The Next-Generation Expeditionary Air Force

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE AIR FORCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FROM: HQ USAF/CC
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1670

SUBJECT: Air Force Research Institute Priorities for FY09

The following four topics are FY09 research priorities for the Air Force Research Institute. I want you to approach these priorities with a fresh, holistic perspective, and provide actionable recommendations. Avoid parochial or functional biases, and I encourage you to consider "third-rail" sensitive issues, as necessary. Ensure your study differentiates near and intermediate term recommendations and examines any implications for increased risk. Where appropriate, provide risk mitigation strategies. A brief description of each topic follows:

A. The Integration of Strike and ISR Missions. Innovation that added strike capability to ISR platforms and ISR pods to strike aircraft has revolutionized airpower capability across the spectrum of operations. This study should examine the continued merging of strike and ISR missions and project an end state where the two missions are fully integrated. Your study should provide specific recommendations to advance the integration, such as eliminating impediments to integration, transforming DOTMLPF and merging operational warfighting processes.

B. Optimum Manning for USAF Operational Force Development. This study will evaluate current manning paradigms and their ability to accommodate rapidly evolving and emerging missions. Specifically, the USAF officer-aviator culture is rooted in decades of history, practice and repetition. However, our current construct constrains a quick buildup of UAS pilots for OIF/OEF, since officer and pilot production require long-lead planning and programming. Your study should examine which missions and functions are best suited for officers and separately for enlisted. Are there necessary distinctions? Should the Air Force reconsider the warrant officer model? What criteria do we use to determine if specific missions require rated personnel? Can new approaches cost less yet yield increased levels of effectiveness? Also, your recommendations should address the role of civilians and/or contractors in direct support to operational missions.

C. USAF Infrastructure: Recommendations for the Next 30 Years. This study will produce a template for basing, key infrastructure, and force beddown in a 10, 20 and 30 year timeframe. This study should frame an ideal/unfettered blueprint that optimizes deploying, fighting and sustaining an expeditionary Air Force across the spectrum of warfare, disaster relief, building partnership capacity and in the conduct of other engagements with traditional allies and
partners. Other considerations include compatibility with the industrial base, posture for strategic deterrence and maximized tooth to tail ratio.

D. Next-Generation EAF. The EAF has matured through numerous operational challenges over the past decade. Incremental change has produced a good system, but how do we take our EAF to the next level? This study will examine EAF development and whether it is engineered to deal with challenges facing us today and projected for the future. Specifically, is the current construct adaptive to meet the demands of the current fight and properly tailored to provide the necessary flexibility and scalability essential for dealing with non Phase-III operations? Is it adaptable across all scenarios involving military operations? Is it adequately designed for the unique requirements and limitations of the Air Reserve Component? Does the current construct provide sufficient flexibility to meet Combatant Commanders’ ever changing requirements? The study should also examine whether the AEF construct is the most effective vehicle for including continuity and stability of leadership in the deployed force. Unlike a Carrier Battle Group or a Brigade Combat Team, an AEF’s flexibility (varied composition) apparently causes some confusion for members of the joint team in assessing its inherent capabilities. Can this be alleviated?

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About the Authors

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Col John L. Conway III, USAF, retired, is a military defense analyst for the Air Force Research Agency (AFRI). He is a distinguished military graduate of the Air Force ROTC program at the University of Alabama, where he earned bachelor’s and master’s degrees in history. He served in many intelligence assignments during his Air Force career. After 9/11, he was a civilian advisor to the commander, Gordon Regional Security Operations Center at Ft. Gordon, Georgia, and he has also worked on the U-2 program at Robins AFB, Georgia.

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Executive Summary

On 20 November 2008, the CSAF tasked the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) to determine if the current expeditionary air and space forces (EAF) construct is engineered to deal with current and future challenges facing the Air Force.* Specific elements for research were the need to meet the demands across the range of military operations, presentation of forces to combatant commanders (CCDR), appropriate flexibility and sustainability, continuity of leadership, and teaming of deployed forces.

In this study, we discuss five issues for change, and our recommendations provide the framework needed to produce the project’s desired end state of a measurable and sustainable expeditionary process that meets combatant commanders’ requirements across the range of military operations.

Interviews were conducted with the Air Staff, Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, Air Force Personnel Center, Air Force Reserve Command, and Air National Guard. Detailed, tactical-level data of their air and space expeditionary force (AEF) processes were assimilated into a strategic-level analysis.

Two major issues identified the need for change. First, each deployment relies on “custom design” because the present AEF construct does not match the operational environment of phase IV and irregular warfare (IW) operations. The original design did not anticipate the demands placed on expeditionary combat support (ECS) (i.e., continuous surge) and the shift in force mix from aviation-related to ECS forces.

Second, the AEF processes do not provide an effective means to measure and communicate deployed-to-employ and employed-in-place forces and capabilities. Without this measurement, the Air Force cannot clearly articulate its total contribution to joint operations and highlight the stress caused by constant rotations.

Based on the study’s findings, the CSAF requested the development of an improved force presentation methodology comparable to the Army’s brigade combat teams, the Navy’s carrier strike groups, and the Marines’ expeditionary forces. This effort created the force presentation and generation construct known as AEF Next. AEF Next presents Air Force combat power using 117 airpower teams, generates these teams from unit-based deployments, and emphasizes teaming within and across units. The CSAF approved the AEF Next construct in November 2010.
We make several recommendations to improve presentation of USAF capabilities to CCDRs:

- The Air Force should establish clear lines of authority and accountability for AEF sourcing by completing the transition of Air Combat Command (ACC) as the force provider for combat and ECS forces.
- The Air Force should organize to support the entire range of military operations by developing a garrison force construct. The current practice of mixing operating and garrison forces is exceptionally efficient but can create an overestimation of combat capability because all of these forces are not actually available for deployment. The current practice creates competing responsibilities for unit commanders and hinders “teaming” of deployed ECS forces.
- The Air Force should create a force presentation model to meet requirements across the spectrum of military operations. It must include all operational forces and capabilities and encompass all forces in support of CCDR requirements. To achieve these ends, it must be definable and measurable.
- The Air Force should develop two sourcing constructs for expeditionary operations: Go-to-War (unit type code [UTC] based) and Sustain Operations (Air Force specialty code [AFSC] based).
- The Air Force should develop a strategic communication plan to improve USAF-wide understanding of deployment processes.

