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The EU’s Experience with Security Sector Governance

Summary

- Civilian oversight ministries are essential to broader efforts to strengthen the performance and responsiveness of security and law enforcement forces. Ministries facilitate coordination among agencies, hold personnel accountable to law and policy, perform administrative functions, shield forces from political interference, and enable civilian oversight through the legislature, civil society, and other mechanisms. Failure to support these roles can undermine efforts to strengthen law enforcement and improve citizen safety in countries affected by conflict or instability.

- The European Union has extensive experience supporting oversight ministries, having prepared twenty-one ministries of interior to join the EU. The European Commission has assisted ministries in developing countries around the world, while the European Council has deployed civilian missions to crisis environments to establish security and the rule of law.

- Efforts to develop the laws, procedures, and organizational structures needed for effective oversight ministries face numerous challenges, from limited human capacity to political and organizational resistance, especially in countries transitioning from conflict or authoritarian rule.

- EU enlargement provided a unique incentive for countries to overcome obstacles to transforming their ministries and improving security sector governance. EU institutions helped translate this incentive into organizational changes by helping candidate countries define a clear structure and vision, deploying experienced experts from EU member states, and managing resistance through coordinated political engagement in support of clearly defined benchmarks.

- In crisis and stabilization countries, the EU has faced greater challenges. Without a strong external incentive, weak capacity and severe political tensions have undermined assistance efforts. The EU has been enhancing its capabilities for deploying skilled personnel to these
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Introduction
As the U.S. government has expanded its efforts to strengthen security and law enforcement forces in countries affected by conflict and instability, it has confronted the challenges of operating in one of the most contentious and politically charged sectors. Efforts to support the development of professional, responsive forces inevitably run into political and organizational resistance as competing factions vie for control of security forces to maintain power and security. At the center of these struggles lie the ministries of interior, justice, home affairs, and defense, which manage and oversee security forces. Weak and politicized ministries can facilitate divisions and factional conflict among forces, constrain their effectiveness, and undermine broader assistance efforts. Well-managed ministries, on the other hand, can improve the responsiveness of security and law enforcement forces.

The European Commission assisted ministries in twenty-one environments and for leveraging member states’ relationships with countries affected by conflict, to help them overcome political obstacles. Yet the EU has often struggled to achieve the coherence among member states and institutions necessary to support locally driven reforms.

- The United States can learn from the EU’s successes and challenges by paying attention to the role of oversight ministries in the development of security and law enforcement forces overseas. To build its capacity to strengthen oversight ministries and other components of security sector governance, the United States should recruit personnel with broader sets of skills, improve coherence among agencies providing assistance, and deepen cooperation with the EU and other donor countries. Through collaboration in headquarters and in the field, the EU and the United States could complement each other’s strengths and pursue common approaches to fostering institutional change in the security sector.

Efforts by the U.S. government to strengthen security and law enforcement forces overseas are increasingly pursued within the framework of security sector reform (SSR). These efforts approach the security sector as an integrated whole to ensure that security forces are professional, accountable, and responsive to the publics they are intended to serve.1 This integrated approach underpins a wide range of objectives, from confronting transnational security threats to establishing the rule of law, safety, and security in countries affected by instability or conflict. Central to this concept is attention to strengthening oversight institutions, including ministries, legislatures, and judiciaries, while fostering citizen participation in holding security forces accountable and addressing the linkages across the entire range of security forces in a given country. Despite growing acceptance of an integrated approach, however, the U.S. government has devoted little attention in practice to supporting oversight ministries for law enforcement forces. With its own police forces largely decentralized, the United States lacks a national-level agency to oversee the various levels of law enforcement. Assistance programs tend to focus on building operational skills and capacity for security and law enforcement forces, with less emphasis on the institutions that manage, coordinate, and hold these forces accountable.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the EU has accumulated extensive experience strengthening oversight ministries. The European Commission assisted ministries in twenty-one countries in meeting the requirements for joining the EU and has strengthened ministries...
in developing countries around the world. The European Council has fielded twenty-two crisis response missions with an emphasis on civilian law enforcement through its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). This report explores the EU’s successes and challenges to draw out lessons for supporting the development of oversight ministries as a component of broader efforts to strengthen security and law enforcement forces. Based on a review of policies, capabilities, and experience in a number of countries, the report identifies common requirements for developing ministry capacity, along with the challenges of pursuing these efforts in countries transitioning from authoritarian rule, conflict, or instability. Attempts to shift the responsibilities, orientation, and capabilities of oversight ministries in such countries directly confront the entrenched political and organizational resistance that impedes broader efforts to strengthen the security sector. The experience of EU enlargement yields insights into how external assistance can contribute to overcoming these challenges; some strategies include building consensus on the structure and role of the ministry early on, deploying the most skilled and appropriate personnel, and confronting political and organizational resistance through establishing a clear framework and effective coordination. The EU’s experience in stabilization and postconflict environments sheds light on approaches to overcoming the additional challenges in these environments. The report concludes by outlining steps the U.S. government should take to improve its capacity and enhance cooperation with the EU and other donors toward more effective support of security sector governance.

The Essential Role of the Oversight Ministry

Oversight ministries play an essential role in the functioning of police, border guards, emergency response agencies, and other internal security and law enforcement forces. Their functions include setting policy and budgets, coordinating policy and strategies across agencies, appointing personnel, inspecting and auditing operations, and managing administrative processes. A ministry cannot alone ensure the effectiveness or responsiveness of security forces without other forms of legislative, judicial, and civilian oversight. Because of its position at the center of the linkages among security forces and institutions, however, an effective oversight ministry can be crucial to broader efforts to strengthen the security sector. Although ministries vary in terms of their responsibilities and structures, most countries have a national-level ministry with policymaking and oversight functions for internal security and law enforcement forces. The term “ministry of interior” is used in this report to refer to any ministry that serves these functions. Failure to devote sufficient attention to strengthening these functions can undermine broader assistance efforts aimed at a wide range of objectives, from confronting transnational crime and terrorism to establishing security and the rule of law after conflict and creating the conditions for economic development.

