The Battle of Second Manassas

Joseph W. A. Whitehorne
Self-Guided Tour

THE BATTLE OF SECOND MANASSAS

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The quotations in this booklet are derived from the following sources: Hunter McGuire’s Stonewall Jackson; Abram Smith’s History of the Seventy-Sixth Regiment; Philip Cheek and Mair Pointon’s History of the Sauk County Riflemen; Rufus Dawes’ Service with the Sixth Wisconsin; William Chapman’s “Dixie Battery at 2d Manassas”; Daniel Leasure’s “Observations in the Pope Campaign in Virginia”; Col. David Strother’s “Personal Recollections of the War”; Edward McCrady’s “Gregg’s Brigade in the 2d Manassas”; Oliver Bosbyshell’s The Forty-Eighth Regiment in the War; J.G. Beatty’s “Second Bull Run”; Marsena Patrick’s Journal; William McClendon’s Recollections of War Time; Henry Blake’s Three Years in the Army of the Potomac; Martin Haynes’ History of the Second New Hampshire Regiment; William Jones’ Diary; George Lewis’ History of Battery E, 1st Rhode Island Artillery; Joseph Polley’s Hood’s Texas Brigade; Alexander Hunter’s Blue and Gray; Philip Faulk’s “A Fighting Regiment . . .” ; T.F. Shoemaker’s Elmira Weekly Journal; Charles Walcott’s History of the Twenty-First Massachusetts Regiment; and The Official Record of the War of the Rebellion.

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Foreword

We study our military past not only to draw inspiration from the exploits of those American soldiers and their commanders who went before us, but also to sharpen our knowledge and understanding of the art of war, thereby equipping us for the military challenges of the future. It is our belief that the careful study of battlefields such as Second Manassas allows today's military students to understand better the complexities and inevitable pressures of warfare. It can also provide them the chance to reflect on and assess military operations, an opportunity rarely attainable in the daily execution of their craft. This is the third in a series of booklets on American battlefields intended to help soldiers use the past to enhance their understanding of the Army's future.

Washington, D.C., 1 September 1989

MICHAEL D. KRAUSE
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Introduction

The contest around Groveton, Virginia, on 29 and 30 August 1862 was characterized by complex maneuvers and fighting over the same areas at several different times. New units were funneled into the battle throughout its course, while others were rushed from one point to another as the action shifted. As a result, it is not possible to cover the ground chronologically, to follow the sequence of events in an orderly manner. This lack of order is a reflection of the high level of confusion experienced at the time. At its simplest, after an engagement the previous night, the first full day of the battle may be said to have consisted of three fierce Federal attacks conducted piecemeal against the positions of Jackson’s corps, then a meeting engagement between the divisions of Hood and Hatch in the evening. The second day was a quiet morning followed by a fierce Federal attack in the afternoon, succeeded by an overwhelming Confederate counterattack that soundly defeated Maj. Gen. John Pope’s army.

The tour will go to twelve locations important to aspects of the battle. Although it is not possible to arrange in sequence the events because of terrain in relation to the original episodes, the stops have been selected to help the visitor see the battle developing. The courage of the men on both sides was exemplary, but technology has overtaken the tactics they used. Nevertheless, the lessons in leadership, command, the use of intelligence, and the performance of men under stress shown by this battle have a lasting value.

The following “Overview” should be read before taking the tour. Stops are keyed to the action described in the Overview. Numbered stops are those made by car. “CR” indicates County Road; “SR” indicates State Road. Stops with numbers and letters are optional additions to the motor phase of the tour. In the Overview names of Confederate personnel and units appear in italic type, Union personnel and units in regular type.

Washington, D.C. 1 September 1989

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Overview of the Battle

In June 1862 President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton were searching for a solution to an embarrassing deadlock in Virginia. Federal operations in the trans-Allegheny west had gone relatively well with the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson and the standoff at the Battle of Shiloh. By comparison, in the east, Northern units had experienced a chain of defeats at the hands of Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley. The superbly equipped and trained Army of the Potomac from which so much had been expected was in an apparent stalemate before attempting to seize Richmond after inching its way for months up the Peninsula. The two civilian leaders brought two western generals to Virginia in the hope of reviving the situation.

The first to arrive was Maj. Gen. John Pope, who was appointed on 26 June 1862 to command a new creation, the Army of Virginia. This force was composed of the various hitherto-independent commands that had operated to such little effect in Northern Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley that spring. Many of the units collectively had experienced a severe hammering from Stonewall Jackson while others were suffering from lack of discipline and poor leadership. General Pope was followed on 11 July by Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, who was appointed General in Chief with directing authority over both Pope and Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, commanding the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula.

The 26 June orders creating the Army of Virginia specified that it should "operate in such manner as while protecting Western Virginia and the national capital from danger or insult, it shall in the speediest manner attack and overcome the rebel force under Jackson and Ewell, threaten the enemy in the direction of Charlottesville and render the most effective aid to relieve Gen. McClellan and capture Richmond."

General Pope knew by the time he received his orders that Jackson had left the Valley and was with Lee near Richmond. Thus he saw his mission as covering Washington from any attacks from the direction of Richmond while deploying to assure the safety of the Valley. He felt further that he should position himself to pull Southern troops away from Richmond, thus indirectly aiding McClellan. Pope believed these objectives could be met best by concentrating his scattered forces in the Sperryville-Warrenton area. Doing so allowed him to safeguard the approaches to the Valley. At the same time his position threatened the important railroad and depot center at Gordonsville, virtually forcing Lee to send troops from Richmond to protect it.

Bringing his forces together allowed Pope to assess the polyglot units he had inherited and to begin establishing teamwork and standards. The Army of Virginia needed all the training it could get. There were tensions among the senior officers, particularly those from the Army of the Potomac who saw Pope as a threat to their idol General McClellan. Staff inexperience was revealed throughout the summer campaign by poor march planning, improper terrain appreciation, and disregard of
John Pope (1822–1892) was commissioned in the Topographical Engineers. Pope received two brevets for gallantry in the Mexican War and was promoted to brigadier general in June 1861, assigned to Missouri. He commanded a district, then a division, and finally the small Army of the Mississippi. He achieved prominent success at Madrid and Island No. 10, helping to open the Mississippi River. Pope was promoted to major general in 1862 and participated in the Corinth Campaign until given command of the newly created Army of Virginia in June 1862. After the defeat at Second Manassas, Pope was relieved and assigned to the Department of the Northwest.

logistical aspects. The supply problem was compounded by poor load planning on the part of Army of the Potomac units deploying as reinforcements from the Peninsula. Many arrived without basic ammunition loads or critical equipment items. The effect of this lack of experience was that Pope's army seemed like a balky team. Its movements were slow and were accomplished with great friction. Staff work was poor and undeveloped, and the new commander did little to help.

General Pope was a man of little tact, often discourteous and overbearing, arrogant and boastful. A pompous assumption of command address to his overworked troops compared them unfavorably to the men he had led in the West, alienating his Easterners permanently. Soon after taking command, Pope had issued orders that stirred up the civil populace and embittered many Southerners against him. The orders authorized foraging, directing Union troops to subsist off the country. The intent of the orders apparently was to restrict guerrilla activity but seemed more to encourage violence against civilians. His actions led General Lee to declare that Pope had to be "suppressed."

Pope's threat to Gordonsville led Lee to send Stonewall Jackson 13–16 July with his and Richard Ewell's Divisions to protect that place. By 27 July, Pope's growing strength caused Lee to add A. P. Hill's Division, raising Jackson's force to about 24,000 men. Lee was able to risk reducing the Richmond defenses because of McClellan's inactivity and indications that the Army of the Potomac was preparing to leave. These signs included such things as the retrograde of wounded and the diversion of reinforcements from the Hampton area to Aquia and Alexandria on the Potomac.

On 3 August, General Halleck directed General McClellan to begin his final withdrawal from the Peninsula and to return to Northern Virginia to support Pope. McClellan protested and did not begin his redeployment until 14 August. The situation created an opportunity for General Lee. The removal of the Army of the
Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) was in the Corps of Engineers and won three gallantry brevets in the Mexican War. He was superintendent of West Point 1852-1855. Lee entered Confederate service 20 April 1861. Adviser to President Jefferson Davis, commander of the Army of Northern Virginia 1 June 1862 to the end of the war. "Lee ranks among the ablest field commanders in American History. In battle he was imperturbable. He enjoyed a rare ability to command respect and affection from his troops, was a master in the art of field fortifications, and possessed an uncanny understanding of his opponents." (Freeman) Lee was president of Washington College (later Washington and Lee) in Lexington, Virginia, after the war until his death.

Potomac as a threat meant that there would be a short period when he could turn on Pope’s force and actually outnumber it before the merger of the two Federal armies. Under these circumstances Pope should have assumed a defensive role from the time Halleck had decided to move McClellan, but his flexibility was impeded by Halleck’s insistence that Pope remain forward along the lines of the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers. Pope was required at first to keep Brig. Gen. Rufus King’s Division at Aquia and Fredericksburg to secure the docks there and also to use other parts of his force to keep open the Orange and Alexandria rail line from Culpeper to Washington. This extended Pope to the maximum. Even when King was released to him on 8 August, Pope still had to hold the river line. Halleck’s insistence on this reduced Pope’s planning options and exposed his force unnecessarily.

Stonewall Jackson noted this and attempted a move against Pope’s forward units; however, poor staff work delayed his movements and he collided with Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks’ II Corps of the Army of Virginia. The two men’s units fought a fierce battle at Cedar Mountain south of Culpeper on 9 August. Pope’s aggressive rhetoric and cautious directives had made his intentions unclear to Banks who, in doubt, chose to attack. The battle was a virtual draw, but Jackson withdrew as the rest of Pope’s force advanced to support the battered Banks. Lee joined Jackson at Gordonsville on 15 August, bringing with him by rail the corps of Pope’s West Point classmate James Longstreet. A skeleton Confederate force remained in Richmond to watch McClellan depart.

Lee felt the best way for him to assure the full relief of Richmond was to unite his forces and move on Pope. “The disparity of force between the contending forces rendered the risks unavoidable.” At this point, Lee’s united force of about 55,000 men slightly outnumbered Pope’s. He hoped to trap Pope in the triangle formed between the convergence of the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers. Again, staff planning was poor and the Southern forces were slow to take up their attack
positions. While this was taking place, on 18 August a patrol from the 1st Michigan Cavalry encountered Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart’s headquarters group at Verdiersville and made off with a copy of Lee’s plan. Pope made use of the information to withdraw skillfully north of the Rappahannock on the night of 18–19 August, basing himself in Warrenton. Lee unsuccessfully probed Pope’s flanks along the river for the next several days.

J. E. B. Stuart led a retaliatory raid against Pope’s headquarters then at Catlett’s Station during the night of 22–23 August. The Confederate cavalry made off with, among other things, Pope’s dispatch book. From it Lee learned of the Army of Virginia’s dispositions as well as the expected rate of reinforcement from the Army of the Potomac. Pope’s letters also revealed his plan to remain on the defensive until his strength grew.

Lee decided he had to break the stalemate along the Rappahannock quickly before he was overwhelmingly outnumbered. All the major fords along the swollen river were well covered, with most of Pope’s army concentrated between Sulphur Springs and Warrenton. The Federal right was at Waterloo, six miles northwest of Warrenton. Lee saw only one chance to change the situation, “If one runs great risks, it is for the purpose of gaining great advantages.” He thus split his forces and sent Jackson’s force completely around Pope’s northern flank. His objective was to bring about a decisive battle in which the advantages of position would be his, forcing Pope to fight on his terms. He knew from the captured papers that Pope was being controlled from Washington, which control required him to keep links to Aquia and along the river line, thus impairing his initiative and freedom of action. Lee also was aware of the internal command problems and lack of cohesiveness in Pope’s army and wanted to take advantage of them while he had the chance. Jackson’s move would compel Pope to give up the river line to safeguard his rear, thus spreading confusion and creating the opportunity for an engagement on terms.
favorable to the Confederates.

Jackson did not tell his senior commanders his plans, but merely started his corps moving after a conference with Lee, Longstreet, and Stuart. He left behind his quartermaster and subsistence trains, but brought along his cattle herd, ordnance, and ambulance trains. The men were ordered to carry three days’ rations and foraging was allowed. The route to be followed was selected by Jackson’s chief engineer Capt. J. Keith Boswell and screened by cavalry raised in the region.

The March Around Pope—A prototypical airborne assault.

At first light on 25 August, Boswell led Jackson’s force out of Jeffersonton on the road to Amissville. Ewell’s Division was in the lead, followed by A. P. Hill’s and then Taliaferro’s. The column turned northeast just pass Amissville, crossing the Hedgeman River at Henson’s Mill. Once across, elements of the 2d Virginia Cavalry moved ahead to screen the line of march. The main body trudged by way of Orleans and Thumb Run Church toward Salem (modern Marshall). The issue of rations to Jackson’s men had been uneven. Departure was so early that some men had been unable to cook their three-days’ supply; others had eaten their full issue by the end of the first day. Thereafter, green corn and apples foraged along the way were the staple ration. The head of the column closed into bivouacs about a mile south of Salem at sunset. Later that night, Col. Thomas T. Munford with the rest of his 2d Virginia Cavalry Regiment rode into town and bedded down. There had been no encounters with the enemy the entire day. Longstreet’s Corps smoothly sup­planted Jackson’s units along the Rappahannock, sustaining the illusion of a strong Confederate presence with artillery duels and aggressive patrolling. Late in the afternoon of the twenty-fifth Lee sent Stuart with all his cavalry eastward to rendezvous with Jackson. Doing so deprived Longstreet of any reconnaissance capability.

General Pope on his side continued to array his forces on the defensive along the Rappahannock River line. The dust from Jackson’s column had been noted and reported by Federal cavalry and signal stations. The Federal headquarters dismissed the information as indicating a Confederate withdrawal into the Shenandoah Valley. Major General Fitz-John Porter’s and Maj. Gen. Samuel Heintzelman’s Corps arrived during the day as reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac. Heintzelman’s men especially were underequipped because of poor load planning incident to their move from the Peninsula. They did not have their corps reserve stocks with them; consequently, the infantry units carried only the minimum basic ammunition load. Porter’s Fifth Corps had marched up the Rappahannock from Aquia and had considerable difficulty discovering its final destination. Pope had failed to send guides or guidance to the corps commander while he was en route.

Jackson renewed his advance early on 26 August. The most likely blocking position on the next day’s route was Thoroughfare Gap. Accordingly, Jackson hastened Munford’s Regiment forward at dawn to hold it. The horsemen found the Gap unoccupied, and the infantry followed them through White Plains to the Gap and on to the village of Haymarket. The dust covered Jackson’s troops, and his officers continually pressed the infantrymen to stay closed up and to keep up the pace. As the column entered Gainesville, it was joined by J. E. B. Stuart and the rest
of his cavalry division. The presence of the larger cavalry force allowed a relaxation in the march discipline. Jackson then headed south from Gainesville to Bristoe Station located on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, Pope's line of communication. His cavalry van arrived at sunset in time to interdict three Federal supply trains after tearing up the tracks and cutting the telegraph wires. Isaac Trimble's brigade of Ewell's Division along with Stuart's cavalry advanced eastward along the railroad later that night to the Federal supply depot at Manassas Junction. They secured that place by 2400, taking over 300 prisoners in the process.

In the meantime Longstreet's wing had begun to follow Jackson's forces, pulling out of its Rappahannock positions by midmorning and leaving only Brig. Gen. R. H. Anderson's Division to divert Pope. Lee and Longstreet had considered forcing the river crossings and reuniting with Jackson by the most direct route but disregarded doing so as impracticable. Moving somewhat more cautiously because of the absence of cavalry, Longstreet camped the night of the twenty-sixth at Orleans, 11 miles from his starting point.

Continued cavalry reports of these movements to the northwest persuaded General Pope to send out on the afternoon of the twenty-sixth a larger cavalry force under Brig. Gen. John Buford to investigate. The Army of Virginia was still deployed to defend the Rappahannock crossings. Major General Irvin McDowell's III Corps had one division (Ricketts') four miles from Warrenton on the Waterloo Road, one (Reynolds') in Warrenton, and one (King's) around Sulphur Springs. The forward divisions continued to engage the Confederates with artillery. Major General Franz Sigel's I Corps remained camped around Warrenton and Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks' II Corps, still recovering from the 9 August fight near Culpeper, was at Fayetteville (modern Opal). Heintzelman's III Corps was joined by Reno's small corps near Pope's headquarters at Warrenton and Maj. Gen. Nathan Hale's other division, commanded by Maj. Gen. George Sykes, was 6 miles east of Bealeton along the railroad. Some of Buford's scouts early in the evening reported a large force moving through Thoroughfare Gap in the Bull Run Mountains, well to the northeast. This information, plus loss of communications to the east along the railroad, led General Pope about 2000 to direct his forces to redeploy to the Gainesville area. Preparations went on through the night but there was little movement until the next day.

Very early on the twenty-seventh, Jackson sent A. P. Hill's and Taliaferro's Divisions to consolidate Trimble's and Stuart's hold on the vast Manassas supply dumps. Ewell's Division with its three brigades was left at Bristoe as a rear guard with orders to fall back on the main force if hard pressed. The main force in the meantime devoted itself to helping itself to the tons of Federal supplies in the dumps and box cars at the Manassas junction.

About 1000 the New Jersey Brigade of Slocum's Division, VI Corps, approached Manassas under Brig. Gen. George Taylor, east from the direction of Union Mills. Jackson ultimately deployed most of A. P. Hill's Division to confront this threat. The veteran Jerseymen detrained north of the railroad bridge and advanced toward Manassas, apparently expecting to disperse a raiding force. They gallantly pressed against Hill's fire until forced to retreat about 1100 with heavy
James Longstreet (1821–1904) was serving as a paymaster at the time he resigned his commission and entered Confederate service in June 1861 as a brigadier general. He commanded a brigade at First Manassas, earning promotion and division command in October 1861. He led his unit with distinction during the Peninsula battles. His performance led General Lee to place him in command of one of the wings of his army during the Pope campaign and at Antietam. Longstreet fought at Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, and Chickamauga. Wounded at the Wilderness in May 1864, Longstreet returned to duty in October, when he served in the defense of Richmond and Petersburg until the end of the war.

losses. General Taylor was mortally wounded, pleading with his officers “for God’s sake to prevent another Bull Run.” The Confederate infantry pursued up to the railroad bridge, then returned to join in the ransacking of the depot, while Rebel cavalry pressed the hapless Federals all the way back to Fairfax Courthouse.

At sundown Ewell brought his division back to Manassas after contending briskly at Bristoe with Hooker’s Division of Heintzelman’s Corps throughout the afternoon. The full Confederate force evacuated Manassas Junction late that night after destroying everything it could not eat or carry away. Each of the Confederate divisions took different routes to their new location on the old battlefield 7 miles to the north of Manassas. Taliaferro moved directly north up the Sudley Springs Road. A. P. Hill crossed Bull Run at Blackburn’s Ford and marched to Centreville where at 1000 on the twenty-eighth he turned west on the Warrenton Pike to the old battlefield. Ewell, the last to leave, also crossed at Blackburn’s Ford, but then followed the north bank of Bull Run until he reached the bridge on the Warrenton Pike where he also turned westward onto the old battlefield. The march was attended with some confusion as Jackson had not been clear as to his plans or his corps’ destination. The multiple routes also thoroughly confused General Pope as to his enemy’s location and intentions.

Longstreet continued his progress eastward throughout the twenty-seventh. A Federal cavalry patrol rode into his van during a midday rest stop at Salem. Buford’s blue horsemen aggressively demonstrated, threatening Lee and his headquarters, then pulled out of town. The size and intentions of the Federal cavalry force could not be determined by Longstreet without cavalry of his own. Consequently, the Confederate move thereafter was even more cautious than before, arriving at White Plains late at night for its second halt.

