegedly adjudged ineffective and criticized, moreover, as "philistine... oversimplified... and formalistic." Liu Shao-chi's view of the efficacy of political indoctrination during this "period of emergency" was revealed in this statement attributed to him: "One should not write about the Three Red Banners, three main rules of discipline and eight points for attention [central themes in the political work of the People's Liberation Army] but instead concentrate on writing about something that can or cannot be done."

More damning than this in the eyes of Mao, Liu at this time is said to have led a movement, justified as an emergency measure, to rehabilitate a number of those party officials and economic and technical specialists who had spoken up in opposition to Mao's "great leap forward" and commune programs in 1959, and, like Peng Te-huai, had been labeled "Right Opportunists" and purged. In this undertaking to "reverse the verdicts on Right Opportunists," Liu both advocated intra-party democracy ("Those who speak at Party meetings should not be punished") and condemned as unduly harsh the "brutal struggle" and "merciless blows" struck at those who had disagreed with Mao in 1959.

Another "emergency measure" which Liu Shao-chi allegedly advocated to cope with the economic crisis was a further retreat from collective agriculture in the spring and summer of 1962. Under the justification that "all methods which help mobilize the production enthusiasm of the peasants can be used," Liu specified that these methods might include "fixing output quotas according to the household and individual farming", practices subsequently...
attacked as the "three freedoms and one contract" or, more simply, as "going it alone" in agriculture.

These, then, comprised the "erroneous tendencies of the right deviation in 1962" which Mao Tse-tung would attack in his first wall poster of 5 August 1966 as the first of several grave political errors by "leading comrades" (Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping et al) which would lead to the "great proletarian cultural revolution." Although conceding that he had committed the mistake of "right deviationism" in 1962, Liu Shao-chi (in his "self-criticism" at the October 1966 central committee work conference) would defend his performance at this time on the ground that, for the most part, Mao not only was kept informed about, but also approved, the decisions of these party meetings and that it was only later that "he expressed his basic disagreement with our evaluation and our way of doing things." Liu's defense is credible, the more so since Mao (as is his custom in periods of retreat in domestic and foreign policy) apparently retired to his tent in January 1962 where he sulked until issuing forth at the Tenth Plenum in September (as Liu put it in his "self-criticism") "to correct my mistakes for the first time."

Whatever the case, it now seems clear that Mao Tse-tung (who only a year earlier had informed Marshall Montgomery "emphatically" that Liu Shao-chi would be his successor) had by the fall of 1962 become suspicious of the loyalty and reliability of some of his top party lieutenants. By contrast, Lin Piao and Chou En-lai had demonstrated anew their loyalty during the preceding "three years of economic hardships." Lin Piao's success in restoring order and discipline within the ranks of the military throughout this period contrasted sharply with the record of unrest and dissidence in much of the rest of Chinese society, including the Chinese Communist party. The story of the development and ultimate surfacing of the "cultural revolution" in the ensuing four years
would be one of the gradual displacement of the old "party machine" (headed by Liu and Teng) by a new team headed by Lin and Chou, and of the progressive application of the more extreme methods and techniques of political indoctrination perfected within the Army in 1960-1962 to encompass all of Chinese society.

C. Mao Counterattacks (September 1962 - May 1964)

"One thing which we can say definitely at this time is that classes and class struggles exist even in socialist states...There is a possibility of...repeated struggles for power...in a socialist state. Our country must clearly understand and study this question. There is a possibility that the reactionary class will revive and it is necessary to strengthen our vigilance. Youth must be well educated and leaders and the masses also must be educated. Even old leaders must study and be educated." -- Mao Tse-tung, Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, 18 September 1962

Although Mao's important speech to the Tenth Plenum has not been published in full, enough is known from extracts to identify the major problems addressed in his speech --problems which remain as central, motivating concerns of the "cultural revolution." Since Mao's domestic and foreign policies had suffered obvious and severe defeats in the preceding three-year period, it was imperative that a rationale be advanced to explain past failures and silence future criticism. This rationale was to explain failures and criticism of party policies as largely the handiwork of "foreign and domestic class enemies" against whose poisonous influence (revisionism) it was necessary to inoculate all classes of Chinese society by means of a massive "education" campaign. Of particular interest in the above extract is the revelation that Mao singled out China's "leaders...even old leaders" as a special target for this campaign--in effect, serving notice on his old comrades-in-arms of the Long March that they were no longer exempt from the painful process of "rectification" and "thought reform" which previously they had inflicted on their subordinates.
Indeed, this warning to "old leaders" in Mao's speech is followed by a passage which, making allowance for the shift in generations, is so prophetic of the course of the "great proletarian cultural revolution" of the past 18 months as to warrant full quotation:

If the generation of our children were to run to revisionism and were to fall into a state of capitalism though they maintain socialism on the surface, the generation of our grandchildren would rise in revolt and overthrow their fathers without doubt. That is because the masses would not be satisfied with revisionism.

Although couched in terms of a future threat posed by China's younger generation, it is reasonable to infer from this statement, in retrospect, that Mao already perceived the danger of "revisionism" in China not as a contingency in the remote future, but as a clear and present danger posed by old 'comrades-in-arms' against whom it would be necessary to move circumspectly (because of their entrenched position in control of the party) and gradually (because of the still weakened condition of the economy).

This judgment is strengthened by the fact that within a matter of months (in May 1963) Mao would depict the threat of "counterrevolutionary restoration" as one which might occur in China in "perhaps only several years or a decade, or several decades at most," unless necessary countermeasures were carried out. The burden of responsibility for implementing these new countermeasures—a three-fold program of "class struggle, the struggle for production and for scientific experimentation"—was assigned to party cadres at all levels. At the same time, the very fact that Mao felt impelled in the spring of 1963 to issue this new warning of more imminent danger suggested a mounting concern that these cadres might (in his words) "collaborate with the enemy and be corrupted, divided and demoralized by him" and thus permit China's "Marxist-Leninist party" to "become a revisionist party."
Other extracts from Mao's key address to the Tenth Plenum reveal his conviction that a major battle of the "class struggle" in China would be fought in the field of culture and ideology. First, Mao warned of the danger of intellectual dissidence by pointing out "that a number of people were making use of the writing of novels to carry out anti-party activities and were creating a climate of public opinion for the restoration of capitalism." Elaborating this point, Mao went on to equate cultural and intellectual diversity with subversive activity by class enemies in the following formulation: "To overthrow a political power, it is always necessary, first of all, to create public opinion, to do work in the ideological sphere. This is true for the revolutionary class as well as for the counter-revolutionary class."

It is for this reason that Chinese Communist spokesmen (e.g. Madame Mao in February 1966 at the Army forum on literature and art) trace the origin of the "cultural revolution" back to Mao's call at the Tenth Plenum to initiate "class struggle" in the cultural field. Further, it is believed that this claim is true, in the sense that the "socialist education"/"class struggle" campaign initiated in the fall of 1962 comprises an integral, if formative, phase of the "cultural revolution." Of more importance, however, is the fact that Mao from the very beginning conceived of this effort, however labeled, "to foster proletarian ideology and liquidate bourgeois ideology in the cultural field" as one of irreconcilable political struggle against "class enemies."

Other extracts show that Mao at the Tenth Plenum revealed his concern over the problem of China's youth--the generational problem of cultivating loyal successors to Mao's revolution--by emphasizing that "class education for youth must be strengthened to ensure that our nation will remain revolutionary and incorruptible for generations and forever." Finally, Mao indicated his resolve to re-establish socialist, collective controls over the economy (especially the rural economy) when he "repudiated the trend of 'going it alone' [i.e. the restoration of individual economy] which had been incited by the bourgeoisie and its exponents within the Party..."
The first stage of this "socialist education"/"class struggle" campaign initiated in the fall of 1962 and extending to mid-1964, was relatively moderate. In May 1963, a campaign to eliminate "harmful bourgeois influence and unhealthy phenomena" in literature and arts was launched at a national conference of writers and artists. In December 1963, Chairman Mao issued another in the "series of extremely important instructions and stern criticisms of literary and art work" which the Chinese regime now characterizes as important milestones on the road to the "cultural revolution." At a meeting of the All-China Federation of Literary Workers, Mao complained that "socialist transformation has by now achieved very little effect" in the various fields of literature and art and termed "absurd" the fact that "many Communists are enthusiastic in promoting feudalist and capitalist art but are not enthusiastic in promoting socialist art."

The task of coping with the disillusionment and cynicism of China's youth, especially its educated youth, was even more formidable than that posed by the intellectuals. Since educational and job opportunities were sharply curtailed following the collapse of the "great leap forward", the almost insurmountable problem faced by party propagandists was to persuade these educated youth to sacrifice their careers and personal ambitions for the good of the revolution.

The solution advanced in the spring of 1963 was the full-blown propaganda campaign to "study the good example of Lei Feng." Intended to imbue China's youth with the "revolutionary spirit" and heroic self-sacrifice of the "extraordinary ordinary soldier," Lei Feng, a major objective of this campaign was to provide an ideological and moral substitute for material incentives in motivating China's youth. In attributing all of Lei Feng's miraculous accomplishments "to earnest and repeated study of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's works," this campaign fore-shadowed the recent phenomenon of Red Guards constantly carrying and consulting their red-bound "Quotations of Mao Tse-tung." In exhorting China's youth to emulate soldier Lei Feng, it anticipated Mao's call to all sectors of Chinese society "to learn from the People's Liberation
Army." And the failure of this campaign to achieve its objectives (there were many reports at the time of students poking fun at Lei Feng as a paragon of virtue) would prompt Mao in time to abandon persuasion in favor of coercion (the violence and terror of the Red Guards) as the solution to China's youth problem.

The main focus of the "socialist education" campaign in the year following the Tenth Plenum, however, was in China's rural areas where the "spontaneous tendency to capitalism" had developed to an alarming degree. Demonstrating the importance he attached to this problem, Chairman Mao drafted a 10-point program in the spring of 1963 designed to re-establish collective controls in the countryside. Held responsible for this resurgence of capitalism, rural cadres were now subjected to a "five anti's" campaign, charged with permitting "individual farming" and engaging in corruption. The appearance of a new "anti's" campaign signified a shift from ideological to political struggle, from persuasion to coercion. Although apparently conducted on an experimental, piece-meal basis in 1963, reporting testified to the violent nature of this rural rectification campaign with accounts of struggle sessions, public trials and beatings of erring cadres.

Of greater interest in tracing the origins of the "cultural revolution," however, was the appearance at this time of Poor and Lower Middle Peasant Associations. Reviving the "peasant association" used during the land reform era (1950-1952) to bully and suppress landlords and rich peasants, the regime began in early 1963 to form Poor and Lower Middle Peasant Associations for the express purpose of implementing, under party control, this new tough rural rectification campaign. The parallels between this organization and the organizations which would be created to carry out the "cultural revolution"--the cultural revolution teams, committees and congresses, and their action arms, the Red Guards--are both numerous and striking.

The first and obvious similarity is that membership is determined by class origin, since by definition the urban and rural proletariat are the most reliable
supporters of Mao's revolution. Second, the authority of these organizations is limited in that neither is empowered to remove party or government leaders or (in theory) interfere in governmental functions. Third, and most important, the principal function of both organizations is to serve as a mechanism for the purge and thought reform of erring party cadres. In effect, these organizations are intended to serve as a kind of popular jury in judging party cadres (who are summoned before them to engage in self-criticism), thus sparing the party itself from the necessity of performing this chore and at the same time serving as a pretense of local democracy. Finally, after subjecting the cadres to criticism and self-criticism, the members of these organizations are then supposed to engage in the same process themselves, regarded as the ultimate stage of the rectification campaign.

At the same time that the "socialist education" campaign in the countryside began to focus on iniquitous party cadres, a new campaign inaugurated in the urban, modern sector of Chinese society reflected the same distrust of the reliability and efficacy of party cadres in China's towns and cities. This was the campaign initiated by Mao's call in December 1963 to "learn from the PLA," with all political, economic and social organizations in China now directed to study and emulate the organizational, operational and ideological training methods of the People's Liberation Army. As subsequently revealed, Mao at this time ordered all departments of the national economy "to study the methods of the PLA, establish and strengthen political work and thus arouse the revolutionary spirit of the millions and tens of millions of cadres and masses on the economic front." This injunction was followed literally, beginning in the spring of 1964 with the establishment in industrial, transportation, trade and finance and all government departments of a political commissar system modeled on that of the PLA.

Although it was difficult at the time to grasp the purpose of this new political network, that purpose is much clearer in retrospect. As an early, vivid expression of his distrust of the conventional party apparatus, it strongly suggests that Mao had already decided that
his party was shot through with incompetents, at best, or dissidents, at worst, and required a thoroughgoing purge. In fact, it was just at this time, in the spring of 1964, that Mao issued a general directive criticizing party cadres for "conceit, complacency and conservatism," a critique which would be widely publicized in ensuing stages of Mao's "cultural revolution" and applied increasingly to "veteran revolutionaries" (i.e. the "old leaders" referred to in Mao's Tenth Plenum speech) in the upper echelons of the party. As this new political network came to be staffed increasingly by political cadres recruited from the PLA in 1964 and 1965, the groundwork was being laid for the emergence of Lin Piao and the PLA as dominant forces in Mao's "cultural revolution."

D. Mao Steps Up the Attack (June 1964 - August 1965)

"You have not gone through any inner-Party struggle. When the Soviet Union was under the rule of Stalin, nobody dared to make friends with another, and no two or three persons would dare to talk together...In the fall of 1964, I told Peng Chen at Peitaiho: It looks as if we too will soon head for a Stalinist phase." -- Statement by Liu Jen (Second Secretary of the Peking Municipal Committee), January 1965

"Following a meeting of Chinese leaders in June 1964, it was decided to launch a movement of 'peaceful struggle'--that is, a public purge with the objective of consolidating socialism--against the serious threat...of ideological agitation...bureaucratism and corruption among party cadres...some of them highly placed in the party hierarchy...

Mao Tse-tung has ordered a complete reform in the cultural field...[because]...internal enemies of the regime are trying to undermine it and this sort of conspiracy usually originates in the cultural sphere." -- Briefing by a Chinese Communist Official, 21 January 1965

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The purposes and strategy of the "great proletarian cultural revolution" were intimated publicly by Mao Tsetung three years ago in the 14 July 1964 polemic "On Khru-shchev's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World" and, as the above quotations suggest, revealed privately in much more candid form in secret party meetings at the time. Reflecting anxiety over the present status and future course of the Chinese revolution, Mao at this time unveiled a 15-point program designed to root out revisionism and prevent a restoration of capitalism in China. The product of Mao's twilight years, this theoretical pronouncement purported to be an authoritative Marxist-Leninist explanation of such assaults on the dictatorship of the proletariat in recent years as the Hungarian counter-revolution in 1956 and the rise of Khru-shchev revisionism in the Soviet Union. The message was clear—unless extraordinary measures were adopted, the same thing could and would happen in China too.

The first of these extraordinary measures was acceleration and intensification of the program of "cultivating revolutionary successors." Characterizing this program as "an extremely important question, a matter of life and death for our Party and our country," Mao laid down five criteria in "On Khru-shchev's Phoney Communism" to govern the selection and training of "revolutionary successors." Of these requirements, perhaps the most important was that they "come forward in mass struggles and are tempered in the great storms of revolution." When combined with the injunction that "they must especially watch out for careerists and conspirators like Khru-shchev and prevent such bad elements from usurping the leadership of the party and government at any level," the essential features of the Red Guard movement initiated two years later were adumbrated in this key Maoist document.

There was, moreover, a new emphasis in Mao's discussion of the problem of cultivating "revolutionary successors" in mid-1964. Whereas previously he had appeared to envisage the principal threat to the integrity and continuity of his revolutionary doctrines as arising when a "new generation" assumed positions of leadership in the
future, Mao now began openly to depict this threat as one posed by the current generation of older party cadres. In addressing a high-level party conference in June 1964, Mao revealed that his five criteria for the selection and training of "successors" were really intended to apply to existing cadres within the party apparatus. On the same occasion, he asserted that there were large numbers of "conspirators like Khrushchev" within the ranks of the Chinese Communist party--"all department and provinces have some." Further, according to a briefing by a Chinese Communist official in early 1965, it was at just this time that Mao, alarmed by the general state of "ideological bankruptcy" of "older cadres" within the party who had lost their "enthusiasm and devotion," decided upon a "new policy of rejuvenating the corps of cadres" with younger men. The intent of this policy, according to the Chinese official, was to "force older cadres to make a maximum effort and try to keep up with the vanguard of progress."

With this in mind, the purpose of a major People's Daily editorial, "Cultivate and Train Millions of Successors," published on 3 August 1964, becomes clear. Asserting China's "socialist revolution" to be one of "uninterrupted revolution," this editorial proclaimed that a new stage of "broadening and deepening of the revolution" had arrived. In keeping with this new stage, it was necessary to make "higher demands" upon the "nucleus of the party leadership at all levels." The new stage of the revolution, in other words, called for the "re-education of our cadres and the readjustment of our revolutionary ranks."