The importance of effective ministries is most visible when addressing high-profile security threats such as terrorism, organized crime, trafficking, and migration, which require cooperation among numerous actors within and across states. By setting policy, defining strategies, and allocating resources across agencies and forces, a well-functioning ministry of interior can help ensure a coordinated response to these complex threats and facilitate cooperation with other states. Ministries of interior often manage criminal databases, border management systems, civil registries, and other systems that facilitate investigation and law enforcement across a range of agencies. In the absence of an effective ministry or other coordinating body, divisions and factionalism among agencies can heighten a country’s vulnerability to transnational threats. In postconflict Liberia, for instance, a legacy of factionalized forces with ill-defined and overlapping roles has limited the state’s ability to confront the growing threat of illicit drug trafficking across Liberia’s borders. Building
capacity to manage such threats requires attention beyond operational capacity and toward strengthening the ministry or agency tasked with interagency coordination.

Oversight ministries also enhance the responsiveness and accountability of security forces to citizens while playing a crucial role in deterring human rights abuses. For national law enforcement forces, the ministry is an important means through which elected officials advance their policy goals, by defining priorities, developing strategies, aligning budgets, and appointing senior personnel. Through dissemination and communication of policies, strategies, and budgets, ministries can facilitate citizen input through the legislature or civil society. Ministries also deter abuse and hold officials accountable through inspectorates that conduct audits and investigate cases of grave misconduct. Well-specified roles and clearly defined procedures within a ministry prevent political interference by specifying the limits of politicians’ involvement in operations and guaranteeing some level of operational independence for the forces. Where these roles and procedures are not enforced or are nonexistent, security forces may remain factionalized and politicized despite external assistance. In some countries of the former Yugoslavia, for example, security units reported directly to the minister of interior rather than following procedures, allowing the minister to employ them for personal or political interests. The weakness of Iraq’s Ministry of Interior after 2003 enabled certain factions to build up rival militias through their control of sections of the ministry. In both cases, the absence of clear and transparent procedures and accountability mechanisms within the ministry of interior facilitated political influence and fueled conflict.

Some ministries fulfill even more basic roles in relation to security and law enforcement forces by performing core administrative functions. Ministries may manage procurement, finance, and logistics, as well as the selection, assignment, and promotion of security personnel. Since these functions are often weak or disrupted in postconflict and stabilization contexts, insufficient attention to strengthening them can exacerbate the logistical constraints that prevent forces from responding to citizens. In East Timor, for example, failure to develop capacities within the ministry to govern personnel, procurement, budgets, and policy enabled leaders to politicize these forces while leaving them hampered by a chronic shortage of equipment and logistical capability. Even where these functions are managed by the forces themselves, ministries often retain some oversight to minimize the risk of corruption, politicization, and abuse. Strengthening these functions can be critical to enhancing the capability of security and law enforcement forces.

The roles and structure of oversight ministries vary considerably. For instance, some countries house oversight functions in a ministry of justice or home affairs rather than a ministry of interior. Ministries of interior may be called on to fulfill roles outside the security and law enforcement arenas, from managing elections to supervising local governments. Some ministries may directly manage national-level police organizations, while others are restricted to setting policy or coordinating decentralized forces. In general, ministries are typically responsible for the following core oversight tasks for security and law enforcement forces:

- Policy and budget planning, including formulating, drafting, and monitoring policy; strategic planning; and allocating resources, setting budgets in line with policy.
- Accountability mechanisms, such as inspectorates, auditors, codes of conduct, and citizen complaint offices, along with procedures for personnel appointment, assignment, and discipline.
- Interagency coordination, by developing policies, strategies, and action plans, establishing specialized directorates or procedures, and monitoring agencies and forces to manage complex, multidimensional issues that require coordination among agencies.
• Public affairs and communication to enable citizen monitoring and input, and to build public trust regarding law enforcement operations and reforms. This element is especially important where citizens are accustomed to regarding security forces with suspicion.

• Administrative functions for the ministry itself and sometimes for the security forces, such as managing procurement, logistics, finances, and human resources.

Given these critical roles, external assistance to ministries may be catalytic in strengthening security and law enforcement, especially when it is part of broader efforts to build capacity and expand civilian oversight. In postconflict and stabilization contexts, skilled personnel may have fled or departed, bureaucracies may be politicized or divided, and the ministry may have facilitated repression or failed to function at all. The government may have little experience in or capability for policy planning, interagency coordination, and administration. Efforts to restructure security forces may challenge the power of individuals and political parties by reallocating control over these forces, insulating them from discretionary control and eliminating opportunities to manipulate funds or authority. These obstacles may block progress on strengthening security and law enforcement forces. By targeting assistance to oversight ministries, external actors can help leaders overcome obstacles and allow assistance to other parts of the security and justice sectors to bear fruit.

EU Capabilities and Experience

Limitations of U.S. Government Support to Ministries of Interior

Despite their central importance in strengthening security and law enforcement, these core functions are often neglected in externally funded assistance programs, especially those supported by the U.S. government. With its police forces highly decentralized, the U.S. government lacks a national-level department or agency with responsibility for oversight of law enforcement forces. The federal departments, including the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Interior, that oversee law enforcement agencies have narrow and specialized mandates rather than broad internal security or law enforcement ones. Oversight of most U.S. law enforcement forces resides in mayoral and gubernatorial offices, city councils, state assemblies, and other local government bodies. This structure complicates efforts by federal agencies to recruit personnel to assist ministries overseas. The agencies that manage this type of assistance, including the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense, have relied on a variety of mechanisms, ranging from contracts with private firms to deploying their own personnel, for the design and implementation of programs. Although many of the individuals involved come from local or federal law enforcement backgrounds, they rarely bring the combination of policy and legislative and administrative skills that is core to ministerial oversight. With a few exceptions, programs tend to focus on strengthening operational skills rather than on oversight functions.