Pope’s forces had begun moving about 0800 on the twenty-seventh. McDowell’s and Sigel’s Corps moved to the vicinity of New Baltimore and Buckland Mills. At
the latter place, Brig. Gen. Robert Milroy's Brigade saved the bridge from destruction by Confederate cavalry in a brisk fire fight. Late in the day, Milroy's Brigade and another of Sigel's units, Brig. Gen. Carl Schurz's Division, moved eastward into Gainesville. Reno's Corps, along with Kearny's Division deployed to Green- wich to be in a supporting position. Major General Joseph Hooker began moving his division early in the day eastward down the railroad. This was the unit that collided at 1400 at Kettle Run near Bristoe Station with Ewell's Division, which it pressed back effectively until Ewell withdrew.

Pope arrived at Bristoe Station that night. He assumed Jackson was “in the bag” at Manassas and directed his forces to concentrate there. He thus removed them from excellent blocking positions, opening the way for the rest of the Confederate Army to join Jackson in the vicinity of Groveton. His plan overlooked the need to keep Lee's two wings separated. The Gainesville position was key and should have been held until Southern deployment and intentions were understood fully. Earlier, General McDowell had placed his and Sigel's units around Haymarket and Gainesville and as far west as New Baltimore. He also had sent out the cavalry forces that caused Lee and Longstreet problems, incidentally confirming their imminent arrival. On his own responsibility, about 1500, he forwarded James B. Ricketts' Division to block Thoroughfare Gap while probing eastward with another division looking for Jackson. He seemed to be forming a realistic picture of the situation. However, later McDowell had to redeploy in response to Pope's orders, leaving Ricketts behind, unsupported. The forces of Porter, Reno, and Heintzelman were concentrated at Bristoe by midmorning of the twenty-eighth. Banks' Corps guarded the army's trains at Catlett Station.

**Contact Regained**

Jackson's command was reunited by 1200 on 28 August in the vicinity of the junction of the Warrenton Pike and the Sudley Springs Road. Later he moved it farther northwest past the hamlet of Groveton in response to reports of Federal troop movements. The Confederates established themselves on a ridge running southwest to northeast, which was protected on its eastern side by the trenches and banks of an unfinished railroad. The position promised to allow linkage with Longstreet's Corps approaching from Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville. It also provided access to the Aldie Gap, eight miles to the northwest, as an escape route if the two wings of Lee's army failed to connect. It was an excellent defensive position from which to challenge Pope's forces. Jackson's men rested in the summer shade while Pope's Divisions sought them out. Finally, late in the day Stonewall saw the right moment to reveal his presence and bring on the battle envisaged by General Lee.

The Federal movements throughout the day had been floundering and cumbersome. In McDowell's area, General Sigel misunderstood the orders requiring his left flank to move along the east-to-west Manassas Gap Railroad, instead plunging southward to align on the more north-to-south Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Sigel further impeded the movement of McDowell's elements with his trains, which he had retained despite orders to the contrary. Reynolds' Division finally headed east from Gainesville along the Warrenton Pike in midmorning. About 1000 it encountered a Confederate brigade led by Brig. Gen. Bradley T. Johnson of Taliafer-
ro's Division, Jackson's Corps, near the junction of the Pike and Pageland Lane. Reynolds deployed Meade's Brigade with a battery, and a brisk exchange of fire ensued until Johnson broke contact. Reynolds assumed he had brushed a reconnaissance force and proceeded down Pageland Lane toward Manassas as ordered without taking further action.

Meanwhile U.S. cavalry picked up Confederate stragglers on the road to Centreville. General Pope weighed the information of Jackson's multiple departure routes and decided that his opponent was at Centreville. Accordingly, about 1200 he issued new orders directing everyone to move on that village. Heintzelman's Corps slogged directly through Manassas Junction. Kearny, in the lead, reached Centreville late in the afternoon, in time to engage briefly a regiment of Confederate cavalry screening the Warrenton Pike west of the village. Reno's Corps bivouacked between Centreville and Blackburn's Ford while Pope set up with Hooker's Division near the Ford. Elsewhere, Sigel started north on the Sudley Springs Road, en route to Centreville. McDowell split his corps, Reynolds continuing down Pageland Lane while Brig. Gen. Rufus King, just turned off the Pike, was ordered to backtrack and head west on the Pike itself toward Centreville.

Late in the afternoon Pope had learned from McDowell of Longstreet's presence at White Plains, but still assumed he had sufficient time to deal with Jackson alone. This would not prove to be the case, however. Longstreet had moved out early on the twenty-seventh, his lead units reaching Thoroughfare Gap by 1500. There, Brig. Gen. G. T. Anderson's Georgia Brigade encountered Ricketts' Federals blocking the passage. While John B. Hood's Texas Brigade probed local trails to support Anderson and to flank the Federals, Wilcox's Division made a longer flanking movement through Hopewell Gap three miles to the north. Hood's force succeeded in turning Ricketts' flank about sunset, forcing him to withdraw. By 2200 the bulk of Longstreet's force had moved through the Gap and was in camps as far east as Haymarket.

Well before that, Jackson had revealed his position to prevent what he assumed was a general Federal withdrawal to the Centreville area. King's Division had succeeded in reversing its course and by 1700 was heading east on the Warrenton Pike, unknowingly proceeding across Jackson's right flank and front, near Brawner's Farm, a mile west of Groveton. Naturally ignorant of the absence of Federal coordination, Jackson assumed King was Pope's north flank guard and had to be attacked before the whole Federal force escaped. The ensuing fight was one of the most brutal of the war. Two of Jackson's Divisions engaged in a slugging match with Brig. Gen. John Gibbon's Brigade and elements of Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday's. Each side valiantly exchanged volleys in the growing darkness, sometimes at ranges of 100 yards or less. Losses were high on both sides, but especially damaging to Jackson was the wounding of two division commanders, Ewell and Taliaferro. The fighting died down by about 2100. By that time, however, Sigel and Reynolds had moved to the sound of the guns, brushed aside some of Jackson's vedettes and set up on the old battlefield north and south of Henry Hill.

Generals King and Ricketts, out of touch with each other and their superiors, had experienced a rough handling from larger Confederate forces. Neither knew what Pope's intentions were and both were unable to find General McDowell, their
corps commander. He had gone to confer with Pope, got lost in the woods, and did not appear again until the following morning. The importance of their position was not apparent to either general. Consequently, in the absence of any guidance both decided, on their own, to withdraw, Ricketts moving to Bristoe Station and King to Manassas.

The way was now fully clear for Longstreet to reunite with Jackson. Pope, however, continued to disregard Longstreet’s presence. Instead, he read into the facts on hand his own version of reality. He considered A. P. Hill’s withdrawal westward from Centreville to be an indicator that Jackson was retreating. He learned of the Brawner’s Farm fight by 2100 and again assumed it was the rearguard action of a retreating enemy. As a result, he changed his orders again, directing all his forces to head for the old Manassas Battlefield to go in for the kill on Jackson’s presumably retreating force.

By this time most of the Federal units had been marching hither and yon since late on the twenty-sixth without rations or a clear idea of their objective. Pope ignored their plight, compounding their problems with poor staff work. An example of this with serious consequences was the orders to General Porter. He was directed on the afternoon of 28 August to move his corps then at Bristoe to the old battlefield by way of Centreville. Porter complied, but, when his force had reached Blackburn’s Ford on the morning of 29 August, Pope told him to turn about and move to Gainesville by way of Manassas. This was Pope’s reaction to the news of King and Ricketts’ withdrawal. Earlier, it will be seen, Pope had directed Sigel on the old battlefield to fix Jackson until everyone else could converge.

Porter got as far as Dawkin’s Branch about two miles northwest of Manassas Junction about 1100, 29 August. He had in the meantime rendezvoused with General McDowell. The two men then received an additional order addressed jointly to them from Pope, which told them to get to Gainesville, to link with the
forces to the north, to be prepared to fall back on Centreville, and to use their own discretion. Porter chose to remain in place observing a growing Confederate force in front of him. McDowell took his corps northward on the Sudley Springs Road to try to establish contact, neither general clear as to what he should do. Pope was continuing to focus exclusively on Jackson while ignoring the growing evidence that Longstreet was nearby.

Battle Joined

The twenty-ninth of August had opened hot and bright with Sigel’s Corps (Schenck’s Division, Schurz’s Division, and Milroy’s Brigade) bivouacked in the vicinity of the Sudley Springs Road–Warrenton Pike. Reynolds’ Division was farther south near the old village of New Market. He had sent patrols nearly as far west as Groveton. General Sigel, responding to Pope’s orders to fix the allegedly fleeing Jackson, quickly pressed an attack. By 0500 on 29 August all the forces at his disposal were in a movement to contact. Jackson was hardly leaving. His forces were set up in the positions he had selected along the old railroad bed and the ridge behind it. The Confederate right starting around Brawner’s Farm was occupied by Jackson’s old division, now commanded by Brig. Gen. William E. Starke, who had replaced the wounded Taliaferro. The center was defended by Ewell’s Division, commanded now by Brig. Gen. Alexander R. Lawton in place of the grievously wounded Ewell. The left, or northern, flank was held by A. P. Hill’s Light Division almost up to the Sudley Springs.

The Federals attacked all along the line. Nowhere had they built depth enough to exploit any local successes. Neither were their assaults coordinated sufficiently to
support each other. As a result, Jackson was able to move reserves to each threatened point without concern for any gaps he may have created. These disjointed efforts were well fought at the unit level and did succeed in pressing Jackson’s men back into their main lines along the old railroad. By 1000, the Federal forces were exhausted and Sigel called a halt for reorganization and to await reinforcements.

About the same time, Longstreet’s Corps had arrived and was moving into line south of Jackson’s position. It had made contact with Stuart’s Cavalry early in the morning between Haymarket and Gainesville. Elements of the cavalry deployed on Longstreet’s southern flank, enabling him to move his force rapidly to the sound of the guns with less concern for security. A little after 1000 Hood’s Division came into Jackson’s view and deployed to the right of his corps in line on both sides of the Pike just east of its intersection with Pageland Lane. Hood’s Batteries and the Washington Artillery deployed on Jackson’s immediate right to provide him additional fire support. Wilcox’s Division was echeloned to Hood’s left rear north of the Pike while Kemper’s Division was echeloned to his right rear southward. D. R. Jones’ Division extended from Kemper’s farther south across the Manassas Gap Railroad and Robertson’s Cavalry Brigade screened toward Manassas.

It was these forces that Porter had noted as his lead division (Morell’s) approached Dawkin’s Branch. Ironically, each was arriving on the scene at about the same time. Porter was possibly inspired to greater caution not realizing that part of the large dust cloud he noted was caused by Stuart’s cavalry dragging bushes on the roads to deceive any observers and to give D. R. Jones more time to get in place. Porter immediately set up a skirmish line and deployed some of his artillery, which
exchanged fire with the Confederates for the rest of the day. His presence bred sufficient caution in Longstreet twice to contest successfully Lee’s suggestion that he launch a corps attack. At 1800 Pope in turn directed Porter to launch an attack, but then later changed his mind and ordered Porter to the main battle instead, still ignoring Longstreet’s presence.

While this drama had been going on to the south, the pressure on Jackson had been renewed dangerously. Pope arrived on the scene from Centreville about noon, bringing with him Heintzelman’s Corps (Kearny’s and Hooker’s Divisions) and Reno’s Corps (Reno’s and Stevens’ Divisions). The fresh troops deployed from the Stone House area into the northern part of the line. While they were doing this, elements of Schurz’s Division attacked at 1200 and seized and held part of the old railroad until relieved by Heintzelman’s Corps about 1400. Several hours of regrouping and rest followed before the assaults were renewed. Then Pope directed Heintzelman to attack with both his divisions. Unfortunately, the assault was again uncoordinated. At 1600 Grover’s Brigade of Hooker’s Division made a legendary bayonet assault against the center of Jackson’s line. Five hundred men were lost in 20 minutes to no avail because lack of reserves prevented exploitation of the Federal penetration and Grover was forced to withdraw. Two hours later Kearny’s Division with Stevens’ Division in support finally launched its attack against Jackson’s extreme left (north). The Federals threatened to roll up that part of the line held by Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg’s S.C. Brigade of A. P. Hill’s Division, but were stopped and repulsed by Lawton’s and Early’s Brigades of Ewell’s Division hustled from less threatened portions of the Confederate line.

As this fighting was dying down, General McDowell arrived with his lead division, Hatch’s (formerly King’s), with Ricketts’ Division about an hour behind. Pope was convinced that some adjustments Jackson was making to his line presaged a withdrawal. Thus at 1730 he ordered Hatch to pursue. Ironically, at the same time General Lee had suggested a probe of some sort to Longstreet. The latter agreed to a reconnaissance by Hood’s Division. Thus, about 1830 Hatch’s Division collided with Hood’s in the vicinity of Groveton. Fighting endured around the crossroads until about 2015, when Hatch was compelled to withdraw. Reynolds’ Division south of the Pike had been prevented from supporting effectively by Longstreet’s artillery. Pope continued to ignore news of Longstreet’s presence in strength, treating Porter’s evidence on his arrival from Dawkin’s Branch merely as excuses for the latter’s inactivity. The redeployment of Porter on the evening of the twenty-ninth meant that Longstreet was free for the next day, despite Pope’s fatuous assessment of the day’s events as a great victory. In fact, Confederate strength had grown further with the arrival about 2400 of R. H. Anderson’s Division from the old Rappahannock line.

The thirtieth of August also dawned hot and dry as both armies eyed each other warily. About 0800 Federal artillery opened up vigorously and Maj. S. D. Lee’s 18-gun battalion was wheeled onto the right of Jackson’s line to reply. Within an hour firing on both sides died down in favor on an uncanny summer morning silence. Lee and his corps commanders conferred at his command post on a hill near the corps coordinating point. They concluded that the Federals had had enough and the battle was probably over. They discussed plans for what to do next before the officers returned to the commands. Then, at noon, additional Federal artillery began rolling
Ponton Bridge on Blackburn’s Ford, 1862.

into view followed by waves of infantry. Obviously, another attack loomed.

Pope planned to attack Jackson’s position on the north side of the Warrenton Pike. He left only Reynolds’ Division to secure his left flank opposite Longstreet, whose presence he continued to disregard. General Porter was to conduct the main attack with Hatch’s and Morell’s Divisions while Heintzelman’s Corps supported on the right (north). At 1500 the two divisions with Sykes’ in support commenced the main attack, with Butterfield’s Brigade of Morell’s Division to the south. The first Federal wave actually reached Jackson’s desperate defenders along the old railroad bed. More waves approached and Jackson signaled to Lee that he needed help. Longstreet had been sizing up the situation on Jackson’s flank. He directed Stephen D. Lee’s eighteen guns to enfilade the advancing Federals about the same time he received orders from Lee to help Jackson. This fire from their left (south) quickly shattered the Federal lines, forcing them to withdraw. Meanwhile, Heintzelman’s units fought briskly with A. P. Hill’s to the north. About 1530 Pope directed Reynolds to leave his position on Chinn’s Ridge south of the Pike and move to back up Porter’s shattered divisions. Reynolds objected to no avail. His departure left only Warren’s Brigade (Sykes’ Division), supporting a single battery, south of the Pike to confront Longstreet. Warren on his own had moved into a position previously occupied by Reynolds when the latter had shifted to Chinn’s Ridge on orders from General McDowell.

Almost simultaneously, Lee and Longstreet saw their opportunity. The latter was giving orders for his whole line to advance about the time he received orders from Lee to do so. About 1545 Longstreet’s Corps attacked, pivoting on Jackson’s position. Lee ordered Jackson “to look out for and protect his [Longstreet’s] left flank.” Hood’s Division advanced at the pivot along an axis formed by the Pike while Longstreet’s other units attacked in a great arc north-northeast. Hood made contact within 150 yards of his start but quickly overwhelmed the fierce resistance offered by Warren’s little brigade a few hundred yards southeast of Groveton. Pope
Ambrose P. Hill (1825–1865) was commissioned in the Artillery; Hill saw service in the Seminole Wars and the Mexican War. He resigned his commission and entered Confederate service as colonel, 13th Virginia Infantry, on 1 March 1861. He served with his regiment at First Manassas and was promoted to brigadier general in February 1862. His dynamic brigade leadership in the defense of Williamsburg and on the Peninsula led to his promotion to major general and command of the Light Division on 26 May 1862. He and his unit performed well at Cedar Mountain, Second Manassas, and Antietam. He briefly replaced the fallen Jackson at Chancellorsville until wounded. Hill was promoted to lieutenant general on 23 May 1863 and given command of a newly created corps.

was to be fortunate in the quality of fighting demonstrated by those of his units hurled in to oppose Longstreet.

Hood advanced a few hundred yards farther, where he was resisted by Anderson’s Brigade and Kerns’ Battery of Reynolds’ Division, caught while shifting to the north. Jackson’s tired force had not pressed at the same pace, allowing the Federal buildup of an artillery line to remain north of the Pike. This fire greatly impeded Hood’s progress as he approached Chinn’s Ridge (Bald Hill) and ultimately prevented any significant Confederate moves north of the Pike.

The developing crises were recognized quickly by McDowell and Pope. While Warren and Anderson sacrificed themselves, the generals rushed units to Chinn’s Ridge and to Henry Hill. Sigel covered the withdrawal of Porter’s Corps, concurrently sending two brigades from Schurz’s Division south of the Pike. These were reinforced by two brigades from Ricketts’ Division marched down from the northern edge of the battlefield. A desperate battle developed on Chinn’s Ridge as wave after wave of Federals, each arriving just in time, beat back the attacking Confederates. By this time, Kemper’s and D. R. Jones’ Divisions had supplanted Hood’s. The time bought on Chinn’s Ridge allowed Milroy’s Brigade, Reynolds’ Division, and Sykes’ Division to establish themselves in a defensive position along the Sudley Springs Road on the west side of Henry Hill.

The Confederates pushed the last Federal defender off Chinn’s Ridge about 1800 and charged against this final Federal line. The approach of D. R. Jones’ Division from the south forced the Federals to extend and refuse their southern flank. Their line held, however. These defenders were relieved by elements of Reno’s Corps about 1930. They repulsed one final Confederate effort in the darkness. Then, about 2030, all was quiet except for the groans of the injured. Pope ordered Banks at Bristoe to save what trains he could and to evacuate. He also directed his forces at
hand to withdraw to Centreville, which they did in reasonably good order. Schurz's Division was the last out, leapfrogging rearward from high ground to high ground. It vacated a final bridgehead west of the Bull Run Bridge at 2300, destroying the bridge itself two hours later.

The Second Battle of Manassas was over. In an aftershock at Chantilly on 1 September Kearny and Stevens were killed. But then Pope's battered army withdrew to the safety of the defenses of Washington and Lee's thoughts shifted to consider an invasion of Maryland to seal his summer triumphs. In less than three weeks he was to fight the great battle of Antietam, quickly overshadowing the achievements and failures on the Plains of Manassas.

Discussion

The operational lapses shown by both forces reflect the greenness of the two opposing armies. These lapses underline the point that the most able commander is constrained in his achievements by the quality, training, and professionalism of the units he commands. Armies grow; they cannot be created on demand. Robert E. Lee's leadership and command relationships developed a much greater responsiveness in his force. The rank and file on both sides were equally sound. The difference between the two armies lay in the quality of their senior leaders and how they dealt with each other. Ironically, aspects of trust affected both forces. Pope lost at Second Manassas because he refused to trust his subordinates; Lee lost a chance for a decisive blow on 29 August because he trusted Longstreet's cautious judgment too much.

