Presented to the
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

December 18, 2018
Disclaimer

Since the horrific February 14, 2018 shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, the Trump Administration has devoted considerable time, resources, and effort to studying ways to keep our students safe and our schools secure. The Federal Commission on School Safety was designed to both research and recommend solutions to advance the safety of our schools. The Commission’s observations and recommendations are contained in this report.

The Commission recognizes that the problem of school violence is long-standing and complex and that there are certain limits to what the federal government can do. This Commission was not established to provide a single solution to this problem, nor did the Commissioners set out to mandate uniform policy to every community. In fact, it is our considered belief that doing so would prove counterproductive. There can be no “one-size-fits-all” approach for an issue this complex.

The shooting in Parkland, FL, was not the first of its kind, nor is it likely to be the last. This does not mean we should give up on doing all we can to minimize the chances that something like that could happen again.

In the pages that follow, the Commission makes recommendations that address multiple aspects of school safety. It does so based on the insights, experiences, and expertise of a wide range of individuals. The recommendations are predicated on the policies already working in state and local communities. They outline steps we all can take—families, communities, schools, houses of worship, law enforcement, medical professionals, government, and others.

Each of us has a role to play in improving the safety of our students and the security of our schools. Only by working together can we help prevent future tragedies and, when those incidents do occur, mitigate their effects and continue to learn from them.

The U.S. Departments of Education, Justice, Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services do not mandate or prescribe practices, models, or other activities in this document. This report contains examples of, adaptations of, and links to resources created and maintained by other public and private organizations. This information, informed by research and gathered in part from practitioners, is provided for the reader’s convenience and is included here to offer examples of the many resources that educators, parents, advocates, administrators, and other concerned parties may find helpful and use at their discretion. The Departments do not control or guarantee the accuracy, relevance, timeliness, or completeness of this outside information. Further, the inclusion of links to items and examples does not reflect their importance, nor are they intended to represent or be an endorsement by the Commission or any of its members, any federal agency or department, or the U.S. Government of any views expressed, or materials provided.

This document has no force or effect of law and does not create any additional requirements for the public beyond those included in applicable laws and regulations; nor does it create any additional rights for any person, entity, or organization. Implementation of the practices identified in this guide is purely voluntary, and no federal agency will take any action against schools that do not adopt them.
December 18, 2018

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Our nation’s schools must be safe places to learn. Sadly, incidents of school violence are too common in the United States, and far too many families and communities have suffered.

Following the school shooting in Parkland, FL, you established the Federal Commission on School Safety. You tasked the Commission with producing a report of policy recommendations in an effort to help prevent future tragedies.

Our work included field visits, listening sessions, and meetings with anyone and everyone who is focused on identifying and elevating solutions. After learning from students, parents, teachers, school safety personnel, law enforcement officers, mental health professionals, and others who play a role in keeping students safe, we have developed recommendations for leaders at the local, state, and federal levels. Our key observations and recommendations are included in this report. Our goal has been to identify local, state, and federal policy for lawmakers and local officials to consider. The report’s recommendations can assist states and local communities in preventing school violence and improving recovery efforts following an incident.

There is no universal school safety plan that will work for every school across the country. Such a prescriptive approach by the federal government would be inappropriate, imprudent, and ineffective. We focused instead on learning more about, and then raising awareness of, ideas that are already working for communities across the country. That is why the Commission’s work and recommendations focus on a variety of school sizes, structures, and geographic locations.

The federal government can play a role in enhancing safety in schools. However, state legislators should work with local school leaders, teachers, parents, and students themselves to address their own unique challenges and develop their own specific solutions. What may work in one community may or may not be the right approach in another. Each local problem needs local solutions. Rather than mandate what schools must do, this report serves to identify options that policymakers should explore.

Ultimately, ensuring the safety of our children begins within ourselves, at the kitchen table, in houses of worship, and in community centers. The recommendations within this report do not and cannot supplant the role families have in our culture and in the lives of children. Our country’s moral fabric needs more threads of love, empathy, and connection.

Together with states, local communities, and families, we can all continue working to uphold our promise to keep students safe as they pursue their futures at school.

Sincerely,

Betsy DeVos, Secretary
U.S. Department of Education
Chair, Federal Commission on School Safety

Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Alex M. Azar II, Secretary
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Matthew Whitaker, Acting Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
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Background

Decades of Problems

On February 14, 2018, a former student walked into Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, FL, and began firing. He murdered 17 people, and wounded many more.

Three months later, a shooter at Santa Fe High School in Texas murdered 10 people. These successive school shootings are two tragedies on a ledger that now spans decades.

School violence has been a persistent problem in the United States. For example, on January 29, 1979, a 16-year-old opened fire on Grover Cleveland Elementary School in San Diego, CA. She killed two adults and wounded eight students and one police officer, for seemingly no reason at all.

In each decade since, we have experienced tragedies of this kind. In the 1980s, communities across the country suffered from school killings—in Alabama and Nevada, in Missouri and Kansas, in Washington, North Carolina, Michigan, and Virginia.

The incidents continued during the 1990s. The decade culminated in a shooting in Littleton, CO—now known as the Columbine High School Massacre. On April 20, 1999, two shooters killed 13 fellow students and wounded 21 before taking their own lives. Virginia Tech came eight years later, with the death toll at 32. At Sandy Hook Elementary School in December 2012, a shooter claimed 26 lives.

These are not just numbers. These are lives that were tragically cut short.

A Tragic Chronology

The following list of school violence incidents is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to illustrate the breadth of the problem.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 29, 1979</td>
<td>Grover Cleveland Elementary School in San Diego, CA</td>
<td>two adults killed, eight students and one police officer wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 31, 1980</td>
<td>Hueytown High School in Hueytown, AL</td>
<td>one student wounded, shooter takes his own life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 19, 1982</td>
<td>Valley High School in Las Vegas, NV</td>
<td>one teacher killed, two students wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 20, 1983</td>
<td>Parkway South Junior High in St. Louis, MO</td>
<td>one student killed, one wounded, shooter takes his own life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 21, 1985</td>
<td>Goddard Junior High School in Goddard, KS</td>
<td>school principal killed, two teachers and one student wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 27, 1985</td>
<td>Spanaway Junior High School in Spanaway, WA</td>
<td>two students killed, shooter takes her own life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 9, 1986</td>
<td>Pine Forest High School in Fayetteville, NC</td>
<td>three students wounded, one critically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 17, 1987</td>
<td>Murray Wright High School in Detroit, MI</td>
<td>one student killed, two wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 16, 1988</td>
<td>Atlantic Shores Christian School in Virginia Beach, VA</td>
<td>two teachers shot, one fatally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 17, 1989</td>
<td>Cleveland Elementary School in Stockton, CA</td>
<td>five students killed, 29 others wounded, shooter takes his own life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2, 1996</td>
<td>Frontier Middle School in Moses Lake, WA</td>
<td>one teacher and two students killed, another student wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1, 1997</td>
<td>Pearl High School in Pearl, MS</td>
<td>shooter kills his mother then kills two classmates and injures seven others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1, 1997</td>
<td>Heath High School in West Paducah, KY</td>
<td>three students killed and five others wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 24, 1998</td>
<td>Westside Middle School in Jonesboro, AR</td>
<td>four students and one teacher killed, 11 others wounded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Establishment and Operation of the Federal Commission on School Safety

On March 12, 2018, President Donald Trump established the Federal Commission on School Safety to review safety practices and make meaningful and actionable recommendations of best practices to keep students safe. Members of the Commission include Secretary Betsy DeVos of the U.S. Department of Education (“ED”), Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) (succeeding former Attorney General Jeff Sessions), Secretary Alex Azar II of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), and Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).

To inform its work the Commission held a series of meetings, field visits, and listening sessions. Commission meetings provided a forum to hear from key stakeholders such as school safety experts, educators, and other concerned citizens. Field visits involved travel to schools by Commission members and staff to observe and learn firsthand about current practices in school safety. Listening sessions occurred around the country and provided the opportunity for the Commission to receive input directly from members of the general public. Parents, students, teachers, counselors, psychologists, administrators, and many others presented statements at these sessions. In addition to hearing from the public, most listening sessions included one or two separate roundtable discussions with state and local officials including Governors, State School Chiefs, law enforcement leadership, mental health representatives, and others.

The Commission held an organizational meeting on March 28, 2018. On May 17, 2018, the Department of Education hosted several families directly impacted by past school shootings, as well as authors of key reports. Full Commission meetings, field visits, and listening sessions began on May 31, 2018, and ended on August 28, 2018. (See page 7 for details of Commission events.) The Commission held four formal meetings, four field visits, and four listening sessions. Responsibilities for planning and carrying out the meetings and field visits were shared by each of the four depart-
ments, while the listening sessions were organized by ED, in consultation with the other departments.

The Commission’s meetings, field visits, and listening sessions were livestreamed and preceded by media advisories. In addition, Commission meetings and listening sessions were transcribed. All of the Commission events are posted to the Commission’s website, [http://www.ed.gov/school-safety/](http://www.ed.gov/school-safety/). Speakers’ written statements at Commission meetings as well as other useful information are also posted to this website.

In addition to the Commission meetings, field visits, and listening sessions, various Commission and agency staff members have met regularly with others in the school safety community. The Commission has repeatedly encouraged all who have an interest in school safety to submit their recommendations and views at safety@ed.gov for consideration by the Commission. Learning from students, parents, teachers, administrators, school safety personnel, school counselors, mental health professionals, law enforcement officers, security professionals, and others through the above-noted means has been critical to the work of the Commission. The Commission reviewed information received from each of these fora.

**Organizational Meeting.** On March 28, 2018, Secretary DeVos convened an organizational meeting of the Commission at the Lyndon B. Johnson Department of Education Building (LBJ). The Commission discussed the scope of work, staffing, coordination with state and local partners, the timeline for future meetings with stakeholders, and how best to incorporate stakeholder input on the areas of focus that President Trump directed the Commission to study.

**Discussion with Families and Authors.** On May 17, 2018, Secretary DeVos hosted a discussion at LBJ to learn from survivors and family members affected by the mass shootings at Columbine High School, Virginia Tech, Sandy Hook Elementary School, and Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. The discussion session also included authors of official after-action reports as well as others knowledgeable on school safety.

**ED-led Field Visit in Hanover, MD.** The first field visit occurred on May 31, 2018, at Frank Hebron-Harman Elementary School in Hanover, MD. The Commission toured the school and hosted a roundtable discussion with administrators, principals, teachers, students, and a national expert on Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports, which is a framework designed to improve social, emotional, behavioral, and academic outcomes for all students.

**ED-led Listening Session in Washington, D.C.** On June 6, 2018, the Commission hosted a public listening session at LBJ. The open session included stakeholders, students, experts, and others who offered recommendations on how best to improve school safety.

**ED-led Commission Meeting in Washington, D.C.** On June 21, 2018, the Commission held a Commission meeting at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building (EEOB) titled, “Ecology of Schools: Fostering a Culture of Human Flourishing and Developing Character.” Commissioners heard from three panels of experts who focused on the effects of entertainment, media, cyberbullying, and social media upon violence and student safety.

**ED-led Listening Session in Lexington, KY.** On June 26, 2018, the Commission hosted two roundtable discussions and its second listening session in Lexington, KY. The discussion included state and local officials, including the Governor of Kentucky, the First Lady of Wisconsin, a State Commissioner of Education, a State Commissioner of Safety and Homeland Security, a State Commissioner of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services, a Chairman of a State Board of Education, a Commissioner of State Police, and law enforcement officers. This session focused on how schools, districts, colleges and universities, and other state and local government agencies can improve school safety. As with the earlier listening session, this occasion provided an opportunity for members of the public to provide their recommendations.

**HHS-led Commission Meeting in Washington, D.C.** On July 11, 2018, the Commission hosted its second meeting at the EEOB titled “Curating a Healthier and Safer Approach: Issues of Mental Health and Counseling for
our Young.” Commissioners heard from three panels of experts who focused on mental health, psychotropic medications, and data and student records confidentiality issues.

HHS-led Field Visit in Adams County, WI. On July 24, 2018, the Commission held its second field visit at Adams Friendship Middle School in Adams County, WI. During this visit, the Commission learned about a rural middle school’s implementation of a statewide mental health framework and how the framework transformed the school’s ability to meet the behavioral health needs of its students. The visit included a roundtable discussion with state officials and mental health professionals. Commissioners also heard from a panel consisting of parents, students, administrators, law enforcement officers, and others, who shared details about integrated behavioral health, home visits and community navigation, cross-agency collaboration, and crisis response.

DOJ-led Commission Meeting in Washington, D.C. On July 26, 2018, the Commission hosted its third meeting at the EEOB titled “Proactively Protecting Our Schools.” This meeting focused on the importance of information sharing between schools and law enforcement, as well as the role of school resource officers (SROs).

DOJ-led Field Visit in Pearcy, AR. On August 1, 2018, the Commission held its third field visit at the Lake Hamilton School District in Pearcy, AR. The Commission heard from state-level elected leaders, legislators, local superintendents, a teacher, state and local education board members, and parents about the challenges faced by rural school districts as well as the strategies they have adopted in an effort to meet them. In particular, the Commission learned about the school district’s Commissioned School Security Officer program, which was developed with the community’s guidance and in cooperation with law enforcement to improve the armed response time to active shooter situations.

ED-led Listening Session in Cheyenne, WY. On August 7, 2018, the Commission hosted two roundtable discussions and its third listening session in Cheyenne, WY. The discussion included state and local officials, including two State Superintendents, a State Attorney General, State Board of Education members, a State Commissioner of Public Safety, local district officials, law enforcement officers, and SROs. In addition, members of the general public from Wyoming and surrounding states presented statements to Commission representatives. This session focused on the particular concerns of rural districts and the distances law enforcement and SROs must travel from school to school.


DHS-led Field Visit in Las Vegas, NV. On August 23, 2018, the Commission held its fourth field visit at the Miley Achievement Center in Las Vegas, NV. The Commission heard from local school leaders, law enforcement officers, security professionals, and architects about what schools can do to enhance their security through various preventive and protective activities.

ED-led Listening Session in Montgomery, AL. On August 28, 2018, the Commission hosted two roundtable discussions and its fourth listening session in Montgomery, AL. The discussion included state and local officials, including the Governor of Alabama, state legislators, a State Superintendent of Education, a State Law Enforcement Secretary, a State Commissioner of Public Safety, higher education leaders, a member of the State Board of Education, and law enforcement officers. In addition, members of the general public from Alabama and surrounding states presented statements to Commission representatives. This session focused on physical security and school design, information sharing among community partners, providing mental health services in schools, and the unique challenges and potential solutions for rural communities.

Federal Commission on School Safety: Accomplishments

At the direction of the President following the shooting in Parkland, FL, the Administration and specifically the Departments of Education (ED), Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), and Health and Human Services (HHS) immediately began taking steps to support state and local efforts to improve school safety.
Immediate Actions to Secure Our Schools

On March 12, 2018, President Trump called for immediate action on a range of policies designed to protect schools and students. The Trump Administration worked to build a bipartisan coalition to garner passage and enactment of two bills: HR 4909, Students, Teachers, and Officers Preventing (STOP) School Violence Act of 2018 and S. 2135, Fix NICS (National Instant Criminal Background Check System) Act.

The STOP School Violence Act helps school personnel and law enforcement identify and prevent violence in schools. The law authorizes more than $1 billion in grant funding through Fiscal Year 2028, administered by the DOJ, to support evidence-based violence-prevention programs in schools throughout the country. These grants will support a range of proactive strategies for identifying and preventing school violence, including evidence-based training, anonymous reporting systems, threat assessments, intervention teams, and increased coordination between schools and local law enforcement. The first grants were announced in October 2018, when DOJ awarded more than $70 million in grant funding to support school safety.

The Fix NICS Act strengthens the federal firearms background check system. Federal agencies are required by law to share critical information with the NICS, which can help determine whether a person is legally prohibited from buying or possessing firearms. The Fix NICS Act reinforces those obligations by requiring federal agencies to submit to the Attorney General semi-annual certifications on a number of reporting metrics, as well as to submit four-year plans for improving reporting. The Attorney General must publish the names of those agencies that fail to comply with these requirements, and political appointees from non-complying agencies may not receive bonus pay. In addition, the DOJ is in the midst of working with states and tribal governments to develop plans to improve record sharing with the NICS, as required by the act. Finally, through grant preferences, the law incentivizes states and tribal governments to provide accurate and timely submissions, including through the Domestic Abuse and Violence Prevention Initiative, an effort designed to strengthen their ability to identify and submit to the NICS all felony conviction and domestic violence records.

President Trump also called for immediate action to “encourage States’ Attorneys General to audit school district compliance with State emergency preparedness activities.” In response, the Commission sent a letter to Governors, State Attorneys General, and Chief State School Officers encouraging them to take such action.

Additional Action from Federal Agencies and States

Following the October 1, 2017 massacre in Las Vegas, NV, the Trump Administration commenced the process to produce a new regulation that would ban bump stocks. Following consideration of public comments on the proposed rule, a final rule implementing the ban is expected to be announced soon.

In addition, HHS and ED have begun initial planning for the Safe School and Citizenship Education demonstration program (referenced in the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018). With the goal of providing and expanding mental health services in low-income public elementary schools and secondary schools, the program is designed to test and evaluate innovative partnerships between institutions of higher education and states or high-need local educational agencies to train qualified school-based mental health service professionals.

In June 2018, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) convened a School Safety Summit that brought together state and local law enforcement partners to provide a forum for sharing information and discussing best practices in school safety. The topics discussed included how to identify troubled students; threat assessments; anonymous reporting systems; school resource officers and other law enforcement coordination; information sharing; hardening of schools; and grants and technical assistance.
Efforts at ED include awarding new grants related to school safety and the delivery of technical assistance to states and school districts, as well as a commitment to regular evaluations of programs. In FY 2018, the Department awarded 11 grants to state education agencies to expand their capacity to support local schools in creating and implementing high quality emergency management plans. ED has also awarded 14 School Climate Transformation Grants to state education agencies to implement multi-tiered behavioral frameworks to improve school safety and well-being.

ED continues to evaluate programs authorized under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) to understand how states and local schools are using funds provided under the ESEA to ensure that students are safe in schools. For example, ED published the report Collaboration for Safe and Healthy Schools: Study of Coordination Between School Climate Transformation Grants and Project AWARE in 2018. The Department is also developing studies under the Title IV, Part A program to further understand how funds are being used to support school safety, as well as to examine how it can best support schools in maximizing the use of these funds.

In addition to funding, ED has placed an increased emphasis on improving technical assistance related to school safety including readiness and emergency management, safe and supportive learning, and social and emotional learning.

DHS has continued to engage students, teachers, school administrators, law enforcement officers, and other members of the K–12 school community on how to better prepare for and protect our schools from active shooters and other emergencies. Since the Parkland shooting, DHS Protective Security Advisors and the Transportation Security Administration have participated in hundreds of school security engagements with K–12 administrators, conducting assessments, sharing best practices, and facilitating exercises. During this period, the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center provided guidance and training to approximately 2,000 school personnel, law enforcement, legislators, and other government representatives on the prevention of school violence. In August 2018, DHS held a two-day roundtable discussion with members of the K–12 school community to collect insight and feedback on how to improve school safety and security. That same month DHS announced a grant opportunity to support the development of mass casualty trauma training for high school students. DHS also recently released a number of new school safety resources, including an operational guide that describes the steps schools can take to create a comprehensive targeted violence prevention plan, a separate guide and self-assessment tool to assist schools in conducting their own security risk assessments, and K–12 Active Shooter Exercise Starter Kits, which provide a package of exercise design, conduct, and evaluation templates to assist schools and school districts in conducting their own tabletop exercises focused on an active shooter incident.

With respect to HHS, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) established Mental Health Technology Transfer Centers. SAMHSA also awarded grants to a privacy technical assistance center to provide training to individuals, families, and practitioners on the implementation of privacy rules such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 CFR Part 2, and the intersection of these rules and FERPA in addressing the needs of school-aged children. SAMHSA has developed a free online interactive guide titled the “Safe Schools Framework Implementation Toolkit” to help schools and communities plan, implement, evaluate, and sustain a comprehensive and coordinated approach to school safety, prevention of youth violence, and activities that promote good mental health. Efforts are underway between SAMHSA and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to provide states and school systems with guidance on school-based funding approaches to address mental and substance use issues. SAMHSA has also awarded more than 160 grants at a total of approximately $57.5 million to communities across the country. The Administration is also implementing mental health programs authorized in the 21st Century Cures Act.

In addition, individual states have taken on enhanced leadership roles in school safety by forming state-level commissions, passing state legislation, and supporting new resources (such as school safety centers). Together, this Administration and the states have made significant near-term progress in strengthening our schools and ensuring educators have the necessary resources to keep our students safe.
For additional information about these grants, see Pub. L. No. 115-141 (March 23, 2018).

Fix NICS Act, Title VI, Division S, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 115-141 (March 23, 2018).


https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-taking-immediate-actions-secure-schools/


For additional information about these grants, see https://www2.ed.gov/programs/schlemergmgt-sea/index.html.

For additional information about these grants, see https://www2.ed.gov/programs/schoolclimatesea/contacts.html.


The Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance Center provides a comprehensive cadre of free resources to assist States, local educational agencies, schools, and institutes of higher education with comprehensive emergency management planning. More information can be found at https://rems.ed.gov. The National Center for Safe and Supportive Learning Environments offers information and technical assistance to States, districts, schools, institutions of higher learning, and communities focused on improving student support and academic enrichment including but not limited to school conditions. More information can be found at https://safe-supportivelearning.ed.gov. The Administration has also supported the funding of the Center to Improve Social and Emotional Learning and School Safety to provide technical assistance to States and districts in the implementation of evidence-based programs and practices in social and emotional learning. More information can be found at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/05/16/2018-10474/applications-for-new-award-center-to-improve-social-and-emotional-learning-and-school. Also, in September 2018, ED awarded funding for the National Center on Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports. The new investment expands funding and services to include enhanced services to students with disabilities with intensive behavioral needs, expanded support to state and local educational agencies for activities to improve student safety and activities to improve student achievement by improving conditions for learning.

For more information about the 21st Century Cures Act, see https://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/lawsenforcedbyfda/significantamendmentstothe21stcenturycuresact/default.html.

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The efforts of the Federal Commission on School Safety have been guided by the need to promote state and local solutions to school violence. To that end, the Commission conducted field visits, listening sessions, and meetings with hundreds of Americans all across the country. The input of these individuals—state and local policymakers, administrators, principals and teachers, law enforcement and healthcare professionals, students and their families—was critical in identifying best practices and the recommendations contained in this Report.

As set forth in the pages that follow, the work of the Commission falls into three broad categories:

a) Prevent—preventing school violence;

b) Protect and Mitigate—protecting students and teachers and mitigating the effects of violence; and

c) Respond and Recover—responding to and recovering from attacks.

The Commission’s work is summarized below.

**Prevent**

**Character education and creation of a positive school climate:** Character education and a positive school climate can help students feel connected to, rather than isolated from, teachers and fellow students. They can also help combat cyberbullying, an area where states, districts, and schools are developing and evaluating promising new approaches. Student-led efforts are critical to addressing cyberbullying. Firm and prompt responses to cyberbullying by staff are necessary as well as having suitable systems for the reporting of incidents.

**Mental health:** Improving access to school-based mental health and counseling for young people is an important aspect of prevention. So, too, is community involvement and support, including the faith community. Prescribing psychotropic medications for complex mental health needs should only be part of a broader treatment plan.

Integrating mental health, substance misuse, and other supportive services into school and pediatric settings can help early identification of needs and access to treatment. Testimony and information gathered from Commission listening sessions, site visits, and meetings noted a lack of school-based or easily accessible mental health professionals. Telephonic and telepsychiatry consultations have the potential to dramatically expand and enhance care.

**Threat assessment:** Beyond the school building and campus, informed and alert communities play a critical role in keeping our schools safe. Prior to most attacks, other students had concerns about the attacker, yet most did not report what they knew to a parent or other responsible adult. Outreach campaigns such as “If You See Something, Say Something®” and similar state-specific programs are essential to encouraging and facilitating the reporting of suspicious activities or other concerning behaviors. There are significant opportunities to customize or expand such efforts.

Suspicious activity reporting programs must incorporate appropriate privacy protections to ensure compliance with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). However, confusion remains in some localities about whether and when student records can legally be shared during a health or safety emergency. Reducing this confusion can lead to greater compliance and appropriate reporting of threats to the safety of students and schools.

**Press coverage:** For optimal engagement with the media after a school safety incident, state and local authorities should develop a media plan as part of their broader crisis preparedness, response, and recovery plan. The “No Notoriety Campaign” (i.e., not using shooters’ names or photos, but instead focusing on facts and victims) is a policy that media outlets and communities across the country should consider.

**Violent entertainment and rating systems:** The role of the family is central to controlling violent entertainment. State and local educational agencies should collaborate with parents to strengthen internet safety measures to curb access to inappropriate content.
In addition, the entertainment industry should ensure its rating systems provide parents with the full complement of information needed to make informed decisions about entertainment for their children.

**School discipline:** Maintaining order in the classroom is a key to keeping schools safe. Teachers are best positioned to identify and address disorderly conduct. However, guidance issued by the prior Administration advocated a federal solution that undercut the ability of local officials to address the impact of disciplinary matters on school safety. The guidance also relies on a dubious reading of federal law. The guidance should be rescinded and information about resources and best practices for improving school climate and learning outcomes should be developed for schools and school districts.

**Law enforcement:** The available research does not support the conclusion that age restrictions for firearms purchases are effective in reducing homicides, suicides, or unintentional deaths. Most school shooters obtain their weapons from family members or friends rather than by purchasing them. States should consider offering training or other resources to promote safe storage of firearms.

Other recommendations include encouraging states to adopt laws permitting “extreme risk protection orders” (ERPOs), which can prevent individuals who pose a threat to themselves or others from possessing or purchasing firearms. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Public Access Line—a critical component of the FBI’s efforts to keep Americans safe—has undergone changes to improve the process for receiving and evaluating tips from the public.

**Protect and Mitigate**

**Training:** All school personnel play a role in school safety and should take part in school safety training. Those best positioned to respond to acts of violence are those with specialized training such as school resource officers (SROs) who are generally sworn law enforcement officers. With respect to training and other related aspects of school safety, states and local policies and approaches should reflect their own unique circumstances and needs.

When a school shooting occurs, law enforcement officers are the ones who rush to the scene, neutralize the shooter, assist victims, and secure the site. The federal government provides a wide array of emergency and crisis training resources to state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to help prevent, plan for, and respond to such incidents.

**Troops to Teachers:** Military veterans and retired law enforcement officers often possess the leadership, experience, and essential training to help ensure the safety and security of our nation’s schools. As the Troops to Teachers program attests, veterans and retired law enforcement officers can also serve as highly effective educators where there are reduced barriers to certification and appropriate incentives are in place.

**Building and campus security:** Every school in America is different, and the appropriate protective measures will vary based on the characteristics of the site, location, resources, and personnel available. A risk assessment can identify vulnerabilities and enable the development of a strategy to address any security gaps.

Effective security plans use a layered approach across all three areas of a school: entry points, the building envelope (e.g., walls, roofs, windows, doors), and the classroom. An effective security plan can be especially valuable in rural areas, where law enforcement response times may be significantly longer than in more urban jurisdictions.

**Respond and Recover**

**Active shooter preparedness:** Reports prepared in the aftermath of school shootings have universally recognized the value of preparing for a potential active shooter incident through training, planning, and related strategies. According to some reports, total casualties could have been higher in Parkland, FL, had the school not provided active shooter preparedness training to staff (the latest training coming just six weeks before the shooting incident).
SECTION 1

Prevent
School shooters don’t simply “snap.” The circumstances that lead to violence are complex and far ranging, often the culmination of months and years of individual experiences. Accordingly, improving school safety cannot focus solely on mitigating incidents of violence. Successful efforts must improve the culture in which students live and learn. This includes developing students of strong character who are connected in meaningful ways to their peers, educators, and communities.

Character development naturally and properly begins in the home. Since the founding of our nation, a clear consensus has recognized that character development is key to a successful society. There must be intentional efforts to foster both the academic advancement and the moral, ethical, and social-emotional development of students.

Character development is essential for a healthy school climate. The promotion of core ethical values such as fairness, respect, and personal responsibility can create a caring community that fosters students’ self-motivation and positive interactions.

Fostering a culture of connectedness is another important aspect of school safety. In the aftermath of the Parkland shooting, multiple reports indicated the alleged shooter experienced feelings of isolation and depression in the years leading up to the shooting. His inability to connect with classmates increased his feelings of detachment and withdrawal, and his isolation only exacerbated other factors that led to violence. Perpetrators of previous school shootings shared that sense of detachment. For example, one Columbine shooter was characterized as depressed and reclusive. In a journal entry he expressed his sense of loneliness and isolation: “I want to die really bad right now…no girls (friends or girlfriends), no other friends except a few, nobody accepting me…I feel so lonely w/o a friend.”

In a similar fashion, family members and acquaintances of the Virginia Tech shooter said that, as his isolation grew during his senior year, his “attention to schoolwork and class time dropped.” By the end, he had done all he could to exclude himself from Virginia Tech’s campus community.

The same was true at Sandy Hook. In the months prior to the tragedy, the shooter isolated himself in his bedroom. He covered his windows with black trash bags and, even though he and his mother lived on the same floor of the home, insisted on communicating with her through email.

Both the Bush Administration’s 2007 Report to the President on Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy and the Obama Administration’s 2013 Now is the Time report issued recommendations on character education. The Bush Report encouraged teachers to increase connectedness in their classrooms and states to develop school cultures that promote safety, trust, respect, and open communication. The Obama Report proposed a $50 million initiative to help 8,000 schools train teachers and other school staff to implement strategies that would improve school climate.

The U.S. Department of Education has awarded grant funds through the School Climate Transformation Grant program to support schools implementing an evidence-based multi-tiered behavioral framework for improving behavioral outcomes and learning conditions for all students. The Department has invested $226.5 million in School Climate Transformation Grants. Since 2014, these grants have promoted state
and district efforts to develop and enhance school-wide positive behavioral interventions and supports (PBIS) frameworks to improve school climate and promote positive school behavior.\textsuperscript{12}

In addition, the Department’s Office of Special Education Programs and the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education jointly fund a Technical Assistance Center on PBIS that supports schools, districts, and states in their implementation of a multi-tiered approach to social, emotional, and behavioral support.\textsuperscript{13} The multiple tiers of PBIS include core instruction, supplemental instruction, and more intensive intervention and supports.

\begin{table}[h]
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\begin{tabular}{|l|
\hline
\textbf{Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS)}
\hline
The PBIS framework supports local flexibility in the selection and implementation of practices in each site, based on unique needs and resources. It has included a variety of programs addressing classroom management, bullying, discipline, character development, social emotional development, and general school climate. For example, a teacher at Hebron-Harman rearranges her classroom seating every two weeks. But before doing so, she asks students to write down the names of five classmates they would like to sit close to and five they think would like to sit near them. Through this simple but effective practice, she can identify which students lack connections with their classmates.
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textbf{Commission Observations}

Character education programs may work best when the whole school integrates character education into the day-to-day work of the students. School leaders can establish character development as a priority by supporting both classroom-level and school-level practices, as well as collaborating with families and community organizations.

Commission members witnessed such an approach when they visited Frank Hebron-Harman Elementary School in Anne Arundel County, MD, to learn about the PBIS framework. The school program seeks to develop a positive school culture by helping educators to develop trusting relationships with their students, who in turn experience schools as a safe and responsive environment supporting their diverse needs, strengths, and learning.\textsuperscript{14}

Along with character education programs, fostering social and emotional learning can help prevent school violence and improve safety. At a May 17, 2018 information session, Secretary DeVos heard from Scarlett Lewis, who founded the Jesse Lewis Choose Love Foundation after her son was killed at Sandy Hook Elementary School. Lewis applauded First Lady Melania Trump’s “Be Best” initiative for endorsing social and emotional learning, acknowledging the positive force of social and emotional skills to improve school safety.\textsuperscript{15}

Social emotional learning (SEL) and character education are distinct aspects of human development. Research suggests that SEL builds the skills that allow youth to put into practice the knowledge they receive through character education.\textsuperscript{16}

Researchers have developed different frameworks to define skills that support character development. One well-accepted framework was developed by the Collaborative for Academic, Social, and Emotional Learning (CASEL).\textsuperscript{17} Based on its experience working with researchers, school administrators, teachers, and others, CASEL encourages the development of five core skills: self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, relationship skills, and responsible decision-making.

\textbf{Research suggests that social emotional learning (SEL) builds the skills that allow youth to put into practice the knowledge they receive through character education.}
Youth who learn these core skills are able to “manage their emotions and interactions in ways that benefit themselves and others.” Most importantly, recent research suggests that the development of social and emotional skills can lead to improved outcomes for educational attainment, employment, and earnings. It can also lead to a significant decrease in the likelihood of crime and delinquency, substance use, antisocial behavioral conditions, aggression, and violent behavior. In addition, the Commissioners heard testimony that 34 percent of high schoolers in America are cyberbullied, and 80 percent of students who are cyberbullied are also bullied at school. Research has tied experience with bullying and cyberbullying to low-self-esteem, depression, anxiety, family problems, academic difficulties, delinquency, school violence, and suicidal thoughts and attempts. Dr. Sameer Hinduja, Professor in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Florida Atlantic University and Co-Director of the Cyberbullying Research Center, told Commissioners that students who cultivate characteristics such as social intelligence, resilience, and confidence are less likely to be bullied or to bully others. Hinduja also cited recent studies that found significantly less bullying in schools where students perceived a better or more positive school climate.

### Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

**STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES**

1. States should provide resources for their schools to help create a positive school climate where students feel connected to, rather than isolated from, their teachers and fellow students.

2. States should support character education programs and expand those already in existence using various federal or state funds.
   - When considering the character education programs, states might use a framework researchers have summarized using the acronym PRIMED: Prioritization, Relationships, Intrinsic Motivation, Modeling, Empowerment, and Developmental Pedagogy.
     - **Prioritization** to ensure character education is an authentic priority for the school by developing shared language, values, and active support from leadership that affirms character as an integral part of a school’s mission.
     - **Relationship building** among staff, youth, families, and communities (including teachers) emphasizing cooperative learning and teaching interpersonal skills.
     - **Intrinsic motivation** to help youth internalize ethical and performance values. Effective programs focus on integrating activities that promote self-growth, such as personal goal setting.
     - **Modeling** ethical and performance values for fostering character development. Youth learn from their older peers as well as adults (e.g., teachers can demonstrate respect in how they speak to students).
     - **Empowerment** results from youth having opportunities for leadership responsibility and a voice in the classroom.
     - **Developmental pedagogy** identifies explicit teaching, setting high expectations for youth and practicing identified skills as hallmarks of effective character development programs.
The U.S. Department of Education’s What Works Clearinghouse completed a systematic review of character education interventions and identified nine that had positive or potentially positive effects on one or more of the following: students’ behavior; academic achievement; and students’ knowledge, attitudes, and values.\(^{24}\)

3. Schools and districts should adopt effective social and emotional learning (SEL) strategies.
   - SEL programs might include the following: a curriculum to teach specific SEL skills; a modification to school or classroom climate through teacher practices or school-wide changes to rules and expectations; and practices to help students develop a growth mindset (i.e., the belief that they can develop most basic abilities through dedication and hard work).\(^{25}\)
   - A recent review of state and district resources for implementing SEL programs highlights the importance of leadership, resources, and legislative support from states and school districts.\(^{26}\)

4. Schools and districts should use a variety of data sources, including school climate surveys, to guide the selection of evidence-based interventions tailored to their specific needs.
   - To assist districts in measuring school climate, the U.S. Department of Education developed school climate surveys that school leaders can download and administer on a web-based platform at no cost. The Department also developed resources for district leaders to use as they interpret their school climate data.\(^{27}\) Using these resources, once a district identifies needs related to school climate, it can then select and implement an evidence-based intervention and then examine and reflect on the outcomes of the intervention.\(^{28}\)

5. Schools and districts should adopt tiered social, emotional, and behavioral supports to establish a climate that appropriately supports and responds to student behavior.
   - The Pennsylvania State University and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation issued a joint briefing paper that discusses school climate, SEL, and blended models that have positive effects on school climate and social and emotional competence. This paper illustrates six key elements for nurturing a healthy school climate and building students’ emotional competence: supportive relationships, engagement, safety, cultural responsiveness, academic challenge, and high expectations.\(^{29}\)
   - Research illustrates the potential of a comprehensive tiered system of support for academics, behavior, and SEL.\(^{30}\)
   - The U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Safe and Healthy Students (OSHS), a part of the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education (OESE), administers the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance Center. The Center helps school districts assess the safety, security, accessibility, and emergency preparedness of school buildings and grounds. It also offers tips to help guide school officials in using multi-tiered interventions and supports to improve school climate.\(^{31}\)
Chapter 1 Endnotes


2. See Benjamin Franklin’s statement of 1750: “...nothing is of more importance to the public weal, than to form and train up youth in wisdom and virtue. Wise and good men are, in my opinion, the strength of a state...” https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-04-02-0009. See also the words of John Quincy Adams: “Public Virtue cannot exist in a Nation without private, and public Virtue is the only Foundation of Republics. There must be a positive Passion for the public good, the public Interest, Honour, Power, and Glory, established in the Minds of the People, or there can be no Republican Government, nor any real Liberty.” https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-04-02-0044; and “Human nature with all its infirmities and depravation is still capable of great things. It is capable of attaining to degrees of wisdom and of goodness, which, we have reason to believe, appear respectable in the estimation of superior intelligences. Education makes a greater difference between man and man, than nature has made between man and brute. The virtues and powers to which men may be trained, by early education and constant discipline, are truly sublime and astonishing.” https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-01-02-0209.


11. The $226.5 million represents the total of such grants from 2014 through 2018 based on U.S. Department of Education data.


17. CASEL is a voluntary association formed more than 20 years ago, with the express goal of establishing high-quality, evidence-based SEL as an essential part of preschool through high school education.


21. A variety of federally-funded programs may be used, in part, for character education, school climate, culturally responsive teaching strategies, and similar programs so long as they meet program requirements. This might include: Title I Grants to Local Educational Agencies (https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titlei/); Title IIA Grants to Local Educational Agencies (https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiia/index.html); Title III Grants to Local Educational Agencies (https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiii/index.html); Title IV Grants to Local Educational Agencies (https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiv/index.html); Career Education Program (https://www2.ed.gov/programs/careereducation/index.html); Indian Education Programs (https://www2.ed.gov/programs/idea/index.html); Demonstration Grants for Indian Children (https://www2.ed.gov/programs/idea infieldex.html); and “We do innovation education innovation-innovation-and-research-eir).”

22. Since 2000, Arizona has supported character education through legislative actions as well as voter initiatives providing funding to teach character education in schools. Currently, the state incentivizes a focus on character education through a state-sponsored Character Education Matching Grant; any public (including charter) school that teaches a character education curriculum aligned to the state’s definition, codified in law, is eligible to apply. Additionally, the state allows individuals to claim an extracurricular activity (ECA) tax credit for making contributions to public schools in Arizona for supporting character education programs as well as other activities that supplement the school’s educational program. For more information, visit www.character.org/wp-content/uploads/What-States-Are-Doing.pdf and http://www.azed.gov/character-education/.


27. For more information on the U.S. Department of Education’s School Climate Surveys, see https://safesupportiveteaching.ed.gov/edscig. Note that the U.S. Department of Education will not have access to any data that districts create with this tool.


Social media can help students access information, connect with family and friends, and provide a means of communication for those who feel isolated or disconnected in the offline world. However, social media can also provide a platform for unfortunate interactions with others, such as cyberbullying. Educators are equally aware that some online conduct, although perceived as bullying, may be protected by the First Amendment.

Based on lessons learned from the shooting in Parkland, the Broward County League of Cities indicated a need for proactive social media monitoring protocols to identify threats and at-risk behaviors. The role of schools in intervening in cyberbullying can be challenging, as students access technology using school and personal internet services, during and outside of school hours, and on and off school grounds. Most schools are limited in their ability to identify and address behavior that occurs off school grounds. In spite of this, there are many examples of school efforts to address cyberbullying. Since 2010, the Federal Partners in Bullying Prevention have developed and disseminated key resources via StopBullying.gov and hosted a biannual bullying prevention summit. First Lady Melania Trump recently launched the “Be Best” initiative, which focuses, in part, on addressing cyberbullying. Various federal programs may, among other purposes, support efforts to address cyberbullying, such as improving school climate and anti-bullying interventions.

**Commission Observations**

In recent surveys, 34 percent of youth reported being cyberbullied in their lifetime, and bullying has been cited as a contributing factor in cases of extreme retaliation, including school shootings. The Commission heard about the importance of engaging the broader community in cyberbullying prevention efforts and of empowering students to lead such initiatives. Presenters characterized cyberbullying as a behavioral issue that is not distinct from more traditional in-person forms of bullying. They emphasized the importance of not blaming technology or restricting access as the means to address cyberbullying. Instead, the presenters suggested focusing on improving overall school climate and changing social norms on how technology is used.

At the June 21 Commission meeting, Dr. Sameer Hinduja, Professor in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Florida Atlantic University and Co-Director of the Cyberbullying Research Center, made the point that cyberbullying is not a technology issue, but rather a social issue. He recommended efforts to build school climate, normalize pro-social behaviors (i.e., responsible digital citizenship), support student-led initiatives, and facilitate student resilience. Hinduja also stressed the importance of students having an adult to turn to if they are dealing with an issue such as cyberbullying. This reinforces recent findings about the key role educators play in empowering students to inform them of cyberbullying and the need to break the “code of silence.”

Dr. Paul Gausman, Superintendent of the Sioux City Community School District, shared with the Commission some successful strategies in his district for addressing cyberbullying. The district collaborates with a company to scan potential social media threats and receive actionable alerts. (Recommendations following the Parkland shooting similarly included the need for proactive social media monitoring protocols to identify threats and at-risk behaviors.) Sioux City also has an online reporting tool for parents and community members to raise concerns. This serves as a significant tool given that a lot of bullying, including cyberbullying, goes unreported and that cyberbullying is a community-based problem. In addition, Gausman

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**FAST FACTS**

In recent surveys, 34 percent of youth reported being cyberbullied in their lifetime, and bullying has been cited as a contributing factor in cases of extreme retaliation, including school shootings.
spoke about his district’s digital citizenship courses for freshmen and reward systems that encourage appropriate social media use.\textsuperscript{11}

With respect to state and local laws, a handful of states and localities have begun to enact laws with criminal penalties for cyberbullying. Key components of state-enacted laws may include specification of prohibited conduct and development and implementation of district procedures for reporting, investigating, and responding to bullying.\textsuperscript{12}

Many schools are using programs designed to intervene in both bullying and cyberbullying behaviors, given their inherent linkages. However, program outcomes have largely been inconsistent in the United States. Many have not led to a significant reduction in bullying (even those programs with demonstrated results in other countries).\textsuperscript{13} On the other hand, developing a positive school climate is consistently associated with lower rates of bullying and cyberbullying behaviors.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{Considerations for parents}

Parents can alert school staff if they become aware that their child may be engaging in, or a target of, cyberbullying. Schools and districts can coordinate with parents to clarify protocols for how parents, students, and members of the community can report this information.

\textbf{Recommendations}

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{FEDERAL GOVERNMENT}
  \begin{itemize}
    \item The appropriate federal agencies should assist states and school districts in leveraging support from existing programs that help reduce cyberbullying.
    \begin{itemize}
      \item StopBullying.gov provides information from various government agencies on what bullying is, what cyberbullying is, who is at risk, and how people can prevent and respond to bullying. The site provides helpful research and resources about bullying-prevention training, state laws and policies, what schools and students can do to prevent bullying, and more.\textsuperscript{15}
      \item The U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Safe and Healthy Students administers the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance Center. The Center offers tips to help guide school officials in considering the use of social media in school behavioral threat assessments.\textsuperscript{16}
      \item The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ website MedlinePlus provides resources that inform users of the warning signs of bullying, prevention and risk factors, and how to help children deal with bullying.\textsuperscript{17} It also discusses existing laws and policies regarding bullying.
    \end{itemize}
  \end{itemize}
  \item \textbf{STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES}
  \begin{itemize}
    \item Many states, districts, and schools are creating their own, innovative approaches to cyberbullying. These practices, many of which are still in the process of being evaluated, could show promise for
preventing and/or addressing cyberbullying. States should adopt similar and effective practices or develop their own. Some examples include:

• Sioux City, IA: As shared by Dr. Paul Gausman during the June 21 Commission meeting, Sioux City Community School District is investing in a multifaceted approach to tackling bullying and cyberbullying. Efforts include empowering and training school staff to take an active role in responding to bullying incidents. They also involve creating a positive school climate; implementing evidence-based social and emotional learning, character education, and mentor programs for students; and enacting clear anti-bullying policies.

• Seattle, WA: Seattle Public Schools is partnering with a nonprofit organization that serves as an intermediary between the district and social media companies to identify and negotiate the removal of cyberbullying content.  

• Deer Park, TX: The Deer Park Independent School District is using a computer-and smartphone-based anonymous reporting application to receive reports of concerning student behavior (such as bullying, cyberbullying, suicidal behaviors, and cheating) from students and parents. The school not only receives these reports but can connect students to school-based resources such as school counselors.

• Poughkeepsie, NY: Poughkeepsie High School and other schools across the state teamed with students from Sienna College to host peer-to-peer learning sessions to create an “upstander” culture around cyberbullying. The goal of the trainings was to build students’ digital responsibility and identify student leaders to become ambassadors for their school.

• Pennsylvania: The state convened a workgroup of key stakeholders to explore its current capacity to prevent bullying, including cyberbullying, and identify potential facilitators and barriers to creating safer and more supportive learning environments. The workgroup, consisting of youth-serving agencies, health providers, educators, and researchers, provided recommendations that form the basis of a statewide plan to address bullying.

2. States, districts, and schools should adopt policies to help prevent cyberbullying, such as school climate initiatives and support for digital citizenship and character development. Because of the importance of peer influence, schools can consider ways to have these efforts led by students.

3. States, districts, and schools should use appropriate systems to monitor social media and mechanisms for reporting cyberbullying incidents. Examples include:

• Michigan’s OK2SAY program allows students to confidentially report tips on potential harm or criminal activities directed at schools, students, or school employees. It uses a comprehensive communication system to facilitate tip sharing—about harmful behaviors that threaten to disrupt the learning environment—among parents, school personnel, students, community mental health service programs, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, and law enforcement officers. OK2SAY also has a free mobile app that allows users to submit real-time confidential tips.

• Colorado’s Safe2Tell program provides an anonymous way for students, parents, school staff, and community members to report concerns regarding their safety or the safety of others. It also provides resources to educate the community on the importance of breaking the code of silence as well as technical assistance to schools and communities before and after tragic events. A Safe2Tell mobile app for reporting threatening behaviors and safety concerns in Colorado is available for students, parents, and community members.
Chapter 2 Endnotes


2. Cyberbullying is defined as bullying behavior that takes place through electronic technology including social media, text messages, video game platforms, and other internet and mobile applications. Cyberbullying is not considered a distinct form of bullying; rather, electronic technology and social media are contexts in which multiple forms of bullying can occur. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's uniform definition, bullying is aggressive behavior between school aged youth in the context of a real or perceived power imbalance that is repeated, or has the potential to be repeated, over time. The definition stresses that because messages shared online are viewed by multiple people, and therefore the harm is repeated, even a single incident can be considered bullying under this definition. (See Gladden, R.M., et al. (2014). Bullying surveillance among youths: Uniform definitions for public health and recommended data elements. Version 1.0. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.) Some incidents, however, while perceived as bullying, may be protected speech under the First Amendment.


6. Consistent with program requirements, Title I grants to local educational agencies (https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/index.html) may support school districts in improving conditions for student learning in Title I schoolwide programs, including through reducing incidences of bullying and harassment. Student Support and Academic Enrichment grants (https://www2.ed.gov/programs/ssae/index.html) and grants under both Rural Education Achievement Programs (REAP) (the Small, Rural School Achievement (SRSA) and Rural, Low-Income Schools (RLIS) programs (https://www2.ed.gov/nclb/freedom/local/reap.html)) may be used for activities to support safe and healthy students, which may include interventions and supports to help prevent or respond to bullying and harassment. In addition, 21st Century Community Learning Centers (https://www2.ed.gov/programs/21stcclc/index.html) are used for before- or after-school activities, some of which could support anti-bullying efforts. Indian Education Grants to Local Educational Agencies (https://www2.ed.gov/programs/indianformula/index.html) can include activities to educate individuals so as to prevent violence, suicide, and substance abuse.


23. For more information visit, https://www.michigan.gov/ok2say/0,5413,7-366-86296---,00.html.

24. For more information visit, https://safe2tell.org/?q=about-us.
A consistent theme throughout Commission listening sessions, site visits, and meetings was the lack of mental health professionals in schools or centers that students and schools can easily access.

Individuals who commit mass shootings may or may not have a serious mental illness (SMI). There is little population-level evidence to support the notion that those diagnosed with mental illness are more likely than anyone else to commit gun crimes. Researchers have concluded that less than 3–5 percent of U.S. crimes involve people with mental illness, and the percentages of crimes that involve guns are lower than the national average for persons not diagnosed with mental illness.1 Databases that track gun homicides (such as the National Center for Health Statistics) similarly show that less than 5 percent of the 120,000 gun-related killings in the United States between 2001 and 2010 were perpetrated by people diagnosed with mental illness.2

A U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Secret Service analysis found that as many as a quarter of individuals who committed mass shootings had been in treatment for mental illnesses, and more than three-quarters had symptoms of a mental illness prior to the time of the shooting.3 Earlier research suggests that such individuals often feel aggrieved and extremely angry, and nurture fantasies of violent revenge. They typically do not voluntarily seek out mental health treatment.4

Although the presence of a mental illness may not be directly correlated to violence, trends with respect to youth mental illness are of great concern. Rates of youth depression, anxiety, self-harm, and most tragically, suicide are climbing.5,6,7,8 Approximately one in 10 children and youth in the United States experience a serious emotional disturbance (SED), yet only 20 percent of them receive the help they need.9,10,11 The reasons for this include failure to recognize problems, fear of negative attitudes and discrimination, and lack of resources.12

Many of these children perform poorly in school and have difficulties at home and in the community. For example, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), between 2007 and 2015 suicide rates increased by 31 percent for males aged 15–19 (from 10.8 to 14.2 per 100,000 population) and by 40 percent for females aged 15–19 (from 2.4 to 5.1 per 100,000).13 Trauma, social isolation, and bullying are highly correlated with the development of SED.14,15,16 Transition-age youth (16–25 years) are a population of particular concern given their high rates of SED and low rates of seeking help.

Similar factors and signs existed in the case of the Parkland shooting, which was allegedly committed by a transition-aged youth. The alleged shooter had experienced numerous instances of difficulties in the community and with his family, including violence against animals and toward his mother and others. The aforementioned social isolation also appeared to be a factor in the Parkland case. The alleged shooter was reported to be lonely, ostracized, and volatile.

A growing number of studies suggests that greater mental, emotional, and behavioral health impacts might be achieved by enhancing protective factors and reducing risk factors that place children and adolescents at risk for adverse health and educational outcomes. These efforts also might buffer children and adolescents from the potentially harmful effects of negative situations and events, such as exposure to violence.17

Unfortunately, past experience demonstrates that these trends are not new. The US has seen alarming school shootings which previous Administrations...
have aimed to address. An examination of recommendations from previous Administrations reveals that many did not focus specifically on mental illness identification or service provision. For example, recommendations following the Columbine shooting focused largely on improving law enforcement’s response to these types of events. Recommendations from subsequent reports, such as following the Virginia Tech shooting, did address access to the mental healthcare system; however, the recommendations centered on a very narrow and specific component of the mental healthcare delivery system. The Now is the Time response following the tragedy at Sandy Hook demonstrated an evolving understanding of the need to address mental health issues through comprehensive recommendations on mental healthcare reform. A review of the Parkland shooting indicates that we need to be more specific and comprehensive with these recommendations.

There is an urgent need to reduce risk for youth mental, emotional, and behavioral difficulties through the implementation of efficacious and effective prevention interventions, as well as identify youth at risk for mental illness in schools and connect them with needed treatment and services. This includes efforts to increase basic mental health literacy, particularly for those working with young people. Research has shown that early identification and treatment improves outcomes. Thus, intervening early is critical given that half of all lifetime cases of mental illness begin by age 14 and three-quarters by age 24.

Most communities and schools lack high-quality treatment for children and adolescents, however. Many areas of the nation are without psychiatrists, psychologists, and other professionals (especially those with experience in treating children) to meet the growing needs. Navigating complex systems to seek care is often challenging for families and involves long wait times, few services, and poor insurance coverage.

**Commission Observations**

Schools have the potential to play a key role in preventing youth mental, emotional, and behavioral difficulties, identifying and supporting students with mental health problems and reducing youth violence. Yet up to 79 percent of school-age youth have unmet mental health needs. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) makes available a free appropriate public education to eligible children with disabilities throughout the nation and ensures special education and related services for them. The IDEA governs how states and public agencies provide early intervention, special education, and related services to more than 6.5 million eligible infants, toddlers, children, and youth with disabilities.

Unfortunately, many schools lack the capacity to identify and adequately treat mental illness. School principals report that student mental health needs are one of their biggest challenges. Integrating mental health prevention and treatment services and supports into schools can provide many benefits, including reducing risk for mental health disorders and increasing access to care for those who need treatment while reducing the stigma of seeking help. It can also help provide early identification, intervention, and a full continuum of services while using a multidisciplinary approach. This involves engaging teachers, parents, and community providers as partners in promoting social, emotional, and academic learning for all students. The continuum of services includes violence prevention programs along with social and emotional development efforts, such as the evidence-based model of the Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) framework. Bringing these efforts to scale across the nation and sustaining them are important steps in improving student mental health and preventing adverse outcomes, including aggression and bullying.

Healthcare providers can also play an important role in identifying children at risk. For example, at a school-based health center in Ashland, OR, a family nurse practitioner addresses a range of behavioral health concerns, including depression, threats of violence, and suicide, for students as well as their families. Additionally, some schools have embedded health clinics that may play an important role in identifying and treating children and adolescents with certain behavioral health conditions.
Comprehensive school-based mental health systems (CSMHS) are school-community partnerships that provide a continuum of mental health services (such as prevention, early identification, and treatment) that support students, families, and the school community. They seek to improve the school climate and can decrease social isolation and marginalization, including bullying.\textsuperscript{25,26} Key aspects include evidence-based universal prevention; training for school and community members to identify and respond to early warning signs of mental health difficulties; and targeted prevention and treatment intervention programs and services supporting the mental health of students. Mental health care delivery is integrated within school settings.

Several states are implementing CSMHS, including Pennsylvania, Maryland, Wisconsin, New Hampshire, Tennessee, and Alaska. The cost of implementing a comprehensive system varies depending on factors such as student needs, evidence-based practices used, and reimbursement for certain services by public and private insurance. Multiple streams of funding, including public and private insurance, are used to finance CSMHS. Currently, federal grants provide support for 20 states to develop CSMHS at up to $1.8 million per year, per state.\textsuperscript{27}

The following approaches have been effective in addressing the mental health needs of youth.

*Prevention of mental, emotional, and behavioral difficulties in youth*

There is a body of research showing that there are efficacious and effective developmentally focused prevention intervention from prenatal through adolescence that decrease risk for mental, emotional, and behavioral difficulties, and there are examples of them being implemented at scale in communities.\textsuperscript{28}

*Violence prevention*

Reducing Youth Violence: Addressing youth violence requires a comprehensive approach. The Safe Schools/Healthy Students (SS/HS) Framework was developed by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) in response to the Columbine School shooting. It provides schools and communities with a template for implementing best practices to prevent youth violence.\textsuperscript{29,30} These practices include:

1. collaboration and partnership with juvenile justice, law enforcement, and other related agencies;
2. enhanced technology to identify patterns and trends;
3. policy change and development, including diversion intervention plans to keep students out of juvenile justice systems;
4. capacity building; and
5. systemic change and integration.

More than 350 school districts have implemented the SS/HS Framework. Over 30,000 mental health professionals, teachers, and administrators have been trained in prevention and other mental health–related practices and activities as well as in the provision of specific parent and caregiver training and support.

State SS/HS successes include a 50 percent reduction in suspensions and expulsions in Connecticut, a 51 percent reduction in risks associated with depression in Pennsylvania, and a 37 percent decrease in the number of students who reported staying home from school due to feeling unsafe in Nevada.\textsuperscript{21}

SS/HS programs can also use enhanced technology to develop a comprehensive data-collection system to track student behavior, providing an interactive online map to depict disciplinary data and identify patterns and trends. The integrated database identifies the time of day and location of disciplinary incidents so that staff can respond to “hot spots” and use the data to make decisions about how to best allocate resources. The estimated cost is approximately $1–3 million to implement at the school district level.

Another valuable resource available to the public is the CDC’s A Comprehensive Technical Package for the Prevention of Youth Violence and Associated Risk Behaviors. This represents a select group of strategies based on the best available evidence to help commu-

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nities and states sharpen their focus on prevention activities with the greatest potential to prevent youth violence and its consequences.\textsuperscript{32}

**Access to treatment for mental illness**

*Starting Early in Life*: Training adults to appropriately identify and respond to concerning behavioral health problems allows children to stay in supportive environments and optimizes their potential for successful development.\textsuperscript{33} The training and education of parents and families is equally important and a critical part of these efforts.\textsuperscript{34}

Work is underway across 32 states, tribes, and territories to implement Project Launch, an evidence-based SAMHSA program, by training staff in childcare, Head Start, home visiting, and other settings.\textsuperscript{35} These efforts help improve children’s social skills and emotional functioning, promote healthy relationships, reduce challenging behaviors, reduce the number of suspensions and expulsions, improve classroom quality, and reduce provider and teacher stress, burnout, and turnover.\textsuperscript{36,37}

In addition, the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), Maternal and Child Health Bureau, in collaboration with the Administration for Children and Families, administers the Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting (MIECHV) Program. The MIECHV Program gives pregnant women and families, particularly those considered at-risk, necessary resources and skills to raise children who are physically, socially, and emotionally healthy and ready to succeed. Awardees select from a list of evidence-based service delivery models.

**Helping Children and Families with the Highest Needs**: Children with high needs may have serious mental health diagnoses, such as major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Mental illness significantly affects their ability to function at home, in school, or in the community. Affected children and their families may have complex medical, behavioral health, and social needs that require a more in-depth and broader array of assistance.

The Commission meeting “Curating a Healthier and Safer Approach: Issues of Mental Health and Counseling of Our Young” comprised experts who testified to the importance of including access to mental health service provision in schools and/or providing robust systems of referrals and linkages to such services. One witness testified that “by providing these services in schools, we have an opportunity to decrease stigma associated with seeking mental healthcare, and we can also decrease many of the barriers to getting students help when they need it.”\textsuperscript{38}

**Ensuring High Quality of Integrated Care**: The quality of community mental healthcare across the nation varies greatly. Very few communities provide comprehensive, coordinated, evidence-based care for children and adults with SMI and SED. The Certified Community Behavioral Health Clinic demonstration and expansion program provides comprehensive, high-quality, integrated care in a “one stop shop” model. It includes access to crisis care, evidence-based treatment for mental and substance use disorders, recovery support services, and linkages with primary healthcare.

**Addressing Childhood Trauma**: In many instances, children with a mental illness have experienced trauma and need treatment. SAMHSA supports the National Child Traumatic Stress Initiative and the National Children Traumatic Stress Network (NCTSN), which improves access to treatment and services for children and adolescents who have experienced or witnessed traumatic events and has identified more than 30 evidence-based interventions to support such children and their families.

These interventions include screening and assessment practices as well as training curricula implemented in approximately one-third of schools of social work. They also include resources targeted to parents, families, and caregivers who play an essential role in understanding and supporting children and teenagers.
who have experienced traumatic events. NCTSN has engaged more than 10,000 local and state partnerships integrating trauma-informed services into a range of child-serving systems.

NCTSN supports efforts in 44 states and D.C. Outcomes from this work show that the percentage of children who reported positive functioning in everyday life (e.g., dealing effectively with daily problems, crises, social situations, school/work) increased by 61 percent from baseline to the most recent assessment.

Caring for Transition-Age Youth: Evidence-based interventions, such as the Transition to Independence Process (TIP), can help improve treatment engagement and functioning for youth and young adults aged 16–25 with or at-risk for SED/SMI. Specifically, TIP involves youth and young adults in a process that facilitates greater self-sufficiency and successful attainment of adult roles and responsibilities. It does so by engaging them and, as appropriate, their families in their own future planning process while providing developmentally appropriate and appealing services and supports.

TIP has been shown to improve the lives of young people in the areas of employment and career, education, living situation, personal effectiveness and well-being, and community-life functioning. Currently, 15 states and D.C. are implementing this approach. Findings from these efforts indicate significant decreases in psychological distress, improvements in physical health, decreases in homelessness, and increases in employment.

Treating First Episode Psychosis: Each year approximately 100,000 individuals, primarily youth, experience a First Episode of Psychosis (FEP). Coordinated Specialty Care (CSC) is a demonstrated effective model for them. Research shows that individuals with early psychosis who receive CSC achieved significant improvements in education and employment as well as a decrease in hospitalization rate.

CSC is a coordinated care approach that provides treatment, family education and engagement, and recovery support services delivered by an integrated, multidisciplinary care team. A set-aside in the SAMHSA Mental Health Block Grant supports states to implement this practice nationwide. For example, Kentucky has developed a data infrastructure to track outcomes and improve the eight CSC programs its set-aside funding supports. Approximately 250 CSC programs are currently in place across the country to reduce the duration of untreated psychosis, improve outcomes, and promote recovery.

Identifying and Supporting At-Risk Youth: A growing evidence base supports approaches to identifying youth at risk for psychosis and providing early interventions that could have an impact on the trajectory of this serious condition. On average, there is a more than 50 percent reduction in risk of an individual actually having a first episode of psychosis after demonstrating early phases of a psychotic disorder for those receiving psychosocial treatment services, such as cognitive behavioral therapy.

Research also demonstrates the association of early intervention services with engagement in treatment, improved involvement in school, and improvement in symptom severity. SAMHSA is working with communities to better understand and address the needs of youth and young adults in the earliest stages of psychosis.

Building Mental Health Literacy: Raising awareness and literacy around mental health issues is a critical component of improving school-based mental health. Mental Health First Aid and Youth Mental Health First Aid are examples of mental health literacy curricula designed to provide a basic understanding of common mental health issues and how to refer people in mental health crises appropriately.

These trainings are widely available to school personnel, parents and families, first responders, law enforcement, and others, with more than one million people across the nation already trained. Research has indicated that gains in mental health knowledge over the course of the training were associated with increased help-seeking intentions, suggesting that mental health literacy may facilitate treatment utilization. Instructor training costs between $1,500 and $2,000, while individual course training varies, with an average cost of $119.

During the Commission’s visit to Adams Friendship Middle School in Wisconsin, it was noted that the Mental Health First Aid model was an essential element to changing school climate and ultimately increasing access to care. Crisis Intervention Team training provides specific training to law enforcement and other first responders in safely responding to people
with mental illness or addiction who are in crisis. Most states have implemented such mental health literacy efforts.49,50

Financing School-Based Mental Health: States have been using a variety of strategies for school-based mental healthcare, including the use of Medicaid and other resources. According to the 2015 CMS (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) Medicaid Financial Management Report, the total computable expenditure for “school-based services” was more than $3.1 billion. The state share was about $1.4 billion. 2016 Financial Management Data indicates expenditure of $3.3 billion.

The 2015 report indicates that 44 states offer reimbursement.51 Examples include Louisiana, which authorized the use of school nurses to deliver Medicaid-funded mental health services to students with Individualized Education Plans, and Arkansas, which developed administrative procedures to finance school-based mental health programs. During the Commission’s Wisconsin site visit, the Adams Friendship School District shared its innovative approach to braiding federal funding streams. This approach enabled the development and implementation of a school-climate culture change to foster access to treatment and provision of services.

Workforce

Behavioral Health Workforce Shortages: A consistent theme throughout the Commission’s listening sessions, site visits, and meetings was the lack of mental health professionals in schools or in centers that students and schools can easily access. Clinical, peer, and family support is critical to help youth and their families with SED engage in and navigate complex systems of care.

High turnover rates, an aging workforce, and low compensation all contribute to workforce shortages across the mental health arena. Unfortunately, this shortage is all too apparent in the school system. Clinical, peer, and family support providers may enhance the workforce efforts by developing trust and effective relationships through similar lived experiences.52,53 They help to address critical caregiver supports and have been shown to improve quality of life, engagement, and satisfaction with services and supports. They also help improve overall health and reduce overall cost of services.54

Training the Workforce: It is important to support clinicians and others in providing high-quality care to ensure broad use and appropriate implementation of best practices. Several new efforts have recently been initiated to accomplish this, including:

1. the Clinical Support System for Serious Mental Illness, to support the implementation of evidence-based practices in the treatment and recovery of individuals with SMI;
2. 12 Mental Health Technology Transfer Centers, which provide regionally focused assistance to clinicians and others;
3. a 90-minute Specialized Educational Tool on Assessing and Addressing Risk of Youth Violence, developed in partnership with the U.S. Department of Education and made available at no cost to teachers, first responders, parents, and students; and
4. mental health literacy training, such as Mental Health First Aid and Crisis Intervention Training.

In addition, HRSA supports several training programs that include the training of future child and adolescent behavioral health professionals. Within HRSA’s Maternal and Child Health Bureau, the Developmental Behavioral Pediatrics Program supports the advanced postdoctoral fellowship training of pediatricians to enhance the behavioral, psychosocial, and developmental components of pediatric care.

Establishing Counseling, Psychological, and Social Services (CPSS) Coordinators: Coordination can have a positive impact on the quality and delivery of mental health and other related services.55 CPSS Coordinators can bring together various providers within and outside of schools to meet students’ needs.56 This can also result in a clear mission, goals, and objectives that promote the integration of procedures and programs.57 Integration of services within the larger school environment helps secure resources, such as confidential space for providing services, and helps minimize lost class time for students seeking services. A recent survey of school districts revealed that 79.5 percent of them had staff to oversee CPSS.58

Using Technology to Address Workforce Issues: Technology can play a significant role in enhancing the workforce. “Telemental health” is the use of video-conferencing to conduct real-time mental health
treatment between a clinician and patient. This can provide needed treatment to people who otherwise may not have access to mental healthcare, including those in underserved or rural areas. The use of telemental health services in both rural and urban environments, including schools, has been effective and cost efficient, and has met with high ratings of satisfaction by students. The cost of implementing telemental health services can vary. The purchase of equipment can be between $500 and $10,000, with each encounter costing approximately $78.

**Recommendations**

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

**FEDERAL GOVERNMENT**

1. SAMHSA and CMS should provide information to states on available financing options for comprehensive school-based mental health care services, enabling states to develop innovative solutions within current requirements.

2. All appropriate federal agencies should increase awareness of mental health issues among students and ways to seek needed care. Often, stigma is associated with the lack of seeking help for a mental health condition. As discussed during the July 11 Commission meeting, stigma is often the reason that individuals needing help choose not to seek treatment.

3. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Health Resources and Services Administration should continue to support the mental health workforce response to children’s needs through existing programs such as the National Health Services Corps Loan Repayment Program.

**STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES**

1. All appropriate state and local agencies should continue to increase awareness of mental health issues among students and ways to seek needed care. Often, stigma is associated with the lack of seeking help for a mental health condition. As discussed during the July 11 Commission meeting, stigma is often the reason that individuals needing help choose not to seek treatment.

2. Schools and local behavioral health agencies should increase training of adults who interact with children (e.g., caregivers, preschool staff) to recognize signs and symptoms of mental illness. This is an imperative step in enhancing school-based mental health services. The Early Childhood Mental Health Consultation model trains such adults to identify early signs of mental health conditions and to respond appropriately. Additionally, training can be enhanced through the development of a network of national and regional technical assistance centers for children, adolescent and youth school-based mental disorder prevention and treatment. The network should assist states and localities in adopting mental health promotion activities, including suicide prevention and clinical treatment provision. It would work in collaboration with the SAMHSA-established national network of Technology Transfer Centers in Prevention, Addiction, and Serious Mental Illness.

Trainings to increase mental health literacy to recognize signs and symptoms of mental illness, such as Mental Health First Aid, also provide key resources for individuals working with children. Distribution of tools and resources, including the SAMHSA-developed PowerPoint “Assessing and Addressing Risk of Violence in Youth,” to all school districts and college campuses, could also be considered.
3. State and local school districts in collaboration with social service, faith based, primary care and law enforcement agencies should develop and implement comprehensive and coordinated approaches that are inclusive of all systems involved in service provision. This is a critical factor in addressing school-based mental health in the most efficient way possible. The systems of care (SOC) framework is an approach that explicitly includes all systems that are involved with providing services to children and is a proven best practice in providing comprehensive, community-based mental health prevention, treatment, and support services to youth with SED or SMI and their parents and families.

Examples of the types of systems in an SOC approach are social services, education, and juvenile justice. Youth and transition-aged youth receiving services in SOC programs may include those experiencing an FEP, those with SED, or those with SMI. Recipients of SOC services have demonstrated significant improvements in behavioral and emotional functioning; significant reductions in thoughts of suicide and suicide attempts; significant reductions in unlawful activities; and significant cost reductions due to decreases in hospitalizations and arrests.60

4. State and local behavioral health agencies should increase the availability of high-quality community-based services such as Certified Community Behavioral Health Clinics and crisis/acute care services (e.g., mobile teams, inpatient care), as needed. These services could include evidence-based practices, trauma-informed services, multidisciplinary team-based approaches, recovery supports, and medication-assisted treatment, where indicated.

5. State and local school districts should engage and activate natural supports in communities. It is not enough simply to engage law enforcement, healthcare, and schools. Other supports, such as the faith community, can help identify and support youth with SED and refer them to needed treatment. Although the school system plays an integral role in ensuring the sound mental health of its students, a holistic community approach is needed. Community partnerships contribute to the success of the expansion of school-based mental health.

6. State and local school districts should increase the use of technology, including telemental health infrastructure, to increase access to services for individuals in underserved or rural areas. Telehealth service provision and care extension strategies include collaborative models of medical education and support to manage patients with complex conditions such as the Extension for Community Healthcare Outcomes (ECHO) type model. These models have been very effective in serving hard-to-reach populations and areas. Telehealth provides a means to treatment access for those who might otherwise not be able to access it.
Chapter 3 Endnotes


18. Interdepartmental Serious Mental Illness Coordinating Committee. (December 13, 2017). The way forward: Federal action for a system that works for all people living with SMI and SED and their families and caregivers.


40. Analysis of data from SAMHSA’s Performance Accountability and Reporting System (SPARS).


Brener et al. (2018).


Students often come to school with multiple complex health, mental health, and social service needs. Schools can play an important role in curating healthy environments that seek to prevent and mitigate the onset of health and mental health conditions. Developing and promoting models in which mental health and substance use screening, treatment, and support services are integrated into school and pediatric settings can help to ensure that children, youth, and adolescents with needs (along with their families) are identified earlier and gain access to treatment and other support services.

Research has shown that less than half of children and adolescents with a mental disorder receive the treatment they need. Of those who received treatment, 24 percent were in school-based settings, 23 percent in specialty mental health settings (such as community-based mental health centers), and 10 percent in primary care. Ensuring there are services and systems available and accessible that support positive social and emotional development early in a child’s life is more effective than working to address problems later in life. Therefore, it is important to provide an array of services that are evidence-based and address a child’s overall health, including mental health.

Given the amount of time children spend there, schools are a natural environment in which to provide these services. Studies show that the way to integrate services and shift the overall school culture to support these services is to develop and implement a plan that works with other important school issues and supports the goals of education. In general, the most successful integration programs also include buy-in from committed and dedicated leaders, and exhibit effective communication and collaboration among the integrated care team. There is solid evidence in support of the impact that school mental health programs can have on academics. Embedded school-based mental health services make the services accessible and acceptable to both students and families. A significant amount of research demonstrates that treatment is much more likely to be effective and completed when services are school based.

Another approach in which mental and physical health services can be integrated is by providing mental and substance use healthcare services in a pediatric primary care setting. Twenty-five percent of children and adolescents seen in primary care settings and about half of all pediatric office visits involve behavioral, emotional, developmental, psychosocial, and/or educational concerns in children and adolescents. It is important to note that psychiatric disorders in children and adolescents are often evaluated and treated in the pediatrician’s office. Research has demonstrated that, in some communities, seeing a pediatrician for a mental health concern may be associated with significantly less stigma than seeing a mental health provider.

There is an increasing trend toward addressing children’s and adolescents’ “whole health” (i.e., both physical and mental health needs) in primary care settings. Evidence suggests that mental health conditions are correlated with adverse physical health conditions, and approximately 75 percent of physical health conditions are correlated with mental health conditions.
health outcomes in conditions like asthma, obesity, and diabetes are correlated with mental health problems.\textsuperscript{17,18,19} When mental health outcomes are addressed, physical health outcomes also improve.\textsuperscript{20} Multiple efforts have been made to integrate pediatric primary care and behavioral health.\textsuperscript{21} The patient-centered medical home model (PCMH), which originated in pediatrics, has at its core the idea of attending to both the individual’s physical and mental health.\textsuperscript{22} The integration of mental health services into pediatric primary care settings has shown effectiveness in several approaches from consultation models (e.g., telephonic consultation with child and adolescent psychiatrists as described in sections of this report), co-location of mental health providers, and care coordination.\textsuperscript{23}

Often included in the integration of primary care and mental health services is care coordination. This involves referring and linking to resources and sharing information among all participants involved with an individual’s care to achieve better health outcomes. Care coordination links youth and their families to services such as specialty healthcare, mental healthcare, and social services programs. As one study puts it, “Coordination of care across settings preempts an integration of services that is centered on the comprehensive needs of the individual and their family, leading to decreased healthcare costs, reduction in fragmented care, and improvement in the individual/family experience of care.”\textsuperscript{24}

Care coordination is a key part of the SAMHSA (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration) Systems of Care model. This is a recommended approach for working with children and their parents/caregivers as they navigate complex multisystem agencies and services. Involving the family in the care of their children and adolescents by including them in the services and supports provided in schools or in pediatric primary care settings is an essential part of providing integrated care. Parents and the family play a key role in supporting any interventions. Not only do parents make treatment decisions for their children, they are also critical in facilitating treatment. In addition, parents and caregivers of children with complex needs often need support and services themselves. Families should be engaged in the development and implementation of treatment services in a meaningful way. Equal partnerships with child, family, and system need to be developed to produce positive outcomes.\textsuperscript{25,26}

Shared decision-making is an emerging best practice in mental and physical health. It is one way to assist people in treatment and recovery and help their families engage in informed, meaningful, and collaborative discussions with providers about their healthcare services. The American Academy of Pediatrics has also acknowledged the critical role of families in improving children’s health outcomes (and outcomes for the family as a whole) and improving the pediatrician’s ability to provide high-quality care.\textsuperscript{27,28}

**Prevention and early intervention programs to divert youth from the Justice System**

Prevention services that address mental health conditions and divert youth from the juvenile justice system are an essential part of an effective continuum of services. Prevention strategies include: education for both the family and the youth on key issues such as substance use, social skill development, support for academic achievement, connection to family and other adults, and close and positive relationships with peers, as well as services and supports for the family, among other interventions. These approaches can lead to the lessening or prevention of future risk.\textsuperscript{29} Research has shown that there are a number of strategies and interventions that reduce youth violence victimization and perpetration and associated risk factors.\textsuperscript{30,31}

In general, persons receiving mental disorder treatment would benefit from treatments that are provided in the least restrictive and most integrated setting possible. It is known that early interventions that support healthy social and emotional development do make a

**Prevention services** that address mental health conditions and divert youth from the juvenile justice system are an essential part of an effective continuum of services.
difference in longer-term outcomes, particularly with regard to children at risk for involvement with juvenile justice. The prevention adage “you can pay now, or you can pay later” is an important foundation for all prevention and early intervention services. This is particularly so when considering interventions that would prevent children from entering into juvenile justice systems that often are very hard for them to get out of once they have a criminal record.

Students with disabilities, including those with mental and substance use disorders, are more likely to be involved in disciplinary actions at school and are more often suspended or expelled. These actions can have a significant negative impact on a young person and may result in social disconnectedness as well as law enforcement and/or juvenile justice involvement. Once a youth becomes involved in the juvenile justice system, receiving needed treatment is challenging.

The prevalence of mental disorders among justice-involved youth ranges from 50 to 75 percent, with about 25 percent having significant impairment. Recidivism studies indicate that the rates of re-arrest for juvenile offenders who have returned from residential treatment and/or juvenile correctional settings range from 40 percent to 85 percent. These findings tend to suggest that when juvenile justice-involved youth are released to the community, there is a higher likelihood that they will reoffend and end up back in the juvenile justice system.

Ensuring that at-risk youth receive timely and appropriate prevention and early intervention services is highly recommended as a best practice. States and localities have implemented programs to divert youth as early in the process as possible as a way to address their mental health needs and keep them out of the juvenile justice system. To increase participation in treatment, they have also provided less formal, community-based alternatives to the justice system.

Court-ordered or emergency treatment

There are multiple avenues for children and adolescents to receive treatment through emergency mental health services and/or court orders. The following four areas summarize these possibilities.

Emergency Mental Health Treatment: Pediatric primary care settings and pediatric emergency departments are now seeing increasing numbers of children and adolescents with mental health conditions. These visits account for 25–50 percent of primary care and 5 percent of pediatric emergency department visits. As children’s legal guardians, parents are generally able to make medical treatment decisions for their children, although specific details around mental health and substance use may vary by state. When safety is jeopardized as a result of a mental health condition, parents or guardians can usually facilitate and consent to treatment. In such situations, court involvement is generally not needed.

Emergency Petitions to Access Treatment: For the most part, parents have the authority to consent for medical and psychiatric treatment for their minor children (even over youth objections) for most conditions up to the age of majority, which is usually 18. In some states, a youth may consent to treatment without parent knowledge; likewise, a youth may have the right to refuse mental health or substance use care even when the parent consents to it. At times, parents may have to petition the court for an emergency hold or temporary detention order to access diagnosis and treatment and to keep their child—and others—safe. Generally, older adolescents enjoy greater legal rights to consent to their own treatment, and a cutoff age is often 14 or 16 years of age.

In some instances, a provider or court may opine that a child’s well-being or safety is in conflict with the wishes of the parent. In circumstances of extreme safety risk in some states, a physician may detain a child or adolescent even if the parent objects. A parent still may need to consent to treatment given (such as medication), even if the child or adolescent is legally committed to a hospital over the objection of the parent. In some jurisdictions, this process would occur through a court-appointed emergency guardian for the child or adolescent. These details vary from state to state.

While involuntary treatment is a tool that can be used, it may lead to a child’s or family’s distrust of a service system that initiated this kind of intervention. In these situations, parents may find themselves responsible for payment of treatment and transportation costs that they were not expecting. If a community has a comprehensive array of services, including care coordination and other more intensive services, the need for involuntary treatment can be reduced.
When possible, decision-making in behavioral health care should be made jointly by family, caregivers, and youth. Partnerships between child, family, and system facilitate positive outcomes.\(^53\)

**Child Welfare:** The state may become involved in treatment decisions if the child or adolescent is in the custody of the state. Child abuse and neglect are defined by state laws, and child protective agencies can become involved in situations of abuse or neglect. “Medical neglect” is a term that can trigger the involvement of the child welfare system if the parent is not agreeing to needed treatment for the child or adolescent or is not following through with treatment determined necessary to treat a serious condition.\(^54\) A temporary or permanent court-appointed guardian may be required to consent to treatment on behalf of the child or adolescent.

