Intelligence Report

INSTITUTE FOR THE USA:
THE KREMLIN'S NEW APPROACH TO AMERICA—WATCHING

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American Kremlinologists viewing the Soviet scene through the cracks in the Kremlin wall sometimes have the feeling that someone is looking back at them.

They are correct. His name is Yuriy A. Arbatov, and he is the Chief of the newly-formed Institute for the USA created to provide the Politburo a better basis for understanding the United States in all its complexities.

Should we be reassured or alarmed by the knowledge that Moscow has the nation under scrutiny by professional analysts rather than party dogmatists? This Intelligence Report presents a basis for reaching a judgment on this question by analyzing the political and professional philosophies of the man and his Institute as revealed in his publications and statements.

This study was prepared solely by SRS. It has been reviewed in OSR and OCI, and it encountered no substantive disagreement. The research analyst in charge was Arthur Cohen.
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The Kremlin's New Approach to America-Watching

Summary

America-watching during Stalin's lifetime distorted and oversimplified the complex process of policy-formulation in the U.S., and analyses of the American scene had to comply with Stalin's arbitrary decision of 1947 to adopt a harsh line toward the U.S. In the Khrushchev period, Stalinist distortion of the U.S. for the first time was subjected to official criticism, but Khrushchev permitted amateurism to dominate America-watching because he (and several of his close colleagues) acted as their own experts. It was not until December 1967, when the Institute for the USA was established, that a professional and systematic approach to understanding the complex forces influencing policy in America was initiated. The post-Khrushchev leaders recognized the absolute necessity for having objective ("scientific") analyses of these complex forces. They probably were convinced that the blunders resulting from Khrushchev's dilettante approach to policy toward the U.S. could be avoided only by nurturing a real professionalism.

The man they selected from the Central Committee apparatus in December 1967 to develop the new Institute, Yuriy A. Arbatov (b. 1923), is a well-informed expert on the U.S. whose judgments are relatively free from doctrinal distortion. In the 1950s, he made his mark as a new kind of party publicist who defended Moscow's policies on the basis of factual information and logic, avoiding such Stalinist crudities as trying to carry a point by branding an opponent as "fascist." By the mid-1960s, when he began to work as an America-expert on more serious matters of policy for the Central Committee apparatus, he became one of the leading advocates of liberalized research on the U.S. He championed the
concept of a multi-discipline ("complex") approach to America-watching—an approach which probed the social, political, economic, and ideological factors influencing Washington's policy decisions.

Arbatov is far better informed on American developments than the old experts. He rejects the Stalinist dogma, which apparently is still held by some Soviets, that policy is made by only a homogenous "miniscule handful" in Washington directly serving the interests of a homogenous group in Wall Street. He assigns real importance to disputes among diverse forces within the Administration and Congress, to pressures from non-official groups, and to economic problems. The Institute has a Section on The U.S. Foreign Policy Mechanism, and one of the topics under systematic scrutiny is how American foreign policy is made. Another Section probes Sovietology in the USA. At the same time, as an expert making interpretations for the politburo, he is an opponent of research work on the U.S. which is not directly related to policy problems.

In the course of establishing Arbatov's Institute, the Soviet leaders by-passed America-experts within another existing institute—apparently because they were displeased with the quality of the old product and the ability of the old men. Described one of these men, as a party hack, pedestrian in outlook, and the possessor of a plodding, dull mind, dedicated to the dogmatic view that the U.S. is completely "imperialistic." By contrast, men who have talked with Arbatov depict him as highly intelligent and eager to expand his already considerable fund of knowledge on the U.S. His ideology (Marxism) does not prevent him from accurately appraising the diverse forces at work on American policy makers. Some of the specialists he has recruited are more informed and open-minded than the traditional dogmatic America-watcher, whom he has disparaged as wearers of ideological "blinders." Arbatov probably will have to wage a continuing struggle against competitors in other institutes and men in the party,
who might prefer a return to the more simplistic (and distorted) view of policy-making in the U.S.

Arbatov has stated that he is called upon to make interpretations of American policy "to the politburo." His Institute apparently produces estimative as well as analytical papers on U.S. policy. The Institute functions more as an adjunct of the Central Committee's International and Bloc departments than as a scholarly component of the Academy of Sciences--its formal role.

Arbatov reportedly has access, beyond the Central Committee departments, to specific men in the politburo--particularly to Kosygin and Suslov. Soviet sources indicate that Arbatov's high-level supporters facilitate the process of recruitment of high-quality personnel. But it is not clear that he has the support of all Soviet leaders, or, more precisely, that he has received equal encouragement from all.

In this connection, Arbatov has been a prominent spokesman for those Soviet leaders who are anxious to attain a disarmament agreement through negotiations. Privately and in Izvestiya, he has warned American policy makers against delaying disarmament talks. In his discussion with former Secretary of Defense McNamara on 31 January 1969, Arbatov argued by implication the need for influential Americans to strengthen the hand of moderates in the Soviet Union, stating that the Soviet decision to engage in arms talks was a controversial one, that deep divisions existed in the Soviet government on this issue, and that many who now supported the talks had only recently moved to that position. Subsequently, other members of his Institute insisted privately to that arms talks must not be delayed or blocked. This line was self-serving, being intended to create a sense of urgency among American officials to start negotiations. Nevertheless, it probably also reflected the real view of those leaders with whom Arbatov had close contacts.
Thus Arbatov and his Institute experts are not only engaged in policy support, but also they appear to have committed themselves to the support of one side—or faction—on a major issue. This means that Arbatov's findings have been, and probably will continue to be, exploitable materials for some (rather than all) politburo members on various issues concerning policy toward the U.S. However, this does not mean that Arbatov deliberately has distorted, or will distort, his findings in order to compress them into a preconceived policy-support package.

The Institute for the USA has made it possible for the politburo to appraise Washington's various policy actions with increased rationality—i.e., with greater accuracy and comprehension. The requirement that simplistic interpretations of any American policy-move must be rejected should buttress any tendency among the Soviet leaders to examine American policy in a more open-minded way than in the past. At the very least, the work of Arbatov and his staff should reduce the degree of error in Soviet appraisals of U.S. intentions on specific issues.

What actions Moscow will take on the basis of this improved comprehension is another matter. The more open-minded Soviet leaders may not have the opportunity to use new insights to reduce frictions in Soviet-American relations. Their relatively increased open-mindedness would conflict with the doctrine-soaked policies of the post-Khrushchev period, influenced significantly by the conservative thinking of Brezhnev.