General Lee capitalized on the strengths of the Army of Northern Virginia and its leaders, completely reversing the strategic situation in a matter of months. Seemingly trapped between McClellan and Pope at Richmond, he took advantage of the opportunities offered by Federal mistakes to relieve that city while moving to threaten his enemy's capital. This shift further reserved to the Confederacy for another season the assets of a large part of Virginia hitherto occupied. It also paved the way for Lee's first invasion of the North as he retained the strategic initiative.

The hapless Pope was relieved shortly thereafter and sent to command a department in Minnesota and the Dakotas. His brief career in command of the Army of Virginia is pitilessly summarized by the historian of the U.S. II Corps, "The braggart who had begun his campaign with insolent reflections . . . had been kicked, cuffed, hustled about, knocked down, run over, and trodden upon as rarely happens in the history of war. His communications had been cut; his headquarters pillaged; a corps had marched into his rear, and had encamped at its ease upon the railroad by which he received his supplies; he had been beaten or foiled in every attempt he had made to 'bag' those defiant intruders; and, in the end, he was glad to find a refuge in the entrenchments of Washington." Understanding the failures of this not unable but flawed leader may be the most valuable legacy of Second Manassas.
Suggested Readings

The Battle of Second Manassas has not attracted as much attention from historians as have many other Civil War engagements. A few books have been published on Pope's Campaign in the summer of 1862. Many able authors have provided chapters on the battle in larger works. However, disparities in fact, interpretations, and opinion indicate that the world is still waiting for a definitive study. The memoirs of individuals and units that participated in the operations often provide good incidental information, but should not be accepted without corroboration. The Official Record of the War of the Rebellion, Series I, Vol. 12, Part II, is indispensable.

Ropes, John C., The Army Under Pope, New York: C. Scribner and Sons, 1881. One of the few works devoted exclusively to the Army of Virginia. Despite its age, it remains a balanced, detailed narrative.


29 August 1862

0500 Sigel’s Corps with Reynold’s Division pressed westward and became engaged in a series of disjointed attacks against Jackson’s position along the railroad.

1000 Sigel called off attacks.

0900–1000 Longstreet’s Corps began arriving south of Jackson’s line and completed its deployment about 1100.

Hood’s Division was on both sides of the turnpike near Page-Land Lane. Wilcox’s Division was echeloned to his left rear, while Kemper’s Division was echeloned to his right rear. D. R. Jones’ Division extended from Kemper’s farther south across the Manassas Gap Railroad and Robertson’s Cavalry screened toward Manassas. Jones engaged elements of Morell’s Division; Porter’s Corps was engaged in desultory fighting all afternoon.

1100 Heintzelman’s Corps (Kearny’s and Hooker’s Divisions) and Reno’s Corps (Reno’s and Stevens’ Divisions) arrived near the Stone House.

1200 The Federal attack was renewed. Schurz’s Division seized part of Jackson’s railroad position and held it until relieved at 1400 by Heintzelman’s Corps.

1400–1500 Period of regrouping and rest with some skirmishing.

1500 Grover’s Brigade, Hooker’s Division made a successful bayonet attack against the center of Jackson’s line; lost 500 men in 20 minutes, was not supported and was forced back.

1700 Kearny attacked on Jackson’s extreme left (north) and began to roll up that part of the line held by A.P. Hill’s Division. Two brigades of Confederate reinforcements were rushed from an unthreatened portion of their line and repulsed Kearny’s men.

1700 Wilcox’s Division was shifted by Longstreet to support D.R. Jones toward Manassas; it soon returned when no threat developed. Fitz-John Porter’s presence to the south had fixed Longstreet’s right wing all afternoon. The Confederate did not want to commit himself until he had determined Porter’s intentions.

1730 Hatch’s (formerly King’s) Division arrived at the Stone House and was ordered to attack westward along the Pike.

1830 Hatch’s Division collided with Hood’s Division, which was probing eastward along the Warrenton Pike. Fighting endured around Groveton until about 1915. Reynolds’ Division south of the Pike had been prevented from supporting effectively by Longstreet’s artillery.

c. 1830 Pope ordered Porter to bring his corps to Groveton. Pope felt Jackson was retreating and disregarded Porter’s reports of Longstreet’s presence south of the Pike. Longstreet was freed for the next day.

30 August 1862

1200 Federals began to move into attack positions; Reynolds shifted to Chinn’s Ridge.

1500 Butterfield’s and Hatch’s Divisions with Sykes’ in support commenced the main attack. They pushed to the railroad held by Jackson’s men but were enfiladed by Longstreet’s artillery on their left (south). Meanwhile Heintzelman’s units pressed farther north.

Chronology
1500 Reynolds was pulled from his position to support Porter. Only Warren's Brigade (Sykes' Division) and Anderson's Brigade (Reynolds' Division) remained south of the Pike.

1530 Longstreet attacked, pivoting on Jackson's position. Hood's Division advanced along an axis formed by the Pike while Longstreet's other units advanced in an arc north-northeast.

1600 Warren's position was overrun. Pope placed more troops on Chinn's Ridge: Ricketts', along with Schurz's and parts of Schenck's Division were rushed in; Sykes' Division went to Henry Hill farther east and was joined later by Reynolds with two of his brigades. Reno and Heintzelman delayed north of the Pike against Jackson, who conformed to Longstreet's advance.

1800 Chinn's Ridge was taken. Fighting shifted to Henry Hill. Sykes and Reynolds held until relieved by Stevens' Division of Reno's Corps, which halted the last Confederate attack.

2030 All quiet.

2300 Schurz's Division evacuated a bridgehead west of Stone Bridge.

31 August 1862

0100 Turnpike Bridge was blown up; Federals drew into Centreville positions. (The stone bridge had been destroyed 9 March 1862 by Confederates. The bridge destroyed 31 August was a temporary wooden span.)

Defeat of Federal Troops. (From Manassas to Appomattox)
By the summer of 1862 the armies of both sides were beginning to develop corps headquarters to control the divisions assigned to them. In June 1862 General Lee divided his army into "wings" under Jackson and Longstreet, respectively. These were organized formally into corps in November of that year. An informal corps organization had existed among the Federal forces since late 1861. These were formally designated in July 1862, but first were numbered sequentially within their respective field armies, causing some confusion. Many of the corps were still forming at the time of the Second Manassas Campaign, hence they were not much better structured or coordinated than their Southern counterparts. There were usually two or three divisions in each corps, sometimes more. Normally three, occasionally four, brigades composed a division. Four or five regiments were assigned to a brigade.

Various manpower practices, plus battle losses, make it extremely difficult to calculate strength accurately by unit designation alone. Volunteer infantry regiments were composed of ten companies, each authorized a maximum of 101 officers and men. With staff included, a full regiment would have numbered about 1,025 officers and men. Regular U.S. Army Infantry regiments were organized into three battalions of three companies each and Federal heavy artillery regiments converted to infantry had three four-company battalions. As a result, they were slightly larger than the volunteer regiments. Federal regiments at Second Manassas had an average strength of 300 men, while similar Confederate units averaged 200 men.

Artillery batteries on the Federal side generally were standardized with six M1857 12-pounder Napoleon pieces. There were about 100 men in a full strength Federal battery. Confederate batteries, on the other hand, ranged from six to two pieces and usually had various models of guns grouped together. This lack of uniformity was offset by a much better higher-level structure. Most Confederate artillery was grouped in battalions deployed under the orders of the wing commander. This arrangement allowed greater firepower to be brought to bear more responsively than on the Federal side. There, batteries were assigned to division, even brigade, levels, often operating independently once battle was joined. The Federals had 38 batteries with 182 guns at Second Manassas, while the Confederates had 184 guns grouped in 45 batteries.

The dissimilarities in centralization extended also to the cavalry. Confederate horse was organized in a single cavalry division, responsive to the needs of the army commander. It was used primarily to gather information. Federal practice assigned cavalry to corps and sometimes to as low as brigades. This deprived the army commander of any reconnaissance capability of his own. There was the probability, realized in the 1862 Campaign, that information would not get to him. This shortcoming was made worse by General Pope's philosophy of cavalry use. He caused his subordinates to push the cavalry mercilessly in deep raids and as hard-riding
escorts and headquarters guards. Rarely was cavalry used by the Federals solely to obtain information. As a consequence, Pope frequently lost contact during critical changes, fatally hampering his planning. At the same time, the cavalry became so debilitated it could not be a factor when it was needed the most at the climax of the campaign.

Order of Battle
28–30 August 1862

Army of Virginia
Maj. Gen. John Pope, Commanding

1 Corps, Army of Virginia (Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel)
1st Division (Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck)
1st Brigade (Brig. Gen. Julius H. Stahel)
27th Pennsylvania
8th New York
41st New York
45th New York
2d Brigade (Col. Nathaniel C. McLean)
25th Ohio
55th Ohio
73d Ohio
75th Ohio
2d Division (merged in the others)
3d Division (Brig. Gen. Carl Schurz)
1st Brigade (Col. Alexander Schimmelfennig)
61st Ohio
74th Pennsylvania
8th West Virginia
2d Brigade (Col. Wladimir Krzyzanowski)
54th New York
58th New York
75th Pennsylvania
3d Brigade (Col. John A. Koltes)
29th New York
68th New York
73d Pennsylvania
Independent Brigade (Brig. Gen. Robert H. Milroy)
2d West Virginia
3d West Virginia
5th West Virginia
1st West Virginia Cavalry
82d Ohio

Artillery of the I Corps, Army of Virginia
K. 1st Ohio Light (Haskin’s)
2d New York Light (Schirmer’s)
F. Pennsylvania Light (Hampton’s)
L. 2d New York Light (Roemer’s)
1. 1st Ohio Light (Dilger’s)
12th Battery, Ohio Light (Johnson’s)
1. 1st New York Light (Wiedrich’s)
13th Battery, New York Light (Dieckmann’s)
C. West Virginia Light (Hill’s)

II Corps, Army of Virginia (Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks)
1st Division (Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams)
1st Brigade (Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford)
10th Maine
46th Pennsylvania
28th New York
5th Connecticut
2d Brigade (merged in the others)
3d Brigade (Brig. Gen. George H. Gordon)
2d Massachusetts
3d Wisconsin
27th Indiana
2d Division (Brig. Gen. George S. Greene)
1st Brigade (Col. Charles Candy)
5th Ohio
7th Ohio
29th Ohio
66th Ohio
28th Pennsylvania
2d Brigade (Col. M. Schlaudecker)
109th Pennsylvania
11th Pennsylvania
3d Maryland
102d New York
8th U.S. Infantry
12th U.S. Infantry
3d Brigade (Col. James A. Tait)
1st District of Columbia
78th New York
60th New York
Purnell Legion, Maryland
3d Delaware

Artillery of the II Corps, Army of Virginia
4th Battery, Maine Light (Robinson’s)
6th Battery, Maine Light (McGilvery’s)
M Battery, 1st New York Light (Cothran’s)
10th Battery, New York Light (Bruen’s)
E Battery, Pennsylvania Light (Knap’s)
F Battery, 4th U.S. (Best’s)

III Corps, Army of Virginia (Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell)
1st Division (Brig. Gen. John P. Hatch vice Rufus King)
1st Brigade (Col. Timothy Sullivan vice
John P. Hatch)
  2d U.S. Sharpshooters
  22d New York
  24th New York
  30th New York
  84th New York
2d Brigade (Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday)
  56th Pennsylvania
  76th New York
  95th New York
3d Brigade (Brig. Gen. Marsena R. Patrick)
  21st New York
  23d New York
  25th New York
  80th New York
4th Brigade (Brig. Gen. John Gibbon)
  2d Wisconsin
  19th Indiana
  6th Wisconsin
2d Division (Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts)
1st Brigade (Brig. Gen. Abram Duryee)
  97th New York
  104th New York
  105th New York
  107th New York
2d Brigade (Brig. Gen. Zealous B. Tower)
  26th New York
  94th New York
  88th Pennsylvania
  90th Pennsylvania
3d Brigade (Col. John W. Stiles)
  11th Pennsylvania
  83d New York
  12th Massachusetts
  13th Massachusetts
4th Brigade (Col. Joseph Thoburn)
  1st West Virginia
  84th Pennsylvania
  110th Pennsylvania
  7th Indiana
Pennsylvania Reserves (Brig. Gen. John E.
  Reynolds)
  1st Brigade (Brig. Gen. George G. Meade)
    1st Rifles
    3d Infantry
    4th Infantry
    7th Infantry
    8th Infantry
2d Brigade (Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour)
  1st Infantry
  2d Infantry
  5th Infantry
  6th Infantry
3d Brigade (Brig. Gen. Conrad F. Jackson)
  9th Infantry
  10th Infantry
  11th Infantry
  12th Infantry
Artillery of the III Corps, Army of Virginia
(Major Tellison, Chief of Artillery)
  1st Battery, New Hampshire Light
    (Gerrish's)
  D Battery, 1st Rhode Island Light
    (Monroe's)
  B Battery, 4th U.S. (Campbell's)
  C Battery, 5th U.S. (Ransom's)
  2d Battery, Maine Light (Hall's)
  5th Battery, Maine Light (Leppien's)
  A Battery, Pennsylvania Light (Simpson's)
  B Battery, Pennsylvania Light (Cooper's)
  C Battery, Pennsylvania Light (Thompson's)
  G Battery, Pennsylvania Light (Kern's)
Cavalry of the Army of Virginia
Cavalry of the III Corps
  Buford's Brigade (Brig. Gen. John
    Buford)
    1st Michigan
    1st Vermont
    1st West Virginia
  Beardsley's Brigade (Brig. Gen. John
    Beardsley)
    1st Connecticut Battalion
    1st Maryland
    4th New York
    9th New York
    6th Ohio
  Cavalry of the III Corps
  Bayard's Brigade (Brig. Gen. George D.
    Bayard)
    1st New Jersey
    1st Pennsylvania
    1st Rhode Island
    1st Maine
    1st New York
III Corps, Army of the Potomac (Maj. Gen.
  Samuel P. Heintzelman)
1st Division (Maj. Gen. Philip Kearny)
  1st Brigade (Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson)
    20th Indiana
    63d Pennsylvania
    105th Pennsylvania
    30th Ohio (6 companies)
  2d Brigade (Brig. Gen. David D. Birney)
    1st New York
    38th New York
    40th New York
    101st New York
    57th Pennsylvania
3d Maine
4th Maine
3d Brigade (Col. Orlando M. Poe)
  37th New York
  2d Michigan
  3d Michigan
  5th Michigan
  99th Pennsylvania
2d Division (Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker)
1st Brigade (Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover)
  1st Massachusetts
  11th Massachusetts
  16th Massachusetts
  2d New Hampshire
  26th Pennsylvania
2d (or Excelsior) Brigade (Col. Nelson Taylor)
  70th New York
  71st New York
  72d New York
  73d New York
  74th New York
3d Brigade (Col. Joseph B. Carr)
  2d New York
  5th New Jersey
  6th New Jersey
  7th New Jersey
  8th New Jersey
  11th New Jersey
  115th Pennsylvania
Artillery of the III Corps, Army of the Potomac
  K Battery, 1st U.S. (Graham’s)
  E Battery, 1st Rhode Island Light (Waterman’s)
  6th Battery, Maine Light (McGilvery’s)
V Corps, Army of the Potomac (Maj. Gen. Fitz-John Porter)
1st Division (Maj. Gen. George W. Morell)
1st Brigade (Col. James Barnes)
  2d Maine
  18th Massachusetts
  22d Massachusetts
  13th New York
  25th New York
  1st Michigan
2d Brigade (Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin)
  9th Massachusetts
  32d Massachusetts
  14th New York
  62d Pennsylvania
  4th Michigan
  Sharpshooters
3d Brigade (Brig. Gen. Dan Butterfield)
  12th New York
  17th New York
  44th New York
16th Michigan
83d Pennsylvania
1st U.S.
2d Division (Brig. Gen. George Sykes)
1st Brigade (Lt. Col. Robert C. Buchanan)
  3d U.S. Infantry
  4th U.S. Infantry
  12th U.S. Infantry, 1st Battalion
  14th U.S. Infantry, 1st Battalion
  14th U.S. Infantry, 2d Battalion
2d Brigade (Lt. Col. William Chapman)
  1st U.S. Infantry (Company G)
  2d U.S. Infantry
  6th U.S. Infantry
  10th U.S. Infantry
  11th U.S. Infantry
  17th U.S. Infantry
3d Brigade (Col. Gouverneur K. Warren)
  5th New York
  10th New York
  Piatt’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. A. Sanders Piatt)
  86th New York
  63d Indiana
Artillery of the V Corps, Army of the Potomac
  3d Massachusetts Battery (Martin’s)
  C Battery, 1st Rhode Island Light (Waterman’s)
  E and G Batteries, 1st U.S. (Randolph’s)
  D Battery, 5th U.S. (Hazlett’s)
  I Battery, 5th U.S. (Weed’s)
  K Battery, 5th U.S. (Smead’s)
IX Corps, Army of the Potomac (Brig. Gen. Jesse L. Reno)
1st Division (Brig. Gen. Isaac J. Stevens)
1st Brigade (Col. Benjamin C. Christ)
  8th Michigan
  30th Pennsylvania
2d Brigade (Col. Daniel Leasure)
  100th Pennsylvania
  46th New York
3d Brigade (Col. Addison Farnsworth)
  79th New York
  28th Massachusetts
2d Division (Brig. Gen. Jesse L. Reno)
1st Brigade (Col. James Nagle)
  48th Pennsylvania
  2d Maryland
  6th New Hampshire
2d Brigade (Col. Edward Ferrero)
  51st New York
  51st Pennsylvania
  21st Massachusetts
Artillery of the IX Corps, Army of the Potomac
  E Battery, 2d U.S. (Benjamin’s)
  D Battery, Pennsylvania Light (Durell’s)
Army of Northern Virginia
General Robert E. Lee, Commanding

Right Wing (Lt. Gen. James Longstreet)
Infantry
Hood's (Evans’) Division (Brig. Gen. Nathan G. Evans)
Hood’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. John B. Hood)
1st Texas
4th Texas
5th Texas
18th Georgia
Hampton’s Legion
Whiting’s (or Law’s) Brigade (Col. Evander M. Law)
4th Alabama
6th North Carolina
2d Mississippi
11th Mississippi
Evans’ Brigade (Col. P. F. Stevens)
17th South Carolina
18th South Carolina
22d South Carolina
23d South Carolina
Holcombe’s Legion
Wilcox’s Division (Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox)
Wilcox’s Brigade
8th Alabama
9th Alabama
10th Alabama
11th Alabama
Pryor’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. Roger A. Pryor)
2d Florida
5th Florida
8th Florida
3d Virginia
14th Alabama
Featherston’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Featherston)
2d Mississippi
12th Mississippi
16th Mississippi
19th Mississippi
Kemper’s Division (Brig. Gen. James L. Kemper)
Kemper’s Brigade (Col. Montgomery D. Corse)
1st Virginia
7th Virginia
11th Virginia
17th Virginia
24th Virginia
Sharpshooters
Jenkins’ Brigade (Brig. Gen. Micah Jenkins)
1st South Carolina
2d South Carolina
5th South Carolina
6th South Carolina
Palmetto
Pickett’s Brigade (Col. Eppa Hunton)
8th Virginia
18th Virginia
19th Virginia
28th Virginia
56th Virginia
D. R. Jones’ Division (Brig. Gen. David R. Jones)
Anderson’s Brigade (Col. G. T. Anderson)
1st Georgia
7th Georgia
8th Georgia
9th Georgia
11th Georgia
Toomb’s Brigade (Col. Henry L. Benning)
2d Georgia
15th Georgia
17th Georgia
20th Georgia
Drayton’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Drayton)
15th South Carolina
50th Georgia
51st Georgia
Mahone’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. William Mahone)
6th Virginia
12th Virginia
16th Virginia
41st Virginia
Wright’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. A. R. Wright)
3d Georgia
22d Georgia
48th Georgia
44th Alabama
Armistead’s Brigade (Brig. Gen. Lewis A. Armistead)
9th Virginia
14th Virginia
38th Virginia
53d Virginia
57th Virginia
5th Virginia Battalion

