Intelligence Report

MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION": ITS LEADERSHIP, ITS STRATEGY, ITS INSTRUMENTS, AND ITS CASUALTIES
(REFERENCE TITLE: POLO XXII)
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MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION": ITS LEADERSHIP, ITS STRATEGY, ITS INSTRUMENTS, AND ITS CASUALTIES

This is a working paper of the DD/I Research Staff. It offers a fairly detailed narrative account of Mao Tse-tung's "cultural revolution" as it has developed since September 1965, a summary of that account, and some speculation on prospects.

This study presents what has been and remains in most respects a minority view, the view of one "school." It finds the evidence persuasive for the propositions that (a) Mao has taken the initiative at each stage, (b) he has been conducting a massive "test" of party leaders and the party apparatus, (c) changes in the leadership have represented primarily a purge directed by Mao, and only secondarily a "power struggle," (d) the entire effort has developed coherently, given its irrational base in dogma, and (e) Mao is now carrying out methodically and in general successfully a scheme for the reorganization of the party which he outlined last autumn.

Because a great deal of the most valuable material on each stage of the revolution to date came to hand well after the fact, the study presents developments both as they appeared at the time and as they looked when further illuminated. Not all of the facts are in yet, and material still to be received may compel a change in some of the present conclusions.

The DD/I/RS would welcome further comment on this working paper, addressed to either the Chief or the Deputy Chief of the Staff.
For when you defeat me in an election simply because you were, as I was not, born and bred in a log cabin, it is only a question of time until you are beaten by someone whom the pigs brought up out in the yard.

-- Randall Jarrell

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MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION": ITS LEADERSHIP, ITS STRATEGY, ITS INSTRUMENTS, AND ITS CASUALTIES

Summary

The "great proletarian cultural revolution" is said by Peking to have derived from a number of specific initiatives taken by Mao Tse-tung between autumn 1962 and autumn 1965. While most of these cannot be confirmed, the "revolution" from the start has obviously been Mao's. It has grown out of concepts evident as far back as 1958, and in particular out of Mao's conviction--stated publicly and emphatically in mid-1964--of the urgency of the need for revolutionary successors whom he could trust to carry out his will.

Mao's obsession with this need--and his consequent insistence on conducting a massive "test" and thorough purge of the Chinese party--has been the central fact of the "revolution." The revolution has not seemed to represent a "power struggle" in the sense of a struggle for dominance in the leadership; the group around Mao, and in particular Mao himself, has been dominant in the leadership in all stages. Mao's initiative in each of these stages has been confirmed by open materials.

Changes in the composition of the group around Mao--changes coming sometimes thick and fast--have seemed to represent primarily changes in Mao's own evaluation of his lieutenants. Some of the changes probably also reflect a contest for position, below Mao, among his lieutenants, looking toward an early succession. While the purge did not begin with such a contest, and the contest has been secondary all along to Mao's initiatives, this maneuvering for position is probably an increasingly important factor.
Moreover, there has clearly been a struggle—which continues—against resistance to Mao's will on the part of the vast apparatus of the party, the government and the military establishment, from the top level down. While there is no declared opposition, this is a struggle to make the apparatus, both in the center and in the provinces, fully responsive to Mao's new team.

The First Test: The "Poisonous Weed"

At a party meeting in September 1965, Mao gave other party leaders some sense of his disappointment with accomplishments from 1962 to 1965 and of his wish for what was in effect a political "great leap forward." He apparently met with some resistance even then. There is evidence that Peng Chen (then the sixth-ranking party leader, and in charge of reforming "cultural" organizations) and Lo Jui-ching (the PLA's chief-of-staff) were among those resisting: Peng (probably) on behalf of greater debate, Lo (probably) on behalf of military preparedness. Others who may have resisted—or, at least, may have failed to show sufficient enthusiasm—were the senior directors of the party apparatus, Liu Shao-chi (Mao's designated successor since 1945) and Teng Hsiao-ping (Liu's own first lieutenant since 1955), the director of the party's propaganda department, Lu Ting-i, and the party central committee's administrative link with Mao, Yang Shang-kun. Some of these six may have worked together against Mao (as now alleged) before or after the September 1965 meeting, although wall-poster assertions of a great conspiracy to overthrow Mao appear contrived.

The opening gun of the "revolution" was fired, reportedly on Mao's order, in early November 1965, in an article attacking a playwright whose earlier work was genuinely critical of Mao. Mao apparently did not tell other party leaders—-with a few exceptions—that he intended a particular anti-Mao play to serve as a test of ideology and loyalty for his entire "cultural" apparatus and for the highest leaders of the party machine which supervised it. In other words, Mao was making a major
initiative without providing clear guidance as to what response was desired, with the intention of punishing those who made the wrong response. He was probably determined from the start to purge Peng Chen, who had already failed him as director of the "cultural" purge, and whose own Peking committee sheltered the attacked playwright and itself contained some writers who had bitterly criticized Mao.

Immediately after the attack on the playwright appeared, Minister of Defense Lin Piao, who was being rapidly built up as the foremost and ideal student of Mao's thought, issued a directive on the work of the PLA which stated the general criterion for the testing of party officials as well--whether they regarded the works of Mao as the "highest instructions" for their own work. Soon thereafter, in late November 1965, Mao left Peking, to sketch or observe the development of the "cultural revolution," and possibly to undergo medical treatment. Lo Jui-ching and Yang Shang-kun, both in posts that made them dangerous, disappeared at this time, probably arrested. At the same time, Lin Piao's PLA newspaper took the lead in defining the immediate "cultural" issue and forcing others to declare themselves--the question of whether the attacked playwright's work was a "poisonous weed" (the Maoist position) or a matter for debate (the "enemy" position).

In mid-January 1966, Mao called together a few party leaders and his own wife (then a minor figure)--a group which later emerged as the "cultural revolution group", directing the campaign--to discuss the unsatisfactory situation, but he did not immediately replace the original group then operating under Peng Chen. In February, Peng issued a self-serving report on the cultural revolution in the name of the politburo--possibly approved by Liu Shao-chi, in Mao's absence from Peking--and he and Lu Ting-i did not act to bring the party press into line with the PLA newspaper on the issue of the "poisonous weed." Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, the supervisors of both Peng and Lu, also failed to take this action. Unlike Peng and Lu, who could not afford to uncover a trail leading to themselves, Liu and Teng need not have
been consciously resisting what they took to be Mao's will in that period; while they may have been (if the charges of opposition to Mao in September 1965 are true), they may instead simply have failed to understand what he wanted, have lacked the illumination of his already-revealed "thought" and the revolutionary ardor which (in Mao's view) would have shown them the "correct" line without specific guidance. While neither Liu nor Teng fell entirely out of Mao's favor at this time, and Teng may have gone on to play an important role in the purge of Peng Chen, the poor performance of the party press during the winter apparently created or strengthened Mao's reservations about Liu, and perhaps about Teng as well. Wall-poster assertions that some of Mao's lieutenants (not Liu and Teng) were plotting a "rebellion" or "coup" in February (during his absence) seem to be a deliberate corruption of a still-obscure but apparently minor incident of that month. In fact, there is no evidence of any important initiative by any of his lieutenants during that winter.

In March, still in Mao's absence, Mao's wife began her spectacular rise to the top, working then--with Lin Piao--on the problem of the political reliability of the PLA. Later in March, Peking announced that Mao was not ill--meaning, perhaps, that he had recovered, possibly from an operation in February. On the same day, Liu Shao-chi--who knew or suspected that his own status was now in question, as (it was later learned) he told someone so at the time--was sent abroad for a month.

By the end of March, Mao was back in action, clearly in command. He intervened in the Chinese party's negotiations with the Japanese party, peremptorily rejecting their draft communique and thus reversing several of his top lieutenants. Peng Chen disappeared from sight at that time, and the party press very quickly discovered that the work of the anti-Mao playwright was indeed a "poisonous weed." The party's Peking committee under Peng Chen tried to protect its own leaders by joining the attack on lesser figures, but Mao's spokesmen carried the attack in their direction.
Preparing the Ground: The Conventional Apparatus

In early April, the PLA newspaper publicly forecast the course of the next several months—a wide-scale if not high-reaching purge. The "cultural revolution" then began for the public in late April and May, with meetings and rallies of all elements of the population to denounce the "black gang" uncovered in Peking (the attacked playwright and his friends on the Peking committee), and to swear allegiance to Mao's thought. Throughout this April-May period, the conventional party apparatus under Liu and Teng, using conventional methods, was in charge of the conduct of the "cultural revolution". Liu and Teng, given in effect another chance, seemed to be doing a good, routine job; there was nothing in the materials of the period to suggest that the party apparatus itself would be displaced by extraordinary vehicles in later stages.

Mao reappeared near Shanghai in early May, looking good. A review of his medical record, however, suggested that—apart from a possible successful operation for Parkinson's disease (as some observers believe)—he was probably suffering from organic brain damage—the result of pre-senile changes or strokes—which could be expected progressively to impair his reasoning and judgment and to increase his suspicion and distrust. In other words, certain features of Mao's behavior which had been evident in his policies for several years would probably be accentuated. At a party meeting later in May, Mao gave some further guidance—but again, apparently, unclear guidance—on the conduct of the "revolution".

Failure of the Apparatus: The Work-Tems

With the ground prepared in April and May, on 1 June the party began to move against the range of cultural and educational organizations and in particular against the educators, the most important of whom were concurrently secretaries of the party committees in their institutions. Liu and Teng, presumably on the basis of a
good performance in April and May, were still in charge of implementing the "revolution." The instrument of the "revolution" in June--almost certainly approved by Mao in the May meeting--was the "work-team." These small teams, which had been used before in the countryside, were named by higher party bodies and assigned to investigate and reorganize educational and cultural bodies; the teams commonly followed or effected the removal of the principal administrators and party secretaries, and took charge.

With a few exceptions, the work-teams failed to back the most militant elements on the campuses (and elsewhere), and in many cases suppressed them in the same ways as had the local party leaders whom the work-teams had dislodged. The work-teams clearly did not have a directive to support such elements, and Liû Shao-chi and Teng Haio-ping have been principally blamed for this. While Mao's spokesmen have encouraged the view that Liu and Teng were consciously sabotaging Mao's policy, and this may be true, the evidence is good that again they did not have a clear directive from Mao himself. In other words, Mao had again set them a test, and again--whether deliberately, or from lack of understanding--they had failed to do what he wished, together with much of the party apparatus.

Beginning at the end of June, probably on Mao's initiative, there was intervention on the campuses by officers--including Mme. Mao--of what was soon to be revealed as the "group in charge of the cultural revolution," plus the more prestigious and adroit Chou En-lai. These leaders apologized to the "revolutionary students" for the "mistakes" of the work-teams, and backed the militants against the teams, which were withdrawn in the next month.

The New Directorate and the New Directive

For the rest of the summer, Mao and the new figures in his favor were improvising. The new central "cultural
revolution group" under Chen Po-ta (Mao's long-time writer) was surfaced in early July. The new instruments of the revolution, immediately formed, were to be "revolutionary committees" responsive to the central group, chosen by election and directed to "give a free rein to the masses" (meaning the militants). On the campuses, these committees initiated another and longer period of at least partially directed violence, against "enemies" identified in the earlier stages. Off the campuses, the "revolution" was also proceeding turbulently, although with less violence and disruption of normal activity.

In early August, Mao reportedly declared his favor directly—in a wall-poster—for the militant students. At the same time Chou En-lai and Mme. Mao both began to prepare the students—some already organized as Red Guards—for large-scale action against the party apparatus, telling them not to dissipate their forces by fighting among themselves, but to concentrate them against enemies in the party. Then on 8 August the party central committee—then in plenum—issued a 16-point directive for the conduct of the "revolution" in which militant exhortations were foremost and which served to encourage the militant students who were soon to be turned loose on the party apparatus.

The 8 August directive—the main lines of which were credibly attributed to Mao personally—stated the party's aim of bringing down the opponents of Mao's line in the party, praised the revolutionary young, predicted "fairly strong" resistance, called for this to be attacked with "daring...above everything else," told the party not to fear "disorder," and stated that "all forces must be concentrated to strike" against the "main target...in the party." It went on to classify all party officials according to their attitudes toward the revolution, warned them against counter-attacking the revolutionaries, and reassured them that they would not be criticized by name in the press (i.e. officially condemned) without higher-level approval. In sum, the directive incited the revolutionary young against the party apparatus without providing them with any clear criterion for distinguishing between those loyal to Mao's thought and those disloyal,
while keeping in the party leadership's hands the later
decision as to whom actually to purge.

The New Team and the Red Guards

This party plenum which had produced the 16-point
directive lasted through 12 August. There is some evidence
that a minority showed resistance in this plenum to Mao's
plans for the further conduct of the revolution, in
particular the plan for the further subordination of the
conventional party apparatus and for attacks on it by the
Red Guards about to emerge. Party spokesmen have implied
that Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping led the resistance
forces at the plenum, but it is not clear whether they
were in open opposition to Mao or (in defending themselves
against charges) simply said things that were taken as
open opposition because Mao was already determined to break
them. In any case, Liu and Teng were demoted by the plenum
(Teng, the junior, was not held responsible to the same
degree for the pair's "errors"), and Lin Piao was "un-
amiously" elected as the party's (sole) vice chairman.
Lin addressed the plenum, identifying himself completely
with Mao, stating his favor for the militants, announcing
the new team's plans for reorganizing the party according
to Mao's principles for the cultivation of revolutionary
successors, reiterating the team's intention to purge
those who proved to be hard-case incorrigibles among
party officials, and confiding his expectation of a long
and hard struggle.

On 13 August the central committee issued a com-
muniqué on the plenum. While certain differences between
the party and the PLA press in commenting on the 8 August
directive had suggested possible differences in degrees
of militancy among members of the new team, the communiqué
itself was thoroughly militant, reiterating the need for
"daring" and for turning the masses loose. Soon there-
after, on 18 August, the Red Guards made their first ap-
pearance at a rally which displayed Lin Piao publicly as
Mao's new anointed successor. The rally also displayed
the rest of the new team (less Mme. Mao): Chou En-lai
as still third-ranking, Tao Chu (the new propaganda chief) and Chen Po-ta of the "cultural revolution group" newly risen to fourth and fifth, Teng Hsiao-ping sixth but demoted among active leaders, Kang Sheng (the old police figure) risen to seventh, and Liu Shao-chi down all the way from second to eighth. Commentaries immediately following the 18 August rally suggested strongly that a number of other party leaders would be brought down, including any who resisted the attacks of the Red Guards.

The Unleashing of the Red Guards

In the days following the rally, Chou En-lai and officers of the central "cultural revolution group" gave a number of interviews to the Red Guards, bypassing the conventional party apparatus which was about to be attacked. The Guards were told that they were free to organize themselves any way they liked, and to say in their posters anything they liked. They were expressly incited against the party apparatus, but—as confirmed in many accounts of these briefings—they were not given specific targets, and were told repeatedly to solve their problems (whom to attack, and how hard to attack) for themselves. In other words, once again the instruments of the revolution were set in motion without clear guidance. (This feature of the revolution—incredible to most Western observers—derives from Mao's conception of the process as a test of both the party officials being attacked and the attacking forces, a revolutionary "storm" in which potential revolutionary successors—both senior and junior—would prove themselves. The concept, to an outsider, is basically irrational; but it is clearly Mao's concept, and Mao in important respects is irrational).

In the last ten days of August the Red Guards burst out in the streets of Chinese cities. Their actions were first reported as directed against the visible signs of traditional, Western and Soviet influence, but a picture later emerged of violence from the start, with beatings, torture, forced labor, pressured suicides, and murder (all of this against a defenseless populace), attacks on party
headquarters and party officials, and clashes between visiting Red Guards and local forces (including Red Guards) organized by local officials. Later information also showed that the Red Guards even in this first stage of their activity began to split into hostile and competing factions, possibly reflecting differences in the new team itself.

The Subsidence of the Red Guards

The violence of the Red Guards began to subside in Peking—the pilot area for the country—at the end of August, at which time Lin Piao and Chou En-lai made the first of a series of speeches in which the two leaders were to take somewhat different lines, leading to speculation about critical differences between them. In this case, while both called for better discipline on the part of the Red Guards ("Don't hit people"), Lin again incited them against party leaders while Chou did not. However, in briefing Red Guards going out to the provinces, Chou also encouraged the Red Guards to move aggressively against local party leaders despite anticipated resistance. Chou again refused—at this stage—to specify targets or to state the new team's favor for one wing of the Red Guards over others, although both of these things were done at a later stage. There is no evidence that Lin Piao or any other leader was giving the Guards contrary instructions privately.

While the party leaders in Peking were calling both for militancy and for discipline, and Peking itself was fairly quiet, serious clashes continued elsewhere in China until mid-September. In some of these clashes, thousands of people were engaged, sometimes with hundreds of injuries and dozens of dead. There is excellent evidence of the insolence and brutality of the Red Guards toward party officials and even the PLA. It seems clear that the dominant leaders did not try very hard to hold the Guards within well-defined limits.
Some observers have held that it was really the objective of the Red Guards in that period to overthrow the first secretaries of the regional, provincial and municipal bodies they "bombarded," and that they therefore failed in their mission; but the evidence is to the contrary. Just as the Guards were not given specific targets, so they were not told how far to go, and the PLA at that stage was not told to help them. Moreover, a survey of the Red Guard action--that is, of the targets of attack, and of the weight of the attacks--shows no pattern. In Peking's eyes the mission of the Red Guards seems to have been, at that stage, not to overthrow but to shock, shake up, test the responses of, the party leaders outside Peking--out of Mao's dogmatic belief that the truth would emerge from such a "storm" and out of the new team's practical desire for additional material on which to base the real purge-list later. The first secretaries outside Peking, however, may well have concluded that most of them would end up on the list no matter what they did.

On 15 September, at a third great rally marking the end of the first period of Red Guard violence, Lin Piao again called for action (by implication, violence) against party leaders, while Chou En-lai chose to emphasize a constructive role for the Red Guards--assisting in production. Again these differences suggested possible policy differences. However, party and PLA journals soon endorsed the positions taken by both leaders, and the Red Guards did in fact help with the harvest.

In briefing the Red Guards in that period for future operations, Chou En-lai and others of Mao's new team emphasized that it was not Mao's intention to destroy the conventional party apparatus, and imposed clear, specific limitations on the Guards (e.g. they were not to seize official media, or imprison people). These spokesmen continued, however, to refuse to provide specific targets or to arbitrate the quarrels among the Red Guards; and the Guards themselves continued to polarize, preparing to set up rival headquarters. At the end of September, it appeared that further and strong action would be taken against important figures in the party, but that there might be some delay.
Waiting, Perhaps Debating

The party's pronouncements in early October were thin and ambiguous: e.g., the party journal in a single editorial called for "striking down" party leaders and for allowing them to correct their errors. However, without publicity, the new team moved to reinstate the most militant students (now Red Guards) who had been denounced and suppressed by the work-teams, and in other ways began at this time to show its favor for this wing. Moreover, also without publicity, self-criticisms by leaders who had made "mistakes" (e.g. Liu Shao-chi's wife) were being offered. Peking continued in this period to make known that Lin Piao was to be Mao's successor and to try to validate his claim to this position.

There is some evidence that in mid-October an important member of the new team submitted to the others a report on the "cultural revolution" which was soon found unsatisfactory, indeed a continuation of the "erroneous line" of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. This report might have been by Tao Chu (who began to be attacked in posters three weeks later), and may have been seen as an effort by Tao to protect the party apparatus (including Tao's own assets in the Central-South, where he had been the regional first secretary), against the plans of more militant members of the new team.

On 18 October, there was another mass rally which was confined to a drive-by and seemed aborted. The reason apparently lay in a dispute among the Red Guards about posting public criticism of Liu Shao-chi, a dispute which may, again, have reflected disagreement in the new team as to how to handle Liu. The Guards were told, in effect, that the time was not ripe, which led to such large-scale fighting among them that the plans for a conventional rally were changed. At about this time, rival Red Guard headquarters began to appear.

Immediately thereafter, the party press began a series of extremely militant commentaries which suggested that the dominant figures of the new team were trying to
persuade some others that the time was at hand for decisive action against some of the party leaders in disfavor. In the same period, the recently-rehabilitated militants of the Red Guards smashed up some government offices in Peking, and there was a barrage of poster attacks on ministries and their coordinating staff offices. These various developments suggested to some observers a warning to Chou En-lai and others not to persist in opposition to the plans of the dominant figures. While Chou and Tao Chu both might reasonably be regarded as less militant than some others, Chou at least was in good favor and remained so, and the line-up of the time thus remains obscure.

Mao's Scenario

On 31 October, Red Flag made public a scenario for the future course of the purge. It told party officials that, with the exception of a few hard cases, those in disfavor with the new team could keep from getting purged by conducting a grovelling self-criticism, admitting their errors (e.g. in the period of the work-teams, or during Red Guard "bombardments"), restoring the reputations of those they had damaged, and (in effect) swearing eternal allegiance to Mao's thought. While some observers argued that Peking was really saying that it was unable to act against leaders in disfavor, the editors suggested instead that Mao was planning a prolonged, elaborate spectacle of a kind he had staged before on a smaller scale.

Materials received much later revealed that the Chinese party was holding a work-conference at this time--ending about 8 November--in which Mao and Lin made important speeches, and in which Liu and Teng, both in disgrace, offered their first self-criticisms. This conference was evidently attended by many or most of the regional and provincial first secretaries, whom Mao could have purged on the spot if that was all he wanted to do. The speeches of Mao and Lin, which are little known, are exceptionally valuable for an understanding of what Mao and Lin in fact wanted to do.
Mao in his speech blamed himself for having allowed Liu and Teng (for some years before August) to handle the "routine work" of the party, admitted that he had not foreseen every turn of the cultural revolution, and reaffirmed the value of mass action. He went on to tell his audience—in particular, the regional and provincial leaders—that they had not been well-prepared for the Red Guard descent on them in August and September and should be better-prepared for (he implied) another wave. He attempted to reassure them that most of them would "pass the test," and said that even Liu and Teng need not be regarded as hard-case incorrigibles like Peng Chen and others of the first group. (Mao was not convincing, however, in this avuncular role.)

Mao's speech was apparently followed by the self-criticisms of Liu and Teng, in which both accepted responsibility for providing erroneous guidance (i.e., guidance later found so) to the work-teams. Liu went on to blame himself for certain rightist retreats in policy in earlier years which Mao almost certainly had approved at the time but which he now wished to attribute to someone else. However, neither self-criticism, as reported, was as grovelling as Mao appeared to desire. In fact, Liu made a thinly-veiled defense of his actions, arguing (truthfully) that he had not been given clear guidance.

Lin Piao in his speech to the conference did not bother to adopt a conciliatory pose and was harsh toward Liu and Teng in particular. He emphasized that Mao meant to carry out a thorough struggle against opposing ideology, for as long as necessary. He too praised the Red Guards. He also asserted that most of the party apparatus outside Peking was "good," but he said frankly that all local leaders would be judged for the mistakes that all local committees had made. It is doubtful that many of the first secretaries from the regions and provinces were reassured by this presentation.
Preparations for the Spectacle

Immediately following the conference, on 10 November People's Daily returned to the proposition--identified in particular with Chou En-lai--that the cultural revolution must not be allowed to interfere with production. It was further reported that factories were being allowed to disband Red Guard units and replace them by "militia." Chou continued in high favor.

During these first two weeks of November, there were renewed reports of serious incidents involving the Red Guards on one hand and party figures, the PLA, and factory workers on the other. In some of these, the Red Guards again beat and tortured party officials. In mid-November, the party closed the city of Peking to visiting Red Guards for the winter, and also forbade the Guards from operating private jails, kangaroo courts, and torture chambers. At the same time, however, the central committee issued a general directive on the rehabilitation of the militants, another sign of the favor of the dominant figures for the very forces which had been doing these things.

As of mid-November, the new team itself did not seem stable. It was still dominated by an irrational and highly suspicious man whose continued favor could not be counted on and who might himself behave so badly that his lieutenants would combine to overthrow him, and its other members looked like a mismatched set. There had already been signs of disagreement--perhaps very serious disagreement--among them, drawn along 'militant' and 'moderate' lines. Most observers, even while disagreeing about what had happened in the previous year, could and did agree at that time that the new team probably would not last.

On 23 November, Red Guard pamphlets denouncing Liu and Teng in detail seemed to foretell early public action against some of the party leaders who had previously been removed from the public scene or publicly demoted. Mao is said to have left Peking (after a final Red Guard rally) on 26 November. On 28 November, Mao's
wife publicly reiterated that those who had failed Mao would be put through criticism and self-criticism in public spectacles, and that some would be brought down in any case; moreover, Mme. Mao seemed to snub Tao Chu publicly on this occasion.

The Beginning of the Spectacle

On 4 December, Mao's new team began to stage this long-promised series of spectacles. On that day, Peng Chen and six lesser officials ("cultural" figures) were handed over to the Red Guards. Posters soon demanded their "trial," and other posters called for the dismissal from their posts of Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-ping. These were probably intended in part as a warning to regional and provincial officials to offer (or augment) their own self-criticisms before time ran out.

By this time, all or almost all of the party's regional bureaus and provincial committees, and most of the major municipal committees, had been repeatedly criticized in Red Guard posters. Some of this criticism—of those not criticized earlier—may have been commissioned by the new team to get such criticism on the record, in order to justify action against all of those (e.g. proteges of leaders in disfavor) against whom it wanted to move for whatever reason. No doubt a large purge-list was taking shape.

At this time (12 December), Red Flag reiterated the ritual by which an erring official must seek forgiveness—self-abasement, reinstatement of those injured, and correction of the record. This editorial was especially interesting in suggesting that many officials were refusing to make the kind of self-criticism Mao wanted, and in further suggesting that some of them were capable of putting Peking to a lot of trouble before being brought down.

Meanwhile, in early December there had continued to be serious clashes between the Red Guards and party
committees, between the Guards and workers, and among elements of the Guards. Beginning on 12 December, party leaders—particularly Chou En-lai and Mme. Mao—again condemned violence by, against, and among the Guards, but again stated their favor for the most militant elements of the Guards, those chiefly responsible for the violence. Chou and Mme. Mao soon took action to disband some of the Red Guard organizations which had opposed these militants, and Chou reportedly asked for a merger of Red Guard organizations, presumably under the domination of the militants. Mao's new team was clearly planning to use the Guards on a large scale again.

From 12 December, the public scene in Peking was filled with rallies. On that date, Peng Chen was put on public display, possibly with others of the first group (Lu Ting-i, Lo Jui-ching, Yang Shang-kun). On 13 December Tao Chu, who himself may (but may not) have been already marked for discard, made the first public attack by a party leader on Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Tao is said to have stated that there had not been enough criticism of the Liu/Teng line—and, of course, not enough self-criticism by those who had implemented it. Tao's defense of himself for implementing that line in June and July was jeered by some of his audience.

In mid-December, the new team released Liu's self-criticism; and Mme. Mao publicly rejected it as a "hoax," but refused to let the Red Guards feature Liu and Teng in a public rally—possibly in the interest of not provoking any additional resistance from the party apparatus. She is also said to have told the Guards to allow the Ministry of Public Security to make all the arrests, while at the same time criticizing the Ministry (still directed by a protege of Teng Hsiao-ping who had turned against Teng) and announcing that it or at least elements of it would henceforth be subordinated to Lin Piao's PLA. Moreover, in the first known instance of specific targeting by a party leader against others not already in clear disfavor, Mme. Mao marked several second-level leaders for action by the Red Guards.
Public criticism of those in disfavor intensified, others came into disfavor, and even old opponents were gathered in. On 19 and 20 December, fresh rallies were held to denounce Peng Chen and others of the first group; all were displayed at the rally, and were brutally handled by the Red Guards. At the same time, huge new posters demanded further action against—even "liquidation" of—Liu and Teng. Other leaders, including Ho Lung of the military affairs committee (who was later to be accused of planning a "rebellion" or "coup") were also denounced. Peng Te-huai, the former Minister of Defense (Lin Piao's predecessor) who had led the opposition to Mao in 1959 and then disappeared, was reportedly seized by Red Guards and brought to Peking.

The decision to move more forcefully against opponents of the new team seemed to be reflected in two other important developments in December. On 26 December (Mao's 73rd birthday), People's Daily made public the essentials of a party directive which turned the Red Guards and other "revolutionary" organizations loose on the factories; it was soon revealed that the "revolution" would move into the countryside "on a large scale" as well. Visible resistance to the "revolution" in those areas may have led the new team to take this action earlier than originally intended. The other was the fall of Tao Chu, and—apparently—of a number of military figures, perhaps a week or so later.

In early January, Tao, the fourth-ranking member of the new team, was being denounced in the same terms as Liu and Teng and may have been paraded around Peking; and at the same time a number of military leaders—both commanders and political officers—began to be denounced. There were several other party leaders, at the second level, who seemed marked for discard. The party appeared to be moving into a period in which there would be unusual opportunities for Mao's lieutenants to maneuver against one another.
Prospects

With respect to action against its opponents, Mao's new team by the end of December 1966 had moved some distance from the situation it had been in as early as October and as late as late November—when its pronouncements had in effect put the new team itself on trial, had obliged it to take some further action if it were not to seem either frivolous or impotent. It had taken such action. But it was again in a situation in which further action seemed to be demanded—action against those in disfavor who had refused to go through the elaborate ritual prescribed for them or had been found irredeemable anyway—including denunciation by name in the official press, the trial and sentencing of some of those in custody in Peking, and the dislodgement of some unregenerate leaders (probably the majority of the regional and provincial first secretaries) outside Peking.

The party directives of December, on extending the "revolution" to the factories and the countryside, gave Mao's new team both an occasion and an instrument for taking action at the same time against regional and provincial leaders: that is, the progress of the revolution would surely cause a great deal of disorder and additional resistance, and party leaders outside Peking could be blamed for this, whereupon the Red Guards and other "revolutionary" organizations could depose those leaders by the approved method of mass action, action taken together with acceptable elements of the party committees. Reports from the provinces in January 1967 suggested that this in fact was happening at several points; Peking was explaining that the simple "overthrow" of those in disfavor would not do, that there must be a "seizure of power" by a "mass movement," and was praising revolutionary "rebels" (against the conventional apparatus) who were calling for joint action with those in the party committees who were loyal to Mao's line. Once again, however, as often since 1957, Mao may have underestimated the resistance his new initiative would provoke. Already in late January there were indications that the PLA would have to be used, something that Mao had preferred not to
do, and which may have been the issue behind the purge of late December. Moreover, if as expected the new offensive were to have damaging economic consequences, the strength of the resistance would also be expected to increase.

The role of the PLA leaders—including the commanders of regional headquarters—may be critical. These leaders have had some reason to worry, but have not had as good reason as have first secretaries outside Peking to conclude that most of them will be purged no matter what they do. On balance, it seems likely that some of them will refuse to follow Mao's orders, but that the great majority will do as they are told. Thus, while it is conceivable that Mao and others of the new team will be overthrown following a split in the PLA, the probability seems otherwise. The prospect seems to be for substantial resistance by various combinations of forces at some points, but not for resistance coordinated to the point of posing a threat to Mao and the other central leaders.

The threat to the new team seems still to proceed primarily from itself. Mao is still irrational, perhaps increasingly so, driven by his obsession. The new team even as recomposed—without Tao Chu—still seems unstable; not even Lin Piao, let alone the less militant Chou En-lai, can be sure of Mao's continued favor.

There are various possibilities for a true "power struggle"—that is, for Mao's power. Two possibilities turn on Lin's position: if he sees himself as declining in Mao's favor (the tone of Peking's treatment of Lin has been muted since November), he might make common cause against Mao—with Chou and various military leaders—while he still can. Or if Lin is actually deposed before he can do this, there might in consequence be the kind of equalization of strength among the two groups of Mao's lieutenants—the Maoists, and the relative moderates around Chou—which would make a frank competition feasible; then, should Chou win out, he might go on—with the support of the military leaders—to depose Mao himself.
There are at least two possibilities for a power struggle which do not depend on a decline in Lin's position. One is that of Mao's death, which could come at any time; the new team might quickly pull apart, through an intensification of the differences that seem already to exist. Another is that of Mao's severe deterioration, to the point of incapacity, so that he would have to be set aside.

While evaluation of these possibilities (especially the health picture) is hazardous, each of the four--a Lin-led coup, a Chou-led coup, Mao's death, or Mao's incapacity--should probably be regarded as an outside chance in itself. And the four of them seem to add up to less than an overall probability of Mao's early overthrow. In sum, the prospect for 1967 seems to be for the continued dominance of Mao and the Maoists, and for their continued progress--at various speeds at various points--toward the reorganization of the party, governmental and military apparatus throughout China.
THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND ITS VEHICLES

The "great proletarian cultural revolution" in China is said by Peking to have derived from a number of insights and pronouncements by Mao Tse-tung between 1962 and the end of 1965: e.g. his admonition to the central committee's tenth plenum in September 1962 "never to forget class struggle," his complaint about the state of the arts in China in December 1963, his warning to Chinese literary associations in June 1964 that they and most of their publications had failed to carry out the party's policies, and his declaration in another central committee meeting of September 1965 that it was necessary to "criticize bourgeois reactionary thinking." Mao is further said to have "personally organized and led" the "cultural revolution" in the "last half of 1965."

While these initiatives now attributed to Mao were not made public at the time and cannot be confirmed, the regime did in fact launch a "socialist education" campaign in spring 1963--a conventional campaign, conducted through orthodox party organs, but reportedly including a purge of low-level party officials--and in mid-1964 publicly indicated that something more ambitious lay ahead. On 14 July 1964, in the last of a series of violently polemical articles directed against the Soviet party, Peking published an article "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism" which has since been attributed to Mao personally. Among other things, the article spoke of "degeneration" in Chinese society (and of the efforts of "degenerates" to find "protectors and agents in the higher leading bodies"), of the need for a "thorough socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts" requiring a century or several centuries, of the need to conduct extensive socialist education movements repeatedly throughout China, and of the need to train millions of successors who would carry on Mao's policies rather than to allow China to evolve into a "phoney" Communist state like the USSR. It was asserted further that such successors would come forward in "mass struggles" and be tempered in the "great storms of revolution."
It is the thesis of this paper that Mao's obsession with the problem of revolutionary successors--of ensuring that his successors, and their successors, be leaders whom he could trust to carry out his will--is the central fact in developments in China since September 1965. This paper will contend that no other hypothesis can explain either the course of the "cultural revolution" or its casualties.

The September 1965 meeting--not a plenum--of the CCP central committee probably played an important role in shaping the "cultural revolution," and possibly in fixing its targets among the top-ranking leaders of the party; but there is little solid information about it. Beyond the bare statement of the party that Mao at this meeting "pointed out that it is necessary to criticize bourgeois reactionary thinking"--which might at the time have referred narrowly to "cultural" matters, or at the other extreme might have referred to every kind of opposition to the entire range of Mao's policies--the evidence on the content of the meeting is confined to a few statements on other occasions, pronouncements by some purged leaders which can be read in various ways, and assertions made recently in wall-posters.

The September 1965 meeting need not, of course, have been confined to the coming revolution, but might have taken up--as well at that time as another--a set of large related matters, not only the content and scope of the "cultural revolution," but policies of economic and military development, the situation of the war in Vietnam on which Peking had staked so much, the implications of all this for Peking's relationship with the USSR, and so on. One Foreign Office has recently advanced a conjecture along just these lines, positing a "dispute" in the Chinese leadership at that time over the question of (a) whether to improve relations with the USSR as a hedge against war with the U.S., (b) whether to push "thought reform" at a faster tempo, (c) whether to give priority to modernization of the military establishment, and (d) whether to continue with economic readjustment or launch another "great leap forward." But the conjecture is obviously inferential, and most other observers would not regard the evidence as permitting such large conclusions.
There is some confirmation in the 1 October 1965 number of Red Flag that the September 1965 meeting had been concerned in large part if not mainly with the forthcoming "cultural revolution," and that there had been some resistance in the meeting to Mao's sense of it. A major editorial on that date, "Adopt the Proletarian World Outlook to Create Our New World," reviewed the "tremendous successes" which had resulted from following Mao's guidance and the party's line, and went on to observe ominously that "the old ideas...have always attempted to fight for survival and to disseminate their influence under the cloak of names and slogans of socialism and Marxism-Leninism"--the implication being that some persons in the party who presented an orthodox appearance were covertly heretical. (This line was later to emerge as the charge that Mao's opponents were waving a false 'Red Flag' in order to bring down the real Red Flag.) Nevertheless, it was still possible for the party journal to reassure its readers that the determination to achieve a through-going "proletarian world outlook...does not mean that we want to negate everything and denigrate heritage"; it was rather to "keep all the valuable parts intact," and the method of operation was to be that of "democratic criticism," making "full use of explanation." The Red Flag warning about heresy-masked-as-orthodoxy was not repeated in the editorial of the People's Daily, which was to lag until the following June in receiving the signals correctly in the "cultural revolution."

A wall-poster not reported until January 1967 also provides some confirmation of opposition to Mao's concepts in that September 1965 meeting. Mao himself is quoted in the poster as declaring that the "party center...proposed revisionism" in September and October 1965. The implication is that the top leaders of the party apparatus--Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping--led this opposition, and another poster of the same period expressly accuses Teng of being in opposition to Mao in that meeting; but these charges came at a time when Peking was blackening Liu and Teng retroactively, and it is uncertain whether they really were in opposition that early.

The evidence is a bit better that Peng Chen and Lo Jui-ching were among those offering resistance then
to some aspect of Maо's plans for the "revolution." Peng Chen, speaking on National Day (1 October) in Peking, can be regarded at least in hindsight as speaking like a man who had lost an argument about "cultural" policy and wanted both to reaffirm his position and to keep the subject open for another effort later: after a number of frank statements about China's backwardness and problems, Peng in this speech asserted that the party must encourage the "full airing of different views" and must pay attention to all views both correct and incorrect, because "divergent views make comparison possible and help guard against onesidedness." (This can also be read as an amplification of portions of the Red Flag editorial, but Chou En-lai in a speech on the same occasion did not take this line.)*

*Lo Jui-ching's speeches of May and September 1965 can also be read as implying favor for positions which, if stated in the September meeting, could have got him into trouble. But readers differ as to which of his conjectured views are applicable. Some hold that in his May speech, in discussing preparations for war and the strategy of "active defense" in war, Lo was stating his favor for some doctrine other than Maо's; it is hard to understand this argument, however, as Lo in his speech spells out the doctrine in terms which seem to be entirely consonant with Maо's, and in fact explicitly cites Maо as his authority for the doctrine. Others hold that in his September speech (delivered just prior to the meeting), Lo was stating his favor for a more aggressive policy in the war in Vietnam, one which would have meant war with the U.S.; others do not find that in his speech but find instead indications of a strong professional respect for (or fear of) the U.S. military establishment ("They are armed to the teeth and possess complete sets of machinery for killing people. Whoever is afraid of death...has no alternative but to surrender..."). Either point of view could have led him to argue that the central problem was not the indoctrination but the combat-readiness of the military establishment, which would entail a compromise with the USSR, and so on. He may well have argued this way, but, it will be contended, for other reasons than those imputed to him on the basis of this speech.
Further light on Peng's possible position in the September meeting comes from a party document asserting that Peng, at a propaganda conference the same month (September 1965), declared that everyone is equal before the truth—a proposition subsequently attacked as a slogan of the "black gang"—and that even Chairman Mao should be criticized if he were wrong. And has recently reported a "rumor" that Peng tried to muster a majority vote against Mao at the September meeting—presumably an overstatement, in view of Peng's continued activity through March 1966. However, the various material, including the fact that action was begun against Peng only two months after the September meeting, does seem to add up to a probability that Peng was in some degree of opposition to Mao at that meeting.

The same is true of Lo Jui-ching, who was apparently seized just two months after the meeting. Lo—presumably not long before his disappearance—had rejected certain orders relating to troop movements, one implication being that Lo was unwilling to accept any further use of the PLA for non-military purposes. This is consonant with some assertions made later in the PLA newspaper

On the PLA anniversary in 1966 (1 August), the newspaper, reviewing the three "big struggles" against representatives of the "bourgeois military line" since 1953 (all of them, actually, stating a professional military point of view as opposed to Mao's obsession with guerrilla warfare and political indoctrination), spoke of the last struggle as "not very long ago," a struggle with those who "had got hold of important posts in the army and... opposed the Party's central committee and Mao Tse-tung's thought,... covertly opposed Comrade Lin Piao's directives on putting politics in the forefront,... gave first consideration to military affairs, technique and specialized work..." Chiang Ching, Mao's wife, conducted a prolonged symposium on "cultural work" in the PLA in March 1966 and wrote a refutation of a thesis which she attributed
to Lo— that there was no class struggle in the PLA (thus placing Lo in direct conflict with Mao's dogma). In other words, Lo's offense was to resist Mao's desire for even further political indoctrination of the armed forces at the necessary expense of military preparedness.*

As for others who may have opposed Mao at that September meeting, there is less evidence. Lu Ting-i, then director of the propaganda department and third in importance among the party leaders thus far purged, also spoke at the September 1965 propaganda conference summoned by Peng Chen, and in his speech attacked Stalin (read Mao). Another possibility is Yang Shang-kun, judging entirely from his disappearance. And as previously noted, it is possible that Liu and Teng were among the opposition. That is, the build-up of Lin Piao to replace Liu as Mao's chosen successor moved swiftly after September 1965, and, while it had begun before the meeting with the attribution to Lin of a major article on Mao's thought,** its acceleration may have reflected Mao's disappointment with Liu's performance at the meeting. Finally, recent poster attacks (since November 1966) on Liu and Teng include the

*A Red Guard poster has quoted Chou En-lai as asserting that Peng and Lo (the "armed forces") were in league. This may or may not have been true, but they seem to have had a common interest in preventing Mao from carrying out his extreme policies.