The Air Force continues to support CCDR requirements around the globe. However, the stresses in today’s operating environment have revealed weaknesses in the way the Air Force presents forces and capabilities in support of CCDR needs. The challenge is to change current processes so that every deployment is not a custom-made wooden shoe.
Introduction

On 20 November 2008, the chief of staff, United States Air Force (CSAF) tasked the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) to examine the current expeditionary air and space forces (EAF) construct to see if it was properly engineered to deal with challenges facing the Air Force today and in the foreseeable future.* Specifically, the research effort was to determine if the current air and space expeditionary force (AEF) construct was properly tailored to provide the flexibility and scalability essential for dealing with non-phase III operations. It had to be adaptable across all scenarios involving military operations; it had to be adequately designed for the unique requirements and limitations of the Air Reserve Component (ARC); and it needed to be sufficiently flexible to meet the ever-changing requirements of the combatant commanders. Finally, it needed to be the most effective vehicle for continuity and stability of leadership in the deployed force and needed to avoid confusion among the joint teams that assessed USAF capabilities.

In this study, we discuss five issues and make recommendations to frame the debate. All are needed to produce the project’s desired end state of a measurable and sustainable expeditionary process that meets combatant commanders’ requirements across the range of military operations.

Research Methodology

A literature review and personal interviews provided the core research methodology for this study. A literature review identified current AEF policy and attendant problems. Interviews were conducted with representatives from the Air Staff, Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, Air Force Personnel Center, Air Force Reserve Command, and Air National Guard. Detailed,

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Based on the study’s findings, the CSAF requested the development of an improved force presentation methodology comparable to the Army’s brigade combat teams, the Navy’s carrier strike groups, and the Marines’ expeditionary forces. This effort created the force presentation and generation construct known as AEF Next. AEF Next presents Air Force combat power using 117 airpower teams, generates these teams from unit-based deployments, and emphasizes teaming within and across units. The CSAF approved the AEF Next construct in November 2010.
tactical-level data of their AEF processes were assimilated into a strategic-level analysis.

**Why the Need for Change?**

We identified several recurring issues driving the need for change during the research effort. These primary factors set the context for the five observations and recommendations discussed later in the paper.

The AEF process satisfies combatant commanders’ (CCDR) requirements. However, a large amount of custom design work is required to provide the requested forces and capabilities. Several Air Force members referred to the sourcing process as the “art” of the AEF. Other USAF members equated sourcing and posturing Air Force deployments with designing and building handcrafted wooden shoes. While any process requires some custom design, the AEF process has moved from a process with some “art” to one that requires mostly custom work. It is time to remove the reliance on “art” and build a construct that is applicable to present and future requirements.

The current operating environment is defined by phase IV/irregular warfare (IW) operations. The present AEF process does not effectively meet the demands of the current operational environment and thus requires extensive custom design work. Aviation assets traditionally made up the majority of the Air Force’s deployed operational capability. Consequently, the original construct focused on the deployment of those assets. While expeditionary combat support (ECS) was considered during the initial development of the construct, the original design did not take into account the demands placed on ECS during phase IV/IW operations. Consequently, ECS integration into the post–9/11 AEF construct has been accomplished with incremental fixes. Phase IV/IW operations require a different mix of deployed Air Force capabilities. There is now a strong need for deployed ECS forces and capabilities. Future operations will most likely continue to demand these assets. Any future rendition of the AEF will need to prepare adequately for this requirement.

The change in the makeup of USAF deployed forces is captured in figure 1. The figure compares the number of deployed ECS forces to the number of aviation (AVI) forces. The intent
of the original AEF construct was twofold: balance the rotational demands of Northern and Southern Watch and provide a force presentation methodology to meet emerging crises. Prior to 9/11, Northern and Southern Watch were the primary rotational operations requiring USAF deployed forces. These rotational operations did not require a constant surge in capability. The mix of forces required for these operations was about 50 percent aviation-related assets and 50 percent combat support.

After 11 September 2001 until the summer of 2003, the operating environment was primarily defined by major combat operations (MCO) in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). An MCO environment requires a surge in capability and usually allows for the mobilization of the Air Reserve Component. The AEF process was designed to support this type of surge for a limited time frame. The duration was generally defined as 6–12 months, and the concept assumed that the Air Force would return to a
baseline of deployed operations that did not require either ARC mobilization or a significant impact on normal home station operations. The surges for the individual MCO portions of OEF and OIF were within this time frame. While all USAF capability surged, the majority of the deployed assets consisted of aviation, aircrews, aircraft maintenance, and a tailored ECS force required to support combat air operations.

As the Air Force transitioned from an MCO operating environment back to rotational operations in support of phase IV and irregular warfare operations, the force mix changed, and the demand for Air Force ECS forces to provide host base support for non-Air Force entities grew. Since the end of MCO, a larger number of ECS forces are now deployed. As a result, the number of ECS personnel deployed is more than double the number of aviation-related assets. The current AEF process was not originally designed for an ECS-centric deployed force mix.

In addition, many of the ECS force specialties (civil engineering, explosive ordnance disposal, security forces, special investigations, etc.) have been in a surge state for over eight years, again a situation the current AEF process was not designed to support. These two issues, ECS-heavy requirements and constant surge rate requirements, cause the need for extensive custom design work when it comes to Air Force deployments.

Finally, according to many of the practitioners of the system, the AEF processes do not provide the Air Force with an effective means to measure and communicate its deployed-to-employ and employed-in-place forces and capabilities. Without effective means to measure these forces and capabilities, it is hard for the Air Force to articulate its contribution to joint operations and the stress to the force caused by constant rotations.

The Air Force has learned much about conducting expeditionary operations since the implementation of the AEF process in October 1999. Certain aspects of the AEF construct have been improved because of challenges it has faced. However, in light of the new challenges facing the Air Force in fighting phase IV and IW operations, it is evident that the AEF must evolve to meet these new challenges.
Observations and Recommendations Framework

Given these drivers for change, the stage is set to discuss specific observations along with problem-solving recommendations. The diagram in figure 2 is the conceptual framework used to present these observations and recommendations.

This framework describes from a macro perspective the phases the Air Force goes through to present its capabilities to support CCDR requirements, with the training, education, and strategic communication aspects vital to and encompassing all the phases. This macro perspective helps to emphasize the holistic and interconnected nature of the USAF expeditionary phases. Recommended changes within a phase should not be made in isolation. Any change must be made with the understanding of potential cascading effects on the other phases. Therefore, we make the following observations and accompanying recommendations with this holistic perspective in mind.