Artillery
Lee's Battalion (Col. Stephen D. Lee)
Bath Artillery, Virginia (Eubanks')
Portsmouth Artillery, Virginia (Oakham's)
Bedford Artillery, Virginia (Jordan's)
Parker's Battery, Virginia
Taylor's Battery, Virginia
Rhett's Battery, South Carolina

Washington Artillery Battalion, Louisiana
(Maj. J. B. Walton)
1st Company (Squire's)
2d Company (Richardson's)
3d Company (Miller's)
4th Company (Eshleman's)

Division Batteries
Thomas Artillery, Virginia (Anderson's)
Dixie Artillery, Virginia (Chapman's)
German Artillery, South Carolina
(Bachman's)
Palmetto Artillery, South Carolina
(Garden's)
Moorman's Battery, Virginia
Louder Artillery, Virginia (Rogers')
Rowan Artillery, North Carolina (Reilly's)
Macbeth Artillery, South Carolina
(Boyer's)
Norfolk Artillery, Virginia (Huger's)
Goochland Artillery, Virginia (Turner's)
Donaldsonville Artillery, Louisiana
Fauquier Artillery, Virginia (Stribling's)

Left Wing (Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson)
Ewell's Division (Brig. Gen. Alexander R. Lawton)
Early's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early)
13th Virginia
25th Virginia
31st Virginia
44th Virginia
49th Virginia
52d Virginia
58th Virginia

Lawton's Brigade (Col. Marcellus Douglass)
13th Georgia
26th Georgia
31st Georgia
38th Georgia
60th Georgia
61st Georgia

Hay's Brigade (Col. Strong)
5th Louisiana
6th Louisiana
7th Louisiana
8th Louisiana
9th Louisiana

Trimble's Brigade (Capt. W. E. Brown)
12th Georgia
21st Georgia
21st North Carolina
15th Alabama
1st North Carolina Battalion

Light Division (Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill)
Branch's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Lawrence O'B. Branch)
7th North Carolina
18th North Carolina
28th North Carolina
33d North Carolina
37th North Carolina

Gregg's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg)
Orr's Rifles, South Carolina
1st South Carolina
12th South Carolina
13th South Carolina
14th South Carolina

Field's Brigade (Col. J. M. Brockenbrough)
22d Virginia Battalion
40th Virginia
47th Virginia
55th Virginia

Pender's Brigade (Brig. Gen. William D. Pender)
16th North Carolina
22d North Carolina
34th North Carolina
38th North Carolina

Archer's Brigade (Brig. Gen. James J. Archer)
1st Tennessee
7th Tennessee
14th Tennessee
19th Tennessee
5th Alabama

Thomas' Brigade (Col. Edward L. Thomas)
14th Georgia
35th Georgia
45th Georgia
49th Georgia

Jackson's Division (Brig. Gen. William E. Starke vice William Taliaferro)
"Stonewall" Brigade (Col. William S. H. Baylor)
2d Virginia
4th Virginia
5th Virginia
27th Virginia
33d Virginia

Campbell's (or J. R. Jones') Brigade (Col. Bradley T. Johnson)
1st Virginia Battalion
21st Virginia
42d Virginia
48th Virginia
Taliaferro's Brigade (Col. Alexander G. Taliaferro)
10th Virginia
23d Virginia
37th Virginia
47th Alabama
48th Alabama
Stafford's Brigade (Col. Leroy A. Stafford)
1st Louisiana
2d Louisiana
9th Louisiana
10th Louisiana
15th Louisiana
Coppen's Battalion
Cavalry (Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart)
Robertson's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Beverly H. Robertson)
2d Virginia
6th Virginia
7th Virginia
12th Virginia
17th Virginia
Lee's Brigade (Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee)
1st Virginia
3d Virginia
4th Virginia
5th Virginia
9th Virginia
Artillery
Jackson's Division (Maj. L. M. Shumaker)
Baltimore Artillery, Maryland
(Brockenbrough's)
Allegheny Artillery, Virginia
(Carpenter's)
Hampden Artillery, Virginia (Caskie's)
Winchester Battery, Virginia (Cutshaw's)
Rockbridge Artillery, Virginia (Poague's)
Lee Artillery, Virginia (Raines')
Rice's Battery, Virginia
Danville Artillery, Virginia (Wooding's)
Hill's Division (Lt. Col. Robert L. Walker)
Fredericksburg Artillery, Virginia
(Braxton's)
Crenshaw's Battery, Virginia
Letcher Artillery, Virginia (Davidson's)
Middlesex Artillery, Virginia (Hardy's)
Purcell Artillery, Virginia (Pegram's)
Branch Artillery, North Carolina (Potts')
Pee Dee Artillery, South Carolina
(McIntosh's)
Ewell's Division
Louisiana Guard Artillery (D'Aquin's)
Chesapeake Artillery, Maryland (Brown's)
1st Maryland Battery (Dement's)
Johnson's Battery, Virginia
Courtney Artillery, Virginia (Latimer's)
Staunton Artillery, Virginia (Garber's)

Second Manassas Losses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Union</th>
<th>Confederate</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total engaged</td>
<td>75,696</td>
<td>48,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>1,724</td>
<td>1,481</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>8,372</td>
<td>7,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>5,958</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total losses</td>
<td>16,054 (21%)</td>
<td>9,197 (19%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Before you begin your tour, be sure to read the battle Overview. Begin your tour with a visit to Manassas National Battlefield Park Visitors’ Center. It is located on Henry Hill, just off State Road (SR) 234, .7 mile north of the I-66 interchange and .5 mile south of its intersection with Route 29 (Lee Highway, the old Warrenton Turnpike).

Pageland Lane

Upon completion of the museum visit, return to SR 234 and drive north .5 mile to Route 29. Turn west (left) on 29 and proceed 2.8 miles through the park property until you reach the intersection of 29 and County Road (CR) 705 (Pageland Lane). Turn south on CR 705 and stop at the first safe place below the junction. Do not visit any of the sites en route, since this is a familiarization drive and you will be able to spend time at each of these places later. The junction of the two roads is just southwest of the coordinating or linking point of Jackson’s and Longstreet’s Corps. There is a monument commemorating a fallen Texan about 30 yards inside the woods on the southwest quadrant of the intersection.

On 28 August, about 0930, Reynolds’ Division en route to Manassas from Gainesville was turning on Pageland Lane when it was fired on by two guns with the 1st Virginia Cavalry supported by infantry from the 21st Virginia Infantry, part of Bradley T. Johnson’s Brigade. The 42d Virginia Infantry was in Brawner’s Woods.

Cooper’s U.S. Battery returned the fire. Companies B, D, and K, 13th Pennsylvania Reserves deployed toward Brawner’s Farm while Companies A, E, and F went into the woods south of the Pike. Meade’s Brigade deployed behind them. 3d and 7th Pennsylvania Reserves north of the intersection, 4th Pennsylvania Reserves south, with the 8th Pennsylvania Reserves held inactive.

The 13th Pennsylvania Reserve Companies north of the road scouted up to Sudley Mill, encountering no one, but seeing activity eastward. Reynolds with McDowell decided the force was rearguard cavalry and resumed their march to Manassas down Pageland Lane.

On the same day, at 1700, Patrick’s Brigade held on the southeast side of the intersection during the Brawner’s Farm fight; 35th and 23d New York deployed northeast. The brigade had been fired upon by artillery from Brawner’s Farm. Gerrish’s battery was in place by the nursery.

On 29 August, between 0100 and
0300, King’s Division may have withdrawn down Pageland Lane toward Manassas. And on the same day, between 0300 and 1000, Early’s and Forrest’s Brigades of Lawton’s Division moved into the fields northwest of the intersection about sunrise. The 13th and 31st Virginia were advanced as pickets just east of Stuart Hill on the other side of the nursery. Early was protecting Jackson’s flanks while looking for Longstreet. His men skirmished with the Pennsylvania Bucktails of Reynolds’ Division.

During 1000 to 1200, Longstreet’s Corps arrived from Thoroughfare Gap. He immediately placed Hood’s Division in this area:

On approaching the field some of Brigadier General Hood’s batteries were ordered into position and his division was deployed on the right and left of the turnpike at right angles.
Irvin McDowell (1818–1885) was brevetted for gallantry at Buena Vista during the Mexican War. When the Civil War broke out, he was made brigadier general in May 1861 and given command of the troops around Washington. He was defeated at Manassas in 1861. Promoted in March 1862, he commanded a corps around Fredericksburg until it was merged as part of Pope’s Army of Virginia. The defeat at Second Manassas destroyed the last vestiges of his reputation as a field leader.

with it, and supported by . . . Evans’ Brigade.

Reilly’s Battery (Rowan Artillery) went into position on the ridge east of the nursery (Stuart Hill).

Wilcox’s Division went into line on Hood’s left (north).

Kemper’s Division deployed south of Hood to the Manassas Gap Railroad Line.

D. R. Jones’ Division moved down Pageland Lane to the south opposite Dawkin’s Branch on the Manassas-Gainesville Road.

Then on 29 August at 1200 Lee established his headquarters on Stuart Hill (known as Munroe’s Hill in 1862), just south of the turnpike.

Brawner’s Farm

Return north to Route 29 and drive east .6 mile to the crossover allowing you to get on the north side of the road by the driveway to Brawner’s Farm. This is marked by a large metal gate securing a dirt driveway traversing about .5 mile to an unpainted farmhouse and outbuildings. Pull off 29 and park in the driveway entrance.

Jackson’s force had occupied the ridge to the northeast for most of 28 August. The approach of King’s Division in the evening caused the Confederate commander to open the battle. Jackson’s reaction to King’s presence was as follows.

He rode across the broomsedge fields to within easy musket range of the Union column. There he trotted his horse back and
forth eyeing the blue troops. We could almost tell his thoughts by his movements. Sometimes he would halt, then trot on rapidly, halt again, wheel his horse and pass along the flank of the column. Then he pulled up suddenly, wheeled and came galloping toward us. “Here he comes, by God,” said several and Jackson rode up to the assembled group (of officers) as calm as a May morning and, touching his hat in a military salute, said . . . “Bring out your men, gentlemen!” The Second Battle of Manassas was about to begin. (From an address by Hunter McGuire at the dedication of Jackson Memorial Hall, VMI)

Reaction in Doubleday’s Brigade, Hatch’s Division, along the Pike, as recorded by A. P. Smith in the 76th Regiment:

As the rebels opened this fire upon our Regiment, a shell passed through the ambulance train, causing great consternation among the drivers and teamsters. The ambulances were immediately ordered to the rear. Just as they were wheeling for that purpose, a frightened teamster on a baggage wagon put his whip to his horses in the act of forcing his way up the narrow road, without regard to ambulance loads of sick and wounded. Surgeon Metcalfe, of the Seventy-sixth, realizing the danger from such conduct in the crowded highway, quickly drew his pistol, and in his convincing style, informed the driver if he moved another inch he would end his fears. This had its desired effect. The teamster, finding himself between two fires, concluded to take the chances of the most remote, and thus a panic was avoided.

Previously, on 28 August at 1800 Gibbon’s Brigade, King’s Division, came under fire. Gibbon first committed the 2d Wisconsin on the assumption that the fire was cavalry (horse artillery) harassment.

. . . ordered the 2d Wisconsin to face to the left and march obliquely to the rear against these pieces to take them in the flank. As it rose an intervening hill it was opened upon by some infantry on its right flank. The left wing was thrown forward to bring the regiment facing the enemy, and the musket firing became very warm. The 19th Indiana was now ordered up in support and formed the left of the 2d Wisconsin whilst . . . the 6th and 7th Wisconsin were both ordered into line.

As recalled by Pvt. George Fairfield, the 7th Wisconsin came on line.

David R. Jones (1825–1863) resigned his commission 15 February 1861 and entered Confederate service as a major and chief of staff to P. G. T. Beauregard at the siege of Fort Sumter. He was promoted to brigadier general on 17 June 1861 in time to command a brigade at First Manassas. On 10 March 1862 he was promoted to major general and led a division with solid competence throughout the Peninsula Campaign. His division secured Thoroughfare Gap 28 August 1862 and later proved a key element in the decisive assault on the second day of Second Manassas. The next month Jones again distinguished himself at South Mountain and at Antietam.
As soon as we emerged from the wood the rebels opened upon us with a terrible infantry fire. We steadily advanced to the brow of the hill... While we were arranging ourselves in line we could see their line which looked like a black mass... not more than fifty yards distant... My God, what a slaughter. No one seemed to know the object of the fight. and there we stood one hour, the men falling all around; we got no orders to fall back, and Wisconsin men would rather die than fall back without orders.

The 19th Indiana came up to the farmhouse.

I formed my line of battle in the road, marched through a piece of woods some three hundred yards, came out into open ground gradually rising from about 3 or 4 hundred yards. The regiment went at double quick from the time it left the woods. On arriving on the top of the hill, crossed a fence and marched about 2 rods, when I halted the regiment. (As recalled by Col. Solomon Meredith)

The Confederates quickly came into position. General Taliaferro reported,

at this time our lines were advanced from the woods in which they had been concealed [into] the open field. The troops moved forward with splendid gallantry and in the most perfect order. Twice our lines were advanced until we had reached a farmhouse and orchard on the right of our line and were within about 80 yards of a greatly superior force of the enemy. Here one of the most terrific contests that can be conceived of occurred. Our troops held the farmhouse and one edge of the orchard, while the enemy held the orchard and the enclosure next to the turnpike. To our left there was no cover, and our men stood in the open field... The enemy, although re-enforced, never once attempted to advance upon our position, but withstood with great determination the terrible fire which our lines poured upon them... In this fight there was no maneuvering and very little tactics,

Taliaferro wrote after the war. "It was a question of endurance, and both sides endured."

The 2d Virginia was opposite the 7th Wisconsin, east of the farmhouse,

we were then ordered to advance, when our column moved steadily forward in full view of the enemy's line. On descending a knoll some 150 or 200 yards from the enemy our line was opened upon with a most terrific and deadly fire of musketry from the enemy's line in the edge of the woods and behind a fence.

John Gibbon (1827–1896) was commissioned in the Artillery. He saw service in the Seminole and Mexican Wars and taught tactics at West Point. He first served as McDowell's chief of artillery and was promoted to brigadier general in May 1862, commanding the "Black Hat" or "Iron" Brigade in King's Division, McDowell's Corps, Army of Virginia. He fought with this brigade throughout the Second Manassas and Antietam Campaigns. He was wounded at Fredericksburg while commanding a division but returned to duty in time to command his division and later its corps (Hancock's) at Gettysburg. There he was wounded again. He rejoined his division to fight with it throughout Grant's 1864 Overland Campaign. Gibbon was given command of a corps in January 1865.
Continue eastward on 29 by making a “U” turn at the first crossover, 300 feet west of the Brawner’s Farm Road. Proceed .4 mile to a lane on the north side of the road bordered by a snake fence; turn in and park. This is Battery Heights. Read the signs provided by the Park Service, then walk halfway to the gun battery visible to the northeast. This area marks the eastern flank of Gibbon’s force in the Brawner’s Farm struggle.

Again on 28 August, between 1800 and 2400, General Gibbon had committed the 6th Wisconsin on his right. It moved right down to the northern edge of the ridge on which the Park Service guns now are located.

As remembered by members of the 6th Wisconsin,

the regiment advanced in line of battle across a field. Soon we heard a rip-rip, but did not fully realize the situation until the boys began to fall. . . . We finally reached the assignment . . . and the old 6th gave a volley that awoke a cheer from the other three regiments and a corresponding yell from that other side. . . . From then on, for about 2-1/2 hours, the fight was terrific. So near together was the fighting lines that by the flash of the muskets we could see the enemy distinctly and they us. We did not remember to have heard another order than the first given, except an occasional one from the officers, “Give them hell! boys, give them hell!”

Major Rufus Dawes of the 6th Wisconsin described the scene:

When Colonel Cutler shouted “March,” every man scrambled up the bank and over the fence, in the face of shot and shell, with something of the feeling that one would hurry to save a friend from peril. My horse partook of the fierce excitement, and ran up the bank and leaped a fence like a squirrel. I could now see the men of the Second Wisconsin. They were under the concentrated fire of at least six times their own number of the enemy. Our regiment, five hundred and four men in ranks, pushed forward rapidly in perfect line of battle, field officers and Adjutant E. P. Brooks mounted and in their places, and colors advanced and flying in the breeze.

The regiment advanced without firing a shot, making a half wheel to the left in line of battle as accurately as if on the drill ground. Through that battle smoke into which we were advancing, I could see a blood red sun, sinking behind the hills. I can not account for our immunity from the fire of the enemy while on this advance. When at a short range, Colonel Cutler ordered the regiment to halt and fire. Our united fire did great execution. It seemed to throw the rebels into complete confusion and they fell back into the woods behind them. We now gave a loud and jubilant cheer throughout the whole line of our brigade.

Our regiment was on low ground which, in the gathering darkness, gave us great advantage over the enemy, as they overshot our line. The other three regiments of the brigade were on higher ground than the enemy. There was space enough vacant between our regiment and the others for a thousand men. Colonel Cutler sat upon his horse near the colors at the center of the regiment. Lieut. Colonel Bragg was on the right and, being myself upon the left, I was in good position to observe the progress of the battle. It was quite dark when
the enemy's yelling columns again came forward, and they came with a rush. Our men on the left loaded and fired with the energy of madmen, and the sixth worked with an equal desperation. This stopped the rush of the enemy, and they halted and fired upon us their deadly musketry. During a few awful moments, I could see by the lurid light of the powder flashes, the whole of both lines. I saw a rebel mounted officer shot from his horse at the very front of their battle line. It was evident that we were being overpowered and that our men were giving ground. The two crowds, they could hardly be called lines, were within, it seemed to me, fifty yards of each other, and they were pouring musketry into each other as rapidly as men could load and shoot. Two of General Doubleday's regiments [56th Pennsylvania and 76th New York] now came suddenly into the gap on the left of our regiment, and they fired a crashing volley. Hurrah! They have come at the very nick of time. The low ground saved our regiments, as the enemy overshot us in the darkness.

Moving about along the woodline just to your west, the 76th New York and 56th Pennsylvania of Doubleday's Brigade were rushed on line between the 7th and 6th Wisconsin.

But a few moments elapsed after entering the wood, before sharp and continuous musketry firing was heard very near, and up the hill hidden by the woods. A strange mounted officer came riding down through the woods, shouting—

"Come on! Come on! Quick! Quick!"

The Seventy-sixth was immediately in motion—over fences, through the bushes, around the trees, over logs—the bullets and shells tearing through the woods like a hailstorm through a wheat field, on rushed the Regiment. Several of the men were killed and wounded before leaving the wood. After going about twenty rods, the Regiment emerged into an open field. Here was battle in real earnest.
Just at this juncture, as the rebels were preparing in great numbers in the woods beyond, for a charge upon our lines, the Seventy-sixth New York and Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania were ordered into line to fill a gap between the Sixth and Seventh Wisconsin.

During a lull in the action, a body of men was seen moving on the extreme left flank. As they came forward they shouted—

"Don't shoot your own men!"

At that distance it seemed doubtful whether they were friend or enemies, and it was not without much hesitation that the Colonel gave the order. "By the left oblique! Aim! Fire!"

