

THE CAESAR, POLO, AND ESAU PAPERS



**HISTORICAL
COLLECTIONS**



COLD WAR ERA HARD TARGET ANALYSIS OF SOVIET AND CHINESE POLICY AND DECISION MAKING

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COLD WAR ERA HARD TARGET ANALYSIS OF SOVIET & CHINESE

POLICY AND DECISION MAKING



1953-1973

CAESAR, POLO & ESAU PAPERS

COLD WAR ERA HARD TARGET ANALYSIS OF SOVIET & CHINESE

POLICY AND DECISION MAKING

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~~TOP SECRET~~

La Purge

Background

June 1953, the presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers, attending its first session as a group, appeared at the opera "The Decembrists" in the Kremlin. Several members of the presidium, including Bagirov and other high-ranking officials, were seen leaving the ranks of the opera house. Beria's absence was both suspicious and unusual. On the 27th, several dozen tanks and military vehicles were observed moving through the city to an unknown destination. These movements continued until 30 June. On 6 July, US intelligence reported a Moscow rumor that Beria was in difficulty and had fled through the city to an unknown destination in West Germany where unprecedented movements of military vehicles were observed during the fact of the crisis.

On 4 July, the presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers made some pointed remarks in the Politburo. "The party removes the yoke of individualism," it stated. "It would have ruined the subordinate the USSR Supreme Soviet, had they not had the USSR Supreme Soviet appointed Sergeev as minister of internal affairs of the USSR." The article in the Pravda newspaper on 7 July, an editorial calling Stalin's Economic Directive a creative and a

Pravda's editorial carried the headline: "The day the news broke. Pravda said that Beria was speaking in an account of the day the news broke. Pravda said that Beria's development of a mask, who does not startags behind life, later strike him off face." According to Pravda, the intensification of the criminal activities of the undermining, advanced by the reaction forces which are hostile to our state." The editorially accused Beria of the following:

TASS published on 10 July the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR by the central committee of the party and its leadership.

The central committee of the USSR Party, listening to and discussing the report of the presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers, G. M. Malenkov as regards the criminal antiparty and antistate actions of L. P. Beria intended to undermine the Soviet state in the interest of foreign capital and

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had

Defense on 16 July... Konev, ple... references to meetings... as did references to... gave rise to rumors in... was seeking sanctuary... August when the Supreme... of eight days, confir... ia from his government... d 26 June, thus fixing

ere given some credence... ficial texts was it ev... d that the accused had... the sentence--death by... however, as in the case... n official Soviet sour


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HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS DIVISION

The Historical Collections Division (HCD) of CIA's Information Management Services is responsible for executing the Agency's Historical Review Program. This program seeks to identify and declassify collections of documents that detail the Agency's analysis and activities relating to historically significant topics and events. HCD's goals include increasing the usability and accessibility of historical collections primarily by developing release events and partnerships to highlight each collection and make it available to the broadest audience possible.

The mission of HCD is to:

- Promote an accurate, objective understanding of the information and intelligence that has helped shape the foundation of major US policy decisions.
- Broaden access to lessons learned, presenting historical material to emphasize the scope and context of past actions.
- Improve current decision-making and analysis by facilitating reflection on the impacts and effects arising from past decisions.
- Showcase CIA's contributions to national security and provide the American public with valuable insight into the workings of its government.
- Demonstrate the CIA's commitment to the Open Government Initiative and its three core values: Transparency, Participation, and Collaboration.



INTRODUCTION

This collection of declassified analytic monographs and reference aids, designated within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Intelligence (DI) as the CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU series, was originally released on 26 June 2007. The continuing sensitivity of some documents in the series requires that they be withheld from declassification. No additional documents have been declassified since the 2007 release.

This booklet includes an annotated bibliography and DVD containing the document collection.

THE CAESAR, POLO, AND ESAU PAPERS

Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 1953-1973

This collection of declassified analytic monographs and reference aids, designated within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Intelligence (DI) as the CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU series, was originally released on 26 June 2007 at the annual meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAHR). The documents reflect the views of seasoned analysts who had followed closely their special areas of research and whose views were shaped in often heated debate. Continuing public interest in the series, as reflected in numerous requests through Freedom of Information and Executive Order channels, led CIA's Office of Information Management Services (IMS) to conduct a search of 'Directorate of Intelligence record systems for documents in this series and then undertake a declassification review of all the documents we located. The 147 documents in this collection, amounting to over 11,000 pages of analysis, were written between 1953 and 1973. The collection includes a large number of newly declassified monographs as well as some studies that have been previously declassified and released to individual requesters. The continuing sensitivity of some documents in the series required that they be withheld from declassification.

In contrast to the streams of formal assessments and reports on all aspects of the Soviet Union and China prepared by the intelligence community, the less formal and uncoordinated CAESAR, ESAU, and POLO studies were not intended as "finished" intelligence products primarily aimed at informing policymakers. Rather, the authors sought to develop a compre-

hensive knowledge base on select political issues that could contribute to building analytic capital for intelligence specialists throughout the community. Consequently, the intent of the collection is to provide insight into some aspects of CIA analytic thinking of the period and to make the documents more readily accessible to the general public.

Two former senior officers in the Directorate of Intelligence--Tom Elmore, former Director of the Office of East Asian Analysis, and James Noren, a Soviet economics expert compiled this collection with assistance from Martha Lutz, Information Review Officer for the Director of CIA and members of the Historical Collections Division of IMS. A third former senior officer, Harry Gelman, former Chief of the Soviet Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, has contributed to this foreword drawing on his many years of membership in the staff that produced most of these studies.

History of the Research

The genesis of CIA'S research efforts on the Soviet Union and Communist China stemmed from growing concern in the intelligence community during the early 1950s over the limited coverage and resources being devoted to international communism as a movement. The Director of CIA (DCI) initially responded by assigning a few analysts in the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) in CIA'S DI to establish Project CAESAR in 1952.

The purpose of the CAESAR project was to study all available information on the members of, and the events affecting, the Soviet leadership hierarchy. The vehicles used by the analysts involved were a series of so-called "working papers," the first of which was "The Doctors' Plot," issued in July 1953. The intended customers were other analysts and operations officers in CIA along with

other community agencies, some of whom, such as the Department of State and the National Security Agency, also contributed to the project. In effect, Project CAESAR represented the DI's first all-source, in-depth research endeavor.

In September 1956, Ray Cline, then-Director of OCI, decided to establish a small new research staff designated as the Sino-Soviet Studies Group (SSSG) within OCI. The SSSG was to continue the CAESAR project while initiating two new research endeavors: POLO, instituted in 1956 to study the Chinese Communist hierarchy,¹ and ESAU, launched in 1959 to examine the Sino-Soviet relationship. Cline declared that he intended these analysts to have a "detailed familiarity with Soviet political leaders, doctrine, and daily policy pronouncements," and to work with analysts with similar expertise on Communist China.

Subsequently, the SSSG was slightly expanded, renamed, and changed in status. In 1963, after Cline had become Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI), he decided to transfer this staff from the OCI and attach it to his own office as the DDI Special Research Staff (later, merely "Research Staff"). Cline took this step largely because of his high opinion of the role the staff's analysts had played in providing evidence of the reality of Sino-Soviet dispute against "furious" opposition elsewhere in CIA and the intelligence community and despite great skepticism among policymakers.² For the next decade, this structural shift served to give this long-term research program a somewhat stronger and more central position in the organization.

1 Although begun in 1956, no recoverable monographs in the POLO series have been located in CIA's document records prior to 1961. The titles of two of the earliest POLO monographs, however, have been identified as "Evolution of the Central Organs of the Chinese Communist Party (1921-1958)" and "Chinese Communist Party and the Intellectuals."

2 "This staff [OCI's SSSG] compiled the data that permitted CIA to lead the way--against furious opposition elsewhere--in charting the strategic conflict between Soviet and Chinese styles of dictatorship and doctrine that was basic to the definitive split in 1960." Ray S. Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA* (Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, Ltd., 1976). p. 151.

The first leader of this research effort, and its heart and soul as the staff's name and its bureaucratic status evolved over the years, was Walter P. (Bud) Southard, a senior intelligence officer who had had unique experience in China as a naval intelligence officer dealing with senior Chinese Communist liaison in the years immediately after World War II. In its first years, the staff was quite small, comprising three or four senior specialists on China and the Soviet Union. Among its initial members were Southard, Philip Bridgham, and Donald Zagoria; after 1961, the core group became Southard, Bridgham, Harry Gelman and Arthur C. Cohen. In later years, the size of the staff grew to approximately eight as younger officers were added. As the staff grew over the years it sought to provide both global coverage on Communism and important non-communist issues not being researched elsewhere, but its principal focus remained on the Soviet Union and Communist China and the relationship between the two.

As working papers, the studies produced by the staff did not require formal coordination with other components of CIA or other agencies in the intelligence community. They were deemed to represent only the views of their authors rather than an official DDI position on an intelligence issue. The staff studies also differed from OCI reports in having no set format, tone, or content. Ray Cline, the official who established the framework for the staff's work--first as

Director of OCI and then as DDI--was clearly determined to free the staff's analysts not only from the constraints of current production deadlines but also from any restrictive review process that might have inhibited the fullest examination of a given issue.

Objectives of the Series

The goal of the Research Staff was to explore in depth the politics of the communist world in order to develop a foundation of intellectual capital for the intelligence community.

Ultimately, this comprehensive research on selected issues improved intelligence assessments of the future direction the Soviet and Chinese leaderships were likely to take in domestic and foreign policy.

