UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
Kent Roberts Greenfield, General Editor

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... to Those Who Served
Foreword

Within a generation the attitude and policy of the United States toward alliances have undergone a revolutionary reversal. The nation has passed from its traditional suspicion and fear of "entangling alliances" to a policy that heavily stakes its security and interests on the co-operation of other powers. In World War I the U.S. Government cautiously defined its relationship with the powers allied against Germany as that of an Associated Power. In World War II, though last to join the Grand Alliance, it virtually integrated its resources with those of the British Commonwealth and co-ordinated its strategy and war aims with the British and the USSR in the most powerful wartime partnership ever forged. Since 1945 it has emerged as the leader in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and has diligently sought allies and built up alliances all over the troubled world. The climax of its most intensive experience with coalition strategy came in the phase of World War II described in this volume, which should therefore have a special interest for all who are concerned with the implications of the revolution in U.S. foreign policy that has taken place in the twentieth century.

R. W. STEPHENS
Maj. Gen., U. S. A.
Chief of Military History

30 April 1958
Washington, D. C.
The Author

Dr. Maurice Matloff, graduate of Columbia College, holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in History from Harvard University. A member of Phi Beta Kappa and the American Historical Association's Committee on the Historian and the Federal Government, he has taught History at Brooklyn College and the University of Maryland and has presented papers and lectured on military strategy and international affairs before the Army War College, the Navy War College, and the American Historical Association. While in the Army during World War II, he studied the Russian area and language at Yale and served as an instructor in intelligence and as a historian in the AAF. In 1946 he joined the Operations Division historical project in the War Department General Staff as a civilian member, becoming in 1949 the Chief of the Strategic Plans Section, Office of the Chief of Military History. Dr. Matloff is coauthor of Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941–1942, and his articles and reviews on modern strategy and statecraft have frequently appeared in various service and professional journals.
Preface

This volume, like its predecessor, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942, is a contribution to the study of wartime national planning and military strategy. The 1941–42 volume, of which the present author was coauthor, told the story of plans and decisions as they affected the missions and dispositions of the U.S. Army in the defensive phase of coalition warfare, when the Grand Alliance was still in its formative stage.

The present volume deals with strategic planning in the midwar era from January 1943 through the summer of 1944. This is the story of the hopes, fears, struggles, frustrations, and triumphs of the Army strategic planners coming to grips with the problems of the offensive phase of coalition warfare. Basic to this story is the account of planning by General George C. Marshall and his advisers in the great debate on European strategy which followed the Allied landings in North Africa and continued to the penetration of the German frontier in September 1944. During this period the great international conferences from Casablanca in January 1943 to the second Quebec in September 1944 were held and the Allies formulated the grand strategy of military victory. The volume follows the plans, issues, and decisions to the end of the summer of 1944, when the problems of winning the war began to come up against the challenges of victory and peace, and a new era was beginning for the Army Chief of Staff and his advisers.

The presentation utilizes both the narrative and the analytical approach. It sets forth the principal steps in the development of the American strategic case, and seeks the raison d'être behind that case. It attempts to view, through the eyes of the Washington high command, the war as a whole and in its main component parts. The method is to trace the plans, concepts, and ideas of the planners up through the different levels—Army, joint staff (Army and Navy), Joint Chiefs of Staff, the meetings of the American staff with the President, and of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the plenary sessions with President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill. The chronological and structural framework for the study is provided by the big conferences, Casablanca (January 1943), TRIDENT (Washington, May 1943), Quebec (August 1943), Cairo-Tehran (November–December 1943), and the second Quebec (September 1944). The periods between the conferences are generally divided into chapters treating the planning for the war against Germany and that against Japan separately and topically. At the conferences themselves, where the Allied
planning threads converge and new syntheses emerge from the debates, compromises, decisions, and revisions, the focus is placed on the advocates of the American military case—especially on General Marshall.

The purpose of this volume is to add to the literature available for the study of U.S. strategic planning. Related objects are to shed light on the American contributions to and experience in a great wartime coalition and on the art of strategy, the art of the calculated risk, as it developed in World War II. No attempt has been made to cover in full the position of other partners in the Grand Alliance. That of the British and other English-speaking allies is being disclosed in accounts that they are publishing. Whether the Russians and Chinese will ever publish full, definitive accounts of their strategy is problematical. Considerable information about American strategy is contained in books that have been written about the United States in World War II, but much of it lies scattered in accounts of important decisions, theaters, and campaigns. And unfortunately, despite a flood of personal recollections of World War II, of the two principal actors on the American side, President Roosevelt did not leave any memoirs and General Marshall has yet to write his. It is hoped that this account, in filling some of the gaps in the available literature, will help those readers especially in need of organized information in this field—staff officers, civil officers, diplomatic historians, and political scientists.

In writing this volume the author acknowledges most gratefully assistance from many of the persons mentioned in the Preface to the preceding volume, notably his former colleagues, Dr. Ray S. Cline, author of *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, who introduced him to this field, and, along with Lt. Col. Darrie H. Richards, bequeathed a legacy of ideas and information; Mr. Edwin M. Snell, his collaborator on the 1941–42 volume, who provided stimulating discussions during the processes of planning and composition and offered valuable suggestions upon reading the text in manuscript; and Miss Alice M. Miller and Mrs. Helen McShane Bailey who gave unstinted help with wartime planning documents.

The author owes a great debt to Mr. Walter G. Hermes, whose assistance has been invaluable. Mr. Hermes investigated many topics essential to the completion of the volume, particularly in the field of strategy and planning in the conflict with Japan. He assembled and analyzed much statistical information, reviewed for the author countless passages and references, and his broad knowledge and precise understanding of the records kept by the Army are reflected throughout the volume.

A great measure of thanks is due to Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, who gave unstintingly of his time, counsel, and scholarly craftsmanship. Others in the Office of the Chief of Military History who were especially helpful were Drs. Stetson Conn and Louis Morton, Colonels George G. O'Connor and Ridgway P. Smith, Jr., Drs. Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, and Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland. He is especially indebted to Miss Mary Ann Bacon, who gave the volume a sympathetic, perceptive, and watchful editing throughout and shepherded it skillfully
through the various stages to publication. For their generous help he wishes to thank the many records experts who aided him—notably Miss Wava Phillips, Mrs. Hazel Ward, Mr. Israel Wice and his assistants, and Mr. Herman Kahn and his staff at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Copy editing was done by Mrs. Marion P. Grimes, selection of pictures by Miss Margaret E. Tackley, and indexing by Virginia C. Leighton. Credit for maintaining a correct text of the manuscript through repeated revisions is due particularly to two highly capable secretaries—Mrs. Ella May Ablahat and Mrs. Edna W. Salsbury.

The author is also obliged to those others who read all or parts of the text in manuscript—to Professors William L. Langer and Charles H. Taylor of Harvard University; to Professor Samuel F. Bemis of Yale University; to Professor Wesley F. Craven of Princeton University, coeditor of the series, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*; to Dr. Harvey A. De Weerd of the Rand Corporation; to Maj. Gen. Frank N. Roberts, who encouraged the author in this undertaking from the beginning; to General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.); to Maj. Gen. Richard C. Lindsay, USAF; to Cols. William W. Bessell, Jr., George A. Lincoln, Edward M. Harris, William H. Baumer; and to other officers that figured, some of them prominently, in the events set forth.

A special category of thanks is reserved to my wife, Gertrude Glickler Matloff, for her constant encouragement and understanding.

In no way does the recognition of individuals for the assistance they have so generously given imply that they have endorsed or approved the interpretations presented herein. For these, as well as the rest of the book, I must bear the responsibility.

MAURICE MATLOFF

30 April 1958
Washington, D.C.
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STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE

1943 – 1944
INTRODUCTION

The Basis of Strategy

In the harried, gray days of December 1942, just a year after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, General George C. Marshall and his planning assistants in Washington were in a dilemma. The war was progressing well, but the Allies had not yet worked out a strategy for victory. They had checked the victorious sweeps of the Axis Powers in Europe and in the far Pacific and had themselves taken the offensive. North Africa, Guadacanal, Stalingrad—all pointed to a turning of the tide. The war between the two coalitions had reached a state of strategic equilibrium and, in a sense, both sides would be starting afresh and on more nearly equal terms. In the area of strategic planning, the two close allies, Great Britain and the United States, would also have to begin anew. After a full year of war, the weight of U.S. forces was beginning to be felt in the theaters. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill had turned down the one big military operational idea advanced in 1942—the War Department proposal to forego opportunities for immediate operations for the sake of building up forces for an early, direct, massive assault on Germany.

All signs pointed to the beginning of a new phase of global and coalition warfare for the strategic planners. Clearly it was time for taking stock.

The Grand Alliance

The year following Pearl Harbor, as the United States geared itself to the war it had not wanted, had been hectic, full of surprises and changes. Gradually the planners, along with the rest of the nation, recovered from the initial shock of the Japanese attack. Pearl Harbor exposed weaknesses in America’s peacetime preparations for war, but it did not impair the major part of the planners’ advance work. The initial Japanese successes left unaffected the fundamental principle already accepted in U.S. military policy that the European theater was to be the decisive one in the global effort. They provided further support for the

---

1 General Marshall had been ordered to Washington to serve as Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division in July 1938, and in October 1938 became Deputy Chief of Staff. He was appointed Chief of Staff in September 1939.

basic political decision underlying U.S. strategic planning throughout World War II—that the war was to be waged as a coalition effort. Despite the critical situation in the Pacific, it remained the American view that the basis of strategy must be collaboration among the powers at war with Germany, with the primary object of defeating Germany.

The Grand Alliance, forged in war and essentially for war purposes, emerged in 1941-42. The alliance was a war marriage, a "marriage of expediency."\(^3\) A common bond of danger drew the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union together in 1941, but each member of the Grand Alliance, as a result of differing traditions, policies, interests, geography, and resources, looked at the European war through a separate pair of spectacles.

**Great Britain**

Great Britain, the island empire dependent upon sea lanes for its very existence and situated precariously on the edge of Adolf Hitler's *Festung Europa*, was the first of the three partners to enter the war against Germany. For centuries it had put its faith in the balance of power. Great Britain could be expected to seek to revive and rally the smaller nations and to continue to throw its weight against any strong power that threatened to upset the balance on the Continent. It could also be expected to intervene actively in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, through which ran its life line to its empire in the Orient. Its economy, while highly industrialized, was, in comparison with that of the United States, small scale. In any global war Great Britain's resources would be stretched thin. Britain was anxious to avoid a repetition of its heavy manpower losses in the land battles of World War I. By necessity and choice, its leaders put their faith in the Navy, the Air Force, and mechanized and armored forces rather than in huge armies of infantry. Experienced in war, diplomacy, and empire, Great Britain had a long history of alliances with European powers, and its military leaders were accustomed to working closely with its politicians and diplomats. Even though Britain was fighting with its back to the wall when the United States entered the war, British military strategy and political strategy paralleled each other wherever possible.

Reduced to their fundamentals, British political aims toward occupied Europe were twofold and, as it turned out, somewhat contradictory. For the immediate future the British sought to encourage resistance and rebellion; but, in the long run, once the cancer of Hitlerism had been excised from the European body politic, the British hoped for a general return, with appropriate reforms, to the *status quo ante bellum*.

**The Soviet Union**

The USSR, second of the three partners to become involved in the struggle against Germany, was a land power with completely internal lines of communication. Though it possessed an enormous population and great resources, its industrial development was still incomplete. Lacking air and naval traditions, it put its faith in geography, in the endurance and loyalty of its people, and in

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the massive Red Army in the desperate battle of survival.

The Soviet Union represented a new, restless, and dynamic force, devoted to a political and economic ideology different from that of its Western partners. In Western eyes, the Soviet Government, born in revolution and come to power during a civil and foreign war, had developed into a baffling hybrid—a combination of Russian National Socialism, Marxist concepts, and policies and practices lingering from czarist days. Dedicated to the proposition that war was inevitable in capitalist society until the world revolution ushered in a new millennial order, Bolshevism lived in an undeclared state of war with the capitalist world.

Today, as we get more perspective on the role of the Soviet Union in World War II, it becomes evident that the period of Soviet defensive struggle against Germany was merely a pause in twin drives for security and expansion. Both drives appear to have been at work in its war with Finland, and even in the uneasy period of its nonaggression pact with Hitler. One of the main reasons for the break with the Fuehrer was the aggressive action of the Soviet Union in pushing farther west in Europe—in asserting its claims on the Balkans—a move that Hitler, confronted with a stubborn Britain on the west, considered too dangerous to countenance. Until the Russians were attacked by Hitler in June 1941, therefore, their military effort can be characterized as warfare in pursuit of aggrandizement. The German invasion simply reinforced Russia's historic desire to strengthen its position in eastern Europe, an objective that it never lost sight of in World War II. However, for almost two years after the German attack, the Soviet Union was engaged in a fight for its very existence and, while political and territorial ambitions were by no means absent, military considerations were more immediately paramount. Still fearful of capitalist encirclement, suspicious of friend and foe alike, it would occupy an uneasy position in the partnership that Maj. Gen. John R. Deane so fittingly entitled "The Strange Alliance."

The United States

And then there was the United States—young, impatient, rich in resources, highly industrialized, the country with the technical "know-how." It was to have its greatest experience in coalition warfare. This was the country whose whole habit in war had been first to declare, then to prepare. Traditionally opposed to becoming involved in European quarrels, the United States nevertheless had strong bonds of culture, language, and tradition with western Europe, especially with England. The American approach to European war, based on its experience in World War I, seemed to be to hold off as long as possible, enter only long enough to give the bully or bullies who started it a sound thrashing, get the boys home, and then try to remain as uninvolved as before. To most Americans war was an aberration, an unwelcome disturber of normalcy.

The American disillusionment with the outcome of World War I in Europe had had its effects. Between World War I and World War II the national policy was deeply influenced by popular beliefs that the United States should neither enter military alliances nor maintain
forces capable of offensive action. The twenty lean years of economy between the wars sapped the strength of the Military Establishment. Yet the legalistic-moral strain that, historically, has so influenced the American approach to foreign affairs remained strong. If only the nations of the world would subscribe to principles of justice and morality, agree to disarm, and outlaw war, all would be well with the world. This idealistic strain, reflected in Wilsonian policies toward Europe during and after World War I, became imbedded in the pragmatism of President Roosevelt and was to emerge in his foreign policies in World War II.

Between 1939 and 1941 the country, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, gradually awakened to the dangers from without. Mobilization of manpower and resources was begun. In 1940 the Selective Service Act was passed. Aid to Britain became official national policy in the same year. Lend-lease was extended to Britain and to other friendly powers in 1941. The strategic planners in Washington, laying aside their earlier academic exercises, widened their horizons and began to think in terms of global and coalition warfare—to take into account the rising danger of war with Japan and the reassertion of German imperialist aims.4

In the uneasy transition from peace to war—perhaps the most difficult of all periods for strategic planners—the planning staffs were faced with myriad unknowns. There was uncertainty about the future temper and will of the American people toward war. There was a dearth of accurate and comprehensive intelligence not only concerning potential enemies but even with reference to friendly powers—Great Britain, France, and the USSR. Little, for example, was known about the Soviet Union's capabilities and intentions in 1941—a condition that was to obtain throughout the war. In fact, on the eve of Pearl Harbor, the U.S. military staff seriously doubted the ability of the Russians to continue as an active participant in the war against Germany.

The staffs—in accord with their traditions—kept aloof in the prewar period from controversies over national policies, even though they did not always agree with the President's words and actions. The President, on his part, in 1939, 1940, and 1941 broadened his knowledge of military affairs to include Army and Air plans, as well as Navy strategy with which he had been more familiar in the past. But he did not commit himself irrevocably to the planners' war plans, nor did he immediately seek to influence the strategic ideas of the staffs. The dissociation of war plans from the President's policy limited their immediate practical value, but in the long run there were important advantages in the loose relationship. It permitted the military planners a good deal of freedom to discuss with British officers the possible ways of using U.S. forces in coalition strategy without seriously committing the administration. For the first time in its history, the United States entered a war considerably advanced in its military planning.

By successive stages the nation made the transition from the status of major supplier or "arsenal of democracy" to outright military collaboration with Great Britain. As a result, when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, the entry of the United States into the war, in Europe as well as in the Pacific, was a natural step for which both Great Britain and the United States were more or less ready. But because of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan appeared to many Americans to be the more natural enemy. The United States had extensive interests in the Far East and a tradition of helping China. Even neutralist sentiment was ready to tolerate a war against Japan. Throughout World War II the United States military staff and the President could never neglect the war in the East. This compulsion must be kept in mind, for it was to play an important part in the relations among the Big Three and in the strategy for the defeat of Germany. Given its domestic politics, and the added pressure of the war with Japan, it did not seem that the United States could fight a long war in Europe. As General Marshall once succinctly put it, "a democracy cannot fight a Seven Years' War."5

The Big Three

These, then, were the three powers that gradually, under the necessity of war, came together. The inner web of their alliance was the close relationship between the United States and Great Britain. The Soviet Union's part in developing and directing the combined strategy of the war was to be relatively small for at least two reasons. Despite its important role in defeating Germany, its strategic problem was simple when compared with the world-wide demands facing the United States and Great Britain. Unlike the Western partners, the USSR would be at war on only one front at a time and that front far distant from its allies. The Russians had but to push westward and destroy the enemy. Their relationship with the United States and Great Britain consisted of demanding and receiving material aid and of pressure against the common enemy. Collaboration, even in these limited fields, was to prove difficult. Normally, the United States and Great Britain transmitted their strategic decisions in general terms to the Soviet Union. The Russians were to take formal part in decisions only at the international conferences at Moscow, Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. From time to time proposals were put forward for a "United Chiefs of Staff" to include the USSR—but nothing came of them. The Russians remained outside the combined staff system, developed for the co-ordination of the Western effort in the global war. From the start these conditions, added to the legacy of suspicion, made genuine understanding between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies difficult. A curious arms-length war partnership was the result.

As has already been suggested, the basis for close military association between the two Western Powers was laid well before Pearl Harbor. To concert their plans and war-making machinery became a necessity for the United States and Great Britain immediately after the Japanese attack. Just a few days before

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Christmas 1941, Prime Minister Churchill and his principal military advisers arrived in Washington for the first of their great wartime conferences with the President and his staff. Out of this conference—known by its code name ARCADIA—came the establishment in Washington, in January 1942, of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) system—the permanent machinery for day-to-day management of the war and for hammering out Allied strategy.\(^6\)

It was partly to supply "opposite numbers" to British colleagues for membership in the combined organization that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the U.S. joint planning system came into being in 1942. As finally constituted, the JCS was composed of the President's chief of staff and the senior officers of the Army, Navy, and Army Air Forces (AAF). Admiral William D. Leahy was appointed as the chief of staff for the President; the other members were General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, and General Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces.\(^7\) These men served both as U.S. members of the Combined Chiefs and as the President's chief military advisers.

Since the three principal British military officers—members of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee—normally had to direct the operations of their services from London, they sent high-ranking representatives to Washington to fonction for them in the CCS. Field Marshal Sir John Dill, head of the British Joint Staff Mission, sat as the fourth and senior British member of the CCS organization in Washington.\(^8\)

The CCS soon became a truly remarkable organization in which decisions were reached by common agreement; no votes were taken. Here, subject to the approval of the President and Prime Minister, policies and plans were concerted; strategies outlined; the timing of operations discussed; broad programs of war requirements, allocations of munitions, and requirements for transportation approved; and objectives measured against resources.

Over and above the CCS system were the Prime Minister and the President, responsible for all military decisions. These extremely active leaders each wore two hats—one military, the other political. As political leaders they sometimes had more in common with each other than with their respective staffs. Advising Mr. Churchill at the summit of the British system of intragovernmental planning was a War Cabinet (including the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Production, and the civilian cabinet officers in charge of the War Office, the Admiralty, and the Air Ministry). The

\(^{6}\) The ARCADIA Conference is discussed at length in Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, Ch. V. At the conference a fixed distinction between the terms "Joint" and "Combined" was adopted. Henceforth "Joint" applied to interservice affairs in the United Kingdom or the United States, and "Combined" to British-American collaboration.

\(^{7}\) Admiral Leahy had served as governor of Puerto Rico and ambassador to France after his retirement as Chief of Naval Operations in 1939. In 1942 the President appointed him Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. Admiral King had become Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, in December 1941 and in 1942 was also designated Chief of Naval Operations. General Arnold became Chief of the

Air Corps in 1938, Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) in 1940, and Commanding General, Army Air Forces, in 1942.

\(^{8}\) Field Marshal Dill had served as Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1939-41. In 1941 he became head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington.
Chiefs of Staff Committee sat with it. Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay, chief of staff to Mr. Churchill in his capacity of Minister of Defence, regularly attended the Chiefs of Staff meetings and also insured close liaison between British political and military leadership. While Mr. Roosevelt could and did draw on the assistance of the war-born joint staff system, he never established anything remotely resembling the British War Cabinet, and the U.S. politico-military governmental machinery in World War II never became as closely knit as that of the British. The differences between the two systems were sometimes strikingly illustrated at the international war conferences.

The full-dress wartime Anglo-American conferences usually came about when planning had matured to a point where top-level decisions on major issues of Allied strategy and policy were necessary. The conferences and the CCS system provided the framework for the main European and Asiatic decisions. At the conferences the JCS, who were early given the responsibility for the Pacific war, submitted their decisions on plans and operations against Japan and normally received a stamp of approval from the Combined Chiefs as a routine matter.

Other Partners

The burden of making major policy decisions was borne by the Western partners, but there were other nations besides the Soviet Union that had to be taken into consideration. Among those also involved to varying degrees in resisting the Axis Powers were China, France, Poland, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Like the Soviet Union, they were on the periphery of the British-American coalition. Like the Soviet Union, they too participated in a limited partnership. Most important among them, in political if not in military terms, were China and France.

China, ancient in civilization and enigmatic to most occidentals, had been in a state of undeclared war with Japan since 1931. In contrast to the other major powers, China was not a modern nation state. Nominally a republic, China resembled a weak feudal kingdom of the Middle Ages. Its leader, Chiang Kai-shek, exercised only paper control over a great part of unoccupied China. The semiautonomous warlords co-operated or remained neutral at will. To confuse the political scene further, the Chinese Communists hovered on the outskirts awaiting an opportunity to advance their position. The complex internal situation permitted free play to domestic power politics and worked against any strong central direction of the Chinese war effort.

Even under ideal conditions, China's contribution could have only been limited. Its industry was undeveloped, its agriculture primitive, its apparent wealth in manpower illusory. Oddly reminiscent of Russia in 1914, China required more manpower than its allies to provide the basic essentials. Lacking any naval power and airpower to speak of, China had organized a huge and unwieldy army of very uneven quality. Poorly equipped, poorly fed, and poorly led, the Chinese ground forces seldom offered more than token resistance to the enemy. With the Japanese dominating its most productive and most heavily populated areas on the seaboard and in Manchuria, China
was all but cut off from its allies. From early 1942 only the difficult and tenuous air route over the mountains from India permitted a thin trickle of supplies to reach China.

Faced with an uncertain struggle for survival, China sought all possible aid from its most sympathetic ally, the United States. In addition, it looked to the United States to act as its champion vis-à-vis the Russians and British, whose past interference in Chinese internal affairs laid their motives open to suspicion. Considerable time would pass before the real impotence of the Chinese war effort would become clear to the United States. Like the Russians, the Chinese were engaged against only one of the enemies in the global conflict. At only one of the international conferences (Cairo) did Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek confer with the Western Powers. The Chinese problem presented a tangled skein in Anglo-American war councils.

France, still smarting from its humiliating defeat by the Germans in 1940, presented a delicate problem. The French, proud of their past and sensitive of their national honor, were a divided people. The Germans occupied half the country and the Vichy collaborators controlled the rest. With its industry and manpower closely watched by the enemy, France’s capacity to resist was confined to underground groups at home and to the Free French under General Charles de Gaulle in North Africa. In spite of its inability to become a major partner or to contribute decisively to the defeat of the Axis Powers, France was accorded an honorary place of importance for political reasons. In the case of the Americans, sympathy for France, dating back to the American Revolution, helped to rationalize the position. Both the British and the Americans wished to see a friendly France re-established on the Continent, though their methods and means of effecting the restoration might differ. Down to the invasion of North Africa, the Americans chose to maintain relations with the Vichy Government; the British to deal with General de Gaulle. The Russians appeared to be indifferent so long as the other partners supported France from their own resources and did not attempt to foist France on the USSR as a first class power. The task of reconciling the fiction of France as a great power with the fact of its internal division and weakness required all the diplomacy and tact that the Anglo-Americans could muster.

Poland and the Netherlands, operating under governments-in-exile, were both working under British direction and followed the British lead for the most part. Forced to rely on British support and British supplies and equipment, they could only hope for the day when Axis defeat would permit them to return to the status quo ante bellum. Only in circumstances where decisions affecting this status were pending did they seek to gain acceptance of their own views.

The other main allies, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—members of the British Commonwealth of Nations—in general permitted the British to represent them in the higher councils of war. The intimate and friendly relations between the United States and Canada, on the one hand, and the close wartime cooperation of the United States with Australia and New Zealand in the fight against Japan, on the other, served to counterbalance British influence among
the three and tended to establish an atmosphere of reliance and good faith between these allies and the two chief Western partners.

The “Europe First” Decision

Even though much of the discussion at the ARCADIA Conference revolved around the problems created by the critical situation in the Pacific, the British and American representatives agreed that the first and major objective of Anglo-American grand strategy must be the defeat of Germany. The principle of “Europe First” had been accepted by both sides at the American-British Conversations (ABC) held in Washington early in 1941. Out of those exploratory staff talks had emerged an important document—ABC-1—which laid down the principles of Anglo-American co-operation should the United States have to resort to war. On the basis of the belief that Germany was the predominant member of the hostile coalition, the main Anglo-American effort was to be made in the Atlantic and European area. Should Japan enter the war, military strategy in the Far East would be defensive. ABC-1 was a conditional understanding; the United States was still not at war. Nevertheless, when war did come the over-all strategy adopted, despite the initial Japanese successes, was essentially that of ABC-1.

For the Americans, political expediency reinforced geography and logistics. Against Germany, British and Soviet power was close at hand. Great Britain offered a base for massing Western land and airpower on Germany’s threshold; in the Mediterranean operations could be undertaken against the Germans just as soon as the United States could land troops on its shores. Before the United States could come to grips with Japan decisively, its naval striking power lost at Pearl Harbor would have to be restored, ships built, and extensive preliminary operations undertaken to secure advance bases and lines of communications across the far Pacific. Furthermore, the Soviet Union and Britain, hard pressed in the European struggle, simply could not wait for a decision in the war against Japan. It followed, therefore, that the defeat of Germany should be the first major objective and that in the meantime the Japanese should be contained until the Allies could assemble enough strength to take the offensive in the Pacific. Thus emerged perhaps the single most important controlling decision in all British-American war policies in World War II.

Although the basic decision of “Europe First” held throughout the war, the question of how it was to be interpreted and applied arose early in the conflict and remained almost to the end. One of the most persistent questions throughout concerned the division of resources between the war in Europe and the war against Japan. This problem reflected a certain divergence of political as well as military factors in Anglo-American strategy. For Britain, with predominant interests in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and on the Continent, the war against Japan tended to be a side show. For the United States, Japan was in many ways the politically preferable objective and the United States was early given the major responsibility for

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*For accounts of ABC Conference and ABC-1, see: (1) Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, Ch. XII; and (2) Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning: 1941–42*, Ch. III.
the Pacific war. As a result, differences from time to time arose between the two allies over the distribution of resources between the two wars. Britain tended to emphasize the effort in Europe at the expense of the Pacific. Although the United States more than met its commitments in Europe, it insisted on a margin of safety in the Pacific.

The Search for a Strategic Plan
1941–42

Close as the United States and the United Kingdom had been drawn by Pearl Harbor, and agreed as they were on the need to defeat Germany first, they had no specific plan for defeating Germany and liberating Europe. 1941–42 saw the emergence of divergent British and American concepts in strategic theory. The British concept for defeating Germany early became apparent. Even at the ABC meetings before the United States entered the war, the British had advanced the idea that the proper line of attack on Germany was through Italy and the Mediterranean. In the summer of 1941 during the Atlantic Conference, the British Chiefs had further spelled out their ideas. They proposed reliance on blockade, bombing, subversive activities, and propaganda to weaken Germany’s will and ability to resist. Local patriots would be secretly armed and equipped to revolt. The emphasis in offensive action would be on mobile, hard-hitting armored forces operating on the periphery of German-controlled territory and eventually striking into Germany itself, rather than on large-scale ground action to meet the full power of the German military machine. No vast armies of infantry such as those used in World War I would be needed. At the Arcadia Conference Churchill further elaborated on these ideas for the President.

The whole approach was in accord with the Churchillian theory of waging war on the Continent—what may be called the peripheral strategy—a concept he had developed after the British experience in World War I. The emphasis would be on swift campaigns of speed and maneuver, on probing soft spots, on a war of attrition. Though the so-called soft underbelly part of the peripheral thesis has received great attention, it must not be forgotten that Norway was always one of Churchill’s favorite operational objectives during World War II. Variations on the concept as applied to the Mediterranean involved entering the Mediterranean via North Africa and then proceeding by way of Italy and the Balkans—either to the north Balkans or to Greece—to Germany. From the beginning, the British envisaged a cross-Channel operation in force only as the last blow against a Germany already in process of collapse. These two ideas of the British—emphasis on the Mediterranean and the cross-Channel operation as a coup de grâce—lingered until the time of the invasion of Normandy. The British concept was a compound of military and political factors, of caution resulting from experiences of the last war and Dunkerque, and of the Prime Minister’s predilections. It was tailored to suit scattered interests, a small-scale economy, and limited manpower for ground armies.

American ideas were quite different. As far back as November 1940, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, had concluded that large-scale
land operations would be needed to beat Germany. In the summer of 1941 the Army strategic planners, studying the requirements of a global war for the initial Victory Program, concluded that sooner or later "we must prepare to fight Germany by actually coming to grips with and defeating her ground forces and definitely breaking her will to com-

"They assumed that the way would have to be paved by achieving overwhelming air superiority in Europe.11 Vague as they were about preliminary preparations, the Army planners were already disposed to think in terms of meeting the German Army head on. To win, they envisaged the need of a U.S. Army of approximately 215 divisions. Here was the kernel of the American theory of a war of mass and concentra-

The Americans and the British each justified their theories and plans in terms of relieving the pressure upon the Russians. Neither side could readily win the other to its concept of strategy and the long debate that ensued led to a delicate relationship with the Soviet Union. From the beginning the Russians, locked in a death struggle on the Eastern Front, had no doubts about the proper Western strategy. They wanted a second front; they wanted it soon; and they wanted it in the West. Each Anglo-American postponement of this second front added fuel to the fire.

The first round of debate on strategy came in 1942 over the British desire for an invasion of North Africa—the TORCH operation—versus the American desire for an early cross-Channel attack—the BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan.12 A number of


11 For the initial Victory Program estimates, the newly established Air War Plans Division prepared a plan known as AWPD/1. This plan, calling for over 2,000,000 men and some 60,000 combat planes, contained the blueprint of AAF wartime expansion and embodied its strategic faith. In the opinion of the air planners, it was doubtful if a large-scale invasion of Europe could be launched before the spring of 1944. The invasion would coincide with the climax of the bombing offensive. The air planners went further and expressed the belief that if the air offensive were successful, a land offensive might not be necessary. Even though these views were not entirely consistent with those of the War Department, General Marshall and the Army planners approved AWPD/1, which became the "bible" of air planners. (For a detailed discussion of AWPD/1, see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, Plans and Early Operations—January 1939 to August 1942 (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1948) (hereafter cited as Craven and Cate, AAF I). 131-32, 146-47, 149-50, 594, 599-600.)

steps led up to the evolution of the Bolero-Roundup plan, the brainchild of the U.S. Army. At the Arcadia Conference the Americans and British had agreed that a first essential in the war against Germany was to preserve the lines of communications across the North Atlantic between the United States and the fortress in the British Isles, and that, as an immediate step in that direction, U.S. forces should be dispatched to Great Britain. The agreement did not include any strategic concept or plan for using that fortress as a base for invasion of the Continent. In the early months of 1942 the need for such a concept and plan began to be keenly felt in the U.S. War Department. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, General Marshall, and the Army planners became increasingly disturbed over the dispersion of troops, ships, and supplies to meet immediate crises in non-European parts of the globe—Africa, the Middle East, the Far East, and the Pacific. To these demands were added the desperate pleas of the Russians and Chinese for more aid. Practically all the forces that the Army and Navy had ready in the first six months after Pearl Harbor had to be sent to the Pacific. Unless the trend toward dissipation were checked, the planners realized, the United States would eventually be deprived of the power to exercise decisive weight and influence in coalition strategy. The thinking of the Army staff was sharply reflected in a notation made on 22 January 1942 by Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, then the chief War Department operations officer for

the Pacific: "The struggle to secure adoption by all concerned of a common concept of strategical objectives is wearing me down. . . . We've got to go to Europe and fight. . . . We've got to begin slugging with air at West Europe; to be followed by a land attack as soon as possible."14

In February and March the War Department planners, under General Eisenhower's guidance, and the Joint Staff Planners studied the whole problem of Pacific deployment in the context of global strategy. Clearly, limits would have to be set for subsequent movements of Army forces to the Pacific, but that in itself would not solve the problem of defeating Germany. As a solution, the Joint Chiefs adopted the concept of invading Europe in force from the United Kingdom with a fixed target date. This plan, as proposed by General Marshall, called for forces to be assembled immediately (Bolero) for a cross-Channel invasion in the spring of 1943 (Roundup). To Bolero-Roundup was added a subsidiary plan, Sledgehammer, providing for an emergency small-scale landing in the autumn of 1942 should either Germany or the USSR seem on the verge of collapse.

On 1 April the President accepted the plan and dispatched Marshall and Harry Hopkins to London to secure British approval. The British approved "in principle," and Bolero received top priority. The relief felt by General Marshall and

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13 Secretary Stimson had been Secretary of War in 1911-13; Governor-General of the Philippines in 1927-29; and Secretary of State in 1929-33. In July 1940 he again became Secretary of War.

14 Notations by Eisenhower, 22 Jan 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File.

General Eisenhower had served as assistant to the military adviser of the Philippine Islands from 1935 to 1940. In June 1941 he became chief of staff of the Third Army. He joined the War Plans Division of the War Department in December 1941 and became chief of that division in February 1942.
his staff found expression, when Marshall returned from London, in a notation by Maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, then Chief, Operations Division, War Department General Staff (OPD, WDGS):

"... at long last, and after months of struggle, ... we are all definitely committed to one concept of fighting! If we can agree on major purposes and objectives, our efforts will begin to fall in line and we won't just be thrashing around in the dark." The agreement lasted less than three months. Obviously, neither the President nor the Prime Minister had been fully persuaded.

To the American staff, BOLERO-ROUNDUP was especially desirable for a number of reasons. It offered, in their opinion, the soundest basis of strategy for the European war—an all-out bombing offensive against Germany and an attack on the northwest coast of France, using the British Isles as the base. BOLERO represented the shortest route from the United States to the heart of Germany. In the British Isles, the United States could safely land its ground forces without the aid of carrier-based air cover and could safely develop air superiority over northern France. The route of attack into Germany via the Low Countries was considered easier than any other. The plan would meet the Soviet demand for a second front. It promised to furnish a definite long-range strategic goal for industrial and manpower mobilization. Above all, it promised decisive action by a definite date—early 1943—and offered a long-range plan that would fulfill the principle of concentration. For a while plans went ahead for the second front. General Eisenhower arrived in England on 24 June 1942 to assume command of the European Theater of Operations (ETO), and U.S. forces began to land in considerable numbers.

But the tide soon turned against the American plan. In June the Prime Minister came to Washington and supported a North African operation—as he had at ARCADIA. So disturbed was the American staff over the evident British intention to scuttle BOLERO-ROUNDUP that in July the Joint Chiefs even considered threatening the British with an all-out offensive in the Pacific—the so-called Pacific alternative—a threat the President refused to allow them to make. In July Hopkins, Marshall, and King went to London for further discussions. Out of these came the decision to launch a North African attack in the autumn of 1942. TORCH replaced BOLERO-ROUNDUP. The American staff had lost out, the President overruling it.

The TORCH decision resulted from two basic factors—President Roosevelt's insistence on action by U.S. ground forces against Germany in 1942, and the categoric refusal of Churchill and his staff to accept the notion of a 1942 cross-Channel operation. The need to relieve the critical British situation in the Middle East undoubtedly influenced Churchill. There were also some positive advantages that all sides recognized could result from a successful TORCH operation. The shipping situation was so tight that all possible measures had to

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Eisenhower had been promoted to the rank of major general on 27 March 1942.
be taken to get more ships. A saving of over 200 ships per month could be effected if Allied convoys to the Middle East and India could go through the Mediterranean instead of around the Cape of Good Hope. There were, it must be recognized, serious questions concerning the feasibility of launching the cross-Channel operation in 1942, or even in the spring of 1943. Practical considerations played an important part. There were resources for Torch; those for the cross-Channel undertaking were more doubtful.

To Marshall and Stimson the Torch decision was a bitter pill. To them it meant the adoption of a strategy of encirclement, of periphery-pecking, and of what Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy later termed "scatterization." It meant inevitable postponement of a definitely scheduled direct thrust against Germany.

What are some of the strategic lessons of the BOLERO versus Torch controversy of 1942? The BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan, a concept generated by the War Department—outside the regular JCS-CCS system—miscarried. In retrospect the plan seems to have been premature. Neither the British nor the forces and the means to cross the Channel appeared to be ready. But forces in being have a way of generating a strategy of their own, and the impatience and pressure of political leaders for action may override the strategy of the military, however sound it may appear to the latter. There were enough forces and means to undertake Torch. The Western Allies undertook Torch.

The Torch decision, which so disappointed American military hopes, also complicated relations with the Soviet Union. Churchill felt the full weight of Marshal Joseph Stalin's disapproval in a stormy interview in Moscow in mid-August. Sensitive as the Western Allies were to Soviet reactions, they tried to compensate for the immediate effects of Torch on aid to the Russians by such friendly gestures as offering direct military assistance in the Caucasus, development of the Persian Gulf delivery route, and a build-up of the Alaska-Siberia air ferry route. These efforts meant little to Stalin. The Western Allies were beginning to learn that there was no banking good will with the Soviet Union. They could expect no real improvement in military relations with the USSR except where collaboration would clearly contribute to the one common interest—the early defeat of Germany.

The Pacific was also diverting power from the American resources on which the Army planners could count for "beating Germany" first. In 1942 demands in the Pacific were exigent and heavy. The first year of the war in the Pacific was largely spent by the United States armed forces in establishing and protecting supply lines and bases from which offensives might later be undertaken against Japan. The War Department had tried to keep the forces and means allotted to the Pacific to a minimum, but it had not fully anticipated the great need for air and ground service units for Australia.

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16 After serving in the War Plans Division from 1936 to 1940, General Handy returned in 1941 and served as Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group until he succeeded Eisenhower in June 1942 as Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division.

17 For the effects of Torch on postponing convoy sailings to the USSR along the northern route, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, Ch. XIV.
and Pacific island bases and had to make successive *ad hoc* increases in the allotment of Army troops. Air deployment to the Pacific conflicted with the determination of the AAF to initiate large-scale bombardment to western Europe.

By mid-1942 the diversion of men and resources to the Pacific had begun to produce results, but the rebuff to the Japanese forces at the battles of Coral Sea (May 1942) and Midway (June 1942) by no means slowed Army deployment to the Pacific. That deployment, in the new phase of the Pacific war, was no longer confined to garrisoning a "line" of bases to support a harassing naval defensive, but was being calculated in terms of tactical offensive moves beyond that line. A series of limited offensives was plotted and begun with the invasion of Guadalcanal in August 1942. The new policy required emergency reinforcements in the fall for both Guadalcanal and the Papua Campaign. Before the close of the year some of the troop strength originally built up in the Central Pacific was being transferred to support these local offensives, and it was clear that still more Army troops would be needed to complete these tasks.

For the Pacific theater as a whole, the total number of Army forces deployed at the end of 1942 (approximately 350,000) was about equal to the total number of Army forces deployed in the United Kingdom and North Africa (approximately 347,000). Nine of the 17 divisions overseas and 17 of the 72 air combat groups overseas were in the Pacific.

In the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater early limitations on Army deployment had been maintained far more successfully, but the problems presented by the CBI theater had by no means been resolved by the close of 1942. In the CBI, as in the Middle East, the United States was drawn into highly complicated jurisdictional, strategic, and logistical problems. Basic strategic considerations, as well as limited Allied resources for mounting major attacks on the Asiatic mainland and pressing immediate needs of other theaters, combined to keep the CBI theater, throughout 1942, low on the list of priorities set by the CCS for overseas deployment. For the United States, the object of strategic policy toward China since the very beginning of the war had been to keep that country actively in the war without a major investment of U.S. forces. To carry out this policy Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell's mission to China had been instructed in February 1942 to increase both the effectiveness of American assistance to the Chinese Government and the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army. After the Burma Road was cut by the Japanese in late April, the problems facing Stilwell's mission became far more difficult. For the U.S. Army, however, the CBI remained—as did the Middle East—essentially an air and supply theater. A year after Pearl Harbor about 17,000 U.S. troops were present in or en route to the China-Burma-India area.

The Middle East was an area of British strategic responsibility and one in which the United States preferred not to become deeply involved. But events in...
1942 had forced successive modifications in the plans for the use of Army forces in the area. At the end of December 1942 about 30,000 troops were present in or en route to the Middle East—primarily air and service troops. This enlarged commitment reflected, in part, increased operational air activities by United States forces in support of British-American offensive action in the Mediterranean. In part, it reflected the greater need for service units required to construct, operate, and maintain the Persian Gulf supply route for shipments of supplies to the Soviet Union.

All in all, by 31 December 1942 slightly more than half of the divisions and about a third of the air combat groups overseas were deployed in the war against Japan. The remaining divisions overseas and over one half of the air combat groups overseas were deployed in the war against Germany. The rest of the air combat groups overseas were distributed among Latin American and South Atlantic bases. The total U.S. Army forces then deployed in the war against Japan exceeded by over 85,000 the total U.S. Army forces deployed in the war against Germany.19 The scattering of men and planes was paralleled by the parcelling out of shipping to move and maintain troops overseas. Throughout 1942 shortages—especially of escort vessels and landing craft—imbalance between available troop and cargo shipping, and the heavy rate of sinkings made shipping the limiting factor in Army planning for overseas deployment.20

With the launching of Torch at the end of 1942, the first stage in the search for a strategic plan against Germany came to an end. 1941–42 had been the period of defensive strategy and a strategy of scarcity. The basic fear was the fear of defeat; the great concern, the survival of the Soviet Union. By the close of 1942 it had become apparent that, though the Western Allies were still not agreed on strategy, their plans were tied to the outcome of the struggle on the Eastern Front. But Stalin had turned down the offer of Roosevelt and Churchill to send an Anglo-American air force to support the Soviet forces in the Caucasus. He made it unmistakably clear that Western military forces were not wanted in Soviet territory to fight beside Soviet soldiers.21 From the West Stalin wanted only more lend-lease and a second front.

The two approaches to war had had their first conflict and British opportunism or peripheral strategy had scored the first victory. However, the issue was not yet squarely joined. That British notions of strategy had tended to prevail was not surprising. British forces had been earlier mobilized and were in the theaters in far greater numbers than were those of the Americans. The United States was still

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19 Figures based on: (1) USAF Statistical Digest, 1947, pp. 2–12; (2) STM–30, 1 Jan 48; and (3) OPD Weekly Status Map, 31 Dec 42. According to the STM–30 computation, total forces deployed in the war against Japan—including Alaska and CBI—amounted to 464,868. Forces deployed against the European Axis Powers—including Africa, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf Service Command—numbered 377,044.

20 For the impact of shipping and other logistical factors on Army planning and the constant struggle to match ends and means in 1942, see Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–43.

21 Stalin's position evidently represented a change of mind, since in September 1941 he had asked for twenty-five to thirty divisions to be sent from Great Britain to Archangel or through Iran to the southern front in the USSR. See Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Grand Alliance (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 462–63.
mobilizing its manpower and resources. It had taken the better part of the year after Pearl Harbor for U.S. forces to have any appreciable effect in the theaters. Strategic planning in 1942 had been largely short run, hand to mouth, and opportunistic. Its scope had been in considerable measure determined by critical shortages in shipping and munitions. Troops had been parcelled out piecemeal to meet immediate threats, crises, and needs in the primarily defensive and garrisoning phase of the war. New to the art of military diplomacy and negotiation, the Americans were still thinking in “either-or” terms—this operation or that one. The one scheme to put Allied planning on an orderly, long-range basis and to achieve the principles of mass and concentration in which the Americans had put their faith had failed. An effective formula for halting the continued dissipation of forces and matériel in what they regarded as secondary ventures still eluded them.

The transition to the strategic initiative introduced many new and complex problems for the American military staff. Active and passive fronts were now established all over the world. The TORCH decision had thrown all Allied strategic planning into a state of uncertainty and flux. The old issues of encirclement versus concentration and Atlantic versus Pacific deployment, which the Army staff hoped had been settled once and for all by the British-American agreement in the spring of 1942 on BOLERO-ROUNDP, were being debated anew. The basic strategic question for the planners was how to limit operations in subsidiary theaters and carry the war decisively to the Axis Powers.

As the strategists groped their way toward agreement on an answer to the question during 1943 and 1944, they often found themselves engaged in consideration of possibilities of action that became academic before a decision on them could be reached. The positive aspect of their planning was governed by the growing inevitability of a large-scale invasion of northwestern Europe, even as the War Department had envisaged it in the spring of 1942, together with the development of essentially comparable means to defeat Japan. Subordinate to this was the attempt to guide the intermediate operations required to prepare the way for the main offensives. To present the story of that strategic planning is the purpose of the pages that follow.
CHAPTER I

Casablanca—Beginning of an Era

January 1943

In 1943 the debate over European strategy entered a new stage. Though the strategic ideas of each partner in the Allied coalition remained essentially the same as in 1942, the circumstances of their application changed. The midwar period—roughly from January 1943 to the establishment of a foothold in Normandy in the summer of 1944—was the period of increasing plenty. The power to call the turn on strategy and to choose the time and place to do battle passed to the Allies. The United States, along with its partners, had to come to grips with the offensive phase of the coalition war. U.S. troops and supplies flowed out in ever-increasing numbers, and the full impact of American mobilization and production was felt not only in the theaters but also in Allied councils. Similarly, the ability of the Russians not only to survive the German assault but also to launch a series of counteroffensives lent weight to Soviet ideas on Allied strategy. The balance of power within the coalition steadily shifted to the United States and the Soviet Union.

As the new year opened, the Western Powers and the Soviet Union were still linked by the bond of danger, but had not yet found a common ground of agreement. Between the United States and the United Kingdom, fundamental war strategy and planning for the immediate future were unsettled. Into this vacuum and state of uncertainty the President, at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, introduced the principle of unconditional surrender—a concept that was to have important consequences for the Allied coalition as well as for the American military staff for the remainder of the war.

The War Against Germany

The President took off on 11 January from Miami, Florida, for his fourth official meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and the first of a series of great midwar international conferences. It was a historic occasion, marking a double first for the President: the first time that a U.S. president had flown while in office and the first time that a U.S. president had left the country in time of war. Roosevelt’s departure and his destination were carefully guarded secrets. The scene of the conference lay 5,000 miles across the hazardous Atlantic at the North African port of Casablanca. There, on the outskirts, in a large hotel on a villa-studded hill overlooking the ocean, the President and his military advisers
met with Mr. Churchill and the British military staff. General Marshall and his staff, Admiral King, and General Arnold had arrived ahead of the President. They had been quartered at the Anfa Hotel with the other members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Surrounded by palm trees, bougainvillaea, and orange groves and with sunny skies overhead, the ten-day conference opened on 14 January. That the palm trees were protected by barbed wire entanglements, that heavily armed infantrymen and Secret Service men roamed constantly among the bougainvillaea and orange groves, and that the blue skies were filled by patrolling fighter squadrons did not seem incongruous in the wartime atmosphere.

In this lush but martial atmosphere, the British and American leaders convened to review questions at issue in global strategy and to find a new basis of agreement. Over luncheon and dinner tables they carried on informal discussions that sometimes lasted into the early hours of the morning. In addition, there were several plenary meetings and a series of Combined Chiefs of Staff conferences. In the absence of Admiral Leahy, who had become ill en route, General Marshall, Admiral King, and Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their British counterparts, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord, and Air Chief
Marshal Sir Charles F. A. Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, were ably assisted by Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington. On the fringes of the conference hovered the two contending leaders of the French, General Henri Giraud, High Commissioner of French Africa, and General Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Fighting French forces. Generalissimo Stalin had turned down the Anglo-American invitation to participate on the ground that the critical situation at Stalingrad demanded his full attention.

What to do after completing the conquest of North Africa was the crucial question in Allied strategy. Any plans for post-Torch operations were directly related to the course of the African campaign. The practical reason for meeting at Casablanca was to provide an opportunity to canvass possibilities directly with the commanders. British and American hopes for a quick victory in the North African campaign had been disappointed. Though most of North Africa already had been won, a hard struggle for Tunisia loomed ahead, and the uncertainty as to when the campaign would end complicated and unsettled all British-American military planning for the future.

The uncertainty was reflected in the intelligence estimates drawn up by the British and Americans before the conference. Both agreed that the Soviet Union would be the chief preoccupation of Germany in the months ahead though Hitler would do his utmost to intensify the war upon Allied shipping. There was also agreement that Germany would do its best to maintain its foothold in North Africa and to keep Italy in the war. On the other hand, the British felt that if Italy collapsed, the Germans would concentrate on the Balkans and leave Italy to its fate, while the Americans predicted that Hitler would step in if Italy showed signs of collapse and would defend the Italian peninsula. The Americans were also less sanguine than their British colleagues over the prospects of German collapse in the near future. The Americans believed that, despite severe losses to the armies and air forces, the German armed forces were still formidable and that German morale and economic position, through deteriorating, showed no conclusive signs of impending collapse.

While British and American strategy had had much in common since early in the war, the question of next moves was susceptible to very different answers. On the answer given would very largely depend the disposition of British and American forces in 1943. The Prime Minister had no doubt what the correct course of Allied action for 1943 should be. In November 1942 he had cabled the President that the "paramount task" before the United States and the United Kingdom was, first, to conquer North

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1 General Brooke had commanded the British 2 Corps in France in 1940; he became commander of the British Home Forces in 1940 and Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1941. Admiral Pound was named First Sea Lord and chief of the British naval staff in May 1939 and became Admiral of the Fleet in July 1939. Air Chief Marshal Portal had served on the Air Council and as Air Officer, Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command; he was appointed Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force, in October 1940.

2 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 662ff.

Africa and open the Mediterranean to military traffic and, second, to use the bases on the African shore "to strike at the underbelly of the Axis . . . in the shortest time." This remained Churchill's opinion in January 1943. As he saw it, it was the obvious immediate objective for consideration at the conference.

The British brought to the conference a full staff and carefully prepared plans and positions. The Americans came with a small staff and with preparations incomplete. Before the conference an unsatisfactory exchange of views had taken place between the American and British staffs. Neither the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff nor their planners had been able to agree on a course of action subsequent to TORCH. Nor was there complete agreement or understanding between the JCS and their planners or between the President and his military staff. General Marshall's own planning staff had at first been so reluctant to accept the TORCH concept and had afterwards been so engrossed in carrying out the decision that they had had only a few weeks in which to face the situation it had created. On the eve of Casablanca the President's attitude on the critical issue of cross-Channel versus Mediterranean operations was to wait and see. He favored building up U.S. forces in both the United Kingdom and North Africa and postponing a decision for a month or two. Such circumstances hardly offered encouragement to

General Marshall to try at once to unite the U.S. representatives on a revised version of the plan to concentrate forces in the British Isles, but Marshall did feel obliged to fight a strong rear-guard action in defense of the plan. His course would serve notice on all that concentrating for a major cross-Channel operation was still a cardinal objective in American strategic planning.

Cross-Channel Versus Mediterranean

At the conference General Marshall led the JCS in a last stand for a major cross-Channel operation in 1943. Early in the conference he stated that the basic question was the extent to which the associated powers had to adhere to the general concept embodied in the Bolero plan and the extent to which they could undertake diversions to help the USSR, improve the shipping situation, and maintain the momentum against the Axis. It was extremely important for the American and British leaders to decide on the "main plot." "Every diversion or side issue from the main plot," he added, "acts as a 'suction pump.'" The previous shifts from Gymnast to Bolero and from Bolero to Torch had, he observed, complicated U.S. programs of production and troop mobilization. American naval construction schedules in particular had been upset by the necessity of producing landing craft for Bolero. It was Marshall's belief that in the diversion to Torch the United States and Great Britain had been "ab-

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4 (1) Msg, Prime Minister to President, 18 Nov 42, No. 195. (No copy in WD files.) This message was circulated as JCS 153, 18 Nov 42, title: Plans and Operations in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Near East. (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 694.

5 For a description of the American staff preparations, see: (1) Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 215-17; and (2) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, Ch. XVII.

6 Min, 55th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.

7 Min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43.

8 Gymnast was the code name for an operation against North Africa under British and American consideration in late 1941 and early 1942.
normally fortunate.” He still favored a main British-American effort against Germany in the form of a cross-Channel operation aimed at northern France.

Reviewing all the old arguments the American staff had advanced since the spring of 1942 in defense of the Bolero-Roundup plan, he added some variations. Any operations in the Mediterranean would definitely retard the concentration of U.S. troops in the United Kingdom. The associated powers should not become committed to “interminable” operations in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, a large Army force should not be immobilized in the United Kingdom awaiting a hypothetical German collapse. A simultaneous extension of operations in the Mediterranean and concentration of forces in the United Kingdom would probably preclude all operations in the Pacific and in Burma. The American staff was concerned as to whether further operations in the Mediterranean would bring advantages proportionate to the hazards involved. Any Mediterranean undertaking projected for 1943 should be weighed in terms of
its effects on the already critical shipping situation and the build-up of forces in the United Kingdom, and of its role in over-all planning for the defeat of the Axis Powers.  

Sir Alan Brooke, replying for the British Chiefs of Staff, took the position that the British and Americans could not land on the Continent in force until Germany definitely weakened. In no case could a cross-Channel operation against northern France be undertaken until late in the summer of 1943. Even then, the number of troops that could be put into France would be severely limited by the lack of landing craft and of logistical facilities in France. Only from twenty-one to twenty-three divisions could be made available for a cross-Channel operation by 15 September 1943. If the Allies prepared for that operation, no support could be given to the USSR throughout the summer. Sir Alan then went on to say the British and Americans should definitely count on entering the Continent in force in 1944. Until Germany weakened, they should try to make Germany disperse its forces as much as possible. In 1943 the best way to do this was to threaten Germany everywhere in the Mediterranean, try to knock Italy out of the war, and try to bring Turkey in. Intensifying British-American air attacks would also force Germany to scatter its air resources. Mediterranean operations, especially against Italy, would result in a considerable diversion of troops from the Soviet front. Pending the deterioration of Germany, the British called for a continued build-up of British-American forces in the United Kingdom in preparation for an invasion of the Continent.

The arguments of the British Chiefs of Staff for action in the Mediterranean in 1943 were reinforced by the eloquent appeals of the Prime Minister. To disperse German forces, he argued, a series of feints against Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, the Dodecanese Islands, and the coasts of Italy and Greece should be made before any Mediterranean operations were launched. He was attracted by the possibility of eliminating Italy from the war. The Germans would then have to take over the defense of Italy and the Italian commitments for the defense of the Balkans. He was particularly interested in drawing Turkey into the war. Turkey might then serve as a base for attacks on the Rumanian oil fields and for opening the Black Sea route to the USSR. With respect to cross-Channel undertakings for 1943, he appeared, like his military staff, to be thinking purely in terms of a SLEDGEHAMMER operation.

In addition to the British arguments, General Marshall had to face the fact that the President was not disinclined toward further Mediterranean action. The President continued to occupy a middle-of-the-road position between Marshall and Churchill. He apparently wanted U.S. troops to continue in action and was attracted by the possibility of a

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9 (1) Min, 55th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43. (2) Min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43. (3) Min, 60th mtg CCS, 18 Jan 43.
10 (1) Min, 57th mtg CCS, 15 Jan 43. (2) Min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43.
12 (1) Msg, Prime Minister to President, 18 Nov 42, No. 195. The message refers to a Presidential message about Mediterranean possibilities. (2) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 676. (3) See also Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 425.
quick, cheap victory in the Mediterranean after the windup of the North African operation—especially one that might lead to the elimination of Italy. He was undoubtedly interested in demonstrating to the Russians the Anglo-American intention of relieving German pressure on them. He may have been influenced at this time in favor of a Mediterranean strategy not only by the British-American impasse over ROUNDUP but also over Burma operations. In any event, the Mediterranean appeared to be the most logical place for the next British-American operation against Germany, and a decision on a planned large-scale operation on the Continent might be postponed until somewhat later. Meanwhile, the President agreed with the Prime Minister, the two countries should build up forces in the United Kingdom that would be prepared to launch an emergency operation in 1943 across the Channel if the Germans showed signs of deterioration.13

Aside from strong arguments advanced by the British and the predilections of the President and Prime Minister, the Chief of Staff had to recognize that certain other critical factors also cast doubt on the possibility of a 1943 ROUNDUP. Chief among these was training for amphibious operations. Thus Marshall called to the attention of the President and the JCS, in a special session held during the conference, Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's current belief that an invasion of the Continent would require a minimum of twelve divisions, twice the force General Eisenhower had originally thought necessary. Moreover, General Eisenhower now felt that many more landing craft than originally estimated would be necessary.14 These revised calculations reflected a change in General Eisenhower's thinking resulting from his experience with amphibious operations following his early association with planning for BOLERO-ROUNDUP in Washington and London in the spring and summer of 1942. Other limiting factors, the Chief of Staff recognized, would be the submarine menace and delivery of supplies to the USSR.

Though other members of the JCS followed the Chief of Staff's lead in advocating ROUNDUP, they could not fail to be attracted by some aspects of Mediterranean undertakings. As a sea power man, Admiral King was impressed with the argument that opening the Mediterranean would result in a tremendous saving in Allied shipping. On the airpower side, General Arnold saw advantages in the possibility of securing air bases in the Mediterranean to strike at Germany from the south.

In the end General Marshall had to yield. The major grounds on which he conceded the argument were the effects on the saving in shipping, the safety of the line of communications to the Mediterranean, and the large number of veteran troops that would be available in the Mediterranean after the African campaign was over. If these forces could be employed without having to be transported to the United Kingdom, the critical Allied shipping situation in the Atlantic would not be aggravated. Economy of tonnage—especially in view of the ever present U-boat menace in the Atlantic—was, Marshall saw, the "major

13 Min, 2d Anfa mtg, 18 Jan 43, Official Casablanca Conf Book.

14 (1) Min, sp mtg JCS and President, 16 Jan 43, Official Casablanca Conf Book. (2) Min, 52d mtg JCS, 16 Jan 43.
consideration." Between the two most feasible Mediterranean operations, Sicily or Sardinia, he felt, along with the rest of the U.S. delegation, that an invasion of Sicily would be the more profitable. With the north coast of Africa and all of Sicily in Allied hands, he stated, approximately 225 vessels could be released for operations in Burma, the Middle East, and the Pacific. The added pressure on Italy, moreover, might lead to its withdrawal from the war, forcing Germany to take over Italian commitments. After the British settled their internal differences over Sicily versus Sardinia—the Prime Minister holding out strongly at this point for Sicily—the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed to undertake an operation against Sicily during 1943. In yielding, Marshall made it clear that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were accepting the Mediterranean operation only as an expedient action dictated by current circumstances. He was opposed as much as ever to interminable operations in the Mediterranean. He still wished to make the main effort against Germany across the Channel. At the same time, he also conceded the importance of persuading Turkey to resist Axis aggression and to permit the associated powers to use its airfields.

In the vital matter of sustaining the flow of lend-lease shipments to the USSR, Marshall's position hewed closely to the British line. There was general agreement that all possible aid should be given to the Russians in order to absorb German strength, but the question of how far to go in sending convoys over the northern route to Murmansk aroused some discussion. The Chief of Staff felt that the heavy losses of 1942 must not be repeated; they might cripple the entire offensive effort against the enemy. The Allies should not set about "destroying" themselves, simply to get ships to Murmansk or to placate Stalin. On the other hand, Marshall did feel that the Russians should be informed of any decision to cancel the convoys during the invasion of Sicily, if this proved necessary. Admiral King, while maintaining that every effort should be made to get the tools of war into Soviet hands, agreed with Marshall that it would not be wise to continue the Murmansk convoys if the losses became prohibitive.

Evidently the President, who had always been a firm exponent of aid to the USSR and who had been willing to have Marshall go to the Soviet Union to discuss mutual problems after Casablanca, was inclined to agree. At any rate, he offered no opposition to the adoption of the proviso that "supplies to Russia shall not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United Nations effort." No attempt

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15 For references to internal British divergences see: (1) min, sp mtg JCS and President, 15 Jan 43, Official Casablanca Conf Book; and (2) Churchill, _Hinge of Fate_, p. 678.

For a discussion of Mediterranean alternatives in Allied strategy and the final compromise on Sicily at Casablanca, see H. M. Smyth, _The Sicilian Campaign and the Surrender of Italy_, MS, Ch. 1, OCMH files.

16 For the summary of Marshall's arguments, see especially: (1) min, 2d Anfa mtg, 18 Jan 43, Official Casablanca Conf Book; (2) min, 60th mtg CCS, 18 Jan 43; (3) min, sp mtg JCS and President, 15 Jan 43, Official Casablanca Conf Book; and (4) min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43.

17 (1) Min, 60th mtg CCS, 18 Jan 43. (2) Min, 2d Anfa mtg, 18 Jan 43. (3) Min, 55th mtg JCS, 19 Jan 43. (4) Min, 56th mtg JCS, 20 Jan 43. (5) History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MS, Sec. II B, Procurement and Allocation of Material Means, Pt. III, Sharing With Allies: Pangs of Coalition Warfare, Ch. IV, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Aid to Russia, 1942-43," by Capt Ernesto Giusti.

18 See Ch. XIII, below.

19 CCS 170/2, 23 Jan 43, title: Final Rpt to the
was made to define just what would constitute "prohibitive cost." The very flexibility of the term indicated that the over-all shipping situation plus the rate of shipping losses in the months before the invasion of Sicily might be the determining factors in carrying through or canceling the Arctic convoys.

The conferees agreed that the attack on Sicily be made with "the favorable July moon" as the target date, or sooner if possible. The stated objectives were: (1) to make the Mediterranean line of communications more secure, (2) to divert German pressure from the Soviet front, and (3) to intensify pressure on Italy. General Eisenhower was designated Supreme Commander. When the British Eighth Army, driving from the east, crossed the Tunisian frontier, General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander would become Deputy Commander in Chief to General Eisenhower and command the Allied forces on the Tunisian front. After the conclusion of the operations in Tunisia, General Alexander was to take direct charge of executing the Sicily (code name Husky) operation. Planning and preparations in the theater for Husky were to begin at once. On the other side of the Mediterranean, operations in support of Turkey—in accord with an agreement between the President and Prime Minister—were to be left as a British responsibility. The defeat of the U-boat menace was accepted by the delegates as a primary charge on the resources of the associated powers.

Vague as their conclusions were on ultimate ground operations against Germany, the conferees did call for the establishment of a combined command and planning staff to plan for a return to the Continent under certain conditions. This return might take the form of small-scale raids, an emergency operation in 1943 in the event of a sudden German collapse, a limited operation in 1943 to secure a bridgehead on the Continent for later exploitation, or "an invasion in force in 1944." For the present they decided it would be sufficient to select a combined planning staff and a British chief of staff. A supreme commander for a 1944 Roundup could be appointed later. Meanwhile, subject to the higher requirements for planned operations in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, U.S. forces would continue to assemble in the United Kingdom (a modified Bolero). Casablanca had opened with the hopes of the U.S. staff centered on an invasion of the Continent in force in 1943. It was obvious from the discussions that such an invasion was not to take place, but Sir Alan Brooke re-
assured the Americans, “we should definitely count on reentering the Continent in 1944 on a large scale.”

**Combined Bomber Offensive**

The debate over basic strategy against Germany inevitably raised fundamental questions pertaining to the use of U.S. airpower. Both sides agreed that the original basis on which a combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom had been conceived was still sound. To defeat Germany, it would be necessary to invade the European continent with large forces. Before the final assault could be launched, it would be necessary to bomb *Festung Europa* vigorously. Therefore, a combined bomber offensive remained a prerequisite to any major ground operations against Germany. But the U.S. Chiefs at Casablanca were urging the concentration of Allied forces, ground as well as air, for an invasion of the Continent in 1943. The British Chiefs, preferring Mediterranean action in 1943, simply pressed for maximum application of strategic airpower against Germany. What then was to be the place of the bomber offensive in Allied strategic plans? What would be its objectives? Specifically, how should American concepts of air tactics and command be accommodated to the fluctuations in combined strategic thinking?

The Army Air Forces was, of course, directly interested. So was General Marshall. He and his planning staff in the War Department had long worked closely with the Air staff and had steadily supported the developing U.S. Air program. During the debate over a major cross-Channel operation, in fact, General Marshall tried to bridge the gap between the American and British thinking on timing by using an argument based on airpower. Inferiority in numbers of ground forces landed in north France in 1943, he maintained, might be offset by “greatly superior” air forces operating from the United Kingdom. On this basis, he implied, the twenty-odd divisions available for cross-Channel operations in mid-September 1943 would be as effective as the forty-eight anticipated in the ROUNDUP plan.

The decision in favor of HUSKY clearly made uncertain an all-out invasion of the Continent in 1943. General Arnold supported the views General Marshall advanced on ROUNDUP at the conference. Yet, as chief spokesman for the AAF, Arnold could not fail to be impressed with certain advantages to U.S. airpower in the postponement of that planned invasion. More time would become available to prove the effectiveness of a systematic strategic air bombardment. That bomber offensive would perforce become a more independent operation, in the prestige of which the autonomy-minded AAF would share. A larger force of heavy bombers could be assembled in the United Kingdom than if forces and means were concentrated to build up for an early continental invasion.

The postponement of the continental invasion fitted current AAF strategic planning. The AAF policy had been clearly set forth in a document issued by the Air planners on 9 September 1942 and known as AWPD–42. In it the planners had argued that it would not

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24 Min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43.
25 Min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43.
26 A full discussion of AWPD–42, essentially a reaffirmation of AWPD/1, is contained in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II, II. Europe—TORCH*
be possible to conduct an air offensive simultaneously against both Germany and Japan with the resources available. Between Germany and Japan, Germany was still favored as the primary objective. The sources of German military strength were more easily and directly accessible to Allied airpower. Until the Allies were ready to open the second front against Germany, they would have to rely upon their numerically superior air forces. For 1943 and the beginning of 1944, therefore, priority should be given to an air offensive against Germany designed to weaken German airpower and the economic basis of German ground strength. That operation could be successfully executed by mid-1944 if over-all requirements of approximately 63,000 combat aircraft for 1943 were met. In AWPD-42, production schedules, priorities and allocations for aircraft, and training and deployment programs were pegged on the mid-1944 date. By that time it would be feasible to launch a combined land offensive against Germany. A similar strategic air offensive could then or somewhat later be launched against Japan. The contemplated air offensive against Germany was to take the form of a combined strategic bomber offensive such as British and U.S. airmen had been envisaging since the entry of the United States into the war. The U.S. air forces in the European theater would concentrate on the destruction of selected vital parts of the German military and industrial machine through precision daylight bombing. The Royal Air Force (RAF) would concentrate upon mass night attacks on industrial areas.

Running through all AAF thinking was the fear that its troops and planes would be scattered to all parts of the globe with no reference to a basic strategic plan, for, like the Army staff, the Air planners believed wholeheartedly in the doctrine of concentration of force. The Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) from the United Kingdom presented a concrete means of applying that doctrine. However disappointed the Americans were over the decision in favor of a Mediterranean operation, the AAF could therefore take comfort in the concurrent decision to mount "the heaviest possible bomber offensive against the German war effort." 27 The ultimate goal of that air offensive was "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened." 28 For the time being, the following order of priority for bombing objectives was set up: (a) submarine construction yards, (b) the German aircraft industry, (c) transportation, (d) oil plants, and (e) other war industry targets. The program provided also for drawing German fighter strength away from the USSR and Mediterranean theaters.

General Marshall willingly accepted the program of the Air leaders for the progressive weakening of Germany through air bombardment. But, in line with his operations staff's long-held con-

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27 (1) CCS 155/1, 19 Jan 43, title: Conduct of the War in 1943. (2) See also Craven and Cate, AAF II, 301.
28 CCS 166/1/D, 21 Jan 43, title: The Bomber Offensive From the United Kingdom.
cept of a cross-Channel air-ground operation, he called for definitely linking that program to the eventual invasion of the Continent. He was reassured by Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal that the Air program would provide for this contingency. Whenever such an invasion became an immediate prospect, Portal stated, attacks on long-term targets would give way to the support of ground operations.29

No less important than air strategy were the related problems of tactics and command. The scepticism expressed in certain British quarters over the AAF's daylight precision bombing methods came to a head at Casablanca.30 The British advanced forceful arguments to demonstrate the superiority of their concept of mass night bombing. General Arnold enlisted the support of Maj. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, the U.S. Eighth Air Force commander, to present the case for the as yet relatively untried and unproven AAF tactical doctrine.31 For a number of reasons—poor weather conditions, inexperienced crews, lack of long-range fighter escorts, improved German fighter tactics and antiaircraft fire, the requirements of the Pacific and Torch—the U.S. program of bombardment had been delayed. A year after Pearl Harbor, Germany had still not felt the pressure of U.S. airpower. Marshall felt the U.S. Air planners deserved a chance to prove their case in the air. Churchill's sympathies were finally won over to the American cause, and the British decided to let the Americans employ their own methods. With evident pride, Churchill has since recorded his satisfaction in the tribute later paid to him by U.S. Air leaders for saving their daylight bombing program at Casablanca.32

It was one thing for the Americans to win acceptance for AAF air tactics; it was another to insure full control by the U.S. commander over the bombing methods employed by his force. General Marshall, speaking for the JCS, argued that a British command would be logical until the U.S. air forces had clearly demonstrated the efficacy of their methods and until they outnumbered the British in the United Kingdom.33 The control of U.S. bombers operating from England should therefore be put in the hands of the British, but, Marshall insisted, the bombing methods and techniques of the U.S. air forces should be the responsibility of U.S. commanders. General priorities should be prescribed by the CCS. The British gave their assent to this arrangement.

The Casablanca Conference marked a strategic milestone in assigning airpower a definite place in Allied planning against Germany. However, its contribution on the use of airpower was more in the nature of general policy and guiding principles than specific plans. Even the target priority list of the combined bomber offensive was only tentative. It became the task in succeeding months to translate general decisions into specific and concrete commitments and objectives.

29 Min, 65th mtg CCS, 21 Jan 43.
30 For a discussion of area versus precision bombing, see Craven and Cate, AAF II, 212–13, 227–29, 296–97.

In January 1942 Eaker had organized the VIII Bomber Command in England, and in December 1942 he became Commanding General, Eighth Air Force.

33 (1) Min, 56th mtg JCS, 20 Jan 43. (2) Min, 65th mtg CCS, 21 Jan 43.
Old Versus New Choices

The inability of the American and British delegations to work out a definite plan for defeating Germany left the U.S. military staff still confronted with the most critical problem in Allied strategy, the cross-Channel-Mediterranean issue. The acceptance of the Mediterranean offensive—against Sicily—the continuation of a modified BOLERO, and the agreement on a round-the-clock combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom, left undecided the more complex question whether the main effort would be made from the United Kingdom or in the Mediterranean. The U.S. and British staffs remained agreed on the necessity of an eventual cross-Channel operation but the questions of timing, method, and extent of subsidiary operations had not been settled. The stake for operational strategy in the debate over further Mediterranean operations would continue to be whether the cross-Channel operation would be a ROUNDUP type, desired by General Marshall and the U.S. staff, or a coup de grâce administered to an enemy critically weakened in a war of attrition, favored by the British Prime Minister. In and out of a series of international conferences in midwar the two staffs would seek final resolution of the issue.

Though Casablanca produced no definitive solution of the cross-Channel-Mediterranean issue, it did represent the last real fling of the "either-or" school of thought in American strategic thinking. Hereafter, the U.S. staff would increasingly have to recognize that a new period of complex choices had been ushered in—one that was to characterize strategic planning for the remainder of the war.

“Combinations and permutations”—involving the combined air offensive, Mediterranean, and cross-Channel undertakings—would henceforth be the substance of U.S. strategic planning. The outstanding questions in European strategy down to the actual landings in Normandy in the late spring of 1944 were no longer to be phrased simply in terms of either a Mediterranean or a cross-Channel operation but in terms of defining the precise relationships among a number of possible alternatives in such a way as to preserve the primacy of the effort launched from the United Kingdom. The problem would no longer simply be either this or that undertaking, but rather this and that.

The War Against Japan

Clear-cut as the differences were between American and British approaches to a strategy for Europe, an even sharper divergence of opinion emerged at the Casablanca Conference over the relation of the war against Japan to the war as a whole. As long as plans for defeating Hitler first remained indeterminate, the precise place of the China-Burma-India and Pacific theaters in the over-all strategy of the war remained uncertain. Fear that the war would drag on for years weighed heavily on the U.S. staff. Their anxiety over the indefiniteness of final strategy against Germany was all the greater since the Americans had early assumed the major burden of the war against Japan. It was a serious question whether the American people and the Army could stand the effects of the exhausting, long, drawn-out fight the war with Japan might well become.

Divergency of views had been fore-
shadowed in the exchange of opinions between the military staffs before the conference. The JCS had then informed the British that they still regarded as basically sound the accepted principle of British-American strategy: "To conduct the strategic offensive with maximum forces in the Atlantic-Western European theater at the earliest practicable date, and to maintain the strategic defensive in other theaters with appropriate forces." At the same time the JCS prepared a modified version that gave notice of their intention to develop offensive and defensive operations against Japan parallel with operations in the Mediterranean. The U.S. Chiefs took more seriously than apparently did the British the consequences of giving the Japanese time to consolidate their conquests in the Pacific. Admiral King was especially anxious to counteract what he believed to be an underestimation—by the British—of Japanese capabilities. In Admiral King's opinion, the whole Allied cause would be jeopardized unless constant pressure were maintained to prevent the Japanese from consolidating their conquests.

The two staffs seemed to be in general agreement as to the need to reopen the Burma Road, but the U.S. Chiefs dwelt more on the urgency of doing it.

**Pacific Operations**

At the conference the U.S. and British Chiefs elaborated on these positions. Each time the British brought up the question of all-out measures in the Mediterranean, the Americans would counter with the question of operations in the Pacific. The Americans advanced a number of arguments to justify the importance of the Pacific effort. To bring the war to an end as quickly as possible was the main goal of the Allies. It was vitally necessary for the United States to hold on to the newly won initiative in the Pacific so that preparations could be made for coming to grips with Japan. It was also essential that the large fleet, air, and ground forces present in the theater not be permitted to become inactive or stagnant. As General Marshall put it, the JCS had greater peace of mind about Japan than a year ago. The Japanese were now on the defensive. However, the Americans had still to worry about the threat of raids from Japanese aircraft carriers against U.S. lines of communications to the Pacific and against the American west coast. The Japanese must be permitted no pause. Experience had shown that the Japanese fought with no idea of surrendering and would continue to be aggressive until defeated by attrition.

At the very first meeting of the CCS at Casablanca General Marshall made the first patent move to secure a definite di-

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**Footnotes:**

34 The summary of JCS views was contained in JCS 167/2, 23 Dec 42, title: Basic Strategic Concept for 1943, circulated as CCS 135 on 26 Dec 42 for consideration of the CCS. The JCS paper followed largely the line of thought developed in Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) studies. See: (1) JSSC 1, 11 Dec 42, title: Basic Strategic Concept for 1943; (2) JCS 167, 11 Dec 42, title: Basic Strategic Concept for 1943; and (3) JCS 167/1, 20 Dec 42, title: Basic Strategic Concept for 1943.

35 Min, 49th mtg JCS, 5 Jan 43.

36 CCS 135/2, 5 Jan 43, title: American-British Strategy in 1943. The paper contains a memo by British Chiefs of Staff.

37 Min, 56th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.
vision of Allied resources between the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. He proposed the adoption of the concept that 70 percent go to the Atlantic theater and 30 percent to the Pacific. King, who had made the same suggestion in a meeting of the JCS with the President in Washington before Casablanca, backed him vigorously, estimating that only 15 percent of Allied resources were then engaged against the Japanese. Marshall specifically warned that sufficient resources would have to be kept in the Pacific. Insufficient resources in the Pacific in 1942, he pointed out, had, in fact, jeopardized the concept of defeating Germany first. King emphasized that operations in the Solomons had been hampered from the start by lack of resources and that the demands of Torch had made further advances impossible. This arithmetical approach to the long-standing question of how to balance Allied effort between the Atlantic and the Pacific, suggested by Marshall and King, was passed over as the British Chiefs turned the discussion back to the immediate needs in the European–Mediterranean area.

To allay American concern for the Pacific, Churchill promised that, after the defeat of Hitler, he would turn all British resources to the defeat of Japan. He went so far as to offer to enter into a special treaty with the United States Government to this effect. The President brushed Churchill's offer aside, replying that his word was enough. The President did suggest, however, that they should try to secure a definite "engagement" from the Soviet Union to join in the fight against Japan once Germany was out of the war.

The British Chiefs voiced the fear that operations against Japan would become too extended and lead to an all-out war. The result would be to drain British-American resources and make their efforts against the principal enemy, Germany, unsuccessful. They preferred to see the Allies stand firm upon a more or less fixed line and repel Japanese attacks. Sir Dudley Pound even suggested that it might be a good idea to let the Japanese dig in and disperse their forces, since it would be impossible to capture the Philippines until after the defeat of Germany.

The U.S. and British staff planners were as far apart in their views as their chiefs. To maintain the initiative against Japan, the U.S. planners reasoned, the Allies would have to apply constant pressure upon the Japanese. Such an exertion of force would not only prevent the foe from digging in but would also lessen the size of the Allied effort needed to keep the Pacific islands secure. Since a static defense would be uneconomical in forces, they recommended the continuation of a series of limited offensives—aimed at seizing the Solomons—eastern New Guinea—Rabaul area; capturing Kiska and Agattu Islands in the Aleutians; beginning operations against the Gilberts, Marshalls, and Carolines up to and including Truk, after the fall of Rabaul; and extending the occupation of New Guinea up to the Dutch border.

On the other hand, the British plan-
ners argued that the most effective way of bringing the war to a swift conclusion was to concentrate everything on defeating Germany and then to devote all possible resources against Japan. While Germany was being worn down, only such pressure as was necessary to prevent Japan from damaging Allied interests and from consolidating its conquests should be applied. Offensive undertakings in 1943 should be limited simply to continuing the current Solomons-New Guinea-Rabaul campaign.44

The British Chiefs took up this theme and protested that before setting out to defeat Japan the British and Americans should first defeat Germany. To Marshall the question was whether to keep a large force dormant in the United Kingdom waiting for Germany to crack or to keep a force engaged in an active offense in the Pacific. Marshall and King denied that the proposed Pacific operations would interfere with plans for the build-up in Europe or for Mediterranean operations. King emphasized that the United States had often been close to the brink of disaster in the Pacific. It was not the intention of the United States to plan beyond gaining positions for the final offensive against Japan. In the meantime, steps must be taken to weaken Japan. Marshall added that a hand-to-mouth policy—as in the past—was very uneconomical and that it was necessary to get a secure position in order to know where the Allies stood in the Pacific.45

Although the official declarations of the CCS were hedged by conditions and safeguards to protect the primacy of the European theater, a modus vivendi was worked out whereby the United States could use its forces in the Pacific for operations to retain the initiative against Japan. The JCS put "on the books" not only the continuation of the advance in the South-Southwest Pacific—with Rabaul as the main target—but also the beginning of a Central Pacific offensive. Admiral King presented the U.S. Navy's classic case for a Central Pacific drive to the Philippines via the Marshalls and Truk. General Marshall lent his support to a drive through the Central Pacific after the capture of Rabaul. In any choice between Truk and Burma, however, Marshall favored operations against Burma.46

Operations in the China-Burma-India Theater

The British were as unenthusiastic about extensive commitments for pursuing the initiative against Japan in Burma as in the Pacific. A number of reasons—political and military—accounted for their position. Intent on further Mediterranean advances, they opposed any drain of Allied strength and means from the war against Germany. Their primary concern in the Far East lay, naturally, with the recovery of their imperial territories in southeast Asia, and they feared possible repercussions of Burma operations on the fate of India. In addition, they tended to minimize the importance of China to the Allied war effort.

On the American side there was a long history of favorable relations with China,

44 CCS 153/1, 17 Jan 43, title: Situation To Be Created in Eastern Theater.
45 Min, 60th mtg CCS, 18 Jan 43.

and much sympathy for it in the conflict with the common enemy, Japan. Military as well as political reasons combined in the support of China. On the military side, the U.S. Chiefs hoped—as they had from early in the war—that the manpower and strategic location of China might somehow be utilized in the struggle with Japan. In that case China might eventually serve the Allied cause in a position somewhat analogous to that of the USSR in the war against Germany. At Casablanca Admiral King expressed the view that: “In the European theater Russia was most advantageously placed for dealing with Germany in view of her geographical position and manpower; in the Pacific, China bore a similar relation to the Japanese. It should be our basic policy to provide the manpower resources of Russia and China with the necessary equipment to enable them to fight.”

On the political side there was the President’s predilection for treating China as a great power—an ally to be built up for war and postwar purposes. As a friendly power that had fallen on hard times, China was therefore to be treated with dignity and its morale raised. Despite the U.S. military policy of “keeping China in the war,” the President and his staff did not always see eye to eye on the extent or manner of Allied help. That policy, moreover, had thus far succeeded in eliciting only very limited collaboration from either the Chinese or the British.

By the beginning of 1943 large Japanese ground forces were still in China, and the country had been all but isolated from the rest of the Allied world. To make more use of Chinese bases and manpower, it was obvious that China’s troops would have to be armed and its bases equipped with supplies from the United States and Great Britain on a much greater scale than in 1942, when only a trickle of supplies had reached China, carried by a few transport planes from India over the Hump. Throughout 1942, Allied leaders and strategists had remained in general agreement that they must keep China in the war and appeared to agree that the best way to do it was to reopen land communications through Burma. In the words of the JCS, on the eve of Casablanca, U.S.-British military policy for the Far East for 1943 should be:

Conduct offensive operations in Burma with a view to reopening the supply routes to China, thereby encouraging China, and supplying her with munitions to continue her war effort and maintain, available to us, bases essential for eventual offensive operations against Japan proper.

The negotiations at Casablanca testified to the difficulties encountered by General Marshall and the rest of the U.S. staff in dealing with the China problem. When the conferees assembled, the British and Chinese had reached an impasse over proposed limited operations against Burma. The British were already engaged in the ill-fated Akyab offensive (code name CANNIBAL) but planned a very modest advance to the banks of the Chindwin River (code name RAVENOUS). In conjunction with this move, Chinese troops from Yunnan were to enter north Burma to exert pressure on the Japanese. In the eyes of the Chinese, however, the agreement was conditional upon the presence of British Fleet units in the Bay.

\[\text{Min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43.}\]

\[\text{CCS 135, 26 Dec 42, title: Strategic Concept for 1943.}\]
of Bengal, in order to ensure naval supremacy and prevent the Japanese from reinforcing north Burma. Chiang Kai-shek also maintained that the British had promised to make seven divisions available for the ground operations, but now planned to use only three. Since the British Eastern Fleet had neither capital ships nor destroyers to screen them, the British refused to provide any naval demonstration in the Bay of Bengal. The Chinese, in turn, stated that without such a show of force they would not attack.

Throughout the meetings at Casablanca, the U.S. Chiefs tried to convince the British of the importance of the RAVENOUS and ANAKIM (capture of Burma) operations. The British admitted that naval supremacy in the Bay of Bengal would be necessary before any conquest of Burma could be carried out, but pointed to the depleted condition of their Eastern Fleet. Admiral King was willing to send six submarines to help the British out. The execution of RAVENOUS, he observed, would help secure the air supply route from India to China.

Not only would the north Burma operation (RAVENOUS) help Chinese morale, the JCS argued, it would also be of value to the Pacific. Marshall stressed the eventual economy in tonnage that would result from the lessening of Japanese pressure in the Southwest Pacific. He pointed to the sacrifice that the United States had made in order to provide Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell with the necessary troops. Shipping vitally needed for Alaska, Hawaii, and the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) had been drawn off to move 6,000 men to Stilwell. The Chief of Staff’s efforts to convince the British met a sharp setback on 16 January when Chiang, pointing to the lack of British naval forces, communicated to the President his refusal to support RAVENOUS.

As the possibilities for RAVENOUS became remote, the JCS turned their attention to the more distant and more important ANAKIM operation, projected for late 1943. Admiral King opposed the British assertion that landing craft and naval cover would be the chief obstacles. He pointed out that ANAKIM was still some ten months away and that by that time the destroyer and landing craft situations might be vastly improved. If the Burma Road were opened, he argued, it would not only bolster the Chinese but also permit increased air efforts against Japan and Japanese shipping. Then, striking a note that was to become quite familiar in later Anglo-American military negotiations, Marshall warned that, unless ANAKIM were undertaken, a situation might arise in the Pacific at any time that would “necessitate the United States regretfully withdrawing from the commitments in the European theater.”

In effect he served notice that the United States would not jeopardize its Pacific responsibilities if a major cross-Channel operation were indefinitely postponed. King’s offer to supply the deficiencies in landing craft and naval cover from U.S. production and by diversion from the

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49 Min, 55th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.
50 Min, 51st mtg JCS, 14 Jan 43.
51 Min, 55th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.
52 Min, mtg JCS and President, 16 Jan 43.
53 Min, 59th mtg CCS, 17 Jan 43.
54 See Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington Government Printing Office, 1953), Ch. VII, which contains a brief discussion of the issues relating to the CBI theater before and during Casablanca.
Pacific—if necessary—deprived the British of their chief reasons for objecting to Anakim. The British Chiefs agreed that plans and preparations for staging the operation in 1943 should be carried out, but final approval would be withheld until summer, when an estimate of the over-all situation could be made. Operation Ravenous would be undertaken even though the Chinese advance from Yunnan had been called off.

The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the U.S. air force in China should be reinforced as far as practicable. The President estimated that 200 to 250 planes should be sent, including heavy bombers, which could be based in India. The effect on China of such aid would, in the President's opinion, be "largely political" but it would also hurt Japan. He believed that aircraft based in India could hit Japanese shipping as well as conduct raids over Japan proper. Marshall carefully pointed out that any increase in bombers or transports would be a very expensive move since the planes, especially the transports, could be used to better advantage in other theaters.

Old Concepts and New Keynotes

The upshot of the discussions on the Pacific-Far East operations at Casablanca was a series of limited and contingent agreements. The United States was to conduct a two-way advance in the Pacific through the Central and South-Southwest Pacific. Plans and preparations were to be made for the recapture of Burma in 1943, but final decision on the operation was to be postponed until the summer of 1943. Increased aid to China in the way of air forces and transports would be provided by the United States. The delegates agreed that the Pacific-Far East operations for 1943 were to be aimed at maintaining pressure on Japan, holding the initiative, and attaining positions of readiness for a full-scale offensive against Japan immediately upon the defeat of Germany.

No real over-all plan for the defeat of Japan emerged from Casablanca. The U.S. Chiefs were still thinking, to a considerable degree, in terms of meeting current threats to Allied positions in the Pacific and particularly of protecting the sea and air routes to Australia—reminiscent of 1942 defensive, opportunistic strategy. They were still thinking largely in abstract terms of the eventual utilization of the manpower and geography of China. Even the United States-United Kingdom understanding on the Pacific advances was essentially an agreement "in principle" of the 1942 variety—with method, timing, means, and ultimate objectives left largely undefined. Measures to be used in the defeat of Japan were vaguely defined in general terms—blockade, bombing, and assault or attack by sea. It was apparent that the Allies would continue, in the foreseeable future, to go farther in the Pacific as well as in the Mediterranean.

Nevertheless, the U.S. staff sounded significant keynotes at Casablanca for its subsequent dealings with the British in 1943.
planning the war against Japan. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff served notice on the British that henceforth more attention would have to be given by the Allies to the question of the strategic offensive against Japan. General Marshall, in effect, notified the British that continued Mediterranean advances would have to be balanced with an enlargement of the scope of operations in the Pacific. His presentation implied that if there were to be no large-scale cross-Channel operation in 1943, the Americans would proceed further in the Pacific—an advance that the U.S. Navy and General Douglas MacArthur in particular would welcome. In this modified form the “Pacific Alternative” emerged as a possible lever for balancing forces and means among diversionary operations in the highly operational stage of the war and for paving the way for a return to the principle of concentration for the cross-Channel effort. The Chief of Staff’s advocacy of large-scale operations in Burma, moreover, focused attention on another possible counterpoise to extending operations in the Mediterranean. Both of these restrictive factors were to figure prominently in the play of subsequent British-American negotiations, compromise, and agreement over final strategy against Germany. In short, Casablanca foreshadowed the larger role that thinking and planning for the strategic offensive against Japan would come to play in Allied strategic councils, both in terms of fixing European strategy and in accomplishing, ultimately, the defeat of Japan itself.

The “Unconditional Surrender” Announcement

On 24 January the President and the Prime Minister held a press conference on the lawn of the President’s villa. Hatless in the bright sunlight and carrying the familiar long cigarette holder, the President sat beside Churchill, who was puffing on one of his omnipresent big cigars. In the course of giving the reporters his comments on the work of the conference, Roosevelt surprised Mr. Churchill by enunciating his now-famous unconditional surrender formula for the defeat of the Axis Powers. By unconditional surrender, the President explained with emphasis, he did not mean the destruction of the peoples of Germany, Italy, and Japan, but the destruction of the evil philosophies that had taken hold in those lands. Although the matter had been discussed during the conference by the two leaders, Churchill had made some reservations on the application of the formula to Italy. The British War Cabinet, however, had no such qualms and recommended that it apply to all three Axis Powers. The Prime Minister evidently had been given no forewarning by the President that the announcement was to be released to the press at this time, but despite his astonishment Churchill recovered quickly and gave the concept his full support. At the earnest request of the President and the Prime Minister, Generals Giraud and de Gaulle managed to shake hands for the benefit of the photogr-
Casablanca in Retrospect

It appeared at the time to the American staff that the thoroughness of British preparations and the long experience of the British in international negotiations had a decisive influence at the conference. In retrospect, the pains taken by the British seem to have been somewhat unnecessary, given the uncertainties of the situation and the unreconciled views on the American side. Despite his forceful presentation of the American military case, General Marshall succeeded in making no real change in the direction Allied strategy had taken in the second half of 1942. The Casablanca Conference merely recognized that the initiative would be maintained by the Allies both in the Pacific and in the Mediterranean, and defined short-range objectives in those areas in terms of operations in the South-Southwest Pacific and against Sicily. No real long-range plans for the defeat of the Axis Powers emerged. The questions of Asiatic and cross-Channel operations were simply left open for future negotiation. Agreement on a round-the-clock combined bomber offensive was reached but it was not tied in precisely with Mediterranean or cross-Channel operations. Nor were the relationships among these operations and Pacific and Asiatic undertakings clearly defined.

The Casablanca Conference was thus indecisive on basic strategic issues. The indecisiveness appeared to the U.S. staff to be a victory for the British. If Casablanca marked essentially the reaffirma-

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61 General Somervell had been Assistant Chief of

62 Pers ltr, Brig Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer to Gen Handy, 22 Jan 43, Paper 5, Item 1a, Exec 3.

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tion of the old in strategic planning, it was also a foreshadowing of the new. The simple terms in which War Department planners had tried to solve the problem of limiting operations in subsidiary theaters had failed. The problem had become so complex—in the new phase of the war—that they would have to start out all over again and find new formulas. However far apart the two nations appeared to be on operational strategy, there was a hopeful sign for the future in the staffs' agreement at last on a general system of command to govern combined British and U.S. operations. The Americans, especially, could take comfort from the incorporation in the set of guiding principles adopted of the conception of unified command—under a supreme commander—that Marshall and his staff had been urging from early in the war.

Significant portents emerged in the American staff's stress on enlarging the scope of the war against Japan and, above all, in the President's announcement of the unconditional surrender concept. So important did the President regard this statement of purpose that he suggested to the correspondents that they might call the Casablanca Conference the "'Unconditional Surrender' Meeting." In the final analysis, his announcement of the unconditional surrender formula was the most significant contribution of the conference—one that, for better or worse, was to have profound influence on the subsequent conduct of the war.

The President had actually informed the JCS of his intention to support this concept as the basic Allied aim in the war in a meeting at the White House on 7 January, one week before the conference. No study of the meaning of this formula for the conduct of the war was made by either the Army or the Joint Staff before or during the conference—a striking illustration of the want of understanding between the White House and the military staffs. Nor did the Combined Chiefs of Staff discuss the significance of the concept to which the President and Prime Minister committed themselves publicly at Casablanca and thereby raised issues long to be debated in the war and postwar periods.

In late 1942 a State Department subcommittee on security problems, which included Army and Navy representatives, had come to the conclusion that unconditional surrender should be imposed upon Germany and Japan, though negotiations might be carried on with Italy. Norman Davis, chairman of the subcommittee, informally imparted the early conclusions of this group to the President, but the subcommittee never made a formal recommendation. The effect of the informal recommendation on the President's thinking and announcement is a moot point. See Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation: 1939-1945, General Foreign Policy Series 15, released February 1950 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 127.

For a description of the background of the President's announcement, see: Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 695-97, 972-74; and Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 684-88. Apparently the only body that discussed the unconditional surrender policy formally at the time of Casablanca was the British War Cabinet.

For a provocative discussion, based largely upon circumstantial evidence, of the background of the enunciation of the concept, see Guenther Moltmann, "Die Genesis der Unconditional-Surrender Forderung," in Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, Vols. 3 and 4 (March and April 1956).

The postwar debate over unconditional surrender may be traced in a number of accounts. For arguments against the concept see: (1) J. F. C. Fuller, "The Lost Peace: An Analysis of the European Strategy of World War II," Army Ordnance, XXXI, No. 161 (March–April 1947), 413-16; (2) Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1949), pp. 14ff.; (3) Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, pp. 123, 166, 382, 477, 549-51, 713-14; (4) Russell Grenfell, Unconditional Hatred
Leaving aside its external effects, this principle was to have important internal consequences for the coalition. It is significant that the President did not set forth as his war aim the objective of restoring the European or Asian balance of power—which, to some observers at least, the United States had been drawn into the global and coalition struggle because the balance of power on the opposite shores of both the Atlantic and the Pacific had been upset. Nor was his concern here with the terms of settlement. What the President appeared to be offering at the time was a simple formula of common and resolute purpose—a slogan that would rally the Allies for victory and drive home to friend and foe alike that this time there would be no negotiated peace and no “escape clauses” offered by another Fourteen Points. In particular, it might serve to reassure the Russians—who were bound to be disappointed by the continued failure of the Western Powers to open the second front in Europe—of the uncompromising determination of the Western Powers to wage a fight to the finish with Germany. It was vague enough to permit general agreement on the planning for the defeat of Germany and yet specific enough to prevent internal dissension over the terms of surrender. But, in retrospect, this concept, which the other partners came to accept, served to conceal the divergent national objectives back of the common strategy eventually worked out by the Western Powers with the Soviet ally. It is, of course, still a moot point whether anything more or less than the single-track idea of unconditional surrender would have succeeded in this “strange alliance.”

For American staff planning, the President’s announcement was to prove no less important. To date the President had asserted control over the U.S. military strategy on grounds of policy. The specific objectives of the President, for which he was prepared to run serious political and military risks, even against the better judgment of his military advisers, were the traditional defensive objectives of U.S. policy—essentially the security of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. These were all reflected in the politico-military policies he had actively supported in 1942—establishing the line Australia-Hawaii, keeping China in the war, maintaining the lines of communication to the United Kingdom, invading North Africa. Beyond these limits the United States had no well-defined objectives. It may be conjectured that at this point in the war, when these objectives were secured, the President passed at once in his mind, impatiently, to the peace conferences that would follow a clear-cut victory, at which he could appear—uncommitted and disinterested—to emulate the purposes, while avoiding the mistakes, of President Wilson. Indeed, from the beginning of the war he had shown a strong disposition to postpone territorial and political settlements
until after the war. Whatever he may have thought, his apparent reluctance to spell out his political objectives discouraged, though it did not entirely prevent the U.S. military authorities from expecting and requesting guidance on the questions of national policy that would in fact be influenced—or simply settled—by future operations.

The strategic planners, who had been concerned in 1940, 1941, and 1942 over the President’s apparent indifference to military expediency, were doubtless pleased to have a freer hand to work out their problems in strictly military terms. But it was by no means a coincidence that, as the war progressed, they would begin to note, and even to insist, that there were really no “strictly military” problems in grand strategy and to keep closer relations with the White House and the State Department in the hope of getting guidance (and, doubtless, of exercising some influence) on the “political” decisions.

Indeed, the principal political decisions that the President made during the midwar years with reference to military operations were made by default. For this reason, of course, they cannot be documented and dated in the same way that active decisions can be documented. This fact is all the more true because the CCS and the JCS, the only bodies that had any standing on military operations, were reluctant to raise political questions.

For the U.S. military staff, unconditional surrender was to serve essentially as a military objective, reinforcing their own notions of a concentrated, decisive war. To them unconditional surrender provided a definable goal that was to be attained as expeditiously as possible. Winning the war decisively would obtain top priority, just as it had in the war games held in peacetime. A convenient handle had thus been provided to the military that could be used in formulating their plans. Henceforth the basic premise of all planning to defeat Germany and Japan would be the accomplishment of unconditional surrender.

At the same time, the formula complicated the task of the U.S. military staff in midwar. It meant that they would now—largely without consistent Presidential guidance—have to work out the precise terms of the offensive phase of the war through negotiation with the Allies. The President’s concern in 1943-44 would be primarily that of meeting the contractual relations with the Allies. With the British, the close partner, this would mean seeing to it that somehow their notion of a cross-Channel operation was reconciled with the American. With the Russians, with whom relations were not so close, it signified continuing to bolster the Soviet war effort with lend-lease and the earliest possible establishment of a second front in Europe. In the President’s view, a firm alliance with the USSR and Great Britain must be sedulously cultivated. He himself would be serving as a medi-

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ator among the Allies—essentially a Wilsonian position.

The great debate on European strategy between the Americans and the British—opened by the decision for TORCH—endured down to the summer of 1944. It is not surprising that the American strategists, left largely on their own to resolve the problems of offensive warfare with the Allied staffs, should take refuge in their conventional view of war as a big engagement. But only gradually did the Americans—with Marshall as the foremost spokesman—win their way back to the notion of waging a war of mass and concentration on the Continent. Their task was to secure agreement of the President, the British, and eventually the Russians. In the debate with the Allies, the trump card held by the U.S. staff was the fresh, flexible military power of the United States—the forces it had built up and still had not committed. The series of decisions reached at the great international conferences of 1943 and 1944—from Casablanca through the Second Quebec—reflect the compromises worked out by the British and Americans—between the principles of opportunism and long-range commitments, between a war of attrition and a war of mass and concentration. In the meantime, old fronts were being expanded and new fronts were being opened all over the world. Significant as the signs and portents of Casablanca proved to be in the final analysis, more significant for the immediate future was the prospect that the advances already begun in the Mediterranean and the Pacific would be carried on in the two areas in which U.S. deployment had been especially heavy in 1942.
CHAPTER II

Advance in the Mediterranean

January–May 1943

The Casablanca Conference left open the question of what would be done after Husky. With the battle for Tunisia yet to be won and the Sicilian invasion projected for July, operations in the Mediterranean would continue to lay heavy claims on the resources of the Western partners. What was to be the extent of the Mediterranean advance? At what point in geography and time would operations that General Marshall and the Army planners regarded as “subsidiary” have to be stopped in order to undertake a major cross-Channel operation?

Critical Shortages and the Battle of the Atlantic

The Shipping Crisis

In the early months of 1943 all roads led the military planners to the shipping bottleneck. The demands of the Mediterranean campaigns bled Atlantic shipping. Husky reinforced Mediterranean claims for escorts and transports and made necessary a search for combat loaders and landing craft—all in short supply. At the same time, the U-boat menace in the Atlantic made a tight situation even tighter.

The CCS and their planners had recognized at Casablanca that shipping would be “the controlling factor” during the coming year. The imbalance between personnel and cargo shipping and the shortage of escort vessels affected all strategic calculations. Only two transports, Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth, were fast enough to cross oceans without escort. The solution to the problem was partly one of increasing production, partly one of reducing destruction. With the defeat of the U-boat accepted as a first charge upon British-American resources, the CCS had approved a program to lessen losses by enemy submarine action. It envisaged a bombing offensive against the submarine pens and facilities and defensive measures such as using more escort vessels, escort carriers, and long-range, shore-based air cover for convoys as soon as they became available. The gravity of the situation compelled the Combined Chiefs to admit that security of sea communications would in all likelihood not improve before late summer, when adequate escort vessels would be on hand for convoy duty.¹

¹ (1) CCS 155/1, 19 Jan 43, title: Conduct of the War in 1943. (2) CCS 160, 19 Jan 43, title: Minimum Escort Requirements To Maintain the Sea
In view of the high Allied shipping losses in 1942 there was real cause for alarm. The losses up to the end of 1942 had exceeded new construction by well over one million tons. During the year, enemy submarines had sunk 1,027 ships, totaling over 5,700,000 gross tons, in the Atlantic. Without control of the seas, the New World might be cut off from the Old and U.S. military strength and resources might have no appreciable effect on the overseas theaters of war. During the winter of 1942–43 the heavy gales and storms in the North Atlantic curtailed losses somewhat, but when the weather broke in March 1943, the U-boats, operating in wolf packs, sank over 500,000 gross tons of shipping, mainly from convoys along the North Atlantic route.

Thereafter, the U-boat menace, while still serious, steadily became less important. The estimated loss rates accepted at Casablanca actually proved to be pessimistic for the period from January through June. The significant fact that the associated powers were able to add over two million gross tons of shipping to their fleets during the same time, in spite of submarine losses, indicated clearly that the U-boats were waging a losing battle. Nevertheless, the submarine threat prevented the optimum use of available shipping by forcing vessels to sail in convoys or on longer, less dangerous routes. The total turn-around time for ships on short runs was often increased by as much as one fourth because the ships had to wait for convoys and hold their speeds to that of the slowest in the convoy.

In March, when the U-boats were taking their heaviest toll, the Americans and British were compelled once again to stop convoys to the USSR over the northern route. The pressure of preparations for the Sicilian operation upon shipping, coupled with the dangers posed by German naval and air concentrations along the northern route, forced the cancellation of the convoys. To offset Stalin's disappointment, Churchill and Roosevelt promised in the early spring of 1943 to do their best to increase shipments via the Persian Gulf and Vladivostok. By June, recurrent crises on the northern route and the failure of the Persian Gulf route, even under American development, to live up to expectations, led to the transfer of fifty-three cargo ships and six tankers in the Pacific to Soviet registry.

Communications of the United Nations. (9) Min, 65th mtg CCS, 21 Jan 43. (4) CCS 170/2, 23 Jan 43, title: Final Rpt to the President and Prime Minister Summarizing Decisions by the CCS.


Added strain was also put on the fulfillment of the British import program for civilian requirements. The inroads made by Axis submarines upon the British merchant fleet and British inability to replace their losses had been forcing the United Kingdom to rely more and more heavily upon U.S. shipping. In November 1942 the President had accepted the goal of 27,000,000 tons of imports for 1943 and had agreed to make up for the British the mounting deficiencies in tonnage. But the changing military situation during the early part of 1943 created additional shipping demands upon the United States, and the import commitment was often relegated to a secondary place.

No definite arrangements on the amount or character of this aid had been made at Casablanca. The intense submarine effort of March and the fact that U.S. bottoms carried only 366,000 tons of imports to the United Kingdom during the first quarter aroused the British to the seriousness of the situation. In March the British Chiefs delivered requests to the JCS for sufficient shipping to carry 1,800,000 tons of imports during the first half of 1943, as well as for shipping aid in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Pacific areas. The justification for the import assistance was based upon the Presidential commitment of November and the need for supplementary help to complete the strategic program set forth at Casablanca. The British stated they would not be able to provide any shipping for BOLERO. In the opinion of Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross, Army Chief of Transportation, to fulfill the British request for import aid would mean that 225,000 U.S. troops would not be moved overseas. If the operational aid were also approved, it would cost another 375,000 troops and reduce the overseas lift figure from 1,400,000 to 800,000 for the year.

The CCS were not allowed to consider the problem, for the President established a special board headed by Harry Hopkins to study it. The CCS did, however, present to the Hopkins Board their priority list for present and future operations. Four categories were set forth: (1) HUSKY, (2) SICKLE (build-up for the bomber offensive against Germany) and South Pacific, (3) ANAKIM, and (4) BOLERO. The CCS also agreed that the minimum fixed charges on British-American shipping for the United Kingdom and the USSR should be met.

The chief difficulty in meeting the import demands would come during the second quarter, when shipping would be at a premium. The Army was faced with pressing demands not only for the Atlantic and Mediterranean but also for operations in the Pacific aimed at Rabaul. Resolving the problem of the relative importance of British civilian and Allied military requirements appeared quite simple to the Army. General Somervell and General Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division (OPD), advised Marshall that cuts should be made in nonmilitary programs if Casablanca plans were to be carried

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* Memo, Gross for Marshall, 17 Mar 43, sub: Re: 183/1, Review of Availability of U.N. Shipping, filed with CCS 183/1 in ABC 560 (26 Feb 43) 1-A.
* Memo, Somervell for Hopkins, 22 Mar 43, sub: Availability of U.N. Shipping, filed with CPS 59/3 in ABC 560 (26 Feb 43) 1-A.
* For a discussion of Pacific requirements and shipping, see Ch. IV below.
out. Both Marshall and King felt that it was the duty of the JCS to spell out the necessary reduction in the import program.

The President did not accept the views of his military advisers. He accepted instead the counsels of Hopkins and Lewis Douglas, War Shipping Administration (WSA) Administrator, and promised the British 7,000,000 tons of assistance during 1943. In spite of the hard fact that a large part of this aid was to be given during the critical second quarter, the goal came very close to being attained by the end of June. Of the 12,000,000 tons to be carried in British and U.S. bottoms planned for by the British, 11,700,000 were carried. Provision was made also for British operational requests, and sixty-one sailings were set up to fill British needs in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean areas.

The President had assessed the situation more accurately than his military advisers, since the decline in submarine sinkings and the rise in merchant construction had allowed the merchant fleet to carry more than indicated in the early estimates. When the first through Mediterranean convoy since 1941 sailed via Gibraltar to Alexandria in May, the prospect of saving some two million tons of shipping for productive employment elsewhere by using this shorter route further brightened the over-all picture.

The rosy hue was reflected by Leahy when he wrote to Donald Nelson in April 1943: “In spite of all losses, our shipping of both men and materials overseas is on schedule as planned. It does not appear that shipping will limit our requirements in 1944.”

This sanguine statement was only partially justified. The total of 496,844 U.S. troops sent overseas to the four main operational theaters during the first half of 1943 was somewhat less than the planned total of 527,200 set forth at Casablanca. Deployment for the North Africa-Husky operations had been expanded from the planned increment of 184,000 to 292,385. The South-Southwest Pacific had received 121,581—well over the planned increment of 79,200. That these additions were at the expense of BOLERO is clear. The total of 250,000 men projected for shipment to the United Kingdom had dwindled to 65,830, or approximately 26 percent of the planned figure.

The low priority accorded BOLERO led Army planners to estimate that only six divisions would be on hand in the United Kingdom by the end of 1943 and forced the senior Joint planners—the Joint Strategic Survey Committee—to reject BOLERO, even as modified by the Casablanca agreement, as impossible.

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14 (1) Min, 73d mtg JCS, 9 Apr 43. (2) JCS 251/2, 10 Apr 43, title: Allocation of Allied Shipping.
15 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43, Chs. XXV and XXVI. In this volume the misunderstandings between Somervell and the British on the import program are treated in detail, as is the part of Douglas in influencing the President.
17 Ltr, Leahy to Nelson, 29 Apr 43, incl to JCS 259/1, 22 Apr 43, title: U.S. Production Requirements, 1944.
18 (1) CCS 172, 22 Jan 43, title: Shipping Capabilities for BOLERO Build-up. The paper was prepared by Somervell with the collaboration of Lord Leathers and noted by the CCS. (2) STM–30, 1 Jan 48.
of attainment. Since available shipping could not supply the additional troops required for the active theaters and still effect the necessary build-up in the United Kingdom, it became obvious that an invasion of the Continent in force during 1943 would not be feasible. Shipping rather than troops limited grand strategy at this juncture. Although conditions would improve steadily during the remainder of the year, it would be impossible to amass sufficient troops and equipment in the British Isles in time to take advantage of the good weather period for a 1943 cross-Channel attack.

**Aircraft**

Deficiencies in aircraft, secondary only to those in ships, were underscored by the Battle of the Atlantic. The AAF interpreted the agreement at Casablanca to conduct "the heaviest possible bomber offensive against the German war effort" to mean that all production of heavy bombers, other than those specifically required in other theaters, would be assigned to the United Kingdom. Heavy-bomber deliveries had been expanded from 2,576 in 1942, or 6 percent of all aircraft, to 9,393 in 1943, or 14 percent, but supply still failed to meet demand. It followed logically that, while this condition prevailed, any increased allocation for another theater would automatically mean a corresponding decrease in the build-up for the bomber offensive against Germany (Sickle). The procedure would be similar to "robbing Peter to pay Paul," with Sickle constantly doubling for Peter.

The first diversion followed close on the heels of the Casablanca Conference, when Arnold informed Chiang Kai-shek that a heavy bombardment group was being assigned to the Tenth Air Force for operations in China. In March two B-17 groups were diverted to the Twelfth Air Force in North Africa to meet the growing needs of the theater, and one B-24 group was scheduled for SWPA for the third quarter of 1943 as a result of the Pacific conference held in Washington. These reallocations were in line with the various troop diversions and in accord with the low priority given Sickle until mid-March. In the light of the slow expansion of air force ground troops resulting from the shortage of transports and the added fact that Bolero ship losses were not being replaced, the status of the U.S. bomber offensive was not only discouraging but even alarming.
The heavy shipping losses of March worried the President and caused him to inquire about using B-24's based on Newfoundland, Greenland, and Iceland and escort carriers in the North Atlantic against the U-boat. Marshall and King informed him that eighty B-24's would be operating from these bases by 1 June. This number would be bolstered by some B-24's of the AAF Anti-Submarine Command and by twelve B-17's that were being sent to Newfoundland. The lone escort carrier on the North Atlantic run would be joined by two more in April. The British also intended to add a total of four escort carriers to the North Atlantic and northern Soviet convoy routes.  

To help meet the critical situation, the CCS decided to provide 255 long-range planes for antisubmarine work in the North Atlantic by 1 July, seventy-five to be supplied by the U.S. Army. The British also desired to augment the air effort against the U-boats in the Bay of Biscay, but this occasioned strong protests from Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews—who on 5 February had succeeded General Eisenhower as Commanding General, European Theater of Operations—against any further diversion from his already overworked bomber forces. He argued that the use of 160 additional bombers for that task would adversely affect Husky and give only a small return in view of the number of planes employed. His stand was supported by the Air Forces and the JCS.  

Thus, during the early 1943 period, not only did the submarines sink Allied ships and supplies, thereby restricting the growth of Allied strength, but they also forced scarce bombers into antisubmarine warfare. Search and attack aircraft were employed for convoy protection and patrols rather than for bombing Germany's war effort. British bombers devoted 90 percent of their bomb tonnage and U.S. bombers 63 percent of theirs during the first six months of 1943 to largely unsuccessful attacks upon the submarine pens and facilities along the French coast.  

Like the indirect effects of the submarines upon the shipping situation, the intangible results of the aircraft diversions to the antisubmarine war were far reaching. For example, the battle with the submarines brought to a head a conflict between the American services on the use and control of long-range aircraft. The crux of the matter lay in the different concepts of antisubmarine warfare held by the Army and Navy. The Navy assigned long-range planes to frontier commands, fleets, and task forces as integral, fixed parts of the command. The Army, on the other hand, visualized the creation of a mobile striking force, set up as a theater command, operating directly under the JCS. The striking force would be shifted to meet the requirements of the situation and could nullify the mobile advantage of the U-boats. The force would be a defensive weapon; it could also become an offen-
sive "hunt and kill" unit, seeking out and destroying submarines wherever and whenever they could be located.29 The differences between the Navy fixed-force procedure and the Army concept of a mobile striking force proved to be insoluble and at one point the President intimated that he would settle the matter himself. He told Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Army Deputy Chief of Staff: "Show me a map and I can easily make a decision"—a statement reminiscent of his earlier solution of the controversy over the Army-Navy boundaries in the Panama-Caribbean area.30

In an attempt to break this impasse, the Army offered to turn over all of its antisubmarine activities to the Navy in

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29 (1) Memo, Dr. Edward L. Bowles for Gens Marshall and McNarney, 3 Mar 43, sub: Recommendations—Army Air Anti-Submarine Effort, WDCSA 560 Anti-Submarine Operations. (2) JCS 958, 19 Apr 43, title: Air Offensive Against the U-Boat. The bulk of correspondence concerning the use of aircraft against U-boats and the later jurisdictional dispute over control of antisubmarine warfare and strategic air forces will be found in WDCSA 560 Anti-Submarine Operations. (3) Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, A Naval Record (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1952), pp. 462–71, contains the naval side of the dispute.


The earlier solution referred to the decision reached at a cabinet meeting on 12 December 1941 to establish unity of command over the Panama Coastal Frontier under the Army and over the Caribbean Coastal Frontier under the Navy. This decision is discussed in a draft chapter, "The Caribbean in Wartime," in the second volume of the subseries, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, written for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II by Stetson Conn, Byron Fairchild, and Rose C. Engelman.

General McNarney had seen service in the War Plans Division in 1939 and was a member of the Special Observers Group in London in 1941. In January 1942 he became chairman of the Reorganization Committee of the War Department and in March he was made Deputy Chief of Staff.

return for recognition by the latter that all long-range striking forces (strategic air forces) were properly the responsibility of the Army.31 To overcome the Navy's doubts about accepting this quid pro quo, Marshall argued that the present use of long-range aircraft was uneconomical and inefficient and would be condemned by the public if the facts were known. He went on to say, "...we must put our own house in order, and quickly, in order to justify our obligation to the country." Furthermore, he warned King that Secretary Stimson would take the problem to the President unless the Army conditions attached to the transfer of aircraft were accepted.32 Reluctantly King informed Marshall of Navy concurrence, although he still believed that the question of strategic air forces belonged more properly to the future.33

Thus, the indirect as well as the direct influence of the German submarine warfare during this era was far reaching. Merchant shipping, escort vessels, and long-range aircraft, all in short supply and in the No. 1 priority production group, were directly concerned. The need for escort vessels hindered the construction of cargo shipping and of offensive naval vessels; the shortage of shipping prevented the completion of Allied
plans and programs in the Atlantic; and
the diversion of bombers to the defensive task of stopping U-boats delayed the process of softening up Germany. Although none of these effects altered the final outcome, they did inject added elements of delay.

