INTELLIGENCE STUDY

POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

(POLO-XXI)

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

REFERENCE TITLE: POLO XXI
# POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUMMARY</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. The Short-Term Succession</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The Longer-Term Succession</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. OTHER POLITICAL PROBLEMS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. The Apparatus of Control</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The cadres</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The military</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The militia</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The People</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The intellectuals</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The youth</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The workers and peasants</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Minority nationalities</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. MAO'S POLITICAL PROGRAM</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Mass Political Indoctrination</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Past history</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The current &quot;socialist education&quot; campaign</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Economic Policy</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Culture and Education</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. PROSPECTS</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. The Economy</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The People</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The Leadership</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

This is a working paper of the DD/I Research Staff, a contribution to the forthcoming National Intelligence Estimate on political problems and prospects in Communist China.

The writer of this paper, Philip L. Bridgham, has benefited from conversations with a number of other observers of the Chinese scene. The DDI/RS would welcome comment, addressed to the writer or to the Chief or Deputy Chief of the staff.
POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Summary

Developments in Communist China within the past 18 months have revealed the existence of political and ideological problems of critical proportions. The basic ingredient of this crisis is the great disparity between the "revolutionary" goals held by Communist China's leaders and the individual, materialistic goals held by the great majority of the Chinese people. The inadequacy of Mao Tse-tung's prescription for achieving the good society (featuring class struggle, heroic poverty and collective enthusiasm) has become increasingly apparent to China's intellectuals, educated youth and a seemingly large number of middle and lower level party cadres. In view of this lack and loss of faith in the validity of Maoism, one of the most urgent political problems in Communist China today is the selection and training of "revolutionary successors" who will come to power after Mao and the Old Guard surrounding Mao have passed on.

In the short term, the death of Mao Tse-tung will have profound, if still dimly perceived, consequences for the effectiveness and stability of the Chinese Communist leadership. Although capable and dedicated, Liu Shao-chi, as the heir apparent, is a pale and insignificant figure compared to Mao, who has ruled the party for 30 years. As a leader of much smaller stature, Liu will probably have to contend with greater factional pressures within the top leadership where significant policy differences have erupted in the past and are believed still to exist.

As seen by Mao, a much more serious threat to the integrity and continuity of his revolutionary doctrines will arise when the "new generation" of party cadres (i.e. those whose training began after the conclusion of armed
struggle in 1949) assumes positions of leadership in a
decade or two. Against this threat, Mao personally has
initiated a long-term program of "cultivating revolution-
ary successors" who can be trusted to carry on loyally
after the Long March veterans have gone. The very length
of time deemed necessary—a minimum of 10 years—suggests
that the present leaders consider this undertaking to
transmit their precious "revolutionary" experience and
traditions to the younger generation to be a formidable
task. Indeed, Mao Tse-tung has recently conceded (in an
interview with Edgar Snow) that he is by no means certain
that future generations in China will continue to develop
the revolution toward Communism.

Peiping is concerned not simply with the long-term
program of developing "revolutionary successors," but
with serious political problems existing now. The most
serious of these is political inertia, a preoccupation
with individual, materialistic goals. An important part
of this problem is the fact that large numbers of party
cadres, especially at the lower levels, share the "bour-
geois"-"revisionist" attitudes of the people they are
supposed to control. Reacting to this threat, the party
leadership has launched an extensive party purge, instituted
a rigid check of the financial income of all party cadres,
and initiated a policy of replacing older cadres who have
become generally demoralized with younger men who are more
enthusiastic and dedicated.

One of the most striking developments of the past
year in Communist China has been the bitter attack launched
by Mao and his lieutenants against China's "revisionist"
intellectuals. In domestic policy, these "revisionists"
de-emphasize "class struggle" in favor of more moderate,
practical programs oriented toward economic development
and improved living standards; and in foreign policy,
they appear to favor Khrushchev's version of "peaceful
coeexistence." What the regime apparently fears is that
these views (which constitute a direct challenge to the
current version of Maoism) will persist in men's minds
and reappear to become influential after Mao and the Old
Guard have passed from the scene.
The problem of youth, which Edgar Snow on his recent visit to Communist China found preoccupying all of the top leaders with whom he talked, is similar to that of the intellectuals, but with special features of its own. The essence of Communist China's youth problem is that educated youth must be persuaded to sacrifice their careers and personal ambition for the good of the revolution. Peiping is taking extraordinary measures to "reform" educated youth and remove them from corrupting influences.

Of all of the "anti-socialist" manifestations which plague the Peiping regime, by far the most important seems to be the "spontaneous tendency to capitalism" which developed to an alarming degree in China's rural areas following the collapse of the "great leap forward." (This refers to a variety of private economic activities, at the expense of the collective economy.) As the organizational arm to enforce a new "hard" line in rural areas, newly-formed Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants Associations under party control have been entrusted with supervising the more energetic and productive "upper middle" peasants who are held responsible for the resurgence of capitalism in the countryside. They are also being used to criticize, expose and generally harass China's rural cadres currently under attack for tolerating, if not conniving in, these widespread capitalist practices. Although just getting under way, this tough rural rectification campaign does not bode well either for efficient management or for increased productivity in China's future agricultural development.

There also has been striking evidence of minority nationality disaffection in China's border areas. The recent adoption of harsher policies of "revolutionary reform" of these minorities may well create additional problems for the regime.