**Child in Need of Services (CHINS):** A child or youth’s behavior can be so challenging that parents cannot manage it. In these situations, the family can enter into a “child in need of services” or “child in need of supervision” arrangement. This is a legal process whereby courts can mandate treatment compliance and/or school attendance. The CHINS process varies by state. In Maryland, for example, it begins when someone makes a referral to the Department of Juvenile Services (DJS). The DJS officer may elect to file a petition that results in a hearing to determine if the child or youth should be placed under formal supervision by DJS.

Additional measures can be considered for some transition-age youth and young adults who exhibit ongoing serious and significant mental health needs and who may be at risk of violence. According to one study, “Homicide is the third leading cause of death for young people between the ages of 10 and 24,”\(^55\) and nationwide, 15.7 percent of students carried a weapon (e.g., gun, knife, or club) on at least one day in the past month.\(^56\) Interventions can mitigate the risk of violent behavior.\(^57\)

**Commission Observations**

Mental health conditions are a leading cause of health-related disability and often go unidentified and untreated. Screening that identifies emotional and behavioral problems is a first step in promoting early intervention and, if necessary, referral to treatment. Schools are a viable setting for screening, which could be incorporated just like visual and hearing screening. During the July 11 Commission meeting, one expert testified that providing services in schools could reduce stigma and increase access to needed care. Primary healthcare providers, parents, caregivers, and other community agencies could also identify signs of mental health and substance use issues. This position is endorsed by the American Academy of Pediatrics\(^58\) and (for depression in youth over age 11) by the United States Preventive Services Task Force.\(^59\)

Unfortunately, the alleged Parkland shooter was not able to access mental health or counseling services within his school. (This is the case with many students with mental health conditions.) In view of his apparent emotional problems, it was recommended that he attend an alternative school in which services would have been provided. But because he was 18, he had the right to refuse such services and stay in the mainstream school that did not provide services.

Through its work, the Commission has identified the following integrated models and approaches that have been successful.

**Whole School, Whole Community, Whole Child:** The WSCC model includes and expands on previously developed frameworks focusing on the “greater alignment, integration, and collaboration between education and health to improve each child’s cognitive, physical, social, and emotional development.”\(^60\)

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“Homicide is the third leading cause of death for young people between the ages of 10 and 24, and nationwide, 15.7 percent of students carried a weapon (e.g., gun, knife, or club) on at least one day in the past month.”

Primary healthcare providers, parents, caregivers, and other community agencies could also identify signs of mental health and substance use issues.
This model builds on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) coordinated school health approach, which has been the blueprint for integrating health-promoting practices in school settings, recognizing the relationship between educational attainment and health.\textsuperscript{51,52} The WSCC model prioritizes the child and the development of a school-wide approach, and supports learning, health, and the school as being a part of the local community.\textsuperscript{63} Colorado, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Maine have implemented aspects of this model at the state and local levels.\textsuperscript{64}

**Interconnected Systems Framework:** Another program that integrates behavioral health services into schools is the Interconnected Systems Framework (ISF). This program uses a Multi-tiered System of Supports (MTSS) approach of academic and behavioral support in schools. The Positive Behavioral Intervention and Supports (PBIS) is an example of an MTSS. The MTSS approach involves three levels, or tiers:

a) a universal tier that provides basic interventions for all students;

b) selective tier for some students at risk; and

c) tertiary intervention for those students in need of diagnosis and treatment for a mental health condition.

This provides the appropriate level of care for each student.\textsuperscript{65,66}

SAMHSA’s Project AWARE (Advancing Wellness and Resilience in Education) currently supports 20 states in developing quality comprehensive school mental health systems that seek to meet the needs of all students, especially those at high risk for violence perpetration and suicide.\textsuperscript{67} Findings from this program show improved ability to identify and refer children and youth with mental health problems to appropriate treatment.

**School-Based Health Centers:** SBHCs are one more model of providing behavioral health services. These centers include “primary medical care; mental/behavioral healthcare; dental/oral care; and health education and promotion.”\textsuperscript{68} SBHCs operate in a variety of ways and can be managed through healthcare providers employed by the school or in partnership with other healthcare agencies. Currently, there are more than 2,300 SBHCs in 49 states and Washington D.C.

Some 94 percent of them are in or on school property, and 67 percent include behavioral health providers on staff.\textsuperscript{69}

SBHCs increase access and improve health, mental health, and educational outcomes for youth and families.\textsuperscript{70,71} Funding for them comes from multiple sources, such as local, state, and federal government, private foundations, and public and commercial health insurers. Examples of federal programs that support school-based services include: the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) SBHC Capital Program, Federally Qualified Health Center funding (Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act), and Title X of the Public Health Service Act.\textsuperscript{72} Services may also be reimbursed by Medicaid if the services are Medicaid coverable and delivered by qualified Medicaid practitioners to eligible and enrolled Medicaid children.

**Coordinated Specialty Care:** CSC is an evidence-based, recovery-oriented, and team-based treatment program for transition-aged youth experiencing a first episode psychosis (FEP). The young person and a defined team of professionals work together to make treatment decisions. Family members and school or employment coaches are essential elements of the treatment intervention.\textsuperscript{73}
**Integration of mental healthcare and pediatric primary care**

**The Chronic Care Model:** The Chronic Care Model was developed to assist primary care settings to more effectively manage long-term conditions. It served as the foundation for the patient-centered medical home and is recommended by the American Academy of Pediatrics as a practice model for children with mental health problems. The Chronic Care Model was developed more than 20 years ago and includes care coordination staff as a key element. The National Initiative for Children’s Healthcare Quality describes this program in detail. The Chronic Care Model has been widely adopted in modern healthcare settings.

**The System of Care Approach:** The System of Care approach begins with recognition that youth with complex conditions and their families must interact with multiple different systems. When these systems are not coordinated, the direction and support given to a family can be confusing, unclear, and overwhelming. The System of Care model builds a team around a family so that interventions and efforts are aligned and staged in a way that families can better manage implementation. It is effective in improving outcomes for children, including functioning, school attendance, reduced depression levels, improved chronic physical health conditions, and several other positive indicators.

**The Massachusetts Child Psychiatry Access Project:** MCPAP is a statewide system in Massachusetts that uses regional consultation teams focused solely on children’s mental health. It supports a telephone consultation service wherein primary care physicians and providers can consult directly with specialty child mental health professionals on-demand. Services include care coordination and follow up, as well as psychopharmacology and psychotherapy consultations. MCPAP also trains primary care providers on how to respond to mental health needs and increases their competency to provide mental healthcare. Primary care providers are often able to address the needs of youth with mild to moderate mental health concerns, while the consultation teams triage and direct to mental health providers those children with more complicated, serious mental health conditions.

**Care4Kids:** Care4Kids is a Wisconsin program that addresses individualized needs by providing a comprehensive care coordination healthcare model for children in out-of-home care (OHC). To ensure access to quality services in a timely manner, Care4Kids provides children with access to primary care physicians trained in the needs of children in OHC by establishing a healthcare coordination team that manages the care for the child. Facilitated by a healthcare coordinator, the team comprises a variety of key stakeholders, such as child welfare staff, healthcare professionals, foster parents, the child’s family, and other important partners as needed. These stakeholders work closely together to ensure that children in the program receive individualized and developmentally appropriate care in a timely way by medical staff trained in trauma-informed care practice. This approach to healthcare is designed to improve physical and mental health outcomes for children, as well as to promote improved resiliency and create stronger natural support systems for children.

**Programs to support diversion of children and youth into mental health treatment and services from juvenile justice systems**

Developing strong partnerships between the juvenile justice system and community organizations (such as mental health agencies, primary care settings, and schools) can help prevent or mitigate an individual’s involvement with the juvenile justice system. The goal of this partnership is to provide needed treatment services and supports to keep the individual functioning effectively in the community and to divert him or her from law enforcement or juvenile justice involvement where appropriate. Diversion programs can be very effective in improving behavioral health outcomes and reducing future delinquency. The Community Preventive Services Task Force’s systematic review of the transfer of juvenile offenders to adult criminal courts showed this strategy resulted in a 34 percent increase in rearrests for violent crimes. Clearly, alternative approaches are important.

**School-Based Diversion Models:** Keeping students with mental disorders out of the juvenile justice system where appropriate and getting them the care they need is an integral component of addressing mental
health. School-based diversion models are designed to fill this critical function.

**Multi-Systemic Therapy:** Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST) is an intensive family- and community-centered program for youth at risk of incarceration and/or out-of-home placement due to problematic behavior. MST is an evidence-based treatment program that provides time-limited, flexible, individualized interventions that address specific issues and needs.

**Therapeutic Foster Care for Delinquent Juveniles:** Therapeutic Foster Care service for young people who have had ongoing interactions with the juvenile justice system has been shown to have positive outcomes, including the reduction of violent crime. The service involves placing at-risk youth with foster families who have received several months of specialized training in how to provide the young person with intensive services in a structured environment. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Community Prevention Services Task Force reviewed this approach and found it to reduce violent crime by 71.9 percent among participants when compared with youths in standard group residential treatment facilities and to have net benefits of $20,351 to $81,664 per youth. 87

**Court-Ordered Treatments for Adults:** Civil commitment processes can mandate treatment for transition-aged youth and young adults over the age of 18 when the individual refuses treatment that would be helpful for the mental illness present. The process usually begins with a temporary hold or petition that seeks to allow time for a diagnostic assessment and determination of the best level of care.

When there is insufficient time to make an accurate diagnosis and treatment recommendation, persons may be subject to unnecessary civil commitment to inpatient treatment or premature release without adequate time to secure appropriate and available outpatient treatment. State laws vary widely regarding the time holds allowed and the process involved.

Assisted Outpatient Treatment (AOT) is a civil commitment law available in 46 states. It allows a court to mandate participation in outpatient treatment and services. Criteria for participation in AOT differ across states, but eligibility may include: posing a threat of substantial harm to oneself or others; having a history of relapsing serious mental illness and/or deterioration of mental status with demonstrated impairment; experiencing multiple hospitalizations or incarcerations related to a mental disorder; a documented history of non-adherence with prescribed treatment; and impaired judgment that is interfering with the ability to make informed decisions about treatment.

Currently, there is wide variability within most states regarding the extent to which AOT laws are utilized. They are almost always used for outpatient step-down after a psychiatric admission and not as a legal intervention that could prevent clinical deterioration. North Carolina is one example of a state with an AOT law that can mandate participation in outpatient treatment designed to stabilize the person and his or her situation so that hospitalization can be avoided.

AOT has produced positive outcomes in adults. This is particularly so in the case of AOT ordered in the context of services that include psychiatric care with attention to medication adherence, counseling, community support services, and medical care. Positive outcomes include increased participation and engagement in treatment and other services, increased adherence to prescribed medication, improved community and social functioning, and reduced incidence of harmful behaviors to self or others. 88 But current laws make it difficult to place individuals into AOT because the legal standard is high—imminent danger of violent behavior toward self or others.
Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1. SAMHSA and CMS should provide guidance and technical assistance to states on how to utilize federal funding sources to support mental healthcare for children and youth.

2. All appropriate federal agencies should support the implementation of evidence-based diversion models, including development and dissemination of clear, step-by-step guidance for schools on how to build an approach that best meets the mental health, developmental, and educational needs of children and youth in their systems.

   One such model is the School Responder Model, where the young person’s mental health and substance abuse needs are assessed and then linked to needed community services, including mental health treatment. An effective responder initiative should identify youth with behavioral health needs, reduce their disproportionate referral to the juvenile justice system, and increase their connection to appropriate services that have been shown to improve mental health outcomes and decrease interactions with the justice system. Key components of this model are 1) cross-systems collaboration teams; 2) family and youth engagement; 3) implementation of a behavioral health response (e.g., screening, assessment and services); and 4) creation of formal structures.

3. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) should develop guidance for service providers, justice officials, first responders, and school systems, on model state involuntary treatment legislation such as AOT. Clinical programs with outreach to individuals are often a necessary companion to AOT laws. An example of this style of service is Assertive Community Treatment teams, which provide psychiatric and medical care, assure adherence to prescribed medications, and provide counseling and assistance with obtaining community supports.

STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. State and local school districts and state and local behavioral health and health agencies should work together to promote screening and early intervention for mental/substance use disorders in all settings by increasing education and awareness of the importance of these services; by supporting the use of evidence-based screening tools and instruments; and by supporting increases in funding for behavioral health professionals in all settings.

2. State and local school districts and state and local behavioral health and health agencies should work together to support evidence-based care coordination models that ensure a thorough assessment and provide referral, follow up, communication, and ongoing collaboration among and between agencies and providers by working with all public and private payers to provide coverage for these services.

3. State and local school districts should expand the implementation of tiered models that intentionally focus on school climate and incorporate social and emotional learning and prevention, as well as access to specialty treatment for the minority of children who require it. WSCC, MTSS, and PBIS are examples of these systematic models.
4. Law enforcement agencies in collaboration with state and local school districts and state and local behavioral health agencies should develop clear guidance for law enforcement, courts, juvenile justice systems, and jails around developing supportive partnerships with schools to implement effective diversion programs, identifying individuals who could benefit from participation in such programs, and implementing proper procedures for identifying mental and substance use disorders. This guidance can identify specific mechanisms and related practices for diversion at various stages (or intercepts) in the criminal and juvenile justice systems, including pre-arrest, pre-booking, arraignment, and juvenile court.

5. State and local behavioral health agencies in collaboration with state and local school districts should expand Multi-Systemic Therapy and other evidence-based treatment modalities to most effectively treat youth at risk of incarceration. Multiple controlled trials of MST report significant reductions in rates of recidivism and conduct problems.

6. State policymakers should examine AOT laws in states with attention to consideration of lowering the commitment threshold for AOT in youth with untreated and unstable mental illness. This is so that an appropriate level of care can be mandated (a) for youth with mental health conditions who would clearly benefit from treatment for a mental illness but have a pattern of not engaging with treatment; and (b) where that treatment would improve the overall condition and reduce the risk of harm to themselves or those around them.

7. State policymakers should consider redefining specific terms currently used in most civil commitment state statutes. For the involuntary commitment of an individual due to suicidality, homicidality, or grave disability, the terms “gravely disabled” and/or “imminent danger” are currently used. States should consider whether statutory modifications to incorporate language such as “mental status reasonably foreseeable to be likely to be associated with suicidality, homicidality, or grave disability” would lead to better public policy outcomes. Such a standard, for example, may help secure the involuntary hospitalization and treatment of individuals before they act on thoughts of harm to themselves or others—or the occurrence of other behaviors resulting from impairment produced by untreated mental illness likely to lead to incarceration or other adverse events.
Chapter 4 Endnotes


3. Ibid.


24. [http://pediatrics.aapublications.org/content/133/5/e1451.full.pdf](http://pediatrics.aapublications.org/content/133/5/e1451.full.pdf).


Federal Commission on School Safety: Prevent


51 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5654888/.


60 ASCD and CDC. Whole school, whole community, whole child: A collaborative approach to learning and health. [https://www.cdc.gov/healthy-schools/wssc/model_update_508tagged.pdf]


63 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Whole school, whole community, whole child website. [https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/wssc/]


66 https://www.phis.org/school/mts.


68 HRSA. [https://www.hrsa.gov/our-stories/school-health-centers/index.html].


72 School-based Health Alliance, National Census of School-based Health Centers. [http://censusreport.sbh4all.org/].


81 https://www.mcgap.com/About/Reports.html#Publications.aspx.

82 https://www.mcgap.com/.


Informed, alert communities play a critical role in keeping our nation safe. By reporting suspicious activities, individuals may be providing the information authorities need to stop an attack before it occurs. This is especially true in relation to school attacks. Studies have shown that, prior to the incident, most attackers engaged in behavior that caused others concern and that others knew about the attacker’s ideas or plan to attack.\(^1\) Indeed, before the Parkland shooting, multiple reports were allegedly received about the shooter’s concerning behavior.\(^2\) How they were processed, evaluated, and acted upon remains under review. What is certain is that effective programs addressing suspicious activity reporting and threat assessment can significantly reduce—or prevent—violence.

Following the shooting at Columbine High School in 1999, the U.S. Secret Service partnered with the U.S. Department of Education to study school violence. Completed in 2002, the Safe School Initiative examined 37 incidents of targeted violence that occurred at elementary and secondary schools (i.e., K–12).\(^3\) The study sought to analyze the thinking and behavior of students who committed these acts from an operational perspective. Its key findings include:

- Incidents of targeted violence at K–12 schools were rarely sudden or impulsive acts.
- Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or plan to attack.
- There is no accurate or useful “profile” of students who engaged in targeted school violence.
- Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that caused others concern or indicated a need for help.
- Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted suicide.
- Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.
- In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.

One of the study’s most significant findings was that, prior to most attacks, other students knew of the attackers’ plans, yet most did not report it to an adult. This finding led the two agencies to conduct a follow-on effort titled the Bystander Study,\(^4\) which was released in 2008. The study explored barriers that may prevent someone from coming forward in advance. A series of in-depth interviews were conducted with persons who did not come forward before an attack took place, as well as those who did come forward and thereby helped to avert a potential school-based attack. The study concluded:

- The relationships between the bystanders and the attackers, and when and how the bystanders came upon information about the planned attacks, varied.
- Bystanders’ willingness to share information ranged from those who took no action to those who actively conveyed their concerns.
- School climate affected whether students came forward.
- Some students did not come forward because they disbelieved that the attacks would occur or they misjudged the likelihood and immediacy of the planned attack.
- In some situations, parents and parental figures influenced whether the bystander reported the information to school staff or other adults in positions of authority.
Based on the above, it is clear that there exists an opportunity to customize or expand the framework of suspicious activity reporting to include the identification and reporting of student behaviors of concern. Outreach campaigns, such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) “If You See Something, Say Something®” campaign, and similar state-specific programs, are essential to both encouraging and facilitating the reporting of suspicious activities or other concerning behavior. They not only remind individuals that it is important to stay vigilant and report things that appear out of the ordinary, they also provide guidance on both what should be considered concerning and how and to whom to report it.

Reporting suspicious or concerning behavior on its own, however, will not prevent a violent act from occurring. The reported information must be appropriately evaluated and, if determined to indicate a legitimate potential threat or concern, properly acted upon. This typically means the conducting of a threat assessment.

The school threat assessment process essentially involves a three-step model in which a team identifies students of concern, gathers information about their behavior and circumstances to assess whether they pose a risk of harm to themselves or the school community, and develops a management plan to mitigate that risk. Threat assessment does not definitively predict whether someone will commit an act of violence. Rather, its goal is to evaluate the risk an individual may pose and implement intervention strategies to address concerns.

Research has shown that threat assessment programs are beneficial, including in preventing mass casualty shootings. For instance, a 2008 field study examined 209 student cases from 103 schools that were referred to a centralized threat assessment team because the student had communicated a threat to commit a violent act resulting in a long-term suspension. For each case, the threat assessment team conducted interviews, assessed the threat, and developed a written report containing findings and recommendations. The results of the threat assessment concluded that all but five students should be returned to school, and none of the alleged threats were carried out.

A 2009 study examined data gathered from Virginia’s 2007 annual school safety audit. It showed that 95 schools had adopted the Virginia threat assessment guidelines, 131 schools used locally developed threat assessment procedures, and 54 reported not using a threat assessment approach. Students were randomly selected from these 280 schools and administered a school climate survey. The schools that used a threat assessment approach had lower rates of bullying and fewer long-term suspensions. Further, students had a greater willingness to seek help for bullying and threats of violence, and had a more positive perception of their school climate.

The importance of suspicious activity reporting and the establishment of threat assessments has been a common theme identified in the wake of past school shootings. The Virginia Tech Commission’s report recommended that states “[e]ducate and train parents, teachers, and students to recognize warning signs and known indicators of violence and mental illness and to alert those who can provide for safety and treatment” and to “[e]stablish and publicize widely a mechanism to report and respond to reported threats of violence.” The report also noted that creating interdisciplinary teams to evaluate information reported by students and staff, assess the degree of threat, and intervene to preempt the threat was an effective practice. It recommended that federal agencies work together and with other appropriate partners to share information on and best practices in behavioral analysis, threat assessments, and emergency preparedness. The Obama Administration’s plan also discussed suspicious activity reporting, and proposed clarifying that no federal law prevents healthcare providers from warning law enforcement authorities about threats of violence.

The Columbine Review Commission report stressed the need for school officials to overcome the “code of silence” that often prevented the reporting of concerning behavior. It recommended all schools establish and encourage students to use an anonymous telephone line or other mechanism to report statements or behavior that they found concerning. The report also recognized the value of threat assessment teams, recommending that they “should be established at
every Colorado high school and middle school.” The Sandy Hook Advisory Commission report discussed how schools can be designed in a way to facilitate the observation of changes in behavior that may be of concern and should be reported.

Various states and districts have implemented suspicious activity reporting and related threat assessment programs. For instance, in 2004 under Governor Bill Owens, the State of Colorado created Safe2Tell to deliver a statewide anonymous 24-hour reporting tool where parents, students, teachers, school administrators, law enforcement, and others can report a perceived threat to their safety or the safety of others. The reporting tool can be accessed from the Safe2Tell website, calling into the hotline, or through an application on a mobile phone. When imminent action is needed on a report, Safe2Tell passes along the information to local school officials and law enforcement. Also, an accountability component was developed to confirm that every report that comes in is investigated by school and law enforcement agencies, that action was taken, and that the outcome was tracked. In May 2014, Colorado incorporated Safe2Tell under the Colorado Office of the Attorney General to ensure reporting avenues, trainings, and education and awareness efforts are available across the entire state.

Similarly, in 2013, Virginia was the first state to pass a law requiring every school in the state to establish a threat assessment team.

**Commission Observations**

**Suspicious activity reporting**

The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative has issued a publication that provides an overview of some of the key characteristics of an effective suspicious activity reporting program. These include the timely vetting of reports received, educating the community on the reporting process, complementary training for staff, and privacy protections.

**Outreach Campaigns:** During the August 16 Commission meeting, Officer Chris Fraley, Region 2 Director for the National Association of School Resource Officers, told Commission members: “Students are a source of valuable information through social media and talk amongst their peers of potential threats or incidents that are being planned. Security in the school building also involves the promotion of see something, say something wherein the students and staff report crime or suspicious activity.”

Visible public awareness messaging campaigns increase vigilance and reporting of suspicious behavior. Successful campaigns, such as the “If You See Something, Say Something®” campaign, typically perform outreach through multiple means, both physically and online. This includes posters, factsheets, infographics, websites, audio and video public service announcements, and public events. Simple messaging focused on what suspicious activity or concerning behavior looks like and how to report are the hallmarks of many of the major campaigns. Colorado’s Safe2Tell program similarly uses a variety of methods to raise awareness, including age-appropriate videos, posters, direct messaging, and classroom discussions. By combining direct messaging along with relevant promotional materials, Safe2Tell effectively spreads its message and tip line number to thousands of students each year. Data shows that more Safe2Tell tip reports come from schools that incorporate the Safe2Tell solution in all practices.

Many campaign organizers also encourage partnering with other organizations to help expand the reach of the messaging. For example, in the execution of the “If You See Something, Say Something®” campaign,
DHS partners with states, cities, and counties; airports and mass transit entities; sports leagues and teams; major sports events and entertainment venues; colleges and universities; fairs and festivals; private sector businesses; and media outlets. Partners typically work together to tailor campaign messages and distribution mechanisms to their specific stakeholder community. All school districts are encouraged to work with DHS to obtain official “If You See Something, Say Something®” materials that increase awareness of the importance of reporting suspicious activity or concerning behavior within their school community.

Anonymous Reporting: As early as the Columbine Commission Report, experts have recognized the importance of providing a mechanism for anonymous reporting. Numerous witnesses at various Commission events concurred, including Chris Harms, Director of the Colorado School Safety Resource Center; Marguerite Herman, Federal Legislative Chair of the Wyoming Parent Teacher Association; and Trisha Daniel, Nationally Certified School Psychologist from the Alabama Association of School Psychologists. Anonymous reporting can be done through various means (e.g., mobile applications, online, email, and phone). It is now a commonplace part of many statewide safety tip lines, such as Michigan’s OK2SAY, Wyoming’s Safe2Tell Wyoming, Utah’s SafeUT, and Nevada’s SafeVoice.

Anonymous reporting is not without its challenges. For example, it sometimes can make it more difficult to evaluate the veracity of a tip and may increase the likelihood of an individual using a reporting system as a means for harassment or false accusations. However, these challenges are considered infrequent and far outweighed by the benefits of allowing anonymous reporting. Further, they can be greatly mitigated through the incorporation of protocols to ensure that all reports are properly evaluated by trained staff and handled with appropriate discretion.

Complementary Training: Training individuals on how to implement a program is critical to its continued success. As Safe2Tell founder Susan Payne pointedly stated in her testimony to the Commission, “we do not rise to the level of expectation in a crisis, we fall to our level of training.” In acknowledgement of this, the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative calls training one of the 10 key elements to successfully integrating suspicious activity reporting into an organization’s operations. In the case of suspicious activity reporting and “If You See Something, Say Something®” campaigns, this includes training the intended audience on how to identify and report suspicious behavior as well as training the recipients of the suspicious activity reporting on how to manage and respond to incoming reports.

In her testimony, Payne provided an overview of the many ways in which Safe2Tell raises education and awareness of the program. Its methods include:

- **Train the Trainer Certifications and Staff Trainings.** Safe2Tell developed a training program that certifies individuals and leaders to present Safe2Tell information, materials, and classroom discussion materials to their communities and schools.
- **Conversation Jumpstarts.** Safe2Tell developed educational lessons to provide school staff a tangible tool to lead guided classroom discussions. Available Conversation Jumpstart topics include bullying, cyberbullying, dating, sexting, weapons, depression, and substance abuse. While discussing issues, trainers talk about the code of silence, when it is appropriate to make a report, and what happens when a report is made.

As part of its “See, Say, Do Something” campaign, in May 2018 the Dallas (TX) Independent School District (Dallas ISD) brought thousands of its students to the city’s American Airlines Center to talk about how to prevent and respond to gun violence in schools. At the event (which was planned with help from the International Association of Venue Managers), representatives of the DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Dallas ISD police, and other officials spoke with students about the importance of being vigilant in observing and reporting classmates’ behavior. This event is a potential model for high-impact community outreach and training.

Another example of a successful approach to suspicious activity reporting training is the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA’s) First Observer Plus™ Program, which TSA offers as a complement to the
“If You See Something, Say Something®” campaign. The First Observer Plus™ Program is a security awareness and training program meant to deliver a simple message to surface transportation professionals to “Observe, Assess, and Report” suspicious activity. Through online and in-person training, the program provides transportation professionals tools to recognize suspicious activity possibly related to terrorism, guidance in assessing what they see, and a method for reporting those observations. Training participants are instructed not to intervene or engage suspicious persons or items, but to follow their organization’s policy for reporting information to local law enforcement and, when possible, to TSA by calling 1-844-TSA-FRST. The TSA First Observer Plus™ Program is available to school transportation frontline employees. Over the past few years, TSA employees have conducted more than 1,000 online school bus training registrations as well as in-person training for more than 200 school bus professionals.

Privacy Protections: As John Verdi, Vice-President of Policy at the Future of Privacy Forum, stated during the July 11 Commission meeting: “trust between students and adults is crucial to ensure that children reach out for help when they need it and report concerns about other students when they have them. Maintaining appropriate safeguards for students’ privacy helps create and maintain that trust.”

During the design and execution of any suspicious activity reporting program it is important to incorporate appropriate privacy protections and to comply with privacy laws. This can raise additional complexities in the school environment where privacy rights embedded in both the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) may apply. As multiple witnesses noted during the July 11 Commission meeting, there often is some confusion regarding what information legally can be shared and with whom when it involves the behavior or mental health history of a student.

The Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, which was issued by the U.S. Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Education in 2013, provides guidance on how FERPA and HIPAA affect the ability to share and act upon suspicious behavior reported in a school environment. Additionally, the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative has issued a Privacy Fact Sheet with some general tips on how to incorporate privacy into suspicious activity reporting efforts. For additional information on FERPA and HIPAA, see Chapters 17 and 18 of this Report.

Threat assessment teams and comprehensive targeted violence prevention programs

In July 2018, the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center published Enhancing School Safety Using a Threat Assessment Model: An Operational Guide for Preventing Targeted School Violence. It notes the following: “[e]nsuring the safety of our schools involves multiple components, including physical security, emergency management, and violence prevention efforts in the form of a threat assessment process. This process begins with establishing a comprehensive targeted violence prevention plan.”

Numerous witnesses stressed the importance of threat assessment teams during Commission meetings, including Donna Michaelis, Manager for the Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety; Kathy Martinez-Prather, Director of the Texas School Safety Center; and Dr. Kathy Murphy, Superintendent of Hoover (AL) City Schools.

In its Operational Guide for Preventing Targeted School Violence, the U.S. Secret Service enumerated the following eight steps for creating a comprehensive targeted violence prevention plan.
8 Steps for Creating a Comprehensive Targeted Violence Prevention Plan

**STEP 1:** Establish a multi-disciplinary threat assessment team. Threat assessments are best performed by multi-disciplinary teams that include highly trained professionals from a variety of different disciplines (e.g., teachers, administrators, school resource officers, school psychologists, guidance counselors). The team will conduct the threat assessments, implement crisis prevention when needed, assess the student’s potential for violence, and develop intervention and management strategies to mitigate that risk.

**STEP 2:** Define behaviors to include those that are prohibitive and concerning. **Prohibited behaviors** should trigger immediate intervention. These behaviors can include, but are not limited to, intimidation, threats, harassment, bullying, and carrying weapons on school property. **Concerning behaviors** may indicate the need for a threat assessment. These behaviors can vary in nature, but may include sudden or dramatic changes in mood and appearance or a decline in school performance. There should be a low threshold of concern so that the plan addresses a continuum of concerning behaviors, not just direct threats or behaviors indicative of planning for an attack.

**STEP 3:** Establish and provide training on a central reporting system. This can include an online form on the school website, email address, phone number, smartphone application, or other mechanism. It is also important to ensure the reporting tool is continually monitored, each report is followed up, and that it allows individuals to report anonymously. Programs and policies must be put into place that promote a climate that ensures those reporting feel safe in their concern and break down the code of silence.

**STEP 4:** Determine the threshold for law enforcement intervention. Although the majority of cases will be handled using school or community resources (e.g., mentoring, counseling, tutoring, and social or family services), some will require law enforcement, especially if there is a safety risk.

**STEP 5:** Establish replicable threat assessment procedures. These procedures include practices for maintaining documentation, identifying sources of information, reviewing records, and conducting interviews with an emphasis on rapport building. Procedures should include the following investigative themes to guide the assessment process: Motive, Communications (unusual or concerning), Inappropriate Interests, Weapons Access, Stressors, Emotional and Developmental Issues, Desperation or Despair, Violence as an Option, Concerned Others, Capacity to Organize an Attack, Pre-Attack Planning Behaviors, Consistency Between Students’ Actions and Statements, and Protective Factors.

**STEP 6:** Develop risk management options. Threat assessment teams should develop a set of risk management options that can be implemented once an assessment is complete. Based on the information developed by the team, an individualized management plan can be created to mitigate any identified risks. Other components of management include notifying law enforcement if an attack is imminent, ensuring the safety of potential targets, creating a situation less prone to violence, and reducing the effect of stressors.

**STEP 7:** Create and promote a safe school climate. School climates should facilitate a culture of safety, respect, trust, and emotional support, where open communication is encouraged, school staff intervene in conflicts and bullying, and students feel empowered to share their concerns.

**STEP 8:** Provide training for all stakeholders. As Donna Michaelis stated at the August 16 Commission meeting, “Training is absolutely vital to the success of a threat assessment program.” Recipients of the training should include faculty, staff, and administrators; students; parents; and school resource officers and local law enforcement. Topics covered by the training might include how to recognize and report concerning behavior, suicide prevention, conflict resolution, and de-escalation techniques.
As more and more states, localities, school districts, and schools begin implementing threat assessment and targeted violence prevention programs, they are developing new approaches. Thus far, three states—Virginia, Florida, and Maryland—have legally mandated the use of threat assessment teams in all public K–12 schools or school systems. Under these laws, the local or district school board must adopt policies for the establishment of threat assessment teams that can assess and intervene against individuals whose behavior may pose a threat to the safety of school staff or students.\textsuperscript{42} The policies must include procedures for referrals to approved community service boards, healthcare providers, or mental health services, when appropriate.\textsuperscript{43}

Funded under California’s Mental Health Services Act, the Los Angeles Police Department created a School Threat Assessment Response Team (START) program to address the need for comprehensive threat prevention and management. In collaboration with the Los Angeles Police Department, START works to address school violence by providing training to communities on risk/threat assessment and developing multi-disciplinary Crisis or Threat Management Teams. The program also assists educational institutions with case consultations, conducting threat assessments, and implementing intervention response and case management plans. It has fielded more than 8,000 calls since its establishment in 2009.\textsuperscript{44}
Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

**FEDERAL GOVERNMENT**

1. The federal government should develop options to support the creation (in conjunction with federal and state partners) of guidance for state and local jurisdictions to implement a comprehensive early warning and reporting system modeled on programs like “If You See Something, Say Something®” and Safe2Tell.

2. As numerous witnesses noted to the Commission, students themselves must be part of the solution and often can help identify the best ways to communicate to and educate their peers. In recognition of that, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of Education should explore sponsoring a Peer-to-Peer Competition Challenge for high school students to develop school security campaigns.

3. To assist schools and school districts in establishing threat assessment teams and targeted violence prevention programs, DHS, as warranted, should periodically update its *Enhancing School Safety Using a Threat Assessment Model: An Operational Guide for Preventing Targeted School Violence*. Additionally, DHS should develop options for supporting the development of a train-the-trainer program to facilitate consistent application of the recommended practices contained in the Guide.

**STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES**

1. States, school districts, and individual schools should establish and provide training on a central suspicious activity reporting system that is continually monitored, allows anonymous reporting, and has procedures in place to ensure proper action is taken on each report. Funds may be available through the STOP School Violence Act of 2018 to assist in developing these systems. The reporting system could be supplemented by an education and awareness campaign that encourages students, teachers, and other members of the school community to report their concerns, provides guidance on what types of activities should be reported, and provides instructions on the various options for submitting a report.

2. School districts and individual schools should establish threat assessment teams and develop comprehensive targeted violence prevention programs. States and localities should consider encouraging and supporting this activity in whatever manner they determine to be the most appropriate. This may include the enactment of legislation mandating that school districts or schools take these actions, the establishment of state or local teams to provide training to school administrators and staff on these activities, and/or the provision of grants or other funds to schools to support these activities.

3. School districts and individual schools should establish comprehensive targeted violence prevention programs supported by multi-disciplinary threat assessment teams as outlined in the U.S. Secret Service guide *Enhancing School Safety Using a Threat Assessment Model: An Operational Guide for Preventing Targeted School Violence*. Schools may be able to receive funds through the STOP School Violence Act of 2018 to assist in establishing these programs. To establish a comprehensive violence prevention program, it is recommended that schools/school districts perform the following steps:
• Establish a multi-disciplinary threat assessment team consisting of highly trained school professionals from a variety of different disciplines (e.g., teachers, administrators, school resource officers, school psychologists, guidance counselors) who, among other things, will conduct threat assessments, assess a student’s potential for violence, and develop intervention and management strategies to mitigate that risk.

• Define concerning behaviors that initiate the need for a threat assessment (e.g., sudden or dramatic changes in mood, appearance, or behavior) and prohibited behaviors (e.g., harassment, bullying, carrying a weapon on school property) that initiate immediate intervention. There should be a low threshold for defining concerning behaviors so that protocols address a continuum of behaviors, not just direct threats or behaviors indicative of planning for an attack.

• Establish and provide training on a central reporting system.

• Determine the threshold for law enforcement intervention.

• Establish replicable threat assessment procedures to include practices for maintaining documentation, identifying sources of information, reviewing records, and conducting interviews with an emphasis on rapport building.

• Develop risk management options to enact once an assessment is complete and individualized management plans to mitigate identified risks and enhance positive outcomes for students of concern.

• Create and promote a safe school climate.

• Provide training for all stakeholders.

4. As numerous witnesses noted to the Commission, students themselves must be part of the solution and often can help identify the best ways to communicate with and educate their peers. In recognition of that, school districts and schools should empower students by increasing engagement with students in the development of school security campaigns.

Ibid.


“If You See Something, Say Something®” campaign materials can be found at https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something/campaign-materials.


Ibid.

Ibid.

For more information on partnering with DHS on an “If You See Something, Say Something®” campaign, visit https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something/become-partner.


Testimony of Chris Fraley to the Federal Commission on School Safety Roundtable (August 7, 2018); testimony of Margaretite Herman to the Federal Commission on School Safety Listening Session (August 28, 2018); and testimony of Trisha Daniel to the Federal Commission on School Safety Listening Session (August 28, 2018).

https://www.michigan.gov/ok2say/.

http://safe2tellwy.org/.


http://safevoicenv.org/.


Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative. 10 ways to integrate suspicious activity reporting into your agency’s operations. https://nsi.ncirc.gov/documents/10_Ways_to_Integrate_Suspicious_Activity_Reporting_into_Your_Agency’s_Operations.pdf.

For additional information about how the Dallas ISD is addressing gun violence in schools, visit https://thehub.dallasisd.org.

www.TSA.gov/firstobserver.

Testimony of John Verdi to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (July 11, 2018), Curating a healthier and safer approach: Issues of mental health and counseling for our young.

See, e.g., testimony of Jennifer Mathis to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (July 11, 2018), Curating a healthier and safer approach: Issues of mental health and counseling for our young; and testimony of Doris Fuller to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (July 11, 2018), Curating a healthier and safer approach: Issues of mental health and counseling for our young.


Ibid.

To learn more, visit http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/dmh/186285_EOB.pdf.
Press coverage of school shootings is often sensational, which can exacerbate the trauma of those directly and indirectly affected and potentially incite successive events. Wall-to-wall cable television coverage, front-page images, and overloaded social media feeds make it nearly inevitable that most people will learn about what transpired, including the names, faces, and personal stories of those who perpetrated the acts of violence.

Reports indicate that the alleged Parkland shooter received letters of encouragement, greeting cards, and even money in prison. The Broward County Public Defender finds this deeply disturbing: “The letters shake me up because they are written by regular, everyday teenage girls from across the nation.”

The extensive correspondence as well as the Facebook communities defending the accused have left many to wonder how a mass shooter became a national celebrity. Indeed, achieving celebrity may have been his very intent. The Sun Sentinel reported that the accused, via a social network, recorded a video bragging about how the massacre he planned would make him notorious: “when you see me on the news you’ll all know who I am.”

Researchers have found that most shooters desire fame and wish to emulate other mass shooters. In several recent surveys, approximately 80 percent of the general public agreed that media coverage of mass shootings can make offenders famous, and 70 percent agreed that this coverage can lead to subsequent attacks. Analyses of media coverage following violent incidents provide strong evidence for a “contagion effect,” which holds that media coverage can increase the probability of future violent incidents.

Social media only amplifies this problem. In the absence of traditional journalistic tools—like editorial discretion—social media allows for the wide dissemination of information, where nearly every individual can be a contributor and a consumer (including would-be shooters). It is increasingly difficult for all involved to strike an appropriate balance between informing the public about school shootings—especially in the context of active security events, where parents and educators need immediate and accurate information—and the real danger that saturated coverage of mass killings may instigate future violence.

In the wake of Parkland, several national news outlets released profiles of the alleged shooter, and media sites reported widely on his YouTube and Instagram posts. In May 2018, news outlets released to the public the videos the accused made. Several Parkland survivors strongly opposed the release of the videos on Twitter, one of them claiming that doing so “only gives him what he wants.” In response, several media outlets, including the Orlando Sentinel, removed the videos from their webpages.

This is the first federal report to examine the issue of media coverage as it relates to the perpetuation of violence. Given the dramatic growth of social media, understanding this new dynamic (including the significantly different ways in which citizens consume information) remains an ongoing challenge. According to a recent poll by the Pew Research Center, “fully 95% of teens have access to a smartphone, and 45% say they are online ‘almost constantly.’”

**Commission Observations**

The American Psychological Association released a study in 2016 that concluded that “the prevalence of mass shootings has risen in relation to the mass media coverage of them and the proliferation of social media sites that tend to glorify the shooters and downplay the victims.”

Senior administrators from the Santa Fe, TX, School District shared with Commission leaders how the
The Commission received testimony and written submissions on the material impact that press coverage can have on schools and communities. For instance, Ben Fernandez, Chair of the National Association of School Psychologists (NASP) School Safety and Crisis Response Committee, testified about not only the contagion effect that press coverage can create but also the effect it can have on children and youth, such as an increase in anxiety levels or substance abuse. Governments, he said, can provide “education, guidance, and technical assistance to help schools better understand the best practices around media engagement following a school crisis to both gather information, disseminate verified facts, and connect with members of the school community.”

Dr. Jennifer Johnston, Assistant Professor, Psychology, Western New Mexico University, shared with the Commission that the Parkland shooting had a contagion effect as far as the Los Angeles Unified School District, which had 63 threats that required investigation. Johnston also noted that some in the media have adopted the “Don’t Name Them, Don’t Show Them” (similar to “No Notoriety”) voluntary policy in an effort to reduce the appeal of mass shootings by those who may be susceptible to external influence. Started in response to the Aurora, CO, movie theater shootings in 2012, the “No Notoriety” campaign emphasizes that media outlets should not use names or display photos of killers.

The Society of Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics suggests a “heightened sensitivity” when it comes to the coverage of crime victims and families. It recommends that journalists “balance the public’s need for information against potential harm.” Survivors of the Parkland shooting have encouraged more journalists to adhere to this code.
Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

**FEDERAL GOVERNMENT**

1. The White House and all federal departments and agencies should adopt the principles of the “No Notoriety” campaign. This helps keep the focus on the facts and the victims and does not mention the names or publish photos of perpetrators once they are apprehended.

**STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES**

1. State, local, and school leaders play a critical role in developing any crisis preparedness, response, and recovery plan. They should include a media plan as well. Those who have already done so should continually review and revise their plans. The media portion of these plans can cover a number of issues, including:
   - who will talk to the press after a tragedy,
   - what information should be released (including considerations for the level of detail, existing safety measures, and details about any forthcoming notifications to families),
   - how to communicate through a variety of media vehicles (e.g., press conference, press release, social media), and
   - when designated individuals should talk to the media, including if families should be contacted first and when media are permitted to enter school grounds.

2. As they examine their media plans, schools should coordinate with local law enforcement and other community leaders on a regular basis to ensure consistent messaging and clear lines of authority. States and local communities can take advantage of support that the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Safe and Healthy Students administers from the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance Center. It provides some tools that school districts can use to assess the safety, security, accessibility, and emergency preparedness of school buildings and grounds. The Center also offers tips to help guide school officials in preparing, developing, and ultimately implementing high-quality school emergency operations plans along with other actionable resources. The Center’s website (https://rems.ed.gov/) is updated frequently.

3. National and local media outlets should consider adopting the “No Notoriety” campaign. State and local authorities should consider employing the principles of “No Notoriety” when communicating the facts of a school safety incident to media outlets.
Chapter 6 Endnotes


Children have 24/7 access to multiple forms of entertainment at their fingertips. Their exposure to violent entertainment is of particular concern—in television, video games, social media, music, movies, graphic novels, and books. Violent content is ubiquitous across these platforms and continues to grow.¹

Neighbors of the alleged Parkland shooter, for instance, told reporters that he often played violent video games for up to 15 hours a day. According to one, “It was kill, kill, blow up something, and kill some more, all day.”²

The Bush Administration did not directly address this issue in its 2007 Report to the President on Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy. Following Sandy Hook, the Obama Administration’s Now is the Time report called on Congress to provide, among other things, $10 million for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to conduct further research on the relationship between video games, media images, and violence.³ President Obama also issued a presidential memorandum that directed the CDC to research the causes and prevention of violence, including links between violent entertainment and aggression.⁴

**Commission Observations**

It is estimated that depictions of violence are present in 90 percent of movies, 68 percent of video games, 60 percent of television shows, and 15 percent of music videos.⁵ While no single factor causes someone to engage in an act of violence, some scholars argue that children who regularly consume violent images are more prone to social isolation and aggressive behavior.⁶

Dr. Rowell Huesmann, Professor of Psychology at the University of Michigan, explained to the Commission that exposure to violence creates “violent behavior scripts” that are a predisposing factor in a child’s developing mind. When behavior scripts are activated under certain environmental conditions, they could lead to a child acting aggressively and violently.⁷

In addition, research has found a relationship between the amount of time children spend viewing violent entertainment and the amount of time they spend with friends. One correlational study found that children who view more violent programs spend less time interacting with other children, which could be an indicator for social isolation.⁸

Others argue that exposure to media violence is not predictive of violent actions. Some studies show that violent entertainment can help to reduce violent behavior,⁹ and their authors contend that most studies in this area find only weak correlational results and not causal results of the potentially negative effects of violent entertainment. Dr. Christopher Ferguson, a Professor of Psychology at Stetson University, reported to the Commission that studies that purport to link video games and violence are often not replicable. Because research on the negative effects of violent entertainment has produced mixed results, he believes debate about the possible role of violent entertainment after a mass shooting is a distraction from other factors.¹⁰

Even though scholars and researchers disagree about the effect of exposure to violent entertainment, some advocate that rating systems can play an important role in informing parents about what their children are watching and playing.

A landmark Supreme Court case, Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, established video games as protected speech under the First Amendment.¹¹

As a result, the entertainment industry continues to
establish voluntary rating systems in the United States for motion pictures, software, television programs, and music.

A variety of rating systems exist to inform the public of entertainment content. The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) film rating system was established in 1968 to provide “parents, guardians, and teachers the tools they need to make informed decisions about what children watch.” Ratings are determined by the Classification and Ratings Administration (CARA), an independent division of the MPAA, via a board comprised of an independent group of parents. In addition to film ratings, CARA provides parent resources such as movie reviews and online sources for movie information.

Some criticize the MPAA rating system for not providing enough information for parents and viewers beyond the simple designation of movies into the categories “G,” “PG,” “PG-13,” and “R.” Additionally, some say the overuse of the “PG-13” rating has resulted in confusion regarding what kind of content is actually included in these movies. The television industry designed the TV Parental Guidelines ratings system to give parents more information about the content and age-appropriateness of television programs. The TV Parental Guidelines Monitoring Board is responsible for ensuring uniformity and consistency in applying the Guidelines. It is comprised of experts from the television industry and public interest advocates.

With respect to music, the Recording Industry Association of America and its member companies created the Parental Advisory Label (PAL) program to help parents determine what may be inappropriate for children. This rating system helps parents recognize music releases containing explicit lyrics, including explicit depictions of violence and sex.

The Entertainment Software Ratings Board (ESRB) provides guidance about video games and applications to help consumers make informed choices about what is suitable for their families. As the video game industry’s self-regulatory body, the ESRB is responsible for enforcing its rating system. It requires complete disclosure of content during the rating process and proper display of rating information on packaging and wherever the game is marketed or sold. This is to comply with “industry-adopted advertising and marketing guidelines intended to ensure that video games are not marketed to audiences for whom they are not intended.”

According to a 2016 survey, 86 percent of parents with children who play video games know about the ESRB’s rating system, and 73 percent say they check a computer or video game’s rating before buying it for their children. The ESRB rating system has gained high levels of trust among parents, who regularly report being satisfied with the level of information as they choose which games to select for children.

**Considerations for parents**

Parents are best positioned to determine which forms of entertainment are appropriate for their children. While rating systems can be helpful tools, they are not a substitute for conversations with children about the content they consume. Parents can consider having direct discussions with their children about such common things as:

- Movies and television programs their children are watching;
- Video games and apps their children are playing or using;
- Music their children are listening to;
- Standards the family has set regarding what is appropriate; and,
- Limits and rules on what can be watched and played.

In addition to rating systems, parents can consider other resources to better understand what entertainment media may be appropriate for their children. For example, Common Sense Media is a source for users to search for specific movies, books, television shows, games, applications, and websites by a range of considerations, including age appropriateness. The site includes user reviews from both the parent’s and the child’s perspective.

Another resource is the Parents’ Choice Foundation, which provides information about children’s media and toys through its Parents’ Choice Awards. Awards focus on design and function, learning value, long-term play value, and the benefits to a child’s social and emotional growth and well-being. Products that contain violent content are not eligible for awards.
The Federal Trade Commission’s website includes a page on Consumer Information on Kids, Parents, and Video Games provides guidance for parents on how they may talk to their kids about entertainment choices. It also provides information and resources for parents regarding video game ratings, mobile game apps, and web-based games.22

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

- STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. State education agencies (SEAs) and local educational agencies (LEAs) should ensure adequate internet safety measures are in place to curb access to potentially inappropriate content. For example, the Narragansett School System in Rhode Island made rigorous filtering decisions to prevent students from accessing inappropriate content.23

2. School and district leaders should partner with parents in an effort to strengthen internet safety measures at schools. For example, parents in the Boulder Valley school district in Colorado requested that the district block social media sites at middle schools and provide parents with a log of their child’s internet activity.24

3. While some self-regulators provide easy-to-understand rating systems and effectively restrict content through retailer requirements, all of them should review and improve policies to ensure access to content is limited to age-appropriate consumers.
Chapter 7 Endnotes


12 https://www.mpaa.org/.


der-valley-school-board-talks-technology-internet-filtering.
Teachers are often best positioned to identify and address disorderly conduct at school. They have an understanding of the students entrusted to their care and can see behavioral patterns on an ongoing basis. In partnership with principals and other school leaders, teachers can help correct—and where necessary, discipline—those behaviors that are unwelcome or unsafe for the school community. Maintaining order in schools is a key to keeping schools safe. Federal policies that adversely impact maintaining order in schools should be corrected.

Policy guidance issued under the Obama Administration placed an emphasis on tracking school disciplinary actions by race. That guidance, set forth largely in a Dear Colleague Letter and other sub-regulatory documents (hereinafter collectively “Guidance”), suggests that even facially neutral school discipline policies may violate federal law if they have a “disparate impact” upon members of certain racial groups in rates of suspension, expulsion, or referral to law enforcement. The Guidance further communicates that such outcomes could give rise to an investigation by the U.S. Department of Education, putting a school at risk of losing federal funds.

As written and implemented, the Guidance has been criticized on three primary grounds. First, it creates a chilling effect on classroom teachers’ and administrators’ use of discipline by improperly imposing, through the threat of investigation and potential loss of federal funding, a forceful federal role in what is inherently a local issue. Second, authorities, including the United States Supreme Court, have questioned the applicability of a disparate impact legal theory to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, upon which the Guidance relies, thus calling into question its legal basis in the school discipline context. Third, the threat of investigations by the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) under sub-regulatory documents such as the “Rethink School Discipline” Guidance has likely had a strong, negative impact on school discipline and safety.
districts may have driven their discipline policies and practices more by numbers than by teacher input. School discipline is a complex issue that is affected by local circumstances. For example, there may be other reasons for disparities in behavior if students come from distressed communities and face significant trauma. Local solutions are best suited for dealing with the unique needs of local communities.

Commission Observations

The Departments of Justice and Education held a summit on school discipline in April 2018. Numerous educators, parents, and experts shared their experiences. Some favored preserving the Guidance to reinforce the message that discrimination based on race, nationality, or ethnicity is unacceptable. Others stressed the importance of preserving specific portions of the Guidance designed to reduce exclusionary discipline (i.e., discipline that results in students spending time away from the classroom), such as the Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) program discussed in Chapter 1. These individuals argued that exclusionary discipline practices have negative outcomes that fall disproportionately on certain demographic groups.

Others spoke against the Guidance, arguing that it is legally flawed and poses severe unintended consequences for school safety. These speakers described how their schools ignored or covered up—rather than disciplined—student misconduct in order to avoid any purported racial disparity in discipline numbers that might catch the eye of the federal government. They also argued that some alternative discipline policies encouraged by the Guidance contributed to incidents of school violence, including the rape of an elementary school student with a disability, the stabbing of one student by another student, and numerous assaults of teachers by students.

At the July 26 Commission meeting, school experts testified about the need for more local flexibility in handling student discipline and that the Guidance endangers school safety. These experts noted that disciplinary policy is most effectively addressed at a local level and that federal intervention in day-to-day disciplinary matters undermines local decision-making. Francisco Negron, General Counsel for the National School Boards Association, argued that discipline is a matter on which classroom teachers and local school leaders deserve both autonomy and deference. Judy Kidd, the President of the Classroom Teachers Association of North Carolina, stressed that the fear of an investigation by OCR has a negative effect on school climate and discipline. Specifically, she stated that the prospect of OCR intervention makes school staff less likely to refer matters to law enforcement. Instead of focusing on safety concerns and creating a climate conducive to learning in the classroom, Kidd noted that, in response to the Guidance, some school leaders have chosen to avoid potential OCR investigations by eliminating the use of out-of-school suspensions and expulsions, without considering the adverse impact that such practices have on school safety.

When school leaders focus on aggregate school discipline numbers rather than the specific circumstances and conduct that underlie each matter, schools become less safe. A report of the AASA, The School Superintendents Association specifically discussed the safety issues that arise when schools are compelled to keep students in the classroom under circumstances where removal may be warranted. Salient comments from the survey underlying the report include:

Comments from 2018 AASA Discipline Survey

- “Students who are allowed to stay in school after gross offenses amp up their behavior in order to see how much they’ll get away with without consequence.”
- “There is a feeling that by keeping some students in school, we are risking the safety of students.”
- “Without proper additional staffing and facilities to keep these students in school, staff do experience a perceived (sometimes real) safety concern.”
- “Schools are not equipped to provide supports to mentally or emotionally unstable children. We need help.”
- “We have received numerous complaints from parents and staff about students who should not be in school based on their disciplinary records.”
- “We see victims of bullying and harassment tend to miss more days of school and are more likely to leave the district when the perpetrators are not removed from school.”
During an August 28, 2018, Commission listening session, Jonathan Butcher, the Senior Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation’s Center for Education Policy, shared similar sentiments, emphasizing that the Guidance extends beyond the appropriate role for the federal government on school safety. Instead, Butcher advocated “school-specific, targeted responses” created at the local level and cautioned that districts do not interpret the Guidance “simply as a suggestion.” Rather, he stated that districts respond to the Guidance in whatever manner is most likely to avoid a lawsuit or federal investigation. In other words, avoiding legal jeopardy rather than achieving school safety drives decision-making.

Those who spoke in support of the Guidance focused on reducing the racial disparities in the discipline numbers without addressing the adverse consequences of the Guidance on school safety and climate. No speaker took the position, for instance, that the Guidance protected schools and teachers from violent acts. Some speakers promoted PBIS and similar policies as innovative, evidence-based reforms that both reduce exclusionary practices and improve school safety. However, no speaker claimed that schools need a federal mandate to adopt those policies, nor did any identify how repeal of the Guidance would prevent states and local school districts from adopting such policies. The Commission encourages schools and localities to implement programs that work best for them as noted in Chapter 1 of this Report on Character Development and a Culture of Connectedness.

In addition to the information provided by experts at Commission meetings, field visits, and listening sessions, materials considered by the Commission confirm the same troubling pattern noted by critics of the Guidance. For example, Gail Heriot, a University of San Diego law professor who also serves on the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, captured how some teachers are caught in the unfortunate web of the Guidance. She noted that school administrators are naturally concerned about scrutiny that may occur if students are disciplined at racially disparate numbers. That concern, she notes, can lead to school administrators closely scrutinizing individual teachers’ disciplinary practices for real or imagined evidence of racial bias, while ignoring the underlying causes of student misbehavior. Heriot noted that students are less safe at school when teachers turn a blind eye to misbehavior by disruptive or violent students in the interest of avoiding running afoul of federal investigators.

Surveys of teachers confirm that the Guidance’s chilling effect on school discipline—and, in particular, on the use of exclusionary discipline—has forced teachers to reduce discipline to non-exclusionary methods, even where such methods are inadequate or inappropriate to the student misconduct, with significant consequences for student and teacher safety. Indeed, while research indicates that exclusionary discipline practices are associated with negative academic outcomes and increased behavioral problems, some teachers have reported challenges with relying on non-exclusionary discipline practices. In Santa Ana, CA, 65 percent of teachers stated that non-exclusionary practices were not effective. Similarly, in Hillsborough, FL, 65 percent of teachers reported that non-exclusionary practices failed to improve school climate. In Madison, WI, only 13 percent of teachers reported that non-exclusionary practices had a positive effect on student behavior. In Charleston, SC, only 13 percent of teachers thought the school district’s “new discipline system works, that the consequences are appropriate, and that it represents an improved approach."

As one teacher observed, policymakers have made it so we have no authority. Only perceived authority. Only as much power as you get your kids to believe. Once the kid finds out he can say ‘F*** you,’ flip over a table, and he won’t get suspended, that’s that.

Accounts of similar teacher experiences have been reported across the country. And while alternatives to exclusionary discipline may be appropriate in many cases, it is important for teachers and schools to have the flexibility they need to impose appropriate discipline and maintain order in the classroom.

Separately, the Commission reviewed the Texas School and Firearm Safety Action Plan. That Plan notes that, when the individual disciplinary decisions of teachers are frequently questioned, teachers may pull back on removing potentially dangerous students from class. Not surprisingly, the Plan also showed that students in classes with disruptive students were less likely to learn.
Research clearly indicates that the failure of schools to appropriately discipline disruptive students has consequences for overall student achievement. For instance, research conducted by Scott Carrell of the University of California, Davis and Mark Hoekstra of Texas A&M University found as follows:

Disruptive students have statistically significant negative effects on the reading and math scores of students in their class. [Carrell and Hoekstra] also found that the presence of a disruptive student increases the probability that his classmates will commit a disciplinary infraction, with the largest behavioral effect observed in boys from low-income families. Thus, disruptive students can create a domino effect, increasing misbehavior and lowering academic achievement across the school. This domino effect can be seen, for example, in Wisconsin, where schools that adopted “non-punitive disciplinary measures” may have experienced lower reading and math scores than schools that maintained a traditional approach to discipline. In another study, University of Georgia professor Joshua Kinsler used data to simulate the interaction between school discipline policies and student achievement. His simulation found that a policy aimed at decreasing the racial discipline gap were associated with increases in the racial achievement gap, because the retention of disruptive students negatively impacted the achievement of African-American students as a whole.

There are also concerns about the underlying premise that African-American students are overrepresented in disciplinary matters due to racial discrimination. Research indicates that disparities in discipline that fall along racial lines may be due to societal factors other than race. For example, using data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class (ECLS-K), researchers replicated the racial gap in student suspensions, but then analyzed the specific circumstances underlying these suspensions and discovered that “the racial gap in suspensions was completely accounted for by a measure of the prior problem behavior of the student—a finding never before reported in the literature.” The report concluded that “[t]hese findings highlight the importance of early problem behaviors and suggest that the use of suspensions by teachers and administrators may not have been as racially biased as some scholars have argued.”

Legal concerns about the current Guidance
The Guidance relies on a disparate impact legal theory, but that theory lacks foundation in applicable law and may lead schools to adopt racial quotas or proportionality requirements. A school’s general duty to treat all students equally is enshrined into law by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VI protects all students who attend institutions receiving federal funding from being treated differently based on their race, color, or national origin. That protection extends to the entire course of the school disciplinary process, from behavior management in the classroom, to referral to an authority outside the classroom because of misconduct, and to resolution of a discipline incident.

The Guidance relies, however, on principles that are not enshrined in Title VI. Instead, it relies upon an implementing regulation of questionable validity to argue that Title VI prohibits not only intentional discrimination, but also many evenhandedly implemented policies that may nevertheless have a racially disparate impact. That reading of Title VI is dubious, at best.

In 1978, the Supreme Court determined that Congress intended Title VI to prohibit “only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause” if committed by a government actor. Just prior to this holding, the Supreme Court also held that the Equal Protection Clause requires proof of intentional discrimination and that disproportionate or disparate impact alone does not constitute a violation.
In 2001, the Supreme Court went further, noting that interpreting Title VI’s implementing regulations to cover unintentional discrimination is in “considerable tension” with the fact that the Title VI statute itself “prohibits only intentional discrimination.” It also called “strange” the argument that executive agencies—like the Department of Justice or the Department of Education—would have the authority to adopt regulations that would prohibit a disparate impact on members of a specific racial group absent any evidence of intentional discrimination.

Despite the Supreme Court’s case law in this area, the Guidance opted to interpret Title VI’s implementing regulation as sufficient to establish a disparate impact theory for certain racial groups in the discipline area. Indeed, the Guidance told schools that even “neutral,” “evenhanded” application of school discipline policies—the administration of policies without racial animus or discriminatory intent—can potentially violate this regulation.

By telling schools that they were subject to investigation, and threatening to cut federal funding because of different suspension rates for members of different racial groups, the Guidance gave schools a perverse incentive to make discipline rates proportional to enrollment figures, regardless of the appropriateness of discipline for any specific instance of misconduct. In response to OCR investigations involving school data, some school districts reportedly adopted racial quotas in school suspensions. Others entered into settlements with OCR that could be interpreted as imposing racial proportionality requirements in school discipline data.

Although the Guidance did not expressly require any school to impose a strict racial quota in suspensions, it is inappropriate for the federal government to pressure schools to establish such quotas. The Guidance presented hypothetical examples of discipline policies that might lead to a federal investigation, thereby incentivizing schools to preemptively shield themselves from federal oversight by minimizing racial disparities in discipline rates. Such expansive application of disparate impact theory is in tension with the purpose of Title VI and leads to school environments where discipline decisions may be based on race rather than student safety.

Courts are skeptical of schools attempting to achieve specific racial proportions in discipline through racial quotas or proportionality requirements, whether pursued unilaterally by a school or after an agreement with an executive agency. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit struck down as unconstitutional a rule that it said would lead to racial quotas in discipline, stating:

Racial disciplinary quotas violate equity in its root sense. They entail either systematically over punishing the innocent or systematically under-punishing the guilty. They place race at war with justice. They teach schoolchildren an unedifying lesson of racial entitlements.

The Guidance also offends basic principles of federalism and the need to preserve state and local control over education. For example, the Department of Education Organization Act warns the Department not to “exercise any direction, supervision, or control over the...administration...of any educational institution, school, or school system.” As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities,” which should be respected even when student dismissals reflect “subjective” policy decisions. Schools should have the flexibility to enforce disciplinary rules in light of their “need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process.” Schools should also receive deference as to whether their policies promote a “valid educational purpose” due to the “special characteristics of the school environment,” and these policies should not be overturned merely because others disagree about their “wisdom.”

A school’s decision to alter its discipline policies, even if prompted by a concern over racially disproportionate data, may end up resulting in another racial group displaying disproportionate discipline numbers. The disparate impact theory implicates an extraordinary range of decisions, as Civil Rights Commissioner Gail Heriot noted by illustration to contexts outside of discipline:

For example, in the education context, a university that considers the Math SAT score of an applicant for admission gives Korean Americans and Chinese Americans an advantage while
disadvantaging many other racial and national origin groups. A college that raises its tuition has a disparate impact on Cajun Americans, Haitian Americans and Burmese Americans, all groups that have below-average median household incomes. Similarly, a high school that decides to invest in a basketball team rather than a baseball team has a disparate impact on Latinos, who, on average, are shorter than African Americans and whites and hence less likely to qualify for the basketball team... A university that gives college credit to students who can pass a foreign language exam has a disparate impact on Irish Americans, Scottish Americans and Anglo Americans, since they are unlikely to have a language other than English spoken in the home. The flawed Guidance rests on a provision whose validity cannot be squared with the Supreme Court’s holdings.

**Recommendations**

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

**FEDERAL GOVERNMENT**

The Commission is deeply troubled that the Guidance, while well-intentioned, may have paradoxically contributed to making schools less safe. Significant concerns also remain regarding the legal framework upon which the Guidance is based. These concerns, together with the repeated concerns expressed by many that disciplinary decisions are best left in the hands of classroom teachers and administrators, warrant rescission of the Guidance. The Commission thus makes the following recommendations:

1. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Department of Education (ED), should rescind the Guidance and its associated sub-regulatory guidance documents. ED should develop information for schools and school districts that will identify resources and best practices to assist schools in improving school climate and learning outcomes as well as in protecting the rights of students with disabilities during the disciplinary process while maintaining overall student safety.

2. DOJ and ED should continue to vigorously enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and provide appropriate information to assist schools and the public in understanding how ED will investigate and resolve cases of intentional discrimination.
Chapter 8 Endnotes

1. On January 8, 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of Education jointly issued sub-regulatory guidance (collectively referred to as the “Guidance”). The Guidance includes the following documents:
   - A Dear Colleague Letter jointly signed by the Department of Justice and the Department of Education (The Dear Colleague Letter also included an Appendix titled “Recommendations for School Districts, Administrators, Teachers, and Staff”).
   - Appendix 1 titled “U.S. Department of Education Directory of Federal School Climate and Discipline Resources”;
   - Appendix 2 titled “Sample Discipline Category Profile”;
   - An FAQ document titled “School Discipline Guidance Package FAQs”;
   - A separate document titled “Supportive School Discipline Initiative.”


3. Wright, J.P., et al. (2014). Prior problem behavior accounts for the racial gap in school suspensions. *Journal of Criminal Justice*. https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/journal-of-criminal-justice/vol/42/issue/3/ (“Our results suggest, however, that the association between school suspensions and blacks and whites reflects long-standing behavioral differences between youth and that, at least in the aggregate, the use of suspensions may not be as racially biased as many have argued.”)

4. As noted by the AASA, The School Superintendents Association in its 2018 Discipline Survey, “[t]he noticeable uptick in investigations and compliance reviews [by the Office for Civil Rights] over the last nine years seems to have acted as a more powerful lever in influencing districts to reduce out-of-school time for students, even if teachers, parents, or students preferred for that specific child to be removed from class.” 2018 AASA discipline survey: An analysis of how the 2014 Dear Colleague Letter on nondiscriminatory administration of school discipline is impacting district policies and practices, at p. 6. Retrieved from http://aasa.org/uploadedFiles/AASA_DisciplineGuidance2014.pdf. The survey was administered by the AASA, The School Superintendents Association; the Association of School Business Officials International (ASBO); and the Association of Educational Services Agencies (ASEA). For purposes of this Report, they are collectively referenced as “AASA.”


6. See transcript, at p. 19: “But ultimately decisions about student discipline are pedagogical. They’re matters of school concern, entitling school leaders to the kind of deference for their educational judgment which the courts have repeatedly acknowledged. So in considering matters of student discipline, particularly as it relates to instances of individual behavior, unrelated to instances of mass violence, for instance, the federal government should follow suit and equally defer to local education experts.”

7. See transcript, at pp. 28–32.


12. Ibid.


21. Ibid.

22. Mac Donald, H. (April 6, 2018), Who misbehaves? Claims that school discipline is unfairly meted out ignores actual classroom misbehavior. *City Journal.* https://www.city-journal.org/html/who-misbehaves-15811.html. Heather Mac Donald, the Thomas W. Smith Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, recently reported on the impact that changes to disciplinary policies have had on teachers. For example, the district attorney in St. Paul, Minnesota called a spike in attacks on teachers following the implementation of non-exclusionary practices a “public health crisis.” Likewise, according to Ms. Mac Donald, Charlotte, North Carolina experienced “an increase in guns, drugs, and assaults on teachers; school assaults in Durham increased more than 50 percent last year.” She also noted that “the district attorney in Syracuse forced schools to return to traditional disciplinary policies after a teacher was stabbed.”


26. Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 257. “A close read of the available empirical literature suggests, however, that racial bias may not be the only factor associated with racial differences in school disciplinary rates. For example, research studies reveal that black youth, in comparison with their white counterparts, are often less prepared for school entry (Magnuson & Waldfogel, 2005; Murmane, et al., 2006; Sadowski, 2006), are disproportionately involved in delinquency and crime (Earls, 1994; Hawkins, Laub, & Lauritsen, 1998), and are more likely to behave in ways that interfere with classroom and school functioning (Beaver, Wright, & DeLisi, 2011). These studies, and others from various disciplines, suggest that the school disciplinary rates may also reflect the problematic behaviors of black youth—problem behaviors that are imported into schools and into classrooms.”


29 See January 8, 2014, Dear Colleague Letter on the Nondiscriminatory Administration of School Discipline at 11, n.21 (“Schools also violate Federal law when they evenhandedly implement facially neutral policies and practices that, although not adopted with the intent to discriminate, nonetheless have an unjustified effect of discriminating against students on the basis of race. The resulting discriminatory effect is commonly referred to as ‘disparate impact.’”) (citing 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2)).


31 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (finding a violation of the Equal Protection Clause requires discriminatory intent, compared to Title VII’s statuteutorily enacted disparate impact standard in employment); see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1979) (“Proof of racially disparate intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”); Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (“[E]ven if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.”).


33 See January 8, 2014, Dear Colleague Letter on the Nondiscriminatory Administration of School Discipline at 11, n.21 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2)); see ibid. at p. 18, Example 6; see also Blad, E. (April 4, 2018), Delos meets with supporters, critics of discipline rules as GAO says racial disparities persist. Education Week. (Summarizing the guidance’s interpretation of disparate impact as mandating that “If a school finds black students...in violation of a rule at higher rates than their peers, that rule must be necessary to ‘meet an important educational goal’”). Even in the context of disparate impact case law, some argue that this was an overly expansive approach to disparate impact liability, in focusing on bottom line disparities in discipline rates rather than whether specific school practices caused those disparities. Regulatory Transparency Project. (September 12, 2017). A review of Department of Education programs: Transgender issues, racial quotas in school discipline, and campus sexual assault mandates, at 8–9; Clegg, R. (April 11, 2018). How the “Dear Colleague” Letter missed the point. Washington Post (Describing the “hyperaggressive approach” taken by the Dear Colleague Letter).


35 See, e.g., Resolution Agreement Oklahoma City Public Schools at 18–19, OCR Docket No. 0714119. (April 4, 2016) (Any statistical disproportionality should be “eliminated to the maximum extent possible.”).

36 See, e.g., Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 350-352 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

37 See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 535–538 (7th Cir. 1997) (striking down lower court decree that would have required school district to engage in racial proportionality requirements in discipline and reasoning that even though the district was under a racial desegregation consent decree, there was no evidence that the district’s current discipline practices intentionally discriminated against students based on race and thus no justification for a policy that amounted to a racial quota).


41 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273–74 (1988) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to principal’s decision to restrict otherwise-protected news content of school publication because the decision was “not unreasonable” and thus related to a “valid educational purpose”); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007) (school given deference as to its decision to restrict speech around school that would concededly be protected by the First Amendment if it occurred away from school); see Bd of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002) (upholding school search policy that would be unconstitutional outside the schools, based on rational basis for it, while expressing “no opinion as to its wisdom”).

Every youth who appears to be “troubled” or displays “troubled” behavior has a unique set of risk and protective factors contributing to his or her behaviors. Risk factors can include mental health symptoms such as mood problems, impulsivity, anxiety, hallucinations, or other psychotic symptoms. They can also include environmental factors such as history of trauma, adverse events, poor supervision, and inappropriate coping behaviors. Often, these risks can exacerbate and compound one another. Some examples include: speech or language delays combined with past traumas; developmental and intellectual disabilities combined with being bullied; and relationship challenges with caregivers combined with substance use disorders. Protective factors play an important role and can be further developed. Among these factors are a relationship with a trusted adult such as a teacher or coach, an undeveloped skill such as art or sports, or a desire to make friends.

The term “youth with complex mental health needs” more accurately reflects the complex forces resulting in how a “troubled youth” may present and will be used henceforth. The term “youth” refers to children, adolescents, and transition-aged youth (ages 16–25).

Given the multifactorial nature of causes of challenging behaviors, the role of medications will depend on such factors as the diagnosis, the presence of co-occurring mental or physical diagnoses, and provider, youth, and family preferences. In her July 11 testimony to the Commission, Dr. Gabrielle Carlson highlighted the unique features of several youth with complex mental health needs, stating that “treatment requires an accurate diagnosis and attention to the individual circumstances and presentation of each child, his or her school, and family.”

Despite the unique needs of every youth, there are several overarching principles that are important to consider with respect to the use of psychotropic medications. While a full review of the principles to consider in prescribing is beyond the scope of this report, the most important points are listed in the sidebar. The categories of medications most commonly used for youth with mental health conditions include selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs, such as fluoxetine, sertraline, citalopram), stimulant medications (e.g., methylphenidate medications, mixed amphetamine salts), antipsychotic medications (e.g., aripiprazole, risperidone), post synaptic alpha2-ad-
renergic agonists (e.g., guanfacine), and other anti-depressants (e.g., bupropion). The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved these medications for specific uses in youth (e.g., fluoxetine for youth with major depressive disorder, fluvoxamine or sertraline for youth with obsessive compulsive disorder, and methylphenidate for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, or ADHD).

Medications are often prescribed for youth even when the FDA has not approved them for that specific diagnosis or age group. This is referred to as prescribing for an “unapproved use.” In general, healthcare professionals may prescribe or use FDA-approved drugs for unapproved uses when they judge it medically appropriate for their individual patients. In some cases, depending on the medication and its use, prescribing an unapproved drug may be within the standard of care. A common example of prescribing an FDA-approved drug for an unapproved use is prescribing a medication for a child that has been FDA-approved for use in adults for a certain condition and not separately studied and approved for use in children. (See Table 9.1 for medications approved by the FDA for children and adolescents and for what conditions.)

Psychotropic medications are effective for many conditions in youth. They can facilitate better outcomes, such as improved academic functioning, reduced anxiety, decreased impulsivity, and decreased symptoms of major depressive disorder. Some examples of these medications and some of their uses include methylphenidate for ADHD, sertraline for generalized anxiety disorder, guanfacine for ADHD, and fluoxetine for depression.2,3,4

When prescribed appropriately, psychotropic medications can play a lifesaving role in the lives of youth with complex behavioral health needs. To give several examples, antipsychotics for youth with schizophrenia can not only reduce symptoms such as hallucinations, but may also reduce the severity of subsequent psychotic episodes.5 For youth with severe major depression, antidepressants can improve mood and improve functioning.6 In situations of severe anxiety, an SSRI such as fluoxetine or sertraline can enable the youth to engage in therapy to develop new coping skills.7 Despite evidence supporting the use of psychotropic medications for specific conditions, more evidence is needed to better understand which medications are helpful for various conditions in youth.

As Dr. Mark Olfson noted in his July 11 testimony to the Commission, “There is compelling evidence that U.S. children and adolescents are undertreated with psychotropic medications.” For example, although one in nine U.S. adolescents suffers from depression, only around 40 percent of them receive any treatment and only about half of those receive an antidepressant medication.8 Olfson noted that even larger gaps exist in the treatment of anxiety and substance use problems.9

Psychotropic medications also can be associated with adverse effects irrespective of whether the prescriber is adhering to best practice guidelines. Common examples of adverse effects include increased restlessness or agitation with SSRIs (particularly in younger age groups), weight gain, associated cardio-metabolic effects, sedation with antipsychotics, and decreased appetite with stimulants.

Concerns have been raised regarding whether SSRIs cause increases in suicidality in youth. Some research has found an elevated risk of suicidality among youth who were prescribed SSRIs compared to those receiving placebo.10 It also described potential mechanisms for this phenomenon, including activation (i.e., increased energy for self-harm). Other researchers found that lower rates of SSRI use could be associated with higher rates of suicide among youth.11,12 Therefore, it is important to consider this potential risk when prescribing SSRIs. The current standard of care for youth on SSRIs includes close clinical monitoring. There is also significant uncertainty about the long-term impact of psychotropic medications on developing brains, and more research is needed in this area.

There is variability across the United States in how closely prescribers adhere to best practice guidelines,
especially for vulnerable populations like youth and youth with complex behavioral health needs. Examples of inappropriate prescribing include: prescribing medications without a clear diagnosis; not monitoring at the recommended intervals (e.g., not checking a glucose level if prescribing second generation antipsychotics) and/or not monitoring the recommended clinical parameters (e.g., not checking blood pressure at regular intervals if the child is on a stimulant); and prescribing without appropriate consideration of proven non-pharmacological interventions, including various disorder-specific psychosocial interventions.

Deviation from best practice prescribing impacts certain groups of youth disproportionately, such as those involved in the foster care system and minority youth. There is evidence that youth who have multiservice system involvement more frequently experience polypharmacy—the concurrent use of multiple medications by a patient—and long-term use, even in the absence of psychosocial treatments. While prescribing more than one medication may be clinically indicated, polypharmacy without a full psychiatric evaluation and without proper monitoring is not consistent with best practice treatment.

Youth with substance use disorders (SUDs) commonly have co-occurring psychiatric disorders and are represented in high numbers in the juvenile justice population. The standard of care is to evaluate and treat co-occurring psychiatric disorders while also addressing the SUDs. In conjunction with the full array of services for youth with SUDs, the use of buprenorphine in youth is promising. At this time, only buprenorphine/naloxone is approved for individuals aged 16 and older, although methadone pharmacotherapy for opioid use disorder can be provided at specially certified opioid treatment programs where specialized interventions for youth are offered for those aged 16–17. Methadone treatment for opioid use disorder can only be undertaken with informed consent from parents (unless the youth has been emancipated) and the adolescent patient. More research is needed to determine when Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT) is clinically indicated in youth, as well as its adverse effects and efficacy. MAT is currently only available for opioid, alcohol, and nicotine use disorders. Workforce gaps also limit access to MAT.

The standard of care is to evaluate and treat co-occurring psychiatric disorders while also addressing the substance use disorders.

Workforce issues for clinicians who prescribe psychotropic medications to youth

Pediatricians and other primary care providers prescribe the majority of psychotropic medications in the United States, but their lack of training in behavioral health conditions is frequently cited as a major concern. Clinicians who prescribe psychotropic medications to youth and adolescents include child and adolescent psychiatrists, pediatricians, advance practice nurses, physician assistants, family medicine physicians, and psychiatrists trained in adult psychiatry.

In some states and in the United States Military Health System, psychologists who have undergone specialized training can prescribe psychiatric medication. Although child and adolescent psychiatrists have the most extensive training in behavioral health conditions, physical health, and child development, families often receive psychotropic medications from providers with varying degrees of training and proficiency in prescribing for youth with complex behavioral health needs. While many pediatricians do an excellent job in addressing the behavioral health needs of their patients, there are ongoing concerns about inadequate training particularly regarding youth with complex behavioral health needs. The reasons for the high rates of prescribing by primary care providers is multifactorial. They include stigma associated with going to a psychiatrist, the convenience and trust in seeing the pediatrician, finding a psychiatrist who is affordable or in-network for insurance, and, most importantly, the critical workforce shortage of child and adolescent psychiatrists.