**One of the functions of Lin's article was to 'correct' a mistake made by Peng Chen in May, when Peng had publicly (and correctly) attributed to Aidit the concept that the countryside of the world will surround and overcome the cities of the world, a concept which Mao claims as his own; Lin in his article set the record 'straight,' and, in view of Mao's boundless vanity, it seems likely that Peng was already in some trouble about this.
charge that Teng at the September meeting made a speech declaring his opposition to the plans for a cultural revolution and in particular to changes in the educational system; this charge is no doubt over-stated, in view of Teng's subsequent continuance in some degree of favor until August 1966, but it is possible that Teng offered less than the resounding approbation that Mao desired.

In sum, while September 1965 was probably an important date in the development of the "cultural revolution," it is impossible to judge how much of Mao's thinking he made known at the meeting. Similarly, while several of the party's leaders--Liu, Teng, Peng, Lu, Lo, Yang, and perhaps others--were or may have been resisting Mao at that meeting, it is impossible to judge the degree or (in most cases) the precise issue.

A harsh tone about the party's intentions, together with a description of the ongoing campaign as a "cultural revolution," appeared in the official version (1 January 1966) of a speech given by the propagandist and culture monitor Chou Yang in November 1965. But Chou was not launching a qualitatively different campaign; he was instead trying to get aboard a bandwagon which (he had observed) had begun to roll in Shanghai three weeks earlier, and which was soon to run down Chou Yang himself.

Mao Contrives a Test, Winter 1965-66

The Shanghai development was the appearance in a local newspaper of a polemical attack by Yao Wen-yuan, a little known Shanghai writer, on a 1961 play by Wu Han, a well-known writer who had worked closely with officials on the party's Peking municipal committee headed by Peng Chen. This event--the initiative for which was taken directly or indirectly by Mao--was not even noticed in the West; this particular issue (10 November) of the paper was not received.

The contention of the party that it was Mao who ordered the firing of this

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opening gun, is more credible than is the contention of
some observers that one of Mao's lieutenants--say, Lin
Piao or Teng Hsiao-ping--planted the article as a specula-
tive investment for which he only later got Mao's back-
ing. Mao was, after all, active at the time, and this
was a major decision.* It also seems, on balance (although
this was in doubt for some months), more likely that Mao
deliberately did not make his intentions clear as to what
purpose the article was to serve, than that Mao fell ill
before he could make his intentions clear. In other
words, Mao meant the article to serve as a test for his
entire "cultural" apparatus and for the highest leaders
of the party apparatus which supervised it, with a few
possible exceptions: Lin Piao, Chen Po-ta and a few
others (e.g., Chiang Ching) were probably regarded as
having already passed the test, and were in Mao's confi-
dence; while Peng Chen, Lu Ting-i and a few others (e.g.
Chou Yang) were probably regarded as having already failed
the test, and thus already marked for purging. Thus Mao
was doing in 1965 what the party had asserted--probably
falsely--that he had done in 1957 in the first stage of
the "hundred flowers" campaign, namely, allowing people
to respond freely (without guidance) to a major initiative,
and then punishing those whose responses did not please
him. (In the 1957 campaign, it had been Mao who was
deceived: the evidence is good that in encouraging free
expression in that campaign he had mistaken obedience

*Peking first said that the local newspaper published
the article "under the leadership of the /Shanghai/ party
organization..." Later, Peking said that this was done
by the Shanghai committee of the party under the "direct
leadership" of Mao and the central committee. in or about October
1965--at any rate, before the 10 November public attack
on Wu Han's play, Hai Jui--Mao called in Peng Chen and
perhaps two other people and asked whether this particular
play did not present ideological problems, and Peng
minimized those problems; Mao then went on to order the publication of an article attacking Hai Jui.
for love and was shocked by the opposition and hostility revealed, and that when the crackdown came the party was simply putting a good face on things by asserting that Mao all along had meant to entice his enemies to stick their heads up so he could cut them off; but Mao had learned something from 1957, that his opponents could be enticed into revealing themselves. It seems likely although it cannot be proved, that Liu and Teng were already on the list of those to be "tested." There is an alternative hypothesis—that Liu and Teng were in Mao's confidence from the start, joined him in watching the party's "cultural" leaders disgrace themselves, and only later fell into disgrace themselves; but this is not consistent with evidence that Liu at least (if not Teng) was falling from Mao's favor as early as March. The failure of Liu and Teng to bring the central press into line on the "cultural" issue as Mao had posed it—whether Hai Jui was a "poisonous weed"—can be explained in either of two ways: (a) they may have been consciously resisting what they sensed to be Mao's will (if the charges of opposition as early as September 1966 are true), perhaps in the expectation that Mao would die or that they would prevail anyway, or (b), as seems a bit more likely, they may instead simply have failed to understand what Mao wanted, have lacked the illumination of his already-revealed thought and the revolutionary ardor which (in Mao's view) should have shown them the "correct" line without specific guidance. Either way, they failed the test.

Open sources agree—and it is credible—that, immediately after the publication of Yao's article, the Peking committee queried the Shanghai com-

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Jui-ching, and Yang Shang-kun--were apparently the first top-level victims of the developing purge.*

It was not clear at the time that Lin Piao and the PLA newspaper had been chosen as the public leaders of the "cultural revolution," although there was some precedent. Since the time of the September 1962 plenum, the PLA under Lin Piao had been consistently presented as the model for all Chinese to emulate in the "creative study and application of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's works." In 1964, a political officer system modelled on that of the PLA had been established in several sectors of the economy, staffed in large part by PLA officers. In September 1965, with the appearance of Lin's first major article (this on Mao's concept of "people's revolutionary war"), the regime had begun to build up Lin as the foremost and ideal student of Mao's thought. And on 15 November 1965, Lin issued a five-point directive on the work of the PLA for 1966. Although this too was not clear at the time, this directive was to be used as the model for the testing of party officials as well as officers of the PLA--the essential point being whether these officials "regarded the works of Mao Tse-tung as the highest instructions" for their work. It was soon explicitly stated and reiterated that Lin himself had shown everybody how to study and apply Mao's thought.

There are various reports and conjectures as to why Mao left Peking and as to what he was doing in this period--lasting until early May--when he remained out of sight. One view (the view taken by this study) is that Mao withdrew in order to sketch out, or to observe (if it had in fact been sketched out in September), from a

*Lo failed to appear on an important military funeral committee in December. The removal of Lo--who had the power to order troops into action--was evidently thought to be a more urgent necessity than the removal of Peng. This was probably true of Yang also; although he may not have been arrested for months.
safer place than Peking, the "cultural revolution" as it developed from November to June, and possibly to prepare for an operation during the winter. At the other extreme is the view that he left because of sudden and critical illness and was so indisposed through this period as to be capable of nothing at all. It is necessary to digress at this point to consider the evidence on Mao's condition.

As early as 1957, there was evidence that Mao's physical health was deteriorating, and by that time there was reason to ask whether his mind was deteriorating as well; it was at that time that he stopped making public speeches. In 1962, a POLO study summarizing the evidence of the previous five years concluded that there was good evidence of his physical decline, and of weakening powers in general, but insufficient evidence either to identify the particular disorder or to permit a conclusion that there had been a radical deterioration (as a result of strokes or whatever). Throughout 1962, 1963, and 1964, Mao's many visitors tended to agree that, while Mao was suffering from various physical infirmities (including tremors suggesting Parkinson's disease, and impaired vision to the point that he required a guide), his mind seemed ("unfortunately") to be sound, i.e. his thinking was coherent and fairly vigorous within the confines of his dogmas, which continued to impel him obsessively toward perfectionist long-term objectives regardless of short-term costs. Mao remained publicly and privately active throughout 1965 to the time of his disappearance in November; most of his visitors reported him as appearing to be in good health, although some took note of his continuing tremors and poor vision (one physician who claims to have examined Mao in 1963 has stated that he made an immediate and positive diagnosis of Parkinson's disease), and others said that he looked "tired"; in this period, the most interesting thing that he told any of his visitors was (in August 1965) that he regarded himself as a "military man," who chose "military assistants," a remark that correctly forecast the rise of Lin Piao and the increasing importance of the PLA in China's life in the following year.
At the time of Mao's disappearance, and particularly as the months wore on with no indication of Mao's whereabouts or condition, there was ground for speculation that Mao was seriously ill—perhaps completely incapacitated, particularly because there was reason to believe that he had suffered one or more strokes and thus might be stricken again at any time. There was not to be any additional 'hard' evidence as to Mao's condition until May 1966, when he re-emerged in what seemed to be astonishingly good shape. Thus one is forced to evaluate the 'soft' evidence while it seems fair to assume that Peking was never telling its officials the complete truth, Mao's role is generally credible, both because (a) some of the things which moreover seemed improbable at the time, have since been confirmed, e.g. the importance of Mao's wife in the "cultural revolution" in general and with respect to specific tasks, and (b) the failure

*Liu Shao-chi was out of the news from mid-November to mid-January, and was presumed at the time to have been with Mao and in Mao's confidence; but the failure of Liu Shao-chi to bring the central party press into line on the question of Hai Jui, in the period of December to April while he was the ranking party leader, seems most credibly explained by Mao's failure to confide in Liu that he meant the issue of Hai Jui to serve as a test for the entire party apparatus (including Liu). Wall-posters have quoted Mao to the effect that he left Peking for Shanghai in November 1965 because he felt that the party apparatus in Peking was unresponsive to him—in other words, that he had already decided to purge the entire top leadership of the party apparatus; but it is uncertain whether he had really decided by that time to purge anyone but Peng Chen and Lo Jui-ching.
to attribute any role to Mao between about mid-January and mid-March, which in effect concedes that he was out of action in that period. This latter indicator as to the period of Mao's inaction is supported by (a) the fact that no source attributes any activity to Mao in this period, (b) the slow progress of the "cultural revolution" in general and the party purge in particular in the same period, as if other leaders were unwilling to make large decisions in his absence, which is just what would be expected, and (c) Mao's reappearance in May of 1965 looking (among other things) as if he had had a successful operation for Parkinson's disease, recuperation from which (including regrowth of hair) could be accomplished easily in two months. In sum, although the evidence is 'soft,' it seems to point to a situation in which Mao took the major initiatives in the "cultural revolution" at least before and after the period of mid-January to mid-March 1966.

To return, then, Mao during December meditated on the course of the "cultural revolution," or, alternatively, was ill in this period and convalescing later, but in any case took action in or about mid-January. Already unhappy with the performance of Peng Chen as head of the five-man committee which had been in charge--possibly since mid-1964, possibly much later in time--of implementing the cultural revolution, and already having set in motion (directly or indirectly) the process that was to destroy Peng (criticism of Wu Han's play as a "poisonous weed"), Mao called together a few "cultural" figures who did not include Peng. Those summoned were: Kang Sheng (already regarded as the only reliable member of Peng's five-man committee), Chen Po-ta (Mao's principal ghostwriter), Ai Ssu-chi (a theorist who died two months later), and Chiang Ching (Mao's present wife, a onetime bit player in the movies, who had been reported ill previously).* Still

*Chen Po-ta has since emerged as head of the "group in charge of cultural revolution," Kang as a senior officer of it, and Chiang as Chen's first deputy in the group.
Mao did not
then set up a new committee, but gave instructions to
the existing five-man committee. In February, Peng
issued an unsatisfactory report on the cultural revolu-
tion in the name of his committee and then in the name
of the politburo—indicating, perhaps, Liu's approval—a
report which minimized class struggle, minimized the
importance of Wu Han's plays (as had Peng in October)
and mildly defended rightist writers against their left-
ist attackers.* Then in March, although he had not yet
read Peng's February report (which is not so surprising
if he had been sick from mid-January to mid-March), Mao
at a politburo meeting spoke to Peng harshly, warning
him that if the propaganda department then subordinate
to the five-man committee could not genuinely implement
the "cultural revolution" he would get rid of it (and,
by implication, that he would get rid of Peng's group too).**

* A wall-poster has confirmed the existence of the five-
man committee and its issuance of this report at this
time. Other posters assert that party and military lead-
ers were plotting a coup at this time (February), the period
of Mao's conjectured inactivity. The poster account is
not credible as a whole, because it assigns key roles to
Lo Jui-ching (almost certainly seized the previous Novem-
ber) and Ho Lung (in such good favor with Mao as late as
August 1966 that Mao rode with him at a rally). But there
was some incident in February 1966 about which word got
out Perhaps that incident will be
recast as a "coup" to further blacken those in disfavor.

** Lu Ting-i, the propaganda department's director, dis-
appeared in April, and most of the leaders of the entire
propaganda apparatus were subsequently disgraced; Lu was
replaced in June as director of the propaganda department
by Tao Chu and as minister of culture by an oldtime mili-
tary figure. Mao went ahead and got rid of Peng's five-
man committee too, probably no later than April.
In the same month, March 1966, Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, almost certainly acting at Mao's direction, convened a symposium in Shanghai on cultural work in the PLA. After the symposium, which lasted 18 days, she prepared a draft—reviewed by Chen Po-ta and then by Mao—which she gave to Lin Piao, who commended it to other members of the Military Affairs Committee, after which it was issued in the name of the General Political Department. This report, among other things, refuted the contention of "Lo Jui-ching" and at least one other military leader that there was no class struggle in the PLA. With this report, Chiang Ching became one of the key figures of the "cultural revolution."

Early in the same month (March), Teng Hsiao-ping had dropped out of sight, and was presumed to be with Mao. Later in March, on the 26th, Peking announced that Mao was not ill (meaning, probably, that he had recovered), and on the same day Liu Shao-chi departed on a trip abroad that was to keep him out of Peking for the next four weeks, a period in which important steps were taken in the "cultural revolution" and the purge. Liu's trip served two purposes: to give the appearance of 'business as usual' after the announcement that Mao was well, and to get him out of the way for the move against

*In November 1966 Chiang gave her first published speech (although she had made several speeches at universities and to Red Guards since early summer) on the "cultural revolution," and at the same time was identified as "advisor on cultural work" to the PLA.

**There is credible recent testimony from the Japanese Communist party that Mao was fully in command in late March. After the CCP and JCP had reached agreement on a joint communique, Mao met with the delegations and peremptorily rejected their draft, thus reversing Chou En-lai and several other senior leaders, whom he criticized for their conduct.
Peng Chen. Liu at least suspected that his own status was in question; he told another head of state at this time that much trouble was ahead in China and that it could involve him personally.)* On 29 March, Peng Chen made his last public appearance; and in the second week of April, probably some days after returning to Peking, Teng Hsiao-ping reappeared in public.

The dispute on the issue of how hard a line to take toward Wu Han's play had been conducted throughout the winter of 1965-66, and was still going on until a few days before Teng's public reappearance. At that time, the end of the first week in April, the party's central publications—People's Daily and Red Flag—agreed that Hai Jui was indeed a "poisonous weed," just as Mao's spokesman and the Liberation Army Daily (Lin Piao's voice) had contended all along. It looked (and still does) as though Teng had brought back to Peking--a few days before he reappeared in public--clear instructions from Chairman Mao, who had decided that the dispute had gone on long enough, that some had passed the test and others had failed it (some, of course, had been given the answers in advance), and that all would now line up on one position. (The PLA newspaper continued, however, to attack positions taken by People's Daily, the party organ, on other issues.)

The Peking committee itself tried quickly—and unsuccessfully—in mid-April to protect its leaders by taking the lead in denouncing one of its own lesser figures who had worked with Wu Han. It was not clear at the time whether any of the party's leaders—even the leaders of the Peking committee—would fall in consequence of the PLA newspaper's admonitions to "old comrades" and those in "high positions" (5 April) and Red Flag's call for action (29 April) against the "protectors" of Wu Han, but it was apparent that "socialist education" was about to move, as the Communists say, to a new and higher stage—that is, a wide-scale if not high-reaching purge.

On 18 April, the Liberation Army Daily in a major editorial forecast the direction, if not the full range, of the developments of the next several months. Entitled "Hold aloft the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thinking..."

*This was learned only in January 1967.

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and take an active part in the great socialist cultural revolution," the editorial reviewed the "sharp class struggle on the cultural front" and the "black anti-socialist thread running counter to Mao Tse-tung's thinking" since 1949, introduced the term "great...cultural revolution" and traced it back to the tenth plenum in September 1962, reiterated its earlier assertion that Mao's works were to be regarded as "supreme guidance," asserted that a "mass movement is rising," and called in sum for nothing less than a "new culture." It did not, however, specify, as party journals were later to specify, that the main targets of the revolution would be the "reactionary academic 'authorities'" and the "bourgeois representatives within the party." On 30 April Chou En-lai lined up on the right side (where he was to remain), declaring that a "cultural revolution of great historical significance is being launched in China." In speeches in the same period, Teng Hsiao-ping spoke briefly but favorably of the new "revolution," while Liu Shao-chi did not find—or was not given—occasion to mention it.

April-May: Dominance of the Party Apparatus

The "cultural revolution" began in some places in late April, soon after the PLA newspaper had given the signal in the 18 April editorial; and it seems to have been underway everywhere in May. The theme of the first stage was also stated (8 May) by the Liberation Army Daily: "Open Fire on the Anti-Party and Anti-Socialist Black Thread."

At just this time (on or about 10 May), Mao reappeared, receiving a group of Albanian visitors at some point believed to be in East China. With Mao on this occasion were Lin, Chou, Teng, and a liaison official (Wu Hsiu-chuan). (Chen Po-ta reappeared at the same time, but not in this group.) In films of the meeting, Mao looked astonishingly good: he looked younger than his years, moved easily and without assistance, and displayed no tremors. Physicians who examined these films concluded
that, if the many previous reports of Mao's condition had been correct, Mao may have had a successful operation for Parkinson's disease (one arresting or delaying the course of the disease) during the winter, and that he was now in good physical health for a man of his age. Other possibilities seemed to be that Mao had a double (but close examination of the stills did not seem to support that possibility), or that Mao had been given stimulants to enable him to appear vigorous. Judging from Mao's behavior in the films, it seemed that, whatever Mao's condition during the winter, he was now back in full command.* (It was later learned from the JCP account of its March interview with Mao that he had been in evident command in March.)

*The Chinese photographers seemed to know the way in which the leadership was shaping up or had already shaped up. Although Teng was sitting to Mao's right, as would be expected on an occasion of liaison with a foreign party, the photographers gave much more attention to Lin than to any other of Mao's lieutenants; Lin himself looked sick and feeble, although, as the physician-observers noted, this appearance could be deceptive.
Throughout China, in late April and May, rallies and meetings of all elements of the population (or their "representatives") were held in order to denounce the "black gang" uncovered in Peking and to swear allegiance to Mao's thought and promise to study it even more thoroughly. These were not casual affairs; they seem to have disrupted community life all over China for a period of weeks; and worse was ahead.

Some observers have surmised that the "cultural revolution" was directed from the start by the "group in charge of the cultural revolution" at the party center in Peking—that is, by the extraordinary body headed by Chen Po-ta, a body which was an enlarged successor to the five-man group headed by Peng Chen until his downfall in or about April 1966. This surmise would seem reasonable at first glance, and also because a number of special groups named—from their own members—by party committees at all levels in April and May expressly to carry out the tasks of the "cultural revolution" were in most if not all cases known as "cultural revolution teams" or "cultural revolution groups." However, while the "group" at the party center may have existed in a quiescent state in April, May and June, there is good evidence that the conventional party apparatus was in charge of the conduct of the "revolution" in its early stages. This fact makes more interesting the emergence of extraordinary party bodies, and the activities of even more special organizations such as the Red Guards, later in the campaign.

In addition to the mass of open materials which attribute all actions in this period to the conventional
party apparatus, there is an apparently authentic document of a hsien-level party committee which deals in detail with the first stage of the "cultural revolution." The (first) secretary of the committee is expressly given the role of leader and commander, and the "nucleus unit...to cope with the work" (i.e., the first cultural revolution team) is to be organized by the party committee. The main directive, according to the document, is to be one "recently" (April or May?) sent them by the party center, "Why We Have to Start the Cultural Revolution." The document further specifies that "all the anti-black line documents recommended by superior party committees" should also be read as supplementary materials. The first stage of the campaign--the one undertaken in most places in April and May, but in some later--was defined in the document as "organization of the study," and the campaign was to pass through the stages of "accusation and confession, debates and struggles, and settlement and ideological rectification." There is no suggestion in the document that the later stages of the campaign are to be dominated not by the conventional party apparatus but instead by extraordinary party bodies like the "group in charge of the cultural revolution" and by extra-party bodies such as the Red Guards.*

*The hsien committee document in its final paragraph introduces a curious formulation--that participation in the revolution will be "under the leadership of the party center, Chairman Mao, and the military committee" (sic); but the reference to the military committee in this context is presumed to be a reference to leadership in a general sense, as there is no suggestion elsewhere in the document that the party committee is getting its orders from any source other than the superior party committees.

With the ground prepared in April and May, the party was ready to move against the range of cultural and educational organizations--"all cultural, educational, journalistic, publishing and academic units"--and in
particularly against the educators, the principal carriers of the disease of "bourgeois ideology."

Before the campaign against these targets was launched, there was apparently another central committee meeting, analogous to the September 1965 meeting. Most of the party's leaders were out of the news during the third and fourth weeks of May. Wall-posters seen much later (December) quoted Lin Piao to the effect that the May meeting considered the fact that most central committee members had a poor understanding of the cultural revolution and were resisting it; and the account of Lin's speech to the October-November work-conference has him criticizing Liu and Teng for acting contrary to the line which--the speech suggests--was stated by Mao in May.* Other posters have suggested 16 May--the date of a "communique" cited by Lin--as the approximate date of the decision to send in work-teams.

The campaign against the educators--which was obviously planned from the start to be a campaign concurrently against the party committees in the universities, committees in which the administrators of the universities were usually leading figures--got underway on 1 June, with a Peking broadcast on the substance of big-character posters written by "revolutionary" students and teachers at Peking National University which denounced the university's administration for its poor (conservative) conduct of the revolution to that time. This was the signal for similar posters to go up on campuses all over China.

There is a fair amount of information on the campaign on several campuses in June, and substantial information on the campaign at Peking National University itself. The campaign at this university--commonly known as "Peita," a contraction of the Chinese name--seems to

*Analysts of OCS were conjecturing at this time, mainly on the basis of propaganda treatment of Liu, that he was already in trouble; this minority view is now known to have been correct, although it was weakened by a related thesis (regarded then and now as incorrect) that Teng Hsiao-ping rather than Mao was the prime mover. The very good treatment that Liu and Teng were getting in the Peking press as late as July is now believed--to have been the result of their own dominance of the press (in Mao's absence) at that time.
have been representative of the campaign against all institutions of higher learning.

The campaign at Peita was launched prematurely on 25 May, with the slap-up of wall-posters denouncing the president of the university, posters written by a group led by a female teacher in the department of what passes for philosophy in China. Official and unofficial sources agree that these posters were covered up by university officials (probably by the party committee in the university, a committee headed by the president himself) after a visit to higher party authorities (almost certainly the reorganized Peking municipal committee) in Peking. On 1 June, however, the party center was ready. On that day, concurrently with an incendiary editorial in the reformed and militant People's Daily which specified that "educators must be the first to receive an education," Peking broadcast the content of the 25 May posters attacking the president. On the same day or the next day (Peking has given both dates) the original posters--reinforced by other posters--went up on the walls. Peking has since described this action as the "first shot" in the revolution at Peita, and has attributed the decision to Mao.

June: The Party's Work-Teams

The vehicle of the revolution at Peita, a vehicle which was to proliferate elsewhere in China during June, was the "work-team." This was a small team--rarely if ever larger than five people--assigned and named by higher party committees, and sent down to investigate and to carry out the cultural revolution.

Peking has confirmed the surmise that the concept of the work-team was approved by Mao if not actually originated by him. Speaking in November 1966, Chiang Ching, Mao's wife, did try to reduce Mao's responsibility for the failure of the work-teams ("As early as June of this year our Chairman Mao made the point that work-teams should not be sent out hastily"), but she nevertheless associated Mao with the decision to send in the work-teams.

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Sources differ as to whether the Peita campus was in a state of anarchy for the first week or ten days of June. Some sources assert that it was, with a welter of denunciations, demonstrations and riots by groups which some sources have described as "revolutionary committees" but which evidently were neither directed by nor responsible to any authority except themselves. The Peking regime itself has fostered an impression of greater and earlier order.

Peking announced on 3 June that the reorganized Peking municipal committee (known to have been in operation no later than 25 May) had decided to assign a "work-team" headed by Chang Ch'ing-hsien (a secretary of the Honan provincial committee) to Peking University to lead the cultural revolution; also, to remove the president and his deputy from the posts of secretary and deputy secretary of the university's party committee; and also, to have the new work-team function as the university's party committee until another could be organized. Underlining its point that the new Peking municipal committee—a part of the regular party apparatus—was in charge of the "revolution" at Peita, the 3 June announcement of Li Hsueh-feng and Wu Te as the new first and second secretaries of the committee went on to state flatly that all of the work of the cultural revolution in the city of Peking was under the "direct leadership" of the new municipal committee. On 5 June, Peking reported that "at present, under the leadership of the work-team appointed to the university" by the new Peking municipal committee, the masses of teachers, students and workers at Peita were "liquidating" the former president's "crimes." The best single source of the events at Peita—seems to support the official version on the point of the early imposition of order; this source reports that the work-team arrived "soon" after the 1 June broadcast (perhaps 5 June is the right date), and that the team immediately took hold.

There was a precedent for the dispatch of a "work-team" of this kind. During the autumn of 1964, "socialist education" work-teams had been sent down from higher party levels to help with political work in the countryside. Such activity included the identification of
activists, the organization of these activists, the organization of criticism of party cadres by the peasants, and eventually the self-criticism of the peasant associations. This activity in the countryside, however, had been low-key and leisurely, compared with the assignment given the new work-teams in the schools.

Similar scenarios—criticism of the administrators and secretaries of universities for conservative leadership of the revolution, and their displacement by work-teams sent from higher party levels—have been provided by Peking and by the provincial press for several other institutions of higher learning. At Chengtu University, for example, "revolutionary students and teachers" began on 3 June to put up posters criticizing the deputy secretary of the university's party committee—the "leader" of the university's existing "cultural revolution group," the group named by the university committee—for having failed to mobilize the mass of revolutionary students. He was moved to hold an "emergency meeting" about this; the Chengtu municipal committee and the Szechuan provincial committee backed the students and criticized him; the students and teachers put up more posters, and he again defended himself but was removed from office by the Chengtu committee sometime before 23 June, at which time it was announced that both the Szechuan provincial committee and the Southwest regional bureau had approved the action, and that the Chengtu committee was sending in a work-team to take over.* Similarly, at Chengchow University the acting president and concurrently secretary of the university's party committee was criticized in

*One interesting item in the Chengtu account is that the dismissal was announced by the Chengtu committee's propaganda department. This suggests that the members of these first "cultural revolution teams"—that is, the teams named by party committees from their own members, as distinct from the work-teams later sent down from higher party organs—were originally selected by the propaganda departments of the party committees.
early June, resisted, but was found guilty by the provincial committee of having suppressed the revolutionary students and teachers; the provincial committee dismissed him, and sent in a work-team in mid-June to "reorganize" his "cultural revolution group." There are similar accounts from a dozen other institutions. In all cases the actions of dismissal of the offending administrator/secretary and of dispatch of the work-team were said to have been taken by the appropriate organ of the conventional party apparatus.

Work-teams were sent to many other places, in addition to the schools. Peking itself has never provided a clear picture of the depth of the effort—that is, how far down into the cities and the countryside they were sent, and the provincial press has not presented a clear picture either. The latter, however, indicates that they were sent to "many" party and government organizations as far down as medium-sized cities and possibly below, and that they were concentrated on (although not restricted to) "cultural and educational units" of all kinds, including newspapers, publishing houses, radio-stations, cultural bureaus, federations of art workers, even movie-houses. The criterion for sending a work-team seems to have been the existence of "problems"—meaning, as in the case of the schools, an insufficiently militant local leadership, the presence of a leader or group of leaders who had already failed the test and was now marked for discard.*

*While these work-teams were struggling with their tasks, the party center publicly indicated its sense of the scope of the problem. On 13 June, the CCP central committee (along with the State Council) issued a notice decreeing the postponement of college entrance examinations for six months in order to "thoroughly carry out the cultural revolution and...reform the educational system." As surrounding commentaries made clear, the new system was to put a new emphasis on class background and political reliability as criteria for admission, on the division of the students' time between study and labor, and on political indoctrination. In late October, Peking reportedly extended the postponement to summer 1965.
Nevertheless, the work-teams do not appear to have been given directives to support the most militant elements of the "revolutionary students and teachers" that they could find, even though they were subsequently discredited for having failed to do just that. Neither, it appears, were the party committees themselves given such directives by whatever combination of leaders was then directing the "cultural revolution" from Peking. Many of the first directives may have emphasized the establishment of order, as many campuses were reported to be out of control.

The picture is complicated by the fact that it is not known how active were the roles, at this stage, of Mao and the small group of lieutenants who were soon to emerge as the "group in charge of the cultural revolution." As previously noted, it is virtually certain that Mao approved the concept of the work-team, and it seems quite probable that Tao Chu as the new head of the Propaganda Department and other officers of the "cultural revolution

*In at least some instances, the work-teams were in fact directed to take action against the leftists. For example, in Tsinghai the provincial party committee announced on 13 June a decision to remove the editor of the Tsinghai Daily for an editorial he had commissioned and published ten days earlier, and to send in a work-team to "systematically examine and reform" the work of the newspaper. The editorial, condemned by the party committee as contrary to Mao's thinking, in fact stated precisely the militant line on the conduct of the revolution that was later to be vindicated (and the editor himself was later to serve as a prime example of a functionary to be "rehabilitated" by a party committee which had acted incorrectly). It is impossible to believe that the Tsinghai party committee would have acted in this way, at this stage of the revolution, if there had been an existing directive to support the militants.
group" (whether it was in operation yet as a group of not) took part in the discussions which preceded the decision to establish the work-teams. There is also a little evidence (to be presented later) that some of these leaders provided some degree of guidance, at least to work-teams in Peking. However, it is probable that the largest roles in providing guidance to the party committees, which in turn provided it to the work-teams, were played by the senior figures of the conventional party apparatus, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. In any case, it is probably the latter who will be forced—or have already been forced—to accept the largest share of responsibility for what has been found retroactively to be the "mistakes" of the work-teams.

Similarly, it is unclear whether Mao planned in advance to discredit the work-teams, as part of a scheme for discrediting the conventional party apparatus and its leaders, or whether instead he found them to be insufficiently revolutionary after examining their performance for some weeks. On balance, the latter seems more likely, if for no other reason than that the pioneer work-teams were assigned by the new Peking party committee which itself had just been named, and thus was not a part of the old apparatus. But in either case Mao was setting the conventional party apparatus another test, as he had with the issue of Hai Jui the previous winter, and as he had with the stage of the "cultural revolution" which had just been conducted by the local party committees whose teams were dislodged by the work-teams; and again it was to fail the test.

What happened was that "many" of the work-teams assigned to the universities—and presumably many of those assigned to other organizations and "units"—did not give in to the extreme demands of campus leftists whose clamor had already brought down the previous administrator/secretaries and leaders of the first "cultural revolution teams" and who were later to be justified in virtually the full range of their demands. In the great majority of cases (judging from Peking's later descriptions of the "mistakes" of the work-team concept and work-team operations), the work-teams sympathized
more with their fraternal party organizations on the campuses, the party committees there which likewise were the product of the conventional party apparatus, than with the militant students (many of whom were soon to emerge as Red Guards).* In other words, the work-teams, following the removal of the administrator/secetary previously marked by the party center as the main target, failed to carry through the range of action against the faculty and student-body demanded by the militants, and in many cases "suppressed" the militants in much the same ways as had the local leaders who had just lost their jobs.

Again the reporting on this stage of the revolution--more precisely, this hiatus in the revolution--is best as regards Pekita. Several sources agree that the work-team assigned there tried to put the campus in order, making the "revolutionary students and teachers" there--primarily the rioting leftists--responsive to the team, and to this end arranged day-long meetings to organize the activity; among other things, the work-team made the students stop beating the teachers and others they disapproved of. The students resented the basic fact of outside control as well as the relatively conservative measures favored by the work-team, and began to hold nightly meetings of their own; among the products of these meetings were posters attacking the work-team. This open warfare--including, in some cases, armed clashes--continued to the end of June, at which time, according to various reports, there was intervention by first-rank

*A relatively small number of work-teams guessed right, or were sent in late enough (in July) to have got some clues. Speaking to this point in November 1966, Chiang Ching described the decision to send the work-teams in the first place as an "error," said that the work of the work-teams was "still more erroneous," and then noted that "some work-teams followed correct principles and policy and did not make mistakes." Apparently the most common attitude was that expressed by Li Hsueh-feng of the Peking committee (according to later posters) on 23 June: "At this tense moment, party members should stand up and defend their party leaders; if they do not, Nazis will take over." As it turned out, 'Nazis' took over anyway.
party leaders, including the principal officers of what was soon to be revealed as the "group in charge of the cultural revolution."

At Tsinghua, China's second-ranking university, the picture was a bit different in the beginning, as the dominant group of students seems to have been to the right of the work-team. They reportedly defied the work-team which arrived in early June and tried—unsuccessfully, as it turned out—to protect the university president. The work-team, which included Mme. Liu Shao-chi, evidently tried to steer a middle course, acting against and "suppressing" both the rightists and the leftists; the latter included the extremely militant student leader Kuai Ta-fu, who was to play a large role later in the activities of the Red Guards in Peking.

In a written self-criticism dated 10 October (reported in wall-posters), Mme. Liu was to provide a summary of the "errors" of the work-team at Tsinghua. The work-team had been (i.e. was found retroactively to have been) too conservative; there had been trouble with the "false leftists" (known to have included some vindicated later as the 'real' leftists, the revolutionaries who had acted correctly) who were trying to discredit the work-team; her own plan was to make an example both of the "black gang" (those regarded as extreme rightists) and the "false leftists," but unfortunately the team had acted against some people whose views differed

*A similar account is provided from South China. In June, the propaganda department of the Kwangtung party committee reportedly sent work-teams into all of the middle schools. The first task of the teams was to restore order, to get control of the schools out of the hands of leftist students who were beating teachers and otherwise running things to suit themselves. The work-teams reportedly worked hard to gain control, but the students fought back with "rebel teams" and "fighting teams" which created such disorder at some schools that the police were called in.
from the work-teams (i.e. those later vindicated as true revolutionaries); the work-team had employed improper methods in prohibiting people from making complaints to the reception office of the CCP central committee and in using the excuse of "protection" to put people in jail; she had been unaware at the time that she was committing errors, had gone on in July to make more mistakes, and had defended the record of the work-team throughout July; and so on. Mme. Liu in this self-criticism gave credit to Chairman Mao personally—as Lin Piao was to do in his speech to the plenum in August—for discovering and reversing the errors of the work-team.

agree that Chiang Ching, Mao's wife, soon to emerge as first deputy director of the new "group" under Chen Po-ta, visited the Peita campus in late June or early July. place Chen Po-ta himself at the scene, at a meeting in late June, ______ adds Tao Chu to the group. The sources agree that these top leaders supported the "revolutionary students" against the work-team. Evidently the decision to provide a clear directive—really a new directive—had been made.

The officers of the "group in charge of the cultural revolution" are made to appear in these accounts as heroic figures—stepping into the action as an extraordinary party body to save the situation for Mao Tse-tung after yet another failure by the conventional party apparatus. This is also the picture presented by Chiang Ching in her November 1966 report. The summary of her speech (all thus far available) has her saying that "the sending of cultural revolution work-teams to various organizations...was an error," and "what those work-teams had done in the course of their work was still more erroneous. Instead of directing the spearhead against the handful of people in authority within the party who were taking the capitalist road and against the reactionary academic 'authorities,' they turned the spearhead against the revolutionary students. The question of what the spearhead of the struggle should be directed against was a cardinal question of right and wrong..."
But it will be noted that Chiang Ching does not assert that the work-teams had been directed—by Mao or anybody else—to support the "revolutionary students" as later defined, and Mme. Liu's account also indicates that there was no such directive. Indeed, the very little evidence as to the roles of officers of the "cultural revolution group" in providing guidance at the time suggests that their guidance was little more militant than that of the conventional party apparatus. Chen Po-ta's visit to the Peita campus in late June. Chen, after criticizing the work-team as too conservative, was charged by officers of the work-team as having himself appointed the team and given it its guidance. Chen denied the charges, which may in fact have been overstated, but it seems at a minimum pretty clear that neither Chen nor any other leader actively promoted the line that was later judged to be "correct." Thus, to the degree that Mao and other leaders impute to the conventional party apparatus responsibility for the "mistakes," Mao and the new team would be doing what the dominant figures in the Chinese party at any given time have usually done—that is, to attribute preponderant responsibility for "mistakes" to other leaders who have fallen from favor and are not strong enough to set the record straight. If in this instance the top-level party leaders being made to look bad are Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, there is some justice in it, for they themselves had been foremost among Mao's lieutenants in this kind of operation—fixing the blame on other leaders for Mao's mistakes and their own—during the period in which the "great leap forward" and the "people's commune" programs had been shown to be such ludicrous failures.

Chou En-lai, speaking to a large meeting of Peking students—probably from all universities in the area—in early July, made the party's first apology for the intrusion of the work-teams at Peita and elsewhere. (He is said by other sources to have made similar speeches in August, again apologizing, and placing the responsibility for the mistakes—including
the original mistake of sending them--on the new Peking municipal committee and the "central committee comrades in Peking." In his July speech, he is said to have told the students that they themselves should take over the revolution completely, including the judging and disposition of the work-teams. At this time (sources vary on the date, but apparently some time in the first week of July), the work-team at Peita was dislodged, and work-teams at other universities suffered the same fate not long afterwards. The work-teams were not officially dissolved even in Peking until later in the month (when they were formally replaced), but the "revolutionary students," possibly reinforced (as one report states) by soldiers in civilian clothes sent to keep the new order itself from being overturned, took charge again--at least in Peking--in early July. Some other areas evidently lagged; some had apparently not got rid of them yet as of late July. The question was: to whom or what were the "revolutionary students"--those backed by Mao's new team in Peking--now responsive?

July and Early August: The "Cultural Revolution Group"

Little is known about the antecedents of the "group in charge of the cultural revolution under the party's central committee" *

*The group was identified publicly on 9 July. Chen Po-ta was identified then as its head, and Tao Chu and Kang Sheng were identified some weeks later as its "advisors." Tao and Yeh Chien-ying were identified as members of the party Secretariat on 9 July also, and Liu Ning-i as a member a few weeks later. All of these appointments may have been made in the June-July period when Mao (according to later posters) was out of Peking and Liu Shao-chi was in charge, and some observers have surmised that some of them--Tao, Yeh, and Liu--may have represented initiatives by Liu rather than Mao. It seems doubtful, however, that key appointments would be made without Mao's approval.
charged with implementing the cultural revolution was active under Peng Chen as of early 1966. This was an extraordinary, ad hoc body; it is believed to have been drawn largely (three of five) from the party's Propaganda Department, but only one other member was identified in the documents—Kang Sheng, who, like Peng, was not a Propaganda Department official. Does not know when the "Five-Man Committee" had been established, but it might have come into being as early as mid-1964, when Peng Chen (soon to emerge as a "close comrade" of Mao's) reported publicly on the need to reform the Peking (classical) opera, which was to be the first of the arts to be reformed in the "revolution on the cultural front." Or it may have been organized in December 1964, at which time Mao is said to have ordered a complete reform of cultural organizations, and at which time Lu Ting-i—director of the Propaganda Department and a presumed member of the Five-Man Committee—became Minister of Culture. Or it may not have been in operation until about September 1965—in which month, according to party documents Peng Chen was presiding over a nation-wide propaganda work conference; and by which time—falling in the period in which Mao himself, Peking asserts, was "personally organizing and leading the great proletarian cultural revolution"—the "Five-Man Committee" is believed to have been in existence.

