Intelligence Report

Portrait of A Neo-Stalinist

Annex To CAESAR XXXIX
(Andrey Kirilenko and the Soviet Political Succession)

(Reference Title: CAESAR XL)
MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS:

This Annex to CAESAR XXXIX (March 1971) traces the rise of a tough apparatchik, Andrey Kirilenko, to a top position within the Soviet system. Although the Annex is published especially for those interested in the Soviet leadership question in some depth, the general reader will find profit in the patterns -- of leadership style, policy, and proteges -- which continue to produce more Stalins than Khrushchevs.

The analysis and judgments of this Annex are consistent with those of CAESAR XXXIX, and have similarly met general agreement among Soviet specialists within the Central Intelligence Agency. Comments on this Annex are welcome, and should be addressed to its author, Mr. Albert L. Salter, of this Staff.

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# PORTRAIT OF A NEO-STALINIST

## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A NOTE ON SOURCES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREVIEW.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. CASE STUDY OF A NEO-STALINIST ON THE RISE.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Learning the Ropes: In the Ukraine (1938-55)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Joining the Fray: The Sverdlovsk Years (1956-62)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. In Khrushchev's Service: The RSFSR Bureau (1962-64)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. In Brezhnev's Service: The RSFSR Bureau (1964-66)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. KIRILENKO'S CAREER AS DEPUTY GENERAL SECRETARY.</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Sharing Power with Brezhnev's Rivals</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Toward &quot;Second in Command&quot; Status.</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Outlining the Five-Year Plan</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Toward the 24th Party Congress</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. POSTSCRIPT ON THE 24th CONGRESS.</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A NOTE ON SOURCES

As in the case of CAESAR XXXIX (Andrey Kirilenko and the Soviet Political Succession), there is very little clandestine data available; thus the analysis presented in this Annex is based almost entirely on information from open sources.

The fragmentary evidence does not permit definitive conclusions in many areas. Significant patterns do evolve, however, in the behavior of individual leaders and groups of leaders, and occasional raetsels illuminate certain important facets and life-style within the top Soviet leadership.
PORTRAIT OF A NEO-STALINIST

Preview

The attitudes, prejudices, and working style of senior Politburo and Secretariat member Andrey Kirilenko are fairly representative of the neo-Stalinism that has come to mark the Soviet leadership system since Khrushchev's ouster. This has its deepest roots in the ground of terror prepared by Stalin in the mid-1930s, when he sought to consolidate his dictatorship through the methodical elimination of real or imagined opponents. Those purges took an especially heavy toll among the Party elite, and in the Ukraine the sweep was clean. Almost all of the leading officials serving in the Ukraine in 1937 had been replaced, by the end of 1938, by previously obscure persons. This was the "new generation" of loyal Communists, many of them previously technicians rather than politicians, whom Stalin and his lieutenants recruited to fill the many vacuums they were creating in the Party's elite corps.

In January 1938 Khrushchev arrived in the Ukraine as Stalin's viceroy to wind up the purge and to oversee the Party recruitment campaign. His political experience set him off sharply against the neo-Stalinist initiates whom he recruited that year. Khrushchev had joined the Communist Party in 1918, and although not technically an Old Bolshevik, he had much in common with the older generation of Party leaders who were directly associated with the October Revolution. He had observed and to some extent participated in the early Leninist regime, with its degree of tolerance for dissident political views and factions and its unifying spirit of enthusiasm for the Communist cause. Khrushchev was also familiar with
its more conspiratorial aspects, which were to loom especially large a decade later as Stalin tightened his grip on the Party.

By contrast, the new elite which Khrushchev formed in the Ukraine in 1938 comprised young Communists who, variously, were sincere in their devotion to Stalin, or intimidated by his terror, or at least aware of how to survive in the system. In any case, they applied themselves to advancing the Stalinist cause, Stalin's name having become synomynous with the ideal of world communism. Because of this awesome baptism into the Party's service, and of their relative inexperience of the greater political diversity Khrushchev and others had known in the 1920s, this "new generation" of leaders acquired many of the political characteristics of Stalin and, in fact, became neo-Stalinists.

This distinction between Khrushchev and his younger Ukrainian hirelings was to set the stage for conflict in the post-Stalin period, after Khrushchev as the new Party boss had brought many of these leaders to Moscow for political support. Although they aided him in his fight against ultraconservatives, especially in the 1950s, these neo-Stalinists were a major force in the coalition of leaders who dumped Khrushchev in 1964, opposing him in large part for his unorthodox, (that is, un-Stalinist) ideas and methods. There is some evidence to suggest that not all of them had endorsed Khrushchev's use of de-Stalinization for his own political purposes, and some of them may even have been surprised and dismayed when he launched the famous attack on Stalin in the "Secret Speech" at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. In any event, most of them deplored the erosion of political and social discipline under Khrushchev, and many probably hoped for and worked toward a revival of more orthodox Soviet rule.

In short, the neo-Stalinists of today -- and they include such men as Brezhnev, Podgorny, Shelest, and Kirilenko, all of whom got their start in the Ukraine.
during the last years of the great purges, as well as the slightly more "old-line" Stalinist Suslov -- tend as a group toward authoritarian methods of rule. In political and social spheres they promote orthodoxy and conformity, allowing little or no room for experiment and dissent. For neo-Stalinists discipline is the watchword, and liberalizing ideas are anathema. In economic affairs they generally favor strict centralization of management for purposes of control, although a certain pragmatism often is visible in attempts to achieve more with limited means. They call themselves Leninists, but they are almost totally committed to Stalinist methods, except for the general and outright use of terror as an instrument of rule -- and the abandonment of terror apparently has been replaced in recent years by an increasing reliance on the labor-camp system, which had been greatly reduced under Khrushchev.

Kirilenko's career makes a good subject for inquiry into the neo-Stalinism of the present Soviet leadership, in that it illuminates fairly typical salient characteristics of the generation of Party leaders who have become the Kremlin policymakers of today. His formative years in Stalin's political machine were marked, especially during the purge period of the 1930s, by an atmosphere of conspiracy in which political protection was a minimum requisite for survival and advance. His ups and downs during the Khrushchev years, when he aligned himself with the "Ukrainian clique," provide a measure of the infighting which waxed within the Party at that time and which continues, to a lesser degree, to impair the smooth functioning of the regime. And, Kirilenko's career of apprenticeship in the Ukraine, of national prominence in the Russian Federation (RSFSR), and finally at the pinnacle of Party service in the central Secretariat demonstrates the unique closeness of his association during all these years with the present regime's leading neo-Stalinist, General Secretary Brezhnev.

Kirilenko's activities also give glimpses into how decisions are made within the framework of the
oligarchic leadership in the Brezhnev era, his success in pursuit of political power offering a gauge of the extent of neo-Stalinist influence on present policies. In addition, Kirilenko's entire career -- his development as an apparatchik, his performance as a decision-maker and technocratic administrator, and his emergence as Brezhnev's possible successor -- reveals the style, personality, and political outlook of a man who is now playing a primary role in shaping the Soviet course and the Soviet leadership of the future.
I. CASE STUDY OF A NEO-STALINIST ON THE RISE

When he arrived at his first professional Party post in Khrushchev's Ukraine in 1938, Kirilenko had behind him relatively scant experience in political work. In fact, his history as revealed in official though incomplete Soviet biographies suggests that as a youth he was anything but political in outlook. A large factor in his enrollment into the ranks of Party administrators probably was his technical ability, combined with his availability at the right time -- the end of the great purge of the Party elite.

Kirilenko's official biographic data include the facts of his birth on 8 September 1906 in the family of an artisan in a village of present-day Voronezh Oblast. (Earlier it was territorially part of Belgorod Oblast, which borders on the eastern Ukraine.) Thus was he born a Russian, despite his Ukrainian sounding name and probable descent from Ukrainian stock, and his biographies list his nationality as Russian. After completing a professional-technical school in 1925, the 18-year-old Kirilenko began a four-year period of work as a machinist and electrician, part of the time in Voronezh enterprises, and part in a mine in the Donbass. He could conceivably have come in contact with Khrushchev in the Donbass, in that the latter had been active there several years prior to 1928, working first in the mines and then in the Donetsk Party apparatus.

Kirilenko appears to have decided or been encouraged by 1929 to enter political work and to prepare for higher education. He served the next two years in various Komsomol and government organizations while studying in his spare time. On completing his preparatory courses in 1930, he enrolled in the Rybinsk Aviation Institute in Yaroslavl' Oblast (in the RSFSR). His student years were, by all
appearances, distinguished only by his joining the Communist Party at the age of 24 in 1931; he graduated only in 1936.* Kirilenko then moved to the Ukraine to take up the profession of design engineer in a Zaporozh'ye aircraft plant. He held this job for two years -- the worst period of the Stalinist terror and purges -- until Khrushchev's arrival to rebuild the Ukrainian Party apparatus.

A. Learning the Ropes: In the Ukraine (1938-55)

The 32-year old Kirilenko began his professional Party service in 1938 as the second secretary of a rayon (district) committee in Zaporozh'ye Oblast. He advanced rapidly, in 1939 becoming a secretary and then second secretary of the Zaporozh'ye Oblast Party Committee. How much of Kirilenko's promotion was due to Khrushchev's direct influence is unknown; assisting the Ukrainian Party boss in cadres and organizational matters then was M.A. Burmistenko, who reportedly had worked in the secret police in the 1920s and later had been closely associated with Stalin's personal secretariat.** In any event, Kirilenko continued until 1941 to serve as second secretary, presumably overseeing organizational and personnel matters.

*Coincidentally, another future leader was graduating in 1936 in Rybinsk, although from the Water Transport Technical School: Yuriy Andropov, presently KGB chief. It is not known if the two young engineers were acquainted at that time. Andropov went into Komsomol work in Yaroslavl' Oblast after graduation, and his path is not known to have crossed Kirilenko's again until much later.

**Robert Conquest, The Great Terror.
in the predominantly heavy-industrial and metallurgical area of Zaporozh'ye, while Stalin and the Kremlin planners began to accelerate their preparations for a possible conflict with Hitler's Germany.

Kirilenko had meanwhile the opportunity to make contact with a number of Party officials who would later assume powerful positions in the regime, especially after Stalin's death. Some of these leaders appear to have been instrumental in assisting Kirilenko's advance. The most important of these was another young engineer named Leonid Brezhnev, who had been promoted in 1938 from a secondary government post to the position of secretary of the neighboring Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Party Committee. In view of the geographic and economic closeness of Zaporozh'ye and Dnepropetrovsk, it would not have been unusual for Kirilenko and Brezhnev to have had some contact at that time. Both of them, in turn, presumably had some political association with Aleksey Kirichenko, who served as chief of the Ukrainian Central Committee's Transportation Department.
during 1938-40 and who became Khrushchev's Ukrainian Party Secretary for industry before the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. Kirichenko was to play an even more important role after the war and after Stalin's death in both Ukrainian and national Party affairs. In fact, his influence may have been as great as Khrushchev's or Brezhnev's was in promoting Kirilenko in the 1950s.