Appropriate treatment, particularly for youth with complex behavioral health needs, begins with a thorough psychiatric evaluation that considers their developmental and behavioral health history, family history, environment, physical health, behaviors, mood, and other factors. Despite the importance of obtaining a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation, many youth with complex behavioral health needs experience barriers to these services.
In the majority of states, there is a critical shortage of child and adolescent psychiatrists. For special populations, such as youth with intellectual and developmental disability disorders, shortages of child and adolescent psychiatrists are even more dire. Many counties throughout the country have no child and adolescent psychiatrists at all. Although the number of adolescents in the population is expected to grow to 45 million by 2050, the pool of child and adolescent psychiatrists is aging and not increasing at the same rate as the youth population. Even at the current time, there are approximately 8,300 practicing child and adolescent psychiatrists in the United States and more than 15 million youth in need of the special expertise of a child and adolescent psychiatrist.

Because of the national shortage of child and adolescent psychiatrists, families with youth in need of a psychiatrist often have to wait for long periods before they are able to be evaluated, travel long distances, and go without specialized care. Pediatricians in rural and other critical shortage areas are sometimes left struggling to manage highly complex youth without adequate training in the management of mental disorders. They have limited access to providers with experience working with youth with mental and substance use disorders.

**Commission Observations**

Best practice treatment varies according to the condition under consideration, the specific situation of the child and family, and other factors. Best practice guidelines are generally established through a process of expert consensus and research. As Dr. Mark Olfson testified to the Commission, treatment must be tailored to individual needs.

Entities involved with developing best practice guidelines vary, but may include professional organizations, specialists contracted by states, or academic centers. In the area of psychotropic prescribing for youth with complex mental health needs, professional organizations such as the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and the American Academy of Pediatrics have developed a number of best practice guidelines. The guidelines cover the use of psychotropic medications in youth generally and for specific conditions. It is also notable that the Canadian Institute for Health Research has supported the development of guidelines for specific types of psychotropic medications for youth, such as antipsychotics. In addition, a number of states have developed psychotropic medication parameters specific to vulnerable populations, such as youth in foster care. Indiana is one such state.

A full description of the guidelines is beyond the scope of this report. However, recommended components of appropriate prescribing frequently include an evaluation of the youth’s behavioral health issues and history, appropriate clinical and laboratory monitoring, appropriate informed consent procedures, access to a broader treatment plan including psychosocial services, and coordination with other providers and service systems involved with the youth.

A particular aspect of best practice prescribing incorporates an adequate informed consent process, which includes engagement of youth and their caregivers in the decision-making process as well as education about the risks and benefits of medications. Another aspect involves expanding shared decision-making approaches. When youth and families are educated about the risks, benefits, and alternatives to medications and are more involved in treatment decision-making, youth are more likely to take medications as prescribed, be engaged in treatment, and
participate in other aspects of care. Family and youth peer advocates can also play an important role in this area.30

**State–wide programs supporting best practice prescribing**

Although guidelines exist for best practice prescribing of psychotropic medications, inappropriate prescribing is all too common. This is particularly so for vulnerable populations. A number of states have developed programs to address the problem of inappropriate prescribing of psychotropic medications for youth, especially where there are shortages of providers specializing in youth behavioral health disorders.

Among the most successful programs are those that are financially supported (often at the state level) and that have multiple components. The latter include resources supporting the education of providers and families, resources such as case management to connect youth to other psychosocial services, a process for review of medication regimens, and the ability for providers to consult with a child psychiatrist specialist. Minnesota, Washington, Ohio, and New Jersey have developed such programs.

One example is Ohio Minds Matter. This quality improvement initiative was launched by the State of Ohio to evaluate and improve prescribing of psychotropic medications. The initiative is a public-private partnership with a $1 million investment from the Ohio Office of Health Transformation and Department of Medicaid. Initiative partners include various state departments, health systems, providers, community representatives, and child and family advocates.

The goals for the project include increasing timely access to safe and effective psychotropic medications and other treatments, improving pediatric health outcomes, and reducing potential adverse effects. A key resource created by the initiative is the Minds Matter Toolkit. The toolkit includes design algorithms, evidence-based guidelines, fact sheets, and online, on-demand learning modules for prescribers, parents, consumers, schools, and agencies.31

**Telephonic consultation programs with child and adolescent psychiatrists**

Consultation models with child and adolescent psychiatrists (which can be stand-alone or part of a broader system) have been successful in supporting pediatricians and other providers to prescribe medications and refer youth to appropriate psychosocial supports. When such telephonic consultations are provided, the primary care provider remains the prescriber of psychotropic medications, unless a decision is made for the youth to receive a face-to-face psychiatric evaluation.

Despite the promising nature of such consultation programs, many providers and communities nationally do not have access to them. Even in the approximately 30 states that have telephonic consultation lines in place, the service is not available to all pediatricians and providers statewide.32

**Access to best practice psychosocial services for youth with complex behavioral health needs**

To address complex behavioral health issues in youth, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) has developed, funded, and implemented a treatment approach called the systems of care framework. The framework stipulates care coordination across multiple systems for youth. Systems such as schools, behavioral health, juvenile justice, and social services are commonly involved in care coordination.

This approach has proven a best practice, as evidenced by annual reports to Congress that review and analyze data from the multisite national evaluation. Data from the 2016 report, “The Comprehensive Community Mental Health Services for Children with Serious Emotional Disturbances Program,” indicate that youth participating in systems of care demonstrate significant:

- improvements in behavioral and emotional functioning;
- reductions in suicide and suicide attempts;
- reductions in unlawful activities; and
- reductions in costs due to hospitalizations and arrests.33

New Jersey has invested significant efforts in developing coordination across multiple systems to enhance its system of care. The state has demonstrated some promising outcomes associated with these efforts.34

Several models of care have been effective for youth with complex behavioral health needs, such as wraparound systems of care.35 Multisystemic therapy is another evidence-based model for youth with severe behavioral health conditions who have been
Youth participating in systems of care demonstrate significant:
- improvements in behavioral and emotional functioning
- reductions in suicide and suicide attempts
- reductions in unlawful activities
- reductions in costs due to hospitalizations and arrests

or are involved in the justice system. For symptoms of trauma, which are common in youth with behavioral health disorders, there are a number of evidence-based psychotherapies. However, psychosocial treatments are only available to a small percentage of the youth who might benefit from them.

Models beyond traditional outpatient behavioral health services are described elsewhere in this report. These models should also be acknowledged for facilitating youth access to appropriate psychotropic medication prescribing.

Child and adolescent psychiatrists can play a variety of roles within school-based mental health programs, both in direct service provision as well as consultation. One example of an innovative model of integrating psychiatry into schools is the University of New Mexico’s Center for Rural and Community Behavioral Health (CRCBH). It uses telehealth technology to connect child and adolescent psychiatry trainees and faculty with youth in rural and frontier schools. In addition to providing care, the CRCBH model provides continuing education to school-based providers.

SAMHSA has considerably enhanced its approach to the provision of technical and training assistance (TTA) on addressing mental disorders, including serious mental illness (SMI). In FY 2019, SAMHSA will fund a Network of Regional TTA Centers, the Mental Health Technology Transfer Centers, to provide training and education to professionals across the country working to address the needs of those affected by mental disorders. The network will include specialty areas of focus related to treating mental disorders. Two population-specific centers will address the needs of the American Indian/Alaska Natives and Hispanic populations.

The network focus will be enhanced with the addition of a specialty emphasis on school-based mental health in each region. Complementing this regional approach, the Clinical Support Services for SMI is a new national TTA Center. It will serve as a national resource on best practices for the provision of evidence-based treatment for individuals living with SMI.

In addition to the shortage of child and adolescent psychiatrists, there are multiple barriers to the availability of other evidence-based psychosocial services for youth with complex behavioral health needs. In fact, as described above, medications are a very small component of the broader treatment plan for many youth with complex behavioral health needs.

“Medication is one aspect of treatment. We have considerable knowledge about how to use it. And often it works best in combination with psychosocial treatments including family and/or individual psychotherapy. It is a tragedy that misinformation, stigma and lack of access keep people from effective treatment.”

— Dr. Gabrielle Carlson, testimony to the Commissioners, July 11, 2018
### Table 9-1
Psychotropic medications approved by the FDA for behavioral health conditions in children and adolescents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medication</th>
<th>Brand names</th>
<th>Indication</th>
<th>Age group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Methylphenidate preparations</td>
<td>Methylin, Ritalin, Ritalin SR, Methylin ER, Quillivant XR, Concerta, Metadata CD, Ritalin LA, Daytrana, Focalin, Focalin XR, Aptensio XR, Cotempla-XR, Quillichew ER</td>
<td>Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)</td>
<td>≥ 6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphetamine, dextroamphetamine and mixed amphetamine salts</td>
<td>Liquadd, Dexedrine, Dextadrine spansules, Vyvanse, Adderall, Adderall XR, Dexosyn, Adzenys, Evekeo, Mydayis</td>
<td>Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)</td>
<td>≥ 6 years (Note several formulations specifically approved for children &gt; 3 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisdexamfetamine</td>
<td>Vyvanse</td>
<td>Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)</td>
<td>≥ 6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-controlled ADHD medications</td>
<td>Strattera (atomoxetine) Tenex, Intuniv (guanfacine and guanfacine ER) Kapvay (clonidine)</td>
<td>Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)</td>
<td>≥ 6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quetiapine</td>
<td>Seroquel</td>
<td>Bipolar disorder Schizophrenia</td>
<td>≥ 10 years ≥ 13 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>palperidone</td>
<td>Invega</td>
<td>Schizophrenia</td>
<td>12–17 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>olanzapine</td>
<td>Zyprexa</td>
<td>Bipolar disorder Schizophrenia</td>
<td>≥ 13 years ≥ 13 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>risperidone</td>
<td>Risperdal</td>
<td>Autism</td>
<td>≥ 5 years 10–17 years 13–17 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aripiprazole</td>
<td>Abilify</td>
<td>Bipolar disorder Irritability associated with autistic disorder Schizophrenia</td>
<td>≥ 10 years ≥ 5 years ≥ 13 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>asenapine</td>
<td>Saphris</td>
<td>Bipolar mania Schizophrenia</td>
<td>10–17 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lursidone</td>
<td>Latuda</td>
<td>Schizophrenia, Bipolar depression</td>
<td>13–17 years 10–17 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chlorpromazine</td>
<td>Thorazine</td>
<td>Schizophrenia/psychosis</td>
<td>≥ 6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haloperidol</td>
<td>Haldol</td>
<td>Sedation/psychotic disorders/Tourette’s disorder</td>
<td>3–12 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pimozide</td>
<td>Orap</td>
<td>Tourette’s disorder</td>
<td>≥ 12 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lithium</td>
<td>Eskatlith, Lithobid</td>
<td>Bipolar disorder</td>
<td>≥ 12 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>duloxetine</td>
<td>Cymbalta</td>
<td>Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD)</td>
<td>≥ 7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>escitalopram</td>
<td>Lexapro</td>
<td>Major depressive disorder</td>
<td>≥ 12 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fluoxetine</td>
<td>Prozac</td>
<td>Depression Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD)</td>
<td>Ages 8–18 Ages 7–17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fluvoxamine</td>
<td>Luvox</td>
<td>OCD</td>
<td>Ages 8–17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sertraline</td>
<td>Zoloft</td>
<td>OCD</td>
<td>Ages 6–17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>amitriptyline</td>
<td>Elavil</td>
<td>Depressive disorders</td>
<td>≥ 12 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clomipramine</td>
<td>Anafranil</td>
<td>OCD</td>
<td>≥ 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imipramine</td>
<td>Tofranil</td>
<td>Depression Enuresis</td>
<td>≥ 12 years ≥ 6 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.42

**FEDERAL GOVERNMENT**

1. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) should seek to increase the number of specialty physicians by encouraging the Accreditation Council on General Medical Education (ACGME) and other key stakeholders to increase the number of residency slots for general psychiatry programs, as well as child and adolescent psychiatry, in order to increase the number of medical students entering psychiatry and increase the number of residents in child and adolescent psychiatry.

2. Appropriate federal agencies should work to support care coordination across multiple systems for complex youth by supporting mechanisms where feasible for collaboration between providers (e.g., billing codes to support communication of physicians with teachers, child welfare workers, probation officers, psychologists, social workers, and other providers as well as other team-based planning).

3. HHS operating divisions, such as the National Institutes of Health, should support research to answer questions regarding effectiveness, safety, and tolerability of psychotropic treatment in youth (including long-term effects) as well as research on safe, effective alternatives, such as psychosocial interventions.

4. All appropriate federal agencies should support technical assistance (TA) for children's mental health, school-based mental health services, and TA to support evidence-based treatments for serious emotional disturbances.

5. Appropriate federal agencies should strengthen standards and quality metrics so that youth have access to high-quality treatment that matches their needs. Because of the uneven quality of psychotropic medication treatment, there is a need to coordinate federal, state, and local approaches to measuring the quality of mental healthcare for children and adolescents, including use of psychotropic medications.

**STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES**

1. State and local health and behavioral health departments, in collaboration with primary care facilities and practitioners and medical schools as appropriate, should expand and enhance the existing primary care workforce by making telephonic and telespsychiatry consultation models available, expanding and supporting provider education, and supporting provider learning collaboratives. Well-designed consultation models include real-time availability by phone of a child and adolescent psychiatrist to consult with a primary care provider to discuss treatment needs and consider the need for additional evaluations or resources.43

   Some of these programs include access to additional types of services, such as connecting youth to case management or therapy services. Examples include the Massachusetts Child Psychiatry Access Program (https://www.mcpap.com/), Maryland’s Behavioral Health Integration in Pediatric Primary Care (http://www.mdhhipp.org/), and the University of Washington Partnership Access Line (http://www.seattlechil-drens.org/healthcare-professionals/access-services/partnership-access-line/).

2. State and local behavioral health departments should expand the integration of behavioral health providers appropriately trained to deliver psychosocial interventions. In addition, they should expand training and capacity in the delivery of non-pharmacological interventions as safe alternatives and/or augmentations to appropriate pharmacotherapy.

3. State and local behavioral health agencies, in collaboration with state and local school districts, should increase access to good treatment through increasing opportunities to access a full array of treatment services in schools. The provision of treatment delivery in schools is imperative to addressing the needs of youth with complex mental health needs. The direct availability of these services in the school setting reduces barriers to access and ensures easy access to mental health service provision.

34 https://www.nj.gov/dcf/about/divisions/dcsc/


42 Recommendations were made with the underlying premise that promising and effective practices to support youth with complex behavioral health needs should be expanded and promoted. It is also important to note that the evidence for a causal link between the use of psychotropic medications and general school safety is weak; rather, the recommendations focus on promoting positive clinical and functional outcomes for youth with complex behavioral health needs.

43 Some examples include Massachusetts Child Psychiatry Access Program (https://www.mcicap.com/) and University of Washington Partnership Access Line (http://www.seattlechildrens.org/healthcare-professionals/access-services/partnership-access-line/).
The suspected shooter at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School is a 19-year-old who purchased the long gun he allegedly used from a licensed dealer after passing a federal background check. His ability to do so sparked new debate about age restrictions on firearm sales. This section provides an overview of federal and state laws that place age-related restrictions on the possession and purchase of firearms. Existing research does not demonstrate that laws imposing a minimum age for firearms purchases have a measurable impact on reducing homicides, suicides, or unintentional deaths.

**Federal laws**

**Long Guns:** Federal law provides no minimum age for the possession of long guns or long gun ammunition. However, the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) does prohibit federally licensed importers, manufacturers, dealers, or collectors (collectively, Federal Firearms Licensees or “FFLs”) from selling or delivering any long gun or ammunition for a long gun to any individual less than 18 years old. Unlicensed persons may sell a long gun to a person of any age.

**Handguns:** Federal law establishes a minimum age for possession of handguns. The GCA prohibits persons under 18 years of age from possessing handguns or handgun ammunition, with certain exceptions for employment, ranching, farming, hunting, target practice, education, and a handgun possessed while defending the home of the juvenile or a home in which the juvenile is an invited guest.

The GCA also prohibits FFLs from selling or delivering any handgun or handgun ammunition to any individual less than 21 years of age. This leaves a three-year “window” when an individual may legally possess handguns and handgun ammunition, but may not purchase them from an FFL. Unlicensed persons may sell a handgun to a resident of their own state so long as the buyer is 18 years old.

**State laws**

Similar to federal firearms laws, state laws pertaining to possession of firearms differ from those pertaining to their purchase. State laws may also distinguish between sales by FFLs and sales by unlicensed persons.

The laws in a number of states reach beyond federal law, placing further age restrictions on the purchase of handguns and long guns. Shortly after the Parkland shooting, the State of Florida passed a law that prohibits firearms (handguns and long guns) purchases by individuals under 21 years old regardless of whether the purchase is from a licensed firearms dealer or from

### Table 10-1: Federal Laws

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Long Guns</th>
<th>Handguns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minimum Age of Possession</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>18, with exceptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minimum Age of Purchase from Licensed Sellers (FFLs)</strong></td>
<td>Prohibited from selling or delivering long guns/ammunition to individuals younger than 18</td>
<td>Prohibited from selling or delivering handgun/ammunition to individuals younger than 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minimum Age of Purchase from Unlicensed Seller</strong></td>
<td>May sell a long gun to a person of any age</td>
<td>May sell a handgun to a resident of their own state as long as the buyer is at least 18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
a non-licensee/private party. In taking this action, Florida joined two other states—Hawaii and Illinois—that have similar laws setting the minimum age for all firearms purchases at 21. The 2018 change in the firearms law in Florida did not include modifications to age restrictions on firearms possession.

Research on minimum age of purchase laws and firearms violence
A 2017 study on the effects of firearms laws on firearms homicides in the United States was based on a systematic review of 34 empirical studies published between January 1970 and August 2016. Five of the 34 studies examined juvenile age restrictions prohibiting the possession and/or purchase of handguns by persons younger than 18 or 21 years.

This review found that the evidence does not indicate that additional state law age requirements would be effective. For example, one study included in the systematic review evaluated the effects of state firearms regulations on homicide and suicide death rates. The study examined laws in effect from 1979 to 1998, including laws pertaining to a minimum age of 21 for handgun purchases and a minimum age of 21 for private handgun possession. None of these state laws was associated with a statistically significant decrease in the rates of firearms homicides or total homicides. Another study found these state age restrictions do not appear to be as effective in reducing homicide or suicide rates as other measures.

One further study examined state-level minimum age laws in place between 1981 and 2010 for handgun possession and found no significant effects on youth suicides or youth unintentional deaths. However, it noted that the current federal minimum age of possession laws are effective in reducing suicide and unintentional deaths among youths.

Where do shooters obtain their firearms?
Laws that modify the age of purchase are likely to be effective if individuals obtain their firearms through legal purchase prior to using them in violent acts. As school shootings are of particular concern, it is important to ask: Where do school shooters get the firearms they use?

The U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Secret Service reviewed 37 incidents of targeted school violence between 1974 and 2000 and found that most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack. More than two-thirds of the attackers acquired the gun (or guns) used in their attacks from their own home or that of a relative. The School Associated Death Study conducted by the Centers for Disease Control found similar results in a study of 323 school-associated violent death events that occurred between 1992 and 1999. Of the firearms used to commit homicides, 23.4 percent were obtained from the home of the perpetrator and 27.6 percent came from a friend or a relative.

The National Institute of Justice is funding researchers at City University of New York’s John Jay College to develop a database of all of the publicly known shootings that have resulted in at least one injury on K–12 school grounds since 1990. This project will provide a detailed understanding of the perpetrators of school shootings as well as recommendations for intervention points that could prevent or reduce the harm caused by shootings. Although the project is ongoing, a preliminary analysis of 106 cases found that only 13 percent of shooters purchased the firearms legally. Higher percentages took the firearms from their parents (29 percent) or stole them from friends or family (25 percent) or strangers (2 percent). Another 5 percent purchased the firearms illegally.

A Wall Street Journal analysis of school shootings with at least three victims dead or injured since 1990 found 32 incidents. Twenty-five of these cases involved shooters who were minors. In 20 cases, reporters were able to identify a source for the gun, and in 17 cases the gun came from the home. Given what we know about how underage shooters most often procure weapons (i.e., taking them from home or stealing them), laws aimed at a minimum purchase age would not have affected most school shooters.

Analyses of completed school shootings indicate that school shooters do not frequently use legal purchase as a method for obtaining firearms. More often, they obtain them from within the home or steal them.
Commission Observations
The existing research findings on the efficacy of current minimum age of firearm purchase laws do not support the conclusion that those laws have a measurable impact on reducing homicides, suicides, or unintentional deaths. Analyses of completed school shootings indicate that school shooters do not frequently use legal purchase as a method for obtaining firearms. More often, they obtain them from within the home or steal them. These findings suggest that modifying the minimum age of firearm purchase is unlikely to be an effective method for preventing or reducing school shootings.

Recommendations
Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

 STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES
1. Without more comprehensive research, and because most school shooters obtain their weapons from family members or friends rather than by purchasing them, states seeking to prevent unlawful adolescent access to firearms should consider offering training or other resources to promote safe storage of firearms.
2. States should consider sponsoring additional research to determine how best to prevent adolescents from unlawfully accessing firearms.

Chapter 10 Endnotes
3 The Florida statute only prohibits licensed dealers from engaging in sales (or facilitation of sales) to those under 21. For practical purposes, this means that no criminal penalty applies to a private seller who fails to ensure a purchaser is over 21 (i.e., a private seller has no affirmative legal obligation to verify the age of a purchaser).
4 The studies discussed in this section focus on the use of firearms by youth in homicides and suicides; they do not specifically address the use of firearms by youth in other crimes.
6 This discussion examines the results of a systematic review of multiple studies. We highlight several examples to elaborate on the overall finding of the review, but it is not our intention to summarize the characteristics of all studies included in the review. We note that one of the studies that was reviewed produced contradictory results, but that study was based on cross-sectional data, which cannot explain the finding of the review, but it is not our intention to summarize the characteristics of all studies included in the review.
9 Gius, M. (2015). The impact of minimum age and child access prevention laws on firearm-related youth suicides and unintentional deaths. Social Science Journal, 52(2): 168–175. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j. sosci.2015.01.003. This study included laws pertaining only to hand-guns and hand-gun possession. Restrictions on long gun possession and minimum age requirement for handgun purchases were not considered.
Too often following a mass shooting we learn that people who knew the shooter saw warning signs of potential violence but felt powerless to do anything. If the person has not yet broken any law and may not meet the mental health standards for involuntary commitment, what can be done?

A number of states have attempted to answer this question, at least in part, through “extreme risk protection order” (ERPO) laws. Also known as gun violence protection orders, risk warrants, or red flag laws, these state laws provide law enforcement (and in some instances, family members) with a legal, temporary way to prevent individuals who pose a threat to themselves or others from possessing or purchasing firearms.

President Trump has called on states to adopt ERPO laws that protect the due process rights of law-abiding citizens. This section describes the state laws that have been enacted, reviews the limited research on their effectiveness, and offers several recommendations.

**ERPO laws: what they are and how they work**

In every state, some form of protection or restraining order is already available in cases involving domestic violence, harassment, stalking, sexual assault, and, in some states, workplace issues. But outside of the context of domestic violence, most protection orders do not result in a temporary legal prohibition against possessing firearms. Additionally, most protection order laws focus on threats directed at the specific person requesting the order. Generalized threats (e.g., against a school) may not qualify under state laws.

ERPO laws seek to fill these gaps by providing a temporary mechanism for removing firearms from individuals found by a court to be a danger to themselves or others. Thirteen states currently have an ERPO law in effect, including eight states that have enacted laws since the Parkland shooting.

The terms of each state statute are summarized in Table 11.1. While state laws differ, the basic process in each state is largely similar:

**Initial Petition.** A law enforcement officer, an attorney for the state, or, in some states, a family or household member offers a court evidence that an individual presents an imminent threat to himself or herself or to others and is in possession of a firearm. Depending on the jurisdiction, the evidence can include a history or pattern of recent threats or acts of violence, dangerous past behavior with firearms, substance abuse, and mental illness.

**Temporary Order.** If the petitioner offers sufficient evidence, the court issues either a search and seizure warrant or a temporary protective order. The initial evidentiary threshold varies by jurisdiction, including reasonable cause, substantial likelihood, clear and convincing evidence, and probable cause.

**Seizure of Firearms.** Once a warrant or protection order is issued, law enforcement seizes and temporarily holds for safekeeping the firearm(s) the at-risk individual owns or has access to.

**Hearing.** Typically, within 14 to 21 days of the issuance of the temporary order or warrant, the court holds a hearing at which the at-risk individual has the opportunity to present evidence that he or she is not an imminent threat to himself or herself or to others.

**Extension of Prohibition.** If the court agrees with the finding that generated the initial warrant or temporary order (though the evidentiary standard may be higher at this point), it can extend the prohibition such that:

**Thirteen states currently have an ERPO law in effect, including eight states that have enacted laws since the Parkland shooting.**
the individual may not retain or purchase firearms for a period of, typically, one year.

While the basic features of these state laws are largely similar, there are a number of notable differences. They include the following:

**Scope.** Both ERPOs and risk warrants provide for initial seizure of firearms already in the possession of the at-risk individual. However, ERPO statutes provide a clearer prohibition against future purchases or possession by the individual, while risk warrant statutes focus on seizure of firearms at the outset of the warrant’s issuance.

**Petitioners.** In five states, only a law enforcement officer or other designated state official may file a petition. In eight states, a family or household member may file a petition with the court. One state also authorizes petitions by mental health professionals.

**Standard of Proof.** At the hearing that takes place after the issuance of the initial order, most states require the petitioner to prove that the individual continues to be a threat to himself or herself or to others by clear and convincing evidence. In three states, the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.

**False Petitions.** Filing a false petition or filing a petition with the intent to harass an individual is punishable in nine jurisdictions, either as a misdemeanor or a felony.

**Additional Notice.** In one state, if the court finds that the individual poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to others, it provides notice to that state’s Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, as it deems appropriate. In five states, the order must be made available to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).³

**ERPO laws: do they work?**

ERPO laws are of relatively recent vintage—the oldest is less than 20 years old, and more than half have been in effect for less than a year. So it is not surprising that there is little research on their effectiveness. Two studies (in the states where such laws have been around the longest) suggest a positive impact on suicide prevention.

In the first study, researchers examining Connecticut’s risk warrant law concluded that the removal of firearms from high-risk individuals may have prevented up to 100 suicides.⁶ They estimated the law resulted in one averted suicide for every 10–11 cases. In 44 percent of cases, the risk warrant led to the respondents receiving psychiatric treatment they may not have received otherwise. Importantly, the study examined the impact of the law on suicides only, not violence against others.

A more recent study looked at both the Connecticut and Indiana risk warrant laws.⁷ It found that Indiana’s law was associated with a 7.5 percent decrease in firearm suicides during the 10 years following its enactment. Connecticut’s law was associated with a 1.6 percent decrease in firearm suicides immediately after its passage, and a 13.7 percent decrease between 2007 and 2015, following increased enforcement in the wake of the Virginia Tech shooting. Like the other study, it did not examine effects on gun violence more generally.

**Commission Observations**

A growing number of states is adopting ERPO laws in an effort to prevent gun violence. The available evidence suggests that the older risk warrant laws may have a positive impact on suicide prevention. We do not know whether they impact gun violence more generally, and it appears no studies have yet evaluated the more recent ERPO laws in other states.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Who can petition?</th>
<th>Standard of proof for initial order or warrant</th>
<th>Hearing held within</th>
<th>Standard of proof at hearing to continue prohibition</th>
<th>How long is firearm held initially?</th>
<th>Order MUST BE made available to the NICS</th>
<th>Penalty for false petition/harassment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>California</strong></td>
<td>ERPO</td>
<td>Law enforcement (LE) officer; immediate family member</td>
<td>Ex parte order: Substantial likelihood that person poses a significant danger</td>
<td>21 days</td>
<td>Clear and convincing evidence</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Misdemeanor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Temporary emergency order (available to LE only): Reasonable cause that person poses immediate and present danger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Connecticut</strong></td>
<td>Risk Warrant</td>
<td>State’s Attorney; Assistant State’s Attorney; or 2 LE officers</td>
<td>Probable cause</td>
<td>14 days</td>
<td>Clear and convincing evidence</td>
<td>Not more than one year</td>
<td>No, but must report to Dept. of Mental Health and Addiction Services</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Delaware</strong></td>
<td>ERPO</td>
<td>LE officer, family member</td>
<td>Nonemergency hearing: Petition may be filed, but no ex parte order available</td>
<td>15 days</td>
<td>Clear and convincing evidence</td>
<td>Not more than one year</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Perjury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency hearing (available to LE only): Preponderance of the evidence that respondent poses an immediate and present danger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Florida</strong></td>
<td>ERPO</td>
<td>LE officer; LE agency</td>
<td>Reasonable cause</td>
<td>14 days</td>
<td>Clear and convincing evidence</td>
<td>Not more than one year</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Third-degree felony</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This table is not intended to provide an exhaustive account of the differing provisions of these state laws. For more detailed information, please consult the various state statutes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Who can petition?</th>
<th>Standard of proof for initial order or warrant</th>
<th>Hearing held within</th>
<th>Standard of proof at hearing to continue prohibition</th>
<th>How long is firearm held initially?</th>
<th>Order MUST BE made available to the NICS</th>
<th>Penalty for false petition/harassment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illinois</strong>&lt;br&gt;H.B. 2354 (effective Jan. 1, 2019)</td>
<td>Firearms Restraining Order</td>
<td>LE officer; family member</td>
<td>Probable cause</td>
<td>14 days (30 days if petitioner requests a six-month order and not an ex parte order)</td>
<td>Clear and convincing evidence</td>
<td>Six months</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Felony (perjury)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indiana</strong>&lt;br&gt;IC 35-47-14</td>
<td>Risk Warrant</td>
<td>LE officer</td>
<td>Probable cause</td>
<td>14 days</td>
<td>Clear and convincing evidence</td>
<td>At least 180 days, after which the individual may petition the court for return of firearm</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maryland</strong>&lt;br&gt;Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-601</td>
<td>ERPO</td>
<td>Physician; mental health provider; LE officer; spouse; co-habitant; relative; person with whom the individual has a child in common; current dating or intimate partner; current or former legal guardian</td>
<td>Reasonable grounds for initial interim ERPO (good for up to two days); probable cause for temporary ERPO (good for up to additional seven days)</td>
<td>A temporary ERPO hearing must be held within two business days of issuance of the interim ERPO&lt;br&gt;A final ERPO hearing must be held within seven days after service of temporary ERPO&lt;br&gt;(The parties may waive the temporary ERPO hearing and proceed directly to final hearing)</td>
<td>Clear and convincing evidence</td>
<td>Not more than one year</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No affirmative sanction, but statute says person who files a petition in good faith is not civilly or criminally liable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Massachusetts</strong>&lt;br&gt;H. 4670 (not yet codified)</td>
<td>ERPO</td>
<td>Family or household member; licensing authority (local police department)</td>
<td>Reasonable cause</td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td>Preponderance of the evidence</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Fines between $2,500 and $5,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than 2.5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Who can petition?</td>
<td>Standard of proof for initial order or warrant</td>
<td>Hearing held within</td>
<td>Standard of proof at hearing to continue prohibition</td>
<td>How long is firearm held initially?</td>
<td>Order MUST BE made available to the NICS</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>New Jersey</strong></td>
<td>A-1217; P.L. 2018, c. 35 (not yet codified)</td>
<td>ERPO</td>
<td>LE officer; family or household member</td>
<td>Good cause</td>
<td>10 days</td>
<td>Preponderance of the evidence</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oregon</strong></td>
<td>ORS 166.525</td>
<td>ERPO</td>
<td>LE officer; family or household member</td>
<td>Clear and convincing evidence</td>
<td>Respondent has 30 days to request hearing, which must take place within 21 days of request; if the respondent does not request a hearing, the protection order is effective for one year</td>
<td>Clear and convincing evidence</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rhode Island</strong></td>
<td>S. 2492 (not yet codified)</td>
<td>ERPO</td>
<td>LE agency</td>
<td>Probable cause</td>
<td>14 days</td>
<td>Clear and convincing evidence</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vermont</strong></td>
<td>13 V.S.A. § 4051</td>
<td>ERPO</td>
<td>State's Attorney or Office of the Attorney General</td>
<td>Preponderance of the evidence</td>
<td>14 days</td>
<td>Clear and convincing evidence</td>
<td>Up to six months</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Washington</strong></td>
<td>RCWA § 7.94.010</td>
<td>ERPO</td>
<td>Family or household member; LE officer or agency</td>
<td>Reasonable cause</td>
<td>14 days</td>
<td>Preponderance of the evidence</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

- **STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES**

1. States should adopt ERPO laws that incorporate an appropriate evidentiary standard to temporarily restrict firearms access by individuals found to be a danger to themselves or others.
   
   • States’ ERPO laws should ensure that the due process rights of the at-risk individual are respected. Notice and an opportunity to be heard are foundational principles of American law, guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and gun ownership and possession are protected by the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.

   These rights must be upheld through appropriate processes, beginning with the initial consideration of a temporary order and continuing through all subsequent steps. For example, state laws that do not require a full hearing promptly after a temporary order is issued, but that put the burden on the respondent to seek a hearing, do not afford as meaningful and robust of an opportunity to be heard as those state laws that do require full hearings. State laws should also provide for prompt return of firearms at the conclusion of the order’s duration, assuming no other lawful restrictions apply.

   • States should likewise be thoughtful about who can file a petition for an ERPO so that the laws effectively address safety concerns without inviting misuse by individuals who are less likely to possess reliable information relevant to a person’s dangerousness.

   Some existing state laws have prompted concerns that the scope of possible petitioners might be too broad and poorly defined, potentially allowing the filing of petitions by people who are unlikely to have relevant and reliable information. To mitigate such concerns, states should adopt clear and narrow definitions identifying appropriate persons with standing to file a petition. States can deter misuse or abuse of the ERPO process through appropriate criminal penalties for false (bad faith) or harassing petitions.

   • States with ERPO laws, and those considering them, should require and establish procedures for sharing information regarding issued protection orders (including their expiration dates) with the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), by submitting those orders to the appropriate database (the National Crime Information Center or NICS Indices). Prohibitions on the purchase of firearms can be enforced only if the information is made available to the NICS in a timely and accurate manner. States wishing to explore how to accomplish this should contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s NICS Section at CJIS-STATE@fbi.gov.
Chapter 11 Endnotes


2. The federal Gun Control Act contains a provision that makes it unlawful for persons subject to certain qualifying domestic violence restraining orders to possess firearms during the pendency of the order. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). State laws may also impose such a restriction, or the restriction may be included as part of the underlying restraining order itself.

3. Connecticut (1999); Indiana (2006); California (2014); Washington (2016); Oregon (2017); Delaware (2018); Florida (2018); Illinois (2018); Maryland (2018); Massachusetts (2018); New Jersey (2018); Rhode Island (2018), and Vermont (2018). The earliest laws (Connecticut and Indiana) are known as “risk warrant” laws and bear a closer resemblance to the process followed by law enforcement to obtain search warrants. Later ERPO statutes in other states bear a stronger resemblance to protection order processes. Similar bills have been introduced in a number of other states. In addition, Texas provides a different mechanism for seizing firearms from certain mentally ill people who are taken into custody. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 573.001(h).

4. Oregon appears to be the only state in which a subsequent hearing is not required. Instead, a respondent has 30 days to request a hearing after he or she is served; if the respondent does not request a hearing, the ex parte order remains in effect for one year, unless terminated by a court.

5. Some of these states direct entry of the order into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), which is one of three databases accessed by the NICS. However, these orders may not meet the criteria for entry in the protective order file of NCIC. In these instances, the order may qualify for entry into a separate NCIC file. The orders may also be entered into the NICS indices (one of the other databases accessed by the NICS). In addition, although some states do not require orders to be made available to the NICS by statute, they may submit the orders to state agencies that do so as a matter of policy.


The Federal Bureau of Investigation receives thousands of calls a day from the public through its Public Access Line (PAL), a unit operating within its Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division. PAL serves as a central intake point for tip information from the public about potential or ongoing crimes. Following the February 14 shooting in Parkland, FL, the FBI conducted a special review of PAL to better understand the operational system and to recommend potential changes to PAL’s protocols and procedures. This section describes the changes made to PAL by the FBI as a result of this review.

PAL operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, providing an around-the-clock way for the FBI to receive and evaluate potentially critical information from the public and take appropriate action. Once PAL receives and processes information provided by the public for FBI investigative and intelligence purposes, it assesses the data and reports appropriate information to the local FBI field office.

As of August 2017, PAL also assumed responsibility for telephone complaint calls from all 56 field offices (as well as most of the FBI’s smaller local offices, called resident agencies), the Major Case Contact Center, the Weapons of Mass Destruction tip line, and all other FBI electronic tips (E-Tips). Through these efforts, PAL centralizes the flow of tip information from the public to the FBI. Since its inception on September 24, 2012, it has received more than three million telephone calls and more than one million E-Tips.

**Improvements to PAL**

PAL is undergoing a transformation, from being the functional equivalent of a call intake center to being a full-fledged Operations Center. This change will provide PAL with greater resources and capabilities related to processing and taking action on information provided by the public. Although PAL will continue to perform the call-intake services associated with the FBI’s tip lines, as an Operations Center it will have the staff and functionality to analyze and disseminate information in a timely manner to the field.

The objective of this transition to an Operations Center is to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of tip handling by making changes to the process, personnel, and systems.

In developing the plans for this transition, FBI personnel visited operations centers of various law enforcement agencies to identify best practices and staffing models. The objective of this transition to an Operations Center is to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of tip handling by making changes to the process, personnel, and systems. The major features of the updated PAL are described below.

**Process:** PAL’s internal processes have been updated to ensure that decision-making is conducted at the most appropriate level. These processes include a new automated tiered triage structure for handling tips. Based on the selection made by the caller, each tip is automatically routed to the appropriate staff.

- **Threats to Life.** These calls are routed to designated Customer Service Representatives (CSRs) for expedited resolution.
- **Non-emergency Situations.** All other appropriate calls offering tips or information are sent to CSRs via automated routing. CSRs then determine the lead value or lead potential of the call and disseminate the information to FBI offices and other law enforcement as appropriate.
- **Nuisance Callers.** CSRs take appropriate action pursuant to PAL’s protocols.

Supervisory Special Agents (SSA) serve as Watch Commanders to provide oversight of this process. For calls determined by a CSR not to have any value as a lead (“No Lead Value” or NLV) that also contain words from a Key Threat Word List, an SSA must review the call and the NLV decision prior to closing the tip. Between January 1, 2018, and June 30, 2018, approximately 40 percent of calls were determined to be NLV. The process ensures that final designations for NLV calls are made based on the judgment of SSAs, who are subject to greater accountability and oversight.
In addition, the FBI implemented a standalone Quality Management (QM) program to review PAL accuracy and quality in near real time. In this program, a QM team tracks performance by conducting reviews of calls to assess CSRs on phone skills, technical skills, and decision skills. The QM team proactively identifies and addresses gaps in PAL’s processes, procedures, and training.

The FBI also made improvements to the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) that serves as a reference resource for CSRs. The improvements include the development of a single comprehensive and concise SOP that is searchable and available electronically.

**Personnel:** The FBI implemented a new staffing model for PAL in July 2018 that includes a staffing increase of 50 CSR and 12 SSA positions. The FBI has also provided a series of mandatory trainings that focus on threats, including a refresher training for CSRs on how to identify and respond to threat-to-life matters.

The CJIS Training and Advisory Process Unit is working with the FBI Headquarters Training Division to develop specific training for the new two-tiered structure. The FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) provided a number of training sessions to PAL personnel, including sessions relating to threat assessments of potential school shooters and identification of pre-attack mental health indicators. In August 2018, the United States Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) staff provided a daylong consultation for PAL personnel discussing threat assessment and the assessment and triage of concerning behavior. In addition, NTAC staff provided training at the PAL facility in West Virginia in November 2018.

**Information Technology:** The FBI updated PAL’s information technology system to better document the steps CSRs and SSAs take to process and review calls prior to final disposition. Additionally, a new product will be implemented by the end of the year that will use speech-to-text technology to identify key threat words in the digital transcript of a call as a means of elevating the call’s priority. The word cloud for E-Tips has already been improved to alert staff of trending and emerging threats. Finally, the FBI added a feature to SSAs’ desktop computer display to alert them when immediate assistance is needed to assess ongoing calls for potential lead value.

PAL is a critical component of the FBI’s efforts to keep the American people safe, and the FBI believes the improvements outlined here will result in a more effective and efficient tip-handling process. The FBI continues to review its processes and procedures for receiving and evaluating tip information reported to PAL to ensure that tip information is effectively and efficiently handled.

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### Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendation below.

#### STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. State and local leaders should encourage the public—including school staff and parents—to be vigilant about reporting information to the FBI that might help prevent violence in schools. This information can be reported by using the FBI’s Online Tips and Public Leads form (https://tips.fbi.gov) or by contacting a local FBI field office (https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices).

2. State and local leaders should also continue to encourage the public to contact their local police department or call 911 to report information regarding immediate threats.
SECTION 2

Protect & Mitigate
All school personnel play an important role in school safety. Training on safety matters helps prepare them to respond to incidents of school violence. The school personnel best positioned to respond to acts of violence are those with specialized training such as school resource officers (SRO), who are typically sworn law enforcement officers, and school safety officers (SSO), who are typically unsworn school security staff. These officers have been specifically trained in school safety to act as a first-line of defense. Their presence at school facilities and on campus allows them to build the kinds of relationships with students that can prevent or mitigate incidents of school violence.

The Columbine Review Commission made specific recommendations about the use of SROs in responding to potential acts of school violence. In the years since Columbine, school leaders have increased the number of specially trained school security staff as part of their strategies to combat school violence. Between 2005 and 2016, the percentage of public schools that reported the presence of security staff at least once a week increased from 42 to 57 percent.

However, these changes are not enough. At a meeting of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission held in the aftermath of the Parkland shooting, Commission members (including the parents of victims) raised specific concerns regarding the training and actions of school personnel during the tragedy. Effective training is critical, making it imperative that schools regularly review training protocols to ensure that every SRO, SSO, teacher, administrator, and student is as prepared as possible to respond to incidents of school violence within the framework of a comprehensive school safety plan.

Placement of specially trained personnel in schools is an effective tool in stopping acts of school violence. In Dixon, IL, SRO Mark Dallas stopped a gunman targeting a high school graduation rehearsal before anyone was harmed. In Ocala, FL, SRO Jimmy Long responded to a gunshot by rushing into a classroom and disarming the shooter before he could fire again.

**Commission Observations**

Research and presentations to the Commission from subject matter experts like Officer Don Bridges from Baltimore, MD highlight the importance of defining the roles and responsibilities of all school staff, including SROs. One way to do so is through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between schools and law enforcement agencies. These MOUs should include a discussion of key areas such as training expectations, duties and responsibilities, funding, information sharing, and student discipline.
Sample Memorandum of Understanding
Between the School District and Law Enforcement

The School Resource Officer (SRO) program in the Montgomery County Public Schools (MD) includes a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between four different police departments operating within the county, the Montgomery County State’s Attorney, and the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office. The MOU is comprehensive and can serve as a model for other entities. Key provisions include:

1. Defined duties and responsibilities of the SROs (see Section B);
2. Training requirements, whereby twice annually the SROs, the school district administrators, and the security staff are required to participate in joint training opportunities (see Section D);
3. Expectations about the chain of command and supervision of SROs between building level administrators and law enforcement (see Section H(1));
4. Expectations regarding information sharing between educators and SROs (see Section H(1)); and
5. Expectations regarding the handling of information received about a student who may pose a threat to himself or herself or to another (see Sections H(2), (4) & (5)).

For the full MOU, visit https://www.montgomeryschoolsmd.org/uploadedFiles/departments/security-new/Executed%20SRO%20MOU.PDF.

As subject matter experts such as Mo Canady, the Executive Director for the National Association of School Resources Officers (NASRO), told the Commission, it is imperative that school safety personnel receive extensive training and be screened for their effectiveness in working with students. NASRO’s Standards and Best Practices for School Resource Officers, first unveiled during the July 26 Commission meeting, emphasizes four main areas: administrative standards, careful selection of SROs, specialized SRO training, and interagency collaboration between schools and law enforcement.7

State education agencies (SEAs) play a key role in providing resources and training for all school personnel to help create and sustain a safe environment for students and educators. SEAs have found success in engaging school staff with law enforcement officers in unified safety training. For example, Sheriff D.J. Schoeff highlighted to the Commission the achievements of Indiana’s School Safety Specialist Academy. The Academy facilitates collaboration between educators and law enforcement officers through an annual two-day training in which educators from each district and SROs/SSOs train side by side.8

A review of state-mandated emergency drills and training related to school safety identified 43 states that required schools to conduct safety training for teachers or other school staff.9 Some 21 of the 43 required training on emergency operations plans or emergency response procedures, and 14 of them required training related to mental health or violence prevention.10

In addition to training requirements, there are other considerations about personnel training such as the extent of collaboration between school leaders and law enforcement officers. Officer Rudy Perez of the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) explained to the Commission how states and school districts can collaboratively approach school personnel training.11 Virginia’s Center for School and Campus Safety provides in-person training on evidence-based bullying prevention tactics and the identification of students who may be at risk for violent behavior.12 The experience of the LAUSD and the Virginia Center may be of value to others.
Examples of Training Requirements

The Los Angeles Unified School District (CA) offers a comprehensive emergency preparedness training program to build the capacity of all LAUSD employees (including educators and school police officers) in school safety, security, and emergency management. The Safety Training for Emergency Preparedness at Schools Program is a series of short, online courses that prepare employees for emergencies by detailing common procedures that employees can adopt. Participants receive certificates after completing each course and a Master Certificate of Emergency Preparedness for completing the entire series of courses. The U.S. Department of Education's Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools grant funded this program. For more information, visit https://achieve.lausd.net/steps.

Virginia has created a rigorous training regimen for the certification of school security officers, including the following minimum requirements:

- Prospective school security officers must undergo a background investigation to include fingerprint-based criminal history record inquiry of both the Central Criminal Records Exchange and the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
- Have a high school diploma, have passed the General Educational Development exam, or have passed the National External Diploma Program;
- Be a minimum of 21 years of age;
- Possess a valid driver’s license if duties require operation of a motor vehicle;
- Successfully complete basic first aid training;
- Complete the minimum entry-level training requirements approved by the board and the Department of Criminal Justice Services and include, at a minimum:
  - The role and responsibility of school security officers;
  - Relevant state and federal laws;
  - School and personal liability issues;
  - Security awareness in the school environment;
  - Mediation and conflict resolution;
  - Disaster and emergency response; and
  - Student behavioral dynamics.


Indiana has statutory requirements for training SROs, including the minimum training requirements for law enforcement officers and at least 40 additional hours of training specific to SROs. This SRO training must be provided by the Indiana law enforcement training board, the NASRO, or another approved SRO training program. Training must include instruction on skills and strategies for school security. See Ind. Code § 20-26-18.2 - School Resource Officers.

Ohio has statutory requirements for training SROs, including a minimum of 40 hours of training from specific entities articulated in the statute including the NASRO, the Ohio school resource officer association, or a current SRO certified to conduct such training. Training requirement topics include how to be a positive role model for youth and strategies for classroom management. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.951. Qualifications for school resource officers.
As noted earlier, in 2016 some 57 percent of public schools reported the presence (at least once a week) of security staff. That number, while an increase over prior years, leaves almost half of America’s public schools without any regular school security staff presence.

There are a wide variety of reasons for the decision not to have regular designated school security staff on site, ranging from funding to remoteness of locale. Ten states have sought to address this situation by allowing school staff to possess or have access to firearms at school. No state mandates arming school staff. Several hundred school districts provide school staff access to firearms, usually as part of a layered approach to school security (see Chapter 16 of the Report for more information about this strategy). All of these programs require a mandatory minimum level of training. Examples of effective training programs include the Texas School Marshal Program,\(^1\) the South Dakota School Sentinel Training Program,\(^2\) the Alabama Sentry Program,\(^3\) and the Arkansas Commissioned School Security Officer program.\(^4\)

### Examples of Additional State Statutes

**Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-127.1(a)(6). Weapons on school safety zones, school buildings or grounds, or at school functions**

> (6) A person who has been authorized in writing by a duly authorized official of a public or private elementary or secondary school or a public or private technical school, vocational school, college, university, or other institution of postsecondary education or a local board of education as provided in Code Section 16-11-130.1 to have in such person’s possession or use within a school safety zone, at a school function, or on a bus or other transportation furnished by a school a weapon which would otherwise be prohibited by this Code section. Such authorization shall specify the weapon or weapons that have been authorized and the time period during which the authorization is valid.

**Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-7c10(d). Same; restrictions on carrying concealed handgun; exceptions; liabilities; employees permitted to carry; penalties for violations; sign requirements.**

> (d) The governing body or the chief administrative officer, if no governing body exists, of any of the following institutions may permit any employee, who is legally qualified, to carry a concealed handgun in any building of such institution, if the employee meets such institution’s own policy requirements regardless of whether such building is conspicuously posted in accordance with the provisions of this section:

> (1) A unified school district;

> (2) A postsecondary educational institution, as defined in K.S.A. § 74-3201b, and amendments thereto.


> (a) The board of trustees in each school district may adopt rules and regulations, in consultation with local law enforcement, to allow the possession of firearms by employees possessing a valid concealed carry permit under W.S. 6-8-104 on or in any property or facility owned or leased by the school district. Employees of a school district who hold a valid concealed carry permit issued under W.S. 6-8-104 may carry a concealed firearm on or into school facilities or other areas designated by the board of trustees, provided the employing school district has adopted rules and regulations that allow possession of firearms on school property and the employee has received approval by the board of trustees as required by this section.
During a field visit to the Lake Hamilton School District in Pearcy, AR, Commission members learned about the Arkansas Commissioned School Security Officer (CSSO) program. School leaders told them about the challenges small rural school districts face in terms of lengthy police response times. As Superintendent Steve Anderson said, “[w]hile we are blessed to have excellent law enforcement officers…because of where we’re located, the last two sheriffs here in Garland County told me we could expect 20 to 30 minutes’ wait time if an active shooter situation happened on campus before an officer could be here. We’re not willing to take that chance. We need someone to protect our kids.”

As an example, the Parkland shooting took less than seven minutes.

These concerns led the Arkansas legislature to amend Ark. Code Ann. § 17-40 et seq. to authorize the use of CSSOs by schools. CSSOs can be administrators, faculty, or staff, and they must pass a standard background check and undergo extensive training. In its preliminary report dated July 1, 2018, the Arkansas School Safety Commission reaffirmed the deterrent effect that such practices can have on school violence.

There is no one-size-fits-all solution, and these programs vary according to the needs of each state. After the Parkland shooting, for example, Florida adopted the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, which requires every school to have a “safe school officer.” Safe school officers can be deployed as an SRO, as an SSO, or through participation in the Coach Aaron Feis Guardian Program, which permits a school employee who does not work exclusively in the classroom to carry a weapon after completing 176 hours of specialized training.

Support for training

Numerous federal programs may, among other purposes, be used to support efforts to train school personnel in various school safety topics. Others specifically focus on criminal justice. For example, the Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) is a formula-based grant program that provides critical federal funding to states, tribes, and local governments to support a range of criminal justice program areas, including “prevention and education programs.” Typically, 56 states and territories and more than 900 local and tribal jurisdictions receive grants each year.

JAG funds may support firearms training for school personnel so long as the training is part of an allowable prevention and education program carried out by an authorized recipient jurisdiction. For example, a local law enforcement entity police department or sheriff’s office might choose to use part of its JAG funds to support a program specifically designed for crime prevention that incorporates such firearms training.
Recommendations
Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

**STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES**

1. States, districts, and local schools should develop a comprehensive school safety plan that includes a requirement for school safety training for all school personnel. When developing training for all school personnel, states and local communities should consider the following:
   - Use specialized school personnel who are trained to prevent, recognize, and respond to threats of violence;
   - Review the quality and quantity of training for all school staff, especially specialized school personnel and others who may carry weapons;
   - Ensure that school administrators are trained on the proper role of SROs and SSOs, including how to work collaboratively with them;
   - Clarify the roles and responsibilities of specialized school personnel such as SROs and SSOs through MOUs;
   - Clarify the parameters of information sharing between school staff, SROs, and SSOs, with special consideration and training regarding the privacy requirements of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA); and
   - Determine, based on the unique circumstances of each school (such as anticipated law enforcement response times), whether or not it is appropriate for specialized staff and non-specialized staff to be armed for the sake of effectively and immediately responding to violence. This can be particularly helpful in districts where the distances involved can make police response times longer.

2. States and local communities, in concert with law enforcement, should consider various approaches to school safety based on their own unique needs. School districts may consider arming some specially selected and trained school personnel (including but not limited to SROs and SSOs) as a deterrent. Before deciding on the voluntary arming of school personnel, states, districts, and schools should carefully consider the following:
   - **Existing security measures**
     What types of security measures already exist to ensure student safety? Is there a full-time SRO already present in case of emergency?
   - **Proximity of police**
     How quickly can local police arrive in the event of an active shooter? How well do local police know the school (e.g., layout of the school, area around the school) in order to coordinate an effective response?
   - **Acceptance of the school community**
     Are school community stakeholders comfortable with arming school personnel? Are there staff members willing to voluntarily participate in such a program, particularly those with prior law enforcement or military training?
• **Preparedness**
  What would initial and ongoing background checks and screening requirements entail?
  What initial and ongoing robust training requirements would be in place?
  How would firearms be properly secured yet made easily accessible when necessary?

• **Local policy and state law**
  Does local policy and state law allow for the arming of school personnel?
  What infrastructure and resources exist for the creation of such a program?
  What potential liabilities exist for such a program (e.g., ability to maintain insurance coverage)?

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**Chapter 13 Endnotes**


12. Virginia law (Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-184) requires the Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety (Center) to provide training for public school personnel on evidence-based anti-bullying tactics, as well as how to identify students who may be at risk for violent behavior and in need of special services. The Center is also required to develop, along with other Virginia State agencies, a model “critical incident” (e.g., an active shooter) training program for public school personnel. Private schools may also participate in the training. The training programs are provided in-person to schools (including school security officers), either through Center staff or contractors. For additional information, see [https://www.dcis.virginia.gov/virginia-center-school-and-campus-safety](https://www.dcis.virginia.gov/virginia-center-school-and-campus-safety/).

13. First enacted in 2013, the Texas School Marshal Program authorizes public school districts and open enrollment charter schools to appoint certain qualifying individuals to serve as school marshals to prevent or abate the commission of any offense that threatens serious bodily injury or death to students, faculty, or visitors on school premises. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 2.127; Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 37.0811; Tex. Gov’t. Code § 411.1871; Tex. Occ. Code § 1701.260, 1701.001; 1701.301. An employee of a school district or an open-enrollment charter school, school marshals are authorized to carry or possess a handgun on the physical premises of a school. Tex. Educ. Ann. § 37.0811. Marshals must attend an 80-hour training course conducted by a law enforcement academy specifically prepared to provide a school marshal curriculum, and must hold an appropriate gun license issued by the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement. Tex. Occ. Code § 1701.260 & § 1701.301. Course material includes topics such as physical security, use of force, active shooter response, and weapon proficiency. Tex. Occ. Code § 1701.260. See more at [https://www.tcoe.texas.gov/content/school-marshals](https://www.tcoe.texas.gov/content/school-marshals).


support school districts in training teachers, school leaders, and other staff as part of schoolwide program plans that, in response to a needs assessment, address school climate and safety, including disciplinary interventions and violence prevention. Student Support and Academic Enrichment grants (https://www2.ed.gov/programs/saas/index.html) and grants under both REAP programs (SRSA and RLIS) may be used for activities to support safe and healthy students, such as high-quality training for school personnel, including specialized instructional support personnel, related to suicide prevention, effective and trauma-informed practices in classroom management, crisis management and conflict resolution techniques, school-based violence prevention strategies, and bullying and harassment prevention, among other allowable uses of funds.


25 To seek JAG funds for such purposes, schools should reach out to their local recipient jurisdictions (local police departments, sheriff’s offices, or local or tribal government representatives) or to their State Administering Agency for JAG funds, which is the designated agency in each state that has a role in allocating JAG resources statewide.
When school violence erupts, it is law enforcement officers who rush to the scene, neutralize the shooter, assist victims, and secure the site. The Parkland shooting was no different. Unfortunately, too many law enforcement officers around the country have been called upon to respond to such incidents. Those who have not are training and preparing for a day they hope will never come.

The U.S. Department of Justice provides a wide array of emergency and crisis training resources for state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies across the country. Through the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department offers grant funding, training and technical assistance, and other resources for those on the front lines working to keep students safe. These programs are outlined below.

**Bureau of Justice Assistance**

**Justice Assistance Grant:** This is a formula-based grant program that provides states, tribes, and local governments with critical funding to support a range of program areas. The latter include law enforcement, prosecution and courts, crime prevention and education, corrections and community corrections, drug treatment and enforcement, planning, evaluation and technology improvement, crime victim and witness initiatives, mental health programs, and related law enforcement and corrections programs. Under this grant program, emergency and crisis training for local law enforcement can be an allowable cost. Typically, 56 states and territories and more than 900 local and tribal jurisdictions receive grants each year.¹

**National Training and Technical Assistance Center:** NTTAC offers online and no-cost training and technical assistance on a wide variety of criminal justice topics, including emergency and crisis training for local law enforcement.²

**Identifying an Armed Person Training:** This training, which is provided as part of the Project Safe Neigh-

Through the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department offers grant funding, training and technical assistance, and other resources for those on the front lines working to keep students safe.

**VALOR Officer Safety and Wellness Training and Technical Assistance Program:** The VALOR program delivers current, dynamic classroom and web-based trainings focused on recognizing indicators of dangerous situations. It involves applying a cognitive approach towards reinforcing effective techniques for managing difficult encounters, implementing casualty care and rescue tactics, and improving wellness and resilience. Since 2010, the VALOR Program has trained more than 41,400 law enforcement officers.³

**Office of Community Oriented Policing Services**

**Preparing for Active Shooter Situations (PASS) Training Program:** PASS supports active shooter training to improve the safety and resiliency of law enforcement officers, other first responders, and communities. It seeks to enhance the ability of law enforcement not only to secure the scene, but also to increase the survivability of the event and protect officers, critical assets, and first responders from the long-term effects of exposure to trauma. In addition to online training, more than 15,000 participants receive in-person training with existing funding, and FY2018 funding supports the delivery of 438 classes across the country that will train more than 16,000 first responders. PASS is also adding to its portfolio more classes in advanced medical skills, solo officer rapid deployment, civilian

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¹ Federal Commission on School Safety: Protect and Mitigate
² Federal Commission on School Safety: Protect and Mitigate
³ Federal Commission on School Safety: Protect and Mitigate
⁴ Federal Commission on School Safety: Protect and Mitigate
casualty care, and exterior response to active shooter events.\(^5\)

**School Violence Prevention Program**: SVPP makes competitive awards to states, counties, and local districts to support coordination with law enforcement on training to prevent student violence, to fund deterrent hardware, and to implement technology for expedited emergency notification.\(^5\)

**Federal Bureau of Investigation Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) Active Shooter Reports**: These BAU studies focus on the detection and disruption of targeted violence attacks in myriad settings, including K–12 schools.

- *The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective* presents a systematic procedure for threat assessment and intervention for use by educators, mental health professionals, and law enforcement agencies.\(^7\)

- *Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education* was prepared by the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Department of Education. It provides an overview of targeted violence at institutions of higher education, discusses initial observations regarding behaviors of the offenders, and offers preliminary considerations on the data that may have relevance to threat assessment.\(^7\)

- *Making Prevention a Reality: Identifying, Assessing, and Managing the Threat of Targeted Attacks* is a collaboration between representatives of law enforcement, academia, law, and mental health, along with the FBI’s Behavioral Threat Assessment Center and the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime. It provides a useful and practical guide for understanding and implementing threat assessment and management at all levels.\(^8\)

- *A Study of the Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the U.S. Between 2000 and 2013* examines the pre-attack behavior of shooters in 160 active shooter incidents in an effort to pinpoint specific behaviors that might be useful in identifying, assessing, and managing those who might be on the pathway to such violence.\(^9\)

**Active Shooter Incidents Reports**: The reports cited below focus on a specific type of shooting situation that law enforcement and the public may face. Though limited in scope, they provide clarity and valuable data to federal, state, tribal, and campus law enforcement as well as other first responders, corporations, educators, and the general public as they seek to neutralize threats posed by active shooters and save lives during such events.

- *A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 and 2013*\(^11\)

- *Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015*\(^12\)

- *Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2016 and 2017*\(^13\)

**Crisis Communications Quick Reference Guide**: This brochure is tailored to chiefs, sheriffs, command staff, and public information officers who handle crisis communications in response to an active shooter, mass casualty, or other law enforcement incidents. It provides checklists for the pre-event, the onset of the incident, and updating the media (pre-press conference and second and subsequent press conferences). Also included are 10 tips to improve communications.\(^14\)

The following resources are available to law enforcement and emergency management professionals by contacting the nearest FBI Field Office or calling 202-324-3000.

**Behavioral Threat Assessment Center**: The BTAC provides both operational support and training to K–12 schools, law enforcement, institutions of higher education, houses of worship, and private businesses. It remains the only multi-agency, behaviorally based threat assessment center operating within the federal government. The BTAC features representation from the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the U.S. Capitol Police, and the Department of Defense’s Naval Criminal Investigative Services, and is staffed by experienced agents, analysts, certified threat managers, and a contract forensic psychiatrist. It provides a full suite of threat assessment and management services to assist K–12 schools and local law enforcement agencies in efforts to mitigate school shootings.

On average, the BTAC annually receives more than 150 requests for operational assistance in managing complex, urgent matters involving potentially violent individuals. This system focuses (a) on providing operational support related to K–12 school shootings
and the prevention of acts of targeted violence against our children; and (b) on delivering the highest quality threat assessment training to law enforcement, mental health, and education professionals.

The BTAC is supported by a robust field program involving more than 230 FBI Special Agents with advanced active shooter/school shooter and threat assessment training who serve as the liaison between schools and the BTAC. Since 2007, training on the pre-attack behaviors of school shooters has been delivered to more than 30,000 K–12 educators, law enforcement officers, and mental healthcare practitioners throughout the United States.

Active Shooter: Managing the Mass Casualty Threat. This 35-minute DVD provides an in-depth look at three unique active shooter events: the Century Aurora 16 Cinemark theatre shooting in Aurora, CO, the Washington Navy Yard shooting in Washington, D.C., and the Los Angeles International Airport shooting in Los Angeles, CA. Each story is told by the emergency professionals and private sector partners who were there. They offer a frank and introspective look at what worked and what could have been done better to manage these chaotic incidents.

Initial On Scene Command Considerations. A two-inch by three-inch pocket guide, it delineates vital issues that need to be considered during the initial minutes and hours of an active shooter, mass casualty, or other law enforcement incident. Topics include priority staging areas, top-tier priority concerns, and secondary-tier priority concerns.

Tactical Considerations for Law Enforcement: Quick Reference Guide. This two-inch by three-inch pocket guide covers pre-scene considerations, scene arrival, training, equipment, and active shooter lessons learned.

The Coming Storm. Through a fictional attack on a college campus, this DVD illustrates lessons learned and best practices drawn from real-life active shooter incidents. It offers practical and detailed first steps law enforcement should take when arriving at the scene of a critical incident. The film is designed to inspire discussion, preparation, and collaboration in managing these devastating and potentially overwhelming events.

A Revolutionary Act. This documentary plus workshop seek to educate the law enforcement community on “the pathway to violence” and key warning behaviors. This can be useful to school resource personnel as the documentary traces the radicalization of shooters by their online media activity.
Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendation below.

**STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES**

1. State and local law enforcement should take advantage of these resources to assist them in preventing, planning for, and responding to school shooting incidents. They are also encouraged to suggest areas in which additional resources might be useful.

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**Chapter 14 Endnotes**

Military veterans and retired law enforcement officers often have the leadership, experience in high-stress environments, and essential training to help ensure the safety and security of our nation’s schools. Many will also possess pedagogical skills—classroom management and real-world experience training others—that can make for highly effective educators. Former service members and police officers stepping into roles as principals, administrators, teachers, counselors, school resource officers (SROs), and other school-related positions could help foster safety in our schools.

As some have noted, “administrators are increasingly finding that many service members make good teachers.”¹ The Troops to Teachers (TTT) program of the U.S. Department of Defense has placed more than 21,000 veterans since 1993 into teaching positions across the country.² TTT officials believe “veterans are an untapped resource to respond to a nationwide teacher shortage that has made it difficult to fill positions at high-needs schools and in math and special education.”³

Despite the success of efforts to place veterans into teaching positions, just 2.1 percent of U.S. teachers in 2016 were veterans.⁴ School campuses would benefit from more veterans and retired law enforcement officers serving our nation’s students.

In recent years, several school shootings have been stopped due to the actions of police officers serving as SROs. For example, Officer Mark Dallas’s 24 years of law enforcement experience aided him in chasing down and neutralizing a shooter at a school in Dixon, IL.⁵ Similarly, Deputy Blaine Gaskill, a SWAT-trained officer who was working as an SRO at a school in Leonardtown, MD, responded rapidly to a school shooter and disabled him before he could fire another shot at one of his fellow students.⁶

Since the Columbine tragedy, several commissions at state and local levels have addressed the issue of school shootings. A task force report in response to the Parkland shooting was the first major school safety report that specifically addressed the topic of hiring retired law enforcement officers as SROs. It identified some of the financial and legal challenges in doing so: “pension plans prohibit re-hiring for a period of time post-separation and there are significant tax penalties for violating these prohibitions; there is still a need for background checks, screening and potentially training.”⁷ The report proposed a legislative recommendation “to allow agencies to re-hire certified law enforcement officers, preempting the pension provisions which prohibit re-hiring during [a] separation period without penalty.”⁸

School safety would benefit from more veterans and retired law enforcement officers leveraging their knowledge and experience to serve our nation’s students in a variety of school roles. These individuals not only have the potential to be effective educators in the classroom but also are underutilized human assets for securing and protecting our schools. Because of their unique skillset with managing conflict and emergency preparedness, they can help foster safe school climates by serving on school safety committees, mentoring at-risk youth, or volunteering in other meaningful ways.

**Commission Observations**

Commission research identified many programs and resources that can help veterans and retired law enforcement officers transition into new careers in education.
education. The TTT program provides counseling and referral services for any interested active duty service member or honorably discharged veteran to help them meet the education and licensing requirements necessary to secure a teaching position.9

In addition, TTT grants to states support offices for recruitment and placement assistance for service members and veterans. For example, a TTT center in Virginia works with all colleges in the state to help veterans become licensed as teachers and find teaching positions in Virginia.10 One study found that TTT instructors are particularly effective in classroom management and maintaining student discipline.11 Principals say TTT participants provide a stable cadre of effective teachers who teach high-demand subjects in high-poverty schools.

Other local programs support TTT efforts. For example, the Los Angeles Unified School District military liaison and human resources office offers services to interested veterans. This includes fast-track application review, individualized guidance, and access to veteran support organizations that offer financial and career development.12

The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs provides a variety of education benefits to help eligible veterans pay for tuition, training, and certification tests to support the transition into new careers in education.13 Veterans and law enforcement officers can take advantage of the Teacher Education Assistance for College and Higher Education (TEACH) grant program. This provides grants of up to $4,000 per year to college students who agree to teach for four years at schools serving students from low-income families.14

Law enforcement officers can also transition to a new career as a school resource officer through the Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Hiring Program.15 Various other federal programs may, among other purposes, potentially support efforts to recruit and retain military and law enforcement officers as teachers, school leaders, and other staff.16

Additionally, a number of nonprofit organizations support veterans and law enforcement officers seeking to move into careers in education. Teach For America has placed more than 50,000 teachers in high-need classrooms, including 314 veterans. The organization maintains a recruiting initiative (“You Served For America, Now Teach For America”) and partnerships with TTT and other nonprofits to encourage veterans to consider the teaching profession.17

The Mission Continues is a nonprofit organization with more than 11,000 veterans engaged nationwide in various community projects, including mentoring at-risk youth in schools. In one of the organization’s projects, 72 veterans served alongside local volunteers to revitalize neighborhoods, parks, and schools in Detroit, MI.18

Veterans and law enforcement officers face various challenges when transitioning into new careers in education.

- There is duplication and a general lack of coordination and control over the array of programs and resources to support the transition of veterans and retired law enforcement officers into careers in education. Many veterans and retired law enforcement officers are unaware of or may not fully understand the benefits of available programs.

- Most programs are limited in scope, focusing on recruiting, preparing, and placing veterans and law enforcement officers as teachers in high-poverty public schools. Other education positions (such as SROs, security personnel, principals, administrators, deans, counselors, nurses, teacher aides, and other support personnel) are not eligible for the TTT program. While all schools could benefit from veterans and retired law enforcement officers helping to improve school safety, TTT is limited to high-poverty schools. The program should consider expanding the scope of eligible schools.

- State licensure and certification requirements can be excessive and unnecessarily burdensome for veterans and law enforcement officers seeking to transition into careers in education. A 2013 Calvert Institute for Policy Research report found that becoming certified to teach in Maryland is so burdensome that it is causing teacher shortages in key subjects such as science, math, and special education. The report suggests that the state consider altering some of its teacher certification requirements to open the field to a larger number of candidates.19
Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

**FEDERAL GOVERNMENT**

1. Congress should pass legislation that establishes a public-private partnership led by a single federal agency to unify the funding and operational control of identifying and recruiting more veterans and retired law enforcement officers into new careers in education. A public-private partnership could help ensure the reach and sustainability of existing programs.

2. Congress should change the intent and scope of the TTT program, broadening its reach to include a wide range of education professionals such as principals, administrators, nurses, counselors, and school resource officers, in addition to teachers.

3. Congress should amend the TTT program to provide financial assistance to veterans and law enforcement officers when teaching at any U.S. school. Because of the importance of school safety issues to all schools, whether high-poverty or not, Troops to Teachers could expand the scope of eligible schools.

4. The U.S. Department of Defense should consider promoting careers in education for future veterans throughout the military life cycle; creating a “future in education” curriculum within the Transition Assistance Program; and authorizing programs such as Skillbridge and the Army’s Career Skills Program to partner with state and local school districts.

**STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES**

1. States and districts should consider offering incentives and additional resources to recruit veterans and law enforcement officers into careers in education. Policies, programs, and incentives could include:
   - Instituting fast-track application reviews for veteran and law enforcement applicants (e.g., as done by the Los Angeles Unified School District);
   - Collecting and using data on veterans and law enforcement officers, including number of applications, hiring, and retention;
   - Adding preference points to a job candidate's score for relevant military and law enforcement experience;
   - Employing a dedicated hiring officer to recruit and hire veterans and law enforcement officers; and
   - Participating in the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs GI Bill On-The-Job training and apprenticeship program as a way to attract veteran candidates to school employment positions.
2. States should reduce barriers to certification and incorporate appropriate incentives and programs that help veterans and law enforcement officers enter new careers in education. Policies, programs, and incentives could include:

- Encouraging districts to provide compensation structures that include salary credit for prior military and law enforcement experience;
- Providing districts with financial incentives to hire significant numbers of veterans and law enforcement officers;
- Changing state legislation and policies that prevent local agencies from re-hiring certified law enforcement officers because of pension penalties;
- Establishing a dedicated military veteran and/or retired law enforcement liaison position;
- Applying for TTT grants and/or establishing a state center designed to conduct outreach and certification support to veterans and law enforcement officers; and
- Partnering with Department of Defense programs such as Skillbridge and the Army's Career Skills Program.\(^{20}\)
Chapter 15 Endnotes


8. Ibid. at p. 85.

9. The program also offers a bonus of up to $10,000, which may be available for eligible participants teaching three years at a school that meets the “eligible” or “high-need” school criteria. For more information, visit the following website: https://proudtoserveagain.com/. Also, Troops to Teachers (n.d.). Overview Retrieved from https://proudtoserveagain.com/About/Overview.


13. U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs (n.d.). Education and training. Retrieved from https://explore.va.gov/education-training. Additionally, the post-9/11 GI Bill provides eligible veterans up to 36 months of education benefits that covers in-state tuition. Eligible veterans may also be entitled to the following payments as well: monthly housing allowance, annual books and supplies stipend, and a one-time rural benefit. For more information, visit https://www.benefits.va.gov/pbill/post911_gibill.asp.


16. For example, Supporting Effective Instruction State grants (https://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherqual/index.html) and grants under both REAP programs (SRSA and RLIS) (https://www2.ed.gov/nclb/freedom/local/reap.html) can support recruitment and retention efforts. Supporting Effective Educator Development grants (https://innovation.ed.gov/what-we-do/teacher-quality/supporting-effective-educator-development-grant-program/) support alternative pathways to education careers that allow teachers and principals with nontraditional preparation and certification to obtain employment in underserved school districts.


20. These programs are designed to prepare transitioning service members for civilian training through on-the-job training and internships, which could include school-based positions. For more information, visit https://dodskillbridge.com/ and https://www.army.mil/standto/2017-07-13.
In attempting to provide secure learning environments through school design and physical hardening, schools must balance many different objectives. These include reducing risks, maintaining open access for students and staff, facilitating a learning environment, and complying with required buildings codes and standards. However, most schools present a variety of avenues for “designing in” layers of security, starting with controlling access at the school’s perimeter and working inward to secure individual classrooms and other internal spaces.

Previous Administrations have explored hardening schools. *The Report to the President on the Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy* stressed the importance of emergency management planning, but did not directly address physical hardening of schools. However, it did recommend that schools use technology to improve security systems. The Obama Administration’s plan to protect children assumed the need for physical security at schools and made it an explicit recommendation. It also proposed the creation of Comprehensive School Safety Grants for the purchase of, among other things, school safety equipment.

State-level commissions also have a mixed record of studying school hardening. The Columbine Review Commission expressed concern over the cost of physically hardening schools and the lack of evidence demonstrating its impact in reducing school violence. Ultimately it recommended that security devices should be used as preventative measures for specific problems at individual schools but not as a broad-based antidote to school violence. Conversely, the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission focused much of its report on “safe school design and operation,” largely endorsing the detailed school design standards developed by the Connecticut School Security Infrastructure Council. While doing so, the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission articulated some key principles that are well-established today, such as ensuring school security design enhances, rather than diminishes, the school’s central educational mission.

A full analysis of the school security measures in place at the time of the shooting at Parkland’s Marjory Stoneman Douglas (MSD) High School was still being developed at the time of the finalization of this Report by the MSD High School Public Safety Commission. However, public reporting on the incident provides a general outline of some of the vulnerabilities in the school’s overall physical security that the shooter exploited. For instance, MSD reportedly had classroom doors that could only be locked with a key from outside the classroom, requiring teachers to reach outside or fully exit the classroom to lock the door during the shooting. It also has been reported that classroom doors had translucent windows without deployable window blockers that would have allowed teachers to prevent the shooter from seeing through door windows and targeting victims inside the classroom. Moreover, doors and windows were made of standard, non-reinforced materials, allowing the shooter to kill many of his victims without having to breach a locked door or enter the classroom.

Even with adequate funding for physical security, the decision on how best to provide security at a school to protect the students, visitors, and staff is complex and difficult. School officials should consider characteristics such as the age of the students, school campus layout, building design, and available financial resources to identify the policies, procedures, and equipment that can best assist efforts to secure their schools and mitigate overall risk. While it is generally agreed that it is not possible to stop every potential...
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act of violence in schools, schools can reduce the likelihood of a violent incident with significant casualties from occurring on their campuses by establishing a strong security team, completing a security assessment, and developing and implementing appropriate plans for security and emergency operations.

**Commission Observations**

The Commission identified various components of an effective approach to enhancing the security of schools. These include practices that have proven successful at either the school, school district, or state government level. Special emphasis was laid on proven plans to establish a sound security management program and enhance physical security at access points (including building façade) and in the context of the classroom.

**Security management**

Schools and school districts employ people, develop plans, and implement procedures to manage school security and the safety of students on campus. Factors that contribute to the effectiveness of security and emergency management efforts at schools include the establishment of a security management team; the development of a school safety community of interest; the conduct of school risk assessments, with the inclusion of the full spectrum of activities that occur at a school during planning; and the existence of security and emergency operations plans.

**Establishing a Security Management Team and Cultivating a “Community of Interest” for School Safety and Security:** To oversee proper development and implementation of a comprehensive school safety and security program, school districts and individual schools should consider first establishing a security management team and designating a team lead. The team should include individuals with a management, oversight, or other significant role in the security of the school, such as the principal or vice-principal, the designated emergency manager, and, if the school has one, the school resource officer.

In addition, every school district and individual school should try to develop a coalition from the community for the common purpose of enhancing the safety of students and the security of schools. As noted in the Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission: “the successful implementation of Safe School Design and Operations (SSDO) strategies requires the support of ‘local champions.’ Each community or school district should have a small standing committee or commission, comprised of individuals representing the school community, law enforcement, fire, EMS and public health, whose responsibility is to ensure that the SSDO standards and strategies are actually implemented in their community.”

A school’s security community of interest begins with its teachers, administrators, counselors, other staff, parents, and students, and also includes external partners like local first responders, social workers, and elected officials. These groups can collaborate to develop emergency operations plans that establish protocols for handling all types of potential hazardous incidents, including natural disasters, accidents, and deliberate attacks like an active shooter. A strong coalition can help carry the message to the rest of the community and minimize resistance to necessary security measures.

**Conducting Risk Assessments at Schools:** A school’s security management team should first consider conducting a risk assessment to determine needs, identify vulnerabilities, and develop a security strategy. A facility risk assessment provides school administrators with an evaluation of current security practices and identifies options for preventing and protecting against violent incidents, including active shooters. In concert with school safety and security decision-makers, school administrators can use these assessments to prioritize security enhancements based on available resources. Recognizing the importance of risk assessments, in 2018 the Florida Department of Education is requiring all Florida school districts to complete an extensive facility risk assessment for each of their schools.
A risk assessment can be conducted internally, in conjunction with local law enforcement, or by a specialized third party security firm. To assist schools in conducting their own risk assessments, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security recently released *K–12 School Security: A Guide for Preventing and Protecting against Gun Violence.*\(^1\) The Guide includes both a narrative overview of proven security practices, as well as considerations and instructions for completing a security self-assessment survey. Together, these documents outline action-oriented security practices and options for consideration based on the results of the individual school’s responses to the survey.

The Phoenix Police Department’s Threat Mitigation Unit is a good example of how local law enforcement can be leveraged to conduct school risk assessments. The Threat Mitigation Unit uses its critical infrastructure vulnerability assessment capability to assess schools across Arizona. In the assessment process, detailed information is gathered about each school and provided to first responders electronically. In return, school districts receive options regarding ways to make their campuses more secure based on the training and experience of the assessment teams.

**Developing Comprehensive Emergency Operations Plans:** A school’s emergency operations plan should center on regular engagement between schools, school districts, and first responders. Collaboration increases the efficiency and effectiveness of response to school-based incidents by providing first responders with the information required to navigate and secure a campus during an incident. Any reduction in the time between the beginning and end of an incident can save lives. In 2013, a federal interagency team released the *Guide for Developing High Quality School Emergency Operations Plans,* which outlines the steps schools can take in collaboration with their local government and community partners to plan for potential emergencies through the creation of a school emergency operations plan.\(^2\) The Guide outlines the functions (e.g., communications, evacuation, shelter-in-place, lockdown) and threats or hazards (e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes, active shooters) for which every school should consider developing a plan.