Windup of the African Campaign

While the Battle of the Atlantic posed a serious but declining threat to British and American plans, programs, and resources, the continuing drain of U.S. military strength and resources to the Mediterranean in the first half of 1943 confirmed the worst fears of the Army planners. Early British and American hopes for a quick victory in North Africa had been disappointed. After the successful landings on the African coast in November 1942, the swift Allied dash toward Tunisia had bogged down—stalled by heavy rains, mud, the poor and slender lines of overland transportation, inadequate airfields, shortages of gasoline, and enemy resistance. By the turn of the year a temporary stalemate was in effect on the Tunisian front. In the early weeks of 1943 the British, Americans, and Germans concentrated on building up strength for the final contest for Tunisia. The Germans took advantage of the short air and sea lines of communication between Sicily and Tunisia to effect a rapid build-up of heavy reinforcements. The Allies, whose advance units had outrun their main supply lines and bases, were faced with the dismal fact that the nearest ports of entry available to them—Bône and Philippeville—had only limited capacity.

In February Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps, which had been closely pressed in its retreat through Libya and Tripolitania by the British driving from the east, established itself on the Mareth Line in southeast Tunisia. The widely dispersed and thinly held positions of the long Allied line permitted the enemy to launch his final offensive thrusts. In mid-February the enemy struck westward from Faid Pass and broke through the Kasserine Pass. When forced to withdraw, he struck at the Medjez-el-Bab area.

These successes proved ephemeral. A series of developments on the Allied side sealed the enemy's fate. When the British Eighth Army arrived at the Mareth Line, Allied forces were reorganized, and new command arrangements for a great offensive were put into effect. General Alexander became General Eisenhower's deputy and was given direct charge of the 18 Army Group, composed of the British First Army, the British Eighth Army, the United States II Corps, and the French units on the Tunisian front. A Mediterranean Air Command was set up under Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder, with Maj. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz (USA) as Commander, Northwest African Air Force. Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham became Naval Commander in Chief, Mediterranean. The rains let up, the roads were improved, the railroad was modernized with American methods and equipment, and gasoline pipelines were built and extended to the front. As a result, a greater number of Allied troops could be moved to the front and maintained there.

The last phase of the Tunisia Campaign began on 20 March. Allied naval
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and air forces took a heavy toll of German air and sea transport moving across the Strait of Sicily. The Allies broke through the Mareth Line. The German and Italian forces under Generaloberst Juergen von Arnim, hemmed in at the tip of northern Tunisia, fought desperately, but in the end had to yield. The British captured Tunis on 7 May, and on the same day U.S. patrols drove into Bizerte. On the 13th, all organized enemy resistance came to an end in North Africa, and the Allies were in full command of the southern littoral of the Mediterranean.34

Build-up in North Africa

The windup of the African campaign required far heavier outlays of forces than originally envisaged in planning for TORCH. More service, ground combat, and air troops had to be used. From the beginning, U.S. service troops had been in very short supply. In March, after attempts to make use of native Arab labor had proved unsatisfactory, U.S. service troops began to arrive in substantial numbers.35 More combat strength was required—as General Eisenhower had stressed to the War Department—both for garrison forces in Morocco to guard against the danger of a German thrust against the Allied forces via Spain, and for the final campaign in Tunisia.36 Air units and replacements of all types—fighter, bomber, and observation—were urgently called for.37 The prospective Husky operation imposed additional claims for forces.

The War Department sought to balance and fulfill the needs of General Eisenhower for both campaigns.38 In the process, General Marshall and his staff strove to eliminate the confusion, haste, and waste—and the volume of communications between Washington and the theater headquarters—that had accompanied the mounting of Torch in late 1942. Procedures between the zone of interior and the overseas command for loading convoys and controlling the dispatch of units and replacements were improved and standardized.39 Despite efforts to put deployment on an orderly basis, shipping problems—including transport and escort shortages and limited port capacity—continued to complicate the dispatch of troops to North Africa. In February, General

34 An account of the plans and operations of the U.S. Army in the Tunisia Campaign is contained in George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957).
35 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43, Ch. XV.
36 Memo, Gen Handy, AG ODS OPD, for CG ASF (Attn: Maj Gen Wilhelm D. Styer), 27 Mar 43, sub:
37 Rpt of ASW on Conditions in Casablanca, OPD 381 Africa (1-27-43), II.
39 See, for example: (1) memo, Lt Col Alfred D. Starbird for Col Claude B. Ferenbaugh, 24 Feb 43, no sub, before Tab 16, Item 1b, Exec 3; and (2) BIGOT-HUSKY msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Eisenhower for Handy, 30 Apr 43, CM-OUT 12614. BIGOT was the code for messages dealing with plans for future operations.
Eisenhower informed the Chief of Staff that the personnel shipping capacity scheduled for convoys to North Africa until June was inadequate to fulfill the needs for the Tunisia Campaign and to bring in the additional combat and service troops required for Husky. As a result, he had to “cannibalize” the 3d Division, which was earmarked for Husky.\(^{40}\)

Despite the efforts of the War Department to limit deployment for Mediterranean ventures, it began to be evident soon after Casablanca that it would be as difficult to limit forces for Husky as it was to limit forces for the conclusion of the North African campaign. Soon after the decision to undertake Husky, Brig. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, chief Army planner, wrote to General Handy from Casablanca that the United States should try to carry out the Sicilian operation with as many of the available U.S. forces in North Africa as could be released without risking the security of the North African area.\(^{41}\) This remained a fundamental War Department aim to the close of Husky. Nevertheless, the Army soon found that, in order to meet the peculiar needs for the amphibious and airborne undertakings projected for Husky, additional troops would have to be sent. The War Department made preparations in the early months of 1943 to dispatch the 82d Airborne Division and the combat-loaded 45th Division from the United States.\(^{42}\)

The increasing numbers of U.S. ground, air, and service troops deployed in North Africa between the close of 1942 and the end of the Tunisia Campaign in May 1943 gave striking evidence of the trend toward the Mediterranean. In the latter part of December 1942, according to War Department planners’ estimates, there were close to 180,000 U.S. troops in North Africa—including approximately 141,000 Army Ground Forces (AGF) troops, 33,800 AAF troops, and only slightly more than 2,500 Services of Supply (SOS) troops.\(^{43}\) When the Tunisia Campaign entered the mop-up stage at the end of the first week in May, U.S. troop strength had increased, the planners estimated, to approximately 388,000—including over 220,500 AGF troops, about 76,850 AAF troops, and almost 90,500 Army Service Forces (ASF) troops.\(^{44}\) Present in the North African theater at the end of December 1942 were the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions and the 1st, 3d, 9th, and 34th Infantry Divisions. In April 1943 the 36th Infantry Division arrived

\(^{40}\) BIGOT msg, Eisenhower to Marshall (info copy OPD), 17 Feb 43, CM-IN 8604.

\(^{41}\) Pers ltr, Wedemeyer to Handy, 22 Jan 43, Item 12, Exec 3.

General Wedemeyer joined the War Plans Division in 1941 and became a member of the Joint U.S. Strategic Committee (JUSSC) in February 1944. In June 1942 he became Chief, Strategy and Policy Group (S&P Gp), OPD.
in North Africa, followed by the 82d Airborne in May, and the 45th Infantry Division in June.\textsuperscript{46} The trend in deployment of U.S. air forces to the Mediterranean was also upward, rising from twenty-four and one half combat air groups at the end of December 1942 to about thirty-seven as of 1 June 1943. The thirty-seven groups included 6 groups on loan from Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton's Ninth Air Force based in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{48}

\textit{Diversion from BOLERO and SICKLE}

In order to maintain the forces in North Africa, larger and larger outlays of munitions, equipment, and supplies of all types had to be made. Thus, not only shipping and aircraft but also quantities of other items were diverted from the support of the American buildup in the United Kingdom. While the number of U.S. troops in North Africa steadily increased between November 1942 and May 1943, the number in the European command dropped—from a high of 220,000 at the end of October 1942 to about 119,000 at the turn of the year. At the end of April 1943 it was down to 115,000, though in May it rose to 131,000.\textsuperscript{47} Much of the strength originally scheduled in the United States for BOLERO or present in the United Kingdom was drained off for the Mediterranean operations. According to the Army planners’ calculations, ground strength declined from approximately 168,000 in the British Isles and Northern Ireland, just before the launching of TORCH in November 1942, to about 59,000 by the end of March 1943, at which level it hovered to the end of the Tunisia Campaign in early May.\textsuperscript{48}

Though Casablanca had cleared the way for full U.S. participation in a heavy combined bomber offensive, the strength in units, replacements, and effective aircraft had not increased as rapidly as had been hoped. The estimated number of air troops in the British Isles and Northern Ireland at the end of the Tunisia Campaign—66,000—was only slightly higher than that present just before the launching of TORCH—58,000. For most of the period between January and May it was below the 58,000 level. During the first three months of 1943 the average combat strength of the Eighth Air Force sank lower than at any time since October 1942. Not until March could a force of more than 100 bombers be put into the air with some regularity. The total effective bombing strength up to the end of April was six operating groups (four B-17 and two B-24). By May only three fighter groups—equipped

\textsuperscript{46} (1) Overseas Troop Bases, 1 April, 1 May, 1 June, 1 July 1943, Troop Section, Logistics Group OPD, OPD Hist Unit file. (2) Unit Records of the Organization and Directory Branch, TAGO.

\textsuperscript{47} For the number of air groups, see Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, World War II (1945), p. 8. For the identity of the air groups, see Craven and Cate, AAF II, 417 and passim.

\textsuperscript{48} STM-30, 1 Jan 48.\textsuperscript{48} The breakdown on ground and air strength in the British Isles and Northern Ireland is based on OPD Weekly Status Maps from 5 November 1942 through 13 May 1943. OPD Status Map figures include air service with air troops and ground service with ground troops.

with P-47's—were available to escort bombers regularly. The crew replacement problem was particularly acute. During the winter months the demands for Torch had been especially heavy, and combat crews in the United Kingdom, forced to operate without adequate replacements, began to suffer from weariness and tension as well as from combat losses. The direct drain to Africa combined with the other factors—the anti-submarine warfare, lack of available shipping, and diversions to the CBI and Southwest Pacific—to slow the rate of build-up of the Eighth Air Force. In March the War Department asked General Eisenhower to keep his shipping requirements for North Africa at a minimum, since every additional ship provided for his theater was a “direct drain” on the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom. From January to May 1943, Eighth Air Force operations over Germany continued to be largely experimental, and the Combined Bomber Offensive remained essentially in the planning stage.\(^{49}\)

**Rearming the French**

To the heavy claims on U.S. military resources growing out of the Mediterranean campaigns in the months following Casablanca was added another—the rearmament of the French in North Africa. The participation of the French in the North African campaign, the rapprochement between Generals Giraud and de Gaulle brought about by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the time of Casablanca, and the hope and desire of the French to take part in the eventual liberation of their motherland raised a unique problem in coalition warfare for the U.S. military planners—rearming a whole foreign army.\(^{51}\) On the eve of the Chief of Staff's departure for Casablanca, the Army planners had pointed out that re-equipping the French troops to make an effective contribution to the Allied cause was an urgent question for British and American consideration.\(^{52}\) At Casablanca General Marshall urged the necessity of equipping the best French divisions in North Africa as rapidly as possible.\(^{53}\) He expressed the belief of the JCS that the use of these divisions would result in a considerable economy in other Allied forces. Marshall and Sir Alan Brooke agreed that French troops in North Africa would be particularly useful for garrison work, freeing British and U.S. forces for combat. At the same time, General Marshall and his advisers realized that equipping a whole new French army was a complicated issue. Repercussions would inevitably be felt in British and U.S. production, training, and equipment programs. The coalition of associated powers would have to agree on a strategic concept for the eventual

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\(^{49}\) Bigot msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Eisenhower, 13 Mar 43, CM-OUT 5058.

\(^{50}\) For full description of the growth and operations of the Eighth Air Force during this period, see Craven and Cate, *AAF II*, Ch. 10.

\(^{51}\) For a description of pre-Casablanca background on aid to the French, see: (1) Marcel Vigneras, *Rearming the French*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957), Ch. I; and (2) Leighton and Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–43*, Ch. XXI.


employment of the new army. Finally, thorny political questions involving the future French government would have to be resolved. Nevertheless, General Marshall believed it necessary to at least begin the task. He therefore proposed at Casablanca to furnish equipment from U.S. resources, insofar as shipping limitations permitted, and to train the French troops in its use.

The President agreed with Marshall’s views. When General Giraud estimated that there were enough French officers and noncommissioned officers in North Africa to raise an army of 250,000, the President took the position that the French leader should be instructed to go ahead and that the British and Americans should make every effort to provide the necessary equipment. General Marshall stated he was prepared to accept the inevitable delay in equipping U.S. forces then forming in the United States in order to equip a French army of 250,000 men. He assured General Giraud that it was in the interests of the United States to bring the French forces to a high degree of efficiency. The question was not whether to equip the French Army but rather how to carry out the program in the face of the limiting factor in all Allied undertakings—the shortage of shipping. On behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, Sir Alan Brooke promised that it was in the interests of the United States to bring the French forces to a high degree of efficiency. The question was not whether to equip the French Army but rather how to carry out the program in the face of the limiting factor in all Allied undertakings—the shortage of shipping. On behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, Sir Alan Brooke promised that, though the British had more limited resources at their disposal than the United States, they would do what they could to help provide modern equipment for the French forces. It was obvious that the United States would have to bear most of the costs.

The upshot of the negotiations at Casablanca was an Allied understanding that a program to equip the French Army should be started immediately. The President and General Marshall accepted the principle of rearming the French in North Africa, with the U.S. target for re-equipping of eleven divisions as quickly as possible. No agreement was reached on a strategic concept for the subsequent employment of the French army. A rearmament committee composed of British, American, and French representatives was promptly established in the theater, and a French officer was sent to Washington to act as liaison between that committee and the War Department. In Washington machinery was put into motion by the War Department to speed equipment to the French.

In the weeks following Casablanca it became clear that U.S. and French military officials did not see eye to eye on what had been agreed upon at the conference. Maj. Gen. Marie Emile Béthouart, chief of the French military mission in Washington, brought the problem to General Marshall’s attention in early February. He pointed out that, according to General Giraud’s version of

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56 The French military mission had arrived in Washington at the close of 1942 to discuss the supply of matériel for the French forces in North Africa.
his understanding with the President, an agreement had been reached to deliver material for three armored divisions, eight motorized divisions, and a first-line air force of 500 pursuit planes, 300 bombers, and 200 transport planes by summer; and that substantial amounts—400 trucks, and enough armament for two armored regiments, three reconnaissance battalions, three tank destroyer battalions, and three motorized divisions—were to be delivered within the next few weeks. General Marshall, who had left the conference before the conclusion of the President's agreement with General Giraud, understood the President had simply promised that the United States would proceed to equip the French troops as quickly as possible, and that such problems as cargo space, types of equipment, and priorities of shipment would be settled later.

Actually this difference of views appears to have been the result of divergent interpretations of the President's marginal note written in French—"Oui en principe"—next to the specific commitments in the agreement with General Giraud. Marcel Vigneras has pointed out that the French interpretation of this phrase suggested a far firmer commitment than the American "yes, in principle" that the President undoubtedly intended. This is an interesting example of semantic differences out of which rose misunderstandings among nations associated in waging a coalition war. In fact, the phrase "in principle"—translated or interpreted differently by British, Americans, French, and Russians—was the source of a number of such Allied misunderstandings in World War II.

While Marshall felt that tanks should be provided for separate tank battalions, he did not believe that equipping three armored divisions was then either practicable or desirable. The whole question of assembling armored divisions in North Africa—British, American, or French—would have to be considered in relation to subsequent strategy. He did believe that the United States should send armament for one armored division—especially since, as he had informed General Giraud, the equipment was available in the United States but the personnel was not ready for it. He assured Béthouart of the Army's confidence in French officers' talent and the rapidity with which French units could be made effective for combat. It was on that basis that the War Department leaders had concluded that the United States was justified in delaying the organization of U.S. divisions at home in favor of equipping French divisions overseas.

The French remained dissatisfied with the current allocation of 25,000 tons per convoy for the French rearmament set by General Eisenhower for the convoys coming to North Africa. According to the War Department policy the decision had to rest with General Eisenhower, since providing shipping for the French might interfere with the campaign needs of the British and U.S. troops. General Eisenhower warned the War Department that a critical situation was developing in the relations with the French.

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Vigneras, *Rearming the French*, Ch. II.

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For a discussion of the American and French divergences, see especially: (1) memo, G. C. M. for McCloy, 4 Feb 43, no sub, and attached memo A. Béthouart for Marshall, 8 Feb 43, sub: Shipments of War Materiel for the French Forces in North Africa, Item 13, Exec 1; and (2) msg, Eisenhower to AGWAR for OPD, 17 Feb 45, CM-IN 9008 (18 Feb 45).
in North Africa. At the same time, the uneasiness of the French over U.S. intentions was brought to the attention of the President and the Secretary of State by Mr. Robert D. Murphy in communications from North Africa. On 20 February the President sought to quiet French fears that the United States was not living up to its promises and to set the record straight on the U.S. agreement at Casablanca. He informed Mr. Murphy:

You can tell them [the French in North Africa] that at no time did I or General Marshall promise equipment for the French divisions at any given date. What was agreed on was the principle of rearming them—to be done as soon as we found it practicable from a shipping point of view.

Mr. Murphy was at liberty to tell the French that the President was receiving the same cries for help from USSR, from the British for supplies for England and for Burma, from China, and from several South American states as well. The President was going ahead with French rearmament as quickly as he could “get it over”; meanwhile, the President advised, the French must remain “calm and sensible.”

Within the limits of shipping and equipment available, the War Department proceeded to fill the requests for equipment for the French—as made by General Giraud through General Eisenhower. General Eisenhower felt strongly that no equipment be sent to the French at the sacrifice of British and American strength for current and subsequent operations in the Mediter-

61 Pers msg, President to Murphy, 20 Feb 43, Item 13, Exec 1. The message, noted in OPD, was forwarded to the Secretary of War by General Marshall.


63 OPD memo, no addressee, 1 Apr 43, sub: French Rearmament, Book 8, Exec 8. OPD action officer was Lt Col Wilbur M. Skidmore.
Americans had equipped another. Still unsolved were the precise timing and scale of French rearmament and the related strategic question of the subsequent role of the French Army. These problems would have to be decided on high military and political levels. It was increasingly apparent to the U.S. staff planners, however, that the campaigns that had brought French North Africa within the Allied orbit and led to the rebirth of the French Army also had added a new and large claimant for U.S. military resources.64

Commitments to the Middle East

Of equal concern to the Washington high command during the wind-up of the African campaign were the mounting U.S. commitments to the Middle East. The events of 1942 and early 1943 forced successive modifications of the Army's policy toward that area of British strategic responsibility. By the close of 1942 there were 30,000 American troops present or en route to the Middle East—primarily service and air troops—with many more scheduled to go. The allocations continued to grow, amounting by the close of the Tunisia Campaign to about twice that number present or en route.65 The increased Middle East commitments reflected in large measure the increased air activities of U.S. forces in the Mediterranean. They also reflected the greater need for service units to operate and maintain the Persian Gulf supply route for Soviet aid shipments.

The British and Americans, from early in the war, had feared that German forces would drive through Turkey and into the Middle East, thereby blocking an important supply route to the USSR, cutting off the flow of oil from the Middle East, attacking the USSR in the Caucasus, and possibly pushing on to form a juncture with Japanese forces. U.S. planners had long recognized the necessity of insuring the security of the Middle East—a strategic bridge between East and West in the global struggle. But by the turn of the year it appeared that the progress of the Allied campaigns in North Africa and on the Eastern Front had eliminated the immediate threat to the Middle East and greatly strengthened the Allied position there.66 The United States could therefore properly plan for the withdrawal of the forces sent to help the British during the crisis of 1942. That action would have the advantages of simplifying British control of operations in their sphere of primary interest and of providing U.S. forces for potentially more decisive operations elsewhere. The planners were well aware that, unless U.S. forces in the Middle East were reduced in operational strength, their presence might itself become an argument for further Mediterranean operations and thereby jeopardize concentration for a major cross-Channel operation.

The Army had other reasons for its reluctance to become involved in active operations in the Middle East. These


65 The figures are based especially on: (1) OPD Weekly Status Maps, 31 Dec 42 and 13 May 43, and (2) STM-30, 1 Jan 48.

66 Memo, JSSC for JCS, 8 Jan 43, sub: Strategic Concept for 1943, Item 69, Exec 10.
found expression in the report of Lt. Col. De Vere P. Armstrong of the Strategy Section, OPD, submitted to the War Department in early January 1943, shortly after Armstrong’s return from an extended visit to the Middle East. He emphasized that upon the defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa, the Middle East would probably become a region for the strategic defensive. In his opinion the British, who were deeply involved in the Middle East—in a political and economic as well as a military sense—would have sufficient forces in the area to defend it. He stated:

...there is no doubt in my mind but that the British war effort in the Middle East is tempered with conscious political and economic thoughts for the future. With the possible exception of Persia, however, I do not believe that this attitude is causing the Allied war effort in the Middle East to suffer.

He feared lest increased U.S. military activity in the Middle East involve the United States in the complex political crosscurrents of that troubled area. The time had therefore come for the United States to “avoid further commitments in the Middle East” and to begin to think of withdrawing its combat forces from the area. At the same time he foresaw that the Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC), through which the United States was funneling supplies to the USSR, would soon become the major U.S. effort in the Middle East. That effort, he emphasized, was most important not only because of the military significance of the aid extended but also because the prestige of the United States as an ally was at stake.  

In the strategic discussions at Casablanca, the Middle East had figured only as a side issue to the basic question of cross-Channel versus Mediterranean operations. In their arguments in favor of the Mediterranean after the conclusion of the African campaign, the British spokesmen proposed operations against the Dodecanese Islands as one possible operation. As noted above, General Marshall and the rest of the JCS, intent upon a cross-Channel operation, were willing to settle only for a western Mediterranean operation. General Marshall and his colleagues felt anxious lest Mediterranean operations, and especially operations in the east Mediterranean, draw off strength from concentration for an eventual cross-Channel operation and probably prevent the United States from undertaking operations in Burma and the Pacific. Back of the anxiety of the U.S. military planners lay their even greater concern over possible involvement in costly diversionary operations in the Balkans. As a result, the U.S. Joint Chiefs at Casablanca played down the potential role of the Middle East in operations immediately following the North African campaign other than possibly to support an undertaking in the western Mediterranean. The compromise agreement on an operation against Sicily affected the Middle East only insofar as the latter region was accepted as one of several possible springboards for executing the

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67 Memo, Armstrong, SS OPD, for Chief S&GP Gp OPD, 12 Jan 43, sub: Rpt of Visit to the Middle East, with JCS Memo for Info 29 in ABC 381 Middle East (3-10-42), 1-A.

68 (1) Min, 57th mtg CCS, 15 Jan 43. (2) Min, 2d mtg CCS with President and Prime Minister, 18 Jan 43, Anfa Camp, Official Casablanca Conf Book.

*See Ch. I above.*
Husky operation. Decisions on eastern Mediterranean moves—and on the role of the Middle East in them—were held in abeyance.

In early March the War Department announced a policy looking to the curtailment of U.S. Army activities in the Middle East. Service troops and facilities to expedite the flow and maintenance of lend-lease supplies for British forces in the Middle East were to be reduced. In early April, however, the War Department informed General Brereton, then Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East, that the service installations were not to be closed down abruptly but were to be turned over gradually to the British. Because of the extreme shortage of British specialists, the U.S. troops were not expected to be released until well after the conclusion of Husky. War Department plans in the early spring allowed for the dispatch to the Middle East only of service units whose primary purpose was to support the U.S. Ninth Air Force, then engaged in the Tunisia Campaign. Army planners were opposed to the retention of U.S. air units as a static garrison in the Middle East after the campaign. But, on the assumption that lend-lease aid to the USSR would remain a primary commitment of the United States, the strength of the Persian Gulf Service Command, they reasoned, should not be reduced.

Command Changes: USAFIME, NATO, and ETO

While making plans for curtailment of U.S. Army activities in the Middle East, War Department planners sought to bring command into line with strategy and deployment. Command arrangements for the U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME) were subject to a number of complications. Though the area was recognized by the Americans and the British as one of British strategic responsibility, the U.S. Army forces in it had been given by mutual agreement a unique responsibility for expediting lend-lease to a third ally, the USSR. The growing importance of the Persian Gulf Service Command and the prospective decline of the rest of the Middle East theater as an area of active operations for U.S. forces made necessary a clarification of relationships between the two. U.S. commands in the Middle East region had to deal with delicate problems in an area in which the United Kingdom, the USSR, and local populations—especially in Iran—had peculiar and often varying interests. Furthermore, the increasing momentum of Allied operations in the Mediterranean raised the problem of the command relationship of Middle East theater to the rest of the Allied forces in the Mediterranean. It also raised the larger problem of the command relationships in the

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1 CS 161/1, 21 Jan 43, title: Operation Husky. (2) Min, 66th mtg CCS, 22 Jan 43. (3) CCS 170/2, 23 Jan 43, title: Final Rpt to the President and Prime Minister, Summarizing Decisions by the CCS.

2 Memo, Col John C. Blizzard, Jr., Chief SS OPD, for Gen Wedemeyer, 17 Apr 43, sub: Disposition of USAFIME, with CPS 58/D in ABC 370 (7-2-42).

3 OPD Diary, 3 Apr 43.

whole Middle East—North Africa—Europe area.

Various proposals were weighed. As early as December 1942, General Handy directed his planners to look into the whole question. Early in January 1943 a special committee concluded that the entire Mediterranean area—including most of the Middle East region—and western Europe should be incorporated in a single U.S.-U.K. command. The committee emphasized that all regions from which British-American attacks might be launched in executing the primary mission—a major offensive against continental Europe—had to be under a single commander. But in view of the many unsettled questions in strategic planning, no action to create an over-all command was taken. General Handy, agreeing that the recommendations of his committee were desirable, sent the whole question back to the planners for further study.

More important for the immediate future was a series of changes affecting U.S. command relationships that grew out of decisions reached at Casablanca. In mid-January Marshall informed Handy, in a communication dispatched from Casablanca, that the JCS had reached an agreement with Eisenhower during the conference on the subdivision of the current European Theater of operations into two parts, Europe and North Africa. The Joint Chiefs were also in agreement that General Andrews, the commanding general of USAFIME, be transferred almost immediately to the United Kingdom to assume control of the European part. The CCS, the JCS also agreed, should establish priorities for missions for all bombers in the European—Mediterranean area. Marshall asked Handy for recommendations on how to put these agreements into effect.

A War Department draft directive was quickly drawn up and forwarded to Marshall at Casablanca. It divided the European—Mediterranean area into the European Theater of Operations, the North African Theater of Operations (NATO), and the Middle East Theater of Operations and outlined the limits of each. Theater boundaries in the European—Mediterranean area were to be ignored in the selection and assignment of objectives for strategic bombing missions for those theaters. The CCS were to determine the strategic objectives and the priorities for such objectives and to direct the shifting of bomber and fighter units between theaters for strategic bombing missions. Strategic

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75 Memo, Handy for Wedemeyer, 7 Dec 42, no sub, with CCS 57/2 in ABC 371 (9-25-42), 1.
76 Memo, Col Ray T. Maddocks, Actg Chief S&P Gp OPD, for Gen Handy, 2 Jan 43, sub: Boundary Revision Between European and African Middle Eastern Theaters, with CCS 57/2 in ABC 371 (9-25-42), 1.
77 Memo, Col Maddocks for Lt Col Frederic H. Chaffee, Africa-Middle East Theater, 5 Jan 43, sub: Boundary Revisions Between European and African Middle East Theaters, with CCS 57/2 in ABC 371 (9-25-42), 1.
78 Memo, Handy for Wedemeyer, 7 Dec 42, no sub, with CCS 57/2 in ABC 371 (9-25-42), 1.
79 See msg, Handy to Braid [Marshall], 18 Jan 43, CM-OUT 6207 (1-19-43). The War Department draft was prepared by OPD and concurred in by General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, and Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, Chief of the Air Staff in Army Air Force Headquarters. For a preliminary version of this draft, see copy appended to draft msg, Handy to Braid, 18 Jan 43, with Paper 75, Book 7, Exec 8.
bombing in the Middle East was to be under British command.

General Marshall made use of these Washington recommendations in his discussions with the CCS at Casablanca on the control of strategic bombardment in the European-Mediterranean area.81 War Department leaders who were at Casablanca used them to brief General Andrews on his assignment in the United Kingdom.82 General Marshall and his Washington staff proceeded, at the close of January and in early February 1943, to put into effect the rearrangements of command assignment and boundaries in the European-Mediterranean area.83 When naming Andrews as commanding general of the new European theater, the War Department also announced that General Brereton would become Commanding General, USAFIME.84 Upon Andrews’ departure for his new assignment on 31 January 1943, Brereton assumed command of USAFIME.85

The division of the European theater into two parts and the designation of the southern half as the North African Theater of Operations symbolized the increasing importance of the Mediterranean. The separation went into effect on 4 February 1943. General Eisenhower, relieved from the command of the European Theater of Operations, which he had headed since June 1942, assumed command of the North African Theater of Operations. Included in the newly established North African theater were the Iberian Peninsula, Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and a considerable portion of northwest Africa—from the Atlantic coast to the eastern boundary of Tunisia. Shorn of its Mediterranean portions, the ETO comprised Iceland, the British Isles, the Scandinavian countries, France, Germany, and the area extending eastward to the western boundary of the USSR and southward through Hungary and Rumania.86

The decisions made during Casablanca fell far short of creating a single Anglo-American command in the European-Mediterranean area. Steps were taken, however, to tie the Middle East in with the rest of the Mediterranean for the swift windup of the North African campaign and for Husky. In

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81 See especially: min, 65th mtg CCS, 21 Jan 43, and Ch. I, above.
83 (1) Msg, Marshall to Young for Handy, 24 Jan 43, CM-IN 11057. (2) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Eisenhower, 2 Feb 43, CM-OUT 627 (3 Feb 43).
84 Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to CG USAFIME, 30 Jan 43, CM-OUT 10547. These War Department instructions transferred the War Department directive to Andrews, dated 24 October 1942, to Brereton, effective upon the latter’s assumption of command of USAFIME.
85 Msg, Brereton, Cairo, to AGWAR (action OPD), 31 Jan 43, CM-IN 0012 (1 Feb 43).
line with previous recommendations of the Chief of Staff, the United States and United Kingdom agreed to accept Air Chief Marshal Tedder as Air Commander in Chief of the whole Mediterranean theater, under Eisenhower in his capacity as Allied commander. Under Air Chief Marshal Tedder were to be the Air Officer Commander in Chief, Northwest Africa (General Spaatz) and the Air Officer Commander in Chief, Middle East (Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas). The single air command responsible to Eisenhower was to direct air operations in both the North African and the Middle East theaters to speed the conclusion of the North African campaign. As noted above, the conferees at Casablanca also agreed that, although the British Eighth Army was to continue to be based in the Middle East, it was to be transferred to Eisenhower's command and General Alexander was to become Deputy Commander in Chief to Eisenhower.

The net result was to provide for a closer knitting of the Allied forces in the Middle East with those in the remainder of the Mediterranean, especially in air and ground commands. These command decisions reinforced the strategic decisions and meant, in effect, that the Middle East forces were increasingly drawn into the Mediterranean orbit and given a supporting role for the windup of operations in the African littoral and for any subsequent moves in the western Mediterranean. Within a month after Casablanca—by 20 February—this new system of Allied operational command in the Mediterranean was in effect.

Thus, with the relationship between the Mediterranean and the European operations still uncertain, the War Department lent its weight in the first half of 1943 to drawing the Middle East theater into the larger orbit of the Mediterranean command. A unified Allied command in the Mediterranean offered the hope of speeding the end of operations in the western Mediterranean in preparation for an eventual cross-Channel effort and, if tied in with the European theater, of possibly discouraging the British from undertaking diversionary operations in the eastern Mediterranean or the Balkans. In any event, the War Department saw a "clear and present danger" in the current trend to the Mediterranean unless U.S. commitments to the Middle East were scaled down, the Middle East were linked to the western Mediterranean, and the whole fitted into some larger strategic pattern against Germany.

The Problem of the Neutrals
Spain and Turkey

The trend toward the Mediterranean raised serious questions concerning relations with neutral powers. U.S. staff planners in World War II were faced with a whole series of unique politico-military problems in connection with the status of the neutral countries. Should neutrals be kept neutral? When should a favorably dispersed neutral be converted into an active partner? What methods should be used to induce neutrals to join the coalition? How far
should the Allies go in weaning a neutral power from neutrality? These were some of the questions that inevitably had to be faced. Only gradually in World War II, as in World War I, had the United States shifted from neutrality. In the United States itself the historic significance of the transition from the position of wooed neutral to that of a wooer of neutrals, perhaps not surprisingly, called forth no great introspection on the part of the busy American political leaders and military planners. Since Allied dealing with neutrals was preeminently in the realm of political negotiations, the course of military planning was subjected to all the vicissitudes and uncertainties of a delicate international diplomacy. While the Allied political leaders here, as in other important strategic issues, in the final analysis called the tune, the military planners were especially intent on pointing out to the Chief of Staff, and through him to the JCS and the President, the cost to major military plans involved in the abandonment of neutrality. Nowhere was this staff role as a military watchdog on national political policy better demonstrated than in the case of Spain and Turkey in 1943.

As the Allied campaign against the Western Axis in late 1942 and through 1943 swept through North Africa and into the Mediterranean, the U.S. political leaders and military staffs kept an anxious eye on the two neutrals—Spain and Turkey—that flanked the Allied forces. Franco’s Spain, from the very beginning of its fight with the republican government, had been closely bound to the fascist governments. The fear of Spanish support for a German drive through Spain and Spanish Morocco aimed at cutting the line of Allied communications in the Mediterranean caused anxiety to British-American military planners preparing for Torch and subsequent Mediterranean operations. It was largely because of this that the Americans had insisted on Casablanca as one of the original landings in Torch, so as to ensure the use of an Atlantic port in the event the entrance to the Mediterranean were blocked. It was largely for this reason also that the War Department helped General Eisenhower provide and equip substantial garrison forces on the borders of Spanish Morocco to counter any sudden move against the Allied flank. Though the problem of Spanish neutrality concerned the military throughout the conflict, the responsibility for handling it lay with the State Department. The planners watched closely the reactions of Franco’s government to State Department efforts to keep Spain from entering the war as an ally of Germany. The continued “neutrality” of Spain, opportunistic though it was, proved to be in part at least a triumph of Anglo-American diplomacy in planning and waging economic warfare.89

Turkey, the uneasy neutral at the other end of the Mediterranean, presented a somewhat different set of complications for the Allies. Allied political negotiations with Turkey throughout 1943 ran the gamut of conciliation,

blandishment, and sternness. An avenue of approach to the Balkan–eastern Mediterranean–Middle East area, Turkey was strategically located to exercise influence—if given adequate help—in a part of the world in which two of the associated powers of the United Nations—the USSR and the United Kingdom—had peculiar and special interests of their own. But for two years—1941–42—Turkey's own position had been highly precarious and it walked a tightrope between the warring camps. Axis conquest of the Balkans and Rommel's threat to Egypt exposed Turkey to the danger of being overrun by an Axis drive toward Suez and the Persian Gulf. To strengthen Turkish opposition to Germany, Great Britain, which was bound to Turkey by treaty, and the United States had, during this period, extended limited amounts of munitions to that neutral. Allied bolstering of a favorably disposed Turkey presented the possibility at the outset of 1943, when German lines of communication and the bulk of German combat resources were oriented eastward, of hindering a Drang nach Osten.90 Turkey might thereby become a bulwark ensuring the security of the Allied position in the Middle East. A friendly Turkey might also serve as a springboard for Allied offensive action against the Axis forces in the Balkan–eastern Mediterranean–Middle East area. The improving Allied prospects in the Mediterranean appeared to Churchill to offer a distinctly favorable opportunity to induce Turkey to join the Allies. He had long been interested in bringing Turkey into the war. Especially attractive to him was the possibility that Turkey might play an active role in connection with an Allied "overland" campaign into the Balkans.91 His staff came to Casablanca with an ambitious plan for rearming Turkey and for using its strength and bases in support of operations in the eastern Mediterranean.92 The President also was interested in Turkey's entry—apparently, like the Prime Minister, as much to ensure a stable peace in the postwar world as for war purposes.93 The principle of preparing the way for Turkey's active participation was accepted by both the British and the Americans at Casablanca.94 The President and the U.S. high command were content to allow the British to play the direct role in dealing with Turkey—considered to be within the area of British strategic responsibility. Matters connected with Turkey would be handled by the British the same way those con-

90 Msg, Prime Minister to President, 2 Dec 42, Item 65a, Exec 10. (2) CCS 135, 26 Dec 42, title: Basic Strategic Concept for 1943. The paper was a JCS memo. (3) CCS 135/1, 2 Jan 43, title: Basic Strategic Concept for 1943—the European Theater. The paper was a memo by the British Chiefs of Staff.

91 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 649.

92 (1) Ibid., pp. 698–99. (2) CCS 157, 18 Jan 43, title: Allied Plans Relating to Turkey. In this paper the British Joint Planning Staff argued that Turkey would, in the foreseeable future, be of greater value as a base for offensive air action than for ground action. A land offensive from Thrace via Salonika into the Balkans would stretch out Axis forces and support Balkan patriots. It would offer a great "prize" but, in their opinion, the immediate prospects for it were poor. Any such land offensive would depend on the Turks holding a secure bridgehead in Europe. (3) Min, 65th mtg CCS, 19 Jan 43.

93 For Roosevelt's and Churchill's views on Turkey, see especially (1) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, Book Two, Ch. 16; and (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 657, 660, 683.

94 CCS 155/1, 19 Jan 43, title: Conduct of the War.
The Prime Minister welcomed the opportunity to "play the hand" with Turkey—with "munitions or diplomacy." He was especially hopeful, he affirmed to the President, for "a warm renewal of friendship between Russia and Turkey. . . . Thus Turkey while increasing her own defenses would stand between two victorious friends. In all this I am thinking not only of the war, but of the post-war." There was a way, under study by the British and U.S. staffs, in which Turkey at war might even help the USSR in the near future. Turkey's bases might be used for air operations against German-controlled resources and transportation facilities in the Balkans. Especially appealing to the British and U.S. political chiefs was the possibility of U.S. bombers attacking the Ploesti oil fields in Rumania. Turkey, the Prime Minister believed, was the key to opening a new route in the Mediterranean via the Dardanelles to send supplies to the USSR. The two political chiefs were particularly anxious following Casablanca to give tangible evidence of their expressed desire to relieve Axis pressure on the USSR—whose fate was still felt to be in some doubt. Stalin's disappointment over the delay in Africa, the continued postponement of the second front in Europe, the interruption of the northern convoys, and other delays in meeting Protocol commitments to the USSR made such aid all the more desirable.

After the Casablanca Conference Churchill went to Adana to meet with President Inonu and other officials of the Turkish Government. He hoped to pave the way for Turkey's entry into the war in the autumn of 1943. He promised to speed up and increase supplies, though he emphasized that he could not draw a blank check on the United States. Upon its entry into the war, Turkey would immediately receive at least twenty-five air squadrons. Despite Churchill's optimism, the results of the conference were inconclusive. No definite promise was given that Turkey would enter the war on the Allied side.

In the following months estimates of material were drawn up by British and Turkish staffs and submitted to Washington, but U.S. officials gave them a relatively low priority, since Casablanca had given no clear indication of the priority for Turkish requirements. Meanwhile, War Department planners continued to study ways and means of resisting an Axis invasion of Turkey and of attacking Axis forces from bases in Turkey. They recognized the obvious

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95 Min, 69d mtg CCS, 20 Jan 43.
96 (1) Memo, Gen Deane for Adms Leahy and King and Gens Marshall and Arnold, 4 May 43, sub: Situation in Turkey, Item 55, Exec 10. The memo contains a message from the Prime Minister to the President of 25 April 1943 in which the Prime Minister objected to the characterization of the aid-to-Turkey program by an American official as "Feeding an 8 course dinner to an 8 day old baby" as overdrawing the picture. (2) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 699.
97 Msg, Prime Minister to President, 10 Feb 43, No. 263, Item 69a, Exec 10.
98 For exchanges between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin in February—April 1943, see: (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 795; and (2) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 745-57.
99 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 795-16.
100 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43, Ch. XVII, contains a summary of the mechanics of military supply to Turkey, including Anglo-American differences over procedures in bidding for U.S. aid.
101 (1) OPD Outline Study of Allied Resistance to a Possible Axis Invasion of Turkey [about 1 Jan
military advantages of a Turkey favorably disposed to the Allied war effort, but staff studies indicated that, if Turkey entered the war on the Allied side with its forces in their current state, Turkey would be a liability rather than an asset. The resultant argument that Turkey not be brought into the war prematurely, and that, in the meantime, it be maintained in a state of neutrality favorable to the Allies, appealed to the senior statesmen among the planners—JSSC—and to the JCS. Such was the argument General Marshall, speaking for the JCS, had advanced at Casablanca.

The acquiescence of the U.S. military staff in the principle of inducing Turkey to join the Allies actively in the war continued to be tempered with the proviso that the price in military aid for the abandonment of neutrality must not be the weakening of a concentrated effort for a major cross-Channel invasion. The U.S. military planners kept on applying this yardstick to proposals for aid to and operations from Turkey. As OPD’s Strategy Section warned, re-equipping the Turkish Army—a force of over forty-five divisions—would be a major commitment that would have serious effects on the ability of Allied countries to equip their own forces. The U.S. military planners urged a “go slow” attitude. It was obvious that much of the required matériel would have to come from U.S. sources. The problem of Turkey’s entry—and the price to be paid for it—was to remain with the Allied political chiefs and their staffs almost to the close of the European conflict.

The variety of claims upon American resources stemming from the commitment to the Mediterranean underlined the task confronting the Army planners. U.S. production was not yet at its peak, shipping was still a limiting factor, and no master plan existed for distributing U.S. resources. The needs of the moment threatened to siphon off more and more of those resources. How to make the most of current opportunities in the Mediterranean and still prevent it from becoming a “suction pump” that might upset long-range goals against Germany was the problem confronting General Marshall and his advisers.
CHAPTER III

The Search for a Formula

The increasing demands for matériel and forces for North Africa, the agreements to execute Husky and to bring Turkey into the coalition, and British feelers to undertake operations in the eastern Mediterranean were interpreted by the Army planning staff as reinforcing the trend toward "encirclement," "periphery-pecking," and "scatterization" begun in July 1942 with the decision to undertake Torch. More remote than ever appeared the possibility of concentrating strong forces in the United Kingdom to strike a decisive blow across the Channel. For reasons of state or personal predilections, the President might still prefer to postpone a final decision on the cross-Channel versus Mediterranean approaches. With evident pride in his flair for strategy, he could hardly repress a triumphant note in declaring to his Army Chief of Staff in early March:

Just between ourselves, if I had not considered the European and African fields of action in their broadest geographic sense, you and I know we would not be in North Africa today—in fact, we would not have landed either in Africa or in Europe!²

The President’s military advisers were not blind to the obvious advantages of securing a firm hold in the Mediterranean, but General Marshall and the Army planning staff, earnest believers in the principle of concentration and vitally concerned with the day-to-day problems of mobilizing and deploying troops to fight a global war, could not but wonder when and where dispersion would end. If political considerations had led the President to take an active hand in military strategy, possible political effects of the resultant military moves now began to force themselves upon the attention of the Chiefs of Staff. At the close of March General Marshall, in discussing with the President the importance of BOLERO, for the first time raised with the President the question of likely repercussions on the political equilibrium in Europe at the close of the war should the hoped-for concentrated Anglo-American drive against Germany from the west not keep pace with the Soviet advance against Germany from the east. General Marshall ventured to suggest:

... if we were involved at the last in Western France and the Russian Army was approaching German soil, there would be a


most unfortunate diplomatic situation immediately involved with the possibility of a chaotic condition quickly following.\(^3\)

The new developments in the struggle against Germany demanded a rethinking by the military planners of ways and means of securing basic strategic objectives and resolving the strategic dilemmas that followed TORCH. The basic question for them was how to deal with current exigencies of the multifront coalition war and still return to the principle of concentration for a major cross-Channel operation. What was to be the form of the over-all pattern in the war against Germany and what were to be the relationships between the parts? The staff planners began in the spring of 1943 to define the choices.

In searching for answers, the Army strategic planners began to advance beyond the exploratory probing of specific alternative operations in the largely “compartmented process of reasoning” that had characterized their strategic thinking before Casablanca.\(^4\) The need to put over-all U.S. military planning on a firmer basis led General Wedemeyer, the Army planner, to sound what was to be a keynote of Army strategic thinking in the later war years. At the close of April, pointing to the opportunism that had hitherto characterized British-American strategic planning, he stressed the need for “the adoption of a long-range concept for the defeat of the European Axis.”\(^5\) Only upon the firm establishment of such a concept, he maintained, could long-range logistical planning be initiated. In the same spirit, Col. Claude B. Ferenbaugh, head of the Operations Division’s European Theater Section, emphasized the effects of the “lack of a definite and consistent long-range strategic concept of operations in the European Theater.” Its absence, he declared, prevented the formulation of “a sound plan both as regards troop basis and the types of equipment necessary for operations in the European or adjacent areas.”\(^6\) However premature the BOLERO-ROUNDUP planning had proved to be in 1942, Army planners were convinced that such long-range planning was now all the more necessary. In this way, permutations and combinations might possibly be held within the limits necessary to prepare for a decisive cross-Channel operation.

The precise formulation of the long-range concept and definition of the relationships between its parts proved to be a difficult and long-drawn-out process in 1943–44, subject to involved negotiation, debate, compromise, and agreement on British and American staff levels and, eventually, on the highest British-American and Soviet political levels. In the spring of 1943 the Army planners began to make some progress toward a clarification of their thinking on two fun-

\(^3\) Memo, G. C. M. for Handy, 30 Mar 43, no sub, WDCSA 381 (Super Secret), I. The Chief of Staff stated that the President had indicated to him that the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, was more concerned about getting Allied troops into the Balkans than into France. General Marshall believed, however, that Eden wished the movement into France to be executed in any event.

\(^4\) Memo, Col William H. Baumer, Jr., for Col Blizzard, 27 Nov 42, sub: Comparison of Bases for Initiation of Major Offensive Against the Axis, Item 20, OPD Hist Unit File.

\(^5\) Memo, Wedemeyer for DCoFS, 28 Apr 43, sub: Rpt of Mission Headed by Gen Devers, OPD 381 Security, 118.

\(^6\) Memo, Ferenbaugh for DCoFS, 30 Apr 43, sub: Rpt of Mission Headed by Lt Gen [Jacob L.] Devers, OPD 381 Security, 118.
damental aspects of this problem—the role of airpower and the possible limits to the Mediterranean advance.

**Role of Airpower**

To define more precisely the role of airpower as a strategic weapon in the war against the European Axis became all the more important to General Marshall and his planning staff in the months following Casablanca when ground operations across the Channel appeared less and less probable for 1943. Along with the Air Forces leaders, they sought to clarify their views on the Combined Bomber Offensive, one object of which, as approved at Casablanca, was to create conditions on the Continent favorable for a cross-Channel landing.

In the early months of 1943 the Army planners continued to argue against the more extreme “victory through air power” school of thought as they had at the close of 1942. In their opinion, the broad strategy of defeating Germany first could be effected only by directing the heaviest possible air attack against Germany in the shortest possible time, thus paving the way for a mighty ground attack to complete the task. U.S. ground forces would have to be mobilized and trained to deliver their maximum impact in Europe as soon as possible, “since there is no reasonable assurance that victory can be achieved by air power alone.”

General Handy expressed his views on the matter in March 1943. He agreed with the Air Forces argument that the only possibility for decisive results against the European Axis in the foreseeable future was by sustained mass bombing attacks, but only if mass bombings were followed by a co-ordinated land and air offensive. In his opinion the lessons of the war to date had indicated that air superiority and, above all, co-ordination between land and air forces, were the “keynote to decisive victories.” Neither the German victories, the British victory at El ‘Alamein, nor the current advance of the Russians had been accomplished by sustained mass bombing attacks. On the other hand, Germany’s intensive air offensive against Great Britain in 1940, without a follow-up by ground forces, had not brought the Germans a victory. Thus far, he observed, the shortage of shipping had precluded the concentration of Allied land power in any decisive area. Ground forces had been dispersed throughout the world to hold essential sea and air bases until such time as shipping would permit a concentration of land power at the “decisive point.” He called for the maximum application of airpower against the industry and resources of Germany, as provided in the Casablanca agreement on the Combined Bomber Offensive. In short, General Handy argued for the application of the principle of concentration of forces to the new strategic weapon, air bombardment. In accord with the current trend of thinking among the Army planners and in the AAF, he recognized the value of a bombing offensive from North Africa as well as one from the United Kingdom. At the same time, also in agreement with the chief of the AAF, he was opposed to dispatching heavy bomb-
On 30 April General Marshall took up the proposals General Eaker of the Eighth Air Force had presented to the JCS the previous day to carry out the Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom. According to Eaker’s plan, the bomber offensive would be divided into four phases aimed at the progressive destruction of the German economic system and military strength and paving the way for the eventual invasion of the Continent. Each phase would be marked by an increase in the size of the U.S. bombing force. The fourth and last phase preceding the land invasion would be reached early in 1944. General Marshall informed General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the AAF, that he had no doubt “as to the over-all importance of heavy bomber operations out of the United Kingdom, the more so as the likelihood of cross-Channel ground operations appears less probable in 1943.” But he saw possible complications in allocating aircraft to carry out the Eaker plan for an all-out bombing effort. Thus far the U.S. military leaders had been unable to concentrate forces in the United Kingdom. If as a result of post-Husky operations a vacuum were created in the Mediterranean, timely concentration of ground forces in the United Kingdom for an invasion attempt would be precluded, and the war would probably be prolonged indefinitely. In this connection, the current estimate by General Wedemeyer that a major cross-Channel operation would not be possible until late 1944 had to be considered. There was also the need for increasing air strength in the Pacific–Far East area. Under these circumstances the Chief of Staff called for further study of the Eaker proposals, particularly of the allocation of bombing strength to the United Kingdom for the fourth phase.

General Arnold concurred with General Wedemeyer’s estimate on a cross-Channel operation. He took the position that the final determination of the allotment for the fourth phase of Eaker’s plan need not be made immediately by the JCS. But he did call upon the JCS to stand firm against any further diversion from the bombing effort against German industrial targets from the United Kingdom. In his view there was no more important task currently facing the JCS than to give complete support to Generals Andrews and Eaker in the United Kingdom.

The Joint Staff Planners in early May agreed with the estimates contained in the Eaker plan that 1,746 heavy bombers would be necessary by the close of 1943 to carry out the third phase, and that by 31 March 1944, the end of the fourth phase, 2,702 heavy bombers would be required. It was their conclusion that the AAF could complete the proposed program and still meet all current and planned commitments to other theaters. On 4 May the JCS decided to go ahead with Eaker’s plan.
Thus, before the British and American leaders and their staffs assembled once more in conference, General Marshall and his staff had advanced considerably in their thinking about the Combined Bomber Offensive outlined at Casablanca. That conference had inseparably linked the offensive to an as yet undefined major cross-Channel operation. The Air Forces was now ready with a concrete bombing program leading up to such an operation in 1944. The JCS had approved the program. The Army planners were prepared to back it up. So far as U.S. staff thinking was concerned, the place of airpower, at least, in the shifting strategic pattern of war against Germany, was becoming clear.

**Limiting the Mediterranean Advance**

The problem of limiting the Mediterranean advance was more difficult. One proposal, which particularly appealed to the Washington staff in the first half of 1943, had been suggested at Casablanca—the possibility of advancing the date for launching Husky. Back of the War Department interest in this proposal lay the hope of putting a quicker end to the Allied drive in the Mediterranean. Generals Marshall and Wedemeyer both urged, in the early spring, a bolder strategic move against Sicily than that envisaged at Casablanca. They called for a Sicilian operation to be launched before the Axis forces were expelled from Africa. Such a move might hasten the destruction of the Axis troops in Tunisia as well as speed the occupation of Sicily. The proposal for a modified Husky was studied at Marshall’s urging in the War Department and in the joint staff. At the same time, the Chief of Staff tried to impress the British Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower with its advantages.

Practical difficulties in the way of launching Husky before 10 July 1943, then the tentative date for which the operation was scheduled, were anticipated by the British, General Eisenhower’s and even General Marshall’s own

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13 (1) Memo, A. C. W. [Wedemeyer] for Blizzard, 1 Apr 43, sub: Premature Husky, with Tab SS 51 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2-95 (7 Jan 43). (2) Memo, Wedemeyer for Joint Strategic Committee, 13 Apr 43, sub: Modified Husky, with Tab 12 in ABC 381 Husky (1943), 1-B.
14 (1) SS 53, 3 Apr 43, title: Advanced Husky. Tab SS 53, ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2-95 (7 Jan 43). (2) SS 53/1 [11 Apr 43], title: Modified Husky Prior to the Expulsion of Axis Forces From Africa, Tab SS 53/1, ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2-95 (7 Jan 43). (3) Memo, Hull, Actg ACofS OPD, for CoFS, 12 Apr 43, sub: Modified Husky, Tab 12, ABC 381 Husky (1943), 1-B. (4) Memo, Capt Forrest B. Royal, USN, for Secy JPS, 14 Apr 43, sub: Possible Modification of Operation “Husky,” Tab 14, ABC 381 Husky (1943), 1-B. (5) Min, 74th mtg JCS, 15 Apr 43. (6) Memo, JPS for CoFS, Gen Arnold, Adms Leahy and King, 19 Apr 43, sub: Modified Husky, Tab 16, ABC 381 Husky (1943), 1-B. (7) Memo, JPS for Gen Marshall, Adms Leahy and King, Gen Arnold, 19 Apr 43, no sub, Tab 17, ABC 381 Husky (1943), 1-B.
15 (1) BIGOT-HUSKY msg, Chief OPD to Chief Planning Gp, Husky, 18 Apr 43, CM-OUT 7685, 7686, 7687. The msg was dispatched in three parts.
(2) Memo, Marshall for Deane, 21 Apr 43, Item 69, Exec 10. The memo contains msg from Marshall to be forwarded to Prime Minister.
planning staffs. Various objections were raised—the necessities of training, the shortage of landing craft, logistical limitations in the theater, risks in moving combat-loaded divisions through the Sardinia–Sicily–Tunisia triangle, the reduction in the number of total assault forces below the minimum number set by the commander (seven infantry divisions), and lack of adequate naval cover. On 30 April, General Marshall informed General Eisenhower that he recognized such obstacles and acknowledged that the situation in the theater and the timing might not be propitious. Nevertheless, he cautioned against the conservatism he felt General Eisenhower’s planners, as well as his own, were showing. The element of surprise and shortening of time afforded the enemy to strengthen the defenses of Sicily might justify the command decision to accept the calculated risks in a modified Husky. The conclusions of General Eisenhower’s planners, Marshall warned, did not reveal “any degree of boldness and daring which have won great victories for Nelson and Grant and Lee.”

In the end, nothing came of the Chief of Staff’s proposal. The strong objections raised in various quarters as well as the windup in Tunisia precluded the acceptance of the bold turning and accelerating move. On 12 May the JCS approved General Eisenhower’s suggested plan for Husky, including his recommendations that Pantelleria be captured—to provide fighter cover—just before mounting Husky, and that an ad hoc Husky be rejected as impracticable. On the following day—the same date that Axis resistance came to an end in Tunisia—the CCS accepted the plan evolved by General Eisenhower’s staff.

Since proposed short cuts for advancing the date of Husky were fruitless, limits to the Mediterranean advance had to be defined in connection with post-Husky operations. In the early months of 1943 the Washington Army staff, busy as it was with the windup in North Africa and with preparations for Husky, gave serious study to the problem of operations in the Mediterranean after Sicily, a problem that would almost certainly be raised at the next conference with the British. The advantages and disadvantages of alternative operations were considered. Southern France, Sardinia and Corsica, the Iberian Peninsula, Crete and the Dodecanese Islands, the Balkans, and Italy were all mentioned as possible objectives. The Army planners were by no means in complete agreement among themselves on the feasibility or advisability of stopping the Mediterranean advance entirely after the Sicilian campaign.

Besides, past experience had made it all too clear that pressure would be futile. For the exchange with the British, see especially: (1) ltr, Brigadier J. K. McNair, Br Joint Staff Mission, Washington, D. C., to Gen Wedemeyer, 29 Apr 43, with Tab 16 in ABC 381 Husky (1943), 1-B; (2) pers ltr with incl. McNair to Wedemeyer, 4 May 43, Item 15, Exec 3; (3) ltr, Wedemeyer to McNair, 5 May 43, with Tab 16 in ABC 381 Husky (1943), 1-B; and (4) memo, Hull, Actg ACoS OPD, for CoS, 6 May 43, sub: Br COS Views on Advanced Husky, with Tab 6 in ABC 381 Husky (1943), 1-B.

18 Min, 80th mtg JCS, 12 May 43.
19 In approving this plan, the CCS retained the 10 July date, previously recommended by General Eisenhower and accepted by them in early April. For a discussion by General Eisenhower of the evolution of the plan for HUSKY and its acceptance, see: Allied Force Headquarters, Commander in Chief’s Dispatch, Sicilian Campaign, 1943, n. d. (hereafter cited as Eisenhower rpt, Sicilian Campaign), pp. 9–4, 7–11, OPD 319.1 ETO (4 Aug 44).
from the British, coupled with political considerations might require further Mediterranean action. The staff was intent on finding ways and means of holding any such advance within the bounds of its major objectives.

In the process, certain lines of reasoning, which were to characterize the staff’s strategic thinking in 1943 and well into 1944, became apparent. Just as General Wedemeyer at Casablanca had advocated restricting any Mediterranean operation after TORCH as far as possible to the forces already in the theater, so the Army planners now urged similar limitations on any post-Husky Mediterranean operation that might be undertaken. They stressed the western Mediterranean as the most favorable area for subsequent Mediterranean operations—considering in general, an operation against southern Italy as the most advantageous. Such an operation, they suggested, offered the advantages of diverting German forces from the Soviet front, completing the collapse of Italy, and obtaining air bases from which to attack vital targets in the Balkans. At the same time, the Army planners also presented the advantages of reducing Mediterranean commitments after Husky to a minimum and transferring the excess forces from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom. If a sizable number of veteran divisions were transferred before the end of 1943, a major cross-Channel operation might be undertaken, they argued, in the spring of 1944.

Complicating a more precise definition of the Army planners’ position on the Mediterranean at this point were highly significant unknowns—the outcome of the Combined Bomber Offensive and of the Russo-German conflict. In any case they were agreed that only by an eventual concentration of forces in the United Kingdom for cross-Channel operations could the “unremunerative scatterization” and “periphery-peeking” trend initiated with the decision for TORCH in July 1942 be stopped.

Similar views on post-Husky Mediterranean operations began to take hold on the joint staff level shortly before the Americans met again with the British in conference. In early May 1943 the newly created working body of joint planners, the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC), recommended that serious consideration be given by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the movement of seasoned troops from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom in the last quarter of 1943. If any Mediterranean operations were initiated after Husky, they should be limited to forces already in the area and centered in the western or central Mediterranean rather than in the eastern Mediterranean. These views were approved by the
JCS on 8 May 1943, a few days before the Trident Conference in Washington began.\(^{25}\)

The dilemma confronting the Army in the spring of 1943 in adjusting its own strategic faith to the changing requirements of coalition warfare was strikingly illustrated in an exchange of views between General Marshall and General Eisenhower. General Eisenhower, who had been one of the original architects of Bolero-Roundup planning, believed that it would be impossible to conduct a full Bolero for a large-scale Roundup while continuing Mediterranean operations:

I personally have never wavered in my belief that the Roundup conception is a correct one, but the time and assets required for building up a successful operation in that direction are such that we could not possibly undertake it while attempting, simultaneously, to keep the forces now in or coming into this theater [North Africa] operating usefully.\(^{26}\)

In Eisenhower's opinion, original estimates for the strength of the cross-Channel assault had been too low. The coastal defenses of western Europe were too strong to be penetrated except with overwhelming resources and strength, and large reserves would have to be assembled to exploit the breakthrough. On the other hand, a number of Mediterranean possibilities after Husky might be feasible. General Eisenhower asked for the Chief of Staff's thoughts on the strategic course of action subsequent to Husky for the Allied forces under his control in the Mediterranean.

General Marshall's response (on 27 April) was that, pending a decision on the highest levels, the U.S. military staff would have to prepare for several possible lines of action. He therefore urged General Eisenhower to make plans for various alternative post-Husky Mediterranean operations—including Sardinia and/or Corsica, and the heel of the Italian boot. The question of an "all-out" invasion of Italy would have to be most carefully considered. In Marshall's opinion, that venture would inevitably have serious repercussions on the Allied shipping situation and in all likelihood would create the much feared suction-effect in the Mediterranean. Another possibility was the eastward shift of British-American effort toward Crete and the Dodecanese with the object of bringing Turkey into the war. At the same time General Eisenhower would also have to be prepared to transfer a large part of his forces to the United Kingdom. While urging the need for advance planning for further Mediterranean undertakings, Marshall declared emphatically that such operations "are not in keeping with my ideas of what our strategy should be. The decisive effort must be made against the continent from the United Kingdom sooner or later."\(^{27}\)

Thus, in the early months of 1943 the

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\(^{25}\) JCS 291, 7 May 43, and JCS 291/1, 8 May 43, title: Invasion of the European Continent From the U.K. in 1943-44. (2) JCS 293, 7 May 43, title: Limited Operations in the Mediterranean in 1943-44. (3) Min, 78th mtg JCS, May 43.

\(^{26}\) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall (action copy OPD), 19 Apr 43, CM-IN 11606.

\(^{27}\) Bigot-Husky msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Eisenhower, 27 Apr 43, CM-OUT 11068. The message represented the final version of a draft communication prepared by OPD and slightly revised by the Chief of Staff. For the preliminary drafts, see: (1) OPD draft msg [CofS to Eisenhower], 26 Apr 43, with Tab SS 58/1 in ABC 981 SS Papers, Nos. 2–55 (7 Jan 43); (2) OPD draft msg [Marshall to Eisenhower], 27 Apr 43, incl to memo, Col Frank N. Roberts for Gen Wedemeyer for Gen Hull, 26 Apr 43, no sub, Item 10, Exec 3.
U.S. staff witnessed with considerable misgivings the increasing drain of Allied resources and strength toward the Mediterranean. The difficulties of halting the apparently ineluctable trend appeared great but, if European strategy were to be fixed in terms of a major cross-Channel operation, the necessity for limiting it became all the more apparent. Already, as a result of shipping limitations, the Army planners were compelled to conclude that for 1943 even the relatively modest build-up for modified cross-Channel operations envisaged at Casablanca would not be possible. 

Some progress was made in the months immediately following Casablanca in clarifying U.S. staff thinking on the role of airpower and on a general approach toward restricting Mediterranean operations. Still lacking was an over-all long-range concept for defeating Germany that would incorporate the principle of concentration in the United Kingdom for a major cross-Channel attack. The possibility of merging cross-Channel, Combined Bomber Offensive, and Mediterranean operations into a new strategic pattern was being studied on the Army and joint staff planning levels. But only the barest outline of a possible synthesis among the three strands was yet visible to the U.S. staff.

Time and costs of waging the global war remained uppermost in the U.S. staff's thinking. In the interim period of early 1943, with Allied strategy against Germany still in flux, a fear of a protracted conflict and a resultant stalemate in the European war began to haunt the U.S. staff. At the same time, strong added pressure for developing an acceptable formula for keeping the Mediterranean issue under control and for defeating Germany decisively and quickly on the Continent was also building up because of the equally significant and continuing demands for American resources and strength for the Pacific. The Army planning staff warned the JCS to take a firm stand against the continued pouring of U.S. resources into the Mediterranean after Husky, lest the time and cost of defeating Japan become almost prohibitive.

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29 Memo, Gen Wedemeyer, Chief S&P Gp OPD, for Maj Gen Muir S. Fairchild, 2 Apr 43, sub: Comments on the Joint Strategic Survey Committee's Paper "Operations Subsequent to Husky," Tab 6, ABC 381 Husky (1943), 1-B. The JSSC proposal for a simultaneous employment of British-U.S. forces from the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean in a three-pronged offensive against France was regarded by the chief Army planner as a "challenging subject" warranting continuous study.

30 See Ch. V, below.

31 Memo, OPD for Marshall, 19 Apr 43, no sub, Paper 36, ABC 381 (9-25-41), VII.
CHAPTER IV

Mounting Pressures in the Pacific and Far East

January–May 1943

If Casablanca had assured the continued preoccupation of the Allies with the Mediterranean, it had also given its stamp of approval to the continued forward movement in the Pacific. At the conference the Americans had, in effect, served notice that prospective continuation of Mediterranean operations would be balanced by parallel operations in the Pacific. The Army planners continued to work on the assumption—never explicitly stated—that further “diversions” to operations in the Mediterranean, to maintain the momentum of operations already begun there, justified similar diversions for operations in the Pacific. This equation remained the basis of War Department dealings with Admiral King and General MacArthur as well as with the British. Intent as General Marshall was on a return to the principle of concentration for a cross-Channel operation, he made further concessions, in the months following Casablanca, to the urgings of King and MacArthur for larger commitments to the Pacific.

The President, who eventually would have to pass on the solution of the larger issues in the war against Japan, still showed no disposition to force such solutions. With strategy in the war against Germany uncertain, it was impossible for the Army staff to make firm long-range planning for the war in the Pacific. The lack of any approved over-all strategy in the war against Japan, of an over-all command or commander, and of an accepted rule for allocating resources and strength emphasized the geographical particularism and the several competing strategies represented by the separate commands in the Pacific and China-Burma-India theaters. To adjust forces, timing, sequence, and command for operations against Japan, the Army and Navy had therefore to resort to a series of step-by-step compromises and improvisations. Where purely inter-service problems were involved, as in the Pacific, the President was content to pursue a hands-off policy, so long as the military staffs could reach agreement to keep the action going forward. Where staff differences over projected action threatened complications with the policies of other countries—as in the China-Burma-India area—he stepped in to support the effort that promised results most quickly and with the least cost.
Stalemate in Burma

In the months following the Casablanca Conference, the situation in the China-Burma-India theater continued to deteriorate. Washington and London went on searching for solutions to the highly complicated problems—jurisdictional, strategic, and logistical—presented by the position of China in the war. The War Department had anticipated that the decisions reached at Casablanca would prove a disappointment to China’s hopes. With the first charge on Allied resources still levied for operations in the war against Germany, and with the growing prospects for an enlarged scale of operations in the Pacific, the CBI was likely to receive the short end of the stick. British forces, it had been agreed, were to continue operations in southern Burma to recapture Akyab—thereby driving closer to important Japanese strongholds in Burma—and were to establish bridgeheads across the Chindwin River in the north, thus threatening Mandalay. The major operations proposed by Stilwell for northern Burma, in the hope of re-establishing overland communications with China, were to be postponed at least till late 1943.

After the Casablanca Conference the CCS had sent a high-ranking trio, Generals Arnold and Somervell and Field Marshal Dill, on a mission to explain to Chiang Kai-shek the decisions made by the conference. They were to help draw up detailed plans, outlined at the conference, for operations in Burma and to emphasize to Chiang the expected results—opening the land route to China, increasing the air tonnage available to Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault’s air force, and direct attacks on Japanese shipping and bases, and on Japan itself.1

At preliminary conferences in New Delhi, the mission worked out a plan for Burma operations in consultation with Field Marshal Sir Archibald P. Wavell and General Stilwell. Wavell emphasized the difficulties of his line of communications in Assam and the advantages of the well-developed interior lines of the Japanese in Burma. The conference agreed that the only feasible plan for capturing Burma in one dry season would be by a seaborne attack against Rangoon.2 The operations were to lead to the recapture of Burma during the period from the fall of 1943 to the spring of 1944. Leaving Somervell in India to investigate communication and supply problems, the mission, which had been joined by General Wedemeyer, moved on to Chungking.

For security reasons, the Chinese were not informed of the plan to launch a

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1 For detailed accounts of this mission, see: OPD 314.7 CTO Sec 3, Ch. VII, Somervell-Arnold-Dill Mission; (2) Arnold, Global Mission, Ch. 23; (3) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, Ch. VIII; (4) Claire Lee Chennault, Way of a Fighter (New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1949), p. 216. Chennault asserts that the mission was sent to soothe the Generalissimo with more promises and to cover up the lack of action on Far Eastern matters at Casablanca. General Chennault had been in China in charge of the American Volunteer Group of pursuit pilots when the United States entered the war. He was recalled to active duty in early 1942 and became commander of the China Air Task Force.

2 (1) Min, 72d mtg CCS, 19 Feb 43. (2) Msg, Wedemeyer to Marshall, 16 Feb 43, CM-IN 8057. The report from Wedemeyer was relayed by Marshall to the President in memo, CoS for President, 16 Feb 43, no sub, WDCSA 381 (Super Secret), I. (3) Min, 106th mtg JCS, 17 Aug 43. It should be noted that Wavell overruled the advice of his planners, who considered the Rangoon operation impracticable, and directed that the plans be completed for an attack against Rangoon in the fall.
direct assault on Rangoon and were given only the broad outline of the scheme of operations. The scheme envisaged forward movements by the Chinese forces at Ledo and in Yunnan and by the British forces at Akyab and on the Chindwin before the monsoon season in order to secure jump-off positions for the fall offensive. Then, after the monsoon, British and Chinese troops would advance toward Mandalay, and seaborne approaches would be made along the Burma coast, culminating in an attack on Rangoon. The British would command the operations, except for those of the Yunnan force, which was to remain under Chiang. The Generalissimo also would assume command of the Ledo Chinese when they linked up with the Yunnan units. After some discussion, Chiang agreed to take part in the operations even if British naval support were later limited.

The British premonsoon operations came to a halt when the Japanese first stopped the Akyab forces and then forced them to retreat. This setback cancelled the proposed advance to the Chindwin and produced a bleak outlook for future operations in Burma. An annoyed Churchill commented to his Chief of Staff:

This campaign [in Burma] goes from bad to worse, and we are being completely outfought and out-maneuvered by the Japanese. Luckily, the small scale of the operations and the attraction of other events has prevented public opinion being directed upon this lamentable scene. We cannot however count on a continuance of this.

When does General Wavell reach this country?

Although Wavell still carried on his preparations for the larger ANAKIM operation, the dismal failure of the Akyab project and the opposition of his staff to any costly and involved operation in Burma made prospects for the postmonsoon venture more and more unlikely. The only successful offensive action taken by the British during the dry season was the penetration by Brigadier Orde C. Wingate's Long Range Penetration Group behind the Japanese lines. For four months Wingate succeeded in disrupting the enemy's line of communications. In the process, the Allies learned valuable lessons in the use of such forces—units supplied by air while operating to the enemy's rear.

While these events were taking place in the theater, the JCS had proceeded with their own preparations for ANAKIM. In March Admiral King informed the British that he would assign six submarines to their Eastern Fleet for ANAKIM, and General MacArthur was directed to send two submarines to police the Strait of Malacca in order to help prevent the Japanese from rein...
forcing Burma in the meantime. Nevertheless, in Washington and London there were new and plainer signs that Anakim would probably not be carried out.

In the early spring the U.S. service chiefs received a clue to the trend of the President’s thinking. In a discussion with Marshall on the relative costs of Anakim and Bolero, the President speculated on the possibilities of modifying or even abandoning Anakim. Omitting the whole question of the continuing drain on Bolero as a result of the build-up in the Pacific and the Mediterranean, he took the position that between Bolero and Anakim—both then low in the priority scale—it was more important to continue Bolero, even at the price of reducing or eliminating Anakim. General Marshall explained to the President that if the United States “stood pat” in the China-Burma-India area, it was highly probable that the Japanese would move in on the airfields used by the U.S. forces and disrupt the air transport route to China. On the question of abandon-

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ing Anakim, Marshall did not commit himself one way or the other, but he instructed his planning staff to study the whole question of Bolero versus Anakim and in particular to investigate the possibilities of modifying Anakim.

The Army planners concluded from their investigation that if Anakim were abandoned the Japanese might well divert forces from Burma to the Solomons and New Guinea, conduct operations against Australia, go on the offensive in Burma and in China, or bomb Calcutta or other cities in India. If the Japanese should elect the first possibility, the shipping needs of the Pacific theaters might be increased to the detriment of Bolero. A move into Australia or an advance into Burma or China would have political repercussions and would adversely affect the morale of the peoples concerned. Any concerted enemy air attack upon Indian cities would require the provision of air and antiaircraft units. A limited Anakim, however, could be substituted for the full-scale operation, thus freeing some shipping that could then be diverted to speed up Bolero. If the objective were restricted to north Burma, the air route to China could be protected and the land route could be constructed. In that event, the planners recommended that the British take Akyab and stage a naval demonstration in the Bay of Bengal. The Chinese at Ledo could then advance toward Myitkyina while the British proceeded toward Mandalay. Finally, the Chinese in Yunnan could join the Ledo units, and the united force, together with the British driving from the west, could take Mandalay.

The planners estimated that U.S. shipping requirements for the CBI would be light in any case, but a modified Anakim might permit the United States to effect a saving by reducing the sailings necessary to satisfy the British requirements. If this was done, initial equipment and maintenance for 215,000 troops could be transported to the United Kingdom during the remainder of 1943. The British might, in addition, transfer to Bolero some of their troopships currently allotted to Anakim, thus permitting the movement of 10,000 more men per month to the United Kingdom. Marshall forwarded his planners' conclusions to the President, but remained noncommittal. He also informed the President that Leahy agreed with the War Department estimates, but that King felt that, even though Anakim might be modified, the United States should continue preparations on the assumption that the complete operation would be carried out. The JCS yielded to the logic of King's opinion, and arrangements were made to transfer one heavy and one medium bombardment group from the Ninth Air Force to the Tenth Air Force after the HUSKY operation was completed. They also decided to help the British in meeting their requirements by lending them twenty ships. Before the British

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Anakim vs. Bolero. Both in ABC 384 Burma (8–25–42), II.

(1) Memo, Wedemeyer for Somervell, 2 Apr 43, sub: Anakim vs. Bolero, ABC 384 Burma (8–25–42), II. (2) SS 55, 2 Apr 43, sub: Anakim, Tab SS 55, ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2–95 (7 Jan 43). (3) OPD draft memo [CofS for President], 3 Apr 43, sub: Anakim, with Tab D, Item 55, Exec 10. The draft memo was slightly revised on 3 April and evidently accepted by the Chief of Staff that day. (4) Memo, Marshall for the President, 3 Apr 43, no sub, Item 55, Exec 10.
would consent to accept these ships, Marshall had to assure the British Chiefs that their acceptance did not constitute a commitment to undertake the operation.12

During the course of the discussions that Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff were holding with Wavell, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, and Admiral Sir James Somerville on the feasibility of mounting ANAKIM, Handy, then in London, reported that the British staff members considered the project dead.13 Additional pressure from the Chinese for more air units and for U.S. troops for ANAKIM, plus evidence of increased Japanese activity in both Burma and China, again led Marshall to urge action in the CBI lest inertia adversely affect the Allied moves in the Southwest Pacific, but his plea fell upon deaf ears.14

As the time for the TRIDENT Conference approached, it was definitely known that the British had turned away from ANAKIM and were going to recommend limited operations in Burma, accompanied by increases in air strength in China. It also became increasingly apparent that the United States was going to accept these recommendations, at least in part.15 Churchill later wrote:

... the full development of the air route and the requirements for a land advance towards Central Burma had proved utterly beyond our resources. It therefore seemed clear beyond argument that the full "Anakim" operation could not be attempted in the winter of 1943–44.16

The Three Demands

Although the Arnold-Somervell-Dill mission was successful in working out a plan—on paper at least—for ground operations in Burma, its achievements for the air phase of the war were less gratifying. Before his arrival in Chung-king, Arnold looked into the entire air setup in India and China. He became firmly convinced that Chennault and his air force should remain under the Tenth Air Force in India for logistical and administrative purposes.17 To strengthen his hand in the negotiations with the Generalissimo, Arnold had arranged for the movement of a heavy bombardment group to China and an increase in the number of Hump transport planes from 62 to 137. The U.S. staff planned that a total of 4,000 tons a month over the Hump would be reached by April.18

Chiang received the news of the air increases without enthusiasm and then made quite clear his own ideas of the requirements of the China theater. Stating his firm belief in the leadership and initiative displayed by Chennault, he asserted that a separate air force, freed

12 (1) Min, 74th mtg JCS, 13 Apr 43. (2) Lit, Lt Gen G. N. Macready (Br) to Gen Marshall, 13 Apr 43, WDCSA ANAKIM Super Secret. (3) Lit, Marshall to Macready, 15 Apr 43, WDCSA ANAKIM Super Secret.
13 Msg, Handy to Marshall, 18 Apr 43, CM-IN 11078.
14 (1) OPD brief, title: Notes ... 80th mtg CCS, 16 Apr 43, ABC 384 Burma (8–25–42), II. (2) Msg, Stilwell to Marshall, 23 Apr 43, CM-IN 14904. (5) Msg, Ferris to MILID, 28 Apr 43, CM-IN 17870. (4) Min, 82d mtg CCS, 30 Apr 43.
16 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 785.
17 Msg, Arnold to Marshall, 5 Feb 43, CM-IN 28690.
from any restrictions imposed by Brig. Gen. Clayton L. Bissell, commander of the Tenth Air Force, must be established in China. If this were not done, China could not go on in the war. Secondly, China would need an increase of tonnage over the Hump, reaching 10,000 tons a month by November, if it were to continue to resist the Japanese. And, finally, the air forces in China must be built up to 500 planes, which could be either in Chennault’s force or in the Chinese Air Force. The logistical considerations involved in any such arrangements were of no interest to the Generalissimo, and he wanted his requests taken to the President for decision.

The Chinese demands, which reflected so visibly China’s disappointment in the Casablanca decisions, produced a showdown between the advocates of airpower *per se* and those who favored a balanced program of parallel air and ground development. The former won the opening round when the President, apparently influenced by Hopkins, directed that a separate air force be set up for Chennault. Roosevelt also wanted thirty more transports sent to the CBI for the Hump run. Marshall, underlining the cost of such diversion, protested strongly against any further allocation of transports to the CBI. He pointed out that airborne divisional units preparing for Husky were short of cargo planes and that Eisenhower had just requested five additional troop carrier groups for that operation. At present, the U.S. Chiefs could only give him three groups and, if this had to be cut by thirty planes, Husky would be jeopardized. To strengthen this theme, Marshall stated that Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt’s request for more planes for the Aleutians had been denied and General MacArthur’s requirements had been delayed. The main problem now, he concluded, was not a lack of planes on the CBI run, but rather a need for more flight and ground personnel; the additional transports would contribute very little to a tonnage increase in the next several months.

Marshall’s plea won a brief respite for the transport situation, but the President did promise Chiang a total of 500 planes for Chennault’s air force and immediate delivery of the transports already allocated.

It became more and more evident during March that the chief air problem in the CBI was not the lack of combat planes and transports, but a need for trained personnel together with ade-
quately equipped and solidly constructed airfields. Planes without ground facilities and men to operate them were as useless as ships without harbors and dock workers.\(^{24}\) The United States sought to spur on the efforts of Wavell and the British to construct airfields in Assam. Administrative difficulties, labor problems, and the weather combined to make the task more intricate and led Marshall to ask Sir John Dill for his assistance. When in early May progress continued to be poor, the President instructed Maj. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler to take over repair and construction on airfields being used by the Americans, and to let him know of any complications that might arise so that he could straighten them out with Churchill, who had just arrived in Washington.\(^{25}\)

The short reprieve in the demand for transports gained by Marshall ended on 1 April when the President informed Chiang that he was sending additional cargo planes. Chennault was to receive 1,500 tons a month as soon as the total over the Hump reached 4,000 tons, but Roosevelt believed that when tonnage attained a total of 6,000 tons a month, possibly during the coming summer, Chennault should get all of the gasoline and supplies that he required. The fact that Marshall and Arnold were notified of this action after it was taken would indicate that the President had already decided on his course. The War Department had no choice but to comply.\(^{26}\)

**The Clash of Personalities**

The weight of the President’s support behind Chiang and Chennault produced a direct conflict with the Army’s consistent policy of backing Stilwell. As long as Roosevelt had remained neutral in this quarrel, Stimson and Marshall had been able to counteract the objections of other Presidential advisers, and of influential Chinese and Chennault adherents, to the frank and sometimes tactless Stilwell. The shifting of the balance by the President tipped the scales in Chennault’s favor. It was not difficult to understand why both Chiang and Roosevelt should have been attracted by the colorful, energetic personality of Chennault, whose daring exploits in the face of great odds had been one of the few bright spots in the China theater.\(^{27}\) The belief of Chen-


\(^{26}\)(1) Memo, Leahy for Marshall and Arnold, 1 Apr 43, no sub, Item 70, Exec 10. (2) Memo, Hull for CoS, 14 Apr 43, sub: President’s Message to C. K. S. [Chiang Kai-shek], March 31st, WDCSA China.

\(^{27}\)For the early accomplishments of the China Air Task Force, see Craven and Cate, *AAF IV*, 428–31.
nault and Chiang in the efficacy of the air effort and its promise of building up China's contribution to the war dovetailed neatly with the President's own desire to strengthen China for an important role in the postwar Far East as an active member of the Big Four. Roosevelt's estimate of China's stature contrasted starkly with the opinion of Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff, and, it may be inferred, with that of Marshall himself. The added fact that Marshall and Harry Hopkins disagreed so violently in their opinions on the Stilwell-Chennault quarrel that by mutual consent they avoided the subject suggests that the President may have had to do without the counsel of his top advisers at critical moments.

The attitude of the War Department is quite easy to comprehend. Stilwell was the personal choice of Stimson and Marshall for the post of commanding general and as such was entitled to their loyalty and support. They respected him as a hard-working, aggressive leader, an excellent trainer of troops, and a sound tactician. Both men realized that his greatest weakness was his lack of tact and diplomacy, but they felt that his positive qualities far outweighed the negative. His knowledge of the Chinese language and his previous service in that country were other important assets. His impatience and intolerance with intrigue and red tape seemed to qualify him especially for the difficult role of galvanizing the Chinese and British into action. Under these circumstances, the vexation Stimson and Marshall felt when outside influences disturbed the normal chain of command was understandable. While recognizing the value of Chennault as an intrepid combat general, the War Department felt it could not countenance the intrigue that resulted in the subversion of his commanding officer.

The bitterness between Stilwell and Chennault was aggravated by a Time Magazine article in February 1943 in which Chennault was represented as deliberately disregarding Stilwell's instructions in order to bring the command problem to a head and force a decision in Washington. In spite of Chennault's denial, the story did nothing to help the already muddled situation. To add to the confusion, Chennault’s new chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Edgar E. Glenn, brought

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30 (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 789. (2) Interv of Sunderland and Romanus with Marshall, 13 Jul 49, filed with MS of their volume, Stilwell's Mission to China, OCMH.
31 For Stimson's account of his part in the Stilwell appointment and his later support of Stilwell, see: Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 528–41. For Marshall's estimate of Stilwell, see: (1) Ltr, Gen Marshall to Vice Adm Lord Louis Mountbatten, 26 Jan 44, in OPD 381 Security, 297; (2) Interv, Sunderland and Romanus with Marshall, 6 Jul 49, filed with MS of their volume, Stilwell's Mission to China, OCMH.
32 (1) Ltr, Marshall to Dill, 10 Sep 43, Item 66, Exec 10. (2) Interv, Sunderland and Romanus with Marshall, 13 Jul 49, filed with MS of their volume, Stilwell's Mission to China, OCMH. For more complete accounts of the Stilwell-Chennault-Chiang controversy, see: (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China; (2) The Stilwell Papers; (3) Chennault, Way of a Fighter; (4) Ltr, Chennault to Wedemeyer, 4 Aug 45, WDCSA 091 China.
word to Chennault from Washington in April that the transport operations were to be transferred from Bissell's command to the Fourteenth Air Force. Although Marshall later assured Stilwell that no such change was contemplated, Chennault evidently was not informed and blamed Stilwell for not executing the alleged order.84 In such an atmosphere only animosity and discord could be expected.

The shape of things to come was brought into clearer focus during March. The President stated his belief in the overriding importance of Chennault's air operations and desired that everything be done to give him a chance to carry out his plan. He rejected Stilwell's suggestion that negotiations with Chiang be conducted on a *quid pro quo* basis and sympathetically supported the dignity of Chiang's position as head of the state. Tact, instead of stern measures, was needed in handling the Generalissimo.35 Although Marshall agreed with the President's estimate of the value of air operations, he hastened to affirm the Army position that the fundamental problems of logistics and ground protection for China air bases would have to be met before the air attack could become effective. The opening of a land route to China and the training of competent Chinese ground troops were necessary to supply and defend the air forces and their bases.36

In accordance with the President's wish, Chennault was assigned three eighths of the tonnage flown over the Hump, supposedly 1,500 out of 4,000 tons, and Stilwell promised to give him full latitude in carrying out his plans. While complying with Marshall's orders, Stilwell warned Marshall that the present swing of the pendulum indicated later maneuvers to put Chennault in command of both the Fourteenth and Tenth Air Forces. To forestall such a move, Stilwell suggested naming an overall air commander right away, but this proposal could not be acted upon by the War Department at this time. Marshall's comment was significant: "We must face the fact that such cannot be done."37

In an effort to retrieve an increasingly unfavorable situation, the War Department had been contemplating the return of Stilwell to the United States to permit him to present his case to the President. When in April Chiang requested the President to bring Chennault home for consultation, Marshall moved quickly to return Stilwell at the same time.38


37 Quote is from msg, Marshall to Stilwell, 27 Mar 43, CM-OUT 10516. See also: msg, Stilwell to Marshall, 20 Mar 43, CM-IN 10715; and msg, Stilwell to Marshall, 31 Mar 43, CM-IN 16735.

Victory Through Airpower?

The conferences that began in Washington at the end of April and lasted through the Trident period gave Chennault and Stilwell an opportunity to present their arguments before all of the interested parties. In turn they met with War Department representatives, the JCS, the President, and the British. The basic question of ground operations versus air attack was examined in detail, but the more delicate problem of Stilwell versus Chennault was also a potent factor in the final decisions. Personality became a bedfellow of strategy.

In the preliminary discussions with the Army staff members, both Chennault and Stilwell set forth conditions in the CBI and the many difficulties of operating successfully in the theater. The main consideration was remedial action to resolve some of the theater's deficiencies—in items of supply and in airfield construction.39

On May first Stilwell sent Marshall Chiang's complaints about the low morale of the Chinese people and the need for increased American aid. Stilwell believed that the low morale was the fault of the Chinese leaders and that the "need" for more aid was simply an opening wedge to lever more supplies from the United States. In his opinion, operations in the CBI and the Southwest Pacific Area should be tied together in a general plan to protect the U.S. forces from misuse by the unstable Chiang. Now, he maintained, was the time to assume a firm stand vis-à-vis both the Chinese and the British and to hold them to their commitments without further concessions.40

Chennault submitted his air plan the same day, setting forth the lucrative targets existing in Japanese-held China and on Formosa that his air force could attack. He visualized a three-stage operation. It would start out with an effort to gain control of the air over China. When this had been accomplished, a period of exploitation would follow during which bombardment would play an increasingly active role. Finally, operations would be extended to include the Japanese mainland itself. To effect this, Chennault would need two groups of fighters, one medium bombardment group, one heavy bombardment group, and a reconnaissance squadron, plus reserves for all four categories. The Chinese Air Force would require eighty fighters and forty medium bombers. Initially, 4,790 tons a month would permit the operation to get under way, eventually building up to 7,128 tons a month in the final stage. Chennault did not feel that the Japanese would be any more successful in repelling such an assault than they had been in the past, and if they made the attempt, their efforts in other theaters would be reduced.41

To carry out the plan efficiently, Chennault believed that the tonnage allocated to the Fourteenth Air Force should be given first priority and that desired quantities of various supplies, such as gasoline, should be sent as requested.

39 Conf with Stilwell and Chennault, 30 Apr 43, Book 9, Exec 8.
40 (1) Memo, Stilwell for CofS, 1 May 43, no sub, OPD 381 CTO, 179. (2) Memo, Stilwell for CofS, 1 May 43, no sub, ABC 384 Burma (8-25-42), II.
He also thought that, to accelerate the operations, he should be allowed direct contact with Chinese officials on air matters.\(^42\)

In his interviews with the President, Chennault found Roosevelt heartily in agreement with him on the importance of keeping China in the war and enthusiastic about the possibilities of air strikes against Japanese shipping. It was clear that while the President was willing to let the ground force program for the Yunnan Chinese armies continue, he did not intend to allow it to interfere with the air plan. The War Department, emphasizing the value of the ground program for the air effort, salvaged what little it could. It managed to moderate Chiang's request that all tonnage be devoted to the strengthening of the air forces.\(^43\)

On the eve of the TRIDENT Conference, the trend toward accentuating the air effort in China was unmistakable, and there was some justice in Stilwell's charge that the President had decided the matter before his interviews with his two commanders.\(^44\) For the past month, the President had been leaning more and more heavily on the Chennault theory of quick victory through increased airpower. Unfortunately for himself, Stilwell failed to make a favorable impression in his meeting with the President and this may have strengthened Roosevelt's conviction that Chennault should be given his opportunity.\(^45\) In vain did the President's Washington military advisers counsel against placing too much confidence in an all-out air offensive unsupported by effective ground troops. As the Chinese dragon eagerly awaited its opportunity to try out its borrowed wings, the War Department could only stand by patiently and hope that eventually it would get its feet back on the ground.

**Planning for Pacific Operations**

In contrast to the international disputes of the China-Burma-India theater and the intraservice conflict between Stilwell and Chennault, the problems of the Pacific were chiefly interservice. The agreements on the Pacific at Casablanca had confirmed the maintenance of constant pressure on and retention of the initiative against the Japanese. American proposals for driving the Japanese pickets from the South and Southwest Pacific, the Aleutians, and the Central Pacific had been put on the planning books. Of chief immediate concern to the U.S. staff was the reduction of Rabaul by the South and Southwest Pacific forces, as soon as the preparatory phases—the Guadalcanal and Papua Campaigns, then in progress—were completed. But problems of operational strategy and policy remained to be settled—problems inextricably mixed up with the complex and long-lingering questions of command in the Pacific. Army-Navy disagreement on the question of over-all command in the Pacific had proved to be a sore spot that eluded treatment. Since neither side was willing to accept the remedies offered by the

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\(^42\) Ltr, Chennault to CG AAF, 4 May 43, sub: Factors Which Limit Operations of the 14th Air Force, Book 9, Exec 8.


\(^44\) *The Stilwell Papers*, p. 204.

other, compromise solutions, which satisfied no one completely, were usually adopted, resulting in makeshift operation-to-operation arrangements that had to be re-examined constantly as conditions changed.

Operational Strategy and Policy
South-Southwest Pacific

In early January before the Casablanca Conference, Admiral King had reopened the question of what the overall command would be after the reduction of Rabaul. Stressing the large Pacific Fleet units involved and the need for continued naval mobility to meet the Japanese Fleet wherever it might threaten, he proposed that an integrated command, to include SWPA, be set up under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. King felt that separate commands would be convenient until the two axes of attack, one from the South Pacific and the other from SWPA, joined for the final assault against Rabaul, but, from that point on, MacArthur should retain strategic direction of the drive under the overall command of Nimitz.46

King’s views led Marshall to state that there were two distinct problems to be considered—first, the long-range matter of overall command, and second, the short-term question of unified control of current operations. He agreed with King that the first was necessary, but argued that it should be subjected to a careful and close scrutiny. The second, he thought, would brook no delay if the United States was to secure the maximum effect from its forces. Deftly evading the major premise regarding Admiral Nimitz, he urged that MacArthur be given strategic direction of the operations as King had suggested. The Commander in Chief, Pacific (Nimitz), would be assigned general control of all Pacific Fleet units so that he could meet all emergencies, and the Commander, South Pacific (Admiral William F. Halsey), would retain direct command of the naval forces engaged in the Rabaul operations. The JCS would continue to control the movements of air forces to meet changing conditions.47

Since the Navy was unwilling to consent to this arrangement, King turned to the conduct of current operations. He secured Marshall’s approval for MacArthur to be queried about his plans to reduce Rabaul and also suggested that naval action might be better directed against the Admiralties rather than the confined waters around Rabaul. He thought that MacArthur should consult with Nimitz and Halsey on these matters before he responded.48

MacArthur replied that he intended to carry out the steps set forth in his dispatch of 8 July 1942.49 By moving his air echelons forward to provide fighter and bomber coverage, he proposed to isolate Rabaul before undertaking the final assault. However, this action would now necessitate increased forces, since the enemy had reinforced the objective. Turning to naval action against the Admiralties, MacArthur

46 Ltr, King to Marshall, 6 Jan 43, Item 67b, Exec 10.
47 Ltr, Marshall to King, 8 Jan 43, sub: Strategic Direction of Operations in the Southwest Pacific, OPD 284 PTO, 8.
warned against any premature naval movement into enemy-held waters without land-based air protection. The condition of neither his ground nor his air forces would permit any offensive to be initiated in SWPA at this time. He maintained that the capture of Rabaul would require long preparation and great resources, but might well become the decisive action in the Pacific. By the time MacArthur’s message arrived, Marshall and King, agreeing that the capture of Rabaul, with its key port, supply, and staging facilities, was still necessary, had decided that a conference between the three Pacific commanders should be held as soon as possible to iron out the details.

While the JCS were waiting for the Pacific commanders to get together, a situation arose in early February that seemed to emphasize the need for overall command or, at least, for closer coordination in the theater. In the face of an imminent Japanese attack on Guadalcanal, a critical shortage of heavy bombers caused both King and Halsey to request reinforcements for the South Pacific Area (SOPAC). MacArthur was requested to co-operate as much as possible, but since his heavy bomber resources were limited and there was no assurance that the impending attack might not be aimed at his own area, he could only promise to try to carry out specified missions. Fortunately, the threatened blow never fell, but the resulting confusion and excitement clearly demonstrated the weaknesses of a mutual co-operation system when danger appeared suddenly.

Further evidence of faulty co-ordination came several days later when Halsey requested all possible air support from SWPA in attacking Japanese shipping in the Buin area on Bougainville. MacArthur, in the light of the recent false alarm, informed Halsey and Marshall that his own operations would require full use of his air forces and that he was completely in the dark in regard to Halsey’s plans. Without information and intelligence co-ordination, he could not consider the dislocation of his own plans and diversion of his air forces. By the 11th, however, some corrective action had been taken, and MacArthur was able to report that Rear Adm. Theodore S. Wilkinson of Halsey’s staff had come to Brisbane and informed him of...
projected operations in the South Pacific Area. Not only had co-ordination been arranged, but Wilkinson had told him that Halsey was completely in accord with MacArthur's concepts regarding Tasks Two and Three.\(^54\)

Only a few days earlier, King had again expressed his dissatisfaction with the failure of MacArthur to provide the JCS with any detailed plans for Task Two. He felt that unless more definite information on such matters as projected operations, Halsey's contemplated role, and the command setup could be secured, the JCS should call upon Nimitz and Halsey to furnish their plans for going ahead in the Solomons "\textit{in support of}" MacArthur.\(^55\)

Although Marshall and his staff agreed that MacArthur should immediately submit definite plans, events made it unnecessary to make any further requests.\(^56\) Instead of a conference in the Pacific, the JCS agreed that the commanders should send their representatives to Washington to present their plans.\(^57\)

Before the conferees assembled, the Navy attempted to bring up three secondary items for consideration by the Army. The first was a proposal to modify the boundary between the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific Areas so that Bougainville would fall in the former area. The second concerned the construction of airfields on Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands, situated between New Guinea and the Solomons. The third had to do with the possible increase of transport aircraft for the South Pacific. The War Department preferred to defer settlement of those problems until the coming meetings.\(^58\)

\textbf{The Pacific Military Conference}

When the Pacific Military Conference opened in Washington on 12 March 1943, the Papua and Guadalcanal Campaigns had been successfully completed. Late in February Admiral Halsey's forces had occupied the Russell Islands,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \(\text{1)}\) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 11 Feb 43, CM-IN 6510.
  \item \(\text{2)}\) Memo for rcd, 15 Feb 43, OPD 981 TS, 25.
  \item Tasks Two and Three were parts of a three-phased series of operations in the Southwest and South Pacific Areas approved by the JCS on 2 July 1942. Task One had included the capture of the Santa Cruz Islands, Tulagi, and adjacent positions; Task Two included the seizure of Lae, Salamaua, and the northeast coast of New Guinea; and Task Three envisioned the capture of Rabaul and adjacent positions in the New Britain-New Ireland area. See Matloff and Snell, \textit{Strategic Planning: 1941–42}, pp. 262–65.
  \item \(\text{55)}\) Memo, King for Marshall, 6 Feb 43, sub: Operations in SWPA for Prosecution of Rabaul Campaign, Item 67c, Exec 10.
  \item \(\text{56)}\) Memo, Marshall for King, 17 Feb 43, sub: Operations in SWPA for Prosecution of Rabaul Campaign, OPD 981 PTO, 125.
  \item \(\text{57)}\) MacArthur had first requested permission to send some of his staff to Washington. The War Department approved, but instructed him to allow his representatives to stop at Nouméa to discuss his plans with Halsey. From there, they would proceed to Hawaii and be joined by members of Nimitz' staff. A later message informed MacArthur that the chief Army planner, General Wedemeyer, would arrive shortly in SWPA. MacArthur's staff representatives should await his coming and travel with him to Washington. \(\text{1)}\) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 15 Feb 43, CM-IN 7418. \(\text{2)}\) Msg, Marshall to MacArthur \textit{et al}, 16 Feb 43, CM-OUT 5656. \(\text{3)}\) Msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 16 Feb 43, CM-OUT 5660.
  \item \(\text{58)}\) \(\text{1)}\) Memo, King for Marshall, 18 Feb 43, sub: Development of Operations in the South-Southwest Pacific, OPD 981 PTO, 125. \(\text{2)}\) Memo, Marshall for King, 19 Feb 43, same sub, OPD 981 PTO, 125. \(\text{3)}\) Memo, CNO for CofS, 23 Feb 43, sub: Installation of Air Strips on Kiriwina Island and Woodlark Island, WDSCA SOPAC. \(\text{4)}\) Memo, Marshall for COMINCH, 22 Feb 43, same sub, WDSCA SOPAC. \(\text{5)}\) Memo, King for CofS, 5 Mar 43, sub: Transport Aircraft for SOPAC, WDSCA SOPAC. \(\text{6)}\) Ltr, McNarney for COMINCH and CNO, 8 Mar 43, same sub, WDSCA SOPAC.
\end{itemize}
some sixty miles northwest of Guadalcanal. This latest move in the Solomons was designed to strengthen the Guadalcanal-Tulagi position and to provide an advanced air and naval operating base for future operations. In addition, the Battle of the Bismarck Sea had allowed the SWPA air force to inflict heavy losses on the Japanese while they were attempting to reinforce the Lae-Salamaua area. Seven transports, four destroyers, and one auxiliary vessel, together with over 3,500 men, were sent to the bottom. This sharp setback marked the last effort of the enemy to send large ships into the Huon Gulf area; henceforth the garrisons were supplied by small barges, submarines, and air transport, which might have a better chance in running the air blockade.

Army-Navy agreement had to be reached to insure the continued and optimum employment of the large forces that had been amassed under General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. Washington military authorities felt the time had come to reach the understanding on operational strategy, resources, deployment, and command for the South-Southwest Pacific that had thus far eluded Army and Navy commanders in the field and their chiefs in the capital.

Practically every senior U.S. staff officer and air commander in the Pacific was in attendance. The conference was welcomed by Admiral King and by General McNarney (representing General Marshall) for the JCS, but after the first meetings the sessions were conducted under the supervision of the Joint Staff Planners, headed by Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr., and General Wedemeyer.

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The Washington planners sought to define the areas of agreement and disagreement. The War Department representatives aimed especially to balance forces and means in terms of the Army’s world-wide commitments and the accepted strategic objectives. This latter task proved to be especially troublesome. As General Wedemeyer reported to the Chief of Staff shortly after the conference began:

The position of the War Department representatives has been rather difficult in that all of the conferees from the Pacific area, both Army and Navy, arrived in Washington determined to get additional means for their respective areas. For obvious reasons, they have been urged on and strongly supported by the Navy.

At the first meeting of the conference, on 12 March 1943, Maj. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur’s chief of staff, presented the ELKTON plan for the seizure and occupation of the New Britain–New Ireland–New Guinea area. The plan, for the continuation of operations leading to the capture of Rabaul, had been prepared by General MacArthur’s staff to cover Tasks Two and Three of the 2 July 1942 JCS directive. It was based upon the concept, advanced for some time by Army representatives, of “elbowing forward” on eastern and western approaches to Rabaul. The eastern approach extended through the Solomons to Kavieng on New Ireland via New Georgia and Bougainville. The western advance proceeded along the northern coast of New Guinea to include the Huon Peninsula and Madang, then across the Vitiaz Strait to western New Britain. The axes would then converge for the final assault upon Rabaul.

The first move by SWPA forces—advancing on the western axis—would be to seize operating airfields on the Huon Peninsula to cover the approaches to New Britain. This would be followed by an advance by the SOPAC forces on the eastern axis to seize and set up air bases on New Georgia to protect the next move, into Bougainville. Then, simultaneously, the two forces would move in and establish air bases—SWPA forces on western New Britain; those from SOPAC on Bougainville. When this had been accomplished, the SOPAC forces would capture Kavieng, thus isolating Rabaul, which would be taken by amphibious assault. To carry out this ambitious plan, MacArthur and his staff had calculated that twelve and two-thirds divisions and thirty air groups would be needed in SWPA, and ten divisions and fifteen air groups in the South Pacific Area. Of this total of twenty-two and two-thirds divisions, ten would have to be amphibiously trained.

The strengths called for in the ELKTON plan were much greater than those projected by the War Department operations staff for the South and Southwest Pacific theaters. By the first of October,
only eight divisions were scheduled to be present in the South Pacific, leaving a shortage of two divisions. Seventeen divisions would be on hand by the first of October in SWPA, but of these, only three of the eleven Australian divisions included could be used offensively, leaving a deficit of three and two-thirds divisions. In the matter of air forces, there would be approximately six groups in the South Pacific on 1 October and fifteen groups in SWPA, or about twenty-four groups short of the theater estimate.

There was little comment on the deficiency in ground troops, since the shortage hinged on shipping limitations rather than a lack of troops. However, the air allocations were strongly contested by the Navy, particularly Admiral Cooke, the chief Navy planner. He felt that the Army Air Forces' interpretation of the Casablanca decisions was in error and that entirely too many planes were committed to the Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom. In spite of the efforts of Wedemeyer and Brig. Gen. Orvil A. Anderson of the Air Forces to head off the introduction of European allocations into the discussion, Cooke persisted in his line of questioning. Anderson asserted that aircraft had been allocated to the Pacific after allotment to Europe in accordance with the AAF interpretation of the Casablanca decision that one of the main lines of offensive action would be the heaviest possible bomber offensive from the United Kingdom against Germany. Anderson stressed that his office merely provided information on the availability of aircraft and did not attempt to determine whether requirements were being met. The function of apportioning aircraft was a prerogative of the Joint Chiefs.

Since accord on the amount of air forces that should be made available to accomplish ELKTON seemed impossible, the conferees decided to refer the question to the JCS, recommending that either the forces allocated be augmented or the current directives for Pacific operations be modified. In the meantime, a subcommittee was appointed to study the possibilities of redistributing forces already allotted to the Pacific in order to ensure the most economical use of them. The subcommittee reported that its members were agreed that the forces required as shown in the ELKTON plan were the minimum necessary and could not be reduced.

Cooke and Wedemeyer then presented the problem to the JCS. King felt that the Casablanca decision should not be interpreted so literally that the operations set up for the Pacific would have to depend entirely upon what was left over from the European theater. On the other hand, Marshall suggested that it would be preferable to decide how the forces now set up for the Pacific could be used, and then investigate what additional forces would be needed.

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65 (1) Memo, Handy for Pacific Conferees, 13 Mar 43, sub: Deployment of Forces, Item 1b, Exec 2. (2) Min, 3d mtg of Pacific Military Conf, 13 Mar 43, ABC 370.26 (7–8–42), 4. (3) SS 35, memo, Blizzard for Wedemeyer, 13 Mar 43, sub: Analysis of ELKTON Requirements, ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2–95 (7 Jan 43).


Handy and Stratemeyer pointed out that if the Pacific aircraft requirements were met, the Combined Bomber Offensive would be directly and adversely affected, the Casablanca decisions might be voided, and the whole strategy of the war might have to be changed. The Army attitude that the Allies must concentrate upon defeating Germany first had as a corollary the increasing of the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom as swiftly as possible. Small increases to the Pacific could be made when such additions did not affect the build-up in the United Kingdom. As a result of this discussion, the Joint planners were instructed to report on the forces that could be sent to the Pacific by fully utilizing all shipping available currently and in the next several months. They were also to report on the possible effects of diverting additional aircraft to the Pacific.\(^{68}\)

Two plans were submitted by the JPS. The first contained two alternatives, both of which reflected the desire of the War Department to hew closely to its interpretation of the Casablanca decisions. Each alternative would have added a moderate number of aircraft to the already planned allocations, along with the shipment of additional ground forces. In the second plan, favored by the Navy, one division allotted to the South Pacific would be canceled and increased air allocations would be sent to both the South Pacific and SWPA. The Army planners considered the latter plan inconsistent with Allied global strategy for 1943 since the forces contemplated were in excess of those believed adequate to fulfill the Casablanca decisions. The air increases would reduce the strength of the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom without providing commensurate return since even these added forces would not be sufficient to reduce Rabaul in 1943.\(^{69}\)

The heart of the matter was the personal preference expressed by the Pacific commanders for air forces over ground forces, if a choice had to be made. The JCS finally approved the second plan and directed the conferees to explore the offensive operations possible in 1943 with all the forces currently allocated and to present their findings to the Joint Chiefs.\(^{70}\)

The gains of the theater representatives may be gauged when compared with the original estimates of air deployment prepared by the War Department operations staff at the start of the conference. By the end of 1943 the additional air allocations would amount to one medium bomber group, two light bomber groups, two fighter groups, one observation group, and one half of a transport group for SWPA, and a small augmentation of heavy bombers and fighters for the South Pacific.\(^{71}\)


\(^{69}\) JCS 238/1, 18 Mar 43, title: Plan for Operations for the Seizure of the Solomon Islands–New Guinea–New Britain–New Ireland Area. The planners estimated that from 1 April to 30 September 1943, 127,722 troop spaces would be available in addition to 129,995 replacements needed by the Army and Navy, and some 87 cargo sailings besides the 387 necessary to sustain the forces already present in the theaters.

\(^{70}\) Min, 67th mtg JCS, 19 Mar 43. General Kenney hints that the President may have influenced the decision to give the Pacific more planes. See George C. Kenney, *General Kenney Reports* (New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), pp. 215–16.

\(^{71}\) (1) Memo, Handy for Pacific Conferees, 13 Mar 43, sub: Deployment of Forces, Item 1b, Exec 2. (2)
The conferees were agreed that even with these increases only Task Two of the 2 July 1942 directive could be carried out—Madang, the southeast portion of Bougainville, Cape Gloucester, and Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands, but not Kavieng and Rabaul. The conferees pointed out that the construction of air bases on Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands would provide support for the Pacific line of communications and over the Solomons area itself. It would allow freer interchange of air resources between SOPAC and SWPA and would also permit a later move into New Georgia. Although Admiral King was not particularly pleased about the inactivity of the South Pacific forces during the advance into the Huon Peninsula and again brought up the subject of operations in the Marshall Islands, the JCS on 21 March approved in principle the concept for 1943 operations presented by the conferees. The Joint planners were instructed to prepare for JCS approval a directive to put the plan into effect.

Although the conference did not officially come to an end until the 28th of March, its practical work ceased on the 21st. The remainder of the time was spent straightening out the many details of the directive, a task that was principally a staff responsibility.

The difficulties of settling the problems of resources and operations seemed minor compared with the intricacies of working out an acceptable answer to the question of command. Counterproposal followed proposal, as both sides jockeyed for position. The attempts of the Navy to have the original directive of July 1942 modified took several directions but met with little success. The Navy's first suggestion was for a territorial change, proposing that all of the Solomons be placed in SOPAC, thus allowing operations in that area to continue by mutual co-ordination under naval command. When this tack failed, the Navy proposed that all of the Pacific theater be placed under Navy command on the same basis that U.S. forces in the European and Mediterranean theaters had been placed under Army command.

In the face of Navy agitation for command or territorial change, the Army clung firmly to the provisions of the July directive, which assigned strategic command in the Solomons to MacArthur at the end of the Guadalcanal-Tulagi operations. Concessions were offered, however, to permit Nimitz increased control of Pacific Fleet units and to give Halsey direct control of forces operating in the Solomons. The Army also offered to put the allocation of forces and the timing of operations under the JCS.

The chief anxiety of the Navy seemed to be the restrictions upon the strategic

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flexibility of the Pacific Fleet, which must, in its opinion, be ready at any moment to meet any threatened attack by the Japanese over the Navy's wide-flung frontier. To satisfy this concern and at the same time to meet the desire of Admiral Leahy to provide firm commitments of naval forces to MacArthur, King proposed that all units of the Pacific Ocean Area, other than those assigned by the JCS to task forces, remain under the control of Nimitz. The proposal was accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff since it was in conformity with the initial stand of the Army and answered Leahy's objection. When King voiced his fear that the large South Pacific naval forces might be inactive while MacArthur was making his first move, Marshall stated that, although MacArthur did not want any grand-scale operations that might draw off air support from the SWPA advance to Madang, he himself felt that every opportunity to exploit Japanese weakness should be taken. From Halsey's own reports, it appeared that he would continue to exert pressure on the Japanese and to advance wherever it was militarily feasible.

The directive sent to the Pacific commanders on 29 March provided that the operations against Rabaul would be under the direction of MacArthur, and that Halsey, working under general directives from MacArthur, would be in direct command of operations in the Solomons. All naval units except those assigned to task forces by the JCS would remain under Nimitz' control. Also, MacArthur was to submit to the JCS general plans on the composition of task forces and on the sequence and timing of his operations.

The Pacific Military Conference had succeeded in bringing about an adjustment of demands vis-à-vis supply for the Pacific. The requests of the Pacific commanders for increased air allocations were examined by the Army planners and found to be excessive on two counts: in the first place, to have complied with the requests would have been to cut down the shipments of aircraft to the United Kingdom for the Combined Bomber Offensive, which had first priority on U.S. production; and second, had the aircraft been available to the Pacific, a shortage of shipping would have limited delivery. The compromise, which the Navy support for increased air commitments produced, resulted in additional planes being sent to the Pacific at the expense of ground troops already projected for that area and of the U.K. bomber offensive. The scope of proposed operations, however, had been limited to those that could be carried out with current allocations, plus the recently won air increases. The theater representatives therefore gained a small victory with the Navy's assistance, but the War Department, on the other hand, had been able to keep the increases

within bounds and the operations within reality. Both groups could feel some measure of satisfaction over the outcome.

The projected operations in the Pacific, which later assumed the code name CARTWHEEL, were to carry the United States through 1943. The command arrangements represented a further compromise between the Army and Navy, probably the best that could have been secured at that time. The Army had preserved its fiction of unity of command and the Navy had safeguarded the position of the Pacific Fleet. In the absence of interservice agreement on a supreme commander, the problem of allocating resources in the Pacific was to remain the task of the JCS. But at the very least, a modus vivendi had been worked out to allow the advance in the Pacific to proceed.

Postlude to the Conference

After waiting patiently for a month for MacArthur's answer, King in early May suggested that MacArthur again be requested to submit his detailed plans and target dates for the operations outlined in the joint directive of 29 March. King pointed out that in the past two months the Pacific had been inactive except for conferences and exchanges of telegrams on the adjustment of forces and the timing and sequence of operations. In his opinion, the inactivity should be ended as soon as possible with the inauguration of offensive operations in the Solomons–Woodlark area.

MacArthur's reply briefly outlined the intended sequence of operations but cautioned that plans would be subject to the changing conditions of the tactical situation. The plans envisaged the occupation of Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands on or about 15 June 1943. While the western axis from SWPA advanced toward Madang, SOPAC forces advancing along the eastern axis would endeavor to infiltrate into New Georgia and capture the Buin–Faisi area. The third steps, on both axes—the occupation of western New Britain and Kieta and the neutralization of Buka—would probably proceed simultaneously. Three task forces were to be established: one for New Guinea operations from SWPA; one for the Solomons from SOPAC; and a third for the Kiriwina-Woodlark and western New Britain operations from both SWPA and SOPAC. No estimates in timing for the later advances were given.

MacArthur later informed Marshall that the seizure of Kiriwina-Woolark and the infiltration into New Georgia would both take place on 30 June instead of on 15 June.

In the meantime, the War Department released a group of P-47's for shipment to SWPA and agreed to make up Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney's heavy bomber deficit by 1 July. MacArthur was also notified that the 1st Cavalry Division,

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82 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 27 May 43, CM-IN 17166.
then in the United States, would be sent
to his area during June, to be followed
by the 24th Infantry Division from
Hawaii as soon as shipping was avail-
able. Negotiations had also been con-
ducted with the Australian Government
in the matter of bringing its air forces
up to strength. At the time of the March
conference, Prime Minister John Curt-
in of Australia had asked President
Roosevelt for 1,500 additional opera-
tional aircraft and 500 additional air
transports to meet future Japanese
threats against Australia. In April the
Australian Minister for External Affairs,
H. V. Evatt, came to Washington to dis-
cuss the situation with the President.
He asked the United States to supply
twenty-seven additional squadrons to
complete the seventy-three-squadron pro-
gram of the Royal Australian Air Force.
The President at first could not see his
way clear to meet this increase, and the
War Department vigorously opposed any
expansion of the RAAF at the expense
of U.S. units elsewhere. However, when
Evatt proposed that the completion of
this program be extended to the end of
1944, Roosevelt decided, for political
reasons, to give the Australians six squad-
rons of obsolescent Army and Navy planes
during the balance of 1943.84

All in all, the military planning grow-
ing out of the Pacific Military Confer-
ence was essentially short range and
limited in scope. Deployment to the
South-Southwest Pacific was still largely
of the familiar piecemeal 1942 variety—
though now aimed at promoting a series
tactical offensives. Brig. Gen. Will-

83 (1) Msg. Kenney to Arnold, 6 May 43, CM-IN
3457. (2) Msg. Marshall to Kenney, 6 May 43, CM-
OUT 2358. (3) Msg. Arnold to Kenney, 7 May 43,
May 43, CM-OUT 3614.