As noted previously, in or about January 1966, according to the party documents Mao, already unhappy with Peng Chen's performance and already having set in motion the process that was to destroy Peng (criticism of Wu Han's play as a "poisonous weed"), called together a small group of "cultural" figures which did not include Peng. Those summoned were: Kang Sheng,
Chen Po-ta, Ai Ssu-chi, and Chiang Ching (Mao's present wife, a onetime bit player in the movies). Following this, Mao gave new instructions to the existing five-man committee. In February, Peng Chen issued his unsatisfactory report on the cultural revolution. Then in March—probably returning to action after an illness, although the party documents do not mention this—Mao warned Peng that he might set up new organs for better conduct of the "cultural revolution." Also as previously noted, Lu Ting-i, the propaganda department's director, disappeared in April and was replaced in June as director of the propaganda department by Tao Chu, and Peng's five-man committee probably disappeared in April also. Mao might have reconstituted it immediately under Chen Po-ta, but there is no public record of its operation until July, when its existence was revealed. Whether Chen's "group" was operating secretly in any part of the period between April and 9 July is still moot; as previously noted, work-team members in effect charged that it was, and it does seem likely that its officers—as individuals if not as a "group"—took part in the decision (of mid-May, apparently) to send down work-teams in June. In any case, there is credible reporting of important roles being played by its leaders at the end of June or in early July (or both). As previously noted, give Chen Po-ta a critical role in deposing the unsatisfactory work-team at Peita, place Chiang Ching on the scene, and adds Tao Chu—three of the four principal figures of the "group." Ever since that time, the "group"

*All earlier references to "cultural revolution teams" or "cultural revolution work-teams" seem to designate either—in April and May—the ad hoc groups established by local party committees from their own members to conduct the first stage, or—in June and early July—the bodies sent down from higher party committees for the second stage and described herein simply as work-teams.
seems to have played the dominant role, among party organs, in directing the "cultural revolution."

When the "group" was surfaced in early July, its principal figures were soon identified: Chen Po-ta as the "head" or "leader," Chiang Ching as his first deputy, and Tao Chu and Kang Sheng as "advisors." Chang Chun-chiao, a secretary of the Shanghai committee, was later identified as another deputy, and Wang Jen-chung of the Central-South committee and Hupei committee and Liu Chih-chien of the General Political Department were still later (before their fall) identified as additional deputies. Other members (untitled) given during the fall by both official sources and wall-posters were Wang Li, Kuan Feng, Chi Pen-yu, Mu Hsin, and Yao Wen-yuan, all of them young writers and polemicists. NCNA has also given Hsieh Tang-chung, a general officer who heads the cultural department of the General Political Department, and wall-posters have additionally given Chang Ping-hua of the Hunan committee and some other provincial and regional figures who have not been confirmed. It is not known how many of this lot—apart from Chen, Chiang, Tao, and Kang—were functioning as members of the "group" in July.

Following Chou En-lai's reported apology to Peking students in early July for the "mistakes" of the work-teams in June, and his reported invitation to the students to take over the cultural revolution and inter alia to "judge" the work-teams, new "revolutionary" committees were formed by election. (The elective process called them "provisional" committees, and by a Fukien broadcast of mid-July.) These new committees initiated another and longer period of violence on the Peita campus (and, no doubt, others).* Still

*A provincial party leader told a congress of cultural revolution activists at about this time that the new policy was to give a "completely free rein to the masses," that the Hupei provincial committee had decided to "conduct open-door rectification of the work-teams sent to universities, colleges and other units," and that the "party center and Chairman Mao" had decreed that the masses were to be masters of the cultural revolution and that "we" (the party) "must humbly learn again from them." Other provincial party secretaries were disseminating similar instructions in the last half of July.

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students there began invading and smashing up the apartments of senior party members (meaning, apparently, those on campus attached to the university's party committee); other sources report the resumption of beating of teachers. This was not really another period of anarchy, but rather of violence at least partially directed. And what direction there was seems to have come from the "group in charge of the cultural revolution" at the party center--specifically, from Chiang Ching, who visited the Peita campus four times during July.

The "revolutionary" committee at Peita in July did indeed "judge" the work-team of June--already criticized as too conservative by Chen Po-ta himself--and of course found it wanting.* The work-team--which at Peita almost certainly did not function at all after the end of June, although others did--was officially replaced by the new committee sometime before 28 July. ** Sources have tended to describe such new committees simply as "revolutionary" committees, which may in fact be the name by which they ascribe to Chiang Ching a guiding role in the formation--in effect, the selection--of the new committee. Sources have tended to describe such new committees simply as "revolutionary" committees, which may in fact be the name by which they

* it was no longer a source of pride to be a member of the party, and that the students regarded the "entire" party apparatus between them and Mao to be worthless.

** gives a credible account of Mme. Mao's speech at Tsinghua on 27 July. She criticized those (especially the work-team) who had acted against the "revolutionary teachers and students" (the militants), and told the university to organize a new revolutionary body, specifying those she did not want to see on it.
were known: that is, the leaders in Peking may not yet have decided to spell them out as "cultural revolution" groups or committees, owing to possible confusion with the earlier and generally discredited cultural revolution teams established by the conventional party apparatus in or about April. There is little doubt, however, that the new groups or committees were identical with the "cultural revolution groups" and "cultural revolution committees"—described likewise as elective bodies—praised and officially sanctioned in the CCP central committee decision of 8 August. The implication, in the reporting of July and early August, was that these new bodies would be directly responsible to the "group in charge of the cultural revolution" in Peking.

The "cultural revolution" was of course proceeding elsewhere than on the campuses in July. There were many reports of meetings of "activists," who were called upon to drive out "freaks and monsters" by such sovereign methods as mass rallies, debates, and big-character posters. In a single province (Anhwei), the party secretary reported to a rally of activists in mid-July that "things are in a state of tremendous turbulence," that in the past month millions of big-character posters had gone up, hundreds of thousands of debates and denunciation meetings had been held, thousands of letters had been written, representatives of the bourgeoisie in the party, government, army and cultural circles had been exposed, and work-teams had been sent to all cultural and educational organizations which had "many problems."* A similar report was

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*It was specified, in this connection, that some cadres had been sent from the "PLA." There are two readings of this: one, simply that PLA work-teams had been sent to PLA cultural-educational units; the other, that PLA cadres had been included in some, or many, or most of the work-teams sent to non-military units. The first reading would ordinarily be preferred; but, in the light of the PLA's past role in publicly leading the "cultural revolution," there seems a good possibility that the second reading is right. There is reason to believe that PLA cadres were included in the "cultural revolution groups" which dominated the next stage of the campaign, and PLA leaders and units were of course prominent in the stage which followed that, the one which was dominated by the Red Guards although organizationally under the leadership of the "group in charge of the cultural revolution."
made, with similar figures, by a party secretary in Kansu at the end of July. Similarly, in the official account of proceedings in Fukien, the workers, peasants, and soldiers were acting as the "main force" in the revolution; armed with Mao's thought, they were wiping out freaks and monsters; in the cities, while continuing their hard work in the factories, they wrote big-character posters in their off-duty hours, and criticized bourgeois ideas and customs, such as refusal to participate in manual labor; in rural areas, the poor and lower-middle peasants also wrote big-character posters, held meetings, exposed sabotage, denounced capitalist opportunism and church leaders, attacked old ideas, exposed and condemned bad books and music and drama, and at the same time prepared to increase agricultural production.

Most of the work-teams which had been sent to the cities in June were apparently withdrawn in July, like the work-teams of the universities, other institutions of higher learning, technical schools, and middle schools. While the withdrawal of these teams from the cities has not been specified in any public statement, the 8 August declaration suggests that, and so do statements by provincial party leaders which appear to apply to all work-teams under their jurisdiction. The picture as regards the countryside is least clear. It appears that the "socialist education" work-teams in the countryside were in general let alone, i.e. that they did not have "cultural revolution" work-teams superimposed on them. And they were apparently not disbanded when the work-teams of June were disbanded; in one of his speeches in July and August, Chou En-lai is credibly reported to have said that the work-teams sent originally to the countryside (beginning in 1964) had done well, the implication being that they would remain. Broadcasts of August made clear that "socialist education work teams" were still active in some places, and this was probably general.

To return to the campuses, where the "revolution seemed to be most advanced and militant, there are several reports of speeches by Chou En-lai and other party leaders to meetings of students in Peking, beginning in early August. These speeches may have come immediately after a statement by Mao--apparently of this period--summarized
by wall-posters seen in December. (Mao's statement pre-dates September, because it is cited in a briefing by an officer of the "cultural revolution group" on 2 September and probably pre-dates mid-August, as it does not mention the Red Guards.) Mao reportedly expressed his dismay at having found, upon his return to Peking (apparently in late July, after an absence since November), that the student movement was "completely cold," indeed "suppressed" by those who were as bad as the "military clique" (presumably Peng Te-huai's). Mao reportedly went on to state that wall-posters should not be covered up for any reason, that no restrictions of any kind should be placed on the student movement, and those who had suppressed the movement would come to a bad end. (This proved to be the case.)*

The various accounts of the content of the speeches of other leaders agree that the party leaders again apologized for the work-teams of June—not just for the "mistakes" made by the work-teams, but for the top-level mistakes of sending in teams from the outside in the first place, and without clear directives. According to a fairly full account of Chou's 4 August speech (made at Tsinghua) which has recently come to hand, Chou described the "sending of work-teams" as a "policy mistake" an attitude he shared, he said, with Li Hsueh-feng (the first secretary of the new Peking committee, which had organized and dispatched the work-teams in June.** Specifically, Chou is said to have continued, when the educational institutions had

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*The exact date of Mao's statement may be 5 August.
A wall-poster of January 1967 refers to a poster written by Mao himself on 5 August in which he denounced those who oppressed the student movement.

**Materials received much later reported a 2 August speech by T'ang Hsiao-ping at People's University, in which he said that the party center (including himself) had not adequately prepared the work-teams, in particular had not given them clear directives. Ironically, he went on to say—as did others briefing the students in August and September—that they must work out their problems for themselves, in other words that they were still not to get clear directives.
asked for replacement of the party organs named by the old (discredited) Peking committee, "we hurriedly decided" to send the work-teams and "failed to consider carefully what the work-teams' basic tasks were" to be. (Chiang Ching was later to formulate the problem the same way, criticizing those who did this, contrary--she alleged--to Mao's instructions.) Moreover, Chou said, the "party's policy was not clearly stated" to the work-teams--another indication that the work-teams did not have clear directives to support the leftists. The work-teams in practice had adopted an "administrative" attitude and had ordered people about, rather than following the "mass line" of discussion. In sum, Chou said, if the party did not carry out the three duties defined by Chairman Mao as "struggling, criticizing, and reforming,"* if it failed to concentrate revolutionary forces to struggle against the "main target" (another formulation echoed four days later) but instead dissipated its forces in looking for "mistakes" and in "making trouble" among the students and other revolutionary forces, it would be committing a serious error in "direction."**

Chou reportedly went on to state his favor for freedom of expression for the students Kuai Ta-fu and Liu Chuan, but to state also that he disagreed with their expressed views. This was of some importance, as these students--still not "rehabilitated" as of early August--were later identified as the leaders of the most militant elements of the Red Guards in Peking, those who were to

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*Chou referred to this formulation as if it were well-known to his audience, and perhaps it was, from wall-posters; but it did not appear in official documents until 8 August.

**According to her later self-criticism, Mme. Liu Shao-chi, who had been removed from the Tsinghua work-team just the day before (3 August), had committed errors of this kind. No version of Chou's speech indicates that Chou included any criticism of Mme. Liu personally.
lead physical attacks on party and government installations and to lead the poster attacks on many party leaders.

Chou reportedly went on to apologize on behalf of the central committee for the "mistakes" of the work teams, and to state expressly that the mistakes must not be attributed entirely to the new Peking committee (although, he said, mistakes made in the course of the work were their responsibility). Chou then returned to the point that "we" (of the party leadership) were primarily to blame for failing to define the correct (militant) line, for having "poured cold water" on the mass movement out of "fear" (a phrase much used later).*

Red Flag was to say much the same thing, in summary form, on 21 August: that "during a short period, mistakes were discovered in the orientation and guidelines" of the cultural revolution, and that Mao Tse-tung at that moment "personally" sketched out the 16-point decision revealed on 8 August.

This 8 August declaration of the central committee—presented under 16 rubrics—was a curious document; a lumpy mixture of militant and cautionary elements, mainly militant. It was interpreted otherwise by many or most observers at the time—that is, as mainly an effort to put the revolution in order, to set some limits to the sweep for enemies, to gain control over the entire process. This was not an unreasonable interpretation, in the light of the disorder, the proliferating and apparently senseless violence of the previous two months, and the potential of the released monster for damaging if not destroying its creator; and it was that in part; but in fact the

*Chiang Ching (Mme. Mao) spoke at a Red Guard "debate" two days later and emphasized one of the points Chou had made—namely, that the students should concentrate their energies on the struggle against enemies (in the party), and not dissipate them in quarrels among themselves. In other words, Mme. Mao, like Chou, at that time refrained from stating the party leadership's favor for one Red Guard faction over another. A lesser figure of the cultural revolution group—Kuan Feng—took the same line in a speech on 2 August.
declaration was followed by the wildest period in recent Chinese history.* The document—which appears in retrospect to have been written deliberately to justify both a militant course (particularly in the short run) and periodic retreats from it as the campaign developed, and the final version of which was said by a party secretary later as having been approved by Mao himself—is worth considering in some detail. It remains the basic document on the conduct of the "revolution."

The 8 August declaration reiterated that the party's long-term aim was to change the "moral outlook of the whole (Chinese) society," and, to this end, its "present" aims were to bring down those "in authority /In the party/ who follow the capitalist road" and the "bourgeois reactionary 'authorities'" in the academic community, to criticize and repudiate bourgeois ideology, and to

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*In describing the documents as "mainly militant," the present writer, who did not see the document until several weeks after the fact and some weeks after the Red Guards had been turned loose, cannot be sure that he would have described it this way at the time. It is surely true, even in hindsight, that there is nothing in the declaration which would permit any observer to predict the Red Guards. Nevertheless, an effort has been made to read this document, like others, as if one were reading it at the time of its publication, in order to get the best possible sense of the consistency or inconsistency of the signals which Peking has been giving its audience throughout the "cultural revolution"; this is important in order to judge whether certain curious developments have reflected disagreement among party leaders, the sending of false signals, or the sending of correct signals which have been misread.
transform education and the arts.* "Revolutionary youths" were presented as the "brave path-breakers" in conducting the revolution, with their big-character posters and "vigorous debates"--youths who inevitably had "certain shortcomings" but whose "main revolutionary direction has been correct."

The declaration conceded "fairly strong" resistance to the revolution, and called for this to be attacked in "a spirit of 'daring,'" a spirit which was to be "put above everything else." As for the party leadership being provided, the declaration went on to classify "party organizations" at all levels as (a) the "daring" and thus "correct"; (b) the conservative and lagging; (c) those who feared exposure of themselves but would be "excused" if they accepted it; and (d) the true bourgeois representatives, "extremely afraid," who had tried to suppress the revolution; those of this latter class were to be dismissed from their posts, although it was not clear just when this was to be done.

After asserting that the party "should not fear disorder," invoking Mao himself for the proposition that a revolution "cannot be gentle," and calling upon the masses to "make the fullest use of big-character posters and great debates," the declaration stated in strong language that "all forces must be concentrated to strike at the handful of ultra-reactionary bourgeois rightists and counter-revolutionary revisionists," and, again, that the "main target of the present movement" was to be those "in the party who follow the capitalist road." The declaration did, however, ask that care be taken to distinguish hard cases in the party from those who had simply made errors, and "reactionary" academics from ordinary academics, and pointed out that diverse opinions among the masses were to be expected, that reasoning and

*This spells out Chou's formulation of 4 August--attributed to Mao--of "struggling, criticizing, and reforming."
not force should be used (with the "masses"), and that minority views (among them) were to be tolerated. Mao himself was given credit, in wall-posters seen in September, for inserting the phrase about reasoning instead of coercing.

The declaration then switched back to the question of the proper attitude (particularly on the part of party officials) toward revolutionaries. It noted that "responsible persons of certain schools, units and work-teams have been launching counter-attacks against the masses" (i.e., had resisted attacks by the revolutionaries), even contending that "opposition to them /several/ means opposition to the CCP central committee"; this kind of discouragement of revolutionaries was said to be "absolutely impermissible." It went on to warn both "anti-party elements" and erring officials against describing elements of the masses as "counter-revolutionaries," and to warn in strong terms against inciting the masses or students to fight among themselves (although there was to be much of this later), noting that "even proven rightists" in these groups would be dealt with at a later stage of the movement.

The declaration went on to classify party cadres in categories analogous to those used to describe the types of leadership being provided in the revolution: the good, the comparatively good (whose mistakes were small), those who had made serious mistakes but were not anti-party rightists, and the "small number" of anti-party rightists who must be "fully exposed" and "pulled down." In an odd ambiguity, this paragraph went on to say that even these elements "should be given a way out so that they can turn over a new leaf"—a passage which could be read, as a passage in Lin Piao's speech to the central committee plenum in the same week could be read, as promising even these elements an opportunity to reform and keep their posts, but which seems in the context of other pronouncements to have been offering them little more than a chance to keep their lives.
The 8 August declaration went on to inform the country that "cultural revolution groups, cultural revolution committees, and cultural revolution congresses" had been found to be "excellent new forms of organizations by which the masses become educated under the party's leadership" (i.e. for the conduct of the purge and reindoctrination), "organs of power" for the cultural revolution, intended as "long-term, permanent mass organizations...suitable for schools and government organizations" and also "basically suitable for factory and mining enterprises, neighborhoods, and the countryside." The members of these groups and committees, and delegates to their congresses, were to be elected locally (i.e., not simply appointed, like the first committees of April and May, and not--even worse--appointed by outsiders and sent down, like the work-teams of June); it was further stated that the "masses may at any time criticize" the members of these groups, and that members found "unfit" could be replaced. (This last provision, for criticism and replacement, was later to give a handle to the Red Guards in attacking, inter alia, the new cultural revolution groups of some of the provincial and municipal party committees.)*

*The party apparatus--presumably directed in this instance by the "group in charge of the cultural revolution" at the party center--moved quickly to establish the new cultural revolution committees and groups.  The party apparatus transmitted to the "work units" or an east China shipping company the directive of the Shanghai party committee to establish "cultural revolution committees or cultural revolution groups" in all units which (are far enough along to) have undergone socialist education. The directive expressly states that the existing socialist education teams "may not undertake responsibility as (the new) group leaders; cultural revolution groups personnel are to be "re-examined or re-elected by the masses." Again, "the campaign must be led by the new cultural revolution groups."  The "work unit" is to hold the position of "leadership" over the new group--that is, the group is to be a part of the unit--"but the important thing is the carrying out of party policy and the firm implementation and execution of the party's mass line leadership." In other words, the work unit is to be very careful about trying to exercise any "leadership" over the new group, and indeed had better stay out of the way of the new group, as the party center is very serious about this effort.
Further, the 8 August declaration reviewed the task of transforming the educational system— that is, getting rid of the domination of "bourgeois intellectuals," combining education with labor, shortening and simplifying the courses, and so on.* It went on to speak of the question of criticizing the "bourgeois authorities" (of the academy and of the party) by name in the press. This action, it said, should first be discussed by party committees of those levels and in some cases cleared by higher party levels.

The declaration, after steering the revolutionaries away from scientists and technicians, discussed "linking up" the cultural revolution with the "socialist education" movement in urban enterprises and rural areas. Where the socialist education movement—a less sharply-focused and less ambitious campaign—was proceeding smoothly, it said, it should not be disturbed. However, suitable occasions could be found for "discussing" questions related to the cultural revolution, and in some places the latter could be used to stimulate the other campaign, if the local party committees approved.

The declaration noted briefly that it ought to be possible to carry out the "cultural revolution" without interfering with production, and that both socialist education and the cultural revolution in the PLA were to be carried on in accordance with directions from the Military Affairs Committee and the PLA General Political Department—i.e., not by either the conventional party apparatus or the new extraordinary cultural revolution.

*New violence on the campus was later reported to have erupted on this same day, 8 August. In this incident, at Lanchow, students at an industrial college there beat up a number of other students in the presence of the police, who did not interfere. This was not "Red Guard" activity, but action by "revolutionary students" who were apparently not organized or in any case not organized to that degree.
apparatus. The declaration concluded by waving the banner of Mao's "thought" and listing specific works of Mao's as basic documents for party committees to study.

In sum, the militant elements are the more impressive—the call for "daring" to be "put above everything else," the rating of party organizations by degrees of "daring," the specification not to fear "disorder," the insistence that "all forces must be concentrated to strike" at the rightists and revisionists, the specification that the "main target" was that of party officials, the failure to specify that force should not be used against party officials, the warning to party and government officials not to resist, and the specification that the rightists were to be "pulled down." In other words, the Red Guards who were to attack party officials in late August and subsequently were correctly reading the 8 August declaration. Mao was inciting the revolutionary young against the party apparatus, and, moreover, without giving them any clear criterion for distinguishing between those loyal to Mao's thought and the disloyal who were to be "exposed" and "pulled down."

The cautionary elements in the declaration reflected the views of opposition elements in the discussion underway in the central committee plenum at the time. [Redacted] fails to specify which elements of the opposition; for example, it seems apparent that the composers of the declaration did not insert these elements in order to conciliate Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, who were brought down at the plenum; and it is hard to believe that they were inserted against Mao's will in order to please Chou En-lai and a group of lesser figures who were to emerge from the plenum as members of the new inner circle, i.e., people who emerged in high favor with Mao. It seems pretty clear that these cautionary elements were in the document because the dominant figures—Mao and Lin—wanted them in, because Mao and Lin envisaged a campaign—which would spare some people and would have periods of remission.
The first commentary on the 8 August declaration—by Red Flag, broadcast on 10 August—described it as the "principal document" of the cultural revolution and as the result of a "scientific summary...made under the personal supervision of Comrade Mao Tse-tung." It reiterated the aims of the revolution and the presence of "relatively strong and persistent" resistance to it, and emphasized the need for "daring" leadership and for turning the masses loose rather than preparing a script for them. It spelled out the point that

Experiences have indicated that each unit must carry out cultural revolution work by relying on its own masses and should not depend on arrangements by upper-level organs. Under general conditions, each unit should carry out cultural revolution work without the help of work-teams dispatched by upper-level organs.

However, persons would sometimes be "assigned by upper-level organs to contact the masses"—presumably, directly assigned by Chen Po-ta's "group" in Peking—and these persons were not to act as "'special envoys'" or rush to make a determination but must be suitably humble before the masses. Red Flag echoed the 8 August declaration in asserting that the effort now should "concentrate on those persons in authority within the party who have taken the path of capitalism"; and it spelled out the point in the declaration about criticism of officials by name. The names of "middle of the road elements" (those still regarded as redeemable), the party journal said, "may be mentioned in big-character posters issued by their own units," but "so long as their names are not openly published in newspapers"—which would require official approval—and "they are allowed in the meantime to issue big-character posters to defend themselves," they need not regard themselves as condemned.*

*In point of fact, the most important party leaders who had fallen had not been identified in the newspapers, but lower-level officials had been.
At the time the 8 August declaration was published, a central committee "plenum"—with perhaps no more than half of the members actually attending—had been in session for a week, and was to continue until 12 August. It was apparent from developments in the week following 12 August—the issuance of a communique on 13 August, the surfacing of a new ranking of Chinese Communist leaders, and the emergence of the Red Guards—that the plenum had seen the formal presentation of Mao's new team and had discussed the future course of the "cultural revolution."

The tone of the communique, and the radical changes made in the leadership, raised the question of whether there had been a showdown in the plenum on policies for the "cultural revolution," a showdown which the militants—Mao and Lin and their supporters—had won. For some months after the plenum, there were only two pieces of testimony on this question. One was of Chou En-lai's remarks to a group of visitors in early September, to the effect that the plenum had decided by majority vote to endorse the cultural revolution (i.e. to approve Mao's further plans for it) and that henceforth arguments against the majority opinion would not be permitted and the minority must absolutely carry out the decisions of the majority; Chou was said to have observed dryly that of course those in the majority would henceforth be playing more prominent roles than those in the minority, and to have implied that Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping were among the minority. All of this seemed, and still seems, credible. It would be unlikely a priori that all of the Chinese leaders would agree with the concepts of those who were dominating the campaign, and in particular it would seem most unlikely that Liu and Teng would find acceptable the displacement of the conventional party apparatus by extraordinary party and extraparty bodies under the direction of a new team—that is, the "cultural revolution" committees and the "Red Guards" which were then being organized and were soon to emerge—especially the plans for attacks on the apparatus by the Red Guards. It is also not incredible that Liu and Teng expressed this opposition openly at the plenum; they would be in effect fighting for their professional life, and would have little or nothing more to lose from
openly expressing their opposition than from quietly acquiescing in the destruction of their base of power. But it is simply not known whether Liu and Teng did openly express it, or instead—in defending themselves against charges—gave some appearance of resistance which was taken as open opposition because Mao had already decided to break them.

A Japanese journalist claims to have been told that Mao and Lin were the ones in a minority at this plenum. This source asserted that the Red Guards in Peking were "hurriedly mobilized" by the "mainstream leaders" (Mao's new team) to coerce Mao's opponents in the plenum, and that the presence of "revolutionary students and teachers" (presumably including Red Guards) during some part of the plenum—reported by the communiqué itself—was for the purpose of forcing a favorable vote, just as troops might be brought up to surround the meeting-room. Although many observers found this testimony credible—presumably on the reasoning that Mao's plans for the future course of the revolution were so extreme that a majority of any group would be opposed to

*There is fragmentary but tantalizing evidence that Liu (if not Teng) went further than simply to state his opposition, that he may in fact have already tried to disrupt the organization of the Red Guards in early August. A poster seen by a correspondent in mid-October accused Li Hsueh-feng, head of the newly-appointed (in late May) Peking committee of the party which had been publicly assigned half of the responsibility for the "mistakes" of the work-teams, of having carried out "oppression of revolutionary operational units," and also demanded an explanation of Li's action in calling a meeting at a Peking institute on 2 August and inviting Liu to the meeting; the poster asked why it was necessary to invite Liu, and what had Li reported to Liu. Another observer, noticing the coincidence of the dates, had suggested the possibility of action by Liu and others on this second day of the plenum to head off both the appearance of the Red Guards at the plenum and the organization of the Red Guards as a movement.
them—the role attributed to the Red Guards seemed overstated: if it were simply a matter of physical force, Mao and Lin appeared already to have control of the orthodox coercive apparatus—the PLA and the security forces (apart from some suspect units); if the Red Guards played any coercive role at the plenum, it would seem to have been in the sense of being put on display by the dominant leaders, for the benefit of both expressed (minority) and latent (larger) opposition, as a vehicle which could be used against opponents within the terms of the "cultural revolution"—that is, without turning the PLA loose against the party apparatus.

Some observers have attached importance to an odd circumstance in the reporting of Mao's visit on the evening of 10 August to a "reception center" in Peking maintained near the central committee headquarters for "revolutionary people." On 10 August NCNA transmitted an account of the visit which was presumably to appear in the 11 August People's Daily; however, the first edition of the newspaper on the 11th was withdrawn, and the paper appeared later in the day with no story about Mao. On the same day, NCNA carried an account similar to its 10 August transmission but reversing a reference which in the original version had named the central committee ahead

*There is a sense, of course, in which Mao and Lin have been and remain in a minority, indeed a minority of two—the fully-developed revolutionaries whose hearts are pure, and who are trying to bring the rest of the party, government, and army, in fact the entire country, to that pitch of perfection. What is at issue, here, however, is whether Mao has been in a minority on a vote, or in terms of expressed opinion; and this seems very doubtful. Mao's problem has not been that of dominating decision-making bodies, but rather that of getting his decisions implemented by much or most of the party apparatus, much of the governmental apparatus, and perhaps even much of the military apparatus.
of Mao in receiving expressions of regard from the masses. It was later reported that the newspaper's original version included a remark from Mao that the party was losing touch with the masses (obviously his true feeling, and the root of the changes he had made, but something that could not be stated publicly in just that way). And a Japanese visitor to China has speculated that Mao was "brought out" on this occasion by the "new mainstream faction" (the implication being that Mao was their puppet), and that "the Liu faction" (the new outsiders) recalled the issue of People's Daily which reported this (only to be reversed and suppressed the next day). It seems unnecessary to reach very far for an explanation of the withdrawal. There seems a sufficient explanation either in the reported remark about the masses, as diplomats in Peking believe, or in the differences between the two texts. The second text is hardly less idolatrous than the first (both accounts are ludicrous, like the accounts of Mao's swim) and even increase the numbers of those around Mao to "tens of thousands" and has the crowd expressing its "best love" for Mao instead of the earlier "warm feelings"; but the second text at a dozen points is a smoother and better job. It is not surprising that the propaganda apparatus--particularly in the light of what had just happened to the old propaganda apparatus--should take pains to get a story about Mao 'right.'

Months later there came to hand a major document, an account of Lin Piao's speech at the plenum, which provided much insight into developments at the plenum and the relationships among Chinese Communist leaders revealed there. The generally credible account, from wall-posters apparently prepared by "revolutionary students" present at the plenum, supports Chou En-lai's version of events rather than the Japanese journalist's. That is, Lin throughout appears to be speaking like a man united with Mao in a secure majority of expressed opinion, one which could do what it wished with opponents in the plenum, and not at all like the spokesman for a "faction." In this speech he is speaking for Mao, informing the
central committee of the program which he as Mao's first lieutenant intends to carry out for Mao, and defining for the central committee his relationship with Mao.*

Lin's speech as reported shows him to identify himself completely with Mao, and to think in the same simplistic terms, with the same visionary long-range goals. In the speech he begins by classifying people into "two kinds" down the line: those who eagerly study Mao's thought, and those who do not (he specifies Lu Ting-i and his "gang"); those who attach great importance to (i.e. are obsessed by) political-ideological work, and those who ignore it or even interfere with it (he fails to specify Lo Jui-ching); those who are energetic and make achievements (e.g. put up lots of big-character posters), even though they offend people and are attacked, and those who are inactive and conciliatory (e.g. put up few posters). Thus, he goes on, the party must be re-organized according to the principles governing the cultivation of revolutionary successors stated by Chairman Mao (in the mid-1964 article on "Khrushchev's Phoney Communism"), and "we"--referring perhaps to the politburo standing committee--have proposed, and Mao has agreed, to dismiss from their posts those who oppose Mao's thought, those who resist political-ideological work, and those who lack revolutionary zeal. Further, he says, "we" are now going to dismiss a number of people, promote a number, and keep a number in their posts. Those who make mistakes,

*This latter part of the speech at first seemed hard to accept at face value, not because of the relationship defined in it but because it seemed inappropriate for Lin rather than Mao to define it, especially if Mao were present. Another observer has removed this difficulty, contending credibly that Mao almost certainly had defined the relationship, in a brief earlier speech, making clear to the central committee that Lin was now his designated successor and would be speaking for him henceforth, and that Mao may well have been absent from some sessions of the plenum.
even serious mistakes, will be given a chance to be tested in future work, provided that they accept education and truly repent; but the incorrigible must be dismissed. (This was exactly the line taken in the 8 August declaration, and with the same ambiguity as to just when the hard cases were to be dismissed.) Unless this is done, Lin continues, the "stalemate" will not be broken, as such people will carry out subversive activity "once trouble flares up." (The reference to "stalemate" appears in the context to mean a loss of momentum in the "cultural revolution," which was at that time in a trough, rather than to designate a situation of "stalemate" between or among contending factions at the top of the party preventing any further action.)

In his speech as reported, Lin goes on to define his own role. In the best Chinese style, he speaks of his talents as unequal to his task, of the possibility that he will make serious mistakes or even fail, and of the need to rely on Mao, the standing committee, and the cultural revolution group. He insists on the need to do everything according to Mao's thought, and implies strongly that one group in the party—one would think, Liu and Teng and others—had been acting contrary to Mao's known will:

There cannot be two policies or two command headquarters. No wishful thinking can replace the thinking of the Chairman, and we cannot stage a rival drama in competition with the Chairman. We want monism...

Lin goes on to define his relationship with Mao. He says that there are "many ideas we do not understand," that "we" must carry out Mao's directives, that he asks Mao for instructions on everything and does everything according to his orders, that he does not "interfere" with Mao on major matters and does not trouble him with minor matters, and that sometimes he does not understand what Mao wants and therefore makes mistakes. He goes on to describe Mao as the "genius of the world revolution," to speak of the "wide gulf between him and us,"
to reiterate a modest assessment of his own talents, but to state his willingness to accept the "decision" of Mao and the central committee.*

In his speech as reported, Lin then speaks directly to the "cultural revolution group" present at the plenum. He speaks of the movement as having begun with vigor, but then having "cold water poured on it"—an obvious reference to the interval dominated by the work-teams. Mao himself, Lin goes on, "reversed the situation"—meaning, presumably, called for the withdrawal of the work-teams and their replacement by cultural revolution groups. He reiterates the abiding aim of transforming men, the expectation of numerous struggles and reversals, and the necessary progress through many stages to achieve both spiritual and material ends. He praises the role of the "cultural revolution group" and again criticizes its predecessors (implying an intention to stick the party-machine leaders, demoted at the plenum, with the responsibility), and concludes resoundingly that Mao's thoughts are the pearls among the fish-eyes.

The 13 August communique of the plenum was less informative than the above account of Lin's speech, although consistent with it. It noted the plenum's "full"

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*The "decision" was presumably that of naming Lin the party's only vice-chairman and thus designating him the successor. In regard to the self-deprecating formulations, several observers have noted that Lin could be expected to speak in this Chinese way no matter what the relationship between Mao and himself, and some have read the speech as a crafty and cynical description of manipulation of Mao by Lin: "I handle the minor matters and I see that no major matters come up." The other interpretation—that Lin is describing his situation frankly—gives a more credible picture: of Lin in awe of Mao, conscious of the difficulties of his new role, and trying to do what Mao wants but not always being able to, because for one thing Mao does not always make it clear and for another changes his mind, so that Lin has to accept the responsibility for "mistakes."
approval of a "series of brilliant policies...put forward by Comrade Mao" since 1962, mainly related to the cultural revolution, and described these as an "important development of Marxism-Leninism." Like the 8 August declaration, it emphasized the need for "daring" in the conduct of the revolution, and said flatly: "Don't be afraid of disorder." It reiterated that the masses were to be turned loose, not "blindly" ordered about, and called for support of the "revolutionary left." And it included praise of the "brilliant example" set by Lin Piao and the PLA in the study of Mao's thought.*

On 16 August, Chen Po-ta, always regarded as a spokesman for Mao, spoke to a mass meeting of students in Peking. Although the Red Guards had still not appeared on the public scene, Chen's speech, not published until the Red Guards had been surfaced, was in effect the first of a series of interviews given the Red Guards by officers of the "cultural revolution group" and by Chou En-lai, interviews in which groups of Red Guards were given a few general directives. Chen's directive was very general in this case. Implying an expectation (like Lin Piao at the plenum) of considerable resistance, he called on the students to "smash all kinds of monsters," spoke of the value to them of passing through "storms and hardship" and the "big revolutionary furnace," and asserted

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*In commenting on the 8 August declaration before the communique appeared, People's Daily on 11 and 13 August, and the Liberation Army Daily on 11 August, differed in their emphases. The party newspaper did not emphasize daring and did emphasize "moral force instead of physical force," while the PLA paper called for "absolute reliance on the left faction of the revolution." There was and continued to be speculation, given some support in the differences of emphasis in the speeches of the two leaders, that the former spoke for Chou En-lai and other possible "moderates," and the latter for Lin Piao (representing Mao) and other apparent "militants."
that their lack of fear was "very correct!!" (The triple emphasis is in the Chinese account.) He called upon them to "immerse" themselves in the masses and, to study "Mao's" program for the cultural revolution. He concluded that in making a revolution, "it is necessary to rely on ourselves." ("Revolutionary students" and Red Guards were later to assert that the party leadership had told them that they were the only forces that the revolution could rely on.)

As of mid-August, then, the picture seemed fairly clear. A militant cultural revolution would continue, and would now turn to the party apparatus across the board, led by the "group in charge of the cultural revolution" and its subordinate bodies, and making much use of "revolutionary students." It was not at all apparent, however, that these students were to be organized as uniformed "Red Guards" and encouraged to throw China into the worst disorder in the 17 years of the Peking regime.

Mid-August to Mid-September: The Unleashing of the Red Guards

The Red Guards made their first public appearance on 18 August at a million-strong rally in Peking, a rally which featured an appearance by Mao Tse-tung in army uniform, speeches by Lin Piao and Chou En-lai, and a new line-up of party leaders which displayed Mao's "close comrade" Lin as Mao's anointed successor. *

Before considering this new factor of the "Red Guards," the little available information on their

*Miraculously, Peking does not give Mao credit for creating the Red Guards--only for recognizing their value when he "discovered" their existence.
antecedents may be summarized.* A Red Guard who was interviewed in September stated that there had been "talk" about forming the Red Guards as early as late May, and that a detachment was first organized at the middle-school attached to Tsinghua university in Peking. Red Guards interviewed in Peking in October said the same thing, specifying 29 May as the date of organizing and naming the group at Tsinghua. Peking itself at the same time offered the same story, stating that this particular unit--now operating as the "Red Guard Unit of the Peking Militant School of Red Guards"--was "among the pioneers" and was organized in May. Some degree of confirmation is also available from wall-posters published in Red Flag, posters written by the Red Guard unit at Tsinghua which indicate that it had been in existence there at least since 24 June. Further, at a critical meeting at Peking on or about 30 June, when one or more of the principal officers of the "group in charge of the cultural revolution" backed the "revolutionary students" and brought down the work-team sent in early June, thousands of school-children were brought in to demonstrate against the work-team; although there is no report that these children were uniformed, this method of operation was to be that of the Red Guards.

Obviously some time was required for the organization and outfitting of the Red Guards before their massive

*The Red Guards came as a complete surprise to observers of the Chinese scene. Although several observers had a creditable record in forecasting many or most (but in no case all) of the spectacular developments--i.e. the party purge, the extension of the purge to the top level, the downfall of Peng Chen and Lo Jui-ching as individuals, the decline of Liu Shao-chi and the rise of Lin Piao and a new team, and the early break-up of the leadership group being presented by Peking as a harmonious unit as late as late July--not a single one of the hundreds of steady observers of the Chinese scene forecast the Red Guards.
and disciplined appearance in Peking on 18 August, and organizing activity on a national scale began about the last week of July. For example, while individual Red Guards--according to later reports--were observed in the Canton area as early as the first week of July, the first report of organizational activity there dates from late July, when the principal of a middle-school there held a meeting to announce that the central committee had ordered the organization of Red Guard units, in order to eliminate all "enemies of the people." The directive reportedly called for students to be chosen only from working-class and poor-peasant families; another source reports that the nominations--made locally--had to be sent to Peking for approval.

A wall-poster published in August in the Chinese press also helps to fix the time; this poster, dated 27 July, attributed to a high-school attached to Tsinghua (the point of origin asserted by the Red Guards themselves), and calling for "revolutionary rebellion" against "hysterical gentlemen" in power, has been treated by Peking as if it had been the opening gun for a nation-wide organizational effort. And as noted previously, the Red Guards were being "nurriedly mobilized" in Peking on 2 August for an appearance at the party plenum.

As for the 18 August rally at which the Red Guards first appeared publicly, while the NCNA account of the rally maintained continuity with the central committee's 8 August decision by reporting that Chen Po-ta of the "cultural revolution group" presided, it also reported that "'Red Guards', composed of the most active, bravest and firmest of the revolutionary students, packed the reviewing stands," that many were dressed in khaki with red armbands (and that Mao himself wore such an armband), and that these "revolutionary students" described themselves as "'Red Guards' for the defense of the party.
central committee, Chairman Mao, and Mao Tse-tung's thought.* It also reported the speeches of Lin and Chou, in which both incited the audience to carry through the cultural revolution (Lin's was the more obsequious to Mao and militant toward everybody else) and in which neither saw fit to say a word about the role of the "cultural revolution group" (instead, Chou slipped in a little praise of Lin Piao). Both of these speeches, like Chen Po-ta's speech of 16 August, qualified as directives to the Red Guards in very general terms.**

At this 18 August rally, Peking published the new standings of party leaders in the form of a name-list of those attending. Mao of course appeared as number one, but followed now by Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Tao Chu, Chen Po-ta, Teng Hsiao-ping, Kang Sheng, and Liu Shao-chi. In other words, Lin had displaced Liu as second-ranking leader and Liu had slid all the way to eighth place (probably not even that, really); Chou had remained number three; Tao Chu, the new director of the propaganda department and one of the leaders of the "cultural revolution group," had leaped all the way from the second level (a regional leader, ranking low in the central committee)

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* Mao did not share his "thought" on 18 August. Peking itself has said that some of the students asked Mao to make a speech, but that Chou answered for him, pointing to the 8 August declaration, and the books of quotations they were carrying, as equivalent to a speech. Some observers were quick--too quick--to conclude that Mao was not being permitted to speak for himself.