Emergency operations plans must describe the actions that students, teachers, and school staff will take during an emergency. Actions may differ significantly depending upon the type of emergency. These differences should be outlined clearly according to the different threats and hazards. Everyone in the school should have a common understanding of what will be expected of them during an emergency—students, teachers, and school staff as well as parents, substitute teachers, coaches, and any contracted workers on the school campus. All areas of the school should be included in the planning, such as auxiliary locations for which the school is responsible and for any events that occur outside of regular school hours or school days.

Informing students, teachers, and school administrators of the practices outlined in a security or emergency operations plan is just as important as developing the plan in the first place. Training provides the most effective way of educating everyone on their roles and responsibilities during an emergency. An effective plan requires meticulous practice and stakeholders trained in executing the plan.

**Considering Before School, After School, and Extra-Curricular Activities in Planning:** At many schools, large numbers of students or other members of the community will be present at the school before school, after school, during extra-curricular activities, and other times when classes are not in session.\(^2\) During these periods, schools often reduce security measures, such as by leaving entry doors unlocked or reducing security staff presence.\(^2\) When designing their security and emergency operations plans, schools need to consider security for these periods.
School building hardening and other physical improvements

Three key areas comprise the physical aspects of schools: the campus, the buildings on the campus, and the classrooms in the buildings. When implemented as part of a security strategy, measures specific to each of these parts of schools can enhance the overall security posture of a school. When designing a physical security plan, schools should keep in mind certain principles, such as respecting the school’s primary mission and incorporating a layered approach to security.

Available funding and the age of existing infrastructure also play a role in determining the best strategy for hardening a school. Administrators must consider their budgetary constraints and identify the most appropriate investment for their schools. According to the National Center for Education Statistics, the average age of the main building of public schools in the United States is 44 years, and 53 percent of schools require funding for repairs, renovations, and modernization to ensure buildings are in overall good condition. Older schools are more challenging to retrofit for security. In addition, many schools do not have the funding to make basic infrastructure repairs, and this makes investing in security difficult.

- Respecting the School Mission: Schools are first and foremost places for learning. When designing physical security measures, schools should ensure that the primary educational mission is not sacrificed for enhanced security. During his testimony at the August 16 Commission meeting, architect Jay Brotman provided numerous examples of how the new Sandy Hook Elementary School was able to further its primary institutional objective as a place of learning while ensuring improved security. For instance, architects designing schools often look for ways to incorporate security while still allowing natural light as “[d]aylight illuminates classrooms while using less energy and research shows positively influences a student’s ability to concentrate and learn.” To achieve this at Sandy Hook, the architects did not use high windows that might prove more difficult to breach but which would also be difficult for the elementary school children to see out of and would reduce natural light in the classroom. Instead, they sloped the ground away from the building, such that the windows are higher to a potential assailant but feel normal to the children inside.

- Layers of Security: As multiple experts noted during Commission meetings, school security strategies should use a layered approach that incorporates multiple, reinforcing echelons of policy, programs, and protective measures. This can help prevent an attacker from exploiting a gap or single point of failure in a school’s security plan. Layering security can also prove valuable in delaying an attacker, thus providing more time for law enforcement to respond to an attack. This is especially valuable in more rural areas where law enforcement response time may be significantly longer due to the need to cover a significantly greater geographic area.

- Access Controls—Limited Entry Points: As all of the experts testifying during the Commission’s August 23 field visit to Miley Achievement Center in Las Vegas, NV, acknowledged, denying intruders and attackers access to school campuses and buildings is a key line of defense. It begins at the entrance to the school’s campus or building. Entry control measures limit the number of access points, allow access only to those who should be on the campus, and provide an opportunity to conduct searches of suspicious items or persons. Having entry controls in place can deter individuals from initiating violent attacks, detect attacks earlier from a safe distance, and delay attackers from reaching vulnerable locations or densely populated areas.

By applying the principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, schools can implement security measures such as fencing, bollards, planters, curbs, or walls to create a single point of entry to the campus, for both vehicles and pedestrians. This allows school staff to more effectively monitor every individual who comes onto the campus. For example, the new Sandy Hook Elementary School is designed with a rain garden with three footbridges...
in front of its main entrance. Through this approach, the school was able to incorporate a natural barrier to vehicles that funnels pedestrian traffic to a single entryway in a visually pleasing design that can also help teach the children about the cycle of water and seasonal plants.

Rerouting roads or eliminating access points might be necessary to assure minimal access points to the campus. Schools that consist of a single building should also work to have limited, monitored entry points by applying the appropriate security measures. All schools should consider equipping exterior doors with an electronic access system that allows for scheduled lock and unlock times. During lock times the use of access cards or video intercom door release systems may be used for student, teacher, or visitor movement.

- **Access Controls—Video Surveillance**: Video surveillance is a valuable security measure for entry control. Surveillance cameras can also be used beyond entry points to monitor areas that are not within the normal view of teachers, administrators, or security personnel, such as hallways and enclosed stairwells. When feasible, school security personnel or other staff should actively monitor video feeds, and the local first responder community should have access to them. Schools sharing video feeds with local law enforcement or others should ensure they are complying with all appropriate privacy laws, such as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), when doing so. Additional information on how to properly share video surveillance while complying with FERPA can be found in Chapter 17 of this report.

- **Access Controls—Screening Systems**: Some schools may also wish to use screening systems to limit who and what can enter a building. These systems typically require one-at-a-time entry to check the person and belongings. Such systems can use metal detection, X-ray, explosives detection devices, or a physical search. The purpose of screening is to prevent illegal or prohibited items from entering any given facility, and there is evidence that supports the efficacy of screening as a method to detect, deter, or deny violent actors. However, these screening systems are labor-intensive, time consuming, and costly. The cost of a retrofit of a school or the time it takes to admit students into the building in accordance with screening procedures may be impediments to implementation. The impact of metal detectors, X-ray machines, and similar screening technologies on school violence is questionable, with at least one study concluding that metal detectors have no apparent effect on reducing violence on school grounds.

- **Building Envelope**: The exterior face of school buildings, including the walls, roof, windows, and doors, comprise the building envelope. Much like in a classroom, these structural components can serve as a significant layer of defense from an incident or natural disaster. In particular, construction materials for doors and windows influence the effectiveness of these features in deterring, delaying, or denying active-shooter attacks. Doors constructed primarily with wood and non-reinforced glass windows offer a lower degree of protection than doors made from steel with blast or bullet-resistant glass windows. Replacing wood framed doors with fire-rated steel or aluminum can improve the level of protection offered. Replacing any non-reinforced glass windows with tempered, wire-reinforced, laminated, or bulletproof glass and applying blast-resistant safety films can strengthen windows to increase the protection they provide. Securing exterior windows so that individuals cannot use them to access a building can also improve the overall security of the building. In addition, clearing the exterior spaces surrounding school buildings of unnecessary foliage or structures may also eliminate spaces that
could conceal illicit activity, provide access to the building above the first floor, or otherwise aid an intruder or attacker’s efforts.

- **Classroom Doors, Locks, and Window Panels:** Depending on their construction and configuration, classroom doors can significantly delay or prevent an attacker from reaching individuals within a classroom, thereby providing a safe area for students and staff during a lockdown. Much like the building envelope, the material from which doors are made will greatly affect their protective value. Reinforcing existing doors or replacing them with bulletproof doors can be very costly, but is an investment that some schools and school districts are making. For instance, in the wake of the Parkland shooting, the Charleston County (SC) School District announced that it will pilot bulletproof doors at three of its schools. The doors were designed to be strong enough to withstand high-powered ammunition, but lightweight enough for school-aged children to open. 37 Regardless of the type of door used, all classrooms should have locks that allow the teacher to lock the classroom door from the inside. Locksets installed on classroom doors should have the ability to be opened from outside the classroom using a key, code, credential, or other method of deactivation. This enables teachers, administrators, and first responders to access the classroom, but not an attacker or intruder. When deciding on a locking device school officials must be aware of, and comply with, fire codes, life safety codes, and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requirements. 38 In addition to the physical locking hardware, training and continued reinforcement of their use is important to get the full benefits of locks. Entry control technologies such as locks can be (and have been) rendered useless by individuals not adhering to proper security processes, such as by propping open doors for convenience or other reasons. 39

Many school doors have windows that allow someone outside the door to observe the inside of the classroom. These windows should be protected or reinforced and have a removable covering that can be quickly applied that obscures visual observation from both sides. Additionally, windows often are located on the door in a position where an attacker could smash the window to gain access to the door’s locking mechanism. Schools can address this by installing reinforcing film that strengthens the glass or using doors designed in a way that a breach of the window will not provide the attacker the ability to access the locking mechanism and unlock the door.

Other measures can be taken to keep students and staff beyond the line of sight and line of fire of an attacker seeking to cause harm through the door window. One school district in southern Ohio has installed hurricane-type screening on door windows in its schools. These retractable screening devices prevent an outside observer from seeing into a room as they allow observation in a straight line only, thereby narrowing the field of view from outside of the classroom. Another approach some schools use is to place tape on the floor of the classroom designating areas of the classroom that cannot be seen through the door window. Students are trained to congregate in those designated areas during lockdowns.

- **Door Numbering Systems:** School buildings come in all shapes and sizes with many entrances and exits. To help first responders gain access to an incident scene in the most efficient manner, schools can collaborate with local first responders to apply a common numbering system to the walls, doors (interior, exterior, and non-access), roof hatches, and stairwells. 40 The value of numbering systems was noted during the August 23 Commission field visit to the Miley Achievement Center by Clark County School District Police Chief James Ketsaa. He stated that the local fire marshal is exploring amending the fire code to require all schools to visibly number outside doors, provide directional (i.e., north, south,
east, west) markings, and number school roofs to support identification from the air. At present, 20 states provide recommendations and resources to schools about this practice via their Statewide School Safety Centers.

- **Hallways, Stairwells, Utility Rooms, and Other Areas**: Each building will have certain areas that are more difficult than others to monitor, such as hallways, stairwells, and utility rooms. Although data about the location of school violence within a school is limited, there is some indication that students feel the least safe in areas with minimal adult oversight and that violence is most prevalent in areas like hallways and stairways that are least monitored. Similarly, spaces behind ceiling panels or walls can be easily accessed but prove difficult to monitor and can serve as staging areas for contraband or hiding places for intruders. Developing or installing systems to monitor these spaces by either physical inspection or surveillance cameras may be necessary to mitigate their use for nefarious purposes. Eliminating non-structural elements of ceilings and walls such as removable panels may help to serve the same purpose.

- **Portable Classrooms**: Portable buildings that are used for classrooms can present unique challenges because they frequently do not have the same construction features as the primary buildings, resulting in windows and doors with lower levels of security. They might also be located in less secured areas that provide easier access to an attacker. If a school has portable buildings (and eliminating their use is not practical), additional security measures may be warranted, including increased monitoring, assigned security personnel, retrofitting doors and locks, or ballistic protection on the windows.
Recommendations
Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

**FEDERAL GOVERNMENT**

1. One of the biggest concerns raised by schools and school districts since the Parkland shooting has been their inability to easily sift through the multitude of security options, equipment, technologies, etc., that are available to their schools. As a way to address this, many individuals in the school security community have suggested the establishment of a federal clearinghouse that could assess, identify, and share best practices on school security. The federal government should develop a clearinghouse to assess, identify, and share best practices related to school security measures, technologies, and innovations.

2. To assist schools and school districts in performing risk assessments and developing emergency operation plans, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should periodically update and provide training on its *K–12 School Security: A Guide for Preventing and Protecting against Gun Violence* (including the associated security self-assessment) and, along with its interagency partners, the Guide for Developing High Quality School Emergency Operations Plans. In addition, DHS should develop options for the creation of a train-the-trainer program to push expertise out into the states and localities to help school districts and individual schools complete these activities.

3. DHS, in partnership with the U.S. Departments of Education and Justice, should explore legislative, regulatory, or procedural modifications to existing grant programs to enable more grant funding or related resources to be available for enhancing school security operations and physical infrastructure. As part of this, DHS should explore designating a portion of Homeland Security Grants for school security activities, and premise the use of those funds on activities that accomplish enhancements recommended in DHS guidance or standards.

**STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES**

1. Schools or school districts should establish a security management team with a designated lead official to oversee security efforts. States and localities should consider supporting these efforts by providing dedicated funding for security management teams. States and localities should also consider requiring school districts or the individual schools within their jurisdiction to establish security management teams. Once established, these teams should work to develop a school security community of interest by engaging the school’s teachers, administrators, counselors, and other staff, parents and students, and external partners like local first responders, social workers, and elected officials.

2. Schools should conduct a risk assessment or have a risk assessment performed in order to identify existing vulnerabilities and support the development of a strategy to address security gaps. To do this, schools could use the security self-assessment that DHS released along with its *K–12 School Security: A Guide for Preventing and Protecting against Gun Violence* or another assessment methodology (or they could work with a third party to conduct the assessment for them). States and localities should consider supporting these efforts by providing dedicated funding for the performing of school risk assessments. They can also consider requiring individual schools within their jurisdiction to complete risk assessments.
3. All school districts and/or individual schools should develop and implement emergency operations plans in accordance with the Guide for Developing High Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, or other similar guidance. Indeed, according to a U.S. Government Accountability Office’s 2015 survey of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, only 32 of the 51 state education departments surveyed indicated that their state required school districts to have emergency operations plans.\(^7\) When designing their security and emergency operations plans, schools should consider security for before school, after school, during extra-curricular activities, and other times when classes are not in session. States and localities should consider supporting these efforts by providing dedicated funding for the development and implementation of emergency operations plans. States and localities should also consider requiring individual schools within their jurisdiction to develop and implement emergency operations plans.

4. Following the completion of a risk or vulnerability assessment to determine what risks and security gaps exist in the school’s current building security program, schools should take steps to address those gaps. In doing so, they should design security measures in a way that achieves security goals without requiring sacrifices to the school’s primary educational and developmental missions. Every school is different, and, therefore, the protective measures in place will vary based on the characteristics of the site, location, resources, and personnel available. Schools should make sure to take into account their unique physical characteristics when designing a security plan. School security plans should use a layered approach across all three areas of a school (i.e., the entry points, the building envelope, and the classroom) with measures designed to complement and support each other. Schools also should consider the special needs of the student population and other individuals who access the school to ensure security measures, emergency notifications, and response plans are effective and account for all.

Chapter 16 Endnotes

2 Departments of Education, Justice, and Health and Human Services. (June 1, 2007). Report to the President on issues raised by the Virginia Tech tragedy, at p. 17.
3 Now is the time: The President’s plan to protect our children and our communities by reducing gun violence. (January 16, 2013) at p. 10 (“We need to make our schools safer, not only by enhancing their physical security and making sure they are prepared to respond to emergencies like a mass shooting, but also by creating safer and more nurturing school climates.”).
4 Ibid., at p. 11.
5 The report of Governor Bill Owens’ Columbine Review Commission. (May 2001) at pp. 120–121.
6 Final report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission. (March 6, 2015) at pp. 4–5.
7 Ibid.
10 Testimony of Max Schachter to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out.
11 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Final report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission. (March 6, 2015) at p. 5.


Broward County League of Cities’ School and Community Public Safety Task Force. (June 4, 2018). Initial report and recommendations, at p. 8 (“For some schools, the dismissal bell results in only a 30-40% reduction in the student population.”).

Ibid. (“There is no SRO coverage for pre-school, after-school, extra-curricular, camps over break, and summer camps.”).


Ibid.

Final report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Committee. (March 6, 2015) at p. 5.

Testimony of Jay Brotman to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out.

Ibid.


Testimony of Jay Brotman to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out.

Ibid.


For more details about Crime prevention through environmental design, refer to www.cpted.net.

Testimony of Jay Brotman to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out.

See, e.g., testimony of Sheriff Tim Troyer to the Federal Commission on School Safety Field Visit (August 23, 2018), Best practices for school building safety.


Underwriters Laboratory (UL) 752 Standard for Bullet-Resisting Equipment offers a standard for use in determining the appropriate construction material for use in retrofitting or designing classroom components. School and school district administrators must determine the appropriate level of ballistic resistance that is necessary and apply the corresponding level from UL 752. UL 752 is a widely recognized standard in the security industry.


The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 3000 guideline provides standard specifications that locksets must meet in order to comply with the ADA and widely accepted life safety best practices. NFPA 3000 should be reviewed and its standards considered by everyone who is responsible for school security and student safety. For more information on different types of locks and considerations to take into account when selecting locks for a school, one valuable resource is the National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities Guide to Door Locking Options in Schools, which can be found at http://www.nccef.org/pubs/door_locks.pdf.

See e.g., Schwartz et al. (2016). The role of technology in improving K–12 school safety, at p. 22.

In Kentucky, for instance, schools in Allen, Edmonton, Grayson, Mercer, Warren, and Scott Counties have worked with their local first responders to incorporate fast path door numbering, a logical system of marking doors, windows, hallways, and classrooms that assists first responders in navigating through school buildings quickly. Similarly, in New Jersey, schools are encouraged to use the Model Door Numbering System, which helps first responders more rapidly respond to incidents by numbering external doors. The New Jersey Center for Safe Schools has issued a guide to help New Jersey schools implement this system, which can be found at https://www.nj.gov/education/schools/security/resources/DoorNumbering.pdf. Finally, a high school in Imperial County, CA, has also adopted the practice of labeling doors for first responders in a way that indicates which key to use, the direction in which the doors will open, and how many rooms are located behind the door.

Testimony of Chief James Ketsaa to the Federal Commission on School Safety Field Visit (August 23, 2018), Best practices for school building safety.


See, e.g., testimony of Jay Brotman to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out; testimony of Max Schachter to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out; testimony of Sheriff Tim Troyer to the Federal Commission on School Safety Field Visit (August 23, 2018), Best practices for school building safety; testimony of Russell Davidson to the Federal Commission on School Safety Field Visit (August 23, 2018), Best practices for school building safety.

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-16-144, Improved federal coordination could better assist K–12 schools prepare for emergencies, (2016).
CHAPTER 17
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act and Other Statutory and Regulatory Privacy Protections

A delicate balance exists between privacy and security in schools. On the one hand, there is the legal requirement to protect the privacy of student education records. On the other hand, it is critical to recognize that some education records may contain information that, if disclosed to appropriate officials, could help prevent students from harming themselves or others.

The primary federal law that governs the privacy of education records is commonly referred to as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). It grants parents certain rights with regard to their children’s education records. These include the right to inspect and review their education records, to seek to have their education records amended, and to file a written complaint with the U.S. Department of Education regarding an alleged violation of FERPA. The law also provides parents with certain consent rights over the disclosure of education records and personally identifiable information (PII) contained therein.

While pursuing the laudable goal of protecting student privacy, FERPA was written in 1974, before the internet, and has repeatedly been criticized as archaic and in need of updating for the digital age. For example, a 2014 White House report on “Big Data” recommended that the federal government “should explore how to modernize the privacy regulatory framework under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act.” Unfortunately, this modernization has not yet taken place, and FERPA retains a pre-Internet approach to data that is out of touch with today’s modern and digitally connected classroom.

For students receiving special education and related services (or being evaluated for eligibility), the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the associated federal regulations at 34 C.F.R. Part 300 provide separate and additional confidentiality protections. Many of these confidentiality provisions are similar to FERPA in scope.

Educators, parents, law enforcement officers, and others are often unclear about FERPA’s specific requirements and exceptions, and some take advantage of the confusion surrounding FERPA. Following the Parkland shooting, one article noted how schools use FERPA as a shield to hide incriminating or embarrassing information. Troy Eid, Chief Legal Counsel to Colorado Governor Bill Owens at the time of the Columbine shooting, said that a fear of liability and “overly restrictive interpretation” of FERPA has “sparked needless confusion among officials and their lawyers.” Teachers injured on the job by violent students similarly complained that their school administrators did not inform the teachers about any known violent behavior of students.

Following the Virginia Tech shooting, the George W. Bush Administration recommended that school policies articulate what types of student information can be shared, with whom it can be shared, and under what conditions it can be shared. Based on those recommendations, the Department of Education amended FERPA regulations to clarify permissible disclosures of student records and PII contained therein in health or safety emergency situations.

Prior to the amendments, schools and districts were more limited in what they could non-consensually disclose in the context of a health or safety emergency. In 2008, citing the need for “greater flexibility and deference” and “so they [schools administrators] can bring appropriate resources to bear on a circumstance that threatens the health or safety of individuals,” the Department removed the strict construction requirement. With the rule change, the Department affirmed that it would review determinations to disclose education records under FERPA’s health or safety exception by assessing whether: (1) there was an “articulable and significant threat to the health or safety of the student or other individuals;” (2) the disclosure was made to appropriate parties; and (3) there was a rational basis for the determination. The Department also stated that, assuming the foregoing was satisfied, it would “not substitute its judgment for that of the
FERPA and School Safety

What is FERPA?
- Applies to all educational agencies (i.e., school districts) and institutions (i.e., schools) that receive funds under any program administered by the U.S. Secretary of Education. In K–12, FERPA applies to most public schools. In postsecondary, FERPA applies to nearly all postsecondary institutions.
- Gives parents the right to access the student’s education records (and to seek to amend any information in the student’s education record that is inaccurate, misleading, or in violation of the student’s right of privacy).
- Requires written parental consent before personally identifiable information (PII) from the student’s education record may be disclosed, subject to certain exceptions.
- When a student turns 18 years of age, or enrolls in a postsecondary institution (at any age), the student becomes an “eligible student” and all parental rights transfer to the student.

What education records does FERPA protect?
- Education records are generally defined as those records that are directly related to the student and maintained by (or on behalf of) an educational agency or institution.
- FERPA excludes certain types of records from this definition, including, but not limited to:
  - Records created and maintained by the educational agency’s or institution’s law enforcement unit for law enforcement purposes;
  - Records made or maintained by a professional or paraprofessional (e.g., physician, psychologist, etc.) that are made, maintained, or used only in connection with treatment of an eligible student, if certain conditions are met.

What are several key exceptions to FERPA’s written consent requirement?
- **Health and Safety Emergencies.** Educational agencies and institutions may disclose PII from education records without consent to appropriate parties (e.g., law enforcement, emergency responders) in connection with an articulable and significant health or safety emergency, if knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other individuals. 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.31(a)(10) and 99.36;
- **School Officials.** Educational agencies and institutions may disclose PII from education records without consent to school officials (including School Resource Officers), provided they meet the school’s criteria for “school officials” with “legitimate educational interests.” 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1);
- **Judicial Orders/Subpoenas.** Educational agencies and institutions may disclose PII from education records without consent in order to comply with judicial orders and lawfully issued subpoenas if the conditions set forth at 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(9) are met;
- **Parents of Dependent Students.** Educational agencies and institutions may disclose PII from the education records of an “eligible student” without consent to the parents of that student if the parents claim the student as a dependent for federal tax purposes. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(8).
- **Juvenile Justice System.** Educational agencies and institutions may disclose PII from education records to state and local officials or other authorities if the disclosure is allowed by a state law adopted after November 19, 1974, and if the disclosure concerns the juvenile justice system and its ability to serve, prior to adjudication, the student whose records are disclosed. The officials and authorities to whom such information is disclosed must certify in writing to the school that the information will not be provided to any other party without written consent, except as provided for under state law. 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.31(a)(5) and 99.38.
After these regulatory changes, the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services issued Joint Guidance on the Application of FERPA and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). This guidance sought to explain the relationship between the two laws and address apparent confusion on the part of school administrators, health-care professionals, and others as to how they apply to student records and the ability to communicate information.

Though these recommendations and actions sought to clarify FERPA, substantial misunderstanding remains at the local level among officials and educators concerning the privacy law, and in particular its application to school-based threats.

**Commission Observations**

A misconception in both the education and law enforcement communities is that FERPA poses an impediment to the sharing of student information that could help prevent school violence and other emergencies. In her comments to the Commission, Sonja Trainor, Managing Director for Legal Advocacy at the National School Boards Association, highlighted this confusion which creates barriers to information sharing and collaboration, thus hampering the ability to prevent potential acts of violence.

Privacy advocates have correctly noted that FERPA already permits schools to disclose the information necessary to protect students and other individuals before and during emergencies, but that continued confusion over the scope of FERPA remains. For example, John Verdi, Vice President of Policy at the Future of Privacy Forum, explained to the Commission how schools can educate school officials and other stakeholders about the existing legal authorities for sharing data to support school safety, rather than expand legal bases for disclosure of student data.

Contrary to common misconceptions, schools have a great deal of flexibility under FERPA to disclose students’ education records, or the PII contained therein, in the context of school safety. These five exceptions to FERPA’s general requirement for written consent are especially relevant:

- disclosures to other school officials;
- disclosures pursuant to a court order or lawfully issued subpoena;
- disclosures in connection with a health or safety emergency;
- disclosures (pursuant to state law) relating to juvenile justice; and
- disclosures to the parents of an eligible student that is claimed by the parents as a dependent for federal tax purposes.

Especially relevant to potential violence at school is FERPA’s health or safety emergency exception which permits the disclosure of students’ education records, or the PII contained therein, to appropriate parties if knowledge of such information is necessary to protect the health or safety of students or other persons in connection with an emergency.

FERPA’s health or safety emergency exception specifically permits schools or districts themselves to disclose PII from students’ education records in the context of emergencies. However, there are certain circumstances when it may not be practical or expedient for schools or districts themselves to make the determinations and disclosures necessary to address the emergency. These situations might include natural disasters that impact multiple districts across the state, emergencies that disrupt a district’s data systems, or emergencies that occur when district personnel are not available. In these limited situations, it is often advantageous for the state education agency to make the disclosure directly, on the school’s or district’s behalf. In a 2005 letter to the Texas Education Agency relating to the disruption caused by Hurricane Katrina, the Department affirmed that in these...
types of situations FERPA authorizes state education agencies to re-disclose students’ education records to appropriate parties under the health or safety emergency exception.\textsuperscript{23}

Police departments often seek access to school surveillance footage to help ensure school safety—only to have schools claim it is an education record protected by FERPA and therefore deny the request. However, FERPA’s definition of “education records” excludes those created and maintained by a school’s law enforcement unit for a law enforcement purpose.\textsuperscript{24} If a school’s security department or campus police maintains the school’s surveillance video system and, as a result, creates surveillance footage for a law enforcement purpose, FERPA would not prevent sharing the surveillance footage with local law enforcement.\textsuperscript{25} Smaller schools without an existing law enforcement unit or security department can still utilize this exclusion by designating a school official, such as the vice-principal, as the school’s law enforcement unit for this purpose.\textsuperscript{26}

Another exception to FERPA’s written consent requirement allows disclosures to school officials who have been determined to have a legitimate educational interest in the education records, such as needing to review the education records in order to fulfill their professional responsibilities.\textsuperscript{27} Schools and districts specify the criteria for determining both who they consider school officials and what constitutes a legitimate educational interest.\textsuperscript{28} Under this exception, schools can disclose education records, or the PII contained therein, that are relevant to school safety to individuals designated as school officials and determined to have a legitimate educational interest, including teachers and school resource officers.\textsuperscript{29}

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\hspace{1cm} disclosures in connection with a health or safety emergency; \\
\hspace{1cm} disclosures (pursuant to state law) relating to juvenile justice; and \\
\hspace{1cm} disclosures to the parents of an eligible student that is claimed by the parents as a dependent for federal tax purposes. \\
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**Recommendations**

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

### FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1. The U.S. Department of Education (ED), should provide technical assistance to clarify that FERPA’s “school official” exception may permit disclosures of disciplinary information about students to the appropriate teachers and staff within the school.

2. ED should work with Congress to modernize FERPA to account for changes in technology since its enactment.

3. ED should clarify that limited disclosures of PII from students’ education records by state education agencies (SEA) under the health or safety emergency exception are permitted, when done on behalf of the school(s) or district(s), and in compliance with other FERPA requirements when the SEA is best positioned to respond to the emergency.

### STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. States should examine their state-level student privacy laws to identify protections that go beyond FERPA and may impede schools’ and districts’ efforts to promote school safety and student well-being. FERPA is not the only student privacy law that can hinder the appropriate sharing of student information in the context of emergency situations. Schools and districts may find that information that could be shared under FERPA may not be shareable under their state student privacy laws.

2. Districts and schools should raise awareness of existing FERPA flexibilities and utilize existing (and forthcoming) trainings through the U.S. Department of Education’s Privacy Technical Assistance Center (PTAC). District and school staff can also make recommendations on additional training needs that can support increased awareness and understanding of FERPA requirements by emailing privacyTA@ed.gov.

The following are some of the existing PTAC resources:

- In 2018, ED published a series of Frequently Asked Questions that clarified FERPA’s applicability to photos and video recordings of students, with specific applicability to surveillance videos.30
- ED has responded to requests from states, school districts, postsecondary institutions, law enforcement agencies, and others for technical assistance on FERPA’s requirements and general privacy best practices in the context of school safety.31
- ED’s June 2010 guidance “Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Disclosure of Student Information Related to Emergencies and Disasters,” and June 2011 guidance “Addressing Emergencies on Campus,” provide detailed explanations of the various exceptions to consent under FERPA that may apply in different safety scenarios.32
Chapter 17 Endnotes

1. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.
10. Ibid. at 74837 (citing 73 Fed. Reg. 15574, 15589 (March 24, 2008)).
11. Ibid.; 34 C.F.R. § 99.36(c).
12. 34 C.F.R. § 99.36(c).
17. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1).
18. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(9).
19. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(10) (emphasis added).
20. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(5).
21. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(8).
24. 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.3 (definition of “[e]ducation records”) and 99.8(b).
28. Schools and districts must specify the criteria in their annual notice to parents and eligible students of their FERPA rights. 34 CFR § 99.7(a)(3) (iii).
29. Disclosures to school officials must meet the requirements of 34 CFR § 99.31(a)(i) and 34 C.F.R. § 99.7(a)(3)(iii).
31. The U.S. Department of Education’s Privacy Technical Assistance Center is a “one-stop” resource for education stakeholders to learn about data privacy, confidentiality, and security practices related to student-level data systems and other uses of student data. For more information visit https://studentprivacy.ed.gov.
Protecting our students and preventing school violence require ensuring that the right people have access to the right information at the right time. There is a need to disclose information to enable safe medical treatment while maintaining a respect for privacy. This is particularly critical with the treatment of mental health conditions. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) is a privacy rule that establishes national standards to protect medical records and other personal health information. It applies to health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and healthcare providers who conduct certain healthcare transactions electronically.

The HIPAA Privacy Rule regulates the sharing of individually identifiable health information known as “protected health information” (PHI) and applies to covered entities (and their business associates).

Covered entities are defined as health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and healthcare providers who transmit health information in electronic form in connection with covered transactions, such as billing insurance electronically. Some healthcare providers, including cash-only practices that do not conduct covered transactions, are not subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Even so, such providers may be subject to states’ health information privacy laws.

Mental health and substance use information is highly relevant in the school safety context. The HIPAA Privacy Rule applies to PHI, including mental health information such as substance use disorder (SUD) diagnosis and treatment information. In addition to HIPAA, much substance use disorder diagnosis and treatment information is protected by 42 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) Part 2, which is regulated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). 42 CFR Part 2 is discussed later in this report.

The HIPAA Privacy Rule establishes a floor of federal privacy protection for PHI held by covered entities and their business associates. However, it does not preempt or replace other federal or state laws that may offer greater privacy protection. Many states or other jurisdictions impose stricter privacy protections than HIPAA, particularly for information considered especially sensitive, such as information related to mental disorder and SUDs. Privacy protections for individuals’ health information are not uniform across the nation, and this is a source of confusion for healthcare entities.

Congress recently considered whether HIPAA interferes with effective communication and treatment for people with serious mental illnesses. It concluded that there is confusion in the healthcare community regarding circumstances under which information can be released under HIPAA. This confusion often hinders communication of information with appropriate caregivers that would support safe and coordinated treatment.

At the July 11 Commission meeting, Jennifer Mathis, Director of Policy and Legal Advocacy at the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, referenced the provision in the 21st Century Cures Act that directed HHS to issue guidance clarifying permissible disclosures of protected information under HIPAA (and as of December 2017 this guidance is available online). Mathis
stated that additional work needs to be done to promote this guidance to the public.  

The HIPAA Privacy Rule does not require a covered entity to disclose PHI in its possession. The Privacy Rule permits a covered entity to disclose an individual’s PHI pursuant to his or her authorization or under circumstances and for purposes expressly described in the Privacy Rule.

Covered entities are permitted to share PHI in several circumstances that are relevant to the school safety context. This includes sharing information with law enforcement, public health authorities, parents and other caregivers, and persons in a position to help prevent a serious and imminent harm to health or safety.

The February 14 Parkland shooting further highlighted many of the complexities surrounding HIPAA and other privacy rules—and the need for individuals, families, schools, and communities to better understand these regulations. The protection of the privacy of the alleged shooter, even after the shooting, has been a source of confusion and criticism.

Commission Observations

It is important to note that disclosures are permissible and often necessary in certain circumstances. As one expert testified during the July 11 Commission meeting, often individuals find HIPAA complex and do not understand the scenarios under which disclosure is permitted.

Disclosing to law enforcement

The Privacy Rule allows covered entities to disclose PHI to law enforcement under certain circumstances. For example, providers are permitted to make such disclosures when required by state or federal law or in response to an administrative subpoena or other civil legal process. Providers may also disclose limited information to help identify or locate a suspect, witness, or missing person; and about individuals who are suspected to be or who are victims of crime. In general, school employees are not providers under HIPAA. However, there may be certain situations where a school employee (such as a nurse or counselor) is a health provider, and in that case HIPAA may apply.

Disclosing to a public health authority

Covered entities may disclose PHI to public health authorities for public health activities (45 CFR 164.512(b)), which could include violence prevention initiatives or state law requirements to report child abuse or neglect.

Disclosing to parents and other caregivers

The Privacy Rule generally treats parents as “personal representatives” of their minor children. Personal representatives generally have the authority to act on behalf of the minor child when providing consent to share information under HIPAA. Providers can decide not to treat a parent as a personal representative if, for example, they have concerns that doing so might put the child’s safety at risk.

The HIPAA Privacy Rule also permits healthcare providers and other covered entities to share PHI with persons involved in the care or payment for care of individuals who are not able to agree or object to the disclosure (e.g., due to a mental health crisis). This is based on the entity’s judgment that sharing PHI is in the best interests of the patient. Under these circumstances, the recipients of the information may include family members, such as parents of children who are no longer minors.

Doris Fuller is a mental illness researcher, advocate, and family member and the former Chief of Research and Public Affairs (ret.) at the Treatment Advocacy Center. During the July 11 Commission meeting, she stated that providers have a history of “stonewalling” families when it comes to providing protected health information. Her experience is that medical providers and schools routinely withhold medical information from family members to avoid liability for violating HIPAA.

Disclosing to anyone who can prevent serious and imminent harm

Providers and other covered entities may disclose patient PHI to avert a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of the patient or others when they have a good faith belief that such a disclosure is necessary to prevent or lessen the threat. Under these circumstances, providers may alert those persons they believe are reasonably able to prevent or lessen the threat. This includes law enforcement, school offi-
cials, teachers, parents, friends, school counselors, or anyone reasonably able to help avert the harm. The disclosure must be made in good faith and be consistent with applicable law and standards of ethical conduct.  

**Education records**

With respect to records held by schools, HIPAA excludes individually identifiable information in “education records” covered by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and certain “treatment records” of eligible students from the definition of PHI. In most cases, therefore, records created by a school nurse or other school health professional (including those that are HIPAA-covered entities) are not subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule.

When HIPAA does apply in school settings and for PHI related to minor children, HHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR) guidance and resource materials help clarify the circumstances when providers may disclose information to parents.

At the July 11 Commission meeting, Jennifer Mathis also stated that the privacy protections of HIPAA are extraordinarily important for individuals with mental health disabilities. Without the assurance of privacy protections, students are less likely to seek help when needed and less likely to engage openly with mental health counselors or other service providers. Mathis stated HIPAA is not to blame for the lack of appropriate disclosures of mental health information.

**Confidentiality of substance use disorder patient records**

Federal regulations governing the confidentiality of SUD patient records (42 CFR Part 2) include statutory provisions (42 U.S.C. 290dd-2) enacted nearly 50 years ago, at a time when individuals seeking treatment for SUDs faced significant discrimination and negative consequences because they sought treatment for addiction. Thus, Part 2 is “intended to ensure that a patient receiving treatment for a SUD in a Part 2 program is not made more vulnerable by reason of the availability of their patient record than an individual with a SUD who does not seek treatment.”

Persons who seek help for and who are in recovery from SUDs may face discrimination in education, healthcare, employment, housing, and family law (e.g., child custody disputes). This may deter patients from seeking treatment or make them reluctant to share information with their healthcare providers about their diagnosis and treatment for SUDs. For SUD patients who often have comorbid conditions, proactive, preventive, and chronic care is important to achieving desired outcomes. Such outcomes are facilitated by appropriate sharing of information by patients with their healthcare providers, among medical staff, and, occasionally, with non-medical providers (such as teachers and coaches) supporting their care.

Information about a patient’s medical conditions, including SUDs, is critical to ensuring patients receive comprehensive care that facilitates and sustains their recovery and overall health. For instance, a healthcare provider treating a patient in recovery from a SUD may wish to avoid prescribing a highly addictive pain medication for the patient’s non-SUD condition because it could cause the patient in recovery to relapse.

The Part 2 regulations apply to any federally assisted program that identifies itself as a SUD program providing treatment services. The regulations require that treatment records identifying a patient as having or having had a SUD be confidential and only disclosed under expressly authorized circumstances. In general, a SUD treatment program that is subject to Part 2 must obtain written patient consent before disclosing patient-identifying information. Once this information is disclosed, re-disclosure is not permitted unless expressly permitted by the written consent of the patient or unless otherwise permitted under Part 2. Certain exceptions to the written consent requirement are permitted under Part 2, such as disclosures for research, medical emergency, and audit and evaluation purposes.

Historically, Part 2 has included more stringent disclosure requirements for SUD records when compared to other health privacy laws such as HIPAA. However, in 2017 and 2018 SAMHSA issued final Part 2 rules that aligned some aspects of Part 2 with HIPAA to facilitate greater information sharing and to ensure that care for SUD patients could be provided in a coordinated and integrated manner. In addition, in 2018 SAMHSA and the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology released fact sheets that provide examples of how Part 2 data can be shared through electronic health records and health information exchanges.
Recommendations
Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

**FEDERAL GOVERNMENT**
1. OCR should analyze current HIPAA guidance to:
   a) Determine whether simpler, more user-friendly information is needed;
   b) Identify additional scenarios based on current school settings to improve understanding of when HIPAA applies to such settings; and
   c) Determine how new or revised guidance may improve coordination between mental health providers, family members, other healthcare professionals, law enforcement, and school personnel.

2. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) should analyze the need for joint OCR-SAMHSA guidance to clarify and explain how HIPAA and 42 CFR Part 2 apply and intersect across different settings to help further address the potential for violence related to comorbidity of SUDs and Serious Mental Illness.

3. HHS should analyze the HIPAA Privacy Rule and existing guidance to determine how current provisions related to disclosures (such as those relating to serious and imminent harm) impact the ability or willingness of covered healthcare providers to report when an individual poses a risk of violence to a school or in another setting. Determine if changes to the Privacy Rule are warranted.

4. HHS should amend the HIPAA Privacy Rule to create a stronger safe harbor for providers to disclose (to a state public health or law enforcement authority) information about patients who need to receive continuous, monitored care because they may be a threat to themselves or others.

5. All appropriate federal agencies should support the development of applications (including for mobile platforms) and electronic health record systems that facilitate patient consent to information sharing among providers.

**STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES**
1. State and local healthcare providers should ask patients to identify any family members or other helpers or caregivers involved in their care before an emergency occurs so the providers know not only who to notify in an emergency situation, but also who to call about their care.

2. To prepare for potential emergency circumstances, schools, healthcare providers, and others affected by the HIPAA Privacy Rule should familiarize themselves with the OCR guidance described above (as well as other applicable law and professional ethical standards) before an emergency occurs.
Chapter 18 Endnotes


3. 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 and 164, Subparts A and E.

4. See the definition of “business associate” at 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.

5. A transaction under the Privacy Rule is the transmission of information between two parties to carry out healthcare-related financial or administrative activities. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.


7. A covered entity must disclose protected health information in only two situations: (a) to individuals (or their personal representatives or designated third party) when the individuals request access to, or an accounting of disclosures of, their protected health information; and (b) to HHS when it is undertaking a compliance investigation or review or enforcement action. See 45 CFR § 164.502(a)(2).


10. Additional materials for consumers and families with minor children can be found at https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-individuals/mental-health/index.html.

11. 45 C.F.R. § 512(j).

12. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.


14. See Purpose and Effect, § 2.2 (b)(2).


16. See Definitions, § 2.11 (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/42/2.11); Applicability, § 2.12, Prohibition on Redisclosure (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/42/2.12); § 2.32 (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/42/2.32).

SECTION 3

Respond & Recover
CHAPTER 19

Active Shooter Preparedness and Mitigation

An active shooter is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area. Active shooter situations are unpredictable and devolve quickly. In most cases, there is no pattern or method to the selection of victims. Because active shooter situations are often over before law enforcement arrives on the scene, individuals must be prepared both mentally and physically to deal with an active shooter attack—without the assistance of trained crisis response personnel.

The shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, FL, bore all the standard characteristics of an active shooter situation. The shooter appeared to indiscriminately target people, firing into some classrooms while walking by others. In less than seven minutes, 17 individuals were killed, and the shooter exited the campus well before off-campus local law enforcement arrived on scene. According to some reports, total casualties may have been higher had the school not provided active shooter preparedness training to staff, the latest coming just six weeks before the shooter required teachers to put that training to use.

Reports prepared in the aftermath of school shootings have universally recognized the value of preparing for a potential active shooter incident and other mass casualty events through training, planning, and related strategies. For example, the Columbine Commission recommended “a much-increased emphasis on training in preparation for large-scale emergencies.” The Virginia Tech Commission recommended that states and locals “[i]ntegrate comprehensive all-hazards emergency management planning for schools into overall local and state emergency planning.” The Sandy Hook Advisory Commission recommended that appropriate agencies “review all existing policies concerning planned responses to active shooters” and “develop and conduct joint regional exercises of planned responses to major events.”

Approaches to address active shooter incidents at schools must be specific to each school’s unique environment.

In its report on school safety, the Obama Administration stated “[o]ne of the best ways to minimize the loss of life in a mass shooting is to make sure law enforcement, first responders, school officials, and others are prepared to respond to an active shooter.” The report called for the immediate expansion of access to federal training and for Congress to provide an additional $14 million to help train police officers and others to respond to active shooter situations.

The unique characteristics of K–12 school environments, including campus layout and building design, present complex challenges to active shooter planning. Therefore, approaches to address active shooter incidents at schools must be specific to each school’s unique environment. Numerous factors should inform the design of a school’s active shooter preparedness program. They include the following.

- **Age:** Students in grades K–12 typically range in age from five to 19, presenting unique challenges for each age group. Elementary students, for example, are unable to understand and respond to an incident in the same manner as a high school student. Therefore, age is often an important consideration in how to discuss awareness campaigns and response methods with students. While the “Run, Hide, Fight” approach for reacting to active shooter incidents is widely taught nationwide, the “Fight” portion of the campaign may not be appropriate for all age groups and may require modification to ensure younger students better understand, respond, and react to an active shooter. Federal, state, and local governments as well as associations and nonprofits have developed approaches tailored for children to respond to active shooter incidents, including: “Lock Out, Get Out, Take Out” and “Observe, Navigate, Escape.”
The Safe and Sound Schools organization created a guide to assist school communities in determining the appropriate approach for educating and training students and staff. Descriptions of the seven levels identified in that guide are below.

<table>
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<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
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| Early (Pre-K and Kindergarten)| • General understanding of danger.  
• Heavily reliant on adults for direction.  
• Capable of practicing basic safety concepts like “get out” and “keep out.” |
| Developing (Early Elementary)| • Demonstrates characteristics of early awareness.  
• Capable of providing basic assistance in an emergency (e.g., turning out lights). |
| Practiced (Upper Elementary) | • Demonstrates characteristics of developing awareness.  
• Capable of assisting adults in an emergency (e.g., closing doors). |
| Proficient (Intermediate/ Middle School)| • Capable of performing practiced actions independently.  
• May or may not demonstrate the ability to interrupt an attacker. |
| Independent (High School and Adult)| • Demonstrates automatic response in a variety of safety situations.  
• Demonstrates ability to independently adapt and apply safety skills and knowledge in a variety of situations.  
• May or may not demonstrate the ability to interrupt an attacker. |
| Advanced (Professionally Trained Adults or Staff Members)| • Capable of leading others and making decisions in emergencies.  
• May or may not demonstrate the ability to interrupt an attacker. |
| Professionals (Responders, Military, Security Professionals)| • Highly capable of decision-making in an emergency.  
• Trained and equipped to provide tactical response in an emergency. |

Individual levels may vary due to the unique developmental, cultural, educational, and personal profiles within a community or classroom. School communities and parents, in partnership, should consider the individual psychological backgrounds and educational needs of students when determining awareness levels as well as appropriate education and training.

- School Design: A school’s design will have a great impact on how it prepares to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover from active shooter incidents. Suburban schools often have campus-style environments with multiple buildings, while urban schools tend to consist of single multi-level buildings. Campus-style schools can be more difficult to secure, as the dispersed school buildings are exposed to attacks from multiple directions. A more compact organization of buildings or a single building provides for more streamlined surveillance and access control. The level of security in individual classrooms (e.g., strength of classroom doors and locks, presence or absence of windows with lines of sight) may influence decisions on active shooter preparedness, as can the existence or absence of layers of security to delay potential attackers. More information on school design and school hardening can be found in Chapter 16 of this Report.

- Student Background and Special Needs: Students come from a variety of family, cultural, and medical disabilities and medical history backgrounds. This presents additional considerations for school safety and security. According to the most recent data provided by the National Center for Education Statistics, approximately 4.8 million public school students identify as English language learners, and 6.7 million students received special education services in 2015. Active shooter awareness and response communications, training, and planning should take language differences and disabilities into consideration to include the entire student population. For example, Washington, D.C.-based Gallaudet University serves deaf and hard-of-hearing students and employs several different methods to communicate with students during an emergency, such as emails, emergency blue lights, orange flags, and person-to-person messaging.

- Laws and Policies: Schools may need to follow different rules than businesses when implementing security policies. Schools are not only responsible for training and keeping students safe, but also for leading students in an emergency. State and local laws as well as school policies concerning security and response vary nationwide, and schools should be aware of the regulatory responsibilities imposed upon them in their jurisdictions.
Commission Observations

Through its various engagements with school safety and security stakeholders, the Commission identified a variety of elements and approaches that experts routinely recommend schools incorporate when developing their active shooter preparedness and mitigation program. These include physically hardening the school, engaging in community planning, encouraging and facilitating the reporting of suspicious behavior, conducting training and exercises, maintaining and testing effective communications systems, and establishing threat assessment teams. Each of these key elements are summarized below.

• **School Hardening:** As numerous witnesses testified during the August 16 Commission meeting and the August 23 Commission field visit, there are several core parts of a comprehensive active shooter preparedness strategy. They include security measures that help control access to the school and its campus, physically strengthen the building, and seek to create secure spaces within classrooms where students and teachers can shelter in the case of an active shooter. These measures can deter an attacker from initiating an attack, protect individuals during an attack, and delay the attacker to allow additional time for local law enforcement to respond. Information on best practices for physically hardening school buildings can be found in Chapter 16 of this Report.

• **Community Planning:** As of the 2015–2016 school year, 92.4 percent of public schools reported having written plans to address a shooting on campus. As Paul Timm, Vice President of Facility Engineering Associates, testified to the Commission at the August 23 Commission field visit, it is beneficial for schools to establish safety planning teams that include school administrators, teachers, parents, students, and other community partners. This approach ensures a multi-disciplinary, multi-perspective methodology that reflects the community’s values, priorities, and unique needs, thereby increasing the chances of implementation success. Whole community planning should happen concurrently, and be coordinated, at the school district and individual school levels. Additional information on cultivating a “community of interest” can be found in Chapter 16 of this Report.

• **Identification and Reporting of Suspicious Behavior:** Physical protection measures only go so far when it comes to preventing an active shooter incident. Potential warning signs are not always the result of a direct threat—more often, there is observable conduct that could signal a threat. As various witnesses during the August 16 Commission meeting attested, detecting and addressing concerning behavior, thoughts, or statements can prevent active shooter situations from occurring. Information related to identifying, reporting, assessing, and acting upon suspicious activity can be found in Chapter 5 of this Report.

• **Training and Exercises:** It is widely agreed that a robust training and exercise program is essential to successfully addressing the complex active shooter threat. For example, during the August 28 Commission listening session, Alabama Governor Kay Ivey discussed how training is a major part of her Smart on Safety Initiative. Also during that session, Alabama State Representative Mac McCutcheon noted

| Figure 19-1 |

**It is beneficial for schools to establish safety planning teams** that include school administrators, teachers, parents, students, and other community partners. This approach ensures a multi-disciplinary, multi-perspective methodology that reflects the community’s values, priorities, and unique needs, thereby increasing the chances of implementation success.
the importance of having law enforcement and school officials train together to respond to emergency situations. Similarly, Kathy Martinez-Prather, Director of the Texas School Safety Center, noted how school districts in Texas are required to train school employees to respond to an emergency and conduct drills and exercises to prepare both school employees and students.24

Active shooter training for students should be age-appropriate and consist of prevention, situational awareness, and response training. School administrator and teacher training should include tabletop exercises (i.e., group exercises that do not involve hands-on practice or fieldwork, but rather are intended to generate discussion of issues surrounding a hypothetical, simulated emergency) with school safety and security teams. When possible and age-appropriate, response training for school administrators, teachers, and students should involve role-play, scenario-based training that simulates a real-life active shooter incident requiring quick decision-making. To the extent possible, all active shooter trainings, especially those related to responding to and recovering from an active shooter incident, should be trauma-informed.25 Additional details on active shooter training and exercises are found later in this section.

In addition to active shooter training, it is important for school staff and students to be trained on and follow appropriate security protocols. The best single entry access control system is of no use if a teacher or student leaves an alternative door propped open. The importance of people and training is well-stated in the Indiana School Safety Guidelines for Emergency Response Systems and echoed in the Broward County League of Cities’ School and Community Public Safety Task Force: “[n]o matter how much money or how many safety and security tools a facility can purchase, the most common failure to safety and security is human error. The term ‘People over Products’ stresses the important role of the individuals within a school in regard to safety. It is critical to ensure training opportunities are provided to employees and students, ensure awareness programs are taking place for the implemented safety and security measures, and employees and students are being empowered to be the most important line of defense.”26

- **Communication Systems and Protocols:** The ability to communicate quickly and effectively often is central to a successful response to an active shooter incident. This includes the ability of school staff or students to quickly inform law enforcement of an active shooter situation, thus initiating the law enforcement response; the ability to quickly alert staff, students, and other members of the community of an ongoing active shooter situation in order to initiate a lock down, evacuation, or other appropriate action; and the ability for law enforcement to communicate among themselves and with the school as necessary during a response.

Unfortunately, as Max Schachter, CEO and Founder of Safe Schools for Alex, noted during his testimony to the Commission, there are “communication-related problems that impede law enforcement during all tragedies, including [the Parkland school shooting].”27 These may include outdated or insufficient communications equipment (e.g., radios or phones that do not receive signals inside school buildings), lack of training on existing communications equipment or protocols, and a lack of interoperability between the communications equipment possessed by first responder organizations and the school.

In regards to notifying law enforcement of an active shooter, Sheriff Tim Troyer told the Commission that calls to 911 typically occur two to three minutes after the start of an attack. As was the case in Parkland, 911 calls are often indirect calls (e.g., made by parents of students who had called their parents rather than law enforcement).28 In order to reduce this delay in notification, Troyer recommended that schools implement mechanically simple means of notification that contact the 911 center directly.29 One school in Indiana accom-
plishes this by having teachers wear an emergency fob around their neck that they can press in the event of an active shooter incident, immediately triggering a school-wide alarm and notifying law enforcement.  

Schools should consider establishing, maintaining, testing, and training on communication technology and protocols (e.g., emergency alerts, mass notifications, intercom announcements) that can alert both staff and students, as well as parents and the broader local community, of an active shooter situation. Within schools, it is best if alerts are both audible and visual, and can be seen and heard throughout the entire school grounds.

Finally, schools should consider working with local law enforcement to test, drill, and exercise the communications equipment first responders will be using during a response to ensure its adequacy. Often, the hardened physical construction of school buildings can make radio or phone communication within the school buildings difficult. Communications equipment that does not properly function within the school will be of extremely limited value during a response. Additionally, as Max Schachter pointed out in his testimony, interoperability of communications equipment, which was a problem during the 9/11 attacks, remains a problem today. For instance, during the response to the Parkland shooting, a lack of interoperable equipment forced law enforcement to resort to hand signals. States and localities can take action to help address these concerns. For example, during the August 28 Commission listening session, Georgia State Representative Rick Jasperse noted how the Georgia legislature provided funding for schools that many are using to acquire “better communication within the school building so when law enforcement rides up, the radios work in the building.”

- Threat Assessments: Numerous witnesses stressed to the Commission the importance of schools establishing threat assessment teams. They included Dr. Jennifer Johnston, Assistant Professor of Psychology at Western New Mexico University; Donna Michaelis, Manager for the Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety; Kathy Martinez-Prather, Director of the Texas School Safety Center; and Dr. Kathy Murphy, Superintendent of Hoover (AL) City Schools. Threat assessment teams are most effective if they are multi-disciplinary and include a diverse group of stakeholders, such as school counselors, school resource officers, teachers, and school administrators. Parents and students are not typically part of the threat assessment team, as personal and confidential information about a student is often discussed. Threat assessment teams are addressed in greater detail in Chapter 5 of the Report.

Many state and local school districts, as well as their local communities, have implemented robust and innovative mitigation strategies, tactics, policies, and procedures to combat the active shooter threat. One example that demonstrates some of the key elements listed above through a layered approach to safety and security is the Spokane (WA) Public School District.

Immediately following the December 2012 Sandy Hook tragedy, the Spokane Public School District commissioned a safety audit of every district school. Areas reviewed included access control, training, physical building security, security team staffing, and community suggestions. Spokane Public Schools have engineered a school safety program that combines important physical safeguards and crucial human elements to deter school violence. The district instituted a single-point-of-entry policy at each school—meaning the school locks every door once school begins and visitors must check in at a single entrance. Visitors enter only after having been cleared via video camera and intercom by office staff or a resource officer. They receive a badge, and the school scans their drivers’ licenses and checks them against a registered sex offender database and a database for anyone with trespass or domestic violence issues.

Spokane Public Schools launched a “See Something, Say Something®” initiative that encourages students to report anything that may indicate a student is struggling and may need help or is posing a danger to himself or herself or to others. The initiative recommends students talk to an adult or report their concerns via text, email, or voicemail. The school district also has a threat assessment team that evaluates the reported information against possible threat indicators. It includes a school psychologist, special education personnel, teachers, principals, vice principals, and resource officers. Under state law, Spokane schools also are required to conduct multiple safety drills each year.
Numerous guides, trainings materials, and other resources have been developed by various federal entities, states, and nonprofit organizations to help schools develop comprehensive active shooter preparedness plans or aspects thereof. A number of these resources are listed in Appendix A.

**Active shooter preparedness training, exercises, and workshops**

As San Bernardino Chief of Police Jarrod Burguan told the Commission when discussing his experiences with two active shooter incidents in his community, “training works. And not just first responders, but it works for everybody involved.” Training for active school shooter scenarios should be designed with the audience receiving the training in mind, whether they are students, teachers and school administrators, or law enforcement officers.

**Active Shooter Training for Students:** While there is some disagreement over whether it is appropriate to subject students to active shooter training, as school shootings become more prevalent, more schools are opting to drill their students on how to respond to an active shooter situation. According to a 2016 U.S. Government Accountability Office report, an estimated 67 percent of school districts conduct active shooter drills involving their students. Whether or not to conduct active shooter drills with the student population is something each community must determine for itself. For those that do elect to conduct active shooter drills with students, they should ensure that the training is age-appropriate and designed in a manner not to unduly traumatize any of the participants.

**Active Shooter Training for School Staff:** All schools should consider providing active shooter training to teachers and other on-site personnel. In his testimony to the Commission, Chief Burguan noted that during the April 2017 shooting at North Park Elementary School, previous training helped enable school staff to successfully evacuate and keep track of more than 500 students. The most effective way to train staff to respond to an active shooter situation is to conduct mock active shooter training exercises. Local law enforcement is an excellent resource in designing training exercises. Training should include discussions on recognizing the sound of gunshots, the “Run, Hide, Fight” or similar approach used in the school, calling 911, reacting when law enforcement arrives, and adopting a survival mindset during times of crisis.

Some school districts have developed videos to supplement training for school staff. For instance, the Santa Ana (CA) Unified School District created a video for teachers and administrators, “Active Shooter Response Protocols: Run, Hide Fight,” that demonstrates ways to fight back or distract a shooter. Videos such as this can also reinforce other school safety practices. One of the Santa Ana video’s many messages is for teachers and administrators to say something if they notice a student or colleague acting irregularly.


**Active Shooter Training for Law Enforcement Officers:** Both the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Justice manage numerous programs to help train federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement officers for active shooter situations. Examples include:

- Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) Active Threat and Tactical Medical Training. More than 60 federal agencies send their new law enforcement recruits to one of FLETC’s basic training programs, each of which includes instruction in active threat response. FLETC also delivers five advanced
programs in active threat response and tactical medical training. A significant portion of program participants are state, local, and tribal law enforcement officers from across the United States, including sworn officers serving universities and local school districts.

FLETC also offers versions of its active threat and tactical medical training programs that help officers return to their home districts with the knowledge, skills, and instructional materials to redeliver the training to others in their departments and geographic areas. Thus, when one officer completes this training, dozens of others can benefit, creating a force multiplying effect. Graduates of the Active Shooter Threat Instructor Training Program and Basic Tactical Medical Instructor Training Program gain access to FLETC’s instructional materials, which state accrediting agencies have often already evaluated and approved. This enables the officers to quickly redeliver the training without having to create their own materials. Moreover, because agencies across the nation end up using identical training materials, training is more consistent, which fosters a better coordinated and integrated response to active threat events among agencies that must work together in these instances.43

- **FEMA Emergency Planning for Schools.** Many of the school preparedness and emergency management training programs offered by FEMA are geared toward campus and local law enforcement officers. As noted above, most of these multi-hazard courses contain lessons relevant to preparing for and responding to both natural and human-caused events, including active shooter situations. Courses that are of particular use to law enforcement include “Multi-Hazard Emergency Planning for Schools,” “Crisis Management for School-Based Incidents—Partnering Rural Law Enforcement, First Responders, and Local School Systems,” and “Campus Emergencies Prevention, Response, and Recovery.”44

- **The Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Preparing for Active Shooter Situations (PASS) Training Program.** This program supports active shooter training to improve the safety and resiliency of law enforcement officers, other first responders, and communities. It seeks to enhance the ability of law enforcement not only to secure the scene, but also to increase the survivability of the event and protect officers, critical assets, and first responders from the long-term effects of exposure to trauma. In addition to online training, more than 15,000 participants will be trained in-person with existing funding, and FY 2018 funding will support the delivery of 438 classes across the country that will train more than 16,000 first responders. PASS is adding to its portfolio more classes in advanced medical skills, solo officer rapid deployment, civilian casualty care, and exterior response to active shooter events.45

- **The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Active Shooter: Managing the Mass Casualty Threat DVD.** This 35-minute documentary provides an in-depth look at three unique active shooter events: the Century Aurora 16 Cinemark theatre shooting in Aurora, CO; the Washington Navy Yard shooting in Washington, D.C.; and the Los Angeles International Airport shooting in Los Angeles, CA. Each story is told by the emergency professionals and private sector partners who were there. They offer a frank and introspective look at what worked and what could have been done better to manage these chaotic incidents.46

- **Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Crisis Communications Quick Reference Guide.** This brochure is tailored to chiefs, sheriffs, command staff, and public information officers who handle crisis communications in response to an active shooter, mass casualty, or other law enforcement incidents. It provides checklists for the pre-event, the onset of the incident, and updating the media (pre-press conference and second and subsequent press conferences). Also included are 10 tips to improve communications.47

- **Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Initial On Scene Command Considerations.** This two-inch by three-inch card delineates vital issues to be considered during the initial minutes and hours of an active shooter, mass casualty, or other law enforcement incident. Topics include priority staging areas, top-tier priority concerns, and secondary-tier priority concerns.48
Tactical Emergency Casualty Care/Mass Casualty Response Training: In active shooter situations, providing rapid medical care to the injured is critical. If students and personnel are seriously injured and do not receive aid in a timely manner, they may die before first responders are even able to enter the building. However, if the students and staff around them can provide appropriate first aid, they may buy the injured time. The Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC) framework outlines how best to do this.

TECC is evidence-based, best practice–driven medical guidance for providers at all levels, including lay persons. It seeks to improve survival from traumatic injuries sustained during intentional mass casualty events. Grounded in the military’s lessons learned in combat, TECC translates best practices in battlefield trauma care into appropriate practices for civilian emergency medicine. TECC includes guidance for First Care Providers (i.e., lay persons who are uninjured and able to help during and immediately after an act of intentional violence). First Care Providers can include students, staff, educators, coaches, volunteers, and administrators. Empowering these individuals to act as caregivers not only saves lives, it can also decrease their sense of helplessness and encourage resilience. Some of the actions taught through TECC include hemorrhage control with direct pressure, tourniquets, and pressure bandages; simple airway management (positioning someone to breathe best); simple management of torso injuries; hypothermia prevention; efficient movement of an injured person; and psychological support/comfort to the wounded and other survivors.

There are three components to a successful First Care Provider program: policy, training, and equipment.

- **Policy**: Any school policies on intentional violence should ensure that both students and staff are empowered to act rapidly during a hostile event, not only to protect themselves but also to provide care to the injured. For adults (educators, staff, administration, custodial staff, volunteers, coaching staff, etc.), policies must provide a clear outline of what is expected of them, what is encouraged of them, and what the scope of their duty to act is in these events, including any limitations.

- **Training**: Consistent, realistic training is necessary for anyone expected to be a First Care Provider. Training should occur frequently enough that all First Care Providers receive the training within a school year. Training should include drills that account for real incident issues like sensory overload, large volumes of blood, and decision-making under stress. A good training curriculum provides not only instruction on medical interventions but also reviews actual equipment available in the facility and discusses specific school system policies. For this to be successful, it is imperative that school systems partner with their local first-arriving law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical services agencies.

- **Equipment**: While medical supplies and equipment (e.g., tourniquets, pressure dressings, hemostatic agents) may be cost prohibitive to some school systems, they are still strongly recommended. When purchasing supplies and equipment, schools should work with their jurisdiction’s public safety medical director(s) to ensure they purchase supplies that are appropriate for the student population. The physical size differences between pre-K and secondary students means that different supplies and equipment may be appropriate for different schools. Guidance from a public safety medical director will prevent the purchase of equipment appropriate for military or law enforcement use that does not work on children.

A number of resources are available to help school districts or individual schools design TECC training programs. They include Tactical Emergency Casualty Care Guidelines for First Care Providers, You Are the Help Until Help Arrives, Introduction to Tactical Emergency Casualty Care, and Stop the Bleed. In August 2018, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) announced a grant opportunity to support the
development of mass casualty event trauma training
for high school students.51

Exercises and workshops
Exercises and workshops help evaluate the success
of training, maintain optimal levels of performance,
and test and evaluate plans. A well-designed exercise
provides a low-risk environment to test capabilities,
familiarize personnel with roles and responsibilities,
and foster meaningful interaction and communication
across organizations. Workshops are a type of discus-
sion-based exercise focused on increased participant
interaction and focusing on achieving or building
a product, such as a report or best practices docu-
mation. Both formats can enhance the security of
schools and safety of students across the nation by
empowering states and school districts to put their
emergency plans in action and identifying areas for
improvement.

One of the most commonly used approaches to eval-
uate active shooter preparedness is through table-
top exercises (TTXs). TTXs are table-based activities
typically held in an informal setting and presented by
a facilitator. They do not involve hands-on practice or
fieldwork, but rather are intended to generate discus-
sion of various issues regarding a hypothetical, simu-
lated emergency. TTXs can be used to enhance general
awareness, validate plans and procedures, rehearse
concepts, and/or assess the types of systems needed
to guide the prevention of, protection from, mitigation
of, response to, and recovery from a defined incident.
Delivered in a low-stress environment, the TTX offers
participants the opportunity to explore different ideas
in the context of a real-world scenario.

When designing TTXs, other exercises, or workshops
to evaluate active shooter preparedness, designers
should consider following the Homeland Security
Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) approach.
HSEEP provides a set of guiding principles for exercise
programs, as well as a common approach to exercise
program management, design and development,
contact, evaluation, and improvement planning.
Principles include using capability-based and objec-
tive-driven exercises informed by risk, engaging the
whole community, and designing a progressive pro-
gram with an increasing level of complexity over time.
These can help a school or school district develop an
effective exercise program. HSEEP also calls for the
documentation of strengths, areas for improvement,
core capability performance, and corrective actions in
an After-Action Report or Improvement Plan. Through
improvement planning, organizations take the cor-
rective actions needed to improve plans, build and
sustain capabilities, and maintain readiness.54

DHS offers a variety of exercises and workshops to
assist schools, local law enforcement, and others
prepare for active shooter situations. They include the
following.

Active Shooter: What You Can Do: Developed by DHS,
this independent study course seeks to guide the
public on how to prepare for and respond to active
shooter crisis situations. Upon completion of Active
Shooter: What You Can Do, employees and managers
will be able to:

• Describe the actions to take when confronted with
  an active shooter and to assist responding law
  enforcement officers;
• Recognize potential school or workplace violence
  indicators;
• Describe actions to take to prevent and prepare for
  potential active shooter incidents; and
• Describe how to manage the consequences of an
  active shooter incident.

The online training is available through the FEMA
Emergency Management Institute.55 Additional train-
ing for law enforcement is available through the Loui-
siana State University's National Center for Biomedical
Research and Training's website.56

Campus Resilience Program Tabletop Exercises:
In support of state and local efforts to build greater
resilience capacity through exercises, the DHS Office of
Academic Engagement’s Campus Resilience Program,
in partnership with the FEMA National Exercise Divi-
sion, conducts a TTX series specifically for academia.
The academia-focused TTX series is primarily focused
on institutes of higher education. It consists of four
offerings:
• the National Seminar and Tabletop Exercise—an annual two-day event that includes workshop sessions, resources, a full-scale TTX, and after-action review session;

• Regional Tabletop Exercises—one-day events hosted multiple times a year designed to address a regionally specific threat;

• the Leadership Tabletop Exercise—a half-day event hosted biannually for institution leadership designed to highlight its role in emergency management; and

• the suite of Exercise Starter Kits—instructions and a set of scalable tools for institutions to develop and run their own tailored TTX to match their most pressing needs while validating specific emergency plans, protocols, and procedures.57

DHS Active Shooter Preparedness Workshop: These scenario-based workshops feature facilitated discussions to engage private sector professionals and law enforcement representatives from federal, state, and local agencies to learn how to prepare for, and respond to, an active shooter situation. Through the course of the exercises, participants evaluate current response concepts, plans, and capabilities for coordinated responses to active shooter incidents. The modules are structured following national preparedness guidance, using the national preparedness mission areas to organize the active shooter topics and the FEMA Comprehensive Preparedness guidance to cover the planning steps.58

Tabletop exercises (TTXs) can be used to enhance general awareness, validate plans and procedures, rehearse concepts, and/or assess the types of systems needed to guide the prevention of, protection from, mitigation of, response to, and recovery from a defined incident.
Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

**FEDERAL GOVERNMENT**

1. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in coordination with other federal agencies, should develop active shooter preparedness training guidelines for educators and administrators, including recommended minimum standards for teacher certification requirements.

2. In order to assist schools in deciding the optimal approach to preparing students for active shooter situations, federal agencies should work with school security stakeholders to identify and develop recommended, age-specific best practices or options for consideration for active shooter training and exercises for students spanning the K–12 spectrum.

3. DHS should develop options for expanding its offerings of TECC training, including train-the-trainer opportunities. Additionally, the federal government should review how grants are allocated to determine if there is a way to better support schools seeking to procure and preposition medical equipment needed to respond to a mass casualty event.

**STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES**

1. States should consider requiring or providing funding for all school districts and individual schools to develop and (on no less than an annual basis) provide training and exercises on comprehensive active shooter preparedness programs.

2. Teacher preparedness is critical to school security, especially in cases of an active shooter. As every state requires teachers to meet certain requirements for certification to teach in their state, it is recommended that states and school districts consider requiring basic school security and/or active shooter preparedness training as part of their state’s teacher certification requirements.

3. All schools should conduct active shooter training and exercises for staff on a recurring basis as well as age-appropriate active shooter training for students. Exercises might include evaluations that assess the participant’s ability to meet exercise objectives and capabilities, and document strengths, areas for improvement, core capability performance, and corrective actions in an After-Action Report or Improvement Plan. Following the exercise, organizations should develop a plan to implement the corrective actions identified during the exercise to improve plans, build and sustain capabilities, and maintain readiness.

4. Providing TECC training to school staff and maintaining appropriate, rapidly accessible medical equipment within schools is a proactive means of reducing loss of life in active shooter scenarios and other potential mass casualty incidents. School systems should provide TECC training to school staff or provide funding for school staff to complete TECC training. Schools should review existing medical equipment within the school and, to the extent possible under existing school budget conditions, maintain appropriate medical equipment consistent with the TECC training.

5. Effective communication systems and rapid dissemination of information can save lives during an incident or event. Schools should establish and maintain effective communications systems (e.g., one-way intercoms or two-way radios) to rapidly provide alerts, warnings, or other key information during an incident. Schools should test their communications equipment and methods during training and exercises. States and localities should also undertake efforts to ensure interoperability of local law enforcement and school communications equipment.
Chapter 19 Endnotes


3 Ibid.


5 The report of Governor Bill Owens’ Columbine Review Commission. (May 2001) at p. x

6 Departments of Education, Justice, and Health and Human Services. (June 13, 2007). Report to the President on issues raised by the Virginia Tech tragedy, at p. 17.

7 Final report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission. (March 6, 2015). At p. 76.

8 Now is the time: The President’s plan to protect our children and our communities by reducing gun violence. (January 16, 2013) at p. 8.

9 Ibid.


13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.


20 See, e.g., testimony of Jay Brotman to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out; testimony of Max Schachter to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out; testimony of Sheriff Tim Troyer to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 23, 2018); Best practices for school building safety; testimony of Paul Timm to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out; testimony of Russell Davidson to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 23, 2018), Best practices for school building safety.


22 Testimony of Paul Timm to the Federal Commission on School Safety Field Visit (August 23, 2018), Best practices for school building safety.

23 See, e.g., testimony of Officer Chris Fraelly to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out; testimony of Donna Michaels to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out; testimony of Susan Payne to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out.


25 For information on “trauma-informed” training, see https://www.samhsa.gov/ocdt/trauma-interventions.


27 Testimony of Max Schachter to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out.

28 Testimony of Sheriff Tim Troyer to the Federal Commission on School Safety Field Visit (August 23, 2018), Best practices for school building safety.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Broward County League of Cities’ School and Community Public Safety Task Force. (June 4, 2018) Initial report and recommendations, at p. 73.

32 Testimony of Max Schachter to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out.

33 Ibid.

34 Testimony of Representative Rick Jasperse to the Federal Commission on School Safety Roundtable, Montgomery, AL. (August 28, 2018).

35 Testimony of Dr. Jennifer Johnston to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (June 21, 2018), The ecology of schools: Fostering a culture of human flourishing and developing character; testimony of Donna Michaels to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out; testimony of Kathy Martinez-Prather to the Federal Commission on School Safety Listening Session (August 28, 2018); and testimony of Dr. Kathy Murphy to the Federal Commission on School Safety Listening Session (August 28, 2018).


37 Testimony of Chief Jarrod Burguan to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out.


40 Testimony of Chief Jarrod Burguan to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out.


42 Information on these and other FEMA and REMS courses can be found at https://training.fema.gov/emi.aspx and https://rems.ed.gov/trainings/CoursesHome.aspx, respectively.

43 Information on these and other FLETC courses can be found at https://www.fletc.gov/training-catalog.

44 Information on these and other FEMA courses can be found at https://training.fema.gov/emi.aspx.

45 Additional information on PASS and other COPS training programs can be found at https://cops.usdoj.gov/training.

46 Copies of this DVD are available to law enforcement and emergency management professionals by contacting the nearest FBI Field Office or calling 202-324-3000.


48 Copies of the card are available to law enforcement and emergency management professionals by contacting the nearest FBI Field Office or calling 202-324-3000.


50 https://ready.gov/unti1helprparri1es.


52 https://www.dhs.gov/stoph1ebleed.


54 For more information on HSEEP, visit https://preptoolkit.fema.gov/web/hseepr-re1ources.


56 http://www.ncb1t.lsu.edu/Course/PER-275.

57 Additional information on the DHS Campus Resilience Program TTXs is available at https://www.dhs.gov/acade mic1esilience.

58 Additional information on the DHS Active Shooter Workshop Program is available at https://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-workshop-participant.
President Donald J. Trump announced the establishment of the Federal Commission on School Safety on March 12, 2018 in the aftermath of the shooting in Parkland, FL. The shooting outraged the nation. It reignited discussions about ways to prevent such tragedies, what we can do to better protect our students, and how to respond to and recover from these acts of violence.

This Commission has led and engaged in many of those discussions and has learned much from them. While Washington has an important role to play, it can play that role more successfully by acknowledging a truth understood by people across the country: What works in Wyoming may not work in New York, and what is effective in an urban setting may not be effective in rural communities. One size does not fit all. Real improvement requires:

a) the efforts and engagement of Americans and communities nationwide who have vitally important insights and experiences to share;

b) recognition that best practices, lessons learned, and recommended approaches must be evaluated in light of, and adapted to, the particular needs and circumstances of each school and community; and

c) the coordination of multiple efforts by schools, school districts, and communities as well as by policymakers at the local, state, and federal levels.

A Multifaceted Longstanding Problem

Engaging a wide range of Americans is essential given the complex and multifaceted nature of school violence. The Commission heard from individuals with diverse perspectives and expertise at Commission meetings, field visits, and listening sessions. Participants included students and their families, state and local policymakers, principals and teachers, and law enforcement and healthcare professionals. Each provided a unique perspective that adds to our understanding of the multiple issues involved and the role each of us must play.

The problem of school violence is complex and it has existed for decades. The Commission has drawn upon the work of previous commissions and reports on school violence at the federal, state, and local levels.

Preventing School Violence

Many individuals have a role to play in prevention efforts—parents, teachers, the media, health care professionals, entertainment industry leaders, and law enforcement. Such efforts are wide ranging. They include creating a positive school climate, combatting cyberbullying, ensuring rating systems allow parents to fully assess the appropriateness of entertainment their children are consuming, and establishing “No Notoriety” practices in the wake of shootings.

Local approaches and priorities are most important. Because teachers, in partnership with principals and other school leaders, know their schools, students, and classrooms best, they should be able to make decisions about school discipline without unnecessary worry about undue federal repercussions.

Similarly, school-based counselors and other healthcare providers are best positioned to identify mental health needs and develop a course of action.

A proper understanding of how school shooters get their hands on firearms (i.e., in most cases from family and friends) must inform state legislative efforts. Individuals deemed, through appropriate processes, to pose a threat to themselves or others can be denied the ability to possess or purchase firearms through “extreme risk protection orders.” They can also be reported through the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s tip line.

Protecting and Mitigating

Training personnel, hardening schools, and engaging the community are all important tools to protect against school violence and to mitigate its effects. Training applies to teachers, school staff, school resource officers (SROs), and state, local, and tribal law enforcement. Increasing numbers of these person-
nel could come from the ranks of the country’s military veterans and retired law enforcement officers, both for security and teaching roles.

All schools will benefit from higher levels of engagement with the communities in which they are located. Greater sharing of information and reporting of suspicious behavior is essential. However, it must be done in a manner that abides by statutory privacy protections.

Responding and Recovering

The unique characteristics of each school (such as campus layout, building design, and age of students) present complex challenges to active shooter planning. Approaches to improve emergency response must be specific to each school.

There is no doubt planning and training helps prepare police officers and first responders to deal with active shooters. However, because active shooter incidents are often over before law enforcement arrives on the scene, onsite personnel must be prepared to deal with an active shooter attack in the absence of trained crisis response officers.

An Ongoing Challenge

The Parkland, FL, shooting was not the first such tragedy in this country and is not likely to be the last without changes at the federal, state, and local levels. The job of this Commission has been to identify best practices and lessons learned that will help schools better prepare for the future.

Each section of the Report concludes with meaningful and actionable recommendations—for the federal government, states, tribes, and local authorities, and for school districts and schools. However, they are just that—recommendations to be considered and adopted as appropriate to each jurisdiction. School staff and local officials are best placed to determine which recommendations to implement in their communities.

From start to finish, this Commission has recognized that the people who best understand the needs of their schools and communities are the families whose children attend those schools and live in those communities. Our job has been to listen to them—as well as to subject matter experts, practitioners, and professionals—and then to share their experiences and knowledge about what has succeeded and what has not.

Going Forward

The important job of finding ways to protect our students and our schools goes on. Americans will continue to seek answers and solutions to the problem of school violence, and those in the federal government will continue to work with state and local governments to protect our students.

This Commission extends its deep gratitude to everyone who has contributed to this work and to those who will continue to engage in this area. The four departments will continue to disseminate federal resources on school safety and provide periodic updates.

Only by working together at all levels and in communities nationwide, can we truly make a difference. For the sake of America’s schools and America’s students, may that work continue.
Appendix A: Federal Resources for School Safety

The Commissioners identified select resources published by their agencies that highlight best practices that may be of immediate use to stakeholders at the state and local levels. Federal agencies may have additional resources that could be leveraged to support school safety efforts, and interested parties can contact relevant program offices to inquire further about such options.

Prevent

- The guide addresses both prevention and intervention from a systemic view, clarifying the role of the school, the community, families, law enforcement, and the justice system and how these groups can work together effectively to prevent and respond to school violence. (http://www.theiACP.org/portals/0/pdfs/schoolviolence2.pdf)

- This toolkit provides resources for law enforcement agencies to partner with mental health providers to effectively respond to calls for service, improve outcomes for people with mental illness, and advance the safety of all. (https://pmhtoolkit.bja.gov)

States’ Roles in Keeping Schools Safe: Opportunities and Challenges for State School Safety Centers and Other Actors, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.
- This report documents the conclusions of a 2016 stakeholder meeting that assembled representatives from 20 states to discuss state school safety issues. (https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/niij/250608.pdf)


- This document puts forward the main points of a research forum on preventing school violence, co-sponsored by a variety of OJP offices. (https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/niij/180972.pdf)

School-Based Bullying Prevention, Model Programs Guide, Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.
- This is a school-based bullying prevention research literature review (https://www.ojjdp.gov/MPG/litreviews/Bullying.pdf) and program implementation guide (https://www.ojjdp.gov/MPG-IGuides/topics/bullying/index.html).