The EU Experience

The EU’s experience in strengthening ministries’ role in oversight of security and law enforcement can yield valuable lessons. In preparing countries for accession to the EU and by intervening in crisis contexts, the EU has sought to transform and strengthen ministries to improve oversight and management of law enforcement forces. The variety of governance structures, legal traditions, bureaucratic systems, organizational cultures, and languages among the EU’s twenty-seven member states serves as a rich resource for countries seeking models to improve their own systems. The recent experience of countries that transformed their own ministries to join the EU can be especially instructive for other countries attempting reform. Yet the
EU has also faced challenges in applying these resources to postconflict and stabilization environments.

Two European bodies have been primarily responsible for assistance to the security sector—the European Commission, which manages development assistance, and the European Council Secretariat, which manages the CSDP missions to crisis contexts. The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in December 2009, includes measures aimed at enhancing the coherence and effectiveness of these institutions. The EU thus continues to evolve in its efforts to address the challenges of strengthening security sector institutions in a variety of contexts.

EU Enlargement: Incentives for Reform

The most extensive transformation of ministries of interior occurred through the EU enlargement process. The expansion from its original six to its current twenty-seven members involved significant reforms across the political and economic system of each new member state to comply with EU standards. After gradual expansion in the 1980s and early 1990s, the biggest wave came in 2004 and 2007 with the accession of twelve countries in Eastern and Central Europe. In these countries, EU member states placed particular emphasis on justice and home affairs, including law enforcement and border management, to ensure that the new members could control the newly expanded borders into Europe and cooperate in confronting transnational crime and terrorism. Strengthening cooperation among customs, border, immigration, and police forces and improving human rights standards and the treatment of minorities necessitated extensive restructuring, reorganizing, and capacity building within ministries of interior.

The powerful incentive of EU membership motivated candidate countries to implement these reforms. Prospective members were required to conform to the EU’s acquis communautaire, the set of rules and regulations for all member states. They also had to meet a set of basic principles known as the Copenhagen Criteria before negotiations for membership could start; the criteria include a requirement for “stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.” These principles were translated into specific benchmarks through National Progress Reports. Compiled and monitored by the European Commission with input from the candidate country governments, the reports identified specific areas where improvements were required for negotiations to advance, ranging from reforming legal frameworks and reorganizing ministries to enforcing new laws and regulations. The National Progress Reports also facilitated monitoring by the Commission by clearly specifying the criteria according to which progress would be judged. In keeping with the interests of EU member states, the reports emphasized the countries’ capacity to manage their borders and cooperate with member states on interdicting transnational crime. The process thus translated countries’ desire to join the EU into pressure for specific reforms of ministries of interior.

While the European Commission monitored progress and negotiated each phase of the process, the candidate country governments led the design and implementation of reforms. The acquis did not include detailed rules for institutional structure or organization. Although many of the requirements were driven by the interests of member states, candidate countries were left with some space for making their own decisions on the structure of their forces, the organization of their administrations, and the sequence of steps to be taken. The process thus put the onus on the countries themselves—and individual leaders within the countries—to design and lead the reforms necessary to meet the criteria.

The EU also provided assistance to enable these changes. Assistance was managed primarily by the European Commission, which transferred funds to candidate countries for
specific reforms, procured technical assistance through direct contracts with consulting firms, or paired candidate country institutions with counterpart institutions in EU member states through “twinning” contracts. These mechanisms enabled candidate countries to select the institutional models they saw as most appropriate. For the twinning contracts, the candidate country could specify the assistance to be provided and select among a set of proposals by member state institutions. The selected member state institution deployed a long-term expert along with a package of shorter-term advisers, often establishing a longer-term relationship between the institutions and individuals.10 Between 1998 and 2002, around 700 “twinners” and 20,000 experts from EU member states were sent to candidate countries, at a cost of nearly €500 million.11 While the candidate countries took the lead on the nature, model, and sequencing of reforms, the European Commission ensured that its priority concerns were addressed by directing the lion’s share of its resources to its priority sectors, including justice and home affairs.

Changes within particular sectors were reinforced through broader reforms of the countries’ bureaucracies. The Copenhagen Criteria required countries to develop the administrative capacity necessary to implement the rules and regulations of the acquis, and to coordinate and manage the complex negotiation process. The resulting efforts to build more professional and apolitical civil service systems paid off in the quality and professionalism of personnel in the ministries of interior. Reforms within the ministries were grounded in broader improvements in procurement, financial management, budgeting, and personnel management, which served as the building blocks for effective oversight of law enforcement forces.

This combination of a strong political incentive, country-level leadership and commitment, clear requirements and monitoring, customized technical assistance, and broader administrative reform enabled significant transformations of the law enforcement and security forces and their oversight ministries. The process did confront numerous obstacles, and was criticized for being driven too much by EU member state interests and for failing to incorporate the concerns of civil society within candidate countries. Even after joining the EU, some countries continue to struggle with weak administrative and legal systems in trying to meet the requirements of the acquis. Nonetheless, the process resulted in notable changes in the capacity and structure of ministries and in the professionalism and performance of law enforcement forces. The transformation of these institutions is matched perhaps only by the success of NATO accession in transforming countries’ defense sectors, which took place in parallel in many of the same countries.

**The European Commission’s Development Approach**

The European Commission has supported ministerial oversight of the security sector as part of its portfolio of development activities around the world.12 The Commission manages assistance programs aimed at improving governance and building institutional capacity in a variety of sectors. In the security and justice sectors, it has supported programs ranging from criminal investigation training to strengthening the strategic planning and oversight capacity of ministries of justice and interior. In 2006, the European Commission adopted a policy on SSR that emphasized its attention to “the governance aspects of SSR,” including “support for state institutions dealing with management and oversight of the security system . . . [and] for civilian control and democratic governance of the public sector in general.”13 Commission funding in this area has focused on crisis prevention activities, consolidation of democratic governance and the rule of law, and support for human rights.

Funds managed by the European Commission are expended through a variety of mechanisms, including direct budget support to host governments, technical assistance contracts with private firms, grants to NGOs, and, in the EU enlargement context, twinning contracts.