** In early November, a Hong Kong correspondent was to contend that Chou in this speech had urged the youth to limit their activities to their own schools, and that this reflected a continuing dispute with Lin Piao over the use of the Red Guards. While subsequent speeches were to suggest possible differences between Lin and Chou, Chou's 18 August speech neither stated nor implied the limitation the correspondent purported to see.
to fourth place on the top level and indeed to first place among functionaries of the party apparatus (Peking may have been signalling an intention to make Tao the secretary general, and it was soon reported that he would serve as Acting Premier in Chou's absences, another job Teng had had); Chen Po-ta, head of the "cultural revolution group" which seemed to have become the most important part of the party apparatus; had risen several notches to fifth place; Teng Hsiao-ping, the secretary-general who had been head of the secretariat and thus the actual director of the orthodox party apparatus (i.e., less the special bodies like the "cultural revolution group") and who was regarded by some observers as having played an important role in carrying out Mao's purge of Peng Chen (a view that is still tenable); nominally retained his sixth position but now with an additional active leader between himself and the top and probably with his grip slipping from his key job; and Kang Sheng, another leader of the "cultural revolution" group suspected of having resumed his duties with the secret police during the purge, moved up several places and into the elite. In sum, Lin Piao had had a great triumph; Chou En-lai had had a triumph (in holding to his position in such a tricky and dangerous period); the leaders of the "cultural revolution group"--Chen, Tao and Kang--had had a great if perhaps insecure triumph; and the principal figures of the old party-machine, Liu and Teng, had had a defeat, Liu a disastrous one, Teng a substantial one.

It was surmised at the time that Liu and (to a lesser degree) Teng had been demoted for some combination of the following reasons: their actual or putative roles as "protectors" of Peng Chen in the past; the uneven performance of the party press (not fully in line until June) in the campaign against the "black gang" beginning the previous November; the retrospective "failure" of the workteams in June; and opposition to, or lack of cooperation in, the superimposition of the "cultural revolution group" on the conventional party apparatus, in particular the direction of the activity of the "group" against the conventional apparatus (as forecast by the 8 August
declaration and emphasized by the 10 August Red Flag).*
This surmise was all right as far as it went; but there
was soon to be reason to conclude that another big item
on the list of charges was going to be that of opposi-
tion--in the central committee plenum of 1-12 August--to
the plans of Mao's new team for turning the Red Guards
loose to terrorize, discredit, and (conceivably) wreck
the conventional party apparatus as an entity. The ques-
tion that immediately presented itself, to those who had
watched Liu and Teng build up the party machine over the
years into what had seemed to be a powerful instrument
responsive to themselves, was whether Liu and Teng would
accept this defeat meekly, or whether they would instead
try to rally what forces they could to resist the new
team (which in turn raised the question of whether they
any longer had access to their old forces).

A color film of the 18 August rally, shown in
Hong Kong two months later and attended by officers of
the U.S. Consulate General there, provided some valuable
if fragmentary indicators as to Mao's status and health
and relations between Mao and other leaders. The U.S.
observers were impressed by the youthful participants'
'apparently sincere adulation' of Mao and the skillful
exploitation of this feeling by speakers and cheerleaders,
preparing the participants to "go out into the provinces
energized and motivated to do battle against those...demons
and monsters who oppose the thinking and will of Mao
Tse-tung." The Consulate General surmised that the demon-
stration was also intended to make Mao's opponents in the
leadership, both those in Peking and those seeking the
films in the provinces, "feel hopelessly overwhelmed...,
asking themselves: who can oppose a leader who evokes
such evident adulation and who controls a mechanism which
can organize such a demonstration of mass support?"

*As previously noted, remarks of Chou En-lai's implying that Liu and Teng had
openly expressed such opposition at the 1-12 August plenum
of the central committee.
U.S. observers of the film reported further that Mao moved slowly but firmly, usually without assistance, and appeared in good health, apart from his apparently poor vision. He seemed alert but detached, and unresponsive to others. (Others have reported this as Mao's "blind god" pose). He did exchange words with Lin Piao, who thereupon made some changes in his printed speech with a pen, and also chattered briefly with Chou, but was not seen to have any exchange with other leaders. Lin Piao had a "ghostly" appearance but seemed otherwise vigorous. Chou En-lai looked tired but performed smoothly. Tao Chu was the only other leader given the special treatment of being filmed standing alone. Some others of the new team--Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, Chiang Ching--were visible but much less prominent.

Red Flag on 21 August reiterated that the principal targets of the "great revolution" were the "reactionary academic 'authorities'...and bourgeois representatives within the party," and it went on to warn that any person who opposed Mao's thought or failed to implement it--"no matter how high his position, how old his standing, and how great his 'fame'"--should be the object of a "struggle waged against him until he is dismissed from his official posts and functions." This seemed to be cut to the measurements of Liu Shao-chi, and to reinforce the impression that a number of other party leaders would be brought down before the purge had run its course.

Another article in that 21 August number of Red Flag, and a People's Daily article two days later, both suggested strongly that the Red Guards were to be sent into action as quasi-military units against elements of the party apparatus at the center and against its regional, provincial and municipal bureaus. The implication throughout was that the Red Guards had been formed in order to organize the "revolutionary students" in a uniform way, giving them the kind of charter and propaganda support which would deter local authorities from organizing resistance to them. Both articles seemed to incite the Red Guards to make physical attacks on their targets, and especially on party organizations. The Red Flag piece, persistently describing the "revolutionary youths" as
"fighters," jeered at the "overlords in power" who were "shaking with fear." It went on to emphasize that the "young fighters" had the "backing of Chairman Mao,"* and described their task as precisely that of "making trouble," bringing down "all the old ideas, culture, customs and habits" (soon to be known as the 'four olds'). Young people, the article went on, were the "most resolute" in following Mao's instructions, and had "by far the greatest love" for him. Finally, the young were bold, daring to "defy the power of law, not vulgar politicians..."

The People's Daily for its part denounced a "stubborn faction" which had "absurdly regarded the leadership of its own units as equivalent to that of the party central committee," reiterated that the party committees of unspecified areas and units had resisted the revolutionary students and in "some areas" had even organized the masses to struggle against the students, and went on most ominously to declare that "the revolutionary student organizations, such as 'Red Guards,' 'Red Flag Fighting Teams,** and others, are legitimate organizations" engaged in "legitimate revolutionary actions," and that anyone opposing these revolutionary actions "opposes Chairman Mao's teachings and the party central committee's decision." In other words, the party organizations marked as targets would have a choice between allowing the Red Guards to conduct violence against them or entering into armed warfare with the representatives of Mao's new team: · on one hand, and with the odds against them, the local figures of the old party apparatus and whatever local military forces they could muster, and on the other Mao, Lin Piao...

*One of the regime's own newspapers later quoted a female Red Guard to the effect that Mao himself at this time (19 August) had told her personally that violence was better than persuasion.

**It has been reported that Red Guard "Fighting Teams" or "Combat Squads" are just that, units organized from the older Red Guards (c. 18-20) to carry out physical violence against assigned targets.
and the bulk of the PLA, and the "cultural revolution group" leaders recently projected into the inner circle. Shaped up that way, if as though it would be an unequal, even if sometimes protracted, contest.

Wall-posters in September spoke of an interview given visiting Red Guards in Peking by Tao Chu on the day--21 August--of the ominous Red Flag editorial. Materials received much later indicate that Tao gave several such interviews in late August, and that other officers of the central "cultural revolution group" also gave such interviews--probably dozens. The new team clearly regarded these personal talks as the best channel of communication with the Red Guards, as the conventional party apparatus was still staffed by officials who were themselves to be targets of Red Guard action.

Accounts of the 21 August interview agree that Tao did not give the Red Guards particular targets, and, in response to their demands for action against particular party leaders, told them in effect that action was up to them. The September posters said that Tao invited the Red Guards to give an account of the behavior of their local party committees, and told them that it was within their power to criticize and "change" their local party officials.

Tao, in response to the Red Guards' demand for a "reorganization" of the Northwest Bureau (held responsible for serious incidents), told them that "you will determine this yourselves." (This group expressly denounced Wang Feng, who, later posters reported, was subsequently denounced by Mao Tse-tung personally.)

Chou En-lai was prominent among those giving interviews and making speeches to the Red Guards in this period, and there is a good wall-poster account of his speech at Tsinghua on 22 August. Chou in this speech, like Lin Piao at the August plenum, began in the approved Chinese way by deprecating his own abilities, and inviting further poster criticism of himself; he then proceeded authoritatively, as if he thought his position to be secure. He noted that the head of the former work-team at Tsinghua, who had made a self-criticism that same day, realized his errors, but he went
on to emphasize, as he had in his 4 August speech, that
the errors were "fundamental errors...in direction and
line" which were not the responsibility of the work-
teams alone but also of the central party leaders who
dispatched the teams. Citing the need for "speedy"
action in Peking in late May, to correct the situation
left by the "black gang," Chou said that the party had had
a choice between sending in work-teams to regain the
leadership or to rely on the local masses and risk "con-
fusion," and chose the former course without due con-
sideration. Further, the errors of the work-teams de-

erived in large part from the fact that they were not
given proper guidance. Thus the larger errors were
those of the new Peking committee and of (unspecified
organs or leaders of) the central committee.

Chou in this speech went on to speak of the many
millions of students throughout China who were not as
"fortunate" as students in Peking, because they had not
"solved their problems there"--i.e., their party organi-
izations and work-teams were making the same old (con-
servative) errors, often "even more errors" than had
been made in Peking, injuring people and carrying out
"white terrorism." Because Mao could not go to all those
places in person, Chou said (implying, as others were
to state expressly, that Mao had directly intervened in
Peking), the 8 August declaration had been prepared as
guidance for the students. As previously noted, the 8
August declaration was militant, and had incited the
students against the party organizations without giving
them any particular guidance; and Chou in this speech
followed the same strategy. He urged them to "rise up
for the revolution," to "solve the problems yourselves,"
and (speaking to visiting students) to "hurry home today
with this fire." He reiterated that "You can solve your
problems by yourselves," and went on to imply that the
provisional cultural revolution committee of Tsinghua,
which had succeeded the work-team not more than three
weeks earlier, had already criticized itself for being
too conservative (a good indication that the students
were reading the 8 August declaration as a militant
directive.)
Chou then answered questions, and made clear that the party leaders encouraged a wide range of student expression and of organizational activity (a point of importance, in view of the variety of opinion already being expressed by, and of organizations already being formed by, the Red Guards). Chou encouraged the convention of all kinds of meetings for "debating," stated clearly that the students had "freedom of publication" (they could say anything they liked in their posters), identified five different Red Guard organizations in Peking and said flatly that "any kind of organization is all right," and reiterated that "as long as the general direction is correct, opinions can be exchanged even if they are different."

Chou went on to ask the students to observe the long-professed party principle of "curing the disease and saving the patient," i.e., that the aim of the campaign was to re-educate and reform as many as possible of those in error, rather than to destroy them. Speaking specifically of the discredited president and party leader of Tsinghua, one found guilty of "following the capitalist road," Chou encouraged the students to struggle against him, but called upon them to make thorough preparations, to carry out propaganda among the people until the ground was ready, to go through the entire process of struggle, criticism and reform. In these passages, Chou seemed to be saying that any additional important party figures—like the one just mentioned, who was still a member of the CCP central committee—who were to be purged would be purged much later, after a prolonged campaign. If this reading is correct, this too was an important point, in view of the apparent failure of the party leaders in Peking to move against any of the party leaders denounced by the Red Guards in the weeks following the first attacks.

There is no evidence that Chou En-lai or any of the officers of the "cultural revolution group"—the small number of party leaders reported as giving general directives to the Red Guards before they were sent into action—gave the Guards any better directives than this. In other words, there is no evidence that they were told to take
action against specific individuals already marked for purging—to take such action against provincial first secretaries, for example, as would provoke such individuals to organize counter-action which would serve as a pretext for replacing them. If this is true, if they were simply told to go into action, without any particular targets and with no specific limitations placed on their actions, then Mao and his new team were making new tests—both of party and government officials and of the "revolutionary students" themselves; that is, the new team would be testing the revolutionary qualifications of the young and identifying those from whom the party's eventual leadership would be drawn, and testing the responses of the party seniors to these initiatives by the young, and would be marking the examinations later.

As of this time (nearing late August) before the Red Guards were sent out, the conventional party apparatus had been hit hard only in one sector—the "cultural" sector, that is, individuals concerned with the direction and management of propaganda, education, and the arts. About 80 important "cultural" figures had been publicly brought down*: seven directors and managers of the central apparatus, including the onetime chief (Peng Chen) of the first "cultural revolution group" and the director of the Propaganda Department (Lu Ting-ji); some seven members of the Peking committee of the party (the only regional, provincial or major municipal committee which had been hit hard as a whole); two deputy directors of departments of regional bureaus and two provincial secretaries; some 15 directors and deputy directors of provincial propaganda departments; six editors; about 23 administrators (presidents or vice-presidents) and

*Only a few party figures who were not concerned with the management of some kind of "cultural" activity had fallen: Lo Jui-ching, Yang Shang-kun (chief of the central committee's administrative office), Liu Jen (Peng Chen's first deputy), and Li Kuei (first secretary in Huehot, Inner Mongolia).
secretaries of party committees of institutions of higher learning; and about 17 officers of unions and federations of artists of various kinds and directors of governmental cultural bureaus. About 50 of these were known to have had important party positions—the main categories excluded being those educators who were not concurrently secretaries of party committees, and the last category given above. The implication of the 21-23 August commentaries summarized above was that this figure of 50 was to be multiplied several times before the Red Guards were put back on the leash.

While the party was preparing to send the Red Guards out into the streets, "cultural revolution committees" and subordinate "groups" were being formed throughout China—as in effect had been directed in the central committee's 8 August declaration—in those places were they had not already been established in July. Some of the schools took the trouble, on the occasion of "electing" these new committees (committees for universities, teams for smaller units), to criticize publicly the two earlier forms of "cultural revolution" organization—the first groups appointed by the party committees, and the workteams which supplanted them—as being inferior to these new bodies elected by and thus (it was implied) responsive to the masses. Nevertheless, at least in the universities, these new committees were in most cases identified as "provisional" committees, as the first such committees—at Peita and Tsinghua—had been; just as the party secretaries who had fallen from favor were generally replaced by "acting" secretaries, the "provisional" committees were clearly on probation. There was considerable ambiguity in the remarks made by party secretaries on these occasions. While some chose to emphasize the role of the new committees and groups in "directing" and "giving instructions" and asserted that they must "boldly lead" the revolution, others chose to underline the point that the committees were to "give free rein to the masses," that the universities were to be "run by the revolutionary teachers and students," and so on; some of the chairmen of the newly-elected committees and groups picked up this last point, being quoted as promising to "run" the school in a worthy fashion, e.g. to "foster reliable proletarian successors."
The emergence of the Red Guards, and some of the remarks quoted above, raised the question of just what degree of authority the new committees were really to have. They were apparently—as "organs of power" given charters by the central committee and as bodies elected expressly to "lead the masses"—to be at least nominally in command of the Red Guards, while they were apparently to be at least nominally responsive to the "revolutionary teachers and students" among whom the Red Guards had just been identified as the best element. And the "revolutionary students and teachers" were apparently to have no relation whatever to the young Communist League, which had not been mentioned for weeks and the leaders of which were evidently in trouble. It appeared that the party center—probably meaning in practice, the "cultural revolution group"—could avoid chaos only by giving the "cultural revolution" units and the Red Guards and other students identical orders concurrently, so that the former could "order" and the latter could "demand" the same actions at the same time.* But there was no way to sort this out at the time; one could only wait to see what would happen.

There was not long to wait. At just about this time, beginning 20 August in Peking and a few other places and a few days later in most places, the Red Guards began to appear in the streets of China's cities, and proliferated in the last week of August. For the first few days, their activities were reported by both Communist and non-Communist media as a kind of dull-witted, humorless Hallowé'en, directed against everything on the scene regarded as "feudal, capitalist, or revisionist" (i.e., traditional,

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*A Chinese Communist official in Eastern Europe reportedly told a journalist at this time (23 August) that Lin Piao would now "carry the red banner," and that Lin and the PLA controlled the activities of the Red Guards. Lin in fact had been foremost in carrying Mao's banner for almost a year, but, as will be argued presently, the PLA did not seem to control the Red Guards.
Western or Soviet). As reported, they put up posters, made speeches, shouted denunciations, changed the names of streets, markets, schools, hotels, temples, theatres, parks and lakes, tore down shop signs, defaced churches, and took similar direct action against both the possessors and the suppliers of offensive (non-proletarian) food and clothing, hair-styles and cosmetics, books and magazines, photographs and paintings and objets d'art, and so on. They were rewarded at once with an editorial in People's Daily, "Very Good Indeed!"--and by other such editorials in those first days.

Observers in Peking began on 25 August to report incidents of brutality by the Red Guards there--scenes of "street punishment," in which the victims were placed in a circle and beaten with belts or cords, or were beaten on the street and dragged into houses, as well as much parading of victims around the streets. On 28 August, posters in Peking reportedly asserted that several Red Guards had already been killed by "counter-revolutionaries." From such posters (reported later), a picture emerged of violence from the start (i.e., immediately after 18 August) at some places, and of widespread violence in the last week of August. In Peking, where the Red Guards had a free hand, the victims of their raids, beatings, torture, and assignments to slave labor, although primarily teachers, included party and government officials, one an officer of the "cultural revolution" section of a municipal cultural bureau; this last was the first reported attack by Red Guards on a subordinate unit of the "cultural revolution group" from which they were supposed to be getting their orders.* They also (in Peking).

*It should be kept in mind, however, that action by the Red Guards against any given cultural revolution committee or team does not necessarily imply refusal to recognize the authority of the central "cultural revolution group." All of the local committees and teams were to be "elected" locally, and could be replaced if found unfit; if the local cultural revolution committee or group were in fact selected and dominated by a party secretary who was himself unfit, it would follow that the cultural revolution group would also be unfit, and that the Red Guards would be hostile to the group as well as the man.
raided the apartments of senior party members, tearing up their clothing and throwing their furniture into the street. Some executions (although not of party officials) were surmised, and "many suicides" reported. In Tientsin (not far away), Red Guards from Peking reportedly beat up a municipal official and people who came to his aid (including women), beat up many other people in other incidents, killed a teacher and perhaps others, and (on 26 August) fought with a "Red Corps" organized by the Tientsin committee of the CCP; this last was the first report of elements being organized by local party officials to repel the Red Guards. (Peking later reported the death on 19 September--from "heart attack"--of the First Secretary of the Tientsin committee; a correspondent reported that the death was really the result of a beating by Red Guards.) There were soon reports from other parts of China of attacks by Peking students on student bodies elsewhere, of threats made by them against officials of "cultural revolution teams," of similar attacks by local students on local people, and of resistance to the Red Guards by a locally-organized "Red Corps" or by local crowds apparently responding to local party leaders.

In the most sensational single development of that last week of August, the Peking regime publicly reported through the Harbin radio on 27 August that a meeting had been held by "revolutionary" people in Heilungkiang to denounce a "black gang" within "leading groups" of the Heilungkiang provincial committee of the CCP (a meeting chaired by an alternate secretary of that committee itself), and then on 29 August that the Red Guards of various Harbin schools had held a "rally to burn down the provincial CCP committee and shell the command headquarters"* (a meeting addressed by a secretary of the Northeast regional bureau of the party). The provincial

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*This "shelling" was later defined as ferreting out the "bourgeois careerists," but one report of the same period states that Red Guards actually set fire to one municipal party committee headquarters in Hunan.
committee was evidently one of those which had organized resistance against the Red Guards (possibly splitting off some of the Red Guards themselves), as the resolution adopted by the rally asserted that local counter-revolutionaries had "put on arm-bands and called themselves Red Guards" and had carried out a "fight against the revolutionaries"; further, the resolution called for a reorganization of the local Red Guards and for the coordination of student activity in the future. In attacking the provincial committee in this fashion, those naming the target and directing the fire—presumably the "cultural revolution group" in Peking and those local officials still in their favor—were making good on their recent threats to incite the Red Guards against the party apparatus.

In all the agitation in Peking at that time (the last 12 days of August), the most interesting development was not reported at the time and not in detail until three months later—the splitting of the Red Guard movement into hostile factions, which physically clashed with one another, and which were alleged by elements of the Guards to be carrying out the will of different groups in the top leadership. The information on this development which became available from wall-posters in November merits a summary.

The Red Guards in Peking began to polarize soon after their original organization there, even before the Red Guard movement was revealed on 18 August; and the materials available come almost entirely from the militant leftists. According to the materials, a meeting was held at Tsinghua to criticize the work-team discredited as too conservative, but those who sympathized with the most militant wing of the Red Guards were still "afraid" to demand the reinstatement of the extremist leader Kuai Ta-fu, who had been cited by Chou En-lai just four days earlier as a person who deserved to have freedom of expression but whose expressed views he (Chou) did not agree with. On 11 August the decision to remove the work-team was announced, and this, perhaps together with Chen Po-ta's militant speech of 16 August, apparently emboldened the sympathizers or supporters of Kuai Ta-fu to agree in a meeting of 17 August to demand his reinstatement. This
set the stage for the "incidents" of 19 and 24 August in which there were physical clashes between the leftists and another group which was no less aggressive in pursuit of its aims but more nearly "moderate" in its attitude on the issue in contention---namely, whether to attack central party leaders openly, especially Liu Shao-chi and his wife.

On the morning of 19 August, according to these leftist materials, the leftists put up posters denouncing Mme. Liu and demanding that she return to the campus for criticism (she had not yet submitted her self-criticism), but these leftists were immediately denounced by other forces, which put up counter-posters and raised the issue of the propriety of public attacks on central party leaders.

On the evening of 19 August, a meeting was held at Tsinghua to discuss the question of reinstating Kuai Ta-fu and other leftists, a meeting presided over by a member of the provisional preparatory committee at Tsinghua, i.e. the new cultural revolution committee subordinate to Chen Po-ta's central "cultural revolution group." Although this official had been among those posting criticism of Mme. Liu in the morning, he did not allow the leftists to dominate the meeting as completely as they wished; he seems to have supported the actual chairman in refusing to permit the leftists to deliver a number of lengthy prepared speeches, forcing them to speak briefly and ineffectually. When the leftists protested this, another group of Red Guards--apparently representing the same forces which had put up counter-posters in the morning--moved in to suppress them, distributed propaganda, beat up at least one leftist, and took over the meeting completely. The leftist materials charge the cultural revolution committee with the responsibility for this, and, by implication, Chen Po-ta, although he was not named on this occasion.

On 22 August, as noted earlier, Chou En-lai spoke again at Tsinghua and incited the revolutionary students in general terms against the party apparatus (not particular leaders), and expressly encouraged them to say almost
anything they liked in their wall-posters, to "debate" in this way, and to form as many kinds of Red Guard organizations as they cared to. This apparently gave fresh encouragement both to the leftists and to the moderates at Tsinghua.

On 24 August, according to the leftist materials, there was a more serious incident, likewise indicating, in the leftist view, that the university's cultural revolution committee (and by implication Chen Po-ta's central group) were pseudo-revolutionaries, actually supporters of the "right" (the moderates). Following Chou's speech, the leftists had evidently put up a number of new posters, criticizing central party leaders, including Chou himself, the Peking party committee, the university's cultural revolution group, and the moderate elements of the Red Guards, but mainly denouncing Liu Shao-chi. According to the leftist materials, the moderates in the afternoon and evening of 24 August took the initiative in an "incident" aimed at discrediting the leftists, in the course of which, among other things, they demonstrated so fiercely against leftist Red Guards meeting in a middle-school that the school was forced to declare a state of siege, seized control of the university's radio-station, tore down all or most of the offensive posters, and assaulted people along the way. The leader of the moderates, Ho Peng-fei, although among those criticizing Mme. Liu five days earlier, is said to have denounced the leftists as anti-Mao, to have praised Chou En-lai, and to have threatened to "settle accounts with those posting criticisms of central leaders. In the leftist document which gives the most detailed account of this, the incident is said to have been sponsored by officials of Mme. Liu's discredited work-team (of which she was not the head), but the evidence for this seems inferential, namely the content of the posters (predominantly anti-Liu) and the fact of participation on the moderate side by Liu's daughter (who had mildly criticized her stepmother's work with the work-team just three days earlier), and this sponsorship seems most improbable, as the work-team was in enough trouble already. At another point in the leftist materials, Red Guards involved in the incident are said to have disclaimed knowledge of the
people behind the action, but others on the scene are said to have stated that the action was taken on the authority of Chen Po-ta with the approval of his "cultural revolution group."

As noted previously, there is no evidence that Red Guards being briefed by party leaders were given specific targets to attack, and, similarly, there is no evidence in the Red Guard materials that "orders" were passed to any Red Guard faction secretly from any corresponding group or faction in the party leadership. Nevertheless, the leaders of the militants appeared to feel that they were expressing the will of Mao and Lin Piao, and the record of Mao's occasional statements and Lin's speeches suggests that the militants were right about that in a general sense, although not in all respects (e.g. with respect to attacking particular targets at particular times). The militants also appeared to feel that their opponents were expressing the different will of Chou En-lai and Chen Po-ta, but an assessment of this is trickier. Chen, regarded always as a direct spokesman for Mao, had not been appreciably 'softer' than Mao and Lin, and may have been held responsible by militant Red Guards for softer positions taken by other members of the "cultural revolution group" which he headed; Chou for his part had apparently told the Red Guards what Mao and Lin had directed him to tell them but had usually suggested a personal distaste for the most militant positions; on balance, the Red Guards seemed right in general in regarding Chou as the spokesman for what was--relatively--a moderate position.

... some observations at the time on that stage of the "cultural revolution" which seemed and still seem sound:

Many of the motives impelling the leaders to launch such a movement must remain a matter of speculation. One was presumably a wish to bring the cultural revolution to a peak of violent physical action, to bring it out from the Party headquarters and universities into
the streets. This was the touch of terror which according to Mao any rectification movement requires; its size, so much greater than anything that has occurred in Communist China before, may be taken as an indication of how crucial the issues behind the cultural revolution appear to the present leaders.

Another objective must have been revolutionary education for the younger generation. Here, as so often in this story, we return to Mao's obsessive fears about China's youth and his desire to train a race of reliable successors. This was an attempt to provide a synthetic revolutionary experience.../and/ to commit the educated youth, all potential bourgeois revisionists, against the bourgeoisie, to attach them finally to Mao and the proletariat by engaging them in violent and irrevocable acts, to ensure their loyalty by involving them in collective responsibility, or guilt.

A third motive was almost certainly connected with the continuing struggle inside the party. The designation of those within the party as the main targets and the evidence of resistance from local Party men in the provinces...lead to the conclusions that the Red Guards...provided the anvil on which Party critics of the Maoist line were to be pounded. The Red Guards may well have been created to effect the purge of the Party from below...

The center of disturbance and of interest /as of early September/ has shifted to the provinces. In Peking the posters hang forlornly from the walls and the party is over. But the cultural
revolution itself continues...What we have
seen is only one particularly bloodthirsty
engagement in what the Chinese leaders them-
selves tell us is a long campaign.

September: The Subsidence of the Red Guards

In late August Mao's new team in Peking had given
an appearance of concern about those aspects of Red Guard
activity which were getting or might get out of hand, al-
though evidence was lacking that Mao and his new team
up to that time had wanted it any more in hand than it
had been. (In other words, Mao and the new team had
wished to have a large degree of disorder, had in fact
called upon the young revolutionaries not to fear dis-
order, had seen this as essential in order to terrorize
the populace and in particular to strike fear into party
functionaries, and now, having made their point, were
willing to assert falsely that the Red Guards had exceeded
their instructions.) Chen Yi at that time (shortly be-
fore 30 August) had told a visitor that the Chinese lead-
ers were planning to bring to a speedy end the "excesses"
of the Red Guards, and on 28 August People's Daily--in
an editorial entitled "Revolutionary Young People Should
Learn from the PLA"—had called for greater discipline.
Noting that Mao himself had originally issued this call,
the party newspaper asserted that the Red Guards and
"other revolutionary organizations" had been established
with the PLA as their model, and asked them to "learn
still better from the PLA" to carry out the "three main
rules of discipline and the eight points for attention"
stipulated by Mao, to "adhere to mass discipline," and
to defend the "people's interests" and "state property." It
pointed out that the 8 August declaration had called
for reasoning, not coercion or force, and said—as the
8 August declaration had not—that this was applicable
even to "those in authority who are taking the capitalistic
road" (i.e., even to the party figures previously identi-
fied as the main targets). In other words, now that the
Red Guards had correctly read and acted upon the militant
emphasis of the 8 August declaration, and subsequent
commentaries, the party leaders could retreat for a while into one of the cautionary provisions of the declaration. Lin Piao and others of the new team were soon to call more clearly for discipline—a discipline which if effected would permit the Red Guards to be used in a more orderly way, over the long term, against a narrower range of targets.

On 31 August there was another huge rally of "revolutionary teachers and students" in Peking, in which Mao had the starring roles. Mao arrived at the rally in the first car, accompanied by Lin, Ho Lung (another old-time military leader and officer of the Military Affairs Committee), Hsieh Fu-chih (still Minister of Public Security, despite the fact that he had been a protege of Teng Hsiao-ping), and Yang Cheng-wu (commander of the Peking headquarters of the PLA); there seems no doubt that Mao intended in this way to emphasize the degree to which the new team united and rested upon the regime's instruments of force. In the second car were the third and fourth-ranking leaders, Chou En-lai and Tao Chu, along with Chiang Ching (Mao's wife) and another party leader (not Chen Po-ta, fifth-ranking, who was missing, but Nieh Jung-chen, a new figure in the inner circle). Back in the third car were the demoted leaders of the old party apparatus, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping.

The rally was opened by Chiang Ching in her capacity as first "deputy head of the cultural revolution group," and was apparently presided over by her (thus maintained continuity, as Chen Po-ta had presided over the first rally). Lin Piao and Chou En-lai again made the speeches. Lin
strongly praised the contribution of the Red Guards to date in destroying the "four olds." He went on, however, to call upon the Red Guards to "distinguish who are our enemies and who are our friends," to "unite with the great majority and concentrate all forces on striking at the handful of bourgeois rightists." The "main target of the attack," he said, must be "those persons in power who have wormed their way into the party and are taking the capitalist road." In this formulation, Lin was reiterating almost verbatim the line which had been taken in the militant portions of the 8 August declaration and by Red Flag on 10 August. (It seems important to recognize that Lin in his August and September speeches was not originating a new line, but identifying himself primarily with the militant elements of the existing line.) Thus restricting the range of Red Guard activity while inciting them anew against party leaders, Lin went on to line up with the 28 August People's Daily on the means of struggle ("Don't hit people," not even the bad "persons in power"), and to describe the Red Guards as "the shock force...of the great cultural revolution and a powerful reserve force of the People's Liberation Army."

Chou En-lai also praised the Red Guards, but he went on to emphasize the need for a discipline as strong as the PLA's, and he did not incite the Red Guards to further action against party leaders as Lin had. Stating expressly what Lin had simply implied, Chou asked the Red Guards to build themselves into a disciplined body and to become a "reliable reserve force" of the PLA.

During the first two weeks of September there were additional indications that Peking intended to put the brake on the Red Guard movement as a whole, while shaping it up as a permanent vehicle on the PLA model—a vehicle which could be driven headlong if so desired for a period of weeks, or used to run over given individuals while missing others, and then reliably slowed or halted.* The

*Delegations from both Red Guard units and the party committees they had been attacking were reported to be trooping into Peking in this period to appeal to the party center.
party's actions at this stage like others cannot be fitted neatly into a clearly-defined period, owing to the lack of synchronization, especially the lag behind Peking itself; as previously noted, the Red Guards in Peking had begun to slow down at the end of August, while Red Guards at many other places (including Red Guards from Peking) were staging riots until mid-September. But the actions taken in Peking of course indicated intentions as regards the conduct of the "cultural revolution" as a whole.

Following up on the admonitory editorials and admonitory elements of leaders' speeches of late August, People's Daily reiterated on 5 September that it was the party's policy to "Struggle By Reasoning, Not By Coercion or Force" (the title of an editorial that day).* And on 7 September the party newspaper told the Red Guards directly that they were not to interfere with productive work and should in fact organize themselves to assist with the autumn harvest. (There had in fact been a number of reports--of the closing-down of factories owing to Red Guard activity, and of the disruption of work and morale in communes.) The paper went on to say that the leaders of economic units should establish two teams--one "mainly" for the cultural revolution, one "mainly" for production.

*Chou En-lai on 9 September talked with the "headquarters" personnel of the Red Guard groups going to the south, and on 10 September gave an extensive briefing to

*The party on the same date put in better order its plans for bringing provincial students to Peking for indoctrination. A later wall-poster cites a party-government directive of 5 September establishing quotas, teacher-student ratios, length of stay (four days), and responsibility for food and transportation. It does not appear, however, that such good order was achieved.
Red Guards going out to many areas. According to the reported (and credible) text of the latter briefing, Chou emphasized the importance of organization and discipline, and of waging the struggle by "reasoning," even though the objective was to "smash." (Chou cited the 8 August declaration, Lin Piao's 31 August speech, and the 5 September editorial as guidelines.)

Chou in this briefing went on to tell the Red Guards that they had the right spirit but also had a lot to learn. They must learn from Mao's works, from their own study and investigation, and from earlier Red Guard expeditions. If they could not solve problems for themselves, they could—in order—ask the Peking headquarters for their region for a directive, ask their leaders remaining in Peking, or ask the appropriate section of the central "cultural revolution group." If they followed this course, Chou said, they could avoid "unpleasant" clashes with other Red Guard units. After telling the students—apparently failing to emphasize—that only "a few" of the party leaders represented the enemy, Chou again emphasized the importance of good behavior, instructing them not to interfere with local cultural revolution committees or local Red Guards, and not to fight with other Red Guards ("this is the thing the leaders in Peking fear most").*

Chou returned to the point that the Red Guard movement was not to rely on directives from the top, that it was to work out the "revolution" for itself so far as possible, "getting help from outside only when necessary." He did instruct them directly, however, not to interfere with production, not even to visit production enterprises without permission from the local cultural revolution bodies. Just as the party leaders were letting the Red Guards solve their own problems, Chou said that the Red Guards should have confidence that the workers could do the same. Chou took note that in some instances workers

*Another account of this briefing states that Chou also explained that a person's family background was not the only consideration in evaluating his reliability. The dominant party leaders were later (December) to charge that their opponents had used this very issue to get the Red Guards fighting among themselves instead of against Mao's opponents.
had been organized to counter-attack Red Guards, and said that the party leaders concerned had been told to solve problems through "discussions." He noted further that party leaders in some areas could be expected to obstruct or even to try to suppress the Red Guards, and these people must be struggled against, as they might prove to be conservatives of the type who dominated the period of June and July. In other words, although Chou did not say so explicitly, the Red Guards would be testing the local party leaders—in effect, testing whether the various elements of the party apparatus outside the center would line up behind Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping or would try instead to demonstrate their allegiance to the new team.

Speaking then to the Red Guards scheduled to visit Shanghai (some 20,000, in this wave) Chou discussed at length the "complicated" situation in Shanghai, but he did not assign specific targets, which would have been a way to work through the complications; he simply told them not to attack "at random," not to insult foreigners, and to consult with other Red Guards; and, in fact, later in the speech, he explicitly declined to say which organizations in Shanghai were regarded as good and which as bad, saying that he trusted the Red Guards to resolve this themselves. Similarly, in speaking of the tricky area of Sinkiang and of the "complex" situations in Sian and Lanchow (there had been serious incidents in both of these also), Chou took note that there are "two differing viewpoints" among Red Guards—meaning, presumably, militant and moderate—but did not tell the students that one wing or the other had the endorsement of the party leaders. Similarly, later in the briefing, he explicitly took note that the Peking Red Guards were divided into three headquarters, and expressed no favor for any one over the others, saying merely that each should stay out of the other headquarters.

On 11 September People's Daily returned to a proposition that had been put forward in the 3 August declaration and had been spelled out by the party newspaper itself on 23 August—namely, that the targets of the Red Guards were not to be allowed to fight back, to organize resistance. Quoting the 3 August declaration to the
effect that "it is not permitted, whatever the pretext, to incite the masses to struggle against one another, or to incite the students to do likewise," the 11 September editorial took note (as it had on 23 August) that "responsible persons in some localities and units openly defied this decision,... created various pretexts to suppress the mass movement,... even incited a number of workers and peasants... to oppose and antagonize the revolutionary students." (There were of course many more instances of this as of 11 September than as of 23 August.) The newspaper reiterated that such resistance was "diametrically counter" to Mao's directives," and that a "firm struggle" would be waged against anyone so foolish as to resist Mao.* This editorial could of course be read as the corollary to the admonitions to the Red Guards in that period--better discipline for the Red Guards, less resistance from the party leaders attacked, a neater script all around. But this could hardly have been satisfactory to the party leaders who were then under attack or expected to be attacked: even if assured in advance that they were in good favor and would just be playing out a farce (a very few such assurances may have been given), acquiescence in this role--public humiliation by children--would undermine their authority forever and thus their ability to perform the jobs they were trying to keep.** This was soon proved to be the case, in Heilungkiang, where a first secretary in high favor with Peking found his provincial committee to be paralyzed, after a particularly militant attack by Red Guards.

*It would seem that those who had "openly defied" a central committee directive would have to be severely punished at a later stage of the campaign, if the central committee and its subordinate organs were ever to exercise authority again.

**The Book of Job comments on their situation: "Unto me men gave ear, and waited, and kept silence at my counsel. After my words they spake not again... But now they that are younger than I hold me in derision, whose fathers I would not have set with the dogs of my flock."
In the same period (dating from late August, in Peking), posters were observed reminding the Red Guards of their subordination to "cultural" revolutionary committees," and warning them not to attack "old revolutionary cadres," nor to use force except against those targets "ratified by the central committee" and municipal committees, nor to search the houses of "revolutionary cadres" (party members?) except when ratified as above, nor even to search "bad elements" unless in coordination with the local police and public security officials.*

In this period of early September, the regime appeared to be taking organizational measures to ensure the continuing coordination of the activities of the Red Guards in a given province or municipality, and perhaps even on a national basis. Provincial broadcasts and wall-posters first spoke of a "Red Guard General Headquarters of Universities and Colleges in Peking," and soon other "General Headquarters" were reported as having been established by a preparatory committee. The objectives were stated by one provincial broadcast as being to "organize, merge, unify, and handle matters under centralized control." The regime seemed to intend to combine all of the individual Red Guard "headquarters" representing separate types of schools into a true general headquarters for a given area--one representing first all types of schools and then all types of Red Guard activity in the area.** The establishment of headquarters in a given

---*Visitors to Tientsin in mid-September reported walls and vehicles covered with posters saying "use peaceful methods, not violence."

**A diplomat in Peking at this time saw a poster dated 15 September announcing that on 13 September there had been held the "first congress for the General Headquarters of the Red Guards among industrial workers in Peking." The notice said that the meeting had "elected" a full "preparatory committee." The diplomat commented that this, on the face of it, looked like a step toward setting up permanent Red Guard organizations in enterprises throughout the country, and he surmised that would (footnote continued on page 86)
area was normally celebrated in a rally attended by leading figures of the provincial and/or municipal party committee, of the local cultural revolution committee, and of the local military headquarters, with speeches by one or more individuals from each such group. These Red Guard headquarters "elected" their officers, and were then supplied with "instructors" from the local PLA headquarters.

Three of these provincial accounts referred to a possible national headquarters of the Red Guards. One (Mukden radio) spoke of an "Amalgamated General Headquarters of the Red Guards," and two others (in South China) referred to the "combined command" of the Red Guards, one of them (Kweiyang) specifying that the Red Guard headquarters in Kweichow had been established as a result of a proposal of representatives of this "combined command" and local colleges. It was not at all clear, however, what the components of this "combined command" were; while it would have made sense for the "combined command" to be simply the command of a general headquarters, representing many types of Red Guard units, the Kweiyang broadcast spoke of the headquarters itself as having been established partly on the initiative of the "combined command" (that is, the combined command existed first); thus the "combined command" may have been composed of local leaders of the party committees, the cultural revolution bodies, and the PLA. Neither was there any way to judge whether there was a "combined command" in Peking. Subsequent materials gave no indication of a national headquarters.