84 (1) Memo. Deane for Leahy, Marshall, King,
and Arnold, 24 Mar 43, sub: Allocation of Addi-
tional Aircraft to Australia, Item 55, Exec 10. (2)
Msg. Marshall to MacArthur, 8 May 43, CM-OUT
3391. (3) Memo. Marshall for President, 23 May 43,
sub: Aircraft for the RAAF, WDSCA Australia. (4)
Memo. Marshall for President, 25 May 43, sub: Dr.
Evatt's Request for the RAAF, WDSCA Australia.
(5) Ltr. Evatt for President, 3 Jun 43, WDSCA Aus-
tralia. (6) Memo. J. T. M. for CofS, 7 Jun 43, sub:

85 Speech, "Outline Strategy of the War," by Bes-
sell, presented at Army and Navy Staff College,
Washington, D. C., 8 Jan 46, Tab 5, ABC 350.001
Speeches (26 Oct 46), 1.
themselves adopted a purely defensive attitude and made no further attempts to advance along the island chain. Second, weather conditions made any offensive action in the area difficult. The overcast that covered the islands most of the time made air and naval operations dangerous and often impossible. Gradually, the activity in Alaska settled down to a war of attrition that proved costly to the Japanese in their efforts to support their garrisons and expensive to the United States since it pinned down a large number of troops that the War Department might have used to better advantage elsewhere.

During the latter part of 1942, there had been some expectation among the Washington military staffs that the North Pacific route might become increasingly important in the Japanese war, especially if the Japanese decided to attack Siberia. In September Admiral King had called for a study of ways and means of supporting Soviet troops in the Far East and if of using Soviet bases to strike at Japan itself should war break out between Japan and the USSR. A special subcommittee of the Joint Staff Planners turned in a report at the end of November, listing what would have to be done to prepare for the contingency. They recommended recapturing the western Aleutians and obtaining Soviet co-operation in planning for a campaign against Japan via the northern route.

January 1943 the JCS approved the recommendations, with only slight modifications, for planning purposes. Meanwhile, the whole question of possible collaboration in the North Pacific—especially air collaboration—was being taken up through the highest political channels. Undaunted by earlier failures, General Arnold had in mid-1942 reopened this question, which had especially interested the AAF from the very beginning of the war. In July the President had sent Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley to Moscow to concert measures with the Russians in the event of an attack by Japan on the USSR. A special object of the Bradley mission was to pave the way for utilizing the air bases of Siberia. After three months' negotiations, an agreement had been reached that Bradley should survey the airfields in Siberia, but the Russians then reversed their decision and the whole proposal collapsed. Rejecting the American offer to commit three heavy bomber groups to Siberia immediately after the outbreak of war between the Soviet Union and Japan, Stalin, on 13 January 1943, informed the President that what he wanted was not air units later in the Far East, but planes at once for the Soviet-German front. The President had already told Stalin that the units would be available only in the event of a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union, and then only by redispersing U.S. air forces in the Pacific. On this note the correspondence ended.

The northern route runs roughly via Alaska, the Aleutians, and the Kamchatka Peninsula into the Kuril Islands and the maritime provinces of the Soviet Union.

Memo, King for JCS, 21 Sep 42, sub: Campaign Against Japan via the Northern Route, ABC 381 Japan (5–31–42), 1.

JPS 67/1, 30 Nov 42, title: Campaign Against Japan via the Northern Route.

Min, 49th mtg JCS, 5 Jan 43.

Msg, Stalin to Roosevelt, 13 Jan 43, incl to memo, Lt Col Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., JCS, for Gen Handy, 21 Jan 43, sub: Bradley Mission, Item 20, Exec 1. For background and details of the Bradley mission, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941–42, pp. 313–16.

Msg, President to Stalin, 8 Jan 43, Item 20, Exec 1.
The failure of the Bradley mission underscored the continued disinterest of the Soviet Union in putting an end to its armed neutrality in the Far East. Obviously, Stalin was determined not to be drawn into a two-front war. Therefore nothing came of the early proposals for co-operation in the North Pacific. Clearly, any offensive from the Aleutians would have to await Soviet entry into the war against Japan. Although the fear, which had spurred the early staff studies, that the Soviet Union might be attacked by Japan proved groundless and the Soviet attitude frustrating, the potential use of the northern route was long to remain a factor in American planning against Japan.

While the Soviet-American negotiations had been under way, Washington relaxed its previous curbs on the schemes of commanders in the theater for clearing the Aleutians, but Marshall warned DeWitt in December that any plan for ejecting the Japanese from the Aleutians must be fitted into the many requirements of the over-all picture. Pointing out that a total of 98,000 men was then committed to Alaska, he observed that, in light of the desperate fighting and the needs in other areas, the Army could not afford a continual increase to the Alaskan area.

At the Casablanca Conference, Marshall himself had tempered the intention of the JCS to drive the Japanese out of the Aleutians to the milder “make the Aleutians as secure as may be,” lest the British be led to believe that contemplated operations were to be on a major scale. For quite a while, Marshall and his staff planners had felt that extensive operations in the Aleutians would be profitless and indecisive in pressing the war against Japan unless the USSR joined in the war and the northern route to Japan was exploited.

The occupation of Amchitka without resistance in January placed the U.S. forces in position to carry out the operation planned against Kiska, but it soon became evident that with the means available the operation would be impossible. On 7 March Rear Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, commanding Task Force 8, suggested that an operation against Attu should be substituted for the one against Kiska. He based his recommendation on the ground that the shortage of shipping and forces, added to the usual obstacles of fog and mist, ruled out the Kiska operation. On the other hand, he urged, the Attu attack could be undertaken with the forces available in the theater.

The JCS looked with favor upon Kinkaid’s proposal and instructed Nimitz and DeWitt to plan and train for the Attu operation provided no additional resources were required. During the following week, DeWitt sent a draft directive to Nimitz suggesting 7 May as the target date. Supreme command was to be invested in Admiral Kinkaid, with the amphibious forces under Rear Adm. Francis W. Rockwell until the landing phase was completed, at which time the

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93 There were 86,089 troops in Alaska at the end of November; the total was increased to 96,061 a month later. See STM-30, 1 Jan 48.

94 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941–42, Ch. XV.

95 Navy msg, 070115, CTF 8 to CINCPAC, 7 Mar 43, OPD 981 Security, 39.

96 Navy msg, 111221, COMINCH to CINCPAC and CG WDC, 10 Mar 43, OPD 981 Security, 39.
commanding general of the assault force, the 7th Infantry Division, would assume direction.\textsuperscript{97}

The need to make a firm decision was accentuated when intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese were building an airfield on Attu. King was all the more anxious that the commitment be made firm, since the Pacific Military Conference discussions then pointed to a deferment of extensive operations in the Solomons. When Marshall agreed, the JCS directed Nimitz and DeWitt to proceed with the operation as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{98} Arrangements on the size of the Army forces to be employed were concluded by direct communication between DeWitt and the War Department. The Army planning staff approved the use of two reinforced infantry regiments, one standard infantry regiment, and some engineer units.\textsuperscript{99}

On 1 April Nimitz issued his official directive for the Attu and Shemya operations. It followed closely the recommendations of DeWitt's draft proposals in the matter of command and retained 7 May as the target date.\textsuperscript{100} DeWitt informed the Chief of Staff that command relationships between the top Army and Navy commanders were excellent and that preparations were going ahead apace. The worst enemy was expected to be not the Japanese but the weather.\textsuperscript{101} DeWitt added that he favored asking the Soviet Union for permission to establish air and naval bases on the Komandorskie Islands. The USSR had already been approached several times for this permission in connection with Siberian air bases and intelligence information about Siberian capacities, but to no avail. Since there had not been any recent change in the Soviet attitude, Marshall felt that there would be no point in bringing the subject to their attention again.\textsuperscript{102}

The attack on Attu, which began on 11 May, ended on the 31st with the complete annihilation of the Japanese garrison.\textsuperscript{103} This, with the concurrent seizure of Shemya, marked the next important step—after Amchitka—looking toward the final expulsion of the enemy from the Aleutians.

\begin{quote}
System of Command of Joint Operations
\end{quote}

The decisions at Casablanca and the heightened operational activity in the Pacific, current and prospective, in the early months of 1943 drove home to the Army the need for something more than the \textit{ad hoc} arrangements for joint Army and Navy action painfully and slowly worked out between the services for each operation. Although interservice agreement on an over-all command and commander still seemed to be out of the question, there was hope that an understanding might at least be reached on

\textsuperscript{97} Navy msg, 172239, CG WDC, to CINCPAC, 19 Mar 43, OPD 981 Security, 59.
\textsuperscript{100} Ltr, CG Landing Force to CG WDC, 22 Jun 43, sub: Rpt of Operations, OPD 981 Security, 74.
\textsuperscript{101} Ltr, Marshall to CG WDC, 12 Apr 43, WDCSA Alaska Super Secret.
\textsuperscript{102} (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Marshall to CG WDC, 12 Apr 43, WDCSA Alaska.
\textsuperscript{103} Ltr, CG Landing Force to CG WDC, 22 Jun 43, sub: Rpt of Operations, OPD 981 Security, 74.
the principles of a system of command for joint Army and Navy action. This subject, closely bound up with the quest for unity of command, had long been under study and negotiation by the Army and Navy. Earlier, the problems of joint command in Iceland, Hawaii, and the Caribbean and in joint tactical undertakings had been settled on an individual basis. The need for a system of guiding rules for joint operations, apart from the customary co-ordination by mutual co-operation, was all the more apparent to the Army after the CCS at Casablanca had approved principles of unified command for combined organizations.

The immediate prospects were not too encouraging. Shortly after that conference, the Navy attempted to revise certain portions of the combined agreement, in spite of the protests of the Army that the understanding had already been adopted by the CCS. Admiral King's quarrel was with the use of the term "joint," which he believed should be restricted to operations carried on by two or more services of one nation, rather than two or more of the arms of one nation. King asserted that the United States had only two services, the Army and the Navy, but each service had at least two arms. Under the definition suggested by the compact on combined command, a joint command could be constituted by any Army and Air Forces operation, or a Navy-Marine task force.

The War Department operations staff felt that King's objection was based on the Navy's refusal to accept the fact that functionally the United States had three fundamental arms—land, sea, and air—within the two armed services. The original definition had been drawn up to recognize this functional use of forces, and for that reason Marshall was counseled to oppose any change.

King proceeded to recommend that this reference to arms be deleted from the agreement completely, along with another that provided for representation on the staff of a combined commander of the various "arms" and "services" of participating nations. He thought that the provision was unnecessary since it would allow nations with small forces operating under an Allied commander to have representation on his staff and cause confusion. King's position was opposed with vigor by the War Department operations staff, which argued that the basic theme of the understanding was the need of the commander for the advice and assistance of staff representatives of the arms and nations constituting the overall force. When Admiral Leahy supported the War Department view, stressing that the concurrence of the British had been obtained with difficulty and that the United States might lose the points it had gained if it reopened the subject, King withdrew his proposals.

Having successfully resisted the attempt to re-examine the combined agreement, the Army planners began working out a similar agreement on the joint

104 Mark S. Watson, The Beginnings of Service Unification, MS, OCMH files.
106 OPD brief, 16 Feb 43, title: Notes . . . JCS 62d mtg, filed with JCS 215 in ABC 322.07 (8-24-42).
107 JCS 215/1, 15 Feb 43, title: System of Comd for Combined U.S.-Br Operations. King cited specifically the staff of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, which would have to have British, Canadian, Dutch, Norwegian, etc., representatives.
108 OPD brief, 16 Feb 43, title: Notes . . . JCS 62d mtg, with JCS 215/1 in ABC 322.07 (8-24-42).
109 Min, 62d mtg JCS, 16 Feb 43.
level. A set of War Department proposals on a system of command for U.S. joint operations had been under study by the Joint Staff Planners since September 1942, and by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee since January 1943.110 During this period, the War Department maintained, the Navy had in effect exercised a "pocket veto" of the Army proposals by delaying consideration of the subject. Finally, in spite of Navy efforts to remove the matter from the agenda of the Joint Planning Staff, the Army planners insisted that it be brought before the JCS, if only as the view of the Army. The Navy contended that there was no necessity for formal directives to bind the two services to unity of command when the determining factor was the willingness of the commanders concerned to co-operate. In rebuttal, the Army asserted that the principle of unified command had been recognized as sound by both services and should be established for joint forces as well as combined.111

The Army planners correlated their views with those of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. The Navy counterparts, suddenly dropping their objections on the ground that they had not been aware that Admiral King had referred the whole subject to the JSSC, approved the revised proposals.112

On 20 April 1943 final agreement was reached by the JCS. Among the principles adopted to govern future operations were: a single commander would be designated by the JCS on the basis of the job to be performed; command prerogatives over a joint force were to be exercised as though the forces involved were all Army or all Navy; the JCS would send the joint commander major directives relating to components of the force; the joint commander would not normally be commander of a component of his force; the joint commander would be assisted by a joint staff, representative of the components of his force; and subsidiary joint forces would be organized on the same principles.113

The acquiescence of the Navy in a definite system of command for joint operations was a step forward in settling outstanding points of difference between the two services. The agreement was by no means a panacea for all the misunderstandings that were bound to arise when interests clashed and service loyalties were concerned, nor was it intended to be. The attempt to place the joint commander in a separate niche was designed to lift him above petty rivalries and to give him a free hand to devote all his energies to the direction of operations.


112 (1) Min, 69th mtg JPS, 14 Apr 43. (2) JCS 263, 15 Apr 43, title: Unified Cmd for U.S. Joint Operations.

With the weaknesses of the mutual cooperation system plainly evident, the reform was designed to create not only greater co-ordination between commanders but also greater efficiency in the use of the forces involved.

The agreement in Washington on the principles of command was in keeping with the quickening pace of the American advance in the Pacific. It promised to speed the execution of the approved joint operational strategy and to mitigate some of the effects of compartmentalization in the Pacific. But the larger and interrelated questions of over-all strategy and deployment in the war against Japan would have to await the solution of basic long-range problems in the coalition and global war, which were beyond the sole jurisdiction of the Army and Navy—the formula for which the Army planning staff in the spring of 1943 was searching.

The results of the negotiations of the U.S. Chiefs and their staffs on the Pacific, in the months immediately following Casablanca, pointed up a number of developments. Several short-term problems of command, resources, and operations had been settled for the immediate future. A system of command for joint action agreeable to both the Army and Navy had been adopted. The proponents of higher priority for the Pacific war had labored, with some success, to secure larger commitments. On the other hand, the old problem of the precise relationship of the war against Japan to the war against the European Axis was more than ever a moot question. Tentative long-range plans to defeat Japan were being studied on the joint planning level, but these were still in the nature of academic exercises and only straws in the wind. Until firm decisions and definite commitment of resources and strength for the defeat of Germany were made, the Pacific war would continue to be conducted on a contingent basis; realistic long-range planning would be impossible. That these implications were not lost on the Army staff became apparent as it turned to preparations for the forthcoming meetings with the British in Washington at the Trident Conference.
CHAPTER V

The New Look in Strategic Planning

In the early months of 1943 General Marshall and his staff began to seek new and firmer long-range bases upon which to plan for victory. The Washington strategic planners conducted an exploratory search in three principal directions: the development of planning techniques and tactics; the calculation of the ultimate size and "cutting edge" of the Army; and the designing of strategic concepts and plans. Gradually recovering from the confusion that had marked its deliberations at the turn of the year, the Army staff applied itself to these problems in the spring of 1943 with renewed vigor. To reorient British-American planning toward longer term and more decisive military goals became its chief concern. The meeting of the President and Prime Minister with their military staffs at the international conference in Washington in May (TRIDENT) offered both incentive and opportunity. Army preparations for the TRIDENT Conference indicated a growing awareness of the new realities in the multifront coalition war and a firmer grasp of its problems.

Reorienting Staff Planning

The U.S. military planners were determined to make a more effective presentation of their case at TRIDENT than they had at Casablanca. The Casablanca Conference had focused their attention on weaknesses in U.S. staff preparations and had driven home the need for reorganizing and reorienting U.S. staff planning—a need apparent to some of the War Department planners before the end of 1942.¹

The definite agreement at Casablanca to undertake an operation in 1943 against Sicily, as urged by the British, and the inability of the U.S. delegation to secure a correspondingly firm British commitment for a major cross-Channel effort had left General Wedemeyer, General Marshall's principal adviser at the conference, keenly disappointed. He wrote: "... we lost our shirts and ... are now committed to a subterranean umbilicus operation in mid-summer ... we came, we listened and we were conquered." General Marshall, he observed, had performed magnificently for the Americans, but had received little effective assistance from his colleagues in the JCS. The small U.S. delegation had, in fact, appeared disorganized in contrast to

¹ For a detailed discussion of the late 1942 developments, see Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 413-17.
the large, well-prepared and united British delegation. General Wedemeyer admired the way the British had presented and argued their case:

They swarmed down upon us like locusts with a plentiful supply of planners and various other assistants with prepared plans to insure that they not only accomplished their purpose but did so in stride and with fair promise of continuing in their role of directing strategically the course of this war. I have the greatest admiration, . . . and if I were a Britisher I would feel very proud. However, as an American I wish that we might be more glib and better organized to cope with these super negotiators. From a worm's eye viewpoint it was apparent that we were confronted by generations and generations of experience in committee work and in rationalizing points of view. They had us on the defensive practically all the time.²

To meet the British on more nearly equal terms at subsequent formal conferences, the Americans would have to match them in thorough, skillful preparation of their case, or accept British proposals. The Americans saw that they would have to lay the groundwork on an interservice basis and pave the way for binding agreements by the JCS on the military courses to be followed. They would have to provide joint studies to serve as a basis for understanding between the JCS and the President and at the same time to anticipate and minimize difficulties in coming to a firm agreement with the British.

Before the TRIDENT Conference, the U.S. military staff put some of the lessons of Casablanca into effect. General Wedemeyer suggested to the JCS that the United States "take the offensive" at TRIDENT by requesting the British to consider papers agreed upon by the JCS. In this way the U.S. representatives would not find themselves in the position of "considering all British papers."³ Generals Marshall and McNarney approved and the Joint Chiefs accepted the recommendation. Brig. Gen. John E. Hull's proposal for increasing the number of representatives in the American delegation was also approved by General Marshall and put into effect by the JCS.⁴ Just before TRIDENT, moreover, the JCS approved the major wartime reorganization of the joint committee system. The movement to regularize and reorganize the system, initiated before the end of 1942, was given an impetus by the experience at Casablanca.⁵ A basic aim of that movement was to breathe new life into the joint system. New agencies, relationships, and divisions of

² Pers ltr, Wedemeyer to Handy, 22 Jan 43, no sub, Case 5, Item 1a, Exec 9.
³ Min, 79th mtg JCS, 10 May 43.
⁵ On 16 January 1943 General McNarney proposed an investigation of the JCS and all its subordinate agencies. His action led to the appointment of a special committee, representing the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff and the JCS Secretariat. Colonel Roberts of the War Department Operations Division was designated to represent General McNarney. Toward the end of March 1943 the committee submitted its report. The reorganization, which was carried out in line with the committee's recommendations, on the whole remained in effect throughout the period of hostilities. See: (1) JCS 202, 16 Jan 43, title: War Planning Agencies; (2) JCS 202/D, 20 Jan 49, title: War Planning Agencies; and (3) JCS 202/2, 25 Mar 43, title: War Planning Agencies.
responsibilities began to appear in the joint planning field.

Already, in November 1942, in order to fill a keenly felt need, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) had been set up to advise the JCS on long-range strategic planning. This high-level strategic committee was composed of Lt. Gen. Stanley D. Embick, former chief of the War Plans Division (WPD) and Deputy Chief of Staff; Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild of the Army Air Forces; and Vice Adm. Russell Willson. Throughout the rest of the wartime period this independent group of “elder statesmen” continued to advise the JCS on broad questions of national policy and world strategy.

The principal achievements of the reorganization movement were the steps taken to increase the effectiveness of the Joint Staff Planners (JPS), a committee that was bogging down under innumerable functions, directly and indirectly relating to strategy, that it was attempting to perform. A more or less co-ordinate committee was chartered in May 1943 to take part of the burden. Initially called the Joint Administrative Committee and subsequently the Joint Logistics Committee (JLC), it dealt on a full-time basis with procurement, allocation, transportation of supplies and equipment, and other activities in the field of logistics. The most significant measure taken to relieve the JPS was the delegation to a working body directly under it of the responsibility for making tentative interservice agreements on the subsequent deployment and employment of U.S. forces. Hitherto “war plans”—below the scope of broad strategy—had been prepared by the Army and Navy staffs largely without benefit of joint action. A reconstituted working committee, now named the Joint War Plans Committee, was established in April 1943. It was designed to answer the need for timely, detailed, joint deployment and operational studies.

Key personnel changes accompanying the transition to the revised planning system brought new vigor into U.S. military planning. In the process, the Army Air Forces gained the voice in joint strategic deliberations on the working level that it had previously won in the JCS and JPS. Col. William W. Bessell, Jr., of the War Department’s operations staff was named senior Army member of the JWPC and held the position until

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8 JCS 149/D, 7 Nov 43, title: Charter of JSSC.
7 General Embick had been Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, from March 1935 until May 1936 and Deputy Chief of Staff from May 1936 until October 1938. He had also served as a member of the Permanent Joint Board of Defense of Canada and the United States, and of the Inter-American Defense Board. General Fairchild had been Assistant Chief of the Air Corps in 1941 and became Director of Military Requirements, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, in 1942. Admiral Willson was a former Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy and had served as Chief of Staff, U.S. Fleet, and Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

9 (1) JCS 202/D/10, 5 May 43, title: Charter, JAdC. (2) Memo, DCofS for Secretariat JCS, 5 May 43, sub: Army Representatives on JAdC, with JCS 202/D/10 in ABC 334.8 JAdC (5 May 43), 1-A.
8 Memo, OPD for CofS, 27 Apr 43, sub: Representation on War Planning Agencies of JCS, ABC 381 United Nations (23 Jan 42), 2. The formal charter of the JWPC is contained in JCS 202/14/D, 11 May 43, title: Charter/JWPC.
10 The JWPC was composed of a number of planning teams. The senior planning team had the duty of assigning and reviewing the work of the other planning teams, which were divided according to the major areas of the world: (1) the Red Team—the Pacific and Far East; (2) the Blue Team—the European–Mediterranean areas; and (3) the White Team—other areas. A fourth team, the Rainbow Team, was concerned with interservice air plans, amphibious operations, and joint command organizations.
after the defeat of Japan. The three senior JWPC planners (or "directors"), representing the Army, the Navy, and the Army Air Forces, actually controlled the detailed functioning of the JWPC. In effect, the Army representatives of the JWPC worked within the JCS committee system to relieve the Chief of Staff and his planning advisers of much of the detailed exploratory conversations with the Navy.

From its establishment in April 1943 until the end of the war, the JWPC prepared a broad variety of studies, papers, and plans. Its main function was the development of joint outline plans for future operations, which were especially valuable as a basis of agreement by the JCS and as a guide for theater headquarters staffs. Reorganization of the joint staff system in Washington paralleled the simultaneous adoption of a system of command for unifying Army and Navy action in the field. Broadly considered, the two movements sprang from the same basic needs—to unify and hasten joint efforts for the accelerating phase of the war—the one in reaching strategic decisions, the other in executing them.

Just before TRIDENT the JWPC hurriedly took over the task of drawing up the papers and plans necessary to prepare the JCS for the conference. This foreshadowed the trend after TRIDENT, when preparations for such conferences were more and more to be systematically centered in the joint planning staff. The interrelated efforts of the military planners to perfect the U.S. joint committee system and the staff work, representation, and procedures for the formal international conferences began to bear fruit in the spring of 1943. Increasingly, from the spring of 1943 onward, Army strategic planners worked through the committee and conference network toward the realization of their strategic objectives. Staff education in the processes of waging a global coalition war was to be continually extended and broadened.

In addition to the expansion of the JCS-CCS system, other characteristics of the military planning processes of the later war years that affected Army staff work were beginning to appear. The Army Air Forces accompanied its efforts to gain more direct control over air operations and air planning with more and more frequent presentation of independent views of strategy. Also, with the tempo of operations in the multifront war accelerating and questions of magnitude and timing becoming more important, the strategic planners recognized the need to turn for logistical advice to qualified staffs and committees in the Army and in the joint system. The special contributions of logistical experts—in ASF as well as in the JLC—in reaching decisions on strategic choices and combinations began to be taken into fuller account.

At the same time, with overseas headquarters growing in size and influence, the theater commanders and their staffs were acquiring greater weight in councils on the strategic direction of the war. The President, the Prime Minister, and the CCS came increasingly to rely on the commanders' judgment and experience.

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11 After service with the Chief of Engineers in 1940-42, Colonel Bessell joined the Strategy Section of OPD in December 1942. He was promoted to brigadier general on 27 May 1944.

12 Cline, Washington Command Post, Chs. XII, XIII.
and to seek their opinion on important matters of strategy. The commanders’ advice was particularly needed in planning the utilization of forces and resources already in the theaters. With the overseas staffs assuming heightened importance in military planning, as operations in the theaters became more complex and widespread, the War Department sought to perfect methods of keeping the Washington staff in close touch with the overseas Army headquarters. War Department links with the theaters became further diversified and personalized.\(^{13}\) Face-to-face deliberations of officers from the War Department with theater commanders and their staffs supplemented communication through regular channels to speed the process of reaching decisions on debatable, complicated, and delicate problems. Personal visits of the Chief of Staff and his strategic advisers, becoming more frequent from early 1943 on, hastened the correlation of theater and intertheater planning with decisions of the international conferences and with Washington military policies and plans.

Finally, in recognition of the fact that wartime military planning was inextricably involved with foreign policy, the Army planners intensified their efforts from the spring of 1943 onward to improve liaison with the White House and State Department.\(^{14}\) By and large, the Army remained preoccupied both before and after the spring of 1943 with the more strictly military aspects of national policy. This reflected staff acceptance of the code, on which it had been working since before the war, that civilian authorities determine the “what” of national policy and the military confine themselves to the “how.” Yet it is also apparent that the fine line between foreign policy and military policy was becoming increasingly blurred as the war went on. The President felt compelled to take an active part in military affairs, and the Army staff found more and more that it could not keep foreign and political affairs out of its military calculations. It had become painfully clear to the staff since the summer of 1942 that political policy might not permit the armed forces to follow the quickest and most direct road to victory according to its lights. In fact, shortly before TRIDENT, General Wedemeyer concluded that the U.S. staff could not win British staff support for a major cross-Channel operation without “the full weight of national policy opposed to the British.”\(^{15}\) The growing concern with political considerations was summed up by General Marshall, speaking for the JCS, in an appearance before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations two days before the conference opened. Denying that the U.S. military staff had discussed political matters at Casablanca, he went on to say, however, that “the thought of political matters” was “necessarily” continuously on their minds. The U.S. Chiefs were aware, he stated, of the “united front methods and ideas” presented by the British Chiefs of Staff, the Prime Minister, and the War Cabinet and were in process of organizing themselves to match the British at the forthcoming meetings. There was no doubt in his mind, he

\(^{13}\) Cline, Washington Command Post, Ch. XV.

\(^{14}\) For detailed discussion, see Cline, Washington Command Post, Ch. XVII.

added, that the needs of military strategy should dominate the conduct of the war. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg recorded his own impression of Marshall's testimony:

In deciding joint questions with the British, he [Marshall] said we were always handicapped by the fact that when the British come to a conference with an idea, it is completely developed to the last degree and has the completely integrated support of the British from Churchill down—including, frequently, a 'softening up' of our own American situation through the activity of all of the British 'Secretaries' here in Washington. He said that this often puts us at a disadvantage.17

The implications of Marshall's stand were clear. Better staff work behind the JCS and closer collaboration between the JCS and the President were needed to present and to win support for the American military case.

Though the forms that staff planning and liaison between the military authorities and their Commander in Chief assumed from the spring of 1943 onward remained essentially American, they reflected the impact of British patterns, models, and performance, which the Americans were attempting to match on more equal terms. The demands of coalition warfare in its offensive phase appeared to be making the comrades-in-arms more nearly similar in planning techniques and methods. Whether the U.S. staff would thereby be able more effectively to "sell" its strategic ideas to its partner in the Grand Coalition remained to be seen. In any event, on the eve of Trident it was clear to the U.S. staff that, in order to gain and keep support for the American military case, greater attention would henceforth have to be paid to mastering the "tactics" of strategic planning.

In the readjustment of planning functions, Army planners were to capitalize on their broad, over-all vantage point in the Washington headquarters, on their influential links with the maturing joint and combined systems, and, above all, on their peculiar staff responsibilities to the Chief of Staff. The basis of their contributions in the planning hierarchy lay largely, as before, in advising on the deployment and employment of U.S. Army forces. In attempting to maintain the delicate balance of strength and resources between the European and Mediterranean theaters and between these areas and the Pacific and Far East, the Army staff planners in Washington continued directly or indirectly to exert a strong influence on over-all strategic thinking. Within the changing framework of strategic planning, they sought with renewed vigor, in the spring of 1943, once more to take the initiative and keep their planning ahead of the Chief of Staff's needs.

Strategy and the Manpower Problem

Behind their concern for an effective formulation and presentation of the

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16 Min, 79th mtg JCS, 10 May 43.
17 Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), pp. 48-49. Senator Vandenberg went on to comment...
American case at TRIDENT lay the growing uneasiness of General Marshall and his staff over the American manpower problem. To continue what appeared to them to be essentially a policy of drift in Allied strategy raised grave issues about mobilizing and deploying U.S. forces. To support a war of attrition and peripheral action, in place of concentrated effort, raised serious problems about the size and kind of Army the United States should and could maintain.

Back of the War Department's original proposal in early 1942 for concentrating forces in the British Isles lay its fundamental aim of committing the bulk of U.S. Army troops to one major front at a time, and thereby of realizing the advantages of long-range planning over a single major line of overseas communications. The presumption was that in order to defeat either Germany or Japan it would probably be necessary to defeat their forces on their home soil. For the War Department, the danger—in 1943 as in 1942—of opening and supporting additional fronts was to be measured not so much in terms of the combat units initially committed as in the terms of the ultimate effect on the employment of U.S. manpower and more specifically on the Army troop basis. Well aware how quickly military situations could change and how important it was to have uncommitted reserves, the planners had also regarded the forces built up in the British Isles in 1942 as a strategic reserve against a sudden turn of events on the Eastern Front. By early 1943 their fondest hopes had been disappointed and their worst fears were being realized. Not only were diversionary peripheral operations generating pressures of their own and sucking in more troops than originally anticipated, but, in the process, the margin of safety represented by the strategic reserve assembled in the United Kingdom had also been largely dissipated. At the same time the conviction was growing that it was finally becoming both necessary and possible to plan on a more realistic, long-range basis for mobilizing the manpower—and resources—needed to win the war. The transition to the initiative appeared to present the opportunity as well as the compulsion to define with greater certainty the main outlines of subsequent operations and to make more dependable estimates of how many trained and equipped units would be required.

To establish a proper manpower balance for the United States in wartime was as difficult as it was important. The absolute ceiling on the number of men physically fit for active military service was estimated to be between fifteen and sixteen million. On the surface it was hard to understand, in the light of the available manpower pool, why there should be any U.S. manpower problem at all. Why, if Germany could maintain a military establishment of 9,835,000 or 10.9 percent of her population and Britain could support 3,885,000 or 8.2 percent of hers, did the United States manpower officials insist in late 1942 that 10,500,000 or only 7.8 percent would be the maximum force that the country could sustain without incurring serious dislocation to the American economy?[10]

The problem as well as the answer stemmed basically from the fact that the Allies had from the beginning accepted the proposition that the single greatest tangible asset the United States brought to the coalition in World War II was the productive capacity of its industry. From the very beginning, U.S. manpower calculations were closely correlated with the needs of war industry.

The Army had therefore to compete for manpower not only with the needs of the other services but also with the claims of industry. By 1943 the "arsenal of democracy," as the United States had come to be called, was just beginning to hit its full productive stride. To cut too deeply into the industrial manpower of the country in order to furnish men for the Army and Navy might interfere seriously with arming U.S. troops and those of the Allies for the successful conduct of the war. Furthermore, the United States was fighting a global conflict. To service its lines of communications extending around the world required large numbers of men, and great numbers of troops were constantly in transit to and from the theaters. To carry the fight across the oceans demanded a powerful Navy and large merchant fleet, which also had to be given a high priority for manpower. Each industry as well as each theater commander was continually calling for more men. The problem for the Army was not only how much should it receive for its share of the manpower pool but also how to divide that share most effectively to meet the diverse demands made upon it.

How to calculate the total strength as well as the combat divisions—"the cutting edge"—needed to win the war had long troubled military authorities. The computations made on the eve of the U.S. entry into the war and through 1942 had necessarily been little more than educated guesses. The unknown quantities were many, the strategic assumptions sometimes proving to be far wide of the mark. Through most of the first year of American participation in the war, the trend had been toward the rapid and, to a considerable degree, chaotic expansion of the various parts of the Military Establishment. Fluctuations in war plans, shipping, and other critical logistical factors, and the heavy requirements for building up numerous headquarters overseas had greatly affected the strategic deployment of the Army. The authorized troop basis for 1942 had been constantly exceeded and changed.20

Meanwhile, the progress of the war on the Soviet front and the prospective air bombardment over the European continent still left uncertain, at the end of 1942, the Army's ultimate size as well as the number of combat divisions necessary to win the war. It was still difficult to predict with exactitude the casualty rates to be expected and the amount of reserve strength needed to be built up. Postponement of the plan to launch a major cross-Channel operation made the need of mobilizing a large U.S. ground Army less immediate. Instead, greater emphasis was to be placed on first developing U.S. airpower. Given the anticipated limitations in shipping, it appeared at the end of 1942 that the projected deployment of a huge air force

for Gen McNamney, 4 Feb 43, sub: Troop Basis, 1943, WDCSA 320.2 (1942-43), III.

20 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, Ch. XVI.
overseas by the end of 1944 would definitely restrict the number of divisions that could be sent overseas by that time. It was clearly undesirable to withdraw men from industry and agriculture too long before they could actually be employed in military operations. Allowing a year to train a division, the mobilization of much more than a hundred divisions by the end of 1943 appeared to be premature. In late 1942, moreover, procurement plans for the armed services for 1943, particularly for the Army ground program, were revised downward by the JCS in response to a War Production Board recommendation. All these limiting factors pointed to the need for scaling down previous long-range calculations, as well as for effecting economies in manpower within the Army.

The process of reducing earlier long-range estimates, begun on the War Department and joint planning levels toward the end of 1942, was clearly reflected in the approved Army Troop Basis for 1943, circulated by G-3 in January of that year. This troop basis set the mobilization program for 1943 at 100 divisions. It called for a total Army strength of 8,208,000, a figure previously approved by the President. This troop basis marked the turning point in War Department and joint Army-Navy calculations. In place of limited objectives that would be greatly exceeded in time, these estimates were approaching the ultimate ceiling strengths of the Army.

Soon, however, the War Department began to foresee difficulties in meeting even the 100-division goal. At the beginning of 1943 divisions were moving overseas much less rapidly than had been anticipated. With ground units accumulating in the United States, the activation schedule for divisions was slowed down. The modification of the procurement program sharply curtailed production of both housing and equipment for U.S. troops in training. The decision to arm French troops with weapons of U.S. manufacture threatened to cut still further into equipment available for the U.S. forces. As a result, War Department authorities were greatly concerned by the spring of 1943 over the question of a balanced mobilization for the remainder of the year.

At the same time, efforts to formulate troop bases for 1944 and beyond pointed to the need for drastic reductions in earlier estimates of ultimate air needs. The initial Victory Program, which represented the Army's most searching prewar examination of long-term strategy and requirements should the United States become involved in the global conflict, had assumed a total of

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10,199,101 men, including 213 divisions, for the Army alone by June 1944.

Even as late as November 1942 the Joint planners were estimating that 10,572,000 men would be needed for the Army by December 1944; the estimated number of divisions had risen to 334. When the requirements of the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard were also added, over-all totals were in excess of 13,000,000. A scaling down toward the lower figures advocated by the manpower chiefs was clearly necessary.

The planners were working from the bases of the late 1941 and early 1942 period, which assumed that the USSR might be defeated by the Germans, thus forcing on the Allies a far greater and more costly ground effort. Since the effects of the planned bomber offensive from the United Kingdom were also an unknown quantity, the planners had had to take its possible failure into consideration. Viewing the two factors pessimistically, it was inevitable the planners should produce high estimates envisaging a very large ground force. They calculated that it would be far easier to decrease an overexpanded army than it would be to build up an inadequate one, especially since it took a year to train a division for combat. Add to their dilemma the uncertainties of shipping and production and the lack of firm strategic decisions to guide them and it was small wonder that the planners were overshooting the mark.

The JCS, on the other hand, faced with criticism of their use of manpower, had realized that the planners' figures would not be accepted and had turned the manpower problem over to their senior advisers. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee concluded that the Joint planners had gone astray in trying to match Allied forces, division for division, with the enemy. They held that proper consideration had been given neither to the relative efficiency of forces nor to prospective Allied air superiority and the effect of the bomber offensive on German morale and war effort. While recognizing that shipping would determine the amount of force that could be applied, they believed that Allied superiority in production would also be a controlling factor and should be exploited in every possible way.

In line with this more optimistic outlook, the Army planners suggested that the most realistic approach to the manpower problem would be to agree upon the maximum number of men that could be inducted into the armed services without impairing the development of U.S. war production capacity. The figure would represent the final troop basis, and strategy would be devised in conjunction with it. Since the President in September 1942 had approved an army of 8,208,000 for 1943, 8,208,000 appeared to be the logical figure with which to work.

By the end of 1942, most of the large force of unemployed existent in prewar days had been drawn into the ranks of the employed. This had served to cushion the rapid and large withdrawals...
of able-bodied men for the services, but it was manifest that if the high induction rate were maintained much longer, the bottom of the barrel would have to be scraped. Congress had given agricultural workers a blanket deferment from the draft in November, thus cutting off one large source of supply, and local draft boards showed a constant disinclination to draft fathers into the service. Essential workers in war plants and in Government were also given special consideration. Some relief from the dwindling pool of manpower resources came when eighteen and nineteen year olds were made available in November, but they gave only temporary respite. Although increased use of women and Negroes, establishment of longer working hours, and improved efficiency in war plants eventually served to augment production, the manpower situation by early 1943 appeared grave.

In January 1943, G-3 warned that the 8,208,000-man Army might approach the limit of manpower available and that some adjustments would have to be made from within to secure the kind of army needed to win the war. Faced with the prospects of a declining manpower reserve and an improving strategic situation, the Army decided to review its employment of men in the continental United States. During the same month Marshall set up the War Department Manpower Board, with Maj. Gen. Lorenzo D. Gasser as its president, to make specific recommendations for reducing the forces assigned to the zone of interior.

Marshall regarded the work of the Gasser Board, which he had established as a manpower watchdog for the Army, as but a part of the effort to be made by all the services to conserve personnel. He advocated surveys by the JSSC of all garrisons in the Western Hemisphere, including Iceland, with a view to making defensive troops available for more active roles. The JCS endorsed his suggestion, and King indicated that he would look into various Navy shore installations that he believed were overmanned. The JSSC found that the strategic considerations demanding large garrisons in the Western Hemisphere during 1942 had altered sufficiently to permit personnel cuts on a wholesale

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**Memo, Edwards for CG's AAF, AGF, ASF, 29 Jan 43, sub: Reduction in Training Establishments and Other Zone of Interior Activities, WDCA 320.2 (1942-43), III.**

**1** Ltr, Marshall to McNarney, 10 Jan 43, WDCA 334 WDMB. **2** Memo, Gasser for CoS, 11 Feb 43, sub: Missions and Functions of the WDMB and Methods of Procedure, WDCA 334 WDMB.


**6** Min, 60th mtg JCS, 8 Feb 45.
basis. Only in the Aleutians, Phoenix-Fanning, and Tonga-Samoan Island groups should the status quo be preserved or small increases be made.35 Carrying out the JSSC recommendations, the Army was able to effect a savings of nearly 150,000 men by the end of 1943 and planned to recover more than 120,000 others by the end of 1944.36

In consonance with this economy drive, Marshall also approved—in February—a new Army troop basis that called for an enlisted strength of 7,500,000, including 150,000 Wacs and between 120 and 125 divisions, for June 1944. The over-all goal for 1943 of 8,208,000, which included officers, was retained on the ground that such a force would be necessary to take advantage of any favorable opportunities that might come to pass.37 Defense of these manpower requirements before the Senate and against such critics as Herbert Hoover was made somewhat more difficult by the unofficial opposition of certain Navy officers.38

In early February there were actually five investigations going on in the Senate and one in the House on the subject of manpower. The position of the Army in the face of this Congressional probing rested upon the heavy preponderance of divisions at the disposal of the enemy and the possible disaster that might ensue if the size of the Army were reduced and the disparity in combat divisions increased.39 The War Department correctly gauged Congressional reaction at this juncture. Maj. Gen. Alexander D. Surles, Director of the War Department Bureau of Public Relations, put it succinctly: "Despite all talk, Congress isn't sure, and members will not risk their political necks by taking a position where they might be charged with sabotaging the war effort. They will talk, but they won't act."40 In order to fortify its own thinking and planning on mobilization, the Army decided that it should also conduct an investigation.

**The Bessell Committee**

In accord with the earnest efforts of the Chief of Staff to trim Army requirements, the operations staff in February designated a special committee, headed by Colonel Bessell, to survey the current military program and to recommend changes indicated by shifting strategic conditions. The main question to be investigated by the committee concerned the efficacy of building up foreign forces—such as the Free French—as opposed to arming U.S. troops, and the possible effects of either alternative on the U.S. manpower situation and on Allied effi

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35 (1) JCS 218, 12 Feb 43, title: Personnel and Deployment. (2) Min, 6th mtg JCS, 16 Feb 43. (3) See also Rpt of WD Committee on Deployment of U.S. Army Forces in 1943, 23 Feb 43, Item 16, Exec 1.
36 Memo, Hull for CofS, 8 Jul 44, sub: Rpt on Reductions in Troop Strength of Western Hemisphere Defensive Installations, ABC 370.5 (2-2-43).
ciency in prosecuting the war. This was a rephrasing of the thorny problem—how far to go in aiding Allies—that the Army planners had faced from the very beginning and were to continue to face.

The ensuing survey made by the committee revealed that little could be gained by increasing the volume of international aid to the Allies at the expense of the development of U.S. forces. Equipping the manpower of various nations, other than the Soviet Union and Great Britain, with arms and munitions would not substantially increase the total amount of effective manpower that could be placed in combat, nor would it succeed in putting troops into combat more quickly than the current program for preparing U.S. troops for active service overseas. In regard to aircraft, the British could not man additional planes; plans had been made to take care of French needs; and there was no indication that the USSR could use heavy bombers effectively in her current circumstances. Beside these factors, any allocations to other nations would slow down the 273-air-group program—which had been approved in September 1942—and endanger adequate support of U.S. forces. The members of the committee felt that the aircraft, shipping, and U-boat problems should have top priority and recommended that the optimum over-all strength of 11,000,000 men should be reached as soon as possible.

In effect, the United States was to continue its dual role in the war as the “arsenal of democracy” and a significant source of trained and equipped manpower.

The limiting factor in manpower would be the ability to replace civilian and military losses. The committee had accepted as reasonable the estimates of Col. Lewis Sanders of the Selective Service System that an armed strength of 10 million to 10.8 million could be maintained indefinitely without undue strain upon the nation and that a peak strength of 12 million could be kept in being for eighteen months if necessary, but would entail some disruption of civilian economy. In late April the Bessell Committee scaled down its estimates of the ultimate strength from 185 to 155 divisions and accepted an 8,200,000-man total as the ceiling figure for planning—the “maximum strength” for the Army imposed by manpower limitations. It recommended that the U.S. Army, and especially the Air Forces, be developed to the maximum strength practicable within the estimated limitations on armed forces and be deployed as quickly as possible.

Since the existing facilities in the United States allowed the training of sixty divisions a year, the committee recommended that the forces necessary for the defeat of Japan be established concurrently with those for the defeat of Germany but without prejudice to that objective. The 273-air-group program could be carried to completion by the late summer of 1944. It was essential, the committee believed, that every means, including the use of limited service personnel in supporting and service

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41 Memo, Handy for Bessell et al., 26 Feb 43, sub: Current Military Program, ABC 400 (2-20-43).
43 Ibid.
44 Rpt of Sp Army Committee (rev), 28 Apr 43, ABC 400 (2-20-43).
elements, be employed to produce maximum combat strength.

The committee concluded that the time had definitely come for long-term programming to guide the war machine that was developing in the United States. With adequate training for the Army requiring a year, mobilization and production had to be planned well in advance. Mobilization and production had, therefore, to be linked to national policy and strategic planning. The basic strategy of the United States was still sound and should be adhered to, and "any tendency to disperse our forces to other than the main effort [should] be avoided." What was required, the committee decided, was a broad and long-range strategic plan for the defeat of the enemies of the United States whereby requirements might be balanced against means and resources and then translated into a realistic military program. In this connection, the committee warned that the American public wearied quickly of war and would not countenance any slow process of attrition.45

In April the need for careful manpower budgeting was further emphasized. Upon informing the services that approximately 1,500,000 men could be furnished to them in 1944, the War Manpower Commission stated that the figure would be close to the limit of the number of men that could be withdrawn from the manpower pool without jeopardizing war production, transportation, and essential civilian services. The Army estimated that by vigorous economy it would be able to save about 485,000 men during the balance of the year 1943. Since the Army-Navy requirements for replacements alone would run about 971,000 for 1944, there should be a cushion of about one million men to fill the need for new units and to meet emergencies. At this time the War Manpower Commission estimated 11,300,000 men, and the JPS 10,900,000, as the number that could be kept in uniform indefinitely. The JPS went so far as to recommend no increase in the Army for 1944 over the approved 1943 Army Troop Basis goals—8,200,000 total strength and 100 divisions (though the latter was already a somewhat dubious figure).46

The emphasis on re-examination and retrenchment that characterized the early months of 1943 was a natural result of the improved strategic situation of the Allies. Accenting the need for a significant change in the contemplated size and kind of Army required to defeat the enemy were the many pressures at home to reduce the large totals earlier projected by the services and to establish manpower ceilings for the armed forces. The efforts of the Army to cut back its own personnel needs were a clear indication of the trend toward economy and a portent of the leveling-off to come. Though the trend toward a final linking of manpower demands of the military with strategy, production, and manpower capabilities of the country was still in an

45 Ibid.

While the Bessell Committee was delving into the military program, another special committee appointed by the President and composed of Harry Hopkins, James F. Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, Bernard Baruch, and Judge Samuel Rosenman was looking into civilian labor shortages. This committee advocated a total of 11,600,000 men for the armed forces. Leahy's participation on the committee made him acutely conscious of the manpower deficits and in favor of strict economy in military personnel.

(1) Leahy, I Was There, pp. 149–50. (4) Min, 66th mtg JCS, 16 Mar 43.

46 JPS 57/8, 26 Apr 43, title: Troop Bases for All Services for 1944 and Beyond.
exploratory stage, the need for arranging the union was gaining strength.

To secure and maintain a manpower balance for the remainder of the war had become an all-important question. The military as well as civilian authorities recognized that no undue strain must be put on the American economy—central to the whole Allied war effort—by overdrafts on the manpower pool for military service. In this sense, the threat of overmobilization in the full tide of coalition war appeared as dangerous as undermobilization had once seemed in the earlier stages (and as too rapid a demobilization upon the war's conclusion would later appear). Though to the end of the war manpower officials would not be able to establish with any certainty absolute limits on American manpower capabilities for military or industrial purposes, relative limits at least were becoming clearer. Even before the entry of the United States into the war, the Army staff had conceived of the United States as the "final reserve of the democracies both in manpower and munitions"—a reserve to be conserved for "timely employment in a decisive theater and not dissipated by diversion in secondary theaters." 48

With retrenchment and economy now the watchwords in military policy, the Army staff was all the more reluctant to accept plans that might dissipate the combat forces in being or prevent the husbanding of a strategic reserve. Unless over-all strategy embodying the principle of concentration were made sufficiently firm and manpower and production requirements for victory were definitely tied to it, the staff feared the disarrangement of the American economy and a stalemate in the war.

By May there was every reason to believe that, as U.S. production bottlenecks and the U-boat menace were increasingly surmounted, the shipping shortage—the "limiting factor" in planning to date—would in time be overcome. But the manpower problem was beginning to loom as an even more significant restriction on subsequent war planning and gave a powerful stimulus to the U.S. staff for putting long-range strategic plans on a firm basis once and for all.

The Army planners were therefore urging, on the eve of TRIDENT, the matching of long-range mobilization and logistical plans with long-range strategic plans. 49 In that way they hoped to achieve an equilibrium in the programs of production and mobilization in the United States and in the distribution of forces and means among the theaters for the stepped-up operational phase of the war. To strike a proper balance among strategic plans, manpower, and other resources for victory in the global combat, fundamental decisions would first have to be reached with the British.

**Preparations and Rehearsal for TRIDENT**

To meet the "always well-prepared British" on more even terms, the JCS directed the Joint Staff Planners on 27


April to prepare outline plans of "all reasonable courses of action" that might follow HUSKY. U.S. strategic planners—JSSC as well as OPD—were urging that the time had come to merge the strategic concept for 1943 with that for 1944 and that the probable courses of action be studied to provide the JCS with plans for the approaching conference. Accepting as unquestioned the Allied objective of defeating Germany decisively and as quickly as possible, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff called for special emphasis to be given to planning for cross-Channel operations.89

In the hectic days that followed in late April and early May—before the British arrived—the Army planners in and out of the newly developing joint staff machinery were exchanging views, preparing data, and formulating plans for the meetings. Especially revealing was an exchange of ideas that took place between the War Department planners and the JSSC on an estimate of the global strategic situation—an exchange of which the Chief of Staff had knowledge.

On the Army side, the operations staff's Strategy Section maintained that 1943–44 would be the “decisive period of the war.” The mobilized and trained manpower of the United States would reach its peak in 1944, and most major items would be in full-scale production in the United States by early 1944. On the other hand, Great Britain was already mobilized to the hilt; the bulk of its forces would shortly be fully trained and equipped for offensive action; and its productive capacity could be expected to increase only slightly. To defeat Germany it was necessary to retain the USSR, still containing the bulk of the German forces, as an active participant in the war. The Strategy Section felt that the Germans would probably attempt to resume the offensive against the Soviet Union at the earliest practicable moment, while holding to the defensive on other fronts. The outcome of the conflict on the Eastern Front would be the determining factor in estimating the military situation that might exist in 1944.

The course of action to be undertaken after HUSKY, according to the Strategy Section, would be largely determined not only by Soviet versus German capabilities but also by the effectiveness of the Combined Bomber Offensive. On the Allied side, the rapid development and application of airpower was regarded as the most encouraging feature of the war effort to date. Air superiority, which was being won in practically all areas, would increase even more rapidly in the months to come. If properly coupled with other undertakings, it could be made the most effective strategic weapon of the Allies.

The Army planners echoed the fundamental War Department faith in a major cross-Channel operation at the same time that they revealed their caution toward continued operations in the Mediterranean. In their opinion forces could be built up in the United Kingdom to initiate cross-Channel operations on a small scale late in 1944, but the operations could not reach major proportions

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89 (1) JCS 271, 24 Apr 43, title: Operations Subsequent to HUSKY. (2) OPD brief, title: Notes . . . 76th mtg JCS, 27 Apr 43. Operations Subsequent to "HUSKY" (JCS 271), with JCS 271 in ABC 384 Post HUSKY (14 May 1943), I. (3) Min, 76th mtg JCS, 27 Apr 43. (4) Memo, Capt Royal, USN, Deputy Secy for Secy JPS, 28 Apr 43, sub: Operations Subsequent to HUSKY, with JPS 169/D in ABC 384 Post HUSKY (14 May 1943), I.
before the spring of 1945. Difficulties of terrain and logistics made a cross-Mediterranean approach to the Continent less desirable than an attack via the Channel. They were prepared to admit that by continuing limited offensives in the Mediterranean in 1943 the Allies could contain strong Axis ground and air forces and possibly cause diversions from the Soviet front. The OPD planners therefore left the way open for accepting further Mediterranean offensives, though their position on post-Husky Mediterranean operations was by no means clear-cut. Without interfering with prospective operations in the European–Mediterranean area, the Allies in 1943–44 could and should neutralize the German U-boats, increase the bomber offensive against Germany, and furnish munitions to the USSR and the French in North Africa.

The Army planners called for adherence to the basic strategic aim of defeating Germany before Japan, so long as the USSR remained effectively in the war. In the event of the defeat of the USSR in Europe, however, the planners advocated the application of the “Pacific Alternative”—which had been advanced by them on various occasions since early 1942. In that case the Allies should reverse their basic strategic concept, secure their positions in the European–Mediterranean area, and wage an all-out offensive against Japan. In line with their recommendation that the main effort for 1943 be made in the European–Mediterranean area, they urged that operations in the Pacific–Asiatic area be restricted to limited offensives designed to retain the initiative and intensify the attrition of Japanese shipping and air resources. Operations in that area should be in line with whatever plan the Allies adopted for the ultimate defeat of Japan. Meanwhile, the continued participation of China in the war must be insured by furnishing to it the maximum supplies and air support possible.\(^{51}\)

In general the JSSC agreed with the Army planners’ conclusions and recommendations. General Embick indicated that he, too, was inclined to believe that 1943 would indicate the direction, if not produce an actual decision, in the Russo-German conflict. The result would, he agreed, improve or preclude the chances of an effective Anglo-American invasion of the Continent. If the premises were correct, however, added weight should be given to the possibilities of the air offensive as advanced by General Fairchild, the Air member of the JSSC. General Fairchild held that the Allies would be able to support the USSR most effectively during the critical summer months of 1943 by avoiding all further commitments in the Mediterranean and by concentrating the available resources in the United Kingdom. On the basis of his optimistic estimate of the effectiveness of the Combined Bomber Offensive in 1943 and early 1944, he felt that the way could be paved for decisive operations against Germany in 1944 rather than 1945.\(^{52}\)

\(^{51}\) (1) SS 79, 28 Apr 43, title: Global Estimate of the Situation, TRIDENT Revision of SYMBOL: Casablanca Books (1 May 1943), Vol. I, Exec 6. In making this study, the SS had worked closely with G-2 and the AAF. (2) Memo, Lt Col Harold P. Tasker, OPD, for JSSC, 28 Apr 43, sub: Global Estimate of the Situation, with Paper 41 in ABC 381 (9-25-41), VII.

\(^{52}\) (1) Memo, Embick, JSSC for S&P Gp OPD, 1 May 43, sub: Comments on OPD. (2) “Global Estimate of the Situation,” dated 28 Apr 1943 and appended informal memo, M. S. F. [Fairchild] [evidently to Embick about 1 May 43], sub: Comments on Global Estimate of the Situation. Both with
Events were soon to show that General Marshall was much impressed by the air argument. It was to furnish him with valuable support in advancing the case for a full-scale cross-Channel offensive in 1944 and for relying more on air forces and less on ground troops in Mediterranean operations.

Meanwhile, the operations staff was sifting into the joint planning mill its plans for post-Husky operations. The dilemma confronting the Army planners in reconciling long-term strategic aims with short-term capabilities and opportunities in the war against Germany came to the fore. On 3 May General Hull, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, acquainted General Marshall with the fact that alternative proposals he had just submitted to the joint planners on post-Husky operations represented a difference of views within his staff. His planners, desirous as they were of a major operation across the Channel, were in favor of a plan calling for limited post-Husky operations in the Mediterranean. He himself did not agree. His preference was for the alternative—no further advance in the Mediterranean after Husky and a concentration of forces in the United Kingdom for a cross-Channel operation in 1944.\(^5^3\)

Out of the joint staff planning mill in early May came a series of specific proposals and suggested courses of action for the Joint Chiefs to follow. Working hurriedly and under great pressure to reconcile conflicting views among U.S. military planners, the newly created JWPC developed outline plans, studies, and recommendations that, upon approval at higher interservice levels, were merged into a pattern of strategic objectives acceptable to the JCS for the conduct of the war in 1943–44.\(^5^4\) In May the JCS approved, for submission to the President, a proposed line of action to be followed by the United States at the coming conference.

The Joint Chiefs emphasized the importance of considering strategic concepts beyond 1943. The U.S. representatives must emphasize the close relationship between the war in Europe and that against Japan. For the United States, a progressively intensified air effort in preparation for the cross-Channel operation, followed by the cross-Channel operation itself in 1944, should constitute the basic strategy against Germany, and its fulfillment must not be delayed or jeopardized by other operations. But the JCS recognized, as had the various Army and joint planning committees, that there were certain merits in operations in the western Mediterranean immediately after Husky—to maintain the momentum of Husky—to utilize resources in

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\(^5^3\) Paper 41 in ABC 381 (9–25–41), VII. General Marshall noted both of these memoranda.

\(^5^4\) Memo, Hull, Actg ACofS OPD, for Marshall, 3 May 43, no sub, Item 15, Exec 3. These plans were prepared in collaboration with G–2, AAF, and ASF and submitted to the JPS. The three plans were: (1) SS 75, 1 May 43, title: Operations To Be Undertaken in the Event Husky Cannot Be Executed; (2) SS 54/1, 8 Apr 43, title: United Nations Courses of Action Subsequent to Husky; and (3) SS 54/2 [12 Apr 43], title: United Nations Courses of Action Subsequent to Husky. All three in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2–95 (7 Jan 43). General Hull’s planners favored the 8 April plan, while he himself preferred the 12 April plan.
the area, furnish support to the USSR, and threaten southern France and Italy. U.S. representatives must be prepared to discuss western Mediterranean operations as an “alternative or compromise,” provided any such operation involved a reduction rather than an increase of Allied strength committed to the area, supported the Combined Bomber Offensive, and did not interfere with the cross-Channel operation. U.S. representatives were to emphasize that such operations were acceptable primarily as emergency undertakings in support of the USSR. Tentatively, the occupation of Sardinia was regarded as more acceptable than other Mediterranean possibilities. Sardinia would draw less from resources needed for concentration in the United Kingdom. The United States must not become involved in operations east of Sicily, except possibly for special air operations. Eastern Mediterranean operations would absorb resources needed for the cross-Channel attack and for operations against Japan; would lead to difficult problems of logistics in an area lacking suitable routes to the decisive theater of war; would arouse Soviet suspicions as to the future of the Dardanelles; and would be difficult to maintain in popular acceptance in the United States, particularly in view of the continuing threat in the Pacific. If the British insisted on ground operations east of Sicily, they would have to proceed alone.

In the event the British insisted on Mediterranean commitments that in American opinion would jeopardize the early defeat of Germany and the ultimate defeat of Japan, the U.S. representatives were to inform the British that the United States might be compelled to revise its basic strategy and extend its operations and commitments in the Pacific. The JCS expected the British to deprecate the importance of the effort against Japan and the necessity for supporting China. Specifically, in the war against Japan, the JCS approved ANAKIM. If the British refused to support ANAKIM, or ANAKIM otherwise proved impracticable and no satisfactory alternative could be agreed upon, then the United States must expand and intensify its operations in the Pacific in order to offset Japanese gains resulting from failure to support China adequately.55

Also on 8 May the JCS, who had had preliminary discussions with the President and Harry Hopkins at the White House just a few days before, held their final meeting with the President in preparation for the conference. Admiral Leahy has since recorded that at that meeting:

It was determined that the principal objective of the American Government would be to pin down the British to a cross-Channel invasion of Europe at the earliest practicable date and to make full preparations for such an operation by the spring of 1944.

Less decisive and far-reaching appeared the agreement on operations in the China-Burma-India theater:

I recommended to the President that he grant Chiang Kai-shek’s request to use all available air transport in the next three months to send aviation material from India to China, but I had no support from the other Chiefs of Staff. The decision for the moment was to try to send essential

55 (1) JCS 286/1, 8 May 43, title: Recommended Line of Action at Coming Conf. JCS 286/1 is a revision of JCS proposals contained in JCS 286, 6 May 43, same title. (2) For JCS approval of JCS 286/1, see min, 78th mtg JCS, 8 May 43.
equipment to both the air and ground forces.\textsuperscript{56}

The President decided to unite with his staff in seeking British support for an early cross-Channel operation. This was one of the most far-reaching decisions of the war. His motives for taking the step at this time are still difficult to determine. The unusual bareness of the record, added to the usual "fog of war," in this case descending over the action of a complex, flexible personality, whose motivation is difficult even at best to assay with any certainty, shrouds the decision in mystery.\textsuperscript{57} Was it the fact that the President's military staff was showing a disposition to accept a continued, if limited, advance in the Mediterranean—a region in which he had always shown an interest secondary only to that of the Prime Minister? And was he thereby given a welcome pawn with which to trade in order to bring the British to terms? Was it that he was awakened by his staff to the danger of continuing a war of attrition and peripheral action—a long, drawn-out conflict or stalemate that might in the process endanger plans and dreams, already forming in his mind, for a brave new world after the war? Was he impressed by arguments on the necessity for long-term versus short-term planning in the conduct of the war? Did the exponents of airpower turn the tide? Had he become strongly impressed with the need of getting on with the war against Japan? Or was it, as is quite likely, a combination of all these factors, whose end product in strategic terms—a cross-Channel "power-drive"—fitted his unconditional surrender formula announced at Casablanca?

Certainly with the impetus the President had given the unconditional surrender concept, and with the encouragement he had given his staff to work along the lines of the cross-Channel attack, he had already indicated that he would be behind it. The time for the decision was the question on which he had hitherto disagreed with his staff. In 1942 he had hazarded the opinion that it might not even be necessary to beat Japan. By the spring of 1943 the Allies had, in the American view, poured about as much as they could into the Mediterranean without getting into trouble. It was no longer a question of waiting for the development of U.S. power; that power was available. The problem was what to do with it. In short, the arguments had practically all been advanced before, but the circumstances, it may be conjectured, now seemed appropriate for the President to accept the arguments and to crystallize the world-wide effort in these terms.

Whatever the effective pressures upon the President and whatever his motive, the U.S. delegates entered the conference united on cross-Channel operations. A year of deviations and diversions had passed since the President's military advisers had first set out with his blessings to win British support for the plan for an early major attack against northwest Europe (the so-called Marshall Memorandum of April 1942). At last the President and his staff were firmly united in trying to pin the British down to such a decision and plan.

\textsuperscript{56} Leahy, \textit{I Was There}, pp. 157-58.

\textsuperscript{57} Searches of the official files in Washington and of the Roosevelt and Hopkins Papers at Hyde Park have yielded no record of the minutes of the meetings of 2 May and 8 May of the JCS with the President at the White House. The only record—even in published accounts—that has turned up is in Admiral Leahy's memoirs.
CHAPTER VI

The TRIDENT Conference—New Patterns
May 1943

On 12 May the President and the Prime Minister, with their chief military advisers, met at the White House for the first session of the TRIDENT Conference. Churchill and his party of approximately a hundred crossed on the Queen Mary to attend the largest assembly of high-level Anglo-American officialdom in the war thus far. Met on his arrival off Staten Island by Harry Hopkins, the Prime Minister had come directly to Washington by train. President Roosevelt, who had brushed aside the suggestion that Churchill stay at the British Embassy during the conference, was on hand to greet him and took him to the White House.

This time the United States was represented by a much fuller complement of staff officers than at Casablanca and also enjoyed the advantage of drawing on the planning staffs in the nation’s capital. The conference opened with even greater optimism for the future than had been shown at Casablanca four months earlier. Allied transition to the strategic initiative, which had begun in late 1942, was virtually complete. Initial campaigns for seizing the offensive had been successful. On the day after the conferees assembled, news came of the end of organized resistance in North Africa. In the Pacific, U.S. forces had completed the Guadalcanal and Papua Campaigns and were engaged in seizing Attu. On the Eastern Front the Soviet forces, having withstood the siege of Stalingrad, were continuing their counteroffensives. The Battle of the Atlantic was turning in favor of the Allies. Preparations were going forward for Husky. Again the question was, “What next?” Against the British predilection for deferring long-range over-all plans, the U.S. staff was ready to press the importance of long-term versus short-term planning.

Cross-Channel and Mediterranean Operations

For fourteen days, 12–25 May, the two delegations debated strategic issues. The President and the Prime Minister met six times with the CCS at the White House, and the CCS held additional sessions almost every day in the Board of Governors room in the stately Federal Reserve Building on Constitution Avenue not too far away.

The single most pressing question was

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1 For a description by Churchill of British preparations for the conference, see Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 782–89.
again the problem of cross-Channel and Mediterranean operations. From the very beginning of the conference, it became apparent that the President had drawn closer to the position of his military staff and that the Prime Minister and his advisers had to face a more united and aggressive American team. As the lines drew more taut on each side, it became easier to define the areas of agreement and disagreement between the British and American cases. But to get any action at all, it was also apparent, each side would have to yield what the other regarded as extreme views, and move closer to a middle ground on which both could stand.

At the opening meeting with the Prime Minister and the CCS, the President declared that the question for immediate decision was how most profitably to employ in 1943 the large Allied forces then in the Mediterranean. Beyond any doubt it would be desirable to knock Italy out of the war—after HUSKY—but, he added, he had “always shrunk from the thought of putting large armies into Italy.” Allied forces might thereby suffer attrition, German troops might be released from Italy, and no pressure would be taken off the USSR. He wondered whether the same results might not be achieved at less cost by air offensives from Sicily or from the heel and toe of Italy.

The President’s position on Mediterranean operations had clearly become more cautious. At the same time he came out unequivocally in favor of a cross-Channel operation for the spring
of 1944. Such an operation would, he maintained, be the most effective method of forcing Germany to fight and thereby relieving German pressure on the USSR. Regardless of operations undertaken in the Mediterranean, there would be a surplus of British and U.S. manpower that should be used for the build-up in the United Kingdom. The President felt that all were agreed that no SLEDGEHAMMER or ROUNDUP was possible in 1943 but that if one operation or the other were to be mounted in the spring of 1944 preparations would have to begin at once. An affirmative and firm decision should be reached at the conference to undertake either SLEDGEHAMMER or ROUNDUP in the spring of 1944.²

The Prime Minister replied that the "first objective" and the "great prize" in the European-Mediterranean area, after HUSKY, was the elimination of Italy from the war. He saw no other way of relieving Axis pressure on the Soviet front in 1943 on so large a scale. The collapse of Italy might mark the "beginning of the doom" of the German people. German forces would have to be diverted from the Eastern Front to replace Italian troops withdrawn from the Balkans or Germany would have to yield the Balkans, the Italian Fleet would be eliminated, and Turkey would be favorably disposed to join the Allies. The Prime Minister did not feel that an occupation of Italy by the Allies would be necessary. On the other hand, in the event of an Italian collapse, ports and air bases necessary for launching operations against the Balkans and southern Europe should be seized. The problem was to decide on the course of action to be followed between the expected completion of HUSKY (end of August 1943) and the spring of 1944 when cross-Channel operations might first be mounted. All these objectives, he emphasized, "led up to BOLERO, SLEDGEHAMMER, and ROUNDUP." His Majesty's Government earnestly favored undertaking a full-scale invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom "as soon as possible," provided a plan offering "reasonable prospects of success could be made." On antisubmarine warfare and on the air bombardment of Germany, he indicated, the United States and Great Britain were in substantial agreement. The President and Prime Minister agreed that Anglo-American forces should not be idle between the end of the Sicily Campaign and the spring of 1944.³

With the stage thus set by the political heads of state, the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff proceeded to marshal their arguments. The British stressed continuing the Mediterranean ground operations after HUSKY as a necessary prelude to an ultimate cross-Channel operation. The Americans emphasized the necessity of "firming up" the cross-Channel undertaking, warning that large-scale ground operations in the Mediterranean would jeopardize the cross-Channel effort. Elaborating on the views of the Prime Minister, the British Chiefs intimated that operations against the mainland of Italy should be backed up by operations in other parts of the Mediterranean. Only through Mediterranean operations could the British and Americans capitalize on the benefits of victories in Africa and Sicily and profitably employ British-American forces and the resources assembled in the area. Acknowledging

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² Min, 1st mtg CCS at White House, TRIDENT, 12 May 43, Official TRIDENT Conf Book.

³ Ibid.
that provision of shipping for another amphibious operation in the Mediterranean in 1943 would affect the build-up in the United Kingdom, they asserted that successful Mediterranean operations, especially the elimination of Italy, would "ease the task" confronting a British-American force landing in northwest Europe from the United Kingdom. With the collapse of Italy and the elimination of the Italian Fleet, the United States and United Kingdom should be able "to mount a threat" through Sardinia and Corsica against southern France in the spring of 1944. Moreover, considerable Allied naval strength could then be transferred from the Mediterranean to the Pacific or the Indian Ocean.4

The British Chiefs concluded that the Mediterranean offered opportunities for action in the autumn and winter of 1943 that might be decisive and, in the final analysis, might contribute more toward paving the way for a successful cross-Channel operation in 1944 than the transference to the United Kingdom of any of the Anglo-American forces then in the Mediterranean—as the Americans were suggesting. The balance of forces on the Continent, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal argued, would change more quickly in Allied favor if Mediterranean operations were undertaken before launching ROUNDUP. Summing up, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke maintained that Mediterranean operations would shorten the war. It was the "firm intention" of the British Chiefs to execute ROUNDUP as soon as favorable conditions were created. It was their "firm belief" that such conditions would arise in 1944. Since the necessary conditions could, in the final analysis, be created only by the Soviet Army, British-American action must consist of intensifying the bombardment of Germany and of drawing off from the Soviet front as many German forces as possible. Unless Mediterranean operations were first carried out, "at best only a SLEDGEHAMMER could be undertaken" and the Anglo-American forces would be pinned down to a bridgehead in France. Such was the strategic context within which the British put forward their case for the Mediterranean.5

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff sought to bring the discussion around to a broader consideration of world strategy and long-range implications of further Mediterranean amphibious operations in 1943, recapitulating the arguments and views on which they had agreed before the meetings. The over-all objective of the United States and Great Britain, in conjunction with the USSR, was to force the unconditional surrender of the European Axis and then bring the full weight of Anglo-American strength to bear in compelling the unconditional surrender of Japan. For Europe, a full-scale assault should be launched against the Continent in the spring of 1944 (a ROUNDUP operation), for which the way should be paved for an intensified air offensive. Forces must be built up for the ground and air assaults and the two countries must be prepared to launch a contingent cross-Channel operation to take advantage of German disintegration at any time.

4 Br COS paper, 12 May 43, title: Conduct of the War in 1943/44, Annex B to min, 89th mtg CCS, 13 May 43, Official TRIDENT Conf Book.

5 (1) Min, 84th mtg CCS, 14 May 43. (2) CCS 224, 14 May 43, title: Operations in the European Theater Between "Husky" and "ROUNDUP." CCS 224 was a memorandum submitted by the British Chief of Staff. (3) Min, 85th mtg CCS, 15 May 43.
thenceforth with whatever forces might be available.

Insofar as post-Husky Mediterranean operations were concerned, the JCS indicated that at most they would be interested only in limited offensive action. Such Mediterranean operations would be designed to destroy the Italian war potential by air attacks from Mediterranean bases, furnish support to the USSR by diverting Axis strength, force a dispersal of Axis strength in order to promote a cross-Channel undertaking, and safeguard Allied positions and communications in the Mediterranean. The JCS emphasized that the strength of the forces to be employed in the Mediterranean must be so limited as not to endanger the success of a cross-Channel operation in 1944 and that in any event U.S. ground and naval forces were not to be employed in the Mediterranean east of Sicily.6

General Marshall was again the forceful spokesman and negotiator for the U.S. staff on European strategy.7 He relied heavily on air arguments that had been winning increasing support in the U.S. staff since Casablanca. Air capabilities, he argued, must be carefully considered in determining subsequent Allied strategy. Advantage should be taken of Allied air strength, especially in the Mediterranean where it should be possible to utilize airpower rather than pour in additional ground strength for subsequent operations. He expressed concern lest the landing of ground forces in Italy create a vacuum, precluding the assembly of sufficient forces in the United Kingdom for the cross-Channel effort. To undertake further Mediterranean ground operations would be to commit the United States and Great Britain, except for air attacks on Germany, to a Mediterranean policy in 1943 and practically all of 1944. Such a policy would prolong the war in Europe and delay the ultimate defeat of Japan, a course not acceptable to the United States.

General Marshall called for consideration of hastening the collapse of Italy by air action alone—a position similar to that advanced by the President. The Chief of Staff maintained that continual air operations in the Mediterranean would contain German troops in the area, just as the concurrent build-up of forces in Great Britain would serve to pin down German forces on the rest of the Continent. He also endorsed a plan, presented to the conference by General McNarney, to bomb the oil fields of Ploesti in Rumania from Mediterranean bases in order to dry up the German supply of oil.8

In supporting a cross-Channel operation for 1944, General Marshall stressed the great faith put by U.S. leaders in the Combined Bomber Offensive. Indeed,
he confessed to his colleagues in the JCS during the conference that, except for the factor of air bombardment in the coming year, "ROUNDUP would be a visionary matter." He questioned the British arguments that operations in the Mediterranean would not appreciably slow the build-up in the United Kingdom and that they were necessary to create favorable conditions for a ROUNDUP. On the contrary, he was concerned lest such operations prohibit the Allies from carrying out any cross-Channel attack. Marshall admitted that landing twenty-five divisions in 1942 in an emergency cross-Channel attack (SLICEMAKER) might have been "suicidal," but the situation had changed radically since then. There was now the prospect of co-ordinating Anglo-American air superiority in direct support of ground forces at any bridgehead established in France and thereby turning the balance in favor of the Allies. Twice before, he observed, the forces the CCS had thought would be available for cross-Channel operations had dwindled to relatively small numbers as a result of increasing requirements for TORCH and HUSKY. Unless the build-up in the United Kingdom (BOLERO) were given priority over Mediterranean operations, he feared a similar result. The British, in their proposals for the Mediterranean, were in his opinion too optimistic in estimates of forces required, on the likely Axis reaction, and on logistical feasibility; they were too pessimistic on the effects of the Allied Combined Bomber Offensive in reducing Germany's strength and paving the way for cross-Channel operations. He summed up for the JCS the basic differences in the attitudes of the two staffs toward Mediterranean operations in this way:

... our [JCS] attitude is to the effect that Mediterranean operations are highly speculative as far as ending the war is concerned. On the other hand, the British feel that Mediterranean operations will result in a demoralization and break-up of the Axis.

As the conference progressed and the points of difference in the British and American cases for European strategy for 1943-44 became clearer, he advised the U.S. Chiefs to aim at "something more than SLICEMAKER and less than ROUNDUP." Whatever line of action was adopted against Germany, it was clear to all the leaders—British as well as American—that current successes in the Battle of the Atlantic must be maintained. General Marshall felt that the needs of antisubmarine warfare made it particularly imperative for the Allies to gain the Azores as soon as possible. He agreed with both the President and the Prime Minister in favoring occupation of the islands, preferably through diplomacy but, if necessary, through diplomacy coupled with threats of force.

The debate on whether Mediterranean operations could be conducted after HUSKY without jeopardizing a ROUNDUP in the spring of 1944 inevitably narrowed down to the question of availability of strength and resources—problems essentially in the planners' realm.
Aside from the need to husband trained U.S. manpower for a major cross-Channel effort—a problem of particular concern to General Marshall—there was, as always, the limiting and troublesome factor of landing craft. That factor, with which British and U.S. planners wrestled during the conference, was complicated by the fact that there could be no certainty as to future production rates or precise requirements for a projected cross-Channel operation a year thence. The first estimate of requirements that the British submitted to the conference called for 8,500 landing ships and craft to lift simultaneously ten divisions for the assault. The U.S. planners felt these calculations to be so far out of line with predictable production rates as to be completely unrealistic. General Marshall termed ROUNDUP on the basis of a ten-division assault for the spring of 1944 a "logistical impossibility." General Wedemeyer and Admiral Cooke, senior U.S. planners, also expressed the belief, shortly after the conference began, that if further amphibious operations were conducted in the Mediterranean after HUSKY, the United States could not meet the landing craft requirements for a full-scale ROUNDUP in 1944.15

In the final analysis, the whole debate on European strategy at the conference turned on the issue of landing craft. Studying the problem further, the U.S. planners concluded that, on the assumption of continued Mediterranean action after Sicily, enough landing craft could be provided in the United Kingdom by the spring of 1944 to lift five divisions simultaneously, three in the assault and two in the immediate follow-up. In the second follow-up two more could be moved. From twenty-six to thirty Anglo-American divisions could be made available in the United Kingdom by the same date. In the end these American planning estimates were accepted by the conference for the guidance of Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan (COSSAC). The number of available landing ships and craft agreed upon for planning purposes was about half (4,504) the original British estimate. Morgan, however, was also to plan on using two airborne divisions in the assault. To convince the British of the logistical feasibility of a cross-Channel operation in the spring of 1944, the U.S. planners pegged the operation to the more certain 1943 production rates, thereby scaling down the size of the assault considerably. So far were the Americans now willing to go in order to win firm British agreement to a definite cross-Channel operation with a definite target date.16

The outcome of the debate at TRIDENT on cross-Channel and Mediterranean operations was another compromise of British and American views. The disagreements were not so great that they could not be reconciled or at least straddled. They could be treated as a disagreement over method. Both sides agreed that the final blow against Ger-

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14 Min, 85th mtg JCS, 19 May 43.
15 Min, 74th mtg JPS, 18 May 43.
16 For the planners' studies and estimates, see especially: (1) CCS 234, 17 May 43, title: Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe; (2) CCS 235, 18 May 43, title: Defeat of Axis Powers in Europe; (3) CPS 71, 20 May 43, title: Rpt by Sub-Committee on Availability of Landing Craft for ROUNDUP; and (4) CCS 244/1, 25 May 43, title: Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertakings and Specific Operations for the Conduct of the War 1943-44.

For a full discussion of the landing craft issue in connection with projected cross-Channel operations at TRIDENT, see Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 60-68.
many could only be struck across the Channel—not from the Mediterranean—but the British argued that to capitalize on immediate opportunities in the Mediterranean would be the best way to prepare for the final blow. The U.S. staff was no longer resisting Mediterranean operations *per se* but only insofar as they might postpone the cross-Channel invasion.

Tied in with these different approaches to European strategy were the divergent attitudes of the British and Americans toward the Combined Bomber Offensive, although even here there was a large measure of basic agreement. At Casablanca both sides had already approved the concept of a Combined Bomber Offensive and its inseparability from a major cross-Channel effort, but now the Americans were pressing for a firm commitment to a four-phased Combined Bomber Offensive culminating on 1 April 1944 and paving the way for a definite cross-Channel operation with a definite target date in the spring of 1944. Still hoping for preliminary operations in the Mediterranean, the British were reluctant to make a firm commitment to such a Combined Bomber Offensive plan lest their other, more immediate, plans be jeopardized.\(^\text{17}\)

In the end both sides had to give ground. The British accepted as a "first charge" the principle, for which General Marshall and his staff had been arguing for more than a year, of concentrating maximum resources in a "selected area" as early as practicable in order to execute "a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel."\(^\text{18}\) They agreed to mount a cross-Channel operation with a target date 1 May 1944, on the basis of twenty-nine divisions present in the United Kingdom by that date (Operation *ROUNDHAMMER*, soon to be called *OVERLORD*).\(^\text{19}\) Its object was to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations could be conducted. The CCS agreed that an immediate expansion of logistical facilities should take place in the United Kingdom and that, after the assault, ports were to be built up on the Continent to accommodate follow-up shipments at the rate of three to five divisions per month.

The Americans had finally won British acceptance of a cross-Channel operation with a definite size and target date. At the same time, the British also approved the Eaker plan, advanced by the JCS, for carrying out the four-phase Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom, to be completed by April 1944. The plan provided for destroying and disrupting the German "military, industrial and economic system" and critically undermining the morale of the German people. German fighter strength was to be whittled down, and increasing penetration into enemy territory was to be made in the successive stages. The conferees also agreed to continue to prepare for an emergency cross-Channel operation (a *SLEDGE-\(^\text{17}\) For a discussion of the Combined Bomber Offensive plan and the debates over it at TRIDENT, see Craven and Cate, *AAF II*, 370–76.

\(^\text{18}\) CCS 242/6, 25 May 43, title: Final Rpt to the President and Prime Minister. CCS 242/6, containing a summary of the TRIDENT decisions, was approved by the President and Prime Minister on 25 May 1943. Unless otherwise indicated, the rest of this section is based on CCS 242/6.

\(^\text{19}\) The CCS agreed to adopt the code name *ROUNDHAMMER* to designate a cross-Channel operation intermediate in size between the old *SLEDGEHAMMER* and *ROUNDUP*. See min, 92d mtg CCS, 21 May 43.
HAMMER) in accord with the directive previously issued to General Morgan. It should be noted that while the basic U.S. aim of winning the British to a firm commitment to cross-Channel objectives appeared to have been gained, the projected ROUNDHAMMER operation was far smaller in scale and a full year later in time than that envisaged in the War Department's original BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan.

In return, the Americans made concessions to British arguments on Mediterranean operations. As has been suggested, the U.S. staff came to the conference in a frame of mind receptive to acceptance of some type of limited Mediterranean operations, if their major strategic aims might thereby be won. They gave their assent to the planning of further operations in the Mediterranean with the object of eliminating Italy from the war. At the same time, they extracted certain provisos. No precise method of eliminating Italy was adopted. General Eisenhower, commander in chief in North Africa, was to plan such operations, but the final decision was to be reserved to the CCS. The Americans also sought to restrict the forces to be used to those already in the Mediterranean. Indeed, they went even further and won British agreement to the preparation for transfer, from November onward, of four U.S. and three British divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom to participate in the cross-Channel operation. A definite ceiling was at last projected for the strength to be devoted to subsequent Mediterranean advances. The conferees decided that General Eisenhower was to plan on the basis of the availability of twenty-seven divisions, in all, for operations and garrisons in the Mediterranean after Husky. So high had the costs of diversion from concentrating on the cross-Channel effort mounted!

Other specific decisions of significance to the war in Europe proved less difficult. The CCS agreed that the U.S. Army Air Forces should send representatives to the Commander in Chief, North African Theater of Operations, to present their plan for bombing the oil fields at Ploesti from bases in North Africa. The British Chiefs of Staff were given the responsibility for preparing a plan to capture the Azores. The islands' land, sea, and air facilities would be made available, in the event of their occupation, to all the Allies. The war on the U-boats must be continued with every available means. That the war effort of the USSR should be aided, Turkey armed, and the French forces re-equipped were again accepted as desirable objectives.

The specific undertakings agreed upon for the Atlantic–European–Mediterranean area for 1943–44 represented a reweaving of British and American strategic conceptions into a new design. The bare outlines of the new pattern of European strategy were beginning to take shape. Whether the steps taken by the U.S. staff toward fixing European strategy in terms of a major cross-Channel effort would be enough to turn the Allies from the Mediterranean and to-
ward northwest Europe by 1944 remained to be seen.

The Pacific and Far East

Although the question of European and Mediterranean operations was the principal issue before the Trident Conference, the war against Japan received considerable attention from both the British and the Americans. The British were fearful that the United States might devote too large a portion of its resources to the defeat of Japan before Germany could be beaten, and the Americans were anxious to elicit a greater response from the British in the prosecution of operations in Burma and to be able to keep the enemy under unremitting pressure in the Pacific. The use by the U.S. staff of the “Pacific Alternative” argument as a lever to restrict Mediterranean activities and to gain British support for a major cross-Channel attack was tempered by British counterpressures to ensure that the war against Japan would remain secondary and hinged upon the favorable outcome of the war against Germany. To a degree, both sides were successful. It soon became evident that a definite over-all plan for the defeat of Japan, for which the U.S. staff was pressing, could not be formulated and adopted until a similar plan, blueprinting the war against Germany, had been accepted and made firm. The time factors for operations, in the meantime, could be estimated only very roughly, and plans would have to remain largely fluid and opportunistic.

Forward in the Pacific

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff came to Trident armed with a general concept of long-range strategy for the Pacific war—a product of the intensive study and search for an over-all plan for the defeat of Japan in which the Joint Planning Staff had engaged in early 1943. At the first plenary session of the conference when Churchill, perhaps forewarned, took the initiative and suggested that the U.S. Chiefs assume the lead in preparing long-range plans to encompass the fall of Japan, the JCS were ready to comply almost at once. The Prime Minister believed that the war against Germany would be over in 1944 and that the “great” campaign against Japan might well begin in 1945. He personally favored the entrance of the USSR into the conflict in the Far East, and the President agreed, predicting that the Soviet Union would join them within forty-eight hours after Germany surrendered.

Some of the old differences of opinion between the British and the Americans

21 Upon its establishment in late April 1943, the JWPC inherited the incomplete studies of the Joint U.S. Strategic Committee, which had been intermittently studying the question since August 1942. Largely on the basis of these revised studies, the JCS presented at Trident their strategic concept for the defeat of Japan. See: (1) min, 61st mtg JPS, 24 Feb 43; (2) JUSSC 40/2, 3 Apr 43, title: Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan; (3) memo, Capt Charles J. Moore, USN, for JPS, 27 Apr 43, sub: Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan (JPS 67/4), with JPS 67/4 in ABC 381 Japan (8-7-42), 1; (4) JPS 67/4, 28 Apr 43, title: Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan; (5) JCS 287 and JCS 287/1, 7 and 8 May 43, title: Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan; (6) min, 80th mtg JCS, 12 May 43; and (7) CCS 220, 14 May 43, title: Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan. CCS 220 contained the JCS proposals presented to the CCS at Trident and was circulated to the CCS on 19 May 43.

22 (1) Min, 1st mtg CCS at the White House, Trident, 12 May 43. Official Trident Conf Book. (2) In Hinge of Fate, page 788, Churchill has since written that during the voyage to the Washington conference he had concluded that the time was ripe to formulate a long-term plan against Japan.
again cropped up. It was the familiar story of the relative importance of the war against Germany versus the war against Japan and the United States' implied threat of a "Pacific Alternative" to counteract British pressure in behalf of the Mediterranean. Marshall reiterated the American position in an early meeting of the Combined Chiefs—the United States did not want to become committed to a Mediterranean war that would prolong the European phase and delay the prosecution of the Pacific war. The American people would not tolerate any such postponement, and the U.S. Chiefs could not accept any such proposals. The Joint Chiefs felt that unremitting pressure on Japan should be maintained and extended in the Pacific and the Far East while the European war was in progress. The American stand was rebutted by the usual British counterargument—Pacific operations must be co-ordinated with those in Europe; they must not prejudice the defeat of Germany, or the war would drag on interminably.

At a meeting of the U.S. JCS during the conference, Marshall went so far as to suggest that if, as a result of the adoption of a Mediterranean strategy, there were to be only a cross-Channel attack of the SLEDGEHAMMER variety, a re-adjustment of landing craft and troop shipping should be made in favor of the Pacific. In line with this feeling, the proposals of the U.S. Joint Chiefs for the defeat of Japan contained the thought: "If, however, conditions develop which indicate that the war as a whole can be brought more quickly to a successful conclusion by the earlier mounting of a major offensive against Japan, the strategic concept set forth herein [beating Germany first] may be reversed." The application of the "Pacific Alternative" argument undoubtedly added another spur to the persuasive factors already suggested for placing a major cross-Channel operation on the planning books at TRIDENT.

The final objective envisaged in the American strategic concept was the unconditional surrender of Japan. This objective, the U.S. staff concluded, might require an invasion of the Japanese home islands—though there was no certainty on that point. In any event, such an invasion would not be practicable until the Japanese will to resist had been greatly reduced, probably only after "a sustained, systematic, and large-scale air offensive against Japan itself." The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that an air offensive of such magnitude could be mounted only from bases in China, and for this reason the Chinese would have to be sustained in the war. Adequate supply routes would have to be established to maintain the Chinese and support Allied operations in and from China. The immediate reopening of the Burma Road and the seizure later of a port on the China coast would be necessary. Hong Kong, which was felt to be the most suitable port for initial seizure, could be captured by forces operating from the interior of China supplemented by amphibious forces operating in the South China Sea. Two lines of advance to this penultimate ob-

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23 Min, 83d mtg CCS, 13 May 43.
25 Min, 84th mtg CCS, 14 May 43.
26 Min, 82d mtg JCS, 15 May 43.
27 CCS 220, 14 May 43, title: Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan.
jective were set forth: one by the British through the Strait of Malacca; the other by the United States, crossing the Pacific to the Celebes Sea by way of the central and southwest Pacific routes. Bases would have to be secured in the Formosa–Luzon sea area as intermediate objectives. Allied success or failure in compelling the enemy to expose his fleet would be the deciding factor in determining which objective in particular to select for attack. If the United States could gain control of the western Pacific waters, Japan might surrender before being invaded.

The Japanese war was divided into six phases, with no time limits imposed and with reliance placed upon the co-operation of British, Chinese, and U.S. forces. During the first period, while the Chinese sought to improve their position in China and the Americans tried to open a line of communications into the Celebes Sea, the British, assisted by Chinese and U.S. forces, would attempt to recapture Burma. The United States would take over the major role in the second phase, retaking the Philippines while Great Britain carried out operations in and around the Strait of Malacca and China made ready to attack Hong Kong. During the campaign against Hong Kong—the third phase—the Chinese would be assisted by U.S. forces, which would enter the northern reaches of the South China Sea, and by further diversionary action around the Strait of Malacca by the British. As the fourth step, the three nations would prepare an overwhelming air offensive against Japan from bases in China and in the fifth period would mount the air attack. The final stage would find the United States providing the main forces for the invasion of Japan, the other two powers assisting. With little debate, the CCS accepted these long-range proposals as a basis for more detailed study by the Combined Staff Planners.

Turning from the general to the specific, Admiral King presented the outline of operations the United States hoped to carry out in 1943–44 in the Pacific. In his opinion, all such operations should be directed toward severing the Japanese lines of communications and toward recapturing the Philippines. King considered decisive action against the Japanese Fleet and seizure of the Mariana Islands prime requirements for victory in the Pacific. Because of their location on the enemy line of communications, the Marianas were the key to the approach to the Philippines regardless of whether the northern, southern, or central route were taken. Pointing out that the ultimate defeat of Japan would come about through blockade, bombing, and assault, he proposed that attrition of Japanese war potential be intensified in the meantime and that favorable positions be secured for the final attack. There was no way of knowing, he cautioned, where Japan would strike next, although it had the ability to invade Siberia or complete the conquest of China. King listed six possible courses of action against Japan for 1943 and 1944 that would damage the Japanese...
lines of communications or would gain for the Allies positions of readiness for the final assault on Japan: (1) air operations from and in China; (2) operations in Burma to augment the flow of supplies to China; (3) operations to drive the Japanese from the Aleutians; (4) seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands; (5) seizure of the Solomons-Bismarck Archipelago and the rest of Japanese-held New Guinea; and (6) operations against Japanese lines of communications.\(^{30}\)

The JCS informed the British Chiefs of Staff in detail of the status of current Pacific operations and of the forces required for future undertakings. No firm dates could be given for any but the most immediate operations, since the reaction of the enemy was impossible to forecast and topographical difficulties might tend to slow down projected moves. The JCS March 1943 directive to the Pacific commanders covering the current American objectives was described for the benefit of the British.\(^ {31}\) Examination of the availability of means for later operations revealed that seven additional Army divisions would be needed to capture the Marshalls, the Carolines, and New Guinea. There would be some shortages in aircraft, but sufficient naval forces would be on hand.\(^ {32}\)

Except for the rather touchy problem of land operations in Burma, the British Chiefs of Staff accepted the U.S. estimate of Pacific strategy and approved the operations recommended.\(^ {33}\) Not only did the United States secure British assent to its Pacific projects, it also sought to call a halt to the practice of reinforcing the Mediterranean at the expense of the Pacific. The U.S. Chiefs turned down a British plea for sending an additional eighty transport aircraft to the Mediterranean for Husky on the ground that the transports would have to come from the South Pacific. Marshall told the British quite bluntly that the limit for Husky had been reached.\(^ {34}\) When the British attempted to restrict the allocation of surplus aircraft to the Pacific once the maximum that could be maintained in the United Kingdom had been reached, Marshall again demurred and successfully argued that the South Pacific had been operating on a shoe-string when great results might be achieved by relatively small air increments.\(^ {35}\)

Though the results of Trident for the Pacific war were not startling in themselves, they did indicate a positive growth of the realization that attention would henceforth have to be given to long-range planning on the combined levels. The nebulous Pacific strategy set forth at the Casablanca Conference had been replaced by the adoption of new short-range objectives and an effort to analyze the future course and requirements of the war against Japan. The Allies would move forward, nibbling at the outer crust of the Japanese holdings and hoping to attain favorable positions whence the center of the empire could be subjected to attack. The policy of attrition would be intensified and additional attempts would be made to hamstring Japanese lines of communications. If nothing new had been added to the

\(^{30}\) Min, 92d mtg CCS, 21 May 43.

\(^{31}\) See Ch. IV above.

\(^{32}\) CCS 239/1, 23 May 43, title: Operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-44.

\(^{33}\) CCS 429/6, 25 May 43, title: Final Rpt to the President and Prime Minister (Trident).

\(^{34}\) Min, 89th mtg CCS, 19 May 43.

\(^{35}\) Min, 95th mtg CCS, 24 May 43.
method of operation at this juncture, at least the will to maintain and push the strategic offensive had been sustained.

**ANAKIM—The Losing Battle**

Although the U.S. Chiefs were successful in securing the adoption of their Pacific program for the immediate future, they did not fare so well in their support of Burma operations. The importance of the Far East in Allied discussions was symbolized by the presence of Wavell, Chennault, and Stilwell in Washington—the first time commanders from the Far East were present at a major international wartime conference. The reluctance of the British to themselves engage in the Burma jungles, coupled with the need to provide China with more immediate assistance, made the U.S. staff's position hopeless from the start. Two basic problems were to be settled: How vital was China to the war effort? How could China be helped most effectively? The British could not agree with the view of the President that China should be treated as a great nation and necessary to the war, nor were they convinced wholeheartedly that China would be essential as a future base of operations, as the U.S. Chiefs and Stilwell believed. But when it came to a question of the kind of aid to be provided China, the British were fully in favor of air rather than ground support.88

The indications that the British had abandoned a full-scale ANAKIM and that they were increasingly opposed to any Burma operation had become more and more clear after their setback at Akyab. Aware of the mounting British disinclination to go into Burma and realizing also that the President's enthusiasm for ANAKIM had cooled, the Army planners turned to the consideration of modified plans that would provide aid to China and yet would not be so ambitious as to discourage the British. Brig. Gen. Carl A. Russell, Deputy Chief of the Theater Group, OPD, advocated the seizure of Myitkyina in north Burma along with the operations against Akyab and Ramree Island and an advance to the Chindwin River.37 Wedemeyer, on the other hand, favored the diversion of U.S. forces and means to the Southwest Pacific if the British would not agree to carry out ANAKIM, especially since the landing craft and shipping involved would be of great assistance to Pacific operations. The Strategy Section of OPD believed that ANAKIM was imperative to keep China in the war and that the United States should insist on British participation since the necessary troops were on hand.38

Against the divided counsels of the Americans, the British presented a solid front. They asserted that any comprehensive land operation in Burma would be wasteful and diversionary from the main European effort. Churchill, their
most persuasive advocate, emphasized the difficulties involved in fighting in the Burmese jungles and was ably seconded by Field Marshal Wavell, who painted a dismal picture of the administrative, logistical, command, climatological, topographical, and medical problems that would impede any Burma operation. The British favored augmenting the air route to China, but were not convinced that Burma had to be re-captured for that purpose. The Prime Minister also advanced one of his pet schemes, an operation against the northern tip of Sumatra, as an alternate to ANAKIM, since it would utilize the large forces then in India.39

The President, convinced that ANAKIM might be too slow to aid China in time, agreed with the British that air support would be the quickest way to assist the Chinese.40 In vain did Stilwell refute the British estimate that the Burma Road would not be opened until 1945 and even then could carry a peak load of only 20,000 tons a month. The President, already favorably disposed toward further emphasis on the air war in China, did not seem to care that the road might be opened to traffic in early 1944 or to have any interest in the more prosaic land operations.41

Left to their own devices, the JCS next attempted to salvage part of ANAKIM and to prevent the wholesale withdrawal of the British from the project. The American argument was based upon two factors: the effect on the Chinese if there were no land operations in Burma, and the relation of land operations to the build-up of the air route. The British were unimpressed with the first argument and unwilling to undertake what they regarded as foolish operations simply to allay Chinese feelings. Nevertheless, Churchill did assent to Roosevelt’s stand for action in 1943, though he asserted that the action should be neither at the expense of the air route nor to placate groundless Chinese suspicions of British good faith.42 Some of the War Department frustration seeped into Marshall’s comment on the situation:

... in the development of ANAKIM, RAVENOUS [the advance to the Chindwin River] had been the first approach. Field Marshal Wavell had objected to RAVENOUS as being unsound for supply reasons, Sir Alan Brooke had objected because of the insecurity of the south flank, and the Generalissimo had objected because it was not coupled with naval action. Finally, ANAKIM in its present form had been agreed upon by all. This was now considered to be impracticable.43

While the debate on operations continued, the question of Chinese participation in the conference arose. The United States did not wish to present Chiang Kai-shek, the commander of the China theater, with a fait accompli, without giving his representatives at least an opportunity to make known Chiang’s views on Far Eastern affairs. Dr. T. V. Soong was permitted to address the CCS and informed them that the Generalissimo wished the Hump tonnage of the next three months to be assigned to the

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39 (1) Min, 1st mtg CCS at White House, TRIDENT, 12 May 43. (2) Min, 2d mtg CCS at White House, TRIDENT, 14 May 43. Both in Official TRIDENT Conf Book.
40 Min, 1st mtg CCS at White House, TRIDENT, 12 May 48. Official TRIDENT Conf Book.
42 Min, 2d mtg CCS at White House, TRIDENT, 14 May 43, Official TRIDENT Conf Book
43 Ibid.
air forces. The Generalissimo regarded ANAKIM as a definite U.S.-U.K. commitment and considered naval forces an essential part of the plan. Later on, Soong told Leahy that unless Rangoon were attacked, Chiang would not move in Burma.44

Although Chiang's support of the air build-up coincided with the wishes of the President and the British, his insistence upon ANAKIM provided Marshall and Stilwell with some ammunition. They also attempted to defend the ground operation as a means of securing the air route, pointing out the possible danger of a strong Japanese reaction to an increased air effort in China. If this threat should materialize, trained ground forces would be required to defend the air bases.45 Neither Marshall nor Stilwell opposed the concept of mounting an air attack against the enemy. Rather, it was to them a question of timing. An air effort without adequate ground defense seemed to them to be putting the cart before the horse.

The Presidential answer to their forebodings was to raise the target tonnage for the Hump in July to 7,000 tons. Of this total, Chennault was to receive the first 4,700 tons and Stilwell’s ground forces the next 2,000 tons; the last 300 would go to Chennault. During May and June the ground forces would get 500 tons and the air forces the remainder. This arrangement supposedly would pro-
vide Chennault with the tonnage he deemed necessary to begin his air attack and yet would not hold up the training of ground units.46 The immediate problem would be to lift 7,000 tons a month over the Hump—3,400 tons a month had been the maximum carried up to April 1943. It is evident that the long-term logistical difficulties of supporting both the air and the ground forces over the Hump were not fully comprehended at the time.

Marshall reintroduced another factor into the CCS debates on Burma—the influence on U.S. operations in the Pacific of pressure on the Japanese flank in southeast Asia. The terrain and fighting conditions in the Southwest Pacific jungles were not dissimilar to those in Burma, he pointed out, and had not prevented Allied troops from advancing in New Guinea and Guadalcanal. Lack of aggressive action in Burma would be unfortunate for the South and Southwest Pacific and fatal to China, he went on, and the CCS should not bank all on the attractive proposition of doing everything by air. He was in no doubt as to the difficulties of the operations, but equally he was in no doubt of their vital importance.47

The British lack of eagerness was finally met by a compromise. The CCS resolved to increase the air route to 10,000 tons per month by early fall, and the British agreed to conduct vigorous and aggressive land and air operations from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in conjunction with a Chinese advance from Yunnan. The land opera-

44 (1) Min, 88th mtg JCS, 15 May 43. (2) Min, 86th mtg CCS, 17 May 43. (3) Leahy, I Was There, p. 160.

45 (1) Min, 2d mtg CCS at White House, TRIDENT, 14 May 43. Official TRIDENT Conf Book. (2) Memo, Stilwell for CofS, 17 May 43, no sub, Stilwell Personal File, Book 3, Item 212. (3) Min, 90th mtg CCS, 20 May 43. (4) Stilwell Papers, p. 204. (5) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, Ch. IX.


47 Min, 90th mtg CCS, 20 May 43.
tions would serve to contain Japanese forces and to cover the air route to China, and would be an essential step in the opening of the Burma Road. In addition, amphibious operations would be carried out against Akyab and Ramree Island, and Japanese sea communications to Burma would be interrupted. It was the same old three-pronged advance—with specified objectives deleted. In the meantime, administrative preparations were to be continued for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of ANAKIM.

The careful avoidance of any mention of Rangoon was intentional, and the President was persuaded to acquiesce in the omission. It marked the final shift away from any attempt to reopen the old Burma Road. Henceforth, emphasis would be placed on constructing a new road across northern Burma from Ledo in India to link up with the old one at Wanting in Yunnan, a distance of 483 miles through swamps and jungle. Churchill was a little disappointed that no mention of his north Sumatra operation had been made, but was assured that it would be studied separately. Chiang Kai-shek was to be informed of all the decisions, except that Akyab and Ramree Island were not to be mentioned by name. No limits were to be placed on the operations except those imposed by time and circumstances. As Stilwell pointed out to Churchill, the weakness of the decisions lay in the vagueness of the wording of the resolutions and the many loopholes that could be used by an irresolute commander. Nevertheless, land operations in Burma were kept on the books.

Looking backward, it is evident that ANAKIM was doomed even before the first meeting at TRIDENT, and the main question to be settled was whether there was to be any major land operation in Burma, and, if so, how far it would go. The President, trusting in the efficacy of airpower and feeling the need to help China immediately, failed to give his Chiefs of Staff any effective support in the ANAKIM argument, and there appeared to be no overwhelming enthusiasm for the substitute plan that had replaced ANAKIM. The one positive decision to emerge was that to augment the air supply route to China, and this would be mainly an American task.

U.S. Combat Troops for Burma

Another by-product of the lack of enthusiasm for ANAKIM at TRIDENT was the increasing coolness shown by the U.S. Army staff toward the related project of sending U.S. ground combat units to the China-Burma-India theater. The possibility of the Army's sending a limited number of ground combat units to the CBI to strengthen Stilwell's position and to stiffen the backbone of Chinese and Empire troops had received some encouragement during March. Marshall sent word to Stilwell that the 1st Cavalry Division, which was being readied for shipment to SWPA, might eventually be

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48 Min, 91st mtg CCS, 20 May 43.
49 Min, 4th mtg CCS at White House, TRIDENT, 21 May 43, Official TRIDENT Conf Book.
50 Min, 6th mtg CCS at White House, TRIDENT, 25 May 43, Official TRIDENT Conf Book.
52 OPD paper, n.d., title: Analysis of the TRIDENT and Anfa Conf, Folder 1, Item 10, Exec 5.
used in Burma operations.\textsuperscript{53} Shipping plans had been drawn up by Somervell, a consistent supporter of the build-up of the CBI, for the diversion of a U.S. corps of two divisions from SWPA and SOPAC to the CBI on the ground that such a move would hasten the end of the war.\textsuperscript{54} But the shortage of shipping during the early spring and the added difficulties of logistics in the CBI kept the plan in the theoretical stage until the time of TRIDENT, when the obvious need for extra drive in the theater occasioned suggestions from the Army planners that U.S. combat troops be sent to spearhead the Burma campaign.\textsuperscript{55}

Although Marshall admitted the merit of giving Stilwell a force upon which he could rely and over which he would have direct command, several other considerations entered into the picture and led the Chief of Staff to oppose the scheme. In an already muddled situation, the arrival of U.S. troops would cause additional administrative, command, and supply problems. Noting there were vast resources of manpower on hand in India that could be tapped, Marshall said that he preferred not to place U.S. units under British command in Burma-India. Lastly, and most important of all, was the danger that committing U.S. combat troops to action in Burma might create another pull, similar to that in the Mediterranean, which would call for shipment of more and more reinforcements and replacements to support the initial commitment.\textsuperscript{56}

On Stilwell's request during TRIDENT for the provision of two divisions, the Army planners commented frankly that while granting the request would bolster Stilwell's position and was therefore desirable, the diversion would have to come from SWPA and SOPAC and also would entail shipping air and support units. The transfer of such a large body of troops could be made only as the result of a major strategic decision and would be worthwhile only if the United States were willing to pay the price.\textsuperscript{57} Wedemeyer bluntly opposed the request unless it could be shown absolutely that it would not interfere with European operations, for it would mean a strain on shipping when there were plenty of men in the area.\textsuperscript{58} Marshall's opposition, combined with the acceptance of limited operations in Burma during the coming year, resulted in the temporary shelving of the project.

The Balance Sheet

The second 1943 conference of the Anglo-American high command was much more satisfactory to the U.S. mili-


\textsuperscript{54} Memo, Somervell for Handy, n.d., sub: Scheme of Deployment for the U.S. Army Forces in 1943, Item 16, Exec 1.

\textsuperscript{55} Memo, Russell for Chief S&G OPD, 8 May 43, sub: ANAKIM, ABC 384 Burma (8-25-42), II.

\textsuperscript{56} (1) Min, 86th mtg JCS, 20 May 43. (2) OPD brief, title: Notes . . . JCS 86th mtg, 20 May 43, Folder 1, Item 10, Exec 5.

\textsuperscript{57} (1) Memo, Hull for Wedemeyer, 21 May 43, no sub. (2) Memo, Col Thomas S. Timberman, Chief Asiatic Sec OPD, for Gen Hull, 22 May 43, sub: Gen Stilwell's Plan of May 21, 1943. Both in OPD 381 Security, 144.

\textsuperscript{58} (1) Memo, Wedemeyer for Hull, 25 May 43, no sub, OPD 381 Security, 144. (2) Memo, Somervell for CofS, 25 May 43, no sub, CG ASF, Chief of Staff, 1942-43 (7). Somervell submitted an ASF study on the shipping cost for effecting the transfer of a corps of 100,000 men (three divisions) from the North African theater and/or from SWPA to the CBI. The cost to BOLERO would have been shipping for five divisions if the troops were taken entirely from North Africa; five and a half divisions if from North Africa and SWPA; and six divisions if the diversion were completely from SWPA.
In the war against Germany, the bare outline of a new and acceptable pattern of strategy was beginning to take shape. The provision at TRIDENT for planning a cross-Channel operation with a target date of 1 May 1944 on the basis of a definite allocation of forces was hailed by the Army planners as the “first real indication” that the British had “definitely accepted” a major operation against the Continent launched from the United Kingdom. That decision might well be, as they believed, the “key decision of the war.” The concomitant decision on the Combined Bomber Offensive furnished the first clear-cut indication of a British-American agreement for definitely merging the projected cross-Channel ground effort with the air offensive.80

Nor were the planners discouraged by the decision to go forward in the Mediterranean after the Sicily operation in order to eliminate Italy. They felt that the agreements on the Mediterranean were designed to contribute to rather than detract from the cross-Channel operation. In the light of the restriction set by the U.S. Chiefs on further increase of forces in the Mediterranean, they were hopeful that the “periphery-pecking complex” and the creation of a vacuum in the Mediterranean, which General Marshall and his assistants had feared, had been stopped.

In the war on the U-boats, new confidence and a more aggressive note had been sounded at TRIDENT than at Casablanca. The attendant agreement to employ force, if diplomacy failed, to occupy the Azores was interpreted to signify that shortening the war had be-

80 SS 106 [25 May 43], title: Analysis of the TRIDENT and Anfa Confs, ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 96–126/3 (7 Jan 43). SS 106, including Appendix A, was prepared by OPD’s Strategy Section.
come of greater importance even than scruples against an attack on a neutral.

Though global strategy was still incomplete, it had, in the opinion of the planners, been far better developed at TRIDENT than at Casablanca. Casablanca had been pre-eminently concerned with projects and accomplishments of 1943, but TRIDENT agreements had gone well beyond that year. Logistics as "a key to strategy," they observed, had also been given a more proper emphasis at TRIDENT, and strategy was being more closely tied in with resources and manpower. The decision of the high commands to meet again in the summer of 1943 to review the agreements reached in the Washington meetings was a further demonstration to them of a fresh note of realism and aggressiveness.61

Though Army planners had cause for immediate satisfaction, it is clear in retrospect that TRIDENT was a halfway point rather than a final destination in the development of strategy. TRIDENT represented the definite transition in U.S. strategic planning to the offensive phase of coalition warfare. Casablanca had given American strategists their initiation; TRIDENT marked their growing-up stage. Gaining skill in preparing and arguing their case, the U.S. staff was advancing in the art of applying quid pro quo in international strategy councils. Though TRIDENT did not provide the final answers, it signified that the staff was at last coming to grips with the new problems and facing up to the new realities of coalition warfare. If wishful thinking and single-minded concentration on a cross-Channel operation still appeared to linger, their methods of reaching the goal were at least becoming more flexible and sophisticated. Though the President and his military staff were still not in complete agreement on all strategic issues, they had closed ranks to the point of presenting a united front on the cross-Channel operation.

The outcome of TRIDENT, as of Casablanca, for the immediate future pointed to the continuation of the Mediterranean and Pacific offensives. Nevertheless, barriers had been manufactured at the Washington meetings to contain or limit the Mediterranean advance, and the defense of Mediterranean operations had largely shifted to the grounds that the operations would set the stage for the projected cross-Channel operation. Some progress had also been made in weaving Pacific and European operations into tentative long-range planning in the war against Japan and Germany respectively. Welcome as these signs were to the Army planners, events were soon to show that all the pieces in the global strategic puzzle had not yet fallen into place and that the Mediterranean issue in particular was still far from moribund.

61SS 106 [25 May 43], title: Analysis of the TRIDENT and Anfa Conf's, ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 96–126/3 (7 Jan 43).
Although TRIDENT did not settle the role the Mediterranean was to play in long-range European strategy, the need for deciding the size, timing, and direction of immediate operations in the Mediterranean became urgent. One effect of TRIDENT was to speed preparations for the invasion of Sicily. By the close of the conference, operational planning for HUSKY was taking final shape. The Germans had at last been defeated in Tunisia, and the Allied headquarters in Algiers could turn its full attention to Sicily. Pantelleria had been accepted as an intermediate objective, an ad hoc, or modified, HUSKY had been rejected, and a full-scale operation had been projected in accord with a plan developed by General Eisenhower’s staff. The final outline plan for Sicily, approved by the CCS on 13 May during the TRIDENT meetings, provided for British and American assaults against southern and southeastern areas of the island. On 22 May, while the CCS were still at the conference, General Eisenhower confirmed 10 July 1943 as D Day.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Eisenhower rpt, Sicilian Campaign, pp. 10–11. (2) Chs. [III] and [III] above. (3) Msg, Eisenhower to WD for CCS, etc., 22 May 43, CM-IN 15551 (24 May 43), NAF 224, Item 1b, Exec 3.
definite, the tempo of preparations for launching the campaign was stepped up both in Washington and abroad.

As a part of the advance planning for Husky, the British arranged for a body, made to appear to be that of a British courier, to be washed ashore on the Spanish coast. In the corpse's pouch were plans for an attack upon Greece under the code name Husky and for a second attack in the western Mediterranean. According to the planted information, only a feint would be made against Sicily. The Germans in due course received word of the body and the plans and reinforced the Peloponnesus and Sardinia.\footnote{For an interesting account of this deception, see Hon. Ewen Montagu, *The Man Who Never Was* (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1954).}

The close of the Tunisia Campaign led to a radical change in the situation in Italy. The defeat in North Africa convinced many Italian leaders that Italy should get out of the war, but Hitler remained adamant in his determination to fight both the Russians and the Anglo-Americans. With their hopes for a political settlement quashed, the Italians were placed in a precarious position. Their military weakness made them acutely aware of the dangers of attempting to break their alliance with Germany, for swift retaliation might follow. On the other hand, they wanted to stop fighting. As they wavered between Scilla and Charybdis, they aroused the suspicion of Hitler. On 20 May he decided to take no chances and directed the German staff to prepare a plan for German control of northern Italy in the event of Italy's defection.

By mid-June, the German commanders in Italy concluded that Italian morale was hopeless and that little could be expected in the way of resistance unless German forces were brought in. The Italian military staff conceded the truth of the German position by permitting and requesting German aid. As German troops entered Italy in increasing numbers during June and the early days of July, the Italians' freedom of action decreased.

Thus, on the eve of Husky, German forces controlled the northern approaches to Italy and were firmly enconced around Rome. If the Italians defected, the German commanders would be in a position to evacuate their forces from the south to a defensive line along the northern Apennines. Were the Italians to continue the fight, the Germans contemplated defending all of Italy. All signs pointed to an Allied attack upon Sicily, but the Germans were forced to be prepared for a number of eventualities. The next move depended upon the Allies—and the Italians.\footnote{For an account of German and Italian plans and preparations for Italy during the pre-Husky period, see Smyth, *Sicilian Campaign and the Surrender of Italy*.}

The uncertainty in the relations between the two European Axis partners was not unwelcome to the Allies, but the German reinforcement of Italy and Sicily was hardly encouraging. To the Allies, Husky represented months of preparation. It developed as a unique combined undertaking, involving mounting, assembling, and supplying assault forces from four widely separated areas—the United States, the United Kingdom, the Middle East, and North Africa. It required the organization and dispatch of one task force from the United States, the assembly in the theater of a gigantic
Allied armada, and the launching of an ambitious amphibious operation. Husky also represented the first large-scale Allied venture in airborne operations. To maintain equal status between U.S. and British forces, special arrangements for command and administration were required. In the process, Husky ushered in an experiment in military government for occupied enemy territory. All of these experiences were to furnish valuable precedents for the management and conduct of subsequent combined operations.

The preparation and execution of this whirlwind campaign, which lasted only thirty-nine days (10 July–17 August 1943), pointed up the fact that much operational planning hitherto performed in Washington was shifting to large theater headquarters. The development of the replacement system and of the standing operating procedure for convoy loading and dispatching troops to the field made much of the work of operations officers in Washington routine and automatic. At the same time the tendency for an increasing number of General Marshall’s plans and operations assistants to go overseas to serve on the theater headquarters staff as observers, liaison officers, planners, and active participants in the operation became even more marked.\(^5\) The chief Army planner, General Wedemeyer, during a tour of extended temporary duty in the North African theater, joined General Patton’s staff and at the latter’s request analyzed the entire operational plan for Husky. Wedemeyer went so far as to ask for and receive command of a regiment and participated in the initial fighting in Sicily.\(^6\) This leaven of practical experience with amphibious operations, needless to say, was to serve the Washington Army headquarters in good stead in subsequent planning for the highly operational phase of the war.