No rebel of that column who escaped death, will ever forget that volley. It seemed like one gun. So well was it directed by our men, as could be judged by the immediate results, that there can be no doubt it very materially contributed to the repulse of this attempted flank attack.

The Regiment had been thoroughly drilled in firing and target practice, and it seemed as though every man took deadly aim, and brought down one or more of the enemy.

When the smoke cleared away a little, the few left of that mass of human beings who had so rapidly left the woods a few moments before, had disappeared, but the ground was literally covered with their dead and wounded. (as recalled by A. P. Smith, in 76th Regiment, New York Volunteers)

Campbell's Battery (B, 4th U.S.) had followed the 6th Wisconsin; it set up first north of the parking lot, then farther out on the ridge where the guns are located now.

Monroe's Battery (D, 1st Rhode Island Light) posted two guns west of the parking lot.

The 95th New York of Doubleday's Brigade provided security for the guns. It was joined by the 30th New York of Hatch's Brigade. Hatch's guns fired support east from near Groveton.

The fighting ended about 2000. After a conference, General King decided to withdraw about 0100, 29 August.

Activity in the area was renewed on 29 August as the Federals probed eastward in an effort to fix Jackson's force for what Pope hoped was a final blow.

On 29 August, about 0500, elements of Sigel's Corps attacked.

At 0900 Schenck's Division of Sigel's Corps reached this point as the left flank of Sigel's attack. Stahel's Brigade straddled the road while McClean's extended southward.

Reynold's Division moved overland from Conrad's (now the SR 234/I-66 intersection) in response to Sigel's request for support on that flank. Two brigades remained around the Lewis House (now where CR 622 goes over I-66). Meade's Brigade went forward with Cooper's Battery (B, 1st Pennsylvania Light). The battery moved east of the Brawner House with one regiment (4th Pennsylvania Reserves) in support. The remainder of the brigade skirmished westward in the direction of Pageland Lane as far as a line parallel to the Brawner Farm Lane.

At 1000 Stahel moved to a point north of the Stonewall Memory Gardens, along Dogan's Branch to be in a position to support Milroy's Brigade engaged farther north.

McClean's Brigade gradually pulled back closer to Groveton to conform with the new line.

At 1030 these changes required Meade to pull back from near Brawner's Farm to south of the turnpike. Seymour's Brigade of Reynolds's Division moved up the Groveton Road and the Pike to relieve him, while Jackson's Brigade came overland from the Lewis House to come on line. Meade's Brigade then pulled back to the Lewis House.
Shortly thereafter, Reynolds learned of the large force coming in front of him and pulled all his units back to the Lewis House area.

Between 1200 and 1600, after the Federals had withdrawn, Hood's Division moved forward on both sides of the Pike to the eastern edge of the woods just west of the embankment. Colonel E. M. Law, brigade commander, said,

I was ordered by Brigadier General Hood, to form the brigade in line of battle to the left of the turnpike and almost at right angles with it, the right resting on the road and the left connecting with Gen. Jackson's line. The Texas Brigade had been previously formed on the right of the road, its left joining my right. With a strong line of riflemen in front, which drove the enemy's skirmishers as it advanced, the brigade moved forward accompanied by Gens Longstreet and Hood until it reached a commanding position about ⅔'s of a mile from Dogan's House.

Hood later launched a night attack from here that will be described at the next stop.

Later during the day Law moved forward to the east side of the Stonewall Memory Gardens when Federal guns farther east all withdrew for ammunition resupply.

On 30 August, about 1530, Porter's heavy attack could be seen clearly from here .6 to .8 miles to the northeast. Confederate guns in this area (the Dixie Artillery and other batteries on Douglas Heights beyond Brawner's House) effectively shattered it. General Cadmus Wilcox observed the Federal attack on Jackson's line from here.

About 3:30 p.m., the enemy's infantry were seen emerging from a wood upon an open field in line of battle, the wood and field being in front of Jackson's extreme right and to the left and near Featherston's Brigade, this is a field about 500 yards wide and terminating 150 yards from Jackson's line, the ground here rising rather steeply for a short distance and then level to the railroad, behind the embankment of which at this point were Jackson's men. Seeing this advance of the enemy, I repaired at once to the interval between Pryor's and Featherston's Brigades. From this point there was an excellent view of the field and not more than 400 yards distant. The first line of the enemy advanced in fine style across the open field. There was but little to oppose them. They were fired upon by our pickets and skirmishers, but they continued to advance, and, ascending the rise above referred to, came within full view of Jackson's line, and were here received with a terrific fire of musketry at short range. They hesitated for an instant, recoiling slightly, and then advanced to near the embankment. Twice did I see this line advance and retire, exposed to a close and deadly fire of musketry. Seeing a second line issuing from the woods upon the field, I was in the act of ordering a battery to be placed in position to fire upon them when a battery was directed by the major-general commanding to fire upon them, this battery being near the turnpike in an excellent and commanding position. The fire of the battery was most opportunely delivered upon this advancing line of the enemy. They were caught in the open field. The effect of every shot could be seen. A rapid fire of shot, shell, and spherical case, delivered with admirable precision, checked their advance. As the shells and spherical case would burst over in front and near them their ranks would break, hesitate and scatter. This artillery fire alone broke regiment after regiment and drove them back into the woods.

Jackson asked for assistance, and Longstreet decided artillery would be the fastest solution. Colonel S. D. Lee's battalion of 9 smooth bores and 9 rifles was on the north side of the ridge between here and the Brawner Farm. Lee said that, beginning about 1600,

with these 18 guns a continuous fire was kept up on the enemy during his attack. His reserves moved twice out of the woods to the support of the attacking columns and twice were they repulsed by the artillery and
driven back to the woods. After the reserves failed to reach the front or attacking columns they were repulsed and endeavored to rally in the open field, but the range of every part of the field was obtained, and a few discharges broke them in confusion and sent them back to the woods. . . . two batteries of the enemy were firing on us, but generally overshot us.

General Longstreet, as noted above, also directed Chapman's Battery (Dixie Artillery) onto the ground here. Chapman reported.

we moved instantly, and at a gallop, soon reached the point . . . on the left of the turnpike, 50 or 100 yards from it. . . . We went into position where . . . indicated and commenced firing at a heavily massed body of infantry on our left, not more than 400 yards distant. . . . I fired from this position until their ranks were broken and driven back.

Confederate Cemetery

Continue east on Route 29 1.1 miles, across the intersection with CR 622 (Featherbed Lane) about 100 yards to the turnoff on the left for the Confederate Cemetery. Pull in and park. The Confederate Cemetery on the east side of the parking lot contains the remains of about 260 men, very few of whom are identified. The cemetery was begun by local ladies who, after the war, assumed responsibility for Confederate remains found on the battlefield. The small white structure west of the parking lot is the Dogan House. It is a log and frame building dating from the 1850s, which was the overseer's house for the Peach Grove plantation. The plantation included the modern Stonewall Memory Gardens and acreage to the north and west.

Again, back on 28 August between 1800 and 2100, Hatch's Brigade halted just west of the intersection during the Brawner's Farm fight. Reynolds' Battery (L, 1st New York Light) fired in support of Gibbon, pulling out westward about 2130.

On 29 August at 0900 Schenck's Division moved down the Pike, then crossed to the south side in line of battle at about New York Avenue to the east. It continued forward to a point south of Brawner's Woods.

Dilger's Battery (I, 1st Ohio Light) was posted just to the south on the high ground where the 14th Brooklyn Memorial is. The 73d Pennsylvania provided security.

Blume's Battery (2d New York Light) set up where the Confederate Cemetery is now. It was supported by four companies from the 41st New York.

Johnson's Battery (12th Ohio Light) set up just north of the cemetery to provide direct support to Milroy's Brigade.

Milroy (2d, 3d, 5th West Virginia, 82d Ohio) deployed on line to the north. When he heard heavy firing farther to the north, he sent two regiments to help while he planned to use his two remaining to take some Confederate batteries to his front. However, he soon shifted everything northward to join the fight he heard.

At 1000 additional artillery was
brought into the line so that five batteries were in place from the 14th Brooklyn Monument extending northward for about 600 yards. When Milroy deflected northward, Stahel’s Brigade of Schenck’s Division had to adjust northward to just above the Stonewall Memory Gardens. He was in the open, subject to Confederate artillery, and eventually pulled east to a point just north of the Confederate Cemetery.

At 1200 Col. Daniel Leasure’s Brigade ([100th Pennsylvania, 46th New York [6 Companies] of Stevens’ Division, Reno’s Corps [IX]) came forward to support Schenck’s Division. Stevens accompanied. Colonel Leasure recalled,

as we were passing the first height, and about ½ my command had passed over the top and were descending into the valley that intervened between the first and second . . . , we suddenly encountered the fire of the enemy’s skirmishers occupying the . . . heights in our front, and we immediately turned and marched by our left flank till we regained the crest of the hill we were passing over, where Gen. Stevens instructed me to take position on the left of the pike, my right resting on the road and as Dilger’s Battery of Sigel’s Corps had a few minutes before retired from that position, his ammunition being exhausted, Gen. Stevens replaced it by Benjamin’s Battery, consisting of four 20-pound Parrotts.

As for Benjamin’s Battery (E, 2d U.S. Artillery),

Benjamin had been on our front, a little to our left, and was moving obliquely to the left across an open field, when he encountered the fire of the enemy’s skirmishers, and as a battery opened on the . . . heights at the same moment, he wheeled his battery, gaining the pike, and passing to the right, took, his position, and unlimbered . . . , but in the open space . . . he overturned one of his caissons full of ammunition . . .

On the twenty-ninth at 1300 Benjamin’s fire had succeeded in neutralizing the Confederate artillery sufficiently to enable Stahel to cross south of the turnpike at the Groveton crossroads, reestablishing contact with McClean, his right resting on the road junction. Confederate skirmishers were about 300 yards west and were finally pushed back by “aggressive volleying,” according to Stahel.

Benjamin’s guns continued to suppress the Confederate artillery, and Leasure continued,

meanwhile, Benjamin was plying his 20-pounders as coolly as if he were practising for fun, though the concentrated fire of five batteries, at fifteen hundred yards, was telling upon his men and horses, as well as upon the men of my command in support. . . . Benjamin himself rode slowly about among his guns, and sometimes dismounted to point a piece. He used a crutch, owing to a wound received in a previous battle, and his lieutenants ably seconded him.

The gun that had had its muzzle blown off still stood grinning with its ragged jaws towards the enemy, and the gunners withdrew it a few rods and buried it, placing a headstone and foot-stone to it, as if it were the grave of a soldier left alone in his quiet rest.

At 1600 on the twenty-ninth Schenck gradually withdrew eastward to Chinn Ridge under growing Confederate artillery fire. The batteries on both sides of the road conformed. This was when Law’s Brigade moved forward to Groveton (c. 1700).

About 1900 the withdrawal of some of Jackson’s troops back to the railroad after a local attack north of here led Generals McDowell and Pope to conclude that the Confederates were retreating. McDowell therefore ordered General Hatch (who had replaced King) to begin a pursuit.

Late on the afternoon of the 29th ultimo I was ordered by General McDowell in person (who was at the time stationed near the Stone House, on the turnpike from Gainesville to Centerville) to move the division on the
Gainesville road in pursuit of the enemy, who, he informed me, were retreating. Gibbon's Brigade had been detached to support some batteries. With the three other brigades of the division and Gerrish's battery of howitzers I proceeded with all the speed possible, hoping by harressing the enemy's rear to turn their retreat into a rout.

After marching about three-quarters of a mile the Second Regiment of U.S. Sharpshooters was deployed to the front as skirmishers, the column continuing up the road in support. The advance almost immediately became warmly engaged on the left of the road. Two howitzers were then placed in position, one on each side of the road, and Doubleday's Brigade was deployed to the front, on the left of the road, and moved up to the support of the skirmishers. We were met by a force consisting of three brigades of infantry, one of which was posted in the woods on the left, parallel to and about an eighth of a mile from the road. The two other brigades were drawn up in line of battle, one on each side of the road. These were in turn supported by a large portion of the rebel force—estimated by a prisoner, who was taken to their rear, at about 30,000 men, drawn up in successive lines, extending 1 1/2 miles to the rear. Doubleday's Brigade moved to the front under a very heavy fire, which they gallantly sustained; but the firing continuing very heavy, Hatch's brigade, commanded by Colonel Sullivan, was also deployed, and moved to the support of General Doubleday. Patrick's brigade, which had been held in reserve, took up a position on the opposite side of the road, completely commanding it. The struggle, lasting some three-quarters of an hour, was a desperate one, being in many instances a hand-to-hand conflict.

Night had now come on, our loss had been severe, and the enemy occupying a position in the woods on our left which gave them a flank fire upon us, I was forced to give the order for a retreat. The retreat was executed in good order, the attempt of the enemy to follow being defeated by a few well-directed volleys from Patrick's Brigade.

General Hood's version as recorded in official records:

At sunset an order came to me from the commanding general to move forward and attack the enemy. Before, however, this division could come to attention it was attacked, and I instantly ordered the two brigades to move forward and charge the enemy, which they did most gallantly, driving them in confusion in front of them. Colonel Law's brigade, being engaged with a very heavy force of the enemy, captured one piece of artillery, three stand of colors, and 100 prisoners, and the Texas brigade three stand of colors. It soon became so very dark that it was impossible to pursue the enemy any farther.

Some of Pope's staff a mile eastward observed the fight.

When it became quite dark there was a beautiful pyrotechnical display about a mile distant on our left, and near the Warrenton Turnpike, occasioned by a collision of King's Division of M'Dowell's Corps with the enemy's right. The sparkling lines of musketry shone in the darkness like fire-flies in a meadow, while the more brilliant flashes of artillery might have been mistaken for swamp meteors. This show continued for an hour, the advancing and receding fires indicating distinctly the surging of the battle tide; and at this time not the slightest sound either of small-arms or artillery was perceptible. It seemed at length that the fire of the enemy's line began to extend and thicken, while ours wavered and fell back, but still continued the contest. Between eight and nine o'clock it ceased entirely, and we returned to our head-quarters station, where we picketed our horses and prepared to pass the night beside a campfire. (Col. David Strother, "Personal Recollections of the War")

At 2100, as Hood's men pressed eastward they captured one gun from Capt. George A. Gerrish's Battery (A, New Hampshire Light), plus the wounded battery commander.

One remained and continued to fire until my men were so near it as to have their faces burned by its discharge.

The battle ended at 2200, when a squadron of the 2d New York Cavalry
charged to cover Hatch's withdrawal. Law's Confederates chewed it up badly. This occurred about midway between the Confederate Cemetery and the Stone House. Hood then pulled back to a point south of Brawner's Woods.

The next day, between 0700 and 1200, Reynolds' Division moved forward from near the Henry House and cleared the area around the Groveton crossroads. The 13th Pennsylvania Reserve set up a skirmish line west of the intersection and linked with skirmishers from the 3d U.S. Infantry, who arrived after 1200 and were set up on the east side of the modern Stonewall Memory Gardens. Syke's Division set up northeast of the Confederate Cemetery.

On the thirtieth of August at 1200, Reynolds pulled back to Chinn's Ridge under pressure from Longstreet's skirmishers and reported a Confederate buildup south of the Pike.

At 1345 Hazlett's Battery (D, 5th U.S.) occupied the hill by the 14th Brooklyn Monument.

At 1430 Warren's Brigade of Sykes' Division deployed south of the Pike to support Hazlett.

John B. Hood (1831–1879) was commissioned into the Infantry. He resigned on 17 April 1861 and entered Confederate service as a lieutenant of cavalry. He led a cavalry force on the Peninsula before promotion on 6 March 1862 to brigadier general and command of the Texas Brigade. He led this force during the Seven Days Battles, at Second Manassas, and at Antietam. Hood was promoted to major general and command of a division in October 1862. He saw action at Fredericksburg and lost an arm at Gettysburg. Upon recovery, Hood commanded a reinforced corps at Chickamauga in September 1863, where he lost a leg. He returned to corps command and was promoted to lieutenant general in February 1864.

Railroad Parking Lot

Retrace your route 50 yards west to the intersection of Route 29 and CR 622. Turn right (north) on CR 622. Proceed .6 mile to a small parking area on your left. Pause and look to the west across the swath cut through the woods by the Park Service. Your view is across a small valley to a rise on which may be seen a brown sandstone monument. This was one of two erected
in the battle area in the winter of 1865 by General William Gamble’s U.S. Cavalry Brigade. Its inscription reads: “In memory of the patriots who fell at Groveton August 28, 29, 30, 1862.” Its mate may be found on Henry Hill near the visitors' center. The white marker visible on the valley floor was originally erected by a Private Albee, a soldier from Wisconsin Company G, 1st Regiment, Berdan’s Sharpshooters. Both markers will be visited walking from the next stop.

Continue northward .5 mile to a parking lot on the right side of the road. This part of the tour will entail a walk of about .75 mile in a loop along part of the old railroad bed. The railroad was begun in the 1850s in an effort to link Alexandria directly with the Manassas Gap Railroad at Gainesville, thence to western markets. The project was a failure and although the well-made cuts and fills were completed, no track was ever laid on it and it has never been used for its intended purpose.

Again, on 28 August between 1200 and 2400, this area was occupied by Col. Bradley T. Johnson’s Brigade of Lawton’s Division after its midday skirmish with Reynolds’ Division. The position also marks the approximate center of Jackson’s Corps line.

Five separate Federal attacks occurred on this spot or within 800 yards to the north or south:

0500—1200—Schurz (Krzyzanowski) north of you.
1000—1200—Milroy’s attack, in this vicinity.
1530—Hooker (Grover), north of you.
1600—Reno (Nagle) in this vicinity.
1700—Kearny (Robinson/Birney) north of you.

Walk from the parking lot south across the road to the sign describing the railroad.

On 29 August between 0530 and 1200, Krzyzanowski’s Brigade of Schurz’s Division reached the railroad about 800 yards north of here. He had lost touch with Milroy to his south and
Schimmelfennig to his north. When he thinned his lines to regain contact, a Confederate counterattack from Gregg’s Brigade thrust him back. He rallied his troops and regained a line on the railroad. The position as seen from the Confederate side is described by one of Gregg’s men:

Our position upon this hill or rocky knoll was slightly in advance of Jackson’s general line; here the ground rising to some extent, the grade of the railroad bed, in our immediate front, rendered the depth of the cut about six feet, but sloping away to our right and left, reduced it to one or two feet on our flanks, while further on our right in front of Thomas’ Brigade, it rose to an embankment. The ground upon our side of the road-bed was almost entirely bare, while on the other side it was covered by a thick growth of brush. On our right, too, this growth extended to (within) about fifty yards of our flank, while on our left, at the same distance, was a field enclosed by a worm fence. The portion of this field nearest our position was cleared and open, but on one side of the field, furthest from us, there was a stand of corn closely covering it. This position was important, not only because it was our extreme left, but because of the Sudley Road, which it commanded. (Edward McCrady “Gregg’s Bde in the 2d Manassas”)

Krzyzanowski’s Brigade remained in line until it was relieved at 1400 by Kearny’s Division. Earlier, about noon, Schimmelfennig’s Brigade had come west of the Sudley-Manassas Road and seized part of the railroad north of Krzyzanowski.

Walk about 150 yards south along the railroad embankment until you encounter a trail forking to your left. Take this left fork about 20 yards to the Park Service marker showing a terrain photograph.

On the twenty-ninth between 1000 and 1200, when Milroy heard the fighting to his north (Krzyzanowski and Gregg), he eventually moved toward it and attacked Trimble’s Brigade, Lawton’s Division, just south of where the Groveton-Sudley Road crosses the unfinished railroad. Milroy reported,

the two regiments sent to Schurz were soon hotly engaged, the enemy being behind a railroad embankment, which afforded them an excellent breast work. The railroad had to be approached from the cleared ground on our side through a strip of thick timber from 100 to 500 yards in width. . . . I observed that my two regiments engaged were being driven back out of the woods by the terrible fire of the rebels.