(footnote continued from page 85)

include "supervising the Party leadership in these organizations." Nothing further was heard of this "general headquarters" at the time, but it was evidently a first step toward the new vehicles that emerged in January. Perhaps the September policy was reversed or held in abeyance before being reaffirmed in party directives in December.
Another important organizational measure taken in this period, in order to slow the momentum of the Red Guards and get or keep them under control, was the establishment of Red Guard Control Squads, a kind of military police (but with larger powers) given complete uniforms and appreciable training. The first of these was reported in Peking at the end of August, and another soon appeared in Tientsin. These were said--like party pronouncements and wall-posters--to have ordered Red Guards to stop using coercion (including torture) and to adhere to the 16-point directive of 8 August, and to recognize at all times the authority of the central committee and municipal committees; they were further said to have the authority to expel disreputable elements and to tear down posters that did not reflect the true intentions of the party leadership. One poster, dating the decision to establish them as 25 August, described them as the elite corps of the Red Guards--just as the Red Guards were the elite corps of the "revolutionary students," and the latter were the elite corps of the masses--and declared that they had authority to "investigate Red Guard organizations in all schools, organizations, factories and units."* Similar bodies were subsequently reported in the provinces, sometimes under the name of "Picket Corps" or "Provost Teams" described as being concerned with "security work and the maintenance of revolutionary order" (among the roving Red Guards). Observed (in films) in action in Peking on 1 October, the control squads did indeed look like the elite of the Red Guards.

This impression of early September--that Peking was moving toward the systematic coordination of Red Guard activity--proved to be misleading. The more important development--which was not to become clear until November--was the logical consequence of the polarization of the Red Guards into militant and moderate elements which had

*A later report on these Control Squads described them as being composed of the oldest Red Guards--in their twenties--and as having "absolute authority."
begun even earlier than 18 August and which was noted in the foregoing section of this paper. This was preparatory action by the most militant elements of the Red Guards to set up rival headquarters, which first appeared in the Northeast, in late September, and then in Peking and several provinces in October.* The Red Guards had been implicitly authorized to do so—that is, to set up whatever organizations they liked—in Chou En-lai's speech at Tsinghua on 22 August (not available until late November), and they may have been explicitly authorized to do so in interviews with officers of the central "cultural revolution group." Unfortunately, no material on the preparatory stage is available, and it is not known whether the militant organizers of the "rebel" headquarters got explicit permission from these officers or any other leaders of the inner circle.

The question remained, in these first two weeks of September which saw the closing of the first—that is, the most violent—phase of Red Guard activity: from whom were the Red Guards getting their orders? The answer—set forth in detail below—seems to be that individual party leaders were the first to recognize that some of the "headquarters" appearing in this period were not later forms of organizations originally reported in the "preparatory" stage, but were in fact rival headquarters. A good account of the material on the evolution of divisions in the Red Guards beginning in August—mostly material received much later, sorted out, and composed chronologically—appears in OCI's monthly political report on China of 16 December 1966. The present writer does not agree, however, that the material shows the rival groups to be "responsive to different individuals" in the politburo standing committee; what it shows, on this writer's reading, is that the militants believe that they are responsive to Mao and Lin, and believe that their opponents are responsive to others, and in some respects are probably right about this—but not in the sense of attacking targets to order.

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leaders, the conventional party apparatus, the PLA, and the new "cultural revolution committees" all had roles, but that their most important guidance from the top level came from Chou En-lai (as their "advisor") and from the central "cultural revolution group," and, at the working level, from the subordinate "cultural revolution" bodies.

In a vague, general sense, the central committee and Chairman Mao were the "leaders" or "commanders" of the Red Guard. In fact the Red Guards were quoted in their first appearance--18 August--as defining their mission as that of defending the central committee, Mao, and Mao's thought. Red Guards like others were constantly describing Mao as China's "supreme commander," or "great leader," or "helmsman," and Red Guard wall-posters often spoke of the party central committee as exercising "leadership" or even "supreme" leadership, and told the Red Guards to recognize this. But there was no suggestion in any material that either Mao or the central committee issued orders directly to the Red Guards.

Similarly, Red Guards were sometimes quoted as recognizing Lin Piao as their leader or commander, or as deputy to Mao in such a role, and it is true that Lin had publicly given them some of their general directives at the rallies of 18 and 31 August. Some sources in this period surmised that Lin had conceived the Red Guards, and others surmised that in any event he had taken them over, or wished to do so. But there was no evidence that Lin was giving them better-defined directives in meetings with small groups, as Chou En-lai--reported to be an "advisor" to the Guards--and leaders of the "cultural revolution group" did on several occasions.

The conventional party apparatus was sometimes said to be in authority over the Red Guards, in the sense that provincial party committees were sometimes described as "leading the cultural revolution" in the province, or as "supervising" the activities of Red Guards in their jurisdictions; and in at least one province Red Guard speakers cited the "leadership" of the provincial committee as well as that of the central committee and Mao.
Leading figures of regional, provincial and municipal party committees were prominent in public gatherings—usually giving the main speeches—at public gatherings centered on the Red Guards, and provincial committees were credited with having called some of these meetings; further, there was a reported directive from one provincial committee that a party functionary assigned directly by the party must "lead" each of the Red Guard units being established throughout the province at the time, and party committees were sometimes reported as directing the recruiting and/or organizing of Red Guard units. The bulk of the evidence from that period suggested that the party committee's leadership was being exercised through an extraordinary party organ, the cultural revolution committee or group. This did not mean that the party committee's leadership was purely nominal; the cultural revolution committee or group was often if not usually led by a secretary of the local party committee, and it was later learned that at least some of the cultural revolution committees and groups in this period were submitting regular or at least numbered reports to the local party committees (as well as to the central committee). But even in cases in which the local cultural revolution committee and groups were headed by local secretaries who had been loyal to their first secretaries, it is doubtful that the local party committees could effectively direct and control the activities of the Red Guards, because the cultural revolution committees and groups were also getting orders from the central "cultural revolution group" which they could disregard only at their peril, and, moreover, Mao's new team in Peking was bypassing the conventional party apparatus in giving the Red Guards their most important instructions in personal interviews, instructions which the Red Guards were bound to take more seriously than orders received from the local party secretaries whom they were free to attack.

The "PLA"—as distinct from Lin Piao personally—was surmised by some observers to be leading, directing or supervising the Red Guards. This surmise appeared to be built upon the many descriptions of the PLA as the model, the calls upon the Red Guards to "learn from the PLA," the assertion that the Red Guards were already or
were to become a "reserve force of the PLA (according to one report, an "armed" reserve), the links with the PLA through the establishment of Corps and the assignment of PLA officers as "instructors," the references to a "combined command" of the Red Guards (the assumption being--perhaps correctly--that the PLA at some level represented part of the combined command), and the prominent roles of military figures (along with party committee and "cultural revolution committee" figures) in the meetings celebrating the establishment of the various headquarters and welcoming Red Guards back from their travels. At least one observer conjectured that the General Political Department of the PLA was directing the Red Guards, and more than one concluded that the supervisory role of the PLA--in itself uncertain--was at any rate "increasing" as of mid-September. Apart from the establishment of the various headquarters, which did indeed suggest a larger PLA role at least in making the Red Guards a disciplined body, the surmise of PLA direction of the Red Guards as of mid-September seemed to be built on little more than an impression of an increased prominence of PLA figures in public activities related to the Red Guards; for example, in at least two Red Guard ceremonies of mid-September, military figures--uncharacteristically--were listed first among the dignitaries present, and in at least three instances the military figures gave the main speeches.

The "cultural revolution group" in Peking and its subordinate bodies--together with Chou En-lai--appeared to have the largest role in the direction of Red Guard activity in this period. Whereas Peking has claimed that the Red Guards originated spontaneously, at a Peking middle-school attached to Tsinghua, on the contrary, that the Red Guards were conceived and first organized by officials of the "cultural revolution group" (Chen Po-ta, Tao Chu, and Chiang Ching were specified); the truth may be that one or more of these officials were the first to consider the uses to which such organized students might be put, and to present this idea to Mao and others. Materials received much later showed that these and other officials of the "group" gave interviews to
groups of Red Guards in July and August, interviews in which at least general instructions were given.

Wall-posters and other sources have reported that "cultural revolution" committees and groups continued to organize the Red Guards, with the lower-level bodies sending their lists to higher-level bodies for approval. The organization of Red Guards in their commune in early September was being handled by PLA men, but under the direction of some unspecified body--perhaps the cultural revolution committee of the local party committee.

There was considerable evidence of a close relationship between the "cultural revolution" bodies and the Red Guards--much of which evidence indicated the direction of the latter by the former--from broadcasts, posters, and the like. Just as officers of the "cultural revolution group" in Peking had presided over the first two Red Guard rallies in Peking (18 and 31 August), in the meetings at many points in China which established Red Guards Corps or welcomed Red Guards home, in most cases in which a presiding official was identified the presiding figure was a party committee official who was concurrently an officer of the committee's cultural revolution committee or group, although there were a few reports of such meetings in which "cultural revolution" figures were not identified as present. Local cultural revolution committees and groups were sometimes identified as receiving "revolutionary students" from other areas, and it was reported that a party directive had called for this:

There were also several reports of "joint" activity by the "cultural revolution" bodies and the Red Guards--e.g., convening meetings, proposing the establishment of Red Guard headquarters, sponsoring forums, or studying the 8 August declaration. And there were at least two explicit statements by party and Red Guard sources that the "revolutionary students and teachers" were working under the "leadership" of the "cultural revolution" bodies. In this connection--perhaps the best evidence of the subordination of the Red Guards in that
period—the top officers of the central "cultural revolution group" in Peking were identified several times as providing direction. As previously noted, the students attacking the provincial party headquarters in Sinkiang in early September claimed to be acting under the authority of Chen Po-ta; and it was to the "cultural revolution groups" all over China that the local academics sent their protest. At about the same time, according to later wall-posters, the competing forces in a research institute attached to a hospital in Peking—the work-team and the body that had dislodged it (a "cultural revolution" body)—both claimed to have the word—a "directive" or direct instructions—from Tao Chu himself*; and Red Guards in Lanchow, attacking the provincial first secretary, telephoned Tao Chu for instructions, who reportedly said that the masses on the spot must decide (and was thus consistent with the line that Chou En-lai had taken on 22 August and 10 September, namely that the revolutionary students should work out their policies themselves). Materials received much later indicated that at least four other officers of the cultural revolution group—Chiang Ching, Kang Sheng, Kuan Feng, and Chang Ping-hua—were giving speeches and interviews to the Red Guards in this period.

Chou En-lai also had a major role, perhaps the most important role of any party leader. Chou was known to have given important instructions to the Red Guards in at least two major speeches in August (some sources say that there were more), he was reported to have given at least two more important interviews in early September.

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*This incident was to figure later in posters attacking Tao Chu himself. The Minister of Health was said in the September posters to have sent the work-team and to have intervened personally on its behalf, while posters of November charged Tao with defending this same Minister of Health.
and he was soon to give another major interview--appearing together with Tao Chu--in which he gave the Red Guards the clearest guidance ever reported. This role has to be kept in mind when considering reports that this or that Red Guard activity was directed against Chou; this is not to say that there was no such activity, as the most militant Red Guard units in late August did appear to believe that their opponents represented Chou's line, but to say that some of the lines which the Red Guards were acting on were formulated by Chou himself.

At the working level, the role of the "cultural revolution" bodies, although the picture they gave was mixed and in some respects suggested the possibility of an expansion of the authority given the Red Guards themselves at the expense of the "cultural revolution" bodies. As for the latter, first, Red Guard units attached to various organizations were themselves ordering subordinate organizations--or Red Guard units attached to them--to send certain persons back to the parent organization to take part in the cultural revolution, or were informing them of plans for meetings--in some cases, to make plans to attack party committees--and directing them to send people to participate. However, it was the cultural revolution groups which were doing this or things like this or were being addressed in such a way as to suggest supervisory authority over Red Guard activity. Finally, in all three of the instances in which higher authority was appealed to, "cultural revolution" bodies were identified as that authority; in addition to the case in Sinkiang, an organization in Kansu specified that its dispatch of a revolutionary cadre to Peking "must be agreed to by the cultural revolution group," and a Red Guard unit in Tibet asked the "central cultural office" in Peking to consider a question posed by another Red Guard unit.
While the party leaders in Peking were calling both for militancy (Lin publicly, Chou privately) and for discipline, and Peking itself was fairly quiet, elsewhere in China in the first two weeks of September many clashes were reported. These continued to include attacks by Red Guards on ordinary citizens, attacks by Red Guards on party committee headquarters and on individual party and government officials (including functionaries of the new "cultural revolution" committees and teams), the "shame parading" of party officials,* battles between various groups of Red Guards (those from Peking were generally reported as the most militant and obnoxious), battles between Red Guards and local citizens organized by party committees to oppose them, and such other features as "hunger strikes" outside party committee headquarters and the use of troops to quell "riots." In some of these disorders, thousands of people were reported to have been engaged, and in some cases hundreds were reported to have been injured and dozens killed, or hundreds as the sum of several incidents).**

* TASS later reported that party officials in Harbin--and their wives--were bound, covered with mud, and taken around town in carts.

** the early September clashes between Red Guards and party officials in Kueilin gives a credible account of a "counter-attack" by local party leaders which included propaganda attacks on the Red Guards as counter-revolutionary and the organization of workers and peasants to attack the Guards physically; the Peking students were said to have been the most feared, and to have been particular targets of surveillance, attack, and arrest; the local party authorities are said also to have tried to prevent these students from sending messages to Peking. The students' material notes that the situation had "changed for the better" by 15 September, but that there were later incidents involving different elements of the "masses of the people," and that the Peking Red Guards hoped to return to Kueilin to fight again alongside the Kueilin Red Guards.
The best illustration of the extreme disorder of the period, and of the bewilderment and outrage of the party officials under attack, comes from the province ("autonomous region") of Sinkiang.

On 2 September Wang En-mao, the first secretary in Sinkiang, had carried out the approved exercise of holding a large rally of "revolutionary students and teachers" (including the Red Guards) at which he had invited them to carry out the struggle and among other things to "conduct criticism against the Sinkiang regional CCP committee and myself." The students took him at his word, or more than his word, which quoted Wang's invitation and asserted that Wang had met with the students some 18 times in the period in which they had been arriving, the students described the 2 September rally as "counter-revolutionary" and Wang's speech as a "black" speech, and afterwards went to the "cultural revolution office" of the provincial committee to demand a copy of the speech. Going on to recount the efforts of the students "to overthrow the autonomous region party committee and Comrade Wang En-mao," on the evening of 3 September some students from Peking broke into the party committee building, shouted for Wang ("that guy named Wang, get the hell down here"), cursed Wang and other officials of the party committee, and issued an ultimatum; this was rejected, although another secretary met with the students twice during the night. The students began a hunger strike during the night, and continued to shout for Wang; and during the morning a large group of them broke into the party committee's living quarters and beat up some 13 PLA officers and men who "tried to explain things" to them. They then conducted a sitdown-and-fasting demonstration before Mao Tse-tung's picture in front of the party headquarters, and asserted that their demonstration "had received the support of Comrade Chen Po-ta" (the implication is that this had come by telegram after the demonstration had begun). Wang finally agreed to meet with them (apparently at two a.m.)
that night), but again they began to "rampage," shouting for him to "get the hell down here" and then making it impossible for him to speak. To speak of the "violent opposition" or the local workers, peasants, and soldiers--implying that there had finally been an armed clash--and to beg for an understanding of the "true facts."

... illustrates well the confusion in the relationships between the various vehicles of the cultural revolution. By the book, the provincial committee had authority over the "cultural revolution" committee, which in turn had authority over the Red Guards, which in turn were modelled on the PLA. Yet here the Red Guards had just taken violent action against the provincial committee (and one under a first secretary with an apparently good record), had felt free to make "demands" of the cultural revolution committee, and had beaten up men of the PLA. It is true that all of those engaged in the action--that is, the party committees, the revolutionary students, and the protesting academics--seem to have recognized the authority of the central "cultural revolution group" in Peking, but they could not agree as to whether the students had that authority behind them, and the central group in Peking seems not to have helped them to clarify the situation.*

*A similar account is provided for Wuhan by wall-posters. Students from Peking went there on 2 September and reported to the reception center set up by the cultural revolution committee there, as they apparently should have; however, they then "demanded" to see immediately the provincial second secretary, who was out of town; incensed by this absence, the Peking students held a meeting (at which, inter alia, they quarreled with Wuhan students over the importance of "proletarian background," which some correctly pointed out that Mao did not have), then marched off to the Hupei party headquarters where they staged a 40-hour hunger strike; while there, they called the party committee a "black store," demanded the dismissal of the second secretary, and threatened violence against the deputy chief of the cultural revolution group of the committee.
Some observers have contended both (a) that all of the party leaders outside Peking who were "bombarded" in this period were targetted in advance by party leaders in Peking, and (b) that it was really the mission of the Red Guards in August and September to overthrow the first secretaries of the regional bureaus and provincial and municipal committees which they "bombarded"—that is, to kill them, or put them out of action with injuries, or force them to abandon their posts and flee—and that they therefore failed in their mission, as this did not happen. The evidence is to the contrary, on both points.

As for the targetting, there is abundant evidence—in the many reported talks of party leaders with Red Guards, that there was not specific targetting, that in fact party leaders briefing the outgoing Red Guards expressly refused to give them targets. This feature of the "revolution" has been incomprehensible to many observers, who have tended to argue that party leaders "must" have issued orders to attack specific targets (i.e. to "bombard" specific party committees and first secretaries), as it would not "make sense" to proceed otherwise. (But it apparently made "sense" to Mao, an irrational man whose entire conduct of the cultural revolution seems irrational to Western observers and even to other Communists, including many of his own comrades.)

While it cannot be proved that specific targetting was not ordered secretly (a negative proposition of this sort cannot possibly be proved), a survey of the "bombardments" as they in fact occurred does support the conclusion that there was no specific targetting—indeed, that this was not to come until December, at a different stage of the campaign, after enemies were clearly identified.

It is recognized that calculations based on assessments of given leaders in terms of a patron-protege relationship must be offered cautiously, but such calculations with respect to Chinese leaders have seemed to work out well enough in the past so that a little weight can be given them. With respect to the "bombardments," whether considered in terms of proteges (known or believed) of
party leaders in disfavor, or in terms of proteges of members of the new team (who might be suspected of targeting others' proteges), or in terms of people apparently unconnected with either class of leaders, the available reporting shows no pattern. As for the proteges of those in disfavor, they were hit hard or fairly hard in the Northwest Bureau, Kansu, Heilungkiang, Anhwei, Fukien and Shanghai, but were missed or touched only lightly in the Southwest Bureau, Szechuan, Yunnan, Tsinghai, Kirin, and Shansi. As for proteges of members of the new team, they were hit hard in Hunan and Kwangtung, and missed or touched lightly in Honan and Hupel. As for the unassociated, they were hit hard in Peking itself, Hopei, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Shensi, and Sinkiang, but missed in Liaoning, Shantung, Kiangsu, Kiangsi, Ninghsia, and Tibet. Moreover, some people not regarded as proteges but known to be in favor with Mao and others of the new team at the time—e.g. Li Hsueh-feng in Peking, who had just been appointed to his post, and Pan Fu-sheng in Heilungkiang, appointed not long before—were hit hard; indeed, the new team was at pains to defend Pan against the Red Guards, informing them after the fact that they should not continue their attacks on this good comrade.

As for the weight of the attack, it is true that the 8 August declaration had stated that it was the aim of the "revolution" to "pull down" the hard-case incorrigibles in the party, but again there is no indication in the many briefings that the Red Guards were instructed in this first stage to go so far as to effect the physical removal of any official from his post. This too has seemed irrational to many observers, as the bombarded secretaries could hardly conclude otherwise than that Mao and Lin were already prejudiced against them and that most of them—whatever they did—were going to be found unfit, so that the new team in Peking "must" have intended to bring them down in that first stage. Nevertheless, the mission of the Red Guards in the eyes of those who sent them seems to have been—in that first stage—to shock, to shake up, to test the responses of, the party leaders outside Peking, partly out of Mao's general belief that
the truth would emerge from such a "storm" and partly from the new team's particular desire to accumulate a part of the truth—that is, evidence for a later judgment as to how much (what portions) of the party apparatus could be salvaged; in other words, for use when the real purge list was drawn up later.

That violence was used at all against the party secretaries, contrary to the nominal provisions of the 8 August declaration that reasoning was to be used instead of force, appears to have derived from the general exhortation to militancy, the failure to provide any rational criterion for differentiating between good and bad officials, and the failure to set clear limitations on the Red Guards' conduct. It would nevertheless be of value to know exactly why some got hit so hard, and some lightly or (so far as is known) not at all.

Unfortunately, the reporting is not good enough—to permit any confident judgment—in most cases, as to what factors were responsible for the weight of an attack on a given party committee and first secretary; but some surmises can be hazarded. In at least some cases, the Red Guards bombarding the party headquarters—e.g. in Sinkiang, Kansu, and Shanghai—seem to have been so militant that even the most well-prepared and tactful first secretary probably could not have handled them, could not have persuaded them they were devoted above all else to Mao and Mao's thought and deserved to hold their jobs; and, of course, a number of the first secretaries were neither well-prepared nor tactful. In other cases—e.g. in Kirin and Chekiang, some fragmentary reporting suggests—the first secretary apparently did a good job with them, either because they were not especially militant in the first place or because he was unusually well-prepared, conciliatory and adept. The militants seemed to have the best sense of Mao's wishes—to provide a hard work-out, a hard examination to be graded later. At the same time, the provincial leaders' response to the
Red Guards—as evaluated by the Red Guards—was certainly not the only factor in determining their later status. Indeed, there is some reason to believe that the new team commissioned poster criticism of some provincial leaders later in the year—those who had previously escaped it—in order to swell the case against any given provincial leader whom the team might decide, for whatever combination of reasons, to purge.

On 15 September Peking held its third great rally ("a million") within a month. Again Mao "reviewed" the gathering without speaking (he is said to have walked to and fro and waved), again Lin Piao appeared as his only "close comrade," again an officer of the "cultural revolution group" opened the meeting (this time Kang Shang, described as "advisor" to the group), again the new line-up of leaders was brought out, and again Lin and Chou En-lai made the main speeches. Lin again praised the Red Guards strongly, again identified the "main target of attack" as people in power in the party, and again exhorted his audience to take action against them—and did not repeat his admonitions against violence, although he did call for the development of a "high sense of organization and discipline."* It was again Chou En-lai

*Just two days later, Wang En-mao, the first secretary in Sinkiang who had had a good deal of violence used against him in early September, delivered himself of some invective. Speaking in Urumchi (Thiwa), Wang praised the progress of the cultural revolution in Sinkiang and endorsed Lin Piao's call for "bombarding the headquarters," but went on to voice "resolute opposition" to the "schemes of monsters and demons...to bombard the headquarters of the proletarian revolution." (A similar broadcast from Hunan on 20 September used much the same formulation to describe what had happened there.) Obviously, in Wang's eyes, and in the eyes of the CCP leadership until summer 1966, the headquarters of the revolution in Sinkiang was the office of the party's provincial committee.
who stated an unmilitant position, this time formulating a constructive role for the Red Guards--assisting in production, and in the roles of workers as well as exhorters. It was not exactly a question of Lin and Chou giving their audience different directives, as the content of Chou's briefings of Red Guards at the time indicated that Chou, like Lin, saw the main immediate role of the Red Guards as that of testing party leaders. But again there was a difference of emphasis, suggesting, at least, the possibility of an important disagreement on the relationship between the "revolution" and production.*

* saw films of the rallies of 31 August and 15 September and passed along some impressions: "The new films preserve the familiar order of prominence: Mao, Lin and Chou to the fore, with Tao and Kang dancing attendance. They also reinforce most strongly the impression that there is nothing basically wrong with Mao. He walks steadily, unassisted except up and down steps. He is generally alert, though he withdraws occasionally into a 'blind god' stance. He is capable of a wide range of gestures. He speaks vigorously (though his voice is not heard on the film) to the other leaders and guests on the rostrum. The only problem in this respect is that his teeth, which were never good, are now in a shocking state... While he obviously makes himself understood in personal conversation, the result of a public address would presumably be unimpressive, and this may well be the reason 'Mao does not speak'..." (This latter point looks frivolous at first glance, but it may in fact be one important reason that Mao does not make public speeches; with his mouth open, when he is not wearing his false teeth, Mao looks senile, foolish, comically evil, 'the grandmother on a box of poisoned chocolates'--and he may never have learned to manage his false teeth well enough to speak effectively with them.)
The 16 September Red Flag chose to emphasize the same point that Lin Piao had. It took up his remarks of 31 August about the need to distinguish between friends and enemies, and reiterated his point of both 31 August and 15 September—as the 8 August declaration had first said—that the "main target" was to be persons in authority in the party. It specified that the "main orientation" of the struggle was to "concentrate efforts to strike at this "handful" of "primary, important, and most dangerous enemies," and warned its audience to avoid the mistake of "taking hold of questions secondary in importance while permitting the main targets to slip by." This formulation, in the context, seemed pretty clearly to call for early and decisive action against a number of party leaders (later, the editorial specified that the revolution was not aimed at "all leading cadres," only the handful). The editorial went on to say that by secondary questions it meant "general shortcomings and mistakes in the work style of the people," as distinct from party functionaries.*

On 18 September the Liberation Army Daily—almost certainly reflecting the views of Lin Piao—chose to emphasize the point that Chou En-lai had. It agreed with Chou that one important task for the PLA, government organizations, and "schools and colleges which have not yet carried out the great cultural revolution" was that of helping to gather the autumn harvest. On the same day Peking Radio announced that, "in response to the call of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the CCP central committee," more than 100,000 Red Guards and other young revolutionaries had gone to Peking's suburbs to do so. It was further announced on the same day that "large groups" of young people were so engaged "in many parts of the country."

* later reported a rumor that there had been a politburo meeting in roughly the period 5-10 September, which inter alia "discussed" the relationship between the cultural revolution and production. The "discussion" clearly persisted beyond 10 September and probably into December, ending in a defeat for those who hoped to keep the "cultural revolution" from interfering seriously with production.
And on 19 September People's Daily underlined the point:
the regime's highest-priority task was now the harvest.*

Nothing new was said or done publicly in the rest
of September. There was an interesting development on
24 September, however, when People's Daily reprinted in
its entirety a long, tedious article from the Liberation
Army Daily of the previous day.** The article--actually
a collection of materials for PLA units to study in pre-
paration for National Day on 1 October--was a review
of the "situation" ("very fine") in familiar terms: the
importance of the "cultural revolution" led by Mao (and
secondarily Lin), the continued presence of a "small num-
ber of persons in power in the party" who must be "struck
down," the great contributions of the Red Guards and the
PLA, the necessity for studying and applying the works
of Mao ("the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era"), the
"transformation" of ideology and enthusiasm into material
gains (an "overall leap forward" seen on "every front"),
the PLA as a "great school of Mao's thought" and the model
for the entire country (the creation of the universal man,
who could and would play all social and productive roles),
the illumination given the entire world by Mao's thought
(the fantasy of China as the center of the "world revolu-
tion"), and the need for the PLA to press ahead on its

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*Ironically, in the same period (21 September) a Honan
broadcast denounced a party official there for evading
the thought of Mao Tse-tung and concentrating on his job
of agricultural production; he was quoted as having said
that the central problem for him was how great the food
shortage would be and how to feed the people better, and
as having criticized the work-teams for holding meetings
instead of working.

**The first posters criticizing Liu Shao-chi were re-
ported on this day, and on the following day (25 September)
Japanese visitors were told that they could not see Liu
because he was "under criticism now."

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present lines (carry through the revolution, hold aloft Mao's banner, etc.). The thing of interest--apart from the demonstration of the PLA's adherence to Mao's dogma in its most extreme form--was the reprinting of it by People's Daily. That is, the party newspaper, rather than originating material of its own for National Day, served up this material prepared for the narrow PLA audience--as if indeed the PLA were the model for everyone in the narrowest, strictest sense. The action placed the PLA newspaper again in the position--which it had occupied through the previous winter and spring--of providing leadership for the "cultural revolution," and it also gave the party's imprimatur to the picture of Lin Piao alone as standing on the heights with Chairman Mao.

Little new material came to hand in the last two weeks of September on the relationship between the Red Guards and the "cultural revolution group" and its subordinate committees and teams. The little there was did not change the picture of mid-September: that is, it was still a mixed picture, with most of the evidence still indicating that the cultural revolution bodies had the largest role in the direction of the Red Guards (even though Lin Piao in Peking might and probably did have a larger voice in policy than either Chou En-lai or the leaders of the central cultural revolution group there). For example, in conversations of about the same time, Chinese Communist officials seemed to have been insisting on the central place of the cultural revolution committees with respect both to the local party committees and the Red Guards: according to these persons, "every organization" in China was to have its cultural revolution body, nominally subordinate to the local party committee but with power to "attack" the local committee for disobedience to the party center, (thus serving as a device for dividing the party committee); the party committee, they said (as summarized by the diplomat), would also be "subject to attack by the Red Guards," the implication being that the Guards would get their orders through "cultural revolution" bodies. Broadcasts showed that officials of the cultural revolution bodies continued to preside over Red Guard rallies...
at the provincial as well as national level; and showed cultural revolution bodies to be directing Red Guard units in various ways.

As previously noted, materials received much later indicated pretty clearly that the Red Guards were not getting orders to attack particular targets; that they were being turned loose with not much more than an exhortation to "sic'm" and an assurance that the truth would be shaken out.* (One group of Shanghai Red Guards, asked how they could judge the "mistakes" of the Shanghai committee, said that they simply used their little red books of Mao's sayings. A Tientsin group said it got its "orders" from People's Daily and Red Flag.) But, insofar as the Red Guards were being directed, the material received later confirmed the impression given by the materials at the time. Notably, the report received in December of Chou En-lai's briefing of 10 September quoted Chou as identifying the central "cultural revolution group" as the ultimate authority for Red Guards who felt obliged to seek directives rather than solving their own problems, and also as telling the Guards to coordinate their activities with the local cultural revolution bodies. These same materials showed that officers of the central cultural revolution group gave many briefings to local and visiting Red Guards in the second half of September.

*This apparently remained true until December. In January 1967 a speech by Chou En-lai to hundreds of visiting Red Guards on 2 October, in which he told them: "On the question of bombarding the headquarters, I cannot identify for you all the targets. I leave to you to prove amid your struggles which headquarters is the black gang and which is not...I leave you to find out for yourselves through struggles when you are wrong...Your bombardment of headquarters cannot be accurate every time. Even people like us cannot be accurate in every shot..."
The most valuable material of the period—for light on the attitude of Mao's new team toward the party apparatus and the Red Guards who had been attacking it—was not received until late November: an account of the "main points" of a long speech by Chou En-lai to visiting Red Guards from the Engineering Institute in Harbin, who had been foremost among those "bombarding the headquarters of the Heilungkiang provincial committee since late August. Chou's speech—regarded as stating essentially the position of other leaders as well—is undated, but his reference to this event as having begun "over a month" prior to his speech suggests that the speech was made near the end of September. The text indicates that Tao Chu spoke on the same occasion, and took essentially the same line.

The speech is particularly interesting for its clear indication that there was such a thing as impermissible behavior by the Red Guards, that the party leaders in Peking either had envisaged all along or had finally formulated some limits beyond which the Red Guards were not to be allowed to go.* In this connection, Chou emphasized in his speech that it was not the intention of the new team to destroy the conventional party apparatus—a basic point that might have been recognized earlier.

*The little new information on the progress of the party in organizing Red Guard "headquarters" presented more problems than it solved. For example, in late September, from Shenyang (Mukden) alone there came accounts not only of the activity of headquarters of Red Guards of universities and colleges, and of headquarters of Red Guards of middle-schools, but of a "General Command of Red Successors", and then of the activity of "Red Guards of Mao Tse-tung's Thought" of universities and colleges and middle-schools in the Mukden area, who declared the establishment of a "Shenyang Headquarters of Red Guards of Mao Tse-tung's Thought" and of a "Shenyang Middle-School Headquarters of Red Guards of Mao Tse-tung's Thought."
from the party's previous insistence that the main enemy consisted of only a "handful" of party officials, but which, in the light of Peking's failure to impose clear limits on Red Guard actions from the start, some of the Red Guards had understandably failed to grasp.

Chou began this speech by congratulating the Red Guards on their "revolutionary rebellion," but went on quickly to say and to repeat that their understanding of Mao's instructions had been "inadequate." He softened this a bit by conceding that mistakes were inevitable, but emphasized (stating several times) that mistakes must be corrected.

Chou then got to his main point: that the Red Guards were not to "struggle" indiscriminately against all members of the provincial, municipal and other party committees. He specified that Pan Fu-sheng, the Heilungkiang first secretary who had been installed only in March, was a good man and had the confidence of party leaders in Peking. He went on to say that even Peng Chen had had a generally good record, and that good work had been done by "several comrades" under Peng's leadership.* Chou said that the Heilungkiang committee also had some "good comrades," and noted further that there were limits to the struggle even against those recognized as "anti-party," because (naming one, Chou Yang) "if we struggle and he dies in the struggle then he will not be able to

*Chou at several points in this speech seemed to take a "moderate" attitude toward party leaders in disfavor, rather than wishing to blacken them retroactively back to the womb. In the absence of detailed accounts of speeches by other leaders believed to speak directly for Mao (Mme. Mao and Chen Po-ta), it cannot be asserted flatly that Chou's attitude differed from Mao's. Nevertheless, while Chou would probably not attempt seriously to defend someone whom Mao wanted to break, all of his speeches suggest that he would be on "moderate" side while the question was still being debated.
speak out further and will not be able to play the role of a teacher by negative example." (The translator was unsure of the accuracy of this passage, but it is a credible rendering, and the point helps to explain the prolonged, elaborate handling of the cases of Peng Chen and others who have fallen.)

Chou went on to emphasize the leadership's confidence in Pan Fu-sheng, and argued reasonably that Pan could not do the entire job himself, that he had to have—and did have—a number of "relatively good provincial committee comrades" to help him. Citing a "demand" by some of the Red Guards that the central committee send "some persons" to Heilungkiang, Chou rejected this idea and went on to make clear that the Northeast Bureau of the party—the superior body—had been given "full responsibility" for handling the problem of Heilungkiang. Further citing reports that some people wished to attack the Northeast Bureau itself (as other regional bureaus had been attacked, but the Northeast had not, at the time), Chou observed dryly that the Northeast Bureau itself had been sent by the central committee, and that, if the Northeast Bureau were attacked as a "black gang," this would amount to attacking the central committee itself; Chou told his audience flatly not to use the term "black gang" again (as applied, apparently, to a party organization), and specified that Mao himself had found this term unsuitable because vague.*

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*It will be recalled that the 'moderate' Red Guard forces which had clashed with the militants at Tsinghua in late August had implicitly associated Chou with opposition to poster attacks—direct or indirect—on the central committee. It is not clear whether Chou in this speech to the Heilungkiang Red Guards was correctly representing Mao's position with respect to this particular point of poster attacks on the Northeast Bureau, as other spokesmen apparently did not try to discourage attacks on any regional bureau.
Chou reiterated his opposition to the if-not-red-then-black school of thought (possibly represented by the extreme leftist Kuai Ta-fu, whose supporters had clashed with forces said to be pro-Chou at Tsinghua), a line which for example would stigmatize as "black" the children of a person who had "made a mistake." Mao opposed this too, Chou said, and went on to make the point that a good revolutionary cadre could not be transformed overnight into an "antiparty" figure, that party officials must be given an opportunity to reform. Chou conceded that some "black" persons would be found, but argued that not even the worst party committee would be "all black."

Returning to the question of the Heilungkiang committee, Chou said that the Northeast Bureau was organizing a "temporary" committee for the province, and that "you must support" Pan Fu-sheng, and "must accept the leadership" of the new committee, although its members might be criticized like anybody else. (Chou did not get into the question of the complications introduced into party committee "leadership" by this factor or by the role of the "cultural revolution group" of the committee--presumably because he wished on this occasion to emphasize Peking's desire for the continued good health of most of the conventional party apparatus.) Further, Chou said (as he had said before, as Tsinghua), the Red Guards could say in their posters anything they liked, as the party and state would not be bound by them, but they could not use the official media--the press, radio, and TV--to state their case; and in particular they could not imprison people, as they had already done ("in the entire country this has happened only in Heilungkiang"). Persons "captured" by the Red Guards, Chou said, must be handed over to the (new) provincial committee and Pan Fu-sheng. The Red Guards must not try to "effect liaison with" (meaning, apparently, "try to make direct use of") the organs of dictatorship, i.e. the PLA, public security offices, and official propaganda media. Emphasizing his point, Chou said that the public security bureau was charged with making "arrests" (apparently meant as an equivalent term to "capturing" people), but still must have the approval of the politburo standing committee. Chou said that Mao had not authorized any organization--the
Red Guards or whatever—to "capture" people, and asked them to recognize that the proletariat could not surrender its dictatorship to unofficial organs. Chou cited Tao Chu's remarks (apparently in a speech just preceding his) to the effect that some schools had a number of Red Guard groups with different points of view, and "if they all began capturing people, would it not be terrible?" Tao had also complained that party leaders in Peking—probably the central "cultural revolution group"—had telephoned the Red Guards in Harbin three times, but they had not yet released their prisoners. (This would seem to be the first reported instance of Red Guard units disregarding—perhaps with important backing—direct orders from the party high command.)

Chou went on to tell the Red Guards not to interfere with production, in fact to "concentrate on promoting production," and to participate in production. This too was to be done under the leadership of the provincial party committee.

Finally, on the question of relations among revolutionary groups, Chou appeared to say that student organizations (including the Red Guards) should respect and help one another, that "bad people" in individual student organizations would be only a small minority, and that these would be dealt with at a later stage of the movement, as had been stated in the 8 August declaration. Chou again made clear that the party leadership in Peking authorized and even encouraged the "proliferation" of student organizations in different forms and with different lines, "because young people's thoughts have ups and downs," and at the end there would be "unanimity."* Chou closed by reiterating that the question of the Heilungkiang party committee had been entrusted by the central committee to the Northeast Bureau and Pan Fu-sheng of the former provincial committee.

*Materials received much later reported Chou as telling another audience of Red Guards on 2 October that the merging of their various factions was the eventual aim, but that this could only be done by "struggle."
In sum, the most violent stage of Red Guard activity subsided after mid-September, and the Red Guards throughout September appeared to be shaping up as a disciplined organization for further use, including violent use again if required; but this latter appearance was in important respects misleading, as later material showed the Red Guards to have already polarized (with at least some of them believing that these factions represented factions in the inner circle itself), and to be preparing to establish rival headquarters. Chou En-lai and the leaders of the central "cultural revolution group" apparently continued to play the largest roles in giving the Red Guards their directives, and Chou in late September made clear to them that they were not to wreck the conventional party apparatus and that certain actions—in particular, using the party's official propaganda media and making arrests—were forbidden to them. The dominant voices of the new team—Mao's voice indirectly, and Lin Piao's and Chou En-lai's voices directly—throughout September encouraged the audience to believe that further and strong action would be taken against a number of important figures in the party (although Chou's voice was softer); after mid-September these same voices (especially Chou's) also suggested that such action might not be taken for some months.

October: Waiting, or Debating (or Both?), or "Struggling"?

Throughout October, observers of the China scene speculated as regards the future of the party leaders who had been demoted in August, of the regional and provincial figures who had been "bombarded" by the Red Guards in August and September, and of the additional party leaders in Peking who came under attack in wall-posters in October. All month long, observers waited in vain for some clear sign of the intentions of those few members of Mao's new team who had not been attacked and were presumably in a position to make the decisions as regards the others, although some observers believed that even these few were unable to work their will. In other words, observers were divided into those who believed that the new team was
waiting for conditions to become ripe before taking further action, others believed that members of the team were debating their future course, others believed that both of these propositions were true (i.e., that the team by this time had in mind a rough scheme—a prolonged morality play—for the next several months, but was debating whether some of the scenes should or even could be staged; the viewpoint of this paper), and others believed that the new team was paralyzed as a team owing to a fierce "power struggle" among its leaders.

The National Day ceremony in Peking on 1 October set the tone. Mao Tse-tung—described by Peking as "looking very healthy"—stood on the Tienamen rostrum and watched a reported 1,500,000 people parade past, many of them bearing his portrait and selections from his works. Although Mao was on view for several hours, he said nothing, contenting himself with "waving his hand" to the "paraders" and "masses." Lin Piao, who stood beside Mao, made an "important speech" which said nothing, simply taking note of the "earth-shaking changes" of the 17 years of the Peking regime and reiterating that the aim of the "cultural revolution" was to "overthrow through struggle the small handful of persons within the party who have been in authority and have taken the capitalist road," while ridding China of its old ideas, culture, customs and habits. Other speeches—none by party leaders—added nothing to nothing.*

The Red Flag editorial of the following day was hardly better. It reiterated the formula of the "struggle against a handful of persons in power within the party," gave the conventional explanation of their emergence (the

*The ceremony was nonetheless impressive. A newsreel of the occasion shows the landscape of a nightmare, with rank upon rank of young Chinese, densely packed and stretching under the blank sky as far as the eye could see, surging past with their eyes lifted to Chairman Mao, brandishing their little red books of dogma and shouting.
"law of class struggle"), contended that "only by means of striking down" such persons in the party could the schemes of the exploiting class be thwarted, and took note that the

tiny handful of persons has adopted new ways to deceive the masses, to resist the 16-point decision and to persist in maintaining the reactionary line of the bourgeoisie, and has gone to great lengths to fulfill its targets by means of inciting the masses to struggle against the masses.