On 14 July 1964, Mao Tse-tung unveiled a 15-point program designed "to prevent the restoration of capitalism" in China. The program exemplifies the dominant element of Mao's thought--his reliance on political indoctrination to motivate and control human thought and behavior. The current "socialist education" campaign
deriving from this program, characterized by the Chinese Communists as the "broadest, deepest socialist revolutionary movement since our party came to power," is currently focused on rural areas where cadre obstructionism and corruption are considered the most serious threat to China's socialist revolution. The campaign is now envisaged as lasting from five to seven years, moving in staggered sequence across the country, province by province, county by county and village by village; and it is planned to carry it through until the thinking and behavior of every adult in Communist China has been investigated.

An important related element of Mao's thought--his conviction that "politics must take command" over the economy, and that political indoctrination rather than material incentive is the key to rapid development--has also become increasingly prominent in the past 18 months. He has ordered all departments of the national economy to model themselves on the PLA, and, in urban areas, a political commissar system of the military type is being established in economic departments. In rural areas, the Peasants' Associations (cited above) are playing a similar role, and Peiping is once again moving toward the system of distribution according to "need."

It is hard to see how a renewed effort to promote economic development through strengthened political controls and political indoctrination, no matter how realistically managed, can help but founder in the long run--and for the same reason that Communist China's periodic attempts to "leap forward" in the past have failed. In attempting what might be called a "controlled leap" in economic development, the Chinese Communist leadership is once again confronted with a fundamental contradiction between the requirements (as the dominant leaders see them) of doctrine and party control, on the one hand, and the requirements of production and economic motivation, on the other.

Although recognizing that such a contradiction exists, the Peiping regime is once again--through the medium of a "socialist education" campaign of unparalleled scope and intensity--acting on the assumption that
it is possible to substitute moral and ideological stimuli for material incentives in economic production and construction. The underlying premise of the "socialist education" campaign—that it is possible to cultivate a new "socialist" or "Communist" man who voluntarily subordinates individual to collective goals and enthusiastically participates in collective production—appears to be based on a utopian view of human nature. When persuasion fails, it becomes necessary to rely increasingly on coercion and suppression. Thus the outlook in Communist China in the years ahead seems to be for the unfolding of a program of economic and social development featuring increased tension and conflict and patterned increasingly on the Stalinist model of forced-draft economic development of a generation ago.

Finally, recent developments support earlier indications that Mao Tse-tung has lost some of the mental and tactical flexibility which he once possessed. There is a parallelism—in some respects—between Stalin's leadership in his declining years and Mao's leadership in the past 18 months. For the period of the next few years, we expect the Peking regime, under the continued domination of Mao or Mao's ideas, to step up the pace of Mao's "revolutionary" programs, and, in so doing, to exacerbate Communist China's already formidable problems.
POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Developments in Communist China within the past 18 months have revealed the existence of political and ideological problems of critical proportions. The basic ingredient of this crisis is the great disparity between the "revolutionary" goals held by Communist China's leaders and the individual, materialistic goals held by the great majority of the Chinese people. Peiping's primary goal of "revolutionization"—i.e. "carrying the revolution through to the end, both at home and abroad"—no longer strikes a responsive chord from a people disillusioned by the failure of Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary ideology to solve China's pressing problems.

The inadequacy of Mao Tse-tung's prescription for achieving the good society (featuring class struggle, heroic poverty and collective enthusiasm) has become increasingly apparent to China's intellectuals, educated youth and, apparently, a large number of middle and lower level party cadres. This lack and loss of faith in the validity of Maoism has led the Peiping regime in recent months to acknowledge the threat of "modern revisionism" and even to concede the possibility of a "capitalist restoration" in China at some future time unless appropriate measures are taken. In view of the advanced age of the top leaders in China (Mao was 71 last December), one of the most urgent of these preventive measures is the selection and training of "revolutionary successors" who will come to power after Mao and the Old Guard surrounding Mao have passed on.

I. THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM

It is important to realize at the outset that Communist China is faced with two separate and quite distinct succession problems. There is the short-term succession problem (which should last a minimum of 10 years), involving
such questions as who among the present generation of leaders will succeed Mao Tse-tung, who in turn will succeed him, and how these changes will affect policy. It is the second, longer-term succession problem concerning the future accession to power of a whole new "younger generation," however, which is currently pre-occupying China's top leaders.

A. The Short-Term Succession

There is good evidence that Mao Tse-tung has been preparing since at least 1956 for an orderly transfer of power on his death to the present chairman of the government, Liu Shao-chi. "In the most recent statement on this problem available in the West, Mao informed Field Marshal Montgomery in the fall of 1961 "emphatically" that he would be succeeded by Liu Shao-chi. He then added, however (in an allusion which appears to support other signs of incipient factionalism within the Chinese Communist leadership), that "after Liu, they could fight over the leadership."

As the heir apparent, Liu Shao-chi has seemed to stand even further to the "left" than Mao in his policy views. There are indications, for example, that he opposed Mao's disastrous experiment with "liberalization" in early 1957. In the summer of 1958, he declared (in the most sanguine view on record of any of the Chinese leaders) that China "will realize Communism very soon." Within the past year, he has been associated prominently with the revival of at least two of the radical programs which date from the "leap forward" era—the mass militia and the "half-work, half-study" educational programs.

More speculatively, there are preliminary indications that the successor, in turn, to the frail Liu Shao-chi (age 66) may also have been designated—namely, the secretary-general of the Chinese Communist party, Teng Hsiao-ping. Believed to be third in power in the CCP, the doctrinaire and militant Teng has recently been assigned a leading government role as acting premier during Chou
En-lai's extended foreign travels. In a perhaps related development, the militant wing of the top leadership has recently been strengthened by the admission to the inner circle of the hard-liner Peng Chen, who appears to have the main responsibility for the crack-down on China's intellectuals and educated youth.