At the start of the war in 1941, many of the leading Ukrainian Party cadres entered military service as political commissars. Khrushchev and Kirichenko functioned as such on the Southwestern Front, for example. Kirilenko became a member of the military council of the 18th Army of the Southern Front. Brezhnev, too, was with the Southern Front at that time, as deputy chief of the Political Administration. In fact, Brezhnev also served, presumably simultaneously, as chief of the 18th Army Political Department, and an article which Kirilenko authored in December 1966 suggested that he and Brezhnev had worked in the same area at the front during this period. However, Kirilenko soon left the military service — probably in April 1942, although official Soviet sources confuse the date — to begin work at a Moscow aircraft plant as a representative of the Soviet Defense Committee. He returned, reportedly in 1943, to his former Ukrainian post of second secretary for Zaporozhye Oblast.

Kirilenko's postwar career was marked by unspectacular but regular advances, behind which were a number of Ukrainian Party leaders. The central figure, of course, was Khrushchev, who had returned to the Ukraine in 1944. For three years, until March 1947, Khrushchev ruled the Ukraine virtually single-handedly. During this immediate postwar period
Khrushchev combined the posts of Ukrainian first secretary, Ukrainian Premier, and Party boss of both the city and the oblast committees of Kiev. He was indefatigably active, and all important personnel actions during this period had to have his approval. His decisive influence in shaping the Ukrainian cadres corps in the postwar period of reconstruction was manifested later in the support his Ukrainian associates, including Kirilenko, gave him in his political struggles against such formidable rivals as Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Kozlov.

Several circumstances suggest, nevertheless, that Brezhnev and others in Khrushchev's Ukrainian cohort had a more direct interest and involvement in promoting Kirilenko to higher posts than had the Party boss himself. For example, Brezhnev's first assignment on returning to the Ukraine from his political work in the military in September 1946 was to the post of Party boss in Zaporozh'ye, replacing the first secretary for whom Kirilenko had worked since 1943 and even before the war. Brezhnev's installation as Party boss over the head of Kirilenko does not argue strongly that Khrushchev had yet acquired an interest in furthering the career of the second secretary. However, Brezhnev and Kirilenko did not work together very long, for the latter's fortunes soon improved: he was promoted in February 1947 to the post of Party boss in Nikolayev Oblast, a Black Sea port and machine-building area. It seems plausible, especially in view of Brezhnev's probable prewar and wartime association with Kirilenko, that this sudden change in Kirilenko's fortunes was in large part due to a Brezhnev recommendation.*

*The promotion was, however, only a small chapter in the story of high-level maneuvering for control over cadres in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldavia. In May 1946 Georgiy Malenkov, by then one of the most powerful Kremlin figures, apparently had suffered a setback at the hands of his rivals in the center and lost direct control over (footnote continued on page 12)
In Dnepropetrovsk

Brezhnev's involvement appeared likely again in the transfer of Kirilenko in July 1950 to the more important position of Dnepropetrovsk Party boss. Brezhnev had held the post from late 1947 until early 1950, when he followed Khrushchev from the Ukraine to Moscow.* Despite their physical absence from the Ukraine, both Khrushchev and Brezhnev undoubtedly continued to exert

(footnote continued from page 11)
the cadres sector. As one consequence, the handling of cadres affairs in the Ukraine was criticized in a Central Committee decree and, more importantly, Aleksey Yepishev was released from political work in the armed forces in July to become Khrushchev's "cadres secretary." The assignment of Yepishev, who had served Khrushchev before the war as Kharkov Party boss, undercut the growing power of Second Secretary Dem'yan Korotchenko, a Kaganovich client who had succeeded in getting direct control over personnel assignments in July 1945 with the exile of the then cadres secretary, Kirichenko, to the post of first secretary of Odessa Oblast. Yepishev continued to serve as cadres secretary until 1949, when he went into a period of political decline. However, since 1962, under the aegis of first Khrushchev and then Brezhnev, Yepishev has held the important position of chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, which carries political rank and power equivalent to that of a Central Committee department chief.

*Khrushchev went to Moscow in December 1949 to join the central Secretariat. Brezhnev left Dnepropetrovsk the following April to work in the Central Committee apparatus and then, in July, was installed as Moldavian Party first secretary.
their influence in the Ukraine. In particular, Brezhnev probably would have had a decisive say in the matter of selecting Kirilenko as his successor. Of course, Kirilenko's transfer would have had at least the formal approval of the new Ukrainian first and second secretaries, Leonid Mel'nikov and Aleksey Kirichenko.*

Kirilenko's Dnepropetrovsk assignment was to last five and a half years, until the end of 1955. He presumably gained further valuable experience from administering the large Party organization in this important industrial area, but he did not appear to be involved much in the political battles that were being fought in the last years of Stalin's reign. He was not elected to the Central Committee or Central Auditing Commission at the 19th Party

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*Mel'nikov had been installed in the Ukrainian Secretariat during Kaganovich's 9-month stint as Party boss in 1947 -- that is, when Khrushchev had been temporarily removed from all posts but that of Ukrainian premier. When Khrushchev regained the post of Party first secretary in the Ukraine, his former second secretary and rival Korotchenko became premier, and Mel'nikov became second secretary. It is unclear whether Khrushchev himself arranged these transfers or the subsequent elevation of Mel'nikov to first secretary; he may more plausibly have proposed or sanctioned Kirichenko's return from his Odessa exile to replace Mel'nikov as second secretary. Mel'nikov was to be removed as Ukrainian Party boss soon after Stalin's death in 1953, and the evidence suggests that Khrushchev sacrificed him in collusion with Beriya in order to install Kirichenko in his place. Mel'nikov reappeared in a diplomatic post after Beriya's removal but never regained a position of power. Since 1966 he has been chairman of the State Committee for Supervision of Industrial and Mining Safety, presumably enjoying the patronage of Brezhnev and Kirilenko in this sinecure. Korotchenko was relegated in January 1954 to the honorific but relatively powerless post of Ukrainian "President," in which he remained until his death in 1969.

-13-
Congress in October 1952, despite the fact that Khrushchchev played a major role at the congress in organizational matters and Brezhnev was elected to the central Secretariat and made an alternate member of the enlarged Party Presidium, as the Politburo was called then and until 1966.* In fact, the period of 1950-53 was one of apparent retrenchment for most "older" Ukrainian Party officials as the turnover of personnel increased in the republic. The change in membership of the Ukrainian Central Committee between republic Party congresses in January 1949 and September 1952 registered a casualty rate of 50 percent among leading cadres. Kirilenko was one of those older leaders whose political connections (and, perhaps, administrative talents) held them in good stead.

The death of Stalin and the consolidation of Khrushchchev's position in 1953 brought increased political upheaval in the Ukraine as elsewhere, but Kirilenko did not get a career break for more than two years. Meanwhile, he had an opportunity to strengthen political ties that would prove useful in the future. His fast-rising associate Kirichenko moved up from Ukrainian second secretary to replace the demoted Mel'nikov as Ukrainian Party boss soon after Khrushchev took over the Party. Nikolai Podgornyy, who had served three years as Khar'kov Party first secretary and was therefore one of Kirilenko's peers

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*On the other hand, the Dnepropetrovsk post apparently did not rate a seat on either the Central Committee or the Central Auditing Commission at that time. Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, the oblast first secretary after Kirilenko, was elected a member of the Central Auditing Commission at the next congress in 1956, but Kirilenko's advance had already made him eligible for full membership in the Central Committee.
in the Ukrainian hierarchy, became second secretary in Kirichenko's vacated place in August 1953.*

Within Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, where he had inherited Brezhnev's political base, Kirilenko developed additional contacts which probably did not significantly contribute to his subsequent advance but which may now, in 1971, redound to his political advantage. These include, above all, Vladimir Shcherbitskiy and Aleksey Vatchenko. Shcherbitskiy made regular advances in his career after Kirilenko's arrival in 1950: from his position of second secretary of Dneprodzerehinsk City, he rose in late 1952 to city first secretary and moved up in early 1954 to become second secretary to Kirilenko in the oblast Party committee. Kirilenko may have collaborated with the top Ukrainian leadership -- the first and second secretaries were still Kirichenko and Podgorny -- in the latter promotion, as well as in the selection of Shcherbitskiy to become Dnepropetrovsk Party boss when Kirilenko left the Ukraine in late 1955. Shcherbitskiy subsequently rose to the position of Ukrainian Premier and CPSU Presidium alternate member. Vatchenko also rose from the ranks in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast during Kirilenko's and Shcherbitskiy's reign: in 1954 he advanced

*Khrushchev and Kirichenko may have preferred Podgorny over Kirilenko and other possible contenders for the Ukrainian "second in command" because of his more extensive contacts. Podgorny had the advantage of having served during 1946-50 as the Ukrainian "permanent representative" in Moscow, in effect as Khrushchev's liaison with the regime's central apparatus. Another possible factor in Podgorny's selection was his earlier background in the food industry, which coincided with Khrushchev's special interest in agriculture and complemented Kirichenko's industrial experience. Nevertheless, it seems difficult to escape the conclusion that Khrushchev preferred more actively political types than Kirilenko appeared to be.
from the post of chief of an unidentified department to secretary of the oblast Party committee, probably simultaneously with Shcherbatskii's arrival as second secretary. Vatchenko, who has been Dnepropetrovsk Party boss since late 1965, actually appears more closely associated with Shcherbatskii than with Kirilenko, to judge by the circumstances of their later careers, but Kirilenko presumably can count on Vatchenko's support.*

The rather extended length of Kirilenko's tour in Dnepropetrovsk probably was connected with Brezhnev's temporary setback immediately after Stalin's death. In one of several high-level changes, Khrushchev's political opponents forced Brezhnev to leave his high Party posts in the Secretariat and Presidium and to serve as a political "commissar" in the armed forces. As Khrushchev made gains, however, so Brezhnev advanced again to higher posts in the Party, becoming Kazakh second secretary in 1954.** Soon thereafter he moved up to the post of Kazakh second secretary V. M. Chebrikov, for example, transferred to Moscow in 1967 to a high post in the secret police: he was identified in October 1969 as KGB deputy chairman. The little that is known of Chebrikov's career suggests that he is also closely associated with Shcherbatskii.

**At the same time, a number of important changes occurred both in the central apparatus and in the Ukraine, including in Kirilenko's Dnepropetrovsk secretariat. Probably the most important of the changes in the central apparatus was the reorganisation of the Department of Party, Trade Union, and Komsomol Organs into a Department of Party Organs, with a branch for the RSFSR under the supervision of Viktor Churayev. This was clearly a Khrushchev move to break up the dynasty which Malenkov had built over the years and was a foreshadowing of the creation of the Bureau for the RSFSR two years later. Churayev had (footnote continued on page 17)
Party boss. By late 1955 Brezhnev had recouped his earlier political strength and was preparing to reenter the central Secretariat and Party Presidium at the 20th Party Congress.

In view of this, it appears probable that Brezhnev was largely responsible for the December 1955 transfer of Kirilenko from the Ukraine to the position of Sverdlovsk Party boss, which resulted not only in his election two months later at the 20th congress to full membership in the Central Committee, but also in his becoming ex officio a charter member of the newly formed Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR.