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The Commission has in some cases contracted directly with security forces, training centers, and other relevant institutions in member states through a restricted competition and contracting process. These mechanisms have been used to access specialized expertise in EU member states, including that necessary for the core functions of oversight ministries. The majority of European Commission programs are planned and implemented in multiyear frameworks. This structure enables the slow, long-term work involved in strengthening institutions, yet it also limits the Commission’s flexibility to respond to crises. The Commission also manages small pools of funding aimed at crisis environments, including the budget for CSDP operations managed by the European Council Secretariat and the Instrument for Stability (IfS). The IfS allows rapid expenditure of funds in support of conflict prevention, early recovery following natural disasters, and postconflict stabilization. Although these funds are limited, they have been used to kick-start SSR activities in programs of up to eighteen months’ duration, such as rapid assessments and the provision of short-term advice, often in conjunction with a CSDP mission in the same country.

**Common Security and Defense Policy Crisis Interventions**

Another mechanism for addressing security and law enforcement issues in crisis contexts is the Common Security and Defense Policy. The CSDP was launched by the European Council in 1999 as part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy to strengthen the EU’s “capacity for autonomous action . . . to respond to international crises.” Since the first mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2003, the CSDP has fielded twenty-two missions aimed at establishing security and strengthening local institutions through the deployment of military and civilian personnel. The majority of these missions have focused on deploying civilian capacity to address rule of law and civilian security. The European Council has adopted SSR as a core activity for CSDP missions, to include “oversight/budget control, administration, transparency and accountability, as well as political control” and “co-locating experts to the national ministry of home affairs to monitor, mentor and advise local authorities in issues related to home affairs policy and SSR.” Although only three recent missions have made explicit reference to SSR in their mandates, many of the missions, from Kosovo to Afghanistan, have sent personnel to advise ministries of interior as part of efforts to strengthen the rule of law.

The core of CSDP missions is the deployment of personnel seconded from member states. The European Council Secretariat has been building its capability to deploy civilian police, border management, and justice sector personnel, including judges, prosecutors, and corrections officials. Although sometimes deployed with an executive mandate, these personnel are more often tasked with “monitoring, mentoring and advising” host country personnel and institutions. Through a methodology that has evolved over successive missions, advisers identify weaknesses in organization, capability, or performance, suggest projects aimed at overcoming these challenges, and advise counterparts on the implementation of the projects. In many missions with a rule-of-law or policing mandate, advisers have worked in the ministry of interior on policy, legislation, and administration to complement the more operational support provided to law enforcement forces. The advisers are supposed to help develop policy and procedures while building the capacity of individuals, often with a focus on strategic-level decision makers to maximize impact. As these missions have evolved, they have become increasingly adept at mobilizing personnel with specialized skills. Yet, as described below, they have at times struggled to find sufficient personnel and resources to fill these roles or leverage their short-term deployments to foster longer-term institutional change.
Complementary Support by Bilateral European Donors

Several EU member states manage their own bilateral assistance programs. In addition to seconding personnel to CSDP missions, member states fund technical assistance, training, and equipment through their own contracts and budget support. Some of these agencies have contributed significantly to strengthening ministries of interior and other oversight mechanisms for the security sector. For instance, the UK’s Department for International Development and the Netherlands government have supported strategic planning processes and provided training and technical assistance directed to ministries of interior and justice on policy, administration, and other aspects of oversight. Development agencies in France, Germany, and other EU states have deployed advisers or brought developing country officials to training institutions in their countries. This type of targeted assistance can complement CSDP missions by funding longer-term support for priorities identified by CSDP advisers. While bilateral efforts play important roles in strengthening ministries of interior, the remainder of this report focuses on assistance provided through EU institutions rather than through bilateral programs.

Overcoming Challenges to Strengthening Ministerial Oversight

The EU’s experience in strengthening ministries of interior highlights a number of challenges. Especially in the security sector, limited capacity, political tension, and organizational resistance can stymie attempts to reform or strengthen a ministry, even where there is strong commitment. The EU’s experience in the enlargement process yields four broad principles for organizing external assistance to overcome these challenges: defining a clear structure early on, mobilizing personnel with specialized skills, strengthening internal leadership and external support to manage resistance, and ensuring a coherent approach among donors. In postconflict and stabilization environments the challenges are often deeper. Human capacity is more limited, resistance is more entrenched, and tensions can explode into violence. In the absence of the carrot of EU membership, the EU has often struggled to foster effective oversight and responsive security forces. Nonetheless, its successes and challenges yield insights into how these principles can be adapted to other contexts.

Defining a Structure, Mandate, and Roles

A crucial step in developing a ministry’s oversight role is defining a structure, mandate, and roles for the ministry and the various forces under its authority. Key elements to be decided include the allocation of roles and functions across ministries and forces, the level of autonomy of security forces vis-à-vis the ministry, the basic mission and orientation of the forces, and the relationship of the ministry to other parts of the security and justice sectors. Each of these decisions affects the appropriate organization and functions of the oversight ministry and implies different priorities for external assistance. Although no universal models exist, and countries must decide these issues according to their own contexts, a decision is crucial to enable efforts to strengthen both the ministry and the security and law enforcement forces.