The signal for a general rectification and purge of the Chinese Communist party at all levels had been given. It was this signal, together with other signs of the beginning of a new, deeper "inner-Party struggle" which led Liu Jen in the fall of 1964 to predict a coming "Stalinist phase" in China.

The issue over which the deeper "inner Party struggle" would be waged was revealed in the second extraordinary measure in Mao's new program to root out revisionism in China--the launching of a bitter attack against China's
intellectuals. The directive to escalate the attack was provided by Mao at a June 1964 All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles when he charged that China's "literary workers" (and the publications under their control) since 1949 had "in the main failed to carry out the party's policies;" had in recent years "fallen to the brink of revisionism;" and, failing earnest reform, "would inevitably become an organization like the Petofi Club of Hungary." Since China's intellectuals had not actively supported the Chinese Communist party, it followed (to quote Mao's view presented at the beginning of this section) that they were engaged in a "conspiracy" with "internal enemies of the regime [who were] trying to undermine it."

This view of a conspiracy between China's intellectuals and leading party cadres, moreover, was revealed publicly in the savage denunciation of the arch-revisionist Yang Hsien-chen (former head of the CCP Higher Party School) initiated in August 1964. In advancing his heretical concept of the dialectic as "two merging into one," Yang was accused of performing the same function as that which the Soviet philosopher Deborin had performed in the late 1920's--namely, providing the "ideological weapon" for "an anti-Party group." Although not developed at this time, this charge of a link between intellectual and party leaders was echoed by Premier Chou En-lai (in a secret portion of his December 1964 work report to the National People's Congress) when he called attention to the "spirit of revisionism which reigns in Chinese political and intellectual circles."

Since the "cultural revolution" is a direct outgrowth of this decision in mid-1964 "to launch a rectification campaign...on the front of literature and art," it is ironic that the man selected by Mao at this time to lead the initial phase was Peng Chen. Selected to head the first "cultural revolution group" of the central committee charged with screening the literary and artistic output of intellectual dissidents in the preceding few years, Peng would find (if he did not already know) that the most flagrant examples of "antiparty and antisocialist poisonous weeds" had appeared in publications of his own Peking party committee. Charged to ferret out high-level intellectual cadres opposed to Mao, he would be the first prominent victim himself.
The third extraordinary measure, although initiated before the publication of "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism," was Mao's plan to revitalize the propaganda apparatus in party and government with political officers recruited from the People's Liberation Army. A definitive statement of the purpose and functions of the newly-established political network in the economy and government was provided by Yang Shu-ken in February 1965 at a national conference for political cadres in trade and finance work. Taking as his text Lin Piao's exposition of the "four firsts" at the October 1960 PLA political work conference (characterized as a "general summation of our Party's experience in conducting politico-ideological work over the past few years"), Yang stressed that the principal function of the new political network was "grasping both ends well"—that is, "to keep a firm grip on both the upper end, the thought of Mao Tse-tung and the policies and directives of the Party center, and the lower end, the ideological state of the broad masses of workers." With this formulation, the intended role for the new political network throughout government and the economy—to replace the existing agitprop apparatus as the transmission belt for Maoist thought and party policies—was made clear. And with the disclosure that most of the some 200,000 ex-PLA officers and men at work in the trade and finance sector were staffing this new political network, it appears in retrospect that the process of reorganization and militarization of the Chinese Communist party, a salient feature of the current "cultural revolution," was well underway in early 1965.

As he would reveal in talks with the French emissary Andre Malraux in the summer of 1965, Mao had come to the conclusion that the Chinese Communist party not only had failed to cope with "revisionism" but was itself largely responsible for "revisionism" in China. When queried by Malraux just what he meant by the term "revisionism," Mao replied that "as a practical matter" he meant "corruption among the cadres and disregard of state directives by the people." Mao was already blaming a defective party apparatus for the failure of his policies. Hence, the need to reorganize and rejuvenate the party by the addition of younger, more militant elements from the People's Liberation Army.
Two developments in the winter of 1964-1965 suggested that Mao blamed not only the rank-and-file but also the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party for the growth of "revisionism" in China. First, in a major work report to the Third National People's Congress in December 1964, Chou En-lai denounced publicly a number of the emergency policies and programs instituted following the collapse of the "great leap forward" in 1960-1962 as the handiwork of "class enemies." Although not revealed at the time, it is now known from Red Guard materials that most of the policies which Chou criticized in his report had either been advocated or approved by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping in this earlier period. Now, after China's economy had revived, the very measures which had enabled this recovery were attacked as "bourgeois" and "revisionist" in nature.

The second development occurred at a central committee work conference held in January 1965, at which a major party document ("Some Current Problems Raised in the Socialist Education Movement in the Rural Areas" or, more simply, "The 23 Points") was drawn up under Mao's personal guidance. The purpose of this conference, as recent Red Guard materials have disclosed, was to criticize and rectify mistakes committed by Liu Shao-chi in directing the rural "socialist education" or "four clearance" campaign in 1964. These mistakes are said to have included (1) making too gloomy an assessment of the results of the campaign ("in the past year and more, instead of winning battles we have lost them during revolutionary struggle"); (2) advocating stringent measures against basic-level cadres as a whole ("many rural cadres have committed errors" and therefore "we must rouse the masses without restraint"); (3) denigrating one of Mao's work methods—that of holding "investigation meetings" ("This method does not work in many cases"); and (4) substituting his own views in place of Mao's theoretical formulations concerning the nature of the "four clearance" movement. As Liu would admit subsequently in his October 1966 "self-criticism," these constituted "mistakes which appeared leftist but were actually Rightist, a repetition of the previous error of 'right deviationism' which he had committed in 1962."
It was clear to those present moreover, that Lao was leveling a serious political attack on Liu Shao-chi at this work conference. Views which Liu had advocated the preceding September at another party meeting were denounced in the document drawn up under Mao's supervision as "not Marxist-Leninist"--a serious charge in a Communist state. In addition, this document revealed that a new target had been selected for the "socialist education" campaign in urban and rural areas, the very same target as that which would be selected subsequently for the "great proletarian cultural revolution"--"those within the party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road." And when the document further asserted that these "class enemies" within the party were being supported and protected by party officials "at higher levels...even provincial and central levels," it appeared that Mao was intent upon extending the scope of his "rectification"/purge campaign into the highest echelons of the Chinese party leadership.

The sharp escalation of the attack against domestic "class enemies" in the last six months in 1964 reached a crescendo in January 1965 only to be followed by a noticeable lull. In seeking an explanation for this lull, it seems clear that a major factor was apprehension over the rapid escalation of the U.S. war effort in Vietnam during the winter and spring of 1965, especially the decision in February to initiate large-scale bombing of North Vietnam on a regular basis. Since this was not playing the game of revolutionary war according to Mao's rules (i.e. it violated Mao's thesis of the sanctuary of revolutionary bases), it must have been an unexpected and alarming development. The reaction, then, was de-emphasis of "class struggle" in order to conciliate and unite the population in the face of a possible war situation. And, in fact, the dominant theme of Communist China's domestic propaganda-political indoctrination campaign in the spring and summer of 1965 was that of "war preparations."

Moreover, it was just at this time that Mao began to display the same concern over the loyalty and devotion of the People's Liberation Army, including high-ranking military cadres, as he had displayed earlier towards the party. In a New Year's Day message to the PLA, Chief of
Staff Lo Jui-ching made the same criticism of "conceit, complacency and conservatism among some of our comrades" which Mao earlier had leveled at party cadres. It would not be revealed until later (in recent Red Guard materials) that Lo himself was guilty of these offenses; that, in fact, he had already been subjected to criticism by Lin Piao for emphasizing military training at the expense of political indoctrination work in the armed forces. Interpreting this as a revival of military professionalism, Mao responded in May 1965 by decreeing the abolition of all military ranks in the armed forces. Another factor explaining the noticeable lull in 1965 in Mao's campaign against "class enemies" within the party, then, was the necessity of dealing first of all with the threat of disidence and insubordination at the highest levels of the Army. *

The most important factor explaining this lull appears in retrospect, however, to have been Mao's decision to allow his top party lieutenants a period of time in which to rectify the mistakes he had pointed out to them. Addressing the October 1966 party work conference, Chen Po-ta would suggest that this had been Mao's strategy by stating: "When the 23 Points were drafted last year, the Chairman criticized Liu and Teng...but the criticism failed to touch them." What is more, the unwillingness of Liu and Teng to accept and act upon Mao's criticism then produced a situation of tension and stalemate within the central committee, as Mao would subsequently reveal in his speech to the October work conference: "At the time of the 23 Points, the atmosphere in Peking was tense and so was that of the central committee." When this tension reached an acute stage at a crucial meeting of the party center in September 1965, the "great proletarian cultural revolution" would begin.

*Confirming the fact that Mao had already become suspicious of Lo Jui-ching was the charge, revealed subsequently in Red Guard materials, that Lo, at this time if not earlier, "told other people that Chairman Mao did not trust him and wanted to purge him."
III. THE REVOLUTION BEGINS

"Last year in September-October, I raised the question of what should be done at local levels if revisionism emerged in the Central Committee. I felt then that my ideas could not be carried out in Peking. Why did the criticism of Wu Han begin in Shanghai, and not in Peking? Because there was no one to do it in Peking." -- Mao Tsetung, Speech at Party Work Conference, 25 October 1966.

"The aim of this great struggle... is to criticize and repudiate Wu Han and the considerable number of other anti-party and antisocialist representatives of the bourgeoisie in the Central Committee and in the party, government and other departments, at the central as well as at the provincial, municipal and autonomous region levels." --Circular of the CCP Central Committee, 16 May 1966.

According to an authoritative Chinese reconstruction, the "great proletarian cultural revolution" originated at a central committee work conference in September-October 1965 when Chairman Mao issued "instructions regarding the criticism of Wu Han." As the above quotations suggest, Mao had already decided to use Wu Han as a stalking horse for much larger game in the "party, government and other departments" (e.g., the People's Liberation Army), including Peng Chen (the First Secretary in Peking), Lo Juiching (the PLA Chief-of-Staff) and quite possibly Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping as well.

It is in this sense, then, as a final test of the loyalty and trustworthiness of his old "comrades-in-arms" that Mao's "cultural revolution" can best be understood. His earlier suspicions of disloyalty strengthened by the display of further resistance by top leaders at this central work conference, Mao apparently decided at this time to initiate a rectification-purge campaign of a new type--directed at "old comrades" and "high-ranking cadres" holding positions of authority--designed to make the Chinese Communist party, the government apparatus, the military, and ultimately the Chinese people, once more responsive to his will.
Forced to plan and run this campaign outside normal party channels, Mao apparently created his own organization and channels of communication at an early stage of the "cultural revolution", with those performing leading roles destined to replace the purge victims. Among those to whom Mao now turned for advice and support were Lin Piao (his long-trusted military leader), Chen Po-ta (his former political secretary), Chou En-lai, Kang Sheng (a long-time intelligence specialist) and last but not least, his wife, Chiang Ching. Since it was directed principally at powerful leaders who controlled much of the party apparatus, Mao would also find it necessary to look outside the party for support and assistance in carrying out this campaign, turning first to the PLA and then to such extra-party mass organizations as the Red Guards.

The objectives and strategy of this new type of rectification-purge campaign, already implicit in Mao's 14 July 1964 polemic "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism," were clearly revealed in a Chinese Communist briefing to a foreign delegation in Peking at this time. Whereas the threat of revisionism in China had been depicted earlier in general terms, it was now traced directly to the activities of high-ranking officials within the party, government and military. Reflecting this change in definition and approach, the objective of this campaign was now stated to be the "removal of any 'little Khrushchevs' who may be lurking in China." In order to detect and remove these "little Khrushchevs," moreover, it was necessary to rely on the "masses" who would be educated "to expose this type of activity."

The reason why it was necessary to rely on the masses was stated with surprising candor: experience had shown that the "little Khrushchevs" had agents and protectors in the security apparatus of the party and government ("the secret service, the Ministry of Justice... and the Control Committee") which therefore could not be trusted to carry out this purge on its own. Since "this cannot be done from the top," it was necessary to educate and mobilize the masses (working together with the security apparatus) to carry out the purge from below. Although it would be nearly a year before China's Red Guards would
appear, the rationale for establishing this extraordinary extra-party organ was set forth clearly in this briefing in the fall of 1965.

Although the Chinese Communists trace its origin to the September-October party conference noted above, the "great proletarian cultural revolution" did not actually begin until November 1965. Even then, for a period of nearly six months, Mao's "cultural revolution" would be carried out largely in secret. This secrecy (a necessary part of the testing process) served to conceal (not only from foreign observers but also from the principal targets) a fundamental truth about the nature of Mao's "cultural revolution"—that the "cultural revolution" was in reality a "political revolution" designed to test the entire apparatus of power (party, government and army) and to purge from it all (no matter how highly placed) found guilty of resisting the policies and programs of Mao Tse-tung. The story of the first stage of this revolution extending from November 1965 to May 1966, then, concerns the progressive unfolding of this rectification-purge campaign in all sectors of Communist China's control apparatus. An important element of this story, moreover, would be the reaction and subsequent conduct of those in high position once aware that they, not dissident writers and artists, were the ultimate target of this campaign.

The first target of the rectification-purge campaign initiated by Mao in November was Peng Chen who, as Mayor and First Secretary, personified "the problem of Peking" and, as head of the first "cultural revolution group" established in mid-1964, symbolized the continuing resistance in both the party and government to Mao's demand for rigid control over China's intellectuals. As is now known, Mao through his wife directed officials in the Shanghai party committee in November 1965 to launch a political attack (in an article by Yao Wen-yuan appearing in the 10 November issue of the Wen Hui Pao) on Wu Han (a deputy major of Peking) and, by extension, on Wu Han's boss, Peng Chen. That this was construed in Peking as a potentially dangerous attack on Peng Chen was indicated by the immediate telephone call of inquiry to the Shanghai committee: "What is your background for publishing Yao's article? Why have you not notified us in advance? Where is your party character?"
Peng's sense of political danger must have intensified sharply when on 29 November the attack by the Shanghai committee was endorsed by the Literation Army Daily, the organ of the People's Liberation Army and of its commander, Lin Piao. To add to his uncertainty and insecurity, Peng was unable to gain access to Mao who, no doubt intentionally, had just left Peking for an extended five-month sojourn in East and Central-South China. Peng's conduct at this point is susceptible of two possibly related explanations. First he may already have sought out Mao following the initial attack of 10 November, at which time he received limited, if ambiguous, assurances of support. On the other hand, he may have felt, along with the other principal figures in charge of party cultural and propaganda work, that he had no alternative but to fight back in self-defense.

In either event, Peng Chen and his supporters did resist and succeeded, moreover, in temporarily warding off the attack. Even after Wu Han published in late December a self-criticism (admitting historical error but not political culpability), there were still a number of intellectuals bold enough to speak out publicly in his defense. Then, for a period of nearly three months, the political attacks against Wu Han (and his defenders) ceased.

The reason for this hiatus was the publication on 12 February of an "Outline Report" by Peng Chen, in the name of his "cultural revolution group" and of the politburo, which summarized the results of the "cultural revolution" to that time and set forth guidelines for its development in the months that followed. Although some of the subsequent charges leveled against this report (e.g. that it had not been discussed in the "cultural revolution group" and in the politburo) are open to question, the recent publication of the text of this report (also known as the "February program") makes clear that the main charge—that Peng issued this report to "cover up the serious political nature of the struggle" against Wu Han—is correct. What is more, by so doing Peng was guilty of violating a specific instruction by Mao to treat Wu Han's play "Hai Jai's Dismissal" as a defense of the "right opportunist" Peng Teshuai and therefore as an attack on "the party and socialism"
(i.e. on Mao Tse-tung). In advocating more freedom for China's intellectuals than Mao was willing to tolerate, Peng in this report deplored the tendency of "academic workers of the left" to behave like "scholar-tyrants who are always acting arbitrarily and trying to overwhelm people with their power," and stressed the need for "prudence" and "caution" and centralized direction in the conduct of the "cultural revolution." Although it sealed his doom, the effect of this report by Peng Chen was to bring to a halt temporarily Mao's "cultural revolution."

A second and equally important target of the campaign initiated by Mao in November 1965 was Lo Jui-ching who, as Communist China's second-ranking military leader, personified continuing resistance within the PLA to Mao's views on army-building (featuring political indoctrination and productive labor at the expense of military training). As a member of the party secretariat and as a Vice Premier, Lo, alone among high-ranking Chinese leaders, held important positions of authority in all three branches of the control apparatus—the party, the government and the military. What is more, Lo also, according to Red Guard materials, served as "Head of the Central Committee Security Bureau," the party security apparatus which (as noted above) had already been adjudged unreliable to carry out Mao's wide-ranging purge. Occupying a uniquely powerful and strategic position in the Chinese Communist hierarchy, it is not surprising that Lo, once Mao's suspicions had been aroused, was the first casualty of this purge, disappearing in late November 1965.