School Violence Prevention Program (SVPP), Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice.
- This program makes competitive awards to states, county and local districts to support coordination with law enforcement on training to prevent student violence; fund deterrent hardware; and implement technology for expedited emergency notification. (https://cops.usdoj.gov/svpp)

Addressing the Risk of Violent Behavior in Youth, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
- This PowerPoint presentation will help teachers and school personnel identify behaviors and other signs that could result in youth violence. The material is intended as a general guide regarding what is known about risk and protective factors and the warning signs that are associated with a risk of violent behavior. The purpose is to inform and help classroom teachers, counselors, and other staff understand the basic facts about youth violence. This useful tool also addresses the protective factors that reduce the risk of violent behavior. (https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/addressing-risk-violent-behavior-youth-know-signs-youth-violence-and-how-identify-and-reduce-risk)
SAMHSA grants, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- Below are some examples of the school and/or child/adolescent/youth focused grants that were announced in fiscal year 2018.
  - Project AWARE (Advancing Wellness and Resiliency in Education)
  - Mental Health Awareness Training (MHAT) Grants
  - Garrett Lee Smith Campus Suicide Prevention Grants
  - Healthy Transitions: Improving Life Trajectories for Youth and Young Adults with Serious Mental Disorders Program
  - Community Programs for Outreach and Intervention with Youth and Young Adults at Clinical High Risk for Psychosis
  - Infant and Early Childhood Mental Health Grant Program
  - Drug-Free Communities (DFC) Support Program

School Climate

Student Support and Academic Enrichment, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, U.S. Department of Education.

- Title IV, Part A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act is the Student Support and Academic Enrichment (SSAE) program. The SSAE program is intended to improve students' academic achievement by increasing the capacity of states, school districts, and local communities to provide all students with access to a well-rounded education; improve school conditions for student learning; and improve the use of technology to enhance academic achievement and digital literacy of all students. (https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/ESSA-TitleIVPartA-SSAE)

- More information about how states subgrant these funds to districts is included in the “Non-Regulatory Guidance Student Support and Academic Enrichment Grants.” (https://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/essa/essassaegrantguid10212016.pdf)


- This resource package contains a set of guides and reference manuals to improve school climate. Resources include information about planning for improvements, collecting and analyzing data, identifying and implementing interventions, and monitoring and evaluating such efforts. Guides contain action steps for district and school administrators, teachers and school staff, students, and community partners. (https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/scirp/about)

School Climate Transformation Grants, U.S. Department of Education.

- The U.S. Department of Education provides funding to school districts and states to support schools implementing an evidence-based multi-tiered behavioral framework (such as positive behavior and intervention supports) for improving behavioral outcomes and learning conditions for all students. (https://www2.ed.gov/programs/schoolclimatelea/index.html)

School Climate Surveys, U.S. Department of Education.

- The U.S. Department of Education developed the high-quality, customizable ED School Climate Surveys (EDSCLS) and associated web-based platform. The EDSCLS allows states, local districts, and schools to collect and act on reliable, nationally-validated school climate data in real-time. (https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/edscls)


- The Technical Assistance Center on PBIS helps schools, districts, and states build systems capacity for implementing a multi-tiered approach to social, emotional and behavioral support that can improve school climate, safety, and academic outcomes for all students, including students with disabilities and students from underrepresented groups. (https://www.pbis.org/)
**Center to Improve Social and Emotional Learning and School Safety**, U.S. Department of Education.

**National Center on Safe and Supportive Learning Environments**, U.S. Department of Education.
- The National Center on Safe Supportive Learning Environments offers information and technical assistance to states, districts, schools, institutions of higher learning, and communities focused on improving student supports and academic enrichment. The center also supports state and local efforts to implement the Title IV-A SSAE program previously described, which can help with the following: 1) provide all students with access to a well-rounded education, 2) improve school conditions for student learning, including school climate and safety, and 3) enhance the use of technology so all students have the opportunity to realize academic success and digital literacy in safe and supportive learning environments. ([https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/](https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/)).

**Project Prevent**, U.S. Department of Education.
- This program provides funding to school districts to increase their capacity to identify, assess, and serve students exposed to pervasive violence, helping to ensure that affected students are offered mental health services for trauma or anxiety; support conflict resolution programs; and implement other school-based violence prevention strategies. ([https://www2.ed.gov/programs/projectprevent/index.html](https://www2.ed.gov/programs/projectprevent/index.html)).

- School connectedness—the belief held by students that adults and peers in the school care about their learning as well as about them as individuals—is an important protective factor. This webpage contains fact sheets and training materials on strategies for increasing school connectedness for school administrators, teachers, and families. ([https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/protective/school_connectedness.htm](https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/protective/school_connectedness.htm)).

- Parent engagement in schools is defined as parents and school staff working together to support and improve the learning, development, and health of children and adolescents. Parent engagement in schools is a shared responsibility in which schools and other community agencies and organizations are committed to reaching out to engage parents in meaningful ways, and parents are committed to actively supporting their children’s and adolescents’ learning and development. Engaging parents in their children’s school life is a promising protective factor. This webpage includes strategies and fact sheets for increasing parent engagement in schools. ([https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/protective/parent_engagement.htm](https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/protective/parent_engagement.htm)).

**Creating and Sustaining a Positive and Communal School Climate: Contemporary Research, Present Obstacles, and Future Directions**, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.
- This report puts forward four recommendations for creating and sustaining a positive and communal school environment. ([https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250209.pdf](https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250209.pdf)).

- The purpose of this project was to develop a standard model for the assessment of school climate and safety guided by authoritative school climate theory. ([https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/grants/251102.pdf](https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/grants/251102.pdf)).

**Bullying and Cyberbullying**

- The Prevention for Schools and School Districts Fact Sheet describes “prevention” and the role it plays in school preparedness including examples of prevention activities, steps for integrating prevention into emergency planning, and key resources for schools and school districts. ([https://rems.ed.gov/Docs/Prevention_Fact_Sheet_508C.pdf](https://rems.ed.gov/Docs/Prevention_Fact_Sheet_508C.pdf)).
The Cyber Safety Considerations for K–12 Schools and School Districts Fact Sheet includes information on the most common online threats facing students, including cyberbullying. The fact sheet describes how school and school district administrators can prepare and respond to online threats. (https://rems.ed.gov/docs/Cyber_Safety_K-12_Fact_Sheet_508C.PDF)


- This brief focuses on the phenomena of electronic aggression, which is any kind of aggression perpetrated through technology—any type of harassment or bullying (teasing, telling lies, making fun of someone, making rude or mean comments, spreading rumors, or making threatening or aggressive comments) that occurs through email, a chat room, instant messaging, a website (including blogs), or text messaging. (https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/ea-brief-a.pdf)

KnowBullying app, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This SAMHSA-developed app helps parents and educators start conversations with children; provides tips and strategies for children, youth, and teens; and teaches the warning signs of bullying or being bullied. (https://store.samhsa.gov/apps/knowbullying/)

Prevent Bullying, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This website provides general information on bullying, such as definitions of bullying and tools to prevent bullying in schools. (http://www.cdc.gov/features/prevent-bullying/)


- This website contains resources for youth, parents, schools, and others to better understand bullying and cyberbullying, including the warning signs, those particularly at risk, and prevention tips. (https://www.stopbullying.gov/)


Bullying Prevention for Parents, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This podcast discusses the crucial role parents play in bullying prevention. (https://tools.cdc.gov/medialibrary/index.aspx#/media/id/304116)


- This website provides resources that inform users of the warning signs of bullying, prevention and risk factors, and how to help children deal with bullying. (https://medlineplus.gov/bullying.html)


- This YouTube video reviews ways to help parents, caregivers, and educators better understand the issue of cyberbullying and the mental health needs of both the young person being bullied, and the young person initiating the bullying. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lUjxqh0ZC0I&t=3s)

Mental Health


- This site provides general information for educators regarding warning signs for mental health issues, how to respond to mental health issues in schools, and how to access crisis support and other mental health services. (https://www.mentalhealth.gov/talk/educators)


- This YouTube video addresses the topic of identifying and managing behavioral health concerns in elementary school classrooms. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_uMHyE5cR4)
Addressing Mental Health Concerns in College, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This YouTube video addresses the topic of mental and substance use disorders among college students. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PfIFLG5yV38)

Supporting Young Adults with Mental Health Difficulties in Post-Secondary Education, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This YouTube video focuses on supporting young people with mental health difficulties—including co-occurring substance abuse—who are engaged in post-secondary education. Presenters provide an overview of trends in college attendance of young adults with mental health difficulties and the challenges of living away from home while working toward recovery. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3&amp;v=zMm54PU1eNl)

Finding Help, Finding Hope: What to Do If You Think Your Child May Have a Mental Health Problem, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This YouTube video focuses on how parents and caregivers can actively engage in their child’s behavioral health care, as well as identify available resources that can help the entire family thrive. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PRlxmmdsH8Y&feature=youtu.be)

Mental Health Awareness Training Grants, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- These grants train individuals to recognize the signs and symptoms of mental disorders, particularly serious mental illness; establish links with school-and/or community-based mental-health agencies for referrals; train emergency services personnel and others to identify people with a mental disorder; employ crisis de-escalation techniques; and educate individuals about resources available in the community for individuals with a mental disorder. (https://www.samhsa.gov/grants/grant-announcements/sm-18-009)

School-based health centers, Health Resources and Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- These centers are the center of health in the schools in which they are based. Services include primary medical care, mental/behavioral health care, dental/oral health care, health education, substance abuse counseling, case management, and nutrition information. Approximately 20 percent of these centers receive funding through the Health Resources and Services Administration’s Health Center Program. (https://www.hrsa.gov/our-stories/school-health-centers/index.html)

Project LAUNCH Grant Program (birth–eight years), Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- The purpose of Project LAUNCH (Linking Actions for Unmet Needs in Children's Health) is to promote the wellness of young children by addressing the physical, social, emotional, cognitive, and behavioral aspects of their development (https://healthysafechildren.org/grantee/project-launch)

Infant and Early Childhood Mental Health Grant Program (birth–12 years), Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This program addresses children who are at risk for, show early signs of, or have been diagnosed with a mental illness including a serious emotional disturbance. The purpose of this program is to improve outcomes for these children by developing, maintaining, or enhancing infant and early childhood mental health promotion, intervention, and treatment services. (https://www.samhsa.gov/grants/grant-announcements/sm-18-018)

The Center of Excellence for Infant and Early Childhood Mental Health Consultation (IECMHC), Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- The Center of Excellence for IECMHC helps communities support the success of the next generation by increasing access to evidence-based IECMHC—an approach that pairs mental health professionals with people who work with young children and their families. (https://www.samhsa.gov/iecmhc)

System of Care (SOC) Expansion and Sustainability Cooperative Agreements (birth–21 years), Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- The SOC grants provide services to improve behavioral health outcomes for children and youth with serious emotional disturbances and their families. This program creates sustainable infrastructure and services that are required as part of the Children’s Mental Health Initiative. (https://www.samhsa.gov/grants/grant-announcements/sm-16-009)
Project Advancing Wellness and Resilience Education (AWARE) Grant Program, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
• This program promotes youth mental health awareness among schools and communities and improves connections to services for school-aged youth. ([https://www.samhsa.gov/nitt-ta/project-aware-grant-information](https://www.samhsa.gov/nitt-ta/project-aware-grant-information))

Safe Schools/Healthy Students (SS/HS) Grant Program, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
• This program is a collaborative effort and comprehensive model to promote mental health among students and create safe and secure schools. ([https://www.samhsa.gov/safe-schools-healthy-students](https://www.samhsa.gov/safe-schools-healthy-students))

Healthy Transitions Grant Program, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
• The Now Is the Time Healthy Transitions grant program improves access to treatment and support services for 16- to 25-year-olds who have, or are at risk of developing, a serious mental health condition. ([https://www.samhsa.gov/nitt-ta/healthy-transitions-grant-information](https://www.samhsa.gov/nitt-ta/healthy-transitions-grant-information))

Clinical High Risk for Psychosis Grant Program, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
• The purpose of this program is to identify youth and young adults, not more than 25 years old, at clinical high-risk for psychosis and provide evidence-based interventions to prevent the onset of psychosis or lessen the severity of psychotic disorder. ([https://www.samhsa.gov/grants/grant-announcements/sm-18-012](https://www.samhsa.gov/grants/grant-announcements/sm-18-012))

The Role of Adverse Childhood Experiences in Substance Abuse and Related Behavioral Health Problems, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
• This overview of the Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) Study includes findings on the role of ACEs in substance use and related behavioral health problems. ([https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/aces-substance-abuse-behavioral-health](https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/aces-substance-abuse-behavioral-health))

A Critical Look at Intergenerational Trauma and Substance Misuse: Implications for Prevention, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
• This webinar offers an introduction to intergenerational trauma and its link to substance misuse and explores ways for prevention practitioners to support and implement trauma-informed prevention approaches. ([https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/critical-look-intergenerational-trauma-substance-misuse-implications](https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/critical-look-intergenerational-trauma-substance-misuse-implications))

Trauma & Adverse Childhood Experiences: Implications for Preventing Substance Misuse, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
• This webinar outlines SAMHSA's comprehensive approach to trauma-informed care, highlighting the mechanisms by which trauma and ACEs influence substance misuse and related behavioral health problems. ([https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/trauma-adverse-childhood-experiences-implications-preventing-substance](https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/trauma-adverse-childhood-experiences-implications-preventing-substance))

Improving the Behavioral Health of Boys and Young Men of Color: Addressing Data Challenges, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
• This webinar discusses the prevalence of health disparities among boys and young men of color and how programs can strengthen their protective factors. ([https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/improving-behavioral-health-boys-color-data](https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/improving-behavioral-health-boys-color-data))

• This program directory features evidence-based programs whose purpose is to prevent and/or reduce delinquency or other problem behaviors in young people. Youth.gov is composed of representatives from twenty federal agencies, including HHS. ([https://youth.gov/](https://youth.gov/))

Increasing Effectiveness of Providers for Child Victims of Violence, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.
• This training session was designed for mental health professionals. ([https://www.ovcttac.gov/views/TrainingMaterials/dsplncEffectProv.cfm](https://www.ovcttac.gov/views/TrainingMaterials/dsplncEffectProv.cfm))
Violence Prevention

• This page provides various tools developed by CDC to help us understand and effectively prevent school violence, including the factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of school violence and what prevention strategies work. ([https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/youthviolence/schoolviolence/tools.html](https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/youthviolence/schoolviolence/tools.html))

• This school assessment can be used to rate the physical attributes of a school and provide specific indicators where protective measures are lacking. ([https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/46282](https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/46282))

• This technical package represents a select group of strategies based on the best available evidence to help communities and states sharpen their focus on prevention activities with the greatest potential to prevent youth violence and its consequences. These strategies include promoting family environments that support healthy development; providing quality education early in life; strengthening youth’s skills; connecting youth to caring adults and activities; creating protective community environments; and intervening to lessen harms and prevent future risk. The strategies represented in this package include those with a focus on preventing youth violence from happening in the first place as well as approaches to reduce the immediate and long-term harms of youth violence in order to prevent future violence. ([https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/yv-technicalpackage.pdf](https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/yv-technicalpackage.pdf))

• This website provides an overview of how CPTED can be incorporated at schools to help manage access to all school areas and minimize opportunities for out-of-sight activities. ([https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/youthviolence/cpted.html](https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/youthviolence/cpted.html))

• These reports summarize the outcomes of summits hosted by FLETC that brought together experts from a variety of disciplines, including law enforcement, academic education, social sciences, private security, and emergency management to develop cross-cutting prevention strategies and a framework for a prevention toolkit adaptable to individual communities. ([https://www.fletc.gov/summits-preventing-multiple-casualty-violence](https://www.fletc.gov/summits-preventing-multiple-casualty-violence))

• This booklet was designed to educate school personnel about at-risk behaviors and activities that assist students with reducing social/psychological commitment to violence as a method of resolving a grievance. ([https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-PreventingExtremismSchools.pdf](https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-PreventingExtremismSchools.pdf))

Violence Among Middle School and High School Students: Analysis and Implications for Prevention, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.
• This “Research in Brief” summarizes conclusions drawn from in-depth interviews with students at risk of violence in schools. ([https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/166363.pdf](https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/166363.pdf))

• This report includes practical advice gathered from experienced school resource officers (SROs) on how law enforcement, schools, and school districts can work together to keep schools safe. The report includes best practices on choosing an SRO, necessary training and resources, improving school climate, and developing threat assessment teams. ([https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/violence-prevention-in-schools-march-2017.pdf/view](https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/violence-prevention-in-schools-march-2017.pdf/view))
Face Recognition Policy Development Template for Use in Criminal Intelligence and Investigative Activities, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The Facial Recognition Template was developed by state, local, and federal law enforcement, privacy, and criminal justice partners to provide law enforcement, fusion centers, and other public safety agencies with a framework for developing face recognition policies that comply with applicable laws, reduce privacy risks, implement minimum required training for authorized users and examiners, and establish entity accountability and oversight. (https://www.it.ojp.gov/GIST/1204/Face-Recognition-Policy-Development-Template-For-Use-In-Criminal-Intelligence-and-Investigative-Activities)

Threat Assessments


- This guide, produced by the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center, provides actionable steps that schools can take to develop comprehensive targeted violence prevention plans. (https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/USSS_NTAC_Enhancing_School_Safety_Guide_7.11.18.pdf)


- The REMS Technical Assistance Center offers a one-day Train-the-Educator training designed to familiarize schools and school districts with school behavioral threat assessments in preventing and reducing targeted violence at K–12 schools. Topics covered include how a threat assessment team can be integrated into the broader framework of school safety, security, emergency management, and preparedness put forth in the Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans (School Guide) referenced above. (https://rems.ed.gov/Docs/Threat_Assessment_Website_Marketing_Flyer_508C.pdf)


- In response to the 1999 attack at Columbine High School, the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) convened a symposium of educational, law enforcement, and mental health experts. This unprecedented effort resulted in the production of an operational manual to assist in the prevention of school shootings. The manual identified best practices for K–12 schools to detect and mitigate targeted violence and remains a foundational guide for all community safety stakeholders. (https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/stats-services-publications-school-shooter-school-shooter/view)


- This report sets forth a process for identifying, assessing, and managing students who may pose a threat of targeted violence in schools. (https://rems.ed.gov/docs/ThreatAssessmentinSchools.pdf)


- This report includes findings from a review of 272 incidents of violence that affected institutions of higher education (IHEs) between 1900 and 2008. The report’s goal is to help threat assessment and campus safety professionals charged with identifying, assessing, and managing the risk of violence at IHEs. (https://rems.ed.gov/docs/CampusAttacks_201004.pdf)


- “If You See Something, Say Something” is a national campaign that raises public awareness of the indicators of terrorism and terrorism-related crime, as well as the importance of reporting suspicious activity to state and local law enforcement. This campaign has partnered with a number of schools to raise student and teacher awareness and encourage reporting of suspicious activity. (https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something)

Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) is a joint collaborative effort by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and state, local, tribal, and territorial
law enforcement partners. This initiative provides law enforcement with another tool to help prevent terrorism and other related criminal activity by establishing a national capacity for gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing SAR information. ([https://nsi.ncirc.gov](https://nsi.ncirc.gov))


- Recognizing the importance of threat assessment and threat management in the mitigation of school and active shooters, the BAU convened a panel in 2015 of domestic and international experts in targeted violence for the purpose of creating an operational guide. In 2017, the BAU released this instructional handbook for schools, colleges, businesses, and houses of worship on initiating threat assessment teams, managing persons of concern, and implementing strategic threat management plans for potentially violent individuals. ([https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/making-prevention-a-reality.pdf/view](https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/making-prevention-a-reality.pdf/view))


- This guide presents a brief summary of the research on violence prevention and intervention and crisis response in schools. It tells school communities what to look for (the early warning signs that relate to violence and other troubling behaviors) and what to do (the action steps that school communities can take to prevent violence and other troubling behaviors, to intervene and get help for troubled children, and to respond to school violence when it occurs). ([https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/172854.pdf](https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/172854.pdf))


- The resource guide was developed to assist law enforcement agencies and fusion centers in understanding the lawful and appropriate use of open source information, focusing on social media. It is designed to help law enforcement agencies and analytic personnel understand the potential tools and resources available to support law enforcement operational and analytic activities. ([https://www.it.ojp.gov/GIST/1200/Real-Time-and-Open-Source-Analysis--ROSA--Resource-Guide](https://www.it.ojp.gov/GIST/1200/Real-Time-and-Open-Source-Analysis--ROSA--Resource-Guide))

STOP School Violence Threat Assessment and Technology Reporting Program, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This program provides funding for the development and operation of school threat assessments and crisis intervention teams, and the development of technology for local or regional anonymous reporting systems. ([https://www.bja.gov/Programs/STOP-School-Violence-Act.html](https://www.bja.gov/Programs/STOP-School-Violence-Act.html))

Resource Libraries and Data Sources

What Works Clearinghouse, Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education.

- This clearinghouse reviews existing research on programs, products, practices, and policies in education. Administrators and teachers may find the clearinghouse especially helpful in choosing evidence-based programs, which may include programs such as character education. ([https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/](https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/))

Averted School Violence Database, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This Averted School Violence Near Miss reporting system allows law enforcement officers, school personnel, and mental health professionals to share data and information on “close calls” in order to improve school safety and prevent tragedies. ([www.asvnearmiss.org](http://www.asvnearmiss.org))


- SAVD presents the most recent data available on school-associated violent deaths; common features of these events; and potential risk factors for perpetration and victimization. Data obtained from this study play an important role in monitoring and assessing national trends in school-associated violent deaths, and help to inform efforts to prevent fatal school violence. The system, which was developed in partnership with the Departments of Education and Justice, monitors school-associated violent deaths at the national level. Information is collected each year from media databases, police, and school officials. ([https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/youthviolence/schoolviolence/savd.html](https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/youthviolence/schoolviolence/savd.html))
CrimeSolutions.gov, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.
  - CrimeSolutions.gov is a web-based clearinghouse of evaluated programs and practices, including programs related to school safety. In this video interview, Dr. Stephanie Gerstenblith discusses how to use CrimeSolutions.gov to find evidence-based programs and practices to improve school safety. (www.crimesolutions.gov)

National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices (NREPP), Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
  - This registry contains information about evidence-based mental health and substance use interventions, including school-based interventions. Administrators and teachers may find the registry especially helpful in choosing evidence-based prevention programs. (https://www.samhsa.gov/nrepp)

  - The Campus Resilience Program Resource Library is designed to provide members of the academic community with access to resources, strategies, guidelines, and templates to address a variety of different vulnerabilities and risks. This library organizes resources according to specific threats/hazards, and has a section dedicated to resources to support schools and other workplaces in preparing for and responding to violent incidents. (https://www.dhs.gov/campus-resilience-program-resource-library)

National Center for Campus Public Safety (NCCPS), Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.
  - The NCCPS supports campus officials in creating safer and stronger campus communities by serving as a one-stop clearinghouse for the many resources available from both the federal government and non-governmental sources. The NCCPS has partnered with an array of public safety organizations, colleges and universities, and subject matter experts to address critical issues in campus safety. (https://www.nccpsafety.org/)
    - The National Center Library of Resources (https://www.nccpsafety.org/resources/library)
    - Active Threat Response Training Resources (http://nccpsafety.org/assets/files/library/Active_Threat_Response_Trainings_Final.pdf)
    - Emerging Issues Forums (https://www.nccpsafety.org/our-work/emerging-issues-forums/)

K–12 School Shooting Database, Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS).
  - The research project is a widely inclusive K–12 school shooting database that documents each and every instance a gun is brandished, is fired, or a bullet hits school property for any reason, regardless of the number of victims, time, day of the week, or reason (e.g., planned attack, accidental, domestic violence, gang-related). The database is available for download as a csv file from the CHDS website. (https://www.chds.us/ssdb/)

  - This report presents statistical data on crime and safety at school from the perspectives of students, teachers, and principals. The report contains 23 indicators of crime and safety at school on topics including victimization at school, teacher injury, bullying and cyber-bullying, school conditions, fights, weapons, availability and student use of drugs and alcohol, student perceptions of personal safety at school, and crime at postsecondary institutions. Data sources include the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), the School Crime Supplement to the NCVS, the Youth Risk Behavior Survey, the School Survey on Crime and Safety, and the School and Staffing Survey. (https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/iscs16.pdf)

  - This document provides research and data to discuss common myths around school safety. (https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250610.pdf)

School Safety: By the Numbers, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.
  - This document summarizes the findings of the NIJ report Summary of School Safety Statistics. (https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/251173.pdf)

  - This “Research in Brief” discusses the findings of an NIJ-funded survey on the firearms experience of the average youth. (https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/172857.pdf)


**Protect and Mitigate**

**Personnel and Training**

**Be Safe and Sound in School (B3S)**, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- In collaboration with the National Crime Prevention Council, B3S is a program that seeks to raise awareness of school safety and security issues and provide the tools and resources needed to effectively address them. ([https://www.ncpc.org/programs/be-safe-and-sound-in-school/](https://www.ncpc.org/programs/be-safe-and-sound-in-school/))

**Serving Safely**, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This program, launched in May 2018, is a national initiative designed to improve interactions between police and persons affected by mental illnesses and developmental disabilities. The initiative includes leaders in policing, mental illness, intellectual/developmental disability, crisis intervention, peer advocacy, emergency medicine, technology development, and prosecution, who together serve as a network of training and technical assistance providers. ([https://www.vera.org/projects/serving-safely](https://www.vera.org/projects/serving-safely))


- TSA offers a number of services to school districts and transportation providers on school bus security including guidelines, assessments, and exercise support. ([https://www.tsa.gov/for-industry/surface-transportation](https://www.tsa.gov/for-industry/surface-transportation))


- This program provides law enforcement officers with evidence-based knowledge, tools, and skills to better defuse and resolve tense situations. This program assists in protecting law enforcement officers, enhancing public safety, and improving outcomes within the communities they serve. Since July 2017, more than 1500 law enforcement officers have been trained. ([www.polis-solutions.net](http://www.polis-solutions.net))

**Law Enforcement and Community: Crisis Intervention Training Model Program**, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The Crisis Intervention Training Model Program provides law enforcement and their communities with targeted training and technical assistance to implement BJA's Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) model. ([https://www.prainc.com/lec-cit-2018/](https://www.prainc.com/lec-cit-2018/))

**Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance (CRITA)**, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This initiative delivers targeted technical assistance directly to local law enforcement based on their identified needs and requests, including those around school safety and security issues. ([https://cops.usdoj.gov/collaborative-reform](https://cops.usdoj.gov/collaborative-reform))


- This program makes competitive awards open to all state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to hire/rehire officers to address specific focus area using community policing approaches, including funding for school resource officers. ([https://cops.usdoj.gov/chp](https://cops.usdoj.gov/chp))


- This program provides funding for the Basic School Resource Officer Course, developed by the National Association of School Resource Officers. This is a 40-hour course designed for law enforcement officers and school safety professionals working in an educational environment. The course provides tools for officers on how to effectively carry out law enforcement and safety duties while building positive relationships with both students and staff in a school context. ([https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2017AwardDocs/chp/SRO_Mandatory_Training_Fact_Sheet.pdf](https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2017AwardDocs/chp/SRO_Mandatory_Training_Fact_Sheet.pdf))

- **TTX Series:** Includes a collection of tailored events, each with unique objectives and outcomes, designed for the academic community. Each event in the series challenges participants with multifaceted threat based scenarios that test and strengthen their institution's preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities.

- **K–12 Active Shooter Exercise Starter Kits:** A set of tools and resources for the academic community to self-conduct a tabletop exercise. The kits reinforce a school's specific emergency plans, protocols, and procedures, while also testing and strengthening its preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities when responding to an active shooter incident.


- **EDGE** is a virtual training platform that allows teachers, school staff, law enforcement officers, and others tasked with school security to create and practice response plans for a wide range of critical incidents. EDGE allows first responders and educators to role-play complex scenarios in a virtual environment, improving and reinforcing coordination, communication, and critical decision-making skills. (https://www.cesiedgetraining.com/)

**Justice Assistance Grant,** Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This is a formula-based grant program that provides states, tribes, and local governments with critical funding to support a range of program areas. The latter include law enforcement, prosecution and courts, crime prevention and education, corrections and community corrections, drug treatment and enforcement, planning, evaluation and technology improvement, crime victim and witness initiatives, mental health programs, and related law enforcement and corrections programs. Under this grant program, emergency and crisis training for local law enforcement can be an allowable cost. Each year, 56 states and territories and more than 900 local and tribal jurisdictions receive grants. (https://www.bja.gov/jag/)

**National Training and Technical Assistance Center (NTTAC),** Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- NTTAC offers online and no-cost training and technical assistance on a wide variety of criminal justice topics, including emergency and crisis training for local law enforcement. (www.bjatraining.org)

**Identifying an Armed Person Training,** Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This training, which is provided as part of the Project Safe Neighborhoods training and technical assistance support, covers guidance for handling felonious possession and use of firearm cases. It includes techniques for identifying/recognizing vehicles with hidden compartments and advanced techniques to identify/recognize armed suspects and their characteristics. (http://www.theiacp.org/psnInitiative)

**STOP School Violence Prevention and Mental Health Training Program,** Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This program provides funding directly to state, local, and tribal jurisdictions for training school personnel and educating students to prevent student violence as well as for training school officials in responding to related mental health crises. Such training, developed and delivered at the local level, seeks to meet the jurisdictions' localized needs regarding the prevention of school violence and responses to related mental health crises. (https://www.bja.gov/Programs/STOP-School-Violence-Act.html)

**VALOR Officer Safety and Wellness Training and Technical Assistance Program,** Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The VALOR program delivers current, dynamic classroom and web-based trainings focused on recognizing indicators of dangerous situations. It involves applying a cognitive approach towards reinforcing effective techniques for managing difficult encounters, implementing casualty care and rescue tactics, and improving wellness and resilience. Since 2010, the VALOR Program has trained more than 41,400 law enforcement officers. (www.valorforblue.org)
Building Security and Emergency Planning

- The documents provide preventive and protective measures to address the threat of gun violence in schools. The Guide is delivered in two parts: the first portion is a PDF with general security best practices and considerations in narrative format; while the second portion is a Microsoft Excel-based security survey. Together, these documents outline action-oriented security practices and options for consideration based on the results of the individual school’s responses to the survey. While the primary audience for the Guide is the K–12 community, institutions of higher education or pre-K schools may also benefit from the information presented. ([https://www.dhs.gov/publication/k-12-school-security-guide](https://www.dhs.gov/publication/k-12-school-security-guide))

- Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) are security subject matter experts who engage with state, local, tribal, and territorial government mission partners and members of the private sector stakeholder community to protect regional, state, and local infrastructure. Since 2013, PSAs have engaged with more than 1,100 schools, providing best practices, conducting assessments, and facilitating exercises, among other things. ([https://www.dhs.gov/protective-security-advisors](https://www.dhs.gov/protective-security-advisors)).

- The Mitigation for Schools and School Districts Fact Sheet describes “mitigation” and the role it plays in school preparedness. This fact sheet contains examples of mitigation activities, steps for integrating mitigation into emergency planning, and key resources for schools and school districts. ([https://rems.ed.gov/Docs/Mitigation_Fact_Sheet_508C.pdf](https://rems.ed.gov/Docs/Mitigation_Fact_Sheet_508C.pdf))
- The Protection for Schools and School Districts Fact Sheet describes “protection” and the role it plays in school preparedness. This fact sheet contains examples of protection activities, steps for integrating protection into emergency planning, and key resources for schools and school districts. ([https://rems.ed.gov/Docs/Protection_Fact_Sheet_508C.pdf](https://rems.ed.gov/Docs/Protection_Fact_Sheet_508C.pdf))

- These grants help schools address violence and foster safer school environments by providing grants to states to increase their capacity to assist school districts in the development, implementation, and review of high-quality and comprehensive school emergency operations plans (EOPs). ([https://www2.ed.gov/programs/schlemermgt-sea/index.html](https://www2.ed.gov/programs/schlemermgt-sea/index.html))

- This guide includes information on the principles of emergency management planning for institutions of higher education (IHEs); a process for developing, implementing, and refining a higher education Emergency Operations Plan (EOP); and suggested content of higher education EOPs. Planning teams at IHEs responsible for developing and revising a higher education EOP may find this document particularly helpful. ([https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/REMS_IHE_Guide_508.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/REMS_IHE_Guide_508.pdf))

- This guide includes information on the principles of school emergency management planning; a process for developing, implementing, and refining a school Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) with community partners; and suggested content of school EOPs. Planning teams responsible for developing and revising school EOPs may find this document particularly helpful. ([https://rems.ed.gov/docs/REMS_K-12_Guide_508.pdf](https://rems.ed.gov/docs/REMS_K-12_Guide_508.pdf))

- The National Strategy for Youth Preparedness Education: Empowering, Educating, and Building Resilience presents nine steps partners can take to help build a nation of prepared youth. The steps focus on building partnerships to enhance youth preparedness learning programs; connecting young people with their families, communities, first responders, and other youth; and increasing preparedness at school. ([ready.gov/youth-preparedness](https://ready.gov/youth-preparedness))

- This primer contains detailed information on assessing threats and vulnerabilities, and the design considerations needed to protect buildings and the people occupying them. The purpose of this primer is to provide the design community and school administrators with the basic principles and techniques to make a school safe from school shootings and ensure it meets the needs of students, teachers, and administrators. ([https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/st/bips07_428_schools.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/st/bips07_428_schools.pdf))


- This guide highlights the research the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center conducted in partnership with the U.S. Department of Education Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools on targeted school violence. ([https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/Making_Schools_Safer_Quick_Reference_Guide_2018_Update.pdf](https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/Making_Schools_Safer_Quick_Reference_Guide_2018_Update.pdf))

Comprehensive School Safety Initiative, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This is a list of awards made under the Comprehensive School Safety Initiative for various fiscal years.
  - 2014: [https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/niij/248381.pdf](https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/niij/248381.pdf)
  - 2015: [https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/niij/249228.pdf](https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/niij/249228.pdf)

Preventing, Preparing for Critical Incidents in Schools, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This article discusses NIJ-funded research on school safety and how schools can better prepare for incidents of violence. ([https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/niij/225765.pdf](https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/niij/225765.pdf))

Keeping an Eye on School Security: The Iris Recognition Project in New Jersey Schools, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This NIJ Journal article discusses the Iris Recognition Project, a school safety initiative in New Jersey. ([https://www.nij.gov/journals/254/pages/iris_recognition.aspx](https://www.nij.gov/journals/254/pages/iris_recognition.aspx))

Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S. Schools, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This document provides basic guidelines to law enforcement agencies and school administrators regarding security technology and school safety. ([https://www.ncjrs.gov/school/178265.pdf](https://www.ncjrs.gov/school/178265.pdf))


- This is a topic page for school safety programs. ([https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/Topic/Details/120](https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/Topic/Details/120))

Safe and Secure, Guides to Creating Safer Schools, Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- To assist schools in their safety efforts, the Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory (NWREL) developed a series of eight guidebooks intended to build a foundation of information that will assist schools and school districts in developing safe learning environments.


• **Guide 5: Fostering School-Law Enforcement Partnerships** is a practical guide to the development and implementation of partnerships between schools and law enforcement agencies. ([https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/book5.pdf](https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/book5.pdf))

• **Guide 6: Instituting School-Based Links With Mental Health and Social Service Agencies** discusses how schools can improve their capacity to serve all students by linking with mental health and social service agencies. ([https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/book6.pdf](https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/book6.pdf))


• **Guide 8: Acquiring and Utilizing Resources To Enhance and Sustain a Safe Learning Environment** provides practical information on a spectrum of resources that concerned individuals and organizations can use in the quest to create safe schools. ([https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/book8.pdf](https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/book8.pdf))

**Additional OJJDP Resources**, Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.


- International Association of Chiefs of Police Prevention and School Safety Resources ([http://www.theiacp.org/Prevention-And-Response-To-School-Violence](http://www.theiacp.org/Prevention-And-Response-To-School-Violence))


- School Safety Special Feature ([https://www.ncjrs.gov/schoolsafety/](https://www.ncjrs.gov/schoolsafety/))


- This brochure is tailored to chiefs, sheriffs, command staff, and public information officers who handle crisis communications in response to an active shooter, mass casualty, or other law enforcement incidents. It provides checklists for the pre-event, the onset of the incident, and updating the media (pre-press conference and second and subsequent press conferences). Also included are 10 tips to improve communications ([https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/as-study-quick-reference-guide-updated1.pdf/view](https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/as-study-quick-reference-guide-updated1.pdf/view))
Privacy Considerations

Privacy Technical Assistance Center (PTAC), U.S. Department of Education.
- PTAC is a “one-stop” resource for education stakeholders to learn about data privacy, confidentiality, and security practices related to student-level data systems and other uses of student data. (https://studentprivacy.ed.gov)

- This guide defines the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), delineates the rights afforded eligible parents and students, and discusses the types of information schools may provide to law enforcement agencies. It also discusses some relevant exceptions to FERPA’s general consent rule that permit the nonconsensual disclosure of personally identifiable information from education records to law enforcement agencies. (https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ferpa-guide.pdf/view)

- Understanding the legal framework of information sharing is the crucial first step for jurisdictions seeking to design and implement effective criminal justice-mental health collaborations. This guide introduces how federal and state laws are likely to influence criminal justice and mental health practitioners’ ability to share information. (https://www.bja.gov/Publications/CSG_CJMH_Info_Sharing.pdf)

- This guide provides a summary of relevant HIPAA provisions. It defines the HIPAA privacy rule, identifies who is and it not required to comply with the rule, and describes the circumstances in which a HIPAA-covered entity may disclose protected health information to law enforcement agencies. (https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/hipaa-guide.pdf/view)

HIPAA for Professionals, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
- The following is a series of questions with corresponding information on the HHS website. (https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/index.html)
  - Does the HIPAA Privacy Rule apply to an elementary or secondary school?
  - Does FERPA or HIPAA apply to elementary or secondary school student health records maintained by a health care provider that is not employed by a school?
  - Are there circumstances in which the HIPAA Privacy Rule might apply to an elementary or secondary school?
  - Where the HIPAA Privacy Rule applies, does it allow a health care provider to disclose protected health information (PHI) about a troubled teen to the parents of the teen?
  - Does the HIPAA Privacy Rule allow a health care provider to disclose protected health information (PHI) about a student to a school nurse or physician?
  - Does FERPA or HIPAA apply to records on students at health clinics run by postsecondary institutions?
  - Does FERPA or HIPAA apply to records on students who are patients at a university hospital?
  - Where the HIPAA Privacy Rule applies, does it permit a health care provider to disclose protected health information (PHI) about a patient to law enforcement, family members, or others if the provider believes the patient presents a serious danger to self or others?
  - Are the health records of an individual who is both a student and an employee of a university at which the person receives health care subject to the privacy provisions of FERPA or those of HIPAA?
Respond and Recover

Active Shooter Preparedness and Response

- DHS provides a variety of active shooter preparedness resources for private citizens, human resources, security professionals, active shooter workshop participants, and first responders. (https://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness)

- This guide informs employers how to respond to active shooter emergencies at their workplace, including how to respond when an active shooter is in the vicinity, how to respond when law enforcement arrives, how to train staff for an active shooter situation, and how to recognize potential workplace violence. (https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active_shooter_booklet.pdf)

- This guide provides a consolidated overview of the federal government’s approach to active shooter preparedness for non-military federal facilities. Many of the policies and procedures discussed in this guide can be applied to schools. (https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/isc-planning-response-active-shooter-guide-non-fouo-nov-2015-508.pdf)

Preparing for Active Shooter Situations (PASS) Program, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice.
- This program provides funding for first responders to attend the Active Attack Integrated Response (AAIR) Course, a two-day in-person training designed to improve coordinated response during active attack incidents. (https://cops.usdoj.gov/training)

- This pocket guide discusses the three options—Run, Hide, Fight—that can make a difference during an active shooter incident. (https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-event-quick-reference-guide_2015.pdf/view)

A Study of the Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the U.S., Behavioral Analysis Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.
- Understanding the prevention of active shootings often relies upon the recognition of worrisome pre-attack behaviors, the BAU released this study in 2018. Using law enforcement records (vs. open source) as the primary source of information, this study thoroughly examined 63 active shooters, including nine who attacked K–12 schools. Key findings included insights into the active shooters’ mental health, concerning behaviors displayed before their attacks, and specific stressors they experienced. This study provides the most current and detailed exploration of observable pre-attack behaviors to date. (https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/pre-attack-behaviors-of-active-shooters-in-us-2000-2013.pdf/view)

- Provided by FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute, this online course provides leading practices and resources to assist elementary and secondary schools, institutions of higher education, and houses of worship in developing emergency plans for preparing for, responding to, and recovering from mass casualty incidents. (https://training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-360)


- This bulletin focuses on how mass violence affects the behavioral health of adult and young survivors or witnesses of a mass violence incident. Public health, behavioral health, and emergency management professionals can use this bulletin to improve their disaster behavioral health preparedness plans. (https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/dtac/srb-mass-violence-behavioral-health.pdf)

Active Shooter Resources, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The Investigative Assistance Act for Violent Crimes Act of 2012 delegated responsibility to the FBI to provide federal assistance during active shooter incidents and mass killings in public places. The FBI has teamed with the Texas State University Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training program, which trains law enforcement and first responders on national standards for response protocol. The FBI’s Office for Victim Assistance also provides a variety of support services for victims, family members, first responders, and investigative teams. (https://www.fbi.gov/about/partnerships/office-of-partner-engagement/active-shooter-resources)

Recovery


- The Recovery for Schools and School Districts Fact Sheet describes “recovery” and the role it plays in school preparedness. This fact sheet contains examples of recovery activities, steps for integrating recovery into emergency planning, and key resources for schools and school districts. (https://rems.ed.gov/Docs_Recovery_Fact_Sheet_508C.pdf)

- The Response for Schools and School Districts Fact Sheet describes “response” and the role it plays in school preparedness. This fact sheet contains examples of response activities, steps for integrating response into emergency planning, and key resources for schools and school districts. (https://rems.ed.gov/Docs/Response_Fact_Sheet_508C.pdf)

Project School Emergency Response to Violence (SERV), U.S. Department of Education.

- This program funds short-term and long-term education-related services for school districts and institutions of higher education (IHEs) to help them recover from a violent or traumatic event in which the learning environment has been disrupted. (https://www2.ed.gov/programs/dvppserv/index.html)


- The Helping Victims of Mass Violence and Terrorism Toolkit leverages expertise from partner agencies, subject matter experts, and lessons learned from past incidents to provide communities with a holistic approach to victim assistance in cases of criminal mass violence and domestic terrorism from planning through long-term recovery. The Toolkit includes checklists, templates and other resources to help communities through these processes. (https://ovc.gov/pubs/mvt-toolkit/index.html)

Vicarious Trauma Toolkit, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The Vicarious Trauma Toolkit is an online collection of resources and tools to support victim-serving organizations—victim services, law enforcement, first responders—to mitigate the impact and consequences of vicarious trauma. The Toolkit provides an Organizational Assessment that enables organizations to assess their current response and then set a path forward using nearly 500 items—policies, practices and program descriptions, research literature, links to websites and podcasts, and videos and testimonials from each discipline. (https://vtt.ovc.ojp.gov/)

Schools/Education Community, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice

- This page contains DOJ and DOJ-sponsored publications relevant to students and others who are victims of crime. (https://ovc.ncjrs.gov/Publications.aspx?TopicID=91)

Through Our Eyes: Children, Violence, and Trauma, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The sixth video in this series focuses on Interventions in Schools. (https://ovc.gov/pubs/ThroughOurEyes/)
Supporting Children Living with Grief and Trauma: A Multidisciplinary Approach, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This training session was designed with victim service providers, mental health professionals, and law enforcement in mind. [https://www.ovcttac.gov/views/TrainingMaterials/dspSupportingChildren.cfm](https://www.ovcttac.gov/views/TrainingMaterials/dspSupportingChildren.cfm)

Expert Q&A: Addressing the Impact of Trauma When a Mass Violence Incident Occurs, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- Incidents of mass violence and terrorism present unique challenges to the communities in which they occur, requiring a coordinated, cross-sector approach among federal, state, local, and tribal governments; private entities; and nonprofit organizations to drive an effective response. This training session addresses how to create and maintain partnerships, address resource gaps, develop victim assistance protocols, and use the protocols after an incident of mass violence or terrorism. [https://www.ovcttac.gov/expert-qa/?tab=2](https://www.ovcttac.gov/expert-qa/?tab=2)

VAT Online: Terrorism and Mass Violence, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- Terrorism and mass violence are of concern to the public at large because events seem to be random, and perpetrators generally have a definitive plan and their own logic behind their attacks. This training module defines terrorism and mass violence, describes the effects on victims and survivors, identifies potential issues arising from these types of events, identifies responders to mass violence incidents and where you should develop a partnership prior to an event, identifies potential needs of victims and communities after a terrorism and mass violence event, and identifies resources for victims and communities. [https://www.ovcttac.gov/views/TrainingMaterials/dspOnline_VATOnline.cfm?tab=1#crimes](https://www.ovcttac.gov/views/TrainingMaterials/dspOnline_VATOnline.cfm?tab=1#crimes)


- This web training series highlights the importance of communities, states, and regions planning a response to incidents of mass violence and terrorism using the OVC resource, Helping Victims of Mass Violence & Terrorism: Planning, Response, Recovery, and Resources Toolkit. The first webinar in this series provides a detailed overview of how to use the Toolkit. Subsequent web trainings delve deeper into sections of the Toolkit. [https://www.ovcttc.gov/views/TrainingMaterials/dspWebinars.cfm#massviolence](https://www.ovcttc.gov/views/TrainingMaterials/dspWebinars.cfm#massviolence)


- Developed through a grant from OVC, this section of the AAP web site provides pediatricians and all medical home teams with the resources they need to modify practice operations to more effectively identify, treat, and refer children and youth who have been exposed to or victimized by violence. [https://www.aap.org/en-us/advocacy-and-policy/aap-health-initiatives/resilience/Pages/Resilience-Project.aspx](https://www.aap.org/en-us/advocacy-and-policy/aap-health-initiatives/resilience/Pages/Resilience-Project.aspx)

ChildVictimWeb, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- Funded by OVC, ChildVictimWeb is a free online training resource designed for professionals from all disciplines who work with children who have experienced or witnessed serious violence. This course describes the prevalence and characteristics of different forms of victimization often experienced in childhood, their psychological, behavioral, social, and health consequences, and implications for practice. Assessment strategies, an evidence-based approach to treatment planning, trauma-informed case management skills, and information about evidence-supported treatments are presented. [http://cv.musc.edu/](http://cv.musc.edu/)

Enhancing Police Responses to Children Exposed to Violence: A Toolkit for Law Enforcement, Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This toolkit may be helpful to law enforcement officers addressing school shootings. [http://www.theiACP.org/children-exposed-to-violence](http://www.theiACP.org/children-exposed-to-violence)


- This research literature review on gun violence and youth focuses on intentional gun violence involving youths ages 10 to 24, including school violence/school shootings. [https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/gun-violence-and-youth.pdf](https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/gun-violence-and-youth.pdf)
Child and Youth Victimization Known to Police, School, and Medical Authorities, Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This paper presents the survey results from the National Survey of Children's Exposure to Violence (NatSCEV) regarding authorities' knowledge of victimization incidents involving children and youth, particularly police, school, and medical authorities. ([https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/235394.pdf](https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/235394.pdf))

Supporting Young People in the Wake of Violence and Trauma, Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.


Trauma Resilience Resources, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This page provides information on agencies, foundations, and other resources that collect data on trauma and resilience. ([https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/trauma-resilience-resources](https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/trauma-resilience-resources))

Coping with Traumatic Events: Resources for Children, Parents, Educators, and Other Professionals, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This page offers online resources designed to assist parents, educators, and other professionals in helping children cope with traumatic events. (Includes a number of resources from the National Child Traumatic Stress Network and a resource related to traumatic stress after mass violence, terror, or disaster.) ([https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/coping-traumatic-events-resources](https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/coping-traumatic-events-resources))

The National Child Traumatic Stress Network (NCTSN), Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- The NCTSN and its various centers have developed and implemented a range of clinical treatments, mental health interventions, and other trauma-informed service approaches as a means of promoting the Network's mission of raising the standard of care for traumatized youth and families. ([https://www.nctsn.org/treatments-and-practices/treatments-that-work/interventions](https://www.nctsn.org/treatments-and-practices/treatments-that-work/interventions))

U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Office of Justice Services.

- This office supports tribal justice systems and provides victim assistance on Indian reservations. ([https://www.bia.gov/bia/ojs](https://www.bia.gov/bia/ojs))
Appendix B: Compilation of Past Findings and Recommendations from Key School Safety Reports

To better understand past federal and state after-action and related school safety and school violence reports, the Commission identified 10 key reports from the period 2001 to 2018. The Commission reviewed the reports and identified actions taken in response. The information has been compiled into a document titled: Compilation of Past Findings and Recommendations from Key School Safety Reports and may be found at https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/key-school-safety-reports.pdf.
Federal Commission on School Safety: Prevent
Appendix B: A Summary of Past Findings and Recommendations from Key School Safety Reports

Purpose
The Federal Commission on School Safety (the Commission) was charged with identifying best practices and providing meaningful and actionable recommendations to keep students safe at school. To effectively capture past efforts in the area of school safety, the Commission identified key school safety reports issued at the federal and state levels of government from 2001 to 2018.

The purpose of this appendix is to present an overview of the trends found throughout the reports and provide a summary of the findings and recommendations from the reports. The information has been captured for educators and other stakeholders to consider when creating safer environments for learning. Two types of reports are included: (a) event-specific reports that were prompted by a specific school shooting incident and (b) reports from the U.S. Secret Service.

Event-Specific Reports
4. Now is the Time—The President’s Plan to Protect Our Children and Our Communities by Reducing Gun Violence (2013)

U.S. Secret Service Reports

Background
Ten key safety reports have been reviewed. The reports highlighted in this review are not an exhaustive list of the information available on school safety, but are relevant reports that have addressed school violence in the last two decades. Figure 1 illustrates the number of reports reviewed based on their status—federal or state. All of the reports were produced by governmental entities including the following: the Office of the President of the United States, federal and state commissions, federal agencies, and a state safety task force.

Figure 1- Status of Reports

- Federal: 36%
- State: 64%

Federal Commission on School Safety: Appendix B
Three of the four state reports were commissioned by a governor in response to a shooting incident within a school within the state. Two of the federal reports were Presidential responses to the same tragedy. Four of the six federal reports were produced by the U.S. Secret Service, three in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Education.

**Approach**

Each report identified has been reviewed, and the findings and recommendations associated with each report have been organized into the tables within this appendix. The findings and recommendations have been drawn from the recommendation summaries within the reports as well as an analysis of the narrative text within individual reports. In this way, the tables offer a comprehensive review of the reports selected, since additional findings and recommendations have been provided that may not be captured in a cursory review of the summaries. There are 647 findings and recommendations recorded within the tables utilizing this method.

Figure 2 illustrates the number of total findings and recommendations by organization status, as well as the number that were derived from commission work. There are nearly an equal number of findings and recommendations associated with the federal reports as with the state reports. The majority of findings and recommendations within the federal reports is attributable to the Secret Service reports (233 findings). However, the only reports selected for a full review were the federal reports that were issued to or by a President and all other state commissioned reports. A full review is inclusive of the Actions Taken that corresponds to or was a result of the recommendation within that report. The Actions Taken highlights federal, state, and local activities. Information about Actions Taken is included in each report’s table.

The two Presidential reports offer recommendations that relate directly to legislative requests and actions. In general, the research associated with the findings and recommendations from these reports yielded greater results, and they were summarily fully reviewed. The correlations between recommendations and legislative actions are the basis of this decision.

The key safety reports also offer trends across the recommendations. The major trend areas are as follows:

- Crisis Response/Emergency Planning
- Communication
- Gun Control
- Information Sharing/Privacy
- Mental Health
- School Design
- Police/School Resource Officers (SROs)

All of the recommendations developed by commissions, state or federal, offered some variation of trends highlighted above.
How to Use the Tables

The tables can be used in various ways:

- To help practitioners, administrators, and elected officials review and potentially improve their school’s existing policies, procedures, and emergency plans. The findings and recommendations highlighted in this document may not be applicable for every state or school district. However, a review of the consolidated list of findings and recommendations can be beneficial to all schools and communities, if only to compare (where suitable) recommendations that could be implemented to enhance school safety.
- To provide benchmarking opportunities to the school community.
- To serve as a source for developing school safety legislation and strengthening school safety policies, procedures, and plans. School safety planning committees can utilize the information within the Appendix to delete, revise, and add to existing documentation they have created to prevent, prepare and mitigate, and respond and recover from emergency events within their respective schools. In addition, there may be findings and recommendations in this document that were effectively implemented after a school shooting (Actions Taken), which can be used to address distinctive needs and circumstances in other locations.
- To help legislators, public education, and safety officials as well emergency agencies evaluate their level of emergency preparedness and crisis response.
- To serve as a tool for continuous research in the area of school safety.

Limitations

The reports that have been utilized for this document and the accompanying Appendix are a selection of federal and state efforts to address school safety, but the research is limited in the following ways:

- **Number of reports reviewed**—there is an expansive amount of research in the area of school safety. The reports utilized in this review are a practical selection of federal and state efforts to address school safety, but the information reviewed does not address all aspects of the issue.
- **Broadness of scope**—the reports that were fully reviewed were issued as responses to school shootings that received substantial recognition, to include media coverage and national legislative action. This expanded the scope of the findings and recommendations within those reports, in that the findings and recommendations were offered to be adopted beyond a single school, district, state, or locality.
- **Association of Actions Taken**—the Actions Taken attributed to findings and recommendations listed within individual reports are associated with specific federal and state legislation, agencies, activities, and data that is indicative of a relationship according to the research team. For this reason, the associations offered in the Actions Taken section of the tables are a reasonable attempt to establish correlations between specific recommendations proposed in a report and quantifiable actions taken based upon those proposals.
- **Unknown information**—blank fields in the tables do not necessarily connote that action was not taken as it may reflect that such action was not publicized or information about it is not readily available.

Organization of the Tables

The tables are organized one table for each report reviewed. Subheadings are categories used within each report. The columns highlight the following:

- **Ref #:** assigned number for the specific recommendation associated with an individual row within the table;
- **Category:** the designation of specific recommendations as labeled within a report;
- **Findings & Recommendations:** suggestion action stated in the report;
- **Page #:** refers to the page where the information can be found within the report; and
- **Actions Taken:** activities that correspond to or were results of the recommendation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref #</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Actions Taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CO - 1</td>
<td>Crisis Response Actions</td>
<td></td>
<td>In 2001, the Colorado Association of School Resource Officers (CASRO) hosted the U.S. Secret Service research staff at their annual summer training conference. The findings from their landmark study of school shooters and forthcoming threat assessment model recommendations were shared. See link for additional information: <a href="http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Legislation/10%20years%20after%20Columbine_0.pdf">http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Legislation/10%20years%20after%20Columbine_0.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO - 2</td>
<td>All Law Enforcement Officers and School Resource Officers should be trained in Rapid Emergency Deployment (RED).</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Legislation passed to amend the Safe Schools Act to require all districts and the Charter School Institute (CSI) to adopt the tenets of the National Response Framework (NRF), including the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS) - C.R.S. 22-32-109.1 (SB-08-181) • All districts and the CSI had to establish a date by July 1, 2009, for when they expected to be in compliance with NIMS. See link for additional information: <a href="https://www.cde.state.co.us/mtss/coloardosafeschoolsact">https://www.cde.state.co.us/mtss/coloardosafeschoolsact</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO - 3</td>
<td>Incident Command System (ICS) should be utilized.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>In 1999, the state began work to improve emergency services communications by issuing a request for proposals for a digital trunked radio network statewide. In 2001, the first phase of statewide digital trunked radio system launched. By 2005, there was a full mutual aid capability created between state digital trunked radio system and Denver. See link: <a href="http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Legislation/10%20years%20after%20Columbine_0.pdf">http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Legislation/10%20years%20after%20Columbine_0.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO - 4</td>
<td>Improved Communications for Critical Emergencies</td>
<td></td>
<td>In 1999, the state began work to improve emergency services communications by issuing a request for proposals for a digital trunked radio network statewide. In 2001, the first phase of statewide digital trunked radio system launched. By 2005, there was a full mutual aid capability created between state digital trunked radio system and Denver. See link: <a href="http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Legislation/10%20years%20after%20Columbine_0.pdf">http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Legislation/10%20years%20after%20Columbine_0.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO - 5</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Agencies should plan communication systems to facilitate crisis communications with agencies most likely to interface with in emergencies.</td>
<td>xi</td>
<td>In April 2011, the Senate Bill 11-173 - Concerning Interoperable Communications in Schools was unanimously voted for in the Colorado House of Representatives. It was the first bill in the nation to establish that communications interoperability is a necessary part of a school safety, readiness, and incident management plan. It was signed into law on June 10, 2011. See link for details: <a href="http://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS/CLICS2011A/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/85763B644B0DC1F68725780800800F8A?Open&amp;file=173_enr.pdf">http://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS/CLICS2011A/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/85763B644B0DC1F68725780800800F8A?Open&amp;file=173_enr.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO - 6</td>
<td>School buildings should use repeaters to better transmit digital communication signals from within school buildings to outside.</td>
<td>xi</td>
<td>In April 2011, the Senate Bill 11-173 - Concerning Interoperable Communications in Schools was unanimously voted for in the Colorado House of Representatives. It was the first bill in the nation to establish that communications interoperability is a necessary part of a school safety, readiness, and incident management plan. It was signed into law on June 10, 2011. See link for details: <a href="http://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS/CLICS2011A/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/85763B644B0DC1F68725780800800F8A?Open&amp;file=173_enr.pdf">http://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS/CLICS2011A/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/85763B644B0DC1F68725780800800F8A?Open&amp;file=173_enr.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO - 7</td>
<td>Develop a single statewide digital trunked communications system.</td>
<td>xi</td>
<td>In 1999, the state began work to improve emergency services communications by issuing a request for proposals for a digital trunked radio network statewide. In 2001, the first phase of statewide digital trunked radio system launched. By 2005, there was a full mutual aid capability created between state digital trunked radio system and Denver. See link: <a href="http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Legislation/10%20years%20after%20Columbine_0.pdf">http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Legislation/10%20years%20after%20Columbine_0.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO - 8</td>
<td>Agencies not within the statewide system should receive funding to enable them to purchase TRP 1000 or similar systems.</td>
<td>xi</td>
<td>In 2000, the Colorado General Assembly passes the Safe Schools Act (C.R.S. 22-32-109.1). Highlights—each school district was required to: • Adopt a mission statement and safe school plan that makes safety a priority in each public school. • Include a uniform and consistently enforced written conduct and discipline code in the plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO - 9</td>
<td>Advance Planning for Critical Emergencies</td>
<td></td>
<td>In 2000, the Colorado General Assembly passes the Safe Schools Act (C.R.S. 22-32-109.1). Highlights—each school district was required to: • Adopt a mission statement and safe school plan that makes safety a priority in each public school. • Include a uniform and consistently enforced written conduct and discipline code in the plan.</td>
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<td>CO -10</td>
<td>Officials in each county should prepare and keep current major critical emergency response plans addressing large-scale crises.</td>
<td>xi</td>
<td>In 2000, the Colorado General Assembly passes the Safe Schools Act (C.R.S. 22-32-109.1). Highlights—each school district was required to: • Adopt a mission statement and safe school plan that makes safety a priority in each public school. • Include a uniform and consistently enforced written conduct and discipline code in the plan.</td>
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<td>CO - 11</td>
<td>Emergency plans should include assessments of response resources, location, and availability of resources and operational requirements.</td>
<td>xii</td>
<td>Governor Ritter identified school safety as a top legislative priority for his 2008 legislative agenda. He subsequently signed the first bill passed during the 2008 legislative session creating Colorado's State School Safety Resource Center - C.R.S. 24-33.5-1801 (SB 08-001). • A state school safety resource center was established in the Department of Public Safety to assist schools in preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from emergencies and crisis situations and to foster positive learning environments. It includes the identification of pilot sites to receive enhanced school safety services. • This legislation created the Center's advisory council, composed of representatives from five other state agencies, higher education, and school districts. • Additional legislation amended the School Safety Resource Center pilot site projects to include funds to support pilot schools to provide school mapping information to first responders in case of an emergency (HB 08-1267). See link: <a href="https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cssrc/history-4">https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cssrc/history-4</a></td>
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<td>CO - 12</td>
<td>Regular planning sessions should be held based on the plan with all pertinent entities.</td>
<td>xii</td>
<td>Safe Communities—Safe Schools Conference, Boulder, CO, May 2000. Provided safe school information from experts to Colorado Schools. See link for most recent output from the conference work circa 2009: <a href="https://cspv.colorado.edu/publications/safeschools/SchoolSafetyGlossary.pdf">https://cspv.colorado.edu/publications/safeschools/SchoolSafetyGlossary.pdf</a></td>
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<td>CO - 13</td>
<td>Every school in Colorado should develop an emergency crisis plan tailored to meet the particular safety concerns at that school.</td>
<td>xii</td>
<td>See CO – 11</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO - 14</td>
<td>Local school administrators should assemble emergency kits appropriate to the size of their respective school.</td>
<td>xiii</td>
<td>See CO – 11</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO - 15</td>
<td>Emergency kits should include school diagrams, alarm-sprinkler-utilities information, important telephone numbers and a current school roster.</td>
<td>xiii</td>
<td>See CO – 11</td>
</tr>
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<td>CO - 16</td>
<td>Each school should schedule crisis drills once a year/preferably once each school term. Police and rescue personnel should</td>
<td>xiii</td>
<td>See CO – 11</td>
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<td>CO - 17</td>
<td>Interaction with Media Representatives</td>
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<td>CO - 18</td>
<td>Each major response agency needs a public information officer (PIO).</td>
<td>xiii</td>
<td>In Colorado, the Strategic Communications team provides public information, crisis communication, and social media support to the Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. A public information officer is available 24/7 for media requests. The public information can be contacted by email or by calling 720-432-2433. See link: <a href="https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/dhsem/information-center">https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/dhsem/information-center</a></td>
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<td>CO - 19</td>
<td>The head official over ICS should establish an operational PIO.</td>
<td>xiv</td>
<td>See CO – 3</td>
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<td>CO - 20</td>
<td>Police, fire, hospital and all victim support agencies should establish PIO or media representation in the planning process.</td>
<td>xiv</td>
<td>See CO – 18</td>
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<td>CO - 21</td>
<td>Tasks of School Resource Officers</td>
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<td>CO - 22</td>
<td>Primary task is to enforce law and protect public safety.</td>
<td>xiv</td>
<td>In May 2013 the Senate Bill 13-138, Concerning School Resource Officers (SRO), was approved. The bill outlines the role of SROs in schools as well as other responsibilities of the school faculty and leadership that are in conjunction with having SROs within their buildings. The language in the bill covers the following recommendations. See link for additional information: <a href="http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Legislation/SB%2013-138%20School%20Resource%20Officer%20Programs.pdf">http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Legislation/SB%2013-138%20School%20Resource%20Officer%20Programs.pdf</a></td>
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<td>CO - 23</td>
<td>Should be law enforcement officers.</td>
<td>xiv</td>
<td>See CO – 22</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO - 24</td>
<td>Should be in uniform.</td>
<td>xiv</td>
<td>See CO – 22</td>
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<td>CO - 25</td>
<td>Trained like first responders in RED.</td>
<td>xiv</td>
<td>See CO – 22</td>
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<td>CO - 26</td>
<td>Should have relevant information about students at school.</td>
<td>xv</td>
<td>See CO – 22</td>
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<td>CO - 27</td>
<td>Police should share criminal conduct information where pertinent.</td>
<td>xv</td>
<td>See CO – 22</td>
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<td>CO - 28</td>
<td>Detection by School Administrators of Potential Perpetrators of School-Based Violence and Administrative Countermeasures</td>
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<td>CO - 29</td>
<td>Should work to change the “code of silence” amongst the student population—loyalty has limits.</td>
<td>xv</td>
<td>In 2002, the Colorado Department of Education launched the Positive Behavior Support statewide initiative that creates positive school-wide climates for safe and civil learning environments. Colorado now has the third largest number of schools involved in such a statewide initiative, with more than 500 schools implementing this framework. See link for details: <a href="https://www.cde.state.co.us/mtss/pbis">https://www.cde.state.co.us/mtss/pbis</a></td>
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<td>CO - 30</td>
<td>Do not discount threats of violence because of the age of students.</td>
<td>xv</td>
<td>The Colorado Department of Education hosted regional trainings for local school districts and community partners regarding Homeland Security-related planning and resources. By this time, 100 percent of Colorado school districts were determined to be in compliance with the Safe School Act’s policy requirement regarding written emergency response plans. Blueprints for Violence Prevention Conference, Denver, March 2006, were provided to practitioners</td>
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<td>CO - 31</td>
<td>Clarify ramifications of threats of violence to students and parents.</td>
<td>xv</td>
<td>In 2000, Attorney General Ken Salazar and Professor Delbert Elliott from Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence at the Colorado University at Boulder toured 64 counties across the state and met with school and communities leaders and students to discuss school safety issues and provide individual guidance. See link: <a href="http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Legislation/10%20years%20after%20Columbine.0.pdf">http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Legislation/10%20years%20after%20Columbine.0.pdf</a></td>
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| CO - 32 | Establish anonymous telephone line for the report of conduct that could lead to violence. | xvi | In 2004, the Safe2Tell Reporting Hotline and Awareness Campaign was launched.  
• The hotline provides a safe and anonymous way to report concerns of safety, focusing on awareness and early intervention.  
• Safe2Tell is a 501c3 agency made possible by grants and funding from the Colorado Trust, the Daniels' Fund, El Pomar Foundation, corporations, and private donors, with a multi-agency advisory board. Executive Director is Special Agent Susan Payne.  
• Trained Colorado State Patrol emergency communications staff handle calls 24/7 and determine what action needs to be taken to help students, parents, and school faculty facing a threat. Hundreds of planned acts of violence are averted.  
• Has provided more than 1,250 targeted presentations to students, school staff, community groups, law enforcement, and others statewide since 2004. In 2007, Colorado General Assembly passed bill supporting Safe2Tell Program (SB 07-197). This ensured anonymity of persons reporting to the hotline and confidentiality of Safe2Tell records. The program is still in operation. See link for details: https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/hb18-1434; https://safe2tell.org/?q=what-we-do-0 |
| CO - 33 | Adopt bullying-prevention program. | xvi | Bullying Prevention Efforts  
• Spring 2001: The Colorado General Assembly amended the Safe School Act to require school districts to have a policy addressing bullying.  
• Summer 2001: The Colorado Association of School Boards issued a model policy to member school districts regarding compliance with the amended Safe School Act.  
• September 2001: The Colorado Department of Education provided a technical assistance packet to all school districts regarding bullying prevention best practices.  
• October 24, 2001: The Colorado Anti-Bullying Campaign was launched by the Colorado Trust, Colorado Attorney General Ken Salazar, and others.  
• Effort included a kick-off event for the campaign, website, hotline, PSAs, and other resources to raise awareness.  
• 2002–2003: The Colorado Department of Education confirmed that 100 percent of the school districts complied with the Safe Schools Act.  
• Since 2003: Numerous statewide efforts include bullying prevention-related resources and ongoing research/best practices. In 2005, the Colorado Trust initiated a three-year, $9 million grant program to fund evidence- and school-based bullying prevention efforts. Forty-five grantees estimate they reached 50,000 young people in 40 Colorado counties during the 2005–2008 project period. See the link for the most updated information in Colorado on Bullying Prevention: https://www.cdc.state.co.us/mtss/bullying |
<p>| CO - 34 | Schools should adopt a code of behavior for students to adhere to. | xvi | See CO – 33 |</p>
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<td>CO - 35</td>
<td>A state task force should be created to develop model threat-assessment plans, standards, programs.</td>
<td>xvii</td>
<td>In 2011, Colorado created a threat assessment guide intended as guidance to Colorado schools and was done in collaboration with the Threat Assessment Work Group of the Colorado School Safety Resource Center. Consultation with district legal counsel and local law enforcement is recommended. The guide outlines what schools should do to create a Threat Assessment team, who the membership should include, and activities to be performed. See link for details: <a href="https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cssrc/threat-assessment">https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cssrc/threat-assessment</a></td>
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<td>CO - 36</td>
<td>A threat assessment team should be established at every high school and middle school in Colorado.</td>
<td>xvii</td>
<td>See CO – 35</td>
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<td>CO - 37</td>
<td>Threat assessment teams should consist of school staff, mental health professionals, and law enforcement.</td>
<td>xvii</td>
<td>See CO – 35</td>
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<td>CO - 38</td>
<td>Threat assessment teams should receive training on threat assessment, suicide prevention, and the law related to student confidentiality.</td>
<td>xvii</td>
<td>In 2016, the Colorado legislature passed the House Bill 16-1063 concerning an exception to the prohibition against disclosing confidential communications with a mental health professional when school safety is at risk—which was a revision of Statute 12-43-218. See link: <a href="https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/images/olls/crs2016-1063_concerning_an_exception_to_the_prohibition_against_disclosing_confidential_communications_with_a_mental_health_professional_when_school_safety_is_at_risk.pdf">https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/images/olls/crs2016-1063_concerning_an_exception_to_the_prohibition_against_disclosing_confidential_communications_with_a_mental_health_professional_when_school_safety_is_at_risk.pdf</a></td>
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<td>CO - 39</td>
<td>Every school should adopt a violence prevention program.</td>
<td>xvii</td>
<td>In 2000, the Colorado Attorney General’s Office began publishing the Colorado School Violence Prevention and Student Discipline Manual. The manual is updated yearly and is an important resource for teachers and school officials who need to know the legal tools available to address the security problems posed by students who engage in violent or disruptive behavior or who use, possess, or distribute alcohol, drugs, or weapons on school grounds. The manual’s most recent update (2009) is available online at <a href="http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Resources/CO%20AG%20Colorado%20Attorney%20General%20Office/Colorado%20School%20Violence%20Prevention%20and%20Discipline%20Manual.pdf">http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Resources/CO%20AG%20Colorado%20Attorney%20General%20Office/Colorado%20School%20Violence%20Prevention%20and%20Discipline%20Manual.pdf</a></td>
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<td>CO - 40</td>
<td>All agencies that possess specific information regarding threatening behavior of a juvenile should share the information with other agencies dealing with that juvenile, to the extent allowed by law.</td>
<td>xvii</td>
<td>In 2000, the Colorado General Assembly passed the Exchange of Information Related to Children Bill—(HB 00-1119). The bill allowed for information sharing between state agencies and schools when there is a need to know to better serve children or to protect school safety. It has been updated as of 2016. See link for details: <a href="https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/images/olls/crs2016-1119_Task_Force.pdf">https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/images/olls/crs2016-1119_Task_Force.pdf</a></td>
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| CO - 41 | All agencies should become familiar with the Colorado Juvenile Information Exchange Laws. | xviii | In 2000, the Colorado General Assembly passed the Exchange of Information Related to Children Bill—(HB 00-1119). One provision of this bill was the creation of a Task Force. The Colorado Attorney General’s office oversaw the HB-1119 Task Force, composed of representatives from school districts and state education-related agencies and organizations, law enforcement, district attorneys, social services, and mental health organizations. Guidelines for negotiating information sharing agreements also are available online at: [https://coag.gov/sites/default/files/contentuploads/oece/School_Safety_SS/Safe2Tell_S2T/juvenile_information_exchange_law.pdf](https://coag.gov/sites/default/files/contentuploads/oece/School_Safety_SS/Safe2Tell_S2T/juvenile_information_exchange_law.pdf)  
Attorneys from the AG’s office provide training and advice to the local agencies mentioned above. |
<p>| CO - 42 | Medical Treatment of Attack Victims | xix | The state legislature passed and Governor Ritter signed Senate Bill 181 (SB-181), Concerning Measures to Improve Coordination Amongst Agencies when Responding to School Incidents, into law during the 2008 legislative term. Most of its content amended the Safe School Act, of which most was reflected in Colorado Revised Statutes 22-32-109.1. SB-181 was an effort to better prepare |</p>
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<td>school districts to respond to emergencies, both natural and manmade. SB-181 required all districts and the Charter School Institute (CSI) to adopt the tenets of the National Response Framework (NRF), including the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS). All districts and the CSI had to establish a date by July 1, 2009, for when they expected to be in compliance with NIMS. See link for details: <a href="http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Legislation/SB%2008-181.pdf">http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/Legislation/SB%2008-181.pdf</a></td>
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<td>CO - 44</td>
<td>SWAT teams should have EMT staff or trained personnel within their units.</td>
<td>xix</td>
<td>The Columbine tragedy initiated the national conversation on SWAT teams being capable of assisting with medical injuries in and during an emergency event. Since such time, training is customary for law enforcement and EMTs alike.</td>
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<td>CO - 45</td>
<td>Reuniting Attack Victims and Their Families</td>
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<td>CO - 46</td>
<td>Victim advocates should be at the ICS Command Center to provide accurate and timely information directly to families.</td>
<td>xix</td>
<td>Colorado has an Office of Victim’s Assistance that operates out of its Law Enforcement Highway Patrol Unit. The services offered by this Office include providing on-scene crisis intervention, care for injured pets, lodging for uninjured passengers, transportation for out-of-state family members, and assistance to school principals and counselors of young victims. Members of the CSP Victim’s Assistance Unit are well educated in victims’ rights, bringing integrity into difficult situations, and giving care and confidence to victims. See link for details: <a href="https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/csp/victims-assistance">https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/csp/victims-assistance</a></td>
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<td>CO - 47</td>
<td>Staff support and stress debriefing needs to be included in the planning process.</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>See CO – 46</td>
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<td>CO - 48</td>
<td>Families of victims should be assigned victim advocates (post-event) who are in close proximity to their home.</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>See CO – 46</td>
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<td>CO - 49</td>
<td>Identification of Victims’ Bodies and Family Access to Bodies</td>
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<td>CO - 50</td>
<td>The procedures for victim identification should be relaxed to accommodate the emotional needs of victims and their families.</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>See CO – 46</td>
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<td>CO - 51</td>
<td>Suicide Prevention in the Aftermath of Incidents Like Columbine</td>
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<td>CO - 52</td>
<td>Programs should be developed and implemented to enable teachers and school administrators to discuss with students the subject of suicide before and after it occurs.</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>In 2006, the Colorado counties of Pueblo, Mesa, Larimer, Weld, and El Paso, as well as the University of Colorado at Boulder, trained in suicide awareness and intervention strategies by the state health department’s Office of Suicide Prevention.</td>
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<td>CO - 53</td>
<td>Faculty and staff in the Colorado school system need to be trained in the warning signs for suicide and the appropriate responses when it is observed.</td>
<td>xx</td>
<td>In 2000, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment created the Office of Suicide Prevention. Colorado’s suicide rate ranked high among states; the office focused initial work on youth suicide prevention statewide. In 2003, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment and The Colorado Trust developed and released the state’s suicide prevention strategic plan. See link for details: <a href="https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cdphe/categories/services-and-information/health/prevention-and-wellness/suicide-prevention">https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cdphe/categories/services-and-information/health/prevention-and-wellness/suicide-prevention</a></td>
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<td><strong>Critical Information Sharing Faces Substantial Obstacles</strong></td>
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<td>B2</td>
<td>Increase information sharing and collaboration among state and local communities, educators, mental health officials, and law enforcement to better provide care and detect, intervene, and respond to potential incidents of violence in schools and other venues.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>In 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice submitted a crime bill to Congress. Among other things, the legislation was proposed to recognize the importance of state efforts to improve information about mental health records and criminal dispositions in ensuring the effectiveness of federal firearms laws. The bill prioritized National Criminal History Improvement Program (NCHIP) grant applications that aimed to improve the quantity and quality of records included in the NICS. The NCHIP grant continues today. See link for more information: <a href="https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&amp;tid=47">https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&amp;tid=47</a>.</td>
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<td>B3</td>
<td>Provide accurate information to help ensure that family members, educational administrators, mental health providers, and other appropriate persons understand when and how they are legally entitled to share and receive information about mental illness, and appropriately do so, particularly where college and school-age children and youth are involved, for the protection and well-being of the student and the community.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>The 2008 and subsequent 2011 U.S. Department of Education Student Privacy regulations were direct responses to state requests for clarification of FERPA regarding the role of the state in using student data while maintaining privacy protections around personally identifiable information. The Department clarified FERPA’s application to state longitudinal data systems through a public process in response to conversations between states and education and public stakeholders over several years and across Administrations. The clarifications aligned FERPA with other federal laws requiring states to link data systems and use student data for evaluation and school and district accountability. These changes were accompanied by provisions designed to tighten privacy protections and provide for fuller FERPA enforcement. When the U.S. Department of Education issued FERPA clarifications, it also took steps to build capacity within the Department to provide technical assistance around privacy protections; these steps included hiring a Chief Privacy Officer, establishing the Privacy Technical Assistance Center, and issuing technical briefs providing guidance and best practices on protecting personally identifiable information. Additionally, in response to both the 2007 Bush and Kaine (VA) reports following the mass shooting at Virginia Tech, many states enacted legislation regarding firearms licensure which accounted for information sharing regarding mental health: • 43 states and DC have some prohibitions of firearm licensure for persons with mental illness. • 36 states have prohibitions for drug abuse. • 31 states have prohibitions for alcohol abuse. • 20 states and DC have databases that track individuals with mental illness.</td>
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| B4   | Along with reviewing federal laws that may apply, clarify, and promote wider understanding about how state law limits or allows the sharing of information about individuals who may pose a danger to themselves or others, examine state law to determine if legislative or regulatory changes are needed to achieve the appropriate balance of privacy and security. | 8    | FERPA  
Any state law or regulation that conflicts with FERPA and its regulations are preempted by the federal law.  
If a school determines that it cannot comply with FERPA because of a conflict with state or local laws, it must notify the Department of Education, and the agency will review the conflicting law and any interpretations of it made by the state and provide guidance to the requesting entity regarding FERPA’s applicability to the situation.  
HIPAA  
In general, a state law or regulation that conflicts with HIPAA and the Privacy Rule is preempted by the federal law.  
The Privacy Rule contains exceptions that allow differing state requirements to control if the state law: (1) relates to privacy of individually identifiable health information and provides greater security than HIPAA. |
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<td>B5</td>
<td>The U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services and Education should develop additional guidance that clarifies how information can be shared legally under HIPAA and FERPA and disseminate it widely to the mental health, education, and law enforcement communities. The U.S. Department of Education should ensure that parents and school officials understand how and when post-secondary institutions can share information on college students with parents. In addition, the U.S. Departments of Education and Health and Human Services should consider whether further actions are needed to balance more appropriately the interests of safety, and treatment implicated by FERPA and HIPPA.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>In 2008 the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services issued Joint Guidance on the Application of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) to Student Health Records. See link: <a href="https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/doc/ferpa-hipaa-guidance.pdf">https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/doc/ferpa-hipaa-guidance.pdf</a>. The purpose of the guidance was to explain the relationship between the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, and to address apparent confusion on the part of school administrators, healthcare professionals, and others as to how these two laws apply to records maintained on students. It also addressed certain disclosures that are allowed without consent or authorization under both laws, especially those related to health and safety emergency situations.</td>
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<td>The U.S. Department of Education should ensure that emergency management grantees and state and local communities receiving training through the program have clear guidance on the sharing of information as it relates to educational records and FERPA.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>On July 1, 2010, the Department of Education announced updated guidelines relating to FERPA and the disclosure of student information related to emergencies and disasters. According to the document, the purpose of the guidance was to answer questions that arose about the sharing of personally identifiable information from students’ education records to outside parties when responding to emergencies, including natural or man-made disasters. See link for information: <a href="http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/pdf/ferpa-disaster-guidance.pdf">http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/pdf/ferpa-disaster-guidance.pdf</a>.</td>
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<td>B7</td>
<td>Federal agencies should continue to work together, and with states and appropriate partners, to improve, expand, coordinate, and disseminate information and best practices in behavioral analysis, threat assessments, and emergency preparedness, for colleges and universities.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>In 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing (COPS) sponsored a national summit on campus safety issues that included campus law enforcement practitioners, local, state, and federal government officials, and representatives from the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) and other law enforcement and higher education organizations. The results of this summit are contained in a report entitled National Summit on Campus Public Safety: Strategies for Colleges and Universities in a Homeland Security Environment, which can be found at <a href="http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/Publications/NationalSummitonCampusPublicSafety.pdf">http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/Publications/NationalSummitonCampusPublicSafety.pdf</a>. The report’s primary recommendation was the creation of a National Center for Campus Law Enforcement that will develop and disseminate training, best practices, model policies, and other resources to enhance public safety on campus. To further this recommendation, the COPS Office</td>
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<td>B8</td>
<td>The U.S. Department of Education, in collaboration with the U.S. Secret Service and the Department of Justice, should explore research of targeted violence in institutions of higher education and continue to share existing threat assessment methodology with interested institutions.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>The FBI’s National Center for Analysis of Violent Crime Behavioral Analysis Unit-1 (BAU) provides federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies with various behavioral analysis services, with a specialty relating to issues involving threat assessment and school violence. The Department of Education and the Secret Service released the following report after this recommendation: Prior Knowledge of Potential School-Based Violence: Information Students Learn May Prevent a Targeted Attack. United States Secret Service and the United States Department of Education (2008). <a href="https://rem.s.ed.gov/docs/DOE_BystanderStudy.pdf">https://rem.s.ed.gov/docs/DOE_BystanderStudy.pdf</a></td>
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<td>B9</td>
<td><strong>Accurate and Complete Information on Individuals Prohibited from Possessing Firearms Is Essential to Keep Guns Out of the Wrong Hands</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>In 2008, the FBI and state agencies denied a firearm to more than 123,000 persons due to National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) records of felonies, domestic violence offenses, and other prohibiting factors. In conjunction, a review of the NICS process, entitled Enforcement of the Brady Act, 2008, reported on investigations and prosecutions of persons who were denied a firearm in 2008. The report described how the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) screens denied-person cases and retrieves firearms that were obtained illegally. Statistics presented include charges most often filed against denied persons by United States Attorneys and results of prosecutions. Investigation statistics from two states are also presented. Key statistics are compared for the years 2008 and 2007. This project was supported by Grant No. 2007-BJ-CX-K004 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. See link: <a href="https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/231052.pdf">https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/231052.pdf</a></td>
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<td>B10</td>
<td>Prioritize and address legal and financial barriers to submitting all relevant disqualifying information to the NICS and other crucial inter-agency information sharing systems to prevent individuals who are prohibited from possessing firearms by federal or state law from acquiring firearms from federally licensed firearms dealers.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>The NICS Section of the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division was working for the eight years prior to this report to promote the submission of information identifying all qualifying prohibited individuals to the NICS Index through a national outreach initiative focused on sharing information with stakeholders about the NICS’ operations. The NICS Section of CJIS promoted the submission of mental health records and sought to further understanding of the scope of federal law and the need to make information available to the NICS through outreach to state and local officials. The NICS Section’s efforts included a wide array of stakeholders, including law enforcement, mental health professionals, and court personnel. The NICS Section had previously sent letters to states reminding them of the scope of federal law and the need to make information available to the NICS. According to the report, the ATF was also proactive in educating law enforcement and the firearms dealer community on federal firearms laws. After the Virginia Tech tragedy, ATF communicated to all state Attorneys General and federal firearms licensees explaining...</td>
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<td>B12</td>
<td>The U.S. Department of Justice, through the FBI and ATF, should continue to encourage state and federal agencies to provide all appropriate information to the NICS so that required background checks are thorough and complete.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>By law, federal agencies are required to provide certain information to the NICS. Section 103(e) (1) of the Brady Act (Pub. L. 103-159) provides the Attorney General the authority to secure directly from any department or agency of the United States information on persons whose receipt of a firearm would violate federal or state law. The provision provides that the heads of such agencies shall provide the information to the NICS. To that end, the Department of Justice has continued to make efforts to ensure that all federal agencies with relevant information forward that information to the NICS. Neither the Brady Act nor other federal laws have required states to submit information on prohibited persons to the NICS, and thus to the extent that states submitted information on prohibited persons to the NICS, they did so voluntarily. The Brady Act established the NCHIP federal funding program, administered by BJS, as the primary means to improve the automation and accessibility of state criminal records at the national level. However, according to the report significant shortcomings existed in 2007 regarding the completeness of the records in the system and the availability of relevant information for NICS checks. See the following report: <a href="https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/231187.pdf">https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/231187.pdf</a>.</td>
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<td>B13</td>
<td>Some states may need to evaluate whether changes or modifications to state law are necessary to make more relevant information available to NICS. The U.S. Department of Justice should work with states to provide appropriate guidance on policies and procedures that would ensure that relevant and complete information is available for background checks.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>In 2008, President Bush signed the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, authorizing more than $1 billion in grants to improve local records reporting. The bill that became law had six provisions: • Enhancement of requirement that federal departments and agencies provide relevant information to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System. • Requirements to obtain waiver. • Implementation assistance to states. • Penalties for noncompliance. • Relief from disabilities program required as condition for participation in grant programs. • Illegal immigrant gun purchase notification. See public law: <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ180/pdf/PLAW-110publ180.pdf">https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ180/pdf/PLAW-110publ180.pdf</a>.</td>
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<td>B14</td>
<td>Improved Awareness and Communication Are Key to Prevention</td>
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<td>B15</td>
<td>Develop cultures within schools and institutions of higher education that promote safety, trust, respect, and open communication. Create environments conducive to seeking help and develop culturally appropriate messages to destigmatize mental illness and mental health treatment.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>In 2008, a total of 29 states enacted 77 bills that dealt directly with Bullying, K–12 School Safety, and Campus Safety. See link: <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx">http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx</a>.</td>
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<td>B16</td>
<td>Educate and train parents, teachers, and students to recognize warning signs and known indicators of violence and mental illness and to alert those who can provide for safety and treatment.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>In 2008, seven states enacted nine bills that dealt directly with parental involvement in areas of violence prevention, school discipline, and mental health awareness/treatment within their respective schools. The states were Colorado, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and West Virginia. See link: <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx">http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx</a>.</td>
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<td>B17</td>
<td>Establish and publicize widely a mechanism to report and respond to reported threats of violence.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Many individual states have hotlines/tiplines for students, parents, or others to report threats of violence. There is no centralized mechanism utilized by states to perform this action.</td>
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| B18   | The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services should work through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) 10 Academic Centers of Excellence on Youth Violence Prevention and collaborate with the U.S. Department of Education to identify opportunities to expand CDC’s “Choose Respect” initiative so that it includes efforts to develop healthy school climates and prevent violence in schools. | 13   | The CDC’s Choose Respect initiative was a national effort to help youth form healthy relationships to prevent dating abuse before it starts. The initiative targets were 11–14 year olds and the caring adults in their lives with the message that dating abuse is not just unacceptable, but also preventable by choosing respect. Based on social marketing principles and models of behavior change, the overall aim of the initiative was to move the target audience through the various stages of change by increasing knowledge and awareness; influencing beliefs; changing attitudes; and changing and sustaining behavior. Two Youth Violence Prevention Centers (YVPCs) were funded by the CDC in 2006 (prior to the report) with similar but broader objectives. The primary objectives of these YVPCs were to:  
- Monitor the magnitude and distribution of youth violence in a defined community  
- Foster collaboration between researchers and communities by bringing together individuals with diverse perspectives  
- Mobilize and empower communities to address youth violence  
- Build the scientific infrastructure necessary to support the development and widespread application of effective youth violence interventions  
- Promote interdisciplinary research strategies to address youth violence in a defined community  
See link for current research: [https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/yvpc/about.html](https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/yvpc/about.html) |
| B19   | The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services should include a focus on college students in its mental health public education campaign to encourage young people to support their friends who are experiencing mental health problems. | 13   | The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, through its Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, launched a Mental Health National Anti Stigma Campaign to encourage young people between 18 and 25 to support their friends who were experiencing mental health problems. The program is no longer called Anti-Stigma. See link for other programming: [https://www.samhsa.gov/](https://www.samhsa.gov/) |
| B20   | The U.S. Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, and Justice should continue to work together and with states and local communities to improve and expand their collaboration on their “Safe Schools/Healthy Students” program. | 13   | The Safe Schools/Healthy Students program provided grants to school districts for comprehensive, community-wide drug and violence prevention projects. School districts are required to partner with local law enforcement, public mental health, and juvenile justice agencies/entities. This program is jointly funded by the U.S. Departments of Education and Health and Human Services and jointly administered by the U.S. Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, and Justice and continues today. See link: [https://www.samhsa.gov/safe-schools-healthy-students/about](https://www.samhsa.gov/safe-schools-healthy-students/about) |
| B21   | It Is Critical to Get People with Mental Illness the Services They Need                                                                 |      | The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) solicited applications for fiscal year (FY) 2009 supplements to the State Mental Health Data Infrastructure Grants for Quality Improvement program. This was an existing grant that was provided with supplemental funding in 2009. These grants were designed to expand grant activities that support mental health prevalence estimation found in state populations.  
Grantees were required to provide coordination, state data analyses, and information dissemination activities that can inform the state on mental health status of various populations.  
SAMHSA made available approximately $200,000 in funding for up to 16 grants for one year. The |
<p>| B22   | Evaluate state and local community mental health systems to ensure their adequacy in providing a full array and continuum of services, including mental health services for students, and in providing meaningful choices among treatment options. | 15   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |</p>
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| B23  | Integrate mental health screening, treatment, and referral with primary healthcare. | 15   | The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA), signed by President George W. Bush, required doctors and insurers to treat mental illness the same as physical illness. It was enacted on October 3, 2008. Key changes made by MHPAEA, which was effective for plan years beginning after October 3, 2009, include the following:  
  • If a group health plan or health insurance coverage includes medical/surgical benefits and Mental Health (MH)/Substance Use Disorder (SUD) benefits, the financial requirements (e.g., deductibles and co-payments) and treatment limitations (e.g., number of visits or days of coverage) that apply to MH/SUD benefits must be no more restrictive than the predominant financial requirements or treatment limitations that apply to substantially all medical/surgical benefits (this is referred to as the "substantially all/predominant test"). This test is discussed in greater detail in the MHPAEA regulation (linked below) and the summary of the MHPAEA regulation found below.  
  • MH/SUD benefits may not be subject to any separate cost-sharing requirements or treatment limitations that only apply to such benefits.  
  • If a group health plan or health insurance coverage includes medical/surgical benefits and MH/SUD benefits, and the plan or coverage provides for out-of-network medical/surgical benefits, it must provide for out-of-network MH/SUD benefits.  
  • Standards for medical necessity determinations and reasons for any denial of benefits relating to MH/SUD benefits must be disclosed upon request.  
  See link: https://www.cms.gov/cciio/programs-and-initiatives/other-insurance-protections/mhpaea_factsheet.html |
| B24  | Review emergency services and commitment laws to ensure the standards are clear, appropriate, and strike the proper balance among liberty and safety for the individual and the community, and appropriate treatment. | 15   | Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Warn—Doctors are responsible for maintaining confidentiality of patient information based on the ethical standards of their profession. However, in an effort to protect potential victims from a patient’s violent behavior many states have passed "duty to warn" laws. These laws impose a duty on psychotherapists to warn third parties of potential threats to their safety. See link: http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-benefits-state-mandates.aspx |
| B25  | Where a legal ruling mandates a course of treatment, make sure that systems are in place to ensure thorough follow-up. | 15   | Many states enacted legislation that supported both mental health and substance abuse coverage from insurance, but there was only one found in the research that specifically identified coverage for court-ordered treatment. The State of Colorado has two laws, both preceding the Bush recommendations:  
  • Substance abuse—court-ordered treatment coverage  
  o ST § 10-16-104.7  
  o Eff. Jan. 1, 2003—Group and Individual, Substance Abuse, Mandated Offering, Subject to co-payment, deductible, and policy maximums and limitations  
  • Mental health services coverage—court ordered  
  o ST § 10-16-104.8  
  o Eff. March 31, 2006—Group and Individual, Mental Illness, Mandated Offering, Subject to in or out of network co-payment, deductible, and policy maximums and limitations  
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<td>B26</td>
<td>The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services should convene the directors of state mental health, substance abuse, and Medicaid agencies and constituent organizations to explore ways to expand and better coordinate delivery of evidence-based practices and community-based care to adults and children with mental and substance use disorders.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA), which was enacted on October 3, 2008, amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Public Health Service Act (PHS Act), and the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Code). The law applied to employment-related group health plans and health insurance coverage offered in connection with a group health plan. The changes made by MHPAEA were generally effective for plan years beginning after October 3, 2009. The MHPAEA of 2008 required health insurers and group health plans to provide the same level of benefits for mental and/or substance use treatment and services that they provide for medical/surgical care. The final rule of the act provided details about the implementation of the MHPAEA, such as: • Ensuring that parity applies to intermediate levels of care, such as treatment received in residential or intensive outpatient settings • Clarifying the scope of the transparency required by health plans, including the disclosure rights of plan participants, to ensure compliance with the law • Clarifying that parity applies to all plan standards, including geographic limits, facility-type limits, and network adequacy • Eliminating an exception to the existing parity rule that was determined to be confusing, unnecessary, and open to abuse See link: <a href="https://www.samhsa.gov/health-financing/implementation-mental-health-parity-addiction-equity-act">https://www.samhsa.gov/health-financing/implementation-mental-health-parity-addiction-equity-act</a></td>
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<td>B27</td>
<td>The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services should examine current strategies for implementing innovative technologies in the mental health field to enhance service capacity, through such means as telemedicine, electronic health records, health information technology, and electronic decision support tools in healthcare.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>HHS and other federal agencies have established prominent grant programs that allow state and private entities to compete for funding in areas that will be innovative for the mental health field. Several of the funding opportunities that have been available to the public are listed below: • Innovative Mental Health Services Research Not Involving Clinical Trials (R01)—(National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), NIH) • Innovations for Healthy Living—Improving Minority Health and Eliminating Health Disparities (R43/R44 - Clinical Trial Optional)—(National Institute on Minority Health and Health Disparities (NIMHD), NIH USA) • NIH Director’s New Innovator Award Program (DP2 - Clinical Trial Optional)—(National Institutes of Health (NIH), HHS) • NIH Director’s Transformative Research Award (R01 - Clinical Trial Optional)—(National Institutes of Health (NIH), HHS) • Challenge.gov—(U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) USA) See link for details: <a href="https://www.nlm.nih.gov/hsrinfo/grantsites.html">https://www.nlm.nih.gov/hsrinfo/grantsites.html</a></td>
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<td>B28</td>
<td>The interagency Federal Executive Steering Committee on Mental Health led by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services should promote federal agency collaboration to support innovations in mental health services and support for school aged children and young adults in primary care and specialty mental health settings using evidence-based programs and innovative technologies. The Committee should also</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>SAMHSA has a Child Mental Health Initiative that is dedicated to funding services in this area. See link: <a href="https://www.samhsa.gov/search_results/?k=mental+health+in+youth">https://www.samhsa.gov/search_results/?k=mental+health+in+youth</a> Early in the Bush era, the President created an interagency Federal Executive Steering Committee consisting of high-level representatives from agencies within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and from nine other federal departments that served children, adults, and older adults who have mental disorders. The Committee provided oversight for the implementation of the Interagency Federal Action Agenda on Mental Health under the President’s New Freedom Initiative in 2002. See link for full report: <a href="http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/mentalhealthcommission/reports/FinalReport/FinalReport-1.htm">http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/mentalhealthcommission/reports/FinalReport/FinalReport-1.htm</a></td>
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<td>B29</td>
<td>Where We Know What to Do, We Have to Be Better at Doing It</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>According to a report by the Council of State Governments, since 2000 at least 13 states have passed legislation establishing school safety councils, committees, and/or studies. Membership of these councils or committees most often include representatives from the department of education, government officials, local law enforcement agencies, emergency agencies including first responders, juvenile justice organizations, school administrators, community members, and parents of students. Common focuses of such committees and councils include school safety assessments, general violence, prevention, mental and behavioral health supports, and the creation of safety, security, and emergency preparedness standards. These committees or councils are either created to be permanently housed in a state department or they are structured to be operational for a specific period of time that culminates in a report that is submitted to a state governmental power such as the legislature or the governor's office. As of 2014, 33 states have statutes that specifically require every school or school district to have a comprehensive school safety or emergency plan (AK, AL, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, IL, KY, LA, MD, ME, MN, MS, MT, NC, NH, NV, NY, OH, OK, RI, SC, TN, TX, UT, VA, VT, WA, WI, and WV). School districts may choose to implement additional requirements for schools regarding their safety plans, including measures that address school safety needs specific to the area. States that lack statutory language regarding school safety plans may address the concerns in state regulations. See link for additional information: <a href="https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/NCSL-School-Safety-Plans-Brief.pdf">https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/NCSL-School-Safety-Plans-Brief.pdf</a></td>
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<td>B30</td>
<td>Integrate comprehensive all-hazards emergency management planning for schools into overall local and state emergency planning.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Many states enacted legislation regarding emergency preparedness planning, prior to the release of the Bush report. However, between 2008 and 2009, 17 states enacted legislation that instituted emergency management response planning into their K–12 and/or post-secondary school plans. 27 bills were passed in the following states: AL, AR, AZ, CA, CO, CT, FL, ID, IL, LA, MD, NH, OK, PA, TN, VA, and WA. See link for additional information: <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx">http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx</a></td>
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<td>B31</td>
<td>Institute regular practice of emergency management response plans and revise them as issues arise and circumstances change.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>See B – 31</td>
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<td>B32</td>
<td>Communicate emergency management plans to all school officials, school service workers, parents, students, and first responders.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>See B – 31</td>
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<td>B33</td>
<td>Develop a clear communication plan and tools to rapidly communicate with students and parents to alert them when an emergency occurs. Utilize technology to improve notification, communication, and security systems.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Between 2008 and 2009, only Virginia enacted legislation that was specific to the establishment of Public Institution Emergency Notification system for students, staff, and faculty—§ 23.1-803. First warning notification and emergency broadcast system required. See link: <a href="https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title23.1/chapter8/section23.1-803/">https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title23.1/chapter8/section23.1-803/</a></td>
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<td>B34</td>
<td>Ensure the actual and perceived effectiveness of campus law enforcement through enhanced professionalism of campus police forces and joint training with...</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Between 2008 and 2009, 10 states enacted legislation that was associated with the effectiveness of campus law enforcement. Those states were: AL, CO, DE, FL, IL, ID, MD, NY, TX, and VA. See link for additional information: <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx">http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx</a></td>
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<td>B35</td>
<td>Be prepared to provide both immediate and longer-term mental health support following an event, and evaluate events and the response to them in order to gather lessons learned and implement corrective measures.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Approximately five states put forward legislation that served to provide parental and student options for behavioral issues, based on changes to school policies in the area of student discipline. The states that adopted flexible school discipline strategies to support mental health issues were: IL, NH, TN, and VA. The bills do not spell out mental health but account for student behavior with flexible options of re-admittance to school post-event. See link to research more information: <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx">http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx</a></td>
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<td>B36</td>
<td>Integrate comprehensive all-hazards emergency management planning for schools into overall local and state emergency planning.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>According to a report by the Council of State Governments, since 2000 at least 13 states have passed legislation establishing school safety councils, committees, and/or studies. Membership of these councils or committees most often include representatives from the department of education, government officials, local law enforcement agencies, emergency agencies including first responders, juvenile justice organizations, school administrators, community members, and parents of students. Common focuses of such committees and councils include school safety assessments, general violence, prevention, mental and behavioral health supports, and the creation of safety, security, and emergency preparedness standards. These committees or councils are either created to be permanently housed in a state department or they are structured to be operational for a specific period of time that culminates in a report that is submitted to a state governmental power such as the legislature or the governor’s office. As of 2014, 33 states have statutes that specifically require every school or school district to have a comprehensive school safety or emergency plan (AK, AL, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, IL, KY, LA, MD, ME, MN, MS, MT, NC, NH, NV, NY, OH, OK, RI, SC, TN, TX, UT, VA, VT, WA, WI, and WV). School districts may choose to implement additional requirements for schools regarding their safety plans, including measures that address school safety needs specific to the area. States that lack statutory language regarding school safety plans may address the concerns in state regulations. See link for additional information: <a href="https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/NCSL-School-Safety-Plans-Brief.pdf">https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/NCSL-School-Safety-Plans-Brief.pdf</a></td>
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<td>B37</td>
<td>The U.S. Departments of Education, Homeland Security, and Justice should collaborate and be proactive in helping state, local, and campus law enforcement receive desired training and making them aware of federal resources on behavioral analysis, active shooter training, and other research and analysis relevant to preparedness and response.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>The U.S. Department of Justice, through the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), established the BJA National Training and Technical Assistance Center (NTTAC) in 2008. It was created to promote the BJA mission by serving as a major source of justice-related training and technical assistance (TTA) information and resources to improve criminal justice systems nationwide. BJA NTTAC continues to offers specialized assistance to the criminal justice field by providing state, local, and tribal communities with rapid, expert, coordinated, and data-driven training and technical assistance. It has several relevant training courses that have been available and currently scheduled for implementation across the country. See link for details related to campus safety: <a href="https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?Program_ID=108">https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?Program_ID=108</a></td>
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| B38  | The U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, jointly and separately, and in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Education, should consider allowing existing grant programs to be used to facilitate joint training exercises for state, local, and campus law enforcement. | 18   | The U.S. Department of Justice has worked with colleges and universities on training initiatives and continues to make funds available to states. Based on this report, the Department of Justice has urged states to consider how to make federal funds available to colleges and universities since 2007. The Department of Justice has a multitude of grants available to states to engage the education community as listed below:  
* Project Safe Neighborhoods  
* STOP School Violence Prevention and Mental Health Training Program  
* STOP School Violence Threat Assessment and Technology Reporting Program |
The U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services and Homeland Security should examine their community preparedness grants to state and local communities, which include an emphasis on early detection of hazards through information sharing, and clarify the grants that are available for the prevention of and preparedness for violence in schools, offices, and public places.