Brezhnev has demanded, in recent years, a closer watch in the USSR over the incursion of Western ideas. In this sense, Arbatov is working in a situation of conflicting leadership aims. On the one hand, the leadership demands an improved effort—including objective analysis—on interpreting foreign developments, resulting in the strengthening of the geographical institutes. On the other hand, there is an increased emphasis on combating foreign influences, resulting in a demand for greater doctrinal orthodoxy in the institutes concerned.
with history, Marxism–Leninism, and philosophy. These conflicting aims may be reflected in the journal soon to be published by Arbatov's Institute. Articles may contain a mixture of some distortion and some accurate depiction of American developments. However, there is less likelihood that the demand for greater orthodoxy will corrupt the classified papers produced by Arbatov and his researchers for the eyes of the policy-makers only.
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Introduction

The effort to develop a realistic understanding of the American political scene was a gradual process after Stalin's death. One of his intellectual legacies—namely, a grossly distorted image of the U.S.—lived on among party workers and academicians in the Khrushchev period. More and more, however, the Soviet leaders recognized that diverse and complex political and social forces were influencing the formulation of U.S. foreign policy and that it was to their interest to make an accurate (objective) analysis of these forces.

I. Stalin's Later Years: Distorting the American Political Scene

The basis of America-watching during Stalin's later years (1947-1953) was hardly more than a prospering dogmatism. Stalin's doctrinal bias severely hampered research and analysis. Moreover, his conception of what the Soviet internal control system should be—that is, his view that police controls should be pervasive—kept Soviet researchers walled off from sources which would have revealed the increasing complexity of developments in the U.S. and the need for sophisticated analysis. He required acceptance of the simplistic myth of government control by "Wall Street" which depicted one group of capitalists alternating with another at the helm of government following national elections. This distortion suppressed knowledge of sharp differences on policy issues among Congressional Democrats and Republicans and within the Cabinet. It also suppressed any understanding of the new phenomena, namely, (1) the stratification among American "capitalists"—big, middle, and small, (2) the rise of influential...
corporation managers and high-level technical personnel as a result of the managerial revolution, and (3) the big increase in the ranks of intellectuals who were becoming influential as opinion-makers of the new urban and suburban middle class. In short, the deep diversity of interests of different groups within the capitalist class should have been a major research target but was not studied, inasmuch as it conflicted with Stalin's doctrinal view of the basic American dichotomy—namely, homogenous "capitalist" interests competing with homogenous "proletarian" interests.

Stalin would not relax controls sufficiently to permit researchers to work out an accurate view of these diverse American interests. He apparently believed that he already knew all he had to know regarding how policy was made. He was dedicated to Lenin's view that it was made by "a miniscule handful" of capitalists who, as like-minded individuals, were obligated only to advance the economic interests of "Wall Street." Intelligence reporting on the U.S. apparently provided him with the factual information he needed whenever he had to determine what major policies had been made. He apparently did not want additional insights, such as might have been provided him by American specialists, regarding different policy views within the U.S. government and among influential figures on the outside. His "Wall Street" dogma was the substitute for insight, and he seems to have downgraded, or discounted, the implications for policy of internal government disputes and extra-government pressures.

Ever since his campaign against "servility toward the West" which was launched in 1947 simultaneously with the Cold War, researchers analyzing the American "political economy" sought security in an arid, quotation-laden approach. Those who worked in the Institute of World Economy and World Politics, of the Academy of Sciences, had just witnessed the denunciation of its Director, Eugene Varga, for writing that Western capitalism would be temporarily free from crises, or "stabilized," for about 10 years. Previously, this had been similar to Stalin's own view. But when Stalin changed it in 1947,
preferring that researchers postulate an "imminent economic crisis," the Institute was abolished. Its researchers were transferred, becoming a mere section—the Section on Economics of Contemporary Capitalism, Institute of Economics, from 1947 to 1956. They were unable to acquire foreign publications and were impelled to distort the American scene, inasmuch as "Every Marxist work on the economics of capitalist countries must be a bill of indictment." (Pravda, 2 September 1950) While Stalin lived, accurate studies were derided as poisonous products of "bourgeois objectivism." As the son of Anastas Mikoyan, Sergo, later put it, researchers in Varga's institute had been "suppressed."

II. The Gradual Shift to Non-Distorting Research

Following Stalin's death in March 1953, particularly in the fall of 1955, the first signs of a liberalizing thaw began to appear in articles on the problem of objective analysis of capitalist countries. Scholars were told that a new era had begun and that they must stop distorting and oversimplifying:

Many scientists take up a dogmatic and oversimplifying attitude toward the economic situation of present-day capitalism. This finds expression in an unexplained rejection or a suppression of the achievements attained in the capitalist countries in the development of production, science, and technology.

(Problems of Economics, #10, February 1955)

Party personnel, too, were directed to avoid "oversimplifying ideas about the decay of capitalism which are now current in our propaganda." (Kommunist, #14, September 1955) A big step in the direction of objective research was made by Mikoyan in his speech of 16 February 1956 to the 20th CPSU Congress when he demanded accuracy in order to explain "the complexity and contradictory nature" of developments in capitalist countries. He complained that academicians had limited themselves to
selecting isolated facts to prove, "for purposes of agitation," the approaching crisis of capitalism and impoverishment of the workers, failing to provide "an all-sided, deep evaluation" of events in capitalist countries.

Varga's old institute was revived and expanded, following the Congress, to be the present-day Institute of World Economics and International Relations. But America-watching was still limited in scope, having been confined to one of six "sections"--the small Section for Problems of American Imperialism--in the Institute. Better working conditions for its researchers included access to American source materials, and one report suggests that on occasion Section members were drawn in to join task forces preparing papers to serve as background information for men in the Central Committee. It may be conjectured, however, that the Section chief did not have direct access to the top Soviet leadership and that the work of his Section usually was not oriented toward policy.

A. The Rise of America-Expert Yuriy A. Arbatov

Yuriy (or Georgiy) Arkadyevich Arbatov (b. 1923), by training a "Doctor of Philosophical Sciences" and a "Candidate of Law" who had graduated from the University of Moscow, made his mark in the 1950s as a party publicist on political developments in capitalist countries, particularly on intellectual currents in the U.S. By the mid-1960s he was working for the Central Committee apparatus. As a post-Stalin critic of American intellectual developments, he tried to make his critiques convincing and credible, which meant that he had to read extensively in U.S. books, journals, and research papers in addition to the American press. In 1956, following the 20th CPSU Congress, Arbatov apparently was encouraged to make available to researchers American materials, primarily with the intention of training them to write "convincing and well-grounded critiques"--Arbatov's phrase--of Western political ideas. He declared
that the "enormous quantity of factual information" accumulated by Western sociologists should be "used by us, critically."

This is the more necessary because the empirical studies of bourgeois sociologists frequently contain material which cannot be found in other sources . . . even disregarding the idea of applying such studies to our country, and considering only the use of the factual material they contain for the study of capitalist society, we must recognize the volume of such material and not ignore it. The critical mastery and assimilation, on a Marxist basis, of such material will undoubtedly facilitate the study of contemporary capitalism. (Problems of Philosophy, October 1956)

For a credible critique of Western sociologists and for a new understanding of Western societies, academicians were encouraged to exploit the published writings of "bourgeois" scholars. They were to be informed critics, rather than ignorant critics, of the U.S.