![Figure 2. USAF macro expeditionary phases.](Based on figures from HAF A5/XW and HAF A8/XS.)
Organize-Train-Equip: Observations and Recommendations

Figure 3. Phase 1: Organize, train, and equip. (Based on figures from HAF A5/XW and HAF A8/XS.)

Observation: Clear lines of authority and accountability are lacking for AEF sourcing.

A recurring question heard during the majority of the research interviews was “Who really controls the AEF processes?” There are multiple organizations involved in the sourcing process. These organizations include Headquarters Air Force (HAF), force providers (FP), major commands (MAJCOM), Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC), and supported CCDRs’ Air Force components. No one argues the need for all these organizations to be involved. However, it is not clear who has the final say once a decision has to be made. Even when a clear policy is provided, at times it is ignored. One air staff member put this issue into perspective. He equated the AEF sourcing process to business at the United Nations (UN): “It seems like there is a UN organization model when it comes to AEF policy enforcement and the sourcing process—too many people have a say without a clear final decision maker to make hard decisions once all inputs are in.” While there is no
doubt the CSAF is the final decision maker, elevating issues to this level should be the exception rather than the rule.

Research also highlighted an apparent power struggle between the organizations involved in AEF sourcing. This struggle is most prevalent when dealing with the ECS forces and capabilities category. Air Force sourcing solution recommendations for ECS forces are the responsibility of HAF, Air Combat Command (ACC), and the Directorate of AEF Operations (AFPC/DPW) at AFPC. Historically, this struggle was manageable in the pre-sustainment OEF/OIF environment with current AEF processes because of the relatively large pool of ECS assets (Active Component and mobilized Air Reserve Component) in comparison to the overall ECS requirement. However, because of the increased demand for deployed ECS capability to support the current operating environment and the decrease in mobilized ARC forces, this struggle must be addressed.

An example of this power struggle occurred during a recent presidential support request. In April 2009 the Air Force nearly failed to provide the capability needed for the president’s trip to Mexico. A unit commander from one MAJCOM did not want to give up the capability after ACC determined that his unit was the best global sourcing solution. The commander provided a rationale for his concerns when his unit was initially asked. However, when those concerns were matched against Air Force-wide issues, the unit was still considered the best sourcing solution. This struggle turned into an ACC versus MAJCOM fight rather than an FP recommendation to a MAJCOM. While this is only one incident, it is a fair representation of similar examples and a fair description of the problem.

**Recommendation: Create a central authority with clear lines of authority and accountability for AEF sourcing.**

There is good news and bad news about this recommendation. The good news is the Air Force has already started down the path to create a central authority. The secretary of defense implemented the Global Force Management (GFM) construct in 2005. GFM designates the commander, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) as the primary joint force provider (JFP) for conventional forces. In this role the USJFCOM
commander identifies and recommends sourcing solutions, in coordination with the military departments and other combatant commands, from all forces and capabilities (except designated forces sourced by US Special Operations Command [USSOCOM], US Strategic Command [USSTRATCOM], and US Transportation Command [USTRANSCOM] as addressed in the Unified Command Plan [UCP]) to the chairman. ACC is the assigned service force provider to USJFCOM to provide the Air Force’s input into global sourcing solutions for combat and ECS capabilities and forces to support combatant command requirements. HQ USAF Program Action Directive (PAD) 07-13, Implementation of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force Direction to Transform and Consolidate Headquarters Management Functions, contains the implementation guidance to transfer several AEF sourcing processes from HQ Air Force Operations Group (AFOG) to ACC. PAD 07-13 directs ACC to have initial operating capability by 1 October 2009 and full operating capability by 1 October 2010.

The bad news is that ACC is not currently manned, trained, or equipped to accomplish its full role as both an Air Force major command and the Air Force’s FP for combat and ECS forces and capabilities. There is time to rectify this problem, but immediate action is needed to complete the transition no later than the deadline for full operating capability. While many of the Air Staff sourcing responsibilities will move to ACC, there are currently no additional manning resources identified to move to ACC. Senior leaders must continue to focus on the issue to insure that ACC is organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish its new assigned task.

Also, ACC has the responsibility to provide sourcing recommendations to USJFCOM for both combat and ECS forces and capabilities. Currently, ACC develops the sourcing solution for combat forces and capabilities only. AFPC/DPW is actually the lead agency for ECS sourcing solutions, with ACC providing minimal oversight. Current working relations are strong between ACC and AFPC/DPW. These relations became more formal on 1 October 2009 when AFPC became a supporting command to ACC for ECS sourcing. While this supporting command relationship helps clarify organizational responsibilities, the lines of authority remain divided between the two commands. Having two organizations involved in the same process creates
a unity of command seam. ACC is responsible for ECS sourcing; it should be resourced to carry out that responsibility. Unifying these organizations under the same command would create a single entity focused purely on Air Force combat aviation and ECS sourcing.

In addition to resource and organizational issues, an Air Force cultural issue needs attention. In ACC’s role as the force provider for combat and ECS forces and capabilities, it is required to make sourcing recommendations for the entire Air Force, not just ACC. Non-ACC organizations must accept this authority. Senior leader engagement is needed to impress upon all organizations that ACC speaks for the Air Force when it comes to sourcing recommendations for combat and ECS forces and their respective capabilities. Not only does ACC need the authority, it needs others to recognize and respect that responsibility and authority as the FP.

One option to help the Air Force accept ACC’s FP role would be to change the name of the command. Changing the name of the command to Air Force Forces Command or Theater Air Forces Command would better communicate the command’s role. As one person interviewed said, the command does not do combat; it provides trained and equipped forces to combatant commanders, who will employ the provided capability in combat. A name change would help break the legacy MAJCOM mind-set of the Tactical Air Command (TAC) days.

If a complete name change is not possible, then another option would be to create a new management headquarters at Langley AFB. This headquarters could be called Air Force Forces Command or Theater Forces Command, with the commander, ACC dual-hatted as the commander. The majority of the personnel for this command would come from existing ACC personnel involved with AEF operations. This dual command structure, while suboptimal compared to the first option, would separate FP responsibilities from other ACC issues.

In either option described above, DPW should be realigned under the new command, while remaining at AFPC to allow for effective integration with other personnel processes. The realignment would unify sourcing processes.

Creating a command focused on force presentation would provide a more centralized approach to combat and ECS sourcing. A
centralized approach is warranted to manage scarce resources against competing combatant commanders’ requirements.