B. Joining the Fray: The Sverdlovsk Years (1956-62)

Kirilenko's assignment to the Sverdlovsk post was not a purely political move but followed logically upon his previous experience in heavy-industrial areas. The location of Sverdlovsk in the heart of the strategically important Urals industrial complex required someone like Kirilenko whose technical competence had been demonstrated. Several circumstances, however, in addition to the imminence of the 20th Party Congress, indicated that the assignment was far from routine. First, the plenum of the Sverdlovsk Party organization which installed Kirilenko as its chief was held in the presence of a top Kremlin leader: Averkiy Aristov, who just a few months earlier, after a

(footnote continued from page 16) served in the Khar'kov Party organization both before and after the war, from 1944 through most of 1950 as oblast first secretary. Subsequently Churayev worked in the central cadre apparatus and presumably was instrumental in assisting Khrushchev's rise to power.
two-year period of political eclipse, had returned to
the central Secretariat to oversee the cadres sector for
Khrushchev. Second, the press account of the plenum in-
dicated that the former Party first secretary, A.M. Kutyrev,
and the incumbent executive committee chairman, K.K.
Nikolayev, were "sharply" criticized for leadership failings.
Against such a background, the arrival of a Ukrainian
official to head the oblast Party organization probably
fostered resentment and rivalry within it.*

The apparent political motive in Kirilenko's trans-
fer to Sverdlovsk at this particular time was reinforced
with the formation of the Bureau for the RSFSR -- the
mini-secretariat which Khrushchev created at the 20th
Party Congress to improve his control over the Central
Committee apparatus. Bureau members included, in addi-
tion to representatives of the RSFSR apparatus, the Party
first secretaries of Moscow, Leningrad, Gor'kiy, and
Sverdlovsk oblasts -- all under the supervision of Khru-
shchev and one other member of the Central Secretariat.
Thus Kirilenko was drawn more closely into the service
of Khrushchev on the eve of the gathering storm of ultra-
conservative opposition to the Party boss.

When the moment of truth arrived, Kirilenko appar-
ently decided that his own political future was tied to

*For one thing, Nikolayev had chaired the Sverdlovsk
executive committee since 1948 and thus had been in con-
tention to accede to the top Party post. He did eventu-
ally attain this position, but only after Kirilenko left
in 1962. That no love had been lost between the two
leaders was suggested in April 1963 -- a time of intense
political struggle between Khrushchev and Koslov which
involved, among other things, several indications of an
attempt to undermine Kirilenko's position -- when Nikolayev
published an article in Pravda which took a swipe at the
handling of construction affairs in Sverdlovsk during
Kirilenko's tenure as Party boss.
Khrushchev's fate, and so he took the offensive in defending the Party boss against the coalition that had formed to oust him. At the June 1957 Central Committee plenum which Khrushchev had insisted his Presidium opponents convene to resolve the leadership issue, Kirilenko took the floor at the outset to demand that the Central Committee reject Molotov's request for a discussion of wavering among the Bloc countries. As Kirilenko undoubtedly understood, the request was merely a tactical device used to approach the real issue of Khrushchev's continuing in power, with Molotov and others intent on attacking Khrushchev for the ill effects of his de-Stalinization policies. Therefore, Kirilenko countered with the suggestion that the plenum discuss instead the wavering within the ranks of the Soviet Party. As a result, Khrushchev got the green light to proceed with the attack against his opposition on a charge of "anti-Party" activity. Clearly Khrushchev and Kirilenko had planned such a tactic in advance, and the risk that the ploy might fail was perhaps not very great.* Nevertheless, Kirilenko was repaid for his help by being made an alternate member of the Party Presidium at the plenum, even though his Sverdlovsk post did not rate such a high rank.

Kirilenko clearly was on his way up with this promotion, for the sake of which he gave up membership on the RSFSR Bureau. It seems likely that he was being groomed for eventual membership on the central Secretariat or for deputy chairmanship of the RSFSR Bureau. Meanwhile, Kirilenko continued to devote most of his attention to his Sverdlovsk duties. After August 1958 these included his membership on the military council of the Ural district.

*The military, behind Marshal Zhukov, ensured that Khrushchev's supporters were flown to Moscow so as to outnumber his opponents in the quorum of the Central Committee which met in the plenary session.
(okrug) -- a Central Committee decision assigned such a role to the Party bosses in all the centers of the military okrugs -- but there is little evidence that this function was much more than nominal.

In 1959-60, however, for reasons which remain obscure, the fortunes of the "Ukrainian clique" took a turn for the worse, and Kirilenko's position suffered as a result. Fro1 Kozlov, the Leningrad-based first deputy premier, suddenly arose as Khrushchev's heir-designate. The ascendacy of Kozlov, himself a new-generation "neo-Stalinist," was facilitated by the departure of most of the old-line Stalinists like Molotov; it marked the beginning of a new stage of political struggle, pitting neo-Stalinists against each other. Aleksey Kirichenko, who since late 1957 had been a member of the central Secretariat and Khrushchev's heir apparent, was demoted in January 1960 to Rostov Party first secretary (and several months later was to lose even that remnant of his power). In May that year, Kozlov joined the Secretariat and gave up his first deputy premier position to another Leningrader, Aleksey Kosygin. With Kozlov's arrival in the Secretariat, a number of Khrushchev's allies were forced to depart: Brezhnev was kicked upstairs to the largely honorific post of Soviet "President," and Aristov was compelled to give up his secretarial position, ostensibly to concentrate on his duties as deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau.

Although Kirilenko continued to perform routine functions during 1960, there were signs that Kozlov's drive for increased power began to affect Kirilenko's
position in 1961. Kozlov's attention may have been attracted when the Sverdlovsk first secretary headed a large official delegation to Warsaw in late September 1960, apparently on an industrial mission.* In any case, Kirilenko showed signs of slipping after Kozlov increased his influence in the RSFSR Bureau in January 1961 with the transfer of Aristov to the ambassadorial post in Warsaw and the appointment of Gennadiy Voronov as the bureau's deputy chairman. For example, the delegation to Hungary which Kirilenko headed in April was small and included no one of significance. In June, just a few months before the 22d Party Congress, Kirilenko was forced to publish in Pravda an admission of economic shortcomings in Sverdlovsk. Finally, at the congress in October, Kirilenko was dropped as an alternate member of the Presidium and reverted to his pre-1957 status as a mere member of the RSFSR Bureau.

Kirilenko's public prominence dropped sharply after that congress, reflecting his political downgrading. After appearing at a Sverdlovsk Party meeting in early November to discuss the outcome of the 22d congress, Kirilenko disappeared generally from public view. His name, together with that of Sverdlovsk executive committee chairman Nikolayev, appeared on a pro forma "letter" to Khrushchev in Pravda which announced fulfillment of the oblast's annual plan at the year's end, but he failed to appear in any meaningful political activity. This change undoubtedly reflected the great influence which allies of Kozlov had gained in the RSFSR Bureau. The bureau's two deputy chairmen at the close of the 22d congress were the holdover Voronov and the newcomer Petr Lomako -- the latter an

*A.P. Rudakov, chief of the Central Committee Department of Heavy Industry and a member of Khrushchev's "Ukrainian clique," was the leading functionary accompanying Kirilenko.
industrialist associated with the Leningraders Kosygin and Kozlov.* The degree to which the new leadership situation in the RSFSR Bureau undermined Kirilenko's position was illustrated in mid-December, when he conspicuously failed to appear at two conferences held in Sverdlovsk -- the first on agriculture which Voronov and the then RSFSR Premier Dmitriy Polyanskiy conducted, and the second on economic management at which Lomako presided. It appeared at that stage to be merely a matter of time before Kirilenko's complete political demise.

C. In Khrushchev's Service: The RSFSR Bureau (1962-64)

Kirilenko dramatically regained and added to his former political power in April 1962, after almost six months of obscurity. The circumstances surrounding his sudden recovery were extraordinary and suggested hanky-panky: he returned to the Party Presidium, not as before with the rank of alternate member but now as a full member with a vote on policy matters, and his installation occurred not at a regularly scheduled Central Committee plenum but "in the back room." Kirilenko's co-optation

*Lomako had been identified as deputy chairman on the eve of the congress. He probably already had been chosen to replace Viktor Churayev, a member of the "Ukrainian clique" who had been appointed deputy chairman just two weeks after Voronov's replacement of Arisiov in January 1961. Kozlov's victory over the Ukrainians at the congress was registered in the demotion of Churayev to bureau member, the retention of Lomako as deputy chairman for industrial affairs, and the promotion of Voronov from alternate to full member of the Presidium and to the newly created position of bureau first deputy chairman, together with Kirilenko's downgrading from Presidium alternate membership to Churayev's level of bureau member.
into the Party Presidium was revealed during a 23-25 April session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. A communique announcing that a Central Committee plenum had been held "during the first session" of the Supreme Soviet and had confirmed Kirilenko's co-optation was not published until 26 April. This plenum apparently had had no other business than the elevation of Kirilenko and the downgrading of Kozlov's protege Spiridonov, discussed below. The irregularity of this procedure* and the presumed opposition to the action were such that the extraordinary plenum, which supposedly confirmed Kirilenko in the policy-making status he holds today, has not been recognized in official Party histories and handbooks.

Personnel actions which accompanied Kirilenko's irregular co-optation indicated that it was one move in Khrushchev's maneuvering against the forces led by Kozlov, whose power and ambition had grown so that they posed a serious threat to the First Secretary. Thus, Kirilenko was confirmed at the same time in the post of first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau, thereby matching Voronov in rank and position. In addition, Kozlov's successor in Leningrad, Ivan Spirdonov, who had moved into the central Secretariat just six months earlier at the 22d Party Congress, now was demoted to chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Council of the Union; his fall to the powerless post neatly balanced the sudden reversal of fortunes for Kirilenko, who had lost out at the congress. Spiridonov's transfer entailed his dismissal from the Secretariat and from the post of Leningrad Party boss, thus effectively removing

*Ivan Zhegalin, a Suslov associate and Ambassador to Romania at the time, commented that he had been unable to attend the plenum because it had been called too precipitately to permit him to reach Moscow in time.
him as a source of resistance to Kirilenko and of support for Kozlov in the Party's highest executive bodies.*

Kirilenko's elevation to the post of first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau had the effect of preventing the Kozlov-led forces from monopolizing control over the appointment of cadres in the RSFSR. In March, one month prior to Kirilenko's comeback, a major reorganization of the Soviet farm sector -- actually a prelude to the Party's bifurcation a half year later -- had given Voronov control over a revised and expanded "nomenklatura" for agricultural cadres in the republic.** It seems likely that Lomako, the deputy chairman for industry, had been in line to control a similar nomenklatura for RSFSR industrial cadres and possibly to receive a promotion to first deputy chairman, but Kirilenko's sudden arrival blocked that opportunity. Lomako remained a deputy chairman after April but presumably had little say in appointments.

Kirilenko's activities during 1962 added to these indications that he was instrumental in supporting Khrushchev's struggle against Kozlov. For example, in August Kirilenko supervised the installation of Viktor Skryabin, his close associate from Zaporozh'ye, as Rostov Party...

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*If, as seems likely, Kirilenko was being groomed during 1957-60 as Breshnev's understudy and was in the position of rivaling Kozlov during the next two years, then Spiridonov apparently had replaced him at the 22d congress as the only provincial Party boss with some national responsibility in the sphere of industry, serving in effect as Kozlov's second. However, with his demotion the following April Spiridonov failed even to retain a place on the RSFSR Bureau.