Even before the 20th CPSU Congress in February 1956, Arbatov had had access to American scholarly publications for special propaganda use. He had been writing "convincing" critiques of American events. For example, access to foreign materials had been indicated in his critical analysis of USIA, which was published in Kommunist, May 1955. His analysis was unusual, inasmuch as it reflected careful and detailed research, drawing on many current American government, newspaper, and academic sources. Far from being the work of an ordinary party polemicist in the Stalin-Zhdanov tradition, Arbatov's article indicated a sophisticated understanding of the complexity of the American "psychological warfare apparatus," of the debate being waged at the time in Congress over the new USIA budget, and of the ideas of scholars specializing in psychological warfare operations, such as Professors Lasswell and Linebarger. Access to the
works of other American specialists on public opinion—e.g., Walter Lippmann and Robert Straus-Hupe—was indicated by Arbatov's pamphlet published in March 1956 on the "role of the masses in international relations." The Khrushchevian tone of this pamphlet strongly suggests that immediately after the liberalizing 20th Congress, Arbatov committed himself to the relatively empirical policies of Khrushchev and Mikoyan. He was a sophisticated writer, and he must have felt that he could advance more rapidly within the party's propaganda apparatus than the conventional hack, particularly at a time when oversimplification was under attack.

Arbatov thereafter, in his special field as a "convincing" critic of American scholars, used his opportunities to support Khrushchevian policies. In the above-mentioned March 1956 pamphlet, for example, he defended the positions that there can be a "parliamentary road" to power for Communists in capitalist countries and that there is "no fatal inevitability of wars." In his review of Professor C. Wright Mills' book, The Power Elite (1956), published in Pravda on 21 December 1956, he implicitly rejected the Molotov view that negotiations with the U.S. were harmful to Soviet interests. Arbatov wrote favorably about the idea of negotiations and detente in his critique of Herman Wouk (New Times, #5, February 1957). In an attack on Strausz-Hupe, he praised the idea of "realistic ... mutual consent" as against international "ultimatums" as the way to peace (New Times, #16, April 1957). Arbatov made a distinction between those influential American writers who favored detente and those who opposed it, and he displayed considerable skill in subjecting Strausz-Hupe's anti-detente arguments to a rational critique.

In this role, he was an early member of the new group of rational-minded party publicists who defended Moscow's policies on the basis of factual information, avoiding the old standard propaganda cliches in order to convey a sense of sobriety in their approach. Arbatov discarded such Stalinist crudities as trying to carry a point by branding an opponent as "Fascist" or "reactionary." For example, in criticizing a VOA broadcaster,
Arbatov made only one sarcastic remark about the man personally, and went on to dissect the broadcast's content, using logic as his major weapon. (New Times, #14, April 1957) This approach was not entirely objective, but it may have been effective with the 500,000 reader-audience of New Times.

As an ambitious party member, Arbatov used his academic training for political rather than scholarly articles. They were all distinguished by a basic orthodoxy of line, whatever that orthodoxy was at any particular time, and combined richly elaborated detail, including the appearance of a scholarly structure. He showed considerable knowledge in refuting six BBC broadcasts by the former British Vice-Consul in Moscow, Sir R.B. Lockart, making Lockart's historical analysis appear to be "ludicrous." (New Times, #50, December 1967) He was also comfortable in writing on doctrinal matters, but he proved to be a less able advocate in this field when confronted with the task of disparaging such serious students of Marxist ideology as Professor Isiah Berlin on Plekhanov (New Times, #6, February 1957) and Professor Maurice Cranston on the "non-scientific" nature of Marxist laws. (New Times, #13, April 1957)

Arbatov's ability to survive and prosper in the party is at least partly the result of his willingness to shift with changes of direction. The Hungarian revolt of October-November 1956 led to a temporary slowdown in liberalization. When the party attacked non-party historians for having misrepresented the "struggle against vulgarization" to mean "adopting a tolerant attitude toward the ideology of the bourgeoisie" (Party Life, #23, December 1956) and when the government issued a decree (7 March 1957) demanding that Problems of History dedicate itself to "partyness" in historical research, Arbatov applied the new strictures to Soviet sociologists. He warned that their sociology "cannot be non-party" or cut off from Marxist values and that, contrary to Freudian views in the West, Soviet scholars must see "class struggle" as the basis of psychological tensions in society. (Problems of Philosophy, #2, April 1957)
Following the June 1957 Central Committee Plenum where Khrushchev won a major victory over Stalinist opponents, Arbatov wrote in defense of Khrushchevian positions as the Soviet leader continued to advance against the "Anti-Party Group." Unlike the neo-Stalinists, who viewed Western leaderships as undifferentiated cabals of war planners, Arbatov depicted them along the lines developed by Khrushchev and Mikoyan:

Lately, some people in the capitalist world see fit to urge 'looking facts in the face,' 'accepting the challenge' and laying emphasis not only on the arms race, but on the competition with Socialism in the economic and social spheres as well . . . The supporters of Socialism, and indeed all honest men, can only welcome the desire of some bourgeois leaders to take up the challenge and compete with Socialism in the economic and social spheres. (International Affairs, #1, January 1959)

And when, at the 21st CPSU Congress in January-February 1959, Khrushchev pursued his dispute with Mao over the importance of using material incentives when advancing toward full Communism—one of several points in dispute—Arbatov was one of the publicists in the party who defended Khrushchev's position. Writing shortly after the Congress, Arbatov attacked Mao indirectly for considering material incentives far less important in a man's attitude toward labor than "spiritual stimuli." (Kommunist, #3, 9 March 1959) That he was able to prepare this article for the party's theoretical journal on short notice suggests that he had become known among officials in the Central Committee as an articulate and quick-response propaganda publicist. At the same time, his university training as a student of philosophy qualified him for more basic doctrinal work, such as participation in 1959 as one of several authors contributing to Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism—a volume reflecting, in part, Khrushchev's relatively moderate view of Communism and relations with the West.
Arbatov later went beyond a defense of Khrushchev to open flattery in order to help bolster the Soviet leader's personal stature. In a joint article written with L. Sedin in April 1960, he participated in Khrushchev's effort to build up his own political position as against that of other presidium members; those junior party cadres who desired advancement had to engage in the sycophantic exercise. But it was a Khrushchevian, pragmatic cult— that is, it was non-Stalinist in its limited scope and passionless nature, and Khrushchev was not depicted as super-human in mentality or divine in personality.