Finally, establishing clear lines of authority and accountability would assist ACC in sourcing ARC assets. GFM guidance requires a sourcing plan two years prior to implementation. The goal is to source forces during planning rather than during execution, in contrast to the current process used for ECS. A two-year look is especially challenging for the ARC because it fills most of its requirements with volunteers. Since the volunteer rate can fluctuate month to month, let alone year to year, it is hard to provide an accurate estimate of how many expeditionary requirements the ARC forces can fill. In the case of the Air Force Reserves, they are merely committing to what they had supported in previous years. ACC will have to use its FP authority to monitor and update the ARC “buy” if volunteers increase.

**Observation: USAF mixes operating and garrison forces.**

The Air Force, unlike its sister services, has chosen to draw its expeditionary force from the same forces expected to maintain and support garrison or home station operations. Thus, in contrast to the Army and Navy, the Air Force mixes its operating and garrison forces. For the purposes of this paper, garrison forces are defined as all units assigned to a base or area for defense, development, operation, and maintenance of facilities.\(^1\) Garrison forces are nondeployable. Operating forces are defined as those forces whose primary missions are to participate in combat and the integral supporting elements thereof.\(^2\) Operating forces are deployed-to-employ or employed-in-place.

The mixing of operating and garrison forces is exceptionally efficient but can create an overestimation of combat capability under certain conditions. It is very efficient for peacetime operations or for a unit conducting operations solely from its permanent base. However, if the operating environment requires a constant surge of deployed ECS capabilities, then this peacetime or limited surge construct becomes very inefficient and leads to constant custom-built deployments. Phase IV and IW operations require high deployment rates consisting primarily of ECS forces and capabilities. The use of both garrison and
operating forces at the unit level erodes the ability of the supporting commander to keep pace with force development, upgrade training, and operational evaluation requirements essential to ensuring that the Air Force continues to provide combat-ready forces to a CCDR. Therefore, the mixing of operating and garrison forces hinders USAF support to CCDRs.

This mixed force construct also makes teaming of deployed ECS forces difficult. There are two levels of teaming. The first level is teaming within a unit. The second level is matching unit leaders with their assigned forces. Combat aviation usually deploys as a unit with home-station assigned leaders and associated home-station aviation support elements. However, this is not done with ECS forces because the home base must continue operating. The Air Force establishes expeditionary ECS units with semi-permanent leadership and ad hoc groupings of unit type codes (UTC) from various organizations filling the unit manpower requirements. For example, rather than “breaking the base” by taking the majority of a civil engineering unit from one base to build an expeditionary squadron, personnel deploy from multiple bases. It is a continual challenge to build a team from scratch in a deployed location only to have the team dissolve after 120 or 179 days. Also, commanders lose responsibility for the deployed ECS forces since they do not deploy with their units. The USAF stresses building teamwork and effective leadership at the garrison location. Why then has the USAF not created a construct to replicate this in the deployed location?

The mixed force construct also causes competing responsibilities for unit commanders: support of garrison operations versus deployed operations. This organizational construct creates a paradox. On one hand, the USAF stresses the importance of supporting CCDR needs, but on the other hand, the USAF has an organizational structure that emphasizes success at the home unit. Mission objectives and evaluation systems must align. Unfortunately, within the USAF they do not. Home station commanders are graded and rewarded for garrison success through the use of operational readiness inspections, unit compliance expectations, and aircrew standard evaluation visits rather than how well their unit members or assets perform while deployed. So rather than overly stressing the garrison operations they are graded on, some unit commanders may do whatever is “legal” to limit the stress at
their home base. Current AFI 10-403, *Deployment Planning and Execution*, execution grade, Air Force specialty code (AFSC), and skill-level substitution rules allow supporting commanders to send personnel who may not meet the CCDRs’ exact requirements.

One Air Staff member explained the issue this way: “The home base must ‘suck it up’ when UTCs deploy, and war fighting is a ‘tax’ to the garrison or home station command. Bottom line, the AEF is an elaborate tax system and the HAF, ACC, and AFPC/DPW are the IRS. Everyone in the USAF knows that they need to pay taxes, but they will take steps to do whatever is ‘legal’ while maximizing their net income.”

Posture coding (P-coding) is a methodology developed to help manage these competing responsibilities. P-coding is primarily a MAJCOM-derived decision governing which UTCs are available to deploy. There is distrust at all levels in the AEF process regarding P-coding. There have been numerous accusations between units and MAJCOMS that, while some units are “all in,” others are not and use P-coding to game the system. Since there is no Air Force standard on the number and types of forces needed to keep a base running, each unit and MAJCOM determine their own requirements.

While every commander understands the importance of deployed operations, the Air Force must do its part and create an organizational structure that supports this understanding.

**Recommendation: Organize the USAF to support the entire range of military operations by developing garrison forces.**

The Air Force must develop garrison forces to support home station operations without hindering deployed operation capabilities. A garrison force construct would separate the personnel responsible for an organization’s permanent support functions from forces responsible for deployed operations. The garrison force would primarily be made up of civilians and contractors along with some military supervisors and leadership. The garrison force would be responsible for the day-to-day operations of a base and would not deploy. This construct would better organize the Air Force for expeditionary operations. While it may not be the most effective construct for peacetime eficien-
cies, it would more effectively posture the Air Force to deal with the entire range of military operations. The USAF would no longer have to worry about breaking the base when deployments are required. Teamwork would improve because large portions of units along with their leaders would deploy together.

In addition, removing a unit commander’s competing responsibilities of taking care of the home mission and supporting the deployed mission eliminates the P-coding concern. Those who remain behind to care for the infrastructure and provide needed family services and support to personnel at the home station would alleviate the competing demands placed upon unit leaders. If unit commanders were allowed to deploy with their personnel, inspections and evaluations could be conducted in the deployed environment to provide an accurate assessment of the performance of individual units. However, a formal manpower study should be used to determine the requirements for operating a base and how that force can be managed by an installation management command. Current P-coding can be the baseline for this study.

This construct is similar to Army and Navy organizational designs. Challenged with lengthy deployments, both services have effectively established clear delineations between the operators who go forward and those who remain behind to take care of the home front. The creation of a garrison force would allow the Air Force’s war-fighting capability to focus on its mission to support CCDR needs without sacrificing the important aspects of caring for those who remain behind to support the war fighters from the home front.