The editorial went on to ask rhetorically how the process of struggle, criticism and reform--i.e., remaking society--could be carried out correctly if "we" maintain the previous "wrong line," again oppress the masses, and continue to incite students against students. But this question had been asked before, and the real question was what Mao's new team was going to do--or try to do--about these people. The editorial simply called upon those people to "pay attention to their own errors and correct them... and not reach the point of antagonizing the party."

By this time there was abundant evidence--some of it from Peking and provincial broadcasts but most of it from wall-posters which were being observed in September by diplomats, correspondents and travellers--that the Red Guards regarded quite a number of the officials of the party's regional bureaus and provincial and municipal committees as having committed grievous "errors" of this kind and as having qualified themselves eminently for "striking down"--rather than being let alone to "correct" their errors themselves.

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In the regional bureaus, two of the three first secretaries regarded as close to Teng Hsiao-ping—Li Ching-chuan of the Southwest Bureau and Liu Lan-tao of the Northwest Bureau—had seen their areas hit hard by "bombardments" since late August, and both had been and were still being denounced personally in strong terms.* Li, concurrently a full member of the politburo, was being charged in particular with having protected a municipal party committee first secretary (in Chungking) who had tried to suppress the Red Guards; while Liu, head of the hardest-hit area of all since August and concurrently an alternate member of Teng's secretariat, was being charged with having refused to meet with the revolutionary students and was also apparently being held responsible in general for the large-scale counter-attacks on the Red Guards (many beatings, some deaths) reported from three provincial capitals (Shensi, Lanchow, and Tihua) of the area. A fourth regional first secretary, Li Hsueh-feng of the North China Bureau, had also been denounced periodically since late August and steadily from 1 October, but not in this capacity—rather in his role as first secretary of the Peking municipal committee. As for the other regional first secretaries, Sung Jen-chiung of the Northeast, as noted, had not been attacked; Wang Jen-chung, the new first secretary of the Central-South Bureau (succeeding Tao Chu), had not

*The third of these first secretaries regarded as close to Teng—like Li Ching-chuan, a protege from Teng's days in the Southwest—the First Secretary of the Northeast Bureau, Sung Jen-chiung, had not had much trouble of this kind in his area, apart from the special case of Heilungkiang, and was not reported as denounced in even one poster. Sung had gone on public record during the summer with strong praise of Lin Piao—a kind of notification to all concerned that he was changing his allegiance—and was given a vote of confidence by Chou En-lai in late September, but it was an open question whether any of Teng's principal proteges would get off so easily.
been attacked and seemed in great shape, as might be expected of a man who was a personal friend of Mao's and had been close to Lin and Tao as well; and there had not been a first secretary of the East China Bureau (since Ko Ching-shih's death in early 1965) to be attacked.

In the provinces and cities, there were several first secretaries who would seem—judging from the fact and the terms of the "bombardment" of their headquarters, and/or from the terms of the wall-poster criticism of them which was still on view—to be eligible for purging, and many more who might be (cases in which the situation had been reported in a confusing way, and/or in which other posters were defending the secretaries attacked). Among the provincial and municipal secretaries subordinate to the Southwest Bureau, first: although the head of the Szechuan provincial committee had not been reported as denounced and was giving an appearance of smooth cooperation with the Red Guards, his subordinate of the Chungking committee and his superior of the Southwest Bureau were both being denounced in strong terms, and he himself would seem at least as responsible as the latter for not backing the students against the Chungking official; the Kweichow committee had been charged with organizing at least three demonstrations against the Red Guards and with jailing some Red Guards, and, while the first secretary was not reported as being denounced by name, the provincial committee itself was soon to come under attack in the posters; and there had been vague reports of Red Guard action against some of the local committees subordinate to the Yunnan provincial committee. Among those subordinate to the Northwest Bureau: the Sinkiang committee had been under heavy "bombardment," the first secretary had very probably organized physical resistance and had publicly denounced those who had wanted to bomb "the headquarters of the proletarian revolution," and he himself was being repeatedly denounced by name; the Shensi provincial and Sian municipal committees had been under continuous "bombardment" for about a month (mid-August to mid-September), there had been organized counter-attacks and at least one very serious incident in Sian (according to a later intercept, this occurred on 25 August and involved some 20,000 people), and the posters in September
were demanding that this committee be dismissed en masse for these offenses; and the Kansu provincial committee, which had apparently been bombarded in late August, was being charged with organizing physical resistance leading to hundreds of injuries and a number of deaths, and the first secretary was being denounced by name (some posters were asking "Tao Chu" to fire him). Among those subordinate to the North China Bureau: Li Hsueh-feng, first secretary of the Peking municipal committee (as well as of the North China Bureau) and concurrently a member of Teng's secretariat, had been denounced for weeks for the poor work of the new Peking committee, attacks presumably heartened by Chou En-lai's August action of publicly attributing to this new committee part of the responsibility for the failure of the work-teams in June and July*; in Hopei, where the old first secretary (Lin Tieh) had already been removed in the spring or summer and was later accused in posters of close association with Peng Chen and Peng's (alleged) policies, there had been serious trouble under his successor, chiefly in the form of clashes (with many deaths and injuries) between Red Guards from Peking and Red Guards in Tientsin (the provincial capital), although it was not clear that the provincial committee had any responsibility for the actions of the latter; and in Inner Mongolia, although there had been no reports of "bombardments" and the head of the Huhehot municipal committee had been purged before the Red Guards went into action, Ulanfu, the first secretary of the Inner Mongolian committee and concurrently an alternate member of the CCP politburo, was being criticized in posters. Among those subordinate to the Northeast Bureau: the Heilungkiang

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*The top leadership's intentions toward Li Hsueh-feng were of special interest, because they could certainly be realized. That is, while there was some question in any given case of whether Peking could bring down a well-entrenched regional or provincial leader without using the PLA for that purpose (which would involve, at least, certain questions of public relations), Li was right at hand and in no position to resist.
provincial committee had been openly bombarded (that is, with Harbin radio announcing its progress), but the old first secretary had been replaced in the spring and the new first secretary was helping to direct the fire in late August and early September, after which some lesser secretaries were removed but he remained untouched and apparently still in favor (later material, as previously quoted, showed Chou En-lai to have given him a strong vote of confidence in late September); similarly, the Kirin committee had acted swiftly to purge one of its officers after the Red Guards criticized him; and, while in Liaoning province a mid-September clash between Red Guards and local workers had been reported from Anshan, there had been no mention of involvement by party committees; all of which may explain why as of early October no regional, provincial or municipal first secretary in the Northeast was reported as being under attack by the posters. As for those subordinate to the Central-South Bureau: the Honan provincial committee, apparently under the command of an acting first secretary after the transfer of its old first secretary to Peking, was being accused of arresting some Red Guards from Peking, and the acting secretary seemed to be implicitly admitting this; the Hupei provincial committee had apparently been bombarded and had reportedly organized resistance, and Red Guards had reportedly demanded the overthrow of this committee (under the leadership of a recent successor to the prestigious Wang Jen-chung), although the Red Guards themselves were being criticized for this in September by some elements; the Hunan provincial committee, which had been under the leadership of an acting secretary while the first secretary was acting temporarily as a deputy director of Tao Chu's propaganda department (he was back in Hunan in September), apparently also had been bombarded and had organized resistance, there had been at least one serious incident in Changsha, and wall-posters in September were criticizing the Changsha committee for refusing to receive the Red Guards and for permitting some of them to be beaten; and in Kwangtung there had been reports of serious clashes in Canton between the army and police on one hand and rioting Red Guards on the other in both August and September, and among groups of Red Guards in September; and in Kwangsi,
there had been eye-witness reports of the clash of hundreds of Peking and local Red Guards with a large group of local 'Red Guards' organized by somebody. Finally, as for those subordinate to the East China Bureau: in Shantung, there had been serious clashes in Tsinan and Tsingtao in late August and early September, and posters in September were charging that a "bad secretary" in Tsinan had organized thousands of workers against the Red Guards and that the municipal committee's cultural revolution group itself in Tsingtao had organized some 40,000 people against them, although, curiously, the posters were not criticizing the Shantung committee for this; in Kiangsu, at least two of the municipal committees (Shanghai and Yangchow) had reportedly been bombarded, with serious incidents in Shanghai (although organized resistance was not reported), and posters in September criticized the Shanghai committee; the Anhwei provincial committee had been bombarded in late August and had reportedly organized resistance, and posters were subsequently criticizing the first secretary by name for barring the Red Guards and for allowing local crowds to beat them, although other posters reportedly defended the secretary and blamed the Red Guards; the Kiangsi provincial committee had apparently also been bombarded, clashes between Red Guards and workers had been reported, and September posters were accusing the committee of having organized beatings of Red Guards; and the Fukien provincial committee and the Foochow municipal committee had also evidently been bombarded, with a number of incidents reported in Foochow (the provincial capital), and subsequent posters were charging the two committees with having jailed some Red Guards and demanding the overthrow of at least the provincial committee.

In sum, as of early October the Red Guards— that is, elements of the Red Guards, as there was no central office known to speak for all of the units—were out for the blood of at least a dozen regional, provincial or major municipal first secretaries: of the Southwest and Northwest Bureaus (and of the North China Bureau in another hat), of the Sinkiang, Shensi, Kansu, Anhwei, Hupei, Kiangsi and Fukien provincial committees, and of the Peking, Chungking, and Sian municipal committees; and they may have been out for the blood also of the first secretaries
of the provincial party committees of Szechuan, Kweichow, Yunnan, Hopei, Inner Mongolia, Honan, Hunan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Shantung, and Kiangsu, and of the municipal committees of Tientsin, Changsha, Tsinan, Tsingtao, Shanghai, and Foochow, as well as (conceivably, although there was no evidence) some of the secretaries in the Northeast. Some move had to be made, toward satisfying them.

On 5 October, according to open sources, the central committee issued a directive related to the "rehabilitation" or "reinstatement" of leftist students--like Kuai Ta-fu of Tsinghua--who had been denounced, suppressed, or labelled pejoratively (as counter-revolutionary, anti-party, whatever) by the work-teams of June and July. This first directive was reported to relate only to one class of students; according to a Yugoslav news agency, it was concerned with "rehabilitation in military academies."

Moreover, Peking was not to call publicly for "restoring the reputations" of such people until 31 October, and one of the sources which reported the 5 October directive reported that a general directive--applying to all organizations--did not appear until 16 November. Nevertheless, non-military students were being "rehabilitated" immediately after the 5 October directive; later information indicates that Kuai Ta-fu was reinstated by Chou En-lai in the first "oath-taking ceremony" on 6 October.

By 7 October, according to a mass of material received in late November, the leftists at Tsinghua (supporters of Kuai's extremely militant faction) had compiled a detailed and extensive brief in defense of their actions in the early stages of Red Guard activity and in accusation of their enemies, as if they expected a showdown sooner or later. Their expectation may have derived from Chou En-lai's remarks of late September (that the factions would contend and eventually reach "unanimity") and from the 5 October directive, and would certainly have been given impetus by the 6 October ceremony.
They might reasonably have believed that they would win—would be supported by the party leadership—in the showdown.* As previously noted, this particular group of militants (the only one from which there is a mass of material) had believed themselves to be carrying out the will of Mao and Lin Piao and their opposition to be carrying out the different will of other leaders, and that they were probably right in some respects. But with respect to the particular issue of early and strong action against leaders, it was not clear what the position of Mao and Lin was, and it seemed probable that the new team was still discussing the scenario. Disagreement would seem to matter greatly only if it were about such questions as whether to take any further action against these groups, singly or in combination, or whom to include, or whether there was to be a long delay in taking any action (a delay which would make Peking look foolish) or if there were wide differences as to the degree of action to be taken against them, questions which members of the new team might see as involving the future of their own individual "kingdoms" or even political lives.

The first half of October provided further evidence of Peking's intention to make clear that Lin Piao

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*Materials received much later indicated that at least some party leaders—including Chen Po-ta, Hsieh Fu-chih, and Yang Cheng-wu—in talks with Red Guards in this period were praising them (by implication, the militants) as representing the "minority" of true believers who must win over the majority. The militants had in fact been in the minority at most schools.
was to be Mao's successor and to validate his claim to that position.* On 9 October Peking Radio reported Lin's "extremely important directions on the study of Chairman Mao's works" in the PLA, as reported by Hsiao Hua, Director of the General Political Department. (The U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong observed that the quotations from Lin in this account were printed in boldface type, a treatment previously reserved for Mao's statements.) Taking as accepted fact the "great achievements in the few years since Comrade Lin Piao took charge of the work of the Military Affairs Committee" of the central committee (Lin had been Mao's deputy in this committee but had seemed really to run it), Hsiao gave credit to Lin's adherence to Mao's thought and went on to emphasize that Lin had "always implemented Mao Tse-tung's thought and followed his correct line most faithfully, firmly, and thoroughly," and at "every historical, crucial turn" in the revolution had "resolutely taken his stand on the side of Chairman Mao and carried out uncompromising struggle against every kind of 'left' and right erroneous line and courageously safeguarded Mao Tse-tung's thought." (Hsiao clearly meant to leave the impression that some of these "crucial turns" had been recent.) Further, Lin was "the closest comrade in arms of Chairman Mao, his best student, and the best example of creatively studying and applying Chairman Mao's works." Lin's own organ, Liberation Army Daily, in commenting on 11 October, included verbatim these passages

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*In contrast, Liu Shao-chi, who had been presented for more than 20 years as Mao's chosen successor, was kept very much in the background; pro-Liu posters were reported to have appeared in Canton briefly in this period, but to have been taken down by Red Guards. (It will be recalled that this was one of the functions reportedly assigned to the Red Guard Control Squads.) Moreover, wall-posters read in Peking on 10 October criticized Liu's wife, Wang Kuang-mei, and one called for her to return to Tsinghua university for self-criticism. It was later learned that Mrs. Liu had submitted a written self-criticism this same day, 10 October.
about Lin's implementation of Mao's thought, his place on Mao's side at every turn, his uncompromising struggle against error, his courageous safeguarding, and his place as the closest comrade, best student, and best example. Moreover, a diplomat in Peking noted in this period the appearance in three major cities (Peking, Tientsin, Canton) of examples of Lin's calligraphy alongside Mao's. Commenting at the time, the U.S. Consulate General noted that this adulation of Lin had come "almost exclusively from military sources"—that is, the PLA newspaper, and speeches by military leaders—and surmised that the effort was inspired by Lin himself in order to consolidate his position and to develop a popular reputation after his many years behind the scenes.*

Nevertheless, the little information available in this period on relationships among the vehicles of the "cultural revolution" continued to suggest that the directing body was the "cultural revolution group" in Peking—along with Chou En-lai—rather than the PLA. Chou and Chiang Ching were both reported to have addressed a gathering of Red Guards on 6 October (and Chou spoke with them again on 31 October). On 12 October, Wuhan radio reported a rally denouncing the deputy director of the Wuhan provincial cultural bureau: all five of the party officials identified as attending were officers of the provincial and municipal cultural relations groups, the dismissal of the condemned official was announced by one of these officers (in the usual form of crediting the provincial committee with the decision, and of noting approval of it by the regional bureau), and the main speeches were given by two of these cultural revolution officers. Similarly, a Japanese correspondent reported

*Lin may have been inspiring the most extreme statements, but all of Peking's propaganda media contributed to this image-building. For example, People's Daily, editorializing on 12 October, described Lin's "directive" to the PLA as "extremely important and timely for all," and praised the PLA's "brilliant example" for "many years."
on 12 October that Red Guards interviewed by him two days earlier had stated that at their school—the middle-school attached to Tsinghua which pioneered the Red Guard movement—"the cultural revolution committee acts as the guidance headquarters, and takes charge of giving guidance to the teams formed by each class." Further, Tao Chu was the leader reported appealed to be Red Guards—at about this time—for support in their criticism of Po I-po. (Materials received much later indicated that at least three other officers of the group—Chen Po-ta, Chang Chun-chiao, and Kuan Feng—were also giving interviews to the Guards in this period.) Finally, the first half of October showed the "cultural revolution" bodies to be making decisions on the disposition of groups of "revolutionary students" and preparing the cases against persons in disfavor.

In mid-October there was another hint of the way in which Mao's new team might choose to handle the matter of party leaders denounced by the Red Guards, including those whom the team wished to keep in their positions. Li Hsueh-feng seemed a good possibility as an example of the latter type of official, if only because he had been appointed only in May and his early removal would be politically embarrassing. A Japanese correspondent in Peking (quoting unidentified "informed sources") reported that Li Hsueh-feng himself, who had been under attack in wall-posters for almost two months and under sustained attack since 1 October, had appeared at a Peking college on 14 October and had conducted a self-criticism before the students.* Li's exercise, credibly reported as "sponsored" by the Red Guards but to be judged by the central "cultural revolution group," was said to have included an account of his own "strong" as well as weak points, a 'balanced' picture which would certainly not satisfy

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*Later materials indicated that some leaders of work-teams had made self-criticisms as far back as August and that Mme. Liu Shao-chi had made hers on 10 October, but this was not known at the time.
the students, who in all such cases would want to see self-abasement. The story pointed to a useful device, useful not only for keeping on a leader in favor but as a pretext for taking action against a leader in disfavor or even (conceivably) for postponing action against a leader in disfavor whom it might be hard or at least awkward to bring down, e.g. (conceivably) some of the denounced regional and provincial leaders. There was in fact a report at the same time that one of these provincial leaders who was in disfavor with the Red Guards but apparently in favor with the new team--Chang Ping-hua of Hunan, a province in which there had been serious incidents--had made a "full self-criticism" in September after returning to Hunan from Peking; this was reportedly displayed on wall-posters in South China. But an account of it shows it to have been another self-serving self-criticism (as Li's was said to be), and Chang at the same time had made (over Changsha radio) a lengthy defense of his entire record in Hunan.*

On 16 October, according to a wall-poster of early January 1967, a report was made--apparently to the central committee or the cultural revolution group--which formulated an "erroneous line" on some important question with respect to the cultural revolution. The wall-poster gives an account of an undated speech by Chen Po-ta which asks why those who submitted the erroneous line in this report

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*The Red Guards apparently read it the same way.

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Visitings Red Guards in Changsha, after "crushing" the municipal party committee and forcing the organization of a new one, on 30 October held another meeting to criticize Chang Ping-hua, who again flew back from Peking (where he was reportedly still serving with the central "cultural revolution group") and listened to the criticism and "admitted his wrong-doings."
refuse to identify themselves and accept the responsibility.* If they were to admit and correct their errors, he reportedly went on, they would be treated much less harshly than if this were not the case. The speech as reported goes on to assert that the erroneous line is in fact the line of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, which was exposed at the August plenum, but that it had been carried on since August by others. One surmise is that the reference was to Tao Chu and some lesser figures of the cultural revolution group, who would have occasion to report on the progress of the revolution and who began to be attacked in wall-posters in early November. Although these and later posters attacked Tao on a number of counts, the recurrent specific charge was that of defending provincial and municipal committees and their leaders; it seems possible that Tao—until recently a regional leader himself—had primary responsibility, among officers of the cultural revolution group, for the handling of those committees, that the report of 16 October denounced by Chen Po-ta was by Tao and on that question, and that it made him "objectively" a supporter of Liu and Teng in their attitude toward the party apparatus. (If so, it would be only a short jump to make Chou En-lai "objectively" a supporter of Liu and Teng; Chou had taken a 'soft' line toward the party apparatus as a whole, and just a week earlier—although citing Mao in support—had rejected a Red Guard request for direct examination of Liu's wife.)

On 18 October, maintaining the more-or-less bi-weekly schedule observed from the start (18 August, 31 August, 15 September, 1 October), Mao and other Chinese leaders again held a mass rally of Red Guards and revolutionary students. This one, however, turned out to be a non-event, and as such the most surprising development of the month. Although many or most of the crowd of 1.5

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*This report may have been given by Chen at the work conference which reportedly began about 20 October and continued into November. One account of Teng Hsiao-ping's self-criticism at this conference has Teng asserting his support of Chen Po-ta's report.
million had been waiting for hours, presumably expecting (as did outside observers) another prolonged appearance by the party leaders and again a speech or two; but what they got was a motor-cavalcade, a drive-by, that was evidently over in half an hour, with no speeches (not even a few words, just waves of the hand), followed by a wait of an hour and then an announcement that the ceremony was over.

The affair left a strong impression that the rally had aborted; that is, that Peking had originally planned something more ambitious—on the model of the first four receptions—and for some reason had been forced to change its plans too late in the day to permit a smooth performance to be staged. Observers were quick to speculate—citing differences between Lin Piao's and Chou En-lai's speeches at previous rallies—that the explanation lay in the inability of the members of the new team to agree among themselves as to the line to take at the rally on the future of the Red Guards. This speculation seemed to some degree supported also by the erratic course of the Red Guard movement—the Red Guards had been turned loose in mid-August, but had been braked in the first two weeks of September, had been diverted mainly to training and production tasks in mid-September, then had been told again on 1 October that important persons in the party were still to be overthrown but had seen none of their targets fall. Another explanation offered was that, despite the impression left by the 18 October rally, the new team did plan it that way all along, i.e. the leaders did not disagree but had nothing new to say; in other words, "It's a crazy way to run a railroad, but that's the way Mao runs a railroad"—a view which was to be supported to some degree by the fact of other rallies in this format later.

However, it was credibly reported not long afterward that the reason lay in a dispute as to whether the time was ripe for public criticism of Liu Shao-chi. A quarrel over which slogans to use was said to have developed between elements of the Red Guards, in which one faction insisted on posting criticism of Liu Shao-chi but was told by central committee representatives on the
scene that this was forbidden because Liu was to appear with Mao at the rally (as he did); the dispute is said to have become bitter, resulting in fighting and casualties on such a scale that the rally was announced as cancelled, which in turn resulted in such an uproar of protest that the new team compromised by staging the drive-by.* Although one would think PLA units, public security forces, and Red Guard control squads on the scene could have kept order, this report was consistent with a report from a Japanese correspondent that Red Guard posters in late October were criticizing a central committee officer for "changing" the slogans at the 18 October rally, with other reports of the period on fighting among Red Guards, and with reports that big-character posters criticizing Liu were being seen occasionally but were up only briefly before being taken down. This explanation of the aborted rally has come to be favored by most observers.

On the next day (19 October), the 30th anniversary of the death of the 'proletarian' writer Lu Hsun, People's Daily offered the first of a series of Peking commentaries presenting Lu Hsun as the "chief commander of China's cultural revolution" (Mao's words), a man of "unyielding integrity" and a model of revolutionary intransigence, who believed in "beating the wild dog...to death." The editorial declared that "we should develop this spirit" and "never show softness or mercy to the enemy," and then immediately spelled it out:

We must resolutely strike down the small handful of those within the party who are in positions of power and have taken the capitalist road, the counter-revolutionary revisionists and all the

* Still later, a wall-poster specified that the Propaganda Department (Tao Chu) had prevented the criticism of Liu and Teng from being posted.
monsters and demons. We must hit them hard, completely discredit them, and never let them rise again.*

The impression was left by this editorial, and by others the same day—and was to be reinforced by other commentaries during October—that the dominant figures of the new team, whose voices presumably appeared in these statements, had decided on their next step and were now trying to persuade other members of the team, or at least some outside the inner circle whose support they wished to have, that the time was at hand or near for the decisive action against other party leaders so often promised. The impression was of disagreement—recent debate—on both the timing and the force of the blow, but there was no good indication as to whether the range of targets was at issue.

On the same day (19 October), correspondents in Peking reported that Red Guard wall-posters were calling for severe punishment of two regional leaders (first secretaries) with whom the Red Guards had had trouble in August and September: posters were demanding that Li Ching-chuan of the Southwest Bureau and Wang En-mao of

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*Mao Tse-tung himself was soon to express this spirit in his own words. In a letter to the Albanian party on 25 October (broadcast 3 November), a letter signed and almost certainly written by Mao, Mao praised the Albanians as "dauntless proletarian revolutionaries,...not like those false friends and double-dealers who have 'honey or their lips and murder in their hearts,' and neither are we... We are invincible; the handful of pathetic creatures who oppose China and Albania are doomed to failure... The U.S. imperialists and all other such vermin have already created their own grave-diggers; the day of their burial is not far off." The letter well illustrates what feature of anyone's behavior is most important to Mao—namely, loyalty to him personally—as well as the harshness of his intransigence and the depth of his delusional thinking.
the Sinkiang Committee be "burned alive" (probably not meant literally). Two days later, the posters demanding the ouster of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping (presumably from their jobs as government chairman and party secretary-general) were reported to have appeared on Peking's main boulevard (similar anti-Liu posters in other cities had been reported by travellers, but this was the first seen in Peking, and the first anti-Teng poster seen anywhere).* On the same day, the Red Guard newspaper resumed the attack on Li Hsueh-feng.

On this same day (21 October), according to a Red Guard tract, a large group of Red Guards led by the extremely militant Kuai Ta-fu invaded the Peking Agricultural Institute and smashed it up, seizing files and making assaults. Kuai, who (it is now known) had been officially rehabilitated and had become the deputy commander of the Third Red Guard Headquarters in Peking (the rival headquarters established by the militants, of which more later), is said to have led a force of 2,000 students and teachers representing twenty-odd universities and middle-schools in Peking, to have had the backing of an important member of the CCP central committee (curiously, Tao Lu-chia, who had been most closely associated with Teng Hsiao-ping and Po I-po, two leaders in disfavor), and to have remained in occupation of the Institute throughout the night. He is said further to have withdrawn after a phone-call from the central committee which among other things rebuked him for breaking into the Institute's security office. While Kuai's violent action (apart from the beatings) had not been specifically forbidden by any known directives to the Red Guards, Red Guard violence in Peking had not been reported for several weeks, and

*The anti-Liu poster was said to have remained up only a short time (as had reportedly been the case with the pro-Liu posters in Canton earlier), but, curiously, it was not reported that the anti-Teng posters had come down.
the reported phone-call seems to have been, to say the least, tardy. It is still not clear whether Kuai's action was taken at his own initiative, possibly in retaliation for a reported raid on leftists at Tsinghua by Red Guards from the Department of Agriculture (of Tsinghua? Or the Ministry?) in late August, or simply because its Red Guard organization belonged to the "moderate" opposition, or whether it really did (as alleged) represent an initiative by an important party figure against some other leader or leaders, and, if the latter, what the initiator hoped to accomplish by it.

Kuai's 21 October raid seems in retrospect to have been related to the beginning on the same day (21 October) of a three-week barrage of poster attacks on, and demonstrations against, some 23 government ministries and four of the staff offices which coordinate their work. Among the party and concurrently government leaders denounced in this period were Chen Yi, Li Hsien-nien, Tan Chen-lin, and Po I-po, all of whom were members of the politburo and only one of whom seemed out of favor with the new team (Po I-po, who had been out of sight, had been criticized a month earlier for assigning some of the work-teams that were found to have failed, and was being hit hard again for this and for allegedly approving—with Teng Hsiao-ping—an exhibit of February 1966 which played up Liu and Teng and played down Mao).*

*Chen Yi himself is credibly reported to have told a group of visiting students on 25 August that all Chinese officials (he did not imply exceptions, as Chou En-lai had in a speech of the same period) were subject to criticism by the masses, that some of the ministers would probably be replaced afterward, and that he himself might be criticized and replaced. This foreknowledge does not, however, necessarily invalidate the view of some observers that the attacks of late October represented a sudden increase in pressure on Chou En-lai and others regarded as disagreeing with the dominant figures of the new team.
Early in this three-week period, and just three days after Kuai's reported invasion of the Peking Agricultural Institute, an unidentified government ministry—apparently one of the communications ministries—reported that it had been invaded and sacked by "students" (presumably Red Guards, and possibly Kuai's forces again). The students had invaded the office, injured several of the staff, and "destroyed everything," and the "central authorities" had refused to intervene. These developments were very similar to those of 21 October, when the intervention of the "central committee" was so tardy that it might as well have been withheld altogether.

Again it was (and remains) unclear as to whether the attack was taken on the initiative of a militant group of Red Guards or at the instigation of a party leader. Neither incident—of 21 October and 24 October—was reported by observers in Peking and there may have been other such unreported incidents in that period. However, it seemed pretty clear even at the time that not all of those criticized were going to have their ministries smashed up, and that not all—probably not even most—were in disfavor with the new team. (For example, Chen Yi appeared with Mao in meeting a foreign delegation, and Li Hsien-nien headed a party delegation abroad, continuing to represent the regime in these meetings as Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping for example had not been allowed to do for months.)* Thus some observers speculated that this combination of events—the poster attacks on ministries and ministers, and the invasions of ministries—were designed not to bring down all or any of them.

*The test of this question of whether a given official was in disfavor—and whether the new team was ready to move against him—might prove to be that of whether the posters remained up (it will be recalled that the Red Guard Control Squads were reportedly given the task of tearing down posters which did not reflect the thinking of the party leaders.)
even most of the government establishment but rather to
serve as a warning to Chou En-lai (the prime minister)
and others regarded as opposed to early or severe action
against discredited party leaders (and perhaps to the
range of marked targets)--a warning that, unless they
forthwith ceased their opposition, they would be added
to the list. While Chou and Tao Chu both could reason-
ably be regarded as less militant than some others, Chou
at least appeared otherwise in good favor, and remained
so; while it seems possible that there was indeed some
disagreement, the line-up of the time is still obscure.*

In the same period (late October), there were re-
newed reports of fighting (even among girls) among Red
Guard units in certain cities (particularly Peking and
Harbin), and, of even greater interest, the splitting of
Red Guards into factions with different lines and dif-
f erent headquarters. For example, the Red Guards of
universities and colleges in Peking were reported at the
time--from wall-posters--to have split into three separate
factions which had established three separate headquarters;

*It should be said, in connection with Red Guard post-
er attacks on whomever, that this paper rejects the view
that attacks on individual leaders were all, from the
start or at any time, either officially inspired or the
expression of initiatives of some leaders against other
leaders; however, some probably represented that--Tao
Chu is one possible case--and explicit targeting by
party leaders did indeed appear in December.

It was not only party figures with important govern-
ment posts who were attacked in October: regional, pro-
vincial and municipal party leaders continued to be at-
tacked, and the attack also extended to a few military
figures, despite the provision in the 8 August declara-
tion that the cultural revolution in the PLA would be
carried out by the PLA's own organs.
according to a reported poster presumably put up by the third headquarters (later identified as that of the militant Kuai Ta-fu), the first two headquarters were reactionary and corrupt, and the first in fact had already been dissolved.*

Materials received much later showed that the split in the Red Guards in Peking which had in fact begun in August and was institutionalized by October had reached several other parts of China—perhaps most of China's cities—by October and was being institutionalized there also. For example, a student in Foochow wrote in early October that her school was split into two factions, one attacking the party committee and one defending it, and a student in Tientsin writing in late October reported the division of the Red Guard movement there between the "rebels" and those who wanted to protect party leaders. "Rebel" Red Guard headquarters appeared in Kofei (Anhwei) in mid-October, and another in Tihua (Sinkiang) in late October. Although the evidence at the time was inconclusive—for example, the Tihua headquarters announced that it would "organize all Red Guards" and thus implied that it would be a true general headquarters for the province—some observers were soon able to surmise correctly that these headquarters, both of them in provinces in which the Red Guards had clashed violently with the local party organizations, were in fact set up as headquarters rivaling those of the Red Guard headquarters—of less militant elements—established there earlier. All of the Red Guard headquarters seemed at the time to have the blessing of Mao's new team (and local party leaders attended the establishment of all kinds), in accordance with

*Kuai's forces remained active in late October. Their newspaper later provided an account of a "serious" clash with PLA forces at the Military Science Academy in this period, apparently centering on the 3rd Red Guard Headquarters' charge that the Academy was refusing to carry out the 5 October instructions in regard to rehabilitation (of leftists), and evidently entailing an attempt by Kuai's forces to seize files. Another account (from a poster) accuses Kuai's forces of injuring some 20 PLA soldiers in the incident.
Chou En-lai's earlier assurance to the Red Guards (reported later) that they were free to take any organizational form and to follow any line that they liked. But presumably those provincial party leaders who had had trouble with the militant elements of the Red Guards were sorry to have to allow the formation of headquarters of these same elements.*

On 31 October Red Flag continued the discussion of Lu Hsun begun by People's Daily on 19 October. The theme was the same: Lu's intransigent, unforgiving spirit as the model. Red Flag went further in explicitly denouncing (attributing to Lu Hsun a hatred of) "the 'peace-makers,' those seemingly 'fair' and 'just' people, the 'fence-sitters' who pretended to be 'unbiased' in the battle..." The journal made clear too that it was speaking not only of the struggle between Communists and non-Communists but of the current domestic campaign:

*That the new team still had much for the Red Guards to do—presumably including new "bombardments"—was confirmed by Chou En-lai in a speech (received later) to some Red Guards on 31 October. Chou told them that the "polemical struggle" in the cultural revolution was still in its "preliminary stage," that they should go out and exchange revolutionary experiences (as "a leftist group is not self-appointed, but should be tested in the furnace of revolution"), and that it would be ten months—i.e. August 1967 at the earliest—before they would be returning to their studies.
in fact, to protect the bourgeois reaction-
ary line and oppose the proletarian re-
volutionary line...*

It could only be conjectured, of course, who those peace-
makers and fence-sitters (those standing between the
dominant figures and their targets) might be, at just
this stage of the cultural revolution and purge. The
Red Flag piece reinforced the views of some observers
that Chou En-lai and some of the "cultural revolution
group" leaders were the persons being denounced, but all
still seemed in good favor.

Moreover, on the same day Chen Po-ta, head of the
central "cultural revolution group," publicly associated
himself with the militant line. Presiding over and speak-
ing at a Peking rally commemorating Lu Hsun, Chen carried
on the line established by People's Daily on 19 October,
citing Lu Hsun's "very important testament" to the effect
that "not...a single one" of one's enemies should be
forgiven. Chen's discussion of Lu Hsun--who "was diametric-
ally opposed to the capitulationism" of certain Chinese
Communist leaders who were opponents of Mao in the 1930s--
was weakened by his concluding focus on foreign enemies
(the Soviet and American camps) rather than enemies in
the Chinese party, but the point came through just the
same, just as it had in Mao's letter to the Albanians.

*The editorial at one point praised Lu Hsun for not
feeling alone even when "isolated" and at another point
said that the "left comrades" engaged in the cultural
revolution should "fear no twists and turns, fear no en-
circlement or attack, fear no isolation...," formula-
tions which could be read as conceding that the new team
had been in a minority among party leaders at various
stages in the conduct of the revolution. It is doubtful,
however, that the new team was hereby admitting that it
had been in a minority at the August plenum (as one re-
port had asserted); the passage seemed rather to be
reiterating that 'resistance to the revolution at various
levels was likely to be substantial.
The following day, Peking broadcast another Red Flag editorial (also from the 31 October number), "The Victory of the Proletarian Revolutionary Line Represented by Chairman Mao"--a victory over, of course, the "bourgeois reactionary line"--which seemed to be making public a scenario for the future course of the purge. The representatives of this latter line, the party journal said,

undertake to suppress the masses, stifle the initiative of the masses, shift the target of the attack, point their spearhead toward the revolutionary masses, and bludgeon the revolutionary masses for being 'counter-revolutionaries, 'anti-party elements,' 'rightists,' and 'pseudo-leftists but real rightists.'

It seemed clear that party leaders previously denounced for their attitude toward the cultural revolution--especially as expressed in the "bombardments" carried out by the Red Guards--were being addressed again here, and the editorial presently took note that the often-cited "handful of persons in authority within the party who are taking the capitalist line" also took this "wrong" view of the masses.

The editorial went on to draw distinctions between the "various people who have committed errors of line": (1) between the small number ("one or two, or just a few") who "put forward the erroneous line," and the "large number" who have "put it into effect";* and (2) between the small number who "consciously" implemented a wrong line, and the large number of those who "unconsciously" implemented

*It was not clear whether "put forward" is meant to convey 'decided upon,' 'formulated,' 'advocated,' or all of these, and whether 'known to be wrong' was meant in addition in this connection. Later speeches by party leaders indicated that all of these meanings were intended.
a wrong line; and (3) between those who have put a wrong line into practice to a "serious" extent, and those who have put it into practice to a small extent; and (4) between those who "persist in error," and those who are "wiling to correct it and are already in process of correcting it." "Generally speaking," the editorial continued, comrades who had made mistakes could be rehabilitated, and "not only might serve as cadres of the second and third categories, but might also be developed into cadres of the first category." The reference is clearly to the categories employed in the 8 August declaration in classifying the attitudes of party organizations toward the cultural revolution: (1) the "daring" and therefore correct; (2) the merely conservative and lagging; (3) the worse cases which feared exposure but would be "excused" if they accepted exposure; and (4) the really hard cases who tried to suppress the revolution and in consequence would be purged. In other words, the 31 October editorial was saying that, with the exception of a few hard cases, party officials now in trouble with the new team—not in all cases those in trouble with the Red Guards—could put themselves right, or at least could keep themselves from getting purged this time around.

But how could this be done? Red Flag answered forthrightly:

The standard to distinguish those who have corrected their errors from those who persist in their errors is their attitude toward the masses—whether they openly admit before the masses they have the wrong line, whether they will sincerely reverse the decisions passed on those of the revolutionary masses who have been branded.../as above/...and undertake to openly reinstate their reputations, and whether they support the revolutionary activities of the revolutionary masses. A Communist who has made an error of line should have the courage to admit and examine his error, and, alongside the masses, criticize what he has done wrong.
Thus Mao and his new team seemed to be pulling together and making official the earlier indicators as to their plans for party functionaries in disfavor with themselves and with the Red Guards. The plan seemed to be: to invite—that is, to direct—party and government leaders to engage in self-criticism over the course of the "cultural revolution" to date, to restore to good standing those militants who had been criticized and suppressed and pejoratively labelled during any stage of the revolution (i.e., by the work-teams, cultural revolution groups, or by party committees during Red Guard "bombardments"), and to apologize in particular for those instances in which resistance had been offered to Red Guard attacks. Presumably, depending both on the prior standing of a given leader with the new team and the fervor of his testimony, a given self-criticism and apology would be (a) accepted, (b) found unsatisfactory and ordered repeated (perhaps again and again), or (c) found to be hypocritical and as proving that the given official was a hard case who could not be rehabilitated and must be purged.

Agreement on this procedure by all members of the new team (as seemed likely) would of course leave room for disagreement as to which officials (from Liu Shao-chi on down) to find to be incorrigible hard cases, and how soon and how harshly to move against them. The four leaders discredited during the previous winter (Peng, Lo, Lu, and Yang) were pretty clearly already classified as incorrigibles, but it was not at all clear whether a decision had yet been reached on Liu and Teng, and, with respect to both groups of leaders, it was not clear how the new team intended to stage their punishment (e.g., whether public or private, concurrently or in waves).

It was possible to argue—some observers did argue—that in choosing this as its next step Peking was confessing its temporary impotence, that is, was saying that it could not act against those party and government officials who were already in disfavor, could not act either because it was paralyzed by disagreement among members of the new team or was physically unable to remove leaders outside of Peking itself. It seemed more
likely, however, that Peking was not making such a confession, but was instead choosing to follow on a national scale a course something like the one it had followed in the Liaoning case of 1958. In that case, the party had staged an enlarged conference of the Liaoning party committee with 186 persons attending—all 48 members of its provincial committee, members of its departments and committees, officials of departments and bureaus of the provincial government, representatives of "people's organizations," and so on. The conference had continued for 112 days, with a nine-day break in the middle, and in the later stages had expanded to include more than one thousand participants. In the course of it, the participants had put up nearly 6,000 big-character posters; Teng Hsiao-ping and Li Fu-chun had come from the Secretariat in Peking and had made reports; and the first secretary of the provincial committee had made the summing up, after which the conference "unanimously" adopted a resolution on the anti-party activities of seven officials of the provincial committee. According to the account: "By using the methods of big blooming, big contending, big debate, baring facts and using reason, the conference exposed, criticized, and thoroughly smashed" the anti-party group. Whether these seven had been given an opportunity to engage in self-criticism before being found hard-case incorrigibles is not clear from the Chinese account; but the point is that Peking thought it worth-while to spend nearly four months in this elaborate exercise, directed against party officials who, like some of the officials under attack in 1966, were "resisting certain important policies and measures of the central committee" and "wanted to take the capitalist road..." A similar spectacle, with new figures in the center of the stage, seemed to be ahead.