The staff itself mainly originated the research topics. Some questions were returned to again and again, such as the status of the Sino-Soviet dispute and leadership positions and maneuvering in the USSR and China. Other topics were taken up in response to the internal arguments over issues with other parts of the CIA, or in support of the DI's research program.

The staff thus did not act in isolation but benefited greatly from the creative tension that developed with other components of the Agency, OCI analysts, and with staff members of the Office of National Estimates (ONE), with officers of the Directorate of Plans, and with the analytical division of CIA'S Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS). The staff's analysts also sought to consult as widely as possible with qualified experts outside CIA--both elsewhere in the Intelligence Community and throughout academia.³

The existence of the staff also benefited those in CIA with whom they interacted. The staff's products served to develop a framework to help both new and experienced analysts better understand key issues, such as political motivations and the objectives sought in foreign policymaking, the role of the military in politics, or the ideological underpinnings of the Communist regimes. Whether OCI analysts agreed or disagreed with conclusions of any given study, the overall goal of developing solid

³ For a number of years, the Special Research Staff was CIA'S primary representative interacting with the academic world. Some members or former members of the Staff (Zagoria, Bridgham, Cohen, and Gelman) published books or articles in academic journals on matters concerning the Chinese and Soviet leaderships.

building blocks to enhance future strategic analysis was considered valid by OCI and DDI leadership.

Although current intelligence remained primarily the responsibility of others, particularly analysts in OCI--the Research Staff produced a number of studies providing useful background for understanding shorter-term issues. For example, the POLO series devoted considerable effort from the mid-1960s to 1973 to examining all facets of Mao's Cultural Revolution, thereby demonstrating the staff's capacity to provide a comprehensive framework for a dynamic and still unfolding current intelligence issue. Some of the monographs on the Cultural Revolution also sought to stimulate analysis by offering alternative interpretations of a developing phenomenon.

OCI management, for its part, recognized the difficulties that would 'arise if analysts responsible for current intelligence also sought to perform long-term research. Even though many of OCI's current intelligence memoranda did, in fact, require considerable research by their authors, the final products required a current focus and short-term analytic judgments, and did not seek to build a bank of knowledge. Therefore, the SRS studies were a unique product, born of a belief that analysts skilled in the requirements of deeper research should be housed in a separate structure that was freed from the ever-evolving and growing demands for current intelligence support to the policymakers.

Most fundamentally, while the staff existed, its presence as a source of an alternative point of view also served to help diminish the risk posed by the development of "groupthink" in the production of finished intelligence.⁴

⁴ Mention must also be made of the stimulating contribution to CIA analysis furnished in the 1950s and 1960s by the analytical component of FBIS, despite the fact that this component throughout the years of its existence was obliged to use only unclassified rather than all-source evidence. In addition, the FBIS analytical group served as a valuable training ground for analysts who later worked in OCI or the Research Staff.

Reorganization of the Mission

Eventually, in 1973 the DDI Research Staff was abolished and its analysts were absorbed into a small new Office of Political Research (OPR). OPR was expected to do in-depth analysis, on a broader geographic basis, about political and interdisciplinary topics of long-range concern to US decision makers. Then, in a further restructuring in 1976, OPR was incorporated into the Office of Regional and Political Analysis (ORPA) whose divisions were charged with experimenting with fresh approaches, emphasizing interdisciplinary analysis and producing longer-range papers. In 1981 the functional-office structure was abandoned in favor of a combination of regional and functional offices to produce multidisciplinary analyses across the directorate.

In retrospect, the products produced by the Special Research Staff remain an exceptional endeavor in CIA's analytic history. Nevertheless, the concept remains a benchmark for any future effort to develop another entity whose mission aims primarily at building intellectual capital for analysts in the intelligence community.

GENERAL HAYDEN'S REMARKS AT THE SHAFR ANNUAL MEETING

Remarks of Central Intelligence Agency
Director Gen. Michael V. Hayden at
the Society for Historians of American
Foreign Relations Conference
(as prepared for delivery)

June 21, 2007

Thank you very much. As a lifelong student of history, I not only respect the work you do, I enjoy it. So I was especially pleased to accept the invitation to meet with this distinguished group.

Last month, I had the privilege to be the commencement speaker at my alma mater, Duquesne University. I told the Class of 2007 that the education I received there taught me at least three great truths, the first of which is "everything is connected to everything else."


That's the historian in me. What we do today inevitably has its roots in the past. And when you choose the Air Force and intelligence, you choose a profession in which history is a strong component.

Now, if you want to know the other great truths from Duquesne, you'll have to read the speech, and for that one, you won't even need a FOIA request. Today's topic is a different truth—CIA's social contract with the American people. More specifically, how that contract guides CIA as we balance two crucial obligations: our need to protect information that helps us protect Americans and our need to inform the public—as best we can—about the work we do on their behalf.

Let me explain what I mean by the social contract. I talked about it when I was up for confirmation just over a year ago, and I've emphasized it inside and outside CIA ever since. It is a first principle for us—central to all we do.

As a secret organization serving an open and free society, CIA has been granted an enormous public trust. That's what secrecy is in a democracy. Not a grant of power, but a grant of trust. Each day, we have to earn that trust—as our democratic system demands—by acting as our fellow citizens expect us to: Skillfully, boldly, and always in keeping with the laws and values of our Republic. That's our social contract.

Here's an informal yardstick I use: If I could tell my brother back in Pittsburgh or my sister in Steubenville what CIA has done and why, would it make sense to them? Would they accept it as reasonable?



General Michael Hayden -
Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 2006-2009.

Of course, we cannot tell the American people everything we do to protect them without damaging our ability to protect them. When it comes to secret intelligence, public sovereignty and oversight reside in the Congress. But there is another window into our activities that's available to the 300 million Americans we serve. It can be found in the documents we release and the work that you and your colleagues do to place that material in a fair and accurate context. That's why declassification is so important to us.

The Agency officers who do that work wrestle constantly with the twin imperatives of essential openness and essential secrecy. They carry a huge responsibility. Simply put, they must decide when a secret is no longer a secret.

You can imagine the tension involved in making that determination. We must balance our responsibility to the public, and to history, to explain our actions and their impact, with our obligation to protect sources, methods, and ongoing intelligence relationships. These are not simple, cut-and-dried issues. They spark vigorous internal debates that ultimately require informed, yet subjective, judgments. We have those debates and make those judgments knowing that mistakes can jeopardize American security, and, in some cases, place lives at risk. An intelligence organization that fails to protect those who work with it—foreign intel services and individuals—will eventually see sources dry up and cooperation diminish. So, as you can see, this is an existential question for us.

Despite these complexities, CIA recognizes the real benefits that flow from greater public understanding of our work and mission. That is not a boast: No other intelligence agency in the world rivals our record on declassification.

From the millions of pages of OSS documents released in the 1980s, to extensive documentation of America's early imagery satellites, the Cuban missile crisis, the U-2 program, and large collections of National Estimates on the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam and Yugoslavia, CIA declassification has contributed greatly to the historical record. Just last year we added to that record with the declassification of volumes on the famous Berlin Tunnel operation and CIA's role in

the rural pacification program in South Vietnam.

These projects even have impact beyond our shores. The collection of China estimates, *Tracking the Dragon*, is on the shelves of a number of Chinese scholars, and the Yugoslavia collection is used in at least one graduate course in Serbia.

Our FOIA program is also very successful. In each of the last nine years, CIA has reduced its backlog—even as we receive about 3,000 new requests annually. This record is unsurpassed in the federal government, and we are making a concerted effort to close old cases, most of which are very complex and involve large numbers of documents.

In that context, we have completed our declassification review and are preparing to release most of the so-called "Family Jewels," a very famous set of documents written over three decades ago, when Director Schlesinger asked employees to report activities they thought might be inconsistent with the Agency's charter. Much of it has been in the press before, and most of it is unflattering, but it is CIA's history. The documents provide a glimpse of a very different time and a very different Agency. When we release these declassified documents, we will put them on our public Web site, just as we have with many others, ensuring easy access.

Under the program that reviews records 25 or more years old, CIA has reviewed and released 31 million pages of previously classified records. One third of those can be full-text searched at the National Archives' College Park facility using CREST, our records search tool.

Just last month, CIA made its latest delivery of declassified electronic records to the Archives—420,000 pages. These documents, like the nine previous deliveries, cover the full range of our work: Finished intelligence, operations reports from the 1940s and 50s, research and development files from the DS&T, and policy files and memos from the leadership level.

Keep in mind, we not only make these records available, we make them easily accessible, through CREST and our Web site. We are very proud of that and are actively exploring ways to do more, including possible deployment of the CREST

system to additional federal records depositories. To date, more than 650,000 pages have been printed from CREST, and the documents available through that user-friendly system are increasingly cited in academic publications.

And remember that nothing about intelligence and declassification happens without human intervention. We do not—we cannot—just kick these things out the door. We have to examine each and every page through the real-world security prism I mentioned. It takes time. It takes care. It takes talent.

Now, this may be a conference of historians, but all of us work in the present, so let me give you a sense of where we're headed and what our declassification priorities are.

I should say right up front that resources for declassification programs are increasingly constrained. This is a function of the unprecedented demands placed on our core mission areas. There simply has never been greater demand from policymakers for quality intelligence—it is at the center of every national security challenge facing the United States today: terrorism, weapons proliferation, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, to name just a few. The ops tempo we have maintained since 9/11—and must continue to maintain—is unmatched in our Agency's history.