I then saw the brave Colonels Cantwell and Zeigler struggling to rally their broken regiments on the rear of the forest out of which they had been driven, and sent two of my aides to assist them and assure them of immediate support. They soon rallied their men and charged again and again up to the railroad, but were driven back each time with great loss. I then sent the Second Virginia to their support, directing it to approach the railroad at the point on the left of my other regiments, where the woods ended, but they were met by such a destructive fire from a large rebel force that they were soon thrown into confusion and fell back in disorder. The enemy now came on in overwhelming numbers. General Carl Schurz had been obliged to retire with his two brigades an hour before, and then the whole rebel force was turned against my brigade, and my brave lads were dashed back before the storm of bullets like chaff before the tempest. I then ordered my reserve battery into position a short distance away, and when five guns had got into position one of the wheel horses was shot dead, but I ordered it to unlimber where they were, and the six guns mowed the rebels with grape and canister with fine effect. My reserve regiment, the Third Virginia, now opened with telling effect. Colonel Cantwell, of the Eighty-second Ohio, was shot through the brain and instantly killed while trying to rally his regiment during the thickest of the fight.

While the storm was raging the fiercest General Stahel came to me and reported that he had been sent by General Schenck to
support me, and inquired where he should place his brigade. I told him on my left, and help support my battery. He then returned to his brigade, and soon after being attacked from another quarter I did not again see him during the day. I was then left wholly unsupported, except by a portion of a Pennsylvania regiment, which I found on the field, and stood by me bravely during the next hour or two. I then rallied my reserve regiment and broken fragments in the woods near my battery and sent out a strong party of skirmishers to keep the enemy at bay while another party went forward without arms to get off as many of our dead and wounded as possible. I maintained my ground, skirmishing, and occasionally firing by battalion, during the greater part of the afternoon.

Grover's Brigade of Kearny's Division came on the field and supported Milroy about 1100.

At 1200 a gap between Milroy and Krzyzanowski was filled by Carr's New Jersey Brigade of Hooker's Division.

was ordered into the wood . . . I sent in the 6th and 7th N.J. Vols. Afterwards received orders to take the balance of the brigade into the woods, which I did at about 2 P.M. Here I at once engaged the enemy . . .

holding my position until our ammunition was all expended. About 4 o'clock we were relieved by Gen Reno, but did not reach the skirt of the woods before a retreat was made and the woods occupied by the enemy.

(Carr occupied the area from trail fork to north of the parking lot.)

Walk a farther 100 yards down this trail to a point where it forks to the right. Step down the right fork and pause.

At 1600 Nagle of Reno's Division relieved Carr and was immediately attacked by Douglas' Brigade of Lawton's Division.

I gave the order to advance. The line had advanced but a few steps when the left was struck with such violence by a regiment (which continued the line to the left) which had broken that the [71st New York], which was on the left of the brigade line, was almost carried away with it. I hastily rode to this part of the line . . . and endeavored to stay this disgraceful retreat, but it was in vain; the tide could not be stemmed. On they rushed over and through my line perfectly panic stricken, breaking and carrying away with them the left of my line. The enemy

Philip Kearny (1815–1862) served as aide to the commanding general of the Army between 1840 and 1846, after which he commanded a cavalry company in the campaign against Mexico City. He resigned in 1851, eventually moving to France where in 1859 he earned his second Legion of Honor. Kearny returned to the United States in 1861 to be commissioned brigadier general of volunteers. He first led the Jersey Brigade; then in 1862 was assigned command of the 3d Division in Heintzelman's III Corps, Army of the Potomac. Promoted to major general on 4 July 1862, he had seen action on the Peninsula before fighting at Second Manassas. Kearny was killed at Chantilly, Virginia, on 1 September 1862.
seeing this charged after them. I then en-
devored to throw back my line to give the
enemy a flank fire. This I found... imprac-
ticable, the wood being too dense to execute
the movement. By this time the enemy had
availed themselves of the large interval
opened on my left and poured through in
large numbers, and had got 50 or 60 paces in
my rear, giving my line an enfilading and
reverse fire. They, however, soon ceased fir-
ing, as they were so mixed up as to endanger
their own men; they then commenced taking
prisoners. Finding my line completely
flanked and turned, and in danger of being
entirely cut off, I gave the order to fall back,
which was done in as good order as could be,
situated as we were. After extricating
the brigade from its entanglement, I reformed
the line and immediately sent forward skirmishers upon the line we had occupied, and
followed them myself.

Also at 1600 Nagle counterattacked
and Milroy tried to support. The 26th
New Hampshire moved south of the
parking lot, the 48th Pennsylvania across it with the 2d Maryland to its
north just inside the present woods. The
experience of the 48th Pennsylvania was
typical.

The regiment advanced firing for about a
quarter of a mile, when Lt. Col. Sigfried
halted it, commanded “cease firing,” or-
dered an advance with bayonets, which were
fixed... the enemy being driven out of 2
ditches, one of them being an old railroad
cut... Receiving a volley of musketry
from the rear, and supposing that some union
troops were firing by mistake... the more
frequently the colors were raised and spread out to the supposed friends in the rear, the
more rapid the musket firing therefrom.
(O.C. Boshyshell, The 48th in the War)

The attacking Confederates were
troops from Johnson’s and Stafford’s
brigades of Starke’s Division. They at-
tacked through Milroy into Nagle’s rear.
Hampton’s Battery F, Pennsylvania
Light Artillery tried to delay the attack.
Sergeant J. G. Beatty, commanding the
left gun of the left section, recounted,
our section was ordered to [Milroy’s] sup-
port, and one section, the left (Lieut.
Irish’s), passed through a strip of woods and
up to Gen. Milroy’s line, and as we were
moving by the left, my piece was in the lead.
Gen. Milroy pointed out the spot where I
should place my gun. I obeyed the order and
continued firing canister at three lines of
rebels just beyond the Railroad Cut, and af-
after each shot, in looking under the rising
smoke, I observed that the rebels were run-
nishing toward us and disappearing, and I so
reported to Lieut. Irish, who, with Gen. Mil-
roy, was close on my left. We had fired six
shots, and were loading the seventh when
General Milroy and Lieut. Irish, having rode
far enough in advance to see into the Rail-
road Cut, and at this moment the rebel yell
was raised and Law’s [Johnson’s and
Stafford’s] rebel brigade charged our... sec-
tion (the only two pieces that crossed the
strip of woods). Just then Gen. Milroy
passed close in front of my gun and gave the
order to fall back, while at the same time, I
had taken the precaution to reverse my lim-
ber, and the gun in recoiling passed the trail
under the limber, and the handspike striking
a small stump could not, for the moment, be
disengaged, and the rebels being upon us I
gave the order “Drive on,” and all started to
fall back to the other section of our battery
on the other side of the wood.

At this moment Corp’l Hess, of my piece,
jumped on the limber-chest with his face to
the rear, and in going to my horse I passed
close to him, looked in his face, and in the
next instant he was shot in the forehead... .
Before the limber moved the dead body of
Henry Hess dropped off the chest. The reb-
els then came forward and took my gun, at
the trail of which lay the body of Corp’l

In the official records Bradley T.
Johnson said of this attack:

In the afternoon the enemy carried the
embankment to my left, and while I was
trying to rally some men not of my com-
mand [the enemy] came close on me and
between my command and the railroad cut.
The men were lying down at the time in
ranks, concealed, and unexpected. I ordered
a charge, and with a yell the Second Brigade
went through them, shattering, breaking,
and routing them. The struggle was brief, but not a man faltered, and with closed ranks their rush was irresistible. They drove the enemy into the railroad cut and out of it.

Johnson and Stafford rampaged through Milroy’s troops, forcing him and Nagle to retire.

Continue another 100 yards down the trail until you reach a small stream, sometimes bridged by the Park Service; pause.

On 30 August at 1600 Porter attacked, Butterfield’s Division on the left, Hatch’s on the right, Sykes’ in support. Heintzelman’s and Reno’s Corps conformed farther north. Patrick’s Brigade of Hatch’s Division was in this area. Patrick described the attack:

The 21st and 35th N.Y. moved steadily forward ... until the whole had reached the further edge of the wood, the left (35th) having on its front a strong body of the enemy in a cornfield and behind a railroad bank, after temporary confusion ... the 21st crossed the fence ... where it sustained a most galling crossfire, which was returned, and the regiment moved forward to the ditch about midway between the fence and the RR embankment. (Marsena Patrick, Journal)

The 15th Alabama of Trimble’s Brigade, Lawton’s Division, defended this area. William A. McClendon described the attack from his view.

“Look out boys, they are coming, lots of 'em.” They just simply jammed up against the embankment ... They were so thick that it was impossible to miss them. Cicero Kirkland of my company, ... mounted on top of our breastwork and poured buck and ball into them as fast as some of the Boys could load and hand him a musket.

Walk a farther 100 yards until the trail emerges into the open at the base of the incline midway in the swath leading to the monument viewed earlier from the road. Private
Albee's simple marker is about 40 yards to your left front (south). Pause.

Robert's Brigade of Butterfield's Division attacked up what is now the open swath. Week's Brigade was just on its western edge. Major William Grower of the 17th New York reported,

we crossed the road, the men scrambling over the fence on the other side, and moved forward steadily in quick time. No sooner had we appeared in plain view of the enemy than he opened a tremendous fire of artillery and musketry on our advancing line ... steadily closing the huge gaps made in the ranks. I now gave the word "double quick, charge" and with a mad yell the gallant fellows rushed up the hill to what was almost certain death.

We now reached a sort of plateau, a battery on the summit of the hill playing upon us, while another in the right opened with canister, completely enfilading our lines ...

Anthony Graves, a member of the 44th New York, recalled,

their fire ... made sad havoc in our ranks; the rain of shot and shell ... was something terrible. About midway across this open field was a dry brook into which many of our men fell for shelter.

Walk the approximate 200 yards up the incline to the south side of the monument. Look back over the open space traversed by the Federals. You are .8 mile from Battery Heights and would have been in full view of S. D. Lee's gunners on Douglas Heights in 1862.

Bradley T. Johnson's Brigade defended in this area. He reported,

about 4 p.m. the movements of the enemy were suddenly developed in brigade manner. They stormed my position, deploying in the woods in brigade, up the hill on the thicket held by the Forty-eighth and the railroad cut occupied by the Forty-second; but as they uncovered from the wood in which they had been massing during the whole day I ordered the Twenty-first and Irish Battalion to charge, which they did with empty guns. I halted them under the shelter of the cut, where, with the Forty-second, they held back the enormous force pressing up the hill on them. Lieutenant Dabney had unfortunately been wounded early in the day, and Captain Goldborough, whom I had ordered to take command, had fallen by my side in the charge, leaving the Forty-eighth without a superior officer with them, and they consequently were soon driven out by the tremendous odds against them; but for a short time the three regiments above named, viz, the Forty-second, Twenty-first, and Irish Battalion, by themselves breastred the storm, driving back certainly twenty times their numbers. As soon as their position was known the rest of the division came to their support, except the Third Brigade, which under Colonel Taliaferro, was employed in whipping a division by itself. Before the railroad cut the fight was most obstinate. I saw a Federal flag hold its position for half an hour within 10 yards of a flag of one of the regiments in the cut and go down six or eight times, and after the fight 100 dead were lying 20 yards from the cut, some of them within 2 feet of it. The men fought until their ammunition was exhausted and then threw stones. Lieut. Lewis Randolph, of the battalion, killed one with a stone, and I saw him after the fight with his skull fractured. Dr. Richard P. Johnson, on my volunteer staff, having no arms of any kind, was obliged to have recourse to this means of offense from the beginning. As line after line surged up the hill time after time, led up by their officers, they were dashed back on one another until the whole field was covered with a confused mass of struggling, running, routed Yankees. They failed to take the cut. The battle of the left wing of the army was over, and the whole of Jackson's corps advanced about a mile, its right on the Warrenton road toward the stone bridge, facing Bull Run. I was not further engaged that day.

After examining the monument and the railroad cut, proceed north back along the railroad embankment until you reach the Park Service painting showing the Confederate
Stafford’s Brigade on Johnson’s north also began to run low on ammunition. He reported, the men procured some from the dead bodies of their comrades, but the supply was not sufficient, and in the absence of ammunition the men fought with rocks.

They were relieved by Brockenbrough’s Brigade before the situation became critical. Porter’s assault was repulsed all along the line by about 1600 and Longstreet then began his devastating counterattack.

Continue along the embankment across the Deep Cut marked by the Park Service back to CR 622. Pause.

At 1530 on the twenty-ninth Hooker committed Grover’s Brigade about 800 yards north of the parking lot as part of what was supposed to have been a coordinated attack with Kearny’s Division. Milroy recalled, toward evening General Grover came up with his New England brigade. I saw him forming a line to attack the rebel stronghold in the same place I had been all day, and advised him to form line more to the left, and charge bayonets on arriving at the railroad track, which his brigade executed with such telling effect as to drive the rebels in clouds before their bayonets.

The attack began with a staff officer approaching Grover,

“What does the general want me to do now?” General Grover asked.

“Go into the woods and charge,” was the answer.

“Where is my support?” the commander inquired.

“It is coming.”

After waiting fifteen minutes for this body to appear, the officer returned and said that General Hooker was much displeased because the charge had not been made.

“Colonel, do you know what we are going to charge on?”

A private inquired of the colonel.

“Yes: a good dinner.” (Henry N. Blake)
A soldier from the 2d New Hampshire described the attack,

Colonel [Gilman] Marston came forward and gave the order to "fix bayonets!" Grover rode the length of the line, telling the men they were to fire one volley, then rely upon the bayonet. . . . Slowly and steadily the line went forward. No sound was heard but the crashing of the brush, with an occasional muttered order, such as "Give way to the right," or "Give way to the left." The left of the line approached an open field, and a halt was ordered while Grover went forward to reconnoiter the front. . . . Many of Milroy's dead and wounded were scattered about; it was also evident that a few of his effectives were lying low, watching the enemy, near the edge of the open in front of the 2d. Some of these arose and passed to the rear as Grover's line came up.

At any rate, after spying out the land to the front, Grover moved the brigade a considerable distance by the right flank before closing with the enemy. . . . Hardly had the advance been resumed when there was a crash of Rebel musketry, an answering roar of Yankee cheers, and almost instantly the 2d was pouring over the railroad embankment. The dash was evidently a surprise to the Rebels, as most of them, having delivered their fire, were closely hugging the ground under cover of the bank. They were expecting a return volley, apparently, but had not anticipated looking into the muzzles of the guns that delivered it. Those that made a fight were instantly shot or bayoneted, and in less time than it has taken to write it the first Rebel line was disposed of. Some threw up their hands and cried for mercy: some, doubtless, "played possum," lying as if dead and making no sign; while others, as soon as they could realize what had happened, made a break for the rear, closely followed by the men of the 2d, now wild with rage of battle. There was a desperate dash for a stand of Rebel colors, but they were saved by the fleetness of their bearer and the devoted bravery of the color guard.

The fragments of the first line were driven in upon a second, a few rods beyond the railroad, and here occurred the most desperate fighting of the day—a hand-to-hand melee with bayonets and clubbed muskets. The second Rebel line was routed and scattered to the rear.

The Confederate reaction was equally violent. Pender's Brigade was rushed to support Thomas' crumbling line.

My men moved forward very gallantly, driving the enemy back across the railroad cut, through the woods on the opposite side. . . . My line was halted on the edge of the field in front of the enemy where I remained some little while. . . . My men advanced well receiving grape from their batteries; but support waited for in vain. . . . I withdrew, and marched back to the railroad cut.

Cross CR 622 and walk about 100 yards north of the parking lot along the railroad bed. Pause.

Meanwhile, at 1700, Kearny's Division had taken over the line to the north from Schurz's Division (c. 1400). At 1700, finally after four hours' preparation, he sent Robinson's and Birney's Brigades into the attack. The assault pushed the Confederates over the railroad and west of the Sudley-Groveton Road. Colonel Nelson A. Gesner of the 101st N.Y. described the action.

We were then ordered to march forward and attack the enemy. We moved forward by the flank into the woods, and upon arriving near the enemy formed line of battle—the Fortieth New York and One hundred and first being together, the Fortieth being on our right. We then advanced and soon the enemy opened a heavy fire of musketry on us. The line then halted and commenced firing. After a few minutes the order was given, "Forward," and the regiment went on in splendid order, through a heavy fire, at a double-quick. The enemy could not stand the charge, but broke and fled (a few now and then turning to fire). After falling back some distance they came to a deep cut. Here they attempted to rally, and partially succeeded. We arrived too soon, however, and they again broke and fled. We continued to drive them before us, stopping now and then to fire a volley into them, until we had driven them clean out of the woods into the clear space beyond. Here we received a heavy
cross-fire from the left at a distance of about 200 paces. I here turned, and found that my regiment in the charge had got somewhat scattered, and ordered a halt in order to reform. After remaining here half an hour, and continuing to fire upon and receive the fire of the enemy, I found that their fire was increasing and working more to our rear. Not seeing any support on our left, and finding that combined strength of the Fortieth and One hundred and first would not amount to over 250 men, I deemed it prudent to retire, and accordingly the command was given, and we fell back in good order at quick-time. We halted in the center of the woods and took shelter behind a sort of rifle pit, built of fence rails, until we were ordered by General Birney to fall back and camp.

A. P. Hill's hard-pressed brigades were reinforced by Early's and Forno's Brigades from Lawton's Division, which counterattacked from the southwest, flanking Kearny's units. Early stated,

my brigade ... advanced upon the enemy through a field and drove him from the woods and out of the railroad cut, crossing the latter and following in pursuit several hundred yards beyond . . . it was not desirable that I go beyond the railroad and as soon as I could arrest the advance of my brigade I moved it back to the railroad and occupied it. This was the last attempt made by the enemy on the afternoon of . . . the 29th.

Return to your vehicle and go on to the next point of interest.

Sudley Church

Turn north from the parking lot back onto CR 622. After going about 300 yards, the road makes a second sharp curve. This marks the approximate point where on the high ground to the east Crenshaw's Virginia Battery established itself. Pause if traffic allows.

Artilleryman William Ellis Jones, Crenshaw's (Virginia) Battery, recorded in his diary,

Skirmishing commenced early in this morning. We were put in a commanding position on a slight rise in an open field and had to keep a bright lookout for yanks. We had not been there long before a column of them were seen making their way through a cornfield about a hundred yards off, when we opened fire, for [the enemy] skedaddled ingloriously. We were under a hot fire from one of their batteries, shells bursting and scattering their fragments all around us but doing no damage to either the men or the horses. We were pretty quiet after this.

Continue 1.3 miles to a stop sign and the junction of CR 622 with SR 234. Turn right (south) and pull into the Sudley Church parking lot almost .1 mile on your right. The original Sudley Church was built in 1814 but was so badly damaged during the war that it was ultimately rebuilt by the 1880s. Some of the funds for its restoration came from former Federal soldiers, grateful for the kindness shown by local residents to Union wounded. The building was used as a Union hospital at the Battle of First Manassas. Confederates may have used it briefly sometime during Second Manassas.

On the twenty-eighth between 0600 and 1200, Schimmelfennig's Brigade of Schurz's Division engaged Gregg's South Carolina Brigade and pressed it back. It first approached east of the road, then shifted to the west. Major
Franz Blessing, 74th Pennsylvania Infantry, described the experience.