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It was evident at the time that it would be necessary for Mao's new team to find against—whether sooner or later—at least some of these officials under attack in 1966—as it had found against those in 1958—if it were not to give the impression that it was indeed unable to act as it would like. Peking had spoken too harshly in recent months, and had made it too clear that some leaders could not be rehabilitated, for the new team to back away without having caused any casualties. Even if the new team did move ahead to purge some additional leaders at the center and in the provinces—as seemed likely—it could not prove that it could do whatever it liked; that is, it would still be possible to argue that the new team had wanted to bring down some additional leaders but could not. But reasonably early action—say, at least the beginning of the exercise against a number of leaders before the end of the year—would be expected if the new team were, as it seemed, in effective control.

November: 'Waiting for Lefty'

On 1 November, Peking broadcast a full account of how Lin Piao gladdened the hearts of railway workers by writing an inscription on the 20th anniversary of the naming of the "Mao Tse-tung locomotive,"* and on 3 November Mao and Lin presided over a sixth reception of "revolutionary young people" at which Lin made the only speech. All of the members of the presumed new standing committee of the politburo were on hand (except one abroad as head of a delegation), and so were Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-

*Lin's inscription: "People's revolution under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought is the locomotive for the advance of history." This is a good example of Lin's ability to say just the kind of thing that would please Mao (although the actual locomotive was so old as to be hardly serviceable).
ping. Again Mao, with Lin at his side, walked around and waved to people; according to a correspondent, he gave the impression that he was about to speak, but did not do so.

Lin in his speech summarized the content of the "victory of the proletarian revolutionary line" represented by Mao over the "bourgeois reactionary line"—essentially that of "putting 'daring' above everything" and relying on the masses—and added one thing to the script: that the masses were to "criticize and supervise" government as well as party organizations and leaders. (This was a post facto justification of the attacks on government ministries reported in the last week of October. It was evidently not regarded by the Red Guards, however, as a call for fresh attacks on the ministries, as these soon dropped off.) Lin also made it explicit that "Chairman Mao supports" the practice of young people travelling about the country on foot to "exchange revolutionary experience (they had been tying up too much transportation), although, he added, such travel needs to be organized. Lin did not refer in any way to Red Flag's call on 31 October for party leaders whose status was questionable to try to clear themselves by self-criticism, but neither did he again incite attacks on party leaders, an omission which again suggested the possibility of resolution of a disagreement as to how to proceed.

There was a surprising development on 5 November, when correspondents in Peking reported the appearance there of posters attacking Tao Chu, the fourth-ranking leader of the party since August and in the same period apparently the most active officer of the "cultural revolution group." (Summary or fragmentary accounts of his remarks in that period had seemed to indicate that he, like Chou En-lai, was taking the line approved by the dominant leaders at the time, even when this line was not the most agreeable to the most militant Red Guards, e.g. telling them to work out their problems for themselves, or directing them to turn over their "prisoners.") Tao was reportedly accused of "taking a revisionist line," and in particular of having supported the Minister of Health
in his oppression of revolutionaries at a research institute.* A correspondent reported on the same day that the office of the party's propaganda department--of which Tao was the director--appeared to be closed. However, other posters defending Tao Chu, also put up by Red Guards of this institute, were reported as appearing alongside shortly, apparently the same day; in these posters, Tao was praised for "putting into practice the proletarian revolutionary line." According to posters reported a few days later, the Red Guards had an interview with Tao Chu at midnight on 5 November--after the posters had gone up--and learned from him that the Minister of Health had been relieved as secretary of the party committee of the Health Ministry in late September. The "interview" itself suggested that Tao was securely-based at the time—that is, it was an "interview," not a "bombardment"; the posters soon (within two or three days) came down, and a few

*It is hard to sort this out. The Minister of Health had been charged in earlier posters with having sent an unsatisfactory ("rightist") work-team to the institute in June, and of having intervened on its behalf in August, "bullying" the members of the "cultural revolution committee" which had presumably been elected to replace the work-team and which presumably had its orders from Tao Chu's "cultural relations group." According to one of these posters, the cultural revolution body at the institute returned from an interview with Tao Chu to "expose the Minister's crimes" and to reverse the situation. However, another poster of the same period (September) had asserted that it was the Minister of Health who was correctly carrying out "Tao Chu's instructions." Those who put up the anti-Tao posters in November were apparently accepting, and renewing, this latter charge. As noted earlier, it does seem likely that the officers of the "cultural revolution group" did have some role in the decision to establish the work-teams in the first place, and they may have had some role in directing the work of these teams; thus it is conceivable that both of the competing factions in this institute did in fact have their instructions from Tao Chu, at different times.
days later posters were observed calling for Tao to be defended "to the death" (like Mao and Lin). Nevertheless, it was apparent that Tao's positions—as an officer of the cultural revolution group and concurrently director of the propaganda department, a very tricky job—made him a fat target, if not at the time then later.*

On 6 November, the Red Guards turned their attention again to Li Hsueh-feng, first secretary of the Peking municipal committee, whom they had been denouncing periodically for weeks. It was reported that several thousand Red Guards staged an angry demonstration all day long outside the Peking committee headquarters and then broke in and occupied it, giving the impression that they intended to remain; it was later reported, however, that after some shouting and waving of banners, the Guards left the building and dispersed. Thus it was not clear whether the new team had finally made a decision not to defend Li against the Red Guards.

On the following day, 7 November, posters attacking another politburo member, Li Fu-chun, reportedly appeared in Peking. A lesser figure, apparently the head of the party committee in the Academy of Sciences, was reportedly made the object of a "concentrated attack" the next day; the interest here was in the implication that the Red Guards were out to disrupt the work of this important academy if not to wreck it. On the same day, Red Guards were reported to be milling around in front of the State Council building with a banner demanding an immediate audience with Chou En-lai, although Chou was not being attacked in the posters. On the next day, a military leader, the chief of the PLA's Rear Service Department, came under poster attack. And at or about this time, Lin Piao himself was reportedly criticized

*As previously noted, materials received much later suggested the possibility that Tao had been criticized—although not by name—in a report made by Chen Po-ta at about this time.
in big-character posters seen in Canton for having made mistakes in organizing the Red Guards and for putting them under PLA "control" (which they were not).

Materials received much later reported—from Red Guard wall-posters—that the CCP held a work conference beginning in late October and ending in early November, probably between 7 November and 9 November. This conference, described in Lin Piao's reported speech as a "continuation" of the August plenum—which had routed the opposition around Liu and Teng, endorsed Mao's plans for the conduct of the "revolution," named Lin as Mao's successor, and demoted Liu and Teng—reportedly featured speeches by Mao and Lin and self-criticisms by Liu and Teng. A point of considerable importance—in that it would indicate that Mao could have conducted a simple purge of much of the provincial apparatus at the time if he had chosen to, rather than going through the elaborate process he had in fact set in motion—is that many or most of the regional and provincial first secretaries attended this conference in late October, and therefore would have been at Mao's mercy in Peking.

There is a credible account (of January 1967) of Mao's speech to this conference, dated as 25 October.* The speech as reported is a little marvel of self-serving 'self-criticism,' in which Mao in fact admits to

*It was apparently a garbled account of this speech that was published by Mainchi on 5 January and soon withdrawn as "bogus." The 5 January version included Mao's alleged protest that his relinquishment of the government chairmanship in 1958 had been involuntary; while it was not inherently incredible that Mao in 1966 should criticize those who in 1958 had encouraged him to give that post to a leader now out of favor, it seemed an odd tactic for Mao to assert that he had at any time been unable to prevail, and the subsequent version (set forth above) sounded more like Mao.
nothing more than having trusted some lieutenants--clearly Liu and Teng are meant--who had proved to be unequal to the task.

In this speech, Mao states that years ago he had "set up a first front" (of others) and a "second front" (where he placed himself), meaning that he allowed others to handle the "routine work" of the party, in the belief that this would facilitate a smooth transfer of power on his death. As it turned out (Mao goes on), he "should have" handled some of these matters himself, and therefore is "in part" responsible for the bad situation in Peking (which has now "been solved").

In this speech as reported, Mao reviews the cultural revolution since June and admits that he did not foresee every development, and in particular that he had not expected as much disruption as had attended the Red Guard movement and that he can understand the complaints of some party figures. He expresses his confidence, however, that his decision to send out the Red Guards was right, as it was this that "really aroused attention" and made everyone take part in the revolution. He then tells his audience that they should make--should already have made--preparations for meeting the revolution "when it comes down on your own head," and goes on to advise them:

After you have gone back you will also have a great deal of political-ideological work to do. Central committee bureaus, regional bureaus, provincial committees, and county committees must hold meetings for ten days or more...

He goes on to say that, following the August plenum, some 70 to 80 percent of these regional bureaus and provincial committees had failed to hold such meetings before the Red Guards were upon them, a failure which was responsible for the disorder. Specifically, the secretaries were not prepared to answer the Red Guards' questions and were placed on the "defensive"; this stage of passivity must
be changed, to regain the initiative (People's Daily picked up this line).*

In this speech, Mao goes on to state that it is "understandable" that a "great cultural revolution" is hard for party leaders to handle, because they have never seen anything like it; and then addresses himself to the question which (he realizes) is in all of their minds--namely, whether Mao and Lin intend to bring them down. Mao assures them that if they correct their mistakes they will be all right: "Who wants to overthrow you? I don't wish to overthrow you, and to my mind the Red Guards do not want to overthrow you either." He goes on to reassure them in three ways, (a) telling them first that the party leaders were once Red Guards themselves, and then (b), using the concept of examination which had been central to the cultural revolution from the start, assuring them that "If you cannot pass the test, I will also find it hard to pass," and finally (c) stating his recognition that most mistakes were honest mistakes and could be forgiven.

Mao then speaks of Liu and Teng by name, stating that they cannot be assigned all of the blame for mistakes, that they are responsible but the central committee (like Mao himself) is also responsible, in that it did not exercise control. The speech as reported concludes with a good illustration of the relationship between Mao and his lieutenants: "Will anyone else take the floor? This will be all for today. Meeting dismissed."

*Reporting on the first stage of the Red Guards' assaults on the party apparatus is fragmentary, but most if not all of the attacking forces apparently demanded an accounting, not only of the given secretary's conduct of the cultural revolution (including his virtually certain "mistakes" in the period of the work-teams) but also of his fitness for his position. Sometimes this demand was stated as offensively as possible, e.g. 'Listen, you son of a bitch, why should you be first secretary?'
The speech associates Mao in his own person with the official line stated in the 8 August declaration and by Chou En-lai (before and after) in interviews with the Red Guards: that the dominant figures of the new team are aiming at a minority, not a majority, of party leaders, and that the principal figures among those in disfavor--Liu and Teng--need not be regarded as hard-case anti-party elements like Peng Chen and others of the first group to fall in disfavor. Mao seems less convincing in this role, however, than does Chou; as witness the intransigent editorials of the period on "beating the wild dog to death" and Mao's harshness in his letter to the Albanian party the same day (25 October). It would not be surprising if many or most of the party leaders present concluded that Mao had already decided that he was going to purge Liu and Teng and most of the regional and provincial first secretaries who were part of the Liu/Teng apparatus, and that he was simply staging an elaborate spectacle for the edification of others. This conclusion would seem especially likely if the 16 October report (discussed) had in fact been by Tao Chu, had in fact taken a moderate line toward the regional and provincial leaders, and had already begun to be criticized by Mao's direct spokesmen. There is some evidence that Chen Po-ta did indeed denounce this report at this conference.*

Mao's speech at the October conference may have been preceded, but seems to have been followed, by the

*Tao Chu reportedly made one foolish mistake while the conference was going on. He and Chen Po-ta on 23 and 24 October talked with Red Guards who were criticizing the People's Daily. According to wall-posters, Tao told the students that they could not criticize the party newspaper because that would mean criticism of the central committee; Chen told the students, on the contrary, they should feel free to criticize the newspaper like anything else (this was in fact the approved line).
self-criticisms of Liu and Teng. Two accounts of Lin Piao's speech seem to indicate that his was the closing speech, or at any rate followed the self-criticisms of Liu and Teng, so the latter two will be summarized here first.

In Liu's speech, as credibly reported, he begins by taking note that many comrades in the central party apparatus and its subordinate organs outside Peking had already conducted self-criticism for their mistakes in guiding the cultural revolution, and expresses regret that most of these mistakes derived from the larger mistake that he himself had made in formulating guidelines in June and July. He notes that "many people" (by implication, including Mao) had favored the dispatch of work-teams, but that the work-teams had worked badly (i.e., were guided badly), "restricting" the masses (from such things as demonstrating and putting up wall-posters), and keeping domestic news away from foreign eyes (a kind of censorship criticized by Mao in his wall-poster of 5 August). Following the mistaken model of the work-team at Peita, Liu goes on, work-teams all over China were responsible for clashes in which the revolutionaries were "suppressed" and pejoratively labelled. In sum, Liu continues, "we did not quite understand the true meaning" (i.e., what Mao wanted) of the cultural revolution.

Liu goes on, in his speech as reported, to describe his mistakes of 1966 as deriving from other "fundamental" mistakes he had made since 1946. He goes on to cite a number of such mistakes—apparently minor—in 1946, 1949, 1951, 1955, and then cites two larger ones—in 1962 and 1964—which have the effect of blaming himself for "rightist" retreats which Mao himself almost certainly approved at the time but now in 1966 wants to attribute to someone else.

Liu goes on to note that his mistakes were discussed by a work conference in late July, followed by the August plenum which had corrected Liu's mistakes in formulating the 8 August declaration (the militant line), that in the course of the conference and plenum a new standing committee
of the politburo had been elected and Lin Piao had been "unanimously" chosen (to replace Liu) as Mao's successor, and that he recognized that Lin and other comrades "are all better and greater than I."

In his speech as reported, Liu concludes by reviewing the reasons for his mistakes: of trusting the apparatus (the work-teams) instead of the masses, of taking the "unavoidable defects" of the masses' revolution as anti-party manifestations, of standing objectively with the "bourgeois class" while regarding himself as a good teacher, and of failing either to understand Mao's thought or to implement it correctly. Moreover, he had failed to seek Mao's guidance sufficiently and had not made enough reports to him (in other words, he had thought he had been given the job, as he had been), and he had ignored correct opinions while welcoming mistaken opinions. Finally, Liu asks for another chance to become "useful" to the party and people.

Teng's self-criticism has been less well reported. The one summary account has Teng declaring his complete support for the "instructions" given by Mao and Lin at the conference and for Chen Po-ta's report (the one possibly critical of a Tao Chu report), and further declaring that those who represent the "bourgeois reactionary line" in the cultural revolution have been Liu and himself. Liu and he (he reportedly goes on) should accept "direct responsibility" for the mistakes made in June and July; the majority of officers of the work-teams, he says, were good comrades, and Liu and he accept the "principal responsibility." (There was surely more to the speech than this, and probably a good deal more self-abasement; a wall-poster later asserted that Teng had been "less stubborn" than Liu.)

The two accounts of Lin Piao's speech to the October conference both from wall-posters--agree almost entirely on the contents; the differences appear to be in the translation of some phrases. Lin's speech is on the face of it tougher than Mao's--that is, he does not bother to adopt an avuncular pose and is harsh toward Liu and Teng in particular; but whether this represented a real difference is uncertain.
Lin opens by taking note of the "tension" in the cultural revolution at one time—presumably August and September, when the Red Guards were attacking the party apparatus—and says that Mao observed this and therefore called this conference, originally scheduled for three days, then for a week, then for 17 days. He goes on to describe the two powerful forces of the revolution—Mao's leadership and the masses—and the "resistance" in the middle, i.e. in the party apparatus between Mao and the masses. Lin says that part of the cause of this resistance was the ideological deficiency of local party committees, but a "more important cause" was the fact that Liu and Teng took a policy line contrary to the line which Mao had stated to the central committee (in May, apparently). "As Chairman Mao's wall newspaper stated" (presumably the poster of 5 August, which did not name Liu and Teng), the Liu-Teng line was a "bourgeois reactionary" line. Everyone knows now (he continues) of the "sabotaging" activity of Liu, Teng, and Lu Ting-yi.

Continuing, Lin observes that not even Stalin had managed to carry out a thorough struggle against opposing ideology, but Mao means to do this. All of Chinese society has been mobilized for the struggle (he goes on), and it will continue.*

*Sometime prior to this conference, perhaps in early October, Lin spoke to the students of a military institute on the need to study Mao's thought. Although there is not much nourishment in the speech (as credibly reported), it well illustrates Lin's identification with Mao. Lin tells the students that the Marxist-Leninist classics are not worth their time, that "99 percent" of their study should be of Mao, that military students must be the model students of Mao, that a "genius" like Mao appears in China only once in several thousand years, and so on at sickening length. This speech expresses the same attitude toward Mao as stated by Lin at the August plenum, but is even more fulsome; none of Mao's lieutenants had gone this far.

According to wall-posters, Yeh Chien-ying on 15 October told a meeting of the Higher Military School that all should rejoice that Lin Piao had been chosen as Mao's successor, because Lin had "gone through a period of examination" by Mao for 38 years, had fully recovered from illness, and was now "the healthiest of all comrades."

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The policy line represented by Liu and Teng, Lin continues, a policy of suppressing the masses and opposing revolution, was in control for a period, but is being overcome. The Red Guards are a true expression of the mass line, have the right impetuous "spirit," and should be "trusted."

Lin reiterates that Liu and Teng were "mainly" responsible for the wrong line which was implemented by many, and that their punishment must be more severe than that given those whose mistakes were unintentional (the line that had already been taken in the People's Daily editorial of 31 October). He then asserts—as Chou and Mao had said—that "we" recognize that the majority of secretaries of party regional bureaus and provincial and municipal committees are "good" people.

Finally, Lin says, "all of you" (apparently speaking directly at this point to the party leaders who had come from outside Peking) must bear some responsibility for mistakes, as "all" local committees had carried out mistaken policy lines to some extent. Each secretary, he concludes, will be treated on his individual merits; cases will be judged neither harshly nor leniently.

In sum, the participants in the conference had been assured that "most" secretaries were recognized to be good or at least redeemable, but not quite that most first secretaries were so regarded. Perhaps the majority concluded that Mao and Lin had not yet made up their minds as to who had "passed" the examination.* The clear implication, however, like the explicit directive of the 31 October editorial, was that they must engage in a thorough, self-abasing self-criticism—the contents of which in any given case could be used as a justification for bringing the self-criticism down. Perhaps only a few would finally pass.

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*Materials received later reported Chou En-lai as having told the Red Guards on 3 October that the party center had not yet reorganized certain unspecified provincial committees because it wanted to wait until those committees had been further "exposed" by the masses.
On 10 November People's Daily* returned to a topic introduced by the 8 August declaration and discussed in September by People's Daily, Chou En-lai, and others: how to carry out the cultural revolution without interfering with production (there had obviously been considerable interference, both before and after 8 August). The 10 November editorial reiterated—as Chou had said—that the circumstances of the revolution were not the same in urban and rural production units as in schools; that, in particular, schools could close to give all their attention to it, while "production absolutely cannot be suspended in industrial and mining enterprises, trade and service units, and people's communes."** Thus the revolution in these economic production units must be conducted in the spare time of the workers, who, moreover, should not go to other areas to exchange experiences. The editorial also reiterated—as Chou had said—that the "revolutionary students" sent to help with production would take part in productive labor as well as propagate

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*There was an unconfirmed but credible report at this time that about half of the party newspaper's staff had recently been replaced by cadres from the Liberation Army Daily, which for more than a year had been the most authoritative organ. A later poster specified that the former editor-in-chief of Liberation Army Daily was now the acting editor of People's Daily.

**A few days earlier, a correspondent had quoted both the director of, and wall-posters at, a factory in Peking to the effect that Red Guards at industrial and mining enterprises—one of the major categories discussed in the 10 November article—could be "disbanded" and replaced by "militia" as the "basic organization" in those enterprises. The director reportedly quoted the central committee to the effect that Red Guard units could be disbanded after popular discussion (they were said to be so disbanded, at that factory), and a wall-poster reportedly referred to "the central committee's instructions on the strengthening of militia in place of Red Guards..."
Mao's thought, and must allow the workers and peasants to carry out their own revolution. Finally, it expanded on what it had said on 7 September, that "each unit carrying out the cultural revolution must organize two groups, in accordance with the stipulations of the party central committee," one to guide the cultural revolution and the other to guide production. Evidently progress had been slow in the establishment of these groups.

On 10 and 11 November Mao received the Red Guards and other "revolutionary" youth for the seventh time--reviewing more than two million people, a number which made it necessary to split the rally into two days if all were to be reviewed.

In the 10 November portion, Chen Po-ta in his capacity as head of the "cultural revolution group" opened the rally, and hundreds of thousands of young people--many of them driven in trucks--passed by Mao, Lin Piao and others for a reported six hours. There were three noteworthy developments this day. First, Mao was moved, according to Peking's account, to speak in a "clear and resounding" voice into the microphone, saying "Long life, comrades" to the shouting youths; according to a correspondent, Mao himself shouted this first public utterance credited to him in several years. Second, according to Peking, Mao had a "cordial conversation with other leaders" on the rostrum, telling them that "you should put politics in command, go to the masses and be one with them, and carry on the great proletarian cultural revolution even better"--a message which was described in a subsequent Peking broadcast as "new instructions" from Mao. Third, according to a correspondent who watched the televised proceedings, Mao spend half an hour in a "smiling" conversation with Liu Shao-chi, whom he had ignored at all past rallies (all of which had taken place after Liu's demotion in early August), a development.
interpreted by some observers as an indication that Mao was blocking further action against Liu or at least was saying again that the time had not yet come.*

In the 11 November portion, Mao and other leaders drove for 90 minutes in open cars past the ranks of youths lining the streets. The only noteworthy development on this day was that Chou En-lai rode with Mao—a pairing perhaps deliberately designed to refute speculation that Chou was in trouble as a "fence-sitter" or "peace-maker," or perhaps reflecting—as Lin Piao's comparatively soft speech of 3 November had perhaps reflected—the resolution of a disagreement.

Chou had a starring role also in the mass rally the next day to commemorate the centenary of the birth of Sun Yat-sen. Although Liu Shao-chi had originally (a year ago) been advertised as being in charge of the Sun ceremony, it was Chou who gave the main speech, while Liu gave none. Chou's speech was a routine celebration of Sun as an uncompromising enemy of imperialism, and included a routine denunciation of the "ruling clique" in the USSR which caused Soviet bloc diplomats to walk out.

*At this time (mid-November) it was reported that the consensus among non-Communist diplomats in Peking was that a "struggle" was going on between Mao and Liu. If the word was being used in a conventional sense—the mobilized forces of the one leader engaged with the mobilized forces of the other—the consensus was a fantasy; Liu and Teng had lost the contest back in August. There was a sense, however, in which the concept could be true: that the new team was (perhaps) reluctant at the time to move against portions of the conventional party apparatus, particularly in the provinces, which it surmised might resist them and which would therefore require an embarrassing and perhaps messy campaign. Even in this sense, the Liu/Teng sympathizers would probably be getting nothing more than a temporary reprieve; the new team, sooner or later, would be moving deliberately against them.
On 15 and 16 November, most of the party leaders and concurrently government leaders who had been attacked in wall-posters in late October and early November were displayed prominently on two official occasions. Chou En-lai, Tao Chu, Li Fu-chun, Chen Yi, and Tan Chen-lin were five of the six "leading members of the CCP central committee" (with Chou foremost) receiving the "long march detachments" of revolutionary youth on 15 November; neither Liu Shao-chi nor Teng Hsiao-ping participated in this reception. On this occasion, Chou added his voice to Lin Piao's in calling for the young people to march around China "spreading revolutionary truth"; in one of those graceful turns which have contributed to Chou's survival and prosperity, he cited Lin as well as Mao as having issued the call. On the next day, Chou, Tao, Li, and Tan, along with Li Tien-yu, a Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the PLA who had also been attacked in posters, were the party leaders who welcomed at the airport the CCP delegation--headed by Kang Sheng--returning from the Albanian party congress. Chou, Tao, Kang, and Li were all identified as members of the standing committee of the politburo, Li for the first time.*

During these first two weeks of November, there were renewed reports of serious incidents involving the Red Guards on one hand and party figures, the PLA, and

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*It was unclear how many members the standing committee now had, in addition to Mao, Lin, Chou, Tao, Chen Po-ta, Kang (the latter three the principal officers of the "cultural revolution group"), and the most recently identified, Li. If Peking were following the order of precedence used since 18 August and including in the standing committee all of the leaders through Li Fu-chun (tenth-ranking), Teng Hsiao-ping, Liu Shao-chi, and Chu Te--all members of the old standing committee--would be included. It seemed likely, however, that the real standing committee had dropped the demoted Liu and Teng, the aged and inactive Chu, and also the eleventh-ranking Chen Yun, replacing the latter with Li Fu-chun as the inner circle's economic specialist.
factory workers on the other; and later reports increased
the scope of such incidents. On or about 4 November,
after spending three or four days in the hands of the Red
Guard, an official of the Peking party committee died,
by suicide or as a result of torture. On 7 November, some
2,000 Red Guards reportedly clashed with PLA forces, in-
juring scores of the latter. On 8 November, Red Guards
reportedly invaded and occupied an electrical machinery
plant in Harbin (this may have had something to do with
the 10 November editorial in People's Daily telling the
Red Guards to stay out of factories).* In the period
9-11 November, there was a prolonged and still obscure
incident in Kiangsu, in which thousands of Shanghai
workers--perhaps after being besieged by Red Guards--com-
mandeered a train to take them to Peking; this incident
required intervention by an officer of the central "cul-
tural revolution group," who flew from Peking with a mes-
sage from Chen Po-ta directing the workers to go home;
Mao is said to have expressed "concern" (it was not stated
for whom or what). On 11 November, Canton radio announced
the death of a vice-governor who had earlier been under
Red Guard poster attack and possibly in Red Guard hands.
On 16 November, Red Guards in Peking reportedly attacked
a machine tool plant, injuring many people, and were
said to have been repelled by worker-militia under orders of
"shoot to kill." And in the period of about 10-
17 November, "rebel" Red Guards in Hefei (Anhwei) report-
edly beat and tortured the provincial first secretary
(Li Pao-hua, with whom they had previously clashed) for
several days, and clashed with "moderate" Red Guards and
workers who rescued or attempted to rescue him, resulting
in several deaths and scores of injuries. At about the
same time, a Red Guard attack
on a "few persons" in the party in Tibet "resulted in
heavy casualties involving more than 100 "persons":

*Regardless of official editorials, the militant wing
of the Red Guards had good reason by this time to believe
that it had the favor of the dominant leaders.
At this time, on 16 November, Mao's new team seemed to have been moved to put the brake again on the Red Guard movement, just as in mid-September. Again, as it happened, Chen Yi, who had privately criticized Red Guard "excesses" in late August, in another private talk with a foreign visitor provided an indication of this: on 16 November, Chen defended the Red Guards as having played a "generally useful" role and said that "on the whole" he favored them, but said also that they had made mistakes and that they should correct them; asserting that Red Guard activity was supposed to be directed against the regional and provincial apparatus of the party and not against the government, the PLA, or industrial installations, Chen implicitly criticized the Red Guards for acting against these latter targets also and explicitly stated that their fire had been misdirected at some parts of the party apparatus too.

*An article by a group of Red Guards broadcast in this period stated well in a brief compass the arrogant confidence of the Red Guards in their value and strength. The article--written by the pioneer Red Guard unit at the Tsinghua middle-school--took note that there were still important people to be brought down ("Has the handful of persons within the party who are in authority and have taken the capitalist road been completely eliminated...? No!") , went on to assert that there would be other important people to be brought down after that ("Will new persons of this sort appear in the future...after the present ones are eliminated? Yes!"), warned the Red Guards' enemies that only the Guards had the right to "rebel" ("if you dare to rebel, we will immediately suppress you"), and concluded triumphantly, "After all, the state machine is in our hands." It was not hard to see how such an attitude--and one expressed in such an offensive way--would give concern even to some of those who supported Mao in his decision to make use of this extraordinary vehicle.
On the same day, a poster reported that Chou En-lai was supervising the investigation of the incident of early November (previously noted) in which a Peking party committee officer had died after interrogation by Red Guards, and that Chou had put Li Fu-chun (revealed the same day as a member of the new politburo standing committee) in charge of the investigation.

Moreover, on this same day (16 November), Peking took a step to reduce the prominence of the Red Guards in national affairs, at least in Peking itself. A joint directive of the CCP central committee and the State Council, signed by Lin Piao for the former and Chou En-lai for the latter, "closed" the city of Peking to visiting Red Guards for the winter. Noting that Peking had already received nine million visiting Red Guards, the directive cited the approaching cold weather (large-scale and increasing illness among the visitors had been reported) and the regime's need for railway transport for important economic tasks, stated that Peking would be a "closed city for all Red Guards from the provinces" after 21 November and that trains carrying Red Guards toward Peking after that date would be turned back, and informed the Guards that even when the "exchange of revolutionary experiences" resumed in April 1967 "only small groups" would be allowed to visit Peking; curiously, the final provision re-opened the "closed" city to Red Guards visiting "on their own responsibility," i.e. able to provide their own food, shelter, and transportation, but this provision would presumably discourage all but a small number.*

*On 1 December, another joint directive extended the deadline--for the departure from Peking of visiting Red Guards--to 20 December; the directive gave the PLA responsibility both for continuing the "training" of those remaining (until the deadline) and for seeing that they actually left and actually got home. It was apparent that the job of clearing Peking was too big for the time originally allowed, partly because a lot of the Red Guards simply ignored the original directive; moreover, some of those leaving Peking were not returning home but were going to other romantic places, e.g. Tibet.
The 16 November directive had the effect of moving the Red Guards away from the center of the stage, as if the party leaders had something else in mind for that position during the winter. This impression that the Red Guards were to play a supporting role for a time—-to re-emerge in a leading role but as a better-disciplined vehicle—was strengthened by the party's action on or about 20 and 21 November in sharply forbidding certain forms of "illegal" action. First observed by a TASS correspondent in Peking in the form of wall-posters signed by the Peking committee of the party,* the party notice forbade "anyone" (meaning primarily the Red Guards) from operating private jails, kangaroo courts, and torture chambers. The correspondent cited Red Guard publications—it is not clear whether they were quoted in or appeared together with the notice—as stating that "opponents" of the Red Guards had been subjected to these methods in a number of places, an assertion confirmed by many other sources; the opponents themselves had employed such methods on occasion, although much less often. Committees in the western part of China showed that directives to the same effect were given to these committees to be made public in posters; and such directives almost certainly went out to party committees throughout China.** The directive led some observers to speculate that the

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*There was some doubt that the Peking committee, the first secretary of which had been under prolonged attack, would have been self-assured enough to issue this order unless it had been given a new first secretary.

**It seemed of some importance that—just as Chou En-lai had been at pains to make clear the authority of party committees in his talk with the Red Guards in late September—the new team chose to make this particular notice public through the party committees rather than through the "cultural revolution" committees and groups or the Red Guards themselves.
action might be the first step in a campaign to discredit
the Red Guards as a movement; but Mao, Lin, Chou and the
other top-ranking leaders of the party had all been so
intimately associated with the movement from the beginning
that this seemed unlikely, less likely than a decision
to clear the center of the stage and to bring back the
Red Guards later as a better-disciplined body.

If the thinking of the party leaders in mid-November
did indeed include a desire to get and keep the Red Guards
under control, they took a step at the same time which
could only be subversive of that end. It was reported
on 21 November--by the newspaper of the 3rd Red Guard
Headquarters (the most militant body) in Peking--that
the CCP central committee on 16 November had issued a
general directive on the rehabilitation of leftists sup-
pressed and pejoratively labelled by party committees,
work-teams (primarily) and other vehicles in the course
of the cultural revolution since spring 1966. (It will
be recalled that a directive of 5 October relating to this
action in the Military Science Academy had been reported,
and that Red Flag on 31 October had called expressly for
party officials to restore the reputations of those left-
ist elements as part of their own process of self-criticism.
The reported directive--which has not come to hand--is
said to have called for the destruction of "all files"
compiled after 16 May (the possible date of the decision
to send in work-teams).

While this reported directive of 16 November was
consistent with the new team's own evaluation of the early
stages of the cultural revolution--that its management
had been too conservative, that Mao's intentions were
being subverted--there is some reason to believe that Mao
himself took the initiative in the issuance of the directive.
In earlier statements on the student movement attributed
to Mao, he had seemed to come down hard on the side of
the most militant students, of precisely those forces
represented by Kuai Ta-fu, whose newspaper reported the
directive. Whether Mao was personally responsible or not,
there could be little doubt that the directive would
encourage the militants--the newly-vindicated--to continue
along their violent course, probably including some of
the same actions that were forbidden to them in the directive
of 20 or 21 November.
The militants were in action again the very next day (22 November), according to a later account in a Red Guard newspaper apparently published by the Shanghai equivalent of Kau-i Ta-fu's group in Peking. There was said to be a demonstration in Shanghai on that date by some 15,000 Red Guards from Shanghai, Peking and other cities--featuring Nieh Yuan-tze, the female leader of the militants at Peking University--against the Shanghai municipal committee of the party and specifically against Tsao Ti-chiu, its acting head. Tsao and other officials of the party committee were reportedly present at the rally to hear themselves denounced as secret saboteurs of Mao's will and, among other things, for having labelled as "counter-revolutionary" the Red Guards from Peking who had staged a riot in the offices of the Shanghai committee in early September. (The Red Guard newspaper which reported the demonstration was said also to have denounced the Shanghai Liberation Daily, the newspaper of the Shanghai municipal committee which had helped to launch the "cultural revolution" just a year before.) The officials were apparently not beaten, however, and Tsao appeared in his official capacity in sending off a delegation of foreign visitors the same day.**

On the same day (22 November), the 3rd Red Guard Headquarters in Peking--the militants, presumably heartened by the 16 November directive on the rehabilitation of leftists, and not disheartened by the 20-21 November ban on "illegal" actions--were reported to be announcing their intention to wreck the rival "royalist" (2nd) headquarters. Their newspaper was said also to be asserting that there were at least two categories (factions) of Red Guards in every school in Peking.

On 23 November, it looked as though 'Lefty' was finally about to arrive--that is, that Mao and his new team had finally given the signal for early public action against some or all of the party leaders who had earlier been removed from the public scene or publicly demoted,

*Much later, there was an unconfirmed report of a clash in Foochow on 24 November, with 38 serious injuries.
and to carry out this action in the center of the stage just vacated by the Red Guards.* In what seemed to be a pretty clear signal of intent, there appeared in the streets of Peking a printed Red Guard pamphlet making very serious charges—of deliberate disloyalty, virtually treason—against Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, and demanding their dismissal from all posts. Whereas it had been reported a few days earlier that on 15 November Red Guard posters denouncing Liu had been seized by another Red Guard organization—thus suggesting that the "militants" and the "moderates" were still being allowed

*It was high time. Writing just a few days earlier (in the first draft of this paper), the present writer had put it this way: "Thus, as of late November, there was stronger reason than ever for Mao's new team to take some action against the 'handful' of irredeemable party leaders whom it had repeatedly threatened to bring down, rather than to let the pressure behind the 'cultural revolution' just leak out into the air. The new team, if it were not to appear either frivolous or impotent, must do one of two things, if not both: (a) take quick action against a few leaders at the center and in the provinces, publicly removing them from their positions and employing whatever physical force was necessary to remove them physically from their offices, or (b) follow the course which it had indicated at the beginning of November as the more likely, that is, to set in motion a ponderous, slow-moving process something like the kind it had employed in the Liaoning case of 1958, in which self-criticism would be invited from almost all officials and would be demanded from those already on the list to be purged, in which most self-criticisms would be accepted but many ordered repeated and a 'handful' found as proving the case against those out of favor, in which elaborate 'conferences' might be staged to conduct the 'struggle' (these might be publicized at the time but more likely after the close), and at the end of which the black 'handful' (or what remained of it) would be publicly expelled from the party." Materials received much later showed that the dominant figures had already set a similar process in motion during the conference which ended in early November.
to "debate" this issue, in other words that as of 15 November the new team was still undecided or still thought that the time was not ripe—the 23 November materials seemed for the first time to have high-level backing. That is, the materials for the first time were printed, and for the first time included information which appeared to come from unpublished party documents, or, at least, from party meetings which would not be expected to be publicized in this detail without high-level approval.

On the very next day, however, the pamphlet reportedly came down from the walls, and on 25 November Liu and Teng appeared with Mao on the first day of another split rally of the Red Guards as if the pamphlet had never appeared. These developments were confusing. That is, it was not at all clear whether (a) the pamphlet had been read correctly as a signal of early public action against Liu and Teng (at least), or (b) it had been read correctly as an indicator of the new team's longer-range plans but incorrectly as an indicator of immediate intentions (in other words, the militant Red Guards had jumped the gun again, as they had at the 18 October rally, and were being told so), or (c) it had been read incorrectly as a team signal instead of an expression of one faction, and the developments of 23 to 25 November really did indicate disagreement among the members of the new team on a serious issue (in other words, one leader or faction had taken the initiative, through the Red Guards, and was being countered by others, including Mao).* Subsequent

*A serious issue, with respect to the treatment of party leaders in disfavor, has been previously defined as those of whether to take further action, whether to suffer a long delay in taking it, whom to strike and how hard to strike. There had been indications for months of possible disagreement among party leaders on these issues, and of possible disagreement among them too on the serious issue of the definition of the role of the Red Guards. But, at least on this writer's reading, there had never been the kind of evidence which would permit a careful analyst to convert the possibility into a probability. This continued to be the case through November, but not through December.
developments were to make clear that the first reading was right—that is, public action against Liu and Teng was soon staged—but they did not make clear that the third interpretation was necessarily wrong; that is, it is possible that Mao himself did not make clear until about this time that he meant to have some sort of public spectacle centering on the crimes of Liu and Teng, and, if he had not, it is possible that when he did he was resolving a disagreement among members of the standing committee.

The Red Guard rally of 25-26 November, advertised as the last until the spring of 1967, was uneventful, apart from the appearance of Liu and Teng in their regular (since August) places. Maintaining continuity, the rally was opened by Kang Sheng as "advisor" to the central cultural revolution group. On the first day, viewing the march-past of some 600,000 Red Guards, Mao is said to have waved repeatedly. Important missing figures—that is, not identified as present—were Chen Yun, Po I-po, Li Hsueh-Feng, and Yang Cheng-wu. On the second day, Mao and Lin and others drove in open cars past 1.8 million young people, and Mao waved some more. Mao is said to have left Peking for his usual winter in the south immediately after the rally, a report supported by Peking's statement that on 26 November the Red Guards lined the road to the airport.*

On the previous day (25 November), posters attacking Chen Po-ta, head of the central "cultural revolution group," and two lesser figures of that group (Wang Jen-chung and Chi Pen-yu) had been observed; it was not known whether they were quickly taken down, as the attacks on Tao Chu had been. It was soon reported also that a 23 November pamphlet attacking Liu and Teng, although taken off the walls, was being used as "material for discussion" in major cities, and that Li Fu-chun and Po I-po were being attacked as supporters of the Liu/Teng line. Thus

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*Mao reappeared in Peking in January; it is not certain that he was ever away.
with every day in late November there was additional reason for the new team to clarify publicly its intentions.*

On 28 November, in a development withheld from the foreign audience until 3 December, Mao in absentia seemed to signal again—as the Red Guard pamphlet of 23 November had seemed to signal—that 'Lefty' was about to arrive, with very bad news for party leaders in disfavor. He did this through his wife, Chiang Ching, who gave the central speech to a rally of 20,000 "militants in the field of literature and art," a speech which had the effect of giving Mao's own promise that those who had failed him must put themselves through a long period of criticism and self-criticism.

*There was not only political reason. A letter of 27 November, from an employee of an industrial research institute in Peking, spoke eloquently of the damage being done to production by the prolonged "debate," the failure of the new team to set a clear course and get on with it. The worker wrote that whereas the "movement was being conducted quite satisfactorily before," recent months had been chaotic. He said that groups and factions were constantly struggling, with bitter arguments and physical clashes, that "most" people were "idle," that the party branch committee was providing no leadership and that no one was managing the daily work, that half a year had been "wasted" on the movement as "we have not promoted or expedited production at all," and that the party center could be expected to criticize the institute for this. The letter illustrated the impossible position in which party committees had been placed, having been told both that they should give the masses a free hand in debating and criticizing and that they should not let this interfere with production. Although the letter-writer viewed the institute as having "betrayed" Chairman Mao, it was probably Mao himself among the top leaders who was most willing to accept this degree of disorder for his long-term political ends.