The good news here is that we're producing great stuff for future historians. The challenge today is that declassification is getting squeezed. We must use the money and manpower devoted to these efforts more smartly than ever. Certain things are required by law, but we want to do even more. Discretionary projects—like the release of more than 300 NIEs in partnership with the National Intelligence Council, and the declassification of hundreds of articles from *Studies in Intelligence*—give us the opportunity to present a more complete story, often with the expert help of CIA's own historians.

So what are the Agency's current declassification priorities beyond our FOIA and 25-year review obligations?

First, continuing support to the State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States

series. CIA understands the importance of this official documentary history. We know the value of conveying a complete and accurate picture of our nation's foreign policy decisions. I'm actually one of the many who has used FRUS, and I can't imagine writing my graduate thesis on the Marshall Plan without it. But again, this is about more than students and researchers. This is about telling the American people what we have done in their name.

As you know, the biggest challenge here for CIA is determining the extent to which covert actions can be declassified to present a full picture of foreign policy. On that front, we are working hard to draw a smaller circle around what must be kept secret. The bottom line: We strive to release as much as we can without endangering ongoing relationships with foreign partners.

A second priority is reviewing records awaiting release in the presidential libraries. Because we believe those records are relatively more valuable to those who write history, we want to devote relatively more resources to them in our 25-year program.

Thirdly, we plan to continue working with the NIC, which is now part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to declassify collections of National Intelligence Estimates.

And fourth, we will continue to focus on discretionary releases of Cold War documents. We have in the pipeline a comprehensive collection of reporting and analysis of Warsaw Pact military programs, for example.

And, in collaboration with the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office, CIA later this year will release hundreds of pages on the development and deployment of the A-12 OXCART. The supersonic reconnaissance aircraft, which was developed with Lockheed as a successor to the U-2, flew missions over North Vietnam and North Korea in 1967-68. The intelligence it gathered helped save American lives by identifying missile sites that our pilots could then avoid. It also located the USS Pueblo, a SIGINT collection ship that the North Koreans had seized. The release of the records will come in conjunction with our 60th anniversary celebration in September.

That's a few months down the road, though. Today, I want to tell you about another collection. Known inside CIA as the "CAESAR-POLO-ESAU papers," it is a compilation of in-depth research and analysis on Soviet and Chinese internal politics and Sino-Soviet relations.

The collection is available to each of you today—147 documents amounting to more than 11,000 pages of analysis done between 1953 and 1973.

What is unusual about this release is that the documents were not intended as finished intelligence products to inform policy. Rather, the authors aimed to create a broad base of knowledge on which analysts throughout the Intelligence Community could draw. In doing so, they relied heavily on consultations not only within the Directorate of Intelligence, but also with operations officers, the analytic division of the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (now known as the Open Source Center), and with a wide range of experts throughout academia.

The CAESAR and POLO papers, which studied the Soviet and Chinese leadership hierarchies, respectively, helped prepare case officers working in the field against Communist targets. And many documents in the ESAU series were used essentially as working papers to inform analysts writing current intelligence on the same subject—formal DI assessments on Sino-Soviet relations that were delivered to policymakers.

The experts who put this collection together point out that many of the papers rely heavily on clandestine collection and other sensitive intelligence methods, information not usually available to researchers outside the Intelligence Community. The judgments in the papers are supported by a great deal of information from diverse sources. Finally, we believe the documents will be of interest to academics, and ultimately, to the public, because they reflect the views of seasoned analysts who followed closely their special areas of research and whose views were shaped in the often-heated internal debates of the Cold War.

Before too long, the collection will be available on the CIA web site—in our FOIA Electronic Reading Room. But for now, this conference is the only place you can get it. So take a copy with you, and after you've had a chance to look at it, let us know what you think.

I mentioned earlier that CIA recognizes the very real benefits that flow from greater public understanding of our work. I want to expand on that, because it really is crucial to our success as an organization.

Greater openness does several things for us.

First, it helps the public, Congress, and the executive branch appreciate the courage and integrity of CIA officers. I've known the Agency over the years through my other assignments, but the last year has taught me a lot about the men and women who serve there. They are among the most dedicated, talented people I have ever had the good fortune of working with.

Also, releasing records that no longer need to be protected helps people understand the limits of our craft. Americans realize the vital importance of intelligence, especially since 9/11. That's a good thing. But it's equally important for people to understand the inherent uncertainties of intelligence work.

CIA officers deal in unknowns and unpredictables. The problems we face are complex and, more often than not, influenced by human behavior, which itself is complex and difficult to predict. We endeavor to reveal what others want to keep hidden, which adds another layer of difficulty to our mission. So even when we are at the top of our game, it's very, very rare that we can give certitude to policymakers.

Openness, particularly declassification of historical records, also exposes the public to one of the challenges CIA faces every day. Our Agency, and particularly our analysts, are at the nexus between the world as it is, and the world as we wish it to be.

Our job is to understand and explain the world as it is. The policymaker, though, has to make decisions or take action. We are expected to inform those decisions and actions by providing

warning and signaling opportunity. That ties us closely to policymakers. They demand that we be relevant, and our craft demands that we be objective. Sitting in that nexus between reality and aspiration is never easy, and I think historical studies of foreign policy and the role of intelligence in shaping it, makes that point clear.

A final reason why declassification, when possible, is in CIA's interest: We want our history and our role in key decisions to be written accurately and fairly. Very often, we simply cannot correct misinformation in the press—history's first draft—without revealing information that would undermine ongoing intelligence operations. And, unfortunately, there seems to be an instinct among some in the media today to take a few pieces of information, which may or may not be accurate, and run with them to the darkest corner of the room.

With the passage of time, declassified historical records can give the full, accurate picture—the good and the bad, along with the necessary context. So eventually, the academic community and the public we ultimately serve together can arrive at informed judgments about CIA's work and effectiveness.

A few months after I arrived at CIA last year, I met with the Publications Review Board—a small, dedicated group that reviews books and other writings by current and former officers. I told them a few things that apply not only to their work, but also to information review and release more broadly. I said I expected CIA to build up a body of knowledge that is declassified, and to use decisions made in particular cases as precedent to guide future decisions.

I also told them that we need to draw hard lines to protect that which is truly secret, but warned that if we're drawing them on the margins, we're doing ourselves a disservice. I know it's a lot easier to say, "no" than to say, "let me think about that," but the latter is where we should be. The best decisions, like the best intelligence, rarely come from the easiest road, especially on the toughest issues.


A few months after that meeting, CIA centralized all declassification review and release programs at the corporate level. We concluded that under

the previous structure, where greater authority rested with the Directorates, decisions too often were opaque, inconsistent, and subject to lengthy, unproductive disputes. The new approach gives our Chief of Information Management Services a stronger hand to ensure that adequate record searches are undertaken and appropriate decisions are made. We want decisions that are reasonable, timely, transparent, and credible.

I firmly believe this approach will improve CIA's standing with key partners inside and outside government, including people like you. It also will strengthen our ability to educate the public about our unique work and our vital contributions to national security.

I hope you'll see good results from these steps. In our robust democracy, people want and deserve to know more about the government agencies they pay for and that exist to serve them, even the secret ones. We work for and serve the interests of the American people. When the protection of information is no longer required, we owe it to our fellow citizens to disclose that information.

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here. It's been a pleasure.



About SHAFR

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) is dedicated to the scholarly study of the history of American foreign relations. As such, it promotes the "the study, advancement and dissemination of a knowledge of American Foreign Relations" through the sponsorship of research, annual meetings, and publications.

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Accompanying DVD contains all documents listed in the bibliography. Documents can also be accessed from CIA's FOIA Electronic Reading room at www.foia.cia.gov/cpe.asp.

CAESAR

1. "The Doctors' Plot," 15 July 1953. 17 pages.

On 15 January 1953, *Pravda* accused "nine doctors—most of them Jewish" of spying on the USSR and murdering "A.S. Shcherbakov and A.A. Zhdanov." The doctors were also "accused of attempting to murder five military figures: Marshals Vasilevski, Konev and Govorov, General Shtemenko and Admiral Levchenko." These accusations "represented a new stage in the fierce propaganda war" and "brought proof of US hostility...by proving that this country had many agents *inside* the USSR."

2. "Death of Stalin," 16 July 1953. 24 pages.

This paper reviews Soviet news bulletins on Stalin's final days and speculates on succession after his death.

3. "The Reversal of the Doctors' Plot and its Immediate Aftermath," 16 July 1953. 14 pages.

"On 4 April, the much publicized doctor's plot was repudiated in a startling public reversal."

4. "Germany," 16 July 1953. 6 pages.

"Outside the Soviet Union, the situation in Germany was to provide the clearest indication of the problems faced by the new Soviet leadership and the difficulty which it had in handling them."

5. "Melnikov's Removal in the Ukraine," 17 July 1953. 6 pages.

"Ukrainian personnel shifts following the death of Stalin culminated in the purge of L.G. Melnikov from his position as first secretary of the Ukrainian party on 12 June....The most important Soviet leader to have been removed since the death of Stalin."

6. "The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship," 29 July 1953. 17 pages.

"The hypothesis is frequently advanced that Zhdanov and Malenkov engaged in a bitter

political conflict for Stalin's favor and for control over the Soviet Communist Party....Many observers profess to see in this conflict and its outcome an explanation for many of the problems of Soviet policy in the post-war years."

7. "The Balance of Power: August 1948 to October 1950," 5 August 1953. 20 pages.