A great contribution to the further theoretical development of this problem (of coexistence) has been made by N.S. Khrushchev—the indefatigable propagandist and persistent advocate of the Leninist idea of the feasibility and historical necessity of peaceful coexistence of states with differing socio-political systems. Many speeches and talks by the head of the Soviet government and his well-known article "On Peaceful Coexistence" published in the American journal, Foreign Affairs, in October 1959 have thrown light on diverse aspects of the policy of coexistence. Moreover, he has contributed a particularly large amount of what is new to development of problems involving the peaceful competition of the two systems. (World Economics and International Relations, #5, 22 April 1960)

Arbatov and Sedin, writing to defend Khrushchev's version of coexistence, distorted the image of Lenin into that of a peace-loving Victorian radical. The main purpose of this distortion was to undercut Mao's militant ("Leninist") demand for a revolutionary strategy against the U.S., particularly in the underdeveloped countries.

Arbatov continued to defend Khrushchev's main formulations as the Sino-Soviet dispute developed. He reaffirmed Khrushchev's revisionist thesis set forth at the 21st Congress, namely, the idea that wars can be
abolished "even before capitalism disappears" in the world. (Kommunist, #9, June 1961) He attacked the Chinese by name for the first time in 1963 while defending the nuclear test ban treaty. (Pravda, 13 August 1963) Shortly afterward, he attacked Stalin by name, linking the Chinese with his view that imperialist wars can be an "indirect" reserve of Communist revolution. (Kommunist, #14, September 1963) But as an American specialist, Arbatov was not one of Moscow's main polemicists in the dispute; he merely paraphrased the definitive CPSU articles on war and peace, and his work seems to have been used as an additional weapon among the polemical batteries Khrushchev had ranged against Mao.

After Khrushchev was deposed in mid-October 1964, Arbatov's pieces reflected a combination of Khrushchevian and post-Khrushchevian political positions. For at least three weeks, he maintained an undiluted Khrushchevian position, attacking Mao's preference for "revolutionary war" over the CPSU Program's prescription for winning adherents to Communism "by the example and revolutionizing influence" of advances made in bloc countries. Beyond that, he again disparaged Stalinism openly by complaining that the force of example had been dealt "a damaging blow by those crude perversions of socialist democracy that were perpetuated in the 1930s and 1940s during the period of the Stalin personality cult." (World Economics and International Relations, #11, 31 October 1964) Within three months, however, Arbatov had shifted to comply with the modified, somewhat harder anti-U.S. positions of the new leadership.

This shift was reflected in Arbatov's important article (published in Pravda on 6 January 1965) which discussed President Johnson's State of the Union message. He stated that the policy of conducting the Cold War was "not yet a political fossil" and that the President's "bridge-building" line toward East Europe was political penetration "very close to the policy of madmen." But this new, qualified emphasis on anti-imperialism was not intended by the new Soviet leadership to be a complete
reversal of the policy of contacts and negotiations with Washington. It was a step back from Khrushchev's non-support of Hanoi—that is, it was intended to mollify Ho and undercut the Chinese accusations in the world Communist movement of USSR-U.S. cooperation. The new leadership also intended to warn the East European countries against moving away from the USSR and toward the U.S. at a time of apparent weakness and indecision during the succession-to-Khrushchev period.

Arbatov's Pravda article provided an anti-imperialist smokescreen for the new leadership, in effect sanctioning a continuation of negotiations with "moderates" in the Johnson Administration. He portrayed the Administration as being locked in a policy struggle which was reflected on the surface in "policy contradictions" he found in the State of the Union message. He went on to set forth several remaining Khrushchevian positions, namely, that the West was impelled to adopt a more "cautious, flexible, and deliberate strategy" because of Moscow's ability to influence international opinion by the "force of example," that the West had to accept "economic competition" and had to make "concessions and compromises" in foreign policy, and that bloc countries would not gain from a nuclear war "even if imperialism, which unleashed it, perished in its flames."

Arbatov carried out his new and important Pravda assignment skillfully, and he probably impressed the new leadership as being their best-informed and most astute expert on the U.S. The article's content indicated that, for the first time, Arbatov was discussing a major American political event of immediate concern to the politburo. And for the first time, he was given the assignment of enunciating a major shift—i.e., toward Hanoi. Thus he was elevated from the ranks of a mere propagandist (although a sophisticated one) to the status of a policy-support expert on key current matters regarding the U.S.
B. Arbatov's Commitment to Non-Dogmatic Research

Arbatov's university training provided him with the ability to separate his role as a party propagandist from his role as an America-watcher who had to analyze political trends in the U.S. in a serious-minded and objective way. In 1965, he joined the ranks of reformers who were championing the cause of liberalizing political research, and he openly supported Dr. F. M. Burlatsky of the Institute of State and Law, Academy of Sciences, who wrote on the need for "science" (i.e., empirical and objective study) in the analysis of political problems. (Pravda, 10 January 1965) The problems to be studied were primarily, but not exclusively, those appearing in Soviet society. Burlatsky emphasized the need to examine problems with a new tool, namely, the discipline known in the West as "political science," which was unique in its many-sided approach, analyzing complex questions by using a combination of "scientific communism, theory of state and law, and sociology, as well as economics." He proposed that special research institutions should be established for "political science," hoping to make it a new, separate field rather than a study subordinated to traditional juridical science. Since 1938, the official Soviet concept of the inseparable bond between the study of law and politics had led to the absorption and denigration of the study of politics by juridical science; it had resulted in a rigid, formal, and legalistic—i.e., useless—treatment of political problems.

Burlatsky was supported by Arbatov (among others) at the annual meeting of the relatively new Soviet Association of Political (State) Sciences (SAPS) in February 1965. Arbatov, who was elected to the Executive Committee of the association, argued that development of "political science" as an independent discipline would make it possible to discover "scientific" answers to all current political questions. He suggested that political science research should be divided into two basic specialties, namely, "internal political, connected with the domestic
problems of socialist society, and external political, connected with international relations and the international communist movement." (Soviet State and Law, #7, July 1965) He supported Burlatsky's plea to the association for a separate political science dedicated to the comprehensive and predominantly empirical investigation of the "totality of political relations (and) political activities in all their manifestations." But other discussants at the meeting, while accepting the need for more emphasis on the study of politics, rejected the idea of an independent discipline to be introduced as a new department in educational institutions. Strengthened by the speech of V. M. Chkhikvadze, Director of the Institute of State and Law (and the boss of Burlatsky), their view prevailed.