**The nomenklatura is a list of designated Party and state posts over which a higher echelon of the Party apparatus has full jurisdiction in making appointments.
first secretary in place of Aleksandr Basov, who had been given a diplomatic assignment. The action was a clear swipe at Kozlov's authority: Basov had gone to Rostov only weeks after Kozlov's arrival in the Secretariat in May 1960, to replace the already severely downgraded Aleksey Kirichenko. Also, Kozlov had been in Rostov in June—that is, only two months before Skryabin's arrival—to meet with the Party leadership after riots had broken out in nearby Novocherkassk, but he had taken no action against Basov; he may, in fact, have been attempting to protect him. The Skryabin appointment probably was also offensive to Party Secretary Mikhail Suslov, who has demonstrated a special interest in his former Rostov bailiwick and who presumably was instrumental in getting Basov a diplomatic post.*

Policy support which Kirilenko gave in 1962 to Vasily Tolstikov, Spiridonov's successor in Leningrad, appeared to reflect Khrushchev's intent to break up the Kozlov-Kosygin "dynasty" there. Tolstikov had risen through the ranks of the Leningrad Party organization but not clearly as a Kozlov protege: Khrushchev himself had taken the highly unusual step of presiding over his installation as Leningrad Party boss, apparently to underline his support of him (and possibly also to put down dissent among Kozlov allies who may have been opposed to the junior Tolstikov).

Against this background, Kirilenko's public support for a Leningrad proposal on industrial management at a

*Under the circumstances, however, Basov's diplomatic assignment was dangerous and thankless: he showed up as an "economic counsellor" at the Soviet Embassy in Havana on 10 August, just weeks before the Cuban missile crisis reached its peak. The posting had the political effect of removing him from Party politics and portending loss of membership on the Central Committee.
Central Committee conference in late July assumed political significance. In his otherwise routine report on Party management of industry, Kirilenko said that the Leningraders' proposal for merging affiliated enterprises into production complexes, or industrial "firms," was of great interest, and he instructed the leaders in other RSFSR provinces to draft similar proposals. He also referred favorably to Khrushchev's support for the "initiative" of the Leningrad Party organization in introducing a two-shift schedule in the machine-building industry.*

Kirilenko's general political position received another boost in November as a result of Khrushchev's controversial bifurcation of the Party into industrial and rural organizations. The reorganization involved additional changes in the leadership of the RSFSR Bureau which virtually eliminated Kozlov's influence in it. First, Voronov was appointed RSFSR Premier and, although remaining a full member of the Party Presidium, thereby was reduced to being only a member of the RSFSR Bureau; that is, he became nominally Kirilenko's subordinate in the RSFSR Party hierarchy. Second, Leonid Yefremov, an apparent Brezhnev ally who had been a bureau member by virtue of his position as Gor'kii Party first secretary, replaced Voronov as first deputy chairman with agricultural responsibilities and became an alternate member of the Party Presidium. Finally, Lomako was dropped as deputy chairman and transferred out of the RSFSR Party apparatus altogether; apparently under the aegis of Kosygin and Kozlov,
he went into a newly created central planning post. Kiri-lenko took up whatever slack resulted from Lomako's de-parture.*

Kirilenko's increased power after November 1962 brought increased opposition from the Kozlov faction, reflecting the heightened intensity of their general struggle against Khrushchev and the Ukrainians. Signs of sniping at Kirilenko picked up markedly in March and April 1962. His name appeared out of Cyrillic alphabetical order, following Kozlov's and Kosygin's, in a list of the top leadership in Pravda on both 12 and 13 March. The annual edition of Spravochnik Partiynogo Rabotnika (Party Official's Handbook), which was signed to the press on 30 March, conspicuously failed to publish the communiqué of the April 1962 plenum at which Kirilenko was "elected" a Presidium member. On 1 April, Pravda published the earlier discussed article by Sverdlovsk Party boss Nikolayev implicitly critical of Kirilenko's performance in construction work. Finally, on 22 and 23 April, Izvestiya and a few other newspapers (notably the Leningrad Party paper) again slighted Kirilenko by placing his name after Kosy-gin's in an otherwise alphabetical list of the Presidium members at an RSFSR Party conference -- and this was a major conference which heard and discussed a Kirilenko report on industrial management! Absent from the list was Kozlov, who had suffered a paralyzing stroke several days earlier and was never to return to active political life.

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*The division of responsibilities between Kirilenko and Yefremov was formalized with the creation of two smaller RSFSR bureaus -- for rural management and for industrial management -- within the older RSFSR Bureau. It is unclear how this arrangement affected Voronov, who remained a member of the older bureau but had no clearly defined responsibility for one or another economic sector. In any case, Kirilenko outranked Yefremov in the Party Presidium even though they held nominally equal positions in the RSFSR Bureau.
But with Kozlov sidelined, Kirilenko came into his own as Khrushchev's main spokesman for industrial affairs. The report which he delivered to the April conference revealed a strong pragmatic approach to economic administration and a greater willingness than he had shown in the past to touch on controversial questions. In a rare departure from his neo-Stalinist position, Kirilenko claimed that stereotypes and rigid policies were a thing of the past, thanks to the renunciation of Stalin's personality cult, and he lauded the November 1962 bifurcation of the Party as an outstanding contribution to improving Party leadership of the national economy. He complained, however, that quite a few Party and economic leaders still were held captive by the former "traditions and customs." While he said that the organizational experience which the Party had accumulated over many years should not be renounced, he warned of the "great danger" in transferring outworn methods to the new Party and economic organs.

Kirilenko's Economic Views

This forward-looking attitude probably was intended to provide a backdrop for Kirilenko's more practical suggestions for reorganizing production. In particular, he strongly reiterated the support he had given in July 1962 to the Leningrad proposal on merging enterprises into industrial firms, or production associations, as they were now being called. Several times in his report Kirilenko termed these associations a "progressive" form of production organization, and he asked for its bolder use in all branches of industry. Asserting that associations had proved their economic soundness, he nevertheless suggested the existence of some controversy over the scheme when claiming that associations were capable of carrying out a unified technical policy without infringing on the interests of sovnarkhozes (the national-economic councils, or regional government organs of planning and management). In fact, the regional sovnarkhozes had already lost some powers, precisely in control over technical policy, to
central state committees which were set up primarily for
defense industries during the bifurcation of the Party along
economic lines in November. Kirilenko thus seemed sensi-
tive to objections which regional Party leaders presum-
ably had raised that the production associations might
further assist a trend toward state-administrative cen-
tralization harmful to their interests. Although his
statement was equivocal, Kirilenko's pragmatic approach
appeared to envision the organization of associations on
a strictly regional basis.*

That Kirilenko held no brief for the central plann-
ers and administrators became more evident as time went
on. His speech to another important industrial conference
in May 1964 was especially hard-hitting in this respect,
perhaps reflecting increased confidence as Kozlov's perm-
ent removal from politics became manifest.** In his speech,

*The report also contained a couple of suggestions of
Kirilenko's interest in somewhat orthodox directions.
He mentioned favorably, for example, the need to intro-
duce computer technology into management. At the same
time, he said that a "production-technical association"
was being set up within the RSFSR Sovnarkhos that would
produce computer equipment, evidently for managerial use
in the sovnarkhos. Kirilenko's main interest in all this
seemed to be to strengthen the sovnarkhos apparatus, rather
than the centralized planning agencies. This would pre-
sumably allow greater Party control in management at the
regional level. In addition, Kirilenko dwelt on ideolo-
gical means of influencing production, such as "socialist
competition," the "movement for Communist labor," and
propaganda of "advanced experience" -- all of which re-
vealed his preference for exhortation over the applica-
tion of material incentives.

**Kirilenko presumably felt less fettered when working
with the Ukrainians Brezhnev and Podgorny, who had been
brought into the central Secretariat as successors to
Kozlov in June 1963.
Kirilenko repeated his call for a further "bold advance" in forming production associations. He coupled this, however, with a warning that their formation should not be an end in itself but promote better organization of production. This admonition reflected awareness of the resistance of the central planning agencies, because he went on to ridicule their indiscriminate issuance of general directives to industrial enterprises already functioning within associations:

General directives [from central agencies] often are addressed to those enterprises which joined associations long ago and are not independent economic units. This is what we call habit. People do not follow life, but it is changing, it does not remain static; small enterprises are merging, but they continue to receive instructions. We feel like telling the comrades who write [such instructions]: 'Do not make people laugh.'

In addition, Kirilenko made a seemingly gratuitous statement on Stalinism in economic management which appeared aimed again at the resistance of conservative administrators:

Stalin's dogmas, divorced from life, did not make possible a sober assessment of the processes taking place in the economy. They drove economic thought into a blind alley and introduced a spirit of conservatism in technical policy. The bureaucratic approach to planning detracted from the role of plans themselves, resulted in major miscalculations, and hampered scientific and technical thought. The liquidation of the cult of personality... made it possible to put economic work on strictly scientific foundations.
Except for the earlier mentioned remarks on the stereotypes and rigid policies which held sway under Stalin (p. 31), this unusual deviation from Kirilenko's standard line marked the only observed public reference he had made or was to make to the person of the late dictator.*

The speech was notable also for Kirilenko's first observed public reference to the use of material incentives, carefully labeled for the purpose of "technical progress." He appeared to blame the state planning apparatus for failing to come to grips with the "complicated" but unavoidable problems of applying "material rewards for good results, for increased efficiency and product longevity." The bulk of the speech, however, revealed an unchanged general attitude in favor of administrative and "moral" means of improving production efficiency.

Kirilenko's attitudes at that time on economic management, revealing a typical apparatchik interest in increasing Party control, such an interest in the chemical sector, the development of which had received unusual attention from Khrushchev as an alternative to expansion of the metallurgical branches of industry.

*In this connection, a significant measure of Kirilenko's reserve on the Stalin issue was his avoiding mention of the late dictator by name in his speech at the 22d Party Congress, where many other leaders were joining the chorus behind Khrushchev in attacking Stalin's person. Kirilenko restricted himself to affirming the correctness of the 20th Party Congress decisions, specifically for their condemning the "personality cult" (a phenomenon divorced, it would seem, from the person of Stalin), exposing its harmful effects and reestablishing collective leadership -- a relatively innocuous endorsement of de-Stalinization.
of a newly created Central Committee department, which would achieve closer supervision of the chemical industry through Party cadres assigned as deputy chairmen for chemistry. It seems probable that this activity reflected the formation of the RSFSR Department of Chemical Industry, which was first publicly identified in September 1964.
Apparently convinced of the efficacy of his plans, Kirilenko in his speech laid out the organization of his Party-controlled campaign for developing "public" forms of economic work. According to Kirilenko, economic laboratories had been organized in 450 enterprises in the RSFSR, the post of chief economist (functioning as a deputy) director for economic matters) had been introduced in more than 1,000 major industrial enterprises, and economic laboratories and economic-analysis departments had been formed in the sovnarkhozes -- all of which appeared to be legitimate economic work. He also indicated, however, that 160,000 persons were engaged in the work of more than 16,000 "public" bureaus and groups of economic analysis in enterprises throughout the republic. Technical economic councils had been formed to administer this activity in 30 oblast industrial Party committees and in 450 city and rayon Party committees throughout the RSFSR. He cited approvingly the experience of the Volgograd Oblast Industrial Party Committee, which used economic councils and "commissions for promoting technical
within the committee's industrial departments, to find ways to cut production costs. Kirilenko lauded this new, Party-directed effort as a means of bringing large numbers of workers and engineering-technical personnel into economic administration.