"Following the death of Andrei Zhdanov, Malenkov rapidly reoccupied a prominent position in the Soviet hierarchy and apparently was allowed to re-establish control over the Party apparatus by carrying out a purge of important Zhdanov adherents."

8. "Indecision and Stress: 1950-1952," 21 August 1953. 25 pages.

"Following the failure of the North Korean attack on South Korea and the failure of the Chinese Communists to drive UN forces from Korea, Soviet leaders grew increasingly concerned about US rearmament and US-inspired integration of Western defense efforts. They apparently became particularly concerned about the establishment of US bases in various peripheral areas of the USSR. In spite of this, Soviet policy remained sterile and provocative."

9. "Politics and the Soviet Army: Developments since October 1952 relating to the political status of the Soviet armed forces," 12 March 1954. 54 pages.

"This study of the post-Stalin period is undertaken to discover what effects recent political changes have had on the armed forces as a whole and on individuals or groups among the high-ranking military leaders, and what influence these military leaders have exerted within the government."

10. "Purge of L.P. Beria," 17 August 1954. 39 pages.

"Beria's star, which had been declining since mid-1951, rose to an extraordinary height following Stalin's death.... Realizing that unquestioned supremacy for any one of their number would soon lead to the liquidation of at least some of the remainder as potential rivals, the ruling group

apparently determined to prevent the assumption of Stalin's power by any one individual. It must have appeared to the other leaders that Beria was making his bid for this power; or possibly, someone was able to convince the others that this was so."

10-A. "Summarization of Reports Preceding Beria Purge," 17 August 1954. 20 pages.

11. "Resignation of Malenkov," 12 September 1955. 66 pages.

"A number of differing interpretations have been advanced to explain the demotion of G.M. Malenkov in February 1955 from his position as chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.... The following paper assembles and re-examines the principal evidence believed pertinent to the leadership problem in the USSR. The re-examination was directed at ascertaining the validity of various causal elements in Malenkov's upset."

12. "Recent Developments in Political Status of Soviet Armed Forces," 20 September 1955. 68 pages.

"It is the purpose of this paper to summarize all available information which would update the examination of the role of the Soviet military in politics and place in perspective the position of the military within the context of Soviet leadership."

13. "Soviet Views on Capitalism," 30 January 1956. 70 pages.

"The purpose of the present study is to examine the elements of continuity and change and the indications of uncertainty and conflict in postwar Soviet views of capitalism, and to attempt to determine the implications of those views on Soviet policies."

14. "The Suez Crisis—A Test for the USSR's Middle Eastern Policy," 3 January 1957. 18 pages.

"The Middle East crisis precipitated by Nasr's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company which culminated in the Israeli and Anglo-French attack on Egypt confronted the Soviet leaders with the choice of accepting the incalculable risks of direct Soviet intervention on Egypt's side or acquiescing in the rapid destruction of the Soviet-equipped Egyptian armed forces and the Nasser regime."

15. "Factionalism in the Hungarian Workers (Communist) Party (1945-1956)," 28 January 1957. 94 pages.

This paper "attempts to discover and analyze the major cliques, factions, and alignments in the Hungarian Workers (Communist) party since 1945 in terms of changing Soviet policy demands and the resultant conflict of interest with the needs of local leaders and the country as a whole."

16. "Soviet Economic Policy: December 1956-May 1957," 8 July 1957. 51 pages.

This study attempts to "pull together available factual information and to draw speculative conclusions on the meaning of the shifts in Soviet economic policy and on the insights these shifts provide into the problems of the Soviet leaders during this period."

17. "Differences in Temperament Among Soviet Leaders as Shown by their Approach to Policy Issues," 30 October 1957. 42 pages.

"This working paper is an attempt to determine the personal predictions and policy leanings of top-level Soviet leaders by analysis of the part they played in various postwar policy disputes." The policy preferences of Zhdanov, Voznesensky, Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Kaganovich, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Zhukov are examined through their responses to disputes in the Kremlin on a variety of topics including nuclear warfare, China, the 20th Party Congress and anti-Semitism.

18. "From the January Plenum to the July Plenum (1955)—Antecedents and Aftermath of Malenkov's Resignation from the Premiership," 12 March 1958. 57 pages.

The author reviews the events leading up to and after Malenkov's resignation, "in order to introduce information relating to Malenkov's demotion obtained only subsequently, and in order to provide some perspective for a discussion of policy changes undertaken in the months after February 1955."

19. "From the July Plenum (1955) to the 20th Party Congress—Antecedents and Aftermath of Malenkov's Resignation from the Premiership," 19 June 1958. 69 pages.

"Khrushchev's increasing role in Soviet policy formulation and implementation and the consequent loss of influence by Malenkov and Molotov meant essentially that the circle of top leaders had been reduced, and it was doubtful if the addition of Kirichenko and Suslov to the presidium by the July plenum would serve to enlarge that circle."

20. "The Tie That Binds—Soviet Intra-bloc Relations: Feb 1956 to Dec 1957," 29 July 1958. 55 pages.

"The USSR's post-Stalin policy thus was designed so as to transform its slaves into willing allies, and, coincidentally, to render international communism more palatable to the non-Communist world."

21. "The Failure of the Soviet-Yugoslav Rapprochement," 3 November 1958. 26 pages.

"If Moscow had been content to accept Yugoslavia as an independent neutral, and the Yugoslavs had refrained from meddling too actively in satellite affairs, Belgrade's demonstrated willingness to pursue a foreign policy close to that of the USSR would have precluded serious conflicts between the two states."

22. "Party-Military Relations in the USSR and the Fall of Marshal Zhukov," 8 June 1959. 41 pages.

"The announcement of Zhukov's release as defense minister was terse and gave no clue as to his future. Observers in Moscow differed as to whether he would be promoted to minister without portfolio, 'kicked upstairs' to some honorific post, or demoted. The last was proved correct."

23. "The Soviet Writer and Soviet Cultural Policy," 15 September 1959. 57 pages.

"The pressure of greater creative freedom, appearing initially in 1953 as cautious protests by veteran writers against the standards of the Stalin era and developing later into headlong assaults by both old and young writers, was officially condoned until it came into open conflict with the dictates of political orthodoxy. When the official brakes and the pressure for retrenchment were applied, in early 1954 and again in late 1956, it was expected that literature would return to its traditional position as the handmaiden of politics.... In

their resolute and protracted feat of resistance, Soviet writers have demonstrated a measure of personal integrity and unity of purpose unmatched by any other segment of Soviet society."

24. "The Soviet History of World War II," 28 October 1959. 61 pages.

"This paper seeks to answer questions posed by the recent increased attention to the history of the war in the Soviet Union. Why is the regime now encouraging historical writing on the war? What interpretation is being promoted? What are the political and military implications?"

25. "Khrushchev on Nuclear Strategy," 19 January 1960. 41 pages.

This paper analyzes "statements on war that Khrushchev has made in public speeches and in interviews from spring 1957 through his report to the Supreme Soviet on 14 January 1960."

26. "The Succession to Khrushchev," 4 March 1960. 14 pages.

"This paper seeks to identify the principals in the anticipated competition and to assess their various prospects as heirs to Khrushchev."

27. "Soviet Policy Toward the Underdeveloped Countries," 28 April 1961. 122 pages.

This working paper, "traces chronologically the development of aspects of Soviet policy toward colonial areas and the countries regarded by Moscow as having achieved various degrees of independence from 'imperialism.' "

28. "Soviet Military Thought on Future War," 3 April 1962. 63 pages.

"This paper is based entirely on open Soviet materials, principally the theoretical military journals and textbooks on military science addressed to audiences of professionals."

29. "Khrushchev and the anti-party group," 27 April 1962. 28 pages.

"This is a working paper, a reconstruction of the challenge to Khrushchev by the 'anti-party group' led by Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich."

30. "Soviet Strategic Doctrine for the Start of War," 3 July 1962. 44 pages.

"Both classified and open Soviet military sources indicate that the USSR has added to its strategic concepts the doctrine of pre-emptive attack."

31. "Soviet Military Problem and the Chinese Problem," 26 April 1963. 32 pages.

"Having failed in the 1950s to integrate Chinese military power into a Moscow-controlled bloc-wide military entity, the Soviets have tended since to exclude China and her followers from major Soviet military planning and bloc military and economic organizations."

32. "Khrushchev's Role in the Current Controversy Over Soviet Defense Policy," 17 June 1963. 28 pages.

"In the process of tracing developments in the Soviet economic-defense sphere since the Cuban crisis, we have sought to discover Khrushchev's objectives and scheme of political maneuver, and to gauge his progress in putting his program across."

33. "Unorthodox Ideas in the U.S.S.R.," 27 June 1963. 46 pages.

"This survey represents the first systematic attempt to deal with a growing volume of classified reports on attitudes and views expressed by younger Soviet citizens in conversations with Western nationals." Subjects include: the goal of communism, present socialist system of the USSR, religion, Soviet economic system, Soviet foreign policy, socialist brotherhood, Marxist-Leninist doctrine, membership in the Communist Party, membership in *Komsomol*, regime deceit, collective guilt for Stalin's crimes, attitude towards the regime, capitalism and the West, concepts of freedom and democracy.

34. "Trends in Soviet Thought on Limited Warfare," 16 December 1963. 40 pages.

"This is a working paper, prepared in support of NIE 11-14-63, 'Capabilities of the Soviet General Purpose Forces, 1963-1969.' Primarily on the basis of open Soviet military and political writings, this report attempts to identify new trends in Soviet thinking on limited warfare

and to probe their possible consequences for Soviet military policy, or foreign policy as it relates to the management of local crises."