The signal for initiating a nation-wide rectification-purge campaign in the armed forces was given by Lin Piao on 15 November 1965 in a five-point directive on the work of the PLA for 1966. Another in a series of directives designed to put "politics in first place" in the army (i.e. Mao's military policies), the significance of this directive is that for the first time it would be used to test and purge the top leadership of the PLA. As the first and most prominent of these purge victims, Lo Jui-ching, according to later Red Guard reports, was "fully exposed" at a meeting in early 1966, a meeting which in all likelihood was an important PLA conference on political work held
in January. Since the indictment of unidentified opponents by Hsiao Hua (in his work report to the conference) was almost certainly directed at Lo Jui-ching, it is of some importance to note these charges, charges which would be subsequently leveled at a number of other high-ranking military leaders in Communist China.

First, Lo was accused of equating the importance of "military affairs" and "politics," thus manifesting a "purely military viewpoint" (or more simply, military professionalism). Next, in contrast with Lin Piao who had described Mao Tse-tung's thought as "the acme of Marxism-Leninism in our time," Lo was charged with entertaining doubts about Mao Tse-tung's thinking," a charge repeated and elaborated in more recent Red Guard materials. Finally, Lo was condemned for "striving for individual military power," violating long-established party practices of "collective leadership and democratic centralism" and deceiving the rank-and-file by "saying one thing in public and something else in private." To combat this dangerous tendency, Hsiao Hua (anticipating the practice of "extensive democracy" which would become a distinctive feature of the "cultural revolution") then called upon the rank-and-file to "expose and oppose without fear" any such "erroneous view or conduct against Mao Tse-tung's thought" wherever found in the PLA.

The last charge against Lo Jui-ching at this time would be made by Madame Mao at an important armed forces literature and art forum held in February 1966. This was the charge, which had the effect of directly linking the PLA rectification-purge campaign with the "cultural revolution," that Lo had opposed implementing the "cultural revolution" in the armed forces, claiming that the "problem of the direction of literature and art in our armed forces is already solved." The convening of this literature and art forum, moreover, was significant in its own right. It constituted an admission, first of all, that there were still serious, unresolved ideological problems in China's armed forces. ("The struggle between the two roads on the front of literature and art is bound to be reflected in the armed forces, which do not exist in a vacuum and cannot possibly be an exception to the rule.")
At the same time, it made clear that Mao had already conferred a leading role on the PLA ("the chief instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat in China...the mainstay and hope of the Chinese people") in implementing his "great proletarian cultural revolution." ("The PLA must play an important role in the socialist cultural revolution.") Indeed, as Red Flag would point out much later (in May 1967 when the documents in question were published), the "forum summary" drawn up following the conclusion of this conference was intended as a "general counter-attack launched by the proletariat" on the "outline report" on the "cultural revolution" prepared and disseminated earlier that same month by "the Peng Chen counterrevolutionary clique."

The third target of the rectification-purge campaign initiated in late 1965 was—as opposed to select individuals within the party, government and military—the party apparatus as a whole, especially the "leading cadres" who controlled the apparatus at all levels of the party. According to the text of a CCP county committee report dated January 1966, a recent central committee directive had called upon all party members to "expose" and "struggle against...Khrushchev revisionists in the party" with the objective of "eliminating the old and corrupt Revisionist group from our party and founding a revolutionary political party instead." The central committee directive went on to characterize "leading cadres" as generally "conceited," "corrupt" and "bureaucratic," and to charge that this "loss of the high qualities of revolutionaries and the superior traditions of the PLA" had both "affected the close relationship between the party and the people and seriously hindered the development of the socialist revolution." The antidote for this "trend toward revisionism in the party" was to "severely penalize" the worst offenders ("purge those hopeless party members") in order "to give warning to others" ("those who are vague in their thinking, those who are not firm enough in their standpoint, and those who intend to escape"). The directive then issued a call for the "proper study of Mao Tse-tung's thinking" by using the "five principles of being outstanding in politics" advanced by Lin Piao on 15 November 1965.
Although there were a number of novel features of this high-level party rectification-purge campaign, the most unusual of all was the fact that it was being carried out under the auspices of Lin Piao's directive. The prominent role of the PLA and Lin Piao in this campaign was revealed publicly in an important 12 February speech (subsequently published in Red Flag) by Wang Jen-chung, the first secretary of Hupeh province. Entitled "Give Prominence to Politics and Put Mao Tse-tung's Thinking in Command of Everything," this speech contained a lengthy exposition of "Chairman Mao's call on the whole party to learn from the PLA." Specifically, party cadres were "to learn from the PLA how to give prominence to politics, how to carry out political and ideological work properly, and how to creatively study and apply Chairman Mao's works." In an indirect but unmistakable allusion to Lin Piao's five-point directive, Wang then stated: "Comrade Lin Piao has called upon us to study Chairman Mao's writings and creatively apply the advice from these writings to solve our problems. Comrade Lin Piao's instruction has shown us how to study and apply Chairman Mao's writings."

Although not publicized at the time, a letter sent by Lin Piao on 11 March to national conferences in the industrial and communications field provided additional evidence of Lin's increased stature. This letter was significant for several reasons. As the first message addressed by the Minister of National Defense to a purely civilian audience, it made clear to those within the party that Lin was now playing a leading political role. Both the style and content of Lin's letter, moreover, were reminiscent of Mao—the style concise and authoritative and the content reaffirming the central tenet of Maoism that "the forces of the spirit can be transformed into tremendous material strength." What was new was Lin's striking admission that "Mao Tse-tung's thought has not grown spontaneously from among the working people" (implying resistance on a fairly wide scale), coupled with the assertion that China urgently needed "unified thinking, revolutionary thinking, correct thinking. That is, Mao Tse-tung's thinking." There was in this message the implication that Mao had already assigned Lin Piao, backed
by the power and authority of the PLA, the mission of eliminating dissident thought in order to achieve "unified thinking" throughout China.

In short, there were a number of signs by the end of March suggesting that Lin Piao was already acting as Mao's second-in-command, not only in the military, but in the party and government as well. In view of these developments, it is understandable that Liu Shao-chi on visiting Burma in April should tell Ne Win that "considerable internal trouble was coming in China and that it conceivably could involve him [Liu] personally."

As noted earlier, an important chapter in the first stage of Mao's "cultural revolution" beginning in November 1965 concerns the reaction and subsequent behavior of those in high position once aware that they were the ultimate target of this campaign. First of all, did Peng Chen, together with other high-ranking party and military leaders, react, as various Red Guard materials in recent months have alleged, by conspiring to stage a counterrevolutionary coup d'etat in February 1966? The case alleging that Peng and company plotted such a "February coup" is both flimsy and unconvincing. In the first place, the Red Guard wall posters present widely differing accounts of this incident, alleging at different times that it was master-minded by Peng Chen acting alone; by Peng Chen in collaboration with the other members of the "Black Gang" (Lo Jui-ching, Lu Ting-i, and Yang Shang-kun); by the "Peng-Lo-Lu-Yang group" in collaboration with the senior military leader Ho Lung; and, most recently, by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. The accounts also differ widely on the chronology of this coup conspiracy, with some asserting that it was planned to take place in February, others that it was planned in February to take place in July, and still others that the plan was merely "to stage a coup in Mao's lifetime."

The substratum of truth underlying these contradictory and lurid accounts appears to be the following: (1) that a proposal was made by Peng in February to station military contingents at three universities in Peking, a
proposal that was turned down; (2) that Mao, in any case, had already prepared for such an eventuality by "the deployment of troops" to Peking; (3) that this incident was then used (most notably by the intelligence specialist Kang Sheng) to discredit and attack new purge victims as traitors as the "cultural revolution" unfolded; and (4) that this tactic of progressively escalating the charges against Mao's top-ranking opponents (principally Liu and Teng) would be suddenly abandoned in April 1967 with the cryptic statement by Premier Chou En-lai that "As far as I know, there was no 1966 February coup d'etat plot." Although more equivocal, Kang Sheng on this occasion also down-graded the importance of the "so-called February coup d'etat conspiracy," pointing out that in any case it should be clearly distinguished "from Peng Chen's attempt to grab party, military and administrative power."

Nor is the charge that Peng Chen, in collusion with Lo Jui-ching (the PLA Chief of Staff), Lu Ting-i (director of the central committee propaganda department) and Yang Shang-kun (director of the general office of the central committee), plotted to stage a coup at some later date "in Mao's lifetime" much more persuasive. Although branded (in the important 1 July 1966 People's Daily editorial "Long Live Mao Tse-tung's Thought") as members of a "counterrevolutionary clique" which aimed at "usurping the leadership of the party, army and government so as to restore capitalism," it seems more probable that their alleged crimes were individual rather than conspiratorial in nature. Rather than an organizational connection, the common bond uniting these leaders appears to have been one of passive resistance to the application of Mao's increasingly simplistic and narrow-minded ideas within their respective spheres of responsibility. The same 1 July 1966 People's Daily editorial provides evidence for this view in a subsequent passage describing the behavior of this "antiparty gang": "Where there is any mention of Mao Tse-tung's ideas, they get upset, start swearing and cursing and even get quite hysterical, just like the imperialists and Khrushchev revisionists."

The occasion for exposing and denouncing Peng Chen and his alleged conspirators was, as we now know, a central
committee work conference held in mid-May 1966. It was at this conference that Lin Piao, in the key speech, first charged that Peng and his fellow conspirators had "wanted to stage a coup d'etat in Mao's lifetime, to destroy Mao Tse-tung." Lauding Mao as "the most brilliant and greatest personality...[whose]...experience is much more profound than that of Marx, Engels and Lenin," Lin then warned that "Whoever opposes him will be denounced by the whole party and the entire nation."

That this warning was directed at a number of those attending this central committee work conference—that in fact it was directed at such top-ranking party leaders as Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping—is suggested by the central committee circular issued 16 May on the conclusion of this conference and by developments in the two-month period which followed. Hailed subsequently as "a great Marxist-Leninist document...which...put forward the theory, line, principles and policies of the great proletarian cultural revolution," this circular strongly implied that the real objectives of this "revolution" were not "bourgeois scholar tyrants" like Wu Han but rather "those within the party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road" who were "supporting" and "protecting" these "scholar-tyrants."

The implication that Mao was using and would continue to use the "cultural revolution" as a device to purge his opponents, who were highly placed in the party, government and military, was there for all to see. Although not identified, these opponents were described in the circular as both numerous and influential: "There are a number of these in the central committee and in the party, government and other departments at the central, as well as at the provincial, municipal and autonomous region level."

That the purge would encompass the military as well was indicated by the reiterated reference to "representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the party, the government, the army and the various spheres of culture" who would have to be "cleared out." And that the purge would (or could) extend into the standing committee of the politburo to include Liu Shao-chi (Mao's long time heir-apparent) was suggested by the statement (attributed to
Mao) in this circular: "Some of [these representatives of the bourgeoisie]...we have already seen through, others we have not. Some we still trust and are training as our successors. There are, for example, people of the Khru-
shchev brand still nestling in our midst." A year later in analyzing the significance of this circular, Red Flag would identify "the 'person of the Khruschev brand' mentioned by Chairman Mao in the document as still nestling in our midst" as none other than Liu Shao-chi.

Moreover, there is evidence at the time that, just as he had set a trap for Peng Chen the preceding November, Mao was now engaged in setting a similar trap for Liu Shao-
chi. The main elements of this new entrapment strategy can be found, in retrospect, in this same 16 May central committee circular. The first element was to characterize "the present struggle" as centering around "the question of implementation of, or resistance to, Comrade Mao Tse-
tung's line on the cultural revolution." The second was to assign Liu Shao-chi the task of implementing "Comrade Mao Tse-tung's line on the cultural revolution," a task made difficult if not impossible by the fact that Mao refused to tell Liu what his "line on the cultural revolution" was. The third was to confront Liu with a basic problem in the organization of the "cultural revolution" by asserting, in the circular, that "most party committees concerned have a very poor understanding of the task of leadership in this great struggle and their leadership is far from conscientious and effective." (This assertion, by the way, suggests that Mao at this early date had already written off the party apparatus as largely defective and incompetent.) The fourth element, then, was to give to Liu Shao-chi instructions concerning the solution of this leadership problem which were deliberately vague if not misleading--instructions given at a party conference in Hangchow on 9 June in Mao Tse-tung's directive "that work teams must not be sent out hastily."

The sending of party "work teams" to administer the "cultural revolution" in China's cultural and educational institutions in June and July was an accepted practice, one which had been employed extensively in the earlier "socialist education" campaign. It was only
natural that Liu and Teng should have attempted to restore party control over the "revolution" after the party committees in these cultural and educational institutions had been attacked and discredited by "revolutionary teachers and students." That Mao was well aware of this, that he made no effort at the time to dissuade Liu and Teng, and that he subsequently attacked this decision as a fundamental policy error—with which to incriminate not only Liu and Teng but also a great number of other party leaders at both the central and provincial levels—strongly suggests that Mao was setting a trap in advance to ensnare a major part of the conventional party apparatus and its leaders.

This conclusion is supported by evidence that Mao at this time was already by-passing normal party channels, working instead through the small group of trusted supporters who comprised the new "cultural revolution group" appointed at the party work conference in May. It seems very likely, for example, that the first big character wall poster put up on 25 May at Peking University by Nieh Yuan-tzu (destined for prominence in the later stages of the "cultural revolution") was drafted on Mao's instructions. It is known from Red Guard materials that Kang Sheng (a leading member of the newly formed "cultural revolution group") was instrumental in bringing this poster to the attention of Mao who then praised it as "the first Marxist-Leninist big-character poster in the whole of China" and ordered that it be publicized extensively throughout the country. As described a year later in Red Flag, the significance of this wall poster, and of Mao's decision to publicize it, was that "it called on the proletarian revolutionaries and the broad masses of revolutionary people to launch a mass movement from below" and thus "break the bondage of the slavishness which has been peddled by the handful of party persons in authority taking the capitalist road."

Mao's strategy of entrapment, then, was to incite the "revolutionary left" in June and July to rise up against the "bondage" of the "work teams" sent by "the handful of party persons" (Liu and Teng) to reassert the authority of the party control apparatus over Mao's "cultural revolution."
Once this was done and the party apparatus counter-attacked, its leaders could then be indicted for the same crime charged against Peng Chen--that of attempting to suppress "the proletarian left."

But this lay in the future. In early June, the time had come to disclose the results to date of Mao's "cultural revolution," transforming it at the same time into a massively publicized, nation-wide campaign. In keeping with this new phase, Peng Chen's dismissal was publicly revealed in a 3 June announcement that the Peking municipal committee had been reorganized and was now headed by a new first secretary, Li Hsueh-feng.

In a series of important editorials beginning 1 June, People's Daily proclaimed the objectives of the new public phase of the "cultural revolution" and the methods necessary to achieve them. The ultimate goal (as outlined in the 2 June editorial entitled "A Great Revolution That Touches People To Their Very Souls") was presented as positive and constructive--"to arouse the enthusiasm of the people and broaden their horizon about the future by means of the great thought of Mao Tse-tung and our great just cause, so that they will unswervingly march ahead." Before this could happen, however, it was necessary to "Wipe Out All Monsters and Freaks" (the title of the 1 June editorial), to purge all those in Chinese society who had been opposed to Maoist policy and thought. That the first stage of the "cultural revolution" would be both destructive and violent, however, was revealed in the following passage in the 4 June editorial. "Without destruction, there will be no construction...Messrs. the bourgeois 'authorities' describe us as 'men of dynamite' and 'clubs'. That's right...We shall smash anyone who tries to oppose the party and socialism...and oppose Mao Tse-tung's thought."

The first task, as indicated in the title of another editorial, was "To Take Over the Cultural Front Controlled by the Bourgeoisie." This was the signal for a massive purge of literally thousands of educators, journalists, writers, artists, composers, publishers and the entire party propaganda apparatus from top to bottom--all
held responsible for the disease of "bourgeois ideology" which had infected the mind of China.

The main thrust of the campaign at this stage, however, was directed at China's educational system, especially the universities which Mao considered a major breeding-ground of dissident thought in China. In order to cleanse thoroughly these Augean stables, a six-month vacation was decreed for all students and new criteria for the selection of students were announced which stressed class background and political reliability. The time had come to provide China's youth with the "combat experience" which Mao had previously termed essential for "cultivating revolutionary successors." In the ensuing struggle waged not only against university administrators and professors but against the party "work teams" as well, the "revolutionary leftists" would receive Mao's blessing and become China's Red Guards.