It will take time and funding of additional personnel to create an Air Force garrison force. This is not a simple task in the current environment of budget constraints. However, the decision to implement this idea should be based on requirements, not near-term budget constraints. The envisioned future IW operating environment will require large numbers of deployed Air Force ECS personnel. As described earlier, a garrison force construct will allow the Air Force to support expeditionary requirements more effectively. It is in the Air Force’s best interest to establish the garrison force requirements and to begin the competition for future funding. A garrison force construct should be an Air Force long-term strategic goal.
The next phase of expeditionary operations deals with the organization of USAF operating forces to enable effective measurement of Air Force capability. As in the previous section, the term *operating force* is defined according to JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

**Observation: USAF does not have a defined force presentation model.**

There is a gap between the organize, train, and equip phase and the force generation phase. The Air Force does not have an effective way to describe in quantifiable terms its total operating force capability or the amount committed in support of CCDR needs. The Air Force does not have an effective force presentation model (FPM), defined as a standard grouping of operating force capability available to support CCDR requirements, deployed or nondeployed.

During its early design stages, the AEF concept was to be both a force scheduling process and an FPM. The Air Force attempted
to equate a numbered AEF to other FPMs such as a carrier strike group (CSG). However, this goal was never realized. The AEF process is currently just a rotation methodology. It is not a way of defining or measuring USAF combat power like other services do through their constructs of brigade combat teams (BCT), Marine expeditionary units (MEU), and CSGs. Numbered AEFs do not describe a standard grouping of operating force capability. When the question is asked “What is in a numbered AEF?” the usual answer is “Whatever you want to be in it.” The situation did not improve as the Air Force’s expeditionary structure evolved into air and space expeditionary task forces (AETF). AETFs are made up of capability from numbered AEFs and enablers. When you ask what is in an AETF, you get the same answer as you get with AEFs: “Whatever you want.”

The FPM void creates several problems in relation to the AEF. First, the void contributes to excessive deployment flexibility leading to a breakdown in force generation processes. The FPM should be the initial step in establishing boundaries for acceptable flexibility by describing a specific unit of measurement of operating force capability. One of the strengths of the current AEF system is its flexibility. However, without a specific unit of measurement, the flexibility stops being appropriate and becomes excessive. Appropriate flexibility allows forces to adjust within appropriate rule sets to meet CCDR requirements while also supporting appropriate force generation. Excessive flexibility leads to the breakdown of the deployment process.

According to the majority of the people interviewed, the current AEF process suffers from extreme flexibility. Without a definable FPM in the current operational environment, UTCs have broken down into less of a description of capability and more of a description of AFSCs. UTCs are five-digit identifiers describing a type of capability that can be tagged for CCDR support. This capability is made up of people, equipment, or both. Since the current FPM unit of measurement is “the deploying force can be any size that you want it to be,” force generation processes such as the use of UTCs begin to lose their meaning. Figure 5 shows this phenomenon (reliable data prior to July 2003 was not available). As of June 2009, 52 percent of standard UTCs with personnel consist of five or fewer people, 32 percent of two or fewer, and 21 percent of one person. Thus,
since July 2003, UTCs with five or fewer have grown by 12 percent; those with two or fewer have grown by 10 percent; and those with only one person have grown by 10 percent.

Figure 5 shows the growth of single-person UTCs. A specific example outlining the UTC problem is also useful. The USAF has 12 air mobility squadrons (AMS), to which there are approximately 44 logistics readiness officers (LRO) assigned. Currently the unit of measurement tracked is 44 LROs as opposed to the larger capability contained in each air mobility squadron. Without maintaining and tracking the larger AMS UTC, the Air Force lacks clarity about the greater impact on AMS capabilities caused by the LRO “cherry picking.” The single-LRO UTC is a description of a personnel requirement, not a capability available to support CCDR requirements.

There is also a culture issue regarding UTCs and the total force. Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) flying units routinely deploy partial UTCs in response to AEF tasking rather than the entire UTC’s primary aircraft authorization (PAA). For example, the normal C-130 squadron PAA is eight aircraft; Air Force Reserve deployments are usually for six aircraft instead of eight. (This is also true for tanker taskings.) This allows some residual capability at the home station. This is particularly important for the ANG because of possible homeland security taskings from the governor. However, “breaking” the aviation UTC confuses the issue regarding inclusion of support UTCs, for example, intelligence.

![Figure 5. Growth of UTCs consisting of a small number of personnel.](Data provided by HAF A5/XW and AFPC/DPW, 24 June 2009.)
If six aircraft deploy, it is difficult to determine what percentage of the aviation support UTCs should deploy with them.

The second problem created by the FPM void is the difficulty in assessing operating force capabilities without a definable unit of measurement. Currently the Air Force cannot effectively measure and explain how much of its capabilities are committed in support of CCDR requirements. Other services talk in FPMs of BCTs, MEUs, or CSGs. These constructs all have broad, quantifiable capability descriptions associated with them. The Air Force, on the other hand, describes its capabilities with a list of tail numbers or AFSCs since AEFs and AETFs have no specific meaning. This difficulty makes it hard to explain to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Congress, the joint force, and the American public just how much of the Air Force’s capabilities support CCDR needs.

Additionally, the lack of an effective FPM makes it difficult for the Air Force to explain request for forces (RFF) shortfalls. A recent example highlights this situation. The Air Force wanted to shortfall a portion of a requested capability increase of a specific type of aircraft. The Air Force had a hard time explaining its reason for the shortfall without an FPM because the unit of measurement that USJFCOM used was the entire amount of tail numbers in the Air Force’s inventory for this capability. When the unit of measurement for a capability is, in this case, in the thousands, it is hard to explain why the Air Force has to shortfall an RFF that is asking for fewer than 20 airframes. In the absence of a quantifiable FPM, the Air Force struggled to communicate how its forces were committed and what the risk would be to fill the RFF.

**Recommendation: Create a USAF force presentation model based on five themes:**

- **Enable the USAF to meet all requirements across the range of military operations**
- **Include all operational forces and capabilities**
- **Capture all forces in support of combatant commander needs**
- **Make the FPM definable**
- **Make the FPM measurable**
The Air Force must fill the FPM void. Flexibility is the key to airpower operations, but in relation to force management, excessive flexibility contributes to the breakdown of processes designed to support CCDR needs. There are a variety of models that can be used to create the FPM. The prevalent models are unit based, force module based, or a hybrid of the two. Each model has its strengths and weaknesses. These models are currently being researched and discussed within the Air Staff. For the scope of this project, the goal was not to recommend a specific model but rather to provide themes that can guide the development of the final construct.