35. "The Soviet Missile Base Venture in Cuba," 17 February 1964. 141 pages.

"The conception of the missile base venture, in our view, was radically defective, and the execution of it was in some respects astonishingly inept. We have tried above all to discover why Khrushchev believed—throughout the course of the venture, from conception to retraction—that his conduct was rational, i.e., why he concluded at least until September that the United States would very probably acquiesce, why he concluded until late October that the venture could be managed to his profit even if the United States did not acquiesce, and why he managed the venture as he did during the week of the crisis in late October."

36. "The Soviet Strategic Interest in Limited Disarmament," 6 March 1964. 49 pages.

"In this exercise, the question of disarmament is discussed in terms of Soviet strategic thought, planning, and goals.... This paper is concerned largely with the hard gains—in Soviet military strength relative to that of the U.S.—which the USSR may hope to make through the conclusion of agreements on limited measures of arms control."

37. "The Higher Military Council of the USSR," 20 July 1964. 42 pages.

"We examine here the Higher Military Council and offer tentative conclusions about the use of this institution by Khrushchev and the military for their various purposes."

38. "The Military and the Succession Problem in the USSR," 5 November 1964. 46 pages.

"The first part of the paper surveys in a general way the army-party relationship since Stalin's death in 1953. The second, conjectural part explores the possible actions of the army in any struggle to settle the present succession problem."

39. "Warsaw Pact Military Strategy: A Compromise in Soviet Strategic Thinking," 7 June 1965. 34 pages.

"The thesis of this study is that the internal Soviet debate on the nature of a war in Europe has had a significant effect on the development of the missions and force structure of the East European armies."

40. "The New Soviet Constitution and the Party-State Issue in CPSU Politics, 1956-1966," 21 July 1966. 113 pages.

"This working paper...examines the ten year dispute, which continues, within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) over the question of the correct role of the Communist party in the modern Russian state. It examines the intense party-state dispute...primarily through positions taken in the party and juridical media."

41. "Strains in Soviet-East German Relations: 1962-1967," 24 February 1967. 115 pages.

"The East Germans have shown concern that, if a rapprochement develops between West Germany on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies on the other, then the East German state will first be weakened by that accommodation and then eventually fall victim to a policy of reunification."

42. "Policy and Politics in CPSU Politburo: October 1964 to September 1967. 31 August 1967. 103 pages.

"Brezhnev...aimed at (1) removing the U.S. presence from Western Europe, (2) fragmenting NATO, (3) strengthening the Soviet position and influence in the Warsaw Pact, and (4) expanding CPSU influence through the agency of local parties in West European politics."

43. "The Stalin Issue and the Soviet Leadership Struggle," 5 July 1968. 18 pages.

"Brezhnev and Shelepin have attempted to gain the support of the old-guard party apparatchiks by espousing orthodox policies."

43-A. "Annex: The Stalin Issue and the Soviet Leadership Struggle," 17 July 1968. 146 pages.

44. "Politics in the Soviet Politburo and the Czech Crisis," 28 October 1968. 19 pages.

"The essay focuses primarily on the conflicting policy tendencies within the Soviet leadership as symbolized by Kosygin and by Brezhnev."

45. "Institute for the USA: The Kremlin's New Approach to America-Watching," 7 October 1969. 44 pages.

"American Kremlinologists viewing the Soviet scene through the cracks in the Kremlin wall sometimes have the feeling that someone is looking back at them. They are correct."

46. "Leonid Brezhnev: The Man and His Power," 5 December 1969. 43 pages.

"After the pyrotechnic Khrushchev, most anyone to become 'number one' in the Soviet Union was likely to appear grey. Brezhnev, the careful, efficient and ruthless bureaucrat who succeeded him, is not completely lacking in imagination, color or style—but almost so."

47. "Brezhnev's Struggle for Dominance: Annex to Leonid Brezhnev: The Man and His Power," 12 December 1969. 44 pages.

48. "Soviet Policy and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War," 16 March 1970. 71 pages.

"In the period before the Six-Day War in 1967, Soviet policy shifted from support of moderate Arab policy to espousal of the radical Arab line, thereby encouraging a sequence of events that Moscow could not control. After the defeat of the Arabs, Soviet policy shifted back again to support of moderate Arab policies. But current trends in Soviet policy are again toward support of Arab radicalism, despite the seeming likelihood of a new war in the Middle East and the possibility of another Arab defeat. These policy shifts reveal how resistant Moscow is to any fundamental departure from its instinctive tendency to support militant Arab nationalism in hopes of Soviet political gains and/or Western political losses in the Middle East."

49. "Andrey Kirilenko and the Soviet Political Succession," 15 March 1971. 12 pages.

"The possibility of Kirilenko's actually succeeding Brezhnev in the top Party post sometime in the

future depends to a decisive degree, of course, on his having developed and maintained sufficient support among the regime's leading oligarchs."

50. "Portrait of a Neo-Stalinist: Annex to CAESAR XXXIX (Andrey Kirilenko and the Soviet Political Succession)," 1 June 1971. 91 pages.

51. "The Politburo and Soviet Decision-Making," 1 April 1972. 96 pages.

"This study examines the processes of the Politburo: the function of its internal parts, the cycle of its operations, and the support of its auxiliary agencies. The picture which emerges is of decision-makers who are neither infallible giants nor glorified clerks, but hard-driving, able politicians."

POLO

1. "Mao Tse-tung and Historical Materialism, I: Revolution," 10 April 1961. 32 pages.

"Chinese Communist spokesmen acknowledge that Mao's early analysis of the Chinese revolution owes a general debt to Lenin and Stalin, but they minimize that debt, and they conceal the importance of Comintern directives in Mao's early thinking."

2. "Mao Tse-tung and Historical Materialism, II: The State Form," 29 June 1961. 25 pages.

"Chinese Communist theorists claim that Mao Tse-tung has contributed to the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state with his concept of the 'people's democratic dictatorship.' This particular claim for Mao appears to be valid. Whereas Marx has envisaged a dictatorship simply of the proletariat, Lenin had proposed adding—for a time—the peasants. Mao originally accepted Lenin's view, but in the late 1930s he began to add to the select circle another class—the middle or 'national' bourgeoisie. Mao regarded this class as having the essential characteristic of anti-imperialism."

3. "Mao Tse-tung and Historical Materialism, IV: The 'Transition to Socialism,'" 9 October 1961. 34 pages.

"Whereas Eastern European leaders after 1948, following Soviet practices, felt obliged

to reject the 'peaceful transformation' of capitalists, Mao was able to *work out the details and put into practice* the Marx-Engels-Lenin theory of 'buying out' the capitalists during a period of gradual transformation."

4. "Mao Tse-tung and Historical Materialism, III: 'Contradictions' in a 'Socialist' Society," 20 October 1961. 25 pages.

"Neither Stalin nor Mao did anything more than to assert that contradictions of this kind [in socialist society] 'cannot' be antagonistic."

5. "The Chinese Communist Leadership, 1958-1961," 28 November 1961. 126 pages.

"We have thought it useful to make this assessment in the context (a) of the development of the Sino-Soviet dispute and (b) of the erratic course of Chinese domestic policy in the period 1958-1961—particularly because, in our view, a further deterioration in the Sino-Soviet relationship and in the regime's economic position may well force a crisis in the Chinese leadership."

6. "The Decline of Mao Tse-tung," 9 April 1962. 32 pages.

This paper "recapitulates the evidence for the *probability* that Mao Tse-tung has been deteriorating in recent years, and for the *possibility* that he is suffering from a serious medical disorder which could soon lead to his death or retirement or overthrow."

7. "The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, Section 1: 1950-59," 2 March 1963. 54 pages.

"This paper traces the political factors which led initially to the dispute and later to the attack of 20 October 1962."

8. "The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, Section 2: 1959-61," 19 August 1963. 92 pages.

"By fall 1959 the Chinese leaders were convinced of the need for negotiations with Nehru in order to prevent their international prestige—including their position in the world Communist movement—from deteriorating."

9. "The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, Section 3: 1961-62," 5 May 1964. 91 pages.

"Chinese policy toward India in 1961 operated on contradictory assumptions, namely, that it was necessary to 'unite' with Nehru and simultaneously to 'struggle' against him."

10. "Communist China's Domestic Crisis: The Road to 1964," 31 July 1964. 200 pages.

"A crucial question in assessing the future course of domestic policy in Communist China is the extent to which Mao Tse-tung and his lieutenants have learned the lessons of the failure of their 'leap forward' approach to economic development."

11. "The Sino-Vietnamese Effort to Limit American Actions in the Vietnam War," 9 June 1965. 37 pages.

"By February-March 1965, their failure to prevent strikes against the North forced them to recognize that Mao was wrong in thinking that small wars could be fought *with only slight risks* to the base areas and to the security of other bloc countries."

12. "Political Problems in Communist China," 19 July 1965. 35 pages.

"The inadequacy of Mao Tse-tung's prescription for achieving the good society (featuring class struggle, heroic poverty, and collective enthusiasm) had become increasingly apparent to China's intellectuals, educated youth, and a seemingly large number of middle and lower level party cadres."

13. "Mao's 'Cultural Revolution': Its Leadership, Its Strategy, Its Instruments, and Its Casualties," 18 February 1967. 218 pages.

"(a) Mao has taken the initiative at each stage, (b) he has been conducting a massive 'test' of party leaders and the party apparatus, (c) changes in the leadership have represented primarily a purge directed by Mao and only secondarily a 'power struggle,' (d) the entire effort has developed coherently, given its irrational base in dogma, and (e) Mao is now carrying out methodically and in general successfully a scheme for the reorganization of the party which he outlined last autumn."