If Mao envisaged the "cultural revolution" as a crucible for testing and selecting trustworthy "revolutionary successors," it is now apparent that he also planned to use it as a final test of the loyalty and reliability of his party apparatus, including a large number of senior party leaders both in Peking and in the provinces. As suggested earlier, some of these (notably Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping) had probably already incurred Mao's distrust and been marked for disposal. Few were aware of Mao's scheme, least of all, the members of party "work teams" sent to administer the "cultural revolution."

With information from published reports, wall posters and especially the confessions of some of the principals involved, it is possible to reconstruct the development of the "cultural revolution" at China's universities (especially those in Peking) during June and July. The fact that 90 percent of the "work teams" committed fundamental errors of "direction and line" (as Mao would subsequently assert) was unmistakable evidence that they had not received clear guidance on how to conduct the revolution. Lacking these directives, they employed the customary techniques of China's rectification-purge campaigns, particularly (as Madame Liu Shao-chi's confession points out) those used in the preceding "socialist education" campaign.
Although violence had always been an integral part of past campaigns, it had been controlled and confined to pre-selected targets. One of the errors of the "work teams," then, was an attempt to restrict the scope and degree of violence with which the "proletarian left" attacked defenseless educators and teachers in China's schools and universities. Despite this effort, there is abundant evidence of widespread, systematic terrorization of China's intellectuals at this time, with students forcing their professors to kneel, beating them, and in one eye-witness account, "painting their faces with chalk and ink, taunting them and spitting at them, all in the name of Chairman Mao."

A far more serious error committed by many "work teams" was confusion of "friends" and "enemies." At a time of great confusion approaching anarchy on many university campuses, the "work teams," once they themselves had come under attack, sided with the majority of students to suppress the "revolutionary left." Although widespread, the best known example of this phenomenon occurred at Tsinghua University in Peking, where Madame Liu Shao-chi was a prominent member of the party "work team." In her confession, Madame Liu discloses how her team first labeled its critics as "troublesome schemers" and "false leftists" and then, after a period of "students struggling against students," "resorted to strong political repression."

It was at this juncture of events at a middle school attached to Tsinghua University that China's Red Guard organization was born. Organized as a fighting force of the "revolutionary minority," this first Red Guard unit in its first wall poster proclaimed its "right to rebel... in order to oppose a revisionist leadership." When Mao Tse-tung in a letter shortly thereafter conferred his blessing on the revolutionary action taken by this Red Guard unit at Tsinghua ("we warmly support all who stand in your position in the cultural revolutionary movement both in Peking and throughout the country"), the stage was set for inaugurating the next, higher level phase of the "cultural revolution." The great significance of the events at Tsinghua University in July is that they provided a pattern soon to be extended to encompass the entire country, with Red Guards issuing forth from the campus "to rebel" against a new and more formidable type of "revisionist leadership" --the Chinese Communist party apparatus itself.
IV. THE REVOLUTION ADVANCES AND RETREATS (AUGUST - NOVEMBER 1966)

A. The Red Guards (August - September 1966)

"Bombard the Headquarters"

"In the last 50 days or more some leading comrades from the Central Committee right down to the local levels... have exercised a bourgeois dictatorship and suppressed the vigorous movement of the great proletarian cultural revolution... This is utterly vicious. Associating this with the erroneous tendencies of the right deviation in 1962 and the apparently 'left' but actually right deviation in 1964, shouldn't this awaken people and make them ponder?" -- Mao Tse-tung's First Wall Poster, 5 August 1966.

"The Party has lost contact with the masses. You should pay attention to state affairs and carry the great proletarian cultural revolution through to the end."
-- Mao Tse-tung, Statement to the "Revolutionary Masses," 10 August 1966

The Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist party of China was held in Peking from August 1 to 12, 1966. In a series of historic decisions, this plenum ratified Mao's choice of a new successor leadership headed by Lin Piao; adopted a 16-point decision concerning the "great proletarian cultural revolution;" and issued a communique approving all of Mao's domestic and foreign policies in the four-year interval since the Tenth Plenum. Six days later, on 18 August, Chairman Mao publicly revealed the new heir apparent, Lin Piao, and the new organization created to carry out his "cultural revolution"--the Red Guards. These developments, together with the Chinese editorial commentary accompanying them, are clearly of fundamental importance in understanding Mao's "cultural revolution." As the above statements by Mao Tse-tung indicate, the time had come to spring the trap on Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and other high-ranking leaders in "the Headquarters," a trap which Mao
may well have been preparing since 1962. As these statements also reveal, the time had come to initiate a massive rectification-purge of the Chinese Communist party as a whole, a purge more extensive and violent than any since the founding of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949.

After 17 years in power, why did Mao Tse-tung feel compelled to undertake such a drastic purge? The answer to this question comes through clearly in the keynote speech made by Lin Piao at the Eleventh Plenum. As reported subsequently on a Red Guard wall poster, Lin Piao on this occasion demanded "a great examination, a general alignment and a general reorganization of the ranks of party cadres" directed at (1) "those who oppose the thought of Mao Tse-tung;" (2) "those who upset political-ideological work;" and (3) "those who have no revolutionary zeal." In addition to these (rightists) who were "to be dismissed from their posts," there were those in an "intermediate state" (the center) who, through fear or incompetence, had made mistakes but who, "provided they accept education and resolutely repent," would be retained in their posts. The third category (the leftists), those who eagerly studied Mao, attached great importance to political-ideological work, and were filled with revolutionary zeal, were to be "promoted." This "general organizational adjustment" was necessary in order to "break the situation of stalemate."

As revealed in Lin's speech, Mao had decreed a general testing and purge of the entire party in order to overcome widespread resistance to his policies and programs, opposition which had produced a "situation of stalemate." Since the most distinctive element of these policies and programs is that of reliance upon political indoctrination to arouse popular enthusiasm and mass support for the construction of a socialist/Communist society in China, Mao's charge that "the Party has lost contact with the masses" constituted a fundamental indictment of the entire party apparatus. Since by definition Mao's policies and programs were correct, the failure of these programs could only, in Mao's eyes, be the result of disloyalty or incompetence on the part of those whom he had entrusted to carry them out.
As noted earlier, the party itself had been ordered in late 1965 to carry out a rectification-purge campaign directed at leadership cadres who were "outwardly complaisant and inwardly disobedient" in their attitude towards Mao's thought. Obviously dissatisfied with the outcome of this effort to purge the party from above, Mao apparently then decided to forge a new weapon designed to purge the party from below—the Red Guards. This explanation of the origin of China's Red Guards would be provided by Mao himself in addressing an important party work conference on 25 October:

"In the case of the cultural revolution during the first few months—in January, February, March, April and May—there were many documents and the central committee issued announcements, but it all seems not to have attracted much attention. It was the big-character posters and the charging forward of the Red Guards that really aroused attention. Then it became impossible not to pay attention. When the revolution comes down on your own head, you have to...carry out political and ideological work."

If a basic objective of the second phase of Mao's "cultural revolution" in June and July had been to subject those in the top echelon of the party leadership to a final examination of their loyalty to, and understanding of, Mao's thought, the overall objective of the "great proletarian cultural revolution," as revealed at the Eleventh Plenum, was to subject the entire party apparatus to a similar test. (As previously argued, Liu, Teng and perhaps a few others were not really being tested, but rather trapped.) The primary function of the Red Guards, then, was to administer this test, providing the element of compulsion necessary to convince party cadres that they had to submit to the testing process. By means of wall posters and investigation meetings, the Red Guards were to carry out "a general reorganization of the ranks of party cadres" (in the words of the 8 August 1966 central committee decision governing the "cultural revolution") by "exposing and criticizing thoroughly" the rightists; by encouraging those in the center (the great majority) to "make serious self-criticism...accept the criticism..."
of the masses...and join in the struggle;" and by discovering the leftists who would "stand in the van of the movement and dare to arouse the masses boldly." For those cadres who still resisted, who still refused to submit to this examination process, thereby revealing their "anti-party, anti-socialist" nature, the directive to the Red Guards (again in the 8 August central committee decision) was clear—they were to be "fully exposed, hit hard, pulled down and completely discredited and their influence eliminated."

It is important to note that Mao believed or professed to believe at the outset that the great majority of party cadres would pass the test of the "cultural revolution." In his closing speech at the Eleventh Plenum, Mao estimated that only a "small minority" of party comrades would be unable or unwilling to carry out the 8 August central committee decision concerning the "revolution." Reflecting this judgment, the party decision itself stated that "the great majority" of party cadres were "good" or "comparatively good" and therefore were expected to pass the test. As late as 25 October in his speech to a party work conference, Mao would assert that the hard-core opposition ("the anti-party, anti-socialist rightists") amounted to only "1 to 3 percent" of total party cadres. Even allowing for an element of disingenuousness in this estimate, it seems clear that from the outset Mao and his new leadership team grossly underestimated the nature and extent of the opposition which the ruthless prosecution of his "cultural revolution" would engender, not only in the party but also in society as a whole.

It is also important to note that the "cultural revolution", as a vehicle for testing and purging those held to be in opposition to Mao, was intended from the outset to apply to the army and government as well. On 10 August, Lin Piao issued a directive governing implementation of the "cultural revolution" in the People's Liberation Army. Echoing the line he had taken in his keynote address to the Eleventh Plenum, Lin made it clear that military cadres were to be subjected to the same test as party cadres to determine whether or not they (1) supported Mao; (2) gave priority to politics; and (3) displayed revolutionary enthusiasm. Those who failed to pass
the test, administered in this case not by Red Guards but by the PLA General Political Department, would be dismissed.

That it would also encompass the government was indicated by Vice Premier Chen I in an interview with foreign students on 25 August. Characterizing the "cultural revolution" as in reality "a political revolution," Chen pointed out that "all higher cadres without exception are placed under the control of the masses." With respect to central government ministries, staff members were empowered to request the "removal" of any official with whom they were "displeased." Chen then concluded this portion of the interview by observing prophetically: "It appears as though some of our Ministers need to be discharged."

Although not mentioned by name, the purpose and functions of the Red Guards were clearly spelled out in the 8 August central committee decision governing the "great proletarian cultural revolution." Referred to as "large numbers of revolutionary young people, previously unknown, who have become courageous and daring pathbreakers," the Red Guards were depicted as the vanguard in carrying out the three-fold objective of Mao's "cultural revolution": (1) "to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road;" (2) "to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic 'author- ities' and the ideology of the bourgeoisie;" and (3) "to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the social- ist economic base..." Recruited primarily on the basis of militancy and revolutionary zeal (membership was largely restricted to representatives of the "five red classes" of workers, poor and lower-middle peasants, revolutionary cadres and revolutionary martyrs), the Red Guards were in certain respects well suited to discharge the most important task assigned them, that of serving as a combat force, as the "army" of Mao's "cultural revolution." The very same qualities--of pugnacity, naivete and fanaticism--of its youthful members, however, would soon split the Red Guard organization, gravely impairing its effectiveness as an instrument for purging the party.
It was ideally suited to carry out its first assignment (conveyed by Chairman Mao during his symbolic meeting with the revolutionary masses on 10 August in Peking) "to pay attention to state affairs and carry out the great proletarian cultural revolution to the end." This was the launching of a reign of terror in China's cities in the last ten days of August directed, in the terminology of the 8 August decision, at "open representatives of the bourgeoisie." Citing Mao on the need for revolutionary violence ("Revolution is an uprising...a violent act whereby one class overthrows another"), bands of teenage Red Guards set about systematically attacking individuals and institutions symbolizing bourgeois, feudal or foreign influence and ransacking homes in search of incriminating evidence. The same acts of violence, brutality and degradation previously directed at educators in China's schools and universities were now committed publicly against defenseless victims.

This extraordinary phenomenon deserves further comment. The resort to "gratuitous" terror—the persecution of powerless and harmless victims designated as "enemies" so that they may be destroyed—has been characterized as the essence of modern totalitarian rule. Closely linked to this phenomenon is a compulsion to repeat the past, an attempt to recreate the heroic, formative period of the revolution when there was a powerful enemy to contend with. Although derived from an examination of earlier forms of Stalinist and Hitlerian rule, this analysis provides valuable insight into the nature of Mao's "cultural revolution." In the violence and terror of Red Guard street attacks, Mao seeks to provide the "combat experience" deemed necessary for "cultivating revolutionary successors." The patent falsity of this synthetic revolution was revealed at the outset in the defenseless nature of the first "enemy" selected for attack.

The second enemy selected for attack—"those within the party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road"—was much more formidable. As noted above, the Red Guards would prove to be an imperfect weapon for attacking this enemy described in the 8 August decision as "the main target of the present movement" and as the
chief source of "resistance" to the "cultural revolution." An additional cause of difficulty, as events have made clear, was a defective strategy of attack.

As noted earlier, this strategy was an attempt to apply on a nation-wide basis the experience gained in implementing the "cultural revolution" in June and July at China's universities in Peking, especially at Tsinghua University. A special feature of this pattern of events had been the testing of the party leadership in Peking and in the central committee on its performance in administering the "cultural revolution." The results of this test were first communicated to the Eleventh Plenum in early August and then to mass meetings of Red Guards assembled in Peking in mid-August to receive instruction on their role in the "cultural revolution." The results were that a number of illustrious senior party leaders, most notably senior party Vice-Chairman Liu Shao-chi and Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping, had failed the test. This was the "revisionist leadership"--"those who are in authority within the party and taking the capitalist road"--which the first contingents of Red Guards in Peking had discovered and overthrown. To seek out and overthrow the counterparts of Liu and Teng in the party apparatus as a whole (especially in the provinces) was the task which China's Red Guards were now exhorted to accomplish.

The main force of the "cultural revolution" was now directed squarely at the party apparatus. Whereas all previous rectification-purge campaigns had been carried out against largely pre-selected targets under the control of a highly centralized, disciplined party machine, the present campaign was for the purpose of ferreting out largely unknown "hidden representatives of the bourgeoisie" (the terminology of the 8 August decision) within this party machine and entrusted to a newly-formed, loosely-organized group of youthful zealots, the Red Guards. It was one thing to stage this drama in Peking where Mao, Lin and the new "cultural revolution group" of the central committee could provide direct guidance and limit disorder. It was quite another thing, however, to dispatch these youthful fanatics to investigate and test on their own the loyalty of party leaders at the local level.
As suggested above, an additional cause of difficulty in the Red Guard movement was defective organization. In order to understand the chaotic nature of Mao's "cultural revolution" in the closing months of 1966, it is necessary to realize that imposition of control from above was expressly prohibited. As stipulated in the 8 August decision, "the only method" was "for the masses to liberate themselves, and any method of doing things in their behalf must not be used." As spelled out in a 23 August People's Daily editorial, this meant specifically for the Red Guards "the right to parade and demonstrate in the streets, the right to assemble and to form associations, and the right of speech and publication." In a speech to a central committee work conference on the same day, Mao minimized the "so-called chaos" which might result from the exercise of these "rights," and, in any case, proclaimed the view: "let there be chaos for some months." In this emphasis on "rights" and prohibition against controls, there was an invitation to anarchy.

The loosely-organized, decentralized system devised to supervise the "cultural revolution" at the local level was revealed in the 8 August central committee decision. At the basic level were "cultural revolutionary groups, committees and congresses" to be organized in "colleges, schools and government and other organizations...[and] generally also in factories, mines, other enterprises, urban districts and villages." Envisaged as "permanent, standing mass organizations," the members of these groups (the new revolutionary elite among students, workers and peasants) were to be selected and subject to recall by the "revolutionary masses" in accordance with "a system of general elections like that of the Paris Commune." Although clearly limited in authority, these "cultural revolution committees" were depicted as providing "general guidance" to Red Guard units when they first appeared in China's schools and universities.

Guidance at the top has been provided by Mao, his new team of leaders, and especially the "cultural revolution group" of the central committee. An unusual and continuing feature of this control system at the top has been that, once policy guidelines are determined, they are then
communicated directly and in person by high-ranking leaders to meetings of Red Guards in Peking. In this series of meetings (most of which are known only from wall posters), Chou En-lai has been the most prominent, followed by Madame Mao and Chen Po-ta. By conveying leadership directives directly to the Red Guards, it has been possible to bypass the conventional party apparatus, itself the object of attack.

Guidance at the intermediate level was at first provided by a network of "cultural revolution groups" within the regional bureau, provincial and municipal party committees. Constituting an extraordinary ad hoc party apparatus, these "groups" presumably received their directives from and were responsible to the "cultural revolution group" of the central committee. Lacking clear-cut directives and limited in authority, these "groups" would in time come under attack themselves for attempting to suppress the "cultural revolution" at the local level.

The charter of the "cultural revolution" was, of course, the 8 August decision of the central committee. Intended to provide guidance for all, the ambiguous, contradictory language of the 16 points comprising this document has proved a basic source of confusion, especially the contradictory provisions governing the identification of those to be purged in the party apparatus. In Point Two, the responsibility for conducting the purge was assigned (implicitly) to Red Guards--"the large numbers of revolutionary young people...[who]...expose and criticize thoroughly, and launch resolute attacks on the open and hidden representatives of the bourgeoisie." In Point Three, however, where party leaders at different levels were directed to encourage Red Guard criticism of their performance, the authority to determine whether a given party leader should be dismissed was clearly retained by the party itself.