While Burlatsky's effort failed to lead to establishment of a separate discipline, a new emphasis was placed on political research. On 13 June 1965, Pravda published a follow-up editorial surveying favorable responses to Burlatsky's January article. Members of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, for example, were quoted as complaining that while there were scholars already working in some areas listed by Burlatsky (contemporary international relations, international workers' movement, the study of socialist and capitalist societies, etc.), the level and scope of their works were not satisfactory, largely because these areas of research were still officially slighted. Regarding contemporary foreign politics, they also complained that dissertations in this field were adversely affected because they had to be arbitrarily fitted into the framework of the old juridical, historical, or philosophical disciplines. The Pravda editorial seems to have reflected leadership impatience with the failure of these traditional disciplines to provide them with useful information, of a current nature, on the effectiveness of Soviet foreign...
and domestic policy. Regarding Arbatov's American specialization, the editorial called for a "political" approach to the study of political power in capitalist countries (among other areas of new emphasis). It concluded by urging researchers, without waiting for the establishment of special institutions of political science, to "considerably broaden their study of political problems in the existing institutions" of higher learning and research. It may be conjectured that between January and June 1965, Arbatov helped to convince some members of the Central Committee that a broader, multi-discipline ("complex") attack on foreign policy problems would prove far more useful to the top policy-makers than the old rigid, formalistic and juridical approach. He probably indicated that the increasing complexity of American politics required a new, "complex" approach, undistorted by oversimplifications and dogma.
III. Origin of the Institute for the USA

A. America-Watching in Other Institutes

In support of party Central Committee workers, research on American foreign policy and economy was centered primarily in the USA Section, Institute of World Economics and International Relations. The Section was headed by Professor I.M. Lemin, who presided over 30 scholars in three sub-sections, namely, American "foreign policy," "economy," and "disarmament." In June 1964, the Institute's deputy director, D.M. Menshikov, son of the former Ambassador to the U.S., stated that research papers for the Central Committee included such subjects as "How will U.S. foreign policy change vis-a-vis the USSR if Goldwater were to be elected to the presidency?" In July 1964, he was completing a book, The Main Drives of U.S. Foreign Policy. But young Mikoyan (also an Institute scholar) stated privately that the older members—he may have meant Lemin (about 70 years old) among others—were "too inflexible and doctrinaire" in their attitudes toward current problems.

Arbatov in 1966 directly criticized the impractical content of books on international relations produced by Soviet scholars, and by implication the Institute was his chief target. In his review of The ABC of Diplomacy (1965) written by Professor A.M. Kovalev of Moscow State University, Arbatov praised the book as an exceptional work, primarily because of its treatment of political "practice."

The book will be of interest because of the close links between theory and foreign political practices, because it reveals not only general principles, but also, so to say, the very 'kitchen' side of diplomatic work. This should be mentioned in particular since poor ties with political practice have so far been the weak spot of many even good works devoted to international relations.

(Kommunist, #12, August 1966) (emphasis supplied)
It is significant that Kovalev, the author praised by Arbatov, was not a member of the Institute which was the major producer of books on "international relations." Institute deputy director Menshikov commented in June 1966 that professionals working for him turned out "a book a year," that his job was to "crack the whip" to see that they "got their books out," and that he personally had written one based on materials accumulated during an earlier trip to the U.S.: Millionaires and Managers. It seems probable that when Arbatov wrote his Kommunist review he was well aware of the Institute's product in book form and that he considered the product useless for practical policy support.

The Soviet leadership's determination to shape research work into a policy-support operation was suggested by the appointment of N.N. Inozemtsev, in preference to a professional economist, to be the new director of the Institute. A former editor of Pravda, Inozemtsev was not respected among academicians as a scholar; he was brought in from the party's propaganda apparatus. Like Arbatov, he was in his middle years (45) and was reported in the fall of 1966 to be "very knowledgeable" on American foreign policy, skillful in writing articles adapting doctrine to international developments, very intelligent, and "a good administrator." Arbatov's Kommunist review, in addition to its criticism of useless theoretical works on diplomacy in general, may also have been directed against Inozemtsev's thick book (759 pages), Foreign Policy of the U.S. in the Epoch of Imperialism (Moscow, 1968), and this may have been an early instance of competition between the two men.

Inozemtsev's Institute had traditional expertise in the economy of the U.S., and unlike Arbatov, Inozemtsev personally had some proficiency in economics. As a Corresponding Member, Department of Economics, Academy of Sciences, Inozemtsev apparently was viewed by men within the Central Committee apparatus as valuable because he was party-trained and not purely a scholar, because he was a good administrator, and because his training would help the effort to improve the Institute's policy-support work on complex economic developments in the U.S. In July 1966, about two months after Inozemtsev was selected as the new Director, one report indicated that the Insti-
tute might be reorganized by moving specialists out to take up research in individual institutes, separating economic research from foreign relations research. During his visit to the U.S. in November 1966, Inozemtsev stated privately that the Institute's main charter was to assess "foreign economics," particularly the economics of the U.S. Subsequently, the Institute's research on the U.S. was indeed concentrated on economic developments, with a secondary place being given to "socio-political problems." (Inozemtsev's Report on the Institute's Research in 1968: Economic Gazette, #10, 1969)

In addition to the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, several other institutes investigate aspects of American affairs as a secondary responsibility. The Institute of Africa (established in 1959) primarily provides support for Soviet political activity in the Dark Continent, but includes in its scope of responsibility the study of the "new colonialism"—i.e., American—appearing in Africa. The Institute of Latin America (established in 1961) centers its attention on Cuba and revolutionary activity in the area, but its supplementary task is to analyze American policy in individual countries. The Institute of the Far East (established in 1965) focuses its attention on China and secondarily on Washington-Peking relations. The evidence suggests, however, that these three area-oriented institutes carry far less of the research load on American policy than does Inozemtsev's institute.

These specialized institutes apparently were set up to support the Soviet foreign policy effort toward the countries of primary importance in each geographical area. The Soviet leaders seem to have wanted Central Committee workers to provide more direct, detailed, and timely analyses of developments in the Congo since 1959, in Cuba since 1961, and in China since 1965. This meant that the policy-support institutes were required to produce research papers of a new kind, namely, timely and realistic, rather than historical and academic; the reference-book nature of institute research was criticized. For example, the Director of the Institute for Africa, V.G. Solodovnikov,
stated that because of the appearance of many new African states, priority research had to be directed toward more detailed and timely work. (Academy of Sciences USSR Herald, May 1965.) The Director of the Institute of Latin America, V. V. Volskiy, complained that research still had "a reference-book or a cognitive-descriptive character," and T. T. Timofeyev stated that it was necessary to "realistically evaluate" new factors in the position of Latin America in the East-West struggle. Both men had spoken at a session of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences which discussed the "new and complex" problems facing Soviet Latin Americanists. (Academy of Sciences USSR Herald, December 1966) Regarding the need for current research on China, B. Zanegin, head of the Foreign Policy Section, Institute of the Far East, stated privately in April 1969 that the older Institute of Oriental Studies is still active but deals with the "antiquities" of China; the new (since 1965) institute concentrates on current issues in the politics and economics of China rather than on the traditional cultural and humanities aspects of China scholarship. Zanegin also stated that the institute had no direct influence on policy toward Peking; policy-support usually meant a process whereby copies of research papers were sent to the appropriate "government bodies"--almost certainly Central Committee departments. Later, the authors recognized sections of their papers incorporated into official articles, according to Zanegin.