14. "Mao's 'Cultural Revolution': Origin and Development," 6 October 1967. 124 pages.

"The 'cultural revolution' must be traced to the 'three years of economic hardships' from 1959-1962 when large numbers of Chinese Communist party, government, and military leaders became disillusioned with Mao's leadership following the collapse of his radical 'great leap forward' and commune programs."

15. "The P.L.A. and the 'Cultural Revolution,' " 28 October 1967. 198 pages.

"The present study...deals mainly with Mao's conduct of the 'revolution' in the P.L.A. (that is, the purge and reorganization of the military apparatus), with Mao's use of the P.L.A. as an instrument for conducting the 'revolution' as a whole, and with the relationship between these two concerns."

16. "Ten Years of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, Section 1: Policy Toward the U.S. and the Diplomatic Isolation of Taipei," 54 pages.

Chapters: "Military Conquest of Taiwan Converted to Political Struggle," "The Issue of UN Entry," and "Diplomatic Isolation of Taipei."

17. "Ten Years of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy: South and Southeast Asia," 4 April 1968. 24 pages.

"Beginning in 1966, Mao Tse-tung gradually shifted his foreign policy toward some countries in the area from diplomacy directed at neutralization to the open encouragement of rural-based insurrection."

17-A. "Annex to 'Ten Years of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, Section 2: South and Southeast Asia,' " 9 April 1968. 184 pages.

18. "Mao's 'Cultural Revolution' in 1967: The Struggle to 'Seize Power,' " 24 May 1968. 49 pages.

"Mao was not forced, the paper argues, to reverse his revolutionary policy by pressure from a 'moderate' faction, nor did the period of moderation which followed his August decisions mean that the 'Cultural Revolution' was over; rather it was a pause, a temporary shift in emphasis from revolution from below to revolution from above."

19. "Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel Organizations in Communist China (A Research Aid)," 28 May 1968. 71 pages.

"An attempt has been made to identify the major Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel groups in each province, autonomous region, and major city, to list the opponents as well as the allies of these groups, to note shifts in these alliances over time, and to provide a brief chronology (where possible) of the varying fortunes of these organizations as of May 1968."

20. "Mao's Red Guard Diplomacy: 1967," 21 June 1968. 37 pages.

"The aberrations which appeared in Peking's foreign policy tactics in 1967 reflected Mao's desire to project his will to pragmatic subordinates in order to make them revolutionary diplomats.... Beyond Mao's special view, however, this diplomacy was in fact illogical and irrational. The beatings of diplomats, invasion of embassy grounds, and export of Mao's cult aroused nationalistic sensitivities abroad, and the adverse international reaction has been as harmful to Peking's foreign policy as Mao's 1958 blunders had been to domestic policy."

21. "Mao's 'Cultural Revolution' III. The Purge of the P.L.A. and the Stardom of Madame Mao," June 1968. 83 pages.

"The present study traces the story to June 1968. It finds Mao to be still the central and dominant figure, but it devotes special attention to the way in which Mao's treatment of the P.L.A. has seemed to work against his ends by provoking resentment among those upon whom his position directly depends, by narrowing his base of support to fanatics and opportunists, and by putting his own position in danger. These trends are highlighted by the activities and status of Madame Mao, who has become one of the principal leaders and has played the starring role in purging the P.L.A."

22. "Factionalism in the Central Committee: Mao's Opposition Since 1949," 19 September 1968. 38 pages.

"As the drama of Mao's Cultural Revolution has unfolded, Communist China's leaders have made

available a vast amount of new information concerning earlier factional struggles within the Chinese Communist Party. Making use of Red Guard materials and other new information...this Intelligence Report re-examines these earlier factional struggles and concludes that Mao's Cultural Revolution is a direct descendant of party conflicts and policy differences of nearly 20 years duration."

23. "The Role of the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels in Mao's Cultural Revolution," November 1968. 192 pages.

"It is the purpose of this report to describe the origins of these groups, the range of their activities, the role they have played at various stages in the cultural revolution, and the organizational structure which was intended to hold them together as unique extra-Party instruments of Mao's purge."

24. "The Role of the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels in Mao's Cultural Revolution," December 1968. 17 pages.

Briefer version of the previous study published at a lower classification.

25. "The Cultural Revolution and Education in Communist China," 23 May 1969. 97 pages.

"The findings of this study, in broad terms, are that 'educational revolution' is basically a function of Mao's distrust of the intellectual and his desire to create a New Chinese Man. This new man, the 'revolutionary successor,' is primarily a product of his education."

26. "The Cultural Revolution and the Ninth Party Congress," 1 October 1969. 40 pages.

"For those who looked to the Ninth Party Congress to provide answers to basic questions about the future of Communist China, this first national congress of the Chinese Communist Party to be held in eleven years was a major disappointment. Whether viewed in terms of the new Party leadership, the new Party structure, or the course of future political and economic policy, the published record of the Congress was generally vague and contradictory."

27. "Communist China: The Political Security Apparatus II. Destruction and Reconstruction, 1965-1969," 28 November 1969. 94 pages.

"This is the second staff study to consider the fortunes, role and shifting structure of the political security apparatus in Communist China."

28. "Lin Piao and the Great Helmsman," 21 January 1970. 31 pages.

"This Intelligence Report gives the reader a sense of Lin's development and character and of his relationship over the years with Mao. It concludes that Lin is a devoted Maoist, that he will probably take the helm from the Great Helmsman, and that he will attempt to follow the revolutionary course that has been charted by Mao."

29. "The Cultural Revolution and the New Political System in China," 30 October 1970. 29 pages.

"This study views the Cultural Revolution in the context of Mao Tse-tung's self-defeating efforts of the past two decades to keep revolutionary momentum alive in China; and ascribes central importance to Mao's attempt to fashion the masses into a weapon against an entrenched and obstructive party apparatus. The nature and consequences of his audacious efforts to save the Party by destroying it are the subject matter of this essay."

30. "Lin Piao and the Structure of Power," December 1970. 74 pages.

"The frail and enigmatic Lin Piao has seemed to many observers a strange choice as the designated heir to Mao Tse-tung....The message of this research study is that in view of Lin's apparent organizational strength, his potential for holding power should not be dismissed lightly.... The paper concludes that Lin's heavy reliance on military protégés and his preference for one type of civilian leader over another, will both tend to deter him from pursuing Maoist policies to the extremes to which Mao has pursued them."

31. "The Failure of Maoist Ideology in Foreign Policy," November 1971. 11 pages.

"The increasingly radical character of this ideology and its claims resulted externally in (1) affronting foreign Communist Parties intent upon following

their own 'national roads' to socialism; (2) alarming national bourgeois governments of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; and (3) reducing China's international prestige to its lowest point in two decades."

32. "The International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party," December 1971. 37 pages.

"The study finds that the ILD, radically reorganized in recent years, has been given new duties—particularly in the realm of improving CCP's relations with governing CP's abroad—and with these new duties an enhanced status."

33. "Peking-Taipei Contacts: The Question of a Possible 'Chinese Solution,'" December 1971. 64 pages.

"This study concludes that no significant Nationalist vulnerabilities to proposed accommodation have developed to mid-1971, but that Peking's expectations and confidence in this regard are now almost certainly on the sharp rise."

34. "Research Aid: Missing Chinese Military Leaders," August 1972. 29 pages.

"About 200 Chinese military leaders have dropped out of sight in 1971-72.... Thirty of the missing are those thus far named in Party documents and briefings as members of Lin's 'counter-revolutionary conspiratorial clique.' The others are missing for presently unknown reasons, but there are grounds for belief that a substantial number of them have been or will be purged for alleged complicity or sympathy with Lin's group."

35. "Policy Issues in the Purge of Lin Piao," November 1972. 65 pages.

"This study finds that the principal—and still unresolved—issue behind the momentous purge of Lin Piao and associates, has been the issue of civilian versus military control over China's political system."

36. "Peking's Support of Insurgencies in Southeast Asia," April 1973. 145 pages.

"China continues to sponsor and support insurgencies against certain governments in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, in the cases of Burma and

Thailand, such covert assistance has significantly expanded....China supports certain insurgencies...largely because that's the way the boss, Mao Tse-tung, wants it—for his own mix of stubbornly-held ideological and personal reasons."

37. "China's Regional and Provincial Leaders: The Purge of the Military, the Rise of Old Party Cadres," July 1973. 126 pages.

"This report traces the steady if slow progress of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai in attempting to restore civilian control of the governing apparatus in China, at the regional and provincial levels, after years of dominance by the PLA."

ESAU

1. "Origins of the Chinese 'Commune Program,' " 17 July 1959. 34 pages.

"The central problem of the period preceding the Chinese Communist leadership's decision to undertake the 'commune' program was the need to devise a program of economic development adapted to China's specific conditions....The commune emerged as the by-product of a protracted and tortuous process of discovering a distinctive Chinese road of 'socialist construction.' "

2. "The Commune: Conception and Experimentation, Spring 1958," 25 pages.

"As of June 1958, the commune as the chosen instrument for China's 'uninterrupted revolution' was yet to be revealed, but it was increasingly evident that some revolutionary change in social organization was imminent. The Soviet party leadership appeared to be in blissful ignorance of the plans of its junior partner."

3. "The Soviet Attitude Toward 'Communes,' " 12 June 1959. 26 pages.