A more glaring contradiction was contained in the discussion of methods to be employed in conducting the rectification-purge campaign. In Point Six, the "debate" was to be "conducted by reasoning, not by coercion or force"; but in Point Eight, the prescription for handling
"anti-party, anti-socialist rightists" was that they "must be fully exposed, hit hard, pulled down and completely discredited and their influence eliminated." Although this contradiction could be reconciled in theory (the first applied to "revolutionary comrades," the second to "class enemies"), the practical difficulty of distinguishing between "friend" and "enemy" remained. For this, the most crucial single issue in any purge, there was no clear, authoritative guidance.

With this background in mind, it is easier to understand the next phase of Mao's "cultural revolution" extending from the first Red Guard rally of 18 August to mid-September. Following a short-course in the strategy and tactics of "cultural revolution," contingents of Red Guards were sent out to all provinces and major cities to transmit and apply the advanced revolutionary experience of Peking—specifically, the experience of testing the party committees on their performance in the "cultural revolution." At this point, the defects of strategy and organization of the Red Guard movement outlined above combined to produce a nationwide explosion of violence.

Instead of revolution on the Peking model, a new pattern of large-scale violence featuring bloody clashes appeared in nearly all the major cities of China. As spelled out in numerous wall posters subsequently, the precipitating factor in nearly all cases was the peremptory demand by Red Guards from Peking on arrival that local party committees "reorganize along the lines of the Peking committee." When this demand was not met, Red Guard leaders then ordered their detachments to "bombard the headquarters," launching a violent attack against both the premises and leaders of the local party committees. To defend themselves, local committees then mobilized their own Red Guards, together with workers, peasants and soldiers. The result was a rash of violent "incidents" throughout most of China, in some cases involving thousands of combatants and producing hundreds of casualties, including many dead.

Although the 8 August decision had predicted "relatively great resistance" once the Red Guards were unleashed
to attack the party, the extent and effectiveness of this opposition was clearly beyond expectation. The response of Mao and Lin and the new team of leaders to this crisis was one of tactical retreat, a regrouping of forces which would extend throughout October and much of November. In a series of measures designed to limit the excesses of the Red Guard movement, the first was an explicit and reiterated prohibition against the use of force. Coupled with a demand for greater discipline, this prohibition was now held applicable (in the 28 August People's Daily editorial entitled "Revolutionary Young People Should Learn from the People's Liberation Army") even to "those in authority who are taking the capitalist road" (i.e. Mao's opponents in the party apparatus). Moreover, authoritative editorials (e.g. the 7 September People's Daily editorial) warned Red Guards not to interfere with production in industry and agriculture, both to safeguard production and remove a major source of friction between Red Guards and workers and peasants.

In addition, a number of tentative organizational measures were taken at this time to strengthen coordination and control. First was an attempt to organize Joint Commands or General Headquarters of Red Guards in the major cities of China, with the aim of centralizing control over Red Guard activities in a given locality. A special feature of these new Red Guard Corps was the employment of high-ranking PLA officers (military district commanders and political commissars) as "instructors," with the announced objective of turning the Red Guards into a highly organized, disciplined battle force and "strong reserve of the People's Liberation Army." Next was the establishment of Red Guard Control Squads, an elite corps invested with authority to investigate and punish infractions of the new discipline. Finally, an extensive effort was undertaken at this time to "link up" the local Red Guard Corps on a nation-wide basis, achieving coordination by sending delegations to "exchange experience." The focal point was Peking, to which in ensuing months literally millions of Red Guards would travel in an unending stream, there to have the psychedelic experience of seeing Chairman Mao and there to receive authoritative instructions on the next phase of the "cultural revolution."
One of the most significant and revealing of these instructions was contained in a mid-September speech by Chou En-lai to a Red Guard group from Harbin. After admonishing the Harbin Red Guards for publicizing their attack on the Heilungkiang Provincial Party Committee in newspapers and radio broadcasts (a violation of the 8 August directive), Chou then proceeded, according to a wall-poster account, to a general critique of their conduct which applied equally to all Red Guard groups during this violent phase of the "cultural revolution." The basic mistake had been to attack the entire provincial party leadership, to attach the "black gang" label to the provincial committee as a whole. But, said Chou, "some of the provincial committee comrades are good," and, moreover, "not all party organizations at all levels are bad." The 8 August decision had clearly specified that "individuals," not "groups," were the main target, and, moreover, "careful investigation" was necessary to ferret out these individuals ("You cannot put caps on people at the start"). They had exceeded their authority, moreover, when they "arrested" members of the provincial committee, an action which only the standing committee of the central committee was empowered to authorize.

The above suggests the calling of a temporary truce in October and November in the battle between the Red Guards and the provincial party apparatus. It was at least tacitly admitted that the Red Guards had gone too far too fast, the classic definition of "leftist" error. At the same time, and it was a vitally important proviso, it was made abundantly clear that the provincial and municipal party committees had also erred in resisting the Red Guard attacks. Citing the provision of the 8 August decision that "it is not permitted, whatever the pretext, to incite the masses to struggle against each other," a 11 September People's Daily editorial pointed out that "responsible persons in some localities and units openly defied this decision...created various pretexts to suppress the mass movement...[and] even incited a number of workers and peasants...to oppose and antagonize the revolutionary students."
The implications of this editorial were ominous. At the appropriate time, once the Red Guard students had been reinforced by militant detachments of young workers, the truce would be lifted and the onslaught against the party apparatus in the provinces renewed. At that time, the pretext would be at hand for purging nearly any leader at the regional bureau, provincial or municipal level whom the Maoists in Peking might select.

B. The October Work Conference (October-November 1966)

"A review of the state of the cultural revolution for the past several months tells us that the strength of the two opposing forces has been very great. There was tension at one time in the situation because...of resistance to some extent in the in-between stratum. Chairman Mao noted this situation and decided to call you together to discuss the situation." -- Lin Piao, Speech at Central Committee Work Conference, 25 October 1966.

"The time of the great cultural revolution has been very short...a mere five months...so it is understandable that there should have been some lack of comprehension and some clashes...We cannot expect the broad masses of central, provincial, district and county cadres to achieve full comprehension overnight...But I am confident that the majority will understand" -- Mao Tse-tung, Speech at Central Committee Work Conference, 25 October 1966.

Opposition to Mao's "cultural revolution" and how to cope with it constituted the central theme of an important central committee work conference held in Peking from 9 October to 26 October 1966. As the statements by Lin and Mao cited above indicate, the extent of this opposition within the party was unexpected, especially the opposition.
by party cadres in "the in-between stratum" who by definition accounted for the great majority. In keeping with this assessment of the nature and extent of the opposition, there was a marked shift in the strategy of the "cultural revolution" throughout October and November, a shift away from violence and physical coercion toward political pressure and persuasion. At the same time, as subsequent developments would make clear, Mao and his new team of leaders were busily engaged in reorganizing and strengthening the forces of the "revolutionary left" in preparation for a new onslaught against the party apparatus.

The nature of the opposition to Mao's "cultural revolution" in the two-month period following the Eleventh Plenum was analyzed and explained by Chen Po-tain in two major speeches at the October work conference.* Characterized as a continuing manifestation of the "bourgeois reactionary line" advanced earlier by Liu and Teng, this opposition was accused of resorting to new tricks after the Eleventh Plenum in another attempt to "suppress the revolutionary masses." The principal trick played by Mao's opponents during this period, according to Chen

*The term "opposition" is an unfortunate one, since it suggests that every case conscious resistance to Mao's directives concerning the "cultural revolution." Much of the "opposition", however, has come from those who consider themselves loyal supporters of Mao but who either have misunderstood the vague and contradictory guidelines laid down to govern the "cultural revolution" or have acted in self-defense. Although recognizing that it is an inadequate and even misleading term, the word "opposition" will be used (for want of a better one) in this study to refer to difficulties, obstacles and resistance of all kinds encountered by Mao and his new team in the implementation of the "great proletarian cultural revolution."
and other regime spokesmen, was that of relying upon a "conservative majority" to suppress a "revolutionary minority" in a number of sectors of the "cultural revolution."

First, Chen revealed that most of the "cultural revolution groups, committees and congresses" (described in the 8 August central committee decision as the "organs of power of the proletarian cultural revolution") established in China's universities and schools during August and September had been taken over by this "conservative majority." As Chou En-lai would put it bluntly in a speech of 3 October, "We have found that 'revolutionary committees' don't work." Even more surprising was the admission that the opposition had seized control of two of the three Red Guard headquarters established in Peking in late August.

The disclosure that Mao's "little revolutionary generals" had been largely taken over by a "conservative majority" was made in speeches by Chen Po-ta, Chou En-lai and Madame Mao at a number of rallies convened in October for the purpose (in Chou's words) of carrying out a "great division and great reorganization" of the Red Guard movement. Demonstrating the gravity of the problem, a central committee emergency directive of 5 October demanded that "leading organs" ("the cultural revolution committees") in all universities and middle schools immediately
stop "inciting students against students and hitting the leftists;" that steps be taken "to protect the minority;"
and that true leftists who had been denounced as "counter-revolutionaries" be "vindicated and rehabilitated in public." The next day a giant rally was held in Peking for the purpose of "rehabilitating" Kuai Ta-fu (soon to become a leader of the reorganized Red Guard movement); of endorsing the militant #3 Red Guard Headquarters as the leading Red Guard organization; and of initiating "a large-scale mass criticism and repudiation of the bourgeois reactionary line" held responsible for the subversion of Mao's Red Guards during the preceding two-month period.

At meetings convened on 21 October and 12 November to reorganize the #1 and #2 Red Guard Headquarters, militant Red Guard groups from four universities, (Peking Aviation College, Peking Normal Institute, Peking Forestry Institute, and Peking Geology Institute) were praised as "revolutionary minorities" who had "rebelled" to seize power from "conservative majorities" in these headquarters. In attempting to explain how it could be that the "majority of Party and Young Communist League members" in the #2 Headquarters had supported a "conservative line," Chi Pen-yu advanced the not very convincing rationale that the fault lay with the "revolutionary minority" of the party's new Peking committee. Convincing or not, this would be the standard explanation for much of the subsequent opposition to Mao's "cultural revolution"--that it was inspired and directed by local party committees.

Another explanation for this embarrassing development was that "conservative" leaders of these Red Guard headquarters had been manipulated and controlled by "class enemies" ("persons in authority taking the capitalist road") who were hiding "behind the scenes." Just as Kuai Ta-fu symbolized the suppressed "revolutionary minority," the symbol of the "conservative majority" was Tan Li-fu of the #1 Red Guard Headquarters. Accused of seeking "special rights for the relatives of higher echelon cadres," Tan typified the large number of sons and daughters of high-ranking cadres who had assumed positions of leadership in the Red Guard movement in August and September. The charge of collusion between these high-ranking cadres and their offspring was at first muted, appearing in wall
posters in October protesting that "parents following the capitalist road were being protected by their children who organized other young people" in their behalf. In the ensuing phase of all-out attack against the party opposition beginning in December, however, this charge would be leveled against nearly all of the new group of top leaders in the politburo who would be purged at that time.

The principal opposition to Mao's "cultural revolution" throughout August and September, however, came from provincial party secretaries who (as pointed out by Chen Po-ta in his 23 October speech to the central committee work conference), "afraid of losing their positions and prestige...instigated workers and peasants to fight against the students." In so doing, they "made themselves out as people who were supported by the majority" (as they undoubtedly were) and pretended that "the organs they managed were the headquarters of the proletarian class." They also claimed, according to Chen, that "the cultural revolution obstructs production," especially that the "large-scale exchange of revolutionary experience" (in which millions of Red Guards traveled to and from Peking) disrupted planning and production. Chen's answer to this charge was (1) to claim that "enormous increases" in agriculture and industrial production had already been achieved in 1966; (2) to assert that a recent central committee directive asking Red Guards not to ride trains or motor vehicles "whenever possible" would "solve the transportation problem;" and (3) most important of all, to point out that Chairman Mao approved of the "exchange of revolutionary experience."

Continuing opposition to Mao's "cultural revolution" was also noted at this time in the People's Liberation Army. In a 5 October emergency directive, the Military Affairs Committee noted that "some leading organs" in military academies and schools had "seriously violated" the 8 August central committee directive by "inciting students to struggle against students" and thereby suppressing the "revolutionary left." This had been caused by "a handful of anti-party and anti-socialist bad elements" in the leading bodies of these academies and schools whom
the "leftists" were now ordered "to drag out, thoroughly struggle and criticize." There was, moreover a companion Military Affairs Committee directive in early October with general application to the PLA as a whole, which ordered party members to expose, struggle against and report to a higher level "statements or actions which run counter to the thought of Mao Tse-tung or the course and policy of the Military Affairs Committee" regardless of the "position in the chain of command" of those involved.

Continuing opposition to the "cultural revolution" in the economic sector was a common complaint of both Red Guards and their mentors in the central committee "cultural revolution group" in October. On 30 October a representative of the #3 Red Guard Headquarters complained to Tao Chu about this opposition as follows: "Now the problems of the workers and peasants are big. They want to produce but they do not want the revolution...This situation is very serious." In a speech the preceding day, Kuan Feng (a member of the "cultural revolution group") discussed the "problem of the factories" in similar terms, pointing out that "in many places, workers are no longer interested in production" and that this made difficult the task of achieving "coordination" between Red Guards and workers.

Having acknowledged the existence of considerable opposition, Mao, Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta in speeches concluding the October work conference on 25 October revealed what the next stage in the "cultural revolution" would be. In brief, party leaders were to be given another chance to pass (in the words of Chen) "the severe test of the cultural revolution." One reason for this second chance, as Mao explained, was that the first test in some respects had not been fairly administered. After the Eleventh Plenum, local party committees "in some places did not have time to hold proper meetings" in which to make necessary "political and ideological" preparation before "the Red Guards charged." What is more, as the important 31 October Red Flag editorial summing up the results of this party conference admitted, there had been "some excesses in words and actions by the masses" in the course of administering the first test.
Most important of all, the members of the central committee were to be given another chance, according to Lin Piao, because "the majority of our comrades acted unintentionally" in opposing the "cultural revolution." They had been deceived into following the "bourgeois reactionary line" of Liu and Teng. The strategy, as revealed in the 31 October Red Flag editorial, was to draw a series of distinctions between the "various people who have committed this error of line." On the one hand, there were the small number ("one or two or just a few") who had "put forward the wrong line" (clearly a reference to Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping), together with an indeterminate number who had "consciously" implemented it and "persisted in error." On the other hand, there were the "large number" who had "unconsciously" put the wrong line into effect and who were "willing to correct" their error. As opposed to the first group of incorrigibles, the second and much larger group of party leaders could be rehabilitated.

The means of redemption, as pointed out by Chen, was for "the majority of comrades...to wake up and draw a dividing line between themselves and the wrong line once the wrong line has been pointed out." As stated more explicitly in the Red Flag editorial, "A Communist who has made an error of line should have the courage to admit and examine his error and, alongside the masses, criticize what he has done wrong." By engaging in self-criticism before the Red Guards, apologizing for previous resistance to Red Guard attacks, and, perhaps most important of all, joining in the attack against the "bourgeois reactionary line" and its perpetrators Liu and Teng, party leaders at the regional bureau, provincial and municipal levels might yet save themselves. Having successfully beaten off the physical attacks launched by Red Guards in late August, local party leaders were now given the opportunity to surrender peacefully.

A vital ingredient in this new strategy of political pressure and persuasion was the extraction of confessions from Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, who obligingly made "self-criticisms" in the closing days of the October work conference. In a lengthy version of Liu's confession as
reported in Red Guard materials, the long-time number-two man in the Chinese Communist party admitted to a number of policy errors beginning as far back as 1945 and culminating in the serious mistake of "right opportunism" committed during his administration of the "cultural revolution" in June and July. Liu refused to admit, however, that he had consciously disobeyed Mao's instructions and, in fact, implied clearly that Mao had approved of most of the policy decisions for which he was now being held responsible. That these confessions were considered unsatisfactory was revealed in Chen Po-ta's charge on the last day of the work conference: "Liu and Teng have not admitted their errors...They have not cast away their wrong ideas."

Thus, despite their confessions, Liu and Teng were still refusing to play the role assigned to them in the campaign of intimidation waged against those in the party apparatus who continued to waver or resist. This role was to serve as "negative examples" of "those within the party who are in authority and are taking the "capitalist road," as a warning that a similar fate of total disgrace and purge awaited those who refused to submit. Responding to Chen Po-ta's call for further criticism, the Red Guards intensified their attack on Liu and Teng in lengthy wall posters and newspaper articles and in speeches at mass rallies throughout November. Identified for the first time as the #1 and #2 "persons who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road," they were also charged for the first time with protecting and supporting the "Black Gang" (i.e. counterrevolutionary clique) of Peng Chen, Lo Jui-ching, Lu Ting-i and Yang Shang-kun during the early stages of the "cultural revolution."