The regiment was then ordered to the left, where it took its position in the general battle line, after advancing about 400 yards under the heavy fire of the enemy, driving the latter back and out of his positions; but by the withdrawing of a regiment stationed on the left of the Seventy-fourth the enemy took advantage, and, outflanking us, we were forced back about 100 yards. Forming again in column for attack the regiment advanced in quick time toward the enemy, who gave way until he arrived at the other side of the railroad dam. Here again flanked by the enemy, and under a galling fire of grape-shot and canister, the regiment had to leave its position, which it did by making a flank movement to the left, forcing the enemy to withdraw from the woods. We advanced over our former position, capturing an ambulance with two wounded officers, to the seam of the woods. At this point a heavy shower of grape-shot and canister pouring into us, we withdrew to the railroad dam. After resting here for about thirty minutes we were ordered by General Schurz to support a battery on the extreme right, keeping in that position till the battery left. We then again joined our brigade. Wearied and exhausted, we camped for the night on the same ground the enemy held the night previous.

Lieutenant Colonel Edward McCrady, 1st South Carolina Infantry, described what it was like to be on the receiving end of Schimmelfennig's repeated assaults.

The cheers were soon again heard and the breaking of the bushes as they advanced. Upon our left, too, this time they came in force up the railroad cut, and were soon on us with a fire both from front and left flank. This time they were in force also to cross around upon our right and endeavor thus to cover the cut. Here as they advanced they came upon Thomas' brigade, posted in the thicket on our right. A short resistance was made and Thomas' brigade gave way. As the enemy followed them they came upon the right flanks of Edwards and ourselves. We had no time to form a regular line to meet them, but such as proved itself equal to the task was soon filled up. I directed Companies A, C, and L to wheel to the right, which with their reduced numbers just filled in the space between Colonel Edwards and ourselves. He, too, found some of his men to the right. The enemy pressed in on us in pursuit of Thomas' men, but here they met desperate resistance. They came upon us in 10 and 20 paces, but our men stood gallantly to their posts. The work of death was terrific, but as each man fell his place was filled by another. Here Captain Barksdale, Lieuten-
Randolph’s Battery deployed about 400 yards south, just west of SR 234, to support Kearny’s attack.

After passing through the woods we came to an open field which was skirted on the south and east by woodland. The unfinished railroad . . . ran diagonally across our front on the north and west of this open space. (George E. Lewis, History of Battery E, 1st R.I. Arty)

The battery engaged in prolonged counter-battery fire, suffering light casualties.

On 30 August about 1600 Gregg’s and Branch’s Brigades of Hill’s Division pressed Kearny’s elements eastward as the Federal line conformed to events farther south.

**Picnic Area**

Drive south from Sudley Church on SR 234 1.2 miles to the park picnic area. Pull into either of the picnic sites. Federals using route 234 (Sudley Road) reported coming under hostile artillery fire as they pulled off it to the west.

On 29 August at 0600, Krzyzanowski’s Brigade of Schurz’s Division deployed across this area as part of Sigel’s first attack.

Hampton’s Battery (F, Pennsylvania Light) set up beyond the latrine building in the middle of the field to support Krzyzanowski’s attack.

At 1000 Heintzelman’s Corps staged through here at midmorning. Kearny east of the road and Hooker south and west of the picnic area.

Reno’s Corps bivouacked in this area the night of 29–30 August and remained here until deployed to the rear under pressure from Jackson’s advance about 1715 on 30 August.
Continue south on CR 234 .5 mile to the Stone House at the junction with Route 29. There is a parking lot to your left adjacent to the house. The place was built about 1820 and was used as an ordinary, or tavern, probably into the 1850s. The building became a hospital during both battles in the area. General Pope established his headquarters on Buck Hill directly to the north of the house. After visiting the house, walk up to the lone cedar on the crest of Buck Hill.
On 29 August Pope arrived on the field shortly after noon. He first set up on the Dogan House hill forward of this position, but soon moved to here because it was easier for everyone to find. He then rode forward to inspect the line. About 1300, David Strother on his staff described arriving at the command post.

I found the General and Staff grouped around a large pine-tree which stood solitary on the crest of an open hill, overlooking our whole line of battle. The summit immediately in our front was occupied by a line of batteries, some thirty or forty pieces, blazing and fuming like furnaces. Behind these a fine brigade of Reno's command lay resting on their arms. To their right stood Heintzelman, with the divisions of Hooker and Kearney, whose musketry kept up a continuous roar. Supporting the left of this line of guns was Sigel, also sharply engaged with small-arms. On an open bluff still further to the left, and on the opposite side of the valley traversed by the Warrenton Turnpike, lay Schenck's Division, which had been a good deal cut up, and was not actively engaged at this moment. The dry grass which covered the hill he occupied had taken fire, and was burning rapidly, occasionally obscuring that portion of the field with its smoke. Beyond him, on the extreme left of our line, General Reynolds with the Pennsylvania Reserves, lay masked from the enemy by a wood. The enemy's position can only be known by the smoke of his guns, for all his troops and batteries are concealed by the wood.

Other points of interest are to be seen from this site:

Sigel's bivouac, night of 28–29 August—Robinson Hill, the White House to the southeast.

Hatch's bivouac, night of 28–29 August—base of Chinn's Ridge, on the southwest side of the road intersection.

McDowell's approach, 1500, 29 August and Porter's c. 0730, 30 August—up
route 234 from the south.

McDowell based himself near the Stone House, but made personal recons elsewhere.

Southeast of road junction along SR 234 are the final positions, 1800, 30 August, of Meade, Milroy, and Sykes, north to south.

This area to the north was occupied by Sigel and Reno the evening of the disaster, 30 August.

New York Avenue

From the Stone House drive west on Route 29, 1.1 miles to New York Avenue. En route, .5 miles west of the Stone House, notice the yellow, green-trimmed farmhouse on a rise on the north side of the road. It is on the site of the Dogan House, "Rosefield," marking the area where the Federals established a heavy gun line against the 30 August final Confederate assault. Turn left into the avenue and park in the small lot on the right. Walk the 150 yards west up the hill to the 14th Brooklyn Monument.

On 30 August General McDowell ordered Reynolds to pursue the Confederates south of the Pike in conjunction with Porter’s attack farther north.

About noon Reynolds’ skirmishers crossed south of here and encountered Longstreet in force several hundred yards to the west. Reynolds recognized the situation and informed McDowell.

Becoming convinced that the enemy were not in retreat, but were posted in force on our left flank, I pushed through the skirmishers to the edge of the woods on the left, gaining sight of the open ground beyond, and advancing myself into the open ground, I found a line of skirmishers of the enemy nearly parallel to the line of skirmishers covering my left flank, with cavalry formed behind them, perfectly stationary, evidently masking a column of the enemy formed for attack on my left flank when our line should be sufficiently advanced. The skirmishers opened fire upon me, and I was obliged to run the gauntlet of a heavy fire to gain the rear of my division, losing one of my orderlies, who had followed me through the woods. I immediately communicated this to the commanding general of the corps, who came upon the ground, and directed me to form my division to resist this attack, the dispositions for which were rapidly completed.

Thus about 1330 Reynolds recoiled to a position forward of the Chinn House on the southwest slope of Chinn’s Ridge. About 1545, McDowell relayed Pope’s orders for Reynolds to come north of the Pike to support Porter’s failed attack.

Other troops were to be sent to my support, when the commanding general, observing the attack of Porter to have been repulsed, ordered me with my division across the field to the rear of Porter, to form a line behind which the troops might be rallied. I immediately started my division in the direction indicated, but before the rear of my column had left the position the threatened attack by the enemy’s right began to be felt, and the rear brigade, under Colonel Anderson, with three batteries of artillery, were obliged to form on the ground on which they found themselves to oppose it. Passing across the field to the right with Meade’s and
Seymour's brigades and Ransom's battery, my course was diverted by the difficult nature of the ground, and the retreating masses of the broken columns among troops of Heintzelman's corps, already formed, by which much time was lost and confusion created, which allowed the enemy to sweep up with his right so far as almost to cut us off from the pike, leaving nothing but the rear brigade and the three batteries of artillery of my division and scattered troops of other commands to resist the advance of the enemy upon our left. It was here that the most severe loss of the division was sustained both in men and material. Kerns losing his four guns, but not until wounded and left on the field; Cooper his caissons.

Colonel Hardin, commanding Twelfth Regiment was here severely wounded. The brigade under command of Colonel Anderson sustained itself most gallantly, and though severely pushed on both front and flank maintained its position until overwhelmed by numbers, when it fell back, taking up new positions wherever the advantages of ground permitted.

August thirty at 1345 Reynolds' withdrawal left Hazlett's battery (D, 5th U.S.) unsupported on the ridge opposite the modern Ridge. First Lieutenant Hazlett reported,

in the afternoon I was ordered by Major General Porter to place the battery on a hill to the left of the road, in order to shell the woods in front of our position until our infantry advanced, and then turn my guns on the enemy's batteries. When the order was given General Reynolds' division occupied the woods on the left and front of the designated position, but as I was proceeding to it I saw his division withdrawing. I rode forward and found that all the troops had been withdrawn, not even leaving pickets. As this was a dangerous position to place the battery in without a strong support. I asked Colonel Warren, commanding the Fifth and Tenth New York Volunteers, if he could not give me some support while I sent back word to General Porter of the state of affairs. He did so, and in consequence saved the battery from capture. The firing from the battery in this position was extremely effective as the effect was very visible.

Soon Colonel Warren informed me that the enemy were approaching through the woods on my left, and immediately after they were upon him with an overwhelming force. Colonel Warren's troops were between the enemy and the battery, on the left of the battery, so that I could afford him no assistance by my fire. I immediately limbered up and left the field at a walk. Although opposed to an overwhelming force, Colonel Warren's men stood their ground until the battery was removed, though at a cost of half their number. I would give all praise and credit to Colonel Warren and his command for the noble manner in which they stood their ground, thereby preventing the capture of this battery.

Warren's Brigade (5th and 10th New York) moved west on the Warrenton Pike and overland to a supporting position, arriving a little after 1300. Warren reported,

this battery was then without support and our whole left flank was uncovered. I immediately assumed the responsibility of occupying the place Reynolds' division had vacated, and made all the show of force I could. For this purpose I deployed three-fifths of the Tenth New York Volunteers to hold the edge of the woods toward the enemy on our left, and keeping the Fifth New York Volunteers in reserve near H, out of view of the enemy's battery at C. Notice of this movement of mine I immediately sent by an officer to General Sykes or General Porter. He found the latter, who directed me to hold on, and sent me mounted orderlies to keep him informed. He was, I believe, near the point N, where Weed's battery was placed. From the point G, I probably had the best view of what followed that the battlefield presented.

As soon as General Butterfield's brigade advanced up the hill there was great commotion among the rebel forces, and the whole side of the hill and edges of the woods swarmed with men before unseen. The effect was not unlike flushing a covey of quails. The enemy fell back to the line of the railroad, and took shelter on the railroad cut and behind the embankment and lined the edges of the woods beyond. Butterfield's advance beyond the brow of the hill B was impos-
sible, and taking his position his troops opened fire on the enemy in front, who from his sheltered position returned it vigorously, while at the same time a battery, somewhere in the prolongation of the line E B, opened a most destructive enfilading fire with special case-shot.

It became evident to me that without heavy re-enforcements General Butterfield’s troops must fall back or be slaughtered, the only assistance he received being from Hazlett’s battery, which I was supporting, and Weed’s near N. After making a most desperate and hopeless fight General Butterfield’s troops fell back, and the enemy immediately formed and advanced. Hazlett’s battery now did good execution on them, and forced one column, that advanced beyond the point of the wood at A, to fall back into it. Unwilling to retire from the position I held, which involved the withdrawal of this efficient battery and the exposure of the flanks of our retreating forces, I held on, hoping that fresh troops would be thrown forward to meet the enemy, now advancing. [The letters appear in Warren’s report and refer to a map now lost.]

The 3d U.S. Infantry skirmish line north of the Pike in the modern Stone-wall Memory Gardens broke up as Porter’s attack disintegrated and six companies drifted southward to tie onto the 5th New York behind Hazlett.

New York Avenue

Return to your car and continue southward .25 mile to a traffic loop and park in the spaces provided. This was the area held so heroically by Warren’s Brigade against Long-

street’s masses.

On 30 August at 1600 Longstreet gave the order to attack. Colonel J. B. Robertson, 5th Texas of Hood’s Brigade, described hitting Warren.
At the edge of the timber the enemy's skirmishers were encountered by my skirmishers and driven back to a point in the timber about 100 yards from the open field beyond. Here I encountered the regiment of the enemy that had been deployed as skirmishers who had rallied on their right. I ordered the regiment to fire on and charge them. They broke and were closely pressed in the open field, where we encountered a second line of the enemy in the 5th Regiment New York Zouaves, who, after permitting the fleeing regiment to pass its lines, presented a solid front for a short time. Their stand was but momentary. They gave way before the impetuous charge of my men and fled, leaving the field strewn with their dead and wounded.

General Warren described the tragedy.

Reynolds' division on my left. probably aware of the superior force of the enemy gathering in his front, fell back from toward P. The enemy advanced with rapidity upon my position, with the evident intention of capturing Hazlett's battery. The Tenth New York was compelled to fall back, scarcely arriving at the position held by the Fifth New York before the enemy, and in such a manner as to almost completely prevent the Fifth from firing upon them. While I was endeavoring to clear them from the front the enemy in force opened fire from the woods on the rear and left flank of the Fifth with most fearful effect. I then gave the order to face about and march down the hill, so as to bring the enemy all on our front, but in the roar of musketry I could only be heard a short distance. Captain Boyd, near me, repeated the command, but his men only partially obeyed it. They were unwilling to make a backward movement. He was wounded while trying to execute it. Adjutant Sovereign carried the order along the line to Captain Winslow, commanding the regiment, and to the other captains, but was killed in the act. Captain Winslow's horse was shot. Captain Lewis, acting field officer, was killed. Captain Hager was killed. Captains McConnell and Montgomery were down wounded, and Lieutenants Raymond, Hoffman, Keyser and Wright were wounded. Both color-bearers were shot down, and all but four of the sergeants were killed or wounded.

Before the colors and the remnant of the regiment could be extricated, 298 men of the Fifth and 133 of the Tenth New York were killed or wounded.

In the Tenth New York Lieutenant Hedden was killed, and Captain Dimmick, Lieutenant Dewey, Lieutenant Mossrop, and Lieutenant Culhane wounded. The colors of both regiments were brought off, and the batteries we were protecting were withdrawn.

We assisted from the field 77 wounded of the Fifth and 8 of the Tenth. The remainder fell into the hands of the enemy. Among these were Captains Boyd, McConnell and Montgomery, and Lieutenants Wright and Raymond, of the Fifth, and Captain Dimmick, Lieutenants Mossrop and Dewey, of the Tenth. Braver men than those who fought and fell that day could not be found. It was impossible for us to do more, and, as is well known, all the efforts of our army barely checked this advance.
House, on the south side of Chinn's Ridge. The original structure represented by the present foundations was built in 1804 and was used as a hospital after both battles.

When on 30 August at 1630 McDowell learned from Reynolds of the obvious Confederate buildup on the Federal flank, he reacted by shifting whatever forces he could to Chinn's Ridge and Henry Hill.

Nathaniel McLean's Brigade of Schenck's Division had been on Chinn's Ridge since 1400, apparently overlooked by his division and his corps (Sigel's).

McDowell had directed Reynolds to a position around the Chinn House, then redeployed him from there about 1500. By the time Reynolds' last element, Hardin's Brigade with Kerns' Battery (G, Ist Pennsylvania Light), approached the Pike in front of Chinn's Ridge, Hood's men were on it. Hardin at McDowell's direction turned and fought a brief action on the ridge center and west of Chinn's Ridge. Colonel Hardin was severely wounded, Captain Kerns was killed and his battery captured. The dying Kerns told some 4th Texas soldiers "I promised to drive you back, or die under my guns, and I have kept my word."

James Longstreet described his advance.

My whole line was rushed forward at a charge. The troops sprang to their work and moved forward with all the steadiness and firmness that characterizes war worn veterans. . . . The attacking columns moved steadily forward, driving the enemy from his different positions as rapidly as he took them. My batteries were thrown forward, from point to point following the movements of the general line. These, however, were somewhat detained by an enfilade fire . . . on my left. This threw more than its proper share of fighting upon the infantry.

And Colonel McLean described what happened.

Much to my surprise, Gen. Reynolds put his troops in motion and marched entirely past and across my front to what point I am not informed. . . . I immediately changed the position of my troops and deployed in line of battle the 73d and 25th Ohio regiments frontal the west and to the left of the battery and the 75th and 55th Ohio . . . on the right of the battery, thus making my line of battle frontal the west, with the battery in the center and 2 regiments on each side. I could by this time see the enemy advancing on my front and a little to my right, driving before them a regiment of zouaves. They came on rapidly, when some troops advanced to meet them from behind a hill on my right. These troops were also driven back in confusion, and as soon as they got out of the way, I opened upon the enemy with the 4 pieces of artillery, throwing first shell, and as they approached nearer, canister. I also commenced a heavy fire with infantry, and in a short time the enemy retreated in great confusion. During this time, my attention had been called to a body of troops advancing toward my position in the rear of my left flank, and supposing them to be enemies, I gave the order to turn 2 pieces of artillery upon them, but countermanded it upon the assurance of some one who professed to know the fact that they were our own troops, and I readily believed this, as their clothing was dark, and then rested easy, thinking reinforcements were coming to take position on my left and occupy the place vacated by Gen. Reynolds. . . . Soon after this a heavy force of the enemy, much superior to my own, marched out of the woods across the position formerly occupied by Gen. Reynolds, in front of my left flank, and swept around so as to come in heavy force both on the front and flank of my left wing. This force opened a heavy fire upon the 73d Ohio. . . . I immediately, when this attack was made, gave the order to change front, so as to repel it if possible, but the retreat of the battery at this moment interfered some what with the movement, as it passed through the 75th. The 55th on my right flank . . . wheeled by battalion to the left and came up.
into line... and the other regiments speedily formed on his left and delivered such a heavy and continuous fire that in a short time the enemy ceased to advance, and commenced to fall back. My men followed with cheers, driving the enemy back rapidly.

On the thirtieth of August at 1700 McLean repelled Hood's and Evans' assaults in desperate fighting. But then he had to confront Corse's Brigade of Kemper's Division, which proved to be the group seen to his rear earlier. Corse approached from the southeast up to the Chinn House. Private Alexander Hunter, 17th Virginia, described what happened.

We neared the Chinn House, when suddenly a long line of the enemy rose from behind an old stone wall and poured straight in our breasts a withering volley at point blank distance. It was so unexpected this attack, it struck the long line of men like an electric shock. Many were falling killed or wounded and but for the intrepid coolness of its colonel, the 17th would have retired from the field in disorder... Now individual bravery made up for the disaster... The line of blue was not fifty yards distant and every man took a sure close aim before his finger pressed the trigger. It was a decisive fight of about 10 minutes, and both sides stood up gamely to their work. Our foes were a western regiment from Ohio, who gave and received and asked no odds.

McLean was pressed back nevertheless.

The forces permitted to approach our rear had got into such a position as to rake us with grape, canister, and musketry while we were attacked severely in front. Under all this, however, my brigade retained the hill until I myself gave the order to fall back slowly... only when my attention was called to a heavy force of the enemy approaching to attack us on our then right flank but former front. I saw that it would but destroy my whole command to await that attack, and therefore gave the order under which we left the hill.

Generals McDowell and Sigel both began to react to the worsening situation on the left. McDowell earlier had ordered Hardin's Brigade to turn and fight. Then he directed first Tower's then Stiles' Brigade of Ricketts' Division to cross to Chinn's Ridge. Tower's men arrived first in good order, Alexander Hunter of the 17th Virginia recalled.

there was hardly a breathing spell... and the enemy was upon us with a fresh line...