No matter how carefully arrangements are made in advance, the fact remains that the death of Mao Tse-tung will have profound, if still dimly perceived, consequences for the effectiveness and stability of the Chinese Communist leadership. Although capable and dedicated, Liu Shao-chi is a pale and insignificant figure compared to Mao, who has ruled the party for thirty years. Generally regarded as cold and colorless, Liu will not be able to elicit the popular enthusiasm and affection still accorded to Mao. And, as a leader of much smaller stature, Liu will probably have to contend with greater factional pressures within the top leadership where significant policy differences have erupted in the past and are believed still to exist. To cite but one example, the conflict between those leaders who attach greater importance to "modernization" (i.e. those who advocate more economic rationalism and military professionalism) and the dominant group of leaders who emulate Mao in attaching greater importance to "revolutionization" seems likely to intensify.

B. The Longer-Term Succession

As seen by Mao, a much more serious threat to the integrity and continuity of his revolutionary doctrines will arise when the "new generation" of party cadres (i.e. those whose training began after the conclusion of armed struggle in 1949) assumes positions of leadership in a decade or two. It is against this threat that Mao personally has initiated a long-term program of "cultivating revolutionary successors" who can be trusted to carry on loyally after the Long March veterans have gone. At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, the criteria used to select candidates for training and future promotion are also being used to weed out large numbers of older
cadres currently under attack for corruption and a long list of assorted "revisionist" and "capitalist" crimes.

Of first importance in appraising this program is to understand that it does not call for early promotion of the "new generation" to positions of responsibility. Authoritative Chinese Communist publications have emphasized that it does not mean "changing shifts" now, but rather that old revolutionary cadres should seriously and systematically set about training successors who will ultimately take over. Both clandestine and open materials indicate that the leadership envisions this training program as lasting a minimum of 10 years and more likely several decades. The very length of time deemed necessary suggests that the present leaders consider this undertaking to transmit their precious "revolutionary" experience and traditions to the younger generation to be a formidable task. Indeed, Mao Tse-tung has recently conceded (in an interview with Edgar Snow) that he is by no means certain that future generations in China will continue to develop the revolution toward Communism. His underlying anxiety, if not pessimism, was revealed in the admission that "Their judgment would prevail, not ours."

It is also important to recognize that the purpose of this program is not to train successors for the upper echelons of the party leadership, but rather for the "basic-level leadership core" at the lower levels of the party hierarchy. Again Chinese Communist publications have made this point explicitly, asserting that the "class enemy" realized the impossibility of "restoring capitalism" at the top (where "we have the Marxist-Leninist leadership of the party central committee headed by Mao Tse-tung") and therefore seek "to realize their plot of restoring capitalism" by starting at the bottom. The same point—that the program of training "revolutionary successors" is designed to remedy weaknesses of younger party members working at the basic level—is implicit in the frequently quoted Chinese statement that "the imperialist prophets are pinning their hopes of 'peaceful evolution' on the third or fourth generation of the Chinese party."
The first criterion in the selection and training of "revolutionary successors" is proper class origin--i.e. they must come from urban proletariat or rural poor and lower-middle peasant families. A second requirement is that they temper themselves by long periods of time spent in "collective productive labor." Finally, and most important, they must distinguish themselves in the current all-embracing "socialist education"--"class struggle" campaign.

The key role assigned to "class struggle" is believed to constitute a fatal flaw in this program to train "revolutionary successors." As spelled out in party publications, the aim is to recreate the environment of past armed revolutionary struggle and thus perpetuate the revolutionary traditions of the CCP. As Mao has pointed out to foreign visitors on several occasions in the past year, the great weakness of China's young party cadres is their lack of "combat experience," and it is hoped that participation in the current largely-contrived "class struggle" will overcome this weakness. It would appear, however, that any attempt to recapture the past in order to solve present-day problems can only end in failure.

II. OTHER POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Although the program of training "revolutionary successors" is designed to meet a long-term threat, it reflects the Peiping regime's concern for other serious political problems already in existence. The most serious of these problems is the political inertia of the Chinese people, expressed in a preoccupation with individual, materialistic goals. The regime speaks of a revival of "bourgeois" or "capitalist" activity, and of an alarming growth of the influence of "Khrushchevite revisionism" among China's intellectuals, educated youth and younger party cadres. As indicated in the discussion which follows, these political ills are pervasive and deep-seated, affecting all segments of Chinese society.
A. The Apparatus of Control

1. The cadres

An important part of the problem is the fact that large numbers of party cadres, especially at the lower levels, share the "bourgeois"-'revisionist" attitudes of the people they are supposed to control. In short, an indispensable first step to re-establishing control over the people at large is to re-establish discipline within the ranks of the Chinese Communist party.

There is good evidence indicating the gravity of this problem. For example, characterizes the bourgeois tendencies and corruption of party cadres as "a very shameful and serious problem." The party center views growing ideological "bankruptcy," bureaucratism and financial corruption among party cadres as "a serious threat." Reacting to this threat, the party leadership has launched an extensive party purge (discussed in the following section), instituted a rigid check of the financial income of all party cadres, and initiated a policy of replacing older cadres who have become generally demoralized with younger men who are more enthusiastic and dedicated.