Although this activity apparently was restricted to the chemical industry in the RSFSR and did not affect a large part of the national economy, some professional government administrators and planners in the center -- Premier Kosygin for example -- undoubtedly had a much less sanguine attitude toward Kirilenko's campaign. The emphasis on the Party's involvement in economic work, which, according to Kirilenko, would mean improving economic training even in the Party education system,* probably also raised the hackles of Suslov and other more orthodox Party ideologues who were concerned that such training was detracting from theoretical studies and leading to the neglect of political work in the Party.** It was clear, therefore, that Kirilenko

*Kirilenko said that economic departments had been formed in "Marxist-Leninist universities" within city Party committees, at which about 40,000 persons were studying, but he felt that the quality of this work left much to be desired.

**The ideologue's viewpoint probably was expressed most clearly in an article which V. Stepanov published in Pravda on 17 May 1965, attacking the practice under Khrushchev of the Party's immersion in economic management to the detriment of ideological and propaganda interests.
had committed himself to supporting Khrushchev's schemes for broad chemicalization and Party management of the economy when the coalition of leaders, including Kosygin and Suslov, finally formed around Brezhnev to oust Khrushchev from political office in October 1964.

D. In Brezhnev's Service: The RSFSR Bureau (1964-66)

During the politically unsettled period immediately after Khrushchev's ouster and for most of 1965 Kirilenko maintained a low profile, engaging in few public activities while presumably concentrating on securing his organizational base. Actually Kirilenko was somewhat on the periphery of the main battlefield, which was the central Secretariat. Here Podgorny, who was "second in command" to Brezhnev by virtue of his responsibility for supervising Party-organizational matters, seemed actually the near equal of the Party boss in the first several months of the new regime. A secondary arena was in the field of competition between the Secretariat and the Council of Ministers -- that is, between Brezhnev and Kosygin. Thus the RSFSR Bureau represented a minor area for skirmishes in the larger political maneuvers in this period.

The regime's first major change, reversing Khrushchev's Party bifurcation scheme, implied a slight setback for Kirilenko and others who had profited politically from bifurcation. At the November plenum which made the decision to return to the organizational structure of the Party that existed before bifurcation, Podgorny delivered the report recommending this action, while Brezhnev played no visible role. In a sense, therefore, Podgorny was identified with a decision which was not clearly in Kirilenko's interest.

The decision to reorganize the Party along old lines led to the reinstatement, for the most part, of all the Party bosses in the republics and lower levels who had given up some of their power in 1962. However, several
personnel changes in the RSFSR had some effect on Kirilenko's position, the overall result of which was in his favor. In December Leonid Yefremov was transferred from the post of first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau to become Party boss in Stavropol' Kray. This manifest demotion, which portended the loss of Yefremov's position on the Party Presidium, left Kirilenko the sole deputy chairman of the bureau under Brezhnev's strictly nominal chairmanship. Voronov may have wanted to reclaim the vacated position of deputy chairman for agriculture, but he remained only a member of the bureau.* In effect, therefore, Kirilenko became de facto Party boss for the entire RSFSR.

At the same time, another change at the provincial level indicated that Kirilenko was not immune from attack in his own area. On 3 December, Suslov presided over the installation of Mikhail Solomentsev in the post of Rostov Rural Party chief in place of Kirilenko's former Zaporozh'ye associate Viktor Skryabin, who was "placed at the disposal of the Central Committee." Three weeks later Solomentsev became Rostov Party first secretary of the reunified organization -- the position which Skryabin had held prior to the 1962 bifurcation; Skryabin disappeared from public view and was not relected to the Central Committee at the 23d Party Congress in April 1966. Thus Suslov

*Possibly Brezhnev decided to monopolize control over the agricultural sphere on the Party side, sharing responsibility for this sector only with Deputy Premier Polyanskiy on the government side. Tending to confirm this possibility was the appointment of Fedor Kulakov sometime in November to the post of chief of the Central Committee's Agricultural Department but not to the position of secretary for agriculture, from which Vasily Polyakov was ousted at that time. Kulakov did not attain that position for almost a year; meanwhile, Brezhnev emerged as the regime's agricultural spokesman in March 1965 when he announced a major program for agricultural development.
struck back for Kirilenko's earlier intrusion in Rostov Party politics (see page 25). However, Suslov's sally came before Kirilenko had consolidated his position on the RSFSR Bureau, and similar incursions in the republic's Party organizations subsequently were not observed.

Probably the most significant move involving a provincial Party official in December was the return of Ivan Kapitonov from political exile to the post of chief of the reunified Central Committee Department of RSFSR Party Organs. Kapitonov had been demoted in 1959 from Moscow City first secretary to the position of Party boss in Ivanovo Oblast. His return to the center in December 1964 probably had the backing of Brezhnev and Suslov as well as Kirilenko. Kapitonov's two deputies in the new department were the former chiefs of the bifurcated departments for RSFSR Party organs -- Nikolay Voronovskiy (industrial), and Mikhail Polekhin (rural). Both Kapitonov and Voronovskiy were to advance as Brezhnev and Kirilenko consolidated their own positions during 1965, as well as again in 1966.

One of the intermediate moves in the strengthening of Kirilenko's influence in the cadres sector, although all the effects were not immediately apparent, was the April 1965 demotion of Vitaliy Titov from the central Secretariat to Kazakhstan to fill the vacancy of republic second secretary which had resulted from Solomentsev's transfer to Rostov. Titov, a Ukrainian associate of Podgorny, had been the junior secretary in charge of Party-organizational
matters and cadres appointments since 1962.* The demotion had a two-fold significance. First, it represented a serious blow to his patron Podgorny, whose dominance in the cadres sector it weakened. Second, Titov's removal coincided with the conferring of new titles and, apparently, of changed roles upon the union-republic and RSFSR departments of Party organs. Public identifications in May revealed that the union-republic department carried the designation, Department of Party-Organizational Work; the RSFSR department underwent the same transformation, becoming the Department of Party-Organizational Work for the RSFSR. The full significance of these titular changes was unclear, but they suggested at least the abolition of Titov's Commission on Party-Organizational Work.

Kirilenko continued to maintain his low public profile during the spring and summer of 1965, while Brezhnev became increasingly involved in maneuvering against Podgorny and senior Party Secretary Aleksandr Shelepin. By late September, Brezhnev had seriously weakened Podgorny's influence in the cadres sector and apparently had put down a challenge from Shelepin for control of the top Party post. Brezhnev also had asserted himself strongly in competition with Kosygin at a Central Committee plenum which launched a reform of industrial planning and management.

As Brezhnev grew in stature, so Kirilenko began to be more politically active. On 14 September, the lead editorial of Sovetskaya Rossiya carried the gist of an

*Titov had been chief of the Department of Party Organs for Union Republics since early 1961; he became additionally a member of the Secretariat and chairman of the Commission on Party-Organizational Questions in November 1962. Almost nothing is known of the function of his commission, but conceivably it was created in part to arbitrate jurisdictional disputes and other conflicts arising between the newly bifurcated Party organizations.
RSFSR Bureau decree which criticized the Rostov Party leadership for allowing an overemphasis on the production of heavy-industrial goods to the detriment of the food sector and light industry -- an obvious swipe at Rostov Party boss Solomentsev. The following month Kirilenko headed a Soviet Party delegation to the Chilean Party Congress, which was his first travel in such capacity to a foreign Communist Party congress. The assignment may not have pleased or had the whole-hearted approval of Suslov, the senior secretary responsible for relations within the Communist movement, if only because of Kirilenko’s strictly provincial position in the RSFSR.

This increased political activity and strength for Brezhnev and Kirilenko in the fall of 1965 was followed by a significant shift in the power balance in December. Podgorny was transferred to the less powerful position of Soviet "President" in place of Anastas Mikoyan, who "retired," and Shelepin gained the key responsibility for Party-organizational matters. The gain for Shelepin entailed, however, some losses as well: he was forced to give up his USSR deputy premiership with the abolition of the Party-State Control Committee, of which he was chairman. In addition, Brezhnev and Kirilenko presumably together succeeded in putting a check on Shelepin’s secretarial powers in the person of Kapitonov, who became a member of the Secretariat and took charge of the union-republic Party-Organizational Work Department. In filling the vacancies which Titov’s departure in April had created, Kapitonov apparently ceased to head the RSFSR department. However, the entire question of the existence of the RSFSR Bureau may have become moot by that time, for it was to be abolished several months later at the 23d Party Congress.*

*An additional indication of the strength of Brezhnev and Kirilenko in December was the reinstatement of their former associate Shcherbitskiy as an alternate member of the Party Presidium. For slightly more than two years Shcherbitskiy had been reduced in rank and placed in

(footnote continued on page 40)
The Fight Over the Goryachev Proposal

The decision to abolish the RSFSR Bureau under the circumstances implied a consolidation of Kirilenko's position and paved the way for a reassignment of responsibilities within the Secretariat at the 23d Party Congress. The cadres apparatus was the subject of a highly controversial though muted debate which arose at the beginning of the congress when these responsibilities were in flux. The evidence does not permit firm conclusions, but the debate appeared to reflect maneuvering by Brezhnev and Kirilenko to prevent Shelepin from consolidating his hold over the cadres sector. In any case, by the end of the congress Shelepin was to yield the cadres portfolio to Kirilenko, who had meanwhile become a full-fledged member of the Secretariat.

The debate, which revolved around the question of the concentration of functions within the central Party apparatus, suggested important differences in principle between Shelepin and Kirilenko on Party-organizational matters, but it also touched indirectly on a number of important issues affecting the position of other leaders. It began on the second day of the congress, 30 March, when Novosibirsk Party chief Goryachev raised the sensitive question of Party-organizational work in the central apparatus. Goryachev's proposal, which he introduced in the context of criticism of young leaders of oblast, city, and rayon Party committees who were "specialists of various branches of the economy but who do not have sufficient Marxist-Leninist education," was for a return to a Stalinist

(footnote continued from page 39)

political limbo in Dnepropetrovsk, where he had served under Kirilenko as second secretary. Now, however, he regained his former position of Ukrainian Premier and the Presidium rank of alternate member which normally goes with that post.
organizational form -- the Cadres Directorate. In place of the arrangement which had existed since 1948, whereby a central department (or departments) of Party organs coordinated the diverse aspects of cadres work with all the economic and other functional departments of the Central Committee concerned, Goryachev argued the need to "create cadres directorates and departments in local Party organs and the Party Central Committee, concentrating in one place the recruitment, assignment, and training of cadres."

Such a proposal, if accepted, meant in effect a radical diminution of the powers, or even the complete elimination, of the Central Committee's functional departments and a concentration of enormous power in the person controlling the Cadres Directorate.

Shelepin was senior cadres secretary at the start of the congress, and it thus seems plausible that Goryachev was speaking on his behalf. This inference is strengthened by two facts. First, Goryachev's implication that the new directorate would place greater emphasis on "Marxist-Leninist" indoctrination in the training of economic cadres appeared in consonance with the ideological bias Shelepin had acquired during long years in the Komsomol and as a watchdog over the secret police.*

*footnote continued on page 42*
strict Party control and directed by an elite of ideologically reliable and highly trained specialists, who would ensure among other things the purification and renewal of ideology in order to "make it the program of the masses again" and to repress material egoism in all social strata and groups. This program would aim at a Party that was to the highest degree idealistic, egalitarian, informed, and organized. 