First, the FPM must pertain to all requirements across the range of military operations. The current AEF process is best suited to address an MCO or an aviation-centric operation. While the AEF process has been adapted to accomplish other missions across the range of military operations, those adaptations were ad hoc. The Air Force’s expeditionary structure and processes must evolve so they can effectively support phase IV and IW operations. In the current ECS-centric operating environment, the ad hoc processes lead to numerous custom-designed sourcing solutions, causing the force generation processes to break down. The FPM must be sized to support varying types of operations.

Second, the FPM must include all operating force capabilities such as aircrews, maintenance, and ECS personnel. This will address a major weakness of the current system that the tempo banding system has somewhat addressed but not completely corrected. The stress of the current ECS-centric operational environment has overwhelmed the attempted fixes of this weakness. A new FPM that includes ECS from the start will go a long way toward eliminating the “art” of the AEF.

Third, the FPM must capture all operating forces supporting CCDR requirements. This includes deployed-to-employ as well as employed-in-place operating forces. This will fix a problem with the current AEF construct, which captures only forces that deploy-to-employ. Garrison forces would not be included since the FPM is a standard grouping of operating force capabilities, not the forces needed to run a permanent base.

Fourth, the FPM must be definable. A definable FPM will put boundaries on what defines our operating force. These bound-
aries will provide a description of a set grouping of operational capabilities available to support CCDR requirements, whether deployed or nondeployed. This definable unit of measurement will reduce the current model’s problem of excessive flexibility. The units of measurement will be tailorable, but having a set standard and rule sets guiding how changes are made will force planners to document changes. The documentation allows planners to measure and then explain the impact of tailoring.

Fifth, the FPM must be measurable. Effective measures are critical if the USAF is to understand and explain its contribution to CCDR requirements and stresses on its operating force. The defined set grouping of operational capabilities mentioned above will provide a baseline for measurement. Tailoring of capability within this baseline unit of measurement is expected to meet the specific needs of CCDRs. When tailoring does occur, the baseline unit of measurement must not change. What needs to be tracked is the deviation between the baseline and the actual tailored package. This would prevent what has occurred with the current UTC system. Currently, tailored UTCs are re-written to express the new tailored capability. This has continued to the point that, as of June 2009, 52 percent of Air Force UTCs consist of five people or fewer. One-person UTC readiness is easy to measure, but that does not provide a useful means to describe USAF operation capability.
Force Generation and Presentation: Observation and Recommendation

Figure 6. Phase 3 and 4: Force generation and presentation. (Based on figures from HAF A5/XW and HAF A8/XS.)

Observation: The AEF process has evolved beyond its original framework and is now expected to do things it was not designed to do. This has resulted in a breakdown of the UTC system.

The demands of the Phase IV and IW operating environments created the need for the AEF process to do things it was never designed to do. The AEF process was designed to support CCDR requirements by presenting force capabilities through UTCs. UTCs described capabilities designed to support expeditionary operations. UTCs were not created to man permanent or enduring requirements. However, that is exactly how they are being used. Deployed locations have become more like permanent bases. The Air Force does not have an alternate way to man permanent/enduring deployed locations, so it uses UTCs. Using UTCs as an alternate personnel system drives UTCs down to
the AFSC level rather than to the capability level. This issue, along with the FPM gap described earlier, has led to the majority of UTCs becoming a meaningless description of capability. The cost of the UTC breakdown is in future war plans and deployments. The current sustainment UTCs are not effective for the planning and deployment of forces and capabilities required for a future MCO. The USAF cannot build effective war plans with single-person UTCs.

Furthermore, in a steady-state environment with requirements defined well in advance of deployment dates, the total force functions reasonably well with a constant pool of volunteers. However, given the new long lead time (two years) for requirements engendered by GFM, it will be difficult to forecast accurate numbers of volunteers from the citizen-Airman cadre that far in advance. Civilian careers, changes in the job market, and even changes in personal situations (e.g., marriage, pregnancy, death, etc.) could affect the size of the available cohort. This is particularly true for limited supply, high demand (LS/HD) career fields. Even a moderate increase in demand will strain the capability of the Guard and Reserve to increase their volunteer numbers, probably resulting in an increase in involuntary mobilizations, creating a ripple effect of further manpower disruptions. The more predictable requirements are, the easier it is for Guard and Reserve assets to fill them. It should also be noted that near the end of the manpower spectrum, prior to the drastic step of reinstituting the draft, is the Air Force’s mobilization of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). While other services, most notably the Army and the Marine Corps, have routinely called up these individuals, the Air Force has not. Estimates from AFRC officials indicate that IRR spin-up periods of up to two years (depending on AFSC) would be required to make this cohort combat ready.

The long-term ramifications of continuous call-up of the Guard and Reserves require further research and evaluation. Several of those interviewed expressed concern over what will happen when the volunteer system either dries up or runs out of money to pay for man days. This will not only affect the Guard and Reserve units at the local level but may also affect the capability to support CCDR requirements.
**Recommendation: The Air Force should develop two sourcing constructs for expeditionary operations: Go-to-War (UTC) and Sustain Operations (AFSC).**

The Air Force should develop two sourcing constructs for expeditionary operations: Go-to-War and Sustain Operations. The Go-to-War construct would be UTC based. Specific UTCs should be created for expected contingencies across the range of military operations. These UTCs would be large enough to describe actual capability. When required to deploy capability to support CCDR requirements, the appropriate UTCs would be selected and tailored. Tailoring would be made within the boundaries and in accordance with the rule sets of the new FPM. In addition, the new garrison force construct would lessen the need to cherry-pick capability from established UTCs because of improved teaming. Without the concern for breaking the home base, larger portions of ECS units could be deployed if needed. This would improve teaming within a unit and the pairing of unit leadership with its deployed personnel.

A measure needs to be established to determine when operations shift from the Go-to-War construct to the Sustain Operations construct. Several items can factor into this measure, such as when rotational operations begin, joint expeditionary taskings begin, reconstruction teams are created, status of forces agreement is reached, organizations like the Coalition Air Force Transition Team are created, or the State Department takes the lead.

After reaching the newly established metric, the Sustain Operations construct begins. This construct would shift to normal AFPC processes, thereby preventing the UTCs from breaking down into meaningless descriptions of capabilities. This would allow the Go-to-War construct to remain meaningful so that planners can realistically build war plans and, if necessary, deploy forces for another contingency.