The lot of a party cadre, especially a rural cadre, has never been a happy one in Communist China. The demands placed on them are onerous and contradictory, in particular the demand that they identify themselves with and win the confidence of the masses and at the same time implement policies which are unpopular with the masses. Expected to work harder and set an example of personal austerity, they suffer the occupational hazard of serving as the scapegoat for mistakes of the party leadership (e.g. the "great leap forward" and the commune policies). In addition to this perennial hazard, party cadres face a special danger today because of the pronounced ambiguity of the party directives they must enforce. As a recent Chinese Communist publication put it, "the party demands that
our cadres creatively—not blindly and mechanically—implement party policies." A wrong guess can, and frequently does, lead to serious trouble.

Because of the recurring practice of the Chinese Communist party of devouring its own in time of trouble, it is not surprising that it encounters difficulty periodically in recruiting and maintaining cadres. Indeed, there is mounting evidence (in both published and clandestine sources) that the punitive rectification campaign now underway against rural cadres is proving counter-productive, with many cadres protesting that the punishments are unfair and that, as a result, they want to resign.

2. The military

By contrast, morale and discipline within the People's Liberation Army is considered to be generally good. Beginning as far back as the winter of 1960-1961 (when the Peiping regime was confronted with the threat of economic and political collapse), extraordinary measures have been taken to ensure the continued loyalty of the armed forces. These have included increased army rations, preferential treatment for the families of servicemen, and, especially, a vigorous and sustained campaign of political indoctrination combined with a tightening of party control over the military. This latter campaign of "socialist education" was apparently so successful that it was expanded, beginning in 1963, to encompass the entire nation, with all political, economic and social organizations in China now directed to study and emulate the organizational, operational and ideological training methods of the PLA. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that the high level of investment in military modernization in recent years has gone a long way to satisfy the demands of the professional military in China.
3. The militia

Paradoxically, the revival of Communist China's militia program in the latter half of 1964 is a development which appears contrary to the interests of China's military professionals. One explanation for this apparent contradiction is that, compared to the "everyone a soldier" mass militia program of 1958, there is to be much closer PLA supervision and direction in the present campaign. Moreover, mindful of its experience in the winter of 1960 when militia units in disaster-stricken provinces joined popular uprisings, the regime this time is placing much greater emphasis on organizational control and political reliability in its militia-building program.

Thus, in attempting to strengthen the apparatus of control by reactivating the militia, the Chinese Communists are faced with essentially the same problem they face with their basic-level party cadres. Stated simply, this is the problem of how to control the controllers.

B. The People

1. The intellectuals

One of the most striking developments of the past year in Communist China has been the bitter attack launched by Mao and his lieutenants against China's intellectuals. Indicating a sense of betrayal, Mao is reliably reported to have said, on initiating this attack, that "the intellectuals have never aligned themselves with us in the struggle against our adversaries." Since China's intellectuals have not actively supported the CCP, they must, according to Mao's doctrine of "class struggle," be engaged in a conspiracy to promote "bourgeois" and "revisionist" ideology in order to undermine the regime.
It is quite clear that Communist China's leaders are genuinely concerned over the threat of intellectual dissidence. A recent visitor was informed by an important Chinese official that "the principal worry of the regime was not economic but political, and specifically the greatest problem was the motivation and loyalty of the intellectuals and the youth." There are frequent references in published discussions to the "strong bourgeois influence present in the fields of culture, education, art and science." Moreover, Premier Chou En-lai called attention to "the spirit of revisionism which reigns in Chinese political and intellectual circles."

What might be called the political platform of these dissident intellectuals was revealed in late 1964 in the savage denunciation of the arch-revisionist Yang Hsien-chen (former head of the CCP's Higher Party School) and in speeches to the National People's Congress detailing criticism of the regime in recent years. In domestic policy, these "revisionists" de-emphasize "class struggle" in favor of more moderate, practical programs oriented toward economic development and improved living standards. In foreign policy, they appear to favor Khrushchev's version of "peaceful coexistence" (as Mao himself did, in 1954-57), would reconcile the differences between socialist countries (i.e. would back down in the Sino-Soviet dispute), and would reduce the amount of foreign aid (which China's economy can ill afford) being used to promote rebellion abroad. That this platform has won significant support within the upper echelons of the Chinese Communist party is doubtful. Rather, what the regime apparently fears is that these views (which constitute a direct challenge to the current version of Maoism) will persist in men's minds and reappear to become influential after Mao and the Old Guard have passed from the scene.

On the other hand, it should be noted that one class of intellectuals still receives favored treatment in Communist China--the scientists and technicians. Compelled by the withdrawal of Soviet experts to develop an
indigenous scientific and technological capability, the Peiping regime concedes that "special treatment is accorded by the State to bourgeois scientists and experts," giving as examples the provision of small Western-style houses and small cars. That this is only a temporary concession is made clear, however, in reiterated warnings to "young scientists and technicians" not to "envy the special treatment" received by bourgeois specialists but rather to "train themselves into Communist new people" dedicated to the principles of struggle and sacrifice.

2. The youth

The problem of youth, which Edgar Snow on his recent visit to Communist China found preoccupying all of the top leaders with whom he talked, is similar to that of the intellectuals, but with special features of its own. The disillusion of youth, whose educational and job opportunities have been sharply curtailed, is greater than other segments of the population since their expectations were higher in the first place. Led to think of themselves as leaders in a new, dynamic China, great numbers of educated youth (e.g. 300,000 in 1964 alone) find themselves sent to the frontier regions and countryside for an indefinite, in many cases permanent, stay. The essence of Communist China's youth problem, then, is that these educated youth must be persuaded to sacrifice their careers and personal ambitions for the good of the revolution.