In 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released application guidance for 14 federal grant programs totaling more than $3 billion. Similar to previous years, the FY 2008 Citizen Corps Program (CCP) was one of four grant programs under the FY 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP). The CCP grants, in excess of $14 million, provided allowances for developing school preparedness plans specifically within the Appendix section. See link: https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1904-25045-2320/fy08_community_preparedness_and_participation_funding_summary_508.pdf


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<tr>
<td>VT-1</td>
<td>Emergency Planning</td>
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<td>VT - 2</td>
<td>Universities should do a risk analysis (threat assessment) and then choose a level of security appropriate.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>In 2008, Virginia enacted Act No. 533 for Public Institution Threat Assessment Team, which required the board of visitors or other governing body of every public institution of higher education to establish a violence assessment and threat assessment team, includes intervention; requires the team to adopt a campus-wide threat assessment policy and to seek cooperation from residential life, academic affairs, law enforcement, the counseling center, and student judicial affairs; and provides for relationships with law enforcement and mental health agencies. See link: <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx">http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx</a></td>
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<td>VT - 3</td>
<td>VT should update and enhance its Emergency Response Plan and bring it into compliance with federal and state guidelines.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>In 2008, Virginia enacted Act No. 526 for Public Institutions of Higher Education, which related to crisis and emergency management plans for public institutions of higher education, required the board of visitors or other governing body of each public institution of higher education to develop a written crises and emergency management plan. See link: <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx">http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx</a></td>
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<td>VT - 4</td>
<td>VT and other institutions of higher education should have a threat assessment team that includes representatives from law enforcement, human resources, student and academic affairs, legal counsel, and mental health.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>See VT – 2</td>
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<td>VT - 5</td>
<td>Students, faculty, and staff should be trained annually about responding to various emergencies and about the notification systems that will used.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>In 2008, Virginia enacted Act No. 413 for Public Institution Emergency Notification, which mandated that each public institution of higher education shall establish a comprehensive, prompt, and reliable first warning and emergency notification broadcast system for students, staff, and faculty. See link: <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx">http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx</a></td>
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<td>VT - 6</td>
<td>Universities and colleges must comply with the Clery Act, which requires timely public warnings of imminent danger.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>For more information on the role that the U.S. Department of Education has regarding the Clery Act, visit the following website: <a href="https://ope.ed.gov/campussafety/#/">https://ope.ed.gov/campussafety/#/</a></td>
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<td>VT - 7</td>
<td><strong>Campus Alerting</strong></td>
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<td>VT - 8</td>
<td>Campus emergency communications must have multiple means of sharing information.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>See VT – 5</td>
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<td>VT - 9</td>
<td>In an emergency, immediate messages must be sent to the campus community that provide clear information on the nature of the emergency and actions to be taken.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>See VT – 5</td>
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<td>VT - 10</td>
<td>Campus police as well as administration officials should have the authority and capability to send an emergency message.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>See VT – 5</td>
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<td>VT - 11</td>
<td><strong>Police Role and Training</strong></td>
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<td>VT - 12</td>
<td>The head of campus police should be a member of a threat assessment team as well as the emergency response team for the university.</td>
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<td>See VT – 2</td>
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<td>VT - 13</td>
<td>Campus police must report directly to the senior operations officer responsible for emergency decision-making.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>In 2008, Virginia enacted Act No. 596 on Campus Police Employment, which allowed any public institution of higher education to direct that its campus police officers and any auxiliary forces not be governed by the state Personnel Act, makes a technical amendment correcting an outdated Code citation, and relates to an institution of higher education’s authority to employ campus police officers. See link: <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx">http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx</a></td>
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<td>VT - 14</td>
<td>Campus police must train for Active Shooters (as did the VTPD).</td>
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<td>VT - 15</td>
<td>The mission statement of the campus police should give primacy to their law enforcement and crime prevention role.</td>
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<td>In 2009, Virginia enacted Act No. 609, Mutual Aid Agreements, which allowed all institutions of higher learning having a police force appointed pursuant to existing law, rather than just state-supported institutions, to enter in and become a party to contracts or mutual aid agreements for the use of their joint forces, both regular and auxiliary, equipment, and materials to maintain peace and good order. See link for details: <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx">http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx</a></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Mental Health Systems</strong></td>
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<td>VT - 16</td>
<td>Va. Code 37.2-808 (H) and (I) and 37.2-814 (A) should be amended to extend the time periods for temporary detention to permit more thorough mental health evaluations.</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>In 2008, Virginia House Bill (HB) 583 Emergency custody orders; extension of time. Allows the magistrate to extend the time of emergency custody orders for one two-hour period if good cause exists to grant the extension. Good cause for an extension includes the need for additional time to (i) find a suitable facility in which to temporarily detain the person subject to the order, or (ii) complete a medical evaluation of the person. See link for details: <a href="http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?ses=081&amp;typ=bi&amp;val=hb583">http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?ses=081&amp;typ=bi&amp;val=hb583</a></td>
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<td>VT - 17</td>
<td>Va. Code 37.2-809 should be amended to authorize magistrates to issue temporary detention orders based upon evaluations conducted by emergency physicians trained to perform emergency psychiatric evaluations.</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>See VT – 16</td>
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<td>VT - 18</td>
<td>The criteria for involuntary commitment in Va. Code 37.2-817(B) should be modified in order to promote more consistent application of the standard and to allow involuntary treatment in a broader range of cases involving severe mental illness.</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>In 2008, Virginia House Bill (HB) 559—Emergency custody orders, temporary detention orders, and involuntary commitment; criteria passed. The bill changed the criteria for emergency custody orders, temporary detention orders, involuntary commitment, and outpatient treatment, including how that criteria is applied to prisoners and juveniles, so that a person may be taken into custody, temporarily detained, involuntarily committed, or ordered to outpatient treatment if the person has a mental illness and there exists a substantial likelihood that, as a result of mental illness, the person will, in the near future (i) cause serious physical harm to himself or others as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening harm and other relevant information, if any, or (ii) suffer serious harm due to his lack of capacity to protect himself from harm or to provide for his basic human needs. This bill incorporated HB 1059 and HB 1237. See link for details: <a href="http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?081+sum+HB559">http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?081+sum+HB559</a></td>
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<td>VT - 19</td>
<td>The number and capacity of secure crisis stabilization units should be expanded where needed in Virginia to ensure that individuals who are subject to a temporary detention order do not need to wait for an available bed.</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>In 2016, the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services and the Virginia Association of Community Services Boards partnered to develop new standards and processes for emergency evaluators, including requiring all new hires to hold master’s or doctoral degrees and to undertake continuing education, supervision, and recertification every two years. See link: <a href="https://www.roanoke.com/news/education/higher_education/virginia_tech/status-reforms-proposed-in-the-aftermath-of/article_6483a99b-000a-54de-9eca-f80490dc3991.html">https://www.roanoke.com/news/education/higher_education/virginia_tech/status-reforms-proposed-in-the-aftermath-of/article_6483a99b-000a-54de-9eca-f80490dc3991.html</a></td>
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<td>VT - 20</td>
<td>The role and responsibilities of the independent evaluator in the commitment process should be clarified and steps taken to assure that the necessary reports and collateral information are assembled before the independent evaluator conducts the evaluation.</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>In 2008, Virginia House Bill (HB) 499 Involuntary commitment; establishes new standard for outpatient commitment. Within the bill, the Governor had attached an amendment that outlined the documents that needed to be presented at the commitment hearing—37.2-815. Commitment hearing for involuntary admission; examination required. Language from the addition reads: The examination shall consist of (i) a clinical assessment that includes a mental status examination; determination of current use of psychotropic and other medications; a medical and psychiatric history; a substance use, abuse, or dependency determination; and a determination of the likelihood that, as a result of mental illness, the person will, in the near future, suffer serious harm due to his lack of capacity to protect himself from harm or to provide for his basic human needs; (ii) a substance abuse screening, when indicated; (iii) a risk assessment; (v) a review of the temporary detention facility’s records for the person, including the treating physician’s evaluation; (vii) an assessment of whether the person meets the criteria for an order authorizing discharge to mandatory outpatient treatment following a period of inpatient treatment; (viii) an assessment of alternatives to involuntary inpatient treatment; and (ix) recommendations for the placement, care, and treatment of the person. See link for details: <a href="https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/37.2-815">https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/37.2-815</a></td>
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<td>VT - 21</td>
<td>The following documents should be presented at the commitment hearing: • The complete evaluation of the treating physician, including collateral information • Reports of any lab and toxicology tests conducted • Reports of prior psychiatric history • All admission forms and nurse’s notes</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>In 2008, the Virginia General Assembly passed House Bill (HB) 499 Involuntary commitment; establishes new standard for outpatient commitment. Within the bill, the Governor had attached an amendment that outlined the documents that needed to be presented at the commitment hearing—37.2-815. Commitment hearing for involuntary admission; examination required. Language from the addition reads: The examination shall consist of (i) a clinical assessment that includes a mental status examination; determination of current use of psychotropic and other medications; a medical and psychiatric history; a substance use, abuse, or dependency determination; and a determination of the likelihood that, as a result of mental illness, the person will, in the near future, suffer serious harm due to his lack of capacity to protect himself from harm or to provide for his basic human needs; (ii) a substance abuse screening, when indicated; (iii) a risk assessment; (v) a review of the temporary detention facility’s records for the person, including the treating physician’s evaluation; (vii) an assessment of whether the person meets the criteria for an order authorizing discharge to mandatory outpatient treatment following a period of inpatient treatment; (viii) an assessment of alternatives to involuntary inpatient treatment; and (ix) recommendations for the placement, care, and treatment of the person. See link for details: <a href="https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/37.2-815">https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/37.2-815</a></td>
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<td>VT - 22</td>
<td>The Virginia Code should be amended to require the presence of the prescreener or other CSB representative at all commitment hearings and to provide adequate resources</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>In 2008, House Bill (HB) 560 Commitment hearing; community services board representative, treating physician, etc. to attend passed. It requires the independent examiner and the community services board employee or designee who prepared the prescreening report, or if the hearing occurs in a different jurisdiction, an employee or designee of the local community services board or...</td>
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<td>VT - 23</td>
<td>The independent evaluator, if not present in person, and treating physician should be available where possible if needed for questioning during the hearing.</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>See VT - 23</td>
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<td>VT - 24</td>
<td>Virginia Health Records Privacy and Va. Code 37.2-814 et seq. should be amended to ensure that all entities involved with treatment have full authority to share records with each other and all persons involved in the involuntary commitment process while providing the legal safeguards needed to prevent unwarranted breaches of confidentiality.</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>In 2008, the Virginia General Assembly passed House Bill (HB) 499 Involuntary commitment; establishes new standard for outpatient commitment. Within the bill, it affords safe harbor in that “any healthcare provider shall be immune for any harm resulting from the disclosure of health records unless he intended the harm or acted in bad faith.” See link for details: <a href="http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?081+sum+HB499">http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?081+sum+HB499</a></td>
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<td>VT - 25</td>
<td>Virginia Health Records Privacy statute should be amended to provide a safe harbor provision that would protect health entities and providers from liability or loss of funding when they disclose information in connection with evaluations and commitment hearings conducted under Virginia Code 37.2-814 et seq.</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>In 2008, Virginia enacted Act No. 441, Institutions of Higher Education, which required the Board of Visitors or other governing board of any public institution of higher education to establish policies and procedures requiring the notification of a parent of a dependent student when such student receives mental health treatment at the institution’s student health or counseling center and it has been determined that the student may cause serious bodily harm to himself or others. See link for details: <a href="http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx">http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/education-bill-tracking-database.aspx</a></td>
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<td>VT - 26</td>
<td>Virginia Code 37.2-817(C) should be amended to clarify: The need for specificity in involuntary outpatient orders; the appropriate recipients of certified copies of orders; the party responsible for certifying copies of orders; the party responsible for reporting noncompliance with outpatient orders and to whom noncompliance is reported; the mechanism for returning the noncompliant person to court; the sanction(s) to be imposed on the noncompliant person who does not pose an imminent danger to himself or others.</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>In 2010, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code § 37.2-817 enacting a two-prong test in new subsections C1 and C2 permitting a court to commit an individual to inpatient hospitalization and then authorize mandatory outpatient treatment following a period of inpatient treatment if the court finds that the individual meets further specific criteria, namely: (i) the person has a history of lack of compliance with treatment for mental illness that at least twice within the past 36 months has resulted in the person being subject to an order for involuntary admission... (ii) in view of the person’s treatment history and current behavior, the person is in need of mandatory outpatient treatment following inpatient treatment in order to prevent a relapse or deterioration that would be likely to result in the person meeting the criteria for involuntary inpatient treatment; (iii) as a result of mental illness, the person is unlikely to voluntarily participate in outpatient treatment unless the court enters an order authorizing discharge to mandatory outpatient treatment following inpatient treatment; and (iv) the person is likely to benefit from mandatory outpatient treatment. At the time of discharge from the period of inpatient hospitalization, the language in subsection C2 prior to initially permitted the treating physician to discharge the person to mandatory treatment if he determines that the person (a) in view of his treatment history and current behavior, no longer</td>
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<td>VT-27</td>
<td>• the respective responsibilities of the detaining facility, the CSB, and the outpatient treatment provider in assuring effective implementation of involuntary outpatient treatment orders</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>The Virginia Health Records Privacy statute should be clarified to expressly authorize treatment providers to report noncompliance with involuntary outpatient orders. Virginia Code 37.2-817.1, Monitoring mandatory outpatient treatment; petition for hearing explicitly states that treatment providers are to report noncompliance with involuntary outpatient orders to the court. See link for most updated version of the Code: <a href="https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title37.2/chapter8/section37.2-817.1/">https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title37.2/chapter8/section37.2-817.1/</a></td>
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<td>VT-28</td>
<td>Virginia Code 37.2-819 should be amended to clarify that the clerk shall immediately upon completion of a commitment hearing complete and certify to the Central Criminal Records Exchange, a copy of any order for involuntary admission or involuntary outpatient treatment.</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Virginia Code 37.2-819 was amended by the Virginia General Assembly in 2008. See link for the most recent update: <a href="https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title37.2/chapter8/section37.2-819/">https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title37.2/chapter8/section37.2-819/</a></td>
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<td>VT-29</td>
<td>A comprehensive review of the Virginia Code should be undertaken to determine whether there exist additional situations where court orders containing mental health findings should be certified to the Central Criminal Records Exchange.</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>In March 2016, the Virginia General Assembly, in Item 313 (S) of the appropriations act, ordered the Department of Behavioral Health &amp; Developmental Services (DBHDS) &quot;to develop a model [program for mental health dockets] that can be replicated in other courts and jurisdictions that determine a need for such a docket.&quot; As a result, DBHDS also began to partner with the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia, both in its own Mental Health Docket Workgroup, as well as on the Problem-Solving Docket Advisory Group convened by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia. The final document that has been produced as a result of these collaborations was published on December 1, 2016, and it is the hope of DBHDS that this report will be used by communities as they explore the creation of a mental health docket in their locality. See link for details: <a href="http://www.dbhds.virginia.gov/library/forensics/ofo%20mental%20health%20docket%20report%20final.pdf">http://www.dbhds.virginia.gov/library/forensics/ofo%20mental%20health%20docket%20report%20final.pdf</a></td>
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<td>VT-30</td>
<td><strong>Information Privacy Laws</strong></td>
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<td>In 2014, the Virginia General Assembly passed House Bill (HB) 1268 Student mental health policies and procedures; violence prevention committees. The bill requires the violence prevention committee of each public institution of higher education to establish policies and procedures that outline circumstances under which all faculty and staff are to report threatening or aberrant behavior that may represent a physical threat to the community. The bill also requires each violence prevention committee to include notification of family members or guardians, or both, as a sufficient means of action in the committee’s policies and procedures for the assessment of individuals whose behavior may present a physical threat, unless such notification would prove harmful to the</td>
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<td>VT-31</td>
<td>Accurate guidance should be developed by the attorney general of Virginia regarding the application of information privacy laws to the behavior of troubled students.</td>
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<td>VT - 32</td>
<td>Privacy laws should be revised to include “safe harbor” provisions.</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>In 2008, the Virginia General Assembly passed HB 576 Mental health records; health provider shall disclose information to provide care, etc. of minor. The bill provides that, upon request, any healthcare provider or other provider rendering services to persons subject to emergency custody orders, temporary detention orders, or involuntary commitment proceedings shall disclose to certain entities and individuals all information necessary and appropriate for the entities or individuals to perform their duties in relation to such orders or proceedings. The bill also provides that any health care provider shall be immune for any harm resulting from the disclosure of health records unless he intended the harm or acted in bad faith. See link: <a href="http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?141+sum+HB1268S">http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?141+sum+HB1268S</a></td>
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<td>VT - 33</td>
<td>The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) should explicitly explain how it applies to medical records held for treatment purposes.</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>The purpose of the guidance was to explain the relationship between the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) to Student Health Records. See link: <a href="https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/doc/ferpa-hipaa-guidance.pdf">https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/doc/ferpa-hipaa-guidance.pdf</a></td>
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<td>VT - 34</td>
<td>FERPA should make explicit an exception regarding treatment records.</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>See VT – 33</td>
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<td>VT - 35</td>
<td>The Department of Education should allow more flexibility in FERPA’s “emergency” exception.</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>On July 1, 2010, the Department of Education announced updated guidelines relating to FERPA and the disclosure of student information related to emergencies and disasters. According to the document, the purpose of the guidance was to answer questions that arose about the sharing of personally identifiable information from students’ education records to outside parties when responding to emergencies, including natural or man-made disasters. See link for information: <a href="http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/pdf/ferpa-disaster-guidance.pdf">http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/pdf/ferpa-disaster-guidance.pdf</a></td>
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<td>Schools should ensure that law enforcement and medical staff (and others as necessary) are designated as school officials with an educational interest in school records.</td>
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<td>VT - 37</td>
<td>The Commonwealth of Virginia Commission on Mental Health Reform should study whether the result of a commitment hearing (whether the subject was voluntarily committed, involuntarily committed, committed to outpatient therapy, or released) should also be publicly available despite an individual’s request for confidentiality.</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>The Commonwealth of Virginia Commission on Mental Health Law Reform was directed by the Chief Justice to conduct a comprehensive examination of Virginia’s mental health laws and services and to study ways to use the law more effectively to serve the needs and protect the rights of people with mental illness, while respecting the interests of their families and communities. Goals of reform include reducing the need for commitment by improving access to mental health services, avoiding the criminalization of people with mental illness, making the process of involuntary treatment more fair and effective, enabling consumers of mental health services to have greater choice regarding the services they receive, and helping young people with mental health problems and their families before these problems spiral out of control. The Commission published a Progress Report in 2009 based on their research. See link for details on progress report:</td>
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<td>VT - 38</td>
<td>The national higher education associations should develop best practice protocols and associated training for information sharing. Among the associations that should provide guidance to the member institutions are: • American Council on Education (ACE) • American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU) • American Association of Community Colleges (AACE) • National Association of State and Land Grant Universities and Colleges (NASLGUC) • National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU) • Association of American Universities (AAU) • Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>The American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU) published a paper in 2009 that addressed many of the issues around information sharing and safety on college campuses. The paper was entitled Balancing Student Privacy, Campus Security, and Public Safety: Issues for Campus Leaders. The purpose of the paper was twofold: to provide background information on student privacy and campus security, and to review best practices that college and university leaders may consider to help ensure that a system is in place to simultaneously maximize an open community and manage public safety preparedness and responsiveness. See link for more details: <a href="http://www.aascu.org/uploadedFiles/AASCU/Content/Root/PolicyAndAdvocacy/PolicyPublications/08_perspectives%281%29.pdf">http://www.aascu.org/uploadedFiles/AASCU/Content/Root/PolicyAndAdvocacy/PolicyPublications/08_perspectives%281%29.pdf</a></td>
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<td>VT - 39</td>
<td><strong>Gun Purchase and Campus Policies</strong></td>
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<td>VT - 40</td>
<td>All states should report information necessary to conduct federal background checks on gun purchases.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>In 2008, President Bush signed the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, authorizing more than $1 billion in grants to improve local records reporting. The bill that became law had six provisions: • Enhancement of requirement that federal departments and agencies provide relevant information to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System. • Requirements to obtain waiver. • Implementation assistance to states. • Penalties for noncompliance. • Relief from disabilities program required as condition for participation in grant programs. • Illegal immigrant gun purchase notification. See public law: <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ180/pdf/PLAW-110publ180.pdf">https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ180/pdf/PLAW-110publ180.pdf</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 41</td>
<td>Virginia should require background checks for all firearms sales, including those at gun shows.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>In 2009, the Virginia Senate issued Senate Bill (SB) 1257 Firearms; criminal records check performed at a gun show before vendor may transfer. The bill would have added a definition of “firearms show vendor” and required that a criminal history record information check be performed on the prospective transferee before the vendor could transfer firearms at a gun show. Under current law, only licensed dealers could obtain such a check. The bill also added a definition of “promoter” and required that the promoter of a gun show provide vendors with access to licensed dealers who would conduct the criminal background check. The bill did not pass and was defeated in the Senate. See link for details: <a href="http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?091+sum+SB1257">http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?091+sum+SB1257</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 42</td>
<td>Anyone found to be a danger to themselves or others by a court-ordered review should be entered in the Central Criminal Records</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>In 2008 House Bill (HB) 815 Voluntary admission; report to Central Criminal Records Exchange passed, which codified Executive Order 50, requiring information regarding involuntary admission to a facility or for mandatory outpatient treatment be forwarded to the Central Criminal Records</td>
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<td>Exchange database regardless of whether they voluntarily agreed to treatment.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Exchange for purposes of determining an individual’s eligibility to possess, purchase, or transfer a firearm. The bill also made substantive changes to who may possess, purchase, or transfer a firearm. In addition to those ordered to involuntary treatment pursuant to Title 37.2, the bill made it illegal for a person found incompetent to stand trial and ordered to mental health treatment to possess or purchase a firearm. The bill also made it illegal for a person who was the subject of a temporary detention order, and subsequently agreed to voluntarily admission for mental health treatment, to possess or purchase a firearm. Such person would be advised that agreeing to voluntary treatment would affect the person’s right to possess or purchase a firearm. Finally, the bill revised the procedures for a person prohibited from possessing or purchasing a firearm because of an acquittal by reason of insanity, involuntary mental health treatment, or voluntary mental health treatment after a temporary detention order to restore his rights to purchase or possess a firearm. See link: <a href="http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?081+sum+HB815">http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?081+sum+HB815</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 43</td>
<td>The existing attorney general’s opinion regarding the authority of universities and colleges to ban guns on campus should be clarified immediately.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>In 2007, 2008, or 2009 the Attorney General did not provide an opinion on guns on campus. However, a Joint House Bill (HJ) 154 Firearms joint subcommittee to study laws and policies relating to purchase, etc. in state was introduced. It would have created a joint subcommittee to review existing laws regarding the purchase, possession, and transport of firearms in the Commonwealth, and to make recommendations for future legislation relating to firearms. The bill did not make it out of the House.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 44</td>
<td>The Virginia General Assembly should adopt legislation in the 2008 session clearly establishing the right of every institution of higher education in the Commonwealth to regulate the possession of firearms on campus if it so desires.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>A law providing this power to school institutions was outlined in 2004 per the Code of Virginia, Title 22.1-277.07:1. Policies prohibiting possession of firearms, which states the following: Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, each school division may develop and implement procedures addressing disciplinary actions against students, and may establish disciplinary policies prohibiting the possession of firearms on school property, school buses, and at school-sponsored activities. See link: <a href="https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title22.1/chapter14/section22.1-277.07-1/">https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title22.1/chapter14/section22.1-277.07-1/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 45</td>
<td>Universities and colleges should make clear in their literature what their policy is regarding weapons on campus.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>See VT – 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 46</td>
<td>Emergency Communication During an Event</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 47</td>
<td>In the preliminary stages of an investigation, the police should resist focusing on a single theory and communicating that to decision makers.</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>See VT – 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 48</td>
<td>All key facts should be included in an alerting message, and it should be disseminated as quickly as possible, with explicit information.</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>See VT – 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 49</td>
<td>Recipients of emergency messages should be urged to inform others.</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>See VT – 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 50</td>
<td>Universities should have multiple communication systems, including some not</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>In 2008 per the Code of Virginia, Title 23.1-803. First warning notification and emergency broadcast system required. The language states the following:</td>
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<td>dependent on high technology. Do not assume that 21st century communications may survive an attack or natural disaster or power failure.</td>
<td></td>
<td>A. The governing board of each public institution of higher education shall establish a comprehensive, prompt, and reliable first warning notification and emergency broadcast system for their students, faculty, and staff, both on and off campus. Such system shall be activated in the case of an emergency and may rely on website announcements; email notices; phone, cellular phone, and text messages; alert lines; public address systems; and other means of communication. See link: <a href="https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title23.1/chapter8/section23.1-803/">https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title23.1/chapter8/section23.1-803/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 51</td>
<td>Plans for canceling classes or closing the campus should be included in the university's emergency operations plan.</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>As of 2008, the Code of Virginia Title 23.1-804. Institutional crisis and emergency management plan authorized the governing board of each public institution of higher education shall develop, adopt, and keep current a written crisis and emergency management plan. Every four years, each public institution of higher education shall conduct a comprehensive review and revision of its crisis and emergency management plan to ensure that the plan remains current, and the revised plan shall be adopted formally by the governing board. This review would be inclusive of school closure protocols. See link for more details: <a href="https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title23.1/chapter8/section23.1-804/">https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title23.1/chapter8/section23.1-804/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 52</td>
<td>Campus Police and Response</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 53</td>
<td>Campus police everywhere should train with local police departments on response to active shooters and other emergencies.</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>From 1977 and forward, the Code of Virginia Title 23.1-813. Officers and members to comply with requirements of Department of Criminal Justice Services has stated that all individuals appointed and employed as campus police officers or members of an auxiliary police force pursuant to this article shall comply with the requirements for law-enforcement officers as established by the Department of Criminal Justice Services pursuant to Chapter 1 (§ 9.1-100 et seq.) of Title 9.1. This infers training. See link: <a href="https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title23.1/chapter8/section23.1-813/">https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title23.1/chapter8/section23.1-813/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 54</td>
<td>Dispatchers should be cautious when giving advice or instructions by phone to people in a shooting or facing other threats without knowing the situation.</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>As of 1997, the Code of Virginia Title 22.1-279.8. School safety audits and school crisis, emergency management, and medical emergency response plans required, a &quot;School safety audit&quot; or rather a written assessment of the safety conditions in each public school to (i) identify and, if necessary, develop solutions for physical safety concerns, including building security issues and (ii) identify and evaluate any patterns of student safety concerns occurring on school property or at school-sponsored events would take place. Solutions and responses include recommendations for structural adjustments, changes in school safety procedures, and revisions to the school board's standards for student conduct. The steps within any school safety plan would be addressed during these audits, which would correspond to execution of the emergency planning procedures. See link for details: <a href="https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title22.1/chapter14/section22.1-279.8/">https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title22.1/chapter14/section22.1-279.8/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 55</td>
<td>Police should escort survivors out of buildings, where circumstances and manpower permit.</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>See VT – 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 56</td>
<td>Schools should check the hardware on exterior doors to ensure that they are not subject to being chained shut.</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>See VT – 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 57</td>
<td>Take bomb threats seriously. Students and staff should report them immediately, even if most do turn out to be false alarms.</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>See VT – 54</td>
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<tr>
<td>VT-58</td>
<td>Emergency Medical Response</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 59</td>
<td>Montgomery County, VA, should develop a countywide emergency medical services, fire, and law enforcement communications center to address the issues of interoperability and economies of scale.</td>
<td>122</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 60</td>
<td>A unified command post should be established and operated based on the National Incident Management System Incident Command System model.</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>See VT – 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 61</td>
<td>Emergency personnel should use the National Incident Management System procedures for nomenclature, resource typing and utilization, communications, interoperability, and unified command.</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>See VT – 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 62</td>
<td>An emergency operations center must be activated early during a mass casualty incident.</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>See VT – 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 63</td>
<td>Regional disaster drills should be held on an annual basis.</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>See VT – 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 64</td>
<td>To improve multi-casualty incident management, the Western Virginia Emergency Medical Services Council should review/revisit the Multi-Casualty Incident Medical Control and the Regional Hospital Coordinating Center functions.</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>In March 2015 the Western Virginia and Blue Ridge EMS Councils, working in tandem with the Near Southwest Preparedness Alliance, joined for the development and implementation of an efficient and effective regional emergency medical services delivery system to include the regional coordination of emergency medical disaster planning and response. The purpose of the plan is to outline their approach to Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) Management. It provides general guidance for MCI Management activities and an overview of our methods of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. See link for details: <a href="www.western.vaems.org/downloads/.../986-brems-wvems-regional-mci-plan-3-12-15">www.western.vaems.org/downloads/.../986-brems-wvems-regional-mci-plan-3-12-15</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 65</td>
<td>Triage tags, patient care reports, or standardized Incident Command System forms must be completed accurately and retained after a multi-casualty incident.</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>See VT – 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 66</td>
<td>Hospitalists, when available, should assist with emergency department patient dispositions in preparing for a multi-casualty incident patient surge.</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>See VT – 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 67</td>
<td>Under no circumstances should the deceased be transported under emergency conditions.</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>See VT – 64</td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 68</td>
<td>Critical incident stress management and psychological services should continue to be available to EMS providers as needed.</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>See VT – 64</td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 69</td>
<td>Chief Medical Officer Recommendations</td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 70</td>
<td>The chief medical examiner should not be one of the staff performing the postmortem exams in mass casualty events; the chief medical examiner should be managing the overall response.</td>
<td>132</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 71</td>
<td>The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) should work along with law enforcement, Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS), chaplains, Department of Homeland Security, and other authorized entities in developing protocols and training to create a more responsive family assistance center (FAC).</td>
<td>132</td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 72</td>
<td>The OCME and Virginia State Police in concert with FAC personnel should ensure that family members of the deceased are afforded prompt and sensitive notification of the death of a family member when possible and provide briefings regarding any delays.</td>
<td>132</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT - 73</td>
<td>Training should be developed for FAC, law enforcement, OCME, medical and mental health professionals, and others regarding the impact of crime and appropriate intervention for victim survivors.</td>
<td>132</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 74</td>
<td>OCME and FAC personnel should ensure that a media expert is available to manage media requests effectively and that victims are not inundated with intrusions that may increase their stress.</td>
<td>133</td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 75</td>
<td>The Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services should mandate training for law enforcement officers on death notifications.</td>
<td>133</td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 76</td>
<td>The OCME should participate in disaster or national security drills and exercises to plan and train for effects of a mass fatality situation on ME operations.</td>
<td>133</td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 77</td>
<td>The Virginia Department of Health should continuously recruit board-certified forensic pathologists and other specialty positions to fill vacancies within the OCME.</td>
<td>133</td>
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<td>VT - 78</td>
<td>The Virginia Department of Health should have several public information officers</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>In 2009, the Virginia General Assembly enacted Chapter 269, an act to amend and reenact §§ 22.1-279.8, 23-9.2:9, 32.1-111.3, 32.1-111.11, 44-146.18, and 44-146.19 of the Code of Virginia, relating</td>
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<td>trained and well versed in OCME operations and in victims services.</td>
<td>to ensuring victims’ rights in emergency management plans. In brief, based on the act the school crisis, emergency management, and medical emergency response plan would include a provision that the Department of Criminal Justice Services and the Virginia Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund shall be contacted immediately to deploy assistance in the event of an emergency as defined in the emergency response plan when there are victims as defined in § 19.2-11.01, as well as current contact information for both. In addition, the act encompassed state procedures in the following areas of the school safety audit, medical training, victims assistance, coordinated emergency response, trauma triage, and more. See link for details on the act: <a href="http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?091+ful+CHAP0269">http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?091+ful+CHAP0269</a></td>
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<td>Funding to train and credential volunteer staff, such as the group from the Virginia Funeral Director’s Association, should be made available in order to utilize their talents.</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>See VT – 82</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Commonwealth should amend its Emergency Operations Plan to include an emergency support function for mass fatality operations and family assistance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VT - 81</td>
<td><strong>Immediate Aftermath and Long-Term Healing</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Emergency management plans should include a section on victim services that addresses the significant impact of homicide and other disaster-caused deaths on survivors and the role of victim service providers in the overall plan.</td>
<td>In 2012 the General Assembly issued Chapter 418, an act to amend and reenact §§ 22.1-279.8, 23-9.2:9, 32.1-111.3, 32.1-111.11, 44-146.18, and 44-146.19 of the Code of Virginia, relating to victims’ rights in emergency management plans; Department of Criminal Justice Services and the Virginia Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund to be lead agencies for those individuals determined to be victims. In brief, the act authorized the Department of Criminal Justice Services and the Virginia Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund to be the lead coordinating agencies for those individuals determined to be victims. It also contained the current contact information for both agencies. The act addressed a multitude of victim’s assistance issues and provided coordinated actions by organization for the issues outlined. See link for information: <a href="http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?121+ful+CHAP0418">http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?121+ful+CHAP0418</a></td>
<td>146</td>
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<tr>
<td>Universities and colleges should ensure that they have adequate plans to stand up a joint information center with a public information officer and adequate staff during major incidents on campus.</td>
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<td>146</td>
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<tr>
<td>When a family assistance center is created after a criminal mass casualty event, victim advocates should be called immediately to assist the victims and their families.</td>
<td></td>
<td>146</td>
<td>See VT – 82</td>
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<td>Regularly scheduled briefings should be provided to victims’ families as to the status of the investigation, the identification process, and the procedures for retrieving the deceased.</td>
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<td>146</td>
<td>See VT – 82</td>
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<td>VT-86</td>
<td>Because of the extensive physical and emotional impact of this incident, both short- and long-term counseling should be made available to first responders, students, staff, faculty members, university leaders, and the staff of The Inn at Virginia Tech.</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>See VT – 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT-87</td>
<td>Training in crisis management is needed at universities and colleges.</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>See VT – 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT-88</td>
<td>Law enforcement agencies should ensure that they have a victim services section or identified individual trained and skilled to respond directly and immediately to the needs of victims of crime from within the department.</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>See VT – 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT-89</td>
<td>It is important that the state’s Victims Services Section work to ensure that the injured victims are linked with local victim assistance professionals for ongoing help related to their possible needs.</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>See VT – 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT-90</td>
<td>Since all crime is local, the response to emergencies caused by crime should start with a local plan that is linked to the wider community. Universities and colleges should work with their local government partners to improve plans for mutual aid in all areas of crisis response, including that of victim services.</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>See VT – 82</td>
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<tr>
<td>VT-91</td>
<td>Universities and colleges should create a victim assistance capability either in-house or through linkages to county-based professional victim assistance providers for victims of all crime categories. A victim assistance office or designated campus victim advocate will ensure that victims of crime are made aware of their rights as victims and have access to services.</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>See VT – 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT-92</td>
<td>In order to advance public safety and meet public needs, Virginia’s colleges and universities need to work together as a coordinated system of state-supported institutions.</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>See VT – 82</td>
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Sections 22.1-279.8 and 9.1-184 of the Code of Virginia establish the Virginia Center for School Safety (VCSS) and set forth specific requirements for training, crisis management, emergency response, and other preventative measures for situations that pose a threat of harm to students or school personnel. VCSS annually collects, analyzes, and publishes school safety data, including information from annual school safety audits. It supports institutions across the state. See link for more details: [http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?131+ful+HB2344S1](http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?131+ful+HB2344S1)
### Table A.4: Now is the Time—The President’s Plan to Protect Our Children and Our Communities by Reducing Gun Violence (2013)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NITT - 1</td>
<td>Close Background Check Loopholes to Keep Guns Out of Dangerous Hands</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No bill requiring criminal background checks for all gun sales was ever successful in Congress during the Obama Administration’s two terms.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NITT - 2</td>
<td>Require criminal background checks for all gun sales.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Democrat Senator Joe Manchin and Republican Senator Pat Toomey proposed the Manchin-Toomey amendment. It was a more limited proposal than a larger Senate bill on guns, which would have mandated criminal background checks on all sales between private parties with limited exceptions. The legislation was proposed but failed in Senate. See link for details: <a href="https://www.congress.gov/amendment/113th-congress/senate-amendment/715/all-info">https://www.congress.gov/amendment/113th-congress/senate-amendment/715/all-info</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>NITT - 4</td>
<td>Call on licensed dealers and private sellers to do their part through executive action. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) will send an open letter to licensed dealers giving them guidance on how best to facilitate these checks.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>In April 2013, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) began the rulemaking process to assess and address any unnecessary legal barriers under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule preventing states from making appropriate data available to the federal background check system. Obama’s January 2016 Executive Action reported that “today, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a final rule expressly permitting certain HIPAA covered entities to provide to the NICS limited demographic and other necessary information about these individuals.” <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/04/fact-sheet-new-executive-actions-reduce-gun-violence-and-make-our">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/04/fact-sheet-new-executive-actions-reduce-gun-violence-and-make-our</a></td>
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<td>NITT - 5</td>
<td>Strengthen the background check system.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>The President took action to invest more than $20 million in 2013 to improve incentives for states to share this information with the federal background check system by improving their abilities to share information with the NICS. See link: <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/03/fact-sheet-strengthening-federal-background-check-system-keep-guns-out-p">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/03/fact-sheet-strengthening-federal-background-check-system-keep-guns-out-p</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>NITT - 6</td>
<td>Address unnecessary legal barriers that prevent states from reporting information about those prohibited from having guns.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>The President took action to invest more than $20 million in 2013 to improve incentives for states to share this information with the federal background check system. In September, the Department of Justice (DOJ) awarded $27.5 million to 42 states and one territory to strengthen the firearms background check system by improving their abilities to share information with the NICS. See link: <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/03/fact-sheet-strengthening-federal-background-check-system-keep-guns-out-p">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/03/fact-sheet-strengthening-federal-background-check-system-keep-guns-out-p</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>NITT - 7</td>
<td>Improve incentives for states to share information with the background check system: The Department of Justice will invest $20 million in FY2013 to give states stronger incentives to make this data available.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Department of Justice (DOJ) awarded $27.5 million to 42 states and one territory to strengthen the firearms background check system by improving their abilities to share information with the NICS. See link: <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/03/fact-sheet-strengthening-federal-background-check-system-keep-guns-out-p">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/03/fact-sheet-strengthening-federal-background-check-system-keep-guns-out-p</a></td>
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<td>NITT - 8</td>
<td>The Administration is also proposing $50 million for this purpose in FY2014 and will look for additional ways to ensure that states are doing their part to provide relevant information.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Administration is also proposing $50 million for this purpose in FY2014 and will look for additional ways to ensure that states are doing their part to provide relevant information.</td>
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Federal Commission on School Safety: Appendix B
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<td>NITT - 9</td>
<td>Hold federal agencies accountable for sharing reliable information with the background check system: Presidential Memorandum holding agencies to requirements that they identify these records, make them available to the background check system, and regularly report that those records are complete and up to date.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Presidential Memorandum issued in 2013: <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/16/presidential-memorandum-improving-availability-relevant-executive-branch">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/16/presidential-memorandum-improving-availability-relevant-executive-branch</a></td>
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<td>NITT - 10</td>
<td>Make sure dangerous people are prohibited from having guns: The President will direct the Attorney General, in consultation with other relevant agencies, to review the laws governing who is prohibited from having guns and make legislative and executive recommendations to ensure dangerous people aren't slipping through the cracks.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Attorney General undertook a comprehensive review of laws that identify potentially dangerous individuals who should not have access to a gun. As part of the review, DOJ solicited input from a variety of experts and stakeholders with a wide range of views. See link for reference: <a href="https://www.apha.org/-/media/files/pdf/topics/gun/gunviolenceprogressrpt.ashx">https://www.apha.org/-/media/files/pdf/topics/gun/gunviolenceprogressrpt.ashx</a></td>
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<td>NITT - 11</td>
<td>Banning Military-Style Assault Weapons and High-Capacity Magazines</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>In December 2012, the President asked the Vice President to develop a series of recommendations to reduce gun violence. On January 16, 2013, they released these proposals, including 23 executive actions. On August 29, 2013, the Administration announced a new policy of denying requests to bring military-grade firearms back into the United States to private entities, with only a few exceptions such as for museums. This new policy was developed to help keep military-grade firearms off the streets. See link: <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/29/fact-sheet-new-executive-actions-reduce-gun-violence">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/29/fact-sheet-new-executive-actions-reduce-gun-violence</a></td>
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<td>NITT - 12</td>
<td>Get military-style assault weapons and high capacity magazines off the streets.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>See NITT – 13</td>
</tr>
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<td>NITT - 13</td>
<td>Reinstate and strengthen the ban on assault weapons: Congress must reinstate and strengthen the prohibition on assault weapons.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>The Assault Weapons Ban of 2013 (AWB 2013) was a bill introduced in the 113th United States Congress as S. 150 by Senator Dianne Feinstein, D-CA, on January 24, 2013, one month after the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting, but the bill did not pass. See link for details: <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/150">https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/150</a></td>
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<td>NITT - 14</td>
<td>Limit ammunition magazines to 10 rounds: Congress needs to reinstate the prohibition on magazines holding more than 10 rounds.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>See NITT – 13</td>
</tr>
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<td>NITT - 15</td>
<td>Finish the job of getting armor-piercing bullets off the streets: Congress should finish the job of protecting law enforcement and the public by banning the possession of armor piercing ammunition by, and its transfer to, anyone other than the military and law enforcement.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>The House Resolution (HR) 1358—Armor-Piercing Bullets Act of 2015, introduced by Democratic Congressman Elliot Engel, never made it out of committee. See link: <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1358/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22Elliot%22%5D%7D">https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1358/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22Elliot%22%5D%7D</a></td>
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<td>NITT - 16</td>
<td>Give law enforcement additional tools to prevent and prosecute gun crime.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>In 2013 the Justice Department, at the request of Attorney General Holder, launched a comprehensive review of the criminal justice system in order to identify reforms that would ensure</td>
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<td>Federal laws are enforced more fairly and—in an era of reduced budgets—more efficiently. Specifically, this project identified five goals: • To ensure finite resources are devoted to the most important law enforcement priorities; • To promote fairer enforcement of the laws and alleviate disparate impacts of the criminal justice system; • To ensure just punishments for low-level, nonviolent convictions; • To bolster prevention and reentry efforts to deter crime and reduce recidivism; and • To strengthen protections for vulnerable populations. See link: <a href="https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2013/08/12/smart-on-crime.pdf">https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2013/08/12/smart-on-crime.pdf</a></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>In the United States Code, 18 USC § 922 provides for penalties for anyone who attempts to engage in the importation of firearms and who is not a licensed importer, manufacturer, or dealer. In many states, the purchase of most firearms must be conducted through a licensed dealer. Private transfer of ownership between firearm owners must be appropriately documented. This was law prior to the Obama Administration's position on gun control, and no additional punishment was enacted through law specifically addressing gun trafficking. See link to review Code: <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title18/pdf/USCODE-2011-title18-partI-chap44-sec922.pdf">https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title18/pdf/USCODE-2011-title18-partI-chap44-sec922.pdf</a></td>
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<td>NITT - 18</td>
<td>There is no explicit law against straw purchasing, so straw purchasers and others who traffic guns can often only be prosecuted for paperwork violations. Strengthen laws in this area.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>The President is calling on Congress to act on the Administration’s $4 billion proposal to help keep 15,000 cops on the street in cities and towns across the country.</td>
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<td>NITT - 19</td>
<td>The President is calling on Congress to act on the Administration’s $4 billion proposal to help keep 15,000 cops on the street in cities and towns across the country.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>The President issued a directive requiring federal law enforcement to trace guns recovered in criminal investigations. This tracing process allows law enforcement to follow a gun’s path from its manufacturer, to the dealer who sold it, to its first purchaser. Making sure federal law enforcement consistently traces recovered guns will help solve violent crimes by generating leads in specific cases, and aggregating large amounts of this tracing data will help reveal national gun trafficking patterns. See link for details: <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/16/presidential-memorandum-tracing-firearms-connection-criminal-investigations">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/16/presidential-memorandum-tracing-firearms-connection-criminal-investigations</a></td>
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<td>NITT - 20</td>
<td>Take executive action to enhance tracing data. All federal law enforcement agencies are uniformly required to trace all guns they recover and keep in custody. The President will issue a Presidential Memorandum requiring them to trace all such firearms.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Law enforcement officers often must return firearms seized as part of an investigation, but they cannot currently use the federal background check system to conduct a check on the gun’s owner. DOJ issued a proposed rule to give law enforcement the ability to run a full federal background check on someone before returning a seized gun. See link for details: <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/01/28/2013-01529/national-instant-criminal-background-check-system">https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/01/28/2013-01529/national-instant-criminal-background-check-system</a></td>
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<td>NITT - 21</td>
<td>Take executive action to help law enforcement avoid returning guns to the wrong hands. Currently, when law enforcement must return firearms seized as part of an investigation, they do not have the ability to conduct a full background check on the owner. The Administration will propose regulations to ensure that law enforcement has access to the database needed for complete background checks.</td>
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<td>NITT - 22</td>
<td>ATF has not had a confirmed director for six years. There is no excuse for leaving the key agency enforcing gun laws in America without a leader. It is time for Congress to confirm an ATF director.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>The ATF went without a permanent director for seven years. The President nominated B. Todd Jones as Director of the ATF and, on July 31, 2013, the Senate confirmed his appointment. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/senate-confirms-atf-director/2013/07/31/dc9b0644-fa09-11e2-8752-b41d7ed1f685_story.html?noredirect=on&amp;utm_term=.15f45a38724a">https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/senate-confirms-atf-director/2013/07/31/dc9b0644-fa09-11e2-8752-b41d7ed1f685_story.html?noredirect=on&amp;utm_term=.15f45a38724a</a> Current (2018) acting director is Deputy Director Thomas E. Brandon. See link for details: <a href="https://www.atf.gov/about/executive-staff">https://www.atf.gov/about/executive-staff</a></td>
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<td>NITT - 23</td>
<td>Eliminate restrictions that force the ATF to authorize importation of dangerous weapons simply because of their age. Congress should get rid of restrictions that prevent ATF from changing this definition, enabling ATF to ensure that firearms imported as curios or relics are actually of interest as collectibles, rather than letting these rules be used as a way to acquire fully functional and powerful military weapons.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>The ATF updated its curios and relics listing in 2018, and provided the definition below based on the regulation implementing federal firearms laws, 27 CFR §478.11. It defines Curio or Relic (C&amp;R) firearms as those which are of special interest to collectors by reason of some quality other than is associated with firearms intended for sporting use or as offensive or defensive weapons. To be recognized as C&amp;R items, 478.11 specifies that firearms must fall within one of the following categories: 1. Firearms that were manufactured at least 50 years prior to the current date, but not including replicas of such firearms; 2. Firearms that are certified by the curator of a municipal, State, or federal museum which exhibits firearms to be curios or relics of museum interest; and 3. Any other firearms that derive a substantial part of their monetary value from the fact that they are novel, rare, bizarre, or because of their association with some historical figure, period, or event. There is no information within the current definition that dissuades acquisition of &quot;fully functional and powerful military weapons.&quot; See link for details: <a href="https://www.atf.gov/firearms/curios-relics">https://www.atf.gov/firearms/curios-relics</a></td>
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<td>NITT - 24</td>
<td>Maximize enforcement efforts to prevent gun violence and prosecute gun crime. The Attorney General will ask all U.S. Attorneys to consider whether supplemental efforts would be appropriate in their districts, in areas such as prosecutions of people who have been convicted of a felony and illegally seek to obtain a firearm, or people who attempt to evade the background check system by providing false information.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>The Attorney General worked with all United States Attorneys to maximize enforcement efforts to prevent gun violence and prosecute gun crime. After the release of the President’s plan to reduce gun violence, the Attorney General rolled out the “Smart on Crime” initiative. As part of the initiative, U.S. Attorneys put in place updated anti-violence strategies that are specific to their districts. See link for details: <a href="https://www.justice.gov/archives/ago/attorney-generals-smart-crime-initiative">https://www.justice.gov/archives/ago/attorney-generals-smart-crime-initiative</a></td>
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<td>NITT - 25</td>
<td>Analyze information on lost and stolen guns and make it widely available to law enforcement. The Department of Justice will publish an annual report on lost and stolen guns to ensure that data collected by ATF is available.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>DOJ issued a report analyzing information on lost and stolen guns, making it widely available to law enforcement and the public. This report included state-by-state statistics about guns reported as missing by licensed gun dealers and individual gun owners. See link: <a href="https://www.atf.gov/resource-center/docs/2012-firearms-reported-lost-and-stolenpdf-1/download">https://www.atf.gov/resource-center/docs/2012-firearms-reported-lost-and-stolenpdf-1/download</a></td>
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<td>NITT - 26</td>
<td>Provide effective training for active shooter situations for 14,000 law enforcement officers, first responders, and school officials.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>DOJ and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provided federal training for law enforcement, first responders, and school officials on active shooter situations. This included trainings for local law enforcement at FBI field offices and active shooter roundtables, workshops, and site security</td>
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<td>NITT - 27</td>
<td>Congress should provide an additional $14 million to help train 14,000 more police officers and other public and private personnel to respond to active shooter situations.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>assessments with police and fire chiefs and school officials. DHS also launched a new active shooter webpage (<a href="https://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness">https://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness</a>), which includes training resources for federal, state, and local partners and the public.</td>
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<td>NITT - 28</td>
<td>Conduct research on the causes and prevention of gun violence, including links between video games, media images, and violence. The President is issuing a Presidential Memorandum directing the Centers for Disease Control and scientific agencies to conduct research into the causes and prevention of gun violence. And the Administration is calling on Congress to provide $10 million for the CDC to conduct further research, including investigating the relationship between video games, media images, and violence.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>The President directed the CDC (<a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/16/presidential-memorandum-engaging-public-health-research-causes-and-preve">https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/16/presidential-memorandum-engaging-public-health-research-causes-and-preve</a>) to research the causes and prevention of gun violence, including links between video games, media images, and violence. However, as of 2016, Obama’s requests to Congress to earmark $10 million for gun violence research in CDC budgets had been rejected for all three years prior by Congress. The CDC did publish a report referencing gun violence during the period. See link for report: <a href="https://dhss.delaware.gov/dhss/dms/files/cdcgunviolencereport10315.pdf">https://dhss.delaware.gov/dhss/dms/files/cdcgunviolencereport10315.pdf</a></td>
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<td>NITT - 29</td>
<td>Better understand how and when firearms are used in violent death. National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS) collects anonymous data, including the type of firearm used, whether the firearm was stored loaded or locked, and details on youth gun access. Congress should invest an additional $20 million to expand this system from the 18 states currently participating to all 50 states.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>As of 2018, the CDC funds 40 states, plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, to participate in NVDRS. See link for details: <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/nvdrs/stateprofiles.html">https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/nvdrs/stateprofiles.html</a></td>
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<td>NITT - 30</td>
<td>Preserve the rights of healthcare providers to protect their patients and communities from gun violence. Clarify that no federal law prevents healthcare providers from warning law enforcement authorities about threats of violence. The Department of Health and Human Services is issuing a letter to healthcare providers clarifying that no federal law prohibits these reports in any way.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>HHS issued a letter to providers clarifying that no federal law prohibits healthcare providers from reporting direct and credible threats of violence to the authorities. See link for letter: <a href="https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/office/lettertonationhcp.pdf">https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/office/lettertonationhcp.pdf</a></td>
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<td>NITT - 30</td>
<td>Protect the rights of healthcare providers to talk to their patients about gun safety. The Administration will issue guidance clarifying that the Affordable Care Act does not prohibit or otherwise regulate communication between doctors and</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>HHS issued guidance clarifying that the Affordable Care Act does not prohibit or otherwise limit communication between healthcare professionals and patients, including about firearms. Healthcare providers can play an important role in promoting gun safety. See Question 5 in the link for details: <a href="https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/aca_implementation_faqs11.html">https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/aca_implementation_faqs11.html</a></td>
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<td>NITT-32</td>
<td>Launch a national responsible gun ownership campaign. The Administration will encourage gun owners to take responsibility for keeping their guns safe with a national campaign.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>In 2013, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) awarded $1 million to the National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) to support the development of a National Public Education Campaign on the subject of responsible gun ownership and safe gun storage. With the award, NCPC was authorized to create, produce, and distribute television, radio, and outdoor Public Service Announcements (PSAs) that encouraged gun owners to safely store their firearms so that they would not fall into the wrong hands. The campaign was also supposed to emphasize the importance of immediately reporting lost or stolen guns to local law enforcement to ensure public safety. See link: <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-awards-1-million-national-crime-prevention-council-support-gun-safety">https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-awards-1-million-national-crime-prevention-council-support-gun-safety</a></td>
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<td>NITT-33</td>
<td>Review and enhance as warranted safety standards for gun locks and gun safes. The Chair of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) intends to review the effectiveness of gun locks and gun safes, including existing voluntary industry standards, and take any steps that may be warranted to improve the standards as well as to protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury or death that arise when those products within the CPSC's jurisdiction fail.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>As of 2013, the Office of the Chairman of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) reviewed the safety standards for gun locks and gun safes and fully engaged the relevant voluntary standards body, which began a process to improve the standards. No official statement from the CPSC was released in reference to safety standard for gun locks and gun safes.</td>
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<td>NITT-34</td>
<td>Encourage the development of innovative gun safety technology: The President is directing the Attorney General to work with technology experts to review existing and emerging gun safety technologies, and to issue a report on the availability and use of those technologies. In addition, the Administration will issue a challenge to the private sector to develop innovative and cost-effective gun safety technology and provide prizes for those technologies that are proven to be reliable and effective.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>DOJ issued a report (<a href="https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/242500.pdf">https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/242500.pdf</a>) reviewing the availability and use of new gun safety technologies. This report incorporated input from a meeting the Attorney General hosted with stakeholders, including manufacturers and technology experts. Building on this report, the Administration issued a challenge to the private sector to develop innovative and cost-effective gun safety technology and provide prizes for those technologies that were proven to be reliable and effective.</td>
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<td>NITT-35</td>
<td>Making Schools Safer</td>
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<td>NITT-36</td>
<td>Put up to 1,000 more school resource officers and counselors in schools and help</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>In 2016, the Obama Administration released resources for schools and colleges on the appropriate use of SROs and campus police. See link for details: <a href="https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/obama-">https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/obama-</a></td>
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<td>NITT</td>
<td>schools invest in safety.</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>administration-releases-resources-schools-colleges-ensure-appropriate-use-school-resource-officers-and-campus-police</td>
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<td>COPS Hiring Grants, which help police departments hire officers, can already be used by departments to fund school resource officers.</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Hiring Grants, which help police departments hire officers, could already be used by departments to fund school resource officers. In 2013, DOJ provided additional points in the COPS grant competition to applicants who requested funds to hire school resource officers. On September 27, the Attorney General announced more than $125 million for COPS grants to 263 cities and counties, including nearly $45 million to fund 356 new school resource officer positions. DOJ also began their work to develop a model for, as well as training curriculum on, the effective use of school resource officers to help create safe and nurturing school climates. See link: <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-awards-hiring-grants-law-enforcement-and-school-safety-officers">https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-awards-hiring-grants-law-enforcement-and-school-safety-officers</a></td>
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<td>NITT</td>
<td>Department of Justice will provide an incentive for police departments to hire these officers by providing a preference for grant applications that support school resource officers.</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Changes were made to the FY2013 COPS Hiring Program to incorporate funding specifically to hire and utilize School Resource Officers on school sites. See link for details: <a href="https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2013_CHP_Open_Solicitation_Letter2.pdf">https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2013_CHP_Open_Solicitation_Letter2.pdf</a></td>
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<td>Put up to 1,000 new school resource officers and school counselors on the job. The Administration is proposing a new Comprehensive School Safety program, which will help school districts hire staff and make other critical investments in school safety. The program will give $150 million to school districts and law enforcement agencies to hire school resource officers, school psychologists, social workers, and counselors.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Justice worked with the Department of Education and other federal agency partners on the development of the Comprehensive School Safety program: <a href="https://ojp.gov/topics/crime/school-crime/Pages/school-safety-initiative.aspx">https://ojp.gov/topics/crime/school-crime/Pages/school-safety-initiative.aspx</a> This includes grant programs such as the School Justice Collaboration Program: <a href="https://www.ojjdp.gov/grants/solicitations/FY2014/SJCPKeepingKidsinSchool.pdf">https://www.ojjdp.gov/grants/solicitations/FY2014/SJCPKeepingKidsinSchool.pdf</a></td>
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<td>NITT</td>
<td>The Department of Justice will also develop a model for using school resource officers, including best practices on age-appropriate methods for working with students.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>In 2013, the National Center for Mental Health Promotion and Youth Violence Prevention issued a brief entitled School Resource Officers: Steps to effective school-based law enforcement. See link: <a href="http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/SRO%20Brief.pdf">http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/SRO%20Brief.pdf</a> In addition, the Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services offered guidance on SROs on their website. See link for the most updated information: <a href="https://cops.usdoj.gov/supportinesafeschools">https://cops.usdoj.gov/supportinesafeschools</a></td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>Invest in other strategies to make our schools safer. School districts could also use these Comprehensive School Safety Grants to purchase school safety equipment; develop and update public safety plans; conduct threat assessments; and train “crisis intervention teams” of law enforcement officers to work with the mental health community to respond to and assist students in crisis.</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>In June 2013 the Department of Education, along with DHS, DOJ, HHS, FEMA, and the FBI jointly published three separate guides to assist schools, institutions of higher education, and houses of worship develop high quality comprehensive emergency operations plans (available at <a href="https://rems.ed.gov/EOPGuides.aspx">https://rems.ed.gov/EOPGuides.aspx</a>). The Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance Center maintains the Department of Education’s school safety resources as well as resources from other federal agencies and other public and private organizations, and creates and disseminates a wide range of virtual tools, trainings, in-person trainings, informational documents, and other materials in support of these guides for developing high-quality emergency operations plans. Available at <a href="http://REMS.ed.gov">http://REMS.ed.gov</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>NITT-42</td>
<td>Every school has a comprehensive emergency management plan.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>See NITT – 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NITT-43</td>
<td>Give schools and other institutions a model for how to develop and implement reliable plans. The Departments of Education, Justice, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security will release—by May 2013—a set of model, high-quality emergency management plans for schools, houses of worship, and institutions of higher education, along with best practices for developing these plans and training students and staff to follow them.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>See NITT – 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NITT-44</td>
<td>Help schools develop and implement emergency plans: Congress should provide $30 million of one-time grants to states to help their school districts develop and implement emergency management plans. Congress should require states and school districts that receive school safety funding from the Department of Education to have comprehensive, up-to-date emergency plans in place for all of their schools.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>In FY 2014, the Department of Education established an 18-month Grants to States for School Emergency Management Emergency Management program with grants to State Educational Agencies (SEAs). See link: <a href="https://www2.ed.gov/programs/schlemermgmt-sea/index.html">https://www2.ed.gov/programs/schlemermgmt-sea/index.html</a> Approximately $13 million was awarded to 25 SEA applicants (out of 36 applications received), for an 18-month grant period, ranging from $250,000 to $1,954,749. The grants assisted SEAs to build their emergency management capacity and provide technical assistance to their local educational agencies (LEAs) to develop high-quality emergency operations plans. The Department of Education’s REMS TA Center provided technical assistance to the grantees in the form of information, resources, tools, training and customized plans for helping grantees assist their LEAs develop high-quality emergency operations plans.</td>
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<td>NITT-45</td>
<td>Create a safer climate at schools across the country.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance Center maintains the Department of Education’s school safety resources as well as resources from other federal agencies and other public and private organizations, and creates and disseminates a wide range of virtual tools, trainings, in-person trainings, informational documents, and other materials in support of these guides for developing high-quality emergency operations plans. Available at <a href="http://REMS.ed.gov">http://REMS.ed.gov</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>NITT-46</td>
<td>Help 8,000 schools create safer and more nurturing school climates. The Administration is proposing a new, $50 million initiative to help 8,000 more schools train their teachers and other school staff to implement these strategies. The Administration will also develop a school climate survey, providing reliable data to help schools implement policies to improve climate.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>In FY 2014, the Department of Education established a five-year School Climate Transformation Grant program with grants to SEAs and LEAs. A total of $7.3 million was awarded to 12 SEA applicants (out of 32 received) with annual awards ranging from $260,427 to $750,000. These grants assisted SEAs to develop, enhance, expand statewide systems of support for, and technical assistance to, LEAs and schools implementing an evidence-based, multi-tiered behavioral framework for improving behavioral outcomes and learning conditions for all students. More than $35 million was awarded to 71 LEA applicants (out of 426 received) with annual awards ranging from $138,576 to $750,000. These grants assisted SEAs to develop, enhance, or expand statewide systems of support for, and technical assistance to, schools implementing an evidence-based, multi-tiered behavioral framework for improving behavioral outcomes and learning conditions for all students. <a href="https://www2.ed.gov/programs/schoolclimatelea/index.html">https://www2.ed.gov/programs/schoolclimatelea/index.html</a> <a href="https://www2.ed.gov/programs/schoolclimatesea/index.html">https://www2.ed.gov/programs/schoolclimatesea/index.html</a> The agency developed the high-quality, adaptable Department of Education School Climate Surveys</td>
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<td>(EDSCLS) and associated web-based platform. The EDSCLS allows states, local districts, and schools to collect and act on reliable, nationally validated school climate data in real-time. The EDSCLS web-based administration platform includes a suite of school climate surveys for middle and high school students, instructional staff, non-instructional staff, and parents/guardians. The EDSCLS can be downloaded and administered free of charge. The platform processes data and provides user-friendly reports in real time. Education agencies administering the survey can store data locally on their systems. The Department of Education does not have access to the data. See link for more detailed information: <a href="https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/edscls">https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/edscls</a></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>In January 2014, the Department of Education and the Department of Justice released a resource package to enhance school safety and improve school discipline (<a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departments-justice-and-education-issue-school-discipline-guidance-promote-safe-inclusive">https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departments-justice-and-education-issue-school-discipline-guidance-promote-safe-inclusive</a>). The package included the following: - A Dear Colleague guidance letter describing how schools can meet their obligations under federal law to administer student discipline without discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin. - A Guiding Principles document, which draws from emerging research and best practices to describe three key principles and related action steps that can help guide state- and locally controlled efforts to improve school climate and school discipline. The three key principles are: (1) Create positive climates and focus on prevention; (2) Develop clear, appropriate, and consistent expectations and consequences to address disruptive student behaviors; and (3) Ensure fairness, equity, and continuous improvement. - A Directory of Federal School Climate and Discipline Resources, which indexes the extensive federal technical assistance and other resources on school discipline and climate available to schools and districts; - An online Compendium of School Discipline Laws and Regulations, which catalogues the laws and regulations related to school discipline in each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, and compares laws across states and jurisdictions; and - An Overview of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, which outlines recent federal efforts on these issues.</td>
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### NITT - 47

Share best practices on school discipline. The Department of Education will collect and disseminate best practices on school discipline policies and help school districts develop and equitably implement their policies. 13


- A Dear Colleague guidance letter describing how schools can meet their obligations under federal law to administer student discipline without discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin.