Contrasted Shelepin's program, incidentally, to its opposite "extreme" in Soviet economic thinking -- Kosygin's platform of reliance on economic methods such as material incentives and expansion of the market mechanism, with a certain devolution of decision-making on the enterprise, within a system of industrial agencies freed from Party control. It should be noted that the economic views which Kirilenko expressed in 1962-64 closely resembled the Shelepin program.
The development of controversy over Goryachev's proposal was suggested by the fact that although the idea received applause at the time no subsequent speaker explicitly endorsed it. Speaking on the day after Goryachev, Primorskiy Kray Party boss Chernyshev implied his general support with a statement on the need to "improve work in the recruitment, assignment, and training of cadres." His lukewarm but favorable attitude may have reflected his divided allegiance, with a bias toward the more ideologically motivated forces. Like Kirilenko, Chernyshev had trained as an aviation engineer and even had served under Kirilenko's supervision in the RSFSR industrial sector in Primorskiy Kray during 1962-64, but his main political allegiance and ideological bent probably were formed during the years of his affiliation with the wartime partisan movement and the Party organization in Belorussia, where he worked directly with Mazurov. In sum, his statement favoring some change in the cadres policy appeared to place him with the presumed supporters of Shelepin.

Opposition to the idea of a single Cadres Directorate was revealed finally on 2 April in the speech of Estonian Party boss Kebin, a notoriously independent and outspoken leader with a background suggesting Suslov's patronage. Kebin rejected Goryachev's proposal in a strong defense of the style of cadres work which was predominant in the post-Stalin period. In his opinion, "leading cadres should be recruited and trained first of all by that department and that organ which is responsible for a given sector of work, and not by a special cadres department" (emphasis added). In other words, he advocated continuing the practice whereby a number of functional departments of the Central Committee -- which are accountable to several secretaries in a general diffusion of power -- have a major
say in deciding who among the officials of lower Party committees should be best qualified for recruitment and training.*

Two days after Kebin's speech, during the windup of discussion on Brezhnev's report, two speakers from the RSFSR spoke as if the issue had been tilted, but the outcome apparently remained undecided. The speakers, Perm' Party chief Galanshin and Kemerovo Party boss Yeshtokin, may have taken their cue from Kirilenko.

Galanshin, who had worked in Perm' in the Urals for many years as a neighbor to Kirilenko, expressed the view that it would be "expedient" to create a strong system for improving the production skills of managerial cadres. His statement thus changed the direction of the debate away from the ideological slant of the Goryachev proposal toward a more pragmatic approach to the training of economic cadres.*** On the other hand, a failure to reach a consensus

*There were several hints in Kebin's remarks on Party-organizational questions that he was allied with Kosygin and/or Suslov in rejecting Goryachev's proposal. Most tellingly, he was highly critical of the past "passion for creating various contrived and often duplicative non-staff Party commissions and councils without consideration of their expediency" -- a fairly clear allusion to the economic councils for economy, technical progress, etc., which Kirilenko had promoted and which Kosygin and Suslov probably opposed in 1964.

***Galanshin, incidentally, made reference to the abolition of the RSFSR Bureau, which virtually all other speakers

(footnote continued on page 45)
on the question was registered very late during the discus-
sion of Brezhnev's report, in the remarks of Yeshtokin, who
had served for four years as Kirilenko's second secretary
in Sverdlovsk. Yeshtokin indicated that "subjectivist
arbitrariness and contrived forms" still existed in Party-
organizational and ideological work, but he failed to sug-
gest a remedy. Instead he suggested that these problems
should be aired on a broad scale within the Party, "perhaps"
even in a discussion at a Central Committee plenum.*

Thus, the proposal for a revival of the Cadres
Directorate and other Stalinist forms of organizing Party
work died a quiet death at the congress, and Shelepin, the
presumed inspirer of the idea, relinquished his control
over the cadres sector to Kirilenko.

(footnote continued from page 44)

had ignored. His remark suggested that he favored greater
centralized Party control than Kebin would have approved.
Thus, Galanshin said he presumed that the bureau's elimina-
tion would lead to a strengthening rather than a weakening
of ties between the center and the provinces. His proposal
for a system of managerial training, therefore, probably
envisioned a large role for the central Party apparatus
despite its apparent link with Kosygin's economic reform
program.

*In the event, however, no such broad Party discussion
or plenum has been noted.
II. KIRILENKO'S CAREER AS DEPUTY GENERAL SECRETARY

Examination of the general lines of authority in the Secretariat during 1966-71 provides a framework for analyzing Kirilenko's further career in greater detail. The activities of the top Party leadership during this period indicate that each senior secretary has served roughly on a par as a deputy to the General Secretary, at least until mid-1970, when Kirilenko's stock seemed to rise. The overall evidence suggests that any of them can deputize fully for Brezhnev during the Party chief's absence, although they mostly have restricted their deputizing activities to their own assigned areas of responsibility.

The new assignments within the Secretariat as a result of the RSFSR Bureau's abolition at the 23d congress were primarily to Brezhnev's advantage, of course, but they were greatly to the political benefit of Kirilenko as well. In addition to his gaining full control over the cadres sector, Kirilenko continued to supervise the important industrial and construction sectors of the economy -- his bailiwick now extended beyond the RSFSR and embraced the entire country -- while Brezhnev gave up whatever formal secretarial responsibility he may have had in this sphere prior to the congress. Shelepin lost not only the cadres sector but also his control over the Administrative Organs Department, which fell under Brezhnev's personal purview. Shelepin was left to supervise the work of Party organs in light industry and the consumer sector. Suslov's long-standing formal responsibility for Communist theory and propaganda remained intact, his position apparently being the only one unaffected by the changes during the congress.*

*Suslov apparently took up the responsibility for light industry and consumer goods when Shelepin left the Secretariat in mid-1967, and Kirilenko's duties remained unchanged.

-47-
The lines of secretarial authority in the field of foreign Communist relations were not clearly drawn, however. Brezhnev as Party boss obviously took a direct personal interest in these relations and involved himself in the most important problems. In time a pattern seemed to take shape. Brezhnev appeared to have a greater interest in liaison with ruling parties and to be more active in overseeing the work of the Bloc Department. Kirilenko also played a large role in this business, especially on matters pertaining to economic relations within the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). Meanwhile, Suslov dealt most often with non-ruling parties and supervised the daily work of the Central Committee's International Department. The International Department's role, however, goes beyond liaison with non-ruling Parties and encompasses general responsibility for the coordination of most aspects of foreign policy, so that Suslov has an important say in all foreign questions.

The none too precise arrangements among the General Secretary's deputies were clearly manifest in several cases of overlapping in Kirilenko's and Suslov's public activities. During 1966-70, approximately two thirds of Kirilenko's significant official contacts with foreign Communists (receiving ambassadors and official delegations in Moscow, attending foreign embassy receptions, heading Soviet Party delegations abroad, and other activities not involving another senior secretary) were within the Bloc of ruling Parties; a full third of his contacts, therefore, were with non-ruling Parties. Similarly, almost half of Suslov's public contacts during the same period were with Bloc Party officials. In fact, their share of the responsibility in trips abroad was just about equal: Suslov led a CPSU
delegation to Finland in November 1966 and went (with Premier Kosygin) to Romania in July 1970; Kirilenko led a Party delegation to Italy in July 1968 and officially represented the CPSU at the French Party Congress in February 1970.

Some of the crossing over in relations with foreign Communist Parties may have been due to Suslov's inability to attend certain functions because of chronic ill health, although he appeared to carry a normal work load until 1970. Also, responsibility for certain parties seemed to reflect a special connection or knowledge, such as has been evident in the case of Kirilenko's continued dealings since 1965 with the Chilean Communist Party. However, in many if not most cases the choice of either Kirilenko or Suslov as the leading Soviet representative appeared to depend on the nature of the business to be conducted in the given instance, Kirilenko being involved most often in economic discussions (and therefore logically more often with the Eastern Europeans in the CEMA framework) and Suslov playing the major role in theoretical matters and general guidance.

The apparent confusion of senior secretarial responsibilities was even greater in the sphere of Party-organizational questions, where the overt association of any Politburo member with personnel placement was very rare and usually misleading. For example, the Soviet press revealed that Suslov alone among the other Politburo members was present at the July 1967 installation of Shelepkin as trade union chief. According to one report reaching the US Embassy in Moscow, Suslov also had attended the meeting of the Moscow City Party Committee which two weeks earlier "decided" to elect the then trade union chief, Viktor Grishin, as its first secretary in place of Nikolay Yeorychev, the "Young Turk" critic of Brezhnev's handling of the Arab-Israeli problem. Suslov also presided over the installation of Grigoriy Romanov as Party boss in Leningrad in place of the transferred Vasilii Tolstikov in September 1970. The reason for Suslov's public involvement in the cadres sector on these occasions is unclear.
but seems to have had a connection with the power politics behind the moves. It is quite likely that Brezhnev assigned Suslov the task of presiding over the above changes so as to avoid too blatant a demonstration of his own personal involvement in a power struggle against Shelepin, who was the loser in each case.

whatever their public roles, it is Kirilenko and not Suslov who since 1966 has had formal jurisdiction over party-organizational work, including appointments.

There is no clear evidence of a similar place for Suslov in the cadres hierarchy.

A. Sharing Power with Brezhnev's Rivals

For several weeks after the 23d Party Congress, Kirilenko was preoccupied with the business of merging the RSFSR Bureau staff with the union-republic components of the Central Committee apparatus and was, therefore, not yet involved in significant administrative or political matters. Presumably he decided to tread easily in his relations with Suslov and Shelepin, who had built strong followings in the apparatus, for most of the chiefs of former RSFSR departments became merely deputy chiefs of the consolidated departments. The fact that there was no wholesale takeover by the former RSFSR apparatchiks,
even in the industrial departments which were fully under Kirilenko's control in the new setup, suggested some self-restraint. However, Voronovskiy and Petrovichev of the RSFSR cadres apparatus were identified after the congress as deputies to Kapitonov in the consolidated Party-Organizational Work Department, indicating a virtual takeover in this sphere.* Neither was identified at first in the post of first deputy chief of the department, but they appeared to outrank Aleksey Skvortsov, the only remaining deputy from the former union-republic department. In addition, Mikhail Khaldeyev transferred during the congress from the RSFSR Agitprop Department (where he had worked in the bifurcation years in Kirilenko's industrial sector as department chief) to the post of editor-in-chief of the important Central Committee journal Partiynaya Zhizn'. This move, although a manifest gain for Kirilenko, undoubtedly was also quite acceptable to Shelepin, who had raised Khaldeyev to a position of prominence in the Komsomol organization during the mid-1950s.

*See foldout opposite p. 56.
There was evidence of significant maneuvering in the Secretariat throughout the second half of 1966, mostly...
between Brezhnev and Shelepin but also involving Kirilenko. The confirmation, probably in early August, of Voronovskiy as first deputy chief of the Party-Organizational Work Department clearly marked a gain for Kirilenko. Then in September, Nikolay Shchelokov, whose main ties were to Brezhnev but who also had been associated to some degree with Kirilenko and Podgornyy in the Ukrainian Party organization, became chief of the uniformed police (militia, now known as MVD) which had been headed by a Shelepin ally, Vadim Tikunov.* At the same time, Shelepin seemed to benefit most among the senior secretaries from the September appointment of Boris Moralev to the vacancy of deputy chief of the Party-Organizational Work Department which Voronovskiy's promotion created. Jockeying by Suslov was clearly demonstrated in November when Mikhail Solomentsev left Rostov to become chief of the Central Committee Department of Heavy Industry -- an appointment which led to his joining the Secretariat the next month. Against the background of Kirilenko's apparent opposition to Solomentsev (see pp. 36-37 and 39), his appointment, together with Moralev's, created the impression that Brezhnev's rivals had the intent and ability to circumscribe the power of the cadres secretary.