The full-blown, if somewhat clumsily executed, propaganda campaign in 1963 "to study the good example of Lei Feng" is a case in point. Intended to imbue China's youth with the "revolutionary spirit" and "heroic self-sacrifice" of the "extraordinary ordinary soldier" Lei Feng, this campaign was not a success, with many students poking fun at this paragon of virtue. The reaction of Communist China's leaders to this unexpected turn of events was one of anger. In September 1964, Mao Tse-tung clearly revealed his resentment in caustic remarks about China's universities.
and the general unreliability of China's university students. In a similar vein, published discussions (e.g. the 1 January 1965 China Youth editorial) have insisted that "the broad masses of intellectual youth must abandon their obnoxious behavior."

More concretely, the Peiping regime has reacted by dispatching large numbers of these students to factories and farms for "reform through labor." This applies not only to all college graduates, who must spend a minimum of one year of physical labor before being assigned a job, a measure which can be explained at least in part on grounds of a dearth of employment opportunities. There are recent reports that all college students (except those being trained in the physical sciences) in Peiping, Tientsin and other cities must now interrupt their study to spend from six to 18 months participating in the "socialist education" campaign now sweeping the country. In addition to the valuable "revolutionary" training which this experience is supposed to provide, another stated objective of this extraordinary measure is to remove these students from the corrupting influence of "bourgeois intellectuals and experts" in China's institutions of higher learning.

3. The workers and peasants

Morale among workers and urban employees, although undoubtedly better than a year ago, is still believed to be depressed because of industrial unemployment and meager purchasing power. Articles on the need for intensified class struggle and the discovery of new capitalist elements within the working class suggest that workers have responded poorly to various campaigns in recent years, including those of increasing production and practicing economy, labor emulation, and "socialist education." In particular, the decision in 1964 to establish in the industrial sector a political commissar system modeled on that of the People's Liberation Army indicated Peiping's desire to create a more militant and disciplined labor force.
Of all the "anti-socialist" activities which plague the Peiping regime, however, by far the most important is the "spontaneous tendency to capitalism" which developed to an alarming degree in China's rural areas following the collapse of the "great leap forward." With the stability of the regime at stake, the Chinese Communist leadership throughout this period had been forced to make numerous concessions to the peasantry, concessions which had progressively expanded the area of private enterprise (cultivation of "private plots," private reclamation of waste land, private household production, and private trading on the "free market") at the expense of the collective economy. As seen by the party leadership, the struggle to re-establish control over China's rural economy then became a life and death struggle in which victory was essential to generating new momentum in economic development.

Although initiated at the Tenth Plenum of the CCP Eighth Central Committee in late September 1962, this campaign to re-establish socialist, collective controls in the countryside was intensified in mid-1964. The immediate cause of this decision to further intensify political pressures may well have been a rural inspection trip in the spring of 1964 by the powerful secretary general of the CCP, Teng Hsiao-ping. According to a credible report, Teng was "shocked" by what he termed the "mushrooming growth of capitalism" in China's rural communes, principally the tendency of better-off production teams to "secretly hoard" part of their produce and of the peasants to exploit their "private plots" for individual gain at the expense of the collective. As a result of this rural survey, Teng reportedly asserted that the Chinese Communists were about to launch a campaign "to wipe out this sort of petty capitalism" in the countryside.

Once again turning to the past for a solution to current problems, the Peiping regime has revived the "peasant associations" used during the land-reform era (1950-52) to bully and suppress landlords and rich peasants. As the organizational arm to enforce the new "hard" line in rural areas, newly formed Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants
Associations under party control have been entrusted with supervising the more energetic and productive "upper middle" peasants who are held responsible for the resurgence of capitalism in the countryside. They are also being used to criticize, expose and generally harass China's rural cadres currently under attack for tolerating, if not conniving in, these widespread capitalist practices. Although just getting under way, this tough rural rectification campaign does not bode well either for efficient management or for increased productivity in China's future agricultural development.

4. Minority nationalities

Striking evidence of minority nationality disaffection in China's border areas has come to light during the past six months. In particular, there have been reports that "frantic" attacks by class enemies have been "smashed" in Kansu, that class struggle has been extremely "sharp and complicated" in Sinkiang, and that the Panchen Lama (the supposedly docile successor to the Dalai Lama) has recently been deposed for "anti-people" activities in Tibet. This opposition notwithstanding, Communist China's leaders have apparently decided to step up the pace of revolutionary reform in minority nationality areas. Thus, it can be predicted with some confidence that dissidence in China's border areas will continue to be a serious problem for many years to come.

III. MAO'S POLITICAL PROGRAM

Reflecting anxiety over the present status and future course of the Chinese revolution, Secretary general Teng Hsiao-ping called in June 1964 for "a whole set of correct policies and measures in China to root out revisionism and prevent a restoration of capitalism." Within a month, Mao Tse-tung answered this call by unveiling (in the 14 July 1964 polemic "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism") a 15-point program designed "to prevent the restoration
of capitalism" not only in China but in all other socialist countries as well.

Presented as a genuine Marxist-Leninist program (as opposed to Khrushchev's "program of phoney Communism"), Mao's 15 "theories and policies" have been depicted by the Chinese Communists as "objective laws governing socialist society" and, as such, possessing universal validity. Although heavily political in nature and focused in part on the solution of long-term problems, Mao's 15-point program is also intended for immediate application as the "basic guiding thought" for China's "socialist revolution and socialist construction." As a restatement of Mao Tse-tung's version of the good society and of the methods necessary to achieve it, this comprehensive program provides a convenient check-list for analyzing and discussing specific political, economic and social programs currently underway in Communist China.