While some of its representatives were busily engaged in theater planning, the Washington Army headquarters completed arrangements for dispatching the 45th Infantry Division and the 82d Airborne Division.\(^7\) The combat-loaded 45th Division was a task force in miniature, for whose preparation the Washington headquarters had already had intensive experience in mounting and moving the Western Task Force for Torch. The 82d Airborne arrived in the North African theater in May, followed a month later by the 45th Division. General Marshall’s operations staff examined General Eisenhower’s troop lists in terms not only of available units, ships, and escorts but also of the effect on other prospective operations, particularly on the build-up in the European theater for

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\(^5\) For a summary of the role of War Department staff officers overseas from 1945 onward, see Cline, Washington Command Post, Ch. XV.

\(^6\) For a discussion of General Wedemeyer’s participation in Husky, see Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 296–99.

the projected cross-Channel operation.\textsuperscript{8}

The contrast in the totals of American strength divided between North Africa and the United Kingdom in the summer of 1943 drove home the need to hold the line so far as possible and to use troops already in the Mediterranean for Husky. By 1 July 1943, just ten days before Husky was launched, the strength of U.S. forces in the North African theater was estimated by the Washington planners at over 528,000, while U.S. strength in the United Kingdom was only about 160,000.\textsuperscript{9} Meanwhile, replacements had to be sent to the active theater, and the War Department took steps to correct deficiencies in the replacement training program in the zone of interior. It opened replacement depots on both coasts, increased capacities for training infantry and field artillery replacements, augmented training periods, and made provision for more small unit training.\textsuperscript{10}

To match British arrangements, the War Department also took a significant step in organizing U.S. forces for Husky. Learning of the apparent British intention to designate General Montgomery's Eastern Task Force for Husky as an army, General Hull, then Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, suggested on 13 May to Marshall the advisability of designating General Patton's Western Task Force—then set up as a corps—also as an army. General Hull was concerned lest world opinion conclude that American contribution to Husky was much less than that of the British—a conclusion contrary to the facts in the case. General Marshall thereupon conferred with Field Marshall Dill, who confirmed the British intention. At the same time, the War Department operations staff learned of General Eisenhower's favorable disposition to Hull's proposal. As a result, on 17 May the Chief of Staff cabled General Eisenhower that the designation of General Patton's force for Husky was to be the U.S. Seventh Army.\textsuperscript{11} General Montgomery's Eighth Army comprised seven divisions, while General Patton's Seventh Army was given six divisions—the 1st, 3d, 9th, and 45th Infantry Divisions, the 2d Armored, and the 82d Airborne. The 9th and part of the 82d Airborne were to be held in reserve in North Africa; the rest were to be used in the first assault.\textsuperscript{12} The Seventh Army became "the first United States field army to operate as a unit in the war."\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{8} Bigot-Husky msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Eisenhower, 29 May 43, CM-OUT 12699, Item 8, Exec 3.

\textsuperscript{9} Memo, Col Alexander D. Reid, Chief European Sec Theater Gp OPD, for Gen Handy, Gen Hull, and Col Bessell, 23 Jul 43, sub: Effect of Torch and Subsequent Diversions Upon BOLERO, Paper 36, Item 1c, Exec 3. Colonel Reid noted that, based on Casablanca figures, U.S. strength for 1 July 1943 had been projected in the United Kingdom at 456,000 and in NATO at 407,700, thereby indicating the build-up in NATO in excess of that in the United Kingdom even more sharply.

\textsuperscript{10} Memo, Handy, ACoFS OPD, for CoFS, 6 Aug 43, sub: Replacements for 1st Infantry Div, Case 59, Book 11, Exec 9.


\textsuperscript{13} Eisenhower rpt, Sicilian Campaign, p. 52.
To provide fighter cover, a major problem in the operation, General Eisenhower had decided to subject the island of Pantelleria, almost equidistant from Tunisia and Sicily, to a heavy Allied bombardment well in advance of the assault on Sicily. Before an amphibious assault, the severe air attacks were supplemented by naval bombardment. The island surrendered after a few rounds of small arms fire were exchanged with the landing forces on 11 June. Next day Lampedusa, a smaller island some distance to the south, also fell. These attacks marked the first successful Allied effort to conquer enemy territory principally by air action.\(^1\)

A month later, on 10 July, the Allied ground forces went ashore in Sicily. U.S. troops participated in the assault on the south coast of Sicily as the Western Task Force (Seventh Army), the attacks coinciding with those launched by the Eastern Task Force (Eighth Army) on the southeast end of Sicily with British forces from the Middle East, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom. Making the assaults for the Americans were three reinforced infantry divisions—the 1st, 3rd, and 45th—and the 2d Armored Division. The 1st and 3rd Infantry and the 2d Armored Divisions were mounted from North African bases. The 45th, trained amphibi-ously in the United States, had spent five weeks at sea and required a brief conditioning in North Africa before its participation in the initial assault. Airborne operations were carried out by the 82d Airborne Division before and after these landings—not without some unfortunate mishaps.\(^2\)

Though the Seventh Army encountered bad weather conditions, the landings on the whole came off without serious opposition. The remarkable performance of the celebrated DUKW—a product of American ingenuity—in unloading over the beaches solved the problem of large-scale supply until suitable ports were captured.\(^3\) Soon the ports of Licata, Syracuse, and Augusta were seized. On 22 July, elements of the U.S. 2d Armored and 3d Divisions, moving with great speed, met at the outskirts of Palermo, and Palermo surrendered without resistance. Early in the morning of 17 August, patrols of the U.S. 3d Division entered Messina not far in advance of patrols from the British Eighth Army. The campaign was over. In the closing days of the operation the strength of the U.S. and British Army forces in Sicily was almost evenly balanced—168,427 American and 168,268 British.\(^4\)


\(^{3}\) The DUKW, a 2 1/2-ton amphibian truck, soon popularly known as the “Duck,” was used to move cargo from ship to shore, and later moved in simultaneously with assault troops, thereby increasing the mobility of attacking forces.

\(^{4}\) (1) Msg, 15th Army Gp to WAR (info copy OI-D), 21 Aug 43, CM-IN 15816. (2) Strength of
At Casablanca, seven months before, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had set as the objectives of the Sicily Campaign: to make the Allied lines of communication in the Mediterranean more secure; to divert as much German strength as possible from the Soviet front during the critical summer period; and to intensify pressure on Italy. General Eisenhower's conclusion was, "The operation achieved all these and much more." The invasion of Sicily, accompanied by heavy bombing on the Italian mainland—especially of the marshaling yards in the Rome area on 19 July—dealt crushing blows to Italian morale and led directly to the overthrow of the Fascist regime.

On 25 July King Victor Emmanuel announced the resignation of Mussolini and charged Marshal Pietro Badoglio with the task of forming a new government. Italy had taken the first step toward withdrawing from the war against the Allies.

Aside from their effect on Italy, air attacks from Mediterranean bases served as a prelude and warm-up for the five groups of B-24's that were withdrawn from Husky on 20 July, the day after the attack on Rome, in order to prepare for a raid on the Ploesti oil refineries in Romania on 1 August 1943. Ploesti, with its rich resources of natural oil of great importance to the German war machine, had long been a favorite target in U.S. military planning. Its special attraction was the prospect of slowing up German operations on the Eastern Front and thereby offering immediate help to the USSR. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, American planners had studied the possibility of bombing Ploesti, and in the late spring of 1942 an ineffective attempt—by a special air group under Col. Harry A. Halverson—had been made by AAF planes from the Middle East.

In the spring of 1943 a new plan had been developed by the Air Staff in Washington—a project for a low-level mass attack based on Bengasi. General Arnold and his planners heartily supported the plan, which was presented at Trident and approved by General Eisenhower and the CCS early in June. In order not to deprive Husky of bomber support, it was agreed by all that the North African air force should provide only two groups of B-24's for the operation (known successively as Statesman, Soapsuds, and Tidalwave) and that the remainder should be obtained by transferring two groups of B-24's (the 93d and 44th) from the Eighth Air Force and temporarily diverting one group (the

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Forces in Sicily, 10 Aug 43, based on msg, CM-IN 15816 (21 Aug 43), Case 91, Book 11, Exec 9.

18 Eisenhower rpt, Sicilian Campaign, p. 31.

19 The decision to bomb the marshaling yards of Rome was taken only after careful consideration by the Allied authorities. Military as well as political considerations determined it. Rome was not only the capital of Fascist Italy, it was also the center of the Italian system of communications. The decision and the operation are discussed in: (1) Craven and Cate, AAF II, 468-85, 479; (2) Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe. (New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 168-69; (3) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 888-89; (4) Smyth, Sicilian Campaign and the Surrender of Italy.

20 A full discussion of the role of the U.S. Army in the planning and execution of the Sicilian campaign is to be presented in Smyth, Sicilian Campaign and the Surrender of Italy.

21 The Halverson Project (HALPRO) is discussed in Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, pp. 459, 461, 141, 245-47, 250.

38th) scheduled to move to the United Kingdom.23 Arriving in the Mediterranean at the end of June and beginning of July 1943, these groups joined the 376th and 98th groups.

The raid on Ploesti of 1 August was not a complete success. The loss of men and planes was heavy—532 (dead, prisoners, missing, or interned) of the 1,726 airmen and 54 of 177 planes, 41 of them in action. Much damage was inflicted on Ploesti's refining and cracking installations, reducing the production of lubricating oils, but the Germans soon repaired the damage. AAF historians, analyzing the results after the close of hostilities, have concluded that "though the over-all damage was heavy it was not decisive."24

Planning Post-HUSKY Operations

The progress of HUSKY inevitably raised anew the question that had been left in suspense at TRIDENT—what was to be the next strategic move? Should large-scale activity in the Mediterranean be closed down, and resources and strength be husbanded for the major operations in northwest Europe? The conferees had agreed to eliminate Italy, but how, where, and when had been left undecided. Should the Allies cross the Strait of Messina and seize the toe of Italy? Should they capture the heel at Taranto, or possibly land higher up the west coast? Or should they limit themselves to occupying Sardinia, as the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had favored? Churchill, who had come to TRIDENT with his heart set on an invasion of the Italian mainland, was disappointed in the vagueness of the agreement on Italy.25 As he confided somewhat later to General Jan Christian Smuts:

Not being satisfied with this, I requested the President [at the close of TRIDENT] to send General Marshall with me to North Africa and there upon the spot to convince Eisenhower and others that nothing less than Rome could satisfy the requirements of this year's campaign.26

Before he left Washington, Churchill explained to Roosevelt that he would feel awkward in discussing post-HUSKY policy with the Allied staff in the theater without the presence of a high-ranking American representative, lest he be charged with having exercised "undue influence." Obviously, if he could persuade Marshall—the strongest and most influential American military protagonist of an early cross-Channel operation—as well as the theater commanders to back an invasion of Italy after Sicily, the Prime Minister would have gone a long way toward realizing his immediate goal in the Mediterranean. At the President's request, General Marshall agreed to defer a trip to the Southwest Pacific in order to accompany the Prime Minister and his staff.27 The transaction between the President and the Prime Minister prompted Marshall's rueful remark,

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23 The Prime Minister, with his usual sensitivity to the use of appropriate code names, liked the change in code name from SOAPSUDS to the more elegant TIDALWAVE. So did the President. "May they grow bigger and better," he declared to the Prime Minister in late June (Msg No. 296, President to Prime Minister, 28 Jun 43, WDCSA ETO (Super Secret)).

24 This brief account of the Ploesti raid is based largely on Craven and Cate, AAF II, 477-84. Quote is from p. 483. See also Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 160-61.

25 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 810.

26 Msg, Prime Minister to Gen Smuts, 16 Jul 43, quoted in Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 36.

27 Min, 6th mtg CCS at the White House, TRIDENT, Official TRIDENT Conf Book.
that "he [Marshall] seemed to be merely a piece of baggage useful as a trading point."  

Algiers Conference, 29 May–3 June 1943

A series of meetings with General Eisenhower and other high-ranking Allied military leaders in the Mediterranean followed at Algiers in the week of 29 May–3 June 1943. Among those present were Generals Sir Harold Alexander, Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, and Sir Alan Brooke, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Maj. Gen. Walter B. Smith, Brig. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks, and General Sir Hastings L. Ismay. Toward the close of the week General Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, who had been on a tour of the overseas theaters, arrived at Algiers to join the Chief of Staff at the meetings.

Churchill and Marshall acquainted Eisenhower with the TRIDENT decisions, explored with him the progress of the HUSKY preparations and the implications of the projected cross-Channel operation (ROUNDBOOTM) for Mediterranean operations after HUSKY, and exchanged views with him on the merits of various possible post-HUSKY operations. At the outset General Eisenhower expressed the view that if the Allies were going to knock out Italy, they should do so immediately after HUSKY with all available means. If HUSKY proved to be an easy undertaking, the Allies should go directly into Italy rather than to any of the Mediterranean islands.

The Prime Minister drew on all his eloquence to reaffirm the position he had supported at TRIDENT. He insisted that he had no desire to interfere with a cross-Channel attack projected for 1944, but he wanted to take full and immediate advantage of all opportunities offered by the capture of Sicily. His "sincere wish and hope" was that the United States and Great Britain could go directly from HUSKY into Italy. He declared that "his heart lay in an invasion of Southern Italy." To Churchill, the choice of southern Italy over Sardinia represented the difference between "a glorious campaign and a mere convenience."  

In reply, General Marshall emphasized that he was not arguing against the broad commitment made at TRIDENT to aim at the fall of Italy but, he stated, the Allies would have to select the particular operation in the Mediterranean to follow HUSKY with great care in order to ensure that it be based on a close calculation of requirements and of actual conditions to be faced. The "ball" and "toe" of Italy were only a small part of the mainland, and operations on the mainland might, in the final analysis, result in great drains on Allied shipping and other resources. Before a decision could be reached on post-HUSKY operations, it would be necessary to estimate German reaction to HUSKY in order to determine

28 Quoted by Stimson, in Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 428.
29 (1) Min, 1st mtg held at Gen Eisenhower’s villa, Algiers, 29 May 43, Official TRIDENT Conf Book. (2) General Eisenhower’s willingness to go directly to

Italy aroused fears among some of the American planners lest the Allies be committed to a major operation in the Mediterranean before the JCS had an opportunity to pass on it. Informal memo, L. J. L. [Lt Col Lawrence J. Lincoln] for Gen Wedemeyer, and appended "Summary Minutes of Meetings—Eisenhower’s Villa, Algiers, 29 May 43," with CCS 223 in ABC 384 Post HUSKY (14 May 43), I.  
28 (1) Min, 2d mtg held in Gen Eisenhower’s villa, Algiers, 31 May 43. (2) Min, 1st mtg held in Gen Eisenhower’s villa, Algiers, 29 May 43. Both in Official TRIDENT Conf Book.
whether there would be real resistance to an Allied landing in southern Italy, whether the Germans would withdraw to the Po, whether the Germans could organize and handle the Italians effectively, and what readjustments they would make on the Soviet front. The information could be secured, in General Marshall's opinion, after the initial phases of Husky were completed.\footnote{Ibid.}

General Marshall thus continued to show the cautious attitude of the U.S. military staff toward large-scale ground operations in the Mediterranean. Pending the outcome of Husky, he recommended that the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, prepare for various Mediterranean operations. The logical approach, he suggested, was to set up two forces, each with its own staff—one to train for an operation against Sardinia and Corsica, the other for an operation against the mainland of Italy. When the Husky situation became sufficiently clear to make a decision on the next step, the necessary air strength and vital resources could be assigned to the force carrying out the plan adopted. As a result of General Marshall's recommendations, General Eisenhower modified the view he had first offered. He would designate
two separate headquarters, each with its own staff, to plan post-Husky operations. One would plan for operations against Sardinia and Corsica; the other for operations against the mainland of Italy, particularly the toe and the ball. If Sicily collapsed quickly, he would cross the Strait of Messina and seize a bridgehead on the mainland.32

The conference ended, as it had begun, without a clear-cut decision on post-Husky operations. The conferees simply concluded that General Eisenhower should send his recommendations to the CCS during the early phases of Husky. In effect, as the Prime Minister summed it up at the close of the meetings, “post-Husky would be in General Eisenhower’s hands.” The Prime Minister had to take what comfort he could from his impression that all were agreed that Italy be eliminated from the war as soon as possible, and if differences arose over the particular course of action recommended by General Eisenhower, they would be settled between the two governments. General Marshall had won his way on postponing a final decision.33

Decision To Undertake AVALANCHE

Meanwhile, in Washington General Marshall’s planning assistants kept one eye on the progress of Husky, the other on post-Husky planning. In examining recommendations for Mediterranean operations after Sicily, they took the same cautious stand Marshall had taken against Allied embroilment in large-scale ground action in Italy. Their yardstick was the likely effect of any Mediterranean operation on the main effort in northwestern Europe. One recommendation to which they objected was that advanced on 3 July by General Arnold for invading Italy in the fall of 1943 in order to occupy the Ravenna–Ancona area.

Arguing purely from the Air point of view, the Air Forces chief dwelt on the advantages of gaining a base area in northern Italy from which the German-controlled industrial centers of southern Europe could be bombed, thus supplementing the Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom and paving the way for an invasion of the Continent. On the other hand, alternative operations—against Sardinia, Corsica, or the Iberian Peninsula—promised only limited results for air operations.34 The Army planners objected that should the enemy offer strong resistance after Husky, a sufficient number of Allied divisions and adequate means would not be available to occupy the northern portion of the Italian boot. It was their hope, however, that the measures finally adopted to eliminate Italy would yield a base area for broadening air operations against German-controlled Europe.35 In fact, so important did they consider this aim that they were opposed to allocating U.S. heavy bombers to Turkey—then

32 Ibid.
33 Min, 9d mtg held at Gen Eisenhower’s villa, Algiers, 3 Jun 43, Official TRIDENT Conf Book.
34 JPS 223, 3 Jul 43, title: Comparison of Various Post-Husky Operations in Relation to Allied Air Capabilities.
35 OPD brief, title: Notes... 83d mtg JPS, 7 Jul 43, Comparison of Various Post-Husky Operations in Relation to Allied Air Capabilities (JPS 223), with JPS 223 in ABC 384 Post Husky (14 May 43).
suggested by the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington—on the ground that the airplanes could be more effectively used in operations based on Italy.  

The Army planners also raised objections to a concomitant recommendation of the British Chiefs of Staff that the Allies occupy the toe and ball of Italy. In presenting their proposal, the British declared that “all means at our disposal” should be used to eliminate Italy from the war, and thereby contain as large a German force as possible in the Mediterranean. Col. George A. Lincoln of the War Department’s operations staff argued that the toe and ball had little military value in themselves. If the Axis Powers chose to resist, a commitment of limited Allied forces available against Italy would not necessarily afford the best method of containing German forces in the Mediterranean or of bringing about the collapse of Italy. On the other hand, air operations from Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica might pave the way for the later disintegration of Italy. In any event, the seven divisions scheduled for transfer from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom must be sent. A major operation in Italy must be avoided so long as there was a “reasonable” chance of executing OVERLORD. A realistic decision by the CCS on post-HUSKY plans, Colonel Lincoln concluded, must be based on General Eisenhower’s appraisal of Axis reaction to HUSKY and of probable Axis reaction to a post-Husky operation, on a reliable estimate of resources remaining after HUSKY, and, above all, on over-all strategic considerations.

Pending the response to HUSKY and the final decision on post-HUSKY operations, the Army planners heartily approved the flexible concept of operations embodied in General Eisenhower’s unfolding plans against Sardinia, southern Italy, and various combinations thereof. In this theater planning, the seizure of the toe or ball of Italy was to be followed by an overland advance to occupy the heel and thence northward to capture Naples. To ensure that post-HUSKY Mediterranean actions would not become extended, the Army planners sought to keep the wherewithal limited to that already allocated to the area, exclusive of planned withdrawals for other operations. On the other hand, the British were anxious to increase the means and strength available to General Eisenhower for an invasion of the Italian mainland in force.

Success of the initial assaults on Sicily soon began to bring the interrelated questions of objectives, resources, and timing to a head. At first the vital resource in immediate question was combat loaders. At the close of June General Eisenhower had asked for the retention of nine combat loaders that TRIDENT had not definitely allocated to other theaters. Within a week after the initial landings the British urged that Eisenhower be given a free hand in respect to shipping—especially combat loaders.

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36 (1) Memo, Handy, ACoS OPD, for DCoS, 3 Jul 43, sub: Heavy Bomber Squadrons for HARDHOOK II. (2) OPD draft Jtr, DCoS for Air Marshal Sir William L. Welsh, Br Joint Staff Mission, incl to memo, Handy for DCoS, 3 Jul 43, sub: Heavy Bomber Squadrons for HARDHOOK II. Both with JPS 16g/D in ABC 384 Post HUSKY (14 May 43), I.


38 OPD brief, title: Notes...101st mtg CCS, 9 Jul 43, Post-Husky Operations North African Theater (CCS 268/1), with CCS 268/1 in ABC 384 Post HUSKY (14 May 43), I. OPD action officer was Col. G. A. Lincoln.
loaders—the resulting loss to be absorbed by BOLERO or the Pacific. The Army planners resisted. They called for General Eisenhower to adjust his projected requirements for combat loaders for post-HUSKY operations to those remaining in the Mediterranean after the withdrawals for BOLERO, BULLFROG (operation against Arakan coast, Burma), and the Pacific were met—as originally planned. In a meeting of the CCS on 16 July General Marshall forcefully backed his planners' point of view on the distribution of resources, observing that losses of combat loaders in the initial HUSKY operations had been slight.  

Up to this point General Marshall's attitude toward an invasion of Italy had been a cautious "wait and see." He now proposed that a bold amphibious attack on Naples be seriously considered. Presumably his stand was influenced—in part at least—by a 15 July report from his intelligence staff on the exploitation of HUSKY. G-2 indicated that Italian combat power had deteriorated to the point where the Allies could assume calculated risks in dealing with Italy. To exploit their advantage, the Allies would be justified in taking prompt action against the Italian mainland. G-2 recommended the Naples area as the most promising target for an Allied invasion and called for studies to be made of an operation to capture Naples and then move on to Rome.  

Reasoning along the same lines, the Chief of Staff suggested on 16 July that the CCS consider launching an amphibious attack on Naples after HUSKY on the ground that if the HUSKY outlook continued favorable the Allies would be justified in taking a bolder move and "some reasonable risk in this direction." Sir John Dill took up Marshall's suggestion at once, and on the same day the CCS cabled General Eisenhower their acceptance of his current strategic concept for post-HUSKY planning purposes and their interest in the possibilities of an amphibious operation against Naples in lieu of an attack on Sardinia.  

In London Churchill received the report of General Marshall's 16 July proposal to the CCS with "evident delight." Secretary of War Stimson, then on a visit to the United Kingdom, was greatly disturbed to find, in the course of conversations with the Prime Minister on 17 July, that Churchill interpreted Marshall's support of a bold move against Naples as an endorsement of his whole Italian policy. Stimson hastened to point out that Marshall had probably proposed the Naples operation only as a short cut designed to hasten "the completion of the Italian adventure" so that there would be no danger of interference with preparations for the cross-Channel operation. On 19 July the Secretary, talking with Marshall via transatlantic telephone, asked for a clarification of views. He reported his impression that the Prime Minister, subject to his "very strong desire" for a march on Rome, was sincere in his promise to support OVERLORD. Stimson informed Marshall of the

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39 (1) OPD brief, title: Notes . . . 102d mtg CCS, 16 Jul 43, Post-"Husky" Operations North African Theater (CCS 268/2), with CCS 268/2 in ABC 384 Post HUSKY (14 May 43), I. (2) Min, 102d mtg CCS, 16 Jul 43.  
41 Min, 102d mtg CCS, Jul 43.  
42 Msg, CCS to Eisenhower and Br COS, USFOR, London, 16 Jul 43, CM-OUT 6689, FAN 165 (info copy OPD).
assumption he had made regarding Marshall's position—that Marshall had suggested the move against Naples in order to hasten the drive on Rome, permit more time for the cross-Channel operation, and preclude the danger of a long, slow march "up the leg" that might eliminate the cross-Channel operation altogether. The Chief of Staff reassured the Secretary of War: "You are absolutely correct. This is exactly what we are after." On 22 July Stimson told Churchill of his talk with Marshall and confirmed his interpretation of Marshall's support of AVALANCHE (code name for attack on the Naples area). He made clear that Marshall and his staff were as firmly in favor of the cross-Channel operation as ever.

Thus it appears that General Marshall's proposal of 16 July signified no sudden new interest on his part in extended, large-scale ground action on the Italian mainland. Far from supporting a departure from the fundamental strategy hitherto espoused by the Army staff, he was seizing on the possibility of the Naples attack as a device to gain all the advantages of a position in Italy—as far north as Rome—as quickly and as cheaply as possible, thereby ensuring rather than impeding the success of OVERLORD. Whatever Marshall's reasons, the possibility of bolder action in the Mediterranean found British staff circles no less enthusiastic than the Prime Minister.

In Washington and in the theater, planning for post-HUSKY operations henceforth took AVALANCHE seriously into account. On 18 July General Eisenhower requested the approval of the CCS to carry the war to the Italian mainland immediately after the capture of Sicily. In the light of the current state of Italian morale this appeared to him to be the best course to achieve the twin objectives of forcing Italy out of the war and of containing the maximum German forces. His planners, he pointed out, were re-examining the proposition of an assault on Naples.

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43 For the British staff views see: (1) CCS 268/6, 21 Jul 43, title: Post-"HUSKY" Operations North African Theater; and (2) J. P. (43) 265, Rpt by Br Joint Planning Staff War Cabinet for Br COS, 21 Jul 43, title: The Exploitation of "HUSKY", with CCS 268/3 in ABC 384 Post HUSKY (14 May 43), I. The British Joint planners here recommended AVALANCHE in place of an operation against the heel (MUSKET) as "a sounder and more decisive operation."

44 General Marshall's staff planners, keeping the Chief of Staff alert to studies exploring his proposal, followed the progress of negotiations between the CCS and General Eisenhower. For an example of the staff planners' briefing function, see memo, OPD for CofS, 17 Jul 43, sub: "HUSKY" Exploitation, with JCS 417 in ABC 384 Post HUSKY (14 May 43), I. OPD action officer was Colonel Roberts. The memo referred to a study of a Naples operation being conducted by the JWPC. The study is contained in JCS 417, 19 Jul 43, title: Rapid Exploitation of "HUSKY."

45 Actually, General Eisenhower and AFHQ planners had long been impressed with the desirability of promptly seizing the port of Naples, but they had been considering the project as the culmination of an overland advance from the south, in exploitation of BUTTRESS and GOSLET (operations against the toe of Italy to capture Reggio on the Calabrian peninsula and against the ball of Italy near Crotone, respectively). Hitherto they had not considered a direct assault upon Naples feasible because of such problems as the anticipated shortage of landing craft and insufficient fighter cover for the operation.
On 20 July, on the basis of a message drafted in the War Department, the CCS cabled their approval.48 Once more the British raised the question of augmenting General Eisenhower's resources—this time to ensure completely the success of AVALANCHE. On 19 July—and more definitely on the 21st—they proposed that nothing be moved out of the Mediterranean until Eisenhower had stated his requirements for the proposed invasion of the mainland. Acknowledging that a stand-fast policy might delay scheduled operations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, they felt that the elimination of Italy from the war would be worth the price. To some extent the British proposal affected combat loaders. Since those slated for the Pacific and BOLERO-SICKLE had already left, Burma operations in all likelihood would suffer the most. The main items in immediate question now appeared to be aircraft—bombers and troop carriers—and possibly also destroyers. To the British, the situation called for immediate and even unilateral action. They proceeded to issue a "stand-fast" order on movements of their own troops, shipping, and other resources from the Mediterranean, urging the Americans to do the same.49

Once more the Army planners raised objections—this time on the ground that JCS support of AVALANCHE was not intended to imply any increase in the means available for post-HUSKY operations. Col. Frank N. Roberts reasoned that General Eisenhower's forces for post-HUSKY had already been augmented at the price of some disarrangement of BOLERO.50 A further increase of means might postpone or cancel operations projected for other theaters—an unacceptable departure from TRIDENT strategy. The JPS went so far as to contend that unless the British went through with the planned withdrawals of combat loaders for BULLFROG, the American LST's (landing ship, tank) for that operation should be sent to the Pacific.51 General Marshall took the same position as his staff in arguing before the CCS on 23 July—that General Eisenhower had the means with which to capture Naples and that "reasonable hazards" could then be accepted in the Mediterranean. If additional shipping and other resources were furnished, OVERLORD as well as Far East and Pacific operations would be jeopardized.52

See: (1) BIGOT-HUSKY msg, Eisenhower to WD for CCS, and to War Office for Br COS, 30 Jun 43 (info copy OPD), CM-IN 434 (1 Jul 43); (2) Smyth, Sicilian Campaign and the Surrender of Italy, Ch. II, "Preliminary Planning of Attack on Italy," pp. 32-33; and (3) Allied Force Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander's Dispatch, Italian Campaign, 3 Sep 43-8 Jan 44 (hereafter cited as Eisenhower rpt, Italian Campaign), p. 12.

Colonel Roberts served in the Military Intelligence Division in 1941 and on temporary duty with the Army forces in the CBI in early 1942. He joined the Strategy Section of OPD in July 1942.

Min, 103d mtg CCS, 23 Jul 43.
the JCS, AVALANCHE would have to be a calculated risk.

In the midst of these exchanges, Washington received the dramatic news of the fall of Benito Mussolini (25 July), and on the following day the JCS and the CCS met in special sessions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were more eager than ever for quick action to knock Italy out of the war. General Marshall now viewed the British proposal as "conservative and orthodox." As he saw it, the situation in the Mediterranean had become different from that envisaged at TRIDENT. Italian resistance was weak. The Allies already possessed Palermo. Allied casualties in Sicily, except for airborne troops, had been very light. As a result, he believed that more Allied forces would be available in the Mediterranean for offensive operations after HUSKY than had been thought possible. The operation against Naples as then conceived was no longer a "calculated risk." A timely operation against the mainland at Naples would greatly strengthen the hand of the new Italian Government in freeing itself from its German partner. In view of the developments during the previous twenty-four hours, it appeared to Marshall that late August, then considered the time when a "fleeting opportunity" to invade the Italian mainland would occur, was much too late. Observing that 60,000 men over and above the TRIDENT agreement would be available for post-HUSKY operations, the JCS adopted the same arguments before the CCS. To the British, the JCS voiced particular concern over the progress of preparations for operations in Burma. Current successes in the Mediterranean had, they asserted, by no means eliminated the need for the Burma operations already agreed upon.58

On 26 July the CCS agreed that General Eisenhower should plan to mount AVALANCHE as soon as possible with resources already available to him. Some carrier-borne air support, however, would be made available to him for that operation from British sources.54 Over and above the exceptions already made, the Americans remained reluctant to retreat from their original decision not to send reinforcements from the United States for AVALANCHE or any other post-HUSKY Mediterranean operation. Nor did they want the scheduled withdrawals from the Mediterranean for other operations interrupted. To make up for the weaknesses in long-range fighters for the AVALANCHE landings, the British themselves actually allotted four of their escort carriers and a light fleet carrier and gave General Eisenhower three of their bomber squadrons scheduled for early departure from the theater.55

On 26 July General Eisenhower, meeting with his staff in Tunis, ordered the preparation of two alternative plans for operations against the mainland of Italy: BUTTRESS (invasion of Calabria) and AVALANCHE. On 27 July he cabled the CCS that a decision as to which of these plans should be put into effect should be possible in a few days—as soon as the military significance of the recent politi-
cal changes in Italy had become sufficiently clear. On 28 July he informed the CCS that the availability of shipping and landing craft made the launching of a formal AVALANCHE by 9 September 1943 a definite possibility. To exploit the situation immediately in the event of a complete collapse of Italy, his staff was also preparing an ad hoc AVALANCHE of about one division. He emphasized the difficulty of the air problem in AVALANCHE—the lack of bases close enough to provide fighter cover for the initial assault and the need to neutralize enemy airpower and disrupt enemy lines of communication. He stressed the need for haste in HUSKY in order to secure the necessary airfields and a “reasonable bridgehead” in the BUTTRESS area and thereby prevent the Germans from transferring their reserves directly to the scene of a landing in AVALANCHE.

On 2 August General Eisenhower confirmed the fact that a lodgment would be required in the BUTTRESS area before a bold stroke such as AVALANCHE could be attempted. He had still to determine the exact character of the landing on the toe. The choice now lay between two planned operations—BUTTRESS and BAYTOWN (an operation across the Strait of Messina near Reggio) as the forerunner of AVALANCHE. While the final decision was to be postponed until the time of the next big Anglo-American conference, QUADRANT, the breaching of the Continent via the “soft underbelly” was close at hand.

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56 Bigot msg, Eisenhower to AGWAR for CCS and to USFOR for Br COS, 27 Jul 43, CM-IN 19362, NAF 300 (info copy OPD).
57 Bigot msg, CinC, Algiers to AGWAR for CCS and to USFOR for Br COS, 2 Aug 43, CM-IN 1142, NAF 307 (info copy OPD).
58 Bigot-Avalanche msg, CinC, Algiers to AGWAR for CCS and to USFOR for Br COS, 2 Aug 43, CM-IN 20257, NAF 303 (info copy OPD).
CHAPTER VIII

Crossroads in the European War

The period between TRIDENT and QUADRANT (from the end of May to mid-August 1943) saw the kindling of high hopes. It also brought discouragement and even despair to the Army planners. It was apparent that the question of how far to go in the Mediterranean was still very much alive. Assuming the collapse or surrender of Italy, what was to be the limit of the advance? When, where, and how was the Mediterranean drive to be cut off? Above all, could operations in the Mediterranean be prevented from drawing off precious resources and vital manpower from a cross-Channel operation in 1944? General Marshall had tried to solve the larger problem with his proposal for a Naples operation, but the expressed desire behind it—to get to Rome—on which both American and British staffs could agree in July, served only to highlight a divergence in views as to the reasons for getting there and whether to go further. Growing indications that the British and Americans had still not resolved their differences over European strategy made the Army planners increasingly uneasy and bore out the contention of General Marshall and his staff that the Allies were indeed at the “crossroads” in the war.

Search for the Formula Continued

The Americans and British looked at the role of operations in Italy in grand strategy through different spectacles. The Americans—including Stimson, Marshall, his staff, and the other Joint Chiefs—feared an entanglement in Italy that would compromise the cross-Channel assault. They wished a short Italian campaign with limited objectives—air bases to supplement the Combined Bomber Offensive against southern Germany, and enough action to tie down German strength. The additional air bases in Italy promised to offset the limitations of weather and distance inherent in air attacks from the United Kingdom and of increased German air defenses in north Germany, which had brought Eaker’s losses close to the danger point. To gain their end, the Allies need not and should not go much farther north than Rome. There must be no further diversions of forces or matériel to the Mediterranean that would interfere with mounting the cross-Channel operation. The Americans wanted Allied operations in the Mediterranean to be justified henceforth by their contributions to the success of the cross-Channel undertaking. The U.S. staff was fearful of the grim
prospect of a slow, costly march "up the leg" of Italy.

On the other hand, the British conception—urged by Churchill—was to press forcefully the campaign against Italy at the least to Rome, preferably as much farther north as possible. Then advantage should be taken of any opportunities that might be opened thereby in the Mediterranean and in southern Europe. The British argued that the success of the cross-Channel operation would thus be all the more certain.

To the Americans this presaged a drive up the boot and an invasion of the Continent from the south—in the direction of the Balkans, Greece, or possibly even southern France. Far from aiding the cross-Channel operation, the Americans feared, such an operation in Italy might actually supplant it. Certainly, the Prime Minister's penchant for the Mediterranean was well known. His interest in support of raids and guerrilla activities in the Balkans was not new to the Americans. More disturbing was the report filtering back to Washington that there was some strong support in British official circles—notable by Foreign Minister Anthony Eden—for invasions of Greece and the Balkans. Whether the Prime Minister was actually prepared to go so far is a moot point. What is less debatable is that he still appeared to have reservations about the projected 1944 cross-Channel operation. Stimson, in his talk with Churchill, was so disturbed when the Prime Minister launched into a "new attack" on ROUNDHAMMER—Churchill once again expressed his fears of a Channel full of Allied corpses—that, as Stimson reported to Washington, "we had it hammer and tongs."

The Americans were also concerned over the possibility of becoming heavily committed on the Iberian Peninsula. Leahy, for whom among the U.S. Chiefs the Iberian route appears to have had most appeal, has recorded that on 23 June the JCS and the President, with Hopkins present, took up the question of an invasion through Spain instead of across the Channel. This consideration grew out of the problem of providing a defense for Portugal should that country declare war on the Axis following an Allied occupation of the Azores. The British staff, as the U.S. military planners knew, was then planning for the occupation of the Azores, peacefully if possible, by force if necessary.

The Army strategic planners had long ago rejected the Iberian route as a feasible approach to bring Hitler to bay, but the question of aiding a prospective ally on the Iberian Peninsula was a more difficult one for them. In answer to a query from the President, General Marshall and his staff planners acknowledged that a peaceful occupation of the Azores would obligate the United States and Great Britain to furnish military assistance to Portugal in the event Portugal decided to join the Allies. At the

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1 The above summary is based mainly on: (1) tel convs, SW and Gen Marshall, 0905, 19 Jul 43, Paper 2, Book 11, Exec 9; (2) interv, Dr. Mathews and Majs Lamson and Hamilton with Gen Marshall, 25 Jul 49, OCMH files; (3) memo for rcd, 27 Jul 43, sub: Talk With Eisenhower, SW files, War Plans, 51; (4) incl to ltr, Stimson to Hopkins, 4 Aug 43, SW files, White House, 36; (5) SS 57/2, 22 Jul 43, title: United Nations Courses of Action in the Event of the Collapse of Italy, Tab SS 57/2, ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2—95 (7 Jan 43); (6) Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 35—36; (7) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 926; and (8) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 429—35.

2 Leahy, I Was There, pp. 165—66.

same time, Marshall advised the President that, for the moment at least, a Portuguese declaration of war should be discouraged. He strongly urged upon the President that "the British be given no opportunity [thereby] to get out of doing OVERLORD." Adhering to the desirability of the cross-Channel route, the President accepted the Army's cautious stand on embroilment on the Iberian Peninsula and so informed the Prime Minister at the close of June.

Wary as ever, the Washington Army planners continued the search for a formula to ensure the primacy of a major cross-Channel operation. Perhaps the most outspoken was General Wedemeyer, who wrote from the North African theater to General Handy in Washington, shortly before the opening of the Sicilian campaign:

Even though Husky is successful after a bitter struggle, we could never drive rampant up the boot, as the P. M. so dramatically depicts in his concept of our continued effort over here. However, if we do decide to continue operations directly against Italy, greatly increased resources than those now envisaged or available in the area, would be mandatory—to insure our position in the western Mediterranean and concurrently to provide sufficient punch in our blow against Italy proper. ROUNDHAMMER would be even more remote, in fact, maybe crossed off the books for 1944. If we could only convince our cousins that this European theater struggle will never be won by dispersing our forces around the perimeter of the Axis citadel. I lay in bed the past several nights trying to evolve an overall concept of winning the war in Europe—one that would stir the imagination and win the support of the P. M. if not that of his recalcitrant planners and chiefs of staff. There are three general approaches to the problem [cross-Channel, Mediterranean, air bombardment and blockade] and of course there could be various combinations and permutations of these.

The Mediterranean Alternative

Some Army planners soon began to question whether there might actually be any longer a complete freedom of choice among the three approaches. The gnawing doubts came to light during the early summer of 1943 as the War Department continued to study the course of Allied action for 1944-45. General Wedemeyer and members of his Strategy Section had taken the familiar Army position in favor of a cross-Channel operations, supported by Mediterranean operations limited to forces and resources already in the area. If exploitation of Mediterranean operations prevented the projected cross-Channel operation from being mounted in the spring of 1944 the Allies would, in the planners' opinion, have to decide whether to reverse the long-accepted strategic concept of beating Germany first. On 17 July—one
week after Husky was launched—General Hull, chief of the OPD Theater Group, striking a far less familiar note in Army planning, registered disagreement. He argued that current Allied success in the Mediterranean had to be exploited and that such a course of action could be accomplished only at the expense of the build-up in the United Kingdom, thereby materially affecting any possible cross-Channel operation for 1944. He declared "it is a case where you cannot have your cake and eat it." In his opinion, the decision lay not between Europe and the Pacific but between Mediterranean and cross-Channel operations. Pointing to the apparently inexorable necessity of sending more and more Allied forces to the Mediterranean, he reasoned that any further operations there would definitely commit the Allies to a main effort in that area.

General Hull had been a devoted supporter of the Bolero-Roundup plan from its inception in the spring of 1942 and even as late as the eve of Trident had taken a strong stand in favor of concentrating on all-out operations from the United Kingdom. What seemed to be a reversal in his views at this point was therefore all the more notable. That he was impelled by practical considerations following from the continued commitment of the "not unlimited" Allied resources to the Mediterranean rather than by a basic change in his strategic faith is suggested in his conclusion:

Although from the very beginning of this war, I have felt that the logical plan for the defeat of Germany was to strike at her across the channel by the most direct route, our commitments to the Mediterranean have led me to the belief that we should now reverse our decision and pour our resources into the exploitation of our Mediterranean operations . . . .

A decision as to how we conduct the war against Japan and against Germany should no longer be delayed . . . .

As to Germany, in my opinion, the decision should be an all-out effort in the Mediterranean.9

In effect, General Hull thus proposed to add a Mediterranean alternative to the familiar "Pacific Alternative" that Army planners and the JCS had advocated at various times since early 1942. General

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8 Memo, Hull for Handy, 17 Jul 43, no sub, with Tab SS 111 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 96–126/3 (7 Jan 43).
9 Ibid.
Hull's proposal sounded a discouraged note in the hope of fulfilling the basic tenet of Army wartime strategic faith—an early and decisive invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom. Taken in the context of the state of Allied strategic planning, his views of 17 July appear, in retrospect, less surprising. After almost a year and a half of discussions, the Allies had still not reached a firm agreement on a plan for cross-Channel operations. On the other hand, the strong pull to the Mediterranean appeared to confirm the oft-expressed fears of the Army planners that the inevitable result would be a major effort against Germany from the Mediterranean rather than from the United Kingdom.

In late July the same sense of frustration was seeping into the comments of other military planners. Col. Voris H. Conner, analyzing the costs of the failure to carry out the Bolero-Roundup concept, pointed to the fact that there was insufficient strength in either the Mediterranean or the United Kingdom for decisive action. Colonels Bessell and Richard C. Lindsay, the senior Army and Air members of the JWPC, reported on 25 July that the Allies had hitherto been "long on lip service but short on results." At successive conferences the Americans had been gradually led into a postponement of Roundup and acceptance of "a time-consuming strategy of pecking at the periphery of Europe." They felt that the United States had been "outmaneuvered" by the British at the conferences because British aims were clear-cut and understood by all their representatives. The British, Bessell and Lindsay continued, were more interested in the restoration of the "balance of power in Europe" in the postwar period than in the early defeat of Germany. They drew a sharp contrast between original plans and actual results in the build-up against Germany. When the Americans and British had first agreed upon Roundup, it had been estimated that the United States could have over a million men (17 divisions and 59 air groups) and 4,000 airplanes in the United Kingdom by April 1943. Actually, by 1 April 1943 the United States had in the United Kingdom only 109,137 troops (one division and 12 3/4 air groups) and 873 planes; even on 1 July there were only 185,532 men (one division and a little over 26 air groups) and 1,841 planes. In the meantime, by 1 July, the United States had built up a force of 520,087 troops (9 divisions, 39 air groups) and 4,087 planes in the Mediterranean area.

Bessell and Lindsay went on to recommend that the United States recognize that the main ground pressure against Germany had in the past been applied by the Soviet Union and that this would probably hold true in the future. The United States and Great Britain should continue to use their air and sea power

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9 Rpt of Bessell and Lindsay, 25 Jul 43, sub: Conduct of the War, with Tab SS 90 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2-95 (7 Jan 43). The figures cited in the Bessell-Lindsay report have been corrected. The figures mentioned above are based upon STM-30, 1 Jan 48, and AAF Statistical Digest, 1945.
against Germany and also continue to plan for an OVERLORD operation "which will take advantage of a marked deterioration in Germany ability to defend Western Europe." Bolero should continue, but without prejudice to the immediate Mediterranean objective—the elimination of Italy. In other words, Bessell and Lindsay concluded, Italy should be knocked out of the war first and then the cross-Channel operation should become the main U.S.-British effort. If the British would not agree to this, the United States should halt its contribution of forces to the Mediterranean, after Italy had been eliminated, and concentrate on defeating Japan.\(^{13}\)

That Bessell and Lindsay were tending to give the old "Pacific Alternative" a new Mediterranean twist became clearer the next day when they joined the Navy member of the JWPC in recommending an even stronger stand on future Mediterranean operations. Protesting that the Trident decision to transfer seven combat divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom was unsound, the JWPC recommended that the pressure in Italy against the Germans be maintained throughout the winter. Arguing that the Trident plans for an opportunistic invasion of northwest Europe were still valid, they nevertheless advised that the ground build-up in the United Kingdom should not be allowed to prejudice operations in Italy.\(^{14}\)

Admiral Cooke of the Joint Staff Plan-\(^{15}\)

\(^{13}\) Rpt of Bessell and Lindsay, 25 Jul 43, sub: Conduct of the War, with Tab SS 90 in ABC 581 SS Papers, Nos. 2–95 (7 Jan 43).

\(^{14}\) JPS 231, 26 Jul 43, title: Operations in the European-Mediterranean Area, 1943–44. JPS 231 was never presented formally to the JCS, but Marshall did receive a copy. See WDCSA 581, II.

\(^{15}\) Min, 89th mtg JPS, 4 Aug 43.
of hope stemmed from the development of the OVERLORD plan by General Morgan's combined planning staff (COS- SAC) in the United Kingdom.

Growing directly out of the TRIDENT decision to plan for a cross-Channel operation (ROUNDHAMMER), the outline plan for OVERLORD was completed by the COS- SAC staff in July and submitted for the consideration of the U.S. staff in Washington on 5 August—shortly before the QUADRANT Conference.

The OVERLORD plan was a culmination of British and American planning for early and decisive cross-Channel operations from the United Kingdom. The

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16 For General Morgan's summary of his directive from the CCS, see ltr, Gen Morgan, CoS to the Supreme Allied Commander (designate), Hq COSSAC, Norfolk House, for Secy Chiefs of Staff Committee, Office of the War Cabinet, 15 Jul 43, COSSAC (43) 26, Incl B to CCS 334, 10 Aug 43, title: Operation "OVERLORD"—Outline Plan, Official QUADRANT Conf Book.

17 JCS 442, 5 Aug 43, title: Operation "OVERLORD.

Various Washington Army planners in July and early August 1943 were kept abreast of the progress of the COSSAC planners in evolving the OVERLORD plan before the plan was actually submitted for the consideration of the JCS on 5 August: (1) Col. Edward H. McDaniel of OPD, a member of the Red Team of the JWPC, evidently had the opportunity of discussing the planning for OVERLORD with General Morgan's staff during the visit of the Red Team to the United Kingdom in July. See msg, Br JPS, London, to U.S. JPS, Washington, 2 Jul 43, Red 283, with JCS 291/1 in ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), 1-A. (2) On 26 July, General Wedemeyer learned that the British Chiefs of Staff were then studying General Morgan's outline plan, which they had received shortly before. Pers memo, Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones, Office of War Cabinet, for General Wedemeyer, 26 Jul 43, with CCS 268/3 in ABC 384 Post HUSKY (14 May 1943), I. (3) In early August, Col. G. A. Lincoln of OPD received a report of the views of Maj. Gen. Ray W. Barker, an American member of General Morgan's staff, expressed at a conference with military leaders in Washington, shortly after General Barker's return from the United Kingdom. See [OPD] memo for Col Lincoln [about 4 Aug 43], no sub, with JCS 442 in ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), 1-A.
ment area, the COSSAC planners decided, would have to contain sufficient port facilities to maintain a force of some twenty-six to thirty divisions as well as follow-up shipments from the United States and elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of three to five divisions per month, the number allocated for planning purposes at TRIDENT. The planners accepted the beaches in the Caen area of Normandy as the most suitable for the initial assault and proposed to expand the lodgment first by seizing the port of Cherbourg on the Cotentin Peninsula, next the ports of the Brittany Peninsula and Nantes, and then building up forces and supplies for the final advance eastward. The Caen area was defined as the sector between the River Orne and the base of the Cotentin Peninsula and was partly selected on the grounds that the sector was weakly held, the defenses were relatively light, and the beaches were of good capacity and sheltered from the prevailing winds. The terrain inland was suitable, the COSSAC planners believed, for airfield development and consolidation of the initial bridgehead, and unsuitable for counteraction by panzer divisions. Enemy air opposition directed at the Caen area, moreover, could only be made at the expense of the air defense of the approaches to Germany, and enemy airfields in range of Caen were limited. On the other hand, the COSSAC planners noted that the Caen area was distant from the Allied bases and that time would elapse before a major port could be captured and put into operation. The planners therefore sought to offset these disadvantages by incorporating the principles of concentration and tactical surprise and by improvising means to insure adequate maintenance over the beaches.

The OVERLORD plan divided the cross-Channel operation into a number of phases: "the preliminary," "the preparatory," "the assault," "the follow-up and build-up," and "further developments after capture of Cherbourg." In the preliminary phase, which was to begin immediately, German resistance was to be softened by propaganda and sabotage and by air action to reduce German air forces on the Western Front, to destroy progressively the German economic system, and to undermine German morale. In this stage, diversionary operations against Pas-de-Calais and the Mediterranean coast of France were planned in order to keep as many German forces from the Caen area as possible.

In the preparatory phase, Allied air forces were to intensify their attacks on German communications so as to isolate further the Caen area from reinforcements by the enemy forces. At the same time, three naval assault forces were to be loaded at ports along the south coast of England, and two follow-up forces were to be loaded elsewhere—one in the Thames estuary and one on the west coast of England. In the assault phase, after a very short air bombardment, the Allies were to land three divisions plus two tank regiments and a regimental combat team simultaneously on the Caen beaches, and airborne troops were to seize the town of Caen. Subsequently, in the follow-up and build-up phase the Allies, directing their action southward and southwestward, were to pivot into the Cotentin Peninsula and drive toward Cherbourg, and at the same time make a thrust southeast of Caen to deepen the bridgehead.
COSSAC planners envisaged the capture of Cherbourg by D plus 14. By that date eighteen divisions were to be ashore and some twenty-eight to thirty-three squadrons of aircraft in operation from airfields in the captured area. They expressed the belief that after the fall of Cherbourg the Germans would probably withdraw to defend the Seine–Paris–Loire line and that it would probably be most profitable for the Allies, under cover of operations against Chartres, Orléans, and Tours, to seize the Breton ports and Nantes in order to build up sufficient strength before trying to force the passage of the Seine. This action would secure enough major ports to maintain at least thirty divisions. As soon as the line of communications permitted and sufficient air forces had been established in France, operations would be begun to force the line of the Seine and to capture Paris and the Seine ports.

In their analysis of the main limiting factors likely to determine the success of the OVERLORD operations, the COSSAC planners emphasized such considerations as control of the air, the number of divisions the enemy could make available for counterattack in the Caen area, availability of landing ships and craft and transport aircraft, and the capacity of the beaches and ports in the sector. To have a reasonable chance of success, the operation would require the reduction of overall German fighter strength and the prevention of German air reinforcements from arriving in the early stages of the operation. It would be particularly necessary to reduce the total strength of the German fighter force between the current time (summer of 1943) and the date of the operation by the destruction of the sources of supplies, by initiating air battles, and by disorganizing the German air forces’ installations and control system in the Caen area immediately before the assault.

Apart from the establishment of a favorable air situation—the “overriding factor” for the success of the plan—the COSSAC planners held that the practicability of the plan depended principally on the number, availability, and strength of the German divisions present in France and the Low Countries in comparison with Allied capabilities. The number of German offensive reserve forces available on D Day in France and the Low Countries as a whole, excluding divisions holding the coast and training divisions, must not exceed twelve full-strength, first-rate divisions. In addition, the Germans must not be able to transfer more than fifteen first-rate divisions from the USSR by D plus 60. The Allies would have to make every effort during the preliminary period, therefore, to scatter and divert the German ground forces, lower their fighting efficiency, and disrupt their communications.

Since there was no port of any appreciable capacity in the Caen sector, Allied logistical support would have to be landed largely over the beaches until the port of Cherbourg was captured and opened. Maintenance would arrive over the beaches for as much as three months for some units. Artificial means would have to be devised to provide sheltered waters, and special equipment and facilities would be required to prevent craft from being damaged during this period. Landing craft and ships were available, the COSSAC planners noted, to lift three assault and two follow-up divisions without “overhead.” While beaches in the
Caen area would preclude landing more than the three assault and two follow-up divisions envisaged for the initial land operation, an additional 10 percent in landing ships and craft would be highly desirable. Though over two airborne divisions would be available, it would be possible for the United States and United Kingdom to lift only two thirds of one airborne division simultaneously on the basis of current forecasts of available transport aircraft. Also, the COS-SAC planners suggested that administrative control of the operation would be greatly simplified if the principle were accepted that the U.S. forces would normally be located on the right of the line and the British and Canadian forces on the left.18

The assumptions, emphases, and conclusions in the COSSAC OVERLORD plan of the summer of 1943, differing from those contained in War Department BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan of the spring of 1942, reflected in part a refinement of detail in specific proposals. More important, they reflected fundamental changes in the general Allied strategic situation in the war, new knowledge of Allied capabilities in combat and of the possibilities and requirements of amphibious and aerial warfare, and limitations imposed and opportunities offered by the course of action upon which the United States and United Kingdom had embarked in the Mediterranean in late 1942 and continued in 1943.

The War Department BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan had been born in a period when the Allies were still reeling under the weight of Axis blows and seeking to parcel out their limited resources in piecemeal defensive deployments all over the globe. There were grave doubts that the USSR would be able, without help, to continue to withstand the German attack. The Army planners had sought to embody in their plan the concept of concentrating Allied forces for a major combined offensive in which the United States and Great Britain, from the United Kingdom in the west, and the USSR, from the east, could employ their forces to crush Germany between them on the continent of Europe. They sought thereby to afford maximum support to the USSR and at the same time to utilize the United Kingdom—representing in their view an ideal base logistically—as the springboard for an Anglo-American attack on northwest France. In the spring of 1942 they had argued for the concept, furthermore, on the ground that it would provide the basic decision necessary for directing all U.S. production and allocation, training, and troop movements toward a single goal, and would also make veterans of U.S. air and ground forces untested as yet in major combat operations.

The OVERLORD plan, on the other hand, was conditioned by the fact that the British and U.S. Governments had decided in July 1942 to seize the initiative in North Africa and were successfully continuing the offensive in the Mediterranean upon which they had embarked in the Torch operation in November 1942. Thus the COSSAC plan-

18 JCS 442, 5 Aug 43, title: Operation "OVERLORD." A full discussion of the OVERLORD plan from its inception through the landings in Normandy is contained in Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack. See also: (1) Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan, Overture to Overlord (New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1950); (2) Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954); and (3) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I.
ners had to take into account limitations in forces and resources imposed by previous instructions and decisions of the Allied high command. The estimated maximum of thirty divisions likely to be available in the United Kingdom for an invasion of the Continent by 1 May 1944 was considerably less than the anticipated employment of forty-eight divisions in the ROUNDUP plan for a main attack in the spring of 1943. By the same token, however, the successful action of the United States and Great Britain in the Mediterranean offered the opportunity, the COSSAC planners pointed out in the OVERLORD plan, for "diversionary operations" against the "Mediterranean coast of France" to create conditions favorable for the cross-Channel undertaking.19

The OVERLORD plan, moreover, prepared in a period when the USSR was demonstrating its ability to withstand the German blows, omitted the emergency phase of the BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan designed in part to keep the USSR in the war. BOLERO-ROUNDUP had stressed the necessity of air preparations and adequate air superiority to insure the success of the ground operation and had outlined an air-ground cross-Channel undertaking in general terms. For OVERLORD, the COSSAC planners were able to draw upon the greater knowledge of and experience with airpower as a tactical and strategic weapon accumulated by the British and Americans since the spring of 1942. In particular, the COSSAC planners were able to weave into OVERLORD the objectives of the Combined Bomber Offensive program, which, in terms of its relationship to the

cross-Channel operation, had been defined in concrete phases and accepted by the CCS at TRIDENT.

The BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan had affirmed that the bottlenecks for ROUNDUP would be shipping and landing craft. The COSSAC planners in OVERLORD also recognized that shipping and landing craft would be limiting factors in determining the success of the operation. Indeed, their plan reflected a reduction in the scope of the assault, in accord with the availability of assault shipping to be expected. Looking ahead to the assault, it appeared to the COSSAC planners all the more important to begin to reduce German fighter strength drastically. This condition "above all others," they asserted, would indicate the date on which the amphibious operation would be launched.20

The War Department BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan and the COSSAC OVERLORD plan each envisaged that, to insure success, the USSR would still have to continue to engage the bulk of the German forces. But OVERLORD more cautiously set specific conditions as to the availability and strength of German divisions, those in France and those withdrawn from the Soviet front, that might be brought to bear against the landings in France. Both plans recognized that ports must early be provided and maintained for the forces in the amphibious operation. The COSSAC planners, drawing upon the experience of the United States and Great Britain in improvising means of maintenance over the beaches in amphibious operations in the Pacific and the Mediterranean, stressed the similar need and expressed confidence in the ability of the Allies to

19 JCS 442, 5 Aug 43, title: Operation "OVERLORD."

20 JCS 442, 5 Aug 43, title: Operation "OVERLORD."
fulfill it for the initial landings in OVERLORD. In selecting the objective for ROUNDUP, the War Department planners had merely called for the first landing to take place somewhere within the area between Le Havre and Boulogne. The COSSAC planners chose specifically the Caen sector, which is further west, in order to capitalize especially on the advantages of tactical surprise and of concentration of force in an area that might successfully be isolated from Axis counterattack. The provision of separate geographic sectors on the fighting front contemplated in OVERLORD, on the other hand, reaffirmed the principle advocated by War Department planners in the spring of 1942 of maintaining a territorial division between the ground forces of the United Kingdom and those of the United States in cross-Channel operations from the United Kingdom.

In early August, General Marshall and his planning assistants, as well as other members of the American staff, began to explore OVERLORD’s feasibility. In the course of the discussions by the JCS on 6 August, General Marshall asked General Wedemeyer, who had just returned from Sicily, to evaluate the practicability of the OVERLORD operation in the light of his experience with landing operations in HUSKY. General Wedemeyer replied that he was “very optimistic,” especially in view of the U.S. Navy’s efficient handling of its tasks in HUSKY. Difficulties pointed out by Admiral Cooke concerning maintenance over the beaches could, he believed, be surmounted in OVERLORD. While General Wedemeyer affirmed that the OVERLORD plan was “feasible and workable,” he shared Admiral Cooke’s concern about the shortage of landing craft as the most serious bottleneck. In any event, if OVERLORD were actually to be executed, General Wedemeyer concluded, the CCS would have to reach a firm decision on the operation at QUADRANT.

General Marshall also took the occasion to put a series of detailed questions to Maj. Gen. Ray W. Barker, a U.S. member of General Morgan’s staff, who had recently returned to the United States. In the process he asked for Barker’s frank opinion of the British attitude toward OVERLORD. General Barker replied that soldiers of all ranks, up to and including General Morgan and General Sir Bernard Paget (commander of the 21 Army Group), were “100 percent favorable toward OVERLORD.” However, when the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and others came under the “sun lamp” of the Prime Minister, the latter’s attitude was reflected, and everyone knew that the Prime Minister was “always looking into the Mediterranean and especially into the Aegean.” General Marshall observed that General Handy had differentiated the two basic alternatives well in remarking that in the Mediterranean political consequences were the goal, whereas OVERLORD was an aggressive offensive action that would accomplish military results by itself from its inception.

Further preliminary examination on the Army and joint planning levels bore out the impressions of General Wedemeyer.

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For General Marshall’s questions to General Barker on the feasibility of OVERLORD, see min, 100th mtg JCS, 6 Aug 43.

Min, 100th mtg JCS, 6 Aug 50.
meyer that the limitations set forth in the plan were serious but not prohibitive, and that the plan was soundly conceived. In the strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe, approved by the JCS on 9 August for presentation at Quadrant, Overlord was accepted as the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort in Europe.

While American planners and the JCS recognized that, at the Quadrant Conference, thorny questions on the priority of forces and resources for Overlord would have to be threshed out and the general problem of the relation of Overlord to operations in the Mediterranean and in other theaters would have to be resolved, the JCS prepared in early August to throw its weight behind the new plan for an invasion of western Europe. A significant stage had thus been reached in the long campaign that had been waged by U.S. military leaders since General Marshall had taken the War Department Bolero-Roundup plan to London in April 1942. At hand now was a new composite planning product neither wholly American nor wholly British in conception—an effort to harness American drive and singleness of purpose to the British sense of realism and caution in order to defeat Germany.

"Combinations and Permutations"

For the Americans to agree on Overlord was one thing. To win firm British acceptance and carry it out was another. The urge to continue momentum in the Mediterranean must somehow be reconciled with the demand for the cross-Channel operation. Realism demanded compromises in the form of "combinations and permutations." That the American planners were thinking more and more in terms of this and that operation was reflected in the discussion and debate in late July and early August over the strategic pattern of operations in the war against Germany to be upheld by the JCS at the next conference.

There were still differences among the American planners—and their chiefs—on such questions as the specific geographical objectives and requirements of subsequent Mediterranean operations, but by and large they agreed that future Mediterranean operations must primarily create conditions favorable to Overlord. On 25 July General Marshall had summed up for the President the basic U.S. military objections to current British strategy in the European war. According to Marshall, the Prime Minister's strategic concept was based on the speculation that a political and economic collapse could be brought about in the occupied countries, especially in the Balkans. If that speculation proved to be faulty the Allies would be committed to a long, drawn-out struggle of blockade and attrition in Europe. The American people, in Marshall's opinion, would not tolerate U.S. participation in such a long war with the bulk of U.S. resources; they would in-

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23 (1) OPD brief, title: Notes . . . 100th mtg JCS, 6 Aug 43, Operation "Overlord" (JCS 442), with JCS 442 in ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), 1-A. (2) Min, 94th mtg JPS, 12 Aug 43. (3) JPS 253, 13 Aug 43, title: Comments on COSSAC Outline Plan for Operation Overlord and CCS 304 (Covering Note of the Br COS). (4) Memo, Secy JPS for Gen Wedemeyer, Adm Cooke, and Gen Kuter, 15 Aug 43, sub: Comments on COSSAC Outline Plan for Operation Overlord and CCS 304, with JPS 253 in ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), 1-A.


25 Ltr, Wedemeyer to Handy cited n. 6.
the Mediterranean, where difficulties of logistics and terrain precluded decisive operations against Germany. They still put their faith in the cross-Channel operation and the Combined Bomber Offensive for an early and decisive victory over Germany. This JCS decision put an end to the short-lived flurry of late July and early August in the planning ranks in behalf of the Mediterranean.

The JCS also set forth a general pattern of Mediterranean operations for 1943-44, dividing it into three main phases: (1) the elimination of Italy from the war and the establishment of air bases as far north as the Rome area, and, if feasible, including the Ancona area; (2) capture of Sardinia and Corsica; and (3) eventual entry of Anglo-American forces and the bulk of the re-equipped French forces into southern France. The last phase was in accord with the current belief of Army and joint planners that an operation against southern France could be launched as a diversionary undertaking to OVERLORD in the spring of 1944. The JCS did not then go so far as to endorse the strategic objective, currently advanced by the JWPC, of merging these two fronts—a proposal termed by OPD’s Strategy Section planners as “undoubtedly sound.”

The caution of the other members of the JCS toward Admiral Leahy’s suggestion of utilizing southern France, in the event of the collapse or occupation of Italy, as a steppingstone by the Allied forces from the Mediterranean to a penetration northward into France and then...
into Germany was currently shared by General Marshall, who was especially concerned lest the Germans seize the opportunity to move into Spain and gain control of the Strait of Gibraltar.  

The JCS also registered the familiar objections to large-scale offensives in the Balkans. The JCS, like their planners, wanted to limit operations in the Balkans to supplying the guerrillas by air and sea and to bombing Ploesti and other strategic objectives from Italian bases.

Even more significantly, the JCS undertook to spell out the relationships between operations in the two areas in respect to resources. Operations in the Mediterranean were, in general, to be limited to means already available in the area, as envisaged at Trident. No change was to be made in the Trident decision to move seven divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom—a transfer strongly endorsed by General Wedemeyer. Above all, to ensure the primacy of Overlord, the JCS accepted General McNarney’s proposal that between Overlord and operations in the Mediterranean—in the event of a shortage of means—Overlord was to be given “an overriding priority.”

Army Planners’ Interpretation of Choices

At the same time that the JCS were reaching agreement on the pattern of operations they proposed to support at Quadrant, the Army planners concluded for the Chief of Staff their interpretation of the basic choices in the war in Europe confronting the American delegation. Their conclusions were forwarded to each U.S. officer delegated to attend the conference, as well as to the President.  

Looking back, on the eve of the conference, the Army planners emphasized the disparity between Anglo-American agreements and performances over the preceding year and a half. The two countries had maintained verbal adherence to the decision that the main effort against Germany was to be a cross-Channel operation and that forces and means were to be assembled in the United Kingdom for that purpose, but in practice they had not followed out the decision. The failure to concentrate forces in the United Kingdom had resulted in a net decrease of U.S. strength and resources that could have been gathered for action against the enemy.

The shift from Bolero to Torch, the planners also stressed, had been attended

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29 For versions of the drafts, which differed slightly from each other, prepared by OPD for submission to the Chief of Staff, see: (1) memo [evidently by SS OPD] for CoS, 7 Aug 43, sub: Conduct of the War in Europe, with Paper 43 in ABC 381 (9-25-43), VII; (2) SS 90, 8 Aug 43, title: Conduct of the War in Europe, Tab SS 90, ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2-95 (7 Jan 43) (SS 90 is preceded by an informal, unsigned note stating that SS 90 represents “in general, U.S. views concerning strategy in Europe—an interpretation based on current JCS papers and minutes.”); (3) for the distribution of SS 90 to all U.S. officers who attended Quadrant, see pencilled notation on copy of SS 90, 8 Aug 43, title: Conduct of the War in Europe, Item 51, Exec 10 (this version, which incorporated SS 90 with slight additions, was taken by Handy to the Quadrant Conference); (4) a copy of SS 90 was forwarded to the President (memo for President, 8 Aug 43, in Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library).
by haste, waste, and confusion. Programs for production, training, and equipment had been disrupted; schedules for deployment and shipping upset. Cargo lift had been lost as a result of the transshipment of supplies through the United Kingdom. U.S. units had been moved great distances into staging areas and then not sent overseas because of sudden changes in plans. The net result was the existence of two limited forces facing the Axis in widely separated areas and the failure to concentrate sufficient strength to insure early and final victory over the Western Axis.\(^{32}\)

The Army planners disclaimed any desire to belittle the achievements of TORCH. They acknowledged that TORCH had brought "great results." The Mediterranean had been opened, Italy was hanging in the balance, southern and eastern Germany faced the threat of air attack, and the highly important Ploesti oil fields had been bombed. The planners also acknowledged that any appraisal of the results that would have occurred had BOLERO been carried out was purely speculative. But, they reasoned, the direct action envisaged in BOLERO-ROUNDUP represented the one chance to end the war in Europe in 1943. In their opinion, the Mediterranean was not the proper area in which to seek a military showdown with Germany. If Allied airpower could be based far enough north in Italy to bomb southern Germany, all the major military gains that could be won from the North African operation would have been achieved.\(^{33}\)

The Army planners concluded that the United States and Great Britain had reached the "crossroads in the war."\(^{34}\) If the practice of dispersing resources were continued, the war might develop into a stalemate. To secure final victory as soon as possible, the United States and United Kingdom would have to decide on a main effort, adhere to it firmly, concentrate forces, and assign to all other undertakings subsidiary missions. The two governments would have to choose between undertaking a decisive effort from the Mediterranean and launching a decisive main effort across the Channel.

The Army planners opposed the allocation of additional forces to the Mediterranean on the ground that the Mediterranean would afford an opportunity neither for decisive military action against the German citadel, nor for greatly relieving the pressure on the USSR. The nature of the terrain and communications systems in the Mediterranean would keep the United States and United Kingdom from effectively deploying a large ground force in combat. It would enable the Germans to take countermeasures in areas bordering the Mediterranean with relatively few forces. The area of operations in the Mediterranean was too distant from major Allied bases, especially for supporting a large-scale amphibious undertaking. The quantity and effectiveness of help or opposition to be expected from the Balkan peoples could not be predicted with accuracy. Operations in the Mediterranean would not contribute to the de-
feat of German submarines and would not compel Germany to expose its air force to the great losses incurred in a defense against a decisive Anglo-American ground-air offensive. Assigning more troops and resources to the Mediterranean would therefore actually help Germany achieve a "strategic stalemate" in Europe.

A cross-Channel offensive, on the other hand, would contribute directly toward final victory over the Axis forces. The United Kingdom was the only available base capable of sustaining a concentrated air-sea-ground attack against the German forces. Such action would lead to the destruction or capture of the most important German submarine bases and would result in the reduction of the German Air Force. It would bring the Anglo-American forces into direct contact with the German Army in an area where air and ground forces could be used "effectively and decisively." Germany would then have to choose between a retreat, which would permit the assault forces to capture strategic land areas, and the transfer of divisions from the Eastern Front and other areas. Such transfers would quickly lead to breaking German defenses and complete Allied victory.

The planners asserted that an expansion of operations in the Mediterranean was consistent with a course of action that would cause the USSR and Germany to annihilate each other, while the United States and the United Kingdom wrecked the internal support of the German war machine by raids, limited operations, sabotage, and strategic bombardment. The Mediterranean area offered an opportunity to gamble for a victory to be won primarily through "psychological and political pressure." Military action would not be the decisive factor, they maintained, if the Mediterranean course were adopted.

On the other side of the argument, the planners emphasized, a cross-Channel operation was based on the assumption that Germany could not be defeated unless the maximum military power of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR were concentrated against the German Army. The purpose of that concentration was to defeat the German Army by a co-ordinated air-ground offensive across the Channel and from the Eastern Front. Military action, rather than political and psychological pressure, would determine the ultimate success or failure of a cross-Channel operation. The Army planners doubted whether the Soviet Army, even aided by the indirect support of strategic bombardment, would be able to destroy the fighting power of the Axis forces without the help of a major Anglo-American air-

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35 Ibid. See also memo [evidently by SS OPD] for CoS, 7 Aug 43, sub: Conduct of the War in Europe, with Paper 45 in ABC 881 (9-25-41), VII. In this version of the memorandum specific goals beyond which subsequent Mediterranean operations should not go were outlined. The planners affirmed that a continuation of major ground operations in the Mediterranean beyond the occupation of bases in Italy and the Italian islands would be "uneconomical." They asserted that the point at which objectives of Mediterranean operations would no longer justify the diversion of resources from the U.K. build-up would be reached when bases in Italy required by the United Nations for maximum air offensives and for diversionary attacks in support of OVERLORD had been captured and occupied. These specific statements on the limits of subsequent Mediterranean operations were omitted from the 8 August version of the memorandum on "Conduct of the War in Europe."

36 SS 90, 8 Aug 43, title: Conduct of the War in Europe, Tab SS 90, ABC 881 SS Papers, Nos. 2-95 (7 Jan 43).
ground operation. The soundest course of action, the Army planners therefore affirmed, was for the United States and Great Britain to assemble air and ground forces in the United Kingdom for a cross-Channel invasion of the Continent.\(^{37}\)

**Strategy, Production, and Manpower**

That the Army planners should show great concern by the summer of 1943 regarding the need for a firm Allied decision was not too surprising. The whole question of quantitative requirements—in manpower and production—for bringing the war to a successful conclusion was involved. In particular, the size and kind of U.S. army to be mobilized and deployed were at stake.

The period of retrenchment and economy in early 1943 produced a more cautious attitude on the part of the Army in regard to manpower.\(^{38}\) Even as the TRIDENT Conference was reaching its conclusion in late May, a deepening realization that careful examination of troop strength and its employment was a "must" led the Army to try to correlate the military program with the requirements stemming from the conference decisions. At this point General Marshall and his assistants took what proved to be an important step in calculating the wartime Army troop basis. A special committee was appointed in the War Department General Staff to study the current military program carefully in an effort to revise it downward. The Committee on the Revision of the Military Program, as it was called, was composed of two OPD officers, Col. Ray T. Maddocks and Lt. Col. Marshall S. Carter, and Col. Edwin W. Chamberlain of G-3, and was to examine the threat of overmobilization and investigate the possibility of decreasing the total number of ground divisions required in the troop basis.\(^{39}\) It was anticipated that the findings of the committee would serve as a guide for determining the ultimate strength of the Army and the subsequent mobilization rate.

Early in June 1943 the committee—informally called the Maddocks Committee since Colonel Maddocks was the steering member—issued its general report.\(^{40}\) Its studies confirmed the need for reducing the number of divisions—a view that had been gaining support since the end of 1942. The strategic basis for that conclusion was in part the demonstration by the Soviet armies of their ability to check the German advance. This development finally made obsolete the initial Victory Program estimates of 1941, which had been based on the assumption that the United States and Great Britain might have to defeat the

\(^{37}\) Ibid.

\(^{38}\) For the earlier discussion of manpower, see Ch. V, above.

\(^{39}\) (1) Memo, Col Woolnough for Col Otto L. Nelson, Jr., 21 May 43, sub: Troop Basis for All Services for 1944 and Beyond (JCS 154/3), OPD 320.2, 819. (2) Memo, McNarney for Maddocks, Chamberlain, and Carter, 24 May 43, sub: Revision of Current Military Program, filed with Tab G with rpt by Sp Army Committee, 15 Mar 43, in ABC 400 (2-20-43). Colonels Chamberlain and Carter had been serving on a joint subcommittee appointed at the beginning of the year to work on the long-range troop basis (JCS 154 series). Colonel Maddocks had been serving as the Army planner's deputy in JPS and as the senior Army member of Joint U.S. Strategic Committee.

\(^{40}\) Interim rpt by Sp Army Committee, 1 Jun 43, title: Revision of Current Military Program, submitted with memo, Maddocks, Chamberlain, and Carter for CoS, 1 Jun 43, sub: Revision of Current Military Program, ABC 400 (2-20-43).
huge armies of Germany and its allies unaided. Another significant factor brightening the strategic picture was the improving prospect of gaining air superiority over the Continent.

The committee made three basic recommendations. First, it proposed the reduction of the strength of the Army authorized for 1943 from 8,248,000 to 7,657,000. Second, it called for a modification of the current troop basis in order to provide a balanced force built around eighty-eight divisions, the number already activated. The twelve additional divisions scheduled for activation during the remainder of 1943 were to be deleted from the 1943 program. Third, it recommended that the ultimate size of the Army and of the major units in it (air and ground) should be decided at the end of the summer. The ultimate size of the Army would largely depend on the course of Soviet-German fighting and the effectiveness of the combined British-American bomber offensive in Europe. The committee made two corollary proposals: that once the ultimate size of the Army was determined, a "firm and final troop basis should be worked out" to "support operations directed by the TRIDENT Conference, and . . . insure a sufficient reserve to exploit any success or to meet any changes in the situation"; and that the units provided in this final troop basis should be allocated to theaters and to the general reserve, and organized, trained, and equipped accordingly.

If the outcome of the fighting on the Eastern Front and of the Combined Bomber Offensive were favorable, the committee believed that an ultimate strength of one hundred divisions would be necessary to win the war. To defeat Germany would require between sixty and seventy divisions and from thirty to forty divisions would be needed for operations against Japan and for a strategic reserve. After the downfall of Germany, some divisions could be transferred from Europe to the Pacific.

In the meantime, the committee suggested that the mobilization rate be slowed down and the target date for reaching the 8,248,000 goal be deferred. Current estimates indicated that of the 88 divisions activated by 1 September 1943, eighty-one would be trained by 1 October 1944, but only fifty would be deployed overseas by that time. A reserve of thirty-one trained and seven partially trained divisions was considered to be adequate for emergencies during 1944. This would help to ease the pressure at the time the manpower shortage was expected to be most acute. Final decision on the strength required for 1944 could be made in September 1943. The committee noted that, while the increase in the Army troop basis for 1944 would amount to less than 0.5 percent, the Navy planned an expansion of over 45 percent.

Before completing its work, the committee proposed several "subsidiary tasks" that would have to be carried out to achieve maximum economy in personnel. It suggested organizational changes within the Army and modifications in accepted missions of the Services. The changes and modifications were expected to eliminate waste, duplication, and unproductive activities, and to make...
the Army's slice of the manpower pie go as far as possible.\footnote{In June 1943, soon after the completion of its work, the Maddocks Committee was dissolved. Besides submitting its general report of 1 June for an orderly program of mobilization and deployment, the committee submitted several special studies, including one on proposed changes in War Department organization. Agreement on the respective missions and jurisdiction of the Services—intimately bound up with questions of organization—proved to be difficult, and the whole question was deferred for solution until after the close of hostilities. For the committee's studies and recommendations, see especially papers filed in OPD 320.2 and in ABC 400 (2-20-43). For a brief discussion of the wartime disagreements over service roles, missions, and organization, see Ray S. Cline and Maurice Matloff, "Development of War Department Views on Unification," in \textit{Military Affairs} (Summer 1949), XIII, No. 2, 65–74.}

In mid-June General Marshall and the Secretary of War approved the committee's general report.\footnote{Interim rpt by Sp Army Committee, 1 Jun 43, title: Revision of Current Military Program, filed in ABC 400 (2-20–43) contains General Marshall's recommendations. An attached "Brief" of the report, 7 Jun 43, bears the note: "This paper has the approval of the Secretary of War. 6/15/43 G. C. M."} At an off-the-record conference the Chief of Staff informed the press that the activation of twelve additional divisions would be deferred until 1944. Lest this news lead the American public to overconfidence and a relaxation of the war effort and, obversely, lest the enemy conclude that the reduction signified that the United States was unable to fulfill its mobilization schedule, he requested that the information be kept in confidence.\footnote{History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MS, Sec. IIC, Mobilization and Demobilization of Military Manpower, Ch. VII, "Planning and Troop Basis for All Services for 1944 and Beyond," by Maj William M. Moody.}

On 1 July the War Department circulated a new, approved Troop Basis for 1943. In accord with the committee's recommendations, it provided for 88 divisions and an Army strength of about 7,700,000.

Two provisional light divisions, which were also authorized, soon were given permanent status. As a result, the new troop basis for 1943 envisaged a "90-division Army."

The effects of the Army economy drive, which Marshall had predicted might produce considerable reductions in manpower during 1943, permitted the 8,248,000 goal to be cut back to 7,686,000 in July 1943.\footnote{History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MS, Sec. IIC, Mobilization and Demobilization of Military Manpower, Ch. VII, "Planning and Troop Basis for All Services for 1944 and Beyond," by Maj William M. Moody.} Further efforts were made by General Gasser to trim continental defense forces, but his proposal to abolish the defense commands and turn over coastal defense duties to the Coast Guard met opposition from OPD. Some reductions could be made, General Handy thought, but the basic purpose of the defense command was still sound.\footnote{History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MS, Sec. IIC, Mobilization and Demobilization of Military Manpower, Ch. VII, "Planning and Troop Basis for All Services for 1944 and Beyond," by Maj William M. Moody.}

The Ground Forces' Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair supported efforts to economize on service troops in the zone of interior and in wartime theaters in order to provide a larger ratio of offensive combat troops.\footnote{History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MS, Sec. IIC, Mobilization and Demobilization of Military Manpower, Ch. VII, "Planning and Troop Basis for All Services for 1944 and Beyond," by Maj William M. Moody.} During this period of Army curtailment the Navy, in order to man new construction, was still expanding. For this reason, Marshall concurred in the Navy troop basis of 2,092,960 for 1943.\footnote{History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MS, Sec. IIC, Mobilization and Demobilization of Military Manpower, Ch. VII, "Planning and Troop Basis for All Services for 1944 and Beyond," by Maj William M. Moody.}

The pressures that had forced the War
Department to resurvey its manpower program in turn necessitated a review of its procurement requirements. Cutting back the size of the Army and reorienting the strategy for the offensive, which entailed a corresponding shift in the kind of army needed, made this imperative. Procurement had been related to strategy through the Victory Program prepared by the Operations Division in coordination with other staff agencies. G-3 had set up the mobilization schedule for troops and from time to time modified it in conjunction with transportation and maintenance prospects. Changes in the mobilization schedule and in the Victory Program Troop Basis were also made to meet deployment shifts approved by the Joint Chiefs. The actual translation of the requirements into production schedules that would meet the demands established by the Victory Program was carried out by the Army Service Forces.

Suggestions received from the Bureau of the Budget and the Office of Economic Stabilization that a high-level unit be set up to investigate the procurement and supply programs led Marshall in early July to establish the War Department Procurement Review Board under the chairmanship of Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy (Retired). There was a definite feeling among Army leaders that this inquiry had been instigated by civilian pressures to secure a greater proportion of raw materials for civilian use and that the President and War Mobilization Director James F. Byrnes had bowed to this demand. The board set to work to survey the existing procurement plans and to bring production rates into line with troop activations and the capabilities of overseas transport. It soon offered a number of practical suggestions for bringing programs and requirements into balance and effecting savings in the use of men and materials.

Out of the uncertainties over strategy, manpower, and production prevalent in early 1943 emerged some definite patterns that were to set the tone and scope of subsequent Army planning. But there was still no fully defined and accepted Allied theory of the relationship among strategy, production, and manpower. The possible limits of each had appeared susceptible to considerable variation in interpretation, and the relationships among them were correspondingly flexible. It is not too much to say that World War II was to close, as it had begun, without a fully developed hypothesis for combining these primary factors in coalition warfare. Under these circumstances, the clearer delineation of the attainable size and shape of the U.S. armed forces

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50 Ltr, Handy to Chairman, WD Procurement Review Bd, 12 Jul 43; sub: Approved Operations and Deployment of U.S. Army Forces, filed with SS 126 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 96-126/3 (7 Jan 43).
51 Memo for ACofS OPD, 12 Jul 43, sub: Notes for Testimony Before WD Procurement Review Bd, filed with SS 126 in ABC 581 SS Papers, Nos. 96-126/3 (7 Jan 43).
52 (1) Ltr, Harold D. Smith, Director of the Budget, to Marshall, 8 May 43. (2) Ltr, Marshall to Smith, 24 May 43. (3) Ltr, Byrnes to Stimson, 24 Jun 43. All in CG ASF, Procurement Review Bd. (4) Ltr, Marshall to Chairman, WD Procurement Review Bd, 30 Jun 43. sub: Procurement Review, filed with SS 126 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 96-126/3 (7 Jan 43).
was destined to serve as a stabilizing factor among the shifting trio. The efforts of the Maddocks Committee, the Manpower Board, and the Procurement Review Board served to emphasize the interdependence of these components and to bring out the need for constant correlation. Troops must be available and trained, equipment must be on hand, and long-term plans must be made. None could stand alone or be effective without careful consideration of the others. The attainment of a more consistent and realistic balance among them was to remain one of the important wartime concerns of the Army staff.

For the Army planners in the summer of 1943, the most important single development among these three elements was the establishment of a manpower ceiling and an upper limit to the cutting edge of the Army. As later events were to show, the War Department action on manpower planning in June and July of 1943 was to mark the reduction of the level of ultimate Army strength calculations to the 7,700,000 indicated in the Maddocks Committee’s report. The generally favorable military situation that ensued was to dictate the acceptance of the 7,700,000 personnel ceiling in subsequent War Department and joint mobilization planning down to the end of the war in Europe. In time, the 90-division program became a permanent feature of wartime mobilization planning. Though the wartime Army as a whole showed a net growth of almost 3,000,000 after 1942 (from about 5,400,000 to almost 8,300,000), the increase went mainly into air and service units and overhead establishment.

55 Actually, the prolongation of the war in Europe into 1945 required the Army to exceed this figure by over 500,000.

56 During the summer of 1943, one infantry division (the 89th) from the existing total of eighty-eight was converted into a light division—the 89th Light Division (Truck); the 71st Light Division (Pack, Jungle) was formed out of miscellaneous elements, giving a total of eighty-nine. The Chief of Staff added the 10th Mountain Division, making ninety divisions. The 2d Cavalry Division was later inactivated in North Africa, giving a final total of eighty-nine.

57 The 13th Airborne Division stationed in Europe and the 98th Infantry Division stationed in Hawaii failed to get into action.

ular, after June 1943 the Army planners knew more exactly the full extent of the cutting edge the wartime Army could expect to reach. Ultimate troop ceilings rather than current shortages henceforth became all-important in planning, and plans had to be made to fit them. Such ceilings would become vital factors in planning the establishment of the last decisive fronts in Europe and in the war against Japan. Henceforth, U.S. strategic planners would be more and more insistent on precise agreements on magnitudes and timing and less and less willing to accept "agreements in principle" of the 1942 variety.
CHAPTER IX

Current Plans and Future Operations in the War Against Japan
June–August 1943

In the months between TRIDENT and QUADRANT the perspective of strategic planning for the war against Japan broadened. Washington and theater planners were looking ahead to the tasks of the future embodied in the TRIDENT resolutions. This entailed planning and preparing for six major projects: launching a Central Pacific offensive; continuation of the MacArthur-Halsey drive in the South-Southwest Pacific; ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians; more airlift to China; mounting a land offensive in Burma; and developing an overall plan for the defeat of Japan. It began to appear that there were at least as many possible approaches and choices in the war against Japan as in the war against Germany. The first essays at synthesis on the combined planning level were attempted even before the Americans themselves clearly grasped all the alternatives or firmly agreed upon the choices.

In this interim period—when final strategy against Germany as well as Japan was not fixed—General Marshall and his staff sought to maintain a balance among the competing lines of action espoused by the Navy, General MacArthur, and the Allies in the Far East, and the basic military objectives in the global war. They tried to keep the war against Japan a dynamic, if limited war—one with increasing momentum, not enough to conflict with “beating Germany first” but enough to assure that, upon the defeat of Germany, Allied strength might be concentrated to defeat Japan rapidly. Amid these circumstances General Marshall and his staff sought to support—with in limits—all feasible strategic courses of action against Japan, reserving final decision on an over-all sequential plan until firm agreements were reached on long-range plans for Europe.

Launching the Central Pacific Thrust

The most important development in the war against Japan during the summer of 1943 was the firm decision to mount a campaign through the Central Pacific island chains. After the vague references of Casablanca were transformed
into a definite approval at Trident, the Navy began to apply full pressure upon the Army to get the drive under way as soon as possible. The initial Army reaction to the Navy's growing insistence was a cautious assent, provided the proposed Central Pacific campaign would not interfere with operations already scheduled for the rest of the Pacific. The opening of another front against Japan was expected to relieve Japanese pressure on other areas and to spread still further the already widely dispersed Japanese naval and air resources. If a drive were launched against the eastern flank, Japan would be threatened on all sides: by Allied forces in SOPAC and SWPA; by U.S. air forces in the Aleutians; by Chinese, British, and American units on the west; and by the ever-present possibility of Soviet attack from Siberia. The compression of the great sprawling empire into a tight, little circle might soon begin in earnest, with the Japanese never certain where the next blow might fall.

The concept of a sweep through the mandated islands to the Philippines was almost as old as the Spanish-American War. For over thirty years, Naval War College classes had been presented, as a regular part of their curriculum, with the problem of recapturing the Philippines. Traditionally, there were three routes that could be followed: a direct frontal approach from the Hawaiian Islands; a northern drive from the Aleutians to the Marshalls, Truk, and the Marianas; and the southern route now being taken by MacArthur and Halsey. All three drives would be essentially amphibious, for the most part requiring strong naval support. The disaster at Pearl Harbor had provided a temporary setback to naval plans. With the resurgence of U.S. fleet strength through new construction and the decline of Japanese fleet strength since Midway, it was inevitable that naval demands would develop to utilize to the hilt the expanding fleet, especially the new, fast carriers.

On 11 June Admiral King emphasized the dissatisfaction of the Navy with the prevailing inactivity in the Pacific. Pointing out that the attack on Attu had been the only offensive move carried out in the Pacific since the windup of the Guadalcanal Campaign and that the action in SWPA and SOPAC scheduled for June would be against lightly held or undefended positions, he recommended an offensive against the Marshalls about 1 November. The great need at the moment, he believed, was for a definite timetable of future operations and he thought that MacArthur should be asked to submit firm dates for SWPA. Furthermore, since the JCS were unable to devote the full amount of attention necessary to insure the maximum co-ordination and proper timing of all principal amphibious operations in the Pacific theater, he held that these responsibilities should be delegated to Nimitz.

On the following day, 12 June, MacArthur, who had been asked by the War

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*(1) JCS 355, 11 Jun 43, title: Future Campaign Operations in POA. (2) Memo, King for Marshall, 11 Jun 43, no sub, OPD 381 Security, 163. King confided to Marshall that, in his opinion, they could have solved all of these problems if they could have made their planned trip to the Pacific in May.
Department to give his views on setting up dates for future operations, maintained that, aside from the 30 June date for the New Georgia-Kiriwina-Woodlark operations, prognostication would be "pure guesswork." His answer neither helped nor satisfied the Joint Staff Planners, who had been assigned the task of studying King's proposals. As Admiral Cooke, the chief Navy planner, put it:

... the Navy had desired to undertake operations in the South Pacific area before this, but had been restrained: the Navy was now proposing the Marshalls operation. The fleet cannot be permitted to remain relatively idle for nine or twelve months ... to assist in ending the delays and postponements, the Navy wants to establish definite target dates for major operations.

Colonel Roberts, representing General Wedemeyer, argued that the Army was in favor of beginning a campaign in the Central Pacific as soon as operations there could be undertaken with a reasonable assurance of success. The effect of operations in the Central Pacific on other operations in the Pacific, however, should be examined: "... the Army would not favor operations in the Marshalls at the cost of planned operations in the Southwest Pacific." At this point the Joint planners recommended that, in spite of the uncertainties, MacArthur be asked to set up tentative dates. In addition, they proposed that the suggested target date of 1 November for the Marshalls be examined in order to ensure that it would not conflict with SWPA and Aleutian operations.

The Army planners could not agree with King's proposal that Nimitz be assigned the responsibility for timing amphibious operations and held out for the retention of the status quo as far as command responsibilities were concerned. General Marshall and Admiral Leahy supported the Army planners' view as sound, since they felt that to accept King's suggestion would in fact give Nimitz command of the Pacific and place MacArthur under him. In their opinion, the timing of operations should remain a function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting on advice of commanders in the field. The continued inability of the JCS to settle the persistent problem of Pacific command had thus resulted in another indecisive round.

On 15 June the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed MacArthur of the tentative plans to commence operations against the Marshalls about the middle of November in order to exploit the growing preponderance of naval strength in the Pacific. For these operations, the 1st Marine Division would be withdrawn from SWPA, and the 2d Marine Division, together with all combat loaders and the major part of Halsey's naval forces, would be taken from the South Pacific Area. To permit planning for the Central Pacific to proceed on a more realistic basis, MacArthur was asked to give an outline of the means and requirements, with provisional dates, for future operations in the South-Southwest Pacific areas.

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Footnotes:


5 Min, 80th mtg JPS, 13 Jun 43.

6 Ibid.

7 (1) Min, 80th mtg JPS, 13 Jun 43. (2) JCS 855/1, 14 Jun 43, title: Future Campaign Operations in POA.

8 Min, 92d mtg JCS, 15 Jun 43.

9 Msg, JCS to CINCSWPA, 15 Jun 43, CM-OUT 6004. This message had originally been drafted by the JWPC and revised by Colonel Roberts to meet the objections of General Marshall and the Navy. At General Marshall's direction it was dispatched before it had been formally approved by the JCS.
Meanwhile, in the event that available means would make it impracticable to carry out a full-scale attack on the Marshalls, plans were also drawn up by the JWPC for the seizure of the more lightly defended Gilbert Islands. An operation against the Gilberts would have the advantages of requiring fewer resources and making a later move into the Marshalls much simpler.\(^\text{10}\)

The intimation that a new line of attack might be opened through the Central Pacific disturbed MacArthur. He cabled Marshall:

From a broad strategic viewpoint I am convinced that the best course of offensive action in the Pacific is a movement from Australia through New Guinea to Mindanao. This movement can be supported by land-based aircraft which is utterly essential and will immediately cut the enemy lines from Japan to his conquered territory to the southward. By contrast a movement through the mandated islands will be a series of amphibious attacks with the support of carrier based aircraft against objectives defended by naval units and ground troops supported by land based aviation. Midway stands as an example of the hazards of such operations. Moreover no vital strategic objective is reached until the series of amphibious frontal attacks succeed in reaching Mindanao. The factors upon which the old Orange plan were based have been greatly altered by the hostile conquest of Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies and by the availability of Australia as a base.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^\text{10}\) Since the need for the information was urgent, General Handy made several final changes and approved the message for dispatch. (1) Draft msg, JCS to CINCPAC, with pencilled note "sent this to Col. Cailey for his file—F. N. R. [Col. Roberts]." OPD 381 Security, 167. (2) Tel convs, Col Roberts with Adm Cooke, 15 Jun 43 with JCS 353/1 in ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43), 1-A.

\(^\text{11}\) (1) JPS 205/1, 17 Jun 43, title: Operations Against the Marshall Islands. (2) JPS 205/3, 10 Jul 43, same title.
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ber and end in the middle of January.12

MacArthur's strong opposition to the withdrawal of the Marine divisions caused Marshall to turn down King's request for the release of the 1st Marines for the Central Pacific campaign. King's request was coupled with a Navy proposal for the definite allocation of two additional Army divisions for the Southwest Pacific. After all, Marshall informed King, the 1st Marines had been rehabilitated and re-equipped in SWPA after the bitter Guadalcanal struggle, and the 25th Division had been diverted to SOPAC as a replacement. Since the invasion of New Britain required an amphibiously trained division, he considered that the withdrawal of the marines would occasion a serious delay and could not be justified. As for the additional Army divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division would arrive in SWPA by August and the 24th Infantry Division was scheduled to move from Hawaii to SWPA by September. Since it had been assumed that both of these divisions would participate in the CARTWHEEL operations, their assignment should now be considered firm.13

A parallel proposal involving the diversion of a heavy bomber group and a medium bomber group from either SWPA or SOPAC to the Central Pacific was submitted by the Air Forces to both MacArthur and Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon. For planning purposes, Arnold desired to know the estimated effect on theater operations if such a withdrawal were made about November and also if it were made at a later date—January or February 1944.14

MacArthur's response was emphatic:

Air supremacy is essential to success. With my present strength, this [success] is problematical. The withdrawal of two groups of bombers would, in my opinion, collapse the offensive effort in the Southwest Pacific Area. In my judgment the offensive against Rabaul should be considered the main effort and it should not be nullified or weakened by withdrawals to implement a secondary attack....15

Harmon was equally opposed, since he believed that his forward progress might be seriously jeopardized by any diversion from his theater.16 These strong protests of the theater commanders were effective in staving off any diversions of bombers from their areas. The bomber groups later assigned to the Central Pacific air forces were sent directly from the United States.17

As plans for operations against the mandated islands took shape, it became

12 (1) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 20 Jun 43, CM-IN 12647. (2) Msg, same to same, 20 Jun 43, CM-IN 13149. (3) Msg, same to same, 22 Jun 43, CM-IN 13605. Halsey later reported that he would use part of the 37th Division in New Georgia and the 2d Marine Division and the 25th Division in the Buin–Faisi operation.

13 (1) Memo, King for CofS, 14 Jun 43, sub: Withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division and Change of Allocation of Two Army Divisions to SWPA From Tentative to Firm Assignment (JCS 238/3). (2) Memo, Marshall for COMINCH, 23 Jun 43, same sub. Both in WDCSA SOPAC. (3) OPD draft memo, CofS for CNO, 23 Jun 43, same sub, OPD 320.2 Australia, 184.

The 1st Cavalry Division actually arrived in July and the 24th Division in September. The 33d Division, dispatched from the United States, arrived in Hawaii in July to replace the 24th Division.


16 Msg, Harmon to CofS for Arnold, 25 Jun 43, CM-IN 15655.

17 Craven and Cate, AAF IV, 169, 293. Not only did SWPA prevent any diversions of bombers but the War Department also added two new fighter groups, the 94th and 475th, to SWPA's air forces during the early summer of 1943.
evident that the Army and Navy disagreed as to the importance of the project. To the Army, the Central Pacific offensive could be considered as a subsidiary diversion that would disperse Japanese means and inflict further losses upon the enemy while the main effort in the South-Southwest Pacific moved forward. But as Colonel Bessell, senior Army member of the JWPC, pointed out, the Army should not be pushed into action for action's sake:

We are trying to reconcile a fast-growing Navy, all deployed in the PACIFIC, with ground and air units which must go to all theaters and in major part to the principal (European) theater so as to be able to "defeat Germany first."

There seems to have grown up in our Navy the fixation that any action by the Fleet must acquire territory. Thus the continual demand that air and ground forces keep pace with the naval expansion in the PACIFIC. We cannot do this until Germany is defeated, and this fact must be admitted. Until we defeat Germany naval action without accompanying ground and shore-based action must be the rule and not the exception. We must have more sea and carrier borne raids and demonstrations in force. If the Japanese Fleet will not come to us, let us go to it, (now that numerical superiority is assured). . . .

I favor finding out:

(1) When can we do the MARSHALLS? If not too late after 1 December 1943, let's do it then, and not assume the risk of delaying the MARSHALLS by undertaking the GILBERTS first. If too late, then OK, let's do the GILBERTS.

(2) Whether we can't "do something" other than the GILBERTS between now and the MARSHALLS. . . .

(3) The exact effects of the GILBERTS on Cartwheel.

In short, let's make no hasty decision based on a hasty estimate just in order to "do something."18

The Army planning staff brought forward a number of objections to specific operations against the Marshalls and Gilberts then under consideration on the joint planning level. The planners argued that the proposed operation against the Marshalls would require the postponement of all operations aimed at Rabaul until well into 1944. "This proposed postponement cannot be accepted. It would be strategically unsound and would result in major political repercussions."19 Nor was the plan for a direct assault on the Marshalls, in their view, sound. The Japanese, because of their large number of mutually supporting bases that would still remain in the Marshalls–Gilberts area and their well-developed ferry route, would regain air superiority as soon as the large carrier forces had to withdraw. The means for ferrying U.S. land-based planes, except for heavy bombers, in to the newly acquired islands did not exist. More feasible to the planners appeared to be the current plan for the Gilberts operation. The ground forces and assault shipping required could be obtained without a serious interruption to CARTWHEEL, though the heavy and medium bomber groups for the garrison force in the Gilberts could be provided only at the expense of other theaters. All such bomber units were earmarked for the build-up in the United Kingdom and, if diverted, could be replaced only from those already employed in the Mediterranean. Before any commitment was made to either operation, the planners therefore con-

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18 Memo, Bessell for Roberts, 18 Jun 43, sub: JPS 205/2, Operations Against the Marshall Islands, ABC 584 Marshall Islands (10 Jun 43). 1
19 SS 113/1, 23 Jun 43, title: Operations in the Central Pacific, with JPS 205/2 in ABC 584 Marshall Islands (10 Jun 43). 1
cluded, all possible operations east of the Philippines–Honshu line must be carefully analyzed.20

The Navy, on the other hand, visualized the operations against the Marshall Islands as the beginning of a new phase in which the expanding carrier forces would speed the end of the war and probably become the spearhead of the attack. Its position received strong support from the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, which had just reviewed U.S. strategy in the Pacific. The committee believed that the United States was trying to reverse the Japanese campaign of 1942 without the benefit of either the surprise or the overwhelming superiority that the enemy had possessed. Judging from the slowness of the advance in New Guinea and the Solomons, the JSSC held that no quick returns could be expected there in the near future and that it was time to reorient Pacific strategy by according first priority to the Central Pacific. Only in the Central Pacific could the increased U.S. naval forces operate to advantage and perhaps force the Japanese Fleet into an engagement.21 King found the committee’s report very much to his liking and backed it actively. He argued that the slowness of the progress in the war against Japan underlined the need to employ naval units, now available in increasing numbers, along the broad eastern sea approaches to the Philippine Islands. In this way the Navy could contribute much more toward accelerating the tempo of operations and to cutting the Japanese lines of communication. At the same time, it could avoid the Japanese land-based aviation that threatened an approach to the Philippines through the more restricted waters of the Celebes Sea.22

The Army planners were unwilling to accept this shift in emphasis so casually. As they saw it, until a comprehensive plan for the defeat of Japan had been drawn up the merits of the two avenues of approach to the Philippines could not be fairly assessed. After an over-all plan had been agreed upon, it would then be necessary to determine whether the physical occupation of Truk and Rabaul would be required and to analyze the effect of Central Pacific operations on all efforts in other theaters. The planners agreed with MacArthur that the U.S. Fleet would be at a serious disadvantage in the Marshalls–Caroline area because of the threat of Japanese land-based airpower.23

The reluctance of the Army to concede at this time the advantages of the Central Pacific route over the SWPA approach was reflected in the 19 July recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners to the JCS on future strategy in the Pacific. Since pressure had to be maintained upon the enemy and since the means to carry out the CARTWHEEL operations were already in, or en route to, the theater, the planners believed that CARTWHEEL should be carried out according to plan. CARTWHEEL, moreover, should serve to inflict additional losses upon the Japanese and decrease their ability to resist the Central Pacific attack. The

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20 (1) Ibid. (2) OPD brief, no date, title: A Summary of Memo on Operations in the Central Pacific (JPS 205/1 and JPS 205/2), with JPS 205/2 in ABC 384 Marshall Islands (10 Jun 43). 1.
22 Min, 94th mtg JCS, 29 Jun 43.
23 OPD brief, title: Notes . . . JCS 94th mtg, 29 Jun 43, with JCS 986 in ABC 384 Pacific (28 Jun 43).
large U.S. naval forces could seize the Gilbert Islands and Nauru about 1 December and thereby widen the front against the Japanese, yet still be within supporting distance of the South Pacific operations. In this way, bases to mount successive operations against the Marshalls and Carolines could be captured, and at the same time the lines of communication to the South-Southwest Pacific could be shortened. The South-Southwest and the Central Pacific lines of attack could be mutually supporting, and the means necessary to stage the Gilberts offensive would not be of such a large scale as to weaken the South-Southwest Pacific drive. Only the 2d Marine Division would have to be withdrawn from the South Pacific to the Central Pacific, and if Rabaul could be neutralized and later bypassed, there would be no requirement for the division in SOPOAC anyway. Additional land forces for the Central Pacific drive would come from Hawaii, and air forces could be assigned from the Eleventh Air Force in Alaska after Kiska was taken. The Gilberts would be an ideal staging point for forward movement into the Marshalls, possibly about 1 February 1944, and in the meantime post-CARHHEEL operations in SWPA would be aimed at gaining control of the Bismarck Archipelago by seizing Manus, Kavieng, and Wewak. Finding that most of the Army's major objections had been met, the Army planners recommended to General Marshall that this report be approved.

On the question of timing, the JCS acquiesced in King's desire to advance the target date for the Gilberts to 15 November and that for the Marshalls to 1 January. Otherwise, the JCS accepted the Joint planners' estimates and agreed that by tying Central and South-Southwest Pacific operations together, each offensive would assist the other. Arnold commented that there might be a little difficulty in providing some of the heavy and medium bombers deemed necessary for the Central Pacific operations, but he felt that since the operations were so important, the Air Forces would have to make the means available somehow. Admiral King maintained that the Central Pacific operations would not interfere with those in the Southwest Pacific. Rather, they would augment them. General Marshall took the position that the United States could ill afford to leave idle the great carrier forces then available, and he, too, felt the operations would help CARTWHEEL.

The JCS directive of 20 July to Nimitz instructed him to organize and train forces for amphibious operations against the Ellice and Gilbert Islands and Nauru; to ready airfields and bases; to carry out the operations; and to prepare for a follow-up move into the Marshalls about 1 January 1944. Fiji and/or Pearl Harbor could be used to mount the operations, and the target date would be about 15 November. The offensive forces would consist of the 2d Marine Division and an Army division, plus supporting troops.

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24 JCS 86/1, 19 Jul 43, title: Strategy in the Pacific.
25 OPD brief, title: Notes . . . 97th mtg JCS, 20 Jul 43, Strategy in the Pacific (JCS 86/1), with JCS 86/1 in ABC 84 Pacific (28 Jun 43).
27 Navy msg, 202204, JCS to CINCPAC, 20 Jul 43, CM-OUT 14495.
On the heels of this directive came another attempt by Admiral King to secure release of the 1st Marine Division from SWPA or the 3d Marine Division from the South Pacific for use in the Central Pacific. Again Marshall was obliged to point out the need for both in the forthcoming CARTWHEEL operations. The waste of shipping entailed would aggravate the already critical situation, he commented, and, furthermore, the Army's 27th Division, then in Hawaii, could be amphibiously trained and used in the Gilberts without dislocating other operations or complicating shipping schedules. The Navy accepted the 27th Division in lieu of one of the Marine divisions.28

While the JCS were discussing the Gilberts and Marshalls operations, the Joint planners moved on to the formulation of outline plans that would push the Central Pacific advance further forward and that would serve to open the line of communications to the Sulu and Celebes Sea areas. They envisaged the seizure of Ponape, the Truk area of the Carolines, and the Palaus as possible intermediate objectives along this route.29 The Gilberts and Marshalls were to be simply the first steppingstones across the Pacific.

The acceptance by the JCS of the Central Pacific offensive inaugurated a new phase in the war against Japan, a predominantly naval phase, built about the mobility of the new fast carriers. The overland and island-hopping advances hitherto characteristic of the Pacific war were now to be gradually supplanted through swifter, bolder strikes by large naval forces knifing behind the Japanese lines of defense and cutting off their forward defense positions.

The SWPA Approach to the Philippines

While Washington was busy with plans for campaigns against the mandated islands, the initial phase of the pre-Rabaul operations had gotten under way.30 In SWPA, Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands off the southeastern tip of New Guinea had been seized on 30 June without opposition. In fact, the Japanese were unaware that the islands had been captured until several months later.31 In the South Pacific, the invasion of New Georgia in the Solomons had begun on the same day and was progressing satisfactorily. In Washington, however, the Joint planners had already shifted their interest to post-CARTWHEEL operations. Outline plans had been prepared for the advance to the northeast New Guinea-Bismarck Archipelago-Admiralty Islands area and as far as the Vogelkop Peninsula of western New Guinea.32 To

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30 See: (1) Ch. IV, above; (2) John Miller, jr., CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1958).

31 Japanese General Staff Under the Direction of SCAP, Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, 8 December 1941 to 2 September 1945 (Vol. II), Ch. VII, 7n, MS in OCMH files.

32 (1) JPS 245, 5 Aug 43, title: Operations in the New Guinea-Bismarck Archipelago-Admiralty Is-
strategic planning for coalition warfare

assist in this long-range planning, MacArthur was requested to submit his outline plans for the recapture of the Philippines. The main features of RENO II indicated clearly that the SWPA staff still held fast to the idea of an orderly march to the Philippines, covering its forward movement by land-based aircraft. The capture of Rabaul was deemed necessary as the next forward step, in order that preparations might be made for movement into western New Guinea and thence up to the Philippines via Halmahera, Morotai, and Manado. There was little new in the plan. RENO II held that all available means should be concentrated in the line of action that promised maximum possibilities for exploitation, since planned allocations for the Pacific did not permit major offensive operations in more than one place at a time. If Allied strength were consolidated, the length of the "bounds" forward and the tempo of the war could be increased. The plan indicated that it would be at least 1945 and possibly later before Mindanao could be captured but that Rabaul and the Admiralties should be in Allied possession by the summer of 1944. Two familiar threads ran through RENO II: the strong belief of MacArthur and his staff in the prime importance of their strategic goals and in the efficacy of their methods of prosecuting the war; and the familiar plea for additional allocations to step up the pace of the war. With the first, the Washington Army staff had no real dispute at this time; the second, the Army planners could heed only at the expense of the European war.


Some documents use Menado. Board of Geographic Names lists the full name, Palau Manadotua.

When the Central Pacific offensive began, the strategic views of MacArthur and his staff would be subjected to closer scrutiny by the JCS. And as long as the European war retained its pre-eminence in the eyes of the CCS, all allocations for the Pacific would continue to be examined and balanced carefully against the requirements for Europe.

Anticlimax at Kiska

Meanwhile, matters were coming to a head in the North Pacific. The resolution of the CCS at TRIDENT to eject the Japanese from the Aleutians gave the United States official permission to end the battles of attrition and weather that had been waged during the past year in the North Pacific. With the fall of Attu in May 1943, only one stronghold, Kiska, remained under enemy control. Plans for its seizure had been under consideration for some time, but lack of necessary means to take the island, supposedly garrisoned by 10,000 stubborn Japanese, had forced postponement.

During the TRIDENT Conference, Nimitz and DeWitt had urged the JCS to approve an operation against Kiska in September, but the Army was reluctant to commit itself to more than the making of plans and preparations.89 Before the Washington Army staff definitely accepted the operation, it wished the full implications with respect to critical items of special equipment to be examined. In fact General Wedemeyer and General Fairchild, the latter of the JSSC, believed that the reduction of Kiska might prove costly and that it might serve the Allied cause better to permit the Japanese to hold the island and suffer the attrition that such a course would entail.40 The Navy, on the other hand, was anxious to expel the remnants of the Japanese from the entire Aleutian chain. The sizable naval forces required in the North Pacific could then be released for employment elsewhere.

In early June Marshall indicated his willingness to leave the final decision on a Kiska operation to the Navy since he considered it primarily a naval concern, but, he cautioned, the gains should be weighed against the cost.41 The Joint Staff Planners were given the task of threshing out the details. With Sir John Dill’s assistance, the JCS secured the consent of the British to use PLOUGH Force in the operation, as suggested by the War Department planning staff.42

89 (1) Navy msg, 192345, DeWitt to CINCPAC, 19 May 43. (2) Navy msg, 210247, CINCPAC to COMINCH, 21 May 43. (3) Ltr, Marshall to King, 23 May 43, sub: Reduction and Occupation of Amateur. All in OPD 381 Security, 132.


41 Min, 91st mtg JCS 8 Jun 43. For continued disagreement by some OPD officers on an operation against Kiska, see memo, Col Blizzard for Gen Handy, 10 Jun 43, sub: Seizure of Kiska, OPD 381 Security, 132.

42 Memo, Deane for Marshall, 10 Jun 43, sub: PLOUGH Force, OPD 381 Security, 162. PLOUGH Force was the 1st Special Service Force, composed of U.S. and Canadian volunteers, originally specially trained and equipped to operate in snow. Partly in response to the Prime Minister’s desire to invade Norway, the War Department had organized this special regimental combat force under Col. Robert T. Frederick in the summer of 1942. Since the project against Norway was not executed, various alternatives for the force were subsequently suggested. It was committed to the Kiska operation (August 1943) and
The Joint planners could see little point in delaying the undertaking since, insofar as climatic conditions were concerned, August would be the most favorable month remaining in 1943. They recommended that a joint directive to Nimitz and DeWitt be approved and the two commanders be permitted to establish the target date, which was later set at 15 August. Five regimental combat teams plus Plough Force and an additional artillery battalion were to be made available; a total of 32,000 troops would be employed. The JCS accepted these recommendations.

The preparation and assembly of this large task force occupied the next two months. In the meantime, the Japanese had decided to pull out of Kiska, and by the end of July they had managed, undetected, to evacuate all their troops by submarine and surface vessel. Heavy fog and murky weather had given the enemy a strong assist. Thus, when the Eleventh Air Force gave Kiska a heavy pounding during the first two weeks of August, its bombs fell on a deserted island and the assault troops moving in on the 15th suffered their only casualties from friendly sources.

The anticlimax at Kiska was compounded by miserable weather conditions. Even had the task force commander been aware of the Japanese evacuation plans, it is doubtful that he could have done much to prevent the Japanese move. More thorough reconnaissance might have revealed the evacuation, but it would have come too late to halt the mounting of the large forces for the expedition. In any event, with the occupation of Kiska and the restoration of U.S. control throughout the island chain, the mission of clearing the Japanese from the Aleutians was completed. Although planning for the use of the northern approach to Japan—still largely contingent on Soviet entry into the war—continued, the concern of the Washington planners over Alaska receded sharply. Men, planes, and equipment assigned to its defense could now be employed at more vital tasks in other theaters.

The Assam Bottleneck

The resolve of the TRIDENT conferees to increase the capacity of the air route to China to 10,000 tons per month by early fall quite naturally included the development of the air and rail facilities in Assam as a companion objective. Without the latter, there would be no possibility of attaining even the more modest goal of 7,000 tons for July that the President had promised Chiang. The difficult weather conditions of the monsoon season, coupled with the poor transportation system of Assam, slowed construction of air facilities almost to a standstill at the very time when great speed was essential to keep up with the influx of aircraft and supplies.
Both the War Department and CCS stood ready to assist. The Air Forces attached ground personnel of CBI bombardment units to the Air Transport Command (ATC) in Assam in an effort to keep the transports in operation until suitable personnel could be sent from the United States. The CCS gave the CBI theater permission to borrow motor transport from the British to help relieve the congestion at Assam railheads until additional trucks could be shipped in and urged that similar transportation problems be worked out in cooperation with the British Army in India. Men and machines of the Ledo Road construction project were made available for airfield development, but basically, as General Wheeler, Commanding General, SOS, CBI, pointed out, the antiquated railroad that serviced Assam was the limiting factor. British cooperation had been sincere, he maintained, but old-fashioned methods of operation and shortages of rolling stock had proved to be the big stumbling block.

In spite of earnest efforts to boost the tonnage flown over the Hump, the CBI theater estimated in mid-July that only approximately 3,200 tons would be carried during that month. This drew the quick response from Arnold that he found the estimate not only "most disappointing" but also "unacceptable." He demanded to know specifically why more transports were not in service and what was needed to get them into operation. He also requested Stilwell's aid in ensuring that spare parts for the airlift were not being diverted from the ATC. Arnold's concern brought swift assurances from the ATC commander, Col. Edward H. Alexander, that all agencies were doing everything possible to increase the Hump tonnage but that the task itself was enormous and the machinery to do the job was not yet on hand.

The total lift of the ATC in July amounted to only 4,500 tons instead of the 7,000 promised by the President, though the promised transport planes were delivered on time and sufficient personnel and freight were on hand to man and load them. Part of the failure to meet the Presidential goal must be ascribed to the state of the Assam line of communications, which precluded the swift construction of the necessary air facilities. Part must be attributed to some lack of efficiency in the India-China wing, ATC, which did not operate as competently over the Hump as the civilian Chinese National Aviation Corporation (CNAC). For the previous progress on the airfields and the fixing of responsibility therefor, see: (1) msg, Marshall to Wheeler, 4 Jun 43, CM-OUT 1828; (2) msg, Wheeler to Marshall, 9 Jun 43, CM-IN 5471; and (3) msg, Kight to George for Alexander, 18 Jun 43, CM-IN 7187.