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and that some of these would be brought down in any case. Peking's account of the rally was remarkable for its illustration of the importance of Chiang Ching, who was clearly illuminated as one of the top leaders of the party (regardless of her nominal rank), and thus for its illustration of Mao's continued domination of the party.*

The 28 November rally was presided over by Chen Po-ta, who made the opening speech; the speech was pedestrian, giving Mao credit for "direct guidance" of the cultural revolution and praising the outstanding contributions" of Mme. Mao to the revolution in literature and art. Mme. Mao followed, speaking first of the need to make Chinese literature and art conform to Mao's thought, asking whether a revolution was not necessary ("shouts of Yes! Yes! from the audience"), and going on to criticize the handling of the revolution across the board in the period dominated by the work-teams (roughly June-July 1966). As had other party spokesmen, she described the decision to send the work-teams as an error in the first place and went on to say that their work had been "still more erroneous," as they had directed their efforts not against the proper targets in the party and in the schools but against the revolutionary students. Notably, Mme. Mao did not say that Mao had disagreed with the decision to send in the work-teams, but attempted to absolve

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*Chou En-lai, the third-ranking party leader, and Chen Po-ta, fifth-ranking, both played supporting and deferential roles at this rally. Moreover, Peking announced that Mme. Mao "received a thunderous ovation from the entire rally" when she stepped forward, and that her speech was received with "repeated ovations"--virtually unprecedented praise, for anyone but Mao himself. It is hard to understand how any observer could argue, after this performance, that anyone but Mao is running the show in China, as it is incredible that anyone but Mao would accord Chiang Ching such treatment. Chiang's role also illustrates, of course, how few people Mao felt he could really trust.

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him of responsibility for the larger errors—as he himself had done in his speech—by asserting that as early as June (the first work-teams were sent in at the beginning of June) Mao had said that "work teams should not be sent out hastily; but a few comrades sent out work-teams hastily without asking Chairman Mao's permission." She emphasized that the serious error was not the organizational form—the work-team—but rather the "principles and policy it followed," implying again that Mao intended to fix the responsibility for this on the party-machine leaders, particularly Liu and Teng.

Mme. Mao went on to speak of the work of the central "cultural revolution group" of which she was first deputy chief (and in which role she had been since summer something like the seventh in importance among leaders of the party), and noted that "new problems cropped up" soon after the Red Guards were turned loose on 18 August; implying strongly (as the U.S. Consulate General noted) that the Red Guard movement was not tightly controlled, she described the group's role as that of gathering facts and investigating and in general trying to "keep up with the constantly developing revolutionary situation." She spoke in particular of her own work in reforming the No. 1 Peking Opera Company, taking note that this work had been supported and encouraged by Mao, Lin, Chou, Chen Pota and Kang Sheng.* Mme. Mao implicitly criticized the new Peking municipal committee—the first secretary of

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* Mme. Mao here cited five of the six party leaders who appeared still to be more important figures than she. The one omission was Tao Chu, who as an officer of the "cultural revolution group" should surely have been named; the omission seemed deliberate, so Tao had something to worry about. Moreover, on this occasion at least four "cultural" organizations were removed from the jurisdiction of the propaganda department headed by Tao Chu. Posters criticizing Tao—for protecting party leaders in the provinces—were on view in Peking again in late November.
which was absent from the rally—for having failed to cleanse the opera company of the influence of the former (disgraced) Peking committee, and then made clearer than ever before Mao's intention to stage a prolonged spectacle of criticism and self-criticism of those who had opposed or had been thought to oppose Mao's line:

Some leading members of the company [read: of the party] must make a clean breast of what they have done and reveal in a thorough way what others have done. This is the only way, and there is no other way out. If they really do so after full criticism by the masses, if they repent genuinely and make a fresh start, they will still be able to take part in the revolution...

Mme. Mao went on to make clear that not all party leaders then in disfavor would be credited with genuine repentance, and called for completion of the task of "struggling against and crushing those in authority who are taking the capitalist road" (along with criticizing and repudiating bourgeois authorities and ideology and transforming education and the arts, just as the 8 August declaration had first formulated it).

Chou En-lai followed, congratulating the No. 1 Peking Opera Company and three other troupes on their incorporation into the PLA—one of the two big "cultural" events announced at the rally, the other being the "good news" of Mme. Mao's official appointment as cultural advisor to the PLA, which she had been de facto for months. Chou went on like Chen Po-ta to emphasize Mao's guidance of the cultural revolution and to praise Mme. Mao's role in the field of literature and art.

In sum, through most of November Mao and the new team spoke equivocally: they continued to permit the Red Guards to criticize whomever they chose, but the party leaders took no public action against any of their targets. They again told the Red Guards not to interfere with
production, forbade them certain "illegal actions," and sent the visiting Red Guards home, but at the same time they apparently did not interfere seriously with the continued violence of the militants, and in fact took action --directing the rehabilitation of the leftists--which could only encourage the militants. Toward the end of November, Mao declared publicly through his wife his intention to stage a prolonged spectacle of criticism of and self-criticism by his opponents, including Liu and Teng.*

December: Less Bread, More Circuses

In early December Mao, and his new team began to stage a series of public spectacles featuring party leaders in disfavor, and by mid-December there were some indications that at least one leading member of the new team itself might join those in disfavor. Serious incidents involving the Red Guards continued in December; while the incidents and some of their possible sponsors were officially criticized, there were further signs of official favor for the militant wing of the Guards which had been most active in such incidents. One important action of the month was taken quietly--the extension of the "cultural revolution" on a much larger scale into industry and agriculture, a decision which on the face of it reversed a position associated mainly with Chou En-lai --although Chou need not have opposed it--and which was

*Materials received later quoted persons writing in late November from different points in China that the process of rehabilitation of people wrongly labelled in earlier stages of the cultural revolution--a process which was to be an important part of the process of self-criticism and correction of error--had begun in their areas and was evidently general. One of the writers noted that he did not dare to take revenge, as he was not sure that the line would not change again.
to provoke the same kind of resistance which the "revolution" had met in its encounter with party organizations.

On 3 December Peking broadcast the proceedings of the rally of 28 November, featuring Mme. Mao's speech with its apparent reiteration of Mao's intention to put party leaders in disfavor through a circus of criticism and self-criticism and to "crush" those whose confessions were deemed incomplete or insincere.* The 3 December broadcast may have been followed quickly by a party directive formulating the next step—the handing over of discredited party leaders to the Red Guards, as a wall-poster of 6 December calling for trials cites an unidentified "decision" of 4 December.

In any case, on 4 December Peng Chen, the senior figure and principal offender among the group of party leaders removed from their posts in the period from November 1965 to May 1966, was taken by the Red Guards from the unresisting hands of his custodians, as were several lesser figures. According to wall-posters, the Red Guards, acting "in compliance" with Mme. Mao's 28 November speech surfaced the day before (in which she had demanded that

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*On the previous day, 2 December, the Tsinghai provincial committee had gone through the approved exercise (although perhaps with insufficient self-abasement), issuing a public statement criticizing its own handling of a Tsinghai Daily editorial of 3 June—which had taken the militant line on the "cultural revolution" later vindicated by Mao and the new team—and restoring the reputation of the responsible editor; the provincial committee held itself "fully responsible" for its June error, although it pointed out that it had not had correct guidance from Peking at the time. At the same time (early December), there were credible reports that the leaders of provincial and municipal party committees in Kweichow and Fukien had recently conducted self-criticisms; some of both had been denounced by the Red Guards during the autumn.
Peng and others be "further exposed"), reconnoitered
the houses of Peng and others on 3 December, and in the
early hours of the next morning were allowed to seize
him in his bedroom and bear him off to "an appointed
place"--to be held, as it later developed, for an appear-
ance before an accusatory rally. The Guards then went
on (the same morning) to pick up six other officials long
in disfavor (all of them concerned in one way or another
with the management of "cultural" matters). They appar-
ently did not pick up at this time, however, the other
main figures of the group which was first to fall into
disfavor--that is, Lu Ting-i, Lo Jui-ching, and Yang
Shang-kun, perhaps because each was regarded as deserv-
ing a spectacle of his own. Very soon (within two days
at most) posters observed in Peking were demanding that
"proceedings" be instituted against these four--plus
Tien Han, whose "criminal" activities were publicly at-
tacked on 6 December--or even (explicitly) that they be
brought to "trial."

Soon after this--before 10 December--the Red Guards
(apparently the same group that had prepared the 23
November pamphlet) also advanced the level of the public
campaign against Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Post-
ers were reportedly observed at this time describing Liu
as the "biggest chief" of the opposition to Mao, the
protector of Peng Chen, the enemy of worthy members of
the new team (e.g. Kang Sheng), the "creator of the
bourgeois reactionary line," a "most disgusting" figure,
and so on. These posters reportedly described Li Hsueh-
feng and Po I-Po--neither officially in disfavor, but
both out of sight for weeks--as members of Liu's entourage
and executors of his mistaken line.* Interestingly, how-
ever, the posters as reported called for the dismissal
of Liu and Teng from their posts but did not call for

*This was true in a sense, as both had played important
roles in the June-July period of the work-teams.
their public trial, unlike the poster treatment of the leaders who fell into disfavor earlier.*

Meanwhile, in early December, there continued to be serious clashes between the Red Guards and party committees, between the Red Guards and workers, and among elements of the Red Guards. There was a report of repeated harrassment of Tsao Ti-chiu in Shanghai, and of several deaths in a clash in the office of Liberation Daily there on 3-4 December; a report of 11 killed and 200 injured (alternatively, 18 dead and 240 injured) in a clash in Chungking on 4 December between Red Guards and workers; a report of a "bloody clash" in Wu-hsi (near Shanghai) the same day; a report of a clash between Red Guards from the various headquarters in Peking on 7

*It was not clear, of course, whether this signified anything more than the fact that the campaign against Liu and Teng was not as far along as it was against the other group. That is, those of the earlier group had already lost their posts, so the posters were calling for the next stage of action against them, some kind of trial, whereas Liu and Teng had not been publicly stripped of their positions, so it would be reasonable to call for this first, moving on then to demand a trial. It seemed possible, however, that Mao and at least some members of the new team thought of Liu and Teng as in a different category from Peng Chen and others of the first group—that is, as being not incorrigible hard cases but rather as among those who could demonstrate by abundant self-abasement that they deserved another chance to perform some humble function for the party. Materials received later indicated that Mao had in fact taken this position on Liu and Teng in the October-November conference, although it was not clear in early December whether he still held it. It was clear that Mao was able to purge Liu and Teng—both evidently under house arrest—if he chose to.
December, at a meeting on the organization of the reception of visiting Japanese students; reports of Red Guard assertions that resistance to the "cultural revolution" was greatest in the Southwest (where a direct protege of Teng Hsiao-ping was still presiding) and that a "period of Red terror" was required; and reports that the Northwest and Central-South Bureaus, and the Anhwei, Kweichow, and Shensi provincial committees were also under one kind of bombardment or another by the Red Guards. Moreover, a detachment of Red Guards visiting Tibet sent an appeal for help to the CCP central committee, the cultural revolution group, and the 3rd Red Guard headquarters (the militants, apparently the parent or directing body),

Finally, the 3rd Red Guard Headquarters' newspaper complained publicly in early December that there had recently been several serious incidents in which their "fighters... were attacked and cruelly beaten up," and that "some of our representatives sent to the scene were beaten up or put in prison, while certain comrades are missing."

By this time, early December, all or almost all of the party's regional bureaus and provincial committees, and most of the major municipal committees, had been repeatedly criticized in Red Guard posters. The only possible exception among the regional bureaus was the Northeast bureau, where Sung Jen-chiuang, a protege of Teng Hsiao-ping, remained surprisingly free from attack, although all of his subordinate provincial committees were

*This detachment soon thereafter requested exemption from the deadline for returning home, in order to carry through the revolution in Tibet; the request was granted. Addressed to Chen Po-ta and Mme. Mao of the cultural revolution group, and illustrated the Red Guards' reluctance to regard a "central committee" directive as genuinely speaking for the party leadership.
being denounced in early December. The only possible exceptions among the provincial committees (merely possible, because not all posters were reported) were those of Kwangsi and Yunnan; all of the others had been denounced in the fall, or were being denounced in November and early December, or both. By this time all of the important party and government leaders in Peking had been or were being denounced as well in at least a few posters, although there had not been serious or sustained criticism of Mao, Lin, or Chou. Thus the new team was free to select, from all of the heads demanded, those that it wanted to cut off, abase, or demote.

Chou En-lai is reported by several sources to have called a special meeting of Red Guard organizations in Peking on 9 December, apparently taking as occasion the incident of 7 December. He is reported to have expressed satisfaction that the "bourgeois reactionary" line of Peng Chen and others of that group had "finally been unmasked"; to have rebuked "some" Red Guards for defending "old cadres who do not want [reserve?] to be defended" (not necessarily including Liu and Teng); and to have expressed favor for the militant wing of the Red Guard movement, in particular welcoming the reorganization of the 2nd Red Guard Headquarters in Peking.* He is also said, however, to have asked the Red Guards for better discipline; while blaming Liao Cheng-chih (a second-level leader) for poor management in the 7 December incident, Chou reportedly went on to criticize the Red Guards themselves for having used violence against "people" in general (i.e. indiscriminately) and in particular for fighting among themselves; as he and Mme. Mao

*Other posters reported that this Headquarters—a rival of the extremely militant 3rd Headquarters—had been reorganized along more militant lines by Chi Pen-yu of the cultural revolution group; and that Chou En-lai had "personally" rehabilitated Kuai Ta-fu, leader of the 3rd Headquarters, and had declared himself a supporter of Kuai's.
had both told them before, he told them again that they
must not fight among themselves, as it diverted atten-
tion from the main task of struggling against enemies
in the party. Chou reportedly said also that after 20
December the Red Guards would be given military training.

The new team seemed also to be addressing itself
to the problem of violence by, among, and against the
Red Guards in a Red Flag editorial broadcast on 12 Decem-
ber. The editorial was subject to so many possible read-
ings, however, that its message did not come through
clearly. For example:

Our party will allow no one to use
the concept of opposing the bombardment
of proletarian headquarters in order to
punish the revolutionary masses and sup-
press the revolution. At present, a
small group of persons...stay in the
background, praise mass student organi-
zations and mass workers organizations
which they have fooled, sow discord among
these organizations, create sects, and
instigate armed fights. They have gone
so far as to adopt all sorts of illegal
means to deal with the masses, so that
they might sit back and watch the tigers
fight...

This "small group" being denounced could be read (first
sentence) as meaning party leaders at the center and in
the provinces who had organized resistance to Red Guards
bombarding them or had divided the bombarding forces,
and/or as meaning (the rest of the paragraph) party
leaders who had given guidance to the Red Guards and
had consciously or unconsciously encouraged the split-
ting of the movement and clashes among its components
(e.g. Chou En-lai in early speeches and officers of
the cultural revolution group), and/or party leaders
in the center and in the provinces who were encouraging physical or poster attacks on the opponents or personal enemies of these leaders.*

And again:

Once the masses who were deceived for the time being come to realize the true features of those who played tricks... they will immediately abandon them and stand on the side of the correct line of the party central committee headed by Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao taught us to carry out the struggle peacefully, not with brute force... Only by resolutely persisting in peaceful struggle and opposing the bad elements who instigate the masses to carry out the struggle with brute force... (and so on)

In point of fact, no one had been genuinely more responsible for inciting the Red Guards themselves to acts of violence than had Mao and Lin Piao, and it was hard to believe that the editorial was aimed at them.** While here too the "bad elements" could be any of the groups

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*Some observers took the editorial as "authoritative evidence" that rival Red Guard factions were being "directed by different individuals in the current /top/ leadership," but that is surely only one possible reading. It is worth noting that the 3rd Red Guard Headquarters, commenting at the time, principally denounced the Red Guard Control Squads, whose task it was to prevent disorder and violence and who had presumably clashed several times with the 3rd Headquarters. Other materials circulating in Peking at the time denounced the 3rd Headquarters itself.

**Just four days later, militant Red Guards in Peking reportedly invaded a conservation ministry, beat up the acting minister, and broke his windows.
cited above, materials of January indicated that the 12 December editorial was aimed primarily not at party leaders in the center but at provincial and municipal secretaries—e.g., in Shanghai—who were even then using a combination of "soft" and "hard" methods against the "revolutionary rebel" workers then being organized.

The editorial went on to reiterate the position first stated in Red Flag on 31 October, which had made public the scenario for the purge: that in order to be regarded as having "sincerely corrected" one's errors, one must (a) expose his errors "before the masses", (b) reinstate those pejoratively labelled by him, (c) correct the picture for lower levels deceived by one's mistaken line (a new requirement), (d) learn from the masses, and (e) support the "revolutionary leftists" in their struggle against the bad "handful" of party leaders. As the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong noted, there was a "strikingly plaintive" note in the editorial's observation that "If only the comrades who committed errors in the past on the line to be followed" would do these things, "they would most assuredly be pardoned by the great revolutionary masses..." It was hard to read this passage as meaning anything else than that a substantial number of party leaders were refusing to follow the lines of the scenario, were refusing to play their assigned roles in the great spectacle beginning to be staged. The editorial went on to warn such "comrades" that if they failed to play their assigned roles, they would surely be "brought down." This seemed to be true, although some of the "comrades" were apparently regarded as having the capability of putting the new team to a lot of trouble before succumbing.*

*It seems very doubtful that Liu and Teng were regarded as having this capability, i.e. of "leading" a rebellion against Mao and Lin (as the popular press was fond of presenting the case). Both Liu and Teng were probably being held incommunicado somewhere in Peking, absolutely impotent in their own persons. It nevertheless remained possible that Mao and Lin would have preferred to finish off Liu and Teng but were hesitating to do so out of fear of the consequences— that is, fear of massing resistance (footnote continued on page 179)
The public scene in Peking for the rest of December was dominated by rallies. On 12 December, according to Red Guard newspapers, a large rally (possibly 100,000) was held in Peking to "struggle" against Peng Chen and "other counter-revolutionary revisionists." The rally, reportedly attended by leaders of the cultural revolution group, featured Peng Chen: that is, he was put on display and was forced to listen to speeches denouncing him for conspiracy and demanding that he be put on trial. (Some later posters said that Peng denied the indictment.) The various accounts do not make clear whether other leaders in disfavor were put on display with Peng at this first rally, but speakers at the meeting denounced them too, in similar terms.

On the following day, 13 December, the new team took another step against Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping—the first public attack on them by a party leader—through Tao Chu, a member of the team whose own position was hard to evaluate. On one hand, he had been under fairly heavy poster attack and had (apparently) been snubbed by Mme. Mao. On the other, he had made an apparently authoritative speech—one which Red Guards were acting on—as late as 7 December, and he was apparently making another such speech now on 13 December. (Information received much later indicated that by mid-December Tao had fallen, and his 7 December speech was being discredited.)

Speaking at a rally (Liu and Teng were not produced), Tao followed roughly the line taken by Mao and Lin Piao earlier: that Liu and Teng represented and had

(Footnote continued from page 178)

from the party machine—and elements of the governmental and military apparatus as well—throughout China, resistance not in "support" of Liu and Teng but motivated by a desperate hope of avoiding the same fate as Liu and Teng, a resistance which could be reduced if Liu and Teng were spared.
formulated a "bourgeois-reactionary" line; that in Mao's absence in June and July they had poisoned the entire country with this line in the name of the central committee, deceiving even Tao himself; that the counter-attack on the Liu-Teng line had been led by Lin Piao; that the Liu-Teng line still had wide influence in leading organs of the party at the center and with the leaders of provincial and municipal committees (possibly his own area of concern), and that it still had not been adequately criticized. He is reported to have said also that the cultural revolution was now to extend more deeply into the factories and the countryside, which was soon confirmed. Finally, he is said to have denounced poster attacks on Mao, Lin, Chou, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng (possibly attempting to associate himself more solidly, in the minds of this audience, with the other five of the big six) and on the cultural revolution group as a group, and then to have said that he welcomed such attacks on himself, that he recognized he had made errors (he specified one, but attributed it to Teng's orders), and that he hoped he would be found to be an adherent of the proletarian line; portions of the audience reportedly jeered this expression of hope. Conspicuous by its absence from this speech as reported was any call for punishment of Liu and Teng or of the regime's plans for them, apart from the implication that they were to participate in further criticism of their "line.*

Three or four days later, on 16 or 17 December, Mme. Mao, who seemed to be rising rapidly to a position as (unofficially) the third-or-fourth-ranking party leader, was the featured speaker at another Red Guard rally. The rally, reportedly attended also by Chou En-lai, Tao Chu, Chen Po-ta, and Kang Sheng, seems to have had the purpose primarily of giving further encouragement to the militant wing of the Red Guards.

*It may have been about this time, however, that Liu and Teng--according to later posters--began to be handed over to Red Guards for a series of small, private "struggle" meetings.
Mme. Mao in her speech reportedly criticized an officer of the cultural revolution group (Wang Jen-chung, concurrently acting first secretary of the Central-South bureau and a protege of Tao Chu), the secretary-general of the premier's office (Chou Jung-hsin),* and the one-time first secretary of the Canton committee recently transferred to the Peking committee (Yung Wen-tao, presumably a close associate of both Tao Chu and Wang Jen-chung), as being responsible for the persistence of a bourgeois "hard core" among youth groups, including the Red Guards. Mme. Mao reportedly went on to blame the three for "recent incidents" (presumably not all incidents), an action which had the effect--because she had already described them as representatives of the "bourgeois" line--of placing the responsibility for incidents on the opponents of the militant wing of the Red Guards (just as party secretaries had been blamed for resisting Red Guard attacks on them). According to some reports, Mme. Mao explicitly criticized the Red Guard control squads which were known to have clashed with the militants--quoting her to the effect that "we are criticizing ourselves because we educated them insufficiently." She reportedly did not, however, ask that those she criticized be imprisoned or otherwise punished; one of the three accused reportedly was present and acknowledged the criticism with bowed head--probably Chou Jung-hsin.

Other speakers at the rally reportedly also criticized opponents of the militant Red Guards; their reported criticism of "bourgeois reactionary" actions by officials in various geographical areas of Peking almost certainly refers to control squads in those areas, which were denounced in the same terms on 16 December by the newspaper of the militant (3rd) headquarters. According to one report, Chou En-lai in his speech went even further than Mme. Mao in depressing if not suppressing the opponents of the militants; in this version, Chou asked the control squads to "disband their organization voluntarily." According to another version of his speech, as reported, his criticism of "errors," violence and crime among the Red Guards was directly evenly against all factions of the Red Guards (like his earlier speeches), rather than

*Chou was later reported to have been the organizer of the Control Squads which had opposed the militant Red Guards.
concentrating on one. Perhaps both versions are right; that is, Chou declared his opposition to sin, and then took a practical action on behalf of the militants.

Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng, at the 16 or 17 December rally, seem to have offered little more than an endorsement of other speakers. Tao Chu, if present, was apparently given no opportunity to speak; at any rate no remarks of his were reported.

Mme. Mao reportedly spoke again at a rally of Red Guards on 18 December, stating a mixture of "militant" and "moderate" positions which appeared to represent Mao's positions at the time.* According to wall-posters reported by two sources, Mme. Mao denounced Liu Shao-chi as a "Khrushchev-type person" and dismissed his self-criticism as a "hoax," but also told the Red Guards that they could not "seize" Liu and Teng—i.e., could not feature them in a public spectacle—because their status was to be resolved by the party (possibly implying, had not yet been resolved). Mme. Mao reportedly again criticized the Red Guard control squads and said that they would be disbanded (Chou En-lai a day or two earlier had reportedly asked that they be), but on the other hand criticized all Red Guard violence, violence by whatever wing or faction (as Chou had reportedly done) and also asked

*It is not entirely clear whether Peking staged one, two or three rallies in the period of 16-18 December. Some sources reported rallies on both 16 and 17 December, but the reported content of the speeches was so nearly identical that a single rally, on one day or the other, seems more likely. The similarity of the reported content of Mme. Mao's speech attributed to 18 December makes it possible that this is simply a fuller version of her speech of 16 or 17 December, but it is treated here as a separate speech because the sources agree on the date of 18 December. Materials yet to be received will probably straighten this out.
the Red Guards in future to submit their charges to the Ministry of Public Security, which would be responsible for taking action (another line first stated by Chou, in or about September), this specification was curious in the light of the remainder of Mme. Mao's speech as reported, and a later report suggested that Mme. Mao may have said instead that the Ministry of Public Security had failed to make the necessary arrests, so Red Guards could now make their own--but other later materials indicated that the first version was correct.

Mme. Mao is said to have gone on to include "Public Security" among the "bourgeois-style" organizations which were not really in sympathy with the revolution, and to have "proposed" that "public security forces" be taken over by the PLA (she said that Hsieh Fu-chih had already agreed to this). However, the various versions of her speech do not make clear whether she was talking about the Ministry of Public Security as a whole or simply about one unreliable component, the municipal Public Security Bureau in Peking. This question is still open.

Further, Mme. Mao is said to have reiterated her charges of 16 or 17 December against Wang Jen-chung, Chou Jung-hsin, and Yung Wen-tao, adding the deputy secretary general of the State Council, Hsu Ming. She reportedly asked the Red Guards to conduct attacks on these people.

According to these sources, Mme. Mao in this 18 December speech went on to add to the list of those in disfavor a much more important regional leader than Wang Jen-chung--namely, Li Ching-chuan, the powerful first secretary of the Southwest Bureau and a full member of the CCP politburo. Adding to the indications that all or almost all of the regional first secretaries and most or many of the provincial first secretaries would be brought down, Mme. Mao is said to have denounced Li as a "manifest wrong-doer" (whether this is a direct quotation is uncertain) and to have gone on to charge that provincial party committees had operated their own intelligence services in Peking (the implication being, on behalf of their independent kingdoms).
On 19 and 20 December, fresh rallies were held to denounce Peng Chen and others of the first group (Lu, Lo, and Yang). Apparently all four were displayed at this rally. A picture was later circulated of Peng, Lu, Lo and Yang standing before a rally with bowed heads and placards around their necks. All of them were handled brutally by the Red Guards, and some of them were reported to have attempted suicide after the rally.

On the same days, fresh posters attacking Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping were reported. These were said to be "huge," and to be demanding their dismissal from all posts and even their "liquidation." Some posters related these two leaders to those of the first group, asserting that the two senior figures were "marshals" of the opposition to Mao and had recruited the others as "generals." Attacks on Liu Ning-i, the labor leader, Li Hsien-nien, the finance and trade specialist, and Ho Lung of the military affairs committee (the latter, apparently, for the first time) were also reported. *

On 20 December, "leaders of the central committee" received some 90,000 officers and men of the PLA, and some 10,000 party and government functionaries, who had helped with the work of taking care of the visiting Red Guards. Hsiao Hua (later to be attacked) spoke on behalf of Lin Piao, the Military Affairs Committee, and departments of the PLA; Mme. Mao spoke as first deputy chief of the central cultural revolution group; and Chen Po-ta and Chou En-lai spoke as members of the politburo standing committee. Mme. Mao and Chen both praised the PLA in particular, at the PLA's portion of the reception, while Chou's praise was more evenly distributed. Both Chen and Chou were given "stormy" applause. Chou went on to lead the singing at the stadium where party and government functionaries were later received. Tao Chu was listed first among other leaders attending, and some others being attacked then or to be attacked later were also present.

*In late January wild accounts of Ho's plans--of February 1966--for a "rebellion" of the PLA and/or a "coup" appeared in posters. Ho in fact had been in good favor at least through August.
On 23 December, according to a correspondent's account of a Red Guard newspaper of 27 December, Chou En-lai, Chen Po-ta, and Mme. Mao spoke to representatives of all three Red Guard headquarters in Peking—the first, the reorganized second (a more militant group), and the third (all along the most militant)—plus Red Guards from secondary schools. Chou is said to have "demanded" that all Red Guards from universities and colleges be united into one group—presumably meaning, among other things, the merger of the three headquarters. Months earlier, Chou had told the Red Guards that debate would continue until all were united in one position, and, if his speech was at all accurately reported, he may have been telling them now that the debate was over and that there was to be just one position—presumably that of the militants, in the light of the many official expressions of favor for them in previous weeks. A few days later, according to another correspondent's account, one of the Red Guard newspapers reported (28 December) that nine of the Red Guard "units" in Peking had "recently" merged.

Also on 23 December, it was reportedly "announced" that Lo Jui-ching had been "taken away"; perhaps his reported suicide took place after this date rather than immediately after the 20 December rally. On 24 December, according to wall-posters, Chi Pen-yu, an officer of the cultural revolution group, reportedly told a rally that Liu and Teng were the leaders of the opposition to Mao, and incited the Red Guards to seize them (this would have been in conflict with the line reportedly taken by Mme. Mao a week earlier, and Chi may instead have told them to keep denouncing Liu and Teng). On the same day, according to a TASS account of a Red Guard newspaper, Peng Te-huai was arrested by Red Guards in western China, to be brought back to Peking for a presumed appearance in a spectacle. And on 25 December, according to an unconfirmed report, there was—or at any rate there was scheduled—a another public rally to denounce Liu and Teng.

On 26 December, a correspondent reported that trucks with loudspeakers were touring Peking announcing that Liu and Teng were the leaders of the "black line" and that they should be deposed. The correspondent reported the
same loudspeakers to be blaring out the "latest" from Mme. Mao, namely (as reported) that all opponents of Mao's thought should be arrested, that "security" authorities in Peking had not been sufficiently militant in doing this, and that in consequence real revolutionaries (Red Guards) were entitled to make such arrests themselves. (While this seemed at the time a possibly genuine account of Mme. Mao's "latest" position, materials received later indicated that at least the last point was garbled; later materials also reported that Chou En-lai soon criticized the use of sound-trucks for such purposes.) The same correspondent reported fresh wall-poster attacks on Liu Shao-chi, Po I-po and Wang Jen-chung, calling them such things as "dogs" and asserting that Mme. Mao had called them a "group of rotters."

On 26 December (Mao's 73rd birthday), a People's Daily editorial made public most of a 10-point directive on the relationship between revolution and production, a directive perhaps formulated in early December, sent through normal party channels at the time, and partially reported in wall-posters later.* The directive, and the editorial reflecting it, quietly but radically changed the line established by People's Daily in September, affirmed by Chou En-lai then and later, and reiterated by the party newspaper in November (see pages 102 and 153) -- that the revolution should be so conducted as not to interfere with production.

The 26 December editorial began from the new proposition that the "working class" is the "leading force and most active factor of the cultural revolution" and the related proposition that industrial and mining

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*Fragmentary information on organizational activity in factories in November suggests the possibility that the directive was dated as early as November, but it may be instead that the early activity was experimental and there was no directive until December.
enterprises must not be allowed to slide down the path of "capitalism and revisionism." But in "some" such enterprises party authorities posed that danger, and therefore the revolution must be carried out in all such enterprises vigorously; indeed, revolution must be put "in command" of production. Those to be charged with this were the "worker masses," who would now conduct a "serious struggle" against those who had pretended to be concerned with production. These latter had done such things as using material incentives to seduce the workers and inciting the workers to struggle against one another and against students (Red Guards). Thus the central committee "has decreed" (a reference to the directive) that officials of industrial and mining enterprises must not retaliate against the masses who criticize them, and (as party officials had earlier been directed to do) they must restore the reputations of those pejoratively labelled; moreover, they must return their jobs and back pay to those fired. Further, workers were now to elect their own cultural revolution bodies--like those set up since August in the universities and all "cultural" organizations--to conduct the struggle. Finally, the workers must be permitted to create "all kinds of revolutionary organizations"--that is, Red Guards or their equivalent. The editorial went on to counsel these revolutionary organizations, as the Red Guards had long been told, to conduct the struggle by reasoning not force, and concluded with an admonition to the workers to "welcome" the revolutionary students coming to the factories to "exchange revolutionary experience"--something they had previously been expressly forbidden to do.

The editorial was consistent with the party directive as reported in wall-posters, but omitted two major points in the directive which were provided in the poster accounts. One related to the "re-election" of groups to "guide" production. The editorials of September and December had directed economic units to establish two groups--one to guide the cultural revolution and one to guide production. The production guidance groups were apparently to continue (or to be established where they had not been), but there was now no clear division between their authority and that of the cultural revolution groups and the Red
Guards or their equivalents (what were soon to emerge as "revolutionary rebel" workers), and, indeed, the editorial strongly suggested that—as in the days of the "great leap forward"—it was to be another case of "politics in command," with all that that would mean for rational management. The other point related to arbitration; the directive as reported provided for the workers to send a "small number" of representatives to the party's municipal or provincial committees or regional bureaus to appeal an issue, or even to Peking (a point which was to prove important).

It was apparent that, just as the Red Guards had been turned loose on the party apparatus in August, the new team was now turning the "revolutionaries" (of whatever designation) loose on the factories. Party leaders did not on this occasion, as they had in August, explicitly call for "disorder" to be created, but a mechanism to promote disorder had again been contrived.* Just as the Red Guards had "bombarded" party headquarters, shaken them up, and made it impossible for them to perform their jobs properly (all in the name of testing them as revolutionary successors), so now the party was setting the new revolutionary organizations against the existing party, youth, and union organizations in the factories and mines, with a similar prospect of armed clashes, purges, and a decline in actual production (all in the name of preventing the restoration of capitalism). One factor in this decision was presumably the desire to eliminate the influence of party authorities (managers and youth and union leaders) who had in the past been associated with party leaders now in disfavor—e.g. Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen, Po I-po, Liu Ning-i—who had been concerned with such activity at the national level.

On the night of 26 December, according to wall-posters observed later, Mme. Mao, Chen Po-ta, and Kang Sheng talked with the leaders of a new revolutionary

*It may be that visible resistance to the "revolution"--in the factories and countryside--impelled the new team to take action earlier than originally intended. But the campaign against this resistance would surely increase disorder, as well as resistance, in the short term.
trade union federation, the "All-China Federation of Red Revolutionaries," obviously designed to replace the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. Mme. Mao at this meeting reportedly denounced the leaders of the ACFTU and the Ministry of Labor—apparently present—as unresponsive to Mao and the politburo; and reportedly again criticized Liu Shao-chi at this meeting, to an audience expected to have some sympathy for Liu. On the next day (27 December), Red Guards of the new federation and also of the old "sealed the office" of the ACFTU in Peking, and four days after that seized the ACFTU's newspaper. The reason given in wall-posters was that the leaders of the ACFTU—notably Liu Ning-i and Lai Jo-yu—had carried out the "revisionist" line of Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and Peng Chen.

Also, on 27 December, there was reportedly another rally of 100,000 Red Guards and workers to denounce Liu and Teng. The speakers were said, echoing Mme. Mao, to have described Liu as "China's Khrushchev" and to have again demanded removal of both from office.* The speakers still did not, however, call for the arrest of Liu and Teng—that is, their arrest by Red Guards for a personal appearance at such a rally.

At the same time, posters were observed demanding that Peng Chen and others of the first group—Lo, Lu, and Yang—be executed. It was not clear whether the

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*Liu's self-criticism (at the October-November work conference) had reportedly appeared on Red Guard posters in Peking the previous day (26 December) and been denounced at once in Red Guard posters as "insincere." TASS reported two days later that Red Guard posters gave Liu an "ultimatum" to come to an Industrial Institute in Peking on 7 January and make (another) self-criticism; this was not confirmed by other sources, and material in early January did not report such an appearance.
"trial" of these leaders had been held or would be held. Peng Te-huai was reportedly returned to Peking on this same day (27 December).

On the following day, posters were observed denouncing a group of economic specialists once identified with relatively conservative positions in economic policy but inactive in recent years--Chen Yun, still a member of the politburo, Teng Tzu-hui, and Liao Lu-yen. Fresh posters were observed attacking Chen Yi again, and Hu Chiao-mu, author of the CCP's official history (1951).

By 29 December, Tao Chu had pretty clearly fallen from favor. On that date, fresh posters were observed--reportedly plastered all over Peking--denouncing Tao as a "new representative of the bourgeois reactionary line." (Later information indicated that Tao had in fact fallen by mid-December.) Judging from poster attacks beginning in early January, a group of military figures--both professional military leaders and political officers--also fell from favor in December, perhaps not until late December but perhaps as early as Tao did. Some observers have conjectured that the cases are connected, that all may have fallen on a single issue, e.g. whether or how to use the PLA against opponents of the new team. This may prove to be the case, but poster-accounts of the speeches of party leaders denouncing Tao in early January show a continued emphasis on the charge of 'protecting' the party apparatus as a whole and the Central-South in particular.* The reasons for the December purge of the military leaders remained quite unclear as of late January.

* Tao may have been making an all-out effort in that period to demonstrate that he was not a "bourgeois-reactionary" element. A later quoted a Red Guard in Canton to the effect that, following a Red Guard attack in late December on a newspaper put out by the Central-South Bureau and regarded by the Guards as "reactionary," Tao Chu had cabled the Red Guard headquarters there to express his strong favor for the action. (footnote continued on page 191)
(footnote continued from page 190)

The source was reportedly "astonished" to learn of denunciations of Tao in Peking, as he had been considered a faithful follower of Mao and supporter of the Red Guards.

* A lurid account was later received* from wall-posters in Canton--of other activities of Tao's in this period. The report alleged that Tao took the initiative to get three regional first secretaries--Sung Jen-chiung (northeast), Li Ching-chuan (Southwest), and Liu Lan-tao (Northwest)--to Peking for a conference with Lin Piao, lasting from 16 to 29 December. According to this account, Lin wanted to arrest the three when it became apparent that they would not support the new team, but Tao disagreed (having promised them safe conduct) and ordered Liao Han-sheng to seal off the airport while he personally escorted the three to the airport and saw them off, then going on himself to Nanking. Although this report was consistent with certain other information--e.g. poster attacks on Liao Han-sheng later, and reported poster assertions that anti-Mao forces in Nanking in some way represented Tao Chu--this information was in the public domain at the time the report was acquired, and it appeared to be a fabrication. It seemed inherently incredible that Tao Chu--who had been in some degree of trouble for a month, after being publicly snubbed by Mme. Mao--would have defied Lin Piao, the second-ranking party leader, or would go to Nanking to organize resistance to Peking and then return to Peking to watch the show. The other activity attributed to Tao in this period--trying to ingratiate himself with other leaders--is credible, but efforts of this kind apparently did not help him; within a week or so of his 29 December appearance, he was reportedly being paraded through the streets of Peking, and, while this was not confirmed, he was obviously in disgrace by early January.
Finally, on 31 December Peking radio announced that in 1967 the cultural revolution would be carried out "on a large scale" in rural areas as well as in factories. This too made public the essentials of a party directive—attributed to 15 December—reported in wall-posters. It was statly flatly in the broadcast editorial that any argument against this course was "incorrect." Young "intellectuals and students"—presumably including the Red Guards—were explicitly encouraged to go to the countryside—as to the factories—to "merge themselves" with the peasants, a course which had also been previously forbidden. The directive as reported on posters said that the revolution in the countryside would be directed "mainly" at a "handful" of party officials and unreformed landowners, rich peasants, reactionaries and rightists, and would be carried out by elected cultural revolution groups composed of poor and lower-middle peasants. Moreover, the directive as reported called expressly for the organization and development of Red Guards composed of these classes of the peasantry.

This directive was revealed—presumably deliberately—at the beginning of the slack season, so that it would not have the same immediately serious effects there as would be produced in the factories by the equivalent directive revealed on 26 December. Nevertheless, if the new team persisted in its intention, eventual disruption and a decline in production could be expected to appear in the rural areas as well.

During December, in sum, Mao and his new team used the Red Guards to publicly humiliate Peng Chen and the three others of the first group, along with some lesser figures, and to return Peng Te-huai for further action; members of the new team themselves publicly denounced, for the first time by leaders, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, while declining to allow them to be put on display at rallies; other leaders were specifically targeted for Red Guard attacks—so far as is known, for the first time; the new team marked for discard one of its own members, Tao Chu; party leaders again condemned violence against, by, and among the Red Guards, while giving further encouragement to the most militant elements...
and calling for the merger of Red Guard units (under the presumed domination of the militants); Mme. Mao revealed that either the Ministry of Public Security or the municipal Public Security Bureau in Peking would be subordinated to the PLA; the new team reiterated the ritual by which an erring official must seek forgiveness (self-abasement, reinstatement of those injured, correction of the record), while suggesting that many officials were refusing to perform this ritual; the party leaders issued directives turning the Red Guards and other "revolutionary" groups loose on the factories and the countryside, obviously accepting a risk of large-scale resistance; and a group of military leaders apparently fell from favor, possibly on the issue of use of the PLA against opponents of the new team. With respect to action against its opponents, the new team had moved some distance from the situation it had been in as early as October and as late as late November--when its pronouncements had in effect put the new team itself on trial, had obliged it to take some further action if it were not to seem frivolous or impotent; but it was again now in a situation in which further action seemed to be demanded--action against those in disfavor who had refused to go through the elaborate ritual prescribed for them* or had been found irredeemable anyway--including denunciation by name in the official press, the trial and sentencing of some of those in custody in Peking, and the dislodgement of some unregenerate leaders outside Peking.

*A wall-poster observed in Peking on 22 January gives a credible account of a "Chairman Mao Tse-tung's four point instruction" on just this question: (1) "everyone must bravely volunteer to meet the masses, conduct self-criticism..., and set fire to himself to burn away his errors"; (2) even if he is put to shame by having his face painted and a pointed hat put on him, he must carry on with his work; (3) only a minority are irredeemable, the others should be "made to correct their mistakes" and allowed to "recover"; and (4) party officials should face the masses' criticism "squarely" and with "dignity," as "the more timid they are, the higher the price."