A. Mass Political Indoctrination

1. Past history

Probably the most distinctive element of Mao's thought is reliance on political indoctrination to motivate and control human thought and behavior. Featuring the "small group" technique of criticism and self-criticism, the methods of "thought reform" (more popularly known as "brain-washing") were developed and perfected during the Yenan period when Mao launched the first of many campaigns to "rectify" dissident thought and undesirable behavior within the CCP. After 1949, the scope of these campaigns was expanded to encompass not only the party but society as a whole.

Although variously labeled (i.e. land reform, agricultural cooperativization, anti-rightist and anti-right opportunist), Communist China's mass political campaign in the 1950's all served the same general purpose. They were intended first of all to ferret out and punish
those who opposed and obstructed party policies. A more important objective of these campaigns, however, was to arouse popular enthusiasm and mass support for the construction of a socialist society in China. The ultimate expression of this political indoctrination, "mass line" approach to economic and social development was, of course, the "great leap forward."

2. The current "socialist education" campaign

At the time of the Tenth Plenum in September 1962, three years of privation and ignominious retreat from the original goals of the "great leap forward" and commune programs had bred apathy, disillusionment and dissatisfaction among all classes of Chinese society. Even more alarming, a large proportion of the party rank and file had begun to display the same symptoms of cynicism toward party programs. It was in response to this crisis of confidence that the Chinese Communist regime launched the "socialist education"-"class struggle" campaign, a campaign with the ambitious objective (in the words of Mao Tse-tung) of "educating man anew and reorganizing our revolutionary ranks."

It is now apparent that Communist China's leadership decided at a high-level party conference in June 1964 to elevate the anti-Soviet and domestic political indoctrination campaigns to a new pitch of intensity—that of "sharp and complex class struggle on the international and domestic fronts." Domestically, on the pretext that Khrushchev's revisionism and the restoration of capitalism posed a clear and present danger to China's socialist revolution, it was decided to transform the "socialist education" campaign into the "broadest, deepest socialist revolutionary movement since our Party came to power." Although encompassing all classes and groups within Chinese society, this campaign is currently focused on rural areas where cadre obstructionism and corruption are considered the most serious threat to China's socialist revolution.
We have excellent reporting on the origin and development of this new-style rural rectification campaign which is called the "Four Clearances." Although initiated in December of 1963 (at which time the party circulated a document alleging that 90 percent of all rural cadres had exhibited shortcomings or committed errors), this campaign in its early stages was neither sufficiently thorough nor tough enough to suit the top leadership. The dissatisfaction of Communist China's leaders with the initial phase of this campaign was revealed in the somewhat ominous question reportedly raised in May 1964 by Mao Tse-tung: "Where have the landlords gone, when previously there were so many?" The message was clear. The campaign would have to start anew, only this time more intensive, harsher methods would be used in order to uncover and punish the prescribed number of "class enemies" in China's rural areas.

Demonstrating the sieve-like thoroughness of this new-style campaign is the fact that it is now envisaged as lasting from five to seven years, moving in staggered sequence across the country, province by province, county by county and village by village. Within a given locality, the process is designed to take three months, relying on massive injections of outside "task force cadres" to administer the campaign. Within these task forces, there is a clear delineation between the "working core" of disciplined and hardened cadres from urban areas who do the actual work of purging the delinquent rural cadres and the other campaigners (many of whom are university students) who perform lesser tasks. One of the most important of these lesser functions is to move into the homes of peasant families for an extended stay, and collect evidence of corruption and other forms of cadre malpractice.

The increasingly harsh and repressive nature of this campaign in recent months is well documented. Once the evidence of misdeeds (principally various types of corruption and abuse of authority) is collected, the erring cadres are then accused in large-scale "struggle" meetings where they must confess their crimes, engage in self-criticism and generally apologize to the peasants.
for their behavior. For those (and they are in the great majority) who have committed relatively minor crimes and who willingly confess, the punishment consists merely of paying back misappropriated funds or the payment of fines. For those committing more serious crimes and those who refuse to confess their guilt, the punishment is to be labeled a "class enemy" and to be sent to a labor camp or, in the most extreme cases, sentenced to death. There are, in addition, numerous reports of cadres committing suicide after being subjected to the pressures of these "struggle" sessions.

Although reportedly this campaign has received popular support in some communes (where cadre bullying and corruption were notorious), this will undoubtedly disappear once the rectifiers finish with the cadres and train their sights on the people. Indeed, this latter stage (known as the "Big Four Clearances") has already begun in certain areas. Indicating the magnitude of the current "socialist education" campaign, it is planned to carry it through until the thinking and behavior of every adult in Communist China has been investigated.

B. Economic Policy

Although not spelled out in his 15-point program, another important element of Mao's thought has become increasingly prominent in Chinese Communist policy decisions during the past 18 months--his conviction that "politics must take command" over the economy and that political indoctrination, rather than material incentive, is the key to rapid development of Communist China's backward economy. As is well known, Mao has directed his propagandists to denounce Khrushchev's "infatuation" with "material incentives" as "goulash Communism." Of far greater significance, he has ordered all departments of the national economy "to study the methods of the People's Liberation Army, establish and strengthen political work, and thus arouse the revolutionary spirit of the millions and tens of millions of cadres and masses on the economic front."
In urban areas, this injunction is being followed literally with the establishment in all industrial, transportation, trade and finance departments of a political commissar system modeled on that of the PLA. Hailed as "a new development of Mao Tse-tung's thought concerning socialist construction," this new political network in the urban sector is designed to create a more militant and disciplined labor force (an accompanying Red Flag commentary called for the formation of a giant, politically disciplined "army of socialist economic construction" in the image of the PLA) in preparation for a new "production upsurge" on the economic front.