48 Msg, Arnold to Alexander, 17 Jun 43, CM-OUT 6972.
49 Msg, Arnold to Stilwell, 17 Jul 43, CM-OUT 7090.
50 Msg, Alexander to Arnold, 19 Jul 43, CM-IN 15509.
Air Operations and Command Problems in the CBI

The disappointing showing of the airlift during the first few months after Trident affected operations in China. Because of tonnage deficiencies, the growth and fighting capabilities of Chennault's air force were of necessity curtailed and the scope of his operations restricted. The total tonnage carried over the Hump in July failed to reach the 4,790-ton mark assigned to Chennault's air force alone. Moreover, intensified Japanese ground and air activity, begun in the late spring, had required a greater effort from the Fourteenth Air Force. It would evidently be impossible to conduct a sustained air drive as long as the supply line remained inadequate.

The offensive launched in May by the Japanese advancing along the Yangtze River course toward the Tung-Ting Lake area had frightened the Chinese. Stilwell, then in Washington, had directed General Bissell, commanding general of the Tenth Air Force, to send forty P-40's from India to the Fourteenth Air Force and to be ready for the possible transfer of a medium bombardment squadron. In addition, Marshall ordered twenty-five P-38's from North Africa to China to help out in the crisis, and Chiang promised to use the Chinese Air Force to the maximum. The Chinese were informed by McNarney that any further increases of air forces in China would depend on Stilwell's estimate of the situation and would have to come from transfers from the Tenth to the Fourteenth Air Force. The many claims on the Fourteenth Air Force in its attempts to check the Japanese advance led to the postponement of other air projects in the CBI. The Army was forced to defer a Navy request that some of the Fourteenth's operational efforts be devoted to mining the continental shelf of east Asia, although it recognized that this menace to Japanese merchant shipping might prove to be most effective. After the Japanese drive petered out in early June and the enemy fell back to his former positions along the Yangtze, the Army made arrangements to mine the inland waters, and the Navy supplied four additional transport planes to carry the tonnage for the project over the Hump.

The Japanese offensive that had so frightened the Chinese turned out to be another multipurpose foray made in an attempt to open the Yangtze as far as Ichang, release the river steamers in that area for use downstream, destroy the rice crop, and train Japanese combat forces. Stilwell complimented Chennault's air force for its work in lifting Chinese morale by disrupting Japanese communications and strafing river traffic during the foray. He pointed out to Marshall, however, that the diversion of Chinese troops from the Yunnan force to repel

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this threat not only had reduced its size but also had delayed its training by six weeks.\textsuperscript{54}

While the Japanese were challenging the Chinese-American air forces in the field, plans were laid in Washington to build up the Fourteenth Air Force in China and the Tenth Air Force in India, especially in high-altitude fighters, so that they could cope with improved enemy aircraft.\textsuperscript{55} In early July the War Department also approved the recommendations of Brig. Gen. Howard C. Davidson, who had just come back from the CBI (and later was to become commanding general of the Tenth Air Force), regarding low-altitude bombing attacks against the Achilles' heel of Japan—merchant shipping. However, as Handy pointed out, although Chennault would have the strength to carry out this bombing when planned allocations were received, the tactical employment of his forces would still remain Stilwell's responsibility.\textsuperscript{56}

Plans alone could not build up an air force, and although planes and personnel were provided Chennault on schedule, the expansion of his air force soon outstripped the logistical support that could be supplied by the airlift. There was some justice in Bissell's complaint of early July that, because of the shortage of gasoline and bombs, bombers were being kept on the ground in China when they could have been used in India against targets in Burma.\textsuperscript{57}

To complicate matters further at this point, Stilwell reported to Marshall that Chiang was contemplating punitive action against the Chinese Communists and requested guidance on the role of U.S. air forces if civil war should break out. He himself advocated a strict hands-off policy. Marshall asked Soong to investigate what could be done to avert any such possibility. As it turned out, the potential crisis soon blew over without incident, and the War Department was not forced to take a definite stand.\textsuperscript{58}

Chiang's dissatisfaction with the current status of China's affairs was not limited to the Communist problem. Chennault warned Arnold that the Generalissimo was about to approach the President directly on the lack of improvement in the air supply route.\textsuperscript{59} It turned out to be Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, newly returned to China from Washington, who presented the Chinese case. She wrote the President that Chennault had only received 1,700 tons in June instead of 3,000, and was unlikely to get more

\textsuperscript{54} (1) Msg, Stilwell to Marshall, 20 Jun 43, CM-IN 12708. (2) Craven and Cate, AAF IV, 522. (3) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. IX.

\textsuperscript{55} Memo, Kuter for CofAS, 21 Jun 43, sub: Augmentation of 10th and 14th Air Forces, OPD 422.1 China (4-11-43), 45.


\textsuperscript{57} Ltr, Bissell to Handy, 6 Jul 43, OPD 381 CTO, 167.


\textsuperscript{59} For a full discussion of the Nationalist-Communist negotiations in China during 1943-44, see Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 75-76, 81-82, 136-44.

\textsuperscript{80} Msg, Chennault to Arnold, 25 Jul 43, CM-IN 18580.
than 3,000 in July of the 4,790 tons promised him. The failure of the Hump deliveries, she continued, could be blamed on the delays in airfield construction in Assam and the lack of centralization of control at the operating airfields, but the situation was not beyond repair. If immediate efforts could be made to supply the personnel, planes, and equipment formerly promised, part of Chennault's program might be salvaged during the remainder of the good flying weather. She asked the President's help in securing these requirements. The President turned the matter over to the War Department.

While the War Department considered ways and means to speed the Hump build-up, the Fourteenth Air Force was again subjected to increasing pressure from Japanese air elements. In late July Chennault's Chief of Staff, General Glenn, requested additional reinforcements from the Tenth Air Force, but Stilwell, considering the defense of the ferry route his first duty, was reluctant to deplete further his Assam air forces. Since Chennault's use of heavy bombers to attack merchant shipping had led to the sharp Japanese reaction and since this reaction was what Chennault had desired and had expressed himself confident of being able to handle, Stilwell had little sympathy with his predicament. Opinion in Washington Army circles tended to support Stilwell's view, and it was felt that if Chennault could not meet the Japanese threat to his air forces, he could withdraw the bombers from the attacks on shipping and use them against other objectives. Although Chennault could draw little comfort from Stilwell or his fellow officers in Washington in his requests for additional aid, certain command changes were made in the CBI air forces that tended to strengthen his position. As has been noted, Marshall had informed Stilwell in late March that for political reasons it would be impossible to put any other air officer over Chennault at this time. However, the Chief of Staff did move during the Trident Conference to provide Stilwell with a competent senior air officer to co-ordinate theater air problems. His selection was Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, then in the CBI on an inspection tour with Handy and currently Arnold's Chief of the Air Staff. The appointment called for delicate handling, since the Generalissimo's candidate for over-all air commander was Chennault, whom he desired to make his own Air chief of staff with a status independent of Stilwell. Marshall had to remind the President that in his opinion Chennault knew little about the ever-present problem of logistics and that, furthermore, he had been a paid employee of the Chinese Government. The President, in turn, had to break the news of Stratemeyer's appointment to Chiang diplomatically, assuring him that this appointment "would not interfere with the intimate and direct relationship between you and Chennault."

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60 Ltr, Mme. Chiang Kai-shek to President, 30 Jul 43, Book 11, Exec 9.
62 See Ch. IV above.
63 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 739.
64 Msg, President to Stilwell for Chiang, 28 Jun 43, CM-OUT 11870.
To Stilwell’s quick protest against any special status for Chennault, Marshall replied:

The peculiar situation in your theater as pertains to Chennault is fully appreciated. However a situation exists here with reference to the same matter with which you are familiar and which is controlling. In this case, the matter of an air commander had been taken up by Soong with the Generalissimo and he has refused. This was known to the President. Accordingly, the only practical method under the circumstances whereby Stratemeyer could be set up as Air Commander for your theater is by [this] procedure. With Stratemeyer on the ground, actual developments should work out much more satisfactorily than expected.66

To propitiate Chiang further, Roosevelt allowed Chennault to become chief of staff of the Chinese Air Force in July and thus to obtain direct access to the Generalissimo, even though, in his role as Fourteenth Air Force commander, Chennault still remained under Stilwell. In another move calculated to ease the tension in the theater, Bissell, long persona non grata to Chennault, was relieved by the War Department in July and brought back to Washington for the post of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence. General Davidson replaced him as commanding general of the Tenth Air Force in India.66 Marshall reassured Stilwell that the Tenth Air Force would retain its current independent status.67

The general dissatisfaction with the slow development of the airlift to China was reflected in these changes. The appointment of Stratemeyer as a trouble shooter was the Army’s answer to the Generalissimo’s attempt to make Chennault an independent air commander and give him control of the ferry route. Chennault’s elevation to the position of Chinese Air Chief of Staff and the recall of Bissell had been offered as palliatives by the President to make the acceptance of Stratemeyer easier, but it seemed clear that the War Department would have to secure increased efficiency of operation and swifter augmentation of the airlift to stave off further maneuvers on the part of those favoring Chennault’s views.

Origins of the Southeast Asia Command

The difficulties of the supply route and the problems of the air situation were paralleled by the intricacies of the land war in India-Burma. Administrative, logistical, and command complications had plagued the British ever since the Japanese had driven them out of Burma in 1942. The poor exhibition made by Empire troops in subsequent clashes with the enemy in Burma and the explanations offered in defense by successive commanders led Churchill to the conclusion that a reorganization of the top command and the injection of new blood into the leadership were necessities.68

Shortly after Trident, the Prime Minister provided the President with his concept of a new organization that would

68 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 801, 944-45.
divorce the operational command from the administrative headaches of India. Under this plan, Wavell would be appointed Viceroy of India and General Sir Claude Auchinleck would become Commander in Chief, India. An operational command would be established for southeast Asia, patterned after either the MacArthur or the Eisenhower model. Churchill suggested Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas as a worthy choice for commander in chief. Stilwell might possibly be his deputy, and three Britishers would be selected as sea, land, and air commanders. Churchill himself favored the SWPA type of headquarters, with the British Chiefs of Staff acting as executive agents for the CCS in matters of operational strategy.69

The President and his military staff welcomed Churchill’s proposals, but requested the submission of other names for the position of commander in chief. Roosevelt reminded the Prime Minister that any change in the CBI command organization would have to be co-ordinated with Chiang.70 Churchill assured Roosevelt that there was no intention of encroaching upon Chiang’s domain and that the new command would be restricted to southeast Asia. However, Churchill did feel that all troops and air units operating in southeast Asia should come under the supreme commander.71

While the political leaders were engaged in this exploratory exchange, Marshall and his staff considered the complications of a southeast Asia command.

The Chief of Staff advised the JCS that Eisenhower’s command organization should serve as a model rather than MacArthur’s, since the U.S. policy of aid to China would not allow “direct subordination to the British Chiefs of Staff of any supreme command which embraces the means of our aid to China.”72 He visualized Stilwell as retaining command of his present forces and serving as a coordinator for troops operating in or from China against areas under the new command. Marshall’s reservations about the current British military leadership in India-Burma were apparent in his comment on the command of U.S. troops. “It is essential, in my opinion,” he concluded, “that we provide American leadership for our American effort, as well as the Chinese troops concerned, rather than permitting these components to be placed under British command.”73

Although the British were doubtful that Stilwell could effectively discharge so many duties simultaneously, they consented to his attempting the task, since the President had approved Marshall’s recommendations. On the other hand, they reiterated their advocacy of the MacArthur type of command as more suitable for the new setup and again strongly supported Sir Sholto Douglas.

It will be remembered that from early in the war CCS exercised direct supervision over strategic and operational matters in the European-Mediterranean area, while the JCS exercised jurisdiction over operational strategy in the Pacific, including SWPA.74

Memo, Marshall for JCS, 28 Jun 43, sub: Supreme Command, Asiatic Theater, OPD 384 CTO, 12. Marshall’s position was in contrast to his later willingness to allow U.S. troops to serve under the more aggressive Brigadier Wingate, the commander of the long-range penetration group, and under Lt. Gen. William J. Slim, who became commander of the British Fourteenth Army in Burma.
for supreme commander. The Americans clung just as stubbornly to their belief in the Eisenhower model. They argued that, as the pace of the war against Japan quickened, it would eventually be necessary to co-ordinate operations in southeast Asia with those in the Pacific. This future centralization should logically come from Washington, since Chiang would have to be consulted in developing future strategy and had representation only on the Pacific War Council, which met in the American capital. Insofar as Douglas was concerned, the U.S. Chiefs flatly refused to accept him, pointing, among other things, to his "lack of experience in Allied matters." They were perfectly willing to have a British supreme commander but held that the man chosen must at least be acceptable to the United States if the new command were to have any chance for success. As alternates they put forward the names of Admiral Cunningham and Air Marshal Tedder, but the British would not release either of the men from his current command.

At this juncture, with all the signs of a stalemate on command and organization in the offing, negotiations were halted until the Anglo-American conference convened at Quebec in August. In the meantime, southeast Asia

Sino-British Attitudes and Policies

The struggle to get major land operations under way in Burma continued during the months following Trident, but the undertaking was urged without enthusiasm by the British and Chinese and sometimes with pessimism by the Americans. Had the Allies been able to agree on a new command for southeast Asia and an energetic commander taken charge, perhaps the negative attitude might have been counteracted.

The modified version of Anakim, now called Saucy, which was adopted at Trident, called for co-ordinated and simultaneous land offensives from Ledo in India and Yunnan in China by the Chinese and from Imphal in India by the British, coupled with British amphibious landings along the Arakan coast in Burma. Saucy was presented to Chiang Kai-shek after the conference for his consideration, but the Generalissimo was in no hurry to approve the latest Anglo-American offering, which was a definite step backward after the more grandiose Anakim. He was especially concerned about the strength of the naval demonstration to be held in the Bay of Bengal and the extent of the U.S. participation in the operations. He asked the President to use his influence to make certain that the British did not delay in carrying

75 Msg No. 311, Roosevelt to Churchill, 9 Jun 43, Item 25, Exec 10.
77 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. X.
out their share of the plan. Then, while Stilwell fumed, Chiang deliberated for over a month before deciding to accept the plan. Stilwell had difficulty in preparing the Yunnan and Ledo Chinese forces for their parts in the SAUCY operation. During the Japanese threat to the Tung-Ting Lake area, troops had been diverted from the Yunnan force, and later Stilwell had to enlist Soong's assistance in preventing the Chinese War Ministry from diverting arms and equipment intended for the Yunnan force to other areas. Soong also was instrumental in securing fillers for the Chinese divisions training in India for the advance from Ledo, when these were slow in coming through. The British, on the other hand, opposed the transfer of additional Chinese divisions from China and their training in India. They maintained that the Ledo Road would be unable to support additional divisions in operations in Burma and that any number of well-trained troops could be used in China itself and should be readied there.

While their opinion of China's capabilities and importance was fairly low, the British were very much interested in receiving operations reports and collecting intelligence information from China. Stilwell strongly opposed giving them this type of information on the ground that his Chinese sources would dry up as soon as they discovered that the British were sharing the reports. In Stilwell's opinion, to establish a combined liaison committee to pool information would be "... like piling Pelion on Ossa and Delhi is already full of Ossas sitting on committees. ..." Although Marshall sympathized with Stilwell's position, he sustained the British request and reminded Stilwell that China was but one segment of the world situation:

This matter brings up the entire question of cooperation with the British upon which I must give you my frank views. Regardless of any feeling the Chinese may have toward the British, the British are our principal ally in fighting this war. It is imperative that we exert every effort to bring about genuine practical cooperation. Any action which tends towards bringing about a serious cleavage between us and the British will have a most serious effect on the conduct of the war and inevitably will seriously embarrass us in other matters in other theaters. The effect would be particularly deplorable at this time when we are making headway in getting the British to accept increasingly more responsibility for Japan's defeat.

Though progress may have been made in securing increased British interest in the war against Japan, it was difficult to detect any noticeable change in their...
basic attitude toward China. They continued to demonstrate their disinclination to operate on the major U.S. premise that it was important to keep China in the war. As the Joint War Plans Committee pointed out just before QUADRANT:

The basic difference between the two planning groups (U.S. and British), which required constant compromise, is the different evaluation placed on the importance of keeping China in the war.\footnote{Memo, JWPC for JPS, 9 Aug 43, sub: Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan, OPD 581 Security, 192. The memo was given to the President by Leahy on 10 August 1943.}

The committee went on to point out that the British position implied unwillingness to run major risks simply to assist the Chinese. Indeed, the British position implied that China was not indispensable in the war. Fundamentally, the JWPC continued, the British were guided by their desire to re-establish the prestige of the British Empire in the Far East. With this aim the United States had no quarrel, but the British realized that it would entail not only the consent but also the active military aid of the United States. Therefore, the British wished a campaign to capture the Burma–Singapore area and points beyond to be a combined effort and in line with this notion were in favor of substituting Formosa for China as the future base of operations against Japan. In conclusion, the JWPC underlined the decision it felt had to be made. The U.S. stand was built around the concept that China would be valuable as a future base of operations and visualized the use of Chinese forces in later operations. If this view were valid, tremendous efforts by both the United States and Great Britain would have to be made; if, on the other hand, the British view were to prevail, planning for the defeat of Japan should be modified accordingly and the whole Burma operation should be re-evaluated.\footnote{Memorandum, JWPC for JPS, 9 Aug 43, sub: Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan, OPD 581 Security, 192. (1) For the British view, see below, pp. 207ff, and also, John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. V, August 1943–September 1944 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), Ch. III.}

The mutual distrust between China and Great Britain and the increasing signs of doubt manifested by the British in the need for Burma operations did little to encourage the Washington planners.

Planning the Over-All War Against Japan

Side by side with planning for specific operations in the Pacific and Far East for the coming year, a new trend gained strength in Washington military planning—the intensive search for a long-range, over-all strategic concept and plan for the defeat of Japan. This was a natural outgrowth of the decision at TRIDENT to accept the U.S. appreciation of the Japanese war as a basis for future study and elaboration on the combined planning level. The limitations to all long-range planning remained constant, but, as General Hull put the case of the War Department planners:

Until a firm decision is made with respect to the use of our resources against each of these nations [Germany and Japan], a proper distribution of the available means to our different theaters cannot be made. Specifically, I mean that until a final decision is made and adhered to with respect to an over-all plan of campaign against Japan, we will continue to find ourselves in the position of being unable to logically
determine what means should be dispatched to the various theaters of the Pacific, and to India and China. . . . Until the plan for the conduct of the war against Japan is decided upon, we are in an indefensible position whenever a question is raised concerning the dispatch of troops to various theaters bordering upon Japan. The decision is made piece-meal, and without full consideration of the effect the dispatch of such troops will have on the main effort of the campaign. . . . Initially, both the Japanese and the German Axis held the initiative. For this reason, it has been necessary that the War Department meet the requirements of the various theaters on a day-to-day basis. That this has been uneconomical is realized by all. We now have the initiative and are in a position to maintain it. The application of our resources to the conduct of the war is, therefore, of our own choosing. As our resources are not unlimited, and as our enemies are both strong, it is essential to a successful outcome of the war that our means be applied in an economical manner. We cannot afford extravagance.87

Despite the lack of firm decisions, the Joint planners and the Joint War Plans Committee went ahead with their planning during the summer of 1943.88 The dealings of the Joint planners with their British counterparts brought home again the fact that the latter did not share the U.S. perspective on the value of Burma operations. Given this disagreement and the fact that the bulk of the men and resources deployed against Japan was American, the Joint planners advised the JCS that it was most important that the United States retain its leadership in planning the war against Japan.89

The American planners' efforts at long-range planning in the summer of 1943 were concentrated in two fields, both in preparation for the next plenary session of the CCS: outlining specific operations to be carried out through 1944, and development of an appreciation of the over-all war against Japan. The planners worked on the assumptions that Italy would be knocked out of the war in 1943 and Germany in the fall of 1944, and that the USSR would enter the war against Japan only when it could do so at small cost to itself. They relied on the Joint Intelligence Committee estimate that, barring radical changes in the over-all situation, Japan could be expected to remain on the strategic defensive.90

The Joint planners proceeded to draw up a tentative schedule for the war against Japan through the end of 1944 and provided the JCS with their estimates of the forces and means required. [See Table 1]. The outstanding feature of this joint plan was the provision for the neutralization of Rabaul in spite of all the protestations of MacArthur and his staff that Rabaul must be captured. The actions planned in the Southwest and Central Pacific areas should aim at reaching the Vogelkop–Palau line by the end of 1944 and should progress on a mutual support basis. In the North Pacific, the JPS believed, the seizure of

87 Memo, Hull for Handy, 17 Jul 43, no sub, with SS 111 in ABC 581 SS Papers, Nos. 96-126/3 (7 Jan 43).
88 (1) CCS 269, 5 Jul 43, title: Appreciation and Plan for the War Against Japan. (2) Min, 95th mtg JCS, 6 Jul 43. (3) Min, 96th mtg JCS, 13 Jul 43. (4) Min, 85th mtg JPS, 14 Jul 43. (5) Min, 102d mtg CCS, 16 Jul 43.
89 JPS 67/6, 7 Jul 43, title: Preparation of Plans for the Defeat of Japan.
90 (1) OPD brief, title: Notes on 100th mtg JCS, 6 Aug 43, with JCS 440 in ABC 384 Pacific-Far East (26 Jul 43), A. (2) JCS Memo for Info 88, 26 Jul 43, title: Estimate of Enemy Situation, 1943-44, Pacific Far East Area.
Kiska would pave the way for possible operations against the Kurils.91

While the specific operations and schedules were being worked out on a joint level, the Combined Staff Planners brought forth an over-all appreciation of the war against Japan. Following the TRIDENT Conference a team of U.S. interservice planners had spent several weeks in London discussing the strategy of the war against Japan with British planners.92 After the team returned to

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91 (1) JCS 440, 4 Aug 43, title: Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 1943-44, Pacific-Far East Area. (2) Min, 100th mtg JCS, 6 Aug 43. The JCS accepted the estimate for presentation to the British. See CCS 301, 3 Aug 43, title: Specific Operations in the Pacific and Far East, 1943-44.

92 The U.S. group was the Red Team of the JWPC—Capt. H. B. Slocum, USN, Colonel McDaniel, and Col. Willard R. Wolfinbarger.
courage China to contribute as much as possible to the war effort, they should not bank too heavily on results from that source.

In support of the U.S. Navy view, the Combined planners recommended that, in the Pacific, the Central Pacific approach to Japan should become the main effort, with operations in SWPA and the Aleutians assuming subsidiary roles. In the Far East, they agreed, China should be kept in the war and Burma should be retaken. The Americans and the British agreed that north Burma should be captured, but differed on the timing of the operations in south Burma. The British preferred a drive on Singapore after north Burma was seized, whereas the Americans favored clearing south Burma first. In either case, Pacific and Asiatic drives should be co-ordinated insofar as possible to ensure mutual support. The advance from the east, primarily with large naval forces, and the advance from the west, primarily with large land and air forces, would converge in the Hong Kong-Formosa area. Hong Kong, if recaptured, would offer important port facilities and a foothold on the China coast. A move could then be made to seize Formosa. Other strategic positions that might be captured, if the seizure of Hong Kong and Formosa proved to be impracticable, included Luzon, Hainan, and one of the Ryukyus. Once a port on the China coast or on the island of Formosa was in Allied hands, long-range strategic bombardment of Japan could begin. At the same time, operations to move closer to Japan could be undertaken in preparation for the final invasion.

As to timing, the planners felt that by the end of 1944 the advance through the Pacific should have reached the Palaus and the advance from the west should have secured possession of most of north Burma. The Philippines, Formosa, the Ryukyus, and Malaya were targets for 1945 and 1946. Final operations against Japan proper would commence in 1947 and extend into the following year.93

To Admiral Cooke, the chief Navy planner, this combined plan appeared to have many faults. Pointing out that the over-all objective accepted at TRIDENT envisioned the defeat of all the Axis nations in the shortest possible time, he observed that there were two alternatives: (1) defeat Germany in 1944 and Japan in 1948 or (2) redistribute forces and defeat both countries in 1946. The latter choice would be more in accord with the TRIDENT objective. Were the Japanese to hold out until 1948, Admiral Cooke believed that the American desire to continue the war would lessen and the Japanese would evade defeat. The British planners could not accept the second alternative and suggested that any such decision would have to be made at a higher level.94 Since Cooke's interpretation but gave voice to the consistent U.S. desire to shorten the Pacific war, the issue would have to be settled on the top British and American levels.

The increasing concern over the need for long-range planning, which had been

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93 (1) CPS 89, 8 Aug 43, title: Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan. CPS 89 corresponds closely to the joint time estimates cited above. (2) CCS 269, 5 Jul 43, title: Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan. (3) Min, 95th mtg JCS, 6 Jul 43. (4) Min, 101st mtg CCS, 9 Jul 43. (5) Min, 94th mtg JPS, 12 Aug 43. (6) Min, 71st mtg CPS, 13 Aug 43. The agreement of the British planners that CPS 89 be the first order of business at QUADRANT contrasted with their earlier reluctance to consider Pacific affairs at all during QUADRANT.

94 Min, 72d mtg CPS, 13 Aug 43.
growing among the American planners since the Casablanca Conference, began to produce results during the summer of 1943, but the planners still lacked the basic high-level Allied decisions to enable them to develop firm and definite plans. The Combined planners had made preliminary progress in defining areas of agreement and disagreement. Until Allied policy and planning were closely linked, this was as far as the planners could go. It was evident to the U.S. planners that the formulation, and even the acceptance, of plans did not mean scheduled operations would follow automatically in the Pacific and CBI. It appeared that at the forthcoming conference the British once again would have to be convinced of the value of China to the war effort. If a land offensive were to be launched in November, fresh impetus would have to be supplied and additional pressure brought to bear upon the British and Chinese.

Insofar as the war against Japan was concerned, planning and preparations for the six major projects, which claimed the greater part of the Army staff's attention during the interval between TRIDENT and QUADRANT, went forward with varying success. On the positive side, the Central Pacific offensive was set up and the continuation of the South-Southwest Pacific drive was approved, for the present on an equal basis. The Japanese evacuation of Kiska had made the goal of clearing the enemy from the Aleutians almost embarrassingly simple. In the CBI, the slow development of the airlift had been frustrating but deceptive, since the difficult preparatory stage was just about over and swift improvement was in the offing. The China air war had brought no decision. The most discouraging prospect was the dim outlook for the Burma operation. Varying policies and interests of the Allied countries—the United States, Great Britain, and China—continued to compound an already muddled situation. Considered as a whole, the trend, except for Burma, was definitely forward, with the pendulum swinging more strongly in favor of the Allies as time and superior resources worked to their advantage. In order to meet the requirements of the theater commanders for maintaining the initiative, inflicting additional attrition, and attaining strategic positions for later offensives against Japan, the War Department had actually dispatched almost 110,000 men in the two months following TRIDENT—87,000 to the Pacific, 3,600 to the CBI, and 19,000 to Alaska. Such was the cost in U.S. military manpower, in midsummer 1943, of attempting to keep the struggle with Japan a dynamic but limited war.

Impressed with the necessity of achieving the delicate balance and proper timing in the global deployment of forces to maintain the strategic initiative now possessed against the two major foes, War Department planners began to generate pressure for a firm and early decision on a basic over-all plan against Japan. Their action was reminiscent of similar pressure brought by the War Department for agreement on an over-all plan for the European conflict in early 1942. But in place of the unique role the War Department had played in developing and supporting its "brain-child"—the BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan—in that essentially defensive and garrisoning phase of

*STM-30, 1 Jan 48.*
the global war, it was now to find itself but one of several contributors to the maturing joint and combined systems, where over-all blueprints in the war against Japan were being debated and devised.

As might have been expected, the first efforts in the early summer of 1943 to formulate over-all long-range plans on the combined planning level showed only preliminary, tentative results. The upshot was a valuable, if as yet somewhat academic, exercise in coalition planning against the second of the two major foes. Basic foundations for coalition planning against Japan were lacking, and would continue to be, until firm decisions were made on the European war at higher levels. Even in this regard the outlook, while not immediately encouraging, was not completely dismal. There was reason to hope that a more definite basis for long-term planning against Japan might soon be supplied as a result of the final showdown on the strategy against Germany the U.S. staff was determined to force at Quadrant.
CHAPTER X

QUADRANT—Shaping the Patterns
August 1943

As the QUADRANT Conference drew near, General Marshall and his staff were convinced of the need for a showdown with the British. Once before—in July 1942—Marshall had led a move for a showdown. Then he had had to yield on a cross-Channel operation and accept TORCH instead. A series of opportunistic moves had followed in the Mediterranean—moves the U.S. staff sought to parallel with limited offensive actions in the Pacific. Marshall had fought to keep the Mediterranean commitments limited while he struggled to keep the BOLERO idea alive and the war against Japan progressing. But there was always the danger that the two limited wars—one in the Pacific, the other in the Mediterranean—would become all-out wars or absorb so much that little would be left for a major offensive in northwest Europe. The Army planners now feared that the Mediterranean trend had already gone so far as to be well-nigh irreversible. There were also signs, as Marshall was aware, of increasing restlessness among Navy planners, anxious to get on with the Pacific war, over his European strategy. At hand was an acceptable plan for concentration in the United Kingdom for a cross-Channel operation—Plan OVERLORD. The time for a final decision on European strategy therefore appeared to Marshall to have arrived. But would the President now support him, and, if so, would they be able to convince the Prime Minister and his staff?

Staff Planning and the President’s Position

Part of the answer was soon to come. General Marshall, on the eve of his departure for Quebec, met with the President at the White House to discuss the line of action to be followed at QUADRANT. At this meeting on 9 August, the President observed that the planners were “always conservative and saw all the difficulties,” and that more could usually be accomplished than they would admit. Between OVERLORD and post-Husky operations in the Mediterranean (now called PRICELESS), he assured the Army Chief of Staff that he was insistent on OVERLORD. But he felt that more could be done in the Mediterranean than was currently proposed by the U.S. planners. Pointing to the scheduled departure of seasoned troops from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom, he agreed that the seven battle-tested
divisions be provided for Overlord. He proposed, however, that seven fresh divisions be dispatched from the United States for Priceless. At the same time the President assured Marshall that he did not wish to have anything to do with an operation into the Balkans nor did he even intend to agree to a British expedition in that area that would cost the United States vital resources such as ships and landing craft necessary for other operations. He was in favor of securing a position in Italy to the north of Rome and taking Sardinia and Corsica, thereby posing a serious threat to southern France.

General Marshall replied that the United States "had strained programmed resources well to the limit" in the agreements already reached regarding Overlord and Priceless. While the movement of three divisions from Priceless forces to Overlord could be undertaken without a loss in troop lift and with some advantage in equipping the French, beyond this point movements to Overlord of veteran units would cost the United States part of its troop lift. Marshall feared that the proposed movement from the United States to Priceless would result in a corresponding reduction for Overlord. He promised the President, however, that he would have a critical review made of the logistical factors involved. In a humorous vein, the President remarked that he did not like Marshall's use of the word "critical" since he wanted help in carrying out his idea rather than obstacles placed in the way.¹

The Army planners that same day presented a report on the logistical implications of reinforcing Priceless.² It indicated that, on the basis of optimistic predictions of available personnel lift in the Atlantic, it would be possible, by 1 May 1944, to build up in the United Kingdom the force of 1,300,000 U.S. troops provided for in Trident estimates and, in addition, to lift approximately 100,000 more either to the United Kingdom or to some other theater.³ Recent troop lists prepared by the European Theater of Operations, however, called for over 1,400,000 U.S. troops by 1 May 1944 to make up balanced striking forces for the Combined Bomber Offensive (Pointblank) and Overlord. If the Trident estimates of 1,300,000 were adhered to, and if the optimistic shipping estimates for the Atlantic proved correct, the Army planners admitted that seven U.S. divisions could be lifted to North Africa by the middle of 1944 without affecting the availability of divisions for Overlord as set at Trident. But, the planners pointed out, the utilization of personnel shipping to lift troops to the Mediterranean before June 1944 would not contribute as much to striking a direct decisive blow at the European Axis as the employment of the same shipping to insure a well-balanced force in the United Kingdom. They observed, moreover, that it was the opinion of General Eisenhower and of the JCS that the force

¹ Memo, G. C. M. for Handy, 9 Aug 43, no sub, WDCSA 381 Super Secret, I.
³ (3) The Army planners' report was based on shipping estimates furnished by the Planning Division of the Transportation Corps, ASF. See memo, Col Marcus B. Stokes, Jr., Chief Planning Div Transportation Corps, for Gen Handy (Attn: Col G. A. Lincoln), 9 Aug 43, sub: Reinforcement of Priceless, incl to memo, Handy for CoS, 9 Aug 43, sub: Movement of Additional Divs to the Mediterranean, Item 51, Exec 10.
currently committed to the Mediterranean (less the seven divisions scheduled for transfer to the United Kingdom) would be adequate to achieve the desired objective of occupying Italy to a line north of Rome, seizing Sardinia and Corsica, and making a diversionary effort against France from the Mediterranean. The addition of seven divisions to General Eisenhower's forces in the Mediterranean would make a total of thirty-one divisions available in that area, as compared with twenty-nine for the main effort, OVERLORD. The Army planners therefore called for the full troop lift of 1,400,000 to be allocated to OVERLORD and POINTBLANK.

At the session of the JCS at noon on 10 August, shortly before a scheduled conference of the JCS with the President, General Marshall reported the President's inclination to furnish seven new divisions from the United States to replace the seven veteran divisions scheduled for transfer to the United Kingdom. Arguing that this reinforcement of PRICELESS would occur at the expense of the build-up for OVERLORD, he emphasized that, even if the seven additional divisions were provided, they could not arrive in the Mediterranean before June 1944. The President, he went on, should be informed of General Eisenhower's report that he had sufficient resources to conduct the proposed operations in Italy. The President should also be apprised that an additional force of seven divisions would in reality constitute an expeditionary force available for use in the Balkans. General Marshall felt that the President was opposed to operations in the Balkans, and particularly to U.S. troop participation in them, on the ground that they represented an uneconomical use of shipping and also because of the political implications involved. In rallying the JCS against the Presidential proposal, General Marshall was supported by Admiral King, who was particularly fearful lest the provision of shipping for seven new divisions to the Mediterranean seriously curtail planned Pacific operations.

Meanwhile—at one o'clock that same afternoon—Secretary of War Stimson, who had recently returned from the United Kingdom, conferred with the President at the White House. That very morning, he had decided to present his conclusions to the President in writing. So serious did he consider the action he was about to recommend—decisions that would affect Marshall's position in the Washington high command—that he called Marshall in to let him read what he was going to say, in case Marshall had any vital objections. Stimson recorded the reaction of the Army Chief of Staff in his diary entry for that day: "He said he had none but he did not want to have it appear that I had consulted him about it. I told him that for that very reason I had signed the paper before I showed it to him or anyone else." Stimson also recorded that the conference that followed at the White House was "one of the most satisfactory" he had ever had with the President.

In the course of the conversation he produced his letter of conclusions. In it Stimson reasoned:

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5 Min, 103d mtg JCS, 10 Aug 43.
We cannot now rationally hope to be able to cross the Channel and come to grips with our German enemy under a British commander. His Prime Minister and his Chief of Imperial Staff are frankly at variance with such a proposal. The shadows of Passchendaele and Dunkerque still hang too heavily over the imagination of these leaders of his government. Though they have rendered lip service to the operation, their hearts are not in it and it will require more independence, more faith, and more vigor than it is reasonable to expect we can find in any British commander to overcome the natural difficulties of such an operation carried on in such an atmosphere of his government.

Stimson went on to point out that the difference between the Americans and the British was "a vital difference of faith." The U.S. staff believed that only by massing the great vigor and might of the two countries under overwhelming mastery of the air could Germany be defeated. The British theory was that Germany would be beaten by a "series of attritions" in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. The USSR, to which both the United States and Great Britain were pledged to open a second front, would not be fooled by "pinprick warfare"—a special danger in the light of postwar problems.

Stimson concluded his letter:

I believe therefore that the time has come for you to decide that your government must assume the responsibility of leadership in this great final movement of the European war which is now confronting us. We cannot afford to confer again and close with a lip tribute to Bolero which we have tried twice and failed to carry out. . . . Nearly two years ago the British offered us this command. I think that now it should be accepted—if necessary, insisted on.

Finally the time had come to put

". . . our most commanding soldier in charge of this critical operation at this critical time." Lincoln had had to. fumble by trial and error until he discovered the right man. Wilson had to choose a relatively unknown. But Roosevelt was far more fortunate. He had General Marshall, who

. . . already has a towering eminence of reputation as a tried soldier and as a broad-minded and skillful administrator. This was shown by the suggestion of him on the part of the British for this very post a year and a half ago. I believe that he is the man who most surely can now by his character and skill furnish the military leadership which is necessary to bring our two nations together in confident joint action in this great operation. No one knows better than I the loss in the problems of organization and world-wide strategy centered in Washington which such a solution would cause, but I see no other alternative to which we can turn in the great effort which confronts us.

The President, Stimson noted, "read it [the letter] through with very apparent interest, approving each step after step and saying finally that I had announced the conclusions which he had just come to himself." 6

Later on 10 August the JCS joined the Secretary and the President at the White House to discuss the coming conference with the British at Quebec. 7 At this meeting the President reported that, from his conversations with the Secretary of War, he had learned that the

6 The entries of 10 August 1943 in Stimson's Diary referred to above and his memo of 10 August, on which this discussion is based, are quoted in detail in Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 435–38. A copy of ltr, Stimson to President, 10 Aug 43, is also contained in SW files, White House, 38.

7 The President had invited Stimson to stay on for the conference with the JCS. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 438.
Prime Minister currently favored operations against the Balkans but was opposed to an operation against Sardinia. The Secretary of War qualified this statement, pointing out that Mr. Churchill had disclaimed any wish to land troops in the Balkans, but had indicated that the Allies could make notable gains in that area if the Balkan peoples were given more supplies. The Secretary of War affirmed that the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, wished the Allies to invade the Balkans. To this the President added that the British Foreign Office did not wish the Balkans to come under Soviet influence, and therefore the British wished “to get to the Balkans first.” He himself did not follow the logic of the British thinking on the Balkans. He did not believe, he stated, that the USSR desired to take over the Balkan states but rather that the USSR wished to “establish kinship with other Slavic people.” He assured the U.S. military leaders that he himself was opposed to Balkan operations. In arguing against a Balkan operation the President reasoned along the lines of the view that had been emphasized by General Marshall and General Handy on the undesirability of basing hopes for victory on political imponderables. He declared that it was “unwise to plan military strategy based on a gamble as to political results.”

In recommending against the President’s proposal for replacing the seven trained divisions to be taken from the Mediterranean with seven from the United States, General Marshall and Admiral King repeated the arguments they had advanced at the meeting of the JCS earlier in the day. On the basis of the War Department study he had made, General Marshall reported that the seven new divisions could be transported to North Africa by the end of June 1944 and the planned build-up for OVERLORD could still be executed. But he emphasized General Eisenhower’s belief that even without the seven divisions to be sent to the United Kingdom he would still have a sufficient force to conduct the projected operations in Italy, capture Sardinia and Corsica, and have fourteen divisions available for an invasion of southern France in coordination with OVERLORD. Dispatching an extra seven divisions to the Mediterranean, Marshall argued, would meet the desires of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, invite their use in an invasion of the Balkans, and so extend the Mediterranean operations as to have a harmful effect on the main effort from the United Kingdom. Following the presentation of these arguments, the President announced that he would advocate leaving General Eisenhower with his current build-up, less the seven divisions earmarked for transfer to the United Kingdom.

Turning to the basic question in grand strategy, Admiral King suggested to the President that, if the British insisted upon abandoning OVERLORD or postponing OVERLORD indefinitely, the United States should abandon the project. The President replied with the optimistic view that the United States itself could, if necessary, carry out the cross-Channel operation. He felt certain that the British would make the necessary bases available to the United States for the operation. General Marshall ob-

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8 Min, mtg held at the White House at 1415 between the President and the JCS, 10 Aug 43, with JCS Memo 97 in ABC 337 (25 May 43).
jected to the President's suggestion on the ground that fifteen British divisions were already available in the United Kingdom. In no other place in the world, he maintained, could fifteen divisions be put into an operation without entailing great transportation and supply problems. The President affirmed his wish for the preponderance of U.S. forces in OVERLORD from the first day of the assault in order to be able to justify the choice of an American commander for the operation. In line with the emphasis that had been placed by Washington military planners on the wastage in the Allied war effort resulting from past divergences from the main plot, General Marshall cautioned the President against subsequent changes in basic decisions. He was prepared to accept only minor diversions from the main plan—and those only when absolutely necessary. It was especially important to avoid such dislocation of the American war effort as had resulted earlier from the change from BOLERO to TORCH. Marshall reminded the President that every such shift in plans resulted in changes in production, loading of convoys, and other phases of U.S. war mobilization, which "reached as far back as the Middle West in the United States."  

The ranks of the American high command appeared closed as never before. Cheered as the staff was, the question remained whether the President and his military advisers could see the agreed policy through in the conference with the British.

had touched on strategy and planning differences in the war against Japan, the JCS had urged the President to try to persuade the Prime Minister to put full British support behind the projected Burma operations—operations to which the President had already agreed on 26 July.  

Stimson has recorded the delight of the U.S. staff with the "clear and definite" stand of the President on the conduct of the war against Germany, marking the full acceptance by the Commander in Chief of the military policy for which Stimson and Marshall had been fighting. The ranks of the American high command appeared closed as never before. Cheered as the staff was, the question remained whether the President and his military advisers could see the agreed policy through in the conference with the British.

The U.S. leaders left the meeting of 10 August agreed to insist on the continuation of the current build-up for the cross-Channel operation from the United Kingdom and on carrying out OVERLORD as the main U.S.-U.K. effort. The JCS now had the President behind them in their plans for Europe.  

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10 The next day the Chief of Staff forwarded to the President cogent reasons for justifying an American commander for OVERLORD on the basis of the comparative strength of the forces involved rather than on the number of divisions alone. Marshall assured the President that the United States would have 3,200 more combat planes, from one to four more combat divisions, and an appreciably greater number of corps and Army supporting troops than the British. At TRIDENT the United States and the United Kingdom had agreed that on the target date the British would provide a minimum of fourteen divisions with a possible increase to eighteen and the United States would provide a total of eighteen and half divisions. General Marshall told the President that he would see to it that the eighteen and half divisions were increased to nineteen without further discussion. See memo, CofS for President, 11 Aug 43, sub: Divs for OVERLORD on May 1, 1944, Item 51, Exec 10. This memo, evidently prepared by OPD, is preceded by a notation on OPD stationery, dated 16 August 1943, which states that the memo was dispatched to the President and received by him on 11 August 1943.  

11 (1) Min, mtg held at White House at 1415 between President and JCS, 10 Aug 43, with JCS Memo 97 in ABC 337 (25 May 43). (2) See also min, sp JCS mtg, 26 Jul 43.  

The Conferees Assemble

After the completion of their preparations, the U.S. military delegation left for Quebec. In preparing for the meetings with the British, American military planners as well as their chiefs had carefully studied British preparations, representation, and techniques in negotiations at past conferences and had taken steps to match them.\(^{13}\)

At Quebec, amid the quaint 18th century charm of the French city, the military staffs were quartered and held their meetings in the impressive Château Frontenac overlooking the St. Lawrence River. The President and Prime Minister made their headquarters at the old fortress known as The Citadel, close by the historic Plains of Abraham, and currently the summer seat of the Governor General of Canada. Special ramps had been installed for the President's use, and the two plenary sessions of the conference were held here for his convenience. As the delegations assembled, the news from the war fronts—especially of the war against Germany—was definitely encouraging. Reports of Italian peace moves were persistent. In Sicily the campaign was in its final stages, and by 17 August—early in the conference—Sicily was entirely in Allied hands. On the Eastern Front the Russians had seized the initiative and had begun to drive the Germans back to their homeland. The Combined Bomber Offensive had finally gotten under way in earnest. In the war on the U-boats in the Atlantic, the tide that had turned in the spring of 1943 was running even more strongly in Allied favor. American intelligence estimates on the eve of the conference predicted that the German war against Allied shipping would continue, but with diminishing effect; that the Germans would try, during 1943, to improve their defensive position in the USSR, and to impair Soviet offensive capabilities by attrition; and that the Germans would stand on the strategic defensive on all fronts during 1944, yielding outlying territories only under compulsion. The estimates held that Germany would resist as long as there was any hope of a negotiated peace.\(^{14}\)

In Alaska, U.S. troops had occupied Kiska, and the Japanese had finally withdrawn from the Aleutians. General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific forces were ready to advance on Salamaua in New Guinea and South Pacific forces were driving ahead on the island of New Georgia. Only in the CBI had the front remained more or less stationary. U.S. intelligence estimates on the Pacific and Far East situation held that Japan would probably remain on the strategic defensive unless convinced that an attack by the USSR was imminent or that

\(^{13}\)See especially: (1) memo, Wedemeyer for Marshall, 8 Jun 43, no sub, Paper 68, Book 10, Exec 8; (2) memo, Lt Col L. J. Lincoln, Actg Chief Combined Subjects Sec OPD, for Col Roberts, OPD, 15 Jun 43, sub: Working Staff To Accompany Planners to the Next Combined Conf, Tab 2 with JPS 189 in ABC 337 (25 May 43); (3) memo, Col Roberts for Rear Adm Bernhard H. Bieri, 26 Jun 43, sub: Proposed Working Staff To Accompany Planners to Next Combined Conf, with JPS 189, "A," in ABC 337 (25 May 43); (4) OPD brief, title: Notes ..., 96th mtg JCS, 27 Jul 43, Quadrant, memo by JSSC (JCS 422, JCS 422/1, CCS 288), with CCS 288 in ABC 337 (25 May 43) (OPD action officer was GAL (Col G. A. Lincoln)); (5) min, 102d mtg JCS, 9 Aug 43; and (6) min, 103d mtg JCS, 10 Aug 43.

\(^{14}\)CCS 300/1, 7 Aug 43, title: Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 1943-44, European–Mediterranean Area.
CHATEAU FRONTENAC, OVERLOOKING THE ST. LAWRENCE RIVER, scene of QUADRANT Conference, August 1943.

American and British planners arrived on the scene to lay the groundwork for the conference a few days before the principals began their sessions. Then in the eleven-day period of the conference between 14 and 24 August 1943, the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff met for a full-dress debate on Allied strategy in the war. Present among the American delegation to assist General Marshall were General Handy, the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, and General Wedemeyer, the Army planner, and a considerable number of other Washington Army planners delegated for duties on the planning and working staff level.

16 (1) Min, 93d mtg JPS, 11 Aug 43. (2) The U.S. planners had come to the conference in advance at the request of the British, but meetings between the two groups of planners did not begin until 13 August. See min, 71st mtg CPS, 13 Aug 43. (3) Min, 94th mtg JPS, 12 Aug 43.
17 Among the Washington Army planners attending the QUADRANT Conference were: OPD members Colonels Roberts and Todd, deputies to Gen. Wedemeyer; Lt. Col. L. J. Lincoln to represent the U.S. Army for implementation; Colonel Starbird to appear for the U.S. Army on European Theater of Operations; Colonel Connor to represent the U.S. Army on North African Theater of Operations; and...
The Prime Minister brought to the conference a full staff complement, including such special assistants as General Morgan (COSSAC), Brigadier Wingate, and Maj. Gen. A. W. S. Mallaby, General Wavell's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, who had flown in from India. Churchill arrived at Quebec on 10 August, then journeyed to Hyde Park for a brief visit with the President, returning to Quebec on 15 August. The President did not arrive at Quebec until the 17th—three days after the Combined Chiefs had begun their sessions.

Debating the Issues in the War Against Germany

The Arguments

In the discussions at QUADRANT between the staffs on the war against Germany, the U.S. Joint Chiefs sought a final resolution of the question whether the main effort was to be made from the United Kingdom or in the Mediterranean. In the process, they sought agreement on the relationship between operations in the two areas. As usual in the conferences with the British in mid-war, General Marshall served as the principal American spokesman on European strategy. In part this was recognition of his strong convictions and his talents in advocacy and military diplomacy. In part it was acceptance of the view that the American concept of European strategy was essentially that of the U.S. Army and its defense in debate with the British should properly be conducted by the War Department spokesman. As already suggested, Marshall was convinced that a final choice between the basic alternatives of cross-Channel versus Mediterranean now had to be made. He was prepared and willing to risk a showdown with the British at this point—the consequences of which he fully realized. He made clear to his colleagues that...

As it had previously decided, the American delegation immediately presented its proposal that OVERLORD be given overriding priority over other operations in the European theater.

Sir Alan Brooke replied for the British Chiefs of Staff that the British were in complete agreement with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that OVERLORD should be the major U.S.-U.K. offensive for 1944. Nevertheless, he went on to stress forcefully the necessity of achieving the three main conditions on which the success of the OVERLORD plan was based: (1) the

Col. Vincent J. Esposito to handle logistical matters for the Army relating to troops. Included with those detailed to attend as members of the JWPC teams were: Colonel Besell of the Senior Team; Colonel McDaniel of the Red Team; Lt. Col. Harvey H. Fischer of the Rainbow Team; and Colonel Armstrong of the Blue Team. See JCS Memo for Info 91, 4 Aug 43, Paper 7, Item 11, Exec 5. For a list of British and U.S. officers in attendance, see Telephone Directory filed in Annex to ABC 337 (25 May 43).

For a discussion of British preparations for the conference during the voyage to the United States, see Churchill, Closing the Ring, Ch. 4.

CCS 303/1, 16 Aug 43, title: Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe. CCS 303/1 contains the JCS statement of views.

Min, 104th mtg JCS, 15 Aug 43.

Min, 108th mtg CCS, 15 Aug 43.
reduction in German fighter strength; (2) the restriction of German strength in France and the Low Countries and of German ability to bring in reinforc-
ments during the first two months; and (3) the solution of the problem of beach maintenance. To create a situation favorable to a successful OVERLORD was the main British aim of Allied operations in Italy. The desired Allied, vis-
à-vis enemy, strength, Brooke emphasized, could be attained by operations in Italy to contain the maximum German forces and by air action from the most suitable Italian bases to reduce German fighter forces. In this connection Sir Charles Portal argued the advantages of gaining the northern Italian air-
fields.22 Not too surprisingly, the British soon turned the discussion to the much-debated question of the seven divisions. If the seven divisions were withdrawn from the Mediterranean, the British Chiefs argued, the Americans and British would run risks in the Medi-
terranean that might preclude or jeop-
ardize success in OVERLORD. On the basis of this reasoning, Sir Alan Brooke concluded, therefore, that the decision sought by the U.S. Joint Chiefs between OVERLORD and operations in the Medi-
terranean would be “too binding.”23

In reply, General Marshall questioned whether the necessary conditions for OVERLORD could be brought about only by increasing Allied strength in the Mediterranean. If Italian resistance proved to be weak, he agreed, the Allies ought to seize as much of Italy as possible. While it would be better if the Allies held the northern airfields of Italy, he believed that almost as much could be accomplished from the Florence area. In his opinion, a successful OVERLORD could be insured only by giving it an overriding priority. Unless OVERLORD were given that priority, the operation might never be launched. Unless the seven divisions from the Medi-
terranean were dispatched and the neces-
sary means were concentrated for OVERLORD, OVERLORD would at best be-
come a “subsidiary operation.” A delay in such decisions not only would hinder the OVERLORD build-up but also would have repercussions on Pacific operations. Marshall again emphasized, this time to the combined staffs, that any exchange of troops contrary to TRIDENT agreements “would absorb shipping” and upset supply arrangements “as far back as the Mis-
sissippi River.” Unless OVERLORD were given an overriding priority, General Marshall went on, the entire U.S.-U.K. strategic concept would have to be re-
vised. In that event, the United States and the United Kingdom would have to rely on air bombardment alone to defeat Germany, and only a reinforced U.S. Army corps for an “opportunistic” cross-
Channel operation might well be left in the United Kingdom. Although the Combined Bomber Offensive had accom-
plished great results, the final outcome of that operation—and the very possi-
bility of an opportunistic cross-Channel undertaking — remained “speculative.” Such a recasting of strategy, he pointed out to the British, might lead to a pos-
sible reorientation of American offensive efforts toward the Pacific.24

The British position, as could be ex-
pected, was not inflexible. On 16 Au-
August, General Marshall informed his American colleagues that Churchill had told him the previous evening "that he had changed his mind over OVERLORD and that we should use every opportunity to further that operation." Marshall had taken the opportunity to tell the Prime Minister that he could not agree to the logic of supporting the main effort by withdrawing strength from it to reinforce the effort in Italy. In Marshall's view, the British approach to OVERLORD was by "indirection."  

To counter the British reservations and qualifications, the JCS on 16 August accepted for presentation to the CCS proposals submitted by General Handy. Handy called for the acceptance by the CCS of the TRIDENT decision for OVERLORD—including the definite allotment of forces for it—and of the American proposal of overriding priority for OVERLORD, without reservations or conditions. The JCS decided to withhold

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the second part of General Handy’s proposals—alternative recommendations for a radical reversal in U.S. strategic policy—calling for the abandonment of OVERLORD and placing the main effort in the Mediterranean, in the event the British Chiefs of Staff refused to back OVERLORD wholeheartedly. On this “Mediterranean alternative” scheme, foreshadowed in General Hull’s analysis a month earlier, the JCS were noncommittal. At the same time, the JCS decided immediately to inform the President, who had not yet arrived at the conference, of the emerging divergences in British and American staff views and especially of their concern over apparent reservations of the British on OVERLORD. General Handy was delegated to fly to Washington at once. On 17 August the President arrived in Quebec to lend his support to OVERLORD. By that time—after three days of staff debate—it was already clear that a compromise was in the making and that the U.S. staff would have to accept something less than “overriding priority” for the operation.

In arguing his case before the President and CCS in plenary session, Churchill declared that he had not favored SLEDGEHAMMER in 1942 or ROUNDUP in 1943, but he “strongly favored” OVERLORD for 1944. His objections to the earlier operations, he stated, had been removed. He wished all to understand, nevertheless, that the implementation of the OVERLORD plan depended on the fulfillment of certain conditions. One of these conditions was that no more than twelve mobile German divisions were to be in northern France at the time the operation was mounted. Another was that the United States and the United Kingdom had attained definite superiority over the German fighter forces at the time of the assault. He urged that the OVERLORD plan be subject to revision by the CCS in the event that the German strength exceeded the twelve mobile divisions. He also suggested that the Allies keep a “second string to their bow” in the guise of a prepared plan to undertake Operation JUPITER—the invasion of Norway, long a favorite project of his.

Churchill and General Marshall agreed that an increase in the initial assault force would greatly strengthen the OVERLORD undertaking.
Minister called for an addition of at least 25 percent strength. General Marshall pointed out that actually there would be four and one half divisions in the assault rather than the force of three divisions suggested at the Trident Conference. The President seized the opportunity to express his desire, already stated to the JCS, to speed the shipment of U.S. troops to the United Kingdom. General Marshall repeated that the matter was being studied. At the same time, he emphasized to the conferees that the greatest limiting factor on all the prospective Anglo-American operations was the shortage of landing craft. Had landing craft been available, Marshall pointed out, the Anglo-American forces could have already made an entry into Italy.81

Turning to Mediterranean operations, the British and U.S. military leaders sought to speed the elimination of Italy from the war and decide the course of action to be taken after the prospective landings in Italy. Keeping abreast of current plans of General Eisenhower’s staff for two amphibious assaults to be launched early in September—Baytown (across the Strait of Messina) and Avalanche (into Salerno Bay)—they took steps to expedite negotiations on Italian peace feelers.82 On the delicate question of how far to go in Italy, the Prime Minister assured the conferees that he was not committed to an advance beyond the Ancona–Pisa line.83 All were agreed on the desirability of capitalizing on the Italian fields as far north as they became available and thereby extending the range of the Combined Bomber Offensive.84

The Prime Minister indicated his hesitancy in placing Anglo-American divisions in southern France as a diversion for Overlord and said that he doubted that the French divisions would be capable of undertaking such an operation. Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that there were two routes by which such a diversion might be achieved: a drive west from Italy, if the Allied forces had been able to advance far enough north, and an amphibious operation against southern France. Such a diversion in southern France, he also maintained, would depend on what the German reactions had been. Troops would be landed in southern France only if the Germans had been compelled to withdraw a number of their divisions from that area. In the light of these conditions, the Prime Minister suggested an alternative plan he termed “air-nourished guerrilla warfare” in southern France. This proposal envisaged flying in supplies for French guerrillas at a rendezvous point in the mountains thirty miles inland from the southern French coast. The President went even further and voiced the belief that guerrilla operations could be conducted in south-central France as well as in the Maritime Alps.85

81 (1) Min, 1st mtg CCS, President, and Prime Minister, Quadrant, 19 Aug 43. (2) Min, 2d mtg CCS, President, and Prime Minister, Quadrant, 23 Aug 43. Both in Official Quadrant Conf Book.
82 (1) Min, 116th mtg CCS, 24 Aug 43. (2) Min, 110th mtg CCS, 17 Aug 43. (3) Min, 108th mtg CCS, 15 Aug 43.
83 (1) Ibid. (2) Min, 2d mtg CCS, President, and Prime Minister, Quadrant, 23 Aug 43. Official Quadrant Conf Book.
84 (1) Ibid. (2) Min, 2d mtg CCS, President, and Prime Minister, Quadrant, 23 Aug 43. Official Quadrant Conf Book.
As for operations in the Balkans, the President indicated his desire to have the Balkan divisions that the Allies had trained, particularly the Greeks and Yugoslavs, operate in their own countries. He expressed the belief that it would be advantageous if these Balkan divisions would follow-up and harass the Germans, should the latter decide to withdraw from the Balkans to the line of the Danube. The Prime Minister suggested that commando forces could also operate in support of the guerrillas on the Dalmatian coast. Neither the British nor the American leaders expressed an interest in offensive land operations by the United States and Great Britain in the Balkans.

A persistent note pervaded the discussion of the American delegates—the fear of draining strength and means away from the cross-Channel operation and the consequent desire to restrict Mediterranean operations. How to keep the war in the Mediterranean a limited one contributing to OVERLORD and early victory over Germany was the problem. In any event, whatever measures were undertaken to eliminate Italy, establish bases on the mainland, seize Sardinia and Corsica, and launch an operation in southern France in conjunction with OVERLORD, should be carried out with the forces allotted at TRIDENT. To such limits the British raised objections. They argued strongly the need for more leeway in allocating resources in order to insure the success of the Mediterranean operations—all the more important now to pave the way for OVERLORD. Hence, they saw great danger in accepting rigid commitments for the Mediterranean—a straight jacket likely to jeopardize the Allied cause in the whole European-Mediterranean area.

Staff differences on the question of Mediterranean commitments were themselves symptomatic of more basic and lingering divergences in European strategy—on the role of preparatory operations and the timing of the main blow. Back of these divergences lay the even more fundamental differences in approach to strategy—the claims of waging attritional warfare versus those of concentration in a selected area. Though a definitive reconciliation of strategic methods and theories might be beyond the scope of the staffs assembled in conference, the practical issue on which the larger divergences came to settle—the question of Mediterranean commitments for the following year—posed a problem for immediate compromise.

Plan RANKIN

In the course of discussing operations in the European-Mediterranean area, British and American military leaders also considered the possibility of an emergency return to the Continent. For this a new plan was at hand—Plan RANKIN. Prepared by General Morgan’s COSSAC staff, it provided for an emergency return to the Continent in the winter of 1943–44, or early spring of 1944 before the target date for OVERLORD.37 Just as OVERLORD represented

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36 Min, 1st mtg CCS, President, and Prime Minister, QUADRANT, 19 Aug 43. Official QUADRANT Conf Book.
37 For the outline of Plan RANKIN, see CCS 320, 20 Aug 43, title: "RANKIN."

According to General Wedemeyer, General Bark-er, the senior member of the COSSAC staff, wrote the outline for RANKIN before he left London for consultation with the U.S. War Department and
the culmination of the thinking on decisive cross-Channel operations that had been embodied in Roundup and Roundhammer, so Rankin signified a new version of the Sledgehammer concept of an opportunistic operation. Added weight was given to the urgency of this planning in view of the President’s expressed interest in it at Quadrant and particularly in the light of his expressed desire at the conference that the “United Nations troops . . . be ready to get to Berlin as soon as did the Russians.”

Plan Rankin set forth three contingencies for the emergency return: Case A: a substantial weakening of German resistance; Case B: a withdrawal of the German forces from occupied countries; or Case C: unconditional German surrender. The COSSAC planners considered that any of these three contingencies might evolve from the continuation of such encouraging developments as the German reverses on the Eastern Front, the growing threat to Germany in Italy and the Balkans, the setback to the German submarine campaign, and the increasing Allied air offensive. The COSSAC planners shaped their proposals for the emergency operations on the considerable alteration of the Allied strategic situation in the European-Mediterranean area since the incorporation of the Sledgehammer concept into the War Department Bolero-Roundup plan in the spring of 1942.

In Case A of Plan Rankin the COS-SAC planners set as the objective a lodgment on the Continent from which the U.S. and British forces could complete the defeat of Germany. The assault area was to be the same as that for Overlord—the Cotentin-Caen sector of northwestern France. If there was a sufficient disintegration in morale and strength of the German armed forces, an operation against organized opposition could be undertaken in January or February 1944 to capture the Cotentin Peninsula. Alternatively, a modified Overlord would be put into effect in March or April 1944. In either case, the COSSAC planners believed, the port of Cherbourg would have to be captured within the first forty-eight hours to provide adequate maintenance. In Case A of Plan Rankin, as in Overlord, diversionary operations in the Pas-de-Calais area, and from the Mediterranean would probably be necessary.

In Case B of Plan Rankin the COSSAC planners also called for a lodgment on the Continent from which the Allies could complete the defeat of Germany. The first place of entry for the main Allied forces in this event was to be Cherbourg. In Case B, moreover, substantial Allied forces were to be sent from the Mediterranean to occupy the ports of Marseille and Toulon and move northward as required.

In Case C of Rankin the COSSAC planners stated that the object was to occupy as quickly as possible areas from which the Allies could enforce the terms of unconditional surrender imposed by their governments on Germany. Under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, France, Belgium, and the Rhine Valley from the Swiss frontier to Duesseldorf were to be under
the control of the U.S. forces, with British representation in the liberated countries; Holland, Denmark, Norway, and northwest Germany from the Ruhr Valley to Luebeck were to compose an area under the control of the British forces, with American representation in the liberated countries.

The COSSAC planners concluded that the forces allotted for OVERLORD should also be considered available for RANKIN. In all three of the contingencies they emphasized the importance of rehabilitating the liberated countries. They therefore recommended that the United States and the United Kingdom lay down policies to govern the establishment of military governments in enemy territory to be occupied by Allied troops and of national administrations in the liberated Allied territories. Nuclei of combined Anglo-American civil affairs staffs in London for Germany and for each Allied and friendly country within the sphere of the Supreme Allied Commander should be established.

In discussing RANKIN, Sir Alan Brooke stated the hope of the British Chiefs that fewer forces might be used for occupation purposes than set forth in the plan. Admiral Leahy replied that the JCS shared this view. The U.S. Joint Chiefs recommended that RANKIN be approved in principle and that it be continuously reviewed. The CCS approved these suggestions, noting that, in line with the plan, the U.S. Joint Chiefs would appoint a commanding general, staff, and headquarters for the U.S. Army group in the United Kingdom.

Compromises and Agreements

The operations in 1943–44 for the defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe, approved by the CCS, the President, and the Prime Minister at QUADRANT, represented another compromise of British and American views on strategy. The conferees agreed that Operation OVERLORD was to be the main Anglo-American effort in Europe with a target date of 1 May 1944, approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation OVERLORD, and authorized him to proceed with preparations. Because of differences in British and American views of the relationship between OVERLORD and Mediterranean operations, the U.S. delegation had to yield on its desire for overriding priority for OVERLORD and accept a compromise statement that, in the event of a shortage of resources, available means were to be disposed and utilized with the “main object” of insuring the success of OVERLORD. The American delegation also accepted, as an added qualification to its original proposal that operations in the Mediterranean area be conducted with the forces allotted at TRIDENT, the clause upheld by the British representatives—“except insofar as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.”

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40 CCS 320, 20 Aug 43, title: "RANKIN:"
41 Min, 115th mtg CCS, 23 Aug 43.

It is interesting to note that in commenting favorably on RANKIN to General Wedemeyer at Quebec, Colonel Starbird of OPD had taken the position that, as a result of public opinion, a more complete occupation of Germany than that envisaged under RANKIN might be necessary. See memo, Starbird for Wedemeyer, 21 Aug 43, sub: Comments on RANKIN, with CCS 320 in ABC 384 NW Europe (20 Aug 43), 1-A.

42 CCS 319/5, 24 Aug 43, title: Final Rpt to the President and Prime Minister.
43 Ibid.
44 For a discussion of Plan RANKIN, see Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 79–82, and Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 104–06.
The same proviso was attached by the British to the planned return of the seven divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD, though Marshall had fought hard for a decision without strings. The conferees also accepted the British proposal that in the event OVERLORD could not be executed, JUPITER should be considered as an alternative and called for plans to be developed and kept up to date for such an operation. All agreed that the Combined Bomber Offensive (POINT-BLANK) was to remain in the "highest strategic priority" and was to be extended from all suitable bases—particularly from Italy and the Mediterranean—as a prerequisite for OVERLORD.

As for Mediterranean operations, the conferees agreed on the basic outlines of the three phases of operations in Italy that the JCS had suggested in their proposals to the CCS before QUADRANT. The first phase, as accepted at QUADRANT, called for the elimination of Italy from the war and the establishment of air bases in the Rome area and, if possible, farther north. For the moment at least, these general objectives in Italy represented a meeting ground between the aims of the Americans and the desires of the British.

The second phase involved, as the JCS had recommended, the seizure of Sardinia and Corsica. In this connection the delegates decided to request General Eisenhower to examine the possibilities of intensifying subversive activities on the islands in order to facilitate entry into them. This action stemmed largely from the American staff’s urging, especially for Sardinia. The JCS had themselves been persuaded to make this proposal to the CCS by Generals Marshall, Handy, and Wedemeyer in the course of staff discussions during the conference. In the meeting of the JCS on 19 August 1943, Generals Marshall, Handy, and Wedemeyer had argued that, in view of the shortage of landing craft available to General Eisenhower, and in the light of the opportunity to test the effectiveness of the Office of Strategic Services organization, "fifth column activity" should be undertaken by the OSS on Sardinia. In the third phase of operations in Italy, the conferees accepted the JCS provision for maintaining constant pressure on German forces in northern Italy and creating conditions favorable for the eventual entry of Allied forces, including most of the re-equipped French Army and Air Force, into southern France. Also in keeping with the American proposal, offensive operations against southern France were to establish a lodgment in the Toulon-Marseille area and exploit northward in order to create a diversion in connection with

The JCS had recommended in their proposals to the CCS the establishment of air bases "as far north as the Rome area, and if feasible, to include the Ancona area." See CCS 305, 9 Aug 43, title: Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe.

(1) Min, 108th mtg JCS, 19 Aug 43. General Marshall directed that General Handy, ACoS OPD, prepare a proposal for submission to the CCS. (2) The original version of the proposed message submitted by General Handy is evidently contained in "Proposed Message from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Eisenhower" [19 Aug 43], Item 51, Exec 10. A pencilled notation on this proposed message indicates that this draft message was "dictated by General Wedemeyer." (3) For the slightly revised version of the proposed message submitted by the JCS to the CCS, see CCS 318/1, 20 Aug 43, title: Sardinia, Fifth Column Activities. (4) For the amendment adding Corsica, suggested by Sir Alan Brooke and included by the CCS in the message sent to General Eisenhower (as FAN 198), see min, 113th mtg CCS, 20 Aug 43.
OVERLORD. Omitted, however, was the qualifying phrase, "with available Mediterranean forces" that the JCS had sought.\(^47\) In line with the proposals of the President and Prime Minister, it was agreed that "air nourished guerrilla operations" in the southern Alps would be conducted if feasible.\(^48\) Also approved was the rearmament of French units up to and including eleven divisions by 31 December 1943. As a result of the deliberations at the conference, the CCS sent a directive to General Eisenhower calling for his appreciation and outline plan on operations in southern France, to be submitted to the CCS by 1 November 1943.\(^49\) In the preparation of the plan, Eisenhower was to consult with the Supreme Commander of the cross-Channel operations (whoever might be appointed) or his chief of staff so that his planning could be correlated with the requirements of OVERLORD.

With little debate, the delegations at QUADRANT rejected the idea of offensive ground operations by the United States and the United Kingdom in the Balkan area. Operations in that area were to be limited to supplying Balkan guerrillas by air and sea, minor commando raids, and bombing of strategic objectives. In keeping with the by then long-familiar concern of the JCS for safeguarding the lines of communications in the Mediterranean, appropriate Allied forces were to be deployed in northwest Africa so long as the possibility of a German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula remained. From the military point of view, the time was not considered right for Turkey to enter the war, but the United States and Great Britain were to continue to supply such equipment to Turkey as they could spare and the Turks could absorb.\(^50\)

Further measures were to be undertaken in the Atlantic to strengthen operations against the U-boats. Especially attractive was the possibility of using the Azores as a base for intensified sea and air operations and for the development of an air-ferry route.\(^51\) During the discussions, the British had indicated that negotiations over the Azores with the Portuguese Government, undertaken by the British Foreign Office in consultation with the British Chiefs of Staff, were approaching a conclusion. The Portuguese had agreed to the entry of a small British force into the Azores on 8 October (Operation ALACRITY). The U.S. delegation was assured by the British Chiefs of Staff that, upon gaining entry into the Azores, the British would seek to make arrangements for U.S. aircraft to use the airfields in the Azores as a base of operations and in transit.\(^52\)

Finally, on the President-Prime Minister level, a significant agreement was reached at Quebec on the question of

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\(^{47}\) For the suggested qualifying phrase by the JCS, see CCS 303, 9 Aug 43, title: Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe.

\(^{48}\) CCS 319/5, 24 Aug 43, title: Final Rpt to the President and Prime Minister.

\(^{49}\) (1) Min, 116th mtg CCS, 24 Aug 43. (2) CCS 328/1, 27 Aug 43, title: Dir to General Eisenhower.

\(^{50}\) See CCS 319/5, 24 Aug 43, title: Final Rpt to the President and Prime Minister.

\(^{51}\) Min, 111th mtg CCS, 18 Aug 43.

\(^{52}\) CCS 319/5, 24 Aug 43, title: Final Rpt to the President and Prime Minister.
command for the projected coalition effort in the European-Mediterranean area. Earlier, the two leaders had agreed that, since the United States had the African command, it was but fair that the commander of the cross-Channel operation be British. With Presidential agreement, Churchill had gone so far as to nominate General Brooke, Chief of the Imperial Staff, for the post and early in 1943 had so informed him. The logic of events, however, now compelled a change. Churchill has since recorded:

... as the year advanced and the immense plan of the invasion began to take shape, I became increasingly impressed with the very great preponderance of American troops that would be employed after the original landing with equal numbers had been successful, and now at Quebec, I myself took the initiative of proposing to the President that an American commander should be appointed for the expedition to France. He was gratified at this suggestion, and I dare say his mind had been moving that way.53

As already observed, the President’s mind indeed had been moving in that direction. An American officer, they therefore agreed, would command OVERLORD, and a British commander would take over in the Mediterranean, the time for the change to depend upon progress in the war. The way was thus cleared, as Stimson had strongly urged before the conference, for an American leader to take over the command of the cross-Channel operation. Whether that prize would fall to Marshall—as Stimson had hoped—or whether Marshall, like his British counterpart, would be passed over by the force of circumstances, remained to be seen.

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53 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 85.

Discussion on the War Against Japan

The British had originally intended to bypass the war against Japan at QUADRANT, but consideration of it consumed as much time and effort as it had at CASABLANCA and TRIDENT. Fear that the Pacific conflict might degenerate into a long war of attrition or stalemate made the United States anxious to spell out the future course and timing of operations. British reluctance to commit Allied resources too heavily in the Pacific until after the Germans collapsed was understandable, but could not withstand the growing American pressure for accelerated action. Two basic questions demanded consideration: selection of the main line of approach to the Japanese homeland and Great Britain’s role in the Pacific after Germany was defeated. Exploration of these vital problems at QUADRANT brought to light areas of Anglo-American disagreement that would require still further examination.

As usual in the midwar international conferences, Admiral King took the lead in presenting the U.S. case for the Pacific war—an acknowledgment by the Army of the Navy’s primary interest in the Pacific. Nevertheless, in backing the case for the Pacific position, Marshall was not unmindful of the Army’s interests. Ever conscious of the need to link Pacific and European strategy, he sought, insofar as possible, to safeguard the plans and projects of Generals MacArthur and Stilwell for their respective theaters.

The Search for a Long-Range Plan

The basis for discussion of the Pacific war at QUADRANT was the over-all plan
produced by members of the Combined Planning Staffs on the eve of the conference. The initial reaction of the JCS to this combined effort had been unenthusiastic, for they agreed generally that it overlooked many possible elements that might shorten the conflict. The American Chiefs’ distaste for any plan that might prolong the war until 1947 or 1948 was keynoted by King and Marshall in the second meeting of the CCS at Quebec. King told the Combined Chiefs that the current lack of means in the Pacific to carry out operations directed toward Rabaul (CARTWHEEL) was occasioned by Allied failure to consider the war against the enemy powers as a whole. Reverting to the mathematical approach of which he was evidently quite fond, he declared that if 15 percent of all Allied resources were now deployed against Japan, then an increase to 20 percent, or just 5 percent, would make one-third more resources available. The resulting decrease in resources available in the European war would amount to a mere 6 percent of the total. King and Leahy both thought it was most important to plan how to transfer the bulk of Allied forces from Europe to the Pacific-Far East once Germany was defeated. Marshall then went on to point out that not only were all operations in the Pacific related to those in Burma, but also affirmed that it was

... essential to link Pacific and European strategy. Movements of ships from the Mediterranean must take place in the next few days if operations from India were not to be delayed, and a decision must be taken. It was important that no time should be lost in agreeing on a general plan for the defeat of Japan since the collapse of Germany would impose the problem of partial demobilization and a growing impatience would ensue throughout the United States for the rapid defeat of Japan.

Since the British would be faced with an even greater demand for demobilization as a result of their long participation in the war, Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff were perfectly amenable to the early completion of a general plan for the war against Japan. They realized that the future role of Great Britain in the struggle would vitally affect British demobilization, particularly that of the ground forces. Since British land forces would probably be substantially de-

54 CPS 83, 8 Aug 43, title: Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan. See also Ch. IX, above.
55 Min, 102d mtg JCS, 9 Aug 43.
56 Min, 107th mtg CCS, 14 Aug 43.
increased after the defeat of Germany, the British desired to base their main contribution to the war against Japan on air and naval units. They hoped that Japan might be defeated by sea and air attack alone, but they agreed with the Americans that, for planning purposes, an invasion by land forces should be assumed as ultimately necessary.  

Using the proposed over-all plan as a basis, staff planners moved to define for the consideration of the CCS the points at issue and those on which the Americans and British agreed. American planners condemned the proposed schedule of operations in the Pacific as being too slow and suggested that the tempo be pitched to defeat Japan within twelve months of the fall of Germany. Although their British counterparts agreed on acceleration, they would not accept the twelve-month limit. Both staffs felt that the reorientation of forces toward the Pacific should be started about four to six months before the fall of Germany. They also agreed on an American advance toward the Central and Southwest Pacific and possibly the Northwest Pacific, and on a British drive via the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea, together with the development of a U.S. line of supply to China through Burma.

Perhaps the sharpest difference of opinion between the British and U.S. planners revolved around the sequence and timing of the operations to take south Burma and Singapore. The Americans believed that south Burma should be cleared right after north Burma and visualized a target date of November 1944 for the beginning of south Burma operations. The British, on the other hand, maintained that after the seizure of north Burma, south Burma should be bypassed until November 1946 and that an effort to take Singapore should be made in 1945. Wedemeyer advised the JCS that the long period of inactivity between the close of north Burma operations (May 1944) and the initiation of the Singapore campaign (March 1945) would result in too great a time lag. Furthermore, operations in south Burma would provide more direct aid to China.

The conflicting views between the two staffs were further complicated by Churchill. He sided with the United States in disapproving a Singapore expedition in 1945, since he did not think that the period from May 1944 to March 1945 should be a time of inaction. Instead, he wanted a move to take the northwestern tip of Sumatra—his favorite Far Eastern operation, which he pictured as the Torch of the Indian Ocean and possibly of as great strategic significance as the Dardanelles operation of 1915. The Prime Minister received little comfort from the President in this direction, for Roosevelt looked at the problem from another angle:

The position occupied by the Japanese might be compared to a slice of pie, with Japan at the apex, and with the island barrier forming the outside crust. One side of the piece of pie passed through Burma, the other led down to the Solomons. He
quite saw the advantages of an attack on Sumatra, but he doubted whether there were sufficient resources to allow of both the opening of the Burma Road and the attack on Sumatra. He would rather see all resources concentrated on the Burma Road, which represented the shortest line through China to Japan. He favored attacks which would aim at hitting the edge of the pie as near to the apex as possible, rather than attacks which nibbled at the crust.\footnote{Min, 1st mtg CCS, President, and Prime Minister, 18 Aug 43, Official QUADRANT Conf Book. See also min, 107th mtg JCS, 18 Aug 43.}

The JCS were willing to forego any definite decision on the south Burma-Singapore question until the next conference, but pressed for the acceptance of the twelve-month target date. In support of their belief in a shorter war, they presented an AAF plan for the defeat of Japan, based upon the use of the new very long range (VLR) bomber—the B-29 Superfortress—which was due to become available in quantity in 1944. The 1,500-mile tactical radius of this new weapon would allow it to reach most of the important targets in Japan proper, if it operated from bases in the Changsha area in China, and its bomb load of ten tons would permit greater destruction to be inflicted by each plane. Since the Air plan was so recent that even the U.S. staff had not had a chance to study it carefully, the CCS referred it to the Combined Staff Planners for close consideration. Inasmuch as use of Chinese air bases was part of the plan, the JCS recommended that the TRIDENT decisions regarding China's importance as an ally be reaffirmed and the capacity of air route to China be expanded. In the meantime, studies could be made of the possibility of operations at Moulmein in Burma and on the Kra Isthmus of the Malay Peninsula to isolate Rangoon—the gateway to north Burma and the Burma Road—and to facilitate the capture of Singapore. As to the Pacific, they urged that the U.S. plan for operations in 1943-44 be accepted \textit{in toto}.\footnote{Arnold, \textit{Global Mission}, p. 444; (4) Churchill, \textit{Closing the Ring}, pp. 90-91; (5) Leahy, \textit{I Was There}, pp. 178-79; and (4) King and Whitehill, \textit{Fleet Admiral King}, pp. 486-87.}

The British met the American proposals more than halfway. Since Japan depended so heavily upon airpower, naval strength, and shipping to maintain its position, the CCS decided that greater emphasis should be placed upon attrition and that greater use should be made of the Allied air forces for this purpose. Through the build-up of the air route to China, the employment of lightly equipped, air-supported jungle troops, and the use of special equipment such as HABAKKUKS and artificial harbors, increased advantages might accrue to the Allies.\footnote{HABAKKUKS referred to the project, in which Churchill was especially interested, for making an artificial landing field out of reinforced ice. Conceived by a British inventor on Mountbatten's staff, it was designed to be used in the ocean or in the English Channel. Various participants in the Quebec conference have in their memoirs described, in slightly differing versions, an amusing incident that occurred during the discussion of the proposal. As an experiment, a small model was brought into a CCS meeting during the conference and Lord Mountbatten fired at it with a pistol. Hearing the shots, one of the planners sitting outside the conference room is reported to have exclaimed, "My God! They're shooting one another! I wonder whom they've shot!" (1) Arnold, \textit{Global Mission}, p. 444; (4) Churchill, \textit{Closing the Ring}, pp. 90-91; (5) Leahy, \textit{I Was There}, pp. 178-79; and (4) King and Whitehill, \textit{Fleet Admiral King}, pp. 486-87.} The British accepted the twelve-month target date for future planning, but on the condition that the reorientation of forces toward the Pacific...
should proceed as soon as the German situation, in the opinion of the CCS, would so allow. Forces for the operations in the Pacific would be provided by the United States and those for the prospective operations in the Southeast Asia area by the British, except for special types available only to the United States. In the Pacific, as customary at the conferences, the U.S. schedule of operations was approved. Operations in north Burma would be carried out in February 1944, but the need for the amphibious landings at Akyab and Ramree would be investigated further. The CCS directed that studies be made on the south Burma-Singapore and Malaya-Sumatra operations. They also decided to examine fully the possibilities of developing the air route to China on a scale that would permit the use of the bombers and transports available after the defeat of Germany.\(^\text{64}\)

The anxiety of the British to assure themselves of a proper place in the later stages of the war—an issue that led to heated staff discussion—was assuaged by assigning to the Combined planners the task of investigating further operations in which the British would play the major role. Evidently the Prime Minister was well satisfied that any doubts regarding Britain’s desire to share in the final defeat of Japan had been effectively removed at \textit{QUADRANT}.\(^\text{65}\) To the Americans, however, the perplexing problem of how and where to use the British naval and air forces in an area where bases were few and logistical difficulties many required answers that, at the moment, they felt in no position to provide.\(^\text{66}\)

Although only certain features of the over-all plan were adopted by the CCS, there were several developments of especial significance. The acceptance of the twelve-month target date promised to shorten the war and to alter radically the timing and possibly the sequence of forthcoming operations. Similarly, the free hand given to the United States in the Pacific to conduct Southwest and Central Pacific offensives simultaneously promised to move the war into higher gear. The main portions of the over-all plan agreed upon by the CCS were essentially the short-term phases indicating immediate directions without committing the Allies to any definite ultimate roads. The relative importance of the different approaches to Japan—land, sea, and air—and the selection of the main line of offense for an invasion of Japan, if this should prove necessary, had not been considered. It remained to be seen whether this inability to determine conclusively where the weight of the Allied drive should be placed and which operations should be held as subsidiary foreshadowed the same prolonged deliberations on Pacific strategy as had marked the planning of European strategy.

\textit{Pacific and Far Eastern Operations 1943-44}

The American decision to open up a new line of advance in the Central Pacific with the Gilberts-Marshalls operations in the fall and winter of 1943-44 was received by the British without protest. This increase of pressure upon the

\(^{64}\) CCS 319/2 (rev), 27 Aug 43, title: Progress Rpt to the President and Prime Minister.


\(^{66}\) (1) Min, 109th mtg JCS, 20 Aug 43. (2) See also, min, sp mtg JCS, 9 Sep 43.
Japanese from the east, which would utilize the expanding U.S. naval forces profitably, made a favorable impression upon Churchill, who disliked the idea of fighting difficult land campaigns in Burma and China. Nevertheless, the British Chiefs at first did question the necessity for pressing forward in the Central Pacific and the Southwest Pacific with equal vigor and suggested that the New Guinea phase be limited to a holding operation, while the main effort took place through the mandated islands. Thus, they observed, resources might be released for OVERLORD.\(^{67}\)

Admiral King attacked this proposal at once, holding that if there were resources that could be spared from the Southwest Pacific, they should be sent to the Central Pacific. He stated that he himself considered both advances essential, and Marshall pointed out to the British that the troops and resources for the New Guinea operations were already in or en route to the theater.\(^{68}\) The British did not press the point further.

Since the British seemed to have no other objections to the American plan, the CCS approved the U.S. proposals to proceed successively through the Gilberts, Marshalls, Ponape, Truk, and the Palaus to the Marianas in 1943-44. Consideration was also to be given to operations against Paramushiro in the Kurils. In the Southwest Pacific, eastern New Guinea as far as Wewak, the Admiralty Islands, and the Bismarck Archipelago were to be seized. As foreshadowed before the conference, Rabaul was to be neutralized rather than captured.\(^{69}\) With these operations accomplished, a further move westward along the New Guinea coast to the Vogelkop Peninsula was to be made in step-by-step, airborne-waterborne advances.\(^{70}\) The decision to neutralize Rabaul marked the first official pronouncement of a policy of bypassing strong centers of resistance and foreshadowed the gradual replacement of the earlier conservative step-by-step method of operations in the Pacific.

In the CBI, the long wrangle over the importance of China and the value of capturing all of Burma came in for a full show of attention. The British appeared perfectly willing to carry out the north Burma campaign, but balked at the need for next clearing south Burma and were disinclined to go through with the amphibious landings at Akyab and Ramree. In fact, on several occasions the Prime Minister flatly opposed any commitment to conduct the latter and warned his Chiefs of Staff against taking any decision that he might later have to overrule.\(^{71}\)

The JCS and the President had agreed before the conference that the Burma campaign should not be delayed, and Roosevelt had even gone so far as to mention the substitution of American resources and ships and possibly two U.S. divisions, should the British seek to withhold forces and supplies for use in their Mediterranean ventures.\(^{72}\)


\(^{68}\)(1) Min, 110th mtg CCS, 17 Aug 43. (2) Min, 107th mtg JCS, 18 Aug 43.

\(^{69}\) See Ch. IX, above.

\(^{70}\) CCS 319/5, 24 Aug 43, title: Final Rpt to the President and Prime Minister.

\(^{71}\)(1) Min, 1st mtg CCS, President, and Prime Minister, 19 Aug 43. Official Quadrant Conf Book. (2) Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 88, 656, 657.

\(^{72}\)(1) Min, 9th mtg JCS, 26 Jul 43. (2) Min, mtg JCS with President at White House, 10 Aug 43. ABC 297 (25 May 43).
King had then been particularly disturbed by the unilateral action taken by the British in the form of their "standfast order" preventing the scheduled departure of resources from the Mediterranean to the CBI. At the conference the JCS exerted considerable pressure on their British colleagues in support of the land campaign to take all of Burma. They pointed out the necessity of support for China, which ultimately would provide the necessary facilities for the huge air forces to be released for use against Japan after the defeat of Germany. To Marshall there appeared to be four issues to be decided: (1) the value of Chinese troops to future operations; (2) the likelihood that the existing Chinese Government might fall if there were no sustaining action; (3) the possible Japanese reaction to heavy air attacks; and (4) the need for a port on the China coast. The road to China would not be opened, he felt, by a Sumatra operation, but only through the capture of all of Burma, including Akyab and Ramree.

The British were not convinced that the reconquest of south Burma was a prerequisite to assisting China, since they believed that the air route could be developed to the degree that it could supply most of the numerous Allied air forces that would become available for the CBI after Germany's defeat. Marshall agreed that, in view of the great difficulties of undertaking ground operations in the CBI, full advantage should be taken of the Allied air superiority. In the matter of Akyab and Ramree operations, however, the British were reluctant to make any decisions.

In the face of this indisposition on the part of the British Chiefs, the intransigence of the Prime Minister, and the lack of Presidential enthusiasm for Akyab and Ramree operations, Marshall admitted to the JCS that he himself considered the plan for the landings unrealistic, since the British seemed unable to produce enough efficient troops to ensure success. The possibility of withdrawing some of the better-led Indian divisions from the Mediterranean was considered by the JCS, but the shipping implications for OVERLORD and the Pacific made such a move of doubtful value.

Nature took a hand in the fate of Burma operations at this juncture, for Auchinleck reported that severe floods in Assam might force the cancellation of either the Ledo or the Imphal advance, and perhaps both. Even without the interference of nature, the limited capacity and inefficient operation of the Assam railroad promised to make difficult logistical support of the land campaigns in Burma. The strains on the Assam line of communications spurred the CCS decision to expand the railway capacity, and to lay gasoline pipelines between Calcutta and Kunming.

The possibility of tonnage deficiencies in Assam led the British Chiefs of Staff to suggest that a policy decision be made on the priority of resources for undertakings in the CBI. They felt that the priority system should not be a rigid one. Nevertheless, they favored putting the

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13 Min, 113th mtg CCS, 20 Aug 43.
14 Min, 110th mtg JCS, 21 Aug 43.
main stress on north Burma operations, so necessary to establish land communications with and to improve and secure the air route to China. This primary emphasis on north Burma operations would serve as a guide for the supreme commander of the Southeast Asia Command—still to be appointed. The commander would, of course, also have to keep in mind the importance of long-range development of the Assam line of communications, so fundamental for all CBI undertakings. Although the JCS recognized that the proposed priority might affect adversely the supply delivery to China over the Hump, they accepted the British recommendations.77

Logistical difficulties involved in supporting both the air effort and the projected ground offensive in China, which the TRIDENT decisions had failed to appraise adequately, had to be faced more realistically at QUADRANT. Despite British and Chinese preference for more emphasis on the air build-up, the end result was an apparent reversal of the priorities set up at TRIDENT. After the enthusiasm for the Chennault air plan that had been so manifest at TRIDENT, this volte-face seemed to be a major change in policy in the CBI. How strictly the reversal would be adhered to in the future remained a matter of conjecture, for although the unimpressive showing made by the air forces in China during the summer may have influenced the President to give the Stilwell-Marshall-Stimson school a chance to demonstrate the efficacy of a ground approach to aiding

China, he gave no clear indication that he had completely abandoned his predilection for the Chennault plan.

The Southeast Asia Command

Extensive negotiations after TRIDENT between the British and Americans over the organization and leadership of the Southeast Asia Command had brought no solution to this vexing problem, although they served to underline the

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77 (1) CCS 327, 23 Aug 43, title: Operations From India. (2) Min, 2d mtg CCS, President, and Prime Minister, 23 Aug 43, Official QUADRANT Conf Book. (3) CCS 319/5, 24 Aug 43, title: Final Rpt to the President and Prime Minister.
points of issue. To stave off another postponement of the campaign in Burma, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had tried, without success, to secure a settlement of the command problem before the conference convened.

The opportunity to discuss the problems face to face allowed the leaders on both sides to modify their positions and seek satisfactory compromises. Marshall, after a meeting with Churchill, admitted to the JCS that the Prime Minister had some ground for complaint on the absence of information from SWPA. In fact, to remedy the situation Marshall consented to the Prime Minister's having a personal representative on General MacArthur's staff. The Chief of Staff did not desire a similar situation in reverse to arise in the proposed southeast Asia command, but felt that a more moderate version of the MacArthur headquarters might be established that would avoid its defects and yet still be acceptable to the British. Changes were suggested that brought British proposals for a command closer to the Eisenhower pattern, while allowing operational control to remain under the British.

The British in turn dropped their brief for Sir Sholto Douglas and finally proposed Lord Louis Mountbatten, then British Chief of Combined Operations, for the post. Churchill found the President and General Marshall "very keen" on Mountbatten's appointment. His record and personality bespoke the kind of young, energetic, and offensive-minded leader that the Burma operations would require.

The most difficult administrative feature of the Southeast Asia Command concerned the appointment of Stilwell as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. The intricate Sino-American command system, which already had Stilwell serving as chief of staff to the Generalissimo, commander of U.S. Army forces in the CBI, and lend-lease administrator, required delicate handling. His responsibilities to the Generalissimo and the JCS were now to be complicated further by a responsibility to Mountbatten and the British Chiefs of Staff. As Stilwell himself expressed it:

The command setup is a Chinese puzzle with Wavell, Auk [Auchinleck], Mountbatten, Peanut [Chiang Kai-shek], Alexander and me interwoven and mixed beyond recognition.

This complex situation came about because the Allies recognized that Chiang would not permit Chinese forces to serve directly under British command and that the only way to ensure Chinese cooperation in the north Burma campaign would be to make Stilwell the middleman or point of contact and liaison. As Deputy Supreme Commander, he would control the Chinese forces engaged in the operations and co-ordinate the efforts of the Fourteenth and Tenth Air Forces so that they could also play their parts.

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78 See Ch. IX, above.
79 Min, 98th mtg JCS, 27 Jul 43.
80 (1) Min, 105th mtg JCS, 16 Aug 43. (2) Min, 106th mtg JCS, 17 Aug 43. (3) Min, 107th mtg JCS, 18 Aug 43.
81 (1) Min, 105th mtg JCS, 16 Aug 43. (2) Min, 116th mtg CCS, 24 Aug 43. (3) Leahy, I Was There, pp. 176-77. (4) Msg, Prime Minister (Quebec) to Deputy Prime Minister, 22 Aug 43, quoted in Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 89-90. See also msg, Prime Minister to Gen Sir Hastings L. Ismay for COS Committee, 24 Jul 43, quoted in Closing the Ring, p. 656.
82 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. X.
83 Stilwell Papers, pp. 218-19.
in Burma. Integration of forces and fulfillment of his varied responsibilities would give Stilwell a task hard to perform successfully, but in view of the already entangled command setup, it appeared to the Americans to offer the only practicable solution. With some doubt and hesitation over the ability of Stilwell to cope with the added duty, the British accepted the American proposals. 84

Geographically, the Southeast Asia Command would embrace Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Malaya, and Sumatra, all but the first then under Japanese domination. Under Mountbatten and Stilwell would be British commanders in chief of the ground, naval, and air forces. The Supreme Commander would have direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff on all matters, since his administrative and logistic support must be based upon India. The Viceroy of India had authority to settle any question of priorities, but Mountbatten could appeal the Viceroy’s decisions to the British Chiefs. General jurisdiction over strategy in SEAC and the allocation of U.S. and British resources of all kinds between China and SEAC would remain under the CCS, but the British Chiefs of Staff would exercise operational jurisdiction and would be the executive agent for transmitting all instructions to the Supreme Commander. To provide for exchange of information and intelligence coordination in India and in SEAC, a Combined Liaison Committee would be established in New Delhi. 85

Having resolved the Anglo-American differences, the ticklish question of presenting the combined agreement to the Generalissimo as a proposal rather than as an accomplished fact required the utmost tact and diplomacy. Since Thailand originally had been included in the China theater, its transfer to SEAC would have to be explained to Chiang gracefully in order to prevent any Chinese loss of face. Colonel Roberts of the Operations Division suggested that Dr. Soong would be the ideal intermediary to break the news. To emphasize the importance attached by the United States to the need for full Chinese cooperation with SEAC in the coming campaign, Marshall personally took Soong aside, after the CCS had informed him in general terms of their proposals, and underlined the necessity for Soong to convince the Generalissimo of the importance of the arrangement. 86

If Chiang would accept the boundaries of SEAC and co-operate with Mountbatten and Stilwell, the prospect for successful Burma operations appeared bright. Besides Mountbatten, the British had brought with them Brigadier Wingate, leader of the daring British raid behind the Japanese lines of communications in Burma earlier in 1943. Wingate’s imaginative and aggressive spirit captured first the favor of the Prime Minister and later the enthusiastic support of Marshall and the other American leaders. 87

Wingate explained to the CCS the tactical employment of his long-range jungle troops, which operated behind

84 Min, 111th mtg CCS, 18 Aug 43.
85 CCS 308/3, 21 Aug 43, title: SEAC.
86 (1) Min, 111th mtg JCS, 23 Aug 43. (2) Min, 2d mtg CCS, President, and Prime Minister, 23 Aug 43. Official QUADRANT Conf Book. (3) Min, 116th mtg CCS, 24 Aug 43.
the enemy's main forces disrupting communications and conducting guerrilla activities until the main advance could reach them. The British now proposed to organize six brigades of lightly equipped, mobile, air-supported troops similar to the Wingate groups. The plans for the units would be elastic and open to alteration in the light of the enemy reaction. Marshall was convinced that Wingate was a "best bet" and suggested that the United States might add a long-range column of its own to work under him in order to encourage the Chinese to act more favorably toward the project.

Injection of new blood into the Burma operation held forth a possibility that the campaign might actually be launched during the coming dry season, and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were ready to help make the possibility a reality in any way that they could. First, however, would come the task of eliminating the attitudes in India-Burma that had produced nothing but delays and excuses during the previous months. New leadership would make little progress until the old attitudes had been supplanted.

Emerging Strategic Patterns

By the close of QUADRANT, War Department planners could point to encouraging signs of progress in planning against Japan as well as against Germany. A mere surface appraisal of the record of accomplishments at the conference in regard to the Japanese would have been misleading. More or less perfunctory approval by the British of the American 1943-44 plan of operations in the Pacific, long overdue establishment of SEAC, lack of decision on subsequent operations in southeast Asia and China after north Burma, de-emphasis of the Chennault air plan after a short trial period, and failure of the CCS to evolve a long-range plan by no means told the whole story. Several essentially new features had entered the planning picture. Paramount among these was what might be called the new urgency—the recognition that the war on all fronts must be pushed forward faster, lest a stalemate develop and home morale bog down. This gathering momentum was manifested at QUADRANT in the fixing of the twelve-month target date for the defeat of Japan once Germany was beaten. The target date for ending the European conflict—October 1944—embodied in the OVERLORD plan accepted at QUADRANT, gave promise of clarifying one of the basic unknowns in over-all strategic planning against Japan—timing—and thus introduced a controlling objective hitherto lacking in that planning. Secondly, the evident intention of the British to get north Burma operations under way was demonstrated by the appointments of Mountbatten and Wingate. For the first time there was confidence that Burma operations would be launched. Going further, the British had served clear notice of their desire for an eventual "full and fair place in the war against Japan"—to borrow Churchill's phrase. In the third place, the American drive to improve the Assam line of communications and to expand the air route to China gave promise of a vastly increased operational effort both in Burma and in China.

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88 (1) Min, 107th mtg CCS, 14 Aug 43. (2) Min, 110th mtg CCS, 17 Aug 43.
89 Min, 107th mtg JCS, 18 Aug 45.
90 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 91.
Lastly, the projected introduction of a new weapon, the B-29, bade fair to revolutionize strategic concepts on the approach to Japan. As ranges of strategic weapons increased and distances shrank, bold new plans for shortening the war might be formulated and carried out. The promise of increased activity in the Pacific and the CBI, coupled with the prospective employment of fast aircraft carriers and very long range bombers, made the outlook for the war against Japan decidedly more encouraging. Emphasis on the strategic offensive against Japan, signalled by the U.S. staff first at Casablanca and then at TRIDENT, was thus confirmed all the more strongly at Quebec, and at least some of the components for an eventual strategic synthesis for defeating Japan appeared to be taking more positive form.

Perhaps the single greatest failure of the conference in respect to the war against Japan, from the viewpoint of the Army planners, was the inability to evolve a long-range strategic pattern. Aside from the twelve-month theory, an agreed blueprint on the “how,” “when,” and “where” of the ultimate defeat of Japan had still not been formulated. The question of whether to rely on bombardment and blockade or the invasion of Japan proper was left open. Selection of the main route was also postponed. That the Army welcomed whatever new plans and “modern and untried” methods of warfare—revolving about carriers, B-29’s, the new policy of neutralization, and inventions and techniques still in the experimental stage—that might keep the Pacific war progressing without absorbing Army troops and resources needed for defeating Germany is obvious. But there could be no certainty over whether the newly emerging strategic elements for speeding the Pacific offensive would eventually supplant the need of an over-all plan against Japan or, in the absence of such a plan, in the long run, might not themselves add to the “suction pump” pressures of the dynamic war in the Pacific.

Though there might still be reason after QUADRANT for Army planners to question whether planning in the war against Japan had been linked firmly enough to European strategy and whether strong enough barriers had been erected to keep the Pacific conflict a limited war, there appeared to be a more solid basis for believing that the trend to the Mediterranean was finally coming under control. Hitherto, that trend had been one of the most important keys to grand strategy—threatening, in the opinion of the American staff, not only any major cross-Channel operation but Burma and Pacific undertakings as well. The U.S. staff had come to Quebec seriously disturbed by the British “standfast” order in the Mediterranean and by the likely effect of Presidential overtures and British predilections for postponing the departure of the seven divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom. To keep the Mediterranean war a limited one contributory to the success of OVERLORD and early victory over Germany was the fundamental aim of the American staff. By the close of QUADRANT the Army planners could point to

91 During the QUADRANT Conference the “standfast” order was revoked and the CCS ordered the Middle East Command to dispatch some landing craft and cargo shipping for Burma operations. Additional releases of Mediterranean shipping followed. See: (1) Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 204-05; and (2) Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 91–92.
In the strategic synthesis emerging from QUADRANT provision was made for drawing together a major cross-Channel operation, the Mediterranean undertakings, and an extended Combined Bomber Offensive from the Mediterranean as well as the United Kingdom, and weaving them into an over-all scheme for defeating the Western Axis Powers. The new synthesis seemed to contain the formula—for which the War Department staff had been searching since the diversion from BOLERO-ROUNDUP to the Mediterranean in TORCH—that would retain the primacy of the cross-Channel operation from the United Kingdom, define the role of subsequent Mediterranean operations in relation to that main effort, and use to the fullest extent the potentialities of the Combined Bomber Offensive.

The War Department staff could take comfort that the new synthesis was developing to a considerable extent in line with their thinking. They could point to the fact that the central element in the new strategic pattern about which the other factors were woven was Operation OVERLORD. The adoption of that plan marked an important milestone in the campaign that had been waged by the American staff since General Marshall had taken the BOLERO-ROUNDUP proposals to London in April 1942. After long debate and many decisions and revisions on the highest levels, the United States and Great Britain had at last agreed upon an outline of a plan for concentrating forces for a major cross-Channel operation for the early and decisive defeat of Germany. Steps had been taken, moreover, to tie together the Mediterranean and OVERLORD operations in order to create favorable conditions for launching and supporting OVERLORD. The stress by British and U.S. leaders on central and western Mediterranean operations in support of OVERLORD and their disavowal of interest in offensive ground efforts in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean seemed to be added proof of their firm resolve to make the main effort against the Axis citadel from the United Kingdom in the spring of 1944. Limits in the form of compromise agreements—qualified as they were—had been set on priorities, magnitudes, and timing for operations in the European–Mediterranean area. Along with authorization for the definite allocation of forces in the approved cross-Channel operation—twenty-nine divisions for target date 1 May 1944—went, therefore, definite restrictions on future Mediterranean advances. The pattern of strategy agreed upon at Quebec pointed the way more clearly than before to the final halting of the diversionary trend from BOLERO to the Mediterranean that had begun with TORCH.

In retrospect, QUADRANT was a critical conference in the evolution of Anglo-American strategy in the war against Germany. If Casablanca represented for U.S. strategists initiation in planning for the offensive phase of coalition warfare, and TRIDENT a halfway mark, QUADRANT was the beginning of the final stretch. The results showed that the American staff had made marked progress in preparing and presenting its case and was mastering the art of military diplomacy. Most encouraging from the Army point of view was the fact that at this conference the President had held through and backed his Army Chief of
Staff on European strategy, enabling the Americans to present a united front to the British. In Army terms the Allies, at the crossroads in European strategy, had chosen correctly. The choice gave promise of realizing the basic objectives of Marshall and his staff in the conflict with Germany—a decisive war waged with a minimum of loss, expense, and time.

Nevertheless, the compromises adopted and the lingering debate over European-Mediterranean strategy in the following year indicate that, in the final analysis, negotiations at Quebec fell short of the final showdown desired by Marshall and his staff. Subsequent events would show that the Mediterranean issue was still far from permanently settled. Not only were the questions of advance in Italy and of eastern Mediterranean operations to rise again, but firm agreement on prospectively one of the most important links between the European and Mediterranean theaters—a southern France operation—still had to be reached. Aside from the need to put Anglo-American (and French) undertakings against Germany into final form, moreover, the conceptions of the Russians on Allied planning for concluding the war in Europe remained to be heard and the Western pattern of operations somehow had to be coupled with the Soviet effort to crush Germany. These problems and their solutions still lay in the future. For the Army staff after QUADRANT the immediate question was whether the outcome of the fight General Marshall had led at Quebec would prove successful and the British would follow through—all the more important now since the Russian bear, long impatient for the "second front" in Europe, was beginning to grumble again.
CHAPTER XI

"The Mediterranean Again"

August–November 1943

Behind the developments at Quebec, a significant transition in Anglo-American strategic planning in the war against Germany was in process. By the summer of 1943 U.S. manpower and production were coming into full play and lending weight to the American position—now, finally, a united front. On the other hand, the British were reaching the peak of their mobilization. The weight of the two partners in the war against Germany was coming into more equal balance. As a result, the strategic thinking and planning of the British had now to be adapted to American notions even as the Americans had been learning to adjust their ideas, planning, and negotiating techniques to those of their ally. The conglomerate pattern worked out at Quebec was one reflection of the shift in military weight. On the surface, at least, it appeared to offer a synthesis in which British and U.S. strategic ideas might be able to exist in reasonable harmony.

Though there was cause for optimism on the part of the Army strategic planners after Quebec, they also had grounds for caution. On the one hand, there was reason to hope that the period of sparring with the British in and out of the international conferences over the cross-Channel-Mediterranean issue might finally be over. OVERLORD had been accepted and steps taken to keep the Mediterranean advance limited and linked to it. On the other hand, past experience of General Marshall and his staff with the Mediterranean "suction pump" gave them pause. Large forces already deployed to the Mediterranean had tended to generate a strategy of their own—a strategy of opportunism, of sufficient logic and appeal to more than match American staff efforts to counter or dilute it. The Army planners, therefore, in the months following Quebec watched to see whether the agreements at the conference to make OVERLORD "top of the bill" would prove firm enough and the barriers erected to contain the Mediterranean advance strong enough. What appeared to the Army planners to be warning signals on the planning horizon were not long in coming—signs that made them seriously question whether the national policies and war aims of Great Britain and the United States in the war against Germany had actually found a lasting meeting ground in the strategic settlement reached at Quebec.
Invasion of Italy

At the conclusion of Quadrant, U.S. Army planners were anxiously awaiting the outcome of the Combined Bomber Offensive, the conflict on the Eastern Front, and the prospective invasion of Italy. Upon the success of these operations depended in large degree the creation of the prerequisite conditions for Overlord as defined at Quadrant. Operations in Italy, in the immediate offing, held forth the promise not only of gaining a foothold on the European continent and eliminating Italy from the war but also of containing a maximum number of German divisions and of furnishing valuable bases for extending the air offensive against Germany and her allies. Army planners were much encouraged by the progress made at Quadrant in weaving prospective operations against Italy with various other undertakings in the European-Mediterranean area into a single pattern to assure the success of Overlord. According to Quadrant agreement, the Mediterranean theater was henceforth to yield to the needs of the cross-Channel operation for manpower and resources. With the prospective invasion of Italy, a new offensive phase in the war against the European Axis seemed to be opening simultaneously with the halting of the diversionary trend to the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, Army planners, as a result of their experience of the past year, kept a sharp lookout lest the attractions and demands of undertakings against the so-called soft underbelly of Europe jeopardize the dominance of the cross-Channel operation.

Planning for the elimination of Italy revealed the increasing influence of the field commander and his staff in strategic planning and conduct of operations in midwar, when Allied troops were coming to grips with the enemy and the tempo of operations was quickening. Events were catching up with plans, and even passing them, and the big theater headquarters staff on the spot was performing various operational functions earlier rendered by the Washington headquarters. It will be remembered that, failing to reach precise agreements on post-Sicily Mediterranean strategy at the Trident and Algiers Conferences in the spring of 1943, the Allied chiefs had instructed General Eisenhower to mount operations designed to force Italy out of the war. The Allied Force Headquarters had proceeded to prepare a number of preliminary plans, but final plans and decisions had to await the outcome of Husky. Toward the end of June, General Eisenhower had informed the CCS of his intention, following a successful Husky, either to invade Calabria (Operation Buttress) and then, if necessary, to enter near Crotone (Operation Goblet), or to occupy Sardinia (Operation Brimstone). Preferring Buttress, he felt it necessary to undertake that invasion with enough force to occupy the heel and advance as far north as Naples. On 16 July the CCS had approved General Eisenhower's strategic concept and, following General Marshall's lead, expressed interest in the possibilities of a direct amphibious undertaking against Naples.

By 10 August, General Eisenhower had reached a decision to invade Italy.
in early September with attacks to be launched against Calabria and the Salerno area. The fall of Mussolini, the speed-up in the Sicilian campaign, and increasing signs that Italy was ready to sue for peace helped convince Allied planners that an invasion in the Naples area had good prospects for success. The decisive argument in favor of Salerno (Operation AVALANCHE) was that the Allies could not land farther north, largely because such objectives were beyond the effective range of single-motor fighters operating from Sicily. A landing in the Salerno area would put the Allies as close to Rome as possible and in a position to capture the port of Naples, a most valuable asset for the supply of their forces on the mainland.

On 16 August General Eisenhower announced his decision to launch Operation BAYTOWN across the Strait of Messina against the toe of Italy between 1 and 4 September and to assault the Salerno area on 9 September. Announcement of the cancellation of BUTTRESS soon followed. Since a ten-day interval between the two assaults would greatly alleviate the shortage in landing craft, permitting the use of at least some in both operations, his staff strove to make the first of the assaults as early as possible. On the 17th, the day the Sicily Campaign closed, General Eisenhower's headquarters confirmed the plan to have BAYTOWN precede AVALANCHE by the maximum possible interval.

BAYTOWN, planned as a predominantly British undertaking, was to be mounted from northeastern Sicily and to employ two divisions of the British Eighth Army (commanded by General Montgomery) in the assault. Striking at Reggio and nearby airfields, the forces were to sweep north to link up with one wing of AVALANCHE and also move toward the east to effect a junction with other British units to be landed near Taranto. AVALANCHE, the major assault on the mainland, was to be launched from Sicily and North Africa by the U.S. Fifth Army (commanded by Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark), using the U.S. VI Corps and the British 10 Corps.

On 9 September General Montgomery's Eighth Army began its crossing of the Strait of Messina. The Allied invasion of continental Europe had become an accomplished fact. On the same day an armistice was signed at Cassibile, near Syracuse, Sicily, by General W. B. Smith for General Eisenhower and Brig. Gen. Giuseppe Castellano for Marshal Badoglio. Public announcement came five days later. The military terms of the unconditional surrender—the so-called short armistice terms—included the cessation of hostilities, the transfer of the Italian Fleet to Allied control, and the

\[\text{AGWAR for CCS and to USFOR for Br COS, 16 Aug 43, CM-IN 11966. (2) Bcmt msg, Gen Smith (sgd Eisenhower) to Gen Whiteley, 17 Aug 43, CM-IN 12560 (action copy OPD). Both msgs were relayed to the conferees at Quebec.}\]

\[\text{4 For a discussion of the planning and execution of the invasion of Italy, especially as seen from the point of view of headquarters and commands in the theater, see: (1) Eisenhower rpt, Italian Campaign; and (2) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, Chs. 10 and 12; (3) Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II; and (4) Smyth, Sicilian Campaign and the Surrender of Italy.}\]
denial of facilities to the Germans. The timing of the announcement was complicated by the fact that originally an American airborne division was to land near Rome at the time the surrender was announced in order to seize the airfields and to deal with the two German armored divisions that had been massed there to aid the Italians. On 2 September—in a communication prepared by the President, the Prime Minister, and General Marshall—General Eisenhower was informed of the Allied chiefs' approval of his decision to go on with AVALANCHE and to land the airborne division near Rome. The latter part of the plan was abandoned at the eleventh hour, however, because the Germans, who since the fall of Mussolini on 25 July had been rushing reinforcements into north Italy, had already invested the airfields, and Italian co-operation with the Allies at that time was still not certain.

The collapse of Italian resistance came more quickly than the Germans had expected. Since the end of the Tunisia Campaign, there had been indications of the possible defection of Italy from the Axis. In late August Hitler had his staff prepare a plan (called ACHSE) for that eventuality. Under this plan all Italian units except those still loyal to the Axis and willing to fight were to be disarmed. German forces in the south would be withdrawn to Rome and would then become a part of Field Marshal Rommel's command in northern Italy. The Germans had no firm plan at this point to defend all of Italy since they did not think it feasible without Italian aid. Instead, they believed that the northern Apennines along the Pisa–Arezzo–Ancona line would be the major defense line. The decision to hold as much of Italy as possible was made after the Allied landings.

On 9 September AVALANCHE was launched with the U.S. Fifth Army initiating the attack. At Salerno the Fifth Army was composed of the British 10 Corps; and the U.S. VI Corps, comprising the 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions and soon to be reinforced by the 82d Airborne, and the 3d and 34th Infantry Divisions. Planning for AVALANCHE had been complicated because the operation was mounted from widely separated ports in Sicily and North Africa and shipping and landing craft had to be transferred from the BAYTOWN operation.

Although most of the planning for AVALANCHE was done in the theater and on the basis of forces already trained and available there, Army planners in Washington had continued to exercise their usual function of helping the theater commander strengthen his build-up for the operation. Using the yard-
sticks provided by the QUADRANT decisions and commitments, they measured the requests of General Eisenhower's theater headquarters staff against the needs of OVERLORD and the Combined Bomber Offensive. Thus, in the process of maintaining the delicate balance necessary in the over-all theater adjustment of resources and strength, the Army planners at times acceded to, at times opposed specific requests. They did not satisfy fully Eisenhower's needs in service units and replacements for P–38 groups. As a rule, they opposed requests for the augmentation of USAAF bombers, on the grounds that such bombers would have to be diverted from the Combined Bomber Offensive based in the United Kingdom and that the diversion would result in a departure from accepted European strategy. When temporary retention of bombers in the Mediterranean promised no undue delay to the CBO—Eisenhower's request for three Wellington night bomber squadrons to remain in his theater for a month before they were returned to the United Kingdom, for example—the Army planners expressed their agreement. On the question of additional divisions for the Italian operation, the War Department took the view that the cargo shipping requirements for any divisions that might be sent could not be permitted to cut into the OVERLORD build-up.

AVALANCHE was not a big amphibious operation—not as big as TORCH, or HUSKY, or OVERLORD, or ANVIL-DRAGOON—against southern France in the summer of 1944—but it involved a fair size force that had become eight divisions by the time it reached Naples and joined up with the British Eighth Army. The Army planners in Washington were encouraged by the quick fall of Foggia (evacuated on 25 September) and the promise of the Allies soon being able to use its air bases to complement the Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom. For the planners, establishment of such an "aerial Second Front" had been a primary objective and a major premise in the justification of an Italian campaign. On 1 October General Clark's forces entered Naples. The Germans fell back to the Volturno River and the formidable defensive positions of the so-called Winter and Gustav Lines.

The campaign in Italy thereafter developed into some of the fiercest and most difficult fighting in the war as the Allied forces sought doggedly to push their advance northward toward Rome against these defensive barriers, stubborn enemy resistance, and difficult terrain and weather conditions. In Italy, following the landing at Salerno, the U.S. Fifth Army initiated the longest single campaign for a U.S. Army in World War II. In the final analysis,
the Italian campaign was to become, as General Eisenhower later phrased it, "distinctly a subsidiary operation" in the war against Germany. But well into 1944 the issue of the extent of the Allied advance in Italy was to figure in Allied strategic discussions as a troublesome question in the lingering carry-over of the old cross-Channel versus Mediterranean debate.