During the recent wave of EU enlargement, these decisions constituted a crucial basis for assistance. The European Commission devoted considerable attention to reorienting security forces away from protecting the state and political interests and toward serving the public and enhancing safety and security. This shift required the development of new oversight and accountability functions within the ministry while shifting operational control out of the ministry to increase the autonomy of law enforcement forces. Commission-funded experts helped draft the appropriate laws and regulations and develop the capacity to implement...
them. Given its interests in secure borders and in confronting transnational crime, the EU focused especially on reorganizing border forces and placing them under a single oversight ministry to enhance coordination with other law enforcement agencies. Within these parameters, however, candidate countries had to choose the most appropriate structure and organization. The European Commission sometimes supported the process of defining the model and structure. In general, however, Commission assistance was most effective after basic decisions had been made by the candidate country itself.\textsuperscript{23}

In postconflict and stabilization environments, weak capacity and political tension can create obstacles to arriving at such decisions. Individuals who benefit from control of resources or authority may resist change. Lack of experience among officials in policymaking, planning, and budgeting can prevent clear decisions from being reached on how to allocate these functions. Yet failure to commit to a clear direction can severely undermine the impact of assistance efforts. In Afghanistan, for example, fundamental disagreements over whether to emphasize counterinsurgency efforts or more community-oriented policing, fueled in part by differences among donors, delayed the development of the ministry and the police forces.\textsuperscript{24} Even minor disagreements over where to house specific functions can delay progress. Once a clear framework for the ministry of internal affairs was established—after some delay—in Kosovo, disagreements among donors over specific procedures and systems delayed progress, and the government was reluctant to alienate donors by choosing one side or another. Lack of consensus on structure and roles can also undermine the impact of individual advisers. In the absence of clear guidelines, advisers tend to fall back on their experience in their home countries, leading to conflicting advice that fuels confusion and lack of confidence in the advisers.\textsuperscript{25} The absence of consensus within the country also increases the risk that assistance programs reflect the priorities of donors rather than local priorities.

Given these complexities, achieving a consensus on the structure, mandate, and roles of the ministry and security forces has posed a significant challenge for the EU in crisis environments. The EU often provides assistance in the absence of a clear institutional structure or direction for the security forces. Consistent with its development approach, the European Commission tends to identify specific weaknesses and focus technical assistance on them. Without an overall framework, European Commission–funded technical advisers have been stymied by political resistance or unclear commitment. For CSDP missions, objectives are defined prior to deployment in a Crisis Management Concept and elaborated in a Concept of Operations and an Operational Plan, all developed by the European Council Secretariat and approved by the Council. These documents lay out the broad goals of the mission and the modalities for operation in the field, but they do not specify goals or approaches for achieving consensus on the structure of institutions within the host country. The CSDP has developed concepts for strengthening the police and justice systems that include detail on approaches, specific structures, and means for achieving them.\textsuperscript{26} These concepts do not, however, include guidance for oversight ministries. In the absence of clear standards for the EU in this area, advisers often promote varying and sometimes conflicting approaches based on their own experiences.

CSDP and European Commission planning teams have sought to overcome these challenges by more clearly defining institutional reform objectives prior to deployment. Since most CSDP missions are deployed at the request of a state, negotiations with the state can provide an opportunity to specify a structure—or at least a process for achieving a decision. Recent CSDP missions have deployed on the basis of strategic plans for the security sector that were approved by the government and laid out specific legislation and procedures to be reformed.\textsuperscript{27} In more urgent stabilization missions, achieving such a consensus may not be possible prior to deployment. In such cases, CSDP personnel have supported strategic

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planning processes to help achieve this consensus. In Afghanistan, a strategic plan and accompanying action plans for the ministry of interior, which were endorsed by the government of Afghanistan, have helped focus capacity-building efforts by various donors within agreed-upon areas. Although often difficult and time-consuming, these processes can lay the basis for longer-term institution-building programs supported by the European Commission or bilateral donors. Defining a structure and direction early on can be crucial to the success of assistance efforts in later phases of engagement.

**Deploying the Right Personnel**

Even with a clear structure, effective assistance requires personnel with the right skills and experience. Strengthening ministries of interior requires individuals skilled in such areas as setting up organizations and procedures, assessing organizational weaknesses, designing strategies and policies, planning and monitoring budgets, drafting laws and regulations, coordinating actors and agencies, and training and mentoring officials. Many of these skills can be found outside law enforcement, in other areas of public administration. Yet it is also important to deploy personnel with experience applying these skills to law enforcement issues, preferably in similar contexts, to ensure their familiarity with the relevant issues, and to enhance confidence and comfort among officials in the host country. During the EU enlargement process, the European Commission tapped the diversity of experience and models through technical assistance and twinning contracts. Although their impact varied, these programs were found to be most effective when the personnel selected had the right skills and experience, when they were deployed for more than a year, and when the program enabled the development of longer-term relationships among counterpart institutions and personnel.

The European Commission recruits personnel for crisis environments in much the same way as it does for its development programs in other contexts. It generally recruits on the open market, through private firms, to find and deploy individuals with the specialized skills and experience needed to tackle specific issues. This approach facilitates the recruitment of personnel with specific skills and is capable of providing a broad range of assistance over the multiyear period typically needed for institutional development. The quality of the individuals varies, however, since skilled private consultants are in high demand or difficult to mobilize, especially to work in insecure environments. Nor does contracting with private firms foster relationships among counterpart officials or institutions. With the exception of the limited funds available in the IFS, European Commission programs are generally unable to respond to rapidly changing crisis contexts.

The CSDP relies on officials seconded from member states. Starting in 2001, a series of successive targets was set for voluntary contributions of personnel from EU member states through the Civilian Headline Goals. Careful analysis involving illustrative deployment scenarios was used to generate a breakdown of all the functions and skills that might be required, along with detailed job descriptions that could be matched to the requirements of specific missions. This approach has enabled CSDP missions to recruit individuals with skills and expertise appropriate to the particular missions. The use of seconded personnel rather than individuals hired through contracts leads to an enhanced level of comfort for counterpart officials while fostering longer-term institutional relationships as seconded officials draw from their home institutions for expertise and support.

The primary challenge for CSDP planners has been their reliance on member states to identify and second personnel. The responsiveness of member states to requests is inconsistent, ranging from the Finnish model, which includes a national strategy and an inter-ministerial coordination mechanism for recruiting personnel, to more fragmented systems that recruit personnel from different levels of government on an ad hoc basis.
even the most committed member states, the number of skilled personnel made available for these missions is limited. Individuals with specialized expertise are too highly valued in their home institutions to be released for sufficient periods to operate as effective mentors in other countries. The limited budget available to the CSDP pays only for the travel costs of personnel, leaving member states to shoulder the burden of salaries while their personnel are deployed. Missions sometimes supplement seconded staff with personnel hired through direct contracts, yet tight budgets limit this option. In insecure environments such as Afghanistan, missions face the additional challenge of finding willing volunteers. With nearly 2,000 civilians already deployed, the CSDP has had trouble finding sufficient personnel, leaving some missions chronically understaffed.