As the organizational arm to cope with the "mushrooming growth of capitalism" in rural areas (which Teng Hsiao-ping had reported in the spring of 1964), newly formed Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants Associations under party control have been entrusted with enforcing a whole set of policies designed "to wipe out this sort of petty capitalism" in the countryside. These poor and lower-middle peasants (characterized as China's rural proletariat) are expected first of all to press for a substantial increase in the sale of grain to the State and in the accumulation of investment funds, overcoming the objections of rich peasants and "some stupid cadres" who favor more income for commune members. In a related and significant development, production teams have been directed to transfer their surplus grain to State food granaries for storage and thus overcome the "secret hoarding" of grain which Teng had also noted earlier in the year. Poor and lower-middle peasants are also reported to be demanding that collective side-line production (e.g. the raising of hogs and other secondary products in the countryside) be developed, again over the opposition of "landlords and rich peasant elements" who wish to exploit their "private plots" for individual gain at the expense of the collective.

An even more dramatic example of "politics taking command" over the rural economy is the fact that a new system of distribution has been introduced in China's communes. Although described as a "new system," it is actually an old one which appeared in 1957 on the eve of
the commune experiment, a system of "distribution mainly according to size of each family and secondarily according to labor." As explained in both clandestine and published reporting, this system, which greatly reduces the proportion of grain distributed according to "work points" (i.e. according to the amount and difficulty of work performed), is said to be favored by poor and lower-middle peasants because they have large families with a relatively weak labor force. Accompanying the revival of this earlier system has been a propaganda campaign attacking over-emphasis on "material incentives" and insisting that "politics" and not "work points" command rural distribution. Thus, although professing continued loyalty to the socialist principle of distribution "according to work," it is clear that the Peiping regime is once more moving towards the equalitarian system of distribution "according to need." As some rural cadres have already protested, this attempt once again to substitute "ideological" for "material" incentives may well have an adverse effect on productivity in China's agricultural development.

C. Culture and Education

Still another element of the Maoist vision revived in 1964 is the romantic and doctrinaire goal (taken directly from the Communist Manifesto) of "eliminating the differences between town and country, between worker and peasant and between mental and physical labor." A central feature of the extravagant ideological claims originally advanced for China's communes, this program reappeared in the form of a party central committee directive on "the two kinds of labor and two kinds of educational systems."

Admittedly experimental in nature, the "two kinds of labor" system proposes to make workers and peasants interchangeable by having them work both in industry and agriculture. Although motivated in part by practical considerations (e.g. an attempt to reduce the permanent staff of agricultural processing plants by employing farmers during the agricultural slack season), it is unlikely
that this system can or will be applied except on a very small scale.

It appears that the regime is much more serious, however, about reviving the "part-work, part-study" educational system. First established on an experimental basis in 1958, this system reflects the Maoist belief that "education must serve proletarian politics and must be combined with productive labor." Especially in rural areas, where large numbers of children from poorer families are still denied educational opportunities and where the curriculum is both elementary and vocational in nature, it is predicted that these "half-farmwork, half-study" schools will in time predominate. Whether in urban or rural areas, however, the goal is the same—to develop a new breed of "working class" intellectuals who can be trusted to support and uphold party policies.

The program does not stop here, however. It applies to all existing intellectuals, students, professionals and party cadres who must now participate in a rigidly enforced system of "collective, productive labor." Although Mao Tse-tung's stated objective all along has been to train "a large detachment of working-class intellectuals who are both "Red and expert," the pendulum has swung sharply away from "expertness" (which was stressed in 1961-62) to "redness", to be induced by contact with the masses and "participation in physical labor."

IV. PROSPECTS

The prospects of the Peiping regime depend in large part on the answers to three questions.

What are the implications of Mao's political doctrines for China's economic development? What will be the popular responses to the ambitious "socialist education" campaign? How will Communist China's aging leaders implement current political programs?
A. The Economy

A crucial question in assessing Communist China's future is whether the Peiping regime views the current mass political indoctrination campaign as a preventive measure to deter a further drift away from revolutionary ideals or as a preparatory measure aimed at mobilizing the Chinese people for a new "production upsurge" or "leap forward" in the future. Although not conclusive, the weight of evidence in recent months suggests the latter—that this campaign is an attempt once again to apply the basic theories underlying the "leap forward" strategy of economic development. At the same time, there is abundant evidence that the Chinese Communist leadership, well aware of serious errors in past efforts to translate these theories into practice, is attempting to apply them now with more realism and practicality.

The revival of Communist China's "mass-line" of socialist construction strongly suggests that the Peiping regime still clings to the "leap forward" strategy of economic development. Underlying this "mass-line" approach is Mao Tse-tung's well-known conviction (as expressed in an interview with Edgar Snow in 1960) that "the Chinese people are China's greatest resource since they are available for transforming the country without capital outlay." Inherent in this conception are the three main ingredients of Communist China's "leap forward" strategy: (1) that the basic wealth of a country is its manpower; (2) that this manpower is available for mobilization and regimentation by the Chinese Communist party; and (3) that this massive mobilization of human labor power can be effected primarily by relying on political indoctrination rather than on material incentives.

In addition to the basic theory, a number of specific programs of the "leap forward" era have been revived in recent months. Among these are the "every man a soldier" mass militia program; the "half-work, half-study" educational program; the system of enforced participation by intellectuals, professionals and party cadres in "collective, productive labor;" and the semi-equalitarian system of
rural income distribution—all of which have been noted and discussed above. Also indicative of a return to "leap forward" programs is the recent shift in agricultural development policy away from mechanization (the panacea advanced at the Tenth Plenum in September 1962) to a labor-intensive policy of "building stable, high-yield farmland."