**Rome Versus Rhodes**

The surrender of Italy led to renewed British pressure for further operations in the Mediterranean. Undertakings in the Mediterranean, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean, seemed to be as inviting to the British as they were disquieting to the U.S. military planners. American Army planners, believing that the over-all strategy for the defeat of the Axis in Europe accepted at QUADRANT had definitely oriented Allied operations northward and westward from the Mediterranean upon the collapse of Italy, began to fear that the strategic pattern would be upset. All land, sea, and air operations undertaken thenceforth, in their opinion, must directly support the cross-Channel effort; unwarranted diversions from the main objective must be avoided. The first mission assigned at QUADRANT to General Eisenhower as Allied Commander—elimination of Italy—had been accomplished; his second major task—to contain a maximum number of German forces in the Mediterranean—had to be carried out so far as possible with forces already available in the area. Eastern Mediterranean operations, the planners believed, in particular were likely to prove to be a vacuum that would draw off vital strength. They recognized British strategic responsibility for such operations based on the Middle East but held that those undertakings should be restricted to forces available in that area. Just as they sought to avoid an overemphasis of eastern Mediterranean ventures, so in a choice between allocating critical resources to the western Mediterranean or to OVERLORD they put their weight behind OVERLORD. In effect, the post-QUADRANT position of the War Department and the JCS was only a refinement of the basic American wish to remain uninvolved in the eastern Mediterranean and to be faithful to the OVERLORD—western Mediterranean pattern outlined at the conference.

Largely with this in mind, the War Department soon after QUADRANT proceeded to put into effect plans to scale down the U.S. effort in the Middle East—other than in aid to the USSR. At the beginning of September it dissolved the USAFICA (U.S. Army Forces in Central Africa) command and incorporated its area with USAFEIME (U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East), relieving Brig. Gen.

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14 For an example of the reasoning of the U.S. Army planners, see SS study [Oct 43], title: Major and Limited Operations in the Balkans via Eastern Mediterranean, Tab 172 in ABC 581 SS Papers, Nos. 160–95 (7 Jan 43).
Earl S. Hoag as commander of USAFICA and appointing a new commander, Maj. Gen. Ralph Royce, to succeed General Brereton in USAFIME. These steps followed closely on the heels of the consolidation by the AAF of units of the Ninth Air Force (in the Middle East) with the Twelfth in the Mediterranean and its decision a little later to reconstitute the Ninth under General Brereton in the United Kingdom—ending its period of service in the Mediterranean.

Royce arrived in the theater on 10 September and reported his new command in effect five days later. War Department instructions to Royce emphasized British strategic responsibility in the area, but, unlike the previous instructions to U.S. commanders in the area, they called for a reduction of aid to the British to a minimum. Royce was also ordered to keep the number of his troops low so that the manpower of the U.S. Army might be employed "more directly" against the enemy.

Events were soon to show that these unilateral actions to scale down the American effort in the Middle East were not enough to dampen British enthusiasm for Mediterranean—especially eastern Mediterranean—ventures.

A round of debate on Mediterranean operations opened almost immediately upon the invasion of Italy. On the same day that AVALANCHE was launched—9 September 1943—the Prime Minister, who had returned to Washington after the Quebec conference, sent for General Marshall. He showed Marshall a statement of his views on courses of action in the European-Mediterranean area following anticipated successes in Italy and indicated that he intended to present the memorandum to the President that day. Mr. Churchill's idea was that he and the President should hold a special meeting with the CCS later in the day to take stock of the new over-all situation presented by the collapse of Italy, and, in the process, discuss points raised in the memorandum. No decisions, he added, were to be expected. Considering it desirable for the JCS to meet before the session with the President and Prime Minister and the British military advisers, General Marshall had copies of the Prime Minister's note sent to the other Joint Chiefs as well as to the American planners.

In his statement the Prime Minister pointed out that, on the assumption the Allies would gain the Italian Fleet, the British fleet that had hitherto contained it would be released for service elsewhere. Substantial British naval power

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15 (1) OPD Diary, 29 Aug 43. (2) OPD draft memo, Marshall for CG's, AGF, AAF, ASF, USAFIME, USAFICA, Africa-ME Wing, ATC [late Aug 43], sub: Comd in the Middle East Central African Theater, with Paper 1 in ABC 381 Middle East (5-10-43), 1-B. (3) D/F, OPD for TAG [through SGS], 1 Sep 43, sub: Transmittal of Ltr of Instrs and incl OPD to TAG for Royce, 1 Sep 43, sub: Ltr of Instrs, WDSCA Middle East (Secret). The D/F contains the boundaries of the enlarged USAFIME. (4) OPD Diary, 3 Sep 43.

16 Craven and Cate, AAF II, 495-96, 642-45. On 16 October 1943 General Brereton assumed command of the Ninth Air Force newly located in the United Kingdom.

17 Ltr of Instrs, CofS for Royce, Cairo, 4 Sep 43, with JCS Memo 29 in ABC 381 Middle East (5-10-43), 1-A.

Though the Persian Gulf Supply Command was to remain under his command, Royce was relieved of responsibility for supply to the USSR. Also excepted from his control were Maj. Gen. Clarence S. Ridley's mission to improve the efficiency of the Iranian Army, Col. H. Norman Schwarzkopf's mission to reorganize the Iranian Gendarmerie, and certain activities in connection with Air Transport Command operations.

18 Min, special mtg JCS, 9 Sep 43.
therefore could be added to the prosecution of the war against Japan. It was his understanding that all were agreed that, following a decisive victory in the Naples area, the Allied armies would advance northward up the Italian Peninsula until they encountered the main German position. He proposed consideration of various possible Mediterranean operations—Corsica, Sardinia, Balkans, Rhodes, and so forth—on the assumption that the current “battle for Naples and Rome” would be successful and the Germans would retreat to the line of the Apennines or the Po. Churchill hoped that by the end of 1943, at the latest, the Allied force would be confronting the main German line in Italy in full strength. For the 1944 campaign, the Allies should be “chary of advancing northward beyond the narrow part of the Italian Peninsula.” By the spring of 1944, strengthened by a fortified line that would have been constructed in the meantime by the Allies—a line to be manned in part by Italian troops—a portion of the Allied troops could be diverted for action elsewhere, either to the west or to the east. He wished it understood that “there can be no question of whittling down OVERLORD,” but he stressed the importance of the Balkan situation and expressed the belief that sufficient use was not being made of the forces in the Middle East. When the defensive line across northern Italy had been established, it might be possible to spare some of the Allied forces assigned to the Mediterranean theater “to empha-

Analyzing these proposals for General Marshall, the Operations Division agreed that, on the whole, the strategy proposed was sound. It took as its guidepost the fundamental assumption supported by Army planners before and during QUADRANT that the overriding aim of projected operations in the European–Mediterranean area was the success of OVERLORD. Agreeing with the Prime Minister that the best possible use be made of the Italian Navy and merchant marine, the Army planners suggested that the critical problem of maintaining them be studied by the British Admiralty and the U.S. Navy Department. They agreed, too, that after a decisive victory in the Naples area, the British-American forces should move northwards until they came against the main German position and certainly far enough to secure suitable air bases to complement the Combined Bomber Offensive. To employ Italian divisions as front-line combat troops, as suggested by the Prime Minister, seemed more questionable. They should be of great value, however, for garrison duty in southern Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia and for administrative tasks in the rear areas, thereby releasing Allied troops. As soon as the Allied forces had reached the main German position, a strong defensive line should be established to protect, for the time being, the prospective air bases in central Italy. Allied resources should be able to cope successfully with enemy counterattacks; Allied air capabilities, in particular, should preclude large-scale

\[^{19}\] Annex to min, mtg CCS with President and Prime Minister at White House, 9 Sep 43, ABC 334 CCS mtgs (1–23–43), 5. \(^{20}\) Memo, Hull, Acting ACoS OPD, for CofS, 9 Sep 43, no sub, with Paper 43 in ABC 381 (9–25–43), VII.
or decisive enemy action. Any diversion of German strength to the Italian theater, moreover, would indirectly contribute to the success of OVERLORD.

Going further, the Operations Division expressed the Army’s continuing reluctance to become involved in eastern Mediterranean operations. It called for close examination of any suggestion to divert Allied troops eastward or westward of Italy: “The diversion of any major forces to the eastward should be resisted unless it can be conclusively shown that such action contributes to the success of OVERLORD.”21 It agreed that careful study must be given to the possibility of supplementing the means agreed upon at QUADRANT for supplies to the guerrilla forces in the Balkans. To use British-American forces, as the Prime Minister had suggested, “to emphasize a movement north-northeastward from Dalmatian ports” was, however, “a dangerous diversionary idea” and should be resisted. Operations against Sardinia and Corsica should be executed with the resources available in the area. The planners agreed that those islands could be easily captured and felt their seizure would facilitate operations against southern France. While the Operations Division stated that it had not as yet been informed of the plans of General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson (the British commander in chief in the Middle East) for Rhodes and the other Dodecanese Islands, it recommended that any operations against those islands should be carried out only with resources available in the Middle East. The sum of such actions in the Mediterranean would best ensure the most effective and timely employment of the combined resources and the strategic areas becoming available to the Allies, and would hasten the defeat of Germany.22

At the special JCS meeting held shortly before the session with the two political leaders on 9 September, the Joint Chiefs expressed doubts and reservations concerning the Prime Minister’s proposals for the Mediterranean. Admiral King pointed out that the Prime Minister had said that he looked east and west, but that when the Prime Minister looked west all he saw was Sardinia and Corsica. The Prime Minister evidently had overlooked the probability of a German withdrawal behind the Alps and a consequent landing by French forces on the coast of southern France in support of OVERLORD. General Marshall upheld the views of the Army planners. In particular, he emphasized that, from the Army point of view, the Prime Minister’s statement about an advance north and northeastward from the Dalmatian ports “did not look so good.”23

The discussion, continued at the White House with the Prime Minister, the President, and the British Chiefs of Staff, was in reality a brief postlude to QUADRANT.24 Steps were discussed for the conversion of Italy into an active agent in the war against Germany and for the best use of Italian resources and forces against the common enemy. At this meeting the President agreed with the Prime Minister that the Allied armies should advance as far north as

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Min, sp mtg JCS, 9 Sep 43.
24 Min, mtg CCS with President and Prime Minister at White House, 9 Sep 43, ABC 354 CCS mtgs (1–23–43), 5.
possible in Italy and then dig in, using whatever Italian forces might be available for defensive operations. Operations in the Balkans, he maintained, would be “largely a matter of opportunity,” and the Allied forces should be prepared to take advantage of any opportunity that presented itself. The President, too, looked for great benefits to be secured from the use of the Italian Fleet and elements of the British fleet released from operations in the war against the Western Axis Powers. In line with a suggestion made by the Prime Minister, the various Mediterranean preparations were referred to the Combined Staff for further examination.

On 10 September the Combined Chiefs of Staff reported to the President and Prime Minister that they were in agreement with the general conception of subsequent operations in Italy. They called for an exploration of the possibility of using Italian naval units for transport purposes in the Mediterranean area. Great importance should be attached to the Balkan situation, and every effort should then be made to augment by sea the supplies being sent by air to the patriot forces. Admiral Leahy and General Marshall agreed with Sir John Dill in expressing the hope that it would be possible to use Dalmatian coast ports to supply Balkan forces without seizing the ports by amphibious operations. Responsibility for support of the Balkan guerrillas was to remain, the CCS agreed, with the Commander in Chief, Middle East, working in closest co-operation with General Eisenhower. They approved the action then being taken by the Commander in Chief, Middle East, with respect to Rhodes and other islands in the Dodecanese. The Office of Strategic Services and the corresponding British agency had already been directed to try their hand in Sardinia. The combined military chiefs agreed with the Prime Minister that French forces should, if possible, be used for the capture of Corsica.

The British and U.S. military staffs seemed, therefore, to be in substantial agreement on Mediterranean operations. Differences in point of view between the Prime Minister and the JCS on the operations, revealed in the go-round in Washington following the AVALANCHE landings, did not come to a head at once, since no new decisions were thought to be immediately necessary. The basic agreements of QUADRANT in the war against the European Axis still appeared to be firm. In accord with the accepted Allied planning for the western Mediterranean, Sardinia and Corsica soon fell into Allied hands. The Italians in Sardinia handed over the island to U.S. troops, and by 18 September the occupation was complete. By 5 October German troops had evacuated Corsica, and French troops arriving from Algiers took control.

Reaction to events in the eastern Mediterranean in late summer and early fall of 1943 made the apparent agreement between the American and British staffs, however, seem illusory. The specific issue arose in connection with operations against Rhodes and other islands in the Dodecanese. The Dodecanese Islands had been largely garrisoned by Italian troops, and the surrender of Italy offered the possibility of easy capture by the Allies. Plans and

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25 (1) CCS 341/2, 10 Sep 43, title: Review of Strategic Situation in the Light of the Italian Collapse. (2) Min, 118th mtg CCS, 10 Sep 43.
preparations for the capture of Rhodes had been in the making in the Middle East Command for several months but, up to the collapse of Italy, General Wilson’s plans for action in the Dodecanese had necessarily been held in abeyance. On 9 September, swiftly upon Italy’s surrender, Churchill cabled from Washington to General Wilson “This is the time to play high. Improvise and dare.”

On the night of 9 September, Major Lord Jellicoe landed by parachute with a small mission on Rhodes to try to bring about a quick surrender of the island. Unfortunately, the Italians were unable to overcome the Germans on the island, and Jellicoe had to make a hasty departure. Within the next few days, small forces dispatched by Wilson to Kos, Samos, and Leros quickly won them. It soon became apparent that the Italian forces had no desire for further fighting. If the Allies were to hold the islands, they would have to provide garrisons, and these could come only from the Allied forces then locked in a bitter struggle in Italy. American policy on the eastern Mediterranean was crystallized in response to the insistence of the British Chiefs of Staff, and of the Prime Minister in particular, that support be provided for the islands. The Prime Minister had long been impressed with the strategic value of gaining control of the Aegean. The surrender of Italy appeared to him to have given the Allies an excellent opportunity to do just that at small cost. To command the Aegean might yield a rich harvest in stimulating Balkan resistance, obtaining the participation of Turkey, and gaining a short-cut sea route to the USSR. The key to all this was Rhodes and its airfields. In his view, moreover, the campaign in Italy could not be viewed separately from events in the Aegean. Early in October he declared to the President:

I believe it will be found that the Italian and Balkan peninsulas are militarily and politically united, and that really it is one theatre with which we have to deal.

On 3 October the British Chiefs of Staff informed the JCS of their agreement with the view of the (British) Commander in Chief, Middle East, on the desirability of capturing Rhodes. General Wilson had declared in late September that the seizure of Rhodes would be necessary to insure Allied positions in islands already occupied in the eastern Mediterranean. To capture Rhodes,

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26 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 205.
27 In the case of eastern Mediterranean operations, the Army planners in Washington evidently fell behind in their efforts to keep up with the global war. On 30 September 1943, Colonel Roberts, chief of the Strategy and Policy Group, OPD, wrote to Brigadier McNair of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington: “Recently we have seen and heard references to operations against the island of Rhodes, but so far we have received nothing official.” He requested Brigadier McNair to ascertain the status of the operations in order that he, Roberts, might keep his chief, General Handy, advised. See ltr, Col Roberts to Brigadier McNair, 30 Sep 43, before CCS 965 in ABC 384 Mediterranean (3 Oct 43).
28 For the Prime Minister’s position on the Aegean operations, see Churchill, Closing the Ring, Ch. 12, and Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 191.
29 For an informative, detailed discussion of British plans and action in the Aegean in the period August–November 1943, see Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V, 88–105.
30 Msg, Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt, 7 Oct 43, quoted in Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 210–11.
31 CCS 965, 3 Oct 43, title: Future Operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. CCS 965 is a memo by the British Chiefs of Staff.
32 Msg, Br COS to Br Joint Staff Mission, 1 Oct 43, with Tab 154 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 131–59 (7 Jan 43). Wilson’s statement of his views grew
he had maintained, would break the outer ring of the defenses of the Balkans, jeopardize enemy positions in Crete, and provide a base for effective action against enemy sea communications throughout the Aegean. The latter effort, in conjunction with bombing from the heel of Italy against land communications, might, furthermore, force the enemy to withdraw from Greece. The British Chiefs of Staff informed their American colleagues that they were especially anxious to avoid a withdrawal from Kos and Leros, and this could be done only by seizing Rhodes. They wished the Middle East commander to consult with AFHQ in preparing the plan for action.

In the next two days General Eisenhower called the attention of the CCS and the War Department to the implications for his theater of an operation against Rhodes and sought the advice of the Washington Army headquarters. To General Marshall he stated his wish to insure that his planning for the winter campaign in Italy would dovetail with the larger projects in view in Washington. He was anxious to have enough assets to carry out undertakings to support OVERLORD effectively. In particular, he sought the Chief of Staff’s views on the Middle East problems, which were constantly recurring. While he recognized that those problems were to a considerable extent bound up with his own, he wished to avoid being drawn into any “mere diversion” involving relatively unimportant and “unrelated” objectives. It was General Eisenhower’s personal view that the greatest possible assistance he could give OVERLORD would be to conduct a vigorous fall and winter campaign and capture the Po Valley. From the Po Valley, he reasoned, the Allied forces could threaten and actually stage diversionary operations in southern France. To the CCS General Eisenhower reported that if an aggressive policy were pursued in the Aegean, his theater would be asked to undertake air and sea commitments that it might not be able to afford. He drew attention to the difficult problems facing him on the mainland of Italy and his especial need for the air forces available. Any significant diversion of strength would, in his opinion, jeopardize the success of the Italian operation.

War Department planners backed General Eisenhower’s point of view and reaffirmed strongly the American position on remaining uninvolved in eastern Mediterranean operations. They advanced a number of arguments against the Rhodes operation. Events had already overtaken the British plan, since the reoccupation of Kos by the Germans, then in progress, had in effect deprived prospective operations against Rhodes out of discussion between himself, the British Chiefs of Staff, and Allied Force Headquarters concerning subsequent operations in the Middle East.

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of the only airfield from which fighter planes could operate effectively. The Middle East was not able to furnish the forces and resources either for launching or for maintaining an Aegean operation. Additional forces would necessarily, therefore, have to come from those urgently needed for Italy. The Italian situation did not warrant, in their opinion, the assumption that air resources or even the two LST's (landing ship, tank) required by the Middle East plans could be transferred to the eastern Mediterranean for the Aegean operation. To divert these resources in support of a "strategically unimportant secondary operation" could only result in jeopardizing the Italian campaign. The planners also feared that the British were visualizing a continued increase in the size of the eastern Mediterranean operations. The Rhodes operation could be viewed only as the beginning of an endless chain of demands for additional forces that would finally result in the eastern Mediterranean drawing off "all the available United Nations resources." The occupation of Rhodes could, moreover, be considered merely as a preliminary step toward a series of operations in the eastern Mediterranean leading to the Balkan mainland. To initiate these moves would be to invite a violent counterattack by the Germans, and the Allies would then find themselves confronted with the necessity of conducting another major operation in the Mediterranean under far less favorable conditions than those under which the current operations were taking place.

The War Department planners concluded that continued operations in the eastern Mediterranean, weighed in the light of the Allied commitments, resources, and the approved strategy for 1944, were therefore unacceptable to the United States. If, despite these arguments, further action was to take place in the eastern Mediterranean, it must be held to a minimum. The planners recommended to the Chief of Staff that undertakings in the eastern Mediterranean be delayed until such time as they could be of help to the other European operations in the accepted strategic pattern. If the British Chiefs of Staff, however, adhered to their decision to conduct Aegean operations in October 1943, the JCS should disapprove the initiation of any operations that would require forces beyond those currently assigned to the Middle East.

In early October the JCS debated the issue. General McNarney advanced a somewhat different line of argument from that of the War Department planners. The Deputy Chief of Staff called attention to the fact that General Wilson apparently had about 3,000 planes and a very large land force then idle. This strength should be used if possible. In McNarney's opinion, the JCS could not take exception to the British view of the strategic significance of Rhodes. If the Allies remained inactive in the Aegean, moreover, the Germans would withdraw troops for use on other fronts. But, McNarney added, the removal of forces from General Eisenhower's theater for such operations in the Aegean could be done only with General Eisenhower's concurrence, and the United States would then give such added assistance as

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37 Min, 117th mtg JCS, 5 Oct 43.
it could. If resources could be found to make operations against Rhodes possible, he was, therefore, in favor of such action.

To Admiral Leahy, the Middle East was "entirely a British proposition." But, since the British wished to withdraw certain resources from the North African theater, the United States would thereby become involved in the operations in the Middle East. The JCS had given their approval to operations in the Middle East, and could not withdraw it. At the same time Leahy did not feel that the JCS could permit the British "unilaterally" to take resources from General Eisenhower's theater. He too feared lest such operations develop into a major campaign in which the United States would find itself involved.

At this point General Marshall suggested a compromise solution that would safeguard the agreed strategic pattern of QUADRANT and General Eisenhower's interests in the Italian campaign, and at the same time respect British strategic responsibility in the Middle East. He recommended that such assistance be given to the Middle East Command as in General Eisenhower's view could be spared from the Italian campaign. The JCS accepted Marshall's proposal. They further agreed to announce to the British Chiefs of Staff that they could not approve of directing General Eisen-

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28 The British Chiefs of Staff had informed General Eisenhower in a message of 1 October (repeated to the Commander in Chief, Middle East) that plans for the Rhodes operation should be based on the assumption that two LST's from General Eisenhower's theater were to be made available to the Middle East. Admiral King took the position that the British Chiefs of Staff apparently devised a "rubber stamp approval" by the JCS for what appeared to be a case of unilateral action. See min, 117th mtg JCS, 5 Oct 43.

29 Min, 117th mtg JCS, 5 Oct 43.

hower to provide for the Middle East Command any forces or equipment that, in his opinion, were needed for his Italian campaign.40

The views of the JCS, forwarded to the British Chiefs of Staff, were almost immediately confirmed by the President. On 7 October he informed the Prime Minister that he was opposed to any diversion of strength that, in the Allied Force Commander's opinion, was necessary during the current critical phase of the Italian campaign. He did not wish to force on General Eisenhower diversions that might limit the prospects of reaching a secure line north of Rome. There was no objection, however, to Eisenhower's supplying assistance he believed could be spared. The President added his dissent to any diversion of forces or equipment that would jeopardize OVERLORD. At his request, the War Department relayed his conclusions to General Eisenhower.41

Disappointed but not discouraged, the Prime Minister took a new tack. He urged the President to permit him to arrange a meeting between the Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff on the one hand, and General Marshall or the President's personal representative and General Eisenhower on the other, at the latter's headquarters, to discuss the Rhodes operation. The American stand, however, remained firm—no undue pressure should be exerted on the Allied Commander in the midst of his
critical campaign. Advising against such a conference, the War Department declared that the question was whether the Allies were to advance to positions north of Rome or to enter into a Balkan campaign, starting with "the southern tip."\textsuperscript{42} Hopkins informed the Prime Minister by transatlantic telephone, in the midst of an apparently bitter exchange over Dodecanese operations, that there was no chance of General Marshall's being sent to such a meeting and that the CCS could deal with recommendations for new moves.\textsuperscript{43}

Washington and London agreed to await General Eisenhower's recommendations for action after weighing the British and American points of view.\textsuperscript{44} These came quickly. On 9 October the whole problem of eastern Mediterranean and Italian operations was threshed out at a conference at La Marsa in Tunis between General Eisenhower, his commanders in chief, and the Commander in Chief, Middle East.\textsuperscript{45} The case for Rhodes was weakened by receipt of reports that Hitler intended to reinforce his army in Italy and fight a major battle south of Rome. The conferees soon concluded that the British-American resources in the Mediterranean—particularly landing craft and air strength—were not large enough to undertake the capture of Rhodes and at the same time to attain the immediate objectives in Italy. The minimum line that had to be reached at the earliest possible date to stabilize the Allied position in Italy, they agreed, was a secure position north of Rome. To attain that goal, a full concentration of Allied resources was necessary. A choice therefore had to be made "between Rhodes and Rome." Confronted with that choice, the commanders in the field were unanimous in their conclusion that Allied efforts had to be concentrated on the Italian campaign. They therefore recommended that the Rhodes operation be postponed until favorable weather and available forces gave the operation a reasonable chance of success and that the CCS re-examine the situation in the Aegean after the capture of Rome.

In Washington, the Army planners enthusiastically received the Mediterranean commanders' decisions.\textsuperscript{46} On 15 October the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff also approved the recommendations.\textsuperscript{47} The operation against Rhodes would be postponed, but the question was to be re-examined after the capture of Rome. Acknowledging that the situation had been considerably altered by the German intention to reinforce southern Italy and fight a battle before Rome, the Prime Minister reluctantly concluded that he had to submit and accept the decision, "painful" as it was.\textsuperscript{48} In

\textsuperscript{42} Memo, Marshall for Leahy, 8 Oct 43, no sub. Item 64, Exec 10. The memo contains a draft message, evidently drawn up in the Office of Chief of Staff, for a proposed reply by the President to the Prime Minister's suggestion for a conference at General Eisenhower's headquarters. This draft may have influenced the White House reply to Mr. Churchill via Mr. Hopkins.

\textsuperscript{43} Sherwood, \textit{Roosevelt and Hopkins}, p. 765.

\textsuperscript{44} Min, 112th mtg CCS, 8 Oct 43.

\textsuperscript{45} Msg, CinC AFHQ to AGWAR for CCS and to USFOR for Br COS, 9 Oct 43, NAF 381, CM-IN 5853.

\textsuperscript{46} (1) SS study [about 12 Oct 43], title: Operation ACCOLADE. (2) Memo, Roberts, Actg Chief S&P Gp OPD, for ACoS OPD, 12 Oct 43, sub: ACCOLADE. Both in Tab 151 in ABC 3 SS Papers, Nos. 131-50 (7 Jan 43).


\textsuperscript{48} Msg, Former Naval Person to the President [10 Oct 43], Item 69b, Exec 10. The message is
retrospect, Churchill has written that this decision caused him "... one of the sharpest pangs I suffered in the war ..." He has explained: "When so many grave issues were pending, I could not risk any jar in my personal relations with the President." Nevertheless, he could not avoid the conclusion—even years after the close of hostilities—that as a result of the American staff's "pedantic" enforcement of its views at this point, a great opportunity had been lost. As it turned out, the Germans quickly completed their reconquest of the Dodecanese, but it took the Allies eight more months to capture Rome.

The Balkans and Turkey

The apparent resolution in mid-October of the debate over the Rhodes operation did not dispel the Army's fears that continued British pressure for Mediterranean—and particularly for east Mediterranean—ventures would pose a serious threat to QUADRANT decisions. The Army planners felt that they had to be alert to counter such pressure and prepare to defend the American position in subsequent meetings with the British. As one Army planner on duty with the British Joint planners in the United Kingdom had written back to his colleagues in the War Department during the debate over Rhodes, "The Prime Minister is interested in the Mediterranean again, and the Eastern Mediterranean too. The Planners [in the U.K.] have been loyal to QUADRANT but their hands may be forced. We had better make damn complete studies and establish our position.”

With this end in view, in late October and early November the War Department planners restudied and restated their position on Mediterranean operations.

The specter of Balkan operations produced a reaffirmation of the planners' basic view of major operations and American involvement in that area. They continued to argue that a major offensive in the Balkans would require maneuvering of large forces in an area where it would be virtually impossible to maintain them because of logistical difficulties. It would necessitate the longest lines of communications of any projected operations in the Mediterranean theater, a theater already at the end of a long communications line. There were three main routes into the Balkans: one, across which the enemy then stood in force, extended from the head of the Adriatic through northern Yugoslavia toward Austria and Hungary; another extended from Salonika along the narrow and rugged Vardar River valley through eastern Yugoslavia to the Dan...
ube near Belgrade; the third reached from Istanbul through Thrace westward via Sofia and Hungary. Use of Salonika or Istanbul as a base for a Balkan invasion would have extended the Allied line of communications into the Mediterranean approximately 900 and 1,500 miles respectively. Terrain, meteorological conditions, and lack of internal communications would make such operations most difficult. In the familiar vein of War Department studies, the planners maintained that such operations would involve the United States in a war of attrition—costly and drawn-out. Such undertakings would, it followed, postpone final decisions in the war against Germany and hence in the war against Japan. They concluded, therefore, that from a military point of view the Balkans were unsuitable for major operations against Germany.

The War Department planners looked for ways and means of keeping subsequent action in the Balkan-eastern Mediterranean area within the accepted basic pattern of operations. They recommended playing on German sensitivity in the Aegean and in the Balkans by a resourceful use of feints and deception in order to assist OVERLORD. Middle East forces should be constantly on the alert to capitalize on any opportunities that might arise in the Aegean should the German position in the Mediterranean weaken. In keeping with the QUADRANT decisions, Allied strategy in the Balkans should continue, they concluded, to be the acceleration of supply to the Balkan guerrillas, air attacks upon vital economic centers, land and sea raids against the coast, and, if possible, minor actions by commandos. In the final analysis, the Allied strategy would be best served if Germany continued to hold the Balkans, provided it were forced to garrison them heavily and pay a high price in troops and matériel.51

War Department apprehensions about the Balkans were shared by the Germans, but for different reasons. The Germans intended to defend the Balkans; they could not afford to do otherwise. The area provided oil, bauxite, copper, and other resources that Germany required to sustain its war machine. During the summer and fall of 1943 the Germans feared that the Allies would invade the Balkans as well as Italy and had steadily reinforced both regions. German forces in the Balkans had increased from ten and a half divisions to sixteen in the three-month period from 15 July to 15 October, while those in Italy had climbed from six and a half to nineteen and a half divisions.52

In early October Hitler issued directives to the Balkan and Italian commands. In his opinion, the Allies would make their main effort either from south-

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51 For the above summary of the War Department arguments on Balkan-eastern Mediterranean operations, see: (1) SS study [Oct 43], title: Major and Limited Operations in the Balkans via Eastern Mediterranean, Tab 172, ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160–95 (7 Jan 43); (2) OPD brief of Operations in the Balkans, 2 Nov 43, with Tab 171, ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160–95 (7 Jan 43); (3) OPD brief, title: Notes . . . 121st mtg JCS, 2 Nov 43, United Nations Strategy in the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean Region (JCS 558), with JCS 558 in ABC 381 Balkan-Mediterranean (1 Nov 43); and (4) SS study, 3 Nov 43, title: The Unsuitability of the Balkans as an Area for Major or Decisive Operations, with Tab 172 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160–95 (7 Jan 43). The last study here listed was the basis of a memo from the War Department to Secretary of War. See memo [WD for SW, about 3 Nov 43], sub: Balkan Operations, Paper 65, Book 13, Exec 9.

52 OKH, Organisations Abteilung Schematische Kriegsgliederung, 17 Jul 43 and 15 Oct 43, copies in OCMH files.
ern Italy in the direction of Albania–Montenegro–southern Croatia or from central Italy, once the Allies captured it, toward northern Croatia and Istria. He intended to defend both the Balkans and Italy and to prevent the Allies from enlarging their foothold in southern Italy. To restrict Allied expansion in the south, Germany would defend the Italian Peninsula along the so-called Gustav Line from Gaeta to Ortona and the Balkan Peninsula down to the Peloponnesus. Thus, the determination of the German leaders to make a stand as far away from the homeland as possible led to the development of a strong protective crust for the “soft underbelly” by October 1943. The Allied threat in the Mediterranean was to be contained.

While the Germans were bolstering their defenses in the Balkans, the War Department planners were concerned over the closely related problem of Turkey. The Army planners had long recognized the advantages of Turkey's becoming an active participant in the war and of thus securing the use of its air bases for operations against the Balkans—projects close to the heart of the Prime Minister. But, as usual, they were anxious about the price and proper timing of that entry. As the Axis thrust eastward had been blunted and Anglo-American agreements were reached on OVERLORD, the American military planners had increasingly doubted the practicability of weaning Turkey from neutrality. In fact, when the crisis on the Soviet front passed in the summer of 1943, the planners called for a change in Anglo-American policy toward Turkey from conciliation and cajoling to sternness.

Emphasizing the priority of OVERLORD and the ineffectiveness to date of the sizable economic aid and considerable British military commitment to bring Turkey into the war, they called for a reduction in aid to Turkey. The JWPC went so far as to suggest that such a recommendation might serve to dampen British interest in the eastern Mediterranean. Token aid, they held, should be furnished to Turkey in return for benevolent neutrality.

At QUADRANT the British planners had themselves pointed to the marked "cooling off" of Turkey's attitude in recent

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53 Magna E. Bauer, Shifting of German Units Before and After Nettuno Landings . . . , MS, OCMH files, p. 28.
months, and stated that they hoped soon to have airfields in Italy from which to bomb Ploesti and communications in the Balkans, eliminating the need for Turkish airfields. General Marshall and the JCS had supported the policy of reduced aid, and the British Chiefs of Staff had agreed that from a military point of view the time was not ripe for Turkey to enter on the Allied side and that supplies should be "slowed to a trickle." To secure the benevolent neutrality of Turkey the CCS, the President, and the Prime Minister had approved at Quebec a policy of supplying such equipment "as we can spare and as the Turks can absorb." In the late months of 1943 the British once more raised the issue of active Turkish participation in the war, this time in conjunction with the possibility of securing Turkish help for operations in the Aegean against Rhodes and the Dodecanese and of gaining a shorter sea route, via the Dardanelles, for delivering supplies to the USSR. Intent on the cross-Channel undertaking, the American planners seriously doubted that the time was right for Turkey's entry. They argued that assistance required by the neutral power in the eastern Mediterranean must not in any case prejudice planned operations in Europe. By early November the U.S. military position on the Balkan–eastern Mediterranean region was being crystallized in this mold on the joint level for presentation to the President and the British.

**Mediterranean Build-up Versus OVERLORD**

**Requirements of the Italian Campaign**

While the U.S. planners felt it necessary in the fall of 1943 to prepare the American case against major involvement in the Balkan–eastern Mediterranean area, they were also viewing with some alarm—on both Army and joint levels—the British attitude toward the withdrawal of Allied resources from the Italian campaign for the build-up in the United Kingdom. The British position merely confirmed the suspicion that the British goal was increased emphasis on the Mediterranean and that the OVERLORD pattern would be upset. Sympathetic as the Washington military planners were with the needs of the Allied commander in the bitter conflict on the Italian mainland, they nevertheless felt that the major part of the strategic objectives in the Mediterranean had already been attained. General Eisenhower should, in their opinion, be supported as strongly as possible, but not at the expense of OVERLORD. The time had come for Allied undertakings to be oriented definitely northward and westward.

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57 Min, 71st mtg CPS, 13 Aug 43.
58 (1) CCS 303, 9 Aug 43, title: Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe. CCS 303 is a memo by U.S. JCS to CCS. (2) Min, 113th mtg CCS, 20 Aug 43. (3) CCS 322, 20 Aug 43, title: Policy Towards Turkey. CCS 322 is a memo by Br COS.
59 CCS 322/1, 30 Aug 43, title: Policy Towards Turkey.
60 (1) Min, 121st mtg JCS, 2 Nov 43. (2) JCS 558, title: United Nations' Strategy in the Balkan–Eastern Mediterranean Region. (3) Memo for red, 4 Nov 43, appended to memo, Col Andrew J. McFarland, Deputy Secy JCS, for Secy JSSC, 5 Nov 43, same sub, with JCS 588 in ABC 381 Balkan–Mediterranean Area (1 Nov 43). (4) Memo, Leahy (for JCS) for President, 9 Nov 43, same sub, Paper 101, Book 15, Exec 9. (5) JCS 558/2, 9 Nov 43, same sub. (6) JPS 884, 15 Nov 43, title: Action That May Be Necessary Should Turkey Enter the War.
In late October the British Chiefs of Staff expressed the view that if the campaign in Italy led to a reverse or even to a stalemate, OVERLORD would inevitably have to be postponed. In the light of Allied naval and air superiority, the Washington military planners could not agree that the Italian campaign was very likely to result in a reverse or even a stalemate. Even if either of these events did occur, they could not agree that OVERLORD would have to be postponed. By knocking Italy out of the war, gaining control of the Italian Fleet, acquiring air bases in Italy, and occupying Sardinia and Sicily, the United States and the United Kingdom had already achieved their basic strategic objectives in the Mediterranean, and had achieved them earlier than anticipated. To take any action that would jeopardize OVERLORD, the primary effort, merely to insure an Allied advance farther on the Italian mainland would, in the planners' opinion, be militarily unsound. In the long run, a German counteroffensive might even enable General Eisenhower's forces to contain a maximum number of divisions and lead to the greatest possible attrition of the enemy's forces. In mid-November these conclusions were approved on the American joint level.\(^{61}\)

While the Washington planners were preparing the American case for con-

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\(^{61}\) (1) CCS 379, 26 Oct 43, title: Operations in the Mediterranean. CCS 379 contains views of the Br COS. (2) JCS 384, 28 Oct 43, same title. JCS 384 is a JPS report. (3) Memo, CoS for President, 8 Nov 43, sub: Conduct of the European War, with Tab 90 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2–95 (7 Jan 43). The memo was evidently drafted by the OPD Strategy Section for the signature of the Chief of Staff. (4) Memo, OPD for CoS, 19 Nov 43, sub: Msg From General Deane With Reference to Possible Russian Desire for Increased Activity in the Mediterranean, Tab 181/1 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160–95 (7 Jan 43). (5) Min, 123 mtg JCS, 15 Nov 43, continued subordination of the Italian campaign to OVERLORD, General Marshall was arguing in a similar vein with the Prime Minister. In late October the Prime Minister informed General Marshall, via Field Marshall Dill, "Naturally I feel in my marrow the withdrawal of our 50th and 51st Divisions, our best, from the very edge of the battle of Rome in the interests of distant OVERLORD. We are carrying out our contract, but I pray God it does not cost us dear."\(^{62}\) General Marshall assured the Prime Minister that he realized General Eisenhower's difficulties.\(^{63}\) In fact, Washington headquarters was even then examining with General Morgan (COSSAC) the possibilities of meeting General Eisenhower's immediate problem—landing craft. But Marshall observed that, in the Washington view, General Eisenhower had adequate troops to fight in Italy without undue risks and that, as General Eisenhower himself had pointed out, the more Germans he could contain in Italy, the better were the chances of OVERLORD.

The potential cost to OVERLORD of a strong Allied bid to advance to Rome and farther north in the face of the determined German resistance also led the Washington staff to view with reservations the planning of General Eisenhower's staff for the fall and winter offensive in Italy. The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, had expressed the belief that nothing would

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\(^{62}\) Msg, War Cabinet Office to Br Joint Staff Mission, 24 Oct 43, Item 12a, Exec 5. The Prime Minister asked Field Marshal Dill to give the message to General Marshall privately.

\(^{63}\) Msg appended to memo, Col W. T. Sexton, SGS, for Comdr R. D. Coleridge, 27 Oct 43, no sub, Item 12a, Exec 5. The memo stated that General Marshall wished that his message in reply to the Prime Minister's of 24 October be transmitted to the Prime Minister through British channels.
help OVERLORD so much as the early establishment of the Allied forces in the Po Valley.64 Once in the Po Valley, the force would be ready to stage a sharp diversionary action in southern France and thereafter in the Balkans, a threat that would draw off German reserves from OVERLORD. The Allied theater staff recommended that certain resources, therefore, be retained in the Mediterranean as long as possible. In studying these recommendations, the Army planners in Washington agreed with the JSSC conclusion that to specify the Po Valley as a strategic objective would imply that sufficient forces should be provided by the CCS.65 On the ground that the Po Valley objective might be obtained only at the expense of OVERLORD, the JSSC and the Army planners, therefore, opposed it. At the close of October the JCS informally approved these recommendations.66

Nevertheless, in the light of Eisenhower's serious view of his immediate needs, Washington headquarters was willing to make some compromises. In early November the Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff took the position that holding the sixty LST's in the Mediterranean, as General Eisenhower had requested for his operations, would not materially affect OVERLORD.67 The American planners proposed and the CCS accepted—after discussion with the theater headquarters—that he be allowed to retain the LST's until 15 December 1943.68 The Army staff, though aware of the QUADRANT decision to all but strip the Mediterranean of amphibious lift, felt that the effect on OVERLORD of this temporary retention would be minor, but that to conduct additional major operations in Italy beyond those then planned by the Allied Force Headquarters would not be possible without at least postponing, and probably abandoning, OVERLORD.69 Undoubtedly, Admiral King's announcement on 5 November that an increase of LST's, LCI (L)'s (landing craft, infantry, large), and LCT's (landing craft, tank) over and above scheduled allotments for OVERLORD would be sent in the coming months to the United Kingdom provided further reassurance for the Army Staff.70

"A Question of Manpower"

Back of the War Department planners' insistence in the fall of 1943 on the para-

64 For AFHQ views, see memo, Gen W. B. Smith, CofS Allied Force, for Secy JCS, 15 Oct 43, no sub, with CCS memo 141 in ABC 384 Post HUSKY (14 May 43), II. See also JCS 531, 14 Oct 43, title: Retention of Certain Units for Offensive Operations in Italy.


66 Memo, McFarland, Deputy Secy JCS for Secy JPS and Secy JSSC, 29 Oct 43, sub: Retention of Certain Units for Offensive Operations in Italy, with JCS 531/2 in ABC 322 Italy (14 Oct 43).

67 See min, 126th mtg CCS, 5 Nov 43.

68 (1) Min, 89th mtg CPS, 4 Nov 43. (2) Min, 126th mtg CCS, 5 Nov 43. (3) Memo, C. H. Donnelly, Secy JPS, for Adm Bieri, USN, Brig Gen Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., USA, and Capt A. K. Doyle, USN, 6 Nov 43, sub: Operations in the Mediterranean, with CCS 397/5 in ABC 384 Mediterranean (26 Oct 43).

69 (1) SS 173, 2 Nov 43, title: Operations in the Mediterranean, Tab 173 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160-95 (7 Jan 43). (2) Msg, OPD to Maj Gen John R. Deane, Moscow, 15 Nov 43. CM-OUT 6032. Action officer was "GAL" (Col Lincoln) of OPD.

For an OPD study of alternative actions against Germany should OVERLORD be canceled or indefinitely postponed, see SS 151/4, 4 Nov 43, title: United Nations Courses of Action in Europe in the Event OVERLORD Is Canceled, Tab 133/4 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 131-59 (7 Jan 43).

70 Min, 126th mtg CCS, 5 Nov 43.
mounty of OVERLORD lay their concern over the limits of U.S. armed strength. Despite the measures adopted by the Army to hold the troop basis to a minimum, it had again become necessary for the War Department—this time not long after QUADRANT—to defend its requirements before Congressional committees.

In September General McNarney had appeared before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in support of the 7,700,000-man army. Speaking in general but illuminating terms, he based the Army case upon strategic requirements, logistics, and the timing of operations. The American policy of defeating Germany first and building up a powerful air force at the temporary expense of the ground combat units had proved sound, he maintained, but it remained as imperative as ever to mobilize and train a strong ground force to complement the air strength. The Army had chosen to win air mastery first because of greater American aircraft production capabilities and the enemy's preponderance in divisions. Despite heavy losses resulting from Allied air and ground activity, however, the enemy had been able to maintain and even expand its armies by drastic economies in manpower. This meant, McNarney declared, that the United States not only must continue to inflict damage on the foe but also must strive to speed up its pace. The Deputy Chief of Staff went on to state that, since the Army had established stations all over the world, the problems of logistics must also be weighed in conjunction with strategic considerations. To supply and maintain the far-flung chain of bases and to keep combat units in action required large increases in the numbers of service troops. These requirements would be further expanded as the enemy's perimeter shrank and American lines of communications grew longer. Fortunately, the shipping situation had improved, and there were now brighter prospects for transporting larger amounts of men and supplies overseas.

Turning to the third factor bearing on the size of the army, the timing of operations, McNarney asserted that, when an operation was set up, military personnel needed to carry it out successfully had to be inducted, trained, equipped, transported, and deployed in a specified area at a designated time. The Army staff had carefully studied the strategic requirements, logistics, and the timing of operations before drawing up the troop basis and General Marshall felt very strongly that the 7,700,000-man army was the minimum that could do the job. Any reduction in this total, McNarney warned in closing, would require a change in the strategic commitments of the United States.

The struggle for acceptance of the Army estimates and the intimation that a 7,700,000-man force would be the limit of Congressional support prompted Marshall to instruct all theater commanders to survey their rear echelon establishments with a view to trimming requirements. "It is no longer entirely a question of shipping," he informed them, "basically it is now a question of manpower."

Despite the favorable developments of the summer in the Russo-German campaign and the increasing success of the

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71 The 7,686,000 figure was often rounded off to 7,700,000.
72 Remarks by General McNarney before the Senate Military Affairs Committee, 15 Sep 43, Exec 9, Book 12.
73 Msg, Marshall to all theater comdr, 22 Sep 43, CM-OUT 10372-CM-OUT 10389.
Combined Bomber Offensive, G-3 advised Marshall to defer final decision on the Army manpower ceiling until the spring of 1944.74 The Operations Division felt, however, that the 7,700,000 figure was an acceptable one, especially since the War Department's economy program had worked out so well. As General Tansey, Chief of the Division's Logistics Group, saw it, this total would be wholly consistent with the U.S. manpower, production, and shipping capabilities, as well as with over-all strategy.75 The President's approval of the JCS recommendations for a 7,700,000-man army and over-all armed strength of 11,264,000 for 1944 (including 320,000 women) came in November 1943. It marked the reduction of ultimate Army strength to the level recommended by the Maddocks Committee report of June 1943—a figure henceforth to be accepted in joint mobilization planning. The ceiling of 7,700,000 was to remain the authorized limit of Army expansion down to the end of the war in Europe in May 1945.76

The Strategic Pattern and the Deployment Trend

In the light of the manpower situation, the need to keep planned deployment and agreed strategy in balance appeared to the Army staff to be more urgent than ever. Commitments of U.S. forces for major operations to end the war in Europe had been entered into at Quadrant; Mediterranean operations were to be limited to forces already available in the area. Significant variations in the deployment of strength and allocation of means from accepted decisions in the war against the Western Axis Powers not only might endanger the over-all European pattern but also might jeopardize the availability of strength eventually needed to defeat Japan. Each division dispatched overseas would draw in its wake a train of vital shipping and supplies. War Department planners, therefore, sought to distribute manpower and resources carefully, trying as always to weigh the "necessary" against the "desirable" and to maintain the ever delicate balance of vital strength among the diverse theaters and operations. Even on the basis of the most careful calculations, Overlord did not seem to contain enough strength to promise a sufficiently wide margin for success. A suggestion by the British Chiefs of Staff and COSSAC after Quadrant on the desirability of increasing the striking force for the Overlord assault by one division was causing a desperate, widespread search by the British and American Chiefs of Staff for the necessary landing craft.77

By the beginning of November 1943, twenty-eight of the existing total of ninety U.S. divisions were deployed overseas.78 Seven divisions were in the Euro-

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75 Memo, Tansey for Handy, 2 Nov 43, sub: Troop Bases for All Services for 1944 and Beyond, OPD 320.2, 819.
76 The troop basis authorization of 8,290,993 in May 1945 was intended to cover the actual increments of strength from mid-1944 onward, which exceeded the 7,700,000 ceiling and resulted largely from the prolongation of the war in Europe. The actual strength reached in May 1945 was 8,291,336. At CCS 285/6, 19 Oct 43, title: "Overlord" Assault. (2) Paper "Overlord," Tab ETO in Gen Handy's copy of OPD Condensed Information Book, 6 Nov 43, Exec 6. (3) Informal memo, G. A. L. for Hull, 19 Nov 43, no sub, Paper 119, Book 13, Exec 9.
77 See [OPD] Paper, title: Major Units and Strength of the Army, Nov 43, Tab Deployment of...
pean theater and eight in the Mediterranean—a total of only two more divisions than the thirteen in the Pacific areas. Of the total of 262 air groups, 119 were then overseas, with 39 in the European, 37 in the Mediterranean, and the remainder scattered in the Western Hemisphere, Pacific, and Asiatic areas.

The bulk of the existing ground and air strength—62 divisions and 143 air groups—was thus still in the continental United States. By the close of 1944 the division strength was to amount, according to the Victory Program Troop Basis approved in October 1943, to 105 divisions (a total never actually reached in World War II). During 1944, according to the current estimates, nineteen U.S. divisions would have to be made available for OVERLORD by 1 May, and by the end of the year the United States build-up in the United Kingdom was to rise to forty-seven divisions. In view of world-wide demands and accepted ceilings and limits on manpower, the necessity of husbanding and concentrating strength to meet the heavy ground and air demands for OVERLORD and the follow-up on the Continent and still have enough forces left over for a strategic reserve and for defeating Japan was henceforth to be a constant concern to the War Department planners.

Intent as the Washington Army staff was in the late months of 1943 on building up strength in the United Kingdom—a movement that steadily increased after its resumption in May and its confirmation at Quebec—the War Department yielded to some departures from QUADRANT decisions and estimates on deployment of U.S. forces to the Mediterranean. Aside from agreeing to the temporary retention of landing ships in the western Mediterranean, the War Department also approved General Eisenhower’s urgent request for two additional U.S. infantry divisions. These reinforcements, he felt, would promote the success of the later operation in northwest Europe. The two divisions (the 85th and the 88th), which the War Department agreed to deploy before 1 January 1944, were intended to help offset the loss of the three British and four U.S. veteran divisions that were to be sent from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD in accordance with TRIDENT and QUADRANT decisions.

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Divs, in Gen Handy’s copy of OPD Condensed Information Book, 6 Nov 43, Exec 6.

* See List, Troop Situation NATO [Nov 43], Tab AAF, in Gen Handy’s copy of OPD Condensed Information Book, 6 Nov 43, Exec 6.

80 (1) STM-30, 1 Jan 48. (2) AAF Statistical Digest, 1945.

81 Victory Program Troop Basis, 26 Oct 43, Tab Deployment of Divisions, in Gen Handy’s copy of OPD Condensed Information Book, 6 Nov 43, Exec 6. This document bears the typed notation, “Approved—By order the Secretary of War—Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff.”


AAF figures are complicated by the many revisions of the Bradley Plan, named after a report submitted by General Follett Bradley to General Arnold in late May 1943. This plan, designed to secure maximum strength in June 1944 in the United Kingdom, had been accepted by the War Department by 21 September 1943. According to the revisions in use in early November, by June 1944 104 groups were to be in the United Kingdom. See Craven and Cate, AAF II, 695–97.

83 A detailed discussion of the buildup of U.S. troops in the United Kingdom in 1943 is contained in Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, Ch. III.

84 For exchanges on the dispatch of two additional divisions to the Mediterranean, see: (1) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 Sep 43, CM-IN 1223, (action OPD); (2) memo, Col G. A. Lincoln for
The intertheater shift of the four U.S. divisions (1st and 9th Infantry, 2nd Armored, and 82nd Airborne) was scheduled to be completed before the close of the year. It began with the transfer of the 1st Infantry Division in early November 1943.\textsuperscript{85}

The War Department also deviated from QUADRANT estimates in backing the dispatch of additional air groups to the Mediterranean for the build-up of the U.S. Fifteenth Air Force. This new strategic air force—proposed by General Arnold in the early fall of 1943 and supported by General Marshall—was to capitalize on the air bases that would become available in Italy and thereby complement the Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom. Arguing against a tendency to employ heavy bombers locally, Marshall particularly stressed the importance of arranging for the movement of four-engine bombers from one theater to another as necessary. In the AAF plan, the build-up of the Fifteenth Air Force was to be based partly on units from the Twelfth Air Force then in the Mediterranean and partly on air groups in the United States then scheduled for the build-up of the Eighth Air Force in the United Kingdom. In October the JCS and CCS approved the AAF proposal and the Fifteenth Air Force was established, effective 1 November 1943.\textsuperscript{86}

The War Department and the AAF thereupon began to carry out the plan for building up the Fifteenth Air Force. The new force was to consist of twenty-one heavy bombardment groups, seven long-range fighter groups, and one reconnaissance group and was to reach full strength by the end of March 1944. The initial strength and equipment of the Fifteenth were to be derived from the Twelfth Air Force. AAF headquarters had planned to divert three B-24 groups from allotments to the United Kingdom for shipment to the Mediterranean in each of the three months from November through January 1944. The first of the three groups did not, however, reach the theater until mid-December 1943. In addition, the War Department authorized the constitution and activation by the end of January 1944 of four heavy

\textsuperscript{85} For the approval of the AAF proposal on WD, JCS and CCS levels, see: (1) memo, Kuter, ACofAS Plans, for Roberts, OPD, 9 Oct 43, sub: Plan To Assure the Most Effective Exploitation of the CBO, with CCS 217 in ABC 381 U.K. (1-20-43); (2) mem, 118th mtg JCS, 12 Oct 43; (3) msg (originator OPD), Spaatz to Eisenhower, 14 Oct 43, CM-OUT 6433; (4) min, 119th mtg JCS, 19 Oct 43; (5) CCS 217/1, 19 Oct 43, title: Plan To Assure the Most Effective Exploitation of the CBO; (6) min, 124th mtg CCS, 22 Oct 43; and (7) min, 125th mtg CCS, 25 Oct 43.

\textsuperscript{86} For the actual intertheater transfer of these four divisions in November–December 1943, see: (1) Overseas Troop Basis, Nov 43, and Overseas Troop Basis, Dec 43, Troop Sec Logistics Gp OPD WDGS, Exec 101; and (2) Order of Battle of the United States Army in World War II, ETO Div, Office of the Theater Historian, Paris, France, Dec 45, in OCMH files.
bombardment wings, two air depot groups, and three air service groups.87

With these exceptions—designed directly or indirectly to aid OVERLORD—the War Department continued its policy of holding the line for the build-up in the United Kingdom. In early November it resisted such suggestions as the British proposal to retain one armored and one airborne division in the Mediterranean and AFHQ's bid for additional divisions.88

Thus the Washington staffs labored in the fall of 1943 to keep OVERLORD "top of the bill" and to balance Allied resources in the European–Mediterranean area in accordance with QUADRANT decisions. Though British proposals for new Mediterranean undertakings and for added support to agreed-upon undertakings in the Mediterranean had on the whole thus far been successfully countered, there was no assurance that increased pressure for such ventures would not result in upsetting the over-all strategic pattern agreed upon at Quebec. Washington's concern for maintenance of the integrity of the QUADRANT pattern became all the greater, therefore, in the late fall of 1943, in the face of divergent British and American proposals for command arrangements in the war against Germany.

87 For a full discussion of the establishment of the Fifteenth Air Force, see Craven and Cate, AAF II, 564–74.
88 Memo, Caraway for Chief S&P Gp OPD, 1 Nov 43, sub: Forces Available in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Tab 154 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 131–59 (7 Jan 43).
CHAPTER XII

Strategy and Command in the War Against Germany

The divergence in strategic thinking between the United States and the United Kingdom in the fall of 1943, apparent in the sparring over the choice and support of operations in the Mediterranean, was also reflected in the fencing over Allied command arrangements for the European–Mediterranean area. With the over-all strategic pattern for the war against Germany outlined at QUADRANT apparently still not firmly accepted, each side sought through the medium of command framework to tip the scales in its own favor. If the strategic pattern for the coalition effort against Germany was still not firm enough to resolve Allied command problems, then favorable command arrangements offered the possibility of influencing the execution of desired operations, and even of helping to “fix” Allied strategy in the preferred mold. In a period of lingering disagreement over basic strategy, maneuvering and debate over the command problem became part and parcel of the strategy story. The structure of the combined command and the nationality and eventually even the identity and personality of proposed Allied commanders were to figure as important elements in that tale.

Normally, thus far in World War II, combined strategy had first been decided upon, then the choice of operations had been made, and only after that had the command problem for particular undertakings been resolved. In the fall of 1943 the emphasis on particular command arrangements, in the absence of firm agreement on the over-all design and related operations, threatened to upset and even reverse that process. The Army staff, striving to retain adherence to the strategic design of QUADRANT, sought to counter command proposals that in its view might jeopardize the over-all pattern.

The Problem of Command Organization

Divergence of British and American strategic thinking as reflected in Washington and London proposals for command arrangements in the European–Mediterranean area was brought into sharp focus in the late fall of 1943. The immediate and specific issue that caused U.S. military planners to crystallize their own position was the British suggestion in early November 1943 to unify command in the Mediterranean under the
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces. Sir John Dill maintained that the British plan would give greater flexibility to operations in the Mediterranean and would place under the CCS the additional forces available in the Middle East. Already disturbed by British gestures toward increasing military support for ventures in the Mediterranean, and the eastern Mediterranean in particular, Washington headquarters hastened to offer counterproposals.

General Marshall soon recommended that the JCS take the position that a supreme commander be designated for all British-American operations against Germany. Under such a commander were to be appointed an over-all commander for northwestern European operations and an over-all commander for southern European operations, the latter to be responsible for all operations in the Mediterranean. Marshall argued that the close relationship between operations in the Italian and western Mediterranean area and those based on the United Kingdom would eventually lead to centering control in one commander. The British suggestion of vesting command of all operations in the Mediterranean in one officer, however desirable in itself, would, he reasoned, further complicate the problem of securing unified direction and coordination of strategic air operations from the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean. Other reasons were advanced for a commander in chief for all Anglo-American operations against Germany. One Army planner pointed out that, if this solution failed to be adopted, the United States and Great Britain would have to fall back on the “intermittent and disjointed coordination” by the CCS committee. In his opinion that committee, whose members were charged with multiple military duties and subjected to political pressures, was suitable for evolving strategy but not for conducting operations.

At the same time, the Chief of Staff did not want to discuss with the British the delicate, related problem of eventual unification of U.S. and British air commands, raised by the U.S. Air Staff, until he had secured a decision on the overall European command. With General Handy he examined sympathetically the vigorous organizational and operational measures proposed by General Arnold for broadening and pressing the air war against Germany from bases in the United Kingdom, Italy, and probably the USSR. General Marshall and General

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1 CCS 387, 3 Nov 43, title: Mediterranean Comd Arrangements. CCS 387 is a memo by the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff.
2 Min, 126th mtg CCS, 5 Nov 43.
3 Memo, CofS for JCS [about 5 Nov 43], sub: Comd of Br and U.S. Forces Operating Against Germany, incl to memo, Sexton, SGS, for Secy JCS, 5 Nov 43, same sub, Item 69, Exec 10.
4 Ibid.
5 Memo, Col G. A. Lincoln, Deputy Chief S&P Gp OPD, for Chief S&P Gp OPD, 8 Nov 43, sub: Comments on SS 133/3, Survey of Conditions Pre-requisite to Launching of OVERLORD, Tab 133/3 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 131-59 (7 Jan 43).
6 For the Air Staff’s proposals, see memo, Arnold for Marshall, 3 Nov 43, sub: CCS Air Plan for the Defeat of Germany, with Paper 43 in ABC 381 (9-25-43), VII. Pointing to the additional bases that had become available to the Allied air forces since QUADRANT and to the overwhelming superiority in numbers of Allied air forces as compared to the German Air Force (11,800 to 3,000 in western Europe), the AAF urged a re-evaluation of the strategic air plan against Germany. A U.S. air command should be established to control operations of U.S. strategic elements based in the United
Handy agreed with General Arnold's proposal that to unify the U.S. strategic air forces in North Africa and the United Kingdom would be a step in the right direction, but they thought it unwise to press the question of unifying U.S. and British air commands until the more vital and very pressing problem of unified command in the Mediterranean, as then proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, and of over-all command in Europe had been settled. If the decisions on these problems were made in accordance with Army views, the problem of Anglo-American air command in the war against Germany, they reasoned, would be settled automatically.

On 9 November General Marshall defended the army views before the JCS. As he saw it, the British were pressing for unified Mediterranean command in order to gain added impetus for operations they were undertaking from time to time in the eastern Mediterranean. As matters stood, the CCS controlled the allocation of resources in the Mediterranean. The British, however, often deemed resources under General Eisenhower necessary for their operations in the eastern Mediterranean. From the point of view of the British Chiefs of Staff, if the entire Mediterranean were placed under one command, resources then under the control of General Eisenhower would be more readily accessible for British purposes. If all the Mediterranean areas were placed under one command, General Marshall observed, the British would doubtless soon press for executive control in that area, particularly since United States troops were "rapidly approaching . . . the minority in the Mediterranean areas."

General Marshall had to agree with other members of the JCS on the probable impracticability of securing British agreement at this time to a supreme commander over the European and Mediterranean areas. Indeed, Churchill was then pressing Dill to leave Leahy and Hopkins in no doubt about his opposition to any such arrangement. Admiral Leahy pointed out that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, was arguing that there was an even greater need for a supreme commander for the Pacific theater. Leahy did not believe that it would be possible to have a U.S. supreme commander.

Kingdom (Eighth Air Force), in Italy (Fifteenth Air Force), and on shuttle missions in the USSR; RAF and AAF tactical principles and techniques should be re-examined; and CCS studies should be directed toward establishment of a supreme Allied air command responsible for execution of the strategic air plan against Germany, utilizing air bases in the United Kingdom, Italy, and probably the USSR.

7 Min, 122d mtg JCS, 9 Nov 43.

8 Min, 22d mtg JCS, 9 Nov 43.

As stated at QUADRANT, after allowing for the return of four U.S. and three British divisions to the United Kingdom, the following forces would be available in the Mediterranean (including the Middle East) on 1 November 1943: nineteen British, five U.S., and five French (native and Free French), a total of twenty-nine divisions. Of this number, seven British and two French divisions were to be required for garrison purposes. The balance, which were to be operationally available on 1 November 1943, would be twelve British, five American, and three French native divisions, a total of twenty divisions. Between 1 November 1943 and June 1944, six more French native divisions were to become operationally available—four for garrison duty in North Africa and two for operations. By June 1944 there were to be available in the Mediterranean, under QUADRANT decisions, a total of twenty-two Allied divisions. See memo, Caraway for Chief S&P Gp OPD, 1 Nov 43, sub: Forces Available in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Tab 154 in ABC 581 SS Papers, Nos. 131–59 (7 Jan 43).

9 For Churchill's views on the proposals to unify OVERLORD and Mediterranean commands, as relayed to Leahy and Hopkins via Dill, in early November see Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 304–06.
commander in both areas. Admiral King pointed to another complication. One of the factors hitherto determining the nationality of the supreme commander had been the numerical strength of the forces of each nation involved, and U.S. strength was now becoming more predominant in practically all theaters.

As a step toward securing the eventual appointment of a supreme commander for the European–Mediter-
anean area, General Marshall looked favorably on the idea supported by the AAF of placing control of all strategic bombing incident to OVERLORD under one Air commander. This commander was to be subordinate to the supreme commander for OVERLORD when the latter was finally appointed. Immediate appointment of an Air commander for strategic bombing would bring together hitherto independent strategic bombing operations and would turn OVERLORD into "an immediate operation and make it a going concern."\(^{10}\) In general agreement on the need to come to an understanding with the British, the JCS on 9 November 1943 decided to withstand British pressure for immediate action on the proposal for unification of the Mediterranean command and to thresh out the British and American command proposals at the next international conference (SEXTANT).

As the Chief of Staff prepared to leave for that conference early in November, the War Department planners spelled out in detail their views on the position to be upheld by the United States. They cautioned that the British proposal for unified command in the Mediterranean was "only one of a series of actions designed to free the British from American interference in what they believe to be the proper European strategy."\(^{11}\) To the Army planners, the logic of the British proposal was understandable only if the major British-American effort were to be in the Mediterranean. A unified command in the Mediterranean would be consonant with the American interpretation of agreed strategy only if resources from the Middle East were thereby made available to General Eisenhower. But to the planners it was not apparent in the British suggestion that Middle East resources would come under the over-all commander in the Mediterranean. To transfer resources from Italy to the east, the planners observed, was exactly what the United States did not want. The United States should not permit General Eisenhower to be placed in a position where he would have to withstand direct pressure from Churchill to undertake operations in the Balkans and the Aegean. General Eisenhower would find it difficult to guard the integrity of his forces in Italy, since the Prime Minister, operating through the British Chiefs of Staff, would continue his current policy of going directly to General Eisenhower’s subordinate commanders.

Until other basic decisions on strategy and command were reached, therefore, the U.S. Army planners argued, it was most important that the United States should not agree to unified command in the Mediterranean, nor even to transferring command from a U.S. to a British commander in chief. In either of these cases, control would almost certainly be exercised through the British Chiefs of Staff, and control by the United States

\(^{10}\) Min, 122d mtg JCS, 9 Nov 43.

\(^{11}\) Memo, Handy, ACofS OPD, for CofS, 10 Nov 43, sub: Problem of Over-all Comd, Paper 4, Folder 3, Item 15, Exec 5.
would diminish rapidly. In that event, even though the United States still had in the Mediterranean a half-million troops and the second largest air striking force in the world, it would have nothing to say about Mediterranean operations. The British Chiefs of Staff, moreover, might continue to follow their recent course of unilateral action and could, if they chose, divert resources from the central to the eastern Mediterranean, thereby forcing the United States, willingly, to embark on a Balkan or an Aegean campaign. Such a course of action might result in the postponement or abandonment of OVERLORD, which, as the Army planners saw it, was becoming “more and more obvious the British desire.”

The Army planners considered that solution of the European command problem depended upon the agreement reached on European strategy. They advised, therefore, that the U.S. delegation to SEXTANT not agree to any proposal on command until they secured a clarification of subsequent British-American European strategy. In addition, before accepting a change in the Mediterranean command, the responsibilities of the over-all commander in the United Kingdom, the command setup for the U.S. Air Forces, and control over resources in the Middle East should be determined. Since the British would be reluctant to accede to the Army proposals, the planners recommended that the United States adopt a practical approach and prepare to engage in “a horse-trading game.”

The Problem of Selecting a Supreme Commander for OVERLORD

Structure and organization was one part of the command problem; selection of a commander for the top Allied post in the war against Germany was another. The strategic implications of the command issue were debated in Washington military circles in the late summer and fall of 1943 also in connection with the question of the possible designation of General Marshall to that post. The President and Prime Minister had left Quebec in agreement that the supreme commander of OVERLORD should be an American and that the officer pre-eminently fitted for the post was General Marshall. In the weeks that followed, a report of his selection was circulated in Washington and London and there was much speculation in the U.S. and British press. It soon developed that the prospective appointment of the Army Chief of Staff was caught up in a tangled web of conflicting rumors, practical concerns, and strategic aims.

The problem of the prospective appointment of Marshall was by no means simple. British as well as American public opinion had to be considered. There were ugly stories of a “British plot” and of devious Presidential pre-election maneuvering behind the reported proposal to remove Marshall from the Washington scene and his central

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.

14 See, for example, msgs, Winant for Secy State, 29 and 30 Sep 43, Paper 120, Book 12, Exec 9.
place in the conduct of the war. None of these had any foundation in fact, but there were real and practical considerations on the American side. There was the problem of finding a replacement for Marshall as Chief of Staff without seriously upsetting the staff and command structure he had built up in Washington or disturbing the smooth relations he had established with Congress. Many sincerely felt that Marshall was indispensable as Chief of Staff. In this group were numbered Admirals Leahy and King and General Arnold, who were in a dilemma, wishing neither to deny Marshall his opportunity nor to break up the winning team represented by the JCS. So disturbed by the reports of Marshall’s prospective appointment was General of the Armies John J. Pershing, the distinguished leader of the American AEF of World War I fame and himself a former Army Chief of Staff, that he felt compelled to take up his pen in the late summer of 1943 and protest to the President against what he believed would be

... a fundamental and very grave error in our military policy. We are engaged in a global war of which the end is still far distant and for the wise strategical guidance of which we need our most accomplished officer as Chief of Staff. I voice the consensus of informed military opinion in saying that officer is General Marshall. To transfer him to a tactical command in a limited area, no matter how seemingly important, is to deprive ourselves of the benefit of his outstanding strategical ability and experience. I know of no one at all comparable to replace him as Chief of Staff.\textsuperscript{15}

In reply, the President agreed that General Marshall was by far the best available man as Chief of Staff. Nevertheless, the President continued, the operations for which Marshall was being considered were the

... biggest that we will conduct in this war. And when the time comes, it will not be a mere limited area proposition, but I think the command will include the whole European theater. . . .

In addition, the British wished to have Marshall to sit with their own Joint Staff.

More than that, I think it is only a fair thing to give George a chance in the field ... and because of the nature of the job we shall still have the benefit of his strategical ability.

The President concluded on a note that was as forceful as it was disarming:

The best way I can express it is to tell you that I want George to be the Pershing of the second World War—and he cannot be that if we keep him here.\textsuperscript{16}

The problem of the relationship of such an appointment to strategy and the conduct of operations was obviously important and much thought was given to it in Washington. Two of the strongest advocates of Marshall for the top command were Stimson and Hopkins. It was Stimson’s hunch, he wrote to the President via Hopkins in late summer, that “just at present the P. M. will make almost any concession to get Marshall over to England.” The concession to be extracted should be the union of the northern and southern European fronts under Marshall and thus an end to competition for resources between the two. Operational command in Italy should be British. To offset any effort by the Prime Minister to “dilute” Marshall’s

\textsuperscript{15} Ltr, Gen Pershing to President, 16 Sep 43, Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

\textsuperscript{16} Ltr, Roosevelt to Pershing, 20 Sep 43, in Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
direct influence over the troops invading northern France, the Americans should also try to get the British to agree to an American deputy for Marshall. Giving Marshall the rank and title of General of the Armies might preserve his influence over other theaters. In any case, Stimson urged, Marshall should leave to take command in the United Kingdom by 1 November in order to prevent "fatal delays and diversions which may sabotage OVERLORD."\(^{17}\)

Though there were good grounds for General Marshall to believe that he was slated for the top Allied European theater command, the political chiefs—the President and Prime Minister—still delayed in making a definite formal announcement. In the early fall of 1943, the President, however uneasy he may have become, apparently still wanted Marshall to have that command—a command to be broader than OVERLORD and to include all the Anglo-American forces attacking Germany. On the other side of the Atlantic Churchill, faced with the factor of British public opinion and intent on carrying out his eastern Mediterranean strategy, was becoming disturbed by reports in the press that Marshall was to be given an all-inclusive supreme command over all Allied forces against Germany.\(^{18}\) Nor did Marshall's own attitude simplify the question. During the period of delay he found himself in a most delicate situation—a situation he met characteristically by keeping a discreet silence regarding his own ambitions and personal preference in the matter. He was anxious to get on with arrangements for pressing the war against Germany, but his own code of conduct forbade him actively to seek the top post—the crowning point of any professional soldier's career. As the weeks went by and no announcement was forthcoming on European command he felt that the whole matter was getting out of hand. On 29 September 1943, he pointed out to General Handy and General Arnold that a White House conference of the previous day had failed to produce an agreement on an announcement of command for the European theater. In view of the widespread speculation in the press and Congress, as General Handy later recorded, the business "was getting into more and more of a mess."\(^{19}\) Turning the question over to them, Marshall instructed them to work out a solution for the whole command problem in the war against Germany. He specifically directed them not to be influenced by the fact that he himself...

\(^{17}\) (1) Ltr, Stimson to Hopkins, with incl for Roosevelt, 16 Sep 43, no sub, SW files, White House, 40. (2) See also memo, McCloy for SW, 28 Sep 43, no sub, SW files, War Plans, 52.

\(^{18}\) (1) Msg, Prime Minister to Hopkins, 26 Sep 43, Hopkins Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Also cited in Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 301–02. (2) Msg, President to Prime Minister, 19 Oct 43, Hopkins Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

For brief discussions on the positions of the President, Prime Minister, and General Marshall in the summer and early fall of 1943 on the prospective appointment of Marshall to the OVERLORD command, see: (1) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 457–41; (2) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 196–97, 207–09; (3) Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 300–306; (4) Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 112–14; (5) Leahy, I Was There, pp. 190–95; and (6) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 758–85. Sherwood concludes: "In back of Churchill's objections to the granting of all-inclusive authority to Marshall in the European war was his indefatigable determination to play his own strategic hand in the Eastern Mediterranean, the area that was now dearer to his heart than ever."

\(^{19}\) Memo for rcd, Handy, ACoS OPD [Oct 43], sub: Attached Papers—(1) A Study of Comd in the European-Mediterranean Theaters; (2) A Proposed Message From the President to the Prime Minister, OPD 984 TS, 20.
self was involved personally in the matter.

With the aid of suggestions from Mr. Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary for Air, and from General Arnold, who was leaving for the west coast, Col. G. A. Lincoln of the Operation Division’s Strategy Section drafted a set of recommendations that, after being reviewed by Generals Handy and Hull, were submitted to General Marshall. According to these proposals, the formula adopted for the system of command must not upset the original concept of the CCS and the existing structure of the CCS and the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff.

Combined staff machinery providing brakes on un-co-ordinated, unilateral action must be retained. The strength of U.S. Army representation on the JCS and of U.S. representation on the CCS must also be maintained. Forces of each nationality must fight, except in emergencies, under echelons of command of their own nationality. Since the greater portion of the troops committed to the Mediterranean were British, the command of all operations against the European Axis in the Mediterranean should pass, at a suitable time, to a British operational commander. Since the great mass of ground forces and the majority of air forces, as well as resources, for OVERLORD were to be American, the supreme commander of that operation should be American.

According to the Army proposals, the point in the war had been reached at which the command of all British-Ameri-

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20 For the following summary of War Department proposals, see: (1) memo with incl, Handy, ACofS OPD, for Marshall, 4 Oct 43, sub: Comdr and System of Comd for War With Germany, and (2) memo with attached papers, Handy for Marshall, 5 Oct 43, same sub; both in OPD 384 TS, 15.

21 Incl 1 to memo, Arnold for Handy, 29 Sep 43, sub: Problem Presented by the Chief of Staff, OPD 384 TS, 15. Tab D.
lose his valuable stabilizing influence in Army, JCS, and CCS deliberations. The Army proposals envisaged that General Marshall would be kept in a position to give over-all advice to the President and to advise the CCS on all matters affecting the European theater, and that the way would be kept open for him eventually to return to Washington and resume his duties as Chief of Staff, or, possibly, for him to be appointed supreme commander of the war in the Pacific. The proposals showed the Army desire to maintain the continuity of U.S. strategic concepts that General Marshall and his planning staff had so largely fashioned and that he had so strongly upheld in joint and Allied councils. They also reflected the Army view of the necessity for keeping the lead strings in the conduct of the global war centered as far as possible in the Army, joint, and combined mechanisms in Washington rather than shifting to virtually independent theater supercommands of the Pershing or Foch types of World War I.

Upon receiving these proposals, General Marshall suggested certain changes, mainly in method of presentation, and recommended that General Eisenhower be designated U.S. Army Group Commander in OVERLORD. At Marshall’s direction the proposals were submitted to the Secretary of War, who signified his approval. Later General Arnold, upon his return to Washington, also endorsed them. After the War Department leaders had given their approval, General Handy, at General Marshall’s direction, presented the recommendations to Admiral Leahy. On 12 October Admiral Leahy reported to General Handy that in general the solution presented was acceptable to the President, but, Admiral Leahy concluded, “its saleability on the other side of the water is doubtful.”

Down to the departure of the U.S. staff for the SEXTANT Conference in early November the matter was unsettled. Announcement by the President and Prime Minister of the commander for OVERLORD was still not forthcoming, the President informing Churchill in late October he could not make Marshall immediately available. Inclined to the idea that Marshall command both OVERLORD and the Mediterranean, the President apparently still had not resolved in his own mind all the problems of such an appointment. On the other hand, the Prime Minister appeared to be as eager for an announcement of command for OVERLORD and as willing to accept Marshall for it as he was determined that OVERLORD and the Mediterranean not be united under a U.S. commander.

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22 To the reluctance expressed by Army leaders in the War Department over the possible departure of General Marshall from Washington were added the voices of Army leaders in the field. Thus after a private conversation with General Eisenhower in Algiers, General Deane reported to General Marshall that Eisenhower “expressed a great hope that you would not leave Washington. His view is that the whole Army regardless of theater looks on you as its commander.” See ltr, Deane, Moscow, for Marshall, 29 Oct 43, Envelope 3, Item 15, Exec 5.

23 (1) Memo [with incl], Col G. A. Lincoln for Col Gailey, 21 Jan 44, no sub, OPD 584 TS. (2) Memo for rcd, Handy, ACoFS [Oct 43], sub: Attached papers—(1) A Study of Comd in the European-Mediterranean Theaters; (2) A Proposed Message From the President to the Prime Minister, OPD 584 TS, 20.

24 Memo for rcd cited n. 23.

25 For the exchange between the President and the Prime Minister at the end of October on the delay in making General Marshall available, and in issuing a joint announcement on the European command, see: (1) msg, Roosevelt to Former Naval
Churchill went so far as to assure Marshall: “I do hope to hear of your appointment soon. You know I will back you through thick and thin and make your path here smooth.” Marshall expressed his appreciation for the Prime Minister’s offer of support, which he considered “vital to the success of OVERLORD.”

The questions of the structure of command and the announcement of the name of the top commander were thus to be held in abeyance—along with the resolution of basic related strategic issues in the war against Germany—pending further discussion with the British at the next conference. British pressure for changes in the Mediterranean command setup in the absence of an agreement on over-all command in the war against Germany confirmed the fears of the U.S. Army planners that the strategic pattern accepted at QUADRANT might be upset. Seriously disturbed, they prepared in conjunction with the rest of the American staff, in the late fall of 1943, to argue once again the whole case on European strategy with the British. What made Army concern over British pressure toward the Mediterranean all the more acute was the pressing realization that the time had at last come to correlate British-American strategy with the plans and expectations of the other major ally in the war against Germany, the Soviet Union.

Person, 30 Oct 43, No. 403, Item 63c (2d part), Exec 10; and (2) msg, Prime Minister to President, 31 Oct 43, No. 481, Item 63c (2d part), Exec 10.

* Msg, Prime Minister to Dill for Marshall, 24 Oct 43, Item 12a, Exec 5. For Marshall’s reply, see memo, Sexton for Coleridge, 27 Oct 43, no sub, Item 12a, Exec 5.
Preparing for a final showdown with the British on European strategy, the U.S. Army planners and leaders were acutely concerned in the fall of 1943 over the need for closer unity among the three major allies—the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR. Through the elaborate machinery of the CCS system and through common undertakings in the theaters, much progress had already been made in pooling British and American ideas, plans, and resources, but with the Soviet Union military relations had not been as close, nor had understanding been as genuine. The USSR, outside the CCS committee and conference system, had remained on the periphery of the Anglo-American coalition.

The survival of the USSR and its continued active participation in the war against Germany had been a prime factor in Anglo-American strategic thinking for nearly two years. As Admiral King had put it at Casablanca: "the geographical position and manpower of Russia is the key to the defeat of Germany." But down to the fall of 1943 at least, no effort to co-ordinate western strategy and planning directly with those of the USSR had been successful. For the Soviet Union the critical question from the beginning of the war had been a second front, and its long-continued postponement had added to Soviet suspicions of the West. As the War Department had come to recognize, until definite signs of a resolute British-American understanding on this issue were shown, the West could expect no improvement in military relations with the Soviet Union.

By the fall of 1943 bridging the gap between Western plans and Soviet expectations had become more imperative than ever to the U.S. military staff. Never had the circumstances seemed more opportune. After much debate and sparring, a pattern of strategy against Germany had finally been evolved by the Western Allies. The massive Soviet drive from the east then in progress and the developing plans for the Mediterranean and the cross-Channel invasion had to be firmly and finally linked if the Allies were to pool their

\[\text{Min, 53d mtg JCS, 17 Jan 43.}\]
efforts effectively to achieve the one common goal—an early victory over Germany.

The USSR in British-American Planning

To the fall of 1943 United States military collaboration with the Soviet Union had been effected chiefly in connection with intergovernmental arrangements on lend-lease. On 6 January 1943 President Roosevelt had reaffirmed the importance of lend-lease to the USSR as a cornerstone in the U.S. war effort:

I understand both the Army and Navy are definitely of the opinion that Russian continuance as a major factor in the war is of cardinal importance and therefore it must be a basic factor in our strategy to provide her with the maximum amount of supplies that can be delivered to her ports. I fully endorse this concept.²

Lend-lease aid to the USSR was a cardinal objective of U.S. policy, but even in that sphere there was much room for improvement in mutual understanding of respective capabilities, limitations, needs, and aims.³ Americans who had come into close contact with Soviet military leaders, Brig. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley for example, felt that the USSR, involved in a land war on one main front, did not appreciate the shipping problems confronting the United States in its multifront global war.⁴

Similarly, there was growing impatience in U.S. military quarters over Soviet refusal to exchange information freely on the use and effectiveness of U.S. military equipment in combat.⁵

Much could be tolerated and excused in 1942 when the USSR was fighting with its back to the wall and U.S. forces and matériel were only beginning to become effective in the international conflict. In 1943 irritations increased. The Russians were safely past the critical turning point in their military fortunes and showed more and more signs of strong staying power. To the Army staff it sometimes seemed that aid to the USSR was a one-sided affair with little appreciation on the part of the Russians of the costs involved—of the serious drain on vitally needed ships, of the postponement in programs of training and equipping American units and deploying them in combat. On those occasions the staff was inclined to doubt the wisdom of U.S. policy, in practice from early in the war, of giving the Soviet Union preferential treatment in the allocation of munitions over all other Allies and even, at times, over the armed forces of the United States. The desire for reciprocal treatment and a stiffening of American policy toward the Soviet ally

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² Memo, Roosevelt for SW, 6 Jan 43, no sub, WDCSA Russia (Secret).
³ (1) Memo, Handy, ACoFS OPD, for CoFS, 8 Mar 43, sub: Heavy Bombers for Russia, WDCSA Russia (Secret). (2) OPD brief, title: Notes, 97th mtg JCS, 20 Jul 43, Third Soviet Protocol (JCS 322/1), with JCS 322/1 in ABC 400.3295 Russia (19 Apr 43). 1.
⁴ See especially, msg, Gen Hurley, Moscow, to President, 8 Dec 42, Case 4, Book 7, Exec 8. The message from General Hurley, sent via the State Department, was circulated in the War Department. General Hurley had reported his visit to the Soviet front and discussions with Soviet officers: “It was evident from conversations with these officers that they were unfamiliar with our transport problems. While discussing in great detail their own transport shortage, they expressed surprise that Great Britain and the United States were experiencing difficulties in getting supplies to South Russia by way of the Persian Gulf and to North Russia by way of the North Atlantic.”
⁵ See, for example, OPD draft msg [CoFS for President] [no addressee], 7 Apr 43, Item 20, Exec 1. The message was not sent.
was reflected in a comment of the Operations Division’s Policy Committee on 23 January 1943:

... the United States should continue to furnish Lend-Lease supplies to Russia to the full extent of our capacity, provided—and provided only—that Russia cooperates with us and takes us into her confidence. As we grow more powerful (and 1943 will most certainly see the United States far stronger, at least on the sea and in the air, than any other belligerent) we can afford to, and in simple self-interest must start exercising the dominant influence to which such power properly entitles us. The time is appropriate for us to start some straight-from-the-shoulder talk with Mr. Joseph Stalin. 8

Irritation with Soviet behavior also appeared in General Handy’s comment to General Marshall in early March 1943:

Russia has given the United Nations little credit for the munitions which we could ill afford to spare and which we have sent in our much-needed ships. Stalin, on the other hand, has consistently called for a second front. Originally our lend-lease was designed to keep our Allies fighting until such time as we had built up our own armed forces. This objective has been achieved, and the time has come when we must complete the equipping of the forces that we have placed in being and move them to the combat zones in order to gain victory in the shortest possible time. Consideration should be given to reducing our aid to Russia and using this equipment to create the conditions and forces required for establishing a second front.

Looking ahead to the end of the conflict and to the time of a political settlement, he went on to say:

Victory in the war will be meaningless unless we also win the peace. We must be strong enough militarily at the peace table to cause our demands to be respected. With this in view, we should give only such equipment to our Allies that they can put to better and quicker use than we can. 7

During the discussion in the spring of 1943 on the Third (London) Protocol—to cover lend-lease to the USSR for the fiscal year 1 July 1943 to 30 June 1944—some Army and Navy support arose for inserting a clause calling for all authorized military and naval attachés and observers to be given the same rights of visit and access to information in the Soviet Union as those extended to their Soviet counterparts in the United States. 8

Not all military men were in agreement on the wisdom of inserting such a proviso. On 22 May General Marshall reported to the JCS that he felt such a proviso would be ill advised. The cardinal principle, he pointed out, was still to help the USSR as much as possible. 9 In any event, military sentiment for circumscribing U.S. aid to the USSR with a proviso for a freer exchange of data continued to be blocked in 1943 by the White House policy that lend-lease to the USSR was not to be used as a basis for bargaining. Like the two earlier protocols, the Third, signed on 19 October in London by representatives of the United States, the United

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* "The Weekly Strategic Resume," 23 Jan 43, 23d mtg PC, ABC 334.3 PC (1 Aug 43), 3.

9 "Memo, Handy, ACofS OPD, for CofS, 8 Mar 43, sub: Heavy Bombers for Russia, WDCSA Russia (Secret).


* Min, 88th mtg JCS, 22 May 43.
Kingdom, Canada, and the Soviet Union, contained no such proviso.\(^{10}\)

Lend-lease to the Soviet Union remained an important commitment for U.S. shipping, planes, equipment, and supplies. The magnitude of the aid during 1943 is indicated in the dry statistics of the tonnage and aircraft deliveries. As of 31 August 1943 the total number of airplanes due under the three protocols was 6,448; factory deliveries had been made to the number of 6,514. Of the 6,207 departures from the United States, 5,389 arrived at their destination, 4,341 passed to Russian control, 556 were lost en route, 1,048 were in American hands at their destination, and the remainder were en route. The AAF and the War Department were directing their efforts toward overcoming the difficulties encountered and expanding the Alaskan and Persian Gulf routes to take care of the normal flow of 495 planes per month called for under the Third Protocol. The number of aircraft leaving Great Falls for the Alaska-Siberia route rose steadily from 54 during September 1942—the month the route opened—to over 300 aircraft per month during June, July, and August 1943. As of 31 August there were in the Persian Gulf area about 1,000 planes, all still in American hands. This route also showed a great increase over 1942, though not the same steady rise that occurred on the Alaskan route—transportation difficulties at Abadan, Iran, especially complicating the delivery problem.\(^{11}\) By mid-1943 the mounting production of American factories, the decline of shipping losses, the increased pace of shipbuilding, and improved capacity on routes of delivery had reacted favorably upon lend-lease deliveries to the Soviet Union.\(^{12}\) In terms of cargo shipped from the Western Hemisphere to the USSR, the year 1943 was to see the dispatch of 4,794,545 long tons as compared with 2,453,097 for 1942. The principal routes in 1943 for this traffic were the Persian Gulf, Soviet Far East (for nonmilitary supplies), northern Soviet ports via the Atlantic (with the exception of the hiatus in convoys from April through October 1943), and the Soviet Arctic via the Pacific (from May through August).\(^{13}\)

Continuing the work it had begun in 1942, the Army staff paid increasing attention in 1943 to plans for improving the Persian Corridor as a supply route to the USSR.\(^{14}\) An interesting experiment in international co-operation in a wartime theater thereby resulted—involving Americans, Englishmen, Russians, and Iranians.\(^{15}\) For the American


\(^{11}\) (1) Memo, Maj Gen James H. Burns, Exec, The President’s Soviet Protocol Committee, for CG AAF, 21 Sep 43, sub: Airplane Deliveries to Russia. (2) Memo, Brig Gen Bennett E. Meyers, Actg ACOFS

\(^{12}\) See Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943–45.

\(^{13}\) (1) State Department work sheets used in compiling Report on War Aid Furnished by the United States to the USSR, November 28, 1945, Item 5, OPD Hist Unit File. (2) See also Motter, Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, Table 1, App. A.

\(^{14}\) See, for example, ltr, Actg SW Patterson to President, 9 Dec 42, inc to memo, Somervell for CofS [7 Dec 42], sub: Dec Rpt to the President Showing the Progress of the WD in Mtg the Second Russian Protocol, WDCSA Russia 1942–43 (Secret).

\(^{15}\) The fascinating story of the U.S. Army experience in the Persian Corridor—including relations of the Americans with the Russians, British, and Iranians—is treated in Motter, Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia. For the detailed story of lend-lease to Russia see Motter and also Leighton and Coak-
cans the problems in the Persian Corridor were complicated by a number of special conditions. Though the whole Middle East theater was recognized by the United States and the United Kingdom as one of British strategic responsibility, the U.S. Army forces in it had been given by mutual agreement a unique responsibility for expediting lend-lease to the USSR. With the concomitant decline in 1943 of the rest of the Middle East theater as an area of active operations for U.S. forces, the Persian Gulf Service Command became increasingly important. Amid the varying national interests, problems constantly arose calling for a conciliation of views as the Americans took over more and more control of the supply functions in the Corridor. To help Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly, U.S. commander of the Persian Gulf Service Command, General Marshall early in the spring of 1943 had directed him to send monthly reports to Washington. The reports were to describe especially any difficulties with the British or Russians and were to be written with a view to being forwarded to the President by the Chief of Staff.

Growing importance of the American contribution in the Persian Gulf area was reflected not only in the rising figures of lend-lease dispatched to and handled there but also in the increase of U.S. personnel. During 1942 only a few hundred U.S. Army troops were in the Persian Corridor, but in 1943 the assigned Army strength steadily rose, exceeding 28,000 at the end of the year. The increasing importance of the U.S. Army role in the supply of the USSR through the Corridor was also reflected in the growing independence of the Persian Gulf Service Command from USAFIME—culminating in the establishment of the Persian Gulf Command as a separate command directly under the War Department on 10 December 1943.

Outside the field of lend-lease, attempts to correlate U.S.-Soviet efforts to the fall of 1943 had been much less successful. The American offer during the siege of Stalingrad to send a group of heavy bombers to Soviet bases in the Caucasus to assist in the defense operations of the Soviet Army had been rejected. The Russians were intensely interested in receiving the planes, but not the men—a solution Marshall thought unwise since it would withhold striking power against the enemy for too long a period while the Russians learned to operate and maintain the aircraft. The U.S. military proposal—backed by

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16 Memo, Handy [for himself], 7 Apr 43, sub: Instrs from Marshall Prior to Departure, Paper 51, Book 8, Exec 8. The instructions were given to General Handy for transmission to Connolly shortly before Handy's departure for an extended tour of the theaters.

17 (1) STM-30, 1 Jan 48. (2) See also, Motter, Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, Table 12, App. A.

18 (1) OPD Diary, 10 Dec 43. (2) OPD memo for rcd, appended to ltr, Marshall to CG's AGF, ASF, etc., 10 Dec 43, sub: Establishment of Persian Gulf Command, OPD 384 Middle East, 28.

For earlier suggestions along this same line, see memo, Wedemeyer for Hull, 25 May 43, no sub, OPD 381 Security, 141; and msg, McNarney to Eisenhower for Marshall, 27 May 43, CM-OUT 11444.

19 For discussions of United States offer and Soviet reaction, see especially Item 20, Exec 1 and OPD 381 Russia.

For a discussion of this episode and of the USSR in Anglo-American plans and operations in 1942, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, Ch. XV.

20 Min, 56th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 48.
the White House—to co-ordinate planning for the use of American airpower in the event of war between the USSR and Japan had also been rebuffed. In rejecting the proposed survey of Siberian airfields by Gen. Follett Bradley, Stalin, on 13 January 1943, stated to Roosevelt: "It would seem obvious that Russian military objects can be inspected only by Russian inspectors, just as American military objects can be inspected only by American inspectors. In this respect [there] must be no misunderstanding."21 President Roosevelt's suggestion at the time of the Casablanca Conference to send General Marshall to the Soviet Union to discuss Allied plans and problems in the war against the Axis Powers also met with a cool reception from Moscow.22

Such developments convinced the military planners that the USSR would not go to war against Japan until after the German threat to the USSR had been eliminated. Beginning with TRIDENT, the U.S. and British staffs joined with the President and the Prime Minister at the end of each of their big mid-war conferences in expressing the hope that, upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, the USSR would help the others bring about the unconditional surrender of Japan. Despite apparent Soviet disinterest and the absence of adequate data, U.S. staff planners continued in 1943 to study the possibilities of a Russo-Japanese war and to keep plans for such an eventuality on a stand-by basis.

During the Anglo-American debates over European strategy, Soviet behavior and tactics were, for the West, as puzzling as they were disturbing. The USSR's curious position as half-ally—in the alliance yet outside of it—meant that the Soviet Union did not directly participate in most of the debates. The Soviet Government nevertheless resorted to a variety of tactics and pressures to influence the result. At the end of each of their conferences, the Western partners announced to the Soviet Union the general decisions reached and their expectations for the second front. Cycles of irritation followed those of good feeling as the prospects of the second front gradually receded from 1942 to 1943 to 1944. A chain reaction of displeasure was generated throughout that part of Soviet officialdom that came into contact with the West and affected dealings on all levels and problems—even those only remotely associated with the issue at hand. Shortly after the TRIDENT Conference in May 1943, the Soviet Government tried a diplomatic gambit, going so far as to recall its ambassadors from London and Washington. There is fleeting evidence—difficult to weigh—suggesting that at least at one point in the summer of 1943 the Soviet Union may even have seriously considered a separate peace with Germany and entered into tentative negotiations.23

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21 Quotation is from msg, Stalin to Roosevelt, 13 Jan 43, incl to memo, Hammond, JCS, for Handy, 21 Jan 43, sub: Bradley Mission, Item 20, Exec 1. See also: (1) OPD draft msg [CofS to President], 7 Apr 43, Item 20, Exec 1; (2) min, 6th mtg CCS, President and Prime Minister at White House, TRIDENT, 25 May 43, Official TRIDENT Conf Book; and (3) Ch. IV, above.

22 (1) Msg, Roosevelt to Stalin, 8 Jan 43, Item 20, Exec 1. (2) OPD draft msg [CofS to President], 7 Apr 43, Item 20, Exec 1. (3) Msg, Stalin to Roosevelt, 15 Jan 43, incl to memo, Hammond, JCS, for Gen Handy, 21 Jan 43, sub: Bradley Mission, Item 20, Exec 1.

press kept up its campaign of registering displeasure at the delay of the second front, at times even questioning the good faith of the Western Allies, especially of the British. The Soviet attitude made any attempt to bring about close military co-operation extremely difficult.

Over-all U.S. military planning continued to be vitally affected in 1943 by events on the Eastern Front. At every international conference, the Western planners sought to achieve one of the most determining factors in British-American strategy—the relief of German pressure on the Soviet Army. Even the planning for the over-all strength and the extent and type of cutting edge of the U.S. Army needed to carry out the American role in global strategy continued, as from the outset of the war, to be directly related to the Soviet military situation.

Thus, as the USSR had increasingly demonstrated its ability to hold and fight back, the Victory Program had been progressively revised downward in armored and motorized units.

Appreciative of the fact that the United States was associated with allies over whose "most fateful decisions"—as General Embick phrased it—they might have no control, U.S. Army planners did not rule out the possibility of a Soviet withdrawal or a Soviet-German rapprochement. Nor were they blind to the fact that the Soviet Union might be fighting the war for completely different ultimate ends from those of Great Britain and the United States. But, aside from examining direct military implications, they usually refrained from speculating openly on policy conflicts developing among the Allies and international political issues likely to arise at the close of the armed conflict. By training and habit, U.S. military men had been nurtured in the tradition of the separation of military and political
spheres in national policy. While, as General Marshall had earlier put it, they could not help having "the thought of political matters" always on their minds, they carefully avoided trespassing on what they regarded as the political field. The absence of clear-cut American political guidance and concrete political objectives susceptible to military implementation in the war reinforced U.S. staff preoccupation with ending the war as quickly as possible and letting those responsible for political problems worry about ultimate political implications and goals. This state of affairs led one U.S. Foreign Service officer in the summer of 1943 to draw a sharp contrast on the points of view of the United States and its allies on military policy in over-all national policy:

Most American military men think of war as a soldier's job to be done. . . . Most of our officers want the job accomplished as soon as possible, with a minimum of fuss over international political and economic issues, which they regard as of secondary importance. Political and economic questions, they feel, can be discussed and decided after the defeat of the Axis.

To our allies the conduct of the war is a function of overall political and economic policy. Military logic is therefore always subordinate to and sometimes violated in favor of political and economic considerations.

Our wartime policy is directed at defeat of the Axis. . . . Certainly they [political and economic principles] have never appeared to override the purely military policy of defeating the Axis.28

Whatever the ultimate political disadvantages of concentrating on the military task of winning the war—a problem much debated in western circles after the close of hostilities—there are indications that the Army staff was not entirely unaware that the conduct of the war would shape the conditions of the peace. This was reflected in General Marshall's expression of concern to the President, in the early spring of 1943, over the possible postwar chaos in Europe if the Western and Soviet drives against Germany did not keep pace.29 But the Army staff also was not without hope that the build-up of American strength during the war would make the United States, as Handy had said, "strong enough militarily at the peace table to cause our demands to be respected." The precise definition of those demands would, in conventional U.S. military practice, be left for others to decide. There was even occasional expression of foreboding over the likely differences in approach between the United States and the USSR to the political problems of the eventual settlement. Since such questions were considered outside conventional military interests and concerns and more properly in the sphere of the political branch of government, a Washington Army staff officer was the more likely to express his reservations, doubts, or suspicions on the ultimate political aims and intentions of the Soviet ally only in the privacy of his own thinking or to a circle of his closest associates. One such recorded case—as revealing as it is rare—was the view expressed in August 1943 by a General Staff officer in connection with the question of a possible agreement with the USSR on "post-German Europe." The fact that the comment was offered by an

29 Memo, G. C. M. for Handy, 30 Mar 43, no sub, WDCA 381 Super Secret, I.
officer not actually responsible for strategic planning for coalition warfare may make it all the more—rather than less—an accurate index to Army sentiment at large. He warned that, in dealing with the Soviet Union, the following ideas had to be borne constantly in mind:

a. Russia is concerned solely with Russia.
b. Any agreement or treaty with Russia will endure only so long as it is expedient for Russia.
c. Even though Russia might enter into negotiations with the expectation of breaking the agreement, she would not even initially come to any agreement which is not heavily weighted in favor of Russia.
d. The Third International is not dead by a long shot. The real objective of Russia is the Sovietization not only of Europe but of the world. Therefore even if Russia came to a satisfactory agreement with us, and to all appearances, lived up to it, we should still be on the losing end. That is, the agreement would be lived up to by the façade of the Russian Government but all the energies and resources of Russia would flow through the Third International into the fertile fields of a disillusioned Europe.
e. In the final analysis the only language understood by Russia is force.
f. In the course of history practically every plan has been tried to hold down powerful nations and preserve peace. The only (repeat only) effective method has been genuine “Balance of Power.” Wars have broken out only upon the break-down of the “balance.” We should, therefore, seek to provide balanced power in Europe.

To prevent Soviet dominance in postwar Europe, he went so far as to recommend:

a. Seek our own councils only for the time being.
b. Pour in the power and forces to the Nth degree in western Europe.
c. Get to Berlin FIRST.
d. Line up our allies, particularly France and Turkey.
e. Then try to gain what we can through agreement with Russia.
f. As for Germany, the mere threat of our alliance with her will suffice to give pause to Russia.30

Despite such occasional expressions of pessimism over ultimate political prospects, the task at hand, in the opinion of the Army planning staff, was to get on with the war. The Soviet Union was still an ally whose military might was being counted on heavily to defeat Germany, and, whatever the differences in national policies and ultimate political aims of the three allies, the immediate and pressing aim was to establish closer unity in military action. To secure their basic goal of a quick, decisive, and relatively inexpensive victory over Germany—and prosecute the war against Japan—the Army planners in the summer of 1943 called for co-ordination of Soviet offensive efforts from the east with British-American air-ground offensive from the west.31 They particularly feared that if, as a result of differences in British-American views over European strategy, the Soviet Army alone was relied upon for major ground operations, a protracted European war would follow and might result in unilateral action culminating in a peace short of complete victory. It was also apparent to the planners that before closer unity of action could be established the Western Allies would have to overcome the suspicion of the Russians that had been building up as a result of the long-promised and

31 SS 90, 8 Aug 43, title: Conduct of the War in Europe, Tab 90 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2-95 (7 Jan 43). A copy of this paper was distributed to all U.S. officers who attended Quadrant.
much-postponed second front. They would have to convince the Russians of the sincerity of their intentions and the firmness of their plans to carry out the invasion from the west and fulfill the long-disappointed Soviet expectations.

Establishment of the U.S. Military Mission to the USSR

Down to the fall of 1943 close collaboration with the USSR was, perhaps, not immediately necessary. The major Soviet and Anglo-American efforts against Germany were still far apart, and overall purposes would seem to have been satisfied if the Allies fought vigorously in their respective theaters and retained the initiative. Following QUADRANT the improved prospects for a second front and the consequent prospective link-up of Soviet and Anglo-American efforts changed the picture. Acceptance by the United States and Great Britain of an agreed European strategy at Quebec made improved collaboration with the USSR appear imperative to the Army and other American leaders.

To gain the confidence of the Soviet staff and win the fullest co-operation of the Soviet Government for the over-all strategic objectives, the Americans proceeded to set their own house in order. As a first step they reorganized the U.S. liaison machinery in Moscow, which had all but broken down as an effective unit in the face of internal friction and even instances of working at cross purposes. Differences had developed between Brig. Gen. Philip R. Faymonville, the lend-lease representative, and Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Michela, the military attaché, and General Michela had also encountered difficulties with the Russians. In addition, Admiral William H. Standley, the U.S. Ambassador, had not been kept informed of U.S. military planning. Since he was the only American who had ready access to Stalin, this gap, too, had militated against effective military liaison in the Soviet capital. When, in the fall of 1943, these chief United States representatives were withdrawn, a new U.S. politico-military team was dispatched.

The new ambassador was Mr. W. Averell Harriman. The choice of Mr. Harriman was especially fortunate and was to prove popular with the Russians. Long an intimate adviser of the President, he had played a leading role in the lend-lease program. Together with Lord Beaverbrook, he had negotiated the initial lend-lease agreement with the Soviet Union in 1941; he had served as the President's representative at the first military discussions between Churchill and Stalin in August 1942; and he had attended many high Anglo-American politico-military conferences.

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32 A brief description of these difficulties is given by Deane in *Strange Alliance*, p. 10. For an account of Admiral Standley's service in the USSR, see William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia* (Chicago, H. Regnery Company, 1959).

The differences between General Faymonville and General Michela, and General Michela's difficulties with the Soviets are reflected in the exchange of messages between General Michela in Moscow and General Strong, G-2, in Washington. See Item 20, Exec 1.
Late in September 1943 Mr. Harriman, with General Marshall, determined the nature and function of the new military mission. It was to be a small group and was to be set up under the direction of the ambassador and headed by Maj. Gen. John R. Deane. From his earlier service in Washington as secretary of the General Staff and from his more recent vantage points as secretary of the JCS and as U.S. secretary of the CCS, Deane had become intimately familiar with high-level strategic plans and military policies. His staff in the USSR was to include Brig. Gen. Sidney P. Spalding of the Army Service Forces and Brig. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg of the Air headquarters staff in Washington. General Spalding was to be responsible for handling lend-lease matters in the USSR in accord with policies established by the Lend-Lease Administration, the U.S. ambassador, and General Deane. General Vandenberg’s assignment was to be a temporary one and he was to return to Washington within six weeks after the establishment of the mission. To avoid embarrassing and complicating the work of the new delegation in Moscow, General Marshall and Mr. Harriman decided that no military attaché or direct representative of G–2 should be appointed for the time being. Attempts would be made to obtain information required by G–2 either from the British or directly from the Russians, if such efforts could be made without interference with the mission’s primary objective.

The primary objective of the military mission—and of Harriman—was to break down Soviet suspicion. The hope was to obtain better knowledge of Soviet plans and to establish closer co-operation in carrying out operational plans against Germany. Harriman and the military mission also were to look toward obtaining Soviet participation in the Pacific war. General Deane was to be at liberty to discuss with the Russians all information concerning U.S. strategy, plans, and operations that might promote the primary objective and that in his and the ambassador’s judgment was appropriate.

On 1 October the War Department informed General Deane of his designation as the head of the mission and gave him a directive. He was cautioned to make no commitments that might cause an increased deployment of U.S. Army supplies or troops, without first securing War Department approval. He was to report in his new capacity to the U.S. ambassador at Moscow immediately upon completion of the coming tripartite conference (United States, Great Britain, and Soviet Union) in Moscow, to which he had in the meantime been designated as a military observer. Later, General Deane’s directive was amended to include a naval division in his mission and thereafter he was to report to the JCS rather than to the War Department.
as specified in his original instructions.36 On 3 October the Soviet Government agreed to the proposal to establish the U.S. military mission to Moscow.37 On 1 November—upon the conclusion of the Moscow Conference—General Deane proceeded to organize the new mission in the Soviet capital. This fresh attempt to unify Allied planning through an effective extension of the Washington politico-military staff and improved liaison mechanisms in a far-off capital was to open a new phase in Soviet-American military collaboration in World War II.38

The Moscow Conference

Preparations and Instructions

A second and far more ambitious effort to secure closer co-ordination of British-American and Soviet national policies and planning took place at the Moscow Conference, 19–30 October 1943. Toward the end of the QUADRANT Conference, Washington learned that Stalin had agreed to a conference in Moscow of the U.S., British, and Soviet foreign secretaries. The meetings were to be exploratory in character and were to pave the way for a later conference of the three heads of government.39 The news was received with enthusiasm by the Western Allies since, as Churchill later recorded, “This was the first favourable mention from the Russian side of a meeting between the three Allies at any level.”40

During the preconference exchanges between Moscow, London, and Washington, Stalin laid considerable stress on the need for military discussions centering on the second front in Europe. It was apparent that, above all, he would want to hear about Allied plans for a landing in France. Though the British and U.S. Governments viewed the forthcoming tripartite meetings in the Soviet capital primarily as a political conference, it seemed wise therefore to include military advisers among their representatives. In late summer and early fall each government prepared to send along a well-briefed military observer to assist the political head of its delegation. In early September General Deane received his first inkling—from British sources—of the President’s intention to have him participate in the conference as the United States military observer. At the same time he learned that the Prime Minister intended to designate General Ismay, Deputy Secretary to the War Cabinet and Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence, as his opposite number at the meetings.41

36 (1) JCS 506/1, 5 Oct 43, title: Instrs for Members of U.S. Military Mission to USSR. (2) Deane, Strange Alliance, p. 12.
37 Msg, Hamilton to Secy State, 3 Oct 43, Tab 9, Item 12, Exec 5.
38 For a discussion of the work of the Deane mission and Soviet-American collaboration during 1943–45, see Deane, Strange Alliance.
40 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 278.
41 (1) JCS 506, 18 Sep 43, title: Instrs Concerning Duty as Military Observer at American-British-Soviet Conf. (2) Deane, Strange Alliance, pp. 9–10. Deane learned of his own and Ismay’s designation from a message sent to London by the Prime Minister from Washington, shown to him confidentially by the British secretary of the CCS, his colleague. It was not unusual for members of the JCS to
At General Deane’s request, the JSSC drew up and the JCS approved instructions for the U.S. military observer in late September. According to these instructions, the primary duty of the military observer was to act as military adviser to the senior United States representative—Secretary of State Cordell Hull. In that capacity he was to advise concerning the military aspects of proposals under consideration and emphasize “the inseparable interrelation between political proposals and military capabilities.” He was to make clear that prospective United States military capabilities could be estimated only on the basis of agreed global strategy. Though he was to present the JCS point of view, he was not authorized to commit the JCS without their specific authority. In matters within the province of the CCS, he was to co-operate closely with the British military adviser, who would be furnished with appropriate extracts of these instructions. The U.S. military adviser was to attend the meetings of the conference and be available on request to present facts, figures, and arguments on military questions.

For Deane’s guidance, the JCS also outlined their position on military aspects of subjects likely to come up for discussion. Thus, in connection with co-ordination of military efforts for the defeat of Germany, he was authorized to divulge such additional details of Anglo-American operations in Europe agreed upon at Quadrant and not already given to the Russians as the timing and reasons therefor, if warranted by developments at the conference. If he revealed the Overlord target date, he was to emphasize the importance of timing Soviet operations in support of Overlord. Plans for the war against Japan were to be disclosed only in general terms, with stress to be put on the solidarity of the British-American effort and on the great advantage to the USSR should it join that effort. The United States was prepared, the JCS also stated, to open a military air route on a reciprocal basis between Seattle and Moscow and hoped that an early agreement to this effect might be reached.

The JCS summed up the U.S. staff position on the role of the USSR in grand strategy. They foresaw that, when Germany was defeated, the powerful Soviet military machine would be in a dominant position east of the Rhine and the Adriatic, and the Soviet Union would be able to impose whatever territorial settlements it desired in Central Europe and the Balkans. At the same time, the USSR’s continued and full cooperation in the war against Germany was of cardinal importance in order to achieve the basic U.S. strategic objective for the earliest possible defeat of Ger-

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42 (1) JCS 506, 18 Sep 43, title: Instrs Concerning Duty as Military Observer at American-British-Soviet Conf. (2) Min, 115th mtg JCS, 21 Sep 43. At this meeting the JCS approved JCS 506 with some modifications and ruled that the paper was not to be taken from the United States. Its contents were to be carried mentally by the military observer.

43 Admiral King was reluctant to have either Deane or Harriman reveal the United States’ Pacific plans. He felt that since the USSR and Japan were at peace, discussion of Pacific plans was undesirable and unnecessary at that time. See JCS 506/1, 5 Oct 43, title: Instrs for Members of U.S. Military Mission to USSR.
many. If the Soviet Union withdrew from the war and the German military machine was essentially intact, Anglo-American operations on the Continent would become impracticable and the effort against Germany would have to be limited on the whole to an air offensive. Similarly, full Soviet participation in the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany was of the highest importance in order to assure the prompt and decisive defeat of Japan and at far less cost to the United States and Great Britain than would otherwise be possible. These views on the military value of the Soviet Union as an ally were but a reaffirmation of the basic Army stand from early in the war.

While the JCS were outlining the course for the military observer to follow at the forthcoming conference, the Army planning staff was busy collecting background data for him on the problems and difficulties involved in establishing a second front. In early October the War Department also instructed Generals Faymonville and Michela, who were being relieved from duty in Moscow and returning to the United States, to await in Cairo the arrival of the Harriman-Deane party en route to Moscow and consult with them. After his departure from Washington, Deane stopped off in England and North Africa. With Mr. Harriman, he met the rest of the United States delegation headed by the Secretary of State en route, and proceeded with them in mid-October to Moscow.

The Meetings and Their Consequences

At the Moscow Conference, in addition to Secretary of State Hull, Mr. Harriman, and General Deane, the American party included a number of State Department officials and a few officers from the Washington staffs. General Deane to collect such data in advance of his trip. General Deane requested OPD to prepare a short study covering bottlenecks in landing craft, transportation, shipping, and so forth.

44 JCS 506, 18 Sep 43, title: Instrs Concerning Duty as Military Observer at American-British-Soviet Conf. As to arrangements for the posthostilities period, the JCS instructed the U.S. military observer that U.S. military resources would be available and adequate to implement any organization for maintaining international peace upon which the United States might agree.

45 In this connection, see also the statements on the wartime role of the Soviet Union contained in the document, "Russia's Position," taken by Hopkins to the QUADRANT Conference and quoted in Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 748–49. This document also advances the view that the Soviet Union's position in postwar Europe would be "a dominant one" and that, with Germany defeated, no power in Europe could oppose Soviet military might successfully. No copy of the document, evidently representing an informal, unofficial position, has been found in Defense Department files.

46 Memo, Handy for Deane, 24 Sep 43, sub: Difficulties of Establishing a Second Front, OPD 381 Security, 217. The memo, and the appended enclosure, grew out of the Chief of Staff's instructions to

Before the conferees assembled there had been a considerable exchange of correspondence among the three Foreign Secretaries about the agenda. The Americans had advanced a number of suggestions, including a four-power declaration and the treatment of Germany during the armistice period. The British had put forward a much longer list of suggestions—including a common policy toward Turkey and Iran and relations between the USSR and Poland. The Russians proposed one topic—and one only—"the consideration of measures to shorten the duration of the war against Germany and her allies in Europe." It became apparent from the outset that the Russians were not prepared to discuss anything else until this military question had been fully explored. At the first formal meeting, on 19 October, Molotov was chosen chairman and the agenda was settled.

The Russians immediately proceeded to a discussion of the one topic they had put on the agenda, dividing it into three parts: (a) vigorous preparations during the rest of 1943 to insure an invasion of northern France; (b) the possibility of inducing Turkey to enter the war immediately; and (c) the possibility of persuading Sweden to permit immediate use of her air bases. The British and Americans agreed to turn the first phase of the discussion—the cross-Channel operation—over to their military observers, Generals Deane and Ismay. Describing the plans for the invasion of Europe, the two generals assured the Russians that at each of the successive British-American conferences from Casablanca through QUADRANT the necessity of aiding the USSR had been a cardinal consideration. They set forth the anticipated role of the Combined Bomber Offensive and briefly outlined various preparations then under way for OVERLORD. Requirements for the build-up for the cross-Channel operations such as landing craft, transportation, and supplies were explained in some detail. The decision of the TRIDENT and QUADRANT Conferences to invade in the spring of 1944 was reaffirmed. At the same time, the two Western military advisers outlined the conditions the United States and Great Britain had accepted as a prerequisite for launching OVERLORD. It was the expectation of the Western Allies, they informed the Russians, that these conditions would be created through the combination of the Combined Bomber Offensive, continued pressure in Italy, secondary landings in France, guerrilla activities in the Balkans, and, most of

shall to Eisenhower, 6 Oct 43, CM-OUT 2345; and (4) msg. Marshall to Royce, 12 Oct 43, CM-OUT 5200.

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all, through Soviet pressure on the Eastern Front.

At the conclusion of this presentation, Marshal Voroshilov and General Gryzlov asked some pointed questions about the conditions necessary for the launching and pressed for an exact date. Fearful of jeopardizing security by a premature announcement so far in advance of the then tentative planning date, early May, the British and American representatives went only so far as to state that the operation would be launched sometime in the spring. In reply to Mr. Molotov's question about the validity of the decision on the cross-Channel operation, General Deane hastened to reassure him, pointing to the action taken at the Quebec conference and affirming the confidence of the United States and Great Britain that the prerequisite conditions would exist. It was the hope of the United States, Deane went on, that its military mission in Moscow would be used as a medium for closer collaboration between the respective staffs. That mission was authorized, he pointed out, to keep the Soviet staff fully informed of the progress of preparations for OVERLORD. The Soviet delegation appeared to be completely satisfied with the sincerity of British and American intentions. They assured the Anglo-American representatives that they would continue the pressure on the Eastern Front and do all they could to help create the conditions necessary for the invasion. The Anglo-American representatives, who had expected another Soviet demand for a "second front right now," thereupon felt relieved.

Taking advantage of the understanding that then appeared to exist among the delegates, General Deane proceeded to put forward for adoption three U.S. proposals to hasten the conclusion of the war against Germany. First, bases should be made available in the USSR for the use of U.S. aircraft in order to execute shuttle bombing against industrial Germany; second, a more effective interchange of weather information should be instituted and, to accomplish this, an improvement of United States and Soviet signal communications should be effected; and, third, air transport between the two countries should be improved. These proposals were made specifically at General Arnold's request.