- A Guiding Principles document, which draws from emerging research and best practices to describe three key principles and related action steps that can help guide state- and locally controlled efforts to improve school climate and school discipline. The three key principles are: (1) Create positive climates and focus on prevention; (2) Develop clear, appropriate, and consistent expectations and consequences to address disruptive student behaviors; and (3) Ensure fairness, equity, and continuous improvement.

- A Directory of Federal School Climate and Discipline Resources, which indexes the extensive federal technical assistance and other resources on school discipline and climate available to schools and districts;

- An online Compendium of School Discipline Laws and Regulations, which catalogues the laws and regulations related to school discipline in each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, and compares laws across states and jurisdictions; and

- An Overview of the Supportive School Discipline Initiative, which outlines recent federal efforts on these issues.

### NITT - 48

**Improving Mental Health Services**

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<td>NITT - 48</td>
<td>Make sure students and young adults get treatment for mental health.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>See NITT – 50</td>
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### NITT - 49

Reach 750,000 young people through programs to identify mental illness early and refer them to treatment. The Administration is calling for a new initiative, Project AWARE (Advancing Wellness and Resilience in Education), to provide this training and set up systems to provide these referrals.

Project AWARE grants promote youth mental health awareness among schools and communities and improve connections to services for school-age youth ([https://www.samhsa.gov/nitt-ta/project-aware-grant-information](https://www.samhsa.gov/nitt-ta/project-aware-grant-information)). Project AWARE is a grant program designed to help state and local education agencies:

- Increase awareness of mental health issues among school-age youth
- Train educators and other youth-serving adults to detect and respond to mental health issues
- Connect children, youth, and families who may experience behavioral health issues with appropriate services

Project AWARE meets these goals by expanding or implementing (among others):

- Access to existing funding systems that support mental health services for school-age youth
- Access to school- and community-based mental health services
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|       | Provide "Mental Health First Aid" training for teachers: Project AWARE includes $15 million for training for teachers and other adults who interact with youth to detect and respond to mental illness in children and young adults. | 14 | - Coordination among state and local youth-serving systems  
- Culturally specific and developmentally appropriate mental health services  
- Mental Health First Aid and Youth Mental Health First Aid training for adults who interact with school-age youth  
- Use of a multi-tiered behavioral framework  
- Youth violence prevention strategies |
| NITT - 51 | Make sure students with signs of mental illness get referred to treatment: Project AWARE also includes $40 million to help school districts work with law enforcement, mental health agencies, and other local organizations to ensure students with mental health issues or other behavioral issues are referred to the services they need. | 14 | See NITT – 50 |
| NITT - 52 | Support individuals ages 16 to 25 at high risk for mental illness. The Administration is proposing $25 million for innovative state-based strategies supporting young people ages 16 to 25 with mental health or substance abuse issues. | 14 | The Now Is the Time Healthy Transitions grant program improves access to treatment and support services for 16- to 25-year-olds who have, or are at risk of developing, a serious mental health condition. The Healthy Transitions grant program:  
- Increases awareness about early indicators of serious mental health concerns  
- Identifies action strategies for when a serious mental health concern is detected  
- Trains provider and community groups to improve services and support  
- Enhances peer and family supports  
- Develops services and interventions to support transitions to adult roles and responsibilities  
Healthy Transitions program strategies include (among others):  
- Increasing public awareness and developing outreach and engagement activities  
- Implementing evidence-based, age-appropriate practices  
- Ensuring cultural and linguistic competence  
- Providing screening, assessment, service coordination, direct treatment, and wraparound recovery and support services  
See link: [https://www.samhsa.gov/nitt-ta/healthy-transitions-grant-information](https://www.samhsa.gov/nitt-ta/healthy-transitions-grant-information) |
| NITT - 53 | Help schools address pervasive violence. To help schools break the cycle of violence, Congress should provide $25 million to offer students mental health services for trauma or anxiety, conflict resolution programs, and other school-based violence prevention strategies. | 14 | In FY 2014 the Department of Education established a five-year Project Prevent program with grants to LEAs.  
A total of $14.2 million was awarded to 22 LEA applicants (out of 115 received). The grants assisted LEAs to increase their capacity to help schools in communities with pervasive violence to better address the needs of affected students and break the cycle of violence. The grants promoted conflict resolution skills and offered students access to community-based counseling services and school-based social and emotional supports.  
See link for details: [https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/states-and-grantees/project-prevent-grants](https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/states-and-grantees/project-prevent-grants) |
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| NITT - 55 | Train more than 5,000 additional mental health professionals to serve students and young adults. To help fill this gap, the Administration is proposing $50 million to train social workers, counselors, psychologists, and other mental health professionals. This would provide stipends and tuition reimbursement to train more than 5,000 mental health professionals serving young people in our schools and communities. | 14   | The Department of Health and Human Services awarded more than $34 million to train just over 4,000 new mental health providers, including:  
  - $30.3 million to expand the mental health workforce through 100 new grants to training programs to train new mental health and substance abuse health professionals who treat children, adolescents, and young adults with, or at risk for, a mental health or substance use disorder.  
  - $2.7 million for five new grants to support youth Minority Fellowship Programs to increase access to mental health services for youth and young adults in America.  
  - $1.6 million for two new grants to support addiction counselor Minority Fellowship Programs to increase access to substance abuse treatment services for youth in America.  
There was an additional $16.7 million to support 17 new Healthy Transitions grants, to improve access to treatment and support services for youth and young adults ages 16 to 25 that either have, or are at high risk of developing, a serious mental health condition. See link for details: [http://wayback.archive-it.org/3926/20150618190008/http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/09/20140922a.html](http://wayback.archive-it.org/3926/20150618190008/http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/09/20140922a.html) |
| NITT - 56 | Launch a national conversation to increase understanding about mental health. The President is directing Secretaries Sebelius and Duncan to launch a national dialogue about mental illness with young people who have experienced mental illness, members of the faith community, foundations, and school and business leaders. | 15   | The Administration hosted the National Conference on Mental Health to discuss how we can all work together to reduce negative attitudes and perceptions about mental illnesses, encourage people experiencing mental health problems to reach out for help, and encourage friends and family members to support their loved ones and connect them with help. The White House applauded the dozens of commitments to increase understanding and awareness of mental health that were made by organizations representing media, educators, healthcare providers, faith communities, and foundations.  
In June 2013, the Administration also launched mentalhealth.gov, a new website featuring easy-to-understand information about basic signs of mental health problems, how to talk about mental health, and how to find help for you or a loved one.  
See link for more details: [https://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/directors/thomas-insel/blog/2013/a-national-dialogue.shtml](https://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/directors/thomas-insel/blog/2013/a-national-dialogue.shtml) |
| NITT - 57 | Ensure coverage of mental health treatment. The Affordable Care Act will also make sure that Americans can get the mental health treatment they need by ensuring that insurance plans cover mental health benefits at parity with other benefits. | 15   | To fill gaps in insurance coverage that make the cost of mental health services prohibitively expensive, the Administration finalized an Affordable Care Act rule that expanded mental health and substance use disorder benefits and parity protections for 62 million Americans. Because of these parity protections, many insurance plans included coverage for mental health and substance use disorders that is comparable to their medical and surgical coverage. See link: [https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/affordable-care-act-expands-mental-health-and-substance-use-disorder-benefits-and-federal-parity-protections-62-million-americans](https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/affordable-care-act-expands-mental-health-and-substance-use-disorder-benefits-and-federal-parity-protections-62-million-americans) |
| NITT - 58 | Finalize requirements for private health insurance plans to cover mental health services. The Administration will issue final regulations governing how existing group health plans that offer mental health services must cover them at parity under the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008. In addition, the Affordable Care Act requires all new small group and individual plans to cover 10 essential health benefit | 15   | The Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury issued a final rule on health plan coverage of mental health and substance use disorders. Under the rule, plan benefits for these conditions, when offered, must be covered at parity with medical and surgical care benefits. The regulation also includes important consumer protections, including making clear the information that insurance companies must provide to help ensure transparency and compliance with the law. See link: [https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/affordable-care-act-expands-mental-health-and-substance-use-disorder-benefits-and-federal-parity-protections-62-million-americans](https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/affordable-care-act-expands-mental-health-and-substance-use-disorder-benefits-and-federal-parity-protections-62-million-americans) |
Ref #: NITT - 59
Recommendations: Make sure millions of Americans covered by Medicaid get quality mental health coverage. There is some evidence that Medicaid plans are not always meeting mental health parity requirements today, an issue that will only become more important as Medicaid is expanded. The Administration is issuing a letter to state health officials making clear that these plans must comply with mental health parity requirements.

Actions Taken: HHS released a letter to state health officials making clear how Medicaid plans must comply with requirements to ensure that mental healthcare is covered the same as other medical services. See link: https://www.medicaid.gov/Federal-Policy-Guidance/downloads/SHO-13-001.pdf


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<td>SH-1</td>
<td><strong>Safe School Design and Operation</strong></td>
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<td>SH-2</td>
<td>All classrooms in K–12 schools should be equipped with locked doors that can be locked from the inside by the classroom teacher or substitute.</td>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>In 2013 the Connecticut Legislature passed Public Act 13-3, which established the School Security Infrastructure Grant Program to assist individual public and non-public schools in improving security infrastructure. There were initially three open rounds of funding administered: Round 1 (2013), Round 2 (2014), and Round 3 (2017). This funding would support upgrades to doors within schools, to include locks. See link for infrastructure grant resources: <a href="http://www.ct.gov/demhs/cwp/view.asp?a=1939&amp;q=548938">http://www.ct.gov/demhs/cwp/view.asp?a=1939&amp;q=548938</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>SH-3</td>
<td>All exterior doors in K–12 schools be equipped with hardware capable of implementing a full perimeter lockdown.</td>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>See SH – 2 for details</td>
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<td>SH-4</td>
<td>A feasibility study should be conducted to develop additional safety standards concerning the issuance of classroom keys to substitute teachers.</td>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>In keeping with Public Act 13-3, Section 86, the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection/Division of Emergency Management and Homeland Security (DESPP/DEMHS), in consultation with the Department of Education, re-convened a multi-jurisdictional, multi-disciplinary working group to review and revise as needed the School Security and Safety Plan Standards and the accompanying School Security and Safety Plan Template that were released last year to help schools and the surrounding communities meet all-hazards threat. The requirements for a plan and for plan standards are now codified in Connecticut General Statutes Sections 10-222m and 10-222n. To this end, each local and regional board of education annually establishes a school security and safety committee at each school within its jurisdiction. The Committee is responsible for assisting in the development of the school security and safety plan for the school and administering the plan. The Committee will decide on issues such as this. See link for more: <a href="https://www.ct.gov/demhs/cwp/view.asp?a=1939&amp;q=553694">https://www.ct.gov/demhs/cwp/view.asp?a=1939&amp;q=553694</a></td>
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<td>SH-5</td>
<td>School custodians should be included as members of school security and safety committees.</td>
<td>A-1</td>
<td>According to Public Act 13-3, the local School Safety Committee members shall include a local police officer, local first responder, teacher and administrator from the school, a mental health professional, and a parent or guardian of a student at the school—and may include any other person deemed necessary, such as a school nurse, custodian or property manager, local emergency management director, local public health director, information technology manager, and</td>
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<td>SH - 7</td>
<td>For the school year commencing July 1, 2014, and each school year thereafter, each local and regional board of education shall establish a school security and safety committee at each school under the jurisdiction of such board. The school security and safety committee shall be responsible for assisting in the development of the school security and safety plan for the school and administering such plan.</td>
<td>A-2</td>
<td>The requirements for a Committee, plan, and for plan standards are now codified in Connecticut General Statutes Sections 10-222m and 10-222n. To this end, each local and regional board of education annually establishes a school security and safety committee at each school within its jurisdiction. The Committee is responsible for assisting in the development of the school security and safety plan for the school and administering the plan. See link: <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/connecticut/2013/title-10/chapter-170/section-10-222n/">https://law.justia.com/codes/connecticut/2013/title-10/chapter-170/section-10-222n/</a>.</td>
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<td>SH - 8</td>
<td>Each local and regional board of education shall annually submit the school security and safety plan for each school under the jurisdiction of such board.</td>
<td>A-2</td>
<td>See SH – 7.</td>
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<td>SH - 9</td>
<td>Each school district to create a permanent committee or commission, the purpose of which shall be to ensure SDDO standards and strategies are implemented in the district.</td>
<td>A-4</td>
<td>See SH – 7.</td>
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<td>SH - 10</td>
<td>The state should amend section 80 (a) of P.A. 13-3 to include an architect licensed in the State of Connecticut among the members of the School Safety Infrastructure Council.</td>
<td>A-4</td>
<td>As of April 2014, the legislation calls for “one appointed by the speaker of the House of Representatives, who shall be a licensed professional engineer who is a structural engineer,” but does not specify an architect. See link for more detailed information: <a href="https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/ACT/PA/2013PA-00003-R00SB-01160-PA.htm">https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/ACT/PA/2013PA-00003-R00SB-01160-PA.htm</a>. See SH 10/chapter 222n/.</td>
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<td>SH - 11</td>
<td>The School Safety Infrastructure Council shall develop school safety infrastructure standards for school building projects.</td>
<td>A-4</td>
<td>A bill to create the School Security Infrastructure Grant Program—Act No. 16-171 was enacted on 06/06/2016. The bill extends the school security infrastructure competitive grant program, provides for joint administration of the program, and authorizes certain entities to apply to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a grant for certain expenses. See link: <a href="https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/ACT/pa/pdf/2016PA-00171-R00SB-00236-PA.pdf">https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/ACT/pa/pdf/2016PA-00171-R00SB-00236-PA.pdf</a>.</td>
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<td>SH - 12</td>
<td>School safety infrastructure standards shall conform to Connecticut and national industry best practice standards for school building safety infrastructure and shall include, but not be limited to, standards regarding (1) entryways to school buildings, classrooms and other space that can become</td>
<td>A-5</td>
<td>School safety infrastructure standards shall conform to Connecticut and national industry best practice standards for school building safety infrastructure and shall include, but not be limited to, standards regarding (1) entryways to school buildings, classrooms and other space that can become</td>
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<td>Public Act 13-3, An Act Concerning Gun Violence Prevention and Children’s Safety: • Sections 80–83 established the School Security Infrastructure Council (SSIC) • Three Commissioners from CT State Agencies • Six Members appointed by CT’s Legislative Leaders • Under P.A. 13-3 the SSIC is charged with developing “school safety infrastructure standards for school building projects... and projects receiving reimbursement as part of the school security infrastructure competitive grant program”</td>
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Federal Commission on School Safety: Appendix B
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|       | areas of safe haven, such as, reinforcement of entryways, forced entry and/or ballistic rated glazing, solid core (FE and/or BR) doors, double door access, computer-controlled electronic locks, remotely controlled locks on all entrance and exits and buzzer systems, (2) the use of cameras throughout the school building and at all entrances and exits, including the use of closed circuit television monitoring, (3) penetration resistant vestibules, and (4) other security infrastructure improvements and devices as they become industry standards.                                                                                                                                   |        | • Required to meet once a year to review established standards  
• SSIC Report was completed on January 1, 2014  
• Standards effective July 1, 2014  
<p>| SH - 13 | Each school shall maintain an accurate list of faculty, staff, and students, complete with emergency contact information, which shall include, but not be limited to, parents and guardians of students.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | A-5    | See SH – 7                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| SH - 14 | Each school shall provide safety and security training for faculty, staff, and students on how to respond to hazards and or events in order to provide competent compliance with the All Hazards School Security and Safety Plan Standards.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | A-5    | In the 2013 Connecticut General Statutes, Section 10-222n—there is a section that outlines School security and safety plan standards. In this statute, standards of the security and safety plans within Connecticut schools are described in detail, as are accounts for training, personnel, frequency, and the nature of compliance. See link for details: <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/connecticut/2013/title-10/chapter-170/section-10-222n/">https://law.justia.com/codes/connecticut/2013/title-10/chapter-170/section-10-222n/</a> |
| SH - 15 | Each school identify specific individuals to serve as safety and security wardens, who shall be responsible for executing and managing the safety and security strategies set forth in the safety and security training.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | A-6    | See SH – 14                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| SH - 16 | Classrooms and other spaces of denser population occupancy be located away from the points of building entry and that spaces of lesser occupancy be adjacent to school entry points, without giving up human visual surveillance and situational awareness of the entry points.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | A-6    | See SH – 12                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| SH - 17 | <strong>Law Enforcement</strong>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| SH - 18 | Mandatory background checks on the sale or transfer of any firearm, including long guns, at private and gun show sales.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | A-6    | In 2013 Public Act 13-3 was passed, and Section 1 outlines the requirements for purchasing a firearm, which includes the following language: &quot;The Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall make every effort, including performing the national instant criminal background check, to determine if the applicant is eligible to receive such [firearm] long gun.&quot; See link for more details: <a href="https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/ACT/pa/pdl/2013PA-00003-R00SB-01160-PA.pdf">https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/ACT/pa/pdl/2013PA-00003-R00SB-01160-PA.pdf</a> |</p>
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<tr>
<td>SH - 19</td>
<td>Require registration, including a certificate of registration, for every firearm. This certificate of registration should be issued subsequent to the completion of a background check and is separate and distinct from a permit to carry.</td>
<td>A-6</td>
<td>See Public Act 13-3, Section 1 for information regarding firearm registration. See link for details: <a href="https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/ACT/pa/pdf/2013PA-00003-R00SB-01160-PA.pdf">https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/ACT/pa/pdf/2013PA-00003-R00SB-01160-PA.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH - 20</td>
<td>Require firearms permits to be renewed on a regular basis. This renewal process should include a test of firearms handling capacity as well as an understanding of applicable laws and regulations.</td>
<td>A-6</td>
<td>See SH – 19</td>
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<tr>
<td>SH - 21</td>
<td>Institute a ban on the sale, possession, or use of any magazine or ammunition feeding device in excess of 10 rounds except for military and police use.</td>
<td>A-6</td>
<td>The Gun Violence Prevention and Child Safety Bill, Act No. 13-3 was enacted on 04/04/2013 in the Connecticut State Legislature. Expands the assault weapon ban to include large capacity magazines and armor-piercing bullets. See page 4 of link: <a href="http://www.ctprobate.gov/Documents/2013%20Legislative%20Summary.pdf">http://www.ctprobate.gov/Documents/2013%20Legislative%20Summary.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH - 22</td>
<td>Institute a ban on the possession or sale of all armor-piercing and incendiary bullets, regardless of caliber. First-time offenses should be classified as a Class D Felony.</td>
<td>A-7</td>
<td>Connecticut Firearm Law Sec. 53-201. Armor-piercing and incendiary .50 caliber ammunition states that any person who knowingly distributes, transports, or imports into the state, keeps for sale, or offers or exposes for sale or gives to any person any ammunition that is an armor piercing .50 caliber bullet or an incendiary .50 caliber bullet shall be guilty of a class D felony, except that a first-time violation of this subsection shall be a class A misdemeanor. See link for details: <a href="https://www.ct.gov/despp/lib/despp/slu/ct_firearms_law_reference_guide_2010.pdf">https://www.ct.gov/despp/lib/despp/slu/ct_firearms_law_reference_guide_2010.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH - 25</td>
<td>Evaluate the effectiveness of federal law in limiting the purchase of firearms via the internet to only those individuals who have passed the appropriate background screening.</td>
<td>A-7</td>
<td><a href="https://www.ct.gov/despp/lib/despp/slu/ct_firearms_law_reference_guide_2010.pdf">https://www.ct.gov/despp/lib/despp/slu/ct_firearms_law_reference_guide_2010.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH - 26</td>
<td>Limit the amount of ammunition that can be purchased at any given time.</td>
<td>A-8</td>
<td>See SH – 24</td>
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<tr>
<td>SH - 27</td>
<td>Prohibit the possession, sale, or transfer of any firearm capable of firing more than 10 rounds without reloading. This prohibition would extend to military-style firearms as well as handguns. Law enforcement and military would be exempt from this ban.</td>
<td>A-8</td>
<td>In October 2013 Section 1. Section 23 of Public Act 13-3 was repealed and the following language was substituted: 1) Any person who possesses a large capacity magazine on or after January 1, 2014, that was obtained prior to April 5, 2013, shall commit an infraction and be fined not more than ninety dollars for a first offense and shall be guilty of a class D felony for any subsequent offense, and (2) any person who possesses a large capacity magazine on or after January 1, 2014, that was obtained on or after April 5, 2013, shall be guilty of a class D felony. See link for details: <a href="http://www.ct.gov/despp/lib/despp/slu/ct_firearms_law_reference_guide_2010.pdf">http://www.ct.gov/despp/lib/despp/slu/ct_firearms_law_reference_guide_2010.pdf</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>SH - 28</td>
<td>Require that trigger locks must be provided at the time of sale or transfer of any firearm.</td>
<td>A-8</td>
<td>2013 Connecticut Firearm Law Sec. 29-37b states firearms dealer to provide gun locking device and warning at time of sale. Penalty associated with non-compliance. See link: <a href="https://www.ct.gov/despp/cwp/view.asp?a=4213&amp;Q=494612&amp;desppNav_GID=2080">https://www.ct.gov/despp/cwp/view.asp?a=4213&amp;Q=494612&amp;desppNav_GID=2080</a></td>
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| SH - 29 | Require that the state develop and update a best practices manual and require that all firearms in a home be stored in a locked container and adhere to these best practices; | A-8  | 2013 Connecticut Firearm Law Sec. 29-37l. Responsibilities regarding storage of loaded firearms with respect to minors - states: "No person shall store or keep any loaded firearm on any premises under his control if he knows or reasonably should know that a minor is likely to gain access to the firearm without the permission of the parent or guardian of the minor unless such person (1) keeps
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<td>SH-30</td>
<td>Require non-residents seeking to purchase a firearm or ammunition in the State of Connecticut to obtain a Certificate of Eligibility and conform to all other regulations applicable to Connecticut residents.</td>
<td>A-9</td>
<td>In the Connecticut Firearm Law Sec. 29-28. Permit for sale at retail of pistol or revolver. Permit to carry pistol or revolver. Confidentiality of name and address of permit holder. Permits for out-of-state residents—it states that out-of-state residents have to comply with Connecticut regulations to gain a temporary permit to purchase a firearm. See link: <a href="https://www.ct.gov/despp/lib/despp/slfu/ct_firearms_law_reference_guide_2010.pdf">https://www.ct.gov/despp/lib/despp/slfu/ct_firearms_law_reference_guide_2010.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH-31</td>
<td>Require gun clubs to report any negligent or reckless behavior with a firearm, or illegal possession of any firearm or magazine, to the Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, Commissioner of Public Safety, and local law enforcement.</td>
<td>A-9</td>
<td>Connecticut Firearm Law Sec. 29-37g. Gun show requirements states that a “Gun Show” is defined as: “any event at which fifty or more firearms are offered or exhibited for sale, transfer or exchange to the public.” All sales, transfers or exchanges taking place at a Gun Show require the seller to obtain an authorization number from the Special Licensing and Firearms Unit. See link: <a href="https://www.cga.ct.gov/current/pub/chap_529.htm#sec_29-37g">https://www.cga.ct.gov/current/pub/chap_529.htm#sec_29-37g</a></td>
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<td>SH-32</td>
<td>Requiring promoters of gun shows to receive a permit from the Chief of Police or Chief Elected Official as well as provide notice to the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection.</td>
<td>A-9</td>
<td>See SH – 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SH-33</td>
<td>Require that any shell casing for ammunition sold or possessed in Connecticut have a serial number laser etched on it for tracing purposes.</td>
<td>A-9</td>
<td>See SH – 24</td>
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<td>SH-34</td>
<td>Any person seeking a license to sell, purchase or carry any type of firearm in the state should be required to pass a suitability screening process.</td>
<td>A-9</td>
<td>Connecticut Firearm Law Sec. 29-38b identifies that a determination of commitment status of person who applies for or seeks renewal of firearm permit or certificate must be completed prior to authorization of a permit. The status must be reported on the application. See link: <a href="https://www.ct.gov/despp/lib/despp/slfu/ct_firearms_law_reference_guide_2010.pdf">https://www.ct.gov/despp/lib/despp/slfu/ct_firearms_law_reference_guide_2010.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH-35</td>
<td>To allow, at a judge’s discretion, the opportunity to temporarily remove any firearms, ammunition, and carry permits from a person who is the subject of an ex parte restraining order, civil protection order, or family violence protective order, at the time of the issuance of that order.</td>
<td>A-9</td>
<td>Connecticut Firearm Law Sec. 29-36f. Eligibility certificate for pistol or revolver: a person is subject to a firearms seizure order issued pursuant to this subsection if they commit any of a list of offense, to include restraining order. See link: <a href="https://www.ct.gov/despp/lib/despp/slfu/ct_firearms_law_reference_guide_2010.pdf">https://www.ct.gov/despp/lib/despp/slfu/ct_firearms_law_reference_guide_2010.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH-36</td>
<td>Grant statewide peace officer status to all sworn law enforcement officers in Connecticut to assure their ability to respond</td>
<td>A-10</td>
<td>In the Connecticut General Statutes, it states that a “Peace officer means a member of the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or an organized local police department, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a state</td>
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<td>SH - 38</td>
<td>Develop regional multi-jurisdictional, multi-discipline, Unified Command concept of operations, integrating local and state police, for major events of great consequence.</td>
<td>A-10</td>
<td>In 2014 the state of Connecticut developed the State Response Framework; the Framework or the SRF is &quot;to describe the interaction of state government with local, federal and tribal governments, nongovernmental response organizations and other private sector partners, the media, and the public in implementing emergency response and recovery functions in times of crisis.&quot; In general, the Framework describes how the State of Connecticut and its partners will work together to support local governments and their residents in responding to disasters and emergencies. See link for details: <a href="https://www.ct.gov/demhs/lib/demhs/srf_v-4_1.pdf">https://www.ct.gov/demhs/lib/demhs/srf_v-4_1.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH - 39</td>
<td>Establish statewide and/or regional Incident Management Teams for public safety personnel.</td>
<td>A-10</td>
<td>See SH - 38</td>
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<td>SH - 40</td>
<td>Integrate Public Safety Dispatch centers, with minimum staffing levels, into all major event response plans.</td>
<td>A-10</td>
<td>The goal of the Connecticut Division of Statewide Emergency Telecommunications (DSET) is to provide for the development and maintenance of coordinated statewide emergency service telecommunications for public safety organizations and to the residents of the State of Connecticut. DSET is responsible for the 9-1-1 Emergency Telecommunications System, Public Safety Data Network, Public Safety Frequency Coordination, Public Safety Telecommunicator Training Geographic Information Systems, the CT Alert Emergency Notification System, and to provide support for the consolidation of public safety answering points. See link for details: <a href="https://www.ct.gov/despp/cwp/view.asp?a=4379&amp;q=514829&amp;desppNav_GID=2125">https://www.ct.gov/despp/cwp/view.asp?a=4379&amp;q=514829&amp;desppNav_GID=2125</a></td>
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<td>SH - 41</td>
<td>Require that lead agencies that respond to major events conduct a review and provide formal after-action reports, which should be maintained on file with the appropriate public agencies.</td>
<td>A-10</td>
<td>See SH – 38</td>
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<td>SH - 44</td>
<td>Create a statewide working group to address first responder mental health issues.</td>
<td>A-11</td>
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<td>SH - 45</td>
<td>Create and publish a Statewide Donations Management Plan for incidents of statewide consequence.</td>
<td>A-11</td>
<td>Connecticut law has a requirement that the safe school climate committee for each school collect and evaluate information relating to instances of disturbing or threatening behavior that may not meet the definition of bullying, and report such information, as necessary, to the district safe school climate coordinator and the school security and safety committee described in Number 3 of the School Safety Plan Standards, above (see Connecticut General Statutes Section 10-222k). See link: <a href="https://www.ct.gov/demhs/lib/demhs/school_security/school_plan_standards_version_4_december_2016.docx">https://www.ct.gov/demhs/lib/demhs/school_security/school_plan_standards_version_4_december_2016.docx</a></td>
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<td>SH - 46</td>
<td>Programs should be developed that focus on violence reduction through the educational process or other entities.</td>
<td>A-11</td>
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<td>SH - 47</td>
<td>Alcohol awareness programs should be included at appropriate points in the K–12 curriculum.</td>
<td>A-11</td>
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<td>SH - 48</td>
<td><strong>Mental and Behavioral Health</strong></td>
<td>A-11</td>
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<td>SH - 49</td>
<td>Build systems of care that go beyond treating mental illness to foster healthy individuals, families, and communities and embrace overall psychological, emotional, and social well-being.</td>
<td>A-11</td>
<td>The Mental and Behavioral Health of Children Bill, Act No. 13-178, was enacted on 06/24/2013. This bill requires the development of a plan to meet children's mental, emotional and behavioral health needs; requires the inclusion of certain strategies, including school and community-based mental health services integration and early intervention enhancement; and provides for collaboration with emergency mobile psychiatric service providers, training of school resource officers, mental health providers, pediatricians and child care providers, home visitation, and a study on nutrition and psychotropic drugs. See link for details: <a href="https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/ACT/pa/pdf/2013PA-00178-R00SB-00972-PA.pdf">https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/ACT/pa/pdf/2013PA-00178-R00SB-00972-PA.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH - 50</td>
<td>Connecticut must build a mental health system that targets detection and treatment while building stronger, resilient communities of care.</td>
<td>A-11</td>
<td>See above SH – 49</td>
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<td>SH - 51</td>
<td>Build a comprehensive, integrated approach to care—one that identifies risk factors, reinforces protective factors, and promotes positive development throughout should be key goals, and peer as well as professional support needs to be involved. Treatment and prevention should be stressed.</td>
<td>A-11</td>
<td>See above SH – 49</td>
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<td>SH - 52</td>
<td>The health delivery systems and reimbursement paradigms should embrace a biopsychosocial model that understands the individual’s physical and mental health strengths and challenges in the context of that person’s social environment and</td>
<td>A-11</td>
<td>In 2014, the Connecticut Department of Public Health issued the Connecticut State Health Improvement Plan, a roadmap for improving the state’s health. The plan identifies seven focus areas and 136 objectives related to the issues that most affect the state’s health and well-being. The broad framework incorporates concepts from national initiatives such as Healthy People 2020 and the National Prevention Strategy. In particular, it focuses on prevention and shared responsibility of all sectors and partners for improving health. The plan also illustrates the need to ensure public health</td>
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<td>and health services are accessible in every community, and for new strategic partnerships to address the social and physical environments in our homes, workplaces, schools, and recreational areas affecting our health. See link for details: <a href="https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Departments-Agencies/DPH/dph/state_health_planning/SHA-SHIP/hct2020/hct2020statehlthimpv032514pdf.pdf?la=en">https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Departments-Agencies/DPH/dph/state_health_planning/SHA-SHIP/hct2020/hct2020statehlthimpv032514pdf.pdf?la=en</a></td>
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<td>SH - 53</td>
<td>Providers should be incentivized through reimbursement mechanisms to integrate both physical and mental health services.</td>
<td>A-12</td>
<td>See SH – 52</td>
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<td>SH - 54</td>
<td>Support models of integrated care driven by family needs in which all providers focus on family strength, address their risk factors, and accept the family as a partner in treatment.</td>
<td>A-12</td>
<td>See SH – 52</td>
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<td>SH - 55</td>
<td>Healthy social development can—and should—be actively taught in schools.</td>
<td>A-12</td>
<td>In January 2018, Dr. Dianna R. Wentzell, Commissioner of Education in Connecticut, issued an Executive Summary to the State Board of Education on a study entitled The Components of Social, Emotional and Intellectual Habits: Kindergarten through Grade 3, which outlined the importance of social-emotional learning in the school system. The document represents the knowledge, skills, and dispositions that form an essential blueprint for social-emotional habits and academic success. The purpose of the document is to provide a model to districts and schools for integrating social and emotional habits into academic content areas so that students will learn, practice, and model essential personal life habits. See link for information: <a href="https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/SDE/Board/BoardMaterials010318/The_Components_of_Social_Emotional_and_Intellectual_Habits_Kindergarten_through_Grade_3.pdf?la=en">https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/SDE/Board/BoardMaterials010318/The_Components_of_Social_Emotional_and_Intellectual_Habits_Kindergarten_through_Grade_3.pdf?la=en</a></td>
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<td>SH - 56</td>
<td>Social-emotional learning must form an integral part of the curriculum from preschool through high school.</td>
<td>A-12</td>
<td>See SH – 55</td>
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<td>SH - 57</td>
<td>A sequenced social development curriculum must include antibullying strategies. As appropriate, it should also include alcohol and drug awareness as part of a broader substance-abuse prevention curriculum for school-aged children.</td>
<td>A-12</td>
<td>Governor Dannel P. Malloy announced on October 4, 2018, that the Connecticut Division of Emergency Management and Homeland Security (DEMHS) is partnering with Sandy Hook Promise (SHP) to help train students, educators, and school administrators how to identify, assess, intervene, and get help for those exhibiting at-risk behaviors through its Start With Hello, Say Something, and SOS Signs of Suicide programs. Through the federal STOP School Violence Act, Connecticut is receiving $500,000 to operate the programs, which will allow SHP and DEMHS to train more than 116,000 students across the state. See link: <a href="https://www.ct.gov/despp/cwp/view.asp?Q=605432&amp;A=4226">https://www.ct.gov/despp/cwp/view.asp?Q=605432&amp;A=4226</a></td>
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<td>SH - 58</td>
<td>School-based health centers should provide a locus of preventive care, including screenings and referrals for developmental and behavioral difficulties, exposure to toxic stress, and other risk factors, as well as treatment offerings that can address crisis, grief and other stressors.</td>
<td>A-12</td>
<td>Among other things, PA 13-247 (§ 193) specifically allows all School-Based Health Centers (SBHCs) to provide behavioral health services. EFFECTIVE DATE: July 1, 2013. See link: <a href="https://www.cga.ct.gov/2014/rpt/pdf/2014-R-0163.pdf">https://www.cga.ct.gov/2014/rpt/pdf/2014-R-0163.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH - 59</td>
<td>Schools should form multi-disciplinary risk-assessment teams that gather information on and respond supportively to children who may pose a risk to others or face a risk to</td>
<td>A-13</td>
<td>Section 24. amends s. 1006.07, F.S., District school board duties relating to student discipline and school safety, to: • Require student disclosure of mental health referrals at registration. • Allow an expelled student who is admitted to another district to be referred for mental health</td>
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| SH-60  | themselves due to toxic stress, trauma, social isolation, or other factors.     | A-13   | services.  
• Require the student code of conduct to include policies for referring violent or disruptive students for mental health services.  
Goal B.3 of the Connecticut Children’s Behavioral Health Plan was established to ensure that all providers and caregivers who work with young children and youth demonstrate competency in promoting social and emotional development in the context of families, recognizing risk factors and early signs of social-emotional problems and in connecting all children to appropriate services and supports. Training for providers working with older children is covered as part of the implementation of specific interventions and through training of school personnel (Goal C.3). See link for details: [http://www.plan4children.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/CBH_PLAN_Exec-Sum-Final.pdf](http://www.plan4children.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/CBH_PLAN_Exec-Sum-Final.pdf) |
| SH-61  | All school staff should be trained in inquiry-based techniques to apply when disciplinary issues arise in order to deepen their understanding of how children's behavior can be linked to underlying stressors. | A-13   | PA 13-178 (§ 1) which supports School Board Collaboration with Mental Health Care Providers, requires emergency mobile psychiatric service providers to collaborate with community-based mental healthcare agencies, SBHCs, and the contracting authority for each local or regional board of education in the state to, at a minimum, (1) improve coordination and communication in order to promptly identify and refer children with mental, emotional, or behavioral health issues to the appropriate treatment program and (2) plan for any appropriate follow-up with the child and family. This may be done through memoranda of understanding, policy and protocols regarding referrals and outreach, liaison between the respective entities, or other methods. See link for details: [https://www.cga.ct.gov/2014/rpt/pdf/2014-R-0163.pdf](https://www.cga.ct.gov/2014/rpt/pdf/2014-R-0163.pdf) |
| SH-62  | Schools should work with all providers to enhance community resources and augment services available in schools. | A-13   | Connecticut, at a minimum, established School Board Collaboration with Mental Health Care Providers, PA 13-178 (§ 1), which requires emergency mobile psychiatric service providers to collaborate with community-based mental healthcare agencies, SBHCs, and the contracting authority for each local or regional board of education in the state to, at a minimum, (1) improve coordination and communication in order to promptly identify and refer children with mental, emotional, or behavioral health issues to the appropriate treatment program and (2) plan for any appropriate follow-up with the child and family. This may be done through memoranda of understanding, policy and protocols regarding referrals and outreach, liaison between the respective entities, or other methods. This work is in conjunction with the CT DCF, and may not be at the federal level but is a demonstration of state/local coordination. See page 4 of the link for details: [https://www.cga.ct.gov/2014/rpt/pdf/2014-R-0163.pdf](https://www.cga.ct.gov/2014/rpt/pdf/2014-R-0163.pdf) |
| SH-63  | The state and federal departments of education should establish lead sections or programs on school mental health to supplement (not replace) the work of CT DCF. | A-13   | Each board of education must ensure that children with disabilities be identified and evaluated in accordance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, or IDEA.  
<p>| SH-64  | The state should consider requiring that a parent's obligations under state law encompass approval of the individualized education plan and adequate documentation of progress. | A-14   | The following is a link to the most up-to-date information regarding requirements for parents under Connecticut’s Individual Education Plan guidance for parents. See link: <a href="https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/SDE/Special-Education/IEP-Manual-REVISIED-July-2018.pdf?la=en">https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/SDE/Special-Education/IEP-Manual-REVISIED-July-2018.pdf?la=en</a> |
| SH-65  | When the particular disabilities that necessitate homebound education include social, emotional, and behavioral difficulties, the student’s individualized education program and related services must address these difficulties expressly in addition to | A-14   | See SH – 64 |</p>
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<td>SH - 66</td>
<td><strong>Barriers to Access: Insurance and Funding Issues</strong></td>
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<td>Goal A.3. of the Connecticut Children’s Behavioral Health Plan, from October 2014, states that Connecticut was to develop a plan to address the major areas of concern regarding how commercial insurers meet children’s behavioral health needs. Based on the redesign of the publicly financed system, the incorporation of a Care Management Entity, and the demonstration of outcomes and cost savings, the commercial insurance sector was to be incentivized to participate in the children’s behavioral health system of care. See link for details of plan: <a href="http://www.plan4children.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/CBH_PLAN_Exec-Sum-Final.pdf">http://www.plan4children.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/CBH_PLAN_Exec-Sum-Final.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH - 67</td>
<td>A fully functional mental health system requires better coordination and access to a broad range of necessary services across payment systems.</td>
<td>A-14</td>
<td>In 2004, Connecticut’s legislature established the Connecticut Allied Health Workforce Policy Board (AHWPB) (Public Act 04-220) to conduct research and planning activities related to the allied health workforce. The report, Connecticut’s Allied Health Workforce: Challenges and Opportunities, provides an update to the June 2014 report, which highlights federal and state healthcare reforms as well as the supply and demand for healthcare workers and the challenges associated with preparing that workforce for the next generation of healthcare delivery. The report concludes with priority focus areas to address Connecticut’s workforce challenges in 2014. See link for details: <a href="https://www.ctdol.state.ct.us/OWC/CETC/Final%20AHWPB%20Report%202015.pdf">https://www.ctdol.state.ct.us/OWC/CETC/Final%20AHWPB%20Report%202015.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH - 68</td>
<td>Higher reimbursement rates in both outpatient and inpatient settings, which better reflect the costs of care, should be a core component of a redesigned behavioral healthcare system.</td>
<td>A-14</td>
<td>In September 2017, U.S. Senators Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and U.S. Representatives Joe Courtney (CT-2) and Elizabeth Esty (CT-5) afforded a $600,000 grant to the University of Connecticut (UConn) and Western Connecticut State University from the Health Resources and Services Administration received through the Behavioral Health Workforce Education and Training (BHWET) Program. The BHWET program, which was reauthorized as part of Murphy’s recently enacted Mental Health Reform Act, seeks to expand the behavioral health workforce and train new mental health providers, such as psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, and paraprofessionals. See link: <a href="https://www.murphy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/new-600000-federal-grant-expands-connecticuts-mental-health-workforce-access-to-treatment">https://www.murphy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/new-600000-federal-grant-expands-connecticuts-mental-health-workforce-access-to-treatment</a></td>
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<td>SH - 69</td>
<td>Connecticut needs to identify and take measures to increase the behavioral health workforce.</td>
<td>A-15</td>
<td>In September 2017, U.S. Senators Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and U.S. Representatives Joe Courtney (CT-2) and Elizabeth Esty (CT-5) afforded a $600,000 grant to the University of Connecticut (UConn) and Western Connecticut State University from the Health Resources and Services Administration received through the Behavioral Health Workforce Education and Training (BHWET) Program. The BHWET program, which was reauthorized as part of Murphy’s recently enacted Mental Health Reform Act, seeks to expand the behavioral health workforce and train new mental health providers, such as psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, and paraprofessionals. See link: <a href="https://www.murphy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/new-600000-federal-grant-expands-connecticuts-mental-health-workforce-access-to-treatment">https://www.murphy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/new-600000-federal-grant-expands-connecticuts-mental-health-workforce-access-to-treatment</a></td>
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<td>SH - 70</td>
<td>Connecticut needs to fix the significant problems with mental health system fragmentation resulting from diverse payment systems and a lack of coordination or consistency among state agencies.</td>
<td>A-15</td>
<td>In July 2018, the Office of Legislative Research issued a Research Report on 2013–2018 Behavioral Health Legislation. Page 13 of the report begins the section on legislative actions to combat fragmentation and inconsistency within the healthcare system as it relates to insurance, to include mental health coverage. See page 13 of link for details: <a href="https://www.cga.ct.gov/2018/rpt/pdf/2018-R-0165.pdf">https://www.cga.ct.gov/2018/rpt/pdf/2018-R-0165.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH - 71</td>
<td>Funding decisions about behavioral healthcare must look beyond the model that has prevailed over the past several decades to embrace psychosocial interventions, services directed toward the achievement of</td>
<td>A-15</td>
<td>In regard to the behavioral diagnosis, Connecticut created a Comprehensive Plan for Children’s Services, PA 13-178, which requires the Department of Children and Families (DCF) and the Office of Early Childhood (OEC), in consultation and collaboration with various individuals and agencies, to take several steps to address Connecticut children’s mental, emotional, and behavioral health needs. For example, it requires DCF to develop a comprehensive plan to (1) meet these needs and (2) prevent or reduce the long-</td>
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<td>SH - 72</td>
<td>Commercial insurance should expand coverage to a broad range of evidence-supported services for individuals with private insurance.</td>
<td>A-15</td>
<td>In July 2018, the Office of Legislative Research issued a Research Report on 2013–2018 Behavioral Health Legislation. Page 13 of the report begins the section on legislative actions to combat fragmentation and inconsistency within the healthcare system as it relates to insurance, to include mental health coverage. See page 13 of link for details: <a href="https://www.cga.ct.gov/2018/rpt/pdf/2018-R-0165.pdf">https://www.cga.ct.gov/2018/rpt/pdf/2018-R-0165.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH - 73</td>
<td>Use of behavioral health carve-outs, designed to control behavioral health costs rather than increase access, should be phased out as quickly as possible.</td>
<td>A-15</td>
<td>See SH – 72</td>
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<tr>
<td>SH - 74</td>
<td>Connecticut establish standards for up-to-date and accurate provider panel lists, as well as mechanism for fining or otherwise holding insurers accountable for publishing inaccurate lists.</td>
<td>A-16</td>
<td>See SH – 72</td>
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<td>SH - 75</td>
<td>Appeals of all denials of care be processed through an independent entity such as the Office of the Health Care Advocate. Insurers should be required to provide reimbursement during the denial and appeals period up to the point of ultimate denial by the neutral reviewing party. When a licensed provider determines that a particular course of treatment is medically necessary, the burden of proof should fall to the insurer to demonstrate otherwise. Any conclusion by a reviewer that care is not medically necessary should be based, to the extent possible, on findings in the medical literature. The results of scientific studies, and/or recommendations of recognized healthcare professional organizations and recognized authorities of evidence of efficacy, especially in the absence of scientific studies, should not be discredited solely on the assertion of the insurer.</td>
<td>A-16</td>
<td>If a resident of Connecticut needs healthcare or healthcare coverage, or has problems with coverage and does not know where to turn, they can contact the Office of the Healthcare Advocate (OHA). OHA is an independent agency that helps people understand what options they may have, how to get and fight for healthcare coverage, including coverage for mental health or substance use treatment, and to make sure they get covered for their specific healthcare needs. See the link for access to their website, which can more accurately address the recommendation: <a href="https://www.ct.gov/oha/site/default.asp">https://www.ct.gov/oha/site/default.asp</a></td>
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<td>SH - 76</td>
<td>Connecticut must find ways to fund integrated models of care for both children and adults that ensure access to quality,</td>
<td>A-16</td>
<td>Connecticut established, through legislation, a Regional Behavioral Health Consultation System for Pediatricians, PA 13-3 ($69), which requires the Department of Child and Family services commissioner, by January 1, 2014, to establish and implement a regional behavioral health consultation and care</td>
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<td>affordable, culturally appropriate, and timely care for residents throughout the state.</td>
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<td>coordination program for primary care providers who serve children. The program must provide them with: 1. timely access to a consultation team that includes a child psychiatrist, social worker, and care coordinator; 2. patient care coordination and transitional services for behavioral health care; and 3. training and education on patient access to behavioral health services. There was no effective date found regarding this legislation. However, in conjunction with this action, Connecticut established School-Based Health Centers (SBHCs) that, among other things, PA 13-247 (§ 193) specifically allows all SBHCs to provide behavioral health services to members of the community. EFFECTIVE DATE: July 1, 2013. See page 3 of link for details: <a href="https://www.cga.ct.gov/2014/rpt/pdf/2014-R-0163.pdf">https://www.cga.ct.gov/2014/rpt/pdf/2014-R-0163.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH - 77</td>
<td>Barriers to Access: Stigma and Discrimination</td>
<td>A-17</td>
<td>The CT STRONG program (Seamless Transition and Recovery Opportunities through Network Growth) engages and connects transition age youth and young adults to high quality behavioral healthcare. The CT Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (DMHAS), in partnership with the CT Department of Children and Families (DCF), present this initiative to engage youth and young adults in innovative approaches to improve rates of service engagement and outcomes with regard to housing stability, health and mental health, education, and employment for individuals aged 16~25. See link for details on this program addressing stigma: <a href="http://www.abhct.com/Programs_Services/CT-STRONG/">http://www.abhct.com/Programs_Services/CT-STRONG/</a></td>
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<td>SH - 78</td>
<td>Support research that will identify the most effective measures to reduce stigma, as well as implementation of those measures.</td>
<td>A-17</td>
<td>Schools are a primary venue for children to receive mental health services. In Connecticut, there are various ways that school personnel may identify a child as possibly needing mental health services. The referral could be made by a teacher or various other school personnel, such as a school psychologist, counselor, nurse, social worker, resource officer, or administrator. The identification could occur in a variety of ways, such as following discussion with the student, a parent, or other school personnel; as part of the special education process; or following a behavioral incident. Many students also receive mental health referral or treatment by healthcare providers at school-based health centers (SBHCs). SBHCs are free-standing medical clinics located within or on school grounds, staffed by a multi-disciplinary team of professionals with expertise in pediatric and adolescent health. They provide primary medical and mental health services to students at the school regardless of insurance coverage. According to the Connecticut Association of School-Based Health Centers, 80 SBHCs that receive DPH funding are located in 20 communities in the state and they provide more than 35,000 students with services annually, including 41,000 visits for mental health concerns. See link: <a href="https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/rpt/2013-R-0081.htm">https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/rpt/2013-R-0081.htm</a></td>
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<td>SH - 79</td>
<td>Integrate mental healthcare with other forms of health screening and care available to children through schools to diminish the stigma associated with mental illness.</td>
<td>A-17</td>
<td>Below, there is more information on three issues related to a school’s identification of students needing mental health services: (1) special education referral and assessment; (2) required school board policies on (a) communication with mental health personnel and (b) the prohibition on schools recommending psychotropic drugs; and (3) a State Department of Education (SDE) grant program to help detect and prevent emotional, behavioral, and learning problems in young children. Here are links to additional information about mental health services in Connecticut schools, from SDE’s website: -school psychology: <a href="http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/cwp/view.asp?a=2678&amp;q=320742">http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/cwp/view.asp?a=2678&amp;q=320742</a></td>
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<td>Coordinated Approach to School Health (which seeks to align several facets of health, including behavioral health, to improve student health as well as academic achievement): <a href="http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/cwp/view.asp?a=2678&amp;q=320726">http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/cwp/view.asp?a=2678&amp;q=320726</a></td>
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<td>SH - 80</td>
<td>Expand programs that engage people across the community in issues relevant to mental health. Programs such as CIT (Crisis Intervention Training) and CIT-Y (training directed toward youth issues) for the law enforcement community, as well as Mental Health First Aid for teachers, counselors, parents, neighbors, coaches, youth group leaders, police officers, and others.</td>
<td>A-18</td>
<td>In Connecticut, mental health crisis intervention services are provided by teams of mental health workers (psychiatrists, RNs, MSWs, psychologists, psychiatric technicians) who intervene in situations where an individual’s mental or emotional condition results in behavior that constitutes an imminent danger to him or herself or to another. Mobile crisis teams visit people in their homes or community sites, and others meet clients in clinics or hospital emergency rooms. Psychiatric emergency rooms and mental health facilities can provide crisis services to people in crisis who can travel or get help with transportation to a facility. See link for details: <a href="http://uwc.211ct.org/mental-health-crisis-intervention-services-connecticut">http://uwc.211ct.org/mental-health-crisis-intervention-services-connecticut</a></td>
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<td>SH - 81</td>
<td>For adolescents and adults facing mental health diagnoses, develop effective psychoeducation for both individuals and families to promote acceptance and decrease stigma.</td>
<td>A-18</td>
<td>See SH – 79</td>
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<td>SH - 82</td>
<td><strong>Privacy and Confidentiality</strong></td>
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<td>SH - 83</td>
<td>Clarify the privacy rights of people living with mental illness in the absence of a clear understanding of what current laws and policies do and do not allow.</td>
<td>A-19</td>
<td>The Connecticut State Department of Education (CSDE) treats data confidentiality and the privacy of student educational records very seriously. It complies with all federal laws including Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), state statutes, and guidelines to protect confidential data. There is an entire site dedicated to information and regulations that outline the state’s responsibility in this area. See link for specific details regarding mental illness: <a href="https://portal.ct.gov/SDE/Performance/Data-Privacy-and-Security">https://portal.ct.gov/SDE/Performance/Data-Privacy-and-Security</a></td>
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<td>SH - 84</td>
<td>Increase efforts to facilitate communication in the service of effective care while respecting individuals’ rights to privacy and autonomy.</td>
<td>A-19</td>
<td>The Connecticut State Department of Education (CSDE) treats data confidentiality and the privacy of student educational records very seriously. It complies with all federal laws including Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), state statutes, and guidelines to protect confidential data. There is an entire site dedicated to information and regulations that outline the state’s responsibility in this area. See link for specific details regarding effective care while respecting individual rights: <a href="https://portal.ct.gov/SDE/Performance/Data-Privacy-and-Security">https://portal.ct.gov/SDE/Performance/Data-Privacy-and-Security</a></td>
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<td>SH - 85</td>
<td>Educational privacy laws should be implemented in such a way that they do not compromise essential communication for children struggling with serious emotional, behavioral, and developmental challenges. With parent permission, schools and treatment providers should in general be allowed to share important information that will facilitate the care and education of children.</td>
<td>A-19</td>
<td>See SH – 84</td>
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<td>SH-86</td>
<td>Mental Illness and Violence</td>
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<td>SH-87</td>
<td>A diagnosable mental illness alone is a very weak predictor of interpersonal violence—particularly compared to other factors such as substance abuse, a history of violence, socio-economic disadvantage, youth, and male gender.</td>
<td>A-19</td>
<td>See United States Secret Service Report—The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States 2002, which verifies this statement: <a href="https://www2.ed.gov/lead/safety/preventingattacksreport.pdf">https://www2.ed.gov/lead/safety/preventingattacksreport.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH-88</td>
<td>Expand and increase availability of early intervention programs for those young adults early in the course of developing and/or established mental illness to reduce the likelihood that a person facing a psychotic illness might resort to violence or self-harm.</td>
<td>A-19</td>
<td>In the Fiscal Year 2018 Bureau of Justice Administration within the Department of State, Connecticut was awarded $500,000 for its STOP School Violence Prevention and Mental Health Training Program. The programs can include early intervention. See link for budgetary information: <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1097816/download">https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1097816/download</a></td>
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<td>SH-89</td>
<td>Utilize behavioral threat assessment; to focus on identifying and intervening with individuals whose behavior and/or communications clearly indicate an intention to commit violence.</td>
<td>A-20</td>
<td>Connecticut General Statutes Sections 10-222m and 10-222n state that each school district has a requirement that a school security and safety committee be established at each school. The safe school climate committee for each school will collect and evaluate information relating to instances of disturbing or threatening behavior that may not meet the definition of bullying, and report such information, as necessary, to the district safe school climate coordinator and the school security and safety committee. See link: <a href="https://www.ct.gov/demhs/lib/demhs/school_security/school_plan_standards_version_4_december_2016.docx">https://www.ct.gov/demhs/lib/demhs/school_security/school_plan_standards_version_4_december_2016.docx</a></td>
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<td>SH-90</td>
<td>The formation of multi-disciplinary teams to conduct risk assessments in schools.</td>
<td></td>
<td>See SH – 89</td>
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<td>SH-91</td>
<td>Each school district in Connecticut should have policies in place that are related to threat assessment and violence management. School [district]s should form multi-disciplinary teams that include an Administrator, a school Police Department Officer, and a school mental health professional (e.g., Psychiatric Social Worker, School Psychologist, Pupil Services and Attendance Counselor), as well as a community mental health provider, to assess threats made in schools.</td>
<td>A-20</td>
<td>Each local and regional board of education annually establishes a school security and safety committee at each school within its jurisdiction. The Committee is responsible for assisting in the development of the school security and safety plan for the school and administering the plan. The Committee members shall include a local police officer, local first responder, teacher and administrator from the school, a mental health professional, a parent or guardian of a student at the school, and may include any other person deemed necessary, such as a school nurse, custodian or property manager, local emergency management director, local public health director, information technology manager, and transportation coordinator. The school security and safety committee should also invite subject matter experts to participate as needed, including, for example, the local public works director, high school student council president, and/or food service director. See link: <a href="https://www.ct.gov/demhs/lib/demhs/school_security/school_plan_standards_version_4_december_2016.docx">https://www.ct.gov/demhs/lib/demhs/school_security/school_plan_standards_version_4_december_2016.docx</a></td>
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<td>SH-92</td>
<td>The risk assessment teams should receive training in threat assessment that will enable them to review specific threats and help manage or support any person who issues a threat as well as warning the potential victims. They should also be available when a child or family has been identified with</td>
<td>A-20</td>
<td>PA 13-3 (§§ 88 &amp; 89), the Safe School Climate Committees, Reports, and Plans expands the duties of the safe school climate committees to include collection, evaluation, and reporting of information about disturbing or threatening student behavior as provided in the school’s security and safety plan. Parents or guardians who serve on the committees must not participate in this new duty, since it may compromise student confidentiality. By law, safe school climate committees are responsible for developing and fostering a safe school climate and addressing bullying and related issues. The act also increases the frequency and the recipients of the SDE report that analyzes public school districts’ bullying prevention</td>
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<td>SH - 93</td>
<td>Adopt the Consortium for Risk-Based Firearm Policy’s December 2013 recommendations.</td>
<td>A-21</td>
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<td>SH - 94</td>
<td><strong>Response, Recovery, and Resilience</strong></td>
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<td>SH - 95</td>
<td>Connecticut should develop a comprehensive statewide plan for effectively responding to large-scale school crisis events that includes educational and behavioral health agencies.</td>
<td>A-21</td>
<td>Annually, each local and regional board of education shall review, update as necessary, and submit a school security and safety plan for each school under its jurisdiction to its Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection/Division of Emergency Management and Homeland Security (DESPP/DEMHS) Regional Coordinator, based on the standards listed here and further provided in the attached template, and any updated template, as well as on the results of the assessment described in Number 8, below. The plan for the school year beginning July 1, 2014, was due no later than July 1, 2015. Going forward, by November 1 of every year thereafter, local and regional boards of education were to submit to their DEMHS Regional Coordinators one of the following: (1) those pages of their plans that have been updated; (2) the form provided by DEMHS that their plans have not changed, along with an updated signature page, or; (3) a revised plan if the current plan has undergone a major revision.</td>
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<td>SH - 96</td>
<td>The plan should specify short and longer-term interventions for different populations, and identify funding mechanisms that will minimize discontinuity of services. It should also clarify a range of roles and responsibilities for state and local entities and designate lead agencies for key functions.</td>
<td>A-21</td>
<td>See SH – 95</td>
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<td>SH - 97</td>
<td>Connecticut and its municipalities should incorporate an enhanced focus on the mental health implications of disasters and other crisis events into all disaster preparedness and response protocols, and implement measures to address the behavioral health needs of children as well as adults.</td>
<td>A-21</td>
<td>The Connecticut General Statutes Section (10-222k) has a requirement that the school security and safety plan for each school provide an orientation on the plan to each school employee at the school, and provide violence prevention training in a manner described in the plan. Training to the plan is critical. This training should be conducted in cooperation with the school safety and security committee, including local law enforcement, fire, emergency management, public health, and emergency medical services. This will give the school community and municipal officials an understanding of the need for unified planning, preparedness, and response. See link for details: <a href="https://www.ct.gov/demhs/lib/demhs/school_security/school_plan_standards_version_4_december_2016.docx">https://www.ct.gov/demhs/lib/demhs/school_security/school_plan_standards_version_4_december_2016.docx</a></td>
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<td>SH - 98</td>
<td>Connecticut should better integrate behavioral health and educational responses to disaster events by thoughtfully incorporating educational and behavioral health agencies into the state’s Unified Command System.</td>
<td>A-22</td>
<td>See SH – 97</td>
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<td>SH - 99</td>
<td>Short-term support by mental health professionals from outside the community</td>
<td>A-22</td>
<td>The Connecticut Departments of Mental Health and Addiction Services (DMHAS) and Children and Families (DCF), working with the University of Connecticut Health Center at the Center for Trauma</td>
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<td>SH - 100</td>
<td>may be required or helpful in the immediate aftermath of a crisis event. The goal should be to transition direct services provided during the recovery process to those who are part of the impacted community or adjoining/nearby communities.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Response, Recovery, and Preparedness (CTRP), have developed an organized network of behavioral health providers to respond to the mental health needs of Connecticut residents following major disasters (e.g., bioterrorism, manmade or natural disasters). The Connecticut Disaster Behavioral Health Response Network (DBHRN) consists of five regional behavioral health disaster response teams that can be deployed immediately anywhere in the state. The geographical areas covered by the teams correspond to the OPM Uniform Health Regions. These teams would respond to disasters or critical incidents when local behavioral health resources have been depleted or are overwhelmed. The goal of the regional behavioral health response teams is to provide an organized response to victims, family members, survivors, or communities affected by disasters. See link for detailed information and resources: <a href="https://www.ct.gov/dmhas/cwp/view.asp?a=2901&amp;q=335024">https://www.ct.gov/dmhas/cwp/view.asp?a=2901&amp;q=335024</a></td>
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<td>SH - 101</td>
<td>The state should also offer the option of engaging a short-term support team, developed prior to an event, to school districts overwhelmed by tragedies to assist in planning and decision-making, such as communications, management of mental health response, provision of security, managing personnel and labor issues, and donations.</td>
<td>A-22</td>
<td>The Connecticut Disaster Behavioral Health Response Network (DBHRN) offers Disaster Response Teams for assistance, who provide interventions in three distinct phases that may be delivered at a disaster site, in an affected community, or statewide. One of the phases and interventions include: Future Preparedness and Mitigation • Support for Behavioral Health Crisis Management Planning • Specialized Training Initiatives (faith community, behavioral health professionals, culturally specific groups) • Stress Inoculation, risk communication • Research • Individual, family, and community preparedness (e.g., Prevention Services designed to strengthen community coping abilities and promote disaster recovery) See link for details: <a href="https://www.ct.gov/dmhas/lib/dmhas/publications/DBHRN-Summary.pdf">https://www.ct.gov/dmhas/lib/dmhas/publications/DBHRN-Summary.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH - 102</td>
<td>The &quot;Recovery&quot; plan should also include provisions addressing bereavement and meaning making through memorialization and commemoration activities so that communities can approach these proactively.</td>
<td>A-23</td>
<td>The Connecticut Disaster Behavioral Health Response Network (DBHRN) offers Disaster Response Teams for assistance, who provide interventions in three distinct phases that may be delivered at a disaster site, in an affected community, or statewide. One of the phases and interventions includes Recovery, which entails the following: • Brief Supportive Counseling • Case Management and Advocacy • Information Dissemination • Screening, Assessment and Referral • Support Groups See link for details: <a href="https://www.ct.gov/dmhas/lib/dmhas/publications/DBHRN-Summary.pdf">https://www.ct.gov/dmhas/lib/dmhas/publications/DBHRN-Summary.pdf</a></td>
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<td>SH - 103</td>
<td>Connecticut should create mechanisms to implement ongoing training and professional development programs outside of crisis circumstances for teachers and school personnel, and establish statewide training requirements tied to professional certification and recertification.</td>
<td>A-23</td>
<td>As of July 2017 Connecticut law PA 17-37—SB 953, states school districts must make available, at no cost, at least 18 hours of professional development each school year to certified employees. They must do this according to a plan developed in consultation with professional development committees consisting of the districts’ certified employees and other appropriate members. The act requires professional development to be consistent with goals the district or its certified employees identify, but eliminates specific requirements. To this end, professional development in areas such as crisis management could be offered. See link: <a href="https://www.cga.ct.gov/2017-2018/sum/2017SUM00037-RO1SB-00953.SUM.htm">https://www.cga.ct.gov/2017-2018/sum/2017SUM00037-RO1SB-00953.SUM.htm</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>SH - 103</td>
<td>Training for teachers and school personnel on how to support children following a disaster should impart basic skills and knowledge in the following areas: the impact</td>
<td>A-23</td>
<td>Connecticut began a program in Mental Health First Aid training in 2013. The 8 to 12-hour training programs (depending on vendor) are known as a mental health version of CPR. People learn how to recognize when someone is having a mental health problem and to intervene until professional help arrives. In 2014, every school district’s safe school climate coordinator was to receive Mental Health</td>
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of trauma and bereavement on children and their learning; likely reactions; strategies for providing psychological first aid, brief supportive services, and bereavement support; and indications for referral for additional mental health services.

First Aid Training, according to the law passed in response to Sandy Hook. The law also allowed school boards to require teachers, school nurses, counselors, and other employees to participate in the training. The Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services staffers were formerly leading the trainings for school personnel at no charge. See link for additional information on services being provided in Connecticut: [http://www.mhconn.org/education/mental-health-first-aid/](http://www.mhconn.org/education/mental-health-first-aid/)

SH - 104 Connecticut should better integrate the behavioral health and education responses to school crisis events by creating a mechanism that facilitates the immediate coordination of supportive services.

A-23 See SH – 99

SH - 105 “Create” a central clearing house for information relevant to disaster response and recovery, with clearly identified channels of access, would help to mitigate the sorts of communication barriers that can impede recovery and risk re-traumatizing vulnerable members of the community.

A-23 Connecticut Clearinghouse serves as Connecticut’s resource center for information about mental and/or substance use disorders, prevention and health promotion, treatment and recovery, wellness, and other related topics. See link: [https://www.recoverymonth.gov/organizations-programs/connecticut-clearinghouse](https://www.recoverymonth.gov/organizations-programs/connecticut-clearinghouse).