In view of these indications of sharpening conflict in the leadership, it is perhaps not surprising that Kirilenko took the opportunity during a public speech in December 1966 to demonstrate his loyalty to Brezhnev. Speaking in Novorossiysk on a commemorative occasion, Kirilenko recalled Brezhnev's wartime service in a manner which exceeded the bounds of collegiality: referring to Brezhnev's political work with the 18th Army in Novorossiysk, Kirilenko cited the "indefatigable activity of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, his personal bravery and steadfastness, and his profound ideological conviction, which served as models of Party spirit and military valor." Such fulsome praise, which

*Kirilenko was caught in the middle here, having worked several years himself with Tikunov.
was reminiscent of the public adulation of Khrushchev in the early 1960s (and Kirilenko was among the most vocal public supporters of the Party boss then as well), may have been intended to remind Brezhnev that he had cause to protect Kirilenko and to give him preference over Suslov and Shelepin as a more reliable deputy.

The following spring there were signs of increased activity on Kirilenko's part that registered Brezhnev's trust and possibly reflected a delegation of greater authority to the cadres secretary. Kirilenko, although undoubtedly not playing the decisive role, must have been involved in Brezhnev's swinging the appointment of Marshal Grechko as Minister of Defense, also in April, against evident opposition from some quarters. Clearly, he and other leaders of the "Ukrainian group" had greater influence over
PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL WORK
DEPARTMENT

Chief: L.V. Kapitonov

1st Deputy: N.A. Voronovskiy (to Chuvash 1st Secretary)
Deputy: N.A. Petrovichev (1st Deputy):
Deputy: A.G. Skvortsov (Retired)

(Deputy): B.N. Moralev

(Deputy): Ye.Z. Razumov
(Deputy): P.P. Anisimov

Deputy: N.S. Perun
COMMISSION ON PARTY-ORGANIZATIONAL QUESTIONS
Chief: V. N. Titov

PARTY ORGANS DEPARTMENT
FOR UNION REPUBLICS
Chief: V. N. Titov
1st Deputy: P. F. Pigalev
Deputy: N. A. Belukha
(to Latvian 2nd Secretary)
(Deputy): I. Ye. Ryazanov
(Deputy): A. G. Skvortsov

PARTY ORGANS FOR
RSFSR INDUSTRY
Chief: N. A. Voronovskiy
Deputy: Ye. K. Ligachev

PARTY ORGANS DEPARTMENT
FOR RSFSR
Chief: M. A. Polekhin
Deputy: N. A. Voronovskiy
Deputy: N. A. Petrovichev

PARTY ORGANS DEPARTMENT
FOR RSFSR AGRICULTURE
Chief: M. A. Polekhin
Deputy: N. A. Petrovichev

Central Cadres Staff
RSFSR Cadres Staff
Central Cadres Staff, incorporating RSFSR Cadres Staff in April 66
PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL WORK
DEPARTMENT

(Chief): None

Chief: I. V. Kapitonov

(Deputy): A. G. Skvortsov

(Deputy): N. Moralev

PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL WORK
DEPARTMENT FOR RSFSR

(Chief): None
was identified in December 1967 as a deputy chief of the department. Possibly Kirilenko intended him as a replacement for Voronovskiy, who vacated the post of first deputy chief and became Party first secretary in Chuvash Oblast at about that time. The person who eventually was identified in June 1968 as Voronovskiy's successor, however, was his close associate from the RSFSR cadres apparatus, Petrovichev, whose experience was broader than Razumov's and whose contacts extended beyond Kirilenko to include, in particular, Voronov and Demichev as well as Shelepin. If, therefore, Kirilenko had planned on making Razumov Kapitonov's first deputy, the opposition to such a move was sufficient to prevent his doing so despite his unquestioned authority in the cadres sector. In any case, the net gain was in Kirilenko's favor.

Meanwhile, in February 1968, Kirilenko's hand was again visible in the appearance of another new deputy chief of Kapitonov's department in the person of Pavel Anisimov. Rising from the ranks of the Leningrad Party organization, Anisimov had established public ties with Kirilenko exclusively among the top leadership since 1962. He apparently replaced the one holdover from the union-republic department of the Podgornyy-Shelepin era, Aleksey Skvortsov, who retired in the same month. In addition, in the wake of Petrovichev's move upward, Nikolay Perun was released from his post of secretary of the Donetsk Party organization in the Ukraine to become deputy chief of the department. Although Perun appears most beholden to Ukrainian Party chief Shelest, biographic information on him is too thin to allow a firm judgment on his political connections within the "Ukrainian group." He could, for example, be allied with Shelest's rival, Ukrainian Premier Shcherbitskiy, whose influence appears to have increased since 1966 — the same year that Perun emerged from a long period of political oblivion to take up his duties in Donetsk.

Kirilenko's increased power and authority in the Secretariat was reflected also in heightened public prominence, giving rise to speculation in some quarters that he
had "replaced" Suslov as the "number two man" in the Party. For example, Kirilenko rather than Suslov accompanied Brezhnev and others to Dresden in late March for a meeting of Party and Government leaders from the Eastern European countries, where political upheaval in Czechoslovakia was the main subject of discussion.* A few days later Kirilenko was named chairman of a commission for the funeral of Soviet cosmonaut Gagarin -- the same function Suslov had performed the preceding year on the death of cosmonaut Komarov. The speculation increased in June, when Kirilenko and Ustinov held a reception for participants in a Central Committee conference of officials involved in the work of "administrative" (security-related) organs: Suslov had had an analogous role with regard to a similar conference in April 1967.

While it seems improbable that Kirilenko had assumed a formally designated "number two" position at this time, he did become more active in the field of international Communist relations, in which Suslov always had been prominent. Kirilenko appeared to be especially active during 1967-69 in pushing for the early convening of the International Communist Conference, which was from the start a pet project of Brezhnev, as well as of Suslov. Reports of his talks with foreign Communists in this period presented a picture of Kirilenko's insisting on holding the conference in order to "restore unity" and on recognizing the leading role of the Soviet Party so as to prevent further fragmentation of the Communist "movement". Kirilenko reportedly complained that positions of "non-alignment" -- he was especially upset over the Romanian position -- made progress toward the conference difficult. Although his attitude in talks with foreign Communists was one of sweet reasonableness, Kirilenko reputedly was among the

*However, Kirilenko's presence might be explained as relating to economic questions, as the inclusion of Gosplan Chairman Nikolay Baybakov in the Soviet delegation suggests.
Left to Right (front row only): D. S. Polyanskiy, A. P. Kirilenko, L. I. Brezhnev, A. N. Kosygin, N. V. Podgorny

Left to Right: A. N. Kosygin, A. P. Kirilenko, L. I. Brezhnev, N. V. Podgorny

Funeral Procession for Cosmonaut Yu. Gagarin, March 1968
most dogmatic advocates of a military solution to the growing problem of Czechoslovak democratization in 1968. Suslov, on the other hand, was widely reported to have been in the minority which urged a political solution to the Czechoslovak heresy; if so, it was possibly because he placed a higher priority than Brezhnev and Kirilenko on convening the often postponed international conference according to schedule in November 1968. In any case, reporting consistently placed Kirilenko among those leaders whose pressure finally brought Brezhnev around to the decision to go ahead in August with the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Kirilenko's greater involvement in foreign Communist relations naturally intensified his rivalry with Suslov. Indications of this competition appeared in the appointment of Party officials to work with the Bloc Department. The most important of these was the unexpected promotion in April 1968 of Konstantin Katushev, previously Party boss in Gork'iy and a professional auto designer with almost no experience in foreign affairs, to the central Secretariat with the primary responsibility of supervising the Bloc Department. This advancement of an official who had risen through the ranks in Gor'kiy under Kirilenko's aegis and who had received personal attention from Brezhnev since 1965 had all the appearances of a power play to prevent the assignment of the Secretariat post to Konstantin Rusakov, an associate of Kosygin and Suslov whose public identification as chief of the Bloc Department just two weeks earlier had suggested that he would enter the Secretariat.*

*Rusakov's predecessor in the department, Andropov, had combined the jobs of department chief and member of the Secretariat.
Further possible indications of Suslov's displeasure with the Kirilenko-Brezhnev push in Bloc liaison matters occurred after the intervention in Czechoslovakia, during the period of "normalization" and renewed preparation for the International Communist Conference (now scheduled for mid-1969). One sign of sniping was a 19 December Pravda identification of Katushev as a secretary "attached to" ("pri") the Central Committee, a highly unusual formulation which implied a lower status than the full-fledged and proper "secretary of the Central Committee." Then, in April 1969, a mix-up in identifying the Soviet participants in a CEMA summit conference, initially omitting Kirilenko's name and then misrepresenting his status on the delegation, appeared to reflect an attempt to downgrade his role in it.*

*On 21 April an official announcement, based on a Central Committee and government decision, listed only Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Katushev among the top leaders on the delegation. (footnote continued on page 64)
C. Outlining the Five-Year Plan***

In July 1969, with the International Communist Conference out of the way, Kirilenko turned his main attention

(footnote continued from page 63)
A TASS bulletin, reporting on the opening session on 23 April, revealed that Kirilenko was "also present" with the delegation. Finally, on 24 April, the central press listed Kirilenko as a full-fledged member of the delegation.

*See pp. 56-57 of CAESAR XXXIX.
away from relations with foreign Communist parties and began to work intensively on the 1971-75 national-economic plan. As senior secretary responsible for industrial production, Kirilenko obviously has a direct interest in long-term plans. It is even possible that he has the formal responsibility for overseeing the work of the Central Committee Department of Planning and Finance Organs, although the evidence is too sparse to allow a firm judgment on this.
The absence of significant activity involving Kirilenko's staff in economic affairs between November 1969 and February 1970 suggests that the basic directives of the long-range plan, at least for industry, had taken shape in the late October Politburo discussions. A Central Committee plenum in mid-December -- the annual occasion for approval of the next year's plan and budget -- became a forum for airing, in addition, the basic features of the new five-year plan.

Subsequent propaganda on the December plenum also held hints that Kirilenko had been a major force behind the important speech which Brezhnev delivered to it. The press accounts indicated that the unpublished speech had focused on "fundamental" questions of economic development. A Pravda editorial on 13 January 1970 elaborated that the plenum had considered "major problems which arise in compiling plans for the future, and in particular the new 5-year plan." The main theme of the post-plenum propaganda -- labor productivity and economic efficiency, rather than increased rates of growth in capital investment, as the foremost criteria -- appeared consistent with the thrust of Kirilenko's critique. One additional question which could
created a major problem in drawing up the plan was whether to adopt production associations as the basic economic unit and, if so, how a network of associations would fit into the ministerial structure. The December plenum apparently addressed itself to this problem, for a Central Committee decree on associations (still unpublished) was adopted in February, and a conference was held especially to discuss the future of them.*

It is unclear what additional work on the 1971-75 plan the December plenum decisions may have caused for Kirilenko and the plan commission. The "major problems" which were said to have arisen in compiling the 5-year plan could have included delays in defining the basic directions of agricultural development.