General Deane later reported that the proposals took the Soviet representatives...
completely by surprise.\textsuperscript{56} He stated that, as a result of the action taken on the proposals, he learned two important lessons for his subsequent dealings with Soviet officials—no subordinate official in the USSR could make a decision on matters involving foreigners without consulting higher authority, and "an approval in principle" by the Soviet Government was not necessarily an indication of a binding agreement. Two days after General Deane had made the proposals, Molotov announced to the conference that the Soviet Government had considered them and approved them "in principle."\textsuperscript{57} Secretary Hull thereupon suggested that the details be worked out immediately by the Soviet Army General Staff and the U.S. military mission. Mr. Molotov agreed.

In Washington the JCS, abreast of General Deane's negotiations in Moscow, quickly moved to develop the three proposals in some detail for his guidance in exploring the subject further with the Soviet representatives. The JCS approved with some modifications a reply proposed by General Arnold. They estimated the requirements for shuttle bases for U.S. aircraft at approximately ten sites, so located as to aid heavy bombers striking targets on the way to and from the United Kingdom. They called for an exchange of basic weather ciphers. The interest in the USRR weather was in connection with shuttle bombing, the transport route north of Tehran, Chinese operations, and the Siberian air route. In connection with air transport, the JCS expressed interest in the Alaska-Siberia route as first in importance; service from the United States to Moscow via the United Kingdom and possibly Stockholm second; extension of current service north from Tehran to Moscow third; and improved connecting services at Tehran fourth.\textsuperscript{58} Actually, General Deane was to find that not until February 1944 were the Russians to enter upon conversations on the proposals and "then only after continuous pressure by the President on Stalin, by Harriman on Molotov, and by me on the General Staff."\textsuperscript{59}

Following the discussion of British-American plans for the invasion, Cordell Hull and Anthony Eden took up the questions raised by the Russians with respect to the neutrals, Turkey and Sweden.\textsuperscript{60} At this time, Mr. Eden took a somewhat more cautious position on the entry of Turkey into the war than Mr. Churchill had previously supported. He declared that Turkey's entry could be effected only at the expense of the Italian operations and of the build-up in the United Kingdom for OVERLORD and the Combined Bomber Offensive. Moreover, since bases were then available in Italy, Turkish airfields from which the Balkan oil fields might be bombed were no longer so important. But, he went on to say, if the rest of the delegates be-

\textsuperscript{56} Deane, \textit{Strange Alliance}, pp. 20–21.
\textsuperscript{57} Msg, Deane to JCS, 22 Oct 43, CM-IN 13560.
\textsuperscript{58} See: (1) "Proposed Cable to General Deane (re CM-IN 13560, 22 Oct 43)" by Gen Arnold, Incl B to memo, Capt Royal, USN, JCS for Adm Leahy, Gen Marshall, and Adm King, 25 Oct 43, sub: Proposed Reply to General Deane's Msg No. 7, 22 Oct, Tab 14, Item 12, Exec 5; (2) min, 120th mtg JCS, 26 Oct 43; and (3) msg, JCS to Deane, Moscow, 26 Oct 43, CM-OUT 11696.
\textsuperscript{59} Deane, \textit{Strange Alliance}, p. 81.
\textsuperscript{60} For the following discussion on Turkey and Sweden at the conference, see especially Msg 3, Secy State to President [21 Oct 43], Incl B to JCS 546, 25 Oct 43, title: Swedish and Turkish Participation in the War.
lieved that Turkey's entry into the war should be pressed, the British would give the matter serious consideration. Secretary Hull felt that the question was essentially a military one, but he presumed that the views expressed by Mr. Eden would also reflect those of the U.S. Government.

Like Turkey, Sweden had long managed to stay aloof from actual hostilities. This course was made all the more complicated for the northern neutral as a result of its exposed geographic position and important trade relations within the German orbit. While Sweden found it difficult to resist German economic and military demands, the Allies were becoming more and more concerned over continued permission extended to the German troops to cross Sweden to and from occupied Norway and over the valuable supplies such as iron ore and ball bearings going from Sweden to Germany. As for the Soviet proposal to obtain the use of air bases in Sweden, Mr. Eden pointed out that vital Allied resources would be drawn off in the process of assuring Sweden protection. Mr. Hull took the position that since these matters were "primarily military in character" they should be left for settlement by the heads of government in consultation with their Chiefs of Staff. He referred both Soviet proposals to Washington for further instructions.

In Washington the propositions were immediately turned over to the Joint staff and Army planning committees for exploration. Some differences of views among Washington military planners soon became apparent. The Army planners, intent upon concentrating Allied efforts for the cross-Channel effort, currently took a dim view of Turkey's entry into the war. In their opinion, no action should be initiated by the Allies to draw Turkey into the war. They advanced a number of arguments. The active participation of Turkey would require the British to honor their agreements to furnish aid to Turkey, and such action would constitute a drain on Allied resources, especially on heavy bombardment aircraft, thus jeopardizing the success of Allied effort in Italy as well as of other operations. Turkey did not want Soviet help and would probably demand British and American guarantees to protect it against the USSR before it would consent to enter the war. As an ally, moreover, Turkey would not contain additional German divisions in the Mediterranean—a major purpose of prospective Mediterranean operations as agreed at QUADRANT. The acquisition of air bases in Turkey, Army planners also pointed out, had become less important as a result of the newly obtained Italian airfields.

The JSSC reached the opposite conclusion—that the United States should take

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61 (1) The President directed that the Secretary of State's message be turned over to the JCS for preparation of a reply. In turn, the JCS directed the JSSC to draft a reply. See memo, Col Lemuel Mathewson for Adm Leahy, 21 Oct 43, no sub, Paper 57, Book 13, Exec 9. (2) On 22 October General Handy instructed Colonels Roberts and Todd—Army planners—to study the Secretary of State's message for matters to be brought to the attention of the JSSC. See memo, T. T. H. for Roberts, 22 Oct 43, no sub, with Tab 14, Item 12, Exec 5.

62 (1) Memo, Roberts, Actg Chief SS OPD, for ACoFS OPD, 23 Oct 43, sub: Studies on Sweden and Turkey, with Tab 164 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160-95 (7 Jan 43). (2) OPD Notes on JCS 546, [n.d.], prepared for JCS mtg, 26 Oct 43, Paper 84, Book 13, Exec 9. Similar points of view are contained in the paper "Notes on JCS 546" filed with Tab 165 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160-95 (7 Jan 43). (3) See Ch. XI above.
the position that it would be very desirable to have Turkey enter the war immediately. Among the advantages of bringing Turkey into the war, the JSSC maintained, were further increase of German commitments in the Balkans and consequent increased dispersion of their forces, the possibility of forcing a German withdrawal from Greece and the Aegean, the access of air bases in Turkey, and the possibility of opening a direct supply route to the USSR via the Dardanelles and the Black Sea. However, the JSSC qualified its recommendation. Action to bring Turkey into the war must not entail commitments of military assistance that would jeopardize projected operations in Europe; and the United States was not in a position to furnish Turkey with substantial military assistance.

The Army planners and JSSC were in somewhat closer agreement on the question of gaining access to Swedish bases. To secure their use, both concluded, would be very advantageous for the Allies—especially for air operations to supplement the Combined Bomber Offensive. But, to the Army planners, the whole proposition was not feasible at that time, since Sweden could not provide adequate protection for the bases and the Allies were unable to supply or reinforce the Swedes via ground lines of communications. Because of Sweden’s fear of the USSR, moreover, the forces involved would in all probability have to be American and British, thus jeopardizing OVERLORD. The Army planners recommended, therefore, that efforts to secure air bases in Sweden be deferred until such time as means became available for opening a land route through Norway from the Atlantic or through Finland from the USSR.

The JSSC agreed that a major British-U.S. amphibious operation would be necessary to seize the necessary lines of communications across Norway—an operation that would imperil OVERLORD. On the other hand, they maintained, it would be practicable to use Swedish air bases for small numbers of fighter bombers, thus aiding the Combined Bomber Offensive. General Marshall and General Arnold, in accord with the Army planners’ views on Turkey and Sweden, expressed their disagreement with the JSSC.

The result of staff discussion and study in Washington was to sound a note of caution for United States delegates at the conference with reference to committing the United States to the Turkish or Swedish ventures. The JCS concluded that it would be desirable to have Turkey enter the war and to secure air bases in Sweden, but only if planned operations in Europe were not thereby jeopardized. Since such assurance

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63 JCS 546, 25 Oct 43, sub: Swedish and Turkish Participation in the War. Inclosure A of JCS 546 is a report by the JSSC on the message of 21 October from the Secretary of State to the President.
64 JCS 546, 25 Oct 43, title: Swedish and Turkish Participation in the War.
65 Memo, Col Todd for Capt Royal, USN, 26 Oct 43, no sub, Folder Oct 1943—USSR and Oct 1943—Turkey, Item 22, Exec 17.
66 For JSSC disagreement with the proposed War Department draft reply from the President to Secretary of State, giving a definitive negative on Turkey, see memo, Adm Willson for JCS, 26 Oct 43, sub: Entry of Turkey into the War, Folder Oct 1944—USSR and Oct 1945—Turkey, Item 22, Exec 17.
67 (1) For the discussion in the JCS on Army and JSSC drafts of proposed replies, see min, 120th mtg
could not be given, the United States military position was that no definite decision could be reached on the issues. Absence of information on the Soviet position concerning assistance to Turkey was an additional reason given by the JCS for delaying the decision. On 28 October Secretary Hull presented to the conferees the President's reply to Molotov's proposals concerning Turkey and Sweden. The answer—in accord with the cautious United States military views—was in the negative on both issues. The British expressed agreement with the American reply. As a result of the British and American stands, the USSR yielded on both proposals. The conferees concluded that final action on Turkey and Sweden would have to be postponed until the three governments had given the problem further study.

How strongly the Soviet delegates felt about the decision on Turkey became apparent to General Deane on the final day of the conference. Their displeasure took the form of refusing to put Deane's proposals concerning shuttle bombing, exchange of weather information, and improved communications and their approval "in principle" into the record of the conference. Molotov contended the proposals had not been discussed in detail. Vishinsky asked—with considerable bitterness—why the Russians should obligate themselves when the United States refused to join them in inducing Turkey to enter the war. That entry would remove fifteen German divisions from the Soviet front and enable the USSR to advance into Prussia in two months. The U.S. proposals and the Soviet agreement in principle were finally entered into the record only as a result of a strong stand taken by Secretary Hull and the promise of generous treatment of the USSR in the distribution of Italian naval and merchant vessels.

Conclusion of the discussion of questions involving military considerations enabled the three Foreign Secretaries to turn their full attention to the more purely political problems facing the conference—with important results. Their agreements were embodied in a secret protocol. It was at this international conference that the leading Allied Powers agreed that the united action pledged for the prosecution of war against their respective enemies was to be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security after the close of hostilities. The agreement was incorporated in the "Four-Power Declaration," proposed by the United States and signed by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China.

It proved difficult to obtain the USSR's consent to include China as a signatory. The U.S. Government, anxious to raise China's morale—then at a low ebb—and to secure the recognition of China's status as one of the big four, was insistent. Only through the per-

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JCS, 26 Oct 43. [2] The draft of the JCS proposed reply from the President to the Secretary of State is contained in JCS 546/1, 27 Oct 43, title: Swedish and Turkish Participation in the War.


No copy has been found in Army files of the President's reply to Cordell Hull. According to Admiral Leahy, the President had tentatively approved the JSSC draft reply of 21 October 1943. Presumably, he also saw the final draft prepared for him by the JCS (JCS 546/1) on the basis of revised JSSC and Army views. See min, 120th mtg JCS, 26 Oct 43.

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*69* This description of the Soviet reaction is based on Deane, *Strange Alliance*, pp. 22–23.
sistent efforts of Secretary Hull, acting on President Roosevelt's instructions, was the Soviet delegation finally won over to accepting China as one of the big four signatories.\textsuperscript{70}

The declaration provided for unanimity on surrender and disarmament terms, the necessity of establishing an international organization (later to be known as the United Nations Organization), and agreements in connection with postwar employment of military forces within the territories of other states and for postwar regulation of armaments. The Americans, British, and Russians also agreed to establish a European advisory commission in London to begin the study of questions connected with the termination of hostilities in Europe, including the terms of surrender to be imposed upon the enemy states and the machinery to implement them. In addition, they decided to establish an advisory council—to include a Russian delegate—for Italian affairs.\textsuperscript{71} Thus was the machinery of co-operation among the three principal Allies to be extended.

In the wake of the conference, decisions on political policy were made that brought the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union closer on the Turkish question. The formal meetings had barely ended when the British and Soviet Foreign Secretaries in Moscow signed a protocol (on 1 November) embodying a compromise agreement that the British would make immediate demands on Turkey for air bases and the two governments would undertake joint action later to bring pressure on Turkey to come into the war before the end of the year.\textsuperscript{72} Thereupon, the President reached the decision that the U.S. Government would join in these efforts, subject to the proviso that British and American resources that in the opinion of the responsible commanders were necessary for OVERLORD or for operations in Italy would not be committed to the eastern Mediterranean area.\textsuperscript{73}

Perhaps the most encouraging signs were the indications at Moscow that the Soviet Government wanted to establish friendlier relations with the United States and Great Britain. The talks among the three Allies had been conducted and concluded in a generally conciliatory manner. Exemplifying the favorable atmosphere and undoubtedly contributing to it was the removal of points of friction in the way of resuming Anglo-American convoys to the USSR on the northern route. Sorely disappointed when the northern convoys had

\textsuperscript{70} The Chinese Ambassador to the USSR, Foo Ping-sheung, was empowered by the Chinese Foreign Office to sign for China. See Hull, \textit{Memoirs}, II, 1906.


\textsuperscript{72} (1) Msg, Secy State, Moscow, for President, 2 Nov 43. (2) Msg, Br COS to Br Joint Staff Mission, Washington, and CinC Middle East, 3 Nov 43. Both in Folder Oct 44–USSR and Oct 43–Turkey, Item 22, Exec 17.

\textsuperscript{73} (1) Msg, President to Harriman and Prime Minister, 4 Nov 43, Folder Oct 44–USSR and Oct 43–Turkey, Item 22, Exec 17. The appended penciled notation, bearing General Marshall's initials, indicates that the message was sent. (2) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 13 Nov 43, CM-OUT 5480.
been postponed in March 1943 and suspended in April, the Russians had pressed for the reinstatement of the sailings. On 21 September Molotov had gone so far as to call in the British ambassador in Moscow and urgently request their resumption. The general situation then seemed to the Prime Minister more favorable. Especially encouraging was the heroic attack of British midget submarines on the Tirpitz, disabling her and removing her as an immediate threat to the convoys. On 1 October the Prime Minister had revealed to Stalin his intention of reinstating the northern convoys—planning to sail one convoy a month in November, December, January, and February, each to consist of approximately thirty-five ships, British and American. But misunderstandings and irritations had soon developed over the question of whether his intention was a firm contract or an “earnest resolve,” as well as over his concurrent request for better treatment of British personnel in the USSR. The Russians had argued that the Soviet Union was bearing the brunt of the fighting against Germany, that the Allies were falling seriously behind in their lend-lease commitments, that the northern route permitted delivery of armaments to the Eastern Front in the shortest time, and that deliveries through the ports and by rail in Iran could in no way compensate for those not delivered on the northern route. During the Moscow Conference, talks by Eden and Stalin smoothed the irritations and removed the misunderstandings. In November shipments via the northern route were reinstated.74

The Moscow Conference is generally known for its political achievements and, in fact, ended without reaching outstanding military decisions. This was more in accord with the President’s and Prime Minister’s original anticipation that the Moscow Conference was not one to plan or recommend military strategy than with Stalin’s evident determination that military strategy be discussed. Nevertheless, the by-products and offshoots of the meetings at Moscow were to prove of considerable significance in the story of strategic planning in World War II. Marking the first time since the outbreak of war that British and U.S. staff officers had met face to face with Soviet military representatives and discussed strategic plans, the conference was a landmark in the development of closer collaboration among the Allied Powers in World War II. The meetings at Moscow laid the groundwork and helped pave the way for later agreements that finally linked Anglo-American strategy with Soviet operations against Germany—a result that was to become apparent only in time. Pointing to an even broader international military collaboration further in the future was a by-product of the discussions at Moscow reported by Harriman to General Marshall on 2 November. This was the confidential assurance given by Molotov to Harriman that the USSR expected to join in the war against Japan “at the appropriate time.”75 It echoed a concurrent promise made by Stalin to Secre-

74 The question of the resumption of the con-

75 Msg. Harriman to Marshall, 2 Nov 43. CM-IN 1946.
Of immediate significance to the U.S. military planners, preparing for the final showdown with the British on the cross-Channel-Mediterranean issue, was the opportunity afforded by the conference to obtain valuable glimpses of Soviet politico-military thinking on the projected operations to end the war against Germany. That preview disclosed both a promise and a potential threat to furtherance of their own strategic thinking and planning. Encouraged by Soviet reception of plans for OVERLORD and the Combined Bomber Offensive, they were alerted to possible dangers to the execution of their own basic concepts by the expressed Soviet interest in the Mediterranean and particularly in the eastern Mediterranean. There were even intimations during the conference—as puzzling as they were disturbing—that the Russians might be willing to accept Allied operations in Italy, in which they expressed great interest, as constituting the second front. The conference therefore served the unexpected purpose of disclosing to the United States planners unanticipated areas of possible disagreement with the USSR—especially in connection with the Mediterranean—that might upset the accepted QUADRANT decisions. Such signs, added to the more familiar British pressure for Mediterranean ventures, gave them pause. At the Moscow Conference, as Stimson has recorded, there were “further alarms” from the Prime Minister. Through Eden, Churchill informed the Russians that a postponement of OVERLORD for one or two months might be necessary if the Italian campaign did not progress satisfactorily. It was apparent that it was necessary not only to achieve a final understanding with the British on an integrated strategic pattern in the war against Germany but with the Russians as well.

The meeting with the Soviet politico-military delegation, furthermore, added to the store of American staff experience in international conference techniques and procedures gathered in dealing with British teams from Casablanca through QUADRANT. The somewhat painfully acquired knowledge of the U.S. staff in the “surprise paper” and “agreement in principle,” British model, was extended to include “approval in principle,” USSR version, in the meaning of which the U.S. staff was initiated at Moscow. The necessity of making thorough staff preparations and achieving closer coordination with the political head of state—hammered home to the American staff as lessons of the earlier conferences—became all the more apparent in order to cope with the peculiarities of a third ally at subsequent meetings. Past experiences with the British, as well as the brief but valuable insights into Soviet

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76 Secretary Hull has since recorded that at a banquet on the last day of the conference, 30 October, Stalin “astonished and delighted me by saying clearly and unequivocally that, when the Allies succeeded in defeating Germany, the Soviet Union would then join in defeating Japan.” The statement was “entirely unsolicited, and he asked nothing in return.” So secret did Hull regard this information that he sent it to the President, one half over the Army code, and the other half over the Navy code. Hull, Memoirs, II, 1509–11.

77 Msg, Secy State to President, 31 Oct 43, Item 63c (2d part), Exec 10.

For further references to the Soviet position on the relationship of the Italian operations to the second front, see also, Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 121.
strategic thinking gained at Moscow, were to help prepare the staff to meet the British and Russians on even terms at the first full-dress, formal staff conference among the three allies later in 1943.

"Fish or Cut Bait"

The British-American pledge to the USSR at the Moscow Conference that a second front would be launched in the spring of 1944 strengthened the conviction of the U.S. Army planners in Washington that the decision to undertake the cross-Channel operation this time must be firmly held. Faithful adherence to that promise was essential not only in order to avoid the creation of a strategic stalemate in Europe but also in order to maintain and strengthen the favorable relations of the "United Nations" fore-shadowed by the accomplishments of the Moscow Conference. But, in probing the implications of current Allied pressures—both British and Soviet—the Army planners felt uneasy lest the over-all strategic pattern in the war against Germany as outlined at QUADRANT and the prospective linking of that pattern with Soviet operations be upset.

The Army planners were particularly alerted to this possibility through General Deane's warning cables from Moscow. On 9 November General Deane informed the JCS of his impressions that the Russians might attach "less importance to Overlord than heretofore"—as indicated by their acceptance at the Moscow Conference that OVERLORD take place in 1944 without pressing for an advance in the date. The Soviet desire to get Turkey and Sweden into the war and concern over British-American pressure in Italy seemed to indicate that the USSR was now more interested in immediate measures than in a second front. Deane warned the JCS that the Americans might be confronted at the next international conference with a demand that further action be undertaken in the Mediterranean immediately, for example, increased pressure in Italy and some operation in the Balkans for the purpose of drawing off German strength from the Eastern Front. The Russians might even urge some delay in OVERLORD if more immediate results thereby became possible. In his opinion, the Russians particularly wanted to end the war quickly and were now confident of their ability to do so. General Deane also relayed Mr. Harriman's impression that the Russians were as keen as ever about the second front. But, Deane stated, Harriman agreed with him that the choice between OVERLORD in the spring of 1944 and more immediate assistance elsewhere would be a very difficult decision for the USSR to make.

Two days later General Deane confirmed these impressions in a message to the War Department. He informed General Marshall that, in a talk with Marshal Voroshilov that day, the Soviet official had stated that the Germans had moved eleven divisions to the Eastern Front in the previous forty days—five

80 OPD draft memo, CofS for President, 8 Nov 43, sub: Conduct of the European War, with Tab 90 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2–95 (7 Jan 43). This sixth draft of a Strategy Section memo was taken by General Handy to the SEXTANT Conference. An earlier version, dated 29 October 1943, is also filed with Tab 90 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2–95 (7 Jan 43).

81 Msg, Deane to JCS, 9 Nov 43, CM-IN 5951.
82 Msg, Deane to Marshall, 11 Nov 43, CM-IN 7461.
from France, four from the Balkans, and two from Italy. He repeated Soviet dissatisfaction, earlier voiced by Molotov and reported to Washington, over insufficient Allied pressure in Italy to prevent the Germans from moving divisions to the Eastern Front. General Deane reported that he had given the American side of the story—the narrow front, terrain obstacles, the landing craft bottleneck, and so forth. British-American pressure in Italy would be an issue at the next meeting with the USSR, General Deane advised. While Voroshilov and other Soviet officials seemed content to wait until next year for OVERLORD, they were insistent that more be done immediately to relieve pressure on the Soviet front.

Within the War Department, the Army planners studied these warning signals and sought to prepare the military case to counter the potential threat to basic United States strategic concepts. The Army planners doubted that any British-American operations that could be undertaken in the Mediterranean before spring—in addition to those currently planned—would be on a large enough scale to force the Germans to withdraw forces from the Eastern Front. An increased effort in the Mediterranean might take one of the following forms: more divisions in the line in Italy; an assault on the Adriatic coast of the Balkans; an amphibious assault on the Aegean islands; or operations through Turkey. These possibilities were ruled out largely because of logistical considerations and because initiation of any of them would result in delaying OVERLORD. The planners pointed to a survey of logistical factors involved, which revealed that additional forces could not be used effectively in the Mediterranean until more bases were captured and additional ports were opened. A decision to put greater stress on Mediterranean operations would probably accelerate those operations before the target date to OVERLORD and might possibly even prevent the Germans from moving more divisions to the Eastern Front, but, in contrast with OVERLORD, would yield only slight results in the long run. To put increased emphasis on the Mediterranean, furthermore, would mean stopping the build-up in the United Kingdom and would enable the Germans to move divisions from northwest Europe to the Eastern Front. The Army planners concluded that the pressure of the British for increased emphasis on the Mediterranean was "becoming very hard to resist." Should the British receive Soviet support for their projects, it would probably be most difficult not to yield. The Russians must, therefore, be clearly informed of the choice before them. They would have to choose between a decision to undertake a major and decisive military offensive in the following spring or to proceed immediately with a series of indecisive efforts in the Balkan—eastern Mediterranean area.

Strength and matériel for such efforts would have to be withdrawn from allo-
cations to OVERLORD. The Russians, who were not faced with the necessity of conducting amphibious operations, must be made to understand the difficulties and demands inherent in those undertakings. The planners warned that the discussions at the next conference might even reach the point of calling for a firm decision either to continue with OVERLORD as then planned or to accede to the Soviet demands and establish the second front in the Mediterranean.

The Army planners concluded that the British and the Russians both must be made to realize that the success of OVERLORD was vitally dependent on a number of factors—continuation of pressure against the Axis in Europe in the Mediterranean and on the Eastern Front; continuation of the Combined Bomber Offensive; and retention of all resources then allotted to OVERLORD for that operation, with the possibility of having to add to them. The Russians and British must recognize, therefore, that the price of immediate aid on a relatively small scale would be cancellation of the decisive operation in the spring of 1944. The disturbing possibility remained that even such arguments at the next conference might not put an end to British and Russian demands for increased pressure in the Mediterranean at the expense of OVERLORD. Continued insistence, in the opinion of the planners, would indicate that the Russians and the British firmly believed that, with additional pressure in the Mediterranean coupled with the Soviet advance, a cross-Channel operation of the RANKIN C variety would suffice. In that event, the planners argued, American resources released by the cancellation of OVERLORD should be allocated in part to the United Kingdom to execute RANKIN, and in part to the Mediterranean for operations in Italy and for minor undertakings in the Balkans. The remainder—in the familiar vein of the "Pacific Alternative" argument—should be diverted to the Pacific to hasten the defeat of Japan.

By early November 1943 the Army planners preparing for the full-dress, formal conference with Great Britain and the Soviet Union believed themselves to be faced with a fundamental dilemma. Anxious as ever to end the war in Europe as quickly as possible, they had continued to put their faith in a major cross-Channel operation. For the same reasons they had remained opposed to strikes at the "soft underbelly" of Europe—to them a war of attrition. QUADRANT had given an acceptable formula—for which they had been searching since the diversion from BOLERO—for retaining the primacy of a cross-Channel operation—OVERLORD—and weaving the Mediterranean and Combined Bomber Offensive into its support. Nevertheless, the complete resolution of the cross-Channel versus Mediterranean debate and the end of the spar-

84 SS Study, 11 Nov 43, title: Operations in the Mediterranean, with Tab 173 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160–95 (7 Jan 43).
85 OPD draft memo for CofS, 12 Nov 43, sub: U.S. Course of Action at SEXTANT in Case Conf Decisions Do Not Guarantee OVERLORD, with JWPC 105/D in ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), 1–A.
86 For Case C of RANKIN, see above, Ch. X.
87 (1) SS Study, 11 Nov 43, title: Operations in the Mediterranean, with Tab 173 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160–95 (7 Jan 43). (2) OPD draft memo for CofS, 12 Nov 43, sub: U.S. Course of Action at SEXTANT in Case Conference Decisions Do Not Guarantee Overlord, with JWPC 105/D in ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), 1–A.
ring with the British over that issue had not followed in the fall of 1943. Signs of Soviet, as well as British, support for immediate Mediterranean ventures threatened not only to upset the QUADRANT pattern but also to reopen the whole problem of European strategy. It had become apparent to the Army planners, in probing the subsequent course of the USSR in the European war, that they were still faced with imponderables. As one of the Army planners put it, "... the Russians, due to their successes, are a bigger question mark than ever."

Army planners could take a measure of comfort from the fact that through the Moscow Conference the areas of possible agreement and disagreement with the USSR—as well as with Great Britain—had become more clearly defined. But the fundamental problem remained of drawing the Allied Powers firmly together in support of the cross-Channel operation and keeping other operations subsidiary. Basic Army views on overall strategy and on the wasteful effects of past diversions from agreements reached convinced the planners that a final decision on European strategy with the British was long overdue. The war with Germany was lengthening, and the three major Allied Powers had still not completely agreed on European strategy or taken basic measures to integrate their efforts in support of it. The lack of a definitive decision in the conflict against Germany, moreover, not only was holding up the progress of the war in Europe but was also threatening to postpone the defeat of the other major enemy, Japan. "The time has now arrived," concluded the planners, "when further indecision, evasion, and undermining of agreements cannot be borne. In plain American words, the talking stage is over and the time has arrived to 'fish or cut bait.'"

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88 The observation was made by Colonel Lincoln, Acting Chief Strategy Section, OPD, in reviewing changes since the Quebec conference. See memo, Col G. A. Lincoln, for Col Roberts, 3 Oct 43, sub: JWPC Review of Adequacy of QUADRANT Strategy, with JPS 253 in ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), I-A.

89 OPD draft memo, CofS for President, 8 Nov 43, sub: Conduct of the European War, with Tab 90 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 8-95 (7 Jan 43). This paper was taken to Sextant.
CHAPTER XIV

Strategic Strands in the War Against Japan
August—November 1943

Aside from uneasiness over the immediate aims of the European allies in the Mediterranean, Army planners had another compelling reason in the fall of 1943 for clinching European strategy once and for all. In their eyes, OVERLORD was more than a lever to secure the invasion of the European continent via the Channel. It was also a means of regulating deployment to the Pacific. The general understanding had been that the early Anglo-American decision to beat Germany first had relegated the war against Japan to a limited and secondary effort until the European foe was beaten. However, the war in the Pacific would not and could not stand still. In the months following Pearl Harbor the idea of BOLERO-ROUNDUP had, as we have seen, been adopted and pressed by the Army planners as a means of controlling run-away deployment in the Pacific. TORCH had thrown this hope, along with their others, into limbo. At Casablanca in January 1943, the Americans had served notice that the continued diversionary trend to the Mediterranean would be matched by expanded action in the Pacific. During the remainder of 1943, the relaxation in favor of commitments for the Pacific, which had begun concomitantly with the TORCH decision, had been continued for maintaining the initiative against Japan seized at Guadalcanal.

Encouraging as prospects were in the war against Japan by the fall of 1943, the expanding operations in the Pacific complicated rather than simplified problems for the planners responsible for strategic deployment of the Army. The operations threatened to absorb too much too fast. How to keep that war progressing without drawing off too much of the manpower and resources needed to defeat Germany was more than ever a disturbing question. How to achieve a proper balance and timing in the deployment of forces among the major theaters was becoming not less but more difficult as the war progressed. The need to replace piecemeal allocations of American resources for defensive and opportunistic purposes in the Pacific by systematic deployment in accord with some agreed over-all plan for the decisive defeat of Japan appeared greater than ever.
As did enterprising commanders elsewhere, those in the Pacific persistently called for more generous allocations. The peculiar needs of campaigns in remote, disease-ridden, water-bound areas at the end of long lines of communications created demands that seemed insatiable. Operations threatened to become larger and larger. Like Topsy, Army forces and resources in the Pacific "just grewed" and, what is more, kept growing. Nor did the Army planners want to postpone the defeat of Japan any longer than necessary to defeat the European foe. In fact, one of the basic arguments in the Army brief for accelerating the European conflict was inability to defend any longer before the American people the postponement of an all-out effort in the Pacific except on the ground that the Allies were preparing to crush Germany at the earliest possible date.

More than OVERLORD therefore lay in the balance. The way out of the dilemma seemed to the Army planners to be threefold: nail down the European strategy; keep up unremitting pressure on Japan but so far as possible within the limits of available Army resources and manpower already deployed; and develop over-all planning against Japan—planning that, without impinging on the strength and means needed to defeat Germany, would capitalize on every possible short cut in order to hasten the defeat of Japan after the collapse of Germany. Along these lines the planners were searching in the fall of 1943 for answers to the problem of the mounting costs of the "secondary war."

The Quest for Short Cuts

At the close of the QUADRANT Conference the Allies were in possession of the strategic initiative against Japan but still without an approved basic plan for its defeat. Strategic planning for the war against Japan had by no means reached the decisive stage arrived at in blueprinting the war against Germany. Although progress had been steady if unspectacular since the Battle of Midway in 1942, a quick look at the existing front lines in New Guinea, the Solomons, and Burma was enough to show that the far-flung Japanese perimeter of defensive positions had as yet scarcely been penetrated. The strategic "inner zone" lay safe and intact. Capitalizing on Anglo-American-Soviet preoccupation with the European struggle and on the weakness of China, Japan was in fact seeking to strengthen its economic and military position behind the outer barrier.

Combined British-American planning had been begun in the spring of 1943 for the "how," "when," and "where" of piercing these defense rings and defeating Japan. By QUADRANT it had largely bogged down in the face of the many political and military imponderables involved. At QUADRANT the CCS attempted to revitalize the planning by supplying an answer to one of the basic unknowns—the problem of timing. The resolution, championed by the Americans at the conference, to hinge the plan against Japan on a twelve-month period after the defeat of Germany introduced a new controlling factor to guide the planners. It gave promise of relating planning against Japan to planning against Germany. To save time
henceforth became a dominant aim of military planning for the defeat of Japan. Especially appealing to Washington Army planners was the possibility of thus reducing the costs of the conflict.

Introduction of the twelve-month concept into the Japanese war made swifter and deeper entry into the enemy's interior lines a "must." Fortunately two elements then in the process of expansion or development bade fair to provide the plans with teeth, fast carrier forces and the very long range bomber, the B-29. The Combined planners at QUADRANT, in assigning the United States responsibility for evolving an over-all plan, instructed the U.S. planners to assume that the Germans would definitely be out of action by October 1944, that maximum employment of Allied airpower against Japan would be effected after that collapse, and that the U.S. and the British Fleets would both be used to the hilt.¹ Upon the surrender of the Italian Fleet, the British would dispatch a large and powerful naval force to the Bay of Bengal via the Pacific. It was the ardent desire of the Prime Minister that this British force be available for several months of fighting in the Pacific before proceeding to the Indian Ocean, possibly to bolster morale in Australia and New Zealand. The U.S. Navy reaction to the proposal was quite unenthusiastic. King argued that a dearth of facilities, serious logistical problems, and a lack of suitable objectives upon which the British force could be used during the limited period of its assignment in the Pacific made such a move of doubtful value. The Army reception of Churchill's suggestion was considerably more favorable, since the Army maintained that the U.S. public would be encouraged to learn of the intensification of pressure upon the Japanese. The Army, on the other hand, was less kindly disposed toward the efforts of another ally—France—to help fight the war in the Pacific. The War Department disapproved French suggestions that French combat units be organized and equipped to engage in battle in the western Pacific in late 1944. It argued against imposing any added burdens upon U.S. production and the tight shipping situation that such a commitment would entail.²

Despite the indecision over the future role of the Allies in the war against Japan, Army planners proceeded to investigate the possibilities of defeating Japan by October 1945—within twelve months after the fall of Germany. Assuming that the USSR and Japan would still be at peace, they rejected approaches from the Philippines and the Kurils and an assault directly on Honshu as time consuming or impracticable. Nor, in their opinion, did a land approach via China promise to meet the target date. The need to reconquer Burma, to overcome the tremendous logistical difficulties, to negotiate endlessly with the Chinese, and to fight large Japanese


ground armies made a major land campaign in China unacceptable. The best possibility for finishing the war in 1945, they concluded, lay in the invasion of Hokkaido, in early 1945, via Hawaii and the Aleutians. To accomplish this, they warned, the scale of operations in the Central and Southwest Pacific and in the Southeast Asia Command must continue at the same pace existing at the time of the fall of Germany until the Hokkaido offensive could be launched. Redeployment and training plans must be set in motion immediately; shipping requirements would have to be thoroughly studied. Hokkaido had been selected since it was a well-placed, lightly defended island that would provide a suitable base for the later invasion of Honshu. By striking deep into the enemy heartland tactical surprise could be won. Current planning, the planners pointed out, was dominated by the step-by-step advance from the west, southwest, and east, so perforce operations during 1943–44 would have to follow these lines of approach. Release of large forces after Germany's defeat in late 1944 would make a direct attack on Japan possible in 1945.3

In the meantime the Air Forces plan, presented at QUADRANT, to use B–29's against Japan was found by the Combined planners to be too optimistic as far as time and logistical factors were concerned. Attacks on the scale visualized as necessary to complete the bombing offensive against Japan by October 1945 could not be mounted in time.4

Investigation of B–29 potentialities did bring to light the need for correlating general planning and Air planning and resulted in the production by the U.S. Joint planners of a more modest plan that called for the operation of the huge bombers from bases at Calcutta and Cheng-tu. Other possible sites were considered. For the first time, stress was placed upon the seizure of the Marianas—currently treated in Pacific planning as a relatively subordinate and distant operation—and the establishment of heavy bomber bases there at the earliest possible date.5

These earnest efforts on the part of the U.S. planners to tailor objectives and operations to comply with the terminal date of October 1945 met with a temporary setback at the hands of the combined planning teams who had been meeting in London and Washington and working on an over-all plan. The combined planning teams had come by October 1943 to the gloomy conclusion that there was "no prospect of defeating Japan by October 1945." They believed that the invasion of Japan would have to be provided for in any comprehensive plan and reaffirmed the future importance of China as a potential base of operations. The main factor limiting the speed at which the Allies could de-

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3 SS 143/1, 7 Sep 43, title: Defeat of Japan via the Island of Hokkaido, ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 131–59 (7 Jan 43).
4 (1) CPS 861/1, 13 Sep 43, title: Studies on the Defeat of Japan. (2) CCS 348, 16 Sep 43, title: Studies on the Defeat of Japan Within 12 Months After the Defeat of Germany. (3) Min, 82d mtg CPS, 16 Sep 43. (4) Min, 139th mtg CCS, 17 Sep 43.
5 (1) JPS 288, 4 Oct 43, title: Plans for the Defeat of Japan Within 12 Months After the Defeat of Germany. (2) King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, pp. 444, 532. King had long regarded the Marianas as the most important objective in the western Pacific but had gotten little support from the Army until the question of B–29 bases arose. See also Philip A. Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, Ch. I.
ploy their vast air forces after Germany’s downfall would be naval and amphibious strength, since it would take the United States several months and the British nine months to reorient their forces. To speed this redeployment, an early decision must be made on the British forces and bases to be used. To help shorten the war, the Combined planners also thought that the USSR must be induced to enter it as soon as possible. They found that the outlook for successful invasion of Hokkaido in the summer of 1945 was rather dim and thought that an advance upon Formosa in the spring of 1945 held more promise. If this hope proved futile, an alternative operation might be launched against northern Sumatra in late 1944 or early 1945. Japan itself might be reached in 1946.

Reaction of the U.S. Joint planners to this combined effort was both diverse and adverse. The Air Forces planner urged that more emphasis be placed upon the potential role of strategic airpower. The Navy member complained that the destruction of the Japanese Fleet as “a primary objective and prerequisite to victory” had not been accorded its proper place. The Operations Division, in briefing the Army member, cautioned against pouring large amounts of men and matériel into China, since it would be out of phase with the twelve-month concept. Though it was important to maintain China in the war, forward air bases constructed for the B-29’s in China could not be defended against Japanese attack, nor could Chinese troops be readied for offensive warfare before 1947. It would therefore not be reasonable to waste time and energy on such long-term projects. Furthermore, the Operations Division believed that as a result of steadily increasing attrition of Japanese air and naval power, the bombing of Japan would become less and less necessary. The Army planners, in preparing for the Sextant Conference in early November, further commented:

Despite the agreement that the United Nations should direct their principal offensive efforts against Germany and contain the Japanese by a series of relatively minor thrusts, it is becoming increasingly apparent that operations against Japan are approaching major proportions. Plans for the defeat of Japan are not yet firm. However, the degree of success enjoyed thus far is indicative of the need of a short term plan for operations against Japan (upon Germany’s defeat) with primary emphasis on an approach from the Pacific rather than from the Asiatic mainland.

They concluded:

U.S. Pacific planning undoubtedly will continue to follow the three avenues of approach to Japan [SWPA, Central Pacific, and North Pacific] with decision at a later date as to the area where the major effort will be undertaken.

The Joint planners felt that too much weight had been placed upon the value of help from the British Fleet and counseled the JCS to make the ultimate objective of the 1945 Hokkaido attack the invasion of Honshu not later than the spring of 1946. In the meantime, 

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6 CPS 86/2, 25 Oct 43, title: The Defeat of Japan Within Twelve Months After the Defeat of Germany.

7 Min, 109th mtg JPS, 27 Oct 43.

8 OPD brief, Notes . . . 111th mtg JPS, 3 Nov 43, sub: The Defeat of Japan Within Twelve Months After the Defeat of Germany, filed with SS 186 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160–95 (7 Jan 43).

9 Compilation of Background Material for Sextant [about 7 Nov 43], prepared by S&P Gp OPD, Tab 4g, ABC 337 (18 Oct 43), 5.
they advocated an advance along the New Guinea–Netherlands East Indies–Philippines axis, to proceed concurrently with the Central Pacific offensive. If any conflict in timing should occur, they stated, “due weight should be accorded to the fact that operations in the Central Pacific promise a more rapid advance toward Japan, our ultimate objective; the earlier acquisition of strategic air bases closer to the Japanese homeland; and of greatest importance, are more likely to precipitate a decisive engagement with the Japanese fleet.”

They believed it would be better to reassess strategy after the completion of the Gilberts-Marshalls campaign.

The Combined and Joint planners’ ideas on the Japanese war were given a distinctly cool reception when they reached the top strategic counselors of the JCS in early November. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee found that planning of the war against Japan continued to be imbued with “conservatism” because of the tendency to overestimate Japan and to underestimate British-American capabilities. The JSSC did not accept Hokkaido as the primary target for 1945 and maintained that the key to Japanese defeat lay in “all-out operations through the Central Pacific with supporting operations on the northern and southern flanks.”

By mid-November American planners were still unable to resolve their disagreement over the future, long-term pattern of operations against Japan and could not present the JCS, preparing to depart for the next conference, with an acceptable solution.

The Progress of Pacific Operations

Failure in the months following Quadrant to define long-term policies and strategy for the Pacific war meant that in the meantime pressures already developed against the Japanese perimeter would continue to be applied and that new pressures would be evolved in the usual opportunistic manner. With the Allies pushing forward in New Guinea toward the Huon Peninsula area and advancing in the central Solomons to the islands of New Georgia and Vella Lavella, the course for the immediate future in the South and Southwest Pacific through New Guinea and toward the Bismarck Archipelago was not difficult to fathom. With the initiation of the Central Pacific campaign against the Gilbert Islands and the launching of Burma operations during the latter part of the year, two additional points of pressure would be applied against the Japanese.

The important task for the Army planners would be to sustain and foster the old drives while making provision for growth and expansion of new lines of offense. Balancing demands against resources, hitherto decided mainly upon a Europe versus Pacific basis, now was to be further complicated by the need for intra-Pacific allocations and priorities between the South-Southwest and the Central Pacific.

Indications of this competition for

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10 JCS 564, 4 Nov 43, title: The Defeat of Japan Within Twelve Months After the Defeat of Germany.

11 (1) JCS 581, 9 Nov 43, title: Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan. (2) JCS 533/6, 16 Nov 43, title: Recommended Line of Action at Next U.S.-Br Staff Conf.

12 JCS 533/5, 8 Nov 43, title: Recommended Line of Action at Next U.S.-Br Staff Conf.
available resources were made clear when Nimitz requested on 20 August that a firm date be set for launching operations in the Marshalls. With the drive on the Gilberts scheduled for 20 November, Nimitz felt that 1 January 1944 would be a reasonable target date for the Kwajalein, Maloelap, and Wotje Atolls in the Marshalls. Capture of the Marshalls would prepare the way for the next step, control of the Carolines, and would support SWPA and Indian Ocean operations. To carry out his plan, Nimitz visualized use of one Army division and two and a half AAF bomber groups. The attacks would be mounted from Oahu and the South Pacific and would use staging points in the Ellice and Gilbert Islands.

The Army planners were concerned over possible shipping complications for the Bismarck campaign that might result from setting an early January date for the Marshalls. Nevertheless, the Chief of Staff supported the Navy contention that Nimitz should have a firm date on which he could count. The Army-Navy understanding was that Nimitz should take into consideration the continuance of the CARTWHEEL thrusts against New Ireland, the Admiralties, and New Guinea in February 1944. In early September the 7th Division, which had been used in the recently completed Aleutians campaign, was designated as the Army division for the Marshalls operation. Later developments forced Nimitz to recommend postponement of the Marshalls target date to 31 January. In accepting his advice, the JCS on 2 November stipulated that the operations should begin not later than 31 January. General Marshall took this occasion to point out the desirability of the high command in Washington using the Foch system of pressing all subordinate commanders constantly in order to keep the enemy continually in retreat and to forestall delays or lags in operations. The unwillingness of Marshall to accept postponements and his eagerness to advance target dates were typical of this period of search for short cuts and faster results.

Readjustments, however, were constantly being made by the Army and Navy as preparations for the Gilberts and Nauru neared completion. In September the Navy discovered that a shortage of attack transports and cargo ships might make the seizure of Nauru both difficult and costly since heavy losses had been anticipated and logistical hazards would be quite severe because of the atoll’s isolated position. The Army accepted the substitution of Makin Atoll for Nauru as an objective, but warned that the U.S. Fleet might sustain more damage from Japanese land-based air in trying to assault Makin.

Aware, too, of the increased stature of the Pacific Ocean Areas in the over-all planning picture, the Army during the summer of 1943 attempted to bring about readjustments in the organization.

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and command of the region. It sought to establish POA as a theater of operations with Nimitz as theater commander. The Navy would not accept the suggestion as it was reluctant to place Nimitz more directly under the JCS. It was especially unwilling to divorce him from direct command of the Pacific Fleet, for which he was then responsible to the Navy. The Navy was far more amenable to a concurrent and closely related Army suggestion to form a joint planning staff under Nimitz. This proposal would give the Army increased representation at POA headquarters and, in the Army view, would insure the more economical and efficient use of Army forces assigned to Nimitz. When, on 6 September, the Navy agreed to a joint planning staff in POA, the Army regarded the concession as an opening wedge in the Army's campaign to make Nimitz theater commander of POA.

Meanwhile, in SWPA the growing importance of the Central Pacific was making MacArthur uneasy. Believing firmly in the New Guinea approach to the Philippines and convinced of the need to recapture the Philippines before any final assault upon Japan, MacArthur was alarmed at the increasing attention given the mandated islands route. His concern lest SWPA operations be shunted aside or halted with the completion of CARTWHEEL was reported to the War Department both by Somervell of ASF and by Col. William L. Ritchie of OPD during their visits in the theater in September and October. MacArthur feared that the failure at QUADRANT to spell out any SWPA advance beyond New Guinea might cause the Australians to slow down, since they would assume that future operations would be basically naval. Acting upon Ritchie's recommendation that the SWPA commander be reassured, the JCS informed MacArthur in early October that unremitting pressure must be applied against Japan from every side and that he should perfect his plans for the seizure of Mindanao. They urged him to try to bolster the Australian war effort and to prepare for the Philippines operations, working on the assumptions that the main effort would be made from SWPA and that a gradual build-up would take place in SWPA generally at the present rate. Final decision would rest upon developments, but the JCS warned him that rapid expansion of naval surface forces might make the Central Pacific the logical route to utilize.

MacArthur's quick response to the JCS instruction was to submit RENO III, a revised, five-part outline plan for SWPA operations. According to RENO III, Rabaul would initially be bypassed

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16 (1) Memo, Marshall for King, 15 Jul 43, sub: Relief by Army Troops of Marine Ground and Aviation Units . . . , WDSCA SOPAC. (2) OPD memo for recd, 9 Nov 43, sub: Designation of CPA as a T/Opns, OPD 584 PTO, 54.
but later seized and used as a base. Timing for the successive steps leading to the attack on Mindanao had been accelerated to permit a February 1945 target date. The desirability of operations against the Carolines was recognized. Phase I, the neutralization of Rabaul, would start about 1 February 1944 and would involve the capture of Hansa Bay in New Guinea, Kavieng on New Ireland, and the Admiralties. This phase would employ the services of seven infantry divisions and two parachute regiments in the assault, along with fifty-nine air groups. Ten divisions would be required for garrison duty. Phases II and III would complete major operations in the New Guinea area. The Humboldt Bay–Arafura Sea sector would be taken in June and the Vogelkop would come under attack in August, to be followed by Geelvink Bay operations in October. Requirements by October would be six divisions and one parachute regiment for assault, thirteen divisions for garrison duty, and over seventy-seven groups for air operations. Requirements by October would be six divisions and one parachute regiment for assault, thirteen divisions for garrison duty, and over seventy-seven groups for air operations. Phases IV and V, operations against Halmahera Island and Manado on northeastern Celebes and, finally, against Mindanao itself in December 1944 and February 1945 respectively, were not covered by any current directive so resources were not estimated.19

To present his ideas on the strategic situation to the JCS before the approaching SEXTANT Conference, MacArthur sent his chief of staff, General Sutherland, to Washington in early November. The earnest behests of Sutherland in support of the New Guinea-Philippines approach accentuated the MacArthur thesis that only in SWPA could ground, sea, and air forces be employed as a team and large strategic bombardment forces be utilized. The already existing air facilities on Mindanao and the opportunity to cut off Japanese resources in the Netherlands East Indies and open up a port on the China coast were also cited as advantages of the Philippines advance. After considering RENO III and listening to Sutherland, the Joint planners came to the conclusion in November that regardless of the merits of the plan, it called for more resources than would be available.20

The same consideration—the need to limit resources in Pacific operations until after the defeat of Germany—also influenced the AAF. It was reflected in the AAF’s refusal of the many requests of Harmon and Kenney for additional long-range fighter planes during the fall of 1943. While fully aware of the good use to which any increases would be put, Arnold queried Handy in mid-October on a Harmon plea for more P-38’s and P-51’s for the South Pacific Area—"More important there than to protect H.B. [heavy bombers] going into Germany or protection of Eisenhower’s army?" Handy’s reply was emphatic: "My answer is—NO!"21

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21 Quote is from memo, Arnold for Handy, 17 Oct 43, no sub, Book 13, Exec 9. See also: (1) memo, Harmon for Col Greeley, 27 Sep 43, no sub, Book 13, Exec 9; (2) msg, Arnold to Harmon, 29 Sep 43.
Despite the War Department's unwillingness to supply either SWPA or SOPAC forces with more resources, which necessarily would have had to be diverted from Europe, progress of operations in those theaters was definitely encouraging. In the Southwest Pacific an amphibious landing in the Huon Gulf area of New Guinea, combined with an airdrop by U.S. troops in the Markham Valley and a converging land advance by the Australians, cut off a large force of Japanese in the Huon Gulf area in early September. This was followed by the fall of Lae and Salamaua by 16 September and the capture of Finschhafen on 2 October. Twenty-five days later South Pacific forces debarked on the Treasury Islands in the Solomons group, and on 2 November invaded Bougainville at Empress Augusta Bay. The attack on western New Britain, scheduled for 20 November, would be supplemented by an airborne operation against Cape Gloucester and would come at the same time as the launching of the Gilberts assault.

In the meantime, Halsey and MacArthur had conferred and decided that South Pacific forces would carry out an attack against Kavieng, using the 3d Marine Division and the 40th and Americal Army Divisions, while SWPA would conduct operations against Manus Island in the Admiralties. Rabaul would initially be bypassed and fleet protection was assured MacArthur for his advance along the New Guinea coast.

The Washington planners, also active during the summer of 1943, had drawn up outline plans for the seizure of the Marianas and Formosa for future use and had also studied the role the North Pacific might play in the over-all plan to defeat Japan. Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians had posed the problem of the use of Alaska as a future base of operations, and in August General DeWitt of the Western Defense Command had proposed mounting an attack from the Aleutians against Paramushiro Island in the Kurils. The Army and Navy offered little objection to this plan on tactical grounds. The prime obstacle seemed to them to be the familiar encumbrance of the Pacific—the lack of sufficient resources to stage the offensive in 1944. The Pacific Fleet, as Admiral Nimitz pointed out, would be fully occupied with operations in the Central and South Pacific. Nevertheless, JCS decided in September that planning for a possible operation in 1945 should be carried on and that a base should be constructed on Adak. In the meantime, Marshall wanted to reduce the Alaska garrison to a maximum of 100,000, and possibly eventually to 80,000, as rapidly as shipping would allow. The Air Forces, on the other hand, went ahead with their plan to build three B-29 bases in the Aleutians by the spring of 1944. Since geographically, strategically, and logistically Alaska was almost a

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CM-OUT 13585; (3) msg, Harmon to Arnold, 5 Oct 43. CM-1N 2880; (4) msgs, Arnold to Kenney and Harmon, 28 Oct 43, CM-OUT 12536 and CM-OUT 12538; and (5) Craven and Cate, AAF IV, 244, 289.


23 Navy msg, 120452, COMSOPAC to CINCPOA and COMINCH, 12 Oct 43, Item 67d, Exec 10. See also: ltr, Harmon to Handy, 23 Nov 43, no sub, OPD 981 Security, 274.

24 (1) Min, 99th mtg JPS, 8 Sep 43. (2) Min, 101st mtg JPS, 15 Sep 43.
separate entity and not a true part of the Western Defense Command, the War Department decided in October to establish the Alaskan Department as a separate theater of operations under Lt. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, Jr., as of 1 November.²⁵

By the end of 1943 it appeared that Alaska would assume a passive role insofar as a ground action was concerned and become primarily an air and naval theater. Whether or not eventual operations, other than air, against the Kurils would be staged from the Aleutians would depend upon whether the USSR entered the war against Japan, upon the status and progress of other Pacific operations, and upon the availability of shipping.

Shipping, Deployment, and Rotation

In an essentially water-bound theater such as the Pacific, the main controlling factor in planning for operations was availability of shipping to move and supply the offensive forces. Limitations imposed upon the Washington staff by the priority given the European war had often necessitated refusals of Pacific theater requests for additional shipping and had helped restrict aggressive efforts in the Pacific simply to retaining the strategic initiative. With the rapid expansion of the Pacific Fleet, the scale and tempo of operations would increase. This augmentation implied greater demands for troop and cargo shipping, still in a state of imbalance, with troop shipping in shorter supply during late 1943.

MacArthur alone wanted to move 150,000 men and their equipment within his own area during the latter part of 1943 in order to put them in position for current and future operations. He requested in August that a total of seventy-one Liberty ships and ten other freighters be provided to ensure him the necessary mobility to take advantage of enemy weaknesses.²⁶ His insistence that failure to meet his requirements might result in operational setbacks led the War Department to consider several alternatives. Since the withdrawal of shipping from the United Kingdom or North Africa runs to meet his needs would have meant a monthly loss of 15,000 spaces in those areas, the War Shipping Administration was prevailed upon by the War Department to assemble ships from other sources. A number of Liberty ships were loaned for sixty days and a group of small cargo ships was scraped together to take care of the remainder of MacArthur's needs.²⁷


The tight shipping situation in the Southwest Pacific led Marshall in early September to request the Joint planners to make a survey of the effects of Central Pacific requirements upon other Pacific operations. He was apprehensive about the demands of the Gilberts and Marshalls campaign and pointed out that in no case was it ever possible to give a commander all that he wanted. Admiral Cooke informed him that there would be plenty of cargo shipping available but personnel carriers would not be abundant. It was Marshall’s opinion, however, that Central Pacific requirements had not been studied closely enough and King agreed, noting that very often assault shipping was requested unnecessarily.\(^{28}\)

By the time the JPS made their report in late September, troop-lift prospects had improved. A troop conversion program that permitted alteration of cargo vessels then under construction to personnel carriers had been approved by the JCS on 10 September, and there would be a surplus lift to the Pacific of 86,000 places by June 1944. However, as King had warned the JCS, combat loaders and landing craft would continue to be the bottleneck in all theaters.\(^{29}\) To provide the LST’s and other landing craft necessary to carry out the CARTWHEEL operations, the Army and Navy agreed in October to permit interchange of these craft between SWPA and SOPAC. The shortage in personnel shipping had its effects upon SWPA operations. According to Ritchie, the attack against western New Guinea and New Britain following the successful seizure of Kaiapit and Finschhafen in eastern New Guinea could have been launched earlier had troop shipping been available.\(^{30}\)

The influence of shipping upon deployment in the Pacific presented a very real problem to the Army planners. They visualized a force of 2,200,000 men, including 35 divisions and 120 air groups, located throughout the area after the defeat of Germany.\(^{31}\) By the end of September 1943, thirteen divisions and thirty-four air groups had been deployed to maintain the strategic initiative. In the Central Pacific the 6th, 27th, 33d, and 40th Infantry Divisions were assigned under Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr.’s, Central Pacific command, with the 7th Division en route from the Aleutians in the shipping that had been amassed for the Kiska operation. The 25th, 37th, 43d and Americal Divisions were under the command of Harmon in SOPAC, and in SWPA MacArthur had the 1st Cavalry and the 24th, 32d, and 41st Infantry Divisions.

Plans to move additional units into the Pacific were entirely dependent upon the availability of shipping, and the demands of each theater throughout the world had to be carefully weighed against all the others. That the allocation of shipping was a difficult and thankless task is indicated by the rejoin-

\(^{28}\) (1) JCS 471, 6 Sep 43, title: Pacific Operations and Availability of Resources. (2) Min, 115th mtg JCS, 7 Sep 43.

\(^{29}\) (1) Min, 115th mtg JCS, 21 Sep 43. (2) OPD brief, Notes . . . 116th mtg JCS, 28 Sep 43, sub: Pacific Operations and Availability of Shipping, filed with JCS 471/1, ABC 561 Pacific (6 Sep 43), 1-A.


The War Department is fully cognizant of the extremely critical shipping situation, which is not confined to the Pacific. Based upon the number of available bottoms and thorough consideration of operational requirements, including an appreciation of forces now available in the several Pacific areas, an allocation of shipping is made monthly to each the Central, South and Southwest Pacific. This allocation is concurred in by the Navy Department here and is in no sense a hit-and-miss guess which fails to consider the needs of each area.\(^{32}\)

In the following week, Handy was forced to turn down Harmon’s bid for another Army division for post-CARTWHEEL operations. Handy informed Harmon that he would have to manage with the divisions already in the theater.\(^{33}\)

Nevertheless, even while a severe shortage of shipping existed, plans were being laid in Washington to ready additional units for shipment and training as soon as conditions eased. To receive divisions fresh from the United States and provide them with amphibious and jungle training, the Army in August had named Richardson Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Central Pacific Area—in addition to his current assignment as commander of the Hawaiian Department—and made him responsible for training new units bound for all Pacific theaters. Designation of the Hawaiian Islands as a training ground would serve the dual purpose of permitting green troops to become experienced and acclimated while furnishing the islands with defensive ground troops during the training period.\(^{34}\)

As Marshall informed MacArthur early in November, the restrictions on shipping, added to the critical manpower shortage in the United States, made acute the need for strictest surveillance and restudy of requirements with a view to converting units already in the Pacific to fill Pacific requirements.\(^{35}\) The actual increase in the forces deployed against Japan might seem somewhat surprising unless it is kept in mind that many of the 1943 requests for men and planes that the War Department refused to grant were over and above approved allocations. By the end of September the Army had 578,278 men located in the Pacific (Central, South, and Southwest), 131,670 in Alaska, and 61,198 in the CBI, making a grand total of 771,146 troops taking part in the war against Japan. The Army forces deployed against Germany had considerably outstripped those against Japan by this time and amounted to 1,032,296 (Mediterranean, European, and Middle East areas). Thus the ratio between the primary and secondary wars was approximately 4 to 3.\(^{36}\)

Despite the numerical Army superiority there were thirteen U.S. Army divisions arrayed against Japan and thirteen against Germany. While the number of air groups (seventy-five) in position for

\(^{32}\) Ltr, Handy to CG USAFCPA, 28 Oct 43, sub: Central Pacific Operations and Deployment, OPD 381 Security, 257.

\(^{33}\) Ltr, Handy to Harmon, 8 Nov 43, no sub, OPD 381 Security, 261.

\(^{34}\) (1) OPD memo for rcd, 11 Aug 43, sub: Designation of CG Hawaiian Department as CG USAFCPA, OPD 384 PTO. (2) Ltr, Hull to Richardson, 23 Aug 43, sub: Mutual Orientation (Plans Formulated re Combat Troops), OPD 381 Security, 225. (3) Msg, Marshall to Richardson, 27 Aug 43, CM-OUT 11429.

\(^{35}\) Msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 4 Nov 43, CM-OUT 1289.

\(^{36}\) STM-30, 1 Jan 48.
European operations at the close of September was more than double the number of groups (thirty-five) pitted against the Japanese, it should be remembered that the bulk of the U.S. Fleet, Navy, and Marine air forces, and Marine ground forces was stationed in the Pacific and thus served to balance the Army preponderance in the European war.\textsuperscript{37}

The steady increase in personnel scattered throughout the Pacific and CBI brought the vexing problem of rotation to the fore. During the initial stages of the war, the great majority of troops had been sent out fresh from the United States and the numbers of combat-weary and sick troops that had to be returned home had been small and of minor importance. As the second year of the conflict drew to its close, more and more men began to show the debilitating effects of malaria, filariasis, and the climate. The enervating consequences of jungle warfare, coupled with the limited recreational and rehabilitation facilities, resulted in a lowering of morale. In the Pacific, disease and climate disabled far more men than did battle casualties. To further complicate this rather dismal picture, the lack of shipping to put any adequate rotation system into effect made the problem even more severe.\textsuperscript{38}

The War Department recognized that the question of rotation must be faced before adverse public opinion and lowered troop morale forced a decision, but the only solution seemed to lie in the provision of additional troop lift for fresh replacements. The availability of adequate shipping for rotation of troops stationed in South America, Central Africa, the Middle East, and the ETO presented no particular difficulty. In the CBI, the Pacific, Alaska, and North Africa the prospects of alleviating the problem seemed poor in view of the lack of transport, the large requirements for fillers that would result, and the understandable disinclination of theater commanders to sacrifice any portion of their troop build-up for rotation replacements. The need for remedial action to set a rotation plan in motion, however, led Marshall in November to accept a suggestion of the Operations Division that a 1-percent-per-month figure be adopted for the hardship areas, starting in March 1944. Selection of individuals to be sent home was to be left to the discretion of the theater commanders, but Marshall proposed that longevity of service and severity of sickness be prime considerations and, since the numbers that could be rotated were going to be small, that a lottery system might be used to determine the fortunate men. He warned, however, that no additional shipping could be made available.\textsuperscript{39}

The sharp protest that this last statement drew from MacArthur was premised on his belief that rotation would not be carried out unless the troop build-up could continue. MacArthur's protest spurred the Washington staff to explore the shipping situation more closely. If four or five Liberty ships a

\textsuperscript{37} USAF Statistical Digest, 1947.

\textsuperscript{38} (1) Ltr, MacArthur to All Cmdrs, U.S. Army Units, SWPA, 29 Jul 43, sub: Rotation of Personnel to the U.S., OPD 330.2, 4. (2) Memo, Stimson for President, 23 Sep 43, sub: Rotation and Return of Personnel on Duty Outside the U.S., OPD 330.2, 4. (3) Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 27 Sep 43, no sub, WDCSA SOPAC.

month could be converted into troop carriers, the Army staff believed that a fleet of twenty-four could handle the rotation program. In December Marshall was to secure JCS approval for conversion and was able to notify the theater commanders that the 1-percent policy would go into effect on 1 March 1944.\(^{(40)}\)

Despite the small beginnings, the War Department hoped that as more shipping became available, a larger percentage of personnel could be rotated. In the meantime at least a start would have been made to allay public opinion and help military morale.

**Build-up in Burma**

The priority that QUADRANT gave to land operations in Burma, coupled with the appointments of Mountbatten and Wingate to SEAC, provided a new impetus to CBI affairs during the fall of 1943. Mountbatten, described by Marshall as "a breath of fresh air," made a favorable impression on the Generalissimo and Stilwell, and preparations were carried on apace to get the offensive forces and supplies ready for the dry-season attack. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff for their part sought to provide Mountbatten with capable assistants. Besides Stilwell as Deputy Supreme Commander, Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, who had been chief Army planner from June 1942 to early September 1943, was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff and General Wheeler, former Services of Supply commander in the CBI, was made Principal Administrative Officer (G-4). In addition, a U.S. long-range penetration group was to be organized and sent out to India to take part in the 1944 campaign.\(^{(41)}\) If new blood and new direction could overcome the old lethargy and procrastination, a true offensive might be launched in Burma during the coming winter.

Meanwhile, with top priority assigned to land operations, a series of plans was being prepared in India and London for possible alternatives. British interest seemed to lie mainly in whether the objective of their 4 Corps advance from India would be Yeu or Indaw-Katha in north central Burma and where and when amphibious operations would be carried out. Reports from the theater received in Washington during September indicated that the British placed little trust in the Chinese war effort and discounted any effective aid from the Yunnan Chinese forces. The Ledo Chinese, in whom the British evidently had more faith, were assigned the task of reaching and taking Myitkyina by spring. The reports also maintained that the British in India lacked confidence in the value of their Indian troops and were concerned over the ability of the Assam line of communications to sustain any prolonged thrust. British uneasiness led Brig. Gen. Benjamin G. Ferris, who commanded Stilwell’s rear echelon at


New Delhi, to comment that the British had a "quartermaster" approach to operations, but the lack of enthusiasm may also be attributed in part to a growing belief held in India that Burma should be bypassed. Reports from London indicated that the outlook for other than limited operations against Burma was poor and that amphibious landings, if conducted at all, would be against the Andaman Islands since the British had apparently written off the Akyab-Ramree assault. Clearly, to counteract this pessimism, Mountbatten and his new aides had their work cut out for them.

Possible adverse effects of the emphasis on ground operations upon the airlift to China had been anticipated at QUADRANT, but evidently had not been considered seriously by the U.S. staff. When Auchinleck, who was in command until the arrival of Mountbatten, warned the Americans in September that he was going to use the British engineer units then working on the Assam airfields to improve the road network leading from Imphal, consternation arose among the U.S. theater staff and in Washington. Their concern was increased by a report that Auchinleck had expressed himself willing to curtail or even completely cut off all tonnage to China if the need should present itself. When Ferris advised Marshall that unless the Assam line of communications could be developed to support both land and air operations, he would soon reach the end of his reserve stocks in Assam and be unable to supply China, the JCS took quick action. Pleading the 10,000-ton-a-month figure over the Hump as a Presidential commitment, they informed their British colleagues on 24 September that they felt that withdrawal of the British engineers from the airfields should be timed so that U.S. units could replace them. Furthermore, they argued, all decisions affecting the tonnage allocations for the airlift should be made by the CCS until SEAC was organized.

The JCS derived little comfort from the British Chiefs of Staff, who supported Auchinleck's position completely. The British Chiefs pointed out that the possible disadvantage to the Hump traffic had been accepted at QUADRANT and that current decisions in the theater must be made by the commander on the spot, though the decisions would always be reported to the CCS.

In the midst of these exchanges, Arnold advised the President that either commitments to China would have to be modified if curtailments upon tonnage were to be imposed on the airlift or QUADRANT decisions would have to be altered. However, on 10 October, the British Chiefs finally agreed to Marshall's request that Stilwell and Auchinleck should be instructed to confer and establish the minimum airlift tonnage figure to be maintained.

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44 (1) Memo, Arnold for Hopkins, 29 Sep 43, sub: Threatened Curtailment of Air Operations in the
that it would be the responsibility of the United States to deliver this total or risk the avalanche of protests certain to follow from the Generalissimo and his adherents.

The War Department had only recently been subjected to intensified pressure from the Chennault supporters to bolster his airpower in China. Not only had Chiang and Soong increased their persistent demands for the fulfillment of the Trident promise; even the British military attaché in China had been induced to use British channels in a vain effort to arouse Churchill’s interest and support in the Chennault program.45

Although there was some justification for the complaints of Chennault and his supporters about the failure of the Army to provide his forces with the two fighter squadrons and the two medium bombardment squadrons promised to him at Trident but still operating with the Tenth Air Force in India, the squadrons had been withheld for logistical reasons in order to protect Chennault’s supply line rather than for any intent to cripple his offensive plan. The Army considered it pointless to expand U.S. and Chinese air forces operating from China until the forces could be maintained on a full operational basis. To pacify Chinese dissatisfaction with the status quo, Marshall prepared a Presidential response to the Chinese complaints, which

was sent to Mme. Chiang on 15 September. The message explained that Chennault’s missing fighters would be sent to China as soon as additional protection for the Assam airfields arrived and that the bombers would be transferred as rapidly as airlift tonnage could support their operations. The slow development of the Hump airlift was attributed to mechanical defects in the C-46’s, floods, and weather rather than to any human deficiencies.46

This explanation helped to win a month’s respite from Chinese importunities, but then Soong again approached the President, who by this time was rather disgusted with the repeated record of failure in China. In passing on the Chinese complaints to Marshall, Roosevelt commented, “... the worst thing is that we are falling down on our promises every single time. We have not fulfilled one of them yet.”47 In an effort to retrieve a dismal situation, Roosevelt on 15 October instructed Marshall to have Somervell, then en route to the CBI, look into the whole business of the airlift and “put a real punch behind it.” The president’s disappointment also led him to urge Churchill to take a personal interest in the build-up of facilities in Assam.48


Prospects of a brighter future for the airlift showed clearly through Somervell’s report several days later. Recognizing the past problems of new planes, untried and inexperienced personnel, poor facilities, and difficult flying conditions, he felt that the Army Transport Command in the CBI was past the critical stage and that improvement would soon be evident. As if to prove Somervell a shrewd prophet, Hump tonnage reached 8,632 tons in October and gave evidence of attaining a greater total in November. This allowed Chennault’s air forces to operate more frequently and permitted the long-delayed reinforcements to be flown to China to join the air offensive.\(^{49}\)

Somervell also closely examined the line of communications in Assam and made command and administrative changes in the Services of Supply organization to bolster the capacity of the vital supply route. To aid the Americans in increasing the load-carrying potential of the Bengal-Assam Railroad—long regarded as the worst transportation bottleneck in the theater—the British co-operated in securing permission for U.S. railroad troops to take over and operate the line. The outlook for improvement in tonnage movements in Assam and over the Hump seemed thus more optimistic for the critical period that lay ahead.\(^{50}\)

Somervell’s visit to the CBI in October coincided with the arrival of Mountbatten to set up his headquarters for SEAC and a concerted effort to get rid of Stilwell. Mountbatten had arranged for an immediate conference with Chiang and Stilwell at Chungking and was disconcerted to discover at the outset that the Generalissimo had apparently made up his mind to request Stilwell’s recall. Somervell attempted to heal the breach, receiving powerful support from Mme. Chiang and her sister, Mme. Kung. In the course of the negotiations, Stilwell not only was forgiven but emerged temporarily, at least, more firmly entrenched in Chiang’s favor than ever before and enjoying the puissant aid of the Soong sisters. Ironically enough, as Stilwell has recorded, the apparent instigator of the October removal proceedings, Dr. Soong, was himself told by the Generalissimo to get sick and stay away from the political scene.\(^{51}\)

Once Stilwell’s status had been settled, the Chungking conference went on more smoothly. When Somervell assured the Generalissimo that land operations in Burma would not interfere with Hump tonnage, Chiang consented to Chinese participation, provided Stilwell commanded all Chinese troops, the British had available a powerful fleet in the Bay of Bengal, and an amphibious operation was conducted in that area. The arrangements for boundaries between the

\(^{49}\) Msg, Arnold to Stratemeyer, 21 Oct 43, CM-OUT 9123. The message directed Stratemeyer to send the two squadrons of mediums to Chennault without delay.

\(^{50}\) (1) Msg, Somervell to Marshall, 23 Oct 43, CM-IN 14107; (2) Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell’s Command Problems, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1956), Ch. I. (3) Joseph Bykofsky, Transportation Service in China, Burma and India in World War II, MS, OCT, HB.

\(^{51}\) Stilwell Papers, pp. 293–95. See also: (1) msg, Stilwell to Marshall, 20 Sep 43, CM-IN 21103; (2) ltr, Wedemeyer to Marshall, 21 Oct 43, no sub. Item 9, Exec 17; (3) msg, Somervell to Marshall, 24 Oct 43, CM-IN 15125; and (4) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, Ch. X. Stilwell was informed at Sextant by Marshall that in September consideration had been given in the War Department to his recall and reassignment to command of the Fourth Army.
China theater and SEAC presented a somewhat delicate matter, especially those in Thailand and Indochina, but a gentleman’s agreement was effected between Mountbatten and Chiang allowing for control of conquered areas in those countries to remain temporarily with the conqueror and for later delineation of boundaries when China’s forces drew near to SEAC. A Chinese suggestion that a Chinese-British-American committee be established at Chungking to handle all political matters that arose during the coming operations won American approval but had to be passed on to the British Chiefs of Staff for consideration.  

The Chungking conference, for all its surface agreement on Burma operations, did not produce a firm commitment from the Chinese to carry out their role. The conditional concurrence given by Chiang still hinged upon the fulfillment of the amphibious and naval parts of the plan. If the British failed to make good their assurances, Chinese support might be withdrawn.

Immediately after the conference, on 21 October, Mountbatten received his directive from the Prime Minister. As its prime responsibilities, SEAC was to engage the enemy as closely and continuously as possible, relieve pressure on the Pacific, and inflict attrition upon the Japanese. SEAC’s secondary mission, significantly enough, would be to maintain and broaden contacts with China by ground and air. The specific objective for amphibious operations for 1944 was left undefined, but preparations were to be begun and British Fleet support was assured.  

To the U.S. planners the chief fault of this directive was the implication that the British Chiefs, rather than the CCS, would decide matters of strategy. Since the JCS had indicated that operations in SEAC should be more closely coordinated with those in the Pacific as the tempo of the struggle increased, the planners considered that the direction of the war against Japan, including decisions on SEAC strategy, should be centered in Washington. As Handy pointed out to Marshall, the amphibious operations in SEAC for 1944, that Churchill wanted, would not necessarily support the north Burma drive and would relegate the land offensive desired by the Americans to a subordinate position. The JCS therefore informed the British that they did not accept the British contention that only matters of ground strategy pertaining to SEAC should be considered by the CCS. The JCS believed that the CCS should exercise a general jurisdictional control over

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53 Msg, COSSEA 1, Prime Minister to Mountbatten, 21 Oct 43, SEAC Information Book, Tab 1, ABC 384 Burma (21 Oct 43).
strategy in SEAC, which would include timing and sequence of operations.\textsuperscript{54}

The poor showing of the Hump expansion project during the summer and the indication that the British still did not consider the opening of a land route to China of vital importance were offset somewhat by the determined effort of the President to secure international recognition for China as a major power. Through the efforts of Secretary Hull, Roosevelt in October had induced the Russians and British to allow China to become a signatory to the Four-Power Declaration of Moscow.\textsuperscript{55} The President also invited Chiang to confer with him at the forthcoming conference in Cairo in late November. But while the President was endeavoring in the fall of 1943 to bolster Chinese morale and importance, Washington military planners were cautiously re-examining the place of China in over-all planning for the defeat of Japan. The Army staff had already decided in September that equipping a second group of thirty Chinese divisions would be impracticable in the near future since it would impose an additional and perhaps unnecessary strain upon the American economy. If the war in Europe should end soon, the required equipment could be made available from surplus American stocks in that area. In October the planners concluded that no guarantee could be given that even the first group could be supplied before 1945. Investigating the need for Chinese combat divisions in an over-all plan against Japan, the Operations Division's Strategy Section concluded that a revision of the U.S. military policy toward China was in order. Comparing Pacific prospects with expected accomplishments in China, the Strategy Section felt that any effort from China would come too late to be of assistance. In line with this premise, it recommended that little more be expended on China than was necessary to keep her in the war, that the bomber offensive based in China be limited, that Burma be bypassed, and that excess service troops be withdrawn from the CBI and used in other theaters.\textsuperscript{56}

This shift in evaluation brought the Army planners, on the eve of SEXTANT, closer to the British point of view and reflected a trend toward a transfer of emphasis from China to the swifter route via the Pacific to Japan. The recognition of the difficulties of employing China as a base or as a source of manpower foreshadowed the revision of U.S. policy that the showdown at SEXTANT would produce.

\textbf{New Techniques and Weapons in the War Against Japan}

\textbf{GALAHAD}

The search for a short-term, over-all plan and the effort to speed specific op-

\textsuperscript{54} (1) JCS 472/2, 6 Nov 43, title: Dir to Supreme Allied Comdr. (2) Memo, Handy for CofS, 9 Nov 43, sub: Prime Minister's Dir to Adm Mountbatten, OPD 384 Security, 6. (3) Min, 122d mtg JCS, 9 Nov 43. (4) CCS 890/1, 18 Nov 43, title: Future Operations in SEAC.

\textsuperscript{55} See Ch. XIII, above.

erations against Japan were two manifestations of the U.S. staff’s desire in the fall of 1943 to get on with the war. Both pointed up a third and related interest—the increasing attention paid to the potentialities of new techniques and weapons of warfare whose full significance for hastening the end of the Japanese conflict was only beginning to be realized but whose cumulative effect promised in time to alter the whole strategic picture.

One likely possibility was suggested by General Wingate’s earlier experiment in jungle warfare with the long-range penetration group. Despite the indeterminate character of Burma plans and the discouraging patterns of indecisiveness and delay previously exhibited in the CBI, General Marshall had agreed at QUADRANT to provide three units modeled after the Wingate columns for the February operations in Burma. The Chief of Staff had long been interested in the possibilities of well-trained, mobile troops operating behind the enemy’s lines in conjunction with the main Allied advance. Since he was strongly in favor of limited U.S. participation in the coming operations and possibly hoping to supply some offensive punch to the attack, Marshall moved swiftly in early September to assemble the 3,000-odd volunteers required for the new force. In view of the need for thoroughly trained and rugged troops for the grueling assignment, he asked MacArthur to provide 300 and Harmon to contribute 700 battle-tested volunteers to form the nucleus of the group. The remaining 2,000 men would be drawn from the Caribbean Defense Command and from the continental United States. Allied plans envisaged one column of 1,000 troops operating in advance of each of the three prongs of the north Burma offensive. News of the prospective dispatch of the long-range penetration unit drew an enthusiastic comment from Stilwell—“Can we use them. And how!”

MacArthur experienced some difficulties in attaining his quota; Harmon, in spite of the greater demand made upon him, assembled his share without too much trouble. With the Chief of Staff actively sponsoring the project, 1,000 men were moved from the Caribbean to the United States by air in three days and, by his direct intervention, the liner Lurline was obtained from the Navy to transport all the volunteers to the CBI.

To supply the long-range columns during the course of actual operations in the field, Marshall and Arnold in September devised a special air task force, popularly called the Air Commando Force, composed of transport, glider, observation, liaison, and fighter aircraft—a self-sufficient, multipurpose unit. The land force, known by the code name GALAHAD and later to win fame as Merrill’s Marauders, was set up to perform one mission of three months’ duration and then was to be taken out of the lines for rest and hospitalization. Marshall vested over-all command in Stilwell, but told Stilwell that, if Wingate were placed in charge of all long-range groups, the

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57 Quote is from Stilwell Papers, p. 219. See also: (1) memo, Somervell for Marshall, 19 Feb 43, no sub, WDSCA 320.2 (1942–43), III; and (2) msgs, Marshall to MacArthur and Harmon, 1 Sep 43, CM-OUT 984 and CM-OUT 985.

U.S. columns should be operated under Wingate. Although Marshall shared some of Stilwell's misgivings over British command of American combat forces in the CBI, he warned Stilwell that in that case, "We must all eat some crow if we are to fight the same war together. The impact on the Jap is the pay-off."59

The personal touch of the Chief of Staff in assembling the long-range group was an unusual occurrence and indicated the deep interest he felt in the project. The eventual fine showing of the GALAHAD troops must have brought Marshall a sense of gratification and satisfaction.

TWILIGHT and MATTERHORN

Of quite a different character was the Air Forces' potential contribution to the Pacific war via the B-29. While the GALAHAD force was a tactical unit to be used in support of local land offensives, the B-29 was a long-range strategic weapon that could penetrate the very heart of the enemy's war machine. Although Marshall did not take the same personal interest in the development of the B-29 that he did in the long-range penetration group, he well understood the efficacy and importance of long-range bombing and had relatively early become a staunch supporter of the value of the Combined Bomber Offensive. It is interesting to note that whereas he favored the use of long-range bombing in Europe as a prelude to the eventual cross-Channel attack, and had earlier resorted to the air argument in order to keep alive the idea of the ground offensive, in the Pacific he employed the same argument in reverse—that the land operations to open the road to China would provide air bases whence Japan could be attacked.

Originally the B-29 had been intended for the air offensive in Europe, but delays in production had postponed the date of quantity delivery to the point where it would have become available too late to play a major role in that theater. Besides, the effectiveness and range of the B-17 and B-24 were deemed sufficient to complete the task of destruction in Europe. The Air Forces, therefore, during the summer of 1943 had turned its attention to the formation of a plan to use the B-29 against Japan and had finished the plan in time to present it to the CCS at QUADRANT.60

The AAF plan visualized a force of between ten and twenty groups of B-29's based in central China, possibly around Changsha. With their 1,500-mile radius of action, the B-29's could carry out sustained bombing operations against the Japanese industrial zone. To support the B-29 bases in China, at first 2,000, and later 4,000, converted B-24.

59 Quote is from msg, Marshall to Stilwell, 13 Nov 43, CM-OUT 5389. See also, (1) memo, Arnold for CoS, 13 Sep 43, sub: Air Task Force Wingate (sic), Book 12, Exec 9; (2) memo, Timberman for SGS, 24 Sep 43, sub: American Long Range Penetration Group, WDCSA 381 China Super Secret; (3) msg, Marshall to Stilwell, 30 Sep 43, CM-OUT 486; (4) msg, Wedemeyer to Handy, 4 Nov 43, CM-IN 2874; (5) msg, Wedemeyer to Handy, 11 Nov 43, CM-IN 7087; (6) memo, Hull for Handy, 13 Nov 43, no sub, Item 12a, Exec 5; and (7) Arnold, Global Mission, p. 442.

type aircraft would be based in India to serve as transports. Calcutta would be used as the port of entry for supplying the project. The AAF pointed out the need for adequate protection of the B-29 bases in China once the operations got under way. Japanese reaction to this threat against their homeland would in all probability be violent, but the AAF assumed that Chinese ground forces and U.S. airpower could successfully defend the B-29 bases. The objective of the AAF plan was to reduce the Japanese war effort to impotency, neutralize the Japanese Air Force, and reduce the Japanese Navy and merchant shipping to a degree that would permit Allied occupation of Japan. The AAF estimated that if twenty-eight groups of B-29’s (784 planes) were available to carry out five missions a month, they could, operating at 50-percent operational strength, do the job in six months. Since such large numbers of B-29’s would not be available for some time, the AAF estimated that, if operations were begun in October 1944 and increased as more B-29’s were produced, the destruction of Japanese resources necessary to permit occupation would be attained by 31 August 1945. This timing would be in consonance with the objective of defeating Japan within twelve months of the defeat of Germany.61

While the implications of this new strategic weapon were being studied by the Combined planners during the week following QUADRANT, the Army queried Stilwell on the feasibility of carrying out the AAF plan. If the plan were accepted, he was informed, ten groups of B-29’s would be based in China in the Changsha area by October 1944 and this number would gradually be increased to twenty groups by May 1945. Two thousand B-24’s, converted into transports, would originally be based around Calcutta; eventually the strength would be doubled.62 Theater reaction in the CBI to the Air Forces’ plan indicated approval in principle but rejection in detail, mainly on the ground that the limited capacity of the port of Calcutta would not allow logistical support of the project within the time allotted. Instead, in September Stilwell and Stratemeyer offered an alternate plan called TWILIGHT, which envisaged basing the B-29’s in the Calcutta area and then shuttling them forward to the Kweilin sector in south central China to offload some of their excess gasoline and to load bombs for the air assault on Japan. In this maneuver not only would the Superfortresses be nearly self-sufficient but maintenance and security measures could also be carried out much more easily at Calcutta. By April 1945, Stilwell and Stratemeyer hoped, ten groups of B-29’s would be ready to start operations.63 The 200-odd-mile shift of the forward base area from Changsha southwest to Kweilin would, of course, decrease the number of industrial targets that the B-29’s could reach in Japan.

Since the original AAF plan had been adjudged too optimistic in its time estimate from a logistical standpoint, TWILIGHT was approved by the Combined planners as the most feasible means of

63 Msg, Stratemeyer and Stilwell to Marshall, 11 Sep 43, CM-IN 9027.
using the B-29 until the larger resources, freed by the defeat of Germany, became available. The Air Forces accepted the Twilight plan, but went on to urge that bases be constructed in the Marianas and on Paramushiro when those islands were captured.64

Further consideration by the Washington Army planners led them to advocate the substitution of Cheng-tu in west central China for the Kweilin area, since the ground and air defenses required at Cheng-tu would be far less extensive and the airfields there could be readied in 1944 rather than 1945.65 Despite these advantages, Cheng-tu was well over 400 miles farther from the target area in Japan than the original base at Changsha selected by the AAF. The operation of the B-29's via Cheng-tu became known as the Matterhorn plan and visualized 150 planes based on Calcutta by March 1944, with another 150 available by the following September. Nine airfields would have to be built at Calcutta and five would have to be ready by March 1944 at Cheng-tu, in addition to two fighter fields. The President followed his approval of Matterhorn on 10 November with personal requests to Chiang and Churchill for assistance in meeting these airfield target dates, and the Army acted quickly to send additional aviation engineer battalions and truck companies to the CBI.66

Once British and Chinese support for Matterhorn had been won, the main problem for the United States would be to provide sufficient construction units to take care of all the vital projects afoot in the CBI. The many production delays that had hitherto bedeviled the B-29 program and caused Presidential annoyance were turned over to the Joint Aircraft Committee for investigation. The committee was instructed by the JCS to look into the effects of granting the production of B-29's a priority above that of other aircraft and to make every effort to increase production.67

The possibilities that the B-29 might shorten the war and serve to give Chinese morale a much-needed boost seem to have been the main reasons for selecting China as the trial area for proving the new bomber. Despite the logistical complications involved, China did present the nearest base from which to strike at the Japanese homeland in the fall of 1943 and the President was anxious to pump new hope and determination into the flagging Chinese effort.68

In anticipation of the value of a mass surprise attack upon Japan, Arnold in

66 (1) JPS 320, 9 Nov 43, title: Early Sustained Bombing of Japan. (2) Msg, President to the Prime Minister, 10 Nov 43, Item 63b, Exec 10. (3) Msg, President to Chiang Kai-shek, 10 Nov 43, Item 63b, Exec 10. (4) JCS 600, 11 Nov 43, title: VLR Airfields (B-29) in China-Burma-India Area. (5) Msg, Arnold to Stratemeyer, 9 Nov 43, CM-OUT 3611. See also, min, 123d mtg JCS, 15 Nov 43, and min, 124th mtg JCS, 17 Nov 43.
68 Craven and Cate, AAF V, 19–20.
early November restrained Chennault's air forces from carrying out sporadic nuisance raids upon the mainland. Meanwhile, joint and combined studies were made of the possibility of using the Marianas to strengthen the weight of the blow against Japan, and it was estimated that twelve groups could be staged there by May 1945 if the islands were captured by July 1944. Several groups could also be located in the Aleutians and be ready for action by the spring of 1944. An AAF suggestion that the new bomber might be used from SWPA drew an enthusiastic plea from Kenney to permit him to send them against Japanese oil holdings in the Netherlands Indies, but since the prime objective of the B-29 was to be the home islands of Japan and the supply of planes was limited, no commitment was made.69

Carriers and Submarines

Along with his interest in the long-range penetration group and the B-29, Marshall showed a keen appreciation of the rising importance of another weapon that promised to shorten the duration of the war—the fast aircraft carrier.70 The growth of the carrier forces since 1942 had been phenomenal. In November 1942, only two of the seven carriers that the United States had upon entering the war were active, and one of these, the Ranger, was in the Atlantic. A year later, Nimitz was able to send the Saratoga and the Enterprise, four carriers of the new 27,000-ton Essex class, five light carriers of the 11,000-ton Independence class, and eight escort carriers against the Gilbert Islands.71

Organized into mobile striking forces, the carriers could be used to attack Japanese naval forces, conduct hit-and-run operations against enemy fortresses, and provide close tactical air support for amphibious landings. Thus, the floating airfields could carry out the process of neutralizing enemy strongpoints by repeated air assaults or help capture positions believed essential to the Allied advance. Neutralizing and bypassing Japanese bastions promised to bring about a faster conclusion of the war. Besides the B-29 and the aircraft carrier, notable progress was also made in developing improved types of landing craft. Such improved vessels as the LVT (A) (1), LVT (A) (2), and LCT (7), which eventually became better known as the LSM, were soon to make their appearance in the Pacific.72

The promise of these newer instruments of warfare sometimes tended to obscure the yeoman service an older weapon—the submarine—was performing against the Japanese. U.S. sub-


70 See, for example, min. 129d mtg JCS, 15 Nov 43.


72 See Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-47.

LVT (A) (1) is landing vehicle, tracked (armored) (Mark I) ("Water Buffalo," turret type); LVT (A) (2) is landing vehicle, tracked (armored) (Mark II) ("Water Buffalo," canopy type); LCT (7) is landing craft, tank (Mark VII); and LSM is landing ship, medium.
The marines received little publicity, since the very nature of their work demanded tight security measures if they were to stand a chance of returning safely to their home bases. As the U.S. submarine fleet in the Pacific increased, its impact upon Japanese naval and merchant shipping mounted. Operating for the most part individually during the first half of the war, U.S. submarines in the Pacific theater had sunk 17 naval vessels and 142 merchant ships plus 4 probables, totaling 666,561 tons by the end of 1942. The pace quickened during the first six months of 1943 when 9 naval vessels and 125 merchant ships were sent to the bottom—Japan lost 575,416 tons. During mid-1943, the U.S. undersea raiders operated in small wolf packs as well as singly, and the addition of new and improved submarines made the last half of the year a most fruitful period. From July through December, 12 Japanese naval vessels and 166 merchantmen were destroyed for a total bag of 793,763 tons. This figure may not seem particularly large when compared with the German sinkings of Allied shipping in the Atlantic, but the Allies could replace their losses and by 1943 were able to increase their merchant fleets. Japan was not in a similar position; its limited shipyard facilities made full replacement impossible.

With the AAF using low-altitude and radar bombing techniques against Japanese shipping and Chennault employing fighter bombers to destroy inland merchant shipping in China, further inroads were made upon the enemy's dwindling merchant marine. The rising rate of Japanese losses imposed restrictions upon her offensive capabilities and even made maintenance and repairs difficult.

The promise of the new weapons and effectiveness of the older ones in late 1943 were encouraging to the staff planners in Washington. If the B-29 could sustain Chinese morale and bomb the Japanese homeland, if the aircraft carrier could cut down the time element in reaching the Japanese inner zone, and if the submarine and Air Forces could inflict additional attrition and reduce the Japanese ability to resist, the end of the conflict could be hastened and the military could more easily justify the secondary war—that against Japan—to the American people.

The fall of 1943 brought no final answer on the ultimate strategy to be employed against Japan. All were agreed on the need to make haste and some promising avenues for future exploitation appeared to be opening, but the American planners had been unable to agree among themselves on a specific over-all plan. The difficulties of developing a plan on the basis of a definite time limit were becoming apparent. Despite the lack of agreement upon long-range plans, the uncertainty over the future roles and intentions of Great Britain, China, and the USSR in the war against Japan, and the priority of the war against Germany, the war against Japan was, on the whole, proceeding favorably. It gave promise of

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74 King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, p. 530.

75 Craven and Cate, AAF IV, 240, 241, 524, 527, 531.
rapid improvement in the near future as fresh points of pressure were applied against the enemy. The heartening expansion of U.S. carrier and submarine forces and the prospective addition of the long-range bombers offered further hopes of an accelerated advance and a shortened war.

Though the search for short cuts still left many basic questions in ultimate strategy unanswered, certain trends in Washington planning opinion came to the fore in the process. It was still an open question whether to rely on the invasion of the Japanese mainland to accomplish the unconditional surrender of Japan. The attention of both the chiefs and their planners was definitely focused on the need to obtain strategic bases and positions from which to take advantage of the redeployment of air, naval, and ground forces from the European theater and compel the early unconditional surrender of Japan. By the end of 1943 it was the well-defined aim of the U.S. planners to schedule operations in the Pacific so that bases would be available to accommodate the large numbers of reinforcements expected there after Germany was defeated. The quest for short cuts also crystallized Washington planning opinion in favor of making the main effort against Japan from the Central Pacific as promising the more rapid progress. Whether this emphasis on the Pacific would emerge from Allied strategic councils as dominant and what the effects might be on the roles of the United Kingdom, China, and the as-yet neutral USSR in the war against Japan remained to be seen.

The gathering momentum of the Allied drive in the secondary war, encouraging as it was, drove home to Army planners the need of finally and firmly fixing European strategy with the Allies at the forthcoming conference. The Army planners were still faced with the basic problem of how to keep the Pacific war a secondary conflict—so far as Army forces and resources were concerned—at least until Germany was beaten. In fact, the encouraging progress of the secondary war made the problem more complicated than ever. Despite the early basic Anglo-American decision to beat Germany first, operations in the Pacific war were taking on major proportions. The costs in Army means and strength had steadily mounted. The limited war threatened to become unlimited. For the Army planners, the hope of a final and firm decision on OVERLORD at the next conference embodied their desires for a measure of stability in global planning—to keep the Mediterranean effort limited while permitting the Pacific war to progress but at the same time remain secondary. With this hope in the forefront of the Army staff's thinking, the U.S. delegation prepared to move to SEXTANT for the next step in defining global strategy.
CHAPTER XV

Final Rehearsals En Route to Cairo

In November 1943 intensive preparations were going forward in Washington for the full-scale meetings with the Allied delegations at the Cairo-Tehran (code name Sextant-Eureka) conference.\(^1\) The military planners were busy putting final touches on studies and plans and preparing their positions of advance and retreat—much like field headquarters making ready for battle. Experience in military diplomacy and the techniques of international conferences over the past year had convinced them of the need for thorough preparation and for greater understanding between the JCS and the President in advance of the meetings.

There were special reasons in November for the planners' concern that pains be taken with the American rehearsal and performance. Not only were the President and his staff to meet with the British and with the Chinese representatives (Chiang Kai-shek and his staff) but also, for the first time in the war, a full-dress conference was to take place between the U.S., British, and Soviet delegations. After a number of fruitless attempts from early in the war to bring the "Big Three" together, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin were finally to meet face to face. The enlarged scope of the international conferences presented unusual complications. The Russians were as yet only at war with Germany, and the Chinese were participating actively only in the war against Japan. To preserve the diplomatic niceties, arrangements had been made therefore for the Western delegations to meet first with the Chinese at Cairo and later with Stalin, who had refused to go beyond Iran, at Tehran.

The general progress of the war since the Quebec conference had been encouraging. The Soviet counteroffensive, sweeping westward, had crossed the Dnieper River; Italy had capitulated, and the Allies were in possession of the bottom of the Italian boot; the Gilberts campaign was about to begin. Nevertheless, certain trends made the Washington planners uneasy. From London and Moscow danger signals were being reported. They raised the serious question for General Marshall and his advisers whether the Russians, like the British, were now willing to settle for opportunistic Mediterranean operations even at the cost of postponing the final crushing blow against Germany on the Continent. From Chungking came the usual appeals for further aid.

A critical point had been reached in

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\(^1\) The composite conference was usually referred to by the code name Sextant, although Sextant properly referred only to the meetings at Cairo. Eureka was the code name given to the interim meetings at Tehran.
Final Rehearsals en Route to Cairo

Allied war planning. Almost two years had gone by since Pearl Harbor, but firm agreement among the Allies on a strategic design to beat even the primary antagonist—Germany—was still lacking. What appeared to be at stake was far more than the date or even the ultimate fate of OVERLORD. The whole strategy of the global war; the “beat Germany first” concept; the roles of the United States, Great Britain, the USSR, and China in the coalition effort—all were in the balance. A final showdown over basic European strategy was in the offing—one with profound implications for the conduct of the war against Japan as well. To the Washington military staff OVERLORD represented the hope—perhaps the last hope—of waging a decisive war, and they were determined to accept no further delay in the long-promised and much-postponed invasion across the Channel. Small wonder that General Morgan, COSSAC, who had just returned from staff discussions in Washington, should warn the British staff on the eve of their departure for Cairo of the temper of the American delegation and of the need to be prepared for a “stiff fight,” in comparison with which QUADRANT might be considered “child’s play.”

The JCS Re-examine Plans Against Japan

On 13 November the President, with a full complement of military advisers, sailed from Hampton Roads, Virginia, on the new battleship USS Iowa for the meetings at Cairo. With him were Harry Hopkins, Generals Marshall, Arnold, Somervell, Handy, and Roberts, and Admirals Leahy, King, and Cooke. That the Americans had come a long way in making ready for international conferences since Casablanca was illustrated both in the representation and in the final preparations aboard ship. In contrast to the handful of U.S. military planners sent to Casablanca, sixty military planning assistants were in the American delegation going to Cairo, including specialists in strategic planning and logistics and theater representatives—Navy as well as Army, with a liberal sprinkling of Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces representatives. Staff meetings were held almost every day during the trip, and important discussions took place both among the Joint

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2 Ltr, Barker, Deputy COSSAC, for Handy, 17 Nov 43, Folder 3, Item 15, Exec 5.
3 The general background of SEXTANT, including the oft-told stories of security leaks and the narrow escape during the voyage to Cairo of the USS Iowa from a torpedo accidentally discharged by one of the accompanying U.S. escort vessels, is briefly recounted in the published memoirs and biographies of a number of the principal American participants: (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 766–70; (2) Leahy, I Was There, pp. 193–99; (3) King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, pp. 499–502; (4) Arnold, Global Mission, pp. 453–59.

For negotiations on the location of the conference, see also Hull, Memoirs, II, 1292–96, 1303, 1306, 1311. For preparations on the British side, see Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 500–53.

4 General Roberts had succeeded Wedemeyer as chief Army planner on 11 September 1943. Roberts had been promoted to brigadier general on 6 November 1943.

5 (1) A brief summary of Army and joint staff preparations for SEXTANT is contained in Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 226–28. (2) To help brief General Handy for the Cairo conference, the Operations Division gathered a variety of data relating to plans, command, operations, deployment, and logistics. These were assembled in one book, an abbreviated version of books prepared by OPD for earlier conferences. See OPD Condensed Information Book, 6 Nov 43, Exec 6. (3) For the detailed story of Army staff preparations for Cairo, see especially: ABC 337 (18 Oct 43); Item 12a, Exec 5; and Item 15, Exec 5.
Chiefs of Staff and between the President and his staff. In the rush of preparations before boarding ship, the JCS had not been able to examine fully their planners' latest proposals for the JCS area of special interest—the war in the Pacific. One of the first subjects to which the JCS now turned was the question of the still-unsettled problem of the long-term plan against Japan.

Following QUADRANT, as already noted, there had been several attempts by the Anglo-American military planners to fashion a workable, long-range plan to bring about the defeat of Japan within twelve months after the fall of Germany, but none had found general acceptance. Indeed, the CPS had been pessimistic about any plan to beat Japan within this time limit. In the face of conflicting opinion among American planners over methods, routes, and objectives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were forced to resolve the problem themselves.6

En route to SEXTANT, the JCS considered the latest plans offered by the JPS and by the JSSC. Marshall and King both expressed astonishment that the Joint planners had recommended Hokkaido rather than Formosa as a primary objective, since Hokkaido did not "loom up as important" in any of the campaigns hitherto considered. Marshall felt that if the U.S. aircraft carriers could be used as striking units rather than as protective cover for landing operations, great damage could be inflicted upon enemy bases without involving a large quantity of assault shipping and a subsequent build-up of land forces. Areas such as the strongly defended fortress of Truk in the Carolines would not have to be invaded. Marshall also thought that the planners had not given enough attention to "Japanese vulnerability through a lack of oil." In his opinion, a hard and fast blueprint of the war should not be set up, as the entire situation might change rapidly if the Japanese Fleet could only be brought into action. Marshall's concept of "flexibility" met with King's approval and presented the American planners with a quite different basic premise upon which to construct their future plans.7

The JCS then went on to consider and accept a recommendation of the JSSC that two plans for the defeat of Japan be formulated, one assuming Soviet participation and the other Soviet nonintervention. The two plans would be based on the premise that sea and air blockade plus intensive air bombardment would be sufficient to defeat the Japanese, thereby making invasion unnecessary. The JSSC optimistically added as another assumption that Germany would be out of the war by the spring of 1944 and that the present and prospective situation therefore warranted "an aggressive, imaginative and optimistic approach to the problem."8

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6 Min, 123d mtg JCS, 15 Nov 43. Marshall's argument for flexibility and adaptability in order to attain his major strategic objectives was not a new characteristic. He had revealed these same qualities earlier in the year in advocating an earlier date for HUSKY and in recommending AVALANCHE. See Ch. VII, above.
7 Min, 123d mtg JCS, 15 Nov 43. Marshall's argument for flexibility and adaptability in order to attain his major strategic objectives was not a new characteristic. He had revealed these same qualities earlier in the year in advocating an earlier date for HUSKY and in recommending AVALANCHE. See Ch. VII, above.
8 Min, 123d mtg JCS, 15 Nov 43. Marshall's argument for flexibility and adaptability in order to attain his major strategic objectives was not a new characteristic. He had revealed these same qualities earlier in the year in advocating an earlier date for HUSKY and in recommending AVALANCHE. See Ch. VII, above.
On the surface, Marshall's doctrine of flexibility in the Pacific smacked strongly of the familiar and current practice of opportunism to which the Army staff had been objecting. On closer examination, it is apparent that the Chief of Staff's suggestions were not calculated to drain off Army forces and resources from the war against Germany. Rather, they would capitalize on new and old instruments and techniques of warfare and draw into play other potentially important strategic factors that, in the final analysis, might shorten the conflict and make less heavy demands on Army forces and resources—at least until the war with Germany was over. Marshall in effect was now urging what might be termed a planned opportunism, in contrast to the earlier "hit or miss," essentially defensive, hand-to-mouth opportunism in compartmented areas of the Pacific. Assuming freedom of movement and deployment among the compartments and along the alternative Pacific routes to Japan, the new policy might permit the most efficient use of the considerable manpower and large number of weapons already in the theater.

Acceptance of a constantly fluid situation, in which the Allies would seek to take every possible advantage of Japanese weakness or slowness in response and of Allied air and naval superiority and mobility, meant that despite the injection of the twelve-month target date there were still too many imponderables to allow all the pieces of the Japanese strategic puzzle to fall immediately into place. With Allied weapons and matériel available in ever-greater quantity, aggressive alertness would permit the fashioning of bolder plans during the period in which the European war was being brought to a close. Such fore-shortening might come through a single development or a combination of developments such as USSR entry into the war, early defeat of the Japanese Fleet, acceleration of the assault shipbuilding program, massed carrier air strikes, or long-range bombardment utilizing B-29's. The accent on flexibility and short cuts did not rule out the ultimate necessity for an over-all plan but did recognize the hard fact that it must await a more propitious moment.

In the meantime, requirements for securing strategic bases and positions of readiness for the deployment of the large forces to become available after Germany's defeat would be one of the main problems confronting the planners. The growing conviction among the JCS and their staffs that the main effort against Japan would be made from the Pacific and the promise of the Central Pacific offensive to provide a more rapid advance than other routes seemed to indicate that the chief interest for future planning would lie in that area. Long-continued interest of the Navy and newfound interest of the Air Forces in the Marianas spurred the JCS to accept their capture as a planning objective in the Central Pacific. Acceptance of the primacy of the Central Pacific route would carry with it the condition that operations in other Pacific and Far Eastern theaters would have to be co-ordinated and probably subordinated to it. Along with efforts to keep China in the war

*a negotiated peace existed. See CCS 300/3, 18 Nov 43, title: Estimate of Enemy Situation, 1944—Europe.
and bring in the USSR, the basic objectives of all operations would be destruction of the Japanese Fleet, shipping, and air forces and establishment of the air and sea blockade of the main Japanese islands.

On the eve of Sextant the JCS had therefore not arrived at an agreed overall plan against Japan. Like the earlier suggestion of dividing resources between the war against Germany and the war against Japan on an arithmetical basis, the idea of relating planning against Japan and Germany via a scheduled time limit appeared doomed to the scrap heap of abandoned strategic dreams. In place of a hard and fast long-range plan, General Marshall and the JCS had decided on the need to retain opportunism, now generally called flexibility, and to pursue a policy of watchful alertness, capitalizing on Japanese mistakes and Allied potentialities and superiorities. For the present, at least, the accent appeared likely to remain upon immediate operations and maintenance of the strategic initiative. The development of an over-all plan would have to await clarification of the European situation, progress of "modern and untried" methods of warfare, and solution of politico-military problems of coalition warfare.

The President Reviews the Issues

The discussions of the staff on board the USS Iowa culminated in two meetings with the President and Harry Hopkins—one on 15 November, the other on 19 November. During these sessions the President and his staff ranged over a wide variety of subjects: the plan for an emergency return to the Continent (Rankin); spheres of responsibility for the occupation of Germany; command of Anglo-American forces operating against Germany; projected operations against Germany and Japan; rearmament of the French forces; the possibility of Turkey's entry into the war; postwar air bases; the agenda proposed for the forthcoming meetings with Chiang Kai-shek, Churchill, and Stalin; and future collaboration with the USSR. The list reflected the fact that postwar concerns were beginning to come to the fore, and the staff sought guidance from the President on these as well as on the more strictly strategic problems in the conduct of the war. In the course of the discussions the President gave the staff a clearer indication of the direction of his thinking and the fullest guidance on politico-military issues he had given them since America's entry into the war.

At the meeting on the 15th, hoping to nail down Overlord and get on with the war against Japan, the staff proposed that the Americans follow their familiar cautious stand on operations in the Balkan-eastern Mediterranean area. The President replied "Amen," adding that the paper embodying the U.S. proposal should be sent to the British and that the American delegation should "definitely stand on it" during the first few days at Cairo.10 Passing to the involved subject of high command in Europe, which had been under discussion by the Joint Chiefs, the President said that "it was

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10 (1) Min. mtg President and JCS, 15 Nov 43. This meeting, as well as that of the 19th, was held aboard USS Iowa, with the President, Harry Hopkins, Generals Marshall and Arnold, Admirals Leahy and King, and Rear Adm. Wilson Brown, Naval Aide to the President, present. (2) JCS 558, 1 Nov 43, title: United Nations Strategy in the Balkans-Eastern Mediterranean Region. (3) JCS 558/1, 5 Nov 43, same title.
his idea that General Marshall should be the commander in chief against Germany and command all the British, French, Italian and U.S. troops involved in this effort.”

On the question of rearming French forces, the President expressed agreement with the staff's view that the United States should not promise U.S. military assistance and equipment beyond current commitments. The staff felt that the existing (eleven-division) program provided the French with the means they could reasonably absorb in assisting in the war against Germany. To augment French forces further for the purpose of postwar occupation of Axis territories, aiding in the war against Japan, and restoring French sovereignty over all territories of the French empire—as the French were then asking—seemed undesirable at this point. The President went on to say that the British wished to build France up to a first-class power that would be on the British side. It was his opinion, however, “that France would certainly not again become a first class power for at least 25 years.”

He did not feel that the United States should commit itself to returning to France all of her colonies. Among the places not to be returned to France he included Indochina, New Caledonia, the Marquesas Islands, and Dakar. Dakar he regarded as a continental outpost for the Americas “starting on the Coast of West Africa.” Dakar’s ports, airfields, and armaments must be kept in United Nations' hands, and Brazil should administer that portion assigned to militarized control of the United Nations.

After time out for further talks among themselves, the JCS met again with the President in the admiral’s cabin on the 19th. Turning once more to the question of command in the war against Germany, the President took up the latest staff alternative proposals. He again expressed his preference for a supreme Allied commander but acknowledged that he might have to compromise with the Prime Minister. To Admiral Leahy’s suggestion that the decision on a unified Mediterranean command should be postponed until after the overall command problem was settled, General Marshall took exception. He now was convinced that the immediate need for unified command was in the Mediterranean.

Apparently seeking to fortify his own preference in the meetings ahead, the President turned the discussion to the question of the total forces the United States and Great Britain would have at

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11 For the staff shipboard discussions on command in advance of the meeting with the President, see min, 123rd mtg JCS, 15 Nov 43.
13 Min, mtg President and JCS, 15 Nov 43.
14 For background discussions of the staff, see especially: (1) min, 124th mtg JCS, 17 Nov 43; (2) min, 125th mtg JCS, 18 Nov 43; and (3) min, 126th mtg JCS, 19 Nov 43.

Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion that follows is based on min, mtg President and JCS, 19 Nov 43. What is apparently a preliminary informal version of the formal recorded minutes is contained in Item 11, Exec 2. A partial record of the minutes is also filed with CCS 320 in ABC 984 NW Europe (20 Aug 43), 1-A.
home and abroad by the first of January 1944. On the basis of rough estimates offered by the staff, the President observed that in total strength overseas the United States was definitely ahead of the British. Soon the United States would have as many men in England for OVERLORD as the total British forces then in that country. General Marshall felt the United States was already ahead of the British in England. Noting that the British had only five operational divisions in England, he pointed out that the United States now had as many deployable men in England as had the British. General Arnold observed that the United States had also passed the British in aircraft overseas and by January 1944 would have over 12,000 operational planes overseas against 8,000 for the British. The more exact figures on American versus British deployment, which General Marshall undertook to obtain for the President, would bear out even more sharply the pinch on British manpower and the consequent limit on anticipated overseas strength, in contrast with the prospect of a steady increase in U.S. manpower overseas in the months ahead.15

In a further discussion on the question of a Mediterranean commander in chief, the names of Generals Alexander and Eisenhower figured prominently as possible choices—depending on whether the supreme Allied commander were a British or an American officer. The President was still wary. Had the staff considered the danger that General Alexander might be dominated by the Prime Minister? General Marshall acknowledged that the JCS accepted this contingency but cited advantages that one command in the Mediterranean would bring. It would be both "logical and show good faith" to accept the British proposal forthwith. Admiral King came to the support of General Marshall; he, too, felt that the question of Mediterranean command should be dealt with immediately and on its own merits. The President next raised the point that the over-all Mediterranean command proposed by the British might have resulted "from an idea in the back of their heads to create a situation in which they could push our troops into Turkey and the Balkans." But he soon agreed with his staff that all dispositions and allocations by a Mediterranean commander in chief would be subject to the decisions of the CCS and the heads of state, and the President could exercise veto power. General Marshall felt that the British would point out—and with some justice—that they had suffered recently from lack of unified command in the Mediterranean. He added that "a commander such as General Eisenhower was always conservative, regarding the sending of reinforcements to another command that was not his own responsibility." On the other hand, an over-all commander who had responsibility for an enlarged theater would feel otherwise about bol-
stering weakened positions in his area of responsibility. Had General Eisenhower had responsibility for the Middle East, he probably would have been more inclined to insure additional air support for the British in the recent action in the Dodecanese.

Despite the arguments of the staff and the known disinclination of the Prime Minister to accept a supreme Allied commander, the President evidently still wished to retain the option of discussing the matter with the British. He concluded that the Americans could agree to a unified command in the Mediterranean and take up the question of a supreme Allied commander separately.

The President next turned to the question of zones of occupation and spheres of responsibility in postwar Germany. If Germany were suddenly to collapse or surrender before or during OVERLORD, the staff obviously would have to know what was expected of the military. Especially important were the practical questions of logistics and the disposition of the U.S. forces. Before them was a paper that contained the proposals of COSSAC and reflected British recommendations on proposed spheres of responsibility in Germany in connection with RANKIN. Since matters of political and economic as well as military policy were involved, the staff requested guidance from the President. The President proceeded to set forth the ideas he had in mind. Territorial dis-

16 For the background papers on RANKIN and for staff discussions on that operation on board the Iowa, see especially: (1) JCS 577, 8 Nov 43, title: Europe-wide "RANKIN"; (2) JPS 921, 10 Nov 43, same title; (3) JCS 577/1, 16 Nov 43, same title; (4) JCS 577/2, 17 Nov 43, same title; (5) min, 124th mtg JCS, 17 Nov 43; and (6) min, 125th mtg JCS, 18 Nov 43.

17 The map is filed in Item 11, Exec 2. At the conclusion of the meeting the map was handed to General Marshall who in turn gave it to General Handy the same day.

positions should conform to the geographic subdivisions of Germany. Practically speaking, Germany should be split after the war into three states—southern, northwestern, and northeastern—or possibly five. The British wanted the northwestern part of Germany and would prefer to see the United States take over in France and Germany south of the Moselle River. This arrangement did not meet with the President's approval. He did not want to be involved in "reconstituting France," and especially wished to avoid complications with de Gaulle. France was "a British baby." The United States should take northwest Germany and U.S. troops should occupy the general area of Netherlands and northern Germany as far east as the Berlin–Stettin line. This would give the Americans the ports of Hamburg and Bremen for their ships and keep the United States out of the expected postwar trouble spots in France and southern Europe. The Russians would have territory to the east and the British to the south and west of the American zone. Possibly a buffer state between Germany and France would be necessary. At one point in the discussion the President, to set forth his ideas of a U.S. occupational zone in Germany more clearly, drew in pencil his proposed line of demarcation on a map the Army staff later brought back to Washington.
Roosevelt's Concept of Postwar Occupation Zones for Germany drawn in pencil by the President himself on a National Geographic Society map while en route to the Cairo conference.
Europe, the President said “for at least one year, maybe two.” The President was not explicit as to Italy and the Balkans area, except to make it clear he did not want U.S. troops there. In fact, the Americans should get out of Italy and France as soon as possible. Significantly, according to the record, the President stated that “There would definitely be a race for Berlin. We may have to put the United States Divisions into Berlin as soon as possible.” But, Marshall later reported to Handy, it was the President’s idea that Berlin would be jointly occupied by U.S., British, and Soviet troops.\(^\text{18}\)

To maintain order in Europe during the occupation, the President had in mind a policy of “quarantine” and the use of the police power of the major powers among the United Nations. Thus he would not want to use U.S. troops to settle local squabbles in such places as Yugoslavia. Instead, the Army and Navy could be used to enforce an economic blockade and seal off trouble spots.

Hitherto, the American staff aboard the Iowa had been thinking about the occupation primarily in terms of the military considerations of OVERLORD. With his usual logic, Marshall pointed out that U.S. forces in OVERLORD would be advancing on the right and that occupation zones set up on that basis would involve less entanglement of forces and shorter and more direct supply lines. But now he and the other Chiefs of Staff concluded that a scheme was needed to disengage from OVERLORD at any stage, in order to switch to occupation areas outlined by the President and meet the political requirements he had set forth. Both the President and Marshall were hopeful of a swift and successful thrust at the heart of Germany. The President envisaged a “railroad” invasion of Germany with little or no fighting. Marshall was hopeful that, by exploiting airpower operating from a bridgehead and air bases seized in OVERLORD, the Allies might get a quick and cheap victory over Germany without having to make the rapid advance on the ground to the German frontier envisaged by COSSAC.\(^\text{19}\)

In any event, Marshall assumed, there would be a shortage of rolling stock and a land advance would have to be made largely by motor trucks.

It is interesting to note that the President’s idea of an American zone in postwar northwest Germany portended a U.S. occupation in force, to be conducted, like the American approach to the European war itself, with a minimum of time, expense, and political complications in European affairs. As he put it, “We should not get roped into accepting any European sphere of influence.”

The President and the staff next took up the proposed agenda for the President’s conferences with Chiang Kai-shek, Churchill, and Stalin. The President seemed determined to have the Chinese war effort supported as strongly as possible.\(^\text{20}\) At the same time, he signified his intention of telling the Generalissi-

\(^\text{18}\) Memo, T. T. H. [Handy], 19 Nov 43, sub: RANKIN, Item 11, Exec 2. This is General Handy’s record of the information given him by General Marshall on 19 November after the meeting of the JCS with the President. The existing record of the minutes of the conference is somewhat confusing on the question of the occupation of Berlin. It contains the puzzling statement, attributed to the President, “The United States should have Berlin.” This, of course, may have been garbled in notation.