"Viewed against the background of Soviet experience and theory the Chinese communalization program is almost certainly regarded by Moscow as 'adventurist.' "

4. "Soviet Positions on the 'Transition to Communism'—Prior to the Chinese Commune Program," 28 August 1959. 34 pages.

This paper details Soviet views on transition including the idea of transition, material-production base, distribution and incentives, the pace of the transition, the universality of the Soviet model, Soviet evaluations of transitions within the bloc, and other topics.

5. "The Commune: Revelation and Initial Organization, Summer 1958," 4 September 1959. 19 pages.

"Traces the piecemeal disclosure of the communes to the Chinese people and to the world and discusses the first part of the organizational phase of the commune movement."

6. "Indications of Soviet Awareness of Chinese Plans for the Communes, Spring-Summer 1958," 16 October 1959. 43 pages.

"The evidence suggests that the Soviet party had less advance information on the communes than one would expect it to have if there were a close working relationship between the two parties."

7. "The Chinese Communist Impact on East Germany," 15 April 1960. 41 pages.

"The Chinese capacity and willingness to adopt more extreme positions than Moscow in foreign and domestic policy give the more Stalinist satellite leaders such as Ulbricht an opportunity to play off the Chinese against the Russians in the hope of exercising greater leverage on Khrushchev's policies."

8. "The Commune, The 'Great Leap Forward,' and Sino-Soviet Relations (August-December 1958)," 15 June 1960. 149 pages.

"The paper seeks to illuminate...the forced-draft development program...the 'leap forward' and the commune; the intraparty struggle...and the conflict of policy and interest between China and the Soviet Union."

9. "Mao Tse-tung on Strategy, 1926-1957 (The Background of the Sino-Soviet Dispute of 1957-1960)," 8 August 1960. 56 pages.

A chronological assessment of Mao's Communist strategy drawing examples from his decisions on China, the Far East, and challenges to the Soviet Union.

10. "The Sino-Soviet Dispute on World Communist Strategy (Autumn 1957-Autumn 1959)," 23 September 1960. 114 pages.

"The classical left-right split in Communist party histories was emerging on the international scene, with Mao beginning to adopt neo-Trotskyite views. In early 1960, Mao's spokesmen were to put forward a new version of Trotsky's concept of 'uninterrupted revolution' as applicable to the 'colonial' countries, and Khrushchev's counterattack would accuse Mao of reviving Trotsky's 'adventurist' foreign policy."

11. "The Sino-Soviet Dispute on World Communist Strategy (Its Development from Autumn 1959 to Summer 1960)," 23 January 1961. 76 pages.

"That Mao was proselytizing in the Communist world against Khrushchev and Khrushchev's strategy was evidenced in January 1960 during the visit to China of an East German government delegation. Mao told the East Germans that he disagreed with Soviet policy on disarmament and Berlin and that China would not sign any disarmament agreement unless it was given its legitimate seat in the United Nations and unless the United States withdrew from Taiwan."

12. "The Sino-Soviet Dispute (June 1960 to November 1960)," 20 February 1961. 63 pages.

"Almost half of this paper is occupied with three extraordinarily valuable documents—summaries of, and copious extracts from, the Soviet party's letter of 21 June to the Chinese party, the Chinese party's letter of 10 September in reply, and the Soviet party's letter of 5 November...in reply to the 10 September letter. These letters spectacularly confirmed the existence of Sino-Soviet disputes on a wide range of issues...and...they revealed other disputes which had not been deduced or reported."

13. "The Sino-Soviet Dispute (The 6 December Declaration, and Soviet and Chinese Presentations of It)," 17 March 1961. 51 pages.

"But if one regards the basic issue as that of whether there is to be a universally acknowledged leader and arbiter of the world Communist movement, and assumes the Soviet party to wish to play

that role, then the declaration, in explicitly denying such a role to any party, represented a victory for the Chinese party and for every other party desiring greater autonomy in the movement."

14. "Sino-Soviet Competition in North Korea," 5 April 1961. 20 pages.

"Victimized by its strategic location throughout history, North Korea appears once again to be the scene of competition for dominant influence between its powerful neighbors.... North Korea has constituted a prime target in Peiping's drive to win acceptance of its more radical approach to the domestic construction of Communism and its more militant approach to international Communist strategy."

15. "The Indian Communist Party and Sino-Soviet Dispute," 7 February 1962. 185 pages.

"By January 1962 the Communist Party of India (CPI) had reached a point at which an open schism in the party in the coming year had become a serious possibility. The renewal of the Sino-Soviet conflict at the 22nd CPSU Congress had greatly worsened an already tense situation within the Indian party, and strengthened forces which for many years had been working toward a split in the CPI."

16. "The New Stage of the Sino-Soviet Dispute (October 1961-January 1962)," 26 February 1962. 109 pages.

"This paper discusses the stage initiated by Khrushchev's new offensive at the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961, examines the forms of pressure on the Chinese still available to Khrushchev, and speculates on the possibility of a Sino-Soviet break in the next year or so."

17. "North Vietnam and Sino-Soviet Relations," 4 March 1962. 42 pages.

"As a major beneficiary of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the form of vastly augmented economic and military assistance from both Moscow and Peiping... the North Vietnamese party leadership have every reason to persist—if they can—in their chosen role of mediator and neutral in the deepening conflict between the Soviet Union and Communist China."

18. "Summary—'Implications of the Sino-Soviet Dispute for US Policy,' " 29 March 1962. 18 pages.

Summary and conclusions reached during Special Study Group meetings held 1 and 21 February and 8 March 1962. The Special Study Group was organized by the Council on Foreign Relations and was composed of government and non-government subject-matter experts.

19. "Soviet-Albanian Relations, 1940-1960," 22 June 1962. 79 pages.

"This is a working paper, reviewing the course of Soviet-Albanian relations from the birth of the Albanian Communist party in 1940 through the walkout of the Albanian leaders from the meeting of the 81 Communist parties in Moscow in November 1960. The paper examines the origins and course of the Soviet-Albanian differences and their relationship to the Sino-Soviet controversy."

20. "The State of Sino-Soviet Relations at the New Year," 7 January 1963. 27 pages.

"We reaffirm in this paper our belief that, sooner or later, an open break between the Soviet and Chinese parties is probable; we make no estimate on the timing of the break."

21. "The North Vietnamese Party and the 'New Situation' in South Vietnam," 10 July 1963. 37 pages.

"A report which attempts to describe one effect of U.S. policy in South Vietnam upon the North Vietnamese regime. The report also deals with the interplay between the North Vietnamese Communist party's treatment of its problem in South Vietnam and the position of that party in the Sino-Soviet dispute."

22. "The Sino-Soviet Struggle in Cuba and the Latin American Communist Movement," 1 November 1963. 172 pages.

"Reflecting developments through the first week of August 1963, the paper considers chiefly the competition of the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties for influence with Castro and the Cuban Communist party, while the Appendix discusses in less detail their competition elsewhere in Latin America."

23. "The Japanese Communist Party: 1955-1963," 20 March 1964. 115 pages.

"Of the dozen or so Communist parties which back or lean toward the Chinese party in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Japanese Communist party is in some respects of special interest. It is the only such party operating in a major developed country; the positions it has taken have been unusually costly to it in its national environment; and, despite its leanings, it thinks of itself as a potential mediator in the dispute."

24. "The Sino-Soviet Conflict in the Fronts: September 1962-December 1963," 12 June 1964. 114 pages.

"The Chinese, if they succeed in setting up rival front organizations, may lead their followers out of the Soviet-controlled organizations. It seems likely, however, that they will continue to see value in using all platforms, and will not leave the fronts unless expelled."

25. "Prince Sihanouk and the New Order in Southeast Asia," 169 pages.

"The first of our papers to deal primarily with a person of interest to the Communists--in this case, Sihanouk of Cambodia--rather than primarily with the affairs of the Communists themselves."

26. "The Showdown on Soviet Authority in the 'Movement,' " 8 February 1965. 94 pages.

"(a) an account of development in the Sino-Soviet relationship from October 1964 (the time of Khrushchev's fall) through January 1965, centered on the Soviet party's plans to assert its authority in meetings of the Communist parties, and (b) a speculation on the prospects for any such meetings and for Sino-Soviet negotiations before or after them."

27. "The 1965 Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese Controversy Over Soviet Military Aid to North Vietnam," 20 December 1965. 59 pages.

"Evidence [redaction] indicates that a running dispute has gone on in private dealings between the Soviet Union and China over this question and that this dispute long delayed the arrival of certain badly-needed Soviet equipment and technicians in North Vietnam."

28. "Zanzibar: The Hundred Days' Revolution,"
21 February 1966. 170 pages.

"The first in a series...to examine a given revolutionary situation."

29. "The Positions of Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow on the Issue of Vietnam Negotiations: 1962-1966,"
31 October 1966. 83 pages.

"Hanoi's acceptance of talks *in principle*...has raised some concern in Peking that Ho Chi Minh and his lieutenants might, at some future stage in the fighting, agree to negotiate. The Chinese have pressed Ho to remain permanently intransigent...and the Soviets, on the other hand, have decided to take no negotiations initiative without Hanoi's consent."

30. "Asian Communist Employment of Negotiations as a Political Tactic,"
November 1966. 55 pages.

"This report...sets forth the fight-talk tactic used by the Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese Communists in the course of important military conflicts, namely, the Chinese civil war, the Korean war, and the Indochina war against the French. It focuses on the factors which have impelled the Asian Communist leaders to begin negotiations and on the various tactics used during negotiations in the effort to extract political concessions from the West."