Thus the general trend in institute research after the late 1950s was toward studies useful for current support of leadership policies. Greater stress on timeliness and practical usefulness of studies led to increased specialization on an area-country basis. This stress culminated in the issuance of a Central Committee decree (14 August 1967) which demanded an improvement in the organization, planning, and financing of institute research.
B. Establishment of the Institute for the USA

1. The Central Committee Demand for "Complex" (Multi-discipline) Research

In its decree of 14 August 1967, the Central Committee directed the Academy of Sciences to recommend (before 1 January 1968) methods for "the basic improvement of the organization, planning, and financing of scientific research in the field of the social sciences." Regarding research on capitalist countries in particular, the decree complained about the defects in the organization of research. It noted that "many aspects and problems of capitalist society and the national liberation movement still await thorough and complex research. The organization of these researches is not carried out purposefully enough." (Decree as published in Pravda on 22 August 1967.) A follow-up Pravda editorial on 23 August suggested that the demand for "complex" research meant a multi-discipline, multi-faceted approach rather than the old, oversimplified study which had failed to comprehend the importance for policy of assessing the social and political complexities of the American scene. It stated that investigations were required regarding the "socio-economic, political, and ideological tendencies of contemporary capitalism."

The attack on oversimplification and the demand for a "complex" approach in institute research had been stated clearly prior to issuance of the decree. In the spring of 1967, members of the Academy of Sciences Presidium criticized the procedures of G.M. Sorokin's Institute of Economics of the World Socialist Systems, stating that "the exceptionally complex tasks facing the Institute require an integrated approach to their solution and thus require the study of not only purely economic problems, but also social, political, and even ideological problems." (Emphasis added.) Some members suggested organizing special sections within the Institute for the study of "problems of a socio-political nature." Academician P.N. Fedoseyev attacked the Institute's "simplified and oversstylized points of view," and then declared that an accurate view
of the real situation in bloc countries required a multi-discipline method of research:

The world socialist economy represents an extremely dynamic system and much hinges on the actual situation in the various countries, on the level of their development, on the actually attained labor productivity, etc; it must be considered that a solution is needed not only for purely economic problems but also for socio-political problems, and that these problems must be considered integrally when analyzing all the possible results and all the existing tasks. (Academy of Sciences USSR Herald, April 1967) (emphasis supplied)

Fedoseyev went on to recommend a strengthened effort by saying that the Institute should be supplied with additional personnel, material sources, and premises; moreover, more researchers should be dispatched for trips abroad. The Academy of Sciences Presidium adopted a resolution calling for (among other things) prompt preparation by the Institute of "objective and complete" information on the economic processes taking place in bloc countries.

This "complex" approach reflected implicit Soviet acceptance of the multi-discipline aspect--one of the few practical aspects--of American social and political science procedures. It was an indirect acknowledgment that Mikoyan had been right when, in his speech at the 20th CPSU Congress, he had disparaged Stalin's dictum on the shrinkage of capitalist production as inadequate for explaining "the complexity and the contradictory nature of events in contemporary capitalism." Moreover, it was an apparent reflection of the Soviet leaders' view that the complex aspects of modern domestic and foreign policy required a liberation of research institutions from the old, unrealistic, text-book images of the U.S. in order to fashion them into useful policy-support units.
2. By-passing the Competition

Reorganization within the existing institutes was one of the consequences of the decree's directives. By December 1967, the USA Section in the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (which previously had three sub-sections) was revamped, made into a Department, and assigned to working on policy-support analyses of special projects concerning the U.S. economy. This directed the Institute's work increasingly toward economic topics—such as the U.S. agricultural economy and the U.S. balance of payments problem—taking it almost completely out of the larger field of analysis of American political developments. The USA Department chief, Yu. M. Melnikov, reportedly was a specialist on U.S. aid to underdeveloped countries. His prior training had been confined to the field of pre-1940 American "economic penetration" in Latin America. He was described in early January 1969 as a party hack, pedestrian in outlook, and the possessor of a plodding, dull mind, dedicated to the dogmatic view that the U.S. was completely "imperialistic." He apparently was not considered by the Soviet leadership as the man they needed to make a new start in improving the quality of analysis of the U.S.

Establishment of the Institute for the USA (five blocks from the U.S. embassy at Khlebnyi pereulok II/3) in December 1967 was a more important consequence of the 14 August 1967 decree's demand for improved social science research of a "complex" nature. Arbatov, its new director, was qualified for the upgraded effort on the U.S. because he was intelligent, informed on the American scene, and relatively pragmatic, willing to view American trends with a minimum of Marxist distortion. Moreover, he was reform-minded, having been active in the appeal of pragmatic men to break down the old formalistic disciplines in the institutes of the Academy of Sciences.
Arbatov stated privately that the main areas of research emphasis would be the U.S. economy, Soviet-American relations, U.S. foreign policy, and U.S. internal developments. U.S. military matters, he declared, would be analyzed by other institutes, but, regarding the political aspects of the arms race, he stated that he was recruiting a group to produce arms control and disarmament studies and to engage in non-government Soviet-American arms control talks.

In line with a suggestion made in September 1968 by Central Committee member A.M. Rumyantsev, Arbatov stated that the Institute would publish a monthly journal. According to one report, starting early in 1970, the Institute will indeed publish a monthly journal—USA: Politics, Economics, Ideology—with Valentin Berezhkov (formerly of New Times) as the prospective editor and Vitaly Petrusenko (formerly a TASS correspondent in Washington) as the deputy editor. Arbatov also indicated that studies would appear in book form including, for example, a monograph on American private corporations. He indicated his intention to arrange for exchanges of newspapers, journals, and other publications, and he is preparing for an exchange of researchers. He prefers to have his own Institute library rather than work out of the holdings of other institutes, and his Scientific Secretary for Foreign Relations, V.P. Filatov, has already contacted the U.S. embassy and private libraries in the U.S.—as well as the Library of Congress—for aid in building up a new collection. Although Arbatov intends to bring the Institute's personnel roster up to 500, by June 1969 he had recruited 140, of whom 60 were fulltime researchers. In addition, 15 post-graduate students were reported to be engaged in research at the Institute.

Institute researchers told they have a subscription list of about 250 U.S. publications, including the Congressional Record, from which they glean useful source materials, especially from the "Extension of Remarks" section. They also stated that the New York Times and the Washington Post are used as the most important newspaper sources.
Arbatov's search for bright, young, reform-minded workers fluent in English opened a competition between the Institute and other institutes. In January 1969, Yu. M. Melnikov, the chief of the USA Department in the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, headed by Inozemtsev, stated privately that Arbatov's organization was a "rival." Another official in Inozemtsev's institute asserted that "We are afraid that he will steal our best American experts. He can pay top salaries. He has influence and prestige. The good people--the young, particularly--are lining up to work with him." (Interview in Business Week, 17 February 1968)

Arbatov himself privately disparaged the older institute. In January 1969 he was reported to have complained that the old approach failed to study the U.S. in all its "complex" aspects, concentrated on America's industrial and military development, and simplified the results of elections to mean a mere placement in national office of part of a single, homogenous "profiteering" elite which was no different from the part which lost the election. The symbol of this "dogmatic approach" was, according to Arbatov, the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, where America-watching was left to a limited subdivision--presumably Yu. M. Melnikov's.