Whatever the reason, Kirilenko's plan commission seems to have presented its final recommendations tardily.

*For Kirilenko's attitudes on associations, see pp. 28-30. The associations were to feature prominently in the published directives of the 5-year plan -- see ahead p. 84.
in February 1970 -- that is, somewhat exceeding its January deadline.* In fact, some of the delay may have been due to routine tidying up of loose ends.

There were signs in April that a detailed outline of the 5-year plan, presumably based on the commission's recommendations, was near completion in draft form. Kirilenko revealed in a mid-April speech in Yerevan that Gosplan had been working on such a draft with other government ministries and departments and with republic governments and that it would be debated "soon" in the Politburo and the government (Council of Ministers).

The Reversal on Agriculture

At the same time, decisions on the agricultural sector were in the offing which apparently would require modification of some of Kirilenko's work on plan priorities. The day before Kirilenko gave his speech in Yerevan, Brezhnev had spoken in Kharkov in some detail on economic questions.
Saying that the December plenum had also discussed agricultural problems, Brezhnev had implied that investment in this sector would be increased only gradually. Similar statements from the Party boss on 21 April suggested that other perennially neglected areas of the economy, such as consumer-goods production and housing, might also be slighted in the next 5-year plan. In both cases, he stressed that the necessary development of these sectors would take time, implying that resources were needed more urgently elsewhere.

Brezhnev soon was to turn these statements on their head, however. The apparent vehicle for this turnabout was the memorandum "On the Agricultural Situation," which Brezhnev presented for the Politburo's attention and approval on 21 May 1970.* The main lines of Brezhnev's memo were made public only on 2 July in his report to a Central Committee plenum, but its impact on the new 5-year plan was immediate. At the end of May, Brezhnev spoke to a session of the USSR Council of Ministers, which had heard Kosygin report on the basic directions of the national economy for 1971-75. According to the press account, the council instructed Gosplan to do "additional work" in finding resources -- a blatant suggestion that Brezhnev's intrusion in this government affair signified a rejection of Gosplan's draft plan, and, implicitly, of Kirilenko's guidelines. Brezhnev immediately repeated his performance at a session of the RSFSR Council of Ministers on 1 June.**

**The press account, which indicated that the 1971-75 plan for the RSFSR was discussed, failed to list RSFSR Premier Voronov or anyone else as having given a report. The inference from Brezhnev's unprecedented forays in these two government bodies -- with which, technically, he has no association -- is that the changes in projected investment which his agricultural memorandum necessitated were so extensive as to upset the carefully weighed priorities of the draft plan and to require appropriate explanation and justification.
hinted at the shift in projected investment priorities in his 12 June speech to his Moscow election district, saying now that time was the main factor in developing agriculture. He opted for a "considerable acceleration" of the program of material assistance to agriculture, rather than allowing it to drag on for 25 years, which suggested that certain "comrades" had such a timetable in mind.

Brezhnev used similar language in justifying the program of increased investment in agriculture, including in machine building for agriculture, which he finally unveiled in his 2 July report to the Central Committee. Again, he seemed to imply the existence of opposition by admitting that "Of course, a certain period of time is needed to resolve fully the task of technically reequipping agriculture." He went on to argue, however, the need to ensure that this period not be prolonged. In line with this, Brezhnev indicated that "as a rule" all branches of industry would be required to assist the agricultural sector with production of machinery and equipment; not a single plant, said Brezhnev, should remain outside "this great and noble cause." He named a number of defense-related ministries which had supplied estimates of what each could contribute without reducing its basic output. In effect, Brezhnev seemed to be saying that for the immediate future -- that is, for 1971-75 -- industrial growth should remain roughly at its present rate, while excess capital should be used for manufacturing agricultural equipment.

How drastically the decisions on agricultural development may have affected Kirilenko's original proposals on economic priorities and the timetable for approval of the 1971-75 plan outline is unclear. According to one report, Gosplan officials in mid-April had expected to be busy through June putting the draft plan directives in order, one official even declaring it essential that it be ready in July. However, in June Soviet officials' activity and remarks indicated their recognition that the plan would be delayed, possibly until as late as the end of the year. (In fact, preparation of the plan directives would take until February 1971.) The failure of the 2-3 July Central
Committee plenum to schedule the 24th Party Congress, which would be required inter alia to approve formally the 5-year plan directives, and the eventual decision to delay the congress until March 1971, which was announced at another plenum convened unexpectedly several days later, reinforced these indications of disarray and confusion in planning. In later explaining the delay in finishing the drafting of the plan, a Gosplan deputy chairman told a Western official that the draft plan had been rejected and returned to the planners -- to be reworked "from A to Z" -- in April (presumably after Brezhnev's speeches in the Ukraine). In sum, it would appear that the shift in projected agricultural priorities which Brezhnev revealed at the early July plenum was a source of delay in the completion of the draft plan outline and in the convocation of the congress.

These changes in the draft plan in any case seemed to imply a partial rejection of Kirilenko's earlier formulations on industrial goals. At the same time, Kirilenko presumably would have agreed to a program of massive investment in machine building for agriculture, such as Brezhnev indicated in his July plenum report was planned.

Brezhnev stressed, for example, the imperative need to create "within a short time" a branch of machine building for the production of equipment for the dairy and fodder industries, as well as to develop machine building for land melioration and agricultural transport. Brezhnev argued that "naturally, a certain time is needed to do all this work, but the countryside needs machinery now." Although Polyanskiy would not oppose investment in agricultural machine-building in principle, he might feel, as he did in 1969, that the money

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*See p. 28 of CAESAR XXXIX.*
could be put to better use toward other programs for agriculture, given the actual low level of agronomics in the countryside. Thus Brezhnev appeared to recognize Kirilenko's view on the immediate channeling of agricultural funds into a machine base. At the same time, Brezhnev's report recognized the justification of continued high rates of investment in the agricultural sector and revealed a consensus, in particular, on the "expediency" of increasing material incentives in the dairy industry -- an apparent bow to the Polyanskiy view.
probably served as the basis of a decree of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers on improving the use of technology in agriculture, a gist of which appeared in the 7 August issue of Sovetskaya Rossiya -- the newspaper most closely associated with KiriLENKO. The decree listed a number of ministries slated to assist in the production of machinery and equipment for the agricultural sector in the forthcoming 5-year period. Notably, however, the list did not include several which
Brezhnev had named at the July plenum as potential participants in the voluntary program: the ministries of aviation, machine-building industry, shipbuilding, and defense industry.

On the day of the decree's publication, Kirilenko and Kulakov conducted a conference in the Central Committee with officials of the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building, evidently to assign them tasks in carrying out the decree. They conducted a similar meeting a month later, on 7 September, on the manufacture of harvesters and spare parts, with officials of the same ministry. Thus, Kirilenko publicly identified himself with at least a part of the program for technical assistance to agriculture which Brezhnev presented at the July Central Committee plenum.

D. Toward the 24th Party Congress

The decision to convene the congress in March 1971, which was made sometime between the Central Committee plenums of 2-3 and 13 July 1970, was accompanied by an apparent extension of the scope of Kirilenko's administrative functions in the Secretariat, which suggested that Brezhnev had delegated some of his powers to him.* It is not clear if the

*See CAESAR XXXIX, pp. 3-7. An especially suggestive episode was the early December 1970 Pravda photograph which showed Kirilenko and Polyanskiy in the second rank behind Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin at an airport ceremony, notably omitting to show Suslov and other ranking leaders who were present. Only Sovetskaya Rossiya and Sel'skaya Zhizn, which are considered politically responsive respectively to Kirilenko and Polyanskiy on most issues, among the other central press dailies also printed the TASS photo. This seemed to underscore the political sensitivity of their editorial boards to Brezhnev's personal interests and to indicate that Kirilenko and Polyanskiy were then the General Secretary's preferences for succeeding eventually to the top Party and government posts.
purpose was to free Brezhnev to devote his main attention to preparing for the congress or if, as seems more likely, the arrangement was intended to suggest that Kirilenko was the General Secretary's personal choice for a "second in command," a status to be formalized in some way at the 24th congress.
Kirilenko's work could well have been the basis of the published draft directives of the 5-year plan which appeared in the Soviet press in mid-February.
with Brezhnev's approving signature. The published directives, in fact, contained for the first time in Soviet practice a section on "improving management and planning," which gave a green light to the formation of production associations on a systematic basis, thus tending to confirm that Kirilenko had a decisive say in drafting them. Until Brezhnev signed his name to the directives, he himself had not mentioned the associations or in any other way been publicly connected with them.
III. POSTSCRIPT ON THE 24th CONGRESS

The proceedings and protocol of the congress registered a slight improvement in Kirilenko's position in the leadership but failed to reflect the heightened authority he apparently held in the Secretariat after last July. Suslov retained exactly the same positions he had held at the 23d Congress in Brezhnev's listing of the Politburo and Secretariat, and his prominence in presiding over several sessions of the congress suggests that he will continue to be an obstacle to Kirilenko's further advance. Kirilenko's improved position in protocol rankings at the congress was due to the downgrading of Voronov in the Politburo and the removal of Shelepin from the Secretariat: Kirilenko moved up to the fifth place on the Politburo (after Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Kosygin, and Suslov) and the third place on the Secretariat (after Brezhnev and Suslov). If indeed it is Brezhnev's plan to achieve public recognition of Kirilenko as "second in command," Suslov's continued presence in the leadership appears to be a major obstacle to its fulfillment.

The election of four additional full members of the Politburo probably was intended to provide for the eventual replacement of some of the aging members of that body, including Suslov. The over-all effect of the additions was a consolidation of Brezhnev's power, but Kirilenko also made appreciable gains in his position. Two of the new members, Ukrainian Premier Shcherbitskiy and Moscow City Party boss Grishin, appear to be more closely associated with Kirilenko than with Brezhnev. Kazakh Party first secretary Kunayev has been the most vocal of Brezhnev's public supporters and probably owes his present position entirely to the General Secretary's patronage, but his views on economic matters seem quite close to those of Kirilenko.* The fourth addition, Party Secretary

*See especially Kunayev's report to the Kazakh Central Committee plenum in December 1969.
Kulakov, has worked closely with Brezhnev and Polyanskiy on agricultural questions since 1965 and has no obvious political connections with Kirilenko (although he was associated with Kirilenko after the July 1970 plenum in the area of agricultural machine building). Kulakov's promotion to the level of senior secretary, where he joins Kirilenko and Suslov as a deputy to Brezhnev, may entail some slight changes in secretarial assignments -- he may, for example, continue to supervise agricultural matters while taking on the responsibility for overseeing the consumer sector and light industry -- but probably will not essentially alter the existing division of labor in the Secretariat, at least for the immediate future.

These and other personnel changes at the congress, as well as the inclusion of a number of Kirilenko's managerial ideas in Brezhnev's report, suggest that the two leaders are now closer than ever before. This situation would seem to improve Kirilenko's chances as a potential successor to the General Secretary in most circumstances. It might also make for heightened conflict with Suslov, Kosygin, and other top leaders who are relatively independent of the Party boss. The outlook, therefore, is for a continuation and perhaps intensification of the main lines of rivalry which have been observed since 1966.