31. "The Disintegration of Japanese Communist Relations with Peking,"
28 December 1966. 77 pages.

"Reviews the major developments in the Japanese Communist Party (JCP)...during which time the JCP has become involved in a bitter controversy with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It does so, not only in the interests of documenting the deterioration in JCP-CCP relations but also in presenting a case study of Mao Tse-tung's tactics in dealing with foreign Communist parties under his new policy of rejecting a working relationship with anyone who is not completely submissive to him."

32. "The Sino-Soviet Dispute Within the Communist Movement in Latin America,"
15 June 1967. 187 pages.

"Focuses mainly on the dramatic growth of Chinese Communist activities in Latin America since mid-1963 and on Moscow's reaction, and only on that aspect of the Cuban Communist Party's development which concerns Castro's efforts to command for his experience a level of ideological influence in the world Communist movement comparable with that of Russia and China."

33. "The Sino-Soviet Struggle in the World Communist Movement Since Khrushchev's Fall (Part 1)," September 1967. 197 pages.

"Part I describes the shift in the emphasis of CPSU policy in the first six months after Khrushchev's fall toward a more vigorous appeal to the interests of all those parties—such as the North Vietnamese—hitherto inclined toward the Chinese and having a special, private vested interest in militant struggle against the United States."

34. "The Sino-Soviet Struggle in the World Communist Movement Since Khrushchev's Fall (Part 2)," September 1967. 161 pages.

"Part II traces the growing CPSU success in 1965 and early 1966 in neutralizing these militant former supporters of the Chinese by advocating 'unity of action' in support of North Vietnam against the United States and by capitalizing on Mao Tse-tung's refusal to cooperate and Mao's arrogant attitude toward all who would not obey him completely."

35. "The Sino-Soviet Struggle in the World Communist Movement Since Khrushchev's Fall (Part 3)," September 1967. 206 pages.

"Part III discusses the flow of events beginning with Mao's refusal to attend the 23rd CPSU Congress in the spring of 1966 and his simultaneous surfacing of the gigantic purge known as the 'great cultural revolution,' describes the subsequent rapid decay of Sino-Soviet state relations and the resumption of direct Soviet attacks on Mao to take advantage of China's increasing isolation, and concludes with an appraisal of the policy lines toward the Communist militants, toward the United States, and toward the Chinese Communist regime."

36. "The Attitudes of North Vietnamese Leaders Toward Fighting and Negotiating," 25 March 1968. 64 pages.

"The paper attempts to show how these attitudes have developed, to set forth the general scheme the leaders have appeared to agree on, and to suggest the circumstances in which latent differences among them could perhaps become important."

37. "The Sino-Soviet Dispute on Aid to North Vietnam (1965-1968)," 30 September 1968. 33 pages.

"Reviews and brings up to date the story of the protracted and acrimonious haggling among the three principals. It reveals that the major issues and motivations of each have remained essentially unchanged, and that suspicion, dispute, and Chinese obstructionism increased rather than abated as the war moved on."

37-A. "Annex: The Sino-Soviet Dispute on Aid to North Vietnam (1965-1968)," 25 November 1968. 122 pages.

38. "Kim Il-Sung's New Military Adventurism," 26 November 1968. 59 pages.

"During the past two years, he has brought into positions of authority a number of military figures who share his increasingly militant and adventurous policies toward South Korea and the United States.... The combination of Kim's ego-mania, revolutionary fervor, and nationalistic self-assertion, point to continued probing and infiltration of South Korea."

39. "Indonesia—1965: The Coup That Backfired," December 1968. 356 pages.

"Essentially, it was a purge of the Army leadership, which was intended to bring about certain changes in the composition of the cabinet. In this sense, it is more correct to refer to the 30 September Movement as a purge, rather than a coup."

40. "The Struggle in the Polish Leadership and the Revolt of the Apparatus," 5 September 1969. 64 pages.

"Intelligence reporting and analysis during the events of 1968 emphasized anti-Semitism and

a classic factional power struggle as the main elements in the conflict. Although both elements were present, this analysis finds that the primary forces stimulating conflict were a widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo of the Gomulka establishment, a desire for internal stability in the face of events in Czechoslovakia, and the frustrated ambitions of younger party and government functionaries."

41. "The Committed Church and Change in Latin America," 10 September 1969. 60 pages.

"This study analyzes the forces for change, the factional alignments taking shape within the Church and between Church and non-Church groups, and evaluates the impact on Latin American social and political structures."

42. "Czechoslovakia: The Problem of Soviet Control," 16 January 1970. 66 pages.

"Analyzes why the Soviet Union lost political control in Czechoslovakia and how that control was restored during 1968 and 1969.... Moscow paid a political price in bringing Prague again to heel, but the price was almost certainly less than Moscow was prepared to pay."

43. "The Evolution of Soviet Policy in Sino-Soviet Border Dispute," 28 April 1970. 101 pages.

"[Chinese] polemical charges and complaints against Soviet 'imperialism' and 'unequal treaties,' designed to embarrass or to discredit the Soviet Union...were having some effect.... And probes by Peking's military patrols were increasingly serious and provocative, although they were kept at a level which would make large-scale Soviet retaliation difficult to justify. At the same time, however, Moscow had to make its threat of major retaliation credible."

44. "The Prussian Heresy: Ulbricht's Evolving System," 29 June 1970. 60 pages.

"The idea of Ulbricht suiting up ranks of computers, computer tenders, and systems analysts and sending them forth to tilt with GDR's hard-core party-machine cadres boggles the imagination. And yet, inherent in Ulbricht's enthusiasm for cybernetics is

the potential for an eventual showdown between a new elite of pragmatic technocrats and the old elite of ideologically-motivated party hacks."

45. "Yugoslavia: The Outworn Structure," 20 November 1970. 72 pages.

"This study calls attention to particularist forces which have decentralized political authority and control within Yugoslavia to an extent unequaled in any Communist society. Whether these forces will undermine centralism is now at issue in Yugoslav debate, and the outlook for post-Tito stability will not become clear for some time."

46. "Fedayeen—'Men of Sacrifice,'" December 1970. 55 pages.

"Effective or lasting unity among the fedayeen—whether subversive, military, or political—faces a myriad of divisive forces, but that as individual groups or in temporary alliances the fedayeen will nonetheless continue to represent a seriously disruptive element in Middle East politics."

46-A. "The Fedayeen (Annex to ESAU XLVII: Fedayeen—'Men of Sacrifice')," January 1971. 107 pages.

"This paper relies primarily on clandestine reporting, particularly for the internal structure and operations of the various fedayeen organizations. [REDACTION] The reporting is quite good on political aspects of the subject such as the maneuverings of the fedayeen groups, their internal disputes, and their ideological and tactical views."

47. "The Growth of the Soviet Commitment in the Middle East," January 1971. 182 pages.

"This study points up the many forces which serve to restrict the USSR from reducing its Middle East bid. Each added commitment creates new defense concerns and heightens the prestige stakes. Hawkish pressures from within the Soviet military and security services sharpen Brezhnev's caution not to be found soft on capitalism. The Soviet piecemeal military commitments become steps which, once taken, cannot easily be reversed. Then, too, the USSR is to some degree the prey, and not the master, of its clients."

48. "Soviet Thinking about the Danger of Sino-U.S. Rapprochement," February 1971. 75 pages.

"The study points up the increasingly close interplay of Chinese and US considerations in Soviet thought and action, the urgency with which the Soviets view the Chinese threat, and the fact that only after Moscow had tamped down the level of 1969 conflict with Peking did it proceed to new and freer US policies—whether heightened toughness or SALT."

49. "The Polish Question: East Germany," July 1971. 65 pages.

"This study examines strains being exerted upon Poland and Polish-East German relations by changing Soviet security concerns, Western European economic expansion, Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, and, in particular, a more assertive East Germany. The study concludes that such forces—contemporary versions of Russian and German national interests—will continue to undercut Poland and to feed Polish-East German animosity."

50. "Peking and the Burmese Communists: The Perils and Profits of Insurgency," July 1971. 140 pages.

"This study documents a case where Peking's policy towards a client Communist movement has been guided throughout by primary regard for China's national interests."

51. "Communism and Cambodia," February 1972. 130 pages.

"Over the past two-and-a-half decades this Hanoi-directed movement has built a more extensive political and military structure than has generally been appreciated to date. In particular, the training of large numbers of ethnic Khmers in North Vietnam... has given the Communists in Cambodia a respectable base on which to build.... The study also finds that Hanoi...is giving the Khmer Communist (KC) Party an increased measure of autonomy...and that the KC political-military apparatus, backed by the power of the Vietnamese Communist Army, poses a serious threat to the Phnom Penh government."

52. "Communism and Cambodia,"
May 1972. 106 pages.

Paper of the same title but at a lower classification.

53. "'Finlandization' in Action: Helsinki's Experience With Moscow," August 1972. 130 pages.

"The Finns have ingeniously maintained their independence, but a limited one indeed, heavily influenced by the USSR's proximate military might, a preconditioned prudence not to offend Moscow, and the existence of various Soviet capabilities to complicate Finland's domestic life."

54. "Soviet Expectations of a European Security Conference," October 1972. 40 pages.

"This memorandum highlights two aspects of Soviet thinking. One is the intent that the CSCE establish permanent organizational machinery through which the USSR could become more directly involved in Western European affairs, economically and politically.... The other...is that the Soviets are striving to accent the non-controversial at a CSCE...with an eye to continuing internal Soviet and Eastern European misgivings about the risks to Communist orthodoxy and control."



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


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