The European Council has sought to address these shortfalls through a new Civilian Headline Goal adopted in 2010. The secretariat is working with member states to streamline their recruitment procedures and offer additional incentives for deployment. As the number, scale, and complexity of missions have increased, the secretariat has undertaken new analysis to revise the requirements, position descriptions, and mix of personnel, based on the experience of CSDP missions. It has begun to streamline recruitment through the Civilian Capabilities Management Tool, which includes a number of software applications aimed at matching personnel to missions through permanently updated catalogues of mission tasks, job descriptions, equipment, and contexts. The Council has also created Civilian Response Teams and a new SSR pool to rapidly mobilize experts from member states for short-term missions and to assist the secretariat in developing concepts, tools, or approaches. The SSR pool will include individuals with skills related to policy, strategy, and organizational development. These efforts should help the EU tap the depth of expertise in member states to deploy the most qualified and appropriate staff. Yet the limited time frame of their deployments means staff will continue to rely on the more enduring assistance provided by the European Commission and other donors for institutional development.

An additional challenge is ensuring that individuals have the necessary skills and preparation for their deployment. The most capable technical experts often lack skills necessary to mentor and advise counterparts, familiarity with the local context, or knowledge of the objectives of the mission. Especially for seconded personnel without experience overseas, training and preparation can be essential in enabling them to use their skills effectively. For CSDP missions, member states are responsible for training their own personnel, leading to inconsistencies in the availability, content, and quality of training. The European Council Secretariat has begun to make training courses available in partnership with the European Group on Training and the European Security and Defence College, a network of institutions and academies throughout Europe. The availability of training remains limited compared to what is required, however, and many of the training programs are either ad hoc or designed for high-level officials rather than personnel to be deployed. The secretariat has also been developing curricula in specialized areas, including SSR. Despite these efforts, much more work is required to improve capacity to quickly recruit and deploy specialized personnel and to ensure consistent preparation for deployment.

Managing Organizational Change

Even with a clearly defined structure and appropriate human and material resources, assistance efforts inevitably confront obstacles generated by political, organizational, or individual resistance. Managing these obstacles requires strong leadership and sufficient resources applied for an extended period of time. External actors can support this process by contributing resources, bolstering skills, and, perhaps most important, backing the leaders who must make risky decisions through sustained political engagement.
In the context of EU enlargement, a uniquely powerful incentive—entry into the EU, with its economic and political benefits—generated considerable momentum. By helping to build consensus on a strategic direction, specifying benchmarks, and monitoring progress, the European Commission helped translate this incentive into specific changes. The Commission also helped sustain momentum by raising key issues through diplomatic channels, publishing lack of compliance and deficits to garner public attention, sometimes withholding aid in cases of delay by the host government, and rewarding progress with discrete steps along the road to accession. The process was most successful when support was provided to leaders and officials within candidate countries to enhance their skills, provide needed equipment, connect them to networks of counterparts in other countries, and back them up politically to help them overcome obstacles in their countries. The European Commission played a key role in this process by raising technical issues to the political level at the European Council, thereby helping maintain pressure on both sides to resolve difficult issues. Since accession was a priority for the European Council and for member states, they continually raised issues in their relations with the candidate countries to maintain a focus on reforms.

The European Commission devoted less attention in the EU enlargement context to involving the broader constituencies needed to back difficult reforms. Changes in EU candidate countries were often driven by governments, without sufficient support from key segments of their populations. In postconflict and stabilization environments, where incentives as powerful as EU membership are rarely present, such support can be critical to the success of reforms. Although CSDP missions engage primarily with state agencies, Commission-funded programs often support civil society, political parties, parliaments, judiciaries, and other actors. Where they are sufficiently linked, these programs can complement institutional reform efforts by providing political leaders and officials with critical domestic support and facilitating the passage and implementation of new laws, procedures, and mandates. Engagement with civil society and other constituencies can also contribute to longer-term political support for reforms to ensure they are sustained after external assistance decreases. Yet both European Commission and CSDP missions have often failed to coordinate these broader assistance efforts with more technical assistance efforts to ministries and law enforcement forces.

Difficulties in achieving coherence among EU member states in postconflict and stabilization environments have further limited the EU’s potential to leverage its relationships and overcome resistance. Even where candidacy for the EU has been on the agenda, as in the western Balkans, disagreements among EU member states and trade-offs between short- and long-term objectives have prevented the EU from leveraging its relationships to overcome obstacles to reform. In the absence of consensus over the direction of reforms or a framework that enables donors to back up technical assistance with political engagement, assistance efforts depend largely on individual relationships, with limited potential for politically or organizationally difficult changes. European Commission–funded institution-building programs can provide crucial assistance for the protracted technical work of developing regulations, procedures, and capacity. Without a political framework such as that afforded by EU accession, however, Commission consultants rarely have access to the political clout needed to support leaders in difficult positions. In CSDP missions, frequent rotations, language barriers, and security restrictions limit the potential for international staff to develop productive relationships. Weak or corrupt civil service systems in many crisis-affected countries compound these challenges and limit the benefit of mentoring and training. Faced with entrenched resistance and the difficulty of achieving changes, CSDP personnel have tended to take on functions themselves rather than try to strengthen their counterparts, thus limiting their impact on organizational changes.
The EU has succeeded in some postconflict and stabilization environments in leveraging the relationships of the European Council and member states with host countries. A constitution, peace accord, strategic plan, or other document that embodies a clear direction for reforms can serve as the framework for dialogue in a similar way to EU accession. With their presence on the ground, CSDP missions can monitor progress to identify and raise issues to the political or diplomatic level. An effective head of mission (HoM) of the CSDP can play a critical role in this process, particularly for ministries of interior. The HoM can liaise directly with counterparts at the minister level to develop relationships, facilitate cooperation among counterparts, and bring obstacles to the attention of the European Council. In Kosovo, a team of advisers to the Ministry of Internal Affairs was placed under the HoM to facilitate engagement. Once issues are raised, EU member states can use their collective or individual influence to engage host country governments diplomatically. The CSDP mission in Georgia was able to leverage the influence of a unified European Council to maintain momentum on rule-of-law reforms, at one point using the visit of Georgian officials to Brussels to raise the level of attention to these issues. In other cases, however, achieving the level of coherence needed to back up host country officials and overcome political obstacles has been a major challenge.