In keeping with the new strategy of political pressure and persuasion, the principal weapon employed by the Red Guards during October and November was that of denunciation by means of wall-posters. Characterizing the posting of wall-posters as a form of "extensive democracy," Lin Piao outlined (in a 3 November Red Guard rally speech) the purpose and scope of this practice as "fearlessly permitting the broad masses to use the media of free airing of views, big-character posters, great debates and extensive
contacts, to criticize and supervise the party and government leading institutions and leaders at all levels. Authorized, even encouraged to criticize, the Red Guards responded by launching wall-poster attacks at one time or another against nearly all of China's top leaders, both in Peking and in the provinces. There were, according to a statement by Tao Chu in late September, only two exceptions to the application of this rule of "extensive democracy"—Chairman Mao and Lin Piao. Although serving diverse purposes, a basic objective of this wall-poster campaign was to intimidate the large proportion of party and government officials who had not yet passed the test of "cultural revolution."

Instructed by Mao, Lin and Chen on how they might save themselves and subjected to continuing denunciation by wall poster, provincial party leaders throughout the country convened three-level (provincial-district-county) cadres' meetings in November to discuss the October work conference report and decide their future course of action. Referring to these provincial meetings, in a speech at a rally in Peking on 27 November, Chou En-lai requested Red Guards attending this rally "to refrain from storming into the meeting-places to break up these meetings." Party leaders attending these conferences were to be permitted "to carry out well their discussions and eliminate their ideological barriers" in order that they might voluntarily "join hands with you in carrying on the proletarian cultural revolution." To ascertain whether party leaders in the provinces had grasped the message of the October work conference, the Red Guards were asked by Chou "to wait for the conclusion of the three-level meetings, and then to ask for a review of their work."

The period of lull in Mao's "cultural revolution" was nearly over. The signal for a renewed onslaught against the party apparatus was given by Madame Mao in a militant speech on 28 November at a literature and art rally in Peking, a rally described subsequently as a "pledge of a general offensive." The time had come to ask party committees a second time "for a review of their work," to test party leaders a second time on their understanding of, and willingness to comply with, Mao's "cultural revolution."
V. THE "JANUARY REVOLUTION" (DECEMBER 1966-JANUARY 1967)

"Only by mobilizing the masses of workers and peasants, who form 90 percent of the population, will it be possible today to defeat the handful of persons within the party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road and to settle the issue of who will win, the proletariat or the bourgeoisie." -- Joint People's Daily-Red Flag Editorial, "Carry the Great Proletarian Revolution Through to the End," 1 January 1967.

"The central task of the great proletarian cultural revolution, in the last analysis, is the struggle by which the proletariat seizes power from the handful of people within the party in authority taking the capitalist road." -- Commentator Article in Red Flag, "Proletarian Revolutionaries, Unite," 16 January 1967.

Although professing confidence at the October work conference that the majority of party cadres would be able to pass the second test of the "cultural revolution," Mao conceded that "there will always be some people who cannot grasp or accept the situation and some people who will set themselves up in opposition." This minority would still attempt, as Mao put it, "to do things according to the old codes and conventions, maintain the status quo, oppose one group of Red Guards and take another group under their wing."

As noted earlier, the provincial party and government apparatus had been able to repulse the first attack by Red Guards in August and September by mobilizing workers and peasants in their defense. To prevent this from happening again, it was necessary for the Maoists to infiltrate and take over these opposition strongholds. This campaign to undermine the opposition's positions of strength and at the same time augment the forces of the "revolutionary left" began immediately after the conclusion of the October work conference, with the formation of new "revolutionary rebel" organizations in industrial and mining establishments, party and government organs, and, to a lesser extent, among the peasantry. The expansion of the "cultural revolution" into the government and the economy would engender
increasing resistance which, in turn, would lead to a final test of strength when Mao would exhort his supporters to "seize power" in all those party, government and economic organizations which continued to resist. Erupting in Shanghai under the name of "the January Revolution," this drive to "seize power" would initiate a period of widespread violence and disorder which persists to the present day.

Explaining why the January Revolution produced so much violence and disorder, Chou En-lai (in an important speech to Revolutionary Rebels on 1 February 1967) would compare this "seize power" movement to the first Red Guard attempt to "bombard the headquarters" of the provincial party apparatus in August and September. Like the earlier movement, this one was designed to subject "members of the party committees in various ministries, provinces and cities" to "a test" through the seizure of power. Like the earlier campaign when "the bombardment was not always accurate," moreover, the struggle target had again been too broadly defined to include all or nearly all party cadres. Also like the earlier campaign, this one had gone too fast and had got out of hand—"those engaged in the seizure of power...went all out in revolution and the movement spread to every part of the country at one stroke." In fact, there is good reason to believe that the original plan had called for a more orderly and systematic attack against the party opposition which Mao had predicted would continue after the October work conference.

A major feature of the original plan was, it is believed, experimentation with the new organizational forms and techniques of the "seize power" formula in a few key areas preparatory to launching the movement on a nationwide basis. Of these key areas, the most important was Shanghai where, almost immediately after the close of the October work conference, the first "Workers' Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters" was established on 8 November. The reason for selecting the Shanghai party committee as the first target in the new stage of the "cultural revolution" was revealed in subsequent Red Guard materials—it had already exposed itself as a "bourgeois headquarters" by maligning and suppressing the Red Guard movement in August.
and September on the pretext of safeguarding "industrial production." This it had done quite openly, sending two telegrams to the central committee Cultural Revolution Group on 24 and 30 September protesting the "serious, critical" effect which "the establishment of revolutionary ties by students throughout China" was producing on industrial production; accusing the Red Guards who had come to Shanghai from Peking of "waging struggle by force;" and asking the party center to recall them.

That the purpose for establishing the "Workers' Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters" was to discredit, undermine and overthrow the Shanghai committee was revealed almost immediately. On the first day of its existence, representatives of the headquarters issued an ultimatum demanding (1) that the municipal committee recognize their organization; (2) that it be provided with instruments of propaganda; and (3) that the Shanghai first secretary attend their inaugural meeting the following day. When these demands were not accepted, the headquarters on 11 November engineered the so-called "An-ting incident," commandeering a train to go to Peking to register complaints against the Shanghai committee and, when halted, blocking the railroad line for two days until a member of the Cultural Revolution Group had come to Shanghai in person to investigate. The upshot of this investigation was not to hold the revolutionary workers responsible (although they had clearly violated an earlier directive that workers "must not use their production hours or leave their production posts to carry out the cultural revolution") but rather, in a decision personally approved by Mao himself, to hold "the East China bureau and the Shanghai municipal committee...fully responsible" and to compel the Shanghai committee on 15 November to surrender to the demands of the Rebel Headquarters.

Two days later, on 17 November, the Cultural Revolution Group issued a 12-point directive extending the "cultural revolution" into factories and mines. Conceding that "responsible persons of some units have erroneously placed the cultural revolution movement in opposition to production... and have been attacking the revolutionaries to defend themselves," the directive called on the working class ("the
leading force and the most active factor of the great cultural revolution") "to set up various cultural revolution organizations," including such "joint organizations of workers" as "federations, associations, representative conferences or congresses" (e.g. the Workers' Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters in Shanghai). The directive also conceded that these new worker organizations might stand in need of outside help by calling on the Red Guards ("revolutionary students' organizations") to "send representatives to establish ties with industrial and mining enterprises and exchange experiences in the great cultural revolution."

On 22 November Madame Nieh Yuan-tzu arrived in Shanghai at the head of a large contingent of Red Guards with the express purpose of organizing a "revolutionary headquarters" in China's largest city. Addressing a meeting of "revolutionary students and teachers" on that date, she attacked the mayor of Shanghai, Tsao Ti-chiu, as an accomplice of Teng Hsiao-ping, and vowed that she would not leave until Tsao "had been thoroughly criticized." She then demanded that her speech be publicized in the Shanghai party newspaper (the Liberation Daily) and, when refused, organized a lengthy seige of this newspaper, precipitating a violent clash with printing workers and other Shanghai workers who had come to their assistance. In early December, the mayor and the entire municipal council, together with the party first secretary, were subjected to long public struggle and criticism meetings and on 4 December the combined forces of the "revolutionary left" took over the Shanghai municipal office building. Then, after this initial test of strength, there was a lull of several weeks while the contending forces in Shanghai regrouped for the showdown in late December which would precipitate the "January Revolution."

If the expansion of the "cultural revolution" in November and December to cover industry and the countryside (a 10-point directive of 15 December extended the revolution into the villages) was intended primarily to re-establish Mao's control over the provinces, there was a parallel escalation and extension of the revolution at the center encompassing the party, government and military
control apparatus in Peking. As noted earlier, the signal for this new and more direct attack on Mao's opponents within the central apparatus was given by Madame Mao in a speech to literature and art workers in Peking on 28 November. Although addressing her remarks to the situation existing in the Number One Peking Opera Company, it soon became apparent that the new, militant line which she enunciated was intended to apply generally to leading cadres in the central apparatus as a whole.

Asserting that the terms "majority" and "minority" meant little, Madame Mao was in effect calling upon the "revolutionary minority" to get organized and rise up in rebellion against the "conservative majority" in party and government organs. Although not identified as such in her speech, "revolutionary rebel groups" had already appeared in the central party apparatus (e.g. in the United Front Work Department on 18 November). The important New Year's Day joint People's Daily-Red Flag editorial would cite this development—that "revolutionary cadres in party and state organizations have risen to revolt against those persons holding positions of authority who are stubbornly clinging to the bourgeois reactionary line"—as one of the "main features" of the "new situation" in Mao's "cultural revolution." Just as Mao's new team had incited a "revolutionary minority" to take over the Red Guard movement and was in the process of inciting a "revolutionary minority" to take over the workers (and peasants) movement, it was now engaged in recruiting a "revolutionary minority" of party and government cadres to rise up and take over the central party and state apparatus.

With the forces of the "revolutionary left" strengthened and reorganized, the time had come to intensify the attack against Mao's high-level opponents. Under the direction of the neurotic if not psychotic Madame Mao (who appeared to be de facto head of the "cultural revolution" during Mao's absence from Peking in December), this attack took the form of Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels joining together to seize, struggle and subject to considerable brutality at public rallies a number of high-ranking party officials, principally the "counter-revolutionary clique" of Peng-Chen, Lu Ting-i, Lo Jui-ching and Yang Shang-kun who had been purged in the initial phase of the "cultural revolution."
The campaign against Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping was also accelerated at this time, with the appearance in late December of long, definitive articles and speeches detailing the record of opposition to Mao by the #1 and #2 power-holders in the party over a 20-year period. At an anti-Liu-and-Teng rally held on 27 December, Madame Mao joined the two militant Red Guard leaders Nieh Yuantzu and Kuai Ta-fu in criticizing Liu Shao-chi's "self-criticism" at the October work conference as inadequate and insincere. The larger purpose of this accusation meeting, as well as the earlier struggle meetings, was revealed by Kuai in the following statement offered as "a word of advice to Liu Shao-chi":

The only way out for you now is to surrender to Chairman Mao and to plead guilty to the people of the whole country. If you do not surrender, we will destroy you...We will drag you out, expose you under the sun, criticize you till you turn foul and crush you.

Not only Liu but all other high-ranking cadres in the party, government and military were being warned of the fate in store for them if they failed to submit.

Indeed, a number of these high-ranking cadres had already been targeted as new victims of the "cultural revolution." First and foremost was Tao Chu, the powerful former head of the Central-South bureau who had been promoted to the position of #4 in the party in the reorganization of the politburo at the Eleventh Plenum in August. As the first of the new revolutionary leadership to fall, Tao was accused of a number of crimes, the most persistent and credible charge being that he had opposed the extension of the "cultural revolution" into industry and the countryside and especially its extension on a large-scale into party and government organs. It is known, for example, that he intervened to defend a number of provincial party first secretaries in the Central-South region from the first onslaught of the Red Guards in August and September. In his last public speech of 13 December, moreover, Tao admitted that the Cultural Revolution Group (for which read Tao) had, "misreading Mao's instructions, tried at one time to restrict the scope of the cultural
revolution," a mistake which was then being remedied by extending the revolution to "factories, villages, commercial and scientific units."

If the purge of Tao Chu revealed continuing high-level opposition within the party apparatus itself, the concurrent attack on Po I-po disclosed continuing high-level resistance to the "cultural revolution" within the government apparatus, especially that part of the government responsible for administering the economy. Po, as Chairman of the State Economic Commission, was charged with attempting ever since the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic to subvert Mao's economic policies and programs by stressing the importance of material factors, especially material incentives, in the production process. Moreover, Po had played a leading role in suppressing the "revolutionary left" at Tsinghua University in June and July, at which time he attacked Kuai Ta-fu as a "super-leftist" and "counter-revolutionary." Since Po had already been criticized at the Eleventh Plenum in August and at the central committee work conference in October, the surfacing and escalation of the attack at this time was apparently intended to intimidate others in the central government apparatus who "stubbornly persisted in the bourgeois reactionary line."

Most surprising of all was the disclosure at this time of a number of new victims in the top leadership of the People's Liberation Army. The first of these was Liu Chih-chien who, as head of the PLA's own Cultural Revolution Group, had only a short time before been entrusted with a large part of the responsibility for purging the ranks of the military of Mao's opponents. The most convincing charge against Liu, leveled by Lin Piao at a Military Affairs Committee meeting, was that, although a believer in Mao's revolution, he had attempted to prevent "clashes and disorder" in its implementation in the armed forces. The indictment of Chu Teh, on the other hand, revealed that Mao had for a long time been suspicious of the loyalty and jealous of the military renown of this former Commander-in-Chief of the PLA. Featured in this indictment were
charges of careerism, of militarism, and of supporting the line of Peng Te-huai, the one-time Minister of National Defense who had challenged Mao's policies in 1959.

The most interesting, serious and significant charges made against a top military leader at this time, however, were those made against Ho Lung, both a member of the politburo and a vice-chairman of the Military Affairs Committee. The central charge was that Ho, utilizing his temporary position as head of the standing committee of the MAC in the summer of 1966, had organized a clique of supporters "in many military regions and services" (Lin Piao's phrase) in a plot to seize power. His accomplices were identified as high-ranking officials in the General Staff Department, the Air Force, the Navy and the Peking and Chengtu Military Regions. Although the charge of plotting is something less than credible, the number of senior military officers implicated in the alleged plot clearly indicated high-level opposition to Mao's "cultural revolution" within the ranks of the military.

Another charge against Ho Lung was that he had manipulated conservative Red Guard organizations "to attack the revolutionary left and bombard the proletarian headquarters" in a vain attempt to "protect" himself and other "persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road." Disregarding the question of the validity of this charge, it is a fact that there was open and violent opposition to the "cultural revolution" by conservative Red Guard organizations in late November and early December. As described by Tao Chu in his last public speech on 13 December, this opposition took the form of (1) slogans and statements criticizing Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng; (2) demands that the Cultural Revolution Group be "kicked out;" and (3) creating "disturbances."

In fact, the term "disturbance" appeared to be a euphemism for a series of "killings and armed attacks" carried out in Peking by West City Inspection Teams in early December and culminating in an attack on the #3 Red Guard Headquarters. In an important editorial of
13 December, Red Flag characterized this "new trick" of the opposition as one of "deliberately creating incidents and stirring up conflicts in which force or coercion is used." More ominously, Kuan Feng (a member of the Cultural Revolution Group) informed Red Guards on 18 December that the principal "behind-the-scenes bosses of the West City Inspection Teams," once their identity was discovered, would be "shot."

In a major speech to a Red Guard rally on 18 December, Madame Mao charged that the Municipal Public Security Bureau had been largely responsible for these bloody clashes in Peking. Describing the Bureau, along with the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Supreme People's Court, as "bourgeois" in nature, she then called upon the Red Guards in her audience to "rise up in rebellion" and "take over" these government organs. The movement to "seize power" from below by calling upon the "revolutionary left" to take over government and party organs had begun.

A week later, addressing the newly-organized "All-China Red Workers General Rebellion Corps," Madame Mao (together with Chen Po-ta) endorsed the recent "seizure" of the Ministry of Labor by this "revolutionary rebel" organization, as well as its intention to take over the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. Her performance on this occasion was remarkable on other counts as well. Described as "crying uncontrollably...with excitement and anger," she exhorted those present to "rebels" against all those responsible (from Liu Shao-chi to the "heads" and subordinate officials of the Ministry of Labor and the ACFTU) for imposing the capitalist and revisionist "contract worker and temporary worker systems" on China's proletariat. With this call to the "revolutionary left" to seize control of China's labor organizations, the stage was set for the outbreak in Shanghai of what has come to be known as the January Revolution—the Maoist drive to "seize power" in the party and government apparatus on a nation-wide scale.