IV. The New Approach Underway

A. Arbatov As Interpreter of the U.S. for the Politburo

1. His Direct Access to the Soviet Leaders

Arbatov's rise from the status of party propagandist to that of a high-level policy-support worker was suggested by his 6 January 1965 Pravda article. Later, on 16 May 1967, Moscow Pravda identified him as a "responsible worker of the Central Committee." Subsequently, his new Institute assignment suggested that the Soviet leaders, who already had a department within another institute working on the U.S., were displeased with the old product and preferred to make a new start with a man whose
views they respected. According to Arbatov was appointed from the central Committee secretariat—that is, from the party's central apparatus—and he was selected specifically to make it possible for the Institute to bring its product directly to the attention of "the highest authorities." Arbatov later stated privately that he is called upon to make interpretations of U.S. policy "to the politburo." And when, in a tongue-in-cheek article, Herman Kahn played the role of hypothetical Soviet expert on the U.S. in a Newsweek article (16 June 1969), it was Arbatov as the leading expert on the U.S. who replied to him (Newsweek, 21 July 1969).

There is evidence of Arbatov's access to specific men in the politburo. He opened his private interview with former Secretary of Defense McNamara on 31 January 1969 with personal greetings from Kosygin. Arbatov had made comments to him which implied that he was "quite close" to Suslov. The same source asserted that Arbatov had direct access to the late politburo member Otto Kuusinen, and had later written Kuusinen's obituary. He almost certainly has direct access, having worked in the party apparatus, to such men as head of the Central Committee's International Department Ponomarev and former head of the Bloc Department Andropov, who is now head of the KGB. Soviet academicians who had discussed Arbatov have stated that his various high-level contacts facilitate the process of recruitment for his institute.

Working directly for the party's central apparatus and the politburo, Arbatov was completely policy-oriented. He rejected, as standards for the new approach to America-watching, highly theoretical speculation of the kind conducted by certain American institutes (such as the Center for Advanced Behavioral Studies at Stanford and Herman Kahn's Hudson Institute). He informed a questioner, who had asked if his Institute would resemble American "think tanks," that "In political studies, I don't believe much in the sort of highly speculative and prophetic work your so-called think tanks specialize in." (Interview in Business Week, 17 February 1968)
Papers prepared by the Institute for policy-makers apparently are estimative in nature and hew close to matters of practical politics. According to A.M. Rumyantsev of the Central Committee, the Institute for the USA (among others) is required to keep its work in a "close relationship" with the foreign and domestic policies of the USSR. (Problems of History, #9, September 1968) During a discussion between Soviet academicians and Senators Gore and Pell in Moscow on 20 November 1968, Arbatov indicated his intimate knowledge of current Soviet policy on arms limitation talks; he apparently was assigned the task of urging the senators to intensify their appeals for a disarmament "initiative" from the U.S. Administration.

2. His Objective Approach to America-Watching

Shortly before his first visit to the U.S., Arbatov told [that the purpose of his trip was to advise his government on the prospects for the U.S. In the process of determining the relationship of U.S. domestic problems to foreign policy, his intention would be, he insisted, to take an "objective and scientific" approach to this study of the U.S., as opposed to propaganda. He had indicated in his Business Week interview in February 1968 that many Soviet specialists working on the U.S. still wore ideological "blinders" and that he would have to train many of his researchers virtually from scratch.

Arbatov's emphasis on the need for an objective approach was similar to the view expressed by the liberal-minded Vice President of the Academy of Sciences and Central Committee member, A.M. Rumyantsev. Defining the nature of institute research on Western countries, Rumyantsev stated that it was necessary to acquire "a profound and precise" knowledge of all processes—i.e., "economic, social, political, and spiritual"—of capitalist countries and that the product must be an "objective and valid assessment" of the overall productive potential of these countries. Making a polemical statement on the need for objective research, he declared that

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To an equal extent, it would be harmful both to implant illusions in respect to the potentialities of modern capitalism, or to underestimate its genuine forces. (Problems of History, #9, September 1968)

He went on to warn researchers against "oversimplification" and stereotype-thinking "in the approach to an analysis of modern capitalism." As a practical measure, Rumyantsev proposed the further development of "field research," inasmuch as "it is necessary to put an end to the physical isolation of Soviet experts on America" (among others) "from the countries which they are studying." Arbatov later stated privately that his first visit to the U.S. (January-February 1969) would not be the last, inasmuch as he planned to make the trip over "from time to time."

On 11 January 1969) Arbatov used an article to argue not only for objective analysis, but also for a higher degree of sophistication in trying to understand the complexities of American policy making. Writing in Izvestiya, he stated that the "most interesting" aspect of the Brookings Institute's book, Agenda for the Nation (1968), was reflected in the organic link between internal difficulties that have reached an unprecedented height and the foreign policy course that Washington pursues.

In an apparent criticism by implication of researchers still tied to the traditional, Stalinist approach to analyzing U.S. domestic problems, he warned that "many old and indeed 'traditional' problems have become entirely different from those 10 or 15 years ago." Arbatov's implication was that America's problems were so "complex" --and "complex problems" was the theme of his article-- that only the new experts could satisfactorily analyze their many facets.
Some of the specialists he had begun to recruit were indeed more sophisticated than the traditional kind of America-watcher. For example, when his new recruit for the study of American economic problems, V.I. Gromeka, expressed unusually objective views on a wide range of U.S. subjects on 9 January 1969, he "shocked" the doctrinaire chief of the USA Department in the rival Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Yu. M. Melnikov. Arbatov's awareness of the complexity of the American policy-making process was indicated by his comment just prior to his U.S. visit: he planned to meet with men who will be making "or influencing" policy over the next four years, and also those who might be influential for years in the future. This is a considerable departure from the view that professors and newspaper editors do not influence the foreign policy of the "miniscule handful" of capitalists who control Washington's foreign relations. Researchers he visited in early February 1969 were impressed by his "extremely sophisticated" understanding of American society and political trends, but they also received the impression that he is tough-minded—i.e., always concerned with the practical political rather than the purely intellectual aspect of a problem.

In addition to rejecting the methodology of purely speculative studies of the U.S. as conducted in the "think tanks," Arbatov also has tried, and found useless, the approach of the quantifiers of all data. He stated in early February 1969 that he had had some experience with the methods of physical scientists and mathematicians in the analysis of social problems and that he had found the approaches of these people too simplistic. He concluded that attempts to reduce "complex" issues of people and society into neat, quantified formulas simply "do not get very far"—i.e., these attempts can deal only with trivia.