Enhancing Donor Coordination

Leveraging assistance to manage political and organizational obstacles and support internal leaders requires close coordination among donors. For the EU enlargement process, the convergence of interests among EU member states and the role of the European Commission in negotiating and monitoring on their behalf helped overcome these challenges. Using the National Progress Reports to build consensus among EU member states, the European Commission set the agenda for the European Council regarding reforms that required political attention. The Commission served as the focal point for raising issues to the political level when necessary, while ensuring the space needed for technical work.

In crisis contexts, coordination has been more challenging. In the absence of a clear framework or focal point, the lack of consensus and insufficient coordination on the direction of reforms have undermined the ability to leverage relationships while leading to duplication, manipulation, and wasted resources. Lack of coordination is especially damaging in the security sector, as different donors’ support of different forces can complicate efforts by the ministry of interior to coordinate among them or to establish linkages among security and justice actors. Disagreements among the EU’s twenty-seven member states have directly undermined efforts to strengthen institutions and leverage relationships. Differences over the sovereign status of Kosovo, for instance, have limited the impact of the CSDP mission and prevented it from engaging on key issues.

Additional obstacles arise from the separate structures and lines of authority between the European Commission and the European Council–led CSDP missions, resulting in separate planning and implementation processes in the same country. CSDP missions are limited by their budgets and short-term mandates from supporting integrated or long-term projects, and must instead rely on the European Commission or other donors. As a result of its multiyear planning framework, however, European Commission assistance is rarely coordinated to fill the gaps or address the reforms prioritized by crisis-oriented CSDP personnel. When they have been linked, these efforts have result in useful synergies. In Kosovo, input by the CSDP into the National Progress Report, compiled by the European Commission as part of the pre-accession process, resulted in targeted Commission assistance to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This type of coordination has been ad hoc and inconsistent, however, especially in countries outside the EU accession framework. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the
European Commission and CSDP missions were following two separate and disconnected strategies for the security sector.\textsuperscript{39}

The Lisbon Treaty addresses many of these shortfalls in order to improve the EU’s capacity to coordinate and leverage its influence. Changes include the establishment of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who oversees the new European External Action Service comprising personnel from the European Commission and European Council Secretariat. In Brussels, Commission programs and CSDP missions will benefit from a more integrated planning process to ensure that Commission and CSDP interventions complement each other in contributing toward a common set of objectives. In the field, new political officers deployed to the EU delegations will help link technical and political issues when appropriate. EU ambassadors with more direct ties to member states should help enlist member states’ support to overcome political obstacles. These changes are for the most part untested, however. Since the CSDP mission and the European Commission maintain separate institutional structures, coordination at the level of implementation will continue to rely on individual efforts. Nonetheless, these changes may contribute to improved coherence and better ability to support technical assistance through diplomatic engagement.

Even where EU assistance achieves greater coherence, competing priorities and programming approaches with other donors undermine momentum and complicate efforts. To address these challenges, planners in the EU and elsewhere have proposed the use of joint planning and implementation mechanisms, by pooling donor funds, by defining joint objectives and programs, or by sharing information on a regular basis. The CSDP has established agreements with a number of countries, including the United States, to enable them to contribute their personnel to EU missions. U.S. personnel have served in the CSDP mission to Kosovo, for instance, leading to greater cooperation between the EU and the United States. Common benchmarks, indicators, and evaluation tools could focus attention on shared goals and measures of success to promote coherent approaches and overcome coordination challenges. Yet these approaches have been difficult to achieve among donors, experts, and host government officials wedded to their perspectives or unable to manage these conflicts. Improved planning between headquarters would be required to lay the groundwork for coordination in the field.

**Recommendations for Enhancing Transatlantic Cooperation in the Security Sector**

A capable oversight ministry is critical to the effectiveness and responsiveness of security and law enforcement forces. Oversight ministries can improve coordination, strengthen accountability, enable core administrative functions, and facilitate other means of civilian oversight. Ministries are also at the center of political and organizational struggles involved in transforming security and law enforcement forces. Support to oversight ministries can be essential to strengthening governance of the security sector and to enabling other components of assistance to succeed. The EU has built its capacity to mobilize experts from among member states with diverse governance structures, legal cultures, organizational models, languages, and experiences in transforming ministries of interior. It has also gained experience in building consensus on the structure of oversight institutions, and in leveraging the relationships of member states to help overcome political obstacles to change. Yet the EU has struggled to achieve the necessary coherence among its twenty-seven member states and between the European Council–led CSDP missions and the European Commission. In some crisis contexts the EU has failed to mobilize sufficient skilled personnel or to link crisis-oriented assistance provided by the CSDP missions with the European Commission’s longer-term support to institutions and civil society. Although changes adopted
in the Lisbon Treaty may improve coherence, these challenges have so far limited the EU’s unique potential to help overcome obstacles and catalyze improved governance in crisis and stabilization environments.

These challenges are not unique to the EU. Institutional change in the security sector is a long-term, complex endeavor that requires coherent, targeted, and sustained engagement on a variety of fronts. The U.S. government faces its own impediments to such integrated support. On the one hand, its political influence and the ability to adopt a coherent diplomatic position have facilitated political and organizational change when that influence is mobilized effectively over time. Yet the United States has also struggled to mobilize qualified personnel and to achieve coordinated and sustained political and technical engagement among agencies with varying short- and long-term perspectives. The experience of the EU suggests a number of ways in which the U.S. government could enhance its efforts to strengthen security and law enforcement forces.