According to the People's Daily—Red Flag New Year's Day editorial, 1967 was to be "a year in which the proletariat, united with other sectors of the revolutionary
masses," would "launch a general attack on the handful of persons within the party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road." In order for this "general attack" to succeed, it was necessary to augment the existing forces of the "revolutionary left" (the Red Guards) by recruiting new contingents of "revolutionary workers and peasants" and of "revolutionary cadres in party and state organizations." As noted earlier, Shanghai had been selected as the first key area in which to try to recruit the urban proletariat as shock troops in the new stage of Mao's "cultural revolution."

It is now time to note how this new strategy worked in practice. In brief, the result was a Pyrrhic victory. Instead of winning over Shanghai's million-odd workers, it antagonized a large proportion of them, strengthening at least temporarily the forces of the "opposition." Instead of fulfilling Mao's promise that "carrying out the great proletarian cultural revolution on a large scale in factories and rural areas" would "stimulate the development of industrial and agricultural production," it precipitated a large-scale strike which for a time crippled the economy of Shanghai. Finally, instead of overthrowing the "handful of persons within the party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road," it resulted in the complete paralysis and breakdown of local government, necessitating a premature, disorderly "seizure of power" in Shanghai for which Mao's "revolutionary rebels" were ill-prepared.

It is important to understand the nature of the "opposition" generated in Shanghai at this time for it would be duplicated in nearly all major cities and provinces, becoming so widespread and tenacious that by mid-1967 the "seize power" movement in China would grind to a halt. Although depicted in every case as the product of "base and sinister tricks" played by the "handful" of Mao's enemies, the actions of the "opposition" at this time were in most cases taken by organizations and groups who considered themselves to be loyal supporters to Mao and the "cultural revolution."

The first illustration of this important truth was the general strike carried out in late December by
Shanghai's railroad, harbor and public utility workers. Although economic grievances may have played a part, it is now known (from observers on the spot as well as from Chinese Communist publications) that this strike was caused primarily by political grievances. Specifically, the strike was called by the much larger "revolutionary organization" of workers called "Worker Red Guards" (comprised of older workers and numbering some 800,000) to protest the radicalism and violence of the "Workers' Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters" (comprised of young workers and students and numbering only some 25,000). In part based on principle, it was also called to protest the claim of the infinitely smaller and brand-new "Rebel Headquarters" to represent not only the Shanghai working class but the Cultural Revolution Group of the central committee as well. Convinced that Mao and other leaders in Peking were not aware of the true state of affairs in Shanghai, "Worker Red Guards" then went on strike, assuming (as one of the organizers subsequently stated) "that the Center would never remain indifferent to this state of affairs (a general strike), but would certainly send someone to Shanghai to settle the problem on the spot." Large numbers of them also commandeered road and rail transport to go to Peking to present their case to party leaders, as did smaller delegations sent by air. When word came back that the "Rebel Headquarters" did in fact have the support of the Center, the morale of the "Worker Red Guards," as one report put it, "was broken and they were quickly dispersed."

Other strikes in Shanghai and elsewhere at this time, were motivated by economic grievances. But instead of being provoked by "reactionary elements" (as alleged in the important 12 January Red Flag editorial, "Oppose Economism and Smash the Latest Counterattack by the Bourgeois Reactionary Line"), these strikes were the direct result of exhortations by Madame Mao (together with Chen Po-ta and other members of the Cultural Revolution Group) to large numbers of contract workers, temporary workers, and apprentice workers to rise up against the "political oppression and economic exploitation" to which they had been subjected by Liu and Teng and all others responsible for foisting these revisionist, capitalist
systems on China's working class. As Madame Mao put it in her 26 December speech, these "contract and temporary workers have suffered the most...and therefore their spirit of revolt is the greatest." But when they rose in revolt, demanding an end to the low-wage policy which was a common feature of all these systems, they were then told that they had been "deceived" and "hoodwinked" into following the "evil road of economism" and were "pursuing only personal and short-term interests."

In fact, as Chou En-lai and others made clear in mid-January, the Maoists had no intention of changing the "contract" and temporary worker systems. Instead of being "manipulated" by "class enemies" hiding "behind the scenes," these low-wage workers (and there are apparently millions of them in China) were being "manipulated" in quite cynical fashion by Madame Mao and other members of the Cultural Revolution Group in furtherance of their own ends—the discrediting and overthrow of Liu and Teng and all others in the party and government apparatus who refused to submit to the new order of Mao's "cultural revolution."

Another form of "economism" (defined as "the conspiracy of using the 'sugar-coated bullets' of economic benefits...to corrupt the masses revolutionary will") at this time in Shanghai and elsewhere was the payment of year-end bonuses and of travel allowances to enable large numbers of "revolutionary workers" to go to Peking to engage in the "large-scale exchange of revolutionary experience," as the student Red Guards had done before them. This had been authorised on a small scale in the mid-November directive extending the "cultural revolution" into the industrial sector. What happened instead was the influx of hundreds of thousands of these workers into Peking in late December and early January, the total (as estimated by Madame Mao in mid-January) exceeding one million. Again the Maoists have depicted this as the result of a conscious plot by "class enemies" to sabotage the "cultural revolution."

The responsibility for this unexpected development must also be borne in large part by the
Maoists themselves. On the one hand, party and government cadres in the industrial (also agricultural) sector were accused of "exploiting" and suppressing the workers. On the other hand, the workers were invited to rise up in rebellion against these revisionist, capitalist systems of "exploitation" and, if need be, to carry their grievances to higher authorities. Having effectively undermined the authority of the local cadres (who quickly succumbed to worker demands for travel funds and economic benefits), the Maoists then accused them (in the words of Chou En-lai) of engaging in a "big plot to pass the burden of all kinds of contradictions [i.e. problems] up to us."

Indeed, the Maoists were confronted with a number of serious problems as they took stock of the "cultural revolution in mid-January 1967. In the first place, there were the aforementioned million-plus workers who had come to Peking, concerning whom Madame Mao is quoted as asking plaintively: "What have they come to the central committee for?" Next, there were reports of wide-spread disorder and bloody clashes in a number of cities and provinces where "revolutionary rebels" were rising up to "seize power" in response to Mao's call to emulate the example of Shanghai. Also, the preliminary results of the "new stage" of extending the "cultural revolution" into factories and mines were at hand, results which showed (according to Chen Po-ta in a 24 January speech) that both revolution and production in the industrial sector had been adversely affected by sending in "revolutionary students" without adequate preparation. Two days later, Chen referred to "the problem of factories and mines" as "a real headache," and, in a significant admission, added: "I bear a heavy responsibility for this." At about the same time, Chou En-lai also admitted that the central committee "had not made sufficient preparation when it decided to launch the great cultural revolution in factories."

Finally, reports on the progress of the "seize power" movement in Shanghai revealed growing chaos following the breakdown of party and government controls in
that city. What had been hailed just a few days previously as a "brilliant example" was now repudiated as a model for general emulation. Addressing a workers rally on 15 January, both Chou En-lai and Chen Po-ta stressed that "seizure and control of everything...as has been done in Shanghai" was "not good" and was not to be repeated in Peking. Indeed what had happened in Shanghai was now depicted as but another example of "plotting" by the enemy, who wanted "to wreck the social order and the process of production and thereby make us a laughing stock" by "withdrawing behind the scenes while allowing you to place all organizations under your seizure and control." Rather than the formula of "seizure and control," Chou and Chen advocated the "supervision formula" as "much better and more practical"—that is, keeping party and government cadres on the job under "supervision" by the "revolutionary rebels."

Another of the difficulties involved in taking over power in Shanghai (as noted by Chou in an 18 January speech) was the inability of "revolutionary workers, peasants and intellectuals" to achieve "unity." Indeed, the failure of the "revolutionary left" to achieve "great unity" was denounced in a series of statements at this time, not only by Chou and Chen Po-ta but also by Madame Mao and even by Mao himself, statements decrying the phenomena of "anarchism," "departmentalism," "sectarianism," "splitting," "small-group mentality" and "ultrademocracy" which characterized the behavior of "revolutionary rebels" generally throughout the country. Having succeeded in the destructive task of overthrowing the party and government control apparatus, the "revolutionary rebels" had failed miserably in the constructive task of establishing a "new revolutionary order."
VI. THE REVOLUTION BOGS DOWN (FEBRUARY-JUNE 1967)

"Originally, the Army was not to intervene in the Cultural Revolution...but now that the class struggle has sharpened, the Army must support the 'Leftists'...Most old cadres still do not understand the Cultural Revolution." -- Mao Tse-tung, Speech at Military Affairs Committee Plenum, 20 or 21 January 1967

"Do not be afraid of disorder...In January and February, production went down...Many have been murdered and many people have committed suicide...Only through taking all these losses can we get the best revolutionary successors." -- Lin Piao, Speech at Central Committee Work Conference, 30 March 1967

The havoc created by Mao's "revolutionary rebels" in their frenzied drive to "seize power" during the January Revolution required immediate and drastic countermeasures. The first of these was the decision of 23 January ordering the People's Liberation Army to intervene in the "cultural revolution," ostensibly to support the "revolutionary left" but actually to restore order. The second was a shift in policy toward party cadres, emphasizing more humane treatment and rehabilitation to make use of their administrative skills. The third was an effort to overcome the pronounced tendency toward "anarchism" which had characterized the behavior of the "revolutionary left" during the "January Revolution," an effort to reorganize, retrench and rectify the ranks of the "Revolutionary Rebels."

Finally, the decision was taken by Mao personally to jettison the Shanghai example in favor of a new model for emulation in the "seize power" movement throughout China--that provided by the "formation of a three-way alliance to seize power" in the province of Heilungkiang. Whereas the "revolutionary rebels" had played the dominant role in Shanghai, they were now to share their power (in fact, the greater part of their power) with two new "allies," the People's Liberation Army and "revolutionary party cadres."
The vicissitudes in the relationship between these three uneasy and, in some ways, incompatible "allies" would provide the dominant theme in the unfolding of the latest stage of Mao's "cultural revolution" extending from February 1967 up to the present. At first, in a period lasting to mid-March, the roles of the PLA and "revolutionary cadres" would be emphasized in a concerted effort to restore order out of the chaos produced by the "January Revolution." This would be followed in April by a resurgence of the "revolutionary left," with the PLA forbidden to suppress this new revolutionary initiative and high-ranking party and government cadres once again subjected to attack. This renewed revolutionary disorder, featuring large-scale fighting between rival Maoist mass organizations, would be followed by the current phase of the "great proletarian cultural revolution," a protracted and not very successful undertaking to have the PLA once again intervene with force to restore at least a minimum level of centralized control over the economy and society of China.

The explanation most commonly advanced for the zig-zag course of Mao's "cultural revolution" in the past six months, a course characterized by alternating and conflicting policies designed to restore order and at the same time sustain revolutionary momentum, would be that it reflected a division between moderates and radicals at the highest level of Mao's new leadership. Although there is some evidence to support this view, the root cause of the ambivalent and uncertain course of the "cultural revolution" in recent months must be traced, it is believed, to conflicting motivations in the mind of Mao Tse-tung himself. In attempting periodically to strike a balance between the conflicting claims of order and revolution, Mao has shifted the weight of emphasis to be attached from time to time to these basically incompatible goals. As the statement by Lin Piao quoted above suggests, however, Mao by no means attaches equal importance to these goals. As the loyal executor of Mao's will and commander-in-chief of the PLA (the only effective stabilizing force in China today), Lin makes quite clear in this statement that revolutionary "disorder" will be
a continuing feature in China until Mao achieves the fundamental objective of this "cultural revolution"--the creation of a new party and government apparatus manned by loyal and trustworthy "revolutionary successors."

A. Efforts to Restore Order, Early 1967

As noted above, the first tactical retreat in the most recent stage of the "cultural revolution" was initiated by directives on 23 and 28 January ordering the PLA to intervene and "render active support to the broad masses of revolutionary leftists in their struggle to seize power." Commenting on these directives in a speech to military students on 31 January, Chou En-lai pointed out that the PLA had originally been ordered not to intervene in the early stages of the "cultural revolution" in order "to protect the demonstrations of the Red Guards and the masses" at a time when "the fronts were not clearly defined." Now that "the struggle between the two lines had sharpened," however, the situation had clarified and it would be possible to identify the "genuine proletarian leftists" when they asked for support. Intervention by the army, moreover, would make those in the middle of the road join the revolutionary ranks and thus "isolate and destroy the opposition." Despite this disingenuous explanation, the net effect of the directive to intervene, no doubt intentional, was to suppress "the demonstrations of the Red Guards" and other organizations of the "revolutionary left" by the imposition of military rule.

As a result of this new and increased responsibility, Chou revealed that the "cultural revolution" would be damped down within the PLA itself. It was necessary to conduct the revolution in the PLA in a "civilized way," said Chou, avoiding "irresponsible criticism" in order to ensure the "stability" and "fighting capacity" of the army at a time when it was confronted by "very serious tasks." On 11 February, a central committee directive would amplify this statement by Chou by explicitly prohibiting "seizure of power from below" at all levels of military command organs, a measure justified by the need
to "maintain a high degree of centralized unity and morale" in China's armed forces.

The new, dominant role of the military in the government and administration of China would be revealed in discussions of the course of the "seize power" movement in February. Although at first the fiction was maintained that "revolutionary rebels" were leading the way in forming the new "three-way alliance to seize power," (e.g. in Heilungkiang province), this pretense was dropped in a 27 February Red Flag article describing the "seizure of power" in Shaanxi province. Here it was made clear that the PLA had taken the initiative throughout, dictating its will and imposing the cadres it had selected upon the representatives of the "revolutionary Left." In those provinces (the great majority) where for various reasons the "seize power movement" had bogged down, the PLA was directed to establish military control commissions charged with maintaining law and order. As the only remaining nation-wide organization still intact, the PLA perforce had to step in to replace the now largely defunct party and government control apparatus.

Commenting on this rapid extension of military control (in a speech delivered to a central committee work conference on 30 March), Lin Piao pointed out that the PLA had "now taken power in 7,000 local units" in China. Although asserting that "by and by we want to
pull the army back from its dominant position in the local units," Lin indicated that it would be some time before this withdrawal could be effected—not until "we have found new leaders." By equating "new leaders" with "revolutionary successors," what Lin appeared to be saying was that the dominant role of the military in China would persist until Mao succeeds in carrying his "cultural revolution" through to completion.

The problem of finding "new leaders" or "revolutionary leading cadres"—the second component of the "three-way alliance"—was an acute one, described by a leading member of the Cultural Revolution Group (Wang Li) in early February as "the biggest problem now." In successive Red Flag editorials of 3 and 23 February drafted under the personal supervision of Mao himself, the problem of "treating cadres correctly" received priority attention. As emphasized in these editorials and accompanying commentary by regime spokesmen, the "revolutionary rebels" in Shanghai and elsewhere had gone too far, "opposing, excluding and overthrowing all cadres indiscriminately." In the graphic description by Wang Li, "all that remained after the 'seizure of power' were some vacant offices and stamps." The most serious problem facing the Maoists in the wake of the "January Revolution" was that it had succeeded too well, destroying the party and government control apparatus without providing an effective substitute. The end result, as regime spokesmen emphasized, was "anarchy," a situation aggravated by rivalry and clashes between "revolutionary mass organizations" acting (as the 23 February Red Flag editorial put it) like "a host of dragons without a leader."

To deal with this alarming situation, the regime instituted what would subsequently be referred to as Mao's "mild cadre policy." Reaffirming the original line taken in the central committee decision of 8 August on the "cultural revolution," this policy called first of all for "correct treatment" and "support" of "revolutionary leading cadres," defined as "those leading cadres who follow the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao." The examplar of this category in the provinces was Pan Fu-sheng, the former party first secretary in Heilungkiang province who had stepped forward to join the "revolutionary left" during the "cultural revolution" and had been
rewarded by a position of leadership in the new "revolutionary committee" established there. Described as "more mature politically...more experienced in struggle...and having greater organizational skill" than the "young revolutionary fighters," these revolutionary cadres were "to act as the core of leadership" both in the "seizure of power" and in the exercise of this power by the new "revolutionary committees."

The new policy of leniency applied not only to these "revolutionary leading cadres" (who were relatively few) but also to the "broad masses of cadres in party and government organizations," including those who had committed "mistakes," even "very serious mistakes." In accordance with Mao's dictum of "curing the sickness to save the patient," these cadres were to be given another opportunity to atone for their errors by "self-criticism" and by staying on the job to perform "good deeds" in the service of the "cultural revolution."