The Air Force should create a deployed unit manning document to define the sustainment needs. These manning positions could be filled through TDY, short tour, or standard tour processes. Tour lengths for these positions would depend on the demand for capability and the supply the Air Force has of that capability. The tempo band concept will still be required to
capture the varying dwell times of career fields. Minimum tour lengths of 179 days might be required in this phase for all deployed forces. Longer tour lengths may create tiered readiness across USAF capabilities, but that is a proven reality of long-duration sustainment operations.

This is not the first time the Air Force has had to shift from an expeditionary footing to a sustainment role. As sustainment operations developed in Europe following World War II, after the Berlin airlift, and on the Korean peninsula following the cease-fire, the Air Force made a conscious shift from an expeditionary mind-set to a sustainment mind-set. Rotations became assignments, which are still controlled by AFPC. This recommendation would involve deciding to acknowledge that current operations in the area of responsibility are, and will be for the foreseeable future, sustainment operations, not expeditionary. By developing manning documents on what each base requires to function and establishing a sustainment operation that uses AFPC to assign personnel rather than ACC and DPW, the Air Force will eliminate the dual assignment system under which it is currently operating. AFPC will focus on sustainment personnel moves, which will include assignments presently accomplished through the AEF system, and 365-day assignments. ACC and DPW will then be able to focus on deployment contingencies that are not in the sustainment phase and will truly evolve into the expeditionary force provider.
Training, Education, and Strategic Communication: Observation and Recommendations

There appears to be a lack of understanding about the AEF process across the Air Force, from the senior officer level down to the unit and individual levels. This stems from challenges in education, training, and strategic communication processes. These difficulties have been part of the AEF process since its inception, as the AEF was intended to mean different things to different users. When a process has multiple meanings, misperceptions will inevitably arise, which are compounded by poor communication and education. For example, some regarded the AEF process as mainly a means to schedule “iron” or combat aircraft. Others marketed the process as a means to provide Airmen with “predictability and stability.” For others, it was a process to explain capabilities to the CCDR.
Regardless of the original intent or expectations of the process, misperceptions developed as individual or unit experiences filtered into the corporate knowledge or perception of how the AEF process should have operated. Poor experiences, such as delayed rotations, short-notice deployments, and lack of predictability, led many Airmen to assume that the process was indeed broken, considering they had been told that the AEF system was intended to bring predictability and stability. This misperception was often compounded by a failure of first- and mid-level leaders who simply did not understand the process. Their own misperceptions of a failed AEF system led to inaccurate assessments of the process, feeding subordinate misperceptions. Examples of this lack of knowledge are rampant; the earlier example of the presidential support mission shows that some unit commanders simply do not understand that ACC is the force provider for the Air Force under GFM. The education needs to go beyond AEF to include the driving forces behind it. GFM is now the supported concept. Air Force personnel must know how the AEF supports joint, secretary of defense, and national military and security objectives.

Moreover, the misperception that the AEF system was broken was often not passed up the chain of command to senior leaders to address and correct. For example, while there was a recognized need for this research project at the staff level where the process functions, some senior leaders indicated surprise that the AEF system was a concern. The misperception on the part of senior leaders that the system is not having issues derives from the fact that the Air Force continues to support the CCDR. However, understanding the evolving AEF process is a challenge for the experts who oversee this process daily. Thus, senior leaders may not be completely aware of the robust nature of the AEF process and the long-term effects of the stresses the process places on the force.

**Recommendations:**

- **Develop a robust education and training plan for key positions responsible for the planning and execution of the AEF process.**
• **Develop a coherent Airman education and training plan.**

• **Develop a strategic communication plan for internal and external recipients.**

The Air Force must develop a robust education and training plan for key positions responsible for planning and executing the AEF process. This plan must encompass all phases of Air Force training and education and must become part of a continuing education process that informs Air Force members of the new changes to the process. AFPC/DPW has an education outreach program. The program provides excellent products for those who want to learn. These products include AEF lesson material and education booklets available online. In addition to putting material on the website, AFPC/DPW conducts briefings at base installations, commander courses, and functional development team meetings at Randolph AFB, TX. DPW also releases policy update articles. While these educational initiatives are extremely valuable, they are incorporated into a comprehensive Air Force education strategy.

One group that is critical to the success of the system is the functional area managers (FAM). There have been recent gains in HAF FAM training and in providing continuing education through a best practices forum. However, the system is new and will need continuous support from senior leaders across the MAJCOMs to ensure that Air Force FAMs are knowledgeable about their own communities and their needs, the AEF process, and the needs of the Air Force. Furthermore, this education process must involve all FAMs and unit deployment monitors (UDM). This could be the first step in developing a deliberate and coherent officer and enlisted education and training plan.

Once the FAMs and UDMs have a clear program that provides them with the appropriate tools to support the AEF system, the Air Force can develop programs to educate everyone from senior leaders down to the newest Airman. The plan should begin with precommissioning and basic training sources and continue through career development courses, professional military education, Weighted Airman Promotion System testing, and annual recurring training. The education process must be coordinated among these programs and be holistic in
nature: it must fully explain how the system works and follow an Airman through his or her career to ensure comprehension and understanding, not just knowledge. Integral to the success of this education piece is training quality instructors in the subject matter and training purveyors of the process itself. The continuing education required for all Airmen should encompass not only those who plan and implement the AEF process but also those who teach others about the process, which will ensure that the individuals who deploy under the process fully understand the implications and realities of the AEF system.

Also the education process must develop a clear strategic communication plan. The notion of predictability and stability needs to be put to rest immediately. To challenge the misperception that the system is broken, the Air Force must also acknowledge that the system has been tasked to do things it was never intended to accomplish. Acknowledging the stresses on the system that have led to breakdowns will provide credibility and academic honesty to leaders who address this challenge and will remedy the misperception that the system is broken. Additionally, once leaders at all levels are educated on the process, expectations, and realities of the AEF system, they can quickly take action to address and correct evolving misperceptions or abuses of the system that contribute to the negative perceptions of the AEF system.

Any strategic communication plan must contain clear messages on the AEF process that can be used at all levels of the Air Force by leaders in all positions, especially the senior leaders of each command. The strategic communication process must go hand in hand with the education and training on the AEF system. Also, it cannot be a one-time effort or push. It must be a continuous and ongoing process to ensure accurate understanding and perception of the AEF system. This three-pronged approach to the AEF system—education, training, and strategic communication—will certainly provide a holistic means to address the challenges of an expeditionary Air Force that seeks to support combatant commanders. It will be an inclusive process where comprehension of the system will be the focus and help alleviate the misperceptions surrounding the AEF system. It will produce Airmen capable of explaining the Air Force’s contribution to the joint fight not only to other Air-
men but to the other services and civilian leaders as well. Regard-
less of the form the AEF takes, the education, training, and stra-
tegic communication processes remain critical to suc-
cessful implementation and continued performance.