In practice, Arbatov seems to start with a relatively open-minded approach in surveying the American scene. He seems aware that in the West Marxists are derided for their "tendentiousness and onesidedness." (Izvestiya, 11 January 1969) As a Marxist, Arbatov continues to be critical of the U.S. "capitalist" system, but his pragmatic approach and his new job has impelled him to become
better informed on precisely how that system operates and precisely what forces are at work in it. He is critical of the "weaknesses of the capitalist business cycle" and the "archaic" system of private ownership of industry, but he is dedicated to learning and applying technology -- i.e., computer aids and systems analysis -- and even "management techniques" of American firms to his new Institute. (Interview in Business Week, 17 February 1968) He is critical of American foreign policy, but he appears determined to accurately report what it is and how it is formulated.

He also appears to strive for full understanding. During a February 1969 round-table discussion

Arbatov appeared to be "shaken" by the gaps revealed in his knowledge of how strategic decisions are made in the U.S. He apparently had been concentrating his efforts on the works of American foreign affairs analysts, primarily in the political science area, but he had not given his attention to the new group of war-gaming and strategic-exchange specialists. But as a career-minded worker, he reportedly was extremely anxious to fill in this knowledge gap, and he was taking copious notes by the end of the discussion. He is known to have privately disparaged his rival in the field of "non-government" bilateral Soviet-American disarmament consultations, declaring in February 1969 that Academician M.D. Millionschikov was "uninformed" on disarmament matters.

Arbatov also seems to be aware that objectivity does not (and cannot) result entirely from his own effort to be open-minded, but depends equally on the support of other men in his Institute. These men apparently are permitted to challenge analyses, testing and refuting them by the facts of developments in the U.S. They are permitted to hold minority views, implying that dogmatic certainty is consciously and constantly under attack.
superiors (or foreign visitors) -- an apparent change from
the usual follow-the-line attitude of other institutes
and ministries. Good questions were asked, and no one
appeared to be an obvious party hack.

Arbatov apparently permits even his own analyses
to be questioned. His interpretation of President Nixon
as a man who would prove to be difficult for the Soviet
leaders to deal with (and therefore not to be preferred
to a president elected from the Democratic Party) appar-
ently was challenged by the Institute Scientific Secretary
for Foreign Relations, V.P. Filatov, who privately stated
on 12 June 1969 that he had been the only Institute member
preferring Nixon because the Soviets could more easily
deal with this type of American leader than some "moderate"
or "liberal." Thus even though Arbatov apparently finds
it difficult to separate himself from his personal bias
(in this case, his "pessimistic" view of the Nixon Ad-
ministration), he permits alternative views to exist as
one of several ways to dispel distortion and restrict
the effects of bias.

In their research, Institute members almost cer-
tainly are provided with classified KGB reports. The
Institute, in effect, functions more as an adjunct of
the Central Committee's International and Bloc depart-
ments than as a scholarly component of the Academy of
Sciences. It includes at least one researcher (I.V.
Mikhaylov) who has worked in the party's International
Department, several others who had held positions in the
Washington embassy, and one who had worked as an economic
 correspondent in New York. These experienced men are able
to keep topics under scrutiny at the Institute on a
practical course.

3. His Position on a Policy Issue: Soviet-
American Disarmament Negotiations

Arbatov has been a prominent spokesman for those
Soviet leaders who are anxious to attain a disarmament
agreement through negotiations. During his January-
February 1969 visit to the U.S, he advocated--to various
scholars, editors, and businessmen—a scaling-down of the arms race in general, and of American military spending in particular. He privately expressed the hope that no drift "to the right" would take place in the U.S., implying that he preferred a moderate course for the new Administration on arms issues. He inquired about patterns of federal spending, and he suggested that the "military-industrial complex" in the U.S. would block a shift in public spending from armaments to a massive monetary attack on poverty and urban decay. In the context of another matter—i.e., the ABM controversy—Arbatov stated privately that more money "should" be going into the cities. His Izvestiya article of 11 January 1969 had strongly suggested that he was somehow involved in the Soviet debate (as well as the one in the U.S.) over allocation of resources, and that he was a spokesman for those Soviet leaders who were anxious to begin USSR-US talks on strategic arms limitations and for those leaders who preferred to see a reduction in Soviet military spending.

His Izvestiya article of 15 April 1969 added some credibility to these conjectures. Regarding the matter of arms costs, he quoted MIT's G. M. Rathjens to the effect that the U.S. and the USSR could avoid another upward turn in the arms-race spiral, which might otherwise prove costly and dangerous for "both" countries. He tried to warn top U.S. policy makers against delaying and making unreasonable demands which would impede disarmament talks and prevent the conclusion of an agreement—a position he took earlier in almost every conversation he had with American scholars, editors, and businessmen.

In his talk with McNamara on 31 January 1969, Arbatov argued by implication the need for influential Americans to strengthen the hand of moderates in the Soviet Union. He told the former Secretary of Defense that the Soviet decision to engage in arms talks was a controversial one, that deep divisions existed in the Soviet government on this issue, and that many who now supported the talks had only recently (and rather reluctantly) moved to that position. In this way Arbatov informed the new Administration that a delay in the start of arms talks might impair the efforts of moderates in
the Soviet leadership. He took the same line with former UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg during the latter's visit to Moscow, stating privately on 18 July 1969 that positive responses from the U.S. were desirable because there was pulling and hauling in the highest Soviet circles about policy toward Washington. Other members of his Institute—namely, Anatoliy Gromyko, son of the Foreign Minister and head of the US Foreign Policy Doctrines section of the Institute, on 12 March, and E.S. Shershnev, deputy director of the Institute, on 4 July—insisted that strategic arms limitation talks must not be delayed or blocked.

This line regarding internal Soviet resistance to arms talks was self-serving, inasmuch as it was intended to create a sense of urgency among American officials to start negotiations. Nevertheless, it probably also reflected the real view of those leaders with whom Arbatov had close contacts. As for his probable disagreement with opponents of arms talks among the military, Arbatov made disparaging remarks about the conservative attitude of some of the Soviet military toward such talks.

B. The Probable Influence of the New Approach

The Soviet leadership's decision in December 1967 to establish an institute of America-experts has made it possible for Moscow to appraise Washington's various policy actions with increased rationality—i.e., with greater accuracy and comprehension. The requirement that simplistic interpretations of any American policy move must be rejected should buttress any tendency among the Soviet leaders to examine American policy in a more open-minded way than in the past. They may not choose to use such an improved comprehension for easing Soviet-American relations, preferring instead to make their overall political effort against Washington more subtle. At the very
least, however, the work of Arbatov and his staff should reduce the degree of error in Soviet appraisals of U.S. intentions on specific issues.

Arbatov has been encouraged to raise the status of America-watching to a professional art practiced by experts rather than by party amateurs and doctrinaire researchers.

It is important to emphasize that the Institute is not an organization of scholars, detached from politics and examining academic subjects, but rather a group of experts recruited to analyze political matters which relate directly to policy. Arbatov is not a tender-minded intellectual, but rather a tough, policy-oriented analyst.