It was just this decision to exploit the economic factor of labor power which led originally to the development of Communist China's "great leap forward" and commune programs in the winter and spring of 1957-58. As at that time, a mass water-conservancy construction campaign has recently been launched and hailed as "the opening phase in the high tide of socialist construction and production which is just rising." As at that time, agricultural investment is now to be financed primarily by the "direct accumulation of labor," i.e. the labor "contributed" by commune members. As at that time, the recent strengthening of controls in rural areas is (to quote a reliable clandestine report) "designed to augment production by exploiting manual labor to the maximum, to compensate for the lack of agricultural machinery."

Also significant is the fact that "leap forward" propaganda themes have reappeared in Chinese Communist policy discussion. After a lapse of several years, there are now confident assertions that "a new leap forward can certainly take place and a big increase in production can be achieved." There are candid appeals to "do things on a big scale" and "to display the same vigorous spirit...of 1958." There is the same exhortation "to set higher production goals" and, particularly reminiscent of the "leap forward" era, the same attacks against "complacency" and other examples of "conservative thinking" which stand in the way of a new "production upsurge." Finally, suggesting that this "leap forward" psychology has already affected Communist China's statistical system, there are the heady claims for agricultural production in 1964, claims which are believed to be substantially higher than the results actually achieved.
There are still important differences between Communist China's current economic development program and that of 1958. The much greater emphasis on "objective conditions" and the reiterated injunctions to "combine theory with practice" and to display a "practical scientific attitude" demonstrate a desire to avoid the excesses and more flagrant mistakes committed during the "great leap forward." In the long run, however, it is difficult to see how a renewed effort to promote economic development through strengthened political controls and political indoctrination, no matter how realistically managed, can help but founder—and for the same reason that Communist China's periodic attempts to "leap forward" in the past have failed. In attempting what might be called a "controlled leap" in economic development, the Chinese Communist leadership is once again confronted with a fundamental contradiction between the requirements (as the dominant leaders see them) of doctrine and party control, on the one hand, and the requirements of production and economic motivation, on the other.

B. The People

Although recognizing that such a contradiction exists, the Peiping regime is once again—through the medium of a "socialist education" campaign of unparalleled scope and intensity—acting on the assumption that it is possible to substitute moral and ideological stimuli for material incentives in economic production and construction. It is extremely doubtful, however, that this campaign will succeed any better than previous political indoctrination campaigns in solving the overriding, perennial problem which still confronts the Chinese Communist leadership—how to persuade the long-suffering Chinese people to produce more and consume less in order to accelerate economic development. The underlying premise of the "socialist education" campaign—that it is possible to cultivate a new "socialist" or "Communist" man who voluntarily subordinates individual to collective goals and enthusiastically participates in collective production—appears to be based on a utopian view of human
When methods of persuasion fail to achieve the utopian objective, it becomes necessary to rely increasingly on methods of coercion and suppression.

This, it is believed, is the significance of the new stage of "acute and violent class struggle" just now unfolding in Communist China. As the Soviets have charged, the Peiping regime has revived Stalin's idea that the more developed the socialist system becomes "the more acute and fierce the class struggle" becomes and the greater the need, consequently, to resort to Stalinist techniques of surveillance and oppression. If this analysis is correct, then the outlook in Communist China in the years ahead is for the unfolding of a program of economic and social development featuring increased tension and conflict and patterned increasingly on the Stalinist model of forced-draft economic development of a generation ago.

C. The Leadership

Another key variable in assessing China's political future is the manner in which Communist China's aging leaders implement current programs: Will the leadership, for example, continue to tolerate the politically-unpalatable but economically-essential institutions of "private plots" and material incentives? Will they recognize the limited appeal of abstract revolutionary theory in motivating human behavior and, instead, emphasize nationalistic goals which are understood and generally supported by the people? In conducting the stepped-up "socialist education" drive, will Peiping's top leaders be able to combine persuasion and coercion in such a way as to avoid further demoralization of party cadres and of China's hard-pressed peasants?

Although answers to these questions are necessarily speculative, recent developments suggest that the aging Mao Tse-tung has lost some of the mental and tactical flexibility which he once possessed. Indeed, there is a parallelism--in some respects--between Stalin's leadership in his declining years and Mao's leadership in the
past 18 months. Some of Mao's recent policies and actions, for example, are reminiscent of the paranoia (a psychosis "characterized by systematized delusions of persecution and of one's own greatness") which characterized Stalin's last years. Mao's hatred of the United States, the Soviet Union and other external enemies, and his current preoccupation with "class enemies" and "phoney Communists" within China, seem to have delusional features. And the recent elevation of the "cult of Mao" to a plane approaching deification raises the intriguing question of whether Mao's ego is reaching the heights attained by Stalin in the years preceding the latter's death.

Admittedly, it would be unwise to press the Stalinist analogy at this stage. It would be even more unwise to assume that Communist China's succession problem will closely resemble that faced by the Soviet Union on the death of Stalin. As noted earlier, Mao foresees that the principal threat to the integrity and continuity of his revolutionary doctrines will arise when a "new generation" of party cadres assumes positions of leadership in a decade or two. In this instance, we agree with Mao's judgment. The need to adjust to changing times and new circumstances may, indeed, lead in time to a de-emphasis of "class struggle," both at home and abroad, in favor of more moderate, practical programs oriented toward economic development and improved living standards. In the meantime, however, and especially for the period of the next few years, we expect the Peiping regime to step up the pace of Mao's "revolutionary" programs, and, in so doing, to exacerbate Communist China's already formidable political problems.