In the event that no action is taken to amend the current sys-
tem, a vigorous education and communication plan must still be
developed and implemented at all levels. Airmen serving today not 
only need to understand the role that they play in the joint 
fight but also must be able to articulate clearly the con-
tributions the Air Force makes as well. This process must be an 
ongoing effort that begins with basic training and commis-
sioning sources and continues through an Airman’s career. This 
continuing process must include the proper training of instruc-
tors. Classroom instruction is only as good as the instructor’s 
knowledge of the subject. Also, continuing education needs to 
encompass the total force and provide a similarly robust and 
effective education plan for Guard, Reserve, and civilian Air 
Force members. This program must expand across all ranks 
and all functions so that when asked how the Air Force sup-
ports current operations, anyone associated with the USAF can 
answer with authority and confidence. At present, that is sim-
ply not the case.
Conclusion

Today’s operating environment has revealed weaknesses in the way the Air Force presents forces and capabilities in support of CCDR requirements. The weaknesses include the AEF not being designed to support all scenarios involving military operations, excessive flexibility of the AEF, unit and leadership teaming, and assessment of contributions to joint operations. The observations in this paper touch the heart of the problems created by these weaknesses. The recommendations are an attempt to provide the framework needed to produce the desired end state of a *measurable and sustainable expeditionary process that meets combatant commanders’ requirements across the range of military operations.*

Completing the transition of ACC to an FP will establish clear lines of authority and accountability for the sourcing and coding of combat and ECS forces and capabilities. The creation of a garrison force construct will improve unit and leadership teaming possibilities at deployed locations. The garrison force will also allow the Air Force to better respond with its capabilities throughout the spectrum of conflict by maximizing ECS capability for deployment. The shift from operations conducted mainly by combat aviation assets to operations conducted increasingly by ECS personnel demands a shift in how the Air Force approaches its force construct.

Furthermore, a new FPM will create the boundaries needed for determining acceptable flexibility during force generation. In addition, the FPM will provide a structure that can be assessed, giving the Air Force the ability to explain its support of CCDR requirements. The FPM will also give the Air Force a construct to evaluate the stress on its forces and capabilities. Creating two sourcing constructs will posture the Air Force to conduct actions across the range of military operations. Eliminating the use of UTCs during sustainment of operations will prevent them from breaking down into descriptions of AFSCs. Finally, education, training, and strategic communications are vital to proper employment of the AEF process and provide the bridge between the process and individual Airmen. Unless Airmen understand how the system works and are able to communi-
cate that knowledge effectively, misperceptions that the system is broken will persist.

It is important to note that these recommendations do not stand alone. The Air Force’s expeditionary process is a complex system. The AFRI project conducted a strategic-level cross-functional review of the entire process to recommend system-wide solutions to problems, not just symptoms. Just as the Air Force’s expeditionary processes are interconnected, so are the recommendations in this paper. Accepting one without another may only address a symptom and not solve the real problem. For example, a simple policy decision could be made to stop the creation of single-person UTCs. While on the surface this decision may look like a good idea, in reality it is not. Made in isolation, a policy decision such as this does not solve the reason why UTCs broke down in the first place. Without addressing the FPM and sustainment issues, a policy decree is only a band-aid fix.

There is no doubt that the Air Force is supporting CCDR requirements around the globe. The challenge is whether the Air Force can adapt its processes so that every deployment is not a custom-made wooden shoe. This study’s “big idea” recommendations are an attempt to provide a framework to solve that problem. The recommendations are not the final solution. The next stage of research is to flesh out the ideas that are found to have merit.

Notes

2. Ibid., 397.
3. Data provided by HAF A5/XW, 5 June 2009.
## List of Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Air Combat Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEF</td>
<td>air and space expeditionary force</td>
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<td>AETF</td>
<td>air and space expeditionary task force</td>
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<td>AFI</td>
<td>Air Force Instruction</td>
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<td>AFOG</td>
<td>Air Force Operations Group</td>
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<td>AFPC</td>
<td>Air Force Personnel Center</td>
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<td>AFPC/DPW</td>
<td>Air Force Personnel Center, Directorate of AEF Operations</td>
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<td>AFPC/DPWPA</td>
<td>Air Force Personnel Center, Directorate of AEF Operations Public Affairs</td>
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<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Air Force Reserve Command</td>
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<td>AFRI</td>
<td>Air Force Research Institute</td>
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<td>AFSC</td>
<td>Air Force specialty code</td>
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<td>AMC</td>
<td>Air Mobility Command</td>
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<td>AMS</td>
<td>air mobility squadron</td>
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<td>ANG</td>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
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<td>ARC</td>
<td>Air Reserve Component</td>
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<td>AVI</td>
<td>aviation</td>
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<td>BCT</td>
<td>brigade combat team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSAF</td>
<td>chief of staff, United States Air Force</td>
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<td>CSG</td>
<td>carrier strike group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPW</td>
<td>Directorate of AEF Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAF</td>
<td>expeditionary air and space forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECS</td>
<td>expeditionary combat support</td>
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<td>FAM</td>
<td>functional area manager</td>
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<td>FP</td>
<td>force provider</td>
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<td>FPM</td>
<td>force presentation model</td>
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<td>GFM</td>
<td>Global Force Management</td>
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<td>HAF</td>
<td>Headquarters Air Force</td>
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<td>IRR</td>
<td>Individual Ready Reserve</td>
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<td>IW</td>
<td>irregular warfare</td>
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<td>JFP</td>
<td>joint force provider</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRO</td>
<td>logistics readiness officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>LS/HD</td>
<td>limited supply, high demand</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJCOM</td>
<td>major command</td>
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<td>MCO</td>
<td>major combat operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary unit</td>
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</table>
OEF  Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF  Operation Iraqi Freedom
O-T-E  organize, train, equip
P-coding  posture coding
PAA  primary aircraft authorization
PAD  Program Action Directive
RFF  request for forces
TAC  Tactical Air Command
UCP  Unified Command Plan
UDM  unit deployment monitor
UN  United Nations
USAF  US Air Force
USJFCOM  United States Joint Forces Command
USSOCOM  United States Special Operations Command
USSTRATCOM  United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM  United States Transportation Command
UTC  unit type code
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Authors: Jeffrey Hukill, Kristal Alfonso, Scott Johnson, John Conway

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