Table A.6: The Broward County League of Cities’ School and Community Public Safety Task Force Initial Report and Recommendations (2018)

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<tr>
<td>PL - 1</td>
<td>Safety of Schools Based on Infrastructure, Policies, and Procedures—Immediate</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>The 2018 Florida Senate Bill (SB) 7026, the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, which was signed by Governor Rick Scott in March, requires each district school board to: • Designate a school administrator who completes the required training within the specified timeframe as the school safety specialist for the district to serve as the district’s primary point of public contact for public school safety functions. • Designate a threat assessment team at each school, and requires the team to operate under the district school safety specialist’s direction. The bill requires the threat assessment team to consult with law enforcement when a student exhibits a pattern of behavior, based upon previous acts or the severity of an act that would pose a threat to school safety. • Formulate and prescribe policies and procedures, in consultation with the appropriate public safety agencies, for emergency drills for hostage and active shooter situations and incorporate procedures to address active shooter situations in the model emergency management and emergency preparedness procedures. • Requires each school safety specialist to coordinate with appropriate public safety agencies that are designated as the first responders to a school’s campus to tour such campus once every three years and provide recommendations related to school safety. See link for details: <a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/BillSummaries/2018/html/1886">https://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/BillSummaries/2018/html/1886</a></td>
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<td>PL - 2</td>
<td>Enforce existing safety and security policies. Procedures must be adhered to, with consequences for failing to comply.</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>The 2018 Florida Senate Bill 7026, the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, which was signed by Governor Rick Scott in March, requires each district school board to: • Designate a school administrator who completes the required training within the specified timeframe as the school safety specialist for the district to serve as the district’s primary point of public contact for public school safety functions. • Designate a threat assessment team at each school, and requires the team to operate under the district school safety specialist’s direction. The bill requires the threat assessment team to consult with law enforcement when a student exhibits a pattern of behavior, based upon previous acts or the severity of an act that would pose a threat to school safety. • Formulate and prescribe policies and procedures, in consultation with the appropriate public safety agencies, for emergency drills for hostage and active shooter situations and incorporate procedures to address active shooter situations in the model emergency management and emergency preparedness procedures. • Requires each school safety specialist to coordinate with appropriate public safety agencies that are designated as the first responders to a school’s campus to tour such campus once every three years and provide recommendations related to school safety. See link for details: <a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/BillSummaries/2018/html/1886">https://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/BillSummaries/2018/html/1886</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>PL - 3</td>
<td>Install windows covering on door to conceal kids in schools.</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>The 2018 Florida Senate Bill 7026, the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, Section 44, appropriates $98,962,286 in nonrecurring funds from the General Revenue Fund to the</td>
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<td>PL - 4</td>
<td>SAFE Team should (a) include Head Facilities person; (b) if schools have other &quot;security&quot; staff (such as campus monitors and security specialists) those staff should also be part of the SAFE Team; (c) ensure First Aid Coordinator has formal first aid training.</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Florida Department of Education to implement a grant program for schools to fund fixed capital outlay costs associated with improving the physical security of school buildings, as identified by a security risk assessment completed by August 1, 2018, by a school district or charter school. Window coverings could be considered a physical improvement. See link: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/12031/urlt/SB-7026-Public-Safety.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/12031/urlt/SB-7026-Public-Safety.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 5</td>
<td>School safety plans should be updated by the schools in the first month of school. These should be delivered to municipal law enforcement and fire, who should acknowledge the review.</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>See PL – 4</td>
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<td>PL - 6</td>
<td>All classroom doors must remain locked at all times (as the current doors only lock from the hallway, not from inside of classroom).</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>See PL – 4</td>
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<td>PL - 7</td>
<td>Consider and implement a policy preventing visitor access to the interior of the campus while students are changing classes.</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Within the Florida Department of Education’s Statewide Policy for Strengthening Domestic Security in Florida’s Public Schools dated October 10, 2003, it was recommended to establish visitor control (i.e., sign-in requirement, screening, badging, etc.) and install visitor screening and tracking systems for photo identification and fingerprint verification, as appropriate (follow best practice standards). See link: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/3/urlt/terrorism_policy.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/3/urlt/terrorism_policy.pdf</a> However, the Public Safety Act SB 7026 Section 28 creates s. 1006.1493, F.S., Florida Safe Schools Assessment Tool (FSSAT), to: • Require DOE, through the Office of Safe Schools pursuant s. 1001.212, F.S., to contract with a security consulting firm that specializes in the development of risk assessment software solutions and has experience in conducting security assessments of public facilities to develop, update and implement a risk assessment tool, which shall be known as the Florida Safe Schools Assessment Tool (FSSAT). • Require the FSSAT to be used by school officials at each school district and public school site in the state in conducting security assessments. • Require the FSSAT to help school officials identify threats, vulnerabilities, and appropriate safety controls for the schools. The FSSAT work could help schools determine if visitor access needs to change at their respective school. See link: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/12031/urlt/SB-7026-Public-Safety.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/12031/urlt/SB-7026-Public-Safety.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 8</td>
<td>School staff should hold mandatory safety meeting to discuss all critical incidents (codes) within the preplanning (week before school starts).</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>See PL – 4</td>
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<td>PL - 9</td>
<td>Within the first two weeks of school, schools should instead practice a fire drill, tornado drill, and lockdown drill (with SRO participation).</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>See PL – 4</td>
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<td>PL - 10</td>
<td>Schools must hold a critical incident (or Code Red) drill every semester.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>See PL – 12</td>
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<td>PL - 11</td>
<td>The Florida Department of Education provided guidance that active shooter drills should be conducted one time each semester.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>The Public Safety Act SB 7026 requires mandatory active shooter training in schools every semester. Students, district school safety specialists, threat assessment teams, faculty, staff, and designated first responders must participate in these drills. See link: <a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/BillSummaries/2018/html/1886">https://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/BillSummaries/2018/html/1886</a></td>
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<td>PL - 12</td>
<td>Maintain current practice of having Broward SIU monitor/supervise at least one of these incident drills per school year AND review critical incidents training with staff.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>The Public Safety Act SB 7026 Section 24 amends s. 1006.07, F.S., District school board duties relating to student discipline and school safety, to require emergency plans to be developed with public safety agencies and include active shooter and hostage situations, which must be conducted as often as other drills; plans should identify those required to contact first responders and require periodic testing of communications systems as well as require superintendents to create policies for violence prevention and intervention, and designate a school safety specialist for the district who must be trained and perform specific duties. See link: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/12031/urlt/SB-7026-Public-Safety.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/12031/urlt/SB-7026-Public-Safety.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 13</td>
<td>Schools are required to post fire drill evacuation maps in all classrooms, with “safe spaces” or “designated spaces” for lockdown drills, or indicate with tape or sign (some safe harbor spaces are closets/restrooms) that are not cluttered or impassable.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>See PL – 12</td>
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<td>PL - 14</td>
<td>All Drill and Code information must be given to all substitutes, so they know what to do in case of emergency. Additionally, substitute teachers should have the same key access as regular teachers.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>See PL – 12</td>
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<td>PL - 15</td>
<td>Ensure Broward Schools Police (SIU) training and meetings for staff are up to date with current school safety practices/procedures and the same message is delivered to all schools.</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>See PL – 12</td>
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<td>PL - 16</td>
<td>All staff and students should wear ID badges.</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>For Broward County, the Superintendent provided the following guidance on June 1, 2018, in a letter to all schools within the county. An excerpt from the letter states: “All safety protocols for routine school operations will be continuously reinforced. This includes requiring students and staff to wear identification badges while on campus at all times and visitors to wear a school or District form of identification while on campus; locking classroom doors at all times; locking and securing exterior doors and gates throughout the day; being vigilant in monitoring the campus throughout the day; and conducting emergency preparedness training for faculty, staff and students on a regular basis.” See link for full letter: <a href="https://www.browardschools.com/cms/lib/FL01803656/Centricity/Domain/197/9903_06042018_Letter">https://www.browardschools.com/cms/lib/FL01803656/Centricity/Domain/197/9903_06042018_Letter</a>.</td>
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<td>PL - 17</td>
<td>Important safety information, such as Silence Hurts (Broward County Public Schools—anonymous hotline), suicide hotline and/or 211, should be included on the back of the badges.</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>Although there is no mention of the number being placed on student ID badges, the Broward County Public Schools District has recently unveiled its newest security feature—a 24-hour Security Hotline. According to its site, this Hotline is another way to provide information to District officials about a potentially dangerous situation. It is to be manned 24 hours a day, seven days a week. All calls are recorded and Caller ID will identify where the incoming call is originating from. Operators will log all the important information, then relay it to the proper authorities (the District’s SIU Department and local law enforcement agencies for follow-up). See link for information on hotline: <a href="http://www.broward.k12.fl.us/siu/tips/">http://www.broward.k12.fl.us/siu/tips/</a></td>
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<td>PL - 18</td>
<td>All visitors should have to enter front office/single point of entry and scan in to STAR system, including BCPS maintenance. Substitutes and all other visitors should either have badges or STAR stickers worn at all times.</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>See PL – 16</td>
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<td>PL - 19</td>
<td>Emphasizing current policy that does not preclude any teacher/staff/administrator from initiating or alerting a code red to alert the school and law enforcement.</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>See PL – 16</td>
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<td>PL - 20</td>
<td>Safety and security policies and procedures should be communicated with everyone on campus as well as law enforcement and fire department.</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>See PL – 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL - 21</td>
<td>BCPS should follow up with the student body and families and community to let them know what security changes/improvements are being made at the school immediately, midterm and long term.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>See PL – 16</td>
</tr>
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<td>PL - 22</td>
<td>Implement meaningful back to school communication now and over the summer to keep all stakeholders informed regarding safety/security improvements.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>See PL – 16</td>
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<td>PL - 23</td>
<td>Safety/Security policy sheet to be distributed to parents either before but no later than at the start of school that they can review the expectations and plans.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>See PL – 16</td>
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<td>PL - 24</td>
<td>Administrators and microtechs and SROs should be trained on how to monitor and access video recordings at each school site.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>See PL – 12</td>
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<td>PL - 25</td>
<td>Initiate “See Something Say Something” protocols for students, teachers and staff.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>See PL – 7</td>
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<td>PL - 26</td>
<td>During opening and closing times of schools, there was consensus that school staff must supervise the ingress/egress points of entry.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>See PL – 12</td>
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<td>PL - 27</td>
<td>All classrooms should have an intercom button and landline phone to alert school/office of critical incidents in the building. If they do not have these, they should have a radio/walkie-talkie to communicate with school/office.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>See PL – 12</td>
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<td>PL - 28</td>
<td>Fencing: Conduct immediate survey of perimeter fencing and scalability.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>On June 8, 2018, a memorandum was issued on Educational Facilities Security Grant—Senate Bill 7026, which was to provide school districts with educational facilities security grant guidelines, specific evaluation criteria, as well as pertinent deadlines. Fencing was a funded provision through this grant program for a school district or charter school. See link: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/EdFacilitiesSecurityGrant-SenBill7026.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/EdFacilitiesSecurityGrant-SenBill7026.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 29</td>
<td>Safety of Schools Based on Infrastructure, Policies, and Procedures—Near Term</td>
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<td>PL - 30</td>
<td>Implement the “StudentProtect App,” or other similar technology, that facilitates/enables students, parents, and school staff to report threats or suspicious activity to administration/school safety team and local law enforcement, with added feature for direct dial to 911 that communicates exact GPS location of the caller.</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Section 19 of The Public Safety Act SB 7026 established a new, anonymous K–12 “FortifyFL” suspicious activity reporting tool, which allows students and members of the community to anonymously report dangerous threats through a mobile app. See link for details: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/12031/urlt/SB-7026-Public-Safety.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/12031/urlt/SB-7026-Public-Safety.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 31</td>
<td>On-Campus After-school, Sports, and Summer programs must have a security plan in place, with safety responsibilities assigned</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>See PL – 12</td>
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<td>PL - 32</td>
<td>Encourage District and municipalities to initiate a social media monitoring protocols to identify as early as possible threats and at-risk behaviors for reporting to appropriate personnel.</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>See PL – 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL - 33</td>
<td>Establish a security supervision standard for the most vulnerable of arrival/dismissal times of day require an extra layer of security from school staff and local law enforcement.</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>See PL – 7</td>
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<td>PL - 34</td>
<td>All public areas of schools, such as hallways, external doors, outdoor areas (playgrounds, common areas), parking lots, entrances/exits to campus should be seen in cameras.</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>The Superintendent of Broward County Schools issued a letter to the community on June 1, 2018, that updated them on the safety measures the county had taken in the wake of the Parkland tragedy. An excerpt from the letter is as follows: “The District is in the process of upgrading real-time surveillance camera systems at all schools. The work will be completed by the end of June 2018.” See link: <a href="https://www.browardschools.com/cms/lib/FL01803656/Centricity/Domain/197/9903_06042018_Letter-to-BCPS-Families-June-1-2018.pdf">https://www.browardschools.com/cms/lib/FL01803656/Centricity/Domain/197/9903_06042018_Letter-to-BCPS-Families-June-1-2018.pdf</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>PL - 35</td>
<td>No public area should be left unmonitored by cameras.</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>The Educational Facilities Security Grant—Senate Bill 7026, which was to provide school districts with educational facilities security grant guidelines, specific evaluation criteria, as well as pertinent deadlines allows for the utilization of grant funds for the installation of cameras, as a funded provision through this grant program for a school district or charter school. See link: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/EdFacilitiesSecurityGrant-SenBill7026.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/EdFacilitiesSecurityGrant-SenBill7026.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 36</td>
<td>Proper and thorough threat assessments must be done and include law enforcement and fire department.</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>The Public Safety Act SB 7026 requires every school in Florida to have a threat assessment team with expertise in mental health counseling, academic instruction, law enforcement, and school administration to meet monthly to review any potential threats to students and staff at the school. See link: <a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/BillSummaries/2018/html/1886">https://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/BillSummaries/2018/html/1886</a></td>
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<td>PL - 37</td>
<td>There was agreement that all BCPS schools must have a single point entry on to the campus and into the schools during school hours.</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Because the Public Safety Act SB 7026 requires every school in Florida to have a threat assessment team to meet monthly to review any potential threats to students and staff at the school, it is expected that the threat assessment process would enable school teams to review safety procedures, inclusive of points of entry. See link: <a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/BillSummaries/2018/html/1886">https://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/BillSummaries/2018/html/1886</a></td>
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<td>PL - 38</td>
<td>Single point entry should have a “buzzer” system that gives office/staff control of that access.</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>The Educational Facilities Security Grant—Senate Bill 7026, which was to provide school districts with educational facilities security grant guidelines, specific evaluation criteria, as well as pertinent deadlines meets this recommendation. Access systems, which would include a “buzzer” system, would be a funded provision through this grant program for a school district or charter school. See link: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/EdFacilitiesSecurityGrant-SenBill7026.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/EdFacilitiesSecurityGrant-SenBill7026.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 39</td>
<td>If gates and external doors are opened or unlocked, which would compromise single point entry, those gates and doors must be supervised.</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>The Public Safety Act SB 7026 requires every school in Florida to have a threat assessment team with expertise in mental health counseling, academic instruction, law enforcement, and school administration to meet monthly to review any potential threats to students and staff at the school. The threat assessment process would enable school teams to review safety procedures, to include</td>
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<td>PL - 40</td>
<td>The Task Force strongly recommends the BCPs evaluate and consider metal detector deployments in schools.</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>On June 8, 2018, a memorandum was issued on Educational Facilities Security Grant—Senate Bill 7026, which was to provide school districts with educational facilities security grant guidelines, specific evaluation criteria, as well as pertinent deadlines. Metal detectors are a funded provision through this grant program for a school district or charter school. See link: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/EdFacilitiesSecurityGrant-SenBill7026.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/EdFacilitiesSecurityGrant-SenBill7026.pdf</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>PL - 41</td>
<td>All schools need to analyze their emergency notification system. Need effective way to communicate to all students/teachers a life-threatening emergency is taking place.</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>Broward County has an alert notification system that is specific for the entire county, but not simply for the schools. Students and parents can sign up. Information on the system can be found at the following link: <a href="http://www.broward.org/Emergency/Pages/AlertBroward.aspx">http://www.broward.org/Emergency/Pages/AlertBroward.aspx</a></td>
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<td>PL - 42</td>
<td>The Knox “Blue Box” system—box painted blue to inform responding police officers that this box is specific for their use. It should be placed somewhere other than in the same location as the current PD Knox Box, so to allow separation between points of entry and to ensure access to the box if one side or area of a building is inaccessible.</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>The Educational Facilities Security Grant—Senate Bill 7026, which was to provide school districts with educational facilities security grant guidelines, specific evaluation criteria, as well as pertinent deadlines meets this recommendation. The Knox systems, as outlined in the recommendation, would be a funded provision through this grant program for a school district or charter school. Schools have the discretion to utilize the grant for school security purposes. See link: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/EdFacilitiesSecurityGrant-SenBill7026.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/EdFacilitiesSecurityGrant-SenBill7026.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 43</td>
<td><strong>Safety of Schools Based on Infrastructure, Policies, and Procedures—Midterm</strong></td>
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<td>PL - 44</td>
<td>Man Trap Containment. All doors leading from that “single point entry” area (usually front office) to the main school should have a preventative measure in place to deter an intruder from gaining access to the rest of the school—such as buzzers, swipe, etc.</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>The Educational Facilities Security Grant - Senate Bill 7026, which was to provide school districts with educational facilities security grant guidelines, specific evaluation criteria, as well as pertinent deadlines meets this recommendation. Access systems, which would include a “buzzer” system, would be a funded provision through this grant program for a school district or charter school. See link: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/EdFacilitiesSecurityGrant-SenBill7026.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/EdFacilitiesSecurityGrant-SenBill7026.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 45</td>
<td>Fencing: Increase height of fencing with recommended rake within limits of code.</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>See PL – 28</td>
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<td>PL - 46</td>
<td>Evaluate protecting classroom door windows from ballistic breach.</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>See PL – 3</td>
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<td>PL - 47</td>
<td>Evaluate if all external windows (windows facing outside) are hurricane proof in all schools and retrofit to protect.</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>See PL – 3</td>
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<td>PL - 48</td>
<td>Increase school safety personnel staffing.</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>The Public Safety Act SB 7026 provides funding for safe-school officers and requires a safe-school officer at each school in the state. Safe-school officers must be sworn law enforcement officers. In addition, the act states that districts must designate a school administrator who completes the required training within the specified timeframe as the school safety specialist for the district to serve as the district’s primary point of public contact for public school safety functions. See memo for additional information: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/GuardianSchoolSafetySpecialist.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/GuardianSchoolSafetySpecialist.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 49</td>
<td>Consider secondary perimeter fencing with a single gate around the portable/modular areas. Special security protocols and</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>See PL – 28</td>
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| PL - 50 | Construction standards/upgrades for portable/modular classrooms. | 83 | Section 31 of Florida Senate Bill 7026 Public Safety (CH. 2018-3, Laws of Florida) amends s. 1013.64, F.S., Funds for comprehensive educational plant needs, is inclusive of capital improvements that would be inclusive of blocking devices. The bill provides the cost for the following items must be below 2 percent per student station and specifies items that are to be excluded from the student station cost calculation, as follows:  
- o Securing entries;  
- o checkpoint construction;  
- o Lighting specifically designed for entry point security;  
- o Security cameras;  
- o Automatic locks and locking devices;  
- o Electronic security systems;  
- o Fencing designed to prevent intruder entry into a building;  
- o Bullet-proof glass; or  
- o Other capital construction items approved by the school safety specialist to ensure building security for new educational, auxiliary, or ancillary facilities.  
| PL - 51 | Use of bollard or other blocking device to prevent vehicular manslaughter on school campuses. | 83 | See PL - 50 |
| PL - 52 | To alleviate communication link problems between schools and E911, consider providing a direct connect to local dispatch (e.g., Indiana schools). | 83 | See PL - 50 |
| PL - 53 | The vulnerability of Portable buildings must be addressed, including the easy access to the buildings, the construction materials which offer no protection. | 83 | See PL - 2 |
| PL - 54 | Advocate that the Florida Dept. of Education establish mandatory security standards and audits for charter schools. | 83 | See PL - 2 |
| PL - 55 | Broward County School Resource Officer Program—Immediate | | |
| PL - 56 | When practical, SRO training should be held on days when students are not in session. | 84 | Section 26 of the Public Safety Act SB 7026 amended s. 1006.12, F.S., Safe-school officers at each public school, to:  
- Require safe-school officers at every school within the district. Districts have discretion to use school resource officers, school safety officers, and/or school guardians (outlined in section 5).  
- Require background checks, drug screening, and psychological evaluations for school resource officers.  
- Allow participation in the school guardian program at the discretion of the district.  
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<td>PL - 58</td>
<td>SRO and all administrators should be supervising/holding those critical incident drills. An &quot;after action report&quot; must be completed in BCPS database.</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>Data on SROs and associated responsibilities in the State of Florida can be found at the following link: <a href="http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/Meetings/June-Meeting-Documents/Presentations/June-8-930AM-Broward-County-Schools-Moquin-SROs.aspx">http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/Meetings/June-Meeting-Documents/Presentations/June-8-930AM-Broward-County-Schools-Moquin-SROs.aspx</a></td>
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<td>PL - 59</td>
<td>School site security assessments should be conducted annually with the school's SAFE team members, all school level administrators, and municipal/agency law enforcement. Input and recommendations from these security assessments will be provided to BCPS SIU for recommendations and approval.</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>The Superintendent of Broward County Schools issued a letter to the community on June 1, 2018, that updated them on the safety measures the county had taken in the wake of the Parkland tragedy. An excerpt from the letter is as follows: &quot;The District has chosen an independent security firm, which is conducting risk assessments for all District schools and reviewing District policies, training and security staffing models to provide recommendations for security enhancements.&quot; See link: <a href="https://www.browardschools.com/cms/lib/FL01803656/Centricity/Domain/197/9903_06042018_Letter-to-BCPS-Families-June-1-2018.pdf">https://www.browardschools.com/cms/lib/FL01803656/Centricity/Domain/197/9903_06042018_Letter-to-BCPS-Families-June-1-2018.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 60</td>
<td>Improve communication between our SROs and local school officials where necessary and implement a formal-districtwide policy instructing principals on cooperation with local law enforcement. This cannot be left to personal discretion.</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>Relationship between SROs and local school officials established in June 2018. See link for details: <a href="https://www.browardschools.com/site/default.aspx?PageType=3&amp;DomainID=14019&amp;ModuleInstanceID=60855&amp;ViewID=6446EE88-D30C-497E-9316-3F8874B3E108&amp;RenderLoc=0&amp;FlexDataID=88570&amp;PageID=38282">https://www.browardschools.com/site/default.aspx?PageType=3&amp;DomainID=14019&amp;ModuleInstanceID=60855&amp;ViewID=6446EE88-D30C-497E-9316-3F8874B3E108&amp;RenderLoc=0&amp;FlexDataID=88570&amp;PageID=38282</a></td>
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<td>PL - 61</td>
<td>It was encouraged that, when possible and consistent with competing operational needs, there should be visible presence of law enforcement vehicles at schools.</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>See PL – 2</td>
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<td>PL - 62</td>
<td><strong>Broward County School Resource Officer Program—Near Term</strong></td>
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<td>PL - 63</td>
<td>All schools should have at least one full-time SRO—exception might be schools that share campuses, then 1 SRO per school campus.</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>As of June 2018, the Broward County District is working to provide at least one School Resource Officer or school safety officer for every school for the new school year. See link: <a href="https://www.browardschools.com/cms/lib/FL01803656/Centricity/Domain/197/9903_06042018_Letter-to-BCPS-Families-June-1-2018.pdf">https://www.browardschools.com/cms/lib/FL01803656/Centricity/Domain/197/9903_06042018_Letter-to-BCPS-Families-June-1-2018.pdf</a> Also see the following for more information on SROs in Broward County: <a href="http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/Meetings/June-Meeting-Documents/Presentations/June-8-930AM-Broward-County-Schools-Moquin-SROs.aspx">http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/Meetings/June-Meeting-Documents/Presentations/June-8-930AM-Broward-County-Schools-Moquin-SROs.aspx</a></td>
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<td>PL - 64</td>
<td>School district must increase the amount it participates in the cost of SROs. Actual costs are well above the current participation amount.</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>As of June 2018, Broward County is working to provide at least one School Resource Officer. Broward County Public Schools (BCPS) preference is to retain and expand the current School Resource Officer (SRO) program as part of the District’s overall safety and security efforts. Under the SRO program, BCPS partners with local municipalities and the Broward Sheriff’s Office to assign certified law enforcement officers at schools. The state legislative requirements (SB 7026) mandate all Florida school districts have an SRO or safe school officer at each school at the start of the 2018/19 school year. In the event a municipal partner is unable to support the District’s current SRO program due to financial reasons or officer availability, the District acknowledges the potential need to participate in the Coach Aaron Feis Guardian Program to meet the new state requirements. See link: <a href="https://www.browardschools.com/site/default.aspx?PageType=3&amp;DomainID=14019&amp;ModuleInstanceID=60855&amp;ViewID=6446EE88-D30C-497E-9316-3F8874B3E108&amp;RenderLoc=0&amp;FlexDataID=88570&amp;PageID=38282">https://www.browardschools.com/site/default.aspx?PageType=3&amp;DomainID=14019&amp;ModuleInstanceID=60855&amp;ViewID=6446EE88-D30C-497E-9316-3F8874B3E108&amp;RenderLoc=0&amp;FlexDataID=88570&amp;PageID=38282</a></td>
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<td>PL - 65</td>
<td>There must be a permanent, stable and dedicated funding stream to ensure uniform SRO program in all BCPS and charter schools.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>See PL – 64</td>
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<td>PL - 66</td>
<td>Install gun lockers in local schools so that patrol rifles can be maintained on campus instead of in vehicles. This will also eliminate the need for an exhibition of these weapons on a daily basis.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>In a letter dated March 23, 2018, Governor Scott stated that funding for school hardening would be distributed as quickly to school districts, but that the districts to include Broward County could use existing funding to make any critical safety improvements immediately. Gun lockers fall within the provisions outlined by the Broward County District in a letter to schools. See link for details: <a href="https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/SGS-BIZHUB18032317450.pdf">https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/SGS-BIZHUB18032317450.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 67</td>
<td><strong>Broward County School Resource Officer Program—Legislative</strong></td>
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<td>PL - 68</td>
<td>Require state to meet its obligation to make adequate provision for safe and secure schools pursuant to Article IX, Section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution. Increase categorical funding for SROs.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>See PL – 64</td>
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<td>PL - 69</td>
<td>Seek from the state adequate funding to full comply with MSDHSPS Act as it relates to SROs.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>See PL – 64</td>
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<td>PL - 70</td>
<td>Seek legislative exception to allow agencies to re-hire retired certified law enforcement officers, preempting the pension provisions that prohibit re-hiring during separation period without penalty.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>As of June 2018, the Broward County Public Schools (BCPS) preference is to retain and expand the current School Resource Officer (SRO) program as part of the District’s overall safety and security efforts. Under the SRO program, BCPS partners with local municipalities and the Broward Sheriff's Office to assign certified law enforcement officers at schools. New state legislative requirements (SB 7026) mandate all Florida school districts have an SRO or safe school officer at each school at the start of the 2018/19 school year. See link: <a href="https://www.browardschools.com/site/default.aspx?PageType=3&amp;DomainID=14019&amp;ModuleInstanceID=60855&amp;ViewID=6446EE88-D30C-497E-9316-3F8874B3E108&amp;RenderLoc=0&amp;FlexDataID=88570&amp;PageID=38282">https://www.browardschools.com/site/default.aspx?PageType=3&amp;DomainID=14019&amp;ModuleInstanceID=60855&amp;ViewID=6446EE88-D30C-497E-9316-3F8874B3E108&amp;RenderLoc=0&amp;FlexDataID=88570&amp;PageID=38282</a></td>
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<td>PL - 71</td>
<td><strong>School Discipline and Mental Health Process—Immediate</strong></td>
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<td>PL - 72</td>
<td>All current administrators, school counselors, SSW, and School Psychologists must complete a level 1 Threat Assessment training annually.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Each district school board within Florida must adopt policies for the establishment of threat assessment teams at each school whose duties include the coordination of resources and assessment and intervention with individuals whose behavior may pose a threat to the safety of school staff or students consistent with the model policies developed by the Office of Safe Schools. A threat assessment team must include persons with expertise in counseling, instruction, school administration, and law enforcement. Other school personnel must also be compliant. See link for details: <a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/BillSummaries/2018/html/18860885545.pdf">https://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/BillSummaries/2018/html/18860885545.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 73</td>
<td>School administration and SROs should hold annual School Discipline trainings before school starts to ensure better coordination and expectations related to at-risk students and what is recommended as part of the discipline matrix.</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Annual school discipline training/threat assessment is mandated by the state, see PL-72. However, the discipline matrix utilized in Florida is attached in the following link: <a href="https://www.browardschools.com/cms/lib/FL01803656/Centricity/Domain/13726/Matrix-3-5.pdf">https://www.browardschools.com/cms/lib/FL01803656/Centricity/Domain/13726/Matrix-3-5.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 74</td>
<td>An external audit should be done annually on each school's discipline infractions and</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>The School Environmental Safety Incident Reporting (SESIR) System currently collects data on 26 incidents of crime, violence, and disruptive behaviors that occur on school grounds, on school</td>
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<td>PL - 75</td>
<td>Consequences to determine if discipline and reporting into the DMS/BASIS system used by the District were handled appropriately.</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>Transportation, and at off-campus, school-sponsored events, during any 24-hour period, 365 days per year. Incidents are reported by schools to the districts, which in turn provide the data to the Florida Department of Education. See link for details: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/schools/healthy-schools/discipline-data.stml">http://www.fldoe.org/schools/healthy-schools/discipline-data.stml</a></td>
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<td>PL - 76</td>
<td>Promise: This is a program that was intended to be evaluated and refined. To that end, there must be timely analysis and disclosure of historic recidivism not just during an existing school year, but also across school years and across types of qualifying offenses. The purpose of this analysis is to ensure that interventions are best aligned with the supports necessary for the student and that the program is properly identifying the scope of at-risk students.</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>The Promise (Preventing Recidivism through Opportunities, Mentoring, Interventions, Supports &amp; Education) program represents the most comprehensive thinking available to address socially unacceptable or illegal behavior, targeting both short- and long-term academic success, aligning best practice models and Restorative Justice principles, and developing pro-social and resiliency skills. Currently there is no public analysis of the program and its results available. There is a landing page on the Broward County Public Schools website that has the most current information on the program. See link: <a href="https://www.browardschools.com/Page/32438">https://www.browardschools.com/Page/32438</a></td>
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<td>School Discipline and Mental Health Process—Legislative</td>
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<td>PL - 78</td>
<td>Seek legislative changes to ensure that disciplinary records for students transferring from private schools are transferred to the public schools.</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>Broward County has a website that is dedicated to information about services offered by 211. See link: <a href="http://211-broward.org/what-is-2-1-1/">http://211-broward.org/what-is-2-1-1/</a></td>
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<td>PL - 79</td>
<td>Community-Based Health Programs—Immediate</td>
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<td>PL - 80</td>
<td>211 must verify that service provider’s information is accurate and routinely updated.</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>Broward County Public Schools has a Mental Health Leadership Team that meets monthly to collaborate and develop prevention and awareness programs that align with the District’s Social Emotional Learning initiative. In the 2016–2017 school year, the Mental Health Leadership Team established a mental health campaign known as TALK (Tell Another—Listening Is Key). As part of this campaign the team also developed the District’s Mental Health and Wellness Portal (<a href="http://www.bcpsmentalhealth.com">www.bcpsmentalhealth.com</a>), which is designed to destigmatize mental illness and make the District’s mental health resources easily accessible to the community. See link for details: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 82</td>
<td>Continued development of and increased funding for the Integrated Data System</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>Broward County Public Schools has a comprehensive electronic database known as Behavioral and Academic Support Information System (BASIS) that provides data needed to drive decision-making and instruction in schools. The data includes student assessment results, attendance data, discipline information, and demographic information. The data is analyzed to create at-risk indicators that guide school-based teams to prioritize student needs. Each school has a Collaborative Problem Solving Team (CPST) that meets frequently to discuss students with academic, behavioral, or social/emotional concerns. Further data is collected through review of records, observations, interviews, etc. This information is then used to develop intervention plans tailored to the individual student’s need. The funding for these initiatives is not spelled out, but both the BASIS system and the CPST are key aspects of the mental health programming. See page 6 of the link for details: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 83</td>
<td>Promote the integration of primary care and behavioral healthcare.</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>Broward County Public Schools actively participates in the Coordinated Council of Broward—a multi-agency entity that serves to coordinate mental health and other services to students and families. The District also has a robust Behavioral Health Partnership that vets community agencies and allows them access to students on campus for additional mental health services as needed. This initiative mitigates the barriers to access that some students and families experience. Additionally, with parental consent, upon discharge of students who are involuntarily hospitalized, the clinical staff from the District are notified so that additional mental health services might be provided as needed. See page 7 of the link for details: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 84</td>
<td>Promote cultural and linguistic competency regarding mental health.</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>The school district advertises the availability of free counseling services through the Family Counseling Program to parents providing them with the opportunity to see counseling services on their own. The Family Counseling Program also accepts referrals from administrators, school social workers, school psychologists, school counselors, teachers, and friends of students. Students are also able to refer themselves. See page 5 of the link for additional information: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 85</td>
<td>Improve communication and coordination between all the stakeholders (e.g., teachers, parents, guardians, mental healthcare team, law enforcement) involved with the student to the extent allowed by law.</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>According to the Broward County Public Schools Detailed Mental Health Assistance Allocation Plan, healthcare personnel in school clinics may identify and provide referral for students needing mental health evaluation. Students are also identified through SEDNET (Multiagency Network for Students with Emotional Behavioral Disabilities) referrals that are received from hospitals, residential providers, and day treatment providers. The school-based team then determines whether services are warranted. Students with an Individual Education Plan (IEP) or 504 Plan can also be identified for counseling as a related service based on the individual’s need. See link for details: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 86</td>
<td>Ensure fidelity to the response to intervention/behavior protocols and a more</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>On October 8, 2018, Attorney General Pam Bondi, along with Florida Department of Law Enforcement Commissioner Rick Swearingen and Florida Department of Education Commissioner Pam Stewart, announced the launch of Fortify Florida, a suspicious activity reporting app. The app is now available to students across the state. See link for details: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/newsroom/latest-news/florida-launches-suspicious-activity-reporting-app-for-students.stml">http://www.fldoe.org/newsroom/latest-news/florida-launches-suspicious-activity-reporting-app-for-students.stml</a></td>
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<td>PL - 87</td>
<td>A School Threat Hotline where students, parents, teachers, etc. can call to report (A safe place to encourage “See Something, Say Something”).</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>Group Counseling is provided as needed by Broward Schools’ mental health professionals, i.e., family therapists, school counselors, school psychologists, and school social workers. Various</td>
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<td>PL - 90</td>
<td>Limit the use of school counselors in the involvement of academic testing. Emphasis should be on counseling services.</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>See PL – 89</td>
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<td>PL - 91</td>
<td>Recommend that the district request a discharge plan for students returning from a Baker Act facility or residential treatment facility, which includes recommendations or a note recommending their return to school (i.e., similar to a child needing clearance to return to school due to measles).</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>The BCPS District has a SEDNET (Multiagency Network for Students with Emotional Behavioral Disabilities) Coordinator who communicates with the local receiving facilities to address unique needs of students who have been hospitalized under the Baker Act. In applicable cases, SEDNET receives referrals and sends them out to school-based ESE Specialists. This referral can lead to a CPS team meeting, an IEP team meeting, a reevaluation plan meeting, or an initial referral for an evaluation. See page 4 of link for details: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 92</td>
<td>Recommend establishing transition teams made up of a teacher, social worker, case manager, administrator, parent(s)/guardian, and community service provider that serve the child to transition from Baker Act facilities.</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>The Broward County Public Schools District has a SEDNET (Multiagency Network for Students with Emotional Behavioral Disabilities) Coordinator who communicates with the local receiving facilities to address unique needs of students who have been hospitalized under the Baker Act. In applicable cases, SEDNET receives referrals and sends them out to school-based ESE Specialists. This referral can lead to a CPS team meeting, an IEP team meeting, a reevaluation plan meeting, or an initial referral for an evaluation. See page 4 of link for details: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 93</td>
<td>Establish mental health liaison positions assigned to each of the district areas to coordinate the transition teams.</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Each school holds Collaborative Problem Solving team meetings at schools to identify at-risk students. The use of at-risk indicators (office discipline referrals, absenteeism, etc.) trigger school-based teams to meet and discuss student needs. As a result, students needing mental health services can be referred to school-based mental health professionals. See page 5 of link: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf</a></td>
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| PL - 94 | Licensed psychologist (i.e., Ph.D., Psy.D.), social workers (i.e., LCSW), mental health counselors (i.e., LMHC), as well as bachelor/master’s level and unlicensed practitioners, should be available to ALL schools in Broward County.                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 88   | Broward County Public Schools have access to the following personnel for Mental Health assistance:  
  • 34 Family Therapists are licensed with the following: LCSW, LMFT, LMHC. All have master’s degrees or higher.  
  • School Social Workers have a minimum of a master’s degree; some also have a Ph.D., Ed.S. and CAP (Certified Addiction Specialist).  
  • 120 School Psychologists (with a master’s degree or higher) are assigned to schools.  
  • 44 ELSL counselors all with a master’s degree or higher (75 percent are licensed in the following areas LMHC, LMFT, LCSW and some have the following degrees, Ph.D., Psy.D., Ed.D.).  
  • 436 Certified School Counselors, each with a master’s degree or higher.  
  • Broward Schools has a contract with a Child & Adolescent Psychiatrist (M.D.).  
  • Psychological Services has consultant agreements with a Child & Adolescent Psychiatrist (M.D.) and a Pediatric Neurologist (M.D.).  
  • 2/3 of the District’s current nursing staff (ARNP, RN, LPN) are provided through contractual agreements with community agencies.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |

Federal Commission on School Safety; Appendix B
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<tr>
<td>PL - 95</td>
<td>Increase resources required to initiate and complete the special education evaluation and eligibility process, culminating in effective Individual Education Plans and Behavior Intervention Plans for children who need related services to be safely educated in the least restrictive environment possible.</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>In the Broward County Public School system, psychological evaluations are conducted for students suspected of having a disability and possibly needing more intensive services. Counseling and additional services can be added to a student's IEP, as warranted. Psychiatric evaluations are conducted as a component of the referral process to consider a change of placement to a separate day school for a student needing a more therapeutic setting. Psychosocial evaluations are conducted as a part of an Emotional or Behavioral Disability (EBD) evaluations or to obtain more information regarding a student's social/developmental history when determined by the CPS team. See link for more: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>PL - 96</td>
<td>Recommend all mental health databases are operating off the same system so that ALL stakeholders who provide direct care know if a student has been previously served.</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Broward County Public Schools has a comprehensive electronic database known as Behavioral and Academic Support Information System (BASIS) that provides data needed to drive decision-making and instruction in schools. The data includes student assessment results, attendance data, discipline information, and demographic information. The data is analyzed to create at-risk indicators that guide school-based teams to prioritize student needs. Each school has a Collaborative Problem Solving Team (CPST) that meets frequently to discuss students with academic, behavioral, or social/emotional concerns. Further data is collected through review of records, observations, interviews, etc. This information is then used to develop intervention plans tailored to the individual student's need. The intervention plan may include individual or group counseling provided by school-based mental health professionals. See page 4 of link: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>PL - 97</td>
<td>Provide more intensive training on &quot;how&quot; to identify children who are at risk and need significant intervention, in addition to programs currently in place. While it should not be expected that teachers act as therapists, it would be advisable that they are aware of signs/behaviors students with suicidal ideation are experiencing/exhibiting.</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>According to the Broward County Public Schools Detailed Mental Health Assistance Allocation Plan, the District is currently finishing its third year of a social and emotional learning initiative designed to incorporate these skills into all areas of the curriculum. Social and emotional learning enhances students’ capacity to integrate skills, attitudes, and behaviors to deal effectively and ethically with daily tasks and challenges. Five core competencies have been adopted by the District to be incorporated in all subject areas and grade levels. These competencies are: Self-Awareness, Self Management, Social Awareness, Responsible Decision-Making, and Relationship Skills. Extensive professional development has been provided to school teams and teachers, as well as a research-based social and emotional learning curriculum, known as Sanford Harmony, which is used in our elementary schools and some middle schools. See page 1 of the link for more details: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>PL - 98</td>
<td>Specialized teams such as the START (School Threat Assessment Response Team) should be developed in Broward County. (Develop the team, training, provide on-going education for assessment, and follow up.)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>According to the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, by August 1, 2018, each school district should have completed a security risk assessment for each public school campus. The assessment must be conducted in consultation with local law enforcement. Although the $99 million in funding for school hardening was to be distributed to assist, school districts were to use existing funding to make any critical safety improvements immediately. See link: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/safe-schools/">http://www.fldoe.org/safe-schools/</a></td>
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| PL - 99| Identify programs that are reporting successful outcomes in reducing violence and promoting healthy learning environments. We need programs that emphasize empathy, coping skills, communication, conflict resolution, anger                                                                 | 88   | The BCPS system provides various types of professional development and evidence-based programs that target mental health interventions for students and teachers. These trainings and interventions include:  
  - Examining Responses to Trauma to Build More Positive Connections to Students  
  - Connecting Social and Emotional Learning with Mental Health  
  - The Positive Impact of Social and Emotional Learning  
  The evidence-based programs include Naviance, LEAPS, Sanford Harmony, and Cloud 9 (SEL Mental |
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| PL - 100 | Programs that promote social emotional learning and provide positive reinforcement should be implemented. | 88 | The Taskforce recommends the immediate post-crisis response be coordinated by relevant parties in the Broward County Emergency Operations Center, such as Human Services, Broward Behavioral Health Coalition, the American Red Cross, the United Way of Broward County, the Broward County School Board, and the Department of Health.  
* Identify and establish a standing committee—Mental Healthcare Response Team.  
* Establish protocols and procedures that are to be enacted immediately upon the report of mass violence/casualty event.  
* Activate Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Mental Health Emergency Response Team triage. The Broward Behavioral Health Coalition should be integrated to any activation of the EOC.  
* Have and maintain lists of qualified mental health professionals and support services for short and long-term recovery efforts.  
* An agency/group should be designated to act as the “clearing house” for offers of mental health support from outside the county. |
| PL - 101 | Recommend NCTSNs Psychological First Aid (PFA) and Skills for Psychological Recovery (SPR) are promising practices for disaster behavioral health response and recovery. Both PFA and SPR were developed by the National Center for PTSD and the National Child Traumatic Stress Network, as well as other individuals involved in coordinating and participating in disaster response and recovery. PFA and SPR intervention strategies are intended for use with children, adolescents, parents and caretakers, families, and adults who are survivors or witnesses exposed to disaster or terrorism. PFA and | 89 | The School Emergency Response to Violence (SERV) Grant is intended to address the long-term recovery efforts that may be needed following a traumatic event. Extended Services grants may provide for up to 18 months to help students, teachers, and school staff recover from a traumatic event. The SERV grant will provide for:  
• Technical assistance on developing an appropriate recovery plan for addressing student needs and assessing the federal, state, and local resources available to the LEA, institutions of higher education, and community to carry out this response  
• Mental health assessments, referrals, and services related to the traumatic event (with the goal of restoring victims/survivors to their pre-incident levels of functioning)  
• Overtime for teachers, counselors, law enforcement and security officers, and other staff  
• Substitute teachers and other staff as necessary  
• Emergency transportation such as expenses incurred during evacuation  
• Transportation and other costs to operate school at an alternative site  
• Repairs of minor damage caused by the traumatic event (Extended Services Grants only)  
• Temporary security measures such as non-permanent metal detectors and additional security guards and security cameras  
This list is not meant to be exhaustive. Applications to fund other services will be considered if the proposed activities are not among the list of services and activities that may not be funded and are necessary to restore the learning environment. See page 10 in link for more information: [http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf](http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf) |
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| PL - 102 | SPR can also be provided to first responders and other disaster relief workers. | 90   | The issue of working and/or living through a traumatic event and how it can negatively affect emotional and physical health, social functioning, and economic well-being is outlined in the BCPS Detailed Mental Health Assistance Allocation Plan. A workshop titled “Tools for Moving Through and Beyond Trauma” is designed to give participants evidence-based practical tools for preventing and managing life’s inevitable stresses, building resilience and self-awareness. This approach, which is grounded in our biology and psychology, is designed to transform even the most devastating trauma into an opportunity for discovering personal meaning and purpose. Objectives include opportunities to:  
  - Experience several evidence-based mind-body medicine techniques as tools to relieve stress, transform trauma, and enhance health and well-being  
  - Understand the connection between caregiving, stress, and chronic illness  
  - Understand how mind-body skills groups are structured to create trauma healing and a Mental Health Assistance Allocation Plan  
  - Recognize the importance of a community response to dealing with crisis  
| PL - 103 | Recommend activities that address the wide range of emotional and physiological signs that manifest themselves in the days, weeks, and months following a traumatic event. | 90   | The District’s Family Counseling Program provides free individual, family, and group counseling services. The goal of the program is to promote student academic performance, responsible behavior in school, and regular attendance. School-based teams and district mental health professionals also refer students and families to community providers for additional services. See link for details: [http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/url/Broward.pdf](http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/url/Broward.pdf) |
| PL - 104 | Recommend a pre-determined number of clients that a counselor is assigned upon intake and will provide services for the duration. | 90   | BCPS strictly follows FERPA guidelines, and require that an Authorization for Release and/or Request for Information is obtained to share information with the student’s primary care providers or other mental health providers, except in the event of an emergency. Formal agreements between the district and agencies requires the entities to disclose the specific educational records to be shared with legitimate educational interests and that all information will be held confidential. See page 7 of link for details: [http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/url/Broward.pdf](http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/url/Broward.pdf) |
| PL - 105 | Recommend identifying areas within the school/institution that provide for greater privacy in disclosure. | 90   | The BCPS District requires that an Authorization for Release and/or Request for Information be obtained with the parent's signature to be able to communicate with community providers, including the student’s primary care physician. Additionally, consent is obtained from parents to make referrals to community providers when mental health issues arise or are identified. See link for details: [http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/url/Broward.pdf](http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/url/Broward.pdf) |
| PL - 106 | Community-Based Health Programs—Legislative | 91   | Funding for some of the major aspects of the BCPS Mental Health program are outlined below:  
  - The Family Counseling Program with Broward County Public Schools is funded through a grant from Broward County Community Partnership Division/Children’s Services. The Family Counseling Program has been receiving this grant for more than 15 years. Since the program continues to meet/exceed outcomes with students and families required by the grant, they anticipate to maintain this successful partnership and continue the level of grant approval each year. Broward County will continue to seek reimbursement for services through Medicaid, and grant opportunities. Grant funding from The New York Life Foundation will allow Broward County Public Schools to engage in consultative services with the |
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<td>PL - 108</td>
<td>Community-Based Safety Issues—Near Term</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>National Center for School Crisis and Bereavement. The partnership will allow an interdisciplinary team of medical, mental health, and school professionals to support short-term and long-term recovery in the aftermath of the crisis at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. This will include educational and mental health resources in crisis management tools, professional development and training, community presentations, and support to students, families, and staff. The School Emergency Response to Violence (SERV) Grant is intended to address the long-term recovery efforts that may be needed following a traumatic event. Extended Services grants may be provided for up to 18 months to help students, teachers, and school staff recover from a traumatic event. See page 10 of the link: <a href="http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf">http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/18612/urlt/Broward.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 109</td>
<td>Individual Public Access Bleeding Control Kits are recommended to be installed in all classrooms.</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>On August 31, 2018, Broward educators took the “Stop the Bleed” medical emergency course. The training was made possible by grant money. Every single school in Broward County will receive at least two Stop the Bleed kits in case of an emergency. All the schools are expected to have the kits by 2019. See link: <a href="https://wsvn.com/news/local/broward-educators-take-stop-the-bleed-medical-emergency-course/">https://wsvn.com/news/local/broward-educators-take-stop-the-bleed-medical-emergency-course/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>PL - 110</td>
<td>Wall-mounted Public Access Bleeding Control Kits are recommended to be installed in places of assembly, such as the cafeteria, auditorium, theater, etc.</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>See PL – 109</td>
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<tr>
<td>PL - 111</td>
<td>It is recommended that all bleeding control kits are housed in a cabinet or container to protect the contents.</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>See PL – 109</td>
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<td>PL - 112</td>
<td>It is recommended that the school board partners with the local Fire Department and Police Department to train the teachers and faculty during the Teachers’ Planning week at the end of the summer break, before students return one week later.</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>Letter from Jeffrey Moquin, Chief of Staff for the Broward County School Board, to all Principals outlining mandatory compliance with emergency preparedness drills, plans, etc. See link: <a href="https://www.browardschools.com/cms/lib/FL01803656/Centricity/Domain/16/2018-19%20Safety%20Memo.pdf">https://www.browardschools.com/cms/lib/FL01803656/Centricity/Domain/16/2018-19%20Safety%20Memo.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 113</td>
<td>Similarly, municipal based deployment in current AED locations should be initiated. Existing programs have been demonstrated to be effectively deployed.</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>Letter from Jeffrey Moquin, Chief of Staff for the Broward County School Board, to all Principals outlining mandatory compliance with emergency preparedness drills, plans, etc. See link: <a href="https://www.browardschools.com/cms/lib/FL01803656/Centricity/Domain/16/2018-19%20Safety%20Memo.pdf">https://www.browardschools.com/cms/lib/FL01803656/Centricity/Domain/16/2018-19%20Safety%20Memo.pdf</a></td>
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<td>PL - 114</td>
<td>Community-based bystander CPR trainings should include a training module for “stop the bleed.”</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>On August 31, 2018, Broward educators took the “Stop the Bleed” medical emergency course. The training was made possible by grant money. Every single school in Broward County will receive at least two Stop the Bleed kits in case of an emergency. All the schools are expected to have the kits by 2019. See link: <a href="https://wsvn.com/news/local/broward-educators-take-stop-the-bleed-medical-emergency-course/">https://wsvn.com/news/local/broward-educators-take-stop-the-bleed-medical-emergency-course/</a></td>
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<td>PL - 115</td>
<td>The results of expert analysis being performed by Broward County consultants and the MSD Commission related to cell phone calls to E911 and distribution thereto,</td>
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<td>any recommendations should be considered by the Task Force.</td>
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<td>PL -</td>
<td>All possible efforts must be made to expedite the upgrade of the Public Safety Radio System.</td>
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<td>116</td>
<td>While waiting for the upgrade of the Public Safety Radio System, immediate steps must be taken by BCPS and the County to remove school board radios from the current system.</td>
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<td>Radio Penetration in Schools, Hospitals, and Public Buildings: It is recommended that a complete analysis is conducted in all Broward Schools to determine the effectiveness of radio communications for all emergency first responders. Following the analysis, any school that shows areas of poor and/or an inability for effective radio communications should have an engineered plan to install a public safety signal booster system (BDA, Bidirectional Antenna). Additional funding and efforts are necessary for legacy hospitals and public buildings.</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>Broward County released Phase 3 of a revised consultant's draft report on Regional 911, the third step in a series of independent analysis of Regional 911 operations intended to ensure continuous improvement in the consolidated system and respond to stakeholder feedback and questions. The draft report provides a roadmap for fully realizing the efficiencies of consolidation, and addresses feedback and questions from E911 stakeholders. See link for details: <a href="http://www.broward.org/CommunicationsTechnology/Pages/Default.aspx">http://www.broward.org/CommunicationsTechnology/Pages/Default.aspx</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>PL -</td>
<td>Community Based Safety Issues—Legislative</td>
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<td>119</td>
<td>Must advocate for funding to support the execution of the Risk Protection Orders and clarify responsibilities of the Judiciary, clerk's office, and law enforcement. When utilized effectively, there will be substantial increased strain on law enforcement and the Court system. Greater clarity and refinement by legislature is necessary to better identify respective responsibilities for the judiciary, clerk's office, and law enforcement for such matters as mandatory reporting by court related to expiration of RPOs, background checks on voluntary transfers, how juveniles and confidentiality are to be handled, and responsibility for court reporters and translators in a civil proceeding.</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>On March 9, 2018, Governor Rick signed into law Senate Bill 7026, also known as the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, which, among other things, enacted section 790.401, Florida Statutes. Section 790.401, Florida Statutes, creates a cause of action known as a petition for risk protection order. See link: <a href="http://www.17th.flcourts.org/risk_protection_orders/">http://www.17th.flcourts.org/risk_protection_orders/</a></td>
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### Recommendations

#### Characterizing the Attacker

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<td>There is no accurate or useful “profile” of students who engaged in targeted school violence.</td>
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<td>Almost ¾ of the attackers felt persecuted, bullied, threatened, attacked, or injured by others prior to the incident.</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>History of having been the subject of a mental health evaluation, diagnosed with a mental disorder, or involved in substance abuse did not appear to be prevalent among attackers.</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>More than half of the attackers demonstrated some interest in violence, through movies, video games, books, and other media.</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>Most attackers had no history of prior violent or criminal behavior.</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Most attackers were known to have had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempt suicide.</td>
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#### Conceptualizing the Attack

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<td>Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive acts.</td>
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#### Signaling the Attack

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<td>Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker idea and/or plan to attack.</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.</td>
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<td>Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that caused others concern or indicated a need for help.</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>In many cases, other students were involved in the attack in some capacity.</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.</td>
<td>27</td>
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#### Resolving the Attack

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<td>Most attacks were stopped by means other than law enforcement.</td>
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#### Recommendations

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<td>When there are indications that a student may pose a threat to the school community arise in the form of revelations about a planned attack, school administrators and law enforcement officials need to move quickly to inquire about and intervene in that plan.</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schools should encourage students to report information regarding potential school attacks by identifying and breaking down barriers in the school environment that may discourage students from coming forward with information. Schools should also ensure that they have fair, thoughtful, and effective systems to respond to whatever students do bring forward.</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>School administrators need to respond to all students who make threats.</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>Those who are conducting inquiries into threats should focus attention on any information that indicates that a student poses a threat, regardless of whether the student has told a potential target he or she intends to do them harm.</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>Rather than trying to determine the type of student who may engage in targeted school violence, an inquiry should focus on a student’s behavior and communications to determine if that student appears to be planning or preparing for an attack.</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>Educators and other adults need to be trained to identify the “signals” of potential attackers and how to make the appropriate referrals.</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>In cases where there is concern about the possibility that a student may engage in targeted violence, attention should be given to any indication that a student is having difficulty coping with major losses or perceived failures, particularly where these losses or failures appear to have prompted feelings of desperation and</td>
<td>35</td>
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Recommendations

hopelessness.

Educators can play an important role in ensuring that students are not bullied in schools and that schools not only do not permit bullying but also empower other students to let adults in the school know if students are being bullied.

Schools and law enforcement officials need to collaborate on policies and procedures of responding when a student is thought to have a firearm in school.

Preventative measures should include protocols and procedures for responding to and managing threats and other behaviors of concern.

Threat Assessments and Targeted School Violence Prevention

The use of a threat assessment approach may be a promising strategy for preventing school-based attack.

Schools need to develop the capacity to pick up on and evaluate available or knowable information that might indicate that there is a risk of targeted school attack.

Schools should employ the results of their risk evaluations or threat assessments in developing strategies to prevent potential school attacks from occurring.

School officials, law enforcement professionals, and others involved in the assessment will need tools, mechanisms, and legal processes that can facilitate their efforts to gather and analyze information regarding a student's behavior and communication.

School and law enforcement personnel should be offered training regarding what information to gather, how to gather and evaluate it, and how they might try to intervene in cases where the information collected suggests a student may be planning or preparing for a school-based attack.

Educators can play a part in prevention by creating an environment where students feel comfortable telling an adult whenever they hear about someone who is considering doing harm to another person, or even whether the person is considering harming themselves.


Recommendations

Fostering a Culture of Respect

Educational settings that support a climate of safety create opportunities for adults and students to demonstrate respect for one another.

Faculty members are positive role models for students.

Space is provided for open discussion where diversity and differences are respected.

Communication between adults and students is encouraged and supported.

Conflict is managed and mediated constructively.

The create of "shame-free" zones in which daily teasing and bullying is not accepted as a normal part of adolescent culture.

Creating Connections Between Adults and Students

Students should have a positive connection to at least one adult in authority.

Schools should emphasize personal contact and connection between school officials and students.

Schools should take steps to identify and work with students who have few perceptible connections to the school.

Creating a Safe/Connected School Climate

Make an assessment of the school’s emotional climate.

Place an emphasis on the importance of listening in schools.
**Recommendations**

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<td>Adopt a strong, caring stance against the student “Code of Silence.”</td>
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<td>Develop a Bullying Prevention/Intervention Program.</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>Involve all members of the school community in planning, creating, and sustaining a school culture of safety and respect.</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>Create ways to develop trusting relationships between each student and at least one adult at school.</td>
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<td>Create mechanisms for developing and sustaining a safe school climate.</td>
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**Underlying Principles of a Threat Assessment**

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<td>Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable, and oftentimes discernible, process of thinking and behavior.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Targeted violence stems from interaction among the person, the situation, the setting and the target.</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is critical to successful threat assessment.</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective threat assessment is based on facts rather than characteristics or “traits.”</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An integrated systems approach should guide threat assessment investigations.</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The central question of a threat assessment is whether a student poses a threat, not whether the student made a threat.</td>
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**Elements of a Threat Assessment Process**

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<tr>
<td>Authorities involved in carrying out a threat assessment inquiry or investigation should gather and analyze information about the behavior and communications of the student of concern.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schools should have in place clear policies on collecting and reacting to information on potentially threatening situations and determining whether this information merits further attention through threat assessment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schools need to establish the authority to conduct an inquiry/investigation or assessment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formal policy authorizing school officials to conduct a threat assessment should cover the following:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• the purpose and scope of the policy;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• the role of educators and the threat assessment team in relation to the role of law enforcement;</td>
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<td>• the identity of, and delegation of authority to, school officials concerning determination that a threat assessment should be pursued;</td>
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<td>• the definition of the threshold of concern for initiating a threat assessment, i.e., description of the nature of behavior that would trigger an assessment;</td>
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<td>• the description of the types of information that may be gathered during the assessment;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• the designation of the individuals who would be responsible for gathering and analyzing information; the steps and procedures to be followed from initiation to conclusion of the assessment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The threat assessment team is responsible for gathering information from what may be multiple sources—teachers, parents, friends, guidance counselors, after-school program staff, part-time employers, and others.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>In formulating information-sharing policies, threat assessment teams need to consult with their respective school or school district legal counsel to ensure members are well-briefed on existing laws and regulations and the implications on the development of policies for accessing and disclosing student information.</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School administrators should create a multi-disciplinary threat assessment team that is based in the school or the school district.</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The roles and responsibilities of the threat assessment team as a whole, and for individual members, should be clearly defined.</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The information gathering and assessment procedures should be clearly defined.</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Team members should be trained together in the assessment process.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multi-disciplinary training sessions should be offered to provide opportunities for professionals in different systems to build relationships and consider how to address issues before a crisis.</td>
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### Recommendations

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<tr>
<td>A senior school administrator should chair the team.</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of a threat assessment team should include:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A respected member of the school faculty or administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>• An investigator, such as a school resource officer or other police officer</td>
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<td>assigned to the school</td>
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<tr>
<td>• A mental health professional, such as a forensic psychologist, a clinical</td>
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<tr>
<td>psychologist, or school psychologist</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Other professionals, such as guidance counselors, teachers, coaches</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ad-hoc member—someone who knows the student of concern and can assist with</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>the specific assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>In order to identify, assess, and manage students who might pose threats of</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>targeted violence, a threat assessment program must build relationships among</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>individuals and organizations both within the school and external to the school.</td>
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#### Conducting a Threat Assessment

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is a difference between a threat assessment inquiry and an investigation.</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat assessment inquiries are initiated, conducted, and controlled by the school threat assessment team.</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat assessment investigations are initiated, conducted, and controlled by law enforcement agencies.</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The line between a threat assessment inquiry and a threat assessment investigation should be determined by the school threat assessment team in consultation with school administrators and law enforcement officials.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The threat assessment program should establish a general threshold for initiating inquiries and referring threatening situations to law enforcement agencies.</td>
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#### Identifying Students of Concern

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<tr>
<td>There are circumstances that bring a student to official attention—to include written assignments, videos, email threats, accusations, and web searches.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Situations of concern are when a student has behaved in a manner that is raised to the attention of school administrators and authorities.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situations of concern require a follow-up inquiry or investigation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>In situations of concern, the identity of the student is known or potentially knowable.</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communication can be as a direct threat or ambiguous.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Students of concern can come to the attention of authorities through second or third parties or through anonymous communication.</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information provided anonymously requires careful evaluation by the school threat assessment team.</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In situations where a student is not easily identifiable from an anonymous communication, more sophisticated identification techniques may be required, i.e., involvement from law enforcement.</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policies regarding the handling of communications that raise concerns about students should address the following topics:</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Establishing low barriers for reporting for those who may have information of concern.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Advising students and adults of the kinds of information that should be brought forward: threats; weapon-seeking and weapon-using behavior; homicidal and suicidal behaviors; behaviors suggesting that a young person is contemplating, or planning, an attack.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ensuring that a thoughtful process is put in place in the school or school district to assess information that is brought forward about a potential attacker. This process should be perceived as credible by students and adults.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Recognizing that what is reported may often be different than what actually was said or occurred.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Establishing and continually reinforcing a policy that it is everyone’s responsibility to help develop and maintain a respectful, safe school environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Reinforcing positive behaviors by teachers, students, and staff in the school.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Building linkages to individuals, groups, and organizations that can offer support and assistance to students and to the school. Sometimes these persons and groups may provide information that can help prevent targeted violent attacks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The threat assessment team needs a central point of contact.</td>
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### Recommendations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The threat assessment team should designate a member of the team to serve as</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>the initial point of contact for information of possible concern.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The threat assessment team member who serves as initial point of contact will</td>
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<tr>
<td>screen information and determine whether to initiate a threat assessment inquiry</td>
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<tr>
<td>or to consult other members of the team.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schools should publicize the name of the designated point of contact to faculty,</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>staff, parents, and students as the person to contact with any information of</td>
<td></td>
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<td>potential concern.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individuals who provide information concerning a student should receive follow-</td>
<td>47</td>
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<td>up acknowledgments of their communications from the central point of contact.</td>
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### Threat Assessment Inquiry

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<tr>
<td>Upon receiving information concerning a potentially threatening situation, the threat assessment team must first consider: “How much time do we have?” An inquiry should be initiated immediately (within hours of notification) in any situation of concern.</td>
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<tr>
<td>If information concerning a threatening situation suggests that violence is imminent, it should be referred immediately to police.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The threat assessment team needs to consider how to handle a student of concern while an inquiry or investigation is being conducted; student rights and privacy must be protected.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a decision has been made to conduct an inquiry, the threat assessment team should develop an information plan:</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. The facts that drew attention to the student, the situation, and possibly the targets</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Information about the student</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Information about “attack-related” behaviors</td>
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<td>4. Motives</td>
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<td>5. Target selection</td>
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<tr>
<td>The sources of information for the inquiry may be as follow:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. School information</td>
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<td>2. Collateral school interviews</td>
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<td>3. Parent/guardian interview</td>
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<td>4. Interviews with the student of concern</td>
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<td>5. Potential target interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information gathered in a threat assessment inquiry should be examined for evidence of behavior and conditions that suggest that the student of concern is planning and preparing for an attack.</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation of information gathered from research and interviews conducted during a threat assessment inquiry should be guided by the following 11 key questions:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. What are the student’s motive(s) and goals?</td>
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<td>2. Have there been any communications suggesting ideas or intent to attack?</td>
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<td>3. Has the subject shown inappropriate interest in any of the following?</td>
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<td>4. Has the student engaged in attack-related behaviors? These behaviors might include:</td>
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<td>• developing an attack idea or plan;</td>
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<td>• making efforts to acquire or practice with weapons;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• casing, or checking out, possible sites and areas for attack; or</td>
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<tr>
<td>• rehearsing attacks or ambushes.</td>
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<td>5. Does the student have the capacity to carry out an act of targeted violence?</td>
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<td>6. Is the student experiencing hopelessness, desperation, and/or despair?</td>
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<td>7. Does the student have a trusting relationship with at least one responsible adult?</td>
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<td>8. Does the student see violence as an acceptable—or desirable—or the only—way to solve problems?</td>
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<td>9. Is the student’s conversation and “story” consistent with his or her actions?</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Are other people concerned about the student’s potential for violence?</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. What circumstances might affect the likelihood of an attack?</td>
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### Recommendations

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If the team concludes that

a. there is insufficient information for the threat assessment team to be reasonably certain that the student does not pose a threat; or
b. the student appears to be on a path to attack; then
c. the team should recommend that the matter be referred to the appropriate law enforcement agency for a threat assessment investigation.

### Threat Assessment Investigation

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In carrying out a threat assessment investigation, investigators should explore a student’s prior contacts with civil authorities and criminal and juvenile justice officials.

Investigators should focus particularly on attack-related behaviors exhibited by the student, including efforts to acquire, buy, or gain access to weapons.

Investigators should, if necessary, request the permission of the student or his parents to search a student’s computer, room, home, car, or workspace. In some cases, investigators may need to obtain search warrants.

Investigators should evaluate information gathered during a threat assessment investigation in accord with the 11 key questions identified in the procedures for conducting a threat assessment inquiry.

As with a threat assessment inquiry, it is critical that investigators document and keep a record of the information that they gather and evaluate in carrying out a school threat assessment investigation.

As investigators proceed with a threat assessment investigation, they continuously should ask themselves the following questions:

- Does the information collected prompt more concern or less concern about the possibility that the student is moving on a path toward a school attack?
- What information might prompt less concern?
- What information might heighten concern?
- What options exist for intervening in the behavior of or redirecting the student away from ideas of or plans for a school attack?
- Should potential targets be contacted, warned, and/or protected?

### Managing a Threatening Situation

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An individual management/monitoring plan should be developed for any student who is identified in a threat assessment inquiry or investigation as posing a threat of targeted school violence.

Successful management of a threatening situation requires substantial time and effort. Management of these situations comprises three related functions:

1. Controlling/containing the situation and/or student in a way that will prevent the possibility of an attack;
2. Protecting and aiding possible targets; and
3. Providing support and guidance to help the student deal successfully with his or her problems.

In the short term, after a threat assessment investigation has concluded that a student poses a risk of targeted school violence, authorities must move immediately to intervene with that student to contain the threatening situation and reduce the potential for violence.

Once the immediate threat of a situation is believed to be under control for the short term, the threat assessment team should turn its attention to longer-term safety.

The threat assessment team should address two central questions: What steps should be taken to contain a potential attacker over the longer term? What course of action should be pursued to deter the potential attacker from posing a future threat of violence?

The primary goal in a school threat assessment is to prevent an attack. The intervention or management strategy selected therefore should be the one with the greatest potential for long-term preventive power.

Those with responsibility to manage a student assessed as posing a threat of targeted violence should consider options for the long-term management of threatening situations in the context of the primary goal of prevention. The response with the greatest punitive power may or may not have the greatest preventive power.

Those responsible for managing a situation and student of concern—school officials, law enforcement officers, mental health professionals, youth service workers, court, probation, or correctional staff—should identify existing resources within the community that can play roles in managing students who pose threats of targeted school violence.

A key focus of the threat assessment process is to connect the student to services and support systems that provide encouragement and hope, and reduce the likelihood that the student will engage in future threatening behavior.
Monitoring of a student may be discontinued after responsible authorities have completed the following tasks:

- Assessing whether (and to what extent) the student has changed unacceptable thinking and behavior over time; and
- Developing and supporting intervention strategies that encourage and help the student to change.

After a determination is made that the subject no longer poses a threat of targeted school violence, formal monitoring is ended.


### Bystander Interview Findings

- The relationships between the bystanders and the attackers, as well as when and how the bystanders came upon information about the planned attacks, varied.
- A majority of those individuals received the information from the attacker more than a day before the attack.
- Bystanders shared information related to a threat along a continuum that ranged from bystanders who took no action to those who actively conveyed the information.
- School climate affected whether bystanders came forward with information related to the threats.
- Bystanders who came forward with information commented that they were influenced by positive relations with one or more adults, teachers, or staff, and/or a feeling within the school that the information would be taken seriously and addressed appropriately.
- Students who displayed a reluctance to come forward indicated that they anticipated a negative response from the school had they shared information.
- Some bystanders disbelieved that the attacks would occur and thus did not report them.
- Bystanders often misjudged the likelihood and immediacy of the planned attack.
- Bystanders reported that often they did not come forward with information related to the potential attack because they felt they had more time to decide on an appropriate action.
- In some situations, parents and parental figures influenced whether the bystander reported the information related to the potential attack to school staff or other adults in positions of authority.

### Implications of the Bystander Interviews

- Schools should ensure a climate in which students feel comfortable sharing information they have regarding a potentially threatening situation with a responsible adult.
- Bystanders who did not share information related to the planned attack reported no connection to the school or a negative perception of the school climate.
- Bystanders who did not share information believed that if they did speak to someone they either would not be believed or would get into trouble.
- Bystanders were reluctant to come forward if they felt that school officials would not keep the source of the information confidential.
- Bystanders with information about a possible attack who felt a positive emotional connection with the school, or with someone on the staff, were comfortable coming forward and reporting what they knew.
- Developing meaningful social and emotional connections with students and creating a climate of mutual respect are essential to keeping schools safe.
- Law enforcement officers and educators need to convey clearly to students that merely reporting information about potential threats will not subject the student to negative consequences and/or liability.
- Because attackers sometimes communicate vague information prior to an attack, a student may be wary of overreacting and getting someone in trouble. It should be explained to students that any reported information or threats will be investigated and appropriate action will be taken.
Recommendations

School districts are encouraged to develop policies that address the many aspects of reporting a threat.

School policies regarding student threats should:

• Encourage students, staff, faculty, parents, and others to report all apparent threats or threatening or disturbing behaviors.
• Provide several options for the reporting of threats, including reporting anonymously if necessary.
• Ensure that all those who report a threat or threatening situation will be treated with respect and that the information they provide will be closely guarded.
• Emphasize that the school will take appropriate action on all reports and will, within the confines of privacy laws, provide feedback to the reporting student that the information was received and that appropriate action was taken.
• Articulate what types of student information and knowledge can be shared, with whom it can be shared, and under what conditions it can be shared.
• Be clear as to who is responsible for acting on information received regarding threats.
• Where the law permits, include law enforcement and mental health officials in the review process.
• Track threats over time so that the information collected regarding threats can be used in the decision-making process.

School districts need to collect more data about threats that will permit law enforcement officials and educators to learn more about what students or groups of students have previously engaged in these behaviors, the manner in which they threatened others, the actions taken by the school and law enforcement in response, and the outcome.

Teachers, administrators, and other faculty should be trained on how to properly respond to students who provide them with information about a threatening or disturbing situation, as well as how to deal with actual threats.


Recommendations

Establish a Multi-disciplinary Threat Assessment Team

The first step in developing a comprehensive targeted violence prevention plan is to establish a multi-disciplinary threat assessment team (hereafter referred to as the “Team”) of individuals who will direct, manage, and document the threat assessment process.

The Team will receive reports about concerning students and situations, gather additional information, assess the risk posed to the school community, and develop intervention and management strategies to mitigate any risk of harm.

Some schools should pool their resources and have a single Team that serves an entire district or county, while other districts may choose to have a separate Team for each school.

Teams should include personnel from a variety of disciplines within the school community, including teachers, guidance counselors, coaches, school resource officers, mental health professionals, and school administrators. The multi-disciplinary nature of the Team ensures that varying points of view will be represented and that access to information and resources will be broad.

The Team needs to have a specifically designated leader. This position is usually occupied by a senior administrator within the school.

Teams should establish protocols and procedures that are followed for each assessment, including who will interview the student of concern; who will talk to classmates, teachers, or parents; and who will be responsible for documenting the Team’s efforts. Established protocols allow for a smoother assessment process as Team members will be aware of their own roles and responsibilities, as well as those of their colleagues.

Team members should meet whenever a concerning student or situation has been brought to their attention, but they should also meet on a regular basis to engage in discussions, role-playing scenarios, and other teambuilding and learning activities. This will provide members of the Team with opportunities to work together and learn their individual responsibilities so that when a crisis does arise, the Team will be able to operate more easily as a cohesive unit.

Define Prohibited and Concerning Behaviors

Schools need to establish policies defining prohibited behaviors that are unacceptable and therefore warrant immediate intervention. These include threatening or engaging in violence, bringing a weapon to school, bullying or harassing others, and other concerning or criminal behaviors.

School policies should also identify behaviors that may not necessarily be indicative of violence, but also warrant some type of intervention. These include a marked decline in performance; increased absenteeism; withdrawal or isolation; sudden or dramatic changes in behavior or appearance; drug or alcohol use; and erratic,
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<td>depressive, and other emotional or mental health symptoms.</td>
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<tr>
<td>If these behaviors are observed or reported to the Team, schools can offer resources and supports in the form of mentoring and counseling, mental healthcare, tutoring, or social and family services.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The threshold for intervention should be relatively low so that Teams can identify students in distress before their behavior escalates to the point that classmates, teachers, or parents are concerned about their safety or the safety of others. It is much easier to intervene when the concern is related to a student’s struggle to overcome personal setbacks, such as a romantic breakup, than when there are concerns about threats posed to others.</td>
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<tr>
<td>During the assessment process, Teams may identify other concerning statements and actions made by the student that may not already be addressed in their policies. Gathering information about these behaviors will help the Team assess whether the student is at risk for attacking the school or its students and identify strategies to mitigate that risk.</td>
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<td><strong>Create a Central Reporting Mechanism</strong></td>
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<td>Schools can establish one or more reporting mechanisms, such as an online form posted on the school website, a dedicated email address or phone number, smart phone application platforms, or another mechanism that is accessible for a particular school community.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Students, teachers, staff, school resource officers, and parents should be provided training and guidance on recognizing behaviors of concern, their roles and responsibilities in reporting the behavior, and how to report the information.</td>
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<td>Teams need to be sure that a team member proactively monitors all incoming reports and can respond immediately when someone’s safety is concerned.</td>
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<td>Regardless of what method schools choose to receive these reports, there should be an option for passing information anonymously, as students are more likely to report concerning or threatening information when they can do so without fear of retribution for coming forward.</td>
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<td>The school community should feel confident that team members will be responsive to their concerns, and that reports will be acted upon, kept confidential, and handled appropriately.</td>
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<td><strong>Determine the Threshold for Law Enforcement Intervention</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reports regarding student behaviors involving weapons, threats of violence, physical violence, or concerns about an individual’s safety should immediately be reported to local law enforcement. This is one reason why including a school resource officer or local law enforcement officer on the Team is beneficial.</td>
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<td>If a school resource officer is not available to serve on the Team, schools should set a clear threshold for times when law enforcement will be asked to take over an assessment. For example, it might be necessary to have law enforcement speak with a student’s parent or guardian, search a student’s person or possessions, or collect additional information about the student or situation outside the school community during the assessment.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Establish Assessment Procedures</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Teams need to establish clearly defined processes and procedures to guide their assessments.</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintain documentation to keep track of when reports come in; the information that is gathered; when, where, and how it was obtained; who was interviewed; the behaviors and circumstances of the student of concern; and the intervention strategies taken. Documentation requirements, such as forms and templates, should be included in the plan to ensure standardization across cases.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use a community systems approach. An effective approach for gathering information to assess a student of concern is to identify the sources that may have information on the student’s actions and circumstances. This involves identifying the persons with whom the student has a relationship or frequently interacts and the organizations or platforms that may be familiar with the student’s behaviors. Students exist in more than one system, and they come in contact with people beyond their classmates and teachers at school. Gathering information from multiple sources ensures that Teams are identifying concerning behaviors, accurately assessing the student’s risks and needs, and providing the appropriate interventions, supports, and resources.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examine online social media pages, conduct interviews, review class assignments, and consider searching the student’s locker or desk. Team members should also review academic, disciplinary, law enforcement, and other formal records that may be related to the student. When reviewing school records, be sure to determine whether the student has been the subject of previous reports to school officials, especially if the student has a history of engaging in other concerning or threatening behaviors. Also determine if the student received any intervention or supports and whether those were beneficial or successful. The Team may be able to draw on information from previous incidents and interventions to address the current situation for the student. This factor further emphasizes the importance of the Team’s</td>
<td>7</td>
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</table>
**Recommendations**

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Documentation to ensure the accuracy and availability of information regarding prior contacts the student of concern may have had with the Team.</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Build rapport that can facilitate information-gathering efforts. By demonstrating that their goal is to support individuals who may be struggling, while ensuring that the student and the school are safe, Teams may be better able to build a positive relationship with a student of concern and the student’s parents or guardians. When Teams have established this rapport, parents or guardians may be more likely to share their own concerns, and the student may be more forthcoming about frustrations, needs, goals, or plans.</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluate the student’s concerning behaviors and communications in the context of his/her age and social and emotional development. Some students’ behaviors might seem unusual or maladaptive, but may be normal for adolescent behavior or in the context of a mental or developmental disorder. To ensure that these students are being accurately assessed, collect information from diverse sources, including the reporting party, the student of concern, classmates, teammates, teachers, and friends. Consider whether those outside of their immediate circle, such as neighbors or community groups, may be in a position to share information regarding observed behaviors.</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Investigative Themes</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Teams should organize their information gathering around several themes or areas pertaining to the student’s actions, circumstances, and any other relevant threat assessment factors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Addressing each theme is necessary for a complete assessment and may uncover other avenues of inquiry to help determine whether the student is at risk for engaging in violence.</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Using the themes to identify where the student might be struggling will help the Team identify the most appropriate resources and actions.</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Investigative Themes: Motives</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Students may have a variety of motives that place them at risk for engaging in harmful behavior, whether to themselves or others. If you can discover the student’s motivation for engaging in the concerning behavior that brought him/her to the attention of the Team, then you can understand more about the student’s goals.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Team should also assess how far the student may be willing to go to achieve these goals, and what or who may be a potential target.</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Investigative Themes: Communication</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Look for concerning, unusual, bizarre, threatening, or violent communications the student made.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The student’s communications may reveal grievances held about certain issues or a possible intended target. They may allude to violent intentions or warn others to stay away from school at a certain time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>These statements might be made in person to classmates, teammates, or friends; in writing on assignments or tests; and/or via social media, text messages, or photo or video-sharing sites.</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teams need to remember that a student who has not made threatening statements may still be at risk for engaging in violence. Whether or not the student made a direct threat should not be the lone indicator of concern.</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Investigative Themes: Inappropriate Interests</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gather information about whether the student has shown an inappropriate or heightened interest in concerning topics such as school attacks or attackers, mass attacks, or other types of violence.</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>These interests might appear in the student’s communications, the books the student reads, the movies the student watches, or the activities the student enjoys.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The context of the student’s interests is an important factor to consider.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>In addition to determining whether the student has any inappropriate interests or fascination with weapons, the Team should assess whether the student has access to weapons.</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Because many school attackers used firearms acquired from their homes, consider whether the family keeps weapons at home, or if there is a relative or friend who has weapons.</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>If there are weapons at home, the Team should determine if they are stored appropriately and if the student knows how to use them or has done so in the past.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Team should also remember that firearms are not the only weapons to be concerned about. Even though many school attackers have used firearms in carrying</td>
<td>11</td>
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### Recommendations

Out their attacks, explosives, incendiary devices, bladed weapons, or combinations of these weapons have been used in past attacks.

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<tr>
<th>Investigative Themes: Stressors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All students face stressors such as setbacks, losses, and other challenges as part of their lives.</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gather information on stressors the student is experiencing, how the student is coping with them, and whether there are supportive friends or family who can help the student overcome them.</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stressors can occur in all areas of a student’s life, including at school with coursework, friendships, romantic relationships, or teammates; or outside of school with parents, siblings, or at jobs.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teams should intervene and prevent bullying and cyberbullying of a student who has been brought to their attention. More broadly, administrators should work to address any concerns regarding bullying school-wide and ensure their school has a safe climate for all students.</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<th>Investigative Themes: Emotional and Developmental Issues</th>
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<tr>
<td>Behaviors exhibited by a student with a diagnosed disorder need to be evaluated in the context of that diagnosis and the student’s known baseline of behavior.</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>If the student is experiencing feelings related to a diagnosable mental illness, such as depression, then the Team needs to consider the effect of these feelings on his or her behavior when assessing the student’s risk of engaging in harm to self or others.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Investigative Themes: Desperation or Despair</th>
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<tr>
<td>Assess whether the student feels hopeless, desperate, or out of options. Determine if the student has had thoughts about or engaged in behaviors that would indicate the student’s desperation.</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Team should determine whether the student has felt this way before, how the student managed those feelings then, and whether those same resources for coping are available to the student now.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Investigative Themes: Violence as an Option</th>
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<tr>
<td>Some students, who are feeling hopeless and out of options, may think violence is the only way to solve a problem or settle a grievance.</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Team should look to see whether the student thinks violence is acceptable or necessary, if the student has used violence in the past to address problems, and whether the student has thought of alternative ways to address the grievances.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess whether parents, friends, classmates, teachers, or others who know the student are worried about the student and whether they have taken any actions in response to their concerns.</td>
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<th>Investigative Themes: Concerned Others</th>
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<tr>
<td>Gather information on the specific behaviors that caused worry or fear. These could include behaviors that may have elicited concerns about the safety of the student or others, such as unusual, bizarre, or threatening statements; intimidating or aggressive acts; indications of planning for an attack; suicidal ideations or gestures; or a fixation on a specific target.</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<th>Investigative Themes: Capacity to Carry Out an Attack</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Determine whether the student’s thinking and behavior is organized enough to plan and execute an attack and whether the student has the resources to carry it out.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning does not need to be elaborate and could be as simple as taking a weapon from home and inflicting harm on classmates at school.</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carrying out an attack requires that the student has access to a weapon and the ability to get that weapon to school undetected.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Investigative Themes: Planning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Targeted attacks at school are rarely sudden or impulsive acts of violence.</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Team should assess whether the student has made specific plans to harm the school. The student might create lists of individuals or groups targeted for violence, or research tactics and materials needed to carry out the attack.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He/she may write out detailed steps and rehearse some aspects of a plan, such as getting to the school, the timing of the attack, or whether to attempt escape, be captured, or commit suicide.</td>
<td>15</td>
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### Recommendations

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<th>Investigative Themes: Consistency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Team should corroborate the student’s statements to determine that they are consistent with the student’s actions and behaviors and with what other people say about the student.</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>When inconsistencies are identified, the Team should then try to determine why that is the case. Determine whether the inconsistency (subject's stories and behavior) is because the student is deliberately hiding something or if the inconsistency stems from another underlying issue.</td>
<td>16</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigative Themes: Protective Factors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A thorough threat assessment requires understanding the full picture of a student’s behaviors and environment, which also includes accounting for the positive and prosocial influences on the student’s life.</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Team should identify factors that may restore hope to a student who feels defeated, desperate, or in a situation that is impossible to overcome. This includes determining whether the student has a positive, trusting relationship with an adult at school.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A trusted adult at school in whom the student can confide and who will listen without judgment can help direct a student toward resources, supports, and options to overcome setbacks.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive situational or personal factors might help to deter a student from engaging in negative or harmful behaviors.</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Team could also use activities or groups the student wants to take part in as motivation for the student to engage in positive and constructive behaviors, such as attending class, completing assignments, and adhering to a conduct or behavior code.</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<th>Develop Risk Management Options</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Once the Team has completed a thorough assessment of the student, it can evaluate whether the student is at risk for self-harm or harming someone else at school.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teams can then develop risk management strategies that reduce the student’s risk for engaging in violence and make positive outcomes for the student more likely.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each student who comes to the Team’s attention will require an individualized management plan.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Team will determine that the student is not currently at risk for engaging in violence, but requires monitoring or is in need of guidance to cope with losses, develop resiliency to overcome setbacks, or learn more appropriate strategies to manage emotions.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources to assist the student could take the form of peer support programs or therapeutic counseling to enhance social learning or emotional competency, life skills classes, tutoring in specific academic subjects, or mental healthcare.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes management involves suspension or expulsion from school. When this is necessary, Teams and school administrators should consider how it might affect their ability to monitor the student. Removing a student from school does not eliminate the risk to the school community.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teams should develop strategies to stay connected to the suspended or expelled student to determine whether the student’s situation is deteriorating or the behaviors of concern are escalating so that they can respond appropriately.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management plans should remain in place until the Team is no longer concerned about the student or the risk for violence.</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Notify law enforcement immediately if a student is thinking about or planning to engage in violence, so that they may assist in managing the situation.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make efforts to address the safety of any potential targets by altering or improving security procedures for schools or individuals and providing guidance on how to avoid the student of concern.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a situation that is less prone to violence by asking the family or law enforcement to block the student’s access to weapons, while also connecting the student to positive, prosocial models of behavior.</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remove or redirect the student’s motive. Every student’s motive will be different, and motives can be redirected in a variety of ways.</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce the effect of stressors by providing resources and supports that help the student manage and overcome negative events, setbacks, and challenges.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Create and Promote Safe School Climates</th>
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<tr>
<td>Teachers and staff in safe school environments support diversity, encourage communication between faculty and students, intervene in conflicts, and work to prevent teasing and bullying.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students in safe school climates feel empowered to share concerns with adults, without feeling ashamed or facing the stigma of being labeled a “snitch.”</td>
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### Recommendations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To help students feel connected to the school, their classmates, and teachers encourage teachers and staff to build positive, trusting relationships with students by actively listening to students and taking an interest in what they say.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Break down “codes of silence” and help students feel empowered to come forward and share concerns and problems with a trusted adult.</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Help students feel more connected to their classmates and the school.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify clubs or teams at school they can join or encourage them to start their own special interest group.</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schools can also support positive school climates by implementing school-wide Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) programs.</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>While teachers and staff can foster relationships and connectedness among the student body, students themselves have a role to play in sustaining safe school climates.</td>
<td>20</td>
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### Conduct Training for All Stakeholders

A comprehensive targeted violence prevention plan is to identify training needs for all stakeholders, including faculty, staff, and administrators; students; parents; and school resource officers or local law enforcement.

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<tr>
<td>Each audience will require a slightly different message, but some stakeholders may also benefit from attending training together, such as parents and students, or school faculty/staff and law enforcement personnel. When developing a training program, consider how frequently each stakeholder will receive training and whether to vary the delivery method of trainings.</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Providing training on other topics, such as suicide awareness and prevention, conflict resolution, mental health, and developmental disabilities, might also allow school faculty, staff, and administrators to foster positive school climates.</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Students need training on the threat assessment process, where to report concerns, and what information they should bring forward.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Students also need assurances that they can make a report to the Team or another trusted adult anonymously, that their information will be followed up on, and that it will be kept confidential.</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Messaging should demonstrate to students that there is a big difference between “snitching,” “ratting,” or “tattling” and seeking help.</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintaining a safe school climate includes providing students with training or lessons to acquire skills and abilities to manage emotions, resolve conflicts, cope with stress, seek help, and engage in positive social interactions.</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parents should also be trained on the threat assessment process at their child’s school and their role in that process. They should be clear on who to call, when, and what information they should be ready to provide.</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training can also reduce the stigma around mental, emotional, or developmental issues and provide information on available resources and when they should seek professional assistance.</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not every school will have a school resource officer, but schools can still develop relationships with local law enforcement agencies and personnel.</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schools can encourage local officers to co-teach classes at the school, serve as coaches or assistant coaches of sports teams, and work with parents and teachers at after-school events.</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>In some communities without school resource officers, local law enforcement agencies have encouraged officers to “adopt a school,” stopping by the school to greet and become familiar with students and teachers, eating lunch on campus, or doing paperwork in an office at the school.</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training for law enforcement and school resource officers should also provide familiarity with emergency response procedures the school has in place and the layout of the campus.</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officers and school staff might benefit from attending training together so that all parties are aware of the point at which local law enforcement should be involved in an investigation.</td>
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In April 2007, in response to the tragic shootings at Virginia Tech, President George W. Bush directed Secretaries Michael Leavitt and Margaret Spellings and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales to provide recommendations on how the federal government could assist; in January 2013, in the wake of the tragedy at Sandy Hook Elementary School, President Barack Obama issued the “Now is the Time” plan to protect children and reduce gun violence.