**Recommendations for Washington Agencies**

The U.S. government should broaden and deepen the pool of personnel available for deployment overseas and should enhance coordination among agencies providing assistance. Looking beyond police organizations, U.S. government agencies should seek experts with management and oversight experience in law enforcement at the state and local levels to plan, manage, and implement assistance programs. Required skills and job descriptions should be identified through scenario-based planning, drawing on the previous missions and experiences of the United States, the EU, and the UN. Methods of securing expertise should move beyond reliance on contracts and explore agreements with state and local governments and the use of the Civilian Response Corps to identify and deploy government officials with policy, legal, financial, and administrative backgrounds in law enforcement.40 To apply this expertise effectively to institutional development, individuals deployed for short-term assistance should coordinate more consistently with longer-term, integrated development programming, as well as with diplomats who manage political relationships. Achieving greater coherence within the U.S. government will require more clearly defined policy, roles, relationships, and coordination mechanisms for the agencies involved.

**Recommendations for Transatlantic Cooperation**

The U.S. government should pursue cooperation with the European Commission and the European Council Secretariat. Efforts should focus on developing common concepts and methods for providing assistance to security sector governance institutions, including oversight ministries. The European Council has begun this process through its focus on strengthening police forces and the justice sector, but more work is needed for oversight institutions. U.S. government agencies should work with their European counterparts to learn from their experience, achieve consensus on the most appropriate models, structures, and approaches, and determine the most appropriate role and contribution of each donor for strengthening oversight ministries and security forces in different contexts. The United States should also seek cooperation on predeployment training by collaborating on curricula and organizing joint training programs, building on existing curricula and training courses.

**Recommendations for Actions in Postconflict Contexts**

In postconflict and stabilization countries, the United States and the EU should define common objectives and joint frameworks for providing assistance. Collaborative efforts should begin in the assessment and planning stage and should include cooperation on strategic
planning processes, joint steering committees, common assessments, and shared indicators and measurement tools. Shared objectives and approaches can enable the United States and the EU to jointly leverage their relationships with host countries and officials more effectively. The United States should seek more opportunities to deploy its personnel in EU missions, especially where the EU has deeper relationships or capacity; invite seconded European experts into its own missions; and find ways to fund priorities identified by EU experts. Although bilateral assistance is necessary, sharing personnel can enhance coherence for institutional development. Such cooperation would be a crucial building block in fostering effective security and law enforcement while serving as a model for broader cooperation in crisis and stabilization contexts.
Notes

3. This politicization through the ministry was a driver of tension and conflict in Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and elsewhere. See, for example, International Crisis Group, No Room for Complacency: Europe Report no. 149 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003). Similar dynamics have fueled conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo.
7. The U.S. State Department, Department of Justice, and Department of Defense have deployed advisers to ministries of interior in a few cases, for example in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. USAID has broader experience strengthening ministries in other sectors but has been constrained by legal and policy restrictions from supporting oversight of security and law enforcement.
8. The Copenhagen Criteria are (1) stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; (2) a functioning market economy, as well as the ability to cope with the pressure of competition and the ability to assume the obligations of membership, in particular adherence to the objectives of political, economic, and monetary union. In addition, candidate countries must be able to put the EU rules and procedures into effect and must have adapted their administrative systems to meet EU standards.
9. The Phare program for 2000–2006 was the primary mechanism to support EU candidate countries in Eastern and Central Europe.
12. For an overview of EU funding mechanisms and their application to SSR, see Maria Derks and Sylvie More, “The European Union and Internal Challenges for Effectively Supporting Security Sector Reform” (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2009).
14. These efforts have been tried in only a few places (European Commission official, interview, Brussels, September 29, 2010).
15. The IIS contains €2.062 billion for 2007–11, including €1.487 billion for short-term and €484 million for long-term conflict prevention, early recovery following natural disasters, and postconflict stabilization. Up to €20 million can be disbursed without approval of member states. See Derks and More, “The European Union and Internal Challenges.”
17. The CSDP was formerly known as the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) until changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.
21. The three SSR missions are EUSEC Democratic Republic of Congo, EUPOL Democratic Republic of Congo, and EU SSR Guinea-Bissau.
25. This critique was especially salient in the early days of the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo missions. See, for example, Michal Meringen and Rasa Ostrowskaite, “ESDP Police Missions: Meaning, Context and Operational Challenges,” European Foreign Affairs Review 10, no. 2 (2005): 215–35.
27. The CSDP mission in Guinea-Bissau, for instance, deployed on the basis of a strategic plan and a request by the government to implement the plan. When the mission failed to achieve substantial progress, the existence of this plan also helped justify a decision to end the mission when it became clear after a change in political conditions that there was insufficient commitment within the government. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/100930%20FACTSHEET%20EU%20SSR%20Guinea-Bissau%20-%20version%2012%20EN.pdf.


30. The first goal was set in 2001 at 200 rule-of-law officials and 2,000 members of civil protection teams. In 2004 these targets were raised to 5,761 police officers, 631 rule-of-law personnel (including judges, prosecutors, and corrections officers), 562 civilian administration experts, and 4,968 members of civil protection teams. See the Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference, Ministerial Declaration, Brussels, November 22, 2004, 102. For an overall assessment of the output of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, see Council Document 14807/07, “Final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, 9 November 2007,” approved by the Ministerial Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference and noted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (Brussels: European Council, November 19, 2007).


32. The Common Foreign and Security Policy budget for roughly 2,000 civilians was only €245million in 2009, limited to travel costs. See Derks and More, “The European Union and Internal Challenges.”

33. Contrary to expectations, the majority of missions have been civilian rather than military, and have focused more on strengthening local institutions than on executive functions. European Council Secretariat official, interview, Brussels, October 28, 2010.

34. See Grevi, Helly, and Keohane, European Security and Defence Policy. 111.


38. Lippert and Umbach, The Pressure of Europeanization, 45.


40. The Civilian Response Corps is a capacity managed by the U.S. Department of State to quickly mobilize civilians with specialized skills to deploy to crisis and stabilization environments.
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