We were now loading and firing at the swiftly approaching enemy, who were about 200 yards distant, advancing straight towards us and shouting with their steady hurrah, so different from the Rebel yell. It was a trying moment and proved the mettle of the individual man. Some ran or cowered white with fear behind the Chinn House... others yet stood in an irregular form and loaded and fired unmindful of the dust and noise of the hurtling shell and screaming shot...

When the Union troops came up to retake the Chinn House, our men began to give ground. On the Yankees came in splendid style, with the Stars and Stripes waving and their line capitally dressed. It was a perfect advance, and some of us forgot to fire our muskets while watching them. In their front line was a little drummer beating a pas de charge. The only time we ever heard the inspiring sound on the battlefield. The dauntless little fellow was handling his sticks heavy, too; for the roll of the drum was heard above the noise of the guns.

Continue north down Chinn's Ridge. The road after leaving the parking lot traces the first Federal line until it was turned by Kemper's attack. About .3 mile down the ridge is a pulloff. Pause. East of it is a grove of trees with a boulder honoring Col. Fletcher Webster, 12th Massachusetts, son of the great orator. The stone was brought from Daniel Webster's home in Marshfield, Massachusetts, and placed in 1914 by the 12th Massachusetts veterans. Continue down the ridge .3
mile to the parking lot at the end.

Tower's Brigade was pushed back onto Stiles' men, who fought midway down the ridge to protect the guns set up there. The 11th Pennsylvania was the center regiment.

Here a most murderous fire of musketry swept the hill. . . . In our front long gray lines in echelon formation briskly with steel and fringed with sheeted flame, were moving magnificently and steadily through the storm. We were upon the open, naked fields. Instantly, our fire opened and in as many minutes our flag went down 5 times. (Phil K. Fault, National Tribune, 19 February 1881)

General Sigel ordered Milroy's Brigade onto the ridge. The 5th West Virginia started out, but Pope countermanded Sigel, sending Milroy to Henry Hill.

At 1730 the 5th West Virginia tied in with Schenck's Brigades under Colonels Koltes and Krzyzanowski, which were committed as Tower and Stiles started to collapse. Colonel Gustav Muhleck of the 73d Pennsylvania in Krzyzanowski's Brigade described what happened.

We reached the top of the hill under a terrific shower of shell, solid shot, chain, &c. I deployed at once. The enemy was right in front, advancing slowly but steadily in deep, dense masses. A galling fire commenced from both sides. To our left, where we found the DeKalb regiment isolated from their brigade, a battery of some other corps d'armee had been abandoned. The last-named regiment, which General Stahel had wished Colonel Koltes to take under his temporary command (it being too far off from his main body), endeavored to save, the cannons, but in vain. The enemy by this time had brought up and posted near the border of the woods (south-southwest of our brigade) two sections of artillery, which, from a distance of scarcely 200 yards, covered my own regiment as well as the others with a perfect shower of projectiles. It was at that supreme moment that the brave Colonel Koltes rode up to the front of his brigade, and swinging his sword high in the air, while ordering his command to take that rebel battery, that a fragment of a shell killed both horse and rider. A rush was made toward the rebel cannons. Some of my men with Second Lieutenant Kennedy, Company F, reached the pieces, but were unsupported, surrounded, and the lieutenant made a prisoner. He escaped a few moments afterward, a man of Company D, Seventy-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, killing the rebel who had made him a prisoner. The terrain was most unfavorable for deploying, being surrounded right and left by woods, with a deep ravine in the rear, and forming a kind of clearing not more than two acres in length.

The combat here raged fierce and terrible for about half an hour, when our small regiments, exhausted and decimated and unsupported, had in their turn to fall back, though not before Colonel Koltes, who saw the enemy outflank us on the right, had given the order to fall back a little on our right and make a stand again. By this time immense forces of the enemy poured through the woods in splendid order and fighting desperately. The colors of my regiment had become rags. I had lost five of the color-bearers and nearly one-half of the eight companies I brought into action. Two companies had been detailed by General to stop the stragglers of the corps which did retreat from the plain beneath. My acting major, Capt. A. Bruckner, had fallen too. My adjutant was a prisoner. My own horse had been shot under me by four balls. We then slowly left the field, still fighting, and taking along the dead body of Colonel Koltes, whom my men carried that night on muskets to Centreville, which latter place the regiment reached rather in broken fragments, and where they rallied again on the next morning.

The vigorous assault of Corse's Brigade, Kemper's Division, on the Federal guns precipitated the clearing of Chinn's Ridge. Corse reported,

at this time, discovering a battery of the enemy to the left and rear of the Chinn house, I ordered a charge of the whole line. The order was gallantly responded to and brilliantly executed, the enemy being driven from their guns. Great gallantry was dis-
played by all engaged, Lieutenant-Colonel [F. G.] Skinner, First Virginia, dashing forward in advance of the whole line, was the first to reach the battery, and I saw him dealing deadly blows with his saber to the Yankee gunners. The steady veteran Terry, with the gallant Twenty fourth, delivered a destructive volley into the enemy's ranks on our left and pushed forward to the charge. The valiant Patton led the heroic Seventh Virginia.

North of the Pike, for most of the battle, Sigel had set up a gun line along the Dogan House Ridge, deterring Hood's and Law's people's efforts to cross the road. The Federals north of the Pike pulled eastward to conform with the southern part of the line.

Meanwhile, two batteries and two brigades of D. R. Jones' Division moved up the Chinn Branch east of the Chinn House. Most of the Federals withdrew back down Chinn's Ridge to the Stone House, the 5th West Virginia and 83d New York, however, moved directly east to Sudley Road and joined the line forming there. As the Southerners moved northeast, they came under fire from the direction of Sudley Road and changed direction to confront the new resistance.

R. H. Anderson's Division moved to the right of D. R. Jones and engaged along Sudley Road; later, Drayton's Brigade of Jones' Division extended Longstreet's right flank even farther eastward.

Longstreet's Corps then aligned north to south with D. R. Jones on the left and R. H. Anderson/Drayton on the south and southeast.

**Henry Hill**

Return .9 mile down the Chinn Ridge Road, past the Chinn House site and continue past the road you came on for another .6 mile to where the road joins SR 234 about 150 yards south of the entrance to the community college. Turn left (north) and go .5 mile to the entrance to the Visitors' Center. Your route along SR 234 parallels the final Federal defensive line. Drive up and park in the Visitors' Center lot and walk back west about 150 yards to a blue sign on a knoll midway between the museum building and SR 234 north of the museum driveway.

At 1700 on the thirtieth General McDowell and his aides frantically directed troops toward Henry Hill as the defenses on Chinn's Ridge began to crumble. Pope shifted his headquarters to the Robinson House and Sigel's Corps occupied the hills north of the Stone House.

Milroy's Brigade, diverted en route to Chinn's Ridge, was the first unit to take up position along the Sudley Road. He covered the area from the park entrance to the grove of trees to the north.

Meade's and Seymour's Brigades of Reynolds' Division crossed from the north, first taking up a position close to the Henry House. Ransom's Battery set up to Milroy's right rear. The Pennsylvanians came forward as they saw Confederates approaching. Meade covered the
line from the grove north to the Stone House.

General Milroy became increasingly overwrought in the course of the fighting.

I soon received an order to move my brigade off to the left on double quick, the enemy having massed their troops during the day in order to turn our left flank. I formed line of battle along the road, my left resting near the edge of the woods in which the battle was raging. Soon our troops came rushing, panic-stricken, out of the woods, leaving my brigade to face the enemy, who followed the retreating masses to the edge of the woods. The road in which my brigade was formed was worn and washed from 3 to 5 feet deep, affording a splendid cover for my men. My boys opened fire on them at short range, driving the rebels back to a respectable distance. But the enemy, being constantly re-enforced from the masses in their rear, came on again and again, pouring in advance a perfect hurricane of balls, which had but little effect on my men, who were so well protected in their road entrenchment. But the steady fire of my brigade, together with that of a splendid brass battery on higher ground in my rear, which I ordered to fire rapidly with canister over the heads of my men, had a most withering effect upon the rebels, whose columns melted away and fast recoiled from repeated efforts to advance upon my road breastwork from the woods. But the fire of the enemy, which had affected my men so little, told with destructive results on the exposed battery in their rear, and it required a watchful effort to hold them to their effective work. My horse was shot in the head by a musket ball while in the midst of the battery [that was] cheering on the men.

George G. Meade’s troops were fighting just north of Milroy. He reported that after moving north across the Pike, Reynolds’ Division was ordered south of it to Henry Hill.

It was ordered to march back to the plateau of the Henry House. At this point the brigade, in conjunction with the division, was deployed in line of battle and charged down the slope of the Henry House ridge toward the Sudley Springs Road, driving before it such of the enemy as had advanced across this road, and taking a position in this road, which was firmly maintained under heavy infantry fire until it was relieved by Buchanan’s brigade of regulars.

It is due to the Pennsylvania Reserves to say that this charge and maintenance of this position was made at a most critical period.
of the day. The enemy had repulsed the attack made by us on our right flank and had himself assumed the offensive on our left flank. His infantry had emerged from the woods, had already secured one of our batteries, and was advancing to the Henry House ridge, which, if he had succeeded in gaining, might have materially altered the fortune of the day. It was the good fortune of the Reserve to be brought into action at this moment, and by their gallant bearing and firm advance to compel the enemy to retire to the shelter of the woods, where he was held in check until the close of the action.

Sykes' two brigades of regulars arrived next. Colonel Chapman's men were ordered immediately to take up a line south of Milroy along the Sudley Road to confront a building threat to the flank. The regulars occupied a line south from the park entrance down to the community college.

My brigade was ordered by Generals Pope, McDowell and others to advance to our proper front; then toward the left of the position occupied by the Federal forces. My arrival was most opportune.

Not a regiment or brigade of the immense reserve held on that field was in effective proximity to repel the advance of the enemy at the point of their approach. The Seventeenth Infantry, leading, marched to the point indicated, followed by the Eleventh, Sixth, Second, and Tenth, and occupied the edge of the wood, through which a heavy force was advancing against us. The line was formed with the Sixth Infantry advanced a little way in the woods. Here, coolly and calmly, my brave troops awaited a visible evidence of the presence of the enemy, when a volley was poured into their lines, with what effect could not be seen for the cover of underbrush, &c. It was replied to by a terrific fire of musketry. The firing continued three-quarters of an hour with no material decrease on the part of the enemy. One effect of our fire was notable—the enemy was checked.

The brigade coolly delivered its fire until our loss urged a withdrawal. The enemy, finding himself checked here, dispatched a force farther to the left, with a section of artillery, threatening our rear. The Ninth New York Regiment of Volunteers, on the left of our line, soon retired, exclaiming, "It is too hot," thus leaving our flank exposed. This also urged the withdrawal of the left. Another volunteer regiment left our right after being engaged but a few minutes. When the First Brigade moved up within view I
ordered the brigade to fall back. While this was being done the enemy opened on us with grape and canister, firing very rapidly; but few casualties were caused by it, however. The First Brigade advanced toward the right of the position left by us. My brigade fell back some 600 yards to Bull Run Hill, on the side toward Centreville. We rested here until orders were received, about 6:30 p.m., to march to Centreville. We reached Centreville about 11 p.m., and bivouacked for the night.

Colonel Chapman was referring to the 12th and 14th U.S. Infantry from Buchanan's Brigade serving as a mobile reserve. They came forward and allowed Chapman's men to withdraw and reorganize; Buchanan recounted.

from this point I was ordered across the turnpike to a position on the plateau between the Henry and Robinson houses, where the brigade was deployed in line of battle, with its right resting on the Henry house.

About 6 p.m., I was ordered to take the battalion of the Twelfth and Fourteenth to a wood to our left and front, to support Meade's brigade, then severely pressed by the enemy, and almost immediately after placing these troops in position, I observed that the Third and Fourth had also been ordered up. I found the enemy in very strong force in the wood, and during the heat of a very severe engagement discovered that he was flanking me with large masses of troops. I immediately commenced to gain ground to my left, so as to meet his movements, and held him in check for nearly an hour. But at length I found the contest too unequal; my command was being cut to pieces; the ammunition of the men nearly expended, and, the enemy's masses vastly out numbering my force. I was forced to give the order to retire. This was done in most excellent order, the men marching steadily and slowly and I resumed my position on the plateau.

The other part of the Brigade consisting of the 3d and 4th U.S. Infantry moved forward near the Henry House road to support Meade and were joined later by the 12th and 14th U.S. coming from the south. Captain Hiram Dryer, commanding the 4th U.S. Infantry, described the action.

We had not been long in position on the plateau above mentioned, then engaged on the left and about 500 yards in our front. On arriving in rear of General Meade's line, which was lying down and firing from a ditch, I halted the regiment and opened fire by battalion, firing six rounds. The enemy having disappeared in front of this position and moved to his right, where he was massing a large body of troops in a dense forest, I received an order from Colonel Buchanan to move the Fourth to the left. I immediately placed the regiment about its length to its left, on a road immediately in front of the woods, where the enemy were expected to make their appearance in a few moments. We had not long to wait for them, when we discovered that they were two brigades strong, by battalion in mass, not 20 yards distant. I immediately gave the command to fire by the battalion, and we gave them three rounds before they could recover themselves enough to reply. Their loss must have been terrible; I then received an order from Colonel Buchanan to retire. I immediately gave the command to face about, and marched in line of battle about 30 yards to the rear, halted and faced about, and gave them another volley.

The enemy's fire having become very severe I here faced about and marched about 60 yards more, halted, and faced about. The left flank of the regiment being covered by one of our own regiments the order was given to fire by wing, firing two rounds, when we were ordered to fall back to our original position on the plateau above mentioned, where we remained but a few moments, then receiving an order to fall in and march to Centreville.

The folding southern flank of the U.S. line was bolstered next by the 86th New York (Steuben Rangers) of Sanders Piatt's small brigade attached to V Corps. It went into line and held off Confederate attackers massed "six rods" away. (T. F. Shoemaker, Elmira Weekly Journal)
This occurred about where the museum is.

The 86th New York, in turn, was supported by Ferrero’s Brigade of Reno’s Division and Schimmelfennig’s of Schurz’s Division posted on Henry Hill to the north. Ferrero’s Brigade took up a position with a six-gun battery on the knoll west of the museum, lining up right to left, 51st Pennsylvania, 21st Massachusetts, 51st New York. Captain Charles F. Walcott, 21st Massachusetts, described the final action.

... just before sunset General Reno suddenly ordered the brigade to move to the left at the double-quick. I can conscientiously say that the regiment and brigade responded to the order with hearty enthusiasm and a stern determination to show the Army of Virginia how they had learned to fight in North Carolina. As we hurried across the field by the flank, shot, shell, and pieces of railroad iron rained around us from badly served rebel artillery, but we were soon covered by the hill on which we were to take our revenge; the 21st losing in the passage of about half a mile only four men... As we came to the hill, General McDowell, known to us all by his peculiar white hat, came up to General Reno and shook hands; the last Union troops withdrew from our front, and we moved into position on the crest of the hill, drowning the rebel yells with cheers for ten thousand men. The white-haired General Milroy, who stood alone on the crest as we came up, was frantic with joy as he welcomed us; and, as we dressed our lines, rode along our front, shouting like a crazy man.

... In our front was an open space of a few hundred yards of gently sloping ground ending in a grove. Behind us a struggling mass of artillery and wagons were trying to cross the bridge over Young’s Branch, blocking the road as far as we could see, and not a soldier that we saw or knew of besides ourselves stood in line of battle, or in reserve. Close in our rear, under the shelter of the hill, a temporary hospital had been established, and all around us the ground was thickly covered with wounded men. The mere fact that the thin unsupported line of fifteen hundred men waited there so steady and fearless for the assault of the rebel masses which were forming in their front, was an act of heroism seldom paralleled in war. General Reno... walked along the line, ordering the men to lie down and keep perfect silence, and then took position in the
centre. We had not long to wait; the sun had set, and it was beginning to grow dark, when we heard a confused hum, and the rush of many feet in our front; stand up was the order, and every man was on his feet; the open space in our front was now alive with the rebel masses, and General Reno gave the welcome order, "Give them about ten rounds, boys. Fire!" A simultaneous volley rolled from infantry and artillery, and then it was every man for himself, and they made quick work: our cartridges were of such small calibre that no ramming was required, and the men had hardly got well warmed up before the firing was stopped. Nothing was standing on the field in front of us, and a chorus of groans and curses filled the air.

The Confederates made one more small attack along the gully south of the museum, then darkness and disorganization ended the fighting. Reno's men pulled out about 2100. Cadmus Wilcox recalled,

the firing continued till after dark for more than half an hour and then gradually ceased. The artillery continued to fire after the musketry had ceased, but by 8:30 it had all ceased. My brigade bivouacked at this point of the field.

(This engagement took place about opposite the museum driveway.)

Stone Bridge

Return to SR 234, turn right (north) and drive .5 mile to the Stone House and Route 29. There, turn right (east) and drive 1.2 miles to the Stone Bridge. Notice the ridges perpendicular to the road used as positions by the Federal rear guard. Turn left into the Stone Bridge parking lot and walk to the east side of the bridge.

Federal units had been leaving the field eastward for several hours, when at 2000 Pope ordered a general withdrawal. Sigel's Corps was the last out with Schenck's Division bringing up the rear. He later told Sigel,

about 8 o'clock you ordered me to withdraw Colonel Schimmelfennig's brigade and to march with my whole command across Young's Branch, two pieces of Captain Dilger's battery and one of my regiments forming the rear guard of the corps. For this office the Sixty-first Ohio was selected—a regiment which throughout the whole campaign had exhibited the most commendable spirit. According to your order I passed the bridge across Young’s Branch about 9 o'clock, and took position with your whole corps on the hilly ground between Young’s Branch and Bull Run. Colonel Schimmelfennig furnished from his command the necessary guards and outposts along Young's Branch and in the direction of the Bull Run Ford. There we remained over two hours, and after all other troops had passed Bull Run, and the road was clear of wagons for several miles, you ordered your corps to resume its march toward Centreville. We crossed the Stone Bridge between 11 and 12 o'clock. You ordered me to take position on the left of the road, front toward the creek, while General Stahel did the same on the right, throwing out our outposts on the other side of the creek and placing Captain Dilger's two pieces so as to command the bridge. Some time afterward one of General McDowell's officers informed you that we were threatened by the enemy on our left.

About 1 o'clock a.m. you ordered your corps to resume its march. My First Brigade, under Colonel Schimmelfennig, was to form the rear guard and was instructed to destroy the bridge. Colonel Kane, of the Pennsylnavia Bucktail Rifles, reported himself to you with a battalion of his men and several pieces
Bridge Ruins, Bull Run.

Dedication of Monument, Bull Run Battlefield, 1865.
of artillery which he had picked up on the road. The bridge was destroyed some time after 1 o’clock and we marched toward Centreville, taking with us Colonel Kane’s promiscuous pieces of artillery behind the first regiment of Colonel Schimmelfennig’s brigade. I rejoined you about 3 o’clock a.m. 2 miles from Centreville.

This concludes the guided tour. You can return to Washington by continuing east on Route 29 from the Stone Bridge to Centreville, where signs will direct you along Route 28 to I-66. Route 29 west will get you to I-66 by way of SR 234 south or farther west at Gainesville.

We hope that as you leave these now quiet fields a greater understanding of the sacrifices made by the men who fought here has enhanced your appreciation of our national ideals. These soldiers’ dedication, courage, and conviction serve as an inspiration to this day. The land itself stands as their monument.
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