A necessary corollary of this effort to enlist cadre support and participation in the "cultural revolution" was more humane treatment. Citing a directive by Mao to elevate the "level of struggle," Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta and other regime spokesmen at this time decried such forms of "corporal punishment" inflicted on leading cadres at public rallies in December and January as "using the big stick," forcing the "wearing of dunce caps" and compelling the victims to kneel "with arms outspread, like wings of jet planes." Of particular concern was the fact that "photos and pictures" of these practices had been sent abroad by foreign correspondents, conveying to foreigners the false impression (as Chou put it) "that this is all the Chinese cultural revolution is about." But of equal and more immediate concern, as Chou went on to stress, these practices if continued could "stir up antipathy among the middle of the road cadres" and "risk losing the sympathy of the masses." As had happened during the first period of tactical retreat in September 1966, the "revolutionary left" was now instructed to use "reason" rather than "force" in dealing with party cadres.
As chief of government and the man entrusted by Mao with maintaining a minimum of order in China during the unfolding of the "cultural revolution," Premier Chou En-lai served as the principal spokesman for this new cadre policy as it applied to the central government. In a series of speeches in early and mid-February to "revolutionary rebels" in the industrial, transportation, trade and finance departments, Chou warned bluntly that they had been "deceived" in thinking that they could "seize power" in the central government apparatus. The role of the rebels in departments under the State Council was to be limited to "supervision" over, rather than replacement of, the ministers, bureau directors and section chiefs in these departments. Even in this reduced role, the rebels had gone too far in their "revolutionary supervision," reducing for example the Ministry of Railway to "a state of confusion" by, among other things, capturing and maltreating the Minister Lu Cheng-tsao. By subjecting government ministers to "merciless criticism," the Rebels were guilty (a strong charge) of "leftist deviationism." The responsibility for this "leftist" error, Chou clearly implied, rested with militant Red Guard organizations which he named, described as "famous" and well-organized, and then chastized for their unauthorized "invasion" into the affairs of the government ministries.

Indeed, the time had come for the young militants of the "revolutionary left" to take their lumps, now blamed for the chaos of the "January Revolution" which they had been incited to carry out. They were attacked and criticized from all directions, not just by the relative moderates (like Chou) but also by the zealots in the Cultural Revolution Group and even by Mao himself. Among the criticisms leveled by Mao at his "little revolutionary generals" at this time were (1) that they were being "corrupted" by "money" and "cars;" (2) that they "called for criticism after criticism and took part in too many rallies;" and (3) that they had been guilty of "sectarianism" and "splittism" and must endeavor to "achieve unity" even with those who held "contrary opinions." Adding to this indictment, Chi Pen-yu of the Cultural Revolution Group criticized Kuo Ta-fu and Nieh Yuan-tzu (the two most prominent Red Guard leaders in Peking) for "hanging
out the signboard of the Peking Revolutionary Rebel Commune" prematurely and without permission, a charge which would serve to explain the disappearance at this time of the ill-fated and short-lived Shanghai Commune.

Other charges of "ultra-leftism" directed at the militant Red Guards by Chi and Wang Li at this time were that they had tried to bring down all cadres and, even worse, had "pointed the spearhead of struggle at the People's Liberation Army." A favorite target for attack was the ultra-militant Red Guard leader Kuai Ta-fu, accused of "playing at Trotsky cliques in the schools," of opposing Kang Sheng (one of the ranking leaders of Mao's "cultural revolution") and of "adopting a grand style."

In addition to these verbal attacks, a number of measures were instituted at this time in a concerted effort to retrench, reorganize and rectify the unruly ranks of the "revolutionary Left." First of all, a 3 February central committee directive ordered all Red Guards in "revolutionary liaison" throughout the country to return to their schools, a directive expanded on 21 February to encompass all "revolutionary organizations" engaged in liaison. Although justified on grounds of health and economy, the primary reason for these directives was to curtail political and economic instability by reorganizing the "seize power" movement on the basis of individual localities and units. Next, reorganization of the Red Guards was effected in Peking by merging the three formerly independent Red Guard headquarters into a single "Red Guard Congress." Speeches at the rally proclaiming this Congress, moreover, suggested an intent to establish similar congresses in all major cities and provinces, with the ultimate goal of forming a national organization.

Finally, it was announced that Red Guards on returning to their schools would have to undergo "rectification"—"a painful process of protracted ideological struggle"—"in order to overcome their "tendencies of departmentalism, small group mentality, ultra-democracy, individualism and anarchism..." And with the disclosure that the PLA would supervise this "rectification" campaign in China's schools and universities, it was clear that the "revolutionary Left" was being disciplined for the excesses it had committed during the 'January Revolution.'
As a result of the urgent need to restore order and maintain production, the "seize power" movement in China at the end of February was in a state of suspended animation. Only Shanghai and the four provinces of Heilungkiang, Kweichow, Shansi and Shantung had succeeded in setting up "revolutionary committees" approved by the central leadership as fulfilling the requirements of a genuine tripartite alliance of revolutionaries, party cadres and the army. In a major summing up of the progress of the "cultural revolution," a 9 March editorial in Red Flag entitled "On the Revolutionary 3-in-1 Combination" revealed what these requirements were. Citing a directive by Chairman Mao that these "provisional organs of power" would have to be "revolutionary and representative and have proletarian authority," this editorial discussed candidly the problems which had obstructed, and would continue to obstruct, the effort by Mao's "proletarian revolutionaries" to "seize power" in China.

The dominant theme of the editorial was that all three components of the alliance—the leaders of revolutionary mass organizations, representatives of the PLA, and revolutionary leading cadres—were essential, as expressed in the injunction not "to overlook or underestimate the role of any one of them." Of particular concern was the practice of "excluding" or "regarding as secondary" the role of "leaders of the revolutionary mass organizations," who, although guilty of "shortcomings and errors," still constituted "the base of the revolutionary 3-in-1 provisional organ of power." Reiterating the policy on party cadres laid down the preceding month, the editorial stressed the importance of the role of the "revolutionary cadres" (that of providing "the nucleus and backbone" of the new "revolutionary committee") while holding forth the prospect of redemption and "proper jobs" for the broad mass of cadres who had made "mistakes." What was new in the discussion of cadre policy, however, was a call for vigilance against "class enemies" who were "distorting" the principles governing the formation of "3-in-1" organs of power to "impose" on the masses cadres who "persisted in their mistakes" and thus "carry out counterrevolutionary restoration."
The editorial's discussion of the PLA revealed that it too was experiencing difficulties in playing its "extremely important role" in the struggle to seize power. Admitting the existence of "dissension between the revolutionary masses and the PLA," the editorial attempted once again to blame this on the "intrigues" of class enemies. More to the point, it revealed that the PLA was having a hard time carrying out the ambiguous directive by Chairman Mao "to actively support the revolutionary Leftists," conceding that "some comrades in the local army units may commit temporary mistakes in giving their support because of the intricate and complex conditions of the class struggle." Following this somewhat gloomy assessment, the editorial then concluded with a cryptic reference to "a big question now confronting the people of the whole country"—"whether to carry the great proletarian cultural revolution through to the end, or to abandon it halfway"—and to the consequent need for "all revolutionary comrades" to "keep a cool head and not get confused."

B. The Resurgence of the Left (Spring 1967)

In this not-so-veiled allusion to mounting opposition lies the explanation, it is believed, for the next phase of Mao's "cultural revolution," which would extend through March and much of April. The principal characteristic of the new phase would be the resurgence of the "revolutionary Left," incited once again to criticize and attack the opposition and thus maintain revolutionary momentum. In Mao's view, the pendulum had swung too far in the direction of order and stability imposed by the PLA and party cadres from above and it was necessary once again to stress the role of the revolutionary masses.

The first target of attack by militant Red Guards and "revolutionary rebels," unleashed again in early March, was what was termed the "countercurrent of counterrevolutionary restoration" in central government organs. This referred to the practice of "false power seizure" whereby senior party cadres or revived party committees had exploited,
so it was charged, Mao's "mild cadre policy" to reinstate all or most of the old officials and systems of control, at the same time ignoring and suppressing the opinions of the "revolutionary left." The ring-leader of the new "counter-revolutionary current" was Vice Premier Tan Chen-lin, charged with perpetrating sham seizures in agricultural departments, but heavy criticism was also leveled at three more Vice Premiers--Chen I, Li Fu-chun and Li Hsien-nien, specialists in foreign affairs, economic, and finance respectively. Although defending the last three of his Vice Premiers against these charges, Chou En-lai, in addressing a March rally of "revolutionary rebels" in industry and transportation, also attacked this "tendency of rehabilitating all cadres, disregarding their previous offenses," characterizing it as an "extremely grave" mistake and as the "main danger" at that time. Chou also revealed in this speech that this phenomenon of "false power seizures" had appeared not only in "central offices" but in "the provinces" as well.

The disclosure of sham seizures in the provinces was related, of course, to the earlier admission (in the 9 March Red Flag editorial) that the PLA might commit (in fact, already had committed) "temporary mistakes" in identifying and supporting authentic "revolutionary leftists" while administering the "cultural revolution." Indicating the nature of these mistakes, the Military Affairs Committee on 6 April issued a ten-point directive which sharply circumscribed the authority of local military commanders in dealing with "revolutionary organizations," forbidding them to fire on rebel groups, to make mass arrests, to classify rebel organizations as counter-revolutionary without central committee approval, or to use force to extract confessions or to punish. Singled out for particular condemnation was the deputy commander of the Tsinghai provincial military district who had "brutally suppressed revolutionary mass organizations by military force" in Tsinghai province. Similar "mistakes" of varying degrees of gravity were soon reported in the additional provinces of Szechwan, Kwangtung, Hupeh and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. And, as the "counter-current" in the central government had required a scapegoat in the person of Vice Premier Tan Chen-lin, so were
two Vice-Chairman of the MAC Hsu Hsiang-chien and Yeh Chien-ying now attacked as responsible for these "mistakes" by the PLA in suppressing the "revolutionary left."

A key ingredient in this new revolutionary upsurge, as in earlier ones, was to escalate the attack against Liu Shao-chi, to launch (according to an important 8 April People's Daily editorial) "a powerful general offensive against the number one party person in authority taking the capitalist road." New features of this intensified campaign in early April were (1) public humiliation at a struggle rally where, nevertheless, Liu continued to deny his guilt as a criminal or counter-revolutionary; (2) wall-poster demands (allegedly citing Kang Sheng and Chi Pen-yu) that Liu be put to death for his "betrayal and collusion with a foreign power;" and (3) a barrage of criticism of Liu's leading theoretical work "How To Be A Good Communist," condemned by Mao at this time as "anti-Marxist."

Among the various uses of this "general offensive" against Liu, the first was to encourage more party cadres to step forward in support of the revolution, both by offering a way out for repentant cadres and by threatening dire consequences (even death) should they refuse. The second and more important was to incite the revolutionary masses to "struggle against and overthrow" the "handful" of Maoist enemies in "each area, department and unit" throughout the country, depicted as the supporters of Liu who had to be removed in order to bring him down. To accomplish this objective, some militant Red Guard detachments were apparently sent out from Peking once again to reinforce local revolutionaries in key provinces where opposition was strong.

The combined result of leashing the PLA (the 6 April directive) and unleashing the "revolutionary left" was, predictably, renewed violence and disorder. Although Lin Piao (in his 30 March speech to the central committee introducing this new phase) had praised "disorder" as necessary to achieve the goals of the "cultural revolution," the character and extent of the "disorder" which ensued...
was clearly beyond expectation. Serious, large-scale clashes were soon reported not only in the provinces but in Peking as well. Developments in Peking, about which more is known, provide a good case study of the chaos and disruption attending the new violent phase of Mao's "cultural revolution" in April and May.

In brief, what happened was that the Red Guards and "revolutionary rebels" utilized their new freedom of action to attack each other and, for good measure, the PLA as well. According to wall-poster reports, a large force of Red Guards invaded Peking University to demonstrate against Nieh Yuan-tzu, chairman of the recently unified Peking Congress of Red Guards, charging her with incompetence and a selfish desire "to gain high office." When an "armed clash" developed and Peking garrison troops were sent to restore order, the Red Guards then directed their attack at the Peking garrison deputy commander. Instances of worker "revolutionary rebels" defying and even seizing PLA representatives were also reported in Peking at this time. As a result, leaders of the Cultural Revolution Group headed by Madame Mao convened a series of meetings in mid-April between feuding Red Guard and "revolutionary rebel" groups to chastize them for attacking the PLA and for engaging in "unprincipled civil wars."

The fact that these "unprincipled civil wars" broke out on the eve of the establishment of the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee goes far to explain the nature of this new type of warfare in China. As opposed to the "principled" variety fought largely on ideological and political grounds, these wars are fought to determine who gets what share of the spoils in the new revolutionary order. It was ironic that the formal proclamation on 20 April of the new Peking Revolutionary Committee—in theory representing the achievement of a genuine and harmonious "three-way alliance"—should have been the occasion for intensified conflict within and among the components of this alliance.
C. Calls for Order Again (May-June 1967)

The extent of the new disorder in Peking was revealed by the Minister of Public Security and concurrently chairman of the new Revolutionary Committee Hsieh Fu-chih, in a speech on 14 May. As reported in a wall poster, Hsieh disclosed that production had declined seven percent in April, a decline due chiefly to "armed struggles" but also to worker protest strikes. In the first ten days of May, according to Hsieh, there had been 133 armed struggles and bloody incidents involving more than 63,000 people of which a "two-figure" number were killed. In addition, cases of beating, destroying, looting, searching houses and illegal arrest had been common and were increasing.

Hsieh's frank discussion of the extent of violence and disorder in Peking was for the purpose of justifying a new get-tough policy by the Peking Revolutionary Committee as spelled out in a six-point directive of 14 May. Citing instructions by Chairman Mao prohibiting "armed struggle" and demanding an end to the "anarchy" existing in many areas, this directive declared such practices as striking people, interfering with the PLA and going on strike to be "strictly prohibited" and ordered the PLA Peking garrison to enforce this directive. As another measure designed to restore order both in Peking and throughout the country generally, the directive reiterated an earlier central committee instruction ordering Red Guards who had gone to the provinces "without first obtaining approval of the central committee" to return to Peking immediately.

Not long before, on 5 May, Hsieh Fu-chih had revealed in a speech to students at Peking University that "armed struggles at factories, schools and various organs" were taking place not only in Peking but in many provinces as well. Despite the fact that "conservative factions" (the opposition) had not yet been defeated in various provinces, the "Leftists" there (as in Peking) had begun to "break up" by fighting among themselves. As a result, the original timetable for "seizure of power" in the provinces --"originally scheduled to be realized between February and May"--had to be extended. Hsieh concluded his gloomy assessment of the status of the "seize power" movement.
in China with the admission that the timetable would have "to be postponed for some time."

Hsieh's pessimistic view of conditions in the provinces was confirmed by wall posters reporting violent clashes and serious disorder in many parts of China throughout May, even to the point of disrupting service on several major rail lines. So serious was this disorder that it was necessary once again, in a joint circular of 4 June--in the name of the central committee, State Council, Military Affairs Committee and Cultural Revolution Group--to direct the PLA to intervene in the troubled areas to restore order. As was the case with earlier directives in Peking, this circular forbade armed struggle, assaults, destruction, pillage, houseraids, and unauthorized arrests; called upon all "revolutionary organizations" to comply, and, to ensure compliance, authorized the PLA "to arrest, detain and punish" those who refused to obey. As Hsieh had predicted, it was necessary once again, as had happened in September 1966 and in February 1967, to apply the brakes to Mao's "cultural revolution." Unlike the earlier efforts, however, it was an open question in mid-1967 how effective this new attempt to restore order in China might prove to be.

Although presented a few weeks earlier, Peking's view of the status of Mao's "cultural revolution" at this time was revealed in an authoritative and illuminating speech by Chou En-lai on 30 April to representatives of various departments of the State Council. In tracing the progress of the "seize power" movement up to that time, Chou pointed to "sham seizures" in both the central government ministries and in the provinces as one of the major problems encountered. This in effect had occurred in ten of China's 26 provinces, reflecting both the strength of the opposition and the weakness (factionalism and disunity) of the "revolutionary left" in the provinces. It had been necessary to institute "military supervision" by the PLA (i.e. military rule) over these ten provinces as a stop-gap measure until Mao's revolutionary supporters were strong enough to effect a genuine power seizure. Another category of provinces, of course, consisted of those where genuine "power seizures" (i.e., approved by Peking) had already
taken place (Heilungkiang, Kweichow, Shansi and Shantung), grouped together with Shanghai and Peking (the only addition to this approved list since February). Of the other twelve provinces, five were presented as being in a transitional stage characterized by talks underway to "negotiate" an "agreement" with Peking, with the remainder apparently only in the opening stages of negotiations or too backward to justify even an attempt at negotiation.

All in all, Chou's speech revealed the Maoist leadership as taking a relatively cautious and painstaking approach, willing to absorb setbacks and resort to various holding operations in the movement to "seize power." At the same time, Chou made it quite clear in his 30 April speech that Mao remained determined to achieve the original goals of his "cultural revolution"—a fundamental reorganization of his party and government preparatory to a new "leap forward" in China's economic and social development.