\(^\text{19}\) Min, 124th mtg JCS, 17 Nov 43.

\(^\text{20}\) Leahy, I Was There, p. 198.
mo only in general terms about the scheduled operations again Japan—specific dates would be omitted. He did not propose to raise the question of a supreme commander for the war against Japan—a problem that had been troubling the staff. The President asked the staff about the progress of the Hump airlift and about preparations for operations in north Burma. General Marshall told the President of the efforts to organize 3,000 American volunteers into long-range penetration groups to precede the Chinese forces. He reported a discouraging communication from Stilwell on the training of Chinese forces in Yunnan. Only a small percentage of the Chinese troops needed had been received; those arriving were new men lacking equipment and suffering from malnutrition. Marshall added that he thought it would be a serious mistake to put additional U.S. combat troops in with the Chinese, British, and Indian forces already in the theater. Introduction of a large contingent of American combat forces into the area would only increase the problem of supplying matériel over the Hump.

Moving on to the question of postwar aims in the Orient, the President observed that the Chinese wanted equal rights with the USSR in Outer Mongolia and Chiang Kai-shek wanted Manchuria returned. Undoubtedly the discussion of this subject would cause trouble. The staff pointed out that the Russians were keenly interested in a "nice big port" and communication to Dairen. The President was hopeful that the whole question could be worked out on a basis of "free zones"—a proposal on which he did not elaborate. Without comment he passed quickly over the Generalissimo's desire for a trusteeship over Korea to be administered by the USSR, China, and the United States. The Chinese would want Formosa and the Bonins. If the United States desired, the Generalissimo would undoubtedly give the Americans base rights in Formosa but not on a permanent basis. On the mandated islands in the Pacific, the President was more definite. They should be under the "composite sovereignty" of the United Nations, with the required military bases to be occupied by the United States.

Coming to the proposed agenda of the meeting with Churchill, the President brought the discussion around once more to the U.S. policy of nonparticipation in operations in the eastern Mediterranean-Balkan areas. General Marshall summed up the Army—and American staff—position, asserting, "We have to see this Balkan matter finished up. We do not believe that the Balkans are necessary. To launch operations in this region would result in prolonging the war [in Europe] and also lengthening the war in the Pacific." He pointed to the more than one million tons of U.S. supplies then in England for OVERLORD. To undertake a Balkan operation would be "going into reverse" and would reduce American potentialities by two thirds. Commitments and preparations for OVERLORD extended as far west as the Rocky Mountains in the United States. If the British insisted on ditching OVERLORD for the Balkans, the Americans could reply "that we will pull out and go into the Pacific with all our forces."

After Marshall stated his case, the President said he felt attention had to be paid to the Soviet attitude in the matter. The Russians were then only sixty miles
from the Polish border and forty miles from Bessarabia and might shortly be on the point of entering Rumania. They might ask that Western Allied forces be sent up the Adriatic to the Danube to help defeat Germany. General Marshall replied that the Americans would have to be ready to explain to the Russians the implications of such a move. If the Soviet forces got to the Bug River, the Western Allies could force the issue from England by throwing in air support. He doubted that any troops the Allies might send to the Balkans, in line with the President's hypothesis, would have an appreciable effect on the situation.

Before concluding the discussion of the forthcoming meeting with the Prime Minister, the staff also called the President's attention to prospective differences over Burma operations. The staff was anticipating British objections especially to the amphibious phase of the Burma undertaking. General Marshall pointed out that Churchill favored operations against Sumatra or the Andaman Islands. In Admiral King's opinion, the British statement that without further help from the United States they could undertake only the Andaman Islands operations was simply "a case of marking time." Both the President and the staff expressed some annoyance at the way the Azores matter had been handled by the British. Their feeling was that U.S. interests in the Azores facilities—recently opened for the use of the Western Allies—might have been more actively promoted, but General Marshall thought that the real source of the trouble had been the lack of energetic American representation in Lisbon.

In preparing for the meeting with Stalin, General Marshall advised the President of the need to establish an organizational basis for doing business with the USSR on the military level. General Handy had been stressing the same point to the JCS—that the forthcoming meetings should develop a method or machinery for collaboration with the USSR. General Arnold wanted the Russians to give advance information as soon as possible on the air facilities that might be available for bases and operations against Japan. The President had already pointed to the need for making a study on the number of bombers that could be operated from the vicinity of Vladivostok once the war with Germany was over. He now commented that "the Soviets would like to have our planes but not our air personnel." On the subject of Soviet interest in Italian ships, the President was far more favorably disposed than Admiral King. President Roosevelt was willing to let the USSR have the use of one third of the vessels as a token of good will, but with the proviso that title to them was not to be transferred.

At the conclusion of the discussions with the President aboard the Iowa, the staff were more firmly united than ever on the stand they would take at the conference. As their position emerged from the talks, the JCS would support OVERLORD as scheduled, a campaign in Burma, and getting on with the Pacific war, but no eastern Mediterranean-Balkan operation. The President ap-

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21 Min, 126th mtg JCS, 19 Nov 43.
22 There was little explicit discussion of specific Pacific operations in the staff meetings with the President on board ship. Since the Pacific was viewed as an area of primary American responsibility, differences over specific undertakings were not likely to emerge in forthcoming discussions with the
peared to be in accord. Never since the United States had entered the war had he given them such a glimpse of his reflections on the political problems that were bound up with the war and its outcome. But nothing that he said aboard ship was designed to deter the staff from fighting the kind of war they had set out to fight—a quick war leading to a decisive military victory. On the contrary, his stated views all seemed oriented toward realizing that objective as soon as possible. All signs pointed to the encouraging prospect that the American delegation would enter the conference as a united team. How the U.S. military position would fare once the staff sat down with the Chinese, the British, and the Russian delegations and the President conferred with their chiefs of state remained to be seen.

On 20 November the _Iowa_ arrived at Oran, where the President was met by Eisenhower and his staff. After a flight to Tunis, the President, on the 21st, toured the historic battlefields of that area with General Eisenhower. The President talked briefly about the future—especially _Overlord_. He undoubtedly seized the opportunity further to ap-
praise Eisenhower, who was then slated to be brought back to Washington as Acting Chief of Staff in Marshall’s place, should Marshall assume command in Europe. With characteristic sensitivity to what history would record, the President commented to Eisenhower that few people remembered the name of the “Chief of Staff” for the last years of the Civil War. He did not like to think that before many years had gone by practically nobody would know General Marshall. This was one of the reasons he wanted Marshall to have the big field command. But, as Eisenhower later recorded, the President also confided his dread at the thought of Marshall leaving Washington. Both Eisenhower and King have also told how, while dining with Marshall at Eisenhower’s cottage during the brief stopover at Tunis, King explained to Eisenhower the steps leading up to the President’s tentative decision to give Marshall the top field command over King’s objection—much to the apparent embarrassment of Marshall, who, with characteristic reserve, kept silent.

During the night of the 21st the President and his party departed by plane for Cairo. No one, least of all Eisenhower, who was soon to join the others at the conference, suspected what the next two weeks would bring.

\[\text{23 (1) Sherwood,} \text{ Roosevelt and Hopkins,} \text{ p. 770.} \]
\[\text{(2) Eisenhower,} \text{ Crusade in Europe,} \text{ p. 197.} \]
\[\text{24 (1) Eisenhower,} \text{ Crusade in Europe,} \text{ p. 196.} \text{ (2) King and Whitehill,} \text{ Fleet Admiral King,} \text{ p. 504.} \]
CHAPTER XVI

Cairo-Tehran—A Goal Is Reached
November—December 1943

Opening Skirmish at Cairo
22–26 November

Reaching Cairo early in the morning of 22 November, the President and his party found that Generalissimo and Mme. Chiang Kai-shek and a small Chinese delegation, as well as the Prime Minister and his large staff, had arrived a few days ahead of them. The U.S. delegation was driven to the conference area located on the outskirts of Cairo not far from the pyramids. Here, behind a barrier that bristled with barbed wire and heavily armed sentries, lay Mena House, a hotel named after the first ruler of the first Egyptian dynasty. The hotel itself was fairly small, but some thirty-four surrounding villas provided comfortable quarters for members of the conference. Plenary sessions were held at the President's villa; military staff meetings were held at Mena House.

On hand were Generals Stilwell and Chennault and Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander, SEAC, and General Wedemeyer, his deputy chief of staff. With little ado, the Combined Chiefs of Staff got down to business on the afternoon of the 22d. The opening days of Sextant—the American-British-Chinese phase—saw the Anglo-American staffs in daily session from 22 through 26 November. The Chinese staff participated in some of these discussions. Two plenary meetings were also held—one on the 23d attended by the Prime Minister, the President, the Generalissimo, and their staffs, and the second on the 24th at which the Chinese were not present.

The first meetings at Cairo between the U.S. and British delegations were concerned mainly with prospective operations in the Far East and Europe. Though no conclusive strategic decisions were reached, these opening debates revealed the lines of conflict emerging and pointed up the terms under which the basic choices had to be made.

Strategic Crossroads in the Far East

Important differences between the British and American stands on the place of China in the war and on the importance of CBI operations soon became apparent. They were reflected most clearly in the positions staked out by Marshall and Churchill—the forceful advocates on each side who had tilted so often at past conferences. Despite growing evidence of feeling among the plan-
ning echelons in the War Department that China's role should be reassessed in the light of improving prospects for a swifter advance through the Pacific. Marshall, during the opening and later meetings of Sextant, consistently supported the potential importance of China to the Allied cause and the need for amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal as the only way to secure Chinese co-operation in the north Burma campaign. Though the opening meetings of Sextant were quite favorable to CBI operations, there were early indications that Churchill opposed any amphibious operations unless they were against Sumatra, his own pet project for the area. The Prime Minister informed Mountbatten at the outset that if there were to be no landing on Sumatra, he would use SEAC's landing craft for an operation against Rhodes. Marshall warned the JCS that Churchill would probably make such an effort to further his Mediterranean schemes.

Because the President and Prime Minister wished Chiang to consider the SEAC plan of operations during the conference, Mountbatten was allowed to present it to the plenary session on the 23d even before it had been examined by the CCS. The plan (code name Champion) envisaged modest advances in January and February 1944 by the British across the Chindwin River in

1 See Ch. XIV, above.
central Burma and along the Arakan front. In the meantime, the Ledo and Yunnan Chinese forces would move forward and attempt to link up in the neighborhood of Bhamo in northern Burma. Each of the three advances would be supported by one of Wingate’s long-range penetration groups, which would be supplied by air. There would also be an amphibious phase, but for security reasons the Chinese were not informed of the proposed target, the Andaman Islands (code name BUCCANEER). Except that its goals were more limited, CHAMPION differed little from its predecessors.

Churchill described the naval units that would be present in the Indian Ocean by the summer of 1944 and stated that Mountbatten would also have an amphibious “circus” to use in the amphibious assault operations. When Chiang asserted that the success of CHAMPION would depend upon the co-ordination of the simultaneous land and sea attacks, however, he was quickly challenged by the Prime Minister. The basic disagreement between Chiang and Churchill over tying together the land and naval phases of the plan set the tone and composition of the long debate that followed, with the United States cast in the role of moderator.  

The Army and its chief spokesman, General Marshall, were sympathetic to the Chinese stand for several reasons. The relationship between Chiang and Stilwell had reached a favorable point at this time, and the Generalissimo had dis-
played keener interest in the training of Chinese combat troops. Marshall urged that this apparent change of heart be encouraged since it showed that Chiang was now amenable to making use of the immense manpower of China, and "this constituted a milestone in the prosecution of the war in the East." He foresaw a definite use for Chinese troops properly trained and led once Germany had been defeated and supplies to China could be increased.4

It was the Chinese themselves who made Marshall's position as an advocate difficult. Chiang told Marshall he did not like the CHAMPION plan because it did not go as far as Mandalay or provide for simultaneous land and sea operations. Later he demanded that 10,000 tons a month be flown into China regardless of the north Burma requirements. Chinese insistence upon this figure overlooked the possible exigencies that might arise during any campaign and caused Marshall to admonish the Chinese generals who presented the demand to the CCS:

General Marshall pointed out that the present campaign was designed to open the Burma Road, for which the Chinese had asked, and that the opening of the Road was for the purpose of equipping the Chinese Army. The Chinese must either fight the battle for opening the Road or else call for more American planes to increase the air lift over the "hump." Any further increase in these American planes, at this time, he was opposed to. There must be no misunderstanding about this. The battle was to be fought to open the Burma Road. Unless this road were opened there could be no increase in supplies to China at this time since no further aircraft or equipment could be provided from the United States due to commitments elsewhere to meet serious shortages.5

Stilwell's account of Marshall's irritation is even more explicit:

Now let me get this straight. You [Chinese] are talking about your 'rights' in this matter. I thought these were American planes, and American personnel, and American material. I don't understand what you mean by saying we can or can't do thus and so.6

Despite these differences of opinion, the Americans and the Chinese evidently reached several agreements. According to the later account of Churchill, "The President, in spite of my arguments, gave the Chinese the promise of a considerable amphibious operation across the Bay of Bengal within the next few months."7 Additional pressure from Chiang on the President to secure something conspicuous that he could use to bolster Chinese morale on his return occasioned some embarrassment for the Americans. The President, after consulting Marshall, promised to arm and equip a Chinese army of ninety divisions but avoided making any definite commitment as to when it would be done. Also, in view of the past failures of the United States to carry out its promises, Roosevelt was loath to give the Generalissimo any concrete assurance that 10,000 tons a month would be delivered to China over the Hump.8

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4 (1) CCS 405, 22 Nov 43, title: Role of China in Defeat of Japan. (2) Min, 128th mtg JCS, 23 Nov 43. (3) Min, 128th mtg CCS, 23 Nov 43.
5 (1) Min, 129th mtg CCS, 24 Nov 43. (2) See also, min, 130th mtg JCS, 25 Nov 43, for reiteration by Marshall of the same argument.
6 Stilwell Papers, p. 855.
7 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 328.
8 Min, 130th mtg JCS, 25 Nov 43. The President's oral promise to arm and equip ninety divisions sometime in the future was, after the end of the war, to lead to considerable discussion between the
Although Marshall was willing to agree to arming a Chinese army so long as it was to be done in the unspecified future, he opposed any further commitment of U.S. combat troops to the CBI. He hoped that the United States was now on the verge of a “transfer of power” in the Pacific, and this too would make the deployment of U.S. combat ground forces to SEAC impracticable.\(^9\) Conversely, Marshall felt that unless Buccaneer, the amphibious phase of Champion, was carried out without delay, the reallocation of U.S. landing craft to the Pacific should be considered. At this time, 26 November, he was confident of the President’s firm support and determination to insist upon Buccaneer. The possibility of the reallocation of resources to the Pacific from the CBI, nevertheless, was a new variation on the old “Pacific Alternative” theme.\(^10\)

After reversing himself, Chiang agreed on 26 November—before the opening

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* Min, 130th mtg JCS, 25 Nov 43.

\(^9\) Min, 131st mtg JCS, 26 Nov 43.
Talks at Cairo ended—to carry out the Chinese portion of Champion. He was apparently confident at this point that there would be an amphibious operation, although the British and Americans still had not reached agreement on where or when the operation would take place. To the British argument that undertaking Buccaneer would postpone Overlord and that the full force of Allied strength should be brought to bear against Germany, Marshall presented the American rebuttal: The Allies had the forces ready and the Chinese were willing to do their share; Buccaneer was of vital importance to operations in the Pacific; and, lastly, the decision to launch Buccaneer could not be interfered with for political reasons. With King firmly backing the Chief of Staff, the JCS informed their British colleagues that any abandonment of the operation would have to be made on the President-Prime Minister level.

Overlord and the Mediterranean

Meanwhile, the opening talks between the British and Americans on European operations had also reached an inconclusive end. Each side was holding its full fire and only rehearsing its arguments for the meetings soon to take place with the Russians, for, as President Roosevelt pointed out, final decisions would depend on the outcome of the conference with Stalin at Tehran.

As might be expected, the specific issue in European strategy under discussion was Overlord in relation to the Mediterranean. At the plenary session on the 24th, the President stated the problem before them as essentially one of logistics—whether Overlord could be retained "in all its integrity" and, at the same time, the Mediterranean be kept "ablaze." Stalin would almost certainly demand continued action in the Mediterranean as well as Overlord. Future action in the eastern Mediterranean seemed to depend on the entry of Turkey into the war. This, too, would have to be discussed with Stalin.

At the session on the 24th, the President did not himself take up the cudgels for the American staff's case on European strategy. However, he drew attention to the growing preponderance of U.S. versus British overseas deployment. The staff figures he cited, received by the British evidently without comment, bore eloquent testimony to the strong hand the Americans held at the conference.

11 On the 27th, after the President and Prime Minister had already left for Tehran, Stilwell informed Admiral Mountbatten that the Generalissimo, before departing Cairo that morning, had reversed himself again and rejected all his earlier agreements. Evidently the reversal of the 27th did not become known to the President at Tehran; in any event, on 30 November Chiang again changed his mind and again agreed to join in Champion. The details of what Chiang agreed to are confusing, but it should be remembered that the Chinese, for security reasons, had still been told nothing of the details of Buccaneer, simply that a major amphibious operation would take place in the Bay of Bengal area. See Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, pp. 62ff.

12 Min, 131st mtg CCS, 26 Nov 43.

13 Min, 2d plenary mtg, Sextant, 24 Nov 43, Sextant Conf Book.

14 The comparative statistics on overseas deployment that the President read out were those he had requested of General Marshall aboard the Iowa. See App. A, below.

Despite the silence of the official record of the conference on British reaction at this point, it appears from other evidence that it was very much in the minds of Churchill and his ministers in the fall of 1943 that British manpower was at a critical state and would continue to go downhill in proportion to American manpower, particularly if the war
Churchill drew a doleful picture of the events of the last two months in the Mediterranean, contrasting it with the long series of world-wide Allied successes over the past year. In Italy the campaign had flagged. With a heavy heart he had agreed to the transfer of the seven divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom. The Allies had not taken advantage of the open Adriatic coast to bolster the guerrillas and promote chaos in the Balkans. Moving to the Aegean, he particularly lamented the loss of the Dodecanese Islands—"cheap prizes" that lay open to the Western Allies upon the collapse of Italy. It was clear that he was still after Rhodes and was chagrined at the reverses recently suffered by the British in the Aegean. It was his hope that the Russians would agree on the importance of bringing Turkey into the war. The effect on the Balkan countries—Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria—would be great. Once Turkish airfields were at Allied disposal and Rhodes recaptured, the other Dodecanese islands would soon fall to the Allies. Stepped-up aid to the Yugoslav patriots need not involve a large commitment of troops and supplies. He emphasized that in Italy the British had no thought of advancing into the Po Valley. The main object was Rome. Whoever held Rome held the "title deeds to Italy," and, with Rome recaptured, the Allies could seize the landing grounds to the north. Only a limited objective, the Pisa-Rimini line, should be the goal of the Italian campaign. When these objectives in Italy had been reached, the time would come to make the decision "whether we should move to the left or to the right."

Turning to OVERLORD, the Prime Minister emphasized that he had not weakened or cooled toward it. Nevertheless, as he saw the problem, the timing would depend more on the state of the enemy than on the "set perfection of our preparations." He went on to say that "OVERLORD remained top of the bill," but "should not be such a tyrant as to rule out every other activity in the Mediterranean." Thus, a degree of elasticity should be permitted in the use of landing craft; the scheduled transfer of landing craft from the Mediterranean for OVERLORD should be deferred for a few weeks. He summed up his program: Rome in January; Rhodes in February; supplies to the Yugoslavs; a settlement of the command arrangements; and the opening of the Aegean, subject to the outcome of an approach to Turkey. All preparations for OVERLORD should go ahead "full steam" within the framework of this Mediterranean policy.

The British Chiefs of Staff elaborated on these views. To them the point at issue with the American staff in European strategy was how far the "sanctity of OVERLORD" was to be preserved. Was that operation to be maintained in its entirety, irrespective of the possibilities in the Mediterranean? Major developments had taken place since QUADRANT—the Soviet campaign had succeeded beyond all expectations; Italy had been knocked out of the war; Turkey might soon come in—that demanded adjust-

with Germany continued after the end of 1944. On 1 November he had circulated a Minute to his advisers, in which he stated: "Our manpower is now fully mobilized for the war effort. We cannot add to the total; on the contrary, it is already dwindling." Quoted in Ehrman, Grand Strategy V, 44. (The Prime Minister's revealing "Memorandum on Man-power, 1st November, 1943" is reproduced in App. X, pp. 569-71, of that volume.)
ments in, if not actual departures from, Trident and Quadrant decisions. The British Chiefs also emphasized that by their Mediterranean policy they were not advocating a departure from the agreed aim to attack the Germans across the Channel in the late spring or early summer of 1944. What they wanted was to take full advantage of all possible opportunities to threaten the Germans in as many areas as possible and thereby stretch German forces to the utmost. If this policy were pursued, Overlord, perhaps in the form of Rankin, would take place in the summer of 1944. If a delay of a few weeks resulted, it should be accepted. Overlord on a fixed date must not be the pivot on which all Anglo-American strategy turned.\(^5\)

When the commanders in the Mediterranean were called upon for their views, General Wilson, the British Commander in Chief, Middle East, argued for Aegean operations in the same vein as had the Prime Minister: it was important to break the “German iron ring” that included Rhodes, Crete, and Greece; Rhodes was the key to the situation, and Turkey’s help should be sought; to capture Rhodes, more equipment would be required from the western Mediterranean. General Eisenhower also agreed on the importance of harrying operations against the enemy in the Aegean. He felt that from the Aegean islands the Balkans might be kept aflame, the Ploesti oil fields threatened, and the Dardanelles opened. The earlier British occupation of the islands had been “right and justified,” but, he went on, the situation had changed and strong German reactions had to be expected. Confronted with the immediate demands of the hard Italian campaign and the scheduled departure of resources from his own theater to the United Kingdom, he emphasized that action in the Aegean should not be undertaken until the Po line had been reached. An advance to the Po presupposed an all-out campaign in the Mediterranean throughout the winter. But if only limited means were available, General Eisenhower believed that the Allied forces could only reach and hold a line north of Rome.\(^6\)

The British bids for “a little flexibility” in use of landing craft, for opportunities and necessities in the Mediterranean, for subsequent consideration of a move to the right from north Italy, and for postponement of the target date for Overlord confirmed all the worst fears of General Marshall and his advisers. Marshall told the JCS that he could understand the Prime Minister’s desire to reap the rich harvest that would follow from the collapse of the Balkans, but the Prime Minister was proposing to pursue the goal “in a laborious way” and in what the American staff considered “a dangerous way.”\(^7\) The U.S. military

\(^5\) CCS 409, 25 Nov 43, title: “Overlord” and the Mediterranean. CCS 409 is a note by the British Chiefs of Staff. Their specific proposals were to: unify command in the Mediterranean; push the Italian campaign until the Pisa-Rimini line was reached; nourish the guerrilla forces in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Albania; bring Turkey into the war in 1945; open the Dardanelles; and undermine resistance in the Balkan states.

\(^6\) Min 131st mtg CCS, 26 Nov 43.

\(^7\) Min, 129th mtg JCS, 24 Nov 43.

For a detailed analysis of the British position at Cairo-Tehran, see Ehrman, Grand Strategy V, Ch. IV. On the basis of his examination of the British records for this official account, Ehrman contends that the Americans were overly suspicious of British views on Overlord and the Mediterranean. He denies that Churchill in 1943 wanted a “Balkan campaign involving substantial British and Ameri-
planners, studying the British proposals, thought that changes in the situation since Quadrant argued for, not against, launching Overlord on or about 1 May 1944. In their opinion, a firm target date was essential for its success. They believed that "extensive operations" in the eastern Mediterranean would weaken and indefinitely postpone the projected cross-Channel attack and were therefore unacceptable. Contrary to the British desire to threaten as many of the vital enemy areas in the Mediterranean as possible, the American staff planners wanted the Western Allies to mass their "limited Mediterranean means" and maintain the greatest possible pressure on the German forces in Italy. Thereby, maximum support would be given both to Overlord and to the Soviet forces.18

Although the British proposals for Mediterranean action ran counter to U.S. staff notions of the paramount importance of Overlord, the JCS "tentatively" accepted them with little debate as a basis for discussion with the Russians. But to safeguard U.S. interest, the Americans obtained British assent to a number of precautionary commitments. The JSSC had particularly urged two commitments in order "that the British be not allowed to use the Soviets to advance their ideas concerning the eastern Mediterranean areas and the Balkans at the expense of Overlord."19 First, the Americans and British would have to come to an agreement on how to answer any Soviet proposal involving major operations through the Balkans or the Aegean. Secondly, the common Anglo-American policy to be adopted toward Turkey should include support of a Soviet proposal to force Turkey into the war only if no troops or supplies would be diverted to Turkey at the expense of approved operations elsewhere.20 Also, Marshall made clear that American acceptance of the British proposals was subject to the understanding that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff did not thereby assent to the abandonment of Buccaneer. Marshall's insistence on this last point led Sir Alan Brooke to point out that if the capture of Rome and Rhodes and Operation Buccaneer were carried out, the date of Overlord would have to be postponed. Marshall replied that he quite understood.21 To accept the British proposals did not mean that the U.S. staff was undertaking to defend them. Far from endorsing them, the action of the Americans merely underscored the fact that they were postponing final decisions until the Soviet views could be heard and taken into account.

The initial sessions at Cairo had therefore merely seen the "battle lines" forming. The divergent views of the two staffs on global strategy were polarizing most clearly around the stands of Marshall and Churchill. Churchill had objections to the invasion of Burma, but wanted further Mediterranean operations, especially in the eastern Mediterranean, even at the expense of delaying the cross-Channel operation. Marshall wanted no eastern Mediterranean opera-

18 JCS 611, 26 Nov 43, title: "Overlord" and the Mediterranean. JCS 611 is a JPS study of CCS 409.
19 JCS 606/1, 25 Nov 43, title: Collaboration With USSR. This paper is a report by the JSSC.
20 (1) CCS 407 (rev), 26 Nov 43, title: Collaboration With the USSR. CCS 407 is a memo by the CCS. (2) Min, 131st mtg CCS, 26 Nov 43.
21 Min, 131st mtg CCS, 26 Nov 43.
tions, but did want the projected operation against Burma and a definitely scheduled cross-Channel operation based on a closely defined target date. The preliminary meetings had clearly fore-shadowed that the debate would come to focus on such specific issues as the availability of landing craft and the costs of amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal and the Aegean. From Cairo on the 23d the President sent out a hurried request to the production authorities in Washington to let him know at once whether the current schedules for production and delivery of landing craft could be increased in the next six months if landing craft were given precedence over all other munitions of war.22

Although ostensibly the debate on operations in the Far East revolved about the question of amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal, basically the dispute resolved itself into a question of determining the future military value of China. The long-existent British feeling that the Americans overrated both the Chinese potential war effort and China's worth as a base for operations came into direct opposition with the U.S. policy of maintaining China in the war and eventually employing both its manpower and its bases. So long as the British were not called upon to make a strong effort to support China, a compromise could possibly have been made, but the Americans were now pressing vigorously for a major operation in the Far East as well as concentration of the precious resources for the invasion of the European continent in force. The future role of China in the war hung upon the outcome of the dispute. At this point in the proceedings—with issues in Asiatic and European strategy unresolved—the Americans and British moved to Tehran, where a fourth power, the Soviet Union, was to cast its weight on the planning scales.

Climax at Tehran
28 November–1 December 1943

On 27 November the President and the Joint Chiefs and the Prime Minister and his chief advisers departed separately by air and along different routes for the historic meetings at Tehran—a conference within a conference. Tehran, capital of Iran, lying within a vast horseshoe of snow-capped mountains, was a meeting place of East and West. Ancient and picturesque, the city was surrounded by earthen ramparts and a moat. Twelve arched gates provided entry into the center of Tehran, where traditional bazaars and modern shops, plodding burros and lend-lease trucks presented a sharp contrast. In this city that blended the old and the new, the Big Three held their first meeting.

Since the U.S. Legation at Tehran lay outside the city walls and was regarded as unsafe for Roosevelt, Stalin offered the President the hospitality and security of the Soviet compound within the city. Admiral Leahy stayed with the President at the Soviet Legation. The other military members of the party were quartered at Camp Parker, headquarters of the Persian Gulf Service Command, outside the city walls. Churchill was lodged at the British Legation in the city.

The bulk of the U.S. military staff and their British opposites stayed behind in Cairo. Aside from Generals Marshall
and Arnold, the Army was represented at Tehran by Generals Somervell, Handy, and Deane, the latter temporarily recalled from his Moscow post. Also in the American delegation were Hopkins, Harriman, Admiral Cooke, and Charles E. Bohlen, who was to act as an interpreter.

There had been considerable discussion at Cairo both within the U.S. delegation and with the British on the question of the proper approach to the Russians. It was apparent that the main emphasis in the tripartite meetings would be on collaboration in the European war. It was also apparent that, as a result of the Anglo-American divergences, the prepared agenda would at best be tentative and that much of the staff discussion might depend on the outcome of the political discussions among the chiefs of state.

There was general agreement among the CCS and their political chiefs that the Americans and British must not do all the explaining and defending. General Deane had strongly advised General Marshall and through him the JCS to take a more aggressive approach than that taken at the Moscow Conference and had urged that specific requests be made of the Russians.

Anxious as the American staff officers were to secure Soviet support for a European strategy built around OVERLORD, they were also as interested as ever in exploring the problem of Soviet aid in the war against Japan. The U.S. Air representatives, of course, especially wanted to secure data on bases that might be made available in the Soviet maritime provinces. The President and General Marshall both felt that the problem of how to approach the Russians on the question of their entry into the war against Japan must be handled gingerly. The President, in fact, had instructed the JCS not to discuss the subject with the Russians. General Marshall felt the CCS were not the proper channel. He told the JCS that he considered the problem of who would actually discuss the subject with the Russians "a matter of the first importance because of the sensitiveness of the Soviets and their tendency to misunderstand." He felt sure that, in previous dealings with the Russians, Americans "had frequently failed for this reason to reach a satisfactory understanding with them but without really knowing why." If the question of the Japanese war should be brought up by the Soviet delegates, he thought it should be made clear to them that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff realized "the delicateness of the subject" and "wished to approach it with extreme caution." And so it was left. Unless the Russians themselves brought the subject up, the question of Soviet entry into the war against Japan would not be raised by the CCS in staff discussions.

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23 Army staff preparations at Cairo for the meetings with the Russians largely took the form of preparing data for General Handy's use. (1) Memo, T. T. H. for Roberts, 24 Nov 43, no sub, Folder 3, Item 15, Exec 5. (2) Memo, Ferenbaugh for Handy, 26 Nov 43, sub: A List of Questions the Russians May Ask and Related Data, Envelope 5, Item 15, Exec 5. This envelope contains data taken by General Handy to Tehran.

24 Min, 129th mtg CCS, 24 Nov 43.

25 JCS 606, 22 Nov 43, title: Collaboration With the USSR. In this paper, Marshall submitted to the JCS a message Deane had sent him from Moscow—No. 57, CM-IN 7730 (15 Nov 43).

26 Min, 130th mtg JCS, 25 Nov 43.

27 Min, 131st mtg JCS, 26 Nov 43.

28 (1) CCS 197 (rev), 26 Nov 43, title: Collaboration With the USSR. (2) Min, 131st mtg CCS, 26 Nov 43.
To the Tehran conference (coded Eureka) Stalin brought a small staff including Molotov, Marshal Voroshilov—the sole Soviet military delegate—and Mr. Pavlov, an interpreter. Three formal plenary sessions were held at Tehran in the Soviet Legation by Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, and their staffs on successive days beginning 28 November. There were also a number of less formal and more purely political discussions among the chiefs of state.29 On the 29th the CCS sat down around a conference table in the Soviet Legation for a purely military conference with the Soviet military representative; on the 30th the CCS met by themselves.

That the American staff and the President entered the Tehran meeting still united and holding their lines was demonstrated in the preparatory discussion they held in the U.S. Legation on the morning of the 28th in advance of the opening plenary session. Analyzing the British position as disclosed up to this

29 Memos and notes of political discussions attended by the Big Three and/or their political advisers are scheduled to be published, in a volume on the conferences at Cairo and Tehran, in the Department of State's foreign relations series.
point, General Marshall observed that it boiled down to undertaking the Rhodes operation in lieu of the Andaman operation. The Prime Minister, he believed, "would use every wile to cut out Buccaneer." The President replied firmly, "We are obligated to the Chinese to carry out the amphibious operation Buccaneer." Considerable means, General Marshall went on to say, would be "sucked in" for Rhodes and other Aegean operations and undoubtedly would result in an unacceptable delay to Overlord. Furthermore, he reported, General Somervell believed that, even if Turkey entered the war, it might be six or eight months thereafter before the Dardanelles could be opened, since it would take considerable time to shift bases in order to undertake operations in the Aegean. As for other Mediterranean activities, Marshall thought more could be done for Eisenhower in Italy and for Tito's forces in Yugoslavia, within limits. Still there must be no undue delay in Overlord.

The President revealed that he was much more favorably inclined toward operations from the Adriatic than from the Dodecanese. Shipping and landing craft, all agreed, were the bottleneck. The President commented that the Russians must be informed that American production of landing craft amounted to just so much per month and that all of it was earmarked for definite operations. Whenever one operation received additional landing craft, shortages were created elsewhere. No pool was available. General Marshall also observed that the British had stated that they could not decide about Buccaneer versus Rhodes until after they had talked to the Soviet authorities. The British did not feel that they should be pressed to carry out an operation for political reasons until the military considerations were proven to be sound.

This argument ascribed to the British represents an interesting turnabout. There was a rather widespread feeling among the American staff that the British Mediterranean policy, as well as global strategy, represented an effort to link military operations with political objectives. In fact, earlier the same day Marshall had informed the JCS that "in his opinion the difficulty with Rhodes arose from the British attempt to relate a military operation with political considerations." He, General Marshall, considered Buccaneer sound. In any case, the real problem was to ascertain what the Russians wished—in particular, what "immediate help" they expected from the Western partners. As Marshall succinctly put it, "They definitely want something and we should find out what it is."

The answer was soon forthcoming. At the very first plenary session on the afternoon of 28 November, Stalin listened quietly to the President's and Prime Minister's opening remarks. Conscious of the historic moment, the President observed, "We are sitting around

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30 Min, mtg President and JCS, Eureka, 28 Nov 43, Sextant Conf Book. The meeting was held at 1130.

31 Min, 132d mtg JCS, 28 Nov 43, at 1000, Eureka Conf. Postwar writers who have dwelt on the complete absence of political motivation or sophistication on the part of the U.S. staff compared with the British in World War II have uniformly overlooked the contemporary British view of American strategic policy for the war in Asia.

32 Min, mtg President and JCS, Eureka, 28 Nov 43, Sextant Conf Book.
this table for the first time as a family, with the one object of winning the war." The Prime Minister also rose to the occasion. He called attention to the concentration of great worldly power represented at the conference table and said that in their hands lay "the future of mankind." Stalin replied appropriately, but briefly, and then, with characteristic bluntness, said, "Now let us get down to business."

The President began the business part of the meeting with a general survey of the war from the American point of view. He dwelt first on the subject of the Pacific, which, he observed, affected the United States more than Great Britain or the USSR. The United States was bearing a major share of the Pacific war. The greatest part of U.S. naval power and about a million soldiers were in the Pacific. American forces had been moving forward toward Japan from the south and currently through the islands from the east as well. In the north there was little more they could do. To the west of Japan, it was necessary to keep China actively in the war. In general terms he set forth the plans for operations through north Burma and into Yunnan Province and noted the fact that still in the discussion stage were plans for "an amphibious operation." Not only was it of the greatest importance to keep China in the war but also to get at Japan as quickly as possible.

He then came to the subject of operations of immediate concern to the USSR and Great Britain. In the past, largely because of transportation difficulties, the Western Allies had been unable to set a definite date for plans to cross that "disagreeable" body of water, the English Channel. They still wanted, and firmly intended, to cross it, but they could not do everything they would like in the Mediterranean and also from the United Kingdom. There was a definite bottleneck in the matter of landing craft. Certain operations contemplated in the Mediterranean would result in a delay of one to three months in OVERLORD; if any large expedition were launched in the Mediterranean, OVERLORD would have to be given up. Several possibilities for the Mediterranean presented themselves: an increased drive into Italy, an operation from the northeast Adriatic, operations in the Aegean, and operations from Turkey. But, if possible, OVERLORD should not be delayed beyond May or June. The Prime Minister interpolated that there were no differences between U.S. and British points of view except as to "ways and means." The President and the Prime Minister both stated that what was now needed was Soviet opinion on how the Western Allies could be of greatest help to the USSR.

Stalin replied first to the President's remarks about the war in the Pacific. The Russians welcomed these successes. "Unfortunately we have not so far been able to help because we require too much of our forces on the Western Front and are unable to launch any operations against Japan at this time," Stalin explained. Soviet forces in the east were adequate for defensive purposes but would have to be augmented about threefold for offensive operations. This could not occur until Germany had
been forced to capitulate. "Then by our common front we shall win."

This official declaration regarding Soviet intentions in the Pacific war—the first assurance given by Stalin directly to the other two chiefs of state—was most heartening to the Americans. From early in the war, the President and the American staff had been hoping the USSR would enter the conflict against Japan. Stalin's announcement instantly eliminated the problem of the best way to bring up the question that had been troubling the President and General Marshall. How important the immediate by-products and subsequent effects of that declaration on coalition strategy and U.S. planning would prove, only the future would show.

Following the Soviet pledge, the remainder of the military discussions focused on the European conflict. Stalin bluntly proceeded to set forth his stand on operations in Europe. He put the weight of Soviet opinion behind OVERLORD, supported by a southern France operation. A large offensive from one direction was not wise. Soviet experience over the past two years had shown the value of converging pincer operations of the type represented by simultaneous operations in southern and northern France. These operations would best help the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister drew on all his eloquence and marshaled all his arguments for Mediterranean—especially eastern Mediterranean—operations that would help the USSR "without delaying OVERLORD more than a month or two." Twenty divisions that could not be moved out of the Mediterranean because of a shortage of shipping could be used to stretch Germany to the utmost. At one point the President helped Churchill's argument by expressing the belief that "possibly an entry through the Northeastern Adriatic for offensive operations against Germany in the direction of the Danube would be of value."

Marshal Stalin was adamant. He did not favor scattering the Allied forces in the Mediterranean. The Allies should be prepared to remain on the defensive in Italy. He now had no hope of Turkey's entering the war. All Mediterranean operations other than southern France should be considered diversionary. The meeting of the 28th ended with Churchill still not completely convinced, but the clear hard fact remained that the Soviet Union had seconded the American case for OVERLORD. Henceforth, the Prime Minister would be fighting a losing battle for secondary operations in the eastern Mediterranean.

The Soviet stand caught the British and U.S. delegations by surprise. The Americans were pleased, the British disappointed. Soviet hints in advance of the conference of a new attitude toward OVERLORD and the Mediterranean had, as has already become evident, given General Marshall and his advisers as much concern as they must have raised the hopes of the Prime Minister. The opposition that the American staff had expected to encounter and the support that Churchill had reason to expect never materialized. General Deane's forebodings were not realized. He has since suggested that the preconference tactics of the Russians, starting with the Moscow meetings, may have only been a resort to maneuvers designed to throw their Western partners off balance and
thereby win through to their own objectives.34

The purely military phase of the discussions on OVERLORD and the Mediterranean was continued at the meeting of the representatives of the three military staffs on the morning of 29 November.35 Sir Alan Brooke took the opportunity to elaborate on the case presented by Churchill. Speaking for the United States, General Marshall first set forth the American point of view of this stage of the war. He explained that the United States now had a war going on two fronts—the Pacific and the Atlantic—and that presented "a dilemma." In contrast with the usual difficulties in war, there was no lack of troops or supplies. In fact, there were now more than fifty divisions in the United States that the Americans wished to deploy overseas as soon as possible. The military problem resolved itself almost entirely into a question of shipping and landing craft. By landing craft he meant in particular special craft to transport motor vehicles and tanks. "While this is, of course, an exaggeration, it might almost be said that we have reached the point of having to ignore strategy in order to advance communications." He emphasized the deep American concern over such logistical problems as the length of voyages, the length of time required in ports, and the over-all time for the turnaround. U.S. air forces had been sent overseas just as soon as they had been trained, and hence the air battle was far more advanced than that on land. One of the most compelling reasons from the beginning for favoring OVERLORD was that it represented the shortest overseas transport route. After the initial successes, transports would be sent directly from the United States to the French ports.

Marshall stated that the question then before the conference was what to do in the Mediterranean in the next three months and in the next six months. To decide the question of Mediterranean operations, solutions would have to be found to the problems of shipping and landing craft and to the provision of adequate fighter air cover. Marshall wanted Voroshilov to understand that at present the United States had landing operations going on at five different places in the Pacific, all of which involved landing craft, and that four more were scheduled for January. The least interference with OVERLORD would result if the Allies confined themselves to reduced operations in the Mediterranean for the next three or four months.

Marshal Voroshilov asked a number of specific questions about preparations for OVERLORD. General Marshall commented on the progress already made and under way. The preparations were pointed to the target date of 1 May 1944. In August 1943 there had been only one U.S. division in the United Kingdom, now there were nine. A tremendous flow of Air personnel to England for the bomber offensive had taken place, and the deployment of other types of troops was also in progress. The United States now had in England, shipped well ahead of the troops who were to use them, a million tons of sup-

34 Deane, Strange Alliance, pp. 44-45.
35 Min, military mtg between the USA, Great Britain, and the USSR, EUREKA, 29 Nov 43-SEXTANT Conf Book. The meeting was held at 1030 in the Soviet Legation, Tehran. The Americans were represented by Admiral Leahy and General Marshall, the British by General Sir Alan Brooke and Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, and the Soviet Union by Marshal Voroshilov.
plies and equipment. Steps were being taken to speed up landing craft construction in both the United States and the United Kingdom. At one point in the discussion, Voroshilov went so far as to ask Sir Alan Brooke bluntly whether he considered OVERLORD as important an operation as General Marshall indicated he did. General Brooke replied that he considered OVERLORD vitally important, but added that he was familiar with the defenses of northern France and did not want to see the operation fail, as it might under certain circumstances. Marshal Voroshilov commented that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet General Staff attached the greatest importance to OVERLORD and felt that operations in the Mediterranean could only be regarded as auxiliary. Marshal Stalin, he added, insisted on the execution of OVERLORD on the date already planned.

The staff discussion on technical difficulties and requirements of the cross-Channel operation led Marshal Voroshilov to relate Soviet experience in crossing large rivers during their advance westward, which he regarded as comparable. Marshall pointed out the vast difference between a river crossing and a landing from the ocean. The failure of a river crossing was a "reverse"; the failure of a landing operation from the sea was a "catastrophe." In the latter case almost complete loss of the men and landing craft would result. Marshall went on to make an illuminating observation, reflective of the different strategic and logistic outlook of the Soviet and American military staffs in World War II. He said his military education had been based on roads, rivers, and railroads and that "his war experience in France had been concerned with the same. During the last two years, however, he had been acquiring an education based on oceans and he had had to learn all over again." He added that before the present war he had never heard of any landing craft "except a rubber boat." Now he thought about little else. Voroshilov was confident that Marshall would find a way. With obvious professional admiration, he replied, "If you think about it, you will do it."

On this optimistic but inconclusive note the military meeting adjourned. Later in the day the military gave their report to the chiefs of state, who had assembled once more. At this point, Marshal Stalin asked who was to be the commander of Operation OVERLORD. When the President and Prime Minister replied that the decision had not yet been made, Stalin immediately declared, "Then nothing will come out of these operations." The Prime Minister pointed out that his government had already expressed its willingness to accept an American as commander and that he agreed it was essential to appoint a commander for OVERLORD without delay. Such an appointment, he indicated, would be forthcoming within a fortnight.

Again Churchill launched into a fervent plea for his Mediterranean policy. What he wanted, he now argued, was enough landing craft to carry at least two divisions. With such an amphibious force it would be possible to do a series of operations: first, move up the leg of

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36 Min, military mtg between USA, Great Britain, and the USSR, Eureka, 29 Nov 13, Sextant Conf Book.
37 Min, 2d plenary session, USA, Great Britain, and the USSR, Eureka, 29 Nov 43, Sextant Conf Book. The meeting was held at 1600 in the Soviet Legation, Tehran.
Italy by amphibious turning movements; second, capture Rhodes, in conjunction with Turkey's entry into the war; and third, launch operations against the southern coast of France in order to help OVERLORD. He acknowledged that such a force in the Mediterranean could not be supplied without either postponing OVERLORD six or eight weeks, or withdrawing landing craft from the Indian Ocean. Again he pleaded for aid to encourage resistance in the Balkans and stressed the importance of Turkey's entry into the war.

Again Stalin was adamant. He wanted no postponement of OVERLORD; it must be executed “by the limiting date.” In comparison with OVERLORD, Turkey's participation, Rhodes, and the Balkans were relatively unimportant. All operations in the Mediterranean other than that against southern France would be mere “diversions.” What had to be determined, he insisted, was the commander for OVERLORD, the date for OVERLORD, and the matter of the supporting operations to be undertaken in southern France in connection with OVERLORD.

To relieve the tension that was building up and bring the matter to some conclusion, the President, who until then had contributed little to this discussion, took a hand. As he saw it, all three seemed to be agreed that the Anglo-American staff should be directed to go ahead on the assumption that OVERLORD was to be the “dominating operation.” While the Combined Chiefs of Staff might recommend subsidiary operations in the Mediterranean, nothing should be considered that might delay OVERLORD.

It was typical of the President at Tehran to act as arbitrator, if not judge, between the other two leaders who were as different in their methods as in the views they represented—Churchill, the master orator and debater, skilled both in words and parliamentary maneuvers; Stalin, “the man of steel,” disdainful of the debater's artifices and diplomatic niceties, terse, blunt, and relentless in his refutation. The President did not appear completely indifferent to Churchill's eloquence and persuasiveness and to the possibilities of Mediterranean ventures, particularly in the Adriatic. But at the same time he was under strong pressure from his military advisers that nothing must delay OVERLORD, and in the end he held through.

The President's task in this respect was undoubtedly made easier, as was that of the American staff, by Stalin's firm stand. The Soviet reinforcement of the American military case, strongly presented and defended by General Marshall on the staff level, permitted the President more freely to play the middleman's role and to step in to smooth the way whenever tension mounted—as it did on the 29th—between the other two contending chiefs of state. Years later Churchill, still convinced that the failure at Tehran to adopt his eastern Mediterranean policy was an error in the direction of the war, would write: “I could have gained Stalin, but the President was oppressed by the prejudices of his military advisers, and drifted to and fro in the argument, with the result that the whole of these subsidiary but gleaming opportunities were cast aside unused.”

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38 For interpretations of the President's role at Tehran, see: (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 780, 789; (2) Deane, Strange Alliance, pp. 41-45; and (3) Leahy, I Was There, pp. 204ff.

39 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 346.
Whether, in the face of the determined American-Soviet stand, the Prime Minister’s hand was further weakened at Tehran by differences with his own staff can only be conjectured. As already suggested, information had reached the U.S. Army staff during SEXTANT that Churchill and his military advisers had not seen eye to eye on the recent Dodecanese operations. It is also known that some high-ranking British officers, General Morgan for example, felt as strongly about OVERLORD as did their American opposites. In any event, after the session on the 29th the British, while continuing to present a united front, began to give ground. On the morning of 30 November, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to recommend that Stalin be informed that OVERLORD would be launched during May in conjunction with a supporting operation against southern France. The operation against southern France was to be mounted on as big a scale as the available landing craft would permit. For planning purposes, D Day of the southern France operation was to be the same as that for OVERLORD. The U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff also agreed to continue the advance in Italy to the Pisa-Rimini line. As a result, the sixty-eight LST’s due to be sent from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom would be kept in the Mediterranean until 15 January. These recommendations issued from another go-round on the interrelated and thorny questions of the timing of OVERLORD, possible subsidiary Mediterranean alternatives, and available landing craft. On the question of Aegean operations the CCS could come to no agreement. The plan for an operation against southern France to which the Chiefs of Staff made reference was, to say the least, vague. It was actually an old plan, newly dusted off. Stalin’s expressed interest at the opening session of the conference in an invasion of southern France linked to OVERLORD had caught the American and British delegations somewhat by surprise. It is true that for a long time the Americans and the British had been thinking about eventually carrying out some kind of southern France operation. It is also true that considerable staff planning had already been done on a southern France operation. But most of the British and American staff planners had been left at Cairo, and the only study available in Tehran was an out-of-date joint outline plan drawn up in midsummer 1943. Working feverishly with this plan as a basis, the U.S. planners in Tehran had a study for the JCS and the President ready on 29 November. The study called for

40 (1) Ltr, Barker, Deputy COSSAC, to Handy, 17 Nov 43. The letter reached Handy at SEXTANT.
(2) Ltr, Handy to Barker, 2 Dec 43. Both in Folder 3, Item 15, Exec 5. The information was relayed by General Handy to “the proper people.”
41 Harris, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 91. See also Morgan, Overture to Overlord, passim.
42 Min, 132d mtg CCS, 30 Nov 43. The meeting was held at 0930 in the British Legation, Tehran.
43 Colonel Bessell has recalled how the outline plan, drawn up in the midsummer of 1943 by the JWPC, came to be available at the Tehran conference. He stated, “Just before General Somervell left Cairo for the Tehran Conference, he asked me whether we had an outline plan for an invasion of Southern France. I dug up our old JWPC study and furnished him a copy. He brought it to Tehran.” Col William W. Bessell, Comments on Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, 6 Sep 56, MS, OCMH files.
44 Recalling the hectic days at Tehran, General Handy has commented: “When we left Cairo for Tehran, it was generally
a two-division assault launched from Corsica and Sardinia, building up to ten divisions. Optimistically, if vaguely, it assumed that the landing craft and the resources would probably be available. It was on the basis of this study that the Americans and the British, urged on by the Russians, committed themselves at Tehran to a southern France operation.

The conference now moved swiftly to a close. On the afternoon of 30 November Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin accepted the report of the Anglo-American staffs. Stalin agreed to time his offensive on the Eastern Front to coincide with the launching of the attack in the West in May 1944. The President promised that he and the Prime Minister would take up the matter of a supreme Allied commander and make a decision within the next three or four days. The military conclusions of Tehran were embodied in a document signed by the President, the Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin on 1 December. In addition to the decisions concerning the second front, the three heads of state agreed to support the partisans in Yugoslavia with supplies and equipment and commando raids. In response to Churchill's plea, they also agreed to make another effort to induce Turkey to enter the war. Stalin even promised that if Bulgaria attacked Turkey, as a result of Turkey's becoming an active participant in the conflict, the USSR would immediately declare war on Bulgaria. Henceforth, the military staffs of the three powers were to keep in close touch on the forthcoming operations in Europe. To mislead the enemy about these operations, a cover plan was to be concocted by their staffs.

Before the Tehran conference ended, the President discussed a number of specific proposals with Stalin for further Soviet-American collaboration. General Deane had strongly urged the proposals upon the U.S. staff. Harriman persuaded the President to take them up with Stalin in some detail. Some of the
subjects, such as shuttle bombing, exchange of weather information, and improved communications, had already been presented to the Russians at the Moscow Conference and the Soviet Government had agreed to these "in principle." In an attempt to pave the way for preliminary planning for eventual operations against Japan, the President at Tehran submitted a request that planning immediately be started for basing 100 to 1,000 American bombers in the Soviet maritime provinces. He also asked whether arrangements could be made for Americans to use naval bases along the Siberian coast and for naval operations in the northwestern Pacific. Stalin cautiously deferred these latest proposals for further study.

At the conclusion of the Tehran conference the Allied coalition appeared to have reached the high-water mark in international collaboration. Not only had key decisions been reached to bring about the speedy defeat of Germany but also, on the political level, discussions had been held, generally on an amicable basis, that seemed to promise much for the eventual peaceful solution of the problems of the postwar era. Roosevelt devoted considerable time to explaining his ideas of a United Nations organization to preserve the peace and administer trusteeships over such territories as the Japanese mandated islands. It was at this conference that the President persuaded Churchill and Stalin to adopt the Declaration of Iran, which pledged support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of that troubled country. No definite agreement was made on the President's proposal to break up the Reich into five major subdivisions or states, but the idea seemed to meet with general approval. There was also some discussion about Polish boundaries. The Curzon line seemed to be generally accepted as the eastern boundary, but Roosevelt made no specific agreement to that effect. The question of the western Polish border was left open. It was also during the political discussions that Roosevelt suggested that the USSR might receive access to the port of Dairen in Manchuria. A compromise was reached on the question of the surrendered Italian warships and merchant vessels, whereby some would shortly be turned over for the wartime use of the Russians.

The favorable atmosphere at Tehran was reflected at the closing dinner attended by the chiefs of state and their staffs. The three chiefs of state delivered speeches stressing lasting friendship among the Allies. Stalin made his oft-quoted statement to the effect that without the miracle of American production the war would have been lost. In concluding his speech Roosevelt declared that "the rainbow, the traditional symbol of hope, could now for the first time, as a result of this Conference, be discerned in the sky."

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46 For the political discussions and decisions at Tehran, see: (1) Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 359-62, 373-74, 381-82, 389-90; (2) Leahy, I Was There, pp. 205-06, 209-12; (3) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 777, 782-83, 785-87, 790, 792-98; (4) Department of State, Publication 2423, The Axis in Defeat: A Collection of Documents on American Policy Toward Germany and Japan, pp. 5-6, containing a copy of the Declaration of Iran.

47 Notes on dinner held in the British Legation,
If the close of the Tehran conference marked, as Sherwood suggests, the zenith of the President’s career,\(^49\) it also represented a triumph for General Marshall and the U.S. staff. Of transcending importance to the military staff was, of course, the firm decision on OVERLORD. The agreement to launch OVERLORD in May 1944 in conjunction with a Soviet offensive on the Eastern Front marked the culmination of the planning efforts of General Marshall and his advisers from early in the war. On 2 December General Handy tersely but cautiously summed up the situation: “There has been a considerable battle, but we have had some aid from outside sources and I hope everything will be all right.”\(^50\)

Swiftly upon the close of the Tehran conference, which had seen the Big Three in the coalition against Germany forge new bonds of unity, a tripartite declaration of importance to the coalition partners against Japan was released from Cairo. The Cairo Declaration, issued on 1 December, set forth Anglo-American-Chinese war aims earlier agreed on by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo. According to this definition of policy, the three Allies in the war against Japan were fighting to “restrain and punish the aggression of Japan.” Disclaiming any desire of gain for themselves, they announced their intention to strip Japan of all the islands in the Pacific that it had seized or occupied since 1941. Territory “stolen from the Chinese,” including Manchuria and Formosa, was to be restored to China, and “in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”\(^51\) The Cairo Declaration, added to the general political understandings of Tehran, gave further proof that the powers allied in the respective coalition efforts against the major foes were beginning to grapple seriously with the problems of territorial settlement and the shape of the postwar world.

**Mop-up at Cairo: 3–7 December**

On 1 December the Combined Chiefs of Staff and on 2 December Churchill, the President, and Admiral Leahy left Tehran by plane for Cairo and the concluding meetings of the conference. Despite the unexpectedly favorable turn of events at Tehran, there was still unfinished business with the British at Cairo. Discussion of the question of an amphibious operation against the Andaman Islands and the whole matter of the Pacific war was pending. Outstanding Anglo-American military problems in the war against Germany also remained for settlement. Resources had to be examined and command adjustments made. Hanging fire was the question of an Aegean Sea venture. Still pending were politico-military problems of Turkey’s possible entry into the war and the prospective zones of Germany to be occupied by British and U.S. troops.

**The Cancellation of BUCCANEER**

In Cairo, the Combined staffs spent five busy days locked in debate. As events showed, there was good reason for

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\(^49\) For Sherwood’s observation, see *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 799.

\(^50\) Ltr, Handy to Barker, 2 Dec 43, Folder 3, Item 15, Exec 5.

General Handy’s caution. With strong Soviet advocacy of the American case at Tehran, the Mediterranean versus cross-Channel issue had been settled. But now the British raised another issue for serious consideration—BUCCANEER versus ANVIL (the invasion of southern France) as part of OVERLORD. The debate, in part, turned on the question of landing craft. As the President and General Marshall had previously pointed out, the scale, scope, and timing of all prospective combined operations depended largely upon the availability of landing craft, then as short in supply as they were greatly in demand. OVERLORD was on a narrow margin, and the British argued that it was important to strengthen that operation as well as to bolster ANVIL (planned as a two-division assault). The preliminary survey by the Combined planners showed there would be enough landing craft only for one and two-thirds divisions for ANVIL.52 To insure success in OVERLORD-ANVIL only a relatively few landing craft seemed needed to be made available within the next few months. But where to find them? One possible source was BUCCANEER. That solution strongly appealed to the British. Behind the somewhat heated Anglo-American conflict that developed over BUCCANEER lay, of course, basic differences over the strategic significance of operations in Burma and the military value of China. Behind the British position also lay the desire of the Prime Minister to make a “final attempt” to persuade the Americans to substitute an operation against Rhodes for that against the Andamans.53

In the ensuing debate Churchill made much of Stalin’s pledge to enter the war against Japan after Germany was defeated. That pledge had not come as a complete surprise to the Americans, since they had received informal hints to the same effect as far back as January 1943 and again at the Moscow Conference.54 The British reaction, on the other hand, suggested that this was something of a revelation to them and would require a re-evaluation of the Pacific war. At the plenary session on 4 December, Churchill seized on the promise of Soviet entry to back his argument on global strategy. He maintained that OVERLORD and ANVIL must succeed and that the landing craft assigned to BUCCANEER should be returned to the Mediterranean to insure that success. The Combined staffs, he felt, should immediately proceed to examine how Soviet participation would affect operations in the Pacific and southeast Asia. Certainly Soviet entry into the war, he now argued, would give the Allies better bases than could be found in China.55

Returning to the projected attack on southern France, the Prime Minister was of the opinion that it should be planned on the basis of an assault force of at least two divisions. This would furnish enough landing craft to launch the “outflanking” operations in Italy and, if Turkey came into the war, to capture Rhodes. He hastened to add, however, that in view of the “new situation” he no longer attached so much importance to Rhodes. The Prime Minister ex-

52 CPS 191/1, 5 Dec 43, title: Amphibious Operations Against the South of France.
53 Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 408-09.
pressed amazement at the large numbers of men — some 58,000 — estimated by Admiral Mountbatten’s staff as needed to take the Andaman Islands from a Japanese garrison of only 5,000. Roosevelt thought the figure could be cut to 14,000. According to the President’s concept of the plan of action to be followed, OVERLORD and ANVIL should be accepted as the “paramount operations of 1944.” Every effort should be made to find the additional eighteen to twenty landing craft required for operations in the eastern Mediterranean, if Turkey entered the war. Mountbatten should be told that he must do the best he could with the resources already allocated to him. He was cold to Churchill’s suggestion that resources might have to be withdrawn to bolster OVERLORD and ANVIL and stated that “we had a moral obligation to do something for China and he would not be prepared to forego the amphibious operation except for some very great and readily apparent reason.”

Churchill pointed out that OVERLORD might provide this reason. Marshall then asserted that the decision was not only political but military as well since, if BUCCANEER were not carried out, there would probably be no operations in Burma and such an outcome would have repercussions in the Pacific. The Prime Minister was careful to remind the conference that he had never committed himself to the scale or timing of the amphibious operation in southeast Asia.

With substantial agreement reached on the European operations and Rhodes receding in importance, attention now focused on the question of the Far Eastern operations. Attempts to reconcile the divergent British and American staff views continued to prove fruitless, and Marshall suggested to the JCS that the President and Prime Minister should be informed of their differences. In Marshall’s opinion, when the tremendous efforts involved in the preparations for the Burma campaign were considered, “a failure to mount it would constitute a loss, which . . . was equivalent to a reverse.” Marshall’s concern was not directed at the amphibious operations alone, for he told the Combined Chiefs that “if it were possible to abandon the amphibious operations and still do the North Burma campaign, he personally would not be seriously disturbed.”

Marshall and the other U.S. Chiefs of Staff were not eternally wedded to BUCCANEER, but were firmly convinced that without such an amphibious operation, Chiang would not commit his forces in Burma. The British, on the other hand, asserted their intent to conduct north Burma operations even without Chinese participation and played down the value of the expected Chinese war effort.

Although the British were inclined to put more weight upon Soviet entry into the war against Japan, the President was “a little dubious about putting all our eggs in one basket.” What if Stalin were unable to be as good as his word? To cancel BUCCANEER might cost Chinese support without obtaining commensurate help from the Russians. Churchill assured him that Chinese continuation in the war was not so de-

56 Min, 3d plenary mtg, Sextant, 1 Dec 43, Sextant Conf Book.
57 Ibid.
58 Min, 133th mtg JCS, 5 Dec 43. See also CCS 423/2, 5 Dec 43, title: Draft Agreement by CCS.
59 Min, 135th mtg CCS, 5 Dec 43.
pended upon Buccaneer as upon the supplies China received over the Hump. The U.S. defense of Buccaneer weakened progressively from this point on, and the President agreed that Mountbatten should be asked what he could do on a smaller scale if the bulk of assault shipping and landing craft were withdrawn from southeast Asia.60

According to Admiral King, the President toward the end of the conference called the Joint Chiefs in for consultation on the effects of breaking the understanding with Chiang. Leahy and Arnold finally agreed that it could be changed and Marshall, after thinking it over, gave in also. Only King remained obdurate and refused to concede, since he felt that Chiang would consider that he had been double-crossed. The President did not at this point inform them of his final decision.61

Later, on the same day (5 December), the President notified Churchill that he had definitely decided to call off Buccaneer, much to the latter’s satisfaction.62 The President, with the aid of Hopkins and the approval of Churchill, then sent a message to Chiang. He told the Generalissimo that European operations agreed upon at Tehran would require such heavy commitments of landing craft that it would be impracticable to devote enough to the Bay of Bengal operations to ensure success. The President went on to offer the Generalissimo the choice between going ahead with north Burma operations—which would be coupled with naval control of the Bay of Bengal, amphibious and carrier raids in the SEAC area, and possibly the bombing of Bangkok and the Burma-Siam railroad—or delaying north Burma operations until November and building up the air transport route in the meantime. He concluded: “I am influenced in this matter by the tremendous advantage to be received by China and the Pacific through the early termination of the war with Germany.”63 The choices offered by the President seemed to be even further narrowed by Mountbatten’s pessimistic estimate of the 6th. Based on a quick review of his resources on the assumption that Buccaneer would be canceled, he disapproved of any small amphibious operations in his theater and doubted that Tarzan (north Burma operations) could be carried out in its original form.64

60 Min, 4th plenary mtg, Sextant, 5 Dec 43, Sextant Conf Book.
61 King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, p. 525. King dates the meeting the morning of 6 December, but surrounding circumstances indicate that this meeting, and the one that followed later in the afternoon, both took place on 5 December.
62 Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 411-12.


King and Leahy both state in their accounts that the President informed them of his decision to cancel Buccaneer late in the afternoon of the 6th, but the President’s official log of the conference indicates that he met with the JCS at 5 P.M. on the 5th. The President’s log is scheduled to be published, in a volume on the conferences at Cairo and Tehran, in the Department of State’s foreign relations series. Churchill relates that he was notified on the 5th after the President, “in consultation with his advisers,” reached his decision that afternoon. Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 411-12. The message to Chiang was sent late on the night of the 5th.

64 CCS 427/1, 6 Dec 43, title: Amphibious Operations in Southeast Asia Alternative to “Buccaneer.” The President’s message to Chiang and Mountbatten’s overpessimistic report were to occasion embarrassment later in the month, when Mountbatten discovered that he could mount a sizable amphibious
At any rate, the JCS, much to their disappointment, had been overruled and the British had won their point. European operations were to be strengthened at the expense of the CBI, and as a result the role of China in future plans was on the decline. The Presidential decision was the turning point for China and its importance to the Allies in the war. The promise of China was now to be replaced by the promise of the Soviet Union as the valuable ally in the Far East.

At the close of SEXTANT the status of CBI plans, aside from BUCCANEER, was much the same as it had been at the opening—undecided. Mountbatten and his staff were still investigating alternatives. Chiang was on the verge of accepting the President's alternate suggestion that he should do nothing until November and of requesting more aid in the meantime. Although small units of the Chinese Ramgarh force were in contact with the Japanese in north Burma, the prospect for early offensive operations appeared rather forlorn at the close of SEXTANT.

Opportunism in the Pacific

The lengthy and spirited discussions on European and southeast Asian affairs at SEXTANT tended to obscure the importance of the combined decisions on Pacific matters. Because of the press of other business, there was little debate on either the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan or on specific operations scheduled for 1944, except as they touched upon SEAC plans. Basically, there was only one issue the Strategy and Policy Group of the Operations Division had thought might produce a difference of opinion—future British participation in the Pacific war. American objections to allowing a greater measure of British effort to be based in the Pacific Ocean stemmed mainly from the shortage of adequate bases and facilities to supply increased demands and from the desire to keep the Pacific essentially a U.S. theater of operations.65

The military situation in the Pacific in November showed that, although Allied efforts to contract the perimeter of the Japanese empire had made little headway in terms of regained territory, the enemy's position was far from enviable. The attrition suffered by Japan's naval, air, and merchant shipping resources had been heavy and would increase as Allied naval and air superiority became more marked. It was the threat of things to come as more Allied resources became available rather than the anticipated effects of current operations that produced an optimistic attitude in Anglo-American planning circles.

U.S. intelligence estimates held that, unless the USSR attacked Japan, Japan would remain on the strategic defensive during the coming year and would seek to strengthen its military position and economic status in its "Inner Zone." According to these estimates, on the other hand, Japan could be expected to initiate local offensives in Burma in an effort to forestall Allied operations and would try to prevent the establishment of any air

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65 Compilation of Background Material for SEXTANT, prepared by S&P Gp OPD [about 10 Nov 43], Tab 2, ABC 337 (18 Oct 43), 5.
bases in China that might threaten this "Inner Zone."  
Some of the optimism that was beginning to pervade Allied thinking on the war against Japan was evident in the over-all plan submitted by the Combined planners at SEXTANT. They were not certain at this point that the invasion of Japan would be necessary, since sea and air blockade coupled with intensive air bombardment might defeat Japan. They also foresaw the possible fall of Germany as early as the spring of 1944, and, should this occur, they thought that the USSR might enter the war against Japan shortly thereafter. Because of the possibility of an abbreviated war, they recommended that the main effort in the war against Japan be made in the Pacific, using both the Central and the SWPA axes, with the objective of reaching the Formosa-China-Luzon area rather than Hokkaido by the spring of 1945. To support this main drive, subsidiary operations would be carried on in the north and south Pacific, China, and SEAC.

In the meantime, the Allies should attempt to destroy the Japanese Fleet, continue to inflict attrition upon the enemy's air and merchant shipping resources, prepare for carrier-borne and shore-based air strikes against Japan, and try to keep China in the war. In addition to these more or less constant objectives, there were two recommendations that graphically reflected the American position. The Allies should:

Insure that the sequence of operations remains flexible and that preparations are made to take all manner of short cuts made possible by developments in the situation.
Take advantage of the earliest practicable reorientation of forces from the European Theater.

The doctrine of flexibility was not a new concept, but rather an old stand-by in the war against Japan. The Combined planners had recommended at QUADRANT that flexibility in planning be maintained in case the Soviet Union should enter the war or China should drop out. Operations in the Pacific had developed along opportunistic lines from the beginning, and it was the Army planners who had raised a clamor for a firm over-all plan so that resources could be planned and allocated. Now, in line with Marshall's counsel en route to SEXTANT, flexibility was to become the official guide for the future, and demands for an immediate definite, hard-and-fast, over-all plan were to abate—at least temporarily. The concept of the earliest practicable reorientation of forces from the European theater had also been stated at QUADRANT, but the U.S. planners thought it bore repetition since the British did not seem to have the same sense of urgency about it as did the Americans.

The Combined planners went on to discuss the availability of forces to carry out their proposed general plan to defeat Japan. They believed that there

67 CCS 417, 2 Dec 43, title: Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan.
would be a sufficiently large British naval force in the Indian Ocean to take care of any Japanese threats. All other available British naval units should be concentrated in the Pacific, provided they could be supported logistically and could be employed usefully. British forces used in the Pacific should be based in the Bismarck-Solomons area so that they could support either the SWPA or the CPA offensive. Acceptance of this recommendation would mean that eventually British naval participation in the Pacific phase of the war would become larger and that the British would probably expect a greater role in the making of strategic decisions.

American ground forces in the Pacific would ultimately reach some forty divisions, the Combined planners surmised, five of which would be Marine. All would have supporting troops, of course. British divisions would be reoriented to the Far East after the defeat of Germany, but British-Indian divisions, in the meantime, would be occupied with SEAC operations. The Combined planners estimated that there would be an American assault lift for twelve divisions and that the British would probably have a lift for three divisions after Germany’s fall. Aircraft should be redeployed as quickly as possible, once the European war was ended. The location of the air forces would depend a great deal upon the USSR’s attitude as to the American use of Siberian bases.

The possibility of the Soviet Union entering the war against Japan led the Combined planners to urge that the Russians be induced to come in as soon as possible. The Allies should discover what the USSR proposed to do and what could be done to help the Soviet Union in the meantime. Conversations should be carried on with the Soviet staff to secure permission for the Allies to enter and develop bases in Kamchatka and the maritime provinces. Plans should also be made to seize and hold the northern Kurils, to open a sea route to the maritime provinces, and to supply and operate air forces from Siberian bases.

General Handy’s comments on the CPS plan, which were read by Marshall to the JCS, emphasized the Army’s satisfaction with the Combined planners’ efforts and reflected the American position on the Pacific war:

The paper in effect agrees to put the main effort of the war against Japan in the Pacific. It does not attempt to establish at this time any long range main effort within the Pacific area. A great advantage of the plan is its flexibility in allowing the Joint Chiefs at any time to create a main effort by the commitment of forces to one or the other axis. It also, of course, allows the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take advantage of the situation as it develops. By accepting this paper, we leave all discussions of the merits of the Central and Southwest Pacific to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In effect it gives the Joint Chiefs of Staff almost complete liberty of action in the Pacific without reference to the British Chiefs of Staff.

Handy’s comments pointed up the fact that the United States would still retain the freedom of action it desired in the Pacific, but the prospect of increased British interest as its forces joined the
other Allies in this area was in the offing.

Moving from the general to the specific, the United States proposals for definite operations during 1944 set forth the same over-all objectives that the combined plan contained and then went on to outline action foreseen for the coming year. In the north Pacific preparations for long-range strategic bombing against the Kurils and northern Japan would be continued, and plans for entry into the Kurils and the maritime provinces should be made in the event that the USSR collaborated. The advance along the New Guinea–Netherlands Indies–Philippines axis should proceed concurrently with the drive against the mandated islands. B-29’s would be based in the Mariana’s to bomb Japan. Air attacks on Netherlands Indies and Philippines targets and air bombardment to neutralize Rabaul would be intensified. Increases in operations and forces, especially air forces, in China were visualized, and the Superfortresses based in India and China would be prepared to strike at the Japanese homeland.

The schedule of operations stressed four factors that might allow short cuts to be taken and accent the need for flexibility: (1) the early defeat of the Japanese fleet; (2) the sudden withdrawal of Japanese forces from certain areas, as had happened at Kiska; (3) increases in the Allied assault shipbuilding program and defeat of Germany earlier than October 1944; and (4) early collaboration of the USSR in the war against Japan. The proposed timing and sequence of planned operations for 1944 followed. (See Table 2) A comparison of this schedule with the one submitted at Quadrant reveals several significant changes in Pacific planning. In the first place, the timing for most operations had been accelerated by one or two months. Secondly, capture of the Marianas, a planning objective approved by the JCS during the trip from the United States to Cairo, had been set up in place of the Palaus operations for October 1944. The development of the B-29 had made the potential air bases in the Marianas of much greater importance than before, and attacks on the Japanese homeland were expected to begin at the end of 1944. Lastly, only in Burma were operations to be postponed and reduced in accordance with Anglo-American decisions. If Burma could be discounted or ignored, the outlook for Pacific operations was optimistic.

Acceptance of both the over-all and the specific plans by the CCS was somewhat perfunctory except for the phases concerned with SEAC. The scant attention these plans received has been attributed by Churchill to the press of more urgent affairs and to the feeling that there would be sufficient time to review the Pacific situation later on.

On the surface, the Allied decisions at Sextant on the war against Japan would seem to cancel each other out—forward movement in the Pacific balanced against comparative inaction in the CBI—but the immediate scope of projected SEAC operations could not be considered equal to the gathering weight and quality of the forces the United

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13 See Ch. IX, above.
15 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 415.
States was bringing to bear upon the enemy in the Pacific. Whatever the immediate disappointment of the JCS over the setback in the CBI, the fact remained that the United States not only was advancing in the Pacific but also was able to retain a free hand in the direction of that phase of the war. Two concepts General Marshall had favored, flexibility and speed, had been successfully upheld. Approval had been given to use the B-29 against Japan, both from the CBI and from the Marianas, in order to inaugurate a new mode of attack upon the enemy. Eventually, the de-emphasis of SEAC operations might ensure the success of OVERLORD-ANVIL. It might also prove a boon to the U.S. drive in the Pacific since the bulk of resources in the war against Japan could now be

Table 2—Planning Schedule of Operations, 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Date</th>
<th>Central Pacific</th>
<th>Southwest Pacific Area</th>
<th>Southeast Asia and China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1–31 January 44</td>
<td>Seizure of the Marshalls, including Eniwetok and Kusaie</td>
<td>Complete seizure of West New Britain, continue neutralization of Rabaul</td>
<td>Operations in upper Burma, Arakan region, and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 January–5 March 44</td>
<td></td>
<td>Seizure of Hansa Bay area (1 February), capture of Kavieng (20 March)</td>
<td>Initiate VLR bombings of Japanese “Inner Zone” from China bases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 April 44</td>
<td>Seizure of Ponape</td>
<td>Seizure of Manus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 44</td>
<td>Seizure of Ponape</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 June 44</td>
<td>Seizure of Pancakes (Truk area)</td>
<td>Seizure of Hollandia (Humboldt Bay)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 July 44</td>
<td>Seizure of eastern Carolines (Truk area)</td>
<td>Initiate VLR bombing of vital targets in Netherlands East Indies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 44</td>
<td></td>
<td>Advance westward along north coast of New Guinea to include Vogelkop</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 44</td>
<td>Seizure of Guam and Japanese Marianas</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intensification of offensive operations in the SEAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 November 44</td>
<td>(end of monsoon)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 December 44</td>
<td>Initiate VLR bombings of vital targets in Japanese “Inner Zone” from bases in Marianas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

devoted to the Pacific line of approach. Whatever the ultimate political implications, the relegation of China to a secondary role seemed to coincide with the estimates of the Army strategic planners and would perhaps permit a more realistic assessment of the over-all strategic picture.

**OVERLORD and ANVIL—The “Supreme Operations”**

The main outcome of the concluding Anglo-American military discussions in Cairo was the confirmation of OVERLORD and ANVIL as the “supreme operations for 1944.” Nothing was to be undertaken in any part of the world to jeopardize their success. This basic decision of Sextant-Eureka enabled the combined staffs to reach a number of important supplementary agreements regarding operations in the war against Germany.

Ways and means to increase the strength of the OVERLORD assault were to be examined constantly. The Combined Bomber Offensive was to continue to have the highest strategic priority, with no change in plan except for a periodic revision of bombing objectives. The operations of the Eighth Air Force were to be intensified as fast as available planes and crews would permit. The Anglo-American staffs agreed that the necessary military co-ordination with the USSR should be arranged through the United States and British missions in Moscow. Experts would be sent from Washington and London to co-ordinate cover and deception plans with the Soviet staff.

General Morgan was to continue planning for RANKIN, the emergency return to the Continent, and to study and report on proposals of the JCS for switching the projected British and U.S. zones of occupation. On 4 December, largely at General Marshall’s insistence, the JCS had attempted to force the zone issue and get an early decision. They submitted recommendations to the CCS for the Americans to occupy the northern and the British the southern spheres in accord with the President’s expressed desires aboard the USS Iowa. General Marshall felt that the issue had more than political significance and that, for the occupation, as for any military operation, adequate time was needed to insure proper preparations. Nevertheless, final decision was deferred by the CCS.

Planning for ANVIL was to go forward as quickly as possible. The commander in chief of the Mediterranean

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76 For the following summary of Sextant decisions, see especially: (1) CCS 426/1, 6 Dec 43, title: Rpt to President and Prime Minister; and (2) msg. Handy to Hull, 7 Dec 43, CM-IN 4483.
theater was directed to submit a plan in consultation with COSSAC. The operation against southern France was to be planned on the basis of not less than a two-division assault, to take place about the same time as OVERLORD—May 1944. The commander in chief of the Mediterranean was to furnish additional support to the partisans in the Balkans in the form of food, clothing, raids, and air operations. In Italy the advance was to be governed by a limited objective—the Pisa—Rimini line. Thereafter, pressure would be exerted on the Axis so far as possible without jeopardizing resources for ANVIL. Operations in the Aegean, in particular the capture of Rhodes, were labelled "desirable" by the CCS, provided they could be fitted into the schedule without detriment to OVERLORD and ANVIL—a far cry from the position that the Prime Minister had upheld during most of SEXTANT.

As for the related problem of Turkey, the Prime Minister, in Cairo, resumed his determined effort to win that neutral
to active participation in the war. The ensuing political talks with Turkish leaders, in some of which the President joined with the Prime Minister, again proved inconclusive, and the Prime Minister bowed to the inevitable. By December the Anglo-American authorities felt that the overall situation had changed so fundamentally that a much smaller scale of assistance than that provided in the HARDIHOOD agreement of the spring of 1943 would be necessary. The British proposed a reduced scale of aid—Plan SATURN. As usual, the Turks wished to make certain that upon their entry into the war they would be strong enough to defend their homeland; they doubted that the new plan would fully meet their security needs. Churchill, faced with OVERLORD only six months away, reluctantly concluded that the resources demanded and the time required for strengthening Turkey could not be conceded. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff and their planners could feel relieved that this possible threat to concentration on OVERLORD had at last been removed. They were reassured that the attractions of eastern Mediterranean ventures for the British would not divert vital strength and means from the main undertakings.

Clearing the air on questions of operational strategy against Germany helped settle a number of command problems that had been hanging fire. The British remained opposed to the U.S. proposal for an over-all European command. Both sides were nevertheless able to agree on the unification of command in the Mediterranean. According to the arrangement worked out, the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, was to assume command of all operations in the Mediterranean, including the Balkans, Aegean Islands, and Turkey. To execute approved operations, he was authorized to transfer forces from one part of the Mediterranean to another, and for operational purposes the British command in the Middle East was brought directly under his orders. The British and U.S. forces allocated to him from the Middle East were to be determined by the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff, respectively. The new arrangement for Mediterranean command was to take effect 10 December 1943. The Americans could now more cheerfully accept the projected step that promised to draw commands and forces more closely to the accepted strategic pattern. From the American point of view, the pieces were being moved into position on the Allied strategy chessboard, and the Middle East, as well as the remainder of the Mediterranean, at last was to assume a proper supporting role to the main moves on the Continent.

Even more directly reassuring to the U.S. staff—and especially to the autonomy-minded U.S. Air Forces—was the

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80 For the negotiations with the Turks in December, see: (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 799-800; (2) Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 415-17, 492, 499-501. See also, memo, Billo, Chief SS for Chief S&P Gp OPD, 24 Dec 43, sub: Notes on Radiogram COS (W) 996 from Br COS to Allied Force Hq, Tab 204, ABC 581 SS Papers, Nos. 196-215 (7 Jan 43).


82 (1) CCS 387/3, 5 Dec 43, title: Dir for Unification of Cmd in the Mediterranean. (2) Min, 138th mtg CCS, 7 Dec 43.
"acceptance" at Cairo of the American proposal for a unified command of U.S. strategic air forces in the Mediterranean and northwest Europe. This was a modification of the original proposal to unify all the British and U.S. strategic air forces against Germany. Despite their vigorous objections "in principle," the British concluded that the question required an American decision. The Americans decided to put their plan into effect forthwith. A "United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe" was to be established, effective 1 January 1944. Consisting initially of the Eighth and Fifteenth U.S. Army Air Forces, its headquarters was to be in the United Kingdom. To make the step more palatable to the British, the JCS agreed that, pending future decisions on the control of all strategic air forces in connection with OVERLORD, the Chief of Air Staff, RAF, should continue to act as co-ordinating agent for the CCS. Under his direction, the U.S. air commander would be responsible for determining target priorities, tactics, and techniques employed; he could also move units between the theaters. On 8 December General Arnold informed General Spaatz that Spaatz was to head the new command. A more direct link-up—via the American air effort—between the Mediterranean and northwest Europe, in anticipation of OVERLORD, was thus provided.

The closing days at Cairo also brought forth a resolution of the problem of command for OVERLORD. On 5 December Roosevelt decided on Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander. Robert E. Sherwood has written that the President made the momentous decision "against the almost impassioned advice of Hopkins and Stimson, against the known preference of both Stalin and Churchill, against his own proclaimed inclination to give to George Marshall the historic opportunity which he so greatly desired and so amply deserved." Marshall later recalled, according to Sherwood, that the President called him to his villa on the 5th. In the course of the ensuing conversation Marshall again refused to declare his preference and made clear he would go along wholeheartedly with any decision the President made. The President concluded, "I feel I could not sleep at night with you out of the country." Undoubtedly, a factor in the President's decision was his feeling that command of OVERLORD—important as it was—was not sufficient justification to spare Marshall from Washington. In any event, Marshall accepted the decision without demur. He may even have independently reached the conclusion that the path of his duty lay in Washington. On the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday, 31 December 1955, Marshall stated that the top field command presented a great temptation: "Of course I would have preferred the appointment."

On 6 December the President, who in all his talks at Cairo with Churchill had been silent on the issue, told Churchill of his decision. The same day Marshall

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83 (1) CCS 400/2, 4 Dec 43, title: Control of Strategic Air Forces in NW Europe and in the Mediterranean. (2) Min, 138th mtg CCS, 7 Dec 43.
84 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 802-03.
85 For the President's decision, see also: (1) Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 418-19; (2) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 441-43; and (3) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 206-09.
86 Quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 803.
87 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 448.
88 Newsweek, January 2, 1956, p. 15.
drafted a note, which the President dispatched to Stalin, announcing Eisenhower's appointment. And so the matter was finally settled. Eisenhower would command OVERLORD, a British commander would take over in the Mediterranean, and Marshall would remain in Washington.

At the last Cairo meetings the American military and naval planners were engrossed—as indeed they had been throughout the conference—in an examination of Allied resources to implement the desired strategy. The shortage of landing craft—by far the most critical and on which all operations turned—called for delicate balance in meeting the global requirements. The word that came from Washington in response to the President's request as to the possible expansion of the landing craft construction program in the already overcrowded shipyards and busy factories was not encouraging. Increases did not promise to become appreciably effective in time to meet the OVERLORD date. Despite this discouraging outlook, the report of the combined logistics experts to the CCS showed an augmentation in the planned allocations in assault lift for OVERLORD and ANVIL. Most of the increases for OVERLORD, especially in critical LST's, had already been announced by King to the CCS on 5 November and were simply confirmed at Cairo. Some LST's for ANVIL were to become available because of the cancellation of BUCCANEER, some were to come from the Pacific allocations, and the rest were to be gathered from miscellaneous sources. The previous CCS instructions to return the sixty-eight LST's from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom by 15 January 1944 remained unchanged. Some LST's to come from the United States for ANVIL had previously been planned for use in the Truk operation in July, but the planners expected that by pooling landing craft within the Pacific areas the Truk operation need not be delayed. From SEXTANT, Marshall and King both sent word that Army and Navy commanders all over the world should scrutinize their landing craft situation with an eye to making the vessels available for "the maximum battle effort." In the next few months, Army and Navy planners would continue their intensive and wearisome search for the precious craft—calculating and recalculating, putting a few here, taking a few there.

In addition to matching resources with plans, the Army planners at Cairo took steps to adjust Army command arrangements in the European—Mediter-
The Mediterranean area in line with the agreed decisions. The decision to unify the Mediterranean command had almost immediate effect. Generals Handy and Somervell conferred with General Marshall and with Generals Royce and Connolly on the changes to be made. The result was an agreement to set up the Persian Gulf Command as a separate theater of operations under General Connolly—effective 10 December 1943. General Royce was to remain as U.S. theater commander in the Middle East, now placed under the Mediterranean command for operational purposes. On the way back from Cairo, Washington theater and logistics specialists stopped off to learn General Eisenhower's views on American command arrangements in the Mediterranean and to confer with the Allied Force Headquarters on resources for Anvil.

From Cairo, Marshall, Arnold, Handy, and Cooke went to the Pacific—an almost symbolic reminder that important as Sextant was for the war in Europe, the war against Japan could not be neglected by the Washington staff. On 7 December the President and the remainder of the staff departed for the United States. On the flight back to Dakar Roosevelt stopped off at Tunis to inform Eisenhower personally of his selection. When on 17 December the USS Iowa, with the President's party aboard, docked at Hampton Roads, Virginia, Army planners were already hard at work studying the implications of Sextant for global planning and taking steps to speed the preparations for Overlord.

Staff Planning and the Significance of Sextant

The spate of decisions with which Sextant ended brought to a close two years of wartime staff discussion and planning. The Allies had finally agreed upon a plan to defeat Germany—one that promised to carry out the concept of "beating Germany first." In retrospect, Sextant was the most decisive of the big military conferences of midwar. If, in planning for the offensive phase of coalition warfare against Germany, Trident symbolized for American strategists a half-way mark, and Quadrant the start of the final lap, Sextant represented the reaching of the goal.

The final act in binding the United States and the United Kingdom to the cross-Channel operation for the spring of 1944 and tying that strategic pattern to a projected Soviet offensive from the east cheered the U.S. high command and planners. The Mediterranean issue appeared to have been settled once and for all. Mediterranean operations were definitely to be limited—in timing, extent of advance, resources, and roles—to the support of Overlord. The national policies and war aims of the three Allied Powers had finally found common agreement in the Overlord-Anvil strategic pattern. The blueprint for Allied victory in Europe gave promise of realizing the basic objectives of General Marshall and his advisers in the war with
Germany—a “decisive” war waged with minimum losses, expense, and time.

But, as usual in coalition warfare, no one staff gained all its desires. All the main threads in operational strategy of 1943—Burma and Pacific, as well as the cross-Channel and Mediterranean—had converged at SEKTANT. The result from the Army point of view was somewhat unexpected. In the process of winning—with Soviet support—its European case, the United States lost out on part of its strategy in the war against Japan. In order to gain its desires in the war against Germany, the American staff had to yield on its plans and hopes for the CBI. What started for them as a showdown on European strategy became a conflict over the strategic significance of operations in southeast Asia. One of the consequences was the indication of new directions in the China-Burma-India theater. The same pressures that pinned the British down to OVERLORD and ANVIL—the need for concentration of resources for the invasion of France—produced a chain reaction resulting in their steadfast refusal to acquiesce in using scarce landing craft in SEAC. The Soviet announcement at Tehran of unequivocal support for OVERLORD-ANVIL—directly weakened the British position on European strategy, while its pledge to enter the war against Japan weakened the American case on the role of the CBI.

As usual, the divergent British and American cases were most clearly reflected in the stands taken by the familiar protagonists and skilled advocates—Churchill and Marshall. Churchill argued for further Mediterranean operations, especially in the eastern Mediterranean, even at the expense of a delay in OVERLORD, and wanted no major undertaking in the CBI. Marshall wanted nothing to delay OVERLORD and no eastern Mediterranean operations and advocated an active campaign in Burma. The President stood between the two. Waving toward the Adriatic and anxious to support China as strongly as possible, Roosevelt ended by putting his full weight behind OVERLORD-ANVIL and reversing himself on China. To get the scheduled cross-Channel operation he wanted and to stay out of the eastern Mediterranean, Marshall had to yield on the Burma operation. But other factors—aside from scarcity of landing craft, British objections, the Soviet announcement, and the President’s reversal—would undoubtedly have made him concede anyway. He wanted to bring the war against Japan to an end as quickly as possible; the ceilings on Army manpower threatened to impose limits to U.S. efforts everywhere, and, as always, the problem of the strategic reserve had to be considered. The promise of the USSR implied bases and manpower, and American planners had begun to discount Chinese capabilities of becoming ready for a major offensive shortly after the defeat of Germany. Marshall and his staff had to recognize that much of the thinking about using Chiang’s manpower and bases had been wishful. Above all, they had begun to recognize that the Pacific promised the fastest approach to defeating Japan.

Given the major determinants of U.S. strategy in 1943—the unconditional surrender concept, which in effect confirmed the military objective of fighting a decisive war; a manpower supply whose ultimate limits had become more apparent and within the terms of which the military were to fight out the war;
the desire to end the war with the least expense in men, money, and time—it was not too surprising that a big operation on the Asiatic mainland would go by the board. It fitted in least well. OVERLORD was on a narrow margin, and the CBI was at the farthest end of the supply line. To keep open a line of communications to support a major campaign in the CBI—even if few U.S. combat troops were actually employed in it—might eventually have put a considerable strain on American manpower and resources. In U.S. military terms, it was the most expendable of operations. The issue was argued out at Sextant in military terms and especially in terms of specific shortages. At stake was the fate of OVERLORD. The upshot was that the Americans yielded on the Burma campaign, the British on the eastern Mediterranean operation.

As it turned out, the decision to forego a large-scale operation on the Asiatic mainland—presaged at Sextant—was no big dramatic decision. Rather, it was a negative one of default. But it was undoubtedly one of the most important for the war, and, it may be argued, for the postwar period as well.

The year 1943 had begun with an indecisive conference at Casablanca, merely confirming that the Pacific and Mediterranean trends would continue. The cross-Channel and Burma operations had simply been left up in the air. No acceptable basis for dividing and relating the efforts against Germany and against Japan had been established. Gradually, in and out of the 1943 conferences, the Mediterranean trend had been tempered and at Sextant definitely tied to a scheduled cross-Channel operation. Though relatively few U.S. troops had been sent to the CBI, that theater had figured as a major element in 1943 discussions and plans. The conference that put the capstone on European strategy marked the beginning of the decline of the CBI in Allied strategy. The equation of matched Mediterranean and Pacific advances, never explicitly stated, that had held through 1943 in Anglo-American planning, was at an end. So too appeared to be the abortive 1943 formulas to link the war against Japan to the war against Germany. Two years after Pearl Harbor the Allies had still not reached agreement on a plan to defeat Japan, but Sextant made clear that Allied attention in operational planning for 1944 would focus on the Pacific as well as Overlord. What the general pattern of strategy to defeat Japan would be and whether any greater success in relating the two wars would be achieved remained for the future to disclose.

Sextant reinforced the portents of the Moscow Conference that political matters would henceforth figure with increasing importance in international deliberations of the coalition partners. Problems of territorial settlements and organization for postwar peace and security were beginning to appear as pressing as those of military plans. More clearly than at any time since Pearl Harbor, the President had—in connection with Sextant—revealed to his military staff the trend of his thinking on postwar political problems. Much of his attention at the conference itself was taken up with political issues. But the staff, which had reached an advanced state in conference techniques and in military diplomacy, was not formally brought into the political discussions at Sextant. Essentially, its deliberations remained
confined, as in conventional U.S. military practice, to the military aspects of questions at issue. In fact, however significant the conference was for American foreign policy, Sextant confirmed that the American staff was fighting and would continue to fight the war in military terms, and in terms of decisive military victory. Nothing decided at the conference would impel the U.S. staff to interpret the unconditional surrender concept—first publicly announced at Casablanca—as anything essentially different from the military objective of fighting a decisive war. Whatever the President's political objectives in the war and his ultimate aims for the postwar world, it is evident that he, like his staff, wanted the war over as quickly and decisively as possible and that he acted at Sextant on that basis. As usual, his precise motivation is less clear. This approach to the war may have represented the impact of his staff's ideas. It may have reflected the need for a simple common denominator in reconciling coalition partners fighting with different political aims and the hope thereby more quickly to gain his own ultimate ends. Perhaps it was no more than the traditional abhorrence of long wars and consequent compulsions of domestic politics in a democracy. Perhaps it was a complex of such influences. Historians of the presidency must provide the answer.

In the final analysis, Sextant marked the beginnings of a realignment of power within the Allied coalition, the significance of which, for the postwar political balance in Europe and Asia, remains to be definitively studied. In the war against Germany, the USSR for reasons of its own put its weight behind American strategy and, confident of its capabilities, asserted its full power as an equal member of the coalition vis-à-vis the United States and the United Kingdom. Long before the USSR or the United States joined the war against Germany, Great Britain's forces had been locked in mortal conflict with the Nazi military might. In the first year and a half after Pearl Harbor, while the United States was gathering its strength and the USSR was largely engaged in a desperate war for survival, British ideas on fighting the European war had tended to prevail over those of the U.S. staff. But in 1943 Great Britain was fully mobilized, and its position in the coalition vis-à-vis the United States, growing stronger and more skilled in the arts of coalition warfare, had gradually been leveled in 1943. In calling the final tune on European strategy at the end of 1943, Great Britain yielded to two powers—the one from the New World, the other from the East—who were to supply the bulk of the military manpower for defeating the German forces on the Continent. In the war against Japan, China began to be counted as less important. The USSR, which pledged itself to enter that conflict, gave promise of taking up the slack. Participation by the USSR was to appear more desirable than ever to the Western Allies. At the same time, the British served notice once more of their own desire for a larger share in the war against Japan. This emerging shift in the Allied balance of power was to provide a new planning environment for the Army staff during the remainder of the war.

The decisions of Sextant confirmed

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87 For a reflection on the problem of the political implications of this shift, especially in connection with postwar Asia, see Appendix B below.
that the two strong protagonists—Marshall and Churchill—would remain at the helm and play out their roles in Anglo-American global strategy. Fittingly also, General Eisenhower, who had shown great adaptability and tact in welding the forces of the two countries in the field and had developed from a U.S. staff officer into an outstanding Allied commander, was to emerge as the commander of the key operation—OVERLORD—itself a compromise between the original desires of the two global chiefs and their staffs. Eisenhower’s projected return to the United Kingdom symbolized the end of the flux that had characterized Anglo-American strategy since the end of 1942 and a shift in coalition warfare back to the track long desired by the Americans and for which they had struggled so hard through 1943. General Eisenhower, who had been so instrumental in fashioning the Army’s BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan and who had gone over to the United Kingdom in June 1942 to prepare for the cross-Channel operation, had, ironically, been heading the Mediterranean campaign since the fall of 1942. He had brought the advance in the Mediterranean to a point where it finally seemed to be within controllable limits and at the close of 1943 prepared once more to return to the United Kingdom, this time destined to stay until victory was won.

On 18 December the President announced to Stimson, “I have thus brought OVERLORD back to you safe and sound on the ways for accomplishment.” Stimson and Marshall and his advisers had every reason to feel that their long struggle to reach a firm understanding with the President, the British, and the Russians had finally been crowned with success. Much water had passed under the bridge since their first attempt in the spring of 1942 to gain a decision for a cross-Channel operation. The road had proved longer, the processes more complicated, the windup somewhat unexpected, and the final plan different from what they had originally envisaged. All this was behind them. Much hard work remained to be done both in Washington and in London to carry out the decision, but the Army staff now looked forward with confidence to the early and decisive Allied victory on the European continent for which they had hoped and planned so long.

*Quoted by Stimson in Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 443.*
By the end of 1943, two years after Pearl Harbor, Allied strategy for the war against Germany had finally been agreed upon and the U.S. Army planners could set their sights on attaining the goals established at Sextant. The main objective would be to amass men and resources for the invasion of the Continent. But the U.S. Army that would be committed against Germany had, like the war plans, developed quite differently from the one the planners had envisaged at the time of Pearl Harbor, or even a year later. Before discussing preparations for Overlord, therefore, the cumulative costs of fighting a multifront war on an opportunistic basis in 1943 should be reviewed. What had happened to the Army internally and externally during the comparatively quiescent period of discussion, debate, and compromise? How were the U.S. forces divided vis-à-vis Germany and Japan by the end of 1943? How had the plans for expanding the Army measured up to the realities of the second year of active American participation in global and coalition warfare?

**Growth of the U.S. Army 1943**

At the end of 1943 the Army planners could look back on another year of flux and change in the Army’s development. The changing requirements and circumstances of coalition warfare in the offensive phase had greatly affected plans and programs for expanding the U.S. Army—in total growth and internal distribution of strength as well as in overseas deployment. Despite the many debates on manpower, the Army had grown from 5,397,674 at the end of 1942 to some 7,482,434 twelve months later. But the year of growth was also a period of retrenchment. Of prime importance had been the realization by the Army that the U.S. manpower barrel did have a bottom. As long as military and civilian production were maintained on a high level, it would be impossible for the Army to scrape the bottom, and the Army showed no inclination to press for any reduction in the American standard of living. While the administration continued to grant agricultural and industrial deferments, the War Department met its own manpower crisis by internal economies such as cutting down requirements for combat troops, reducing overhead establishments, and lowering garrison requirements.1

Because of manpower shortages and

1 Sec Chs. VIII and XI, above.
the failure of the Office of Selective Service to meet Army quotas, the ceiling of 7,700,000 approved by the President in November 1943 was not reached until March 1944. Not only was the Army short more than 200,000 men at the end of 1943, it also contained large groups—such as those soldiers studying in the colleges under the Army Specialized Training Program—that could not be immediately employed. Manpower squeezes, together with strategic, logistical, and operational considerations, helped to change the shape as well as the size of the Army during 1943.

The reduction of the early 1943 Troop Basis of 8,208,000 to 7,700,000 men in November had been accomplished by the more or less general acceptance of the 90-division limit as the “cutting edge” necessary to win the war. Within this limit the character of the cutting edge changed considerably. There was a definite trend toward increasing infantry and airborne divisions during 1943 since strategic and tactical demands as well as the need to save shipping space favored the use of forces that were not so heavily armed or so completely motorized. As a result, a decrease in the rate of activation of armored divisions took place and motorized infantry divisions were reconverted to standard infantry divisions. At the end of 1942 there had been fifty-two infantry, two cavalry, fourteen armored, two airborne, and four motorized divisions in the Army—seventy-four in all. One year later there were ninety divisions in existence—sixty-seven infantry, two cavalry, sixteen armored, and five airborne. The sixteen new divisions activated during 1943 represented less than half the number of divisions—thirty-eight—activated in 1942.

Accumulation of activated and trained divisions in the United States began to mount during 1943 because of the lack of over-all strategic decisions, the imbalances in shipping, and the strain on port capacities. Training camps were crowded and it was difficult to activate additional divisions—only thirteen moved overseas during the year as compared with seventeen in 1942. This left sixty divisions in various stages of readiness scattered over the United States. Many were neither at full strength nor fully equipped, since replacements often had to be drawn from the newer divisions and the equipping of French divisions in North Africa had produced some shortages. When the new demands for manpower were made in late 1943 to operate the B-29’s, to provide for the rotation program, and to keep the Army Specialized Training Program going on a reduced basis, any possibility of organizing another fifteen divisions in 1944, as had been planned in mid-1943, appeared doomed.

As in 1942, the distribution of strength within the Army shifted greatly—and again in favor of air and service troops. Here, favorable circumstances helped the Army to meet the changing needs of global warfare. The fine showing of the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front and the increased effectiveness of the Combined Bomber Offensive meant that fewer U.S. ground troops than originally planned would be required to defeat the

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2 Leighton and Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–43*, Chs. XXV and XXVI.
4 Ibid., pp. 231–32.
Axis Powers. Meanwhile, acceptance of the 90-division limit, placing a curb on the growth of the ground forces, permitted a greater proportion of the 1943 accrual to be devoted to strengthening the air and service forces. The intensification of the air war against both Germany and Japan during this build-up period and the development and improvement of the long lines of communications all over the world to supply the far-flung U.S. forces kept on augmenting the air and service totals. By the end of the year, the number of men in the service branches totaled 2,735,076, an increase of 47 percent; those in the ground arms 2,451,007, an increase of 26 percent; and those in the Air Corps 1,810,900, a 42-percent increase. For the first time during the war, troops in the service branches outnumbered those in the ground arms. The number of air groups had climbed steadily at about the same rate of speed as in 1942, rising from 136 at the end of 1942 to 210 a year later.

At the same time, the limits imposed upon ground combat troops inevitably focused Army attention upon the replacement problem. Until the bulk of the ground units were committed to action, they would be subject to further raids upon their personnel and equipment to provide replacements for divisions already engaged in combat. With the great campaign of the war looming ahead, this problem, the planners realized, would have to be resolved if an adequate and prepared strategic reserve were to be on hand to cope with possible setbacks.

Expansion of the Army Overseas

In spite of the lack of over-all plans and the persistent shipping imbalances, the total overseas strength of the Army had increased from 1,064,643—including 17 divisions and 72 air groups—at the end of 1942 to 2,618,075—including 30 divisions and 136 air groups—a year later. At the close of 1943 some 35 percent of the total Army personnel were out of the country as contrasted with only 20 percent at the end of 1942. During the same period the strength of the Army deployed against Germany and Japan rose from 841,512 to 2,329,427, an increase of over 275 percent. On the other hand, the distribution of these Army forces did not proceed exactly as the Army planners had intended, although the deployment totals were fairly close to the planners' estimates of early 1943. Table 3, based on deployment against Germany and Japan, contrasts the planners' estimates of late March 1943 for the end of the year with the actual deployment at the end of the year. The history of the war during 1943 is reflected in these figures—mounting deployment to the Mediterranean and Pacific, growing costs of the China commitment, and neglect of the build-up in the United Kingdom for the cross-Channel attack. Here, in its simplest form, is the story of the United States' course in the war during 1943.

Deployment to the United Kingdom

Of all the main areas of deployment, the European theater was affected most during 1943 by the failure to carry out the proposed build-up. The planners'
ambitious scheme of early 1943 to station over a million men in the United Kingdom by the beginning of 1944 collapsed as the demands of the Mediterranean and Pacific, the tight shipping situation, and the inactive status of the theater itself as far as ground operations were concerned combined to prevent the projected expansion. In the last half of the year, the increase of the bomber offensive and the transfer of four divisions from the Mediterranean helped to make up some of the deficit, but the rise from 119,702 men on 31 December 1942 to 768,274 a year later still fell over a quarter of a million men short of the planners' estimates.7

Only one division, the 29th Infantry, had been located in the United Kingdom in December 1942. [See Table 4] It was to remain the only major U.S. ground force in the area as late as 31 July 1943. Ten divisions arrived during the last five months of the year—four from the Mediterranean (1st and 9th Infantry, 82d Airborne, and 2d Armored), one from Iceland (5th Infantry), and five from the United States (2d, 8th, and 28th Infantry, 101st Airborne and 3d Armored).

In the meantime, the fifteen air groups present in the United Kingdom at the end of 1942 increased to more than fifty-two groups a year later; the aircraft strength had almost quintupled.8 Some 294,385 personnel, almost 40 percent of the total stationed in the United Kingdom, belonged to the Air Forces. The late spurt in deployment and the final decision at SEXTANT to undertake OVERLORD offered the prospect that, at long

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7 All figures in this and in the following deployment sections are based on STM-30, 1 Jan 48, and USAF Statistical Digest, 1947, unless otherwise noted.

8 The air group figures for the United Kingdom and for the Mediterranean were received from U.S. Air Force, Directorate of Statistical Services. No breakdown for these two areas is given in the USAF 1947 Statistical Digest.
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*Notes:*
- <sup>a</sup> Indicates data from official sources.
- (e) Indicates estimated data.

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<td>64 miscellaneous</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*The personnel figures include ground, air, and service troops. They are based upon STM-38, 1 January 1948. The totals for air combat groups and aircraft are based upon USAF Statistical Digest, 1947, unless otherwise noted.
* The 5th Infantry Division was stationed in Iceland until October 1943.
* The totals of aircraft are based on AAF Statistical Digest, 1945, since no such breakdown is given in the USAF Statistical Digest, 1947.
* Middle East aircraft figures are included in the Mediterranean figures.
last, top priority would be accorded to the U.K. augmentation—ground as well as air.

Deployment to the Mediterranean and Middle East

In the Mediterranean the Army deployment, continuing the trend begun with the landings in North Africa in late 1942, mounted steadily until November 1943. Despite American reluctance to expand Mediterranean operations, the forces in being in the area and the advantages, both political and military, of whittling down German strength on the ground as well as in the air inevitably created pressures that led to further campaigns in the Mediterranean. The momentum generated by the Torch operation produced the Sicilian and Italian campaigns, which caused the planners' estimates of March 1943 to be exceeded by about 150,000 men by the end of 1943. At the end of 1942, when the Allies were engaged in North Africa, there were 227,092 U.S. troops in the Mediterranean area; twelve months later, when the scene of battle had shifted northward to Italy, there were 597,658 troops, an increase of 370,566, in the Mediterranean theater.

In December 1942 there were six Army divisions—the 1st, 3d, 9th, and 34th Infantry and the 1st and 2d Armored—in the Mediterranean. With the addition of the 36th and 45th Infantry and the 82d Airborne Divisions, the area reached the peak of its expansion—nine divisions—in September 1943. By the close of 1943, however, the shipment of the four divisions to the United Kingdom and the arrival of one fresh division in the Mediterranean—the 88th Infantry—from the United States left the area with the same total it had begun the year—six.

The greater part of the increase in personnel over the twelve-month period took place not in ground combat troops but in air and service troops. The Air Forces climbed from twenty-five to forty-one groups and aircraft strength more than tripled. Air Forces personnel mustered 142,790, or about one fourth of the total in the area. The Mediterranean air forces not only furnished air support for the land operations in Italy, they had also become a valuable part of the Combined Bomber Offensive since they were able to strike at objectives beyond the reach of the air forces based in the United Kingdom.

Only in the adjoining area—the Middle East—had the planners' estimates of early 1943 been closely borne out. There, the 30,850 men present in December 1942 increased to 50,553 a year later, just 1,500 short of the estimate. As in the preceding year, the Army sought to remain as uninvolved as possible in the internal problems of this area of British responsibility and to keep its forces at a minimum. The sweep of the war northward in the Mediterranean and toward Europe enabled the Army in 1943 to cut down its commitments to the British in the Middle East—commitments that had involved considerable Army effort and personnel in the critical days
of 1942. At the same time, American aid to the other major European partner in Europe—the Soviet Union—via the Middle East became all the more important. All of the increase in American personnel in the Middle East in 1943 was devoted to furthering the development of the U.S. command in the area consecrated to supplying the Russians over the southern route. In December 1943 this trend was reflected in the formal separation of the Persian Gulf Service Command from the jurisdiction of USAFIME and its redesignation as a separate entity, the Persian Gulf Command.

**Deployment Overseas in the Western Hemisphere**

Changes in the over-all military situation were also reflected in the decline of such essentially defensive areas as the Caribbean. When the manpower situation became acute in early 1943, Marshall ordered the defensive garrisons surveyed and reduced wherever possible. It was natural that the Caribbean Defense Command, which had reached a total of 119,286 troops at the end of 1942, should feel the squeeze of economy. By the close of 1943 its strength had been cut to 91,466. Although there was a paper reduction in the number of air groups assigned to the Caribbean during 1943 from nine to two groups, the actual number of aircraft on hand increased slightly during the year. The reduction in groups was accomplished by removing the organized group designations and forming larger separate squadrons. The possibility of nuisance sea raids and the threat of submarine depredations led to the retention of air protection for this southern sea frontier.

The same trend was apparent in Alaska. During 1943 the Alaskan command had grown from 96,061 at the beginning of the year to 148,167 in August 1943, when operations against Kiska were undertaken. Following the departure of the Japanese from the Aleutians in July, a steady decline in Army commitments set in, and by the end of 1943 there were 121,535 men in the Alaskan area. Two air groups were maintained in Alaska during the year, but the number of squadrons in those groups was reduced from ten to six and the number of assigned aircraft decreased slightly. The decline in importance of overseas Western Hemisphere areas for Army ground deployment reflected the War Department's realization that the shooting war had indeed passed them by.

**Deployment to the CBI**

For the U.S. Army, the CBI continued to represent a complicated web of political, military, and jurisdictional problems. Although the Allies had won back very little territory from the Japanese on the Asiatic mainland, the constant dilation of the U.S. commitment to the area during 1943 resulted in an increase of over 500 percent in the number of Army troops stationed in the CBI. The rise from 17,087 in December 1942 to 94,560 in December 1943 indicated the mounting costs involved in sustaining the Chinese in the war against Japan. To the United States in 1943 the CBI remained—as in 1942—essentially an air and service theater. The United States was pledged to open an overland line of communications to China and was
attempting to build up an airlift in the meantime. Since the Army managed to prevent the assignment of any U.S. combat divisions to the theater, the bulk of allocations to the area in 1943 consisted of air and service troops. The complexities of the intricate line of communications and the persistent demands of the airlift drew in more and more manpower during 1943. A further increase appeared in prospect for 1944 as preparations for the B-29 were pushed forward.

There were seven air groups and six separate squadrons in the CBI at the end of 1943, including over 40,000 Air Forces personnel, as against four groups plus one squadron the previous December. Aircraft strength in the theater more than tripled. The big problem for the Army in China was still logistics, and until this was conquered definite limitations on the size of Chennault’s air forces would exist, especially since B-29 groups would soon be on hand to further complicate the supply picture.

Deployment in the Pacific

In the Pacific, where the growing requirements of the offensive phase had succeeded the piecemeal increases of the defensive and garrisoning stage, Army deployment continued uninterrupted. The Guadalcanal Campaign had, as had the North African operation, been as much offensive as defensive in nature, and each had led to further demands as the initial momentum increased. In 1943, as British pressures in the Mediterranean were matched by U.S. pressures in the Pacific, deployment to the Pacific mounted steadily. During most of the year U.S. and other Allied forces were employed in step-by-step advances in the South and Southwest Pacific. In the course of 1943 they advanced to Bougainville in the Solomons and to the Huon Peninsula in New Guinea. The close of the year found Allied forces invading the island of New Britain in the Southwest Pacific and U.S. forces launching the great amphibious sweep in the Central Pacific with the invasion of the Gilbert Islands. During the course of these operations the Army forces scattered throughout the Pacific almost doubled—from 350,720 in December 1942 to 696,847 at the end of the following year—an increase of over 100,000 more than the planners had counted upon having in the Pacific according to their estimates of early March 1943.

Thirteen Army divisions were stationed in the Pacific at the end of 1943 to carry out the ambitious plans for the dual drive during 1944. Nine divisions had been present in December 1942—the 24th, 25th, 27th, and 40th Infantry in the Central Pacific; the Americal, 37th, and 43d Infantry in the South Pacific; and the 32d and 41st Infantry in the Southwest Pacific. During 1943 four divisions arrived in the Pacific—the Central Pacific received the 6th and 33d Infantry from the United States and the 7th Infantry from Alaska; the 25th Infantry arrived in the South Pacific from Hawaii; and the Southwest Pacific got the 24th Infantry from Hawaii and the 1st Calvary from the United States. In contrast with deployment to the United Kingdom, all four divisions sent from the mainland to the Pacific in 1943 arrived before August, which marked the beginning of the accelerated build-up for the cross-Channel invasion.

Deployment to the Pacific during 1943 continued to be a formidable exercise
in logistics. The enormous distances, the shortage of base and communications facilities, and the imbalances in shipping affected—as in 1942—the character and extent of American deployment in this largely oceanic theater. For every combat division sent to the area, twice as many service troops were required for transport and supply. In the meantime, there was a constant expansion in aircraft and air personnel. The number of air groups in the Pacific increased from seventeen to thirty-two and the number of aircraft more than doubled. The number of medium and light bombers, so necessary in preparing for the step-by-step advance in New Guinea and the island advance through the Solomons, almost quadrupled. Air Forces personnel mounted to 162,376, roughly 23 percent of the total Army deployment in the Pacific. With the launching of the Central Pacific drive in late 1943, requirements for the Pacific area would continue to mount in preparation for the more powerful and extended air and amphibious assaults of 1944.

The Tally Sheet

What do all these figures signify in terms of the war against Germany and that against Japan? During 1943 the Army sent overseas close to a million and a half men against the enemy, including 13 divisions and 8,516 aircraft. Over two thirds of these totals, including more than 1,000,000 troops, 9 divisions, and over 6,000 aircraft were deployed against Germany.

When these figures are added to the totals sent overseas in 1941–42, it is apparent that the balance was finally being redressed in favor of the war against Germany. The cumulative totals at the end of 1943 showed 1,416,485 men, including 17 divisions and 8,237 aircraft deployed against Germany, as opposed to 912,942 troops, including 13 divisions and 4,254 aircraft lined up against Japan—a sharp contrast to the picture at the end of 1942, when in manpower and number of divisions the war against Japan had maintained an edge over the war in Europe. The 1943 Army deployment figures accorded far more closely with the Allied concept that Germany should be beaten first and the main weight of Allied power should be brought to bear upon that country. Approximately 60 percent of Army personnel and over 65 percent of Army aircraft deployed against Germany and Japan were now marshaled against Hitler. And even though the ratio of divisions was only 57 to 43 percent, the European divisional build-up was just on the verge of burgeoning forth. The trend that had allowed the faster expansion of the Pacific in 1942 was being definitely reversed.9

On the other hand, failure of the Allies to agree upon a specific plan for the cross-Channel attack until SEXTANT had permitted deployment in the war against Japan to develop at a much quicker pace than the planners had expected in March 1943. It was not until October that the divisions in Europe exceeded those in the Pacific-Far East.

Were the Army figures the sum total of the U.S. war effort, the conclusion might be drawn that Americans were now fighting the multifront war according to their early concept of the primacy of the struggle in Europe. But it would be quite erroneous to make any such

9 For the 1942 trend see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941–42, Ch. XVI.
### Table 5—U.S. Overseas Deployment: 31 December 1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Against Germany</th>
<th>Against Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>European theater</td>
<td>Mediterranean theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army (^a)</td>
<td>1,810,367</td>
<td>805,792</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force (^b)</td>
<td>979,310</td>
<td>473,889</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy (^c)</td>
<td>437,175</td>
<td>294,385</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marine (^d)</td>
<td>391,400</td>
<td>36,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Division</td>
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<td>16+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>3+</td>
<td>3+</td>
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<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
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<th>Against Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>European theater</td>
<td>Mediterranean theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>8,807</td>
<td>4,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy bombers</td>
<td>2,263</td>
<td>1,686</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium bombers</td>
<td>1,084</td>
<td>444</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light bombers</td>
<td>167</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>3,456</td>
<td>1,866</td>
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<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>268</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transports</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>253</td>
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<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>1,50</td>
<td>123</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>472</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>158</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carrier aircraft</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>283</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat ships</th>
<th>Against Germany</th>
<th>Against Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleships</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>188</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer escorts</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>LST's</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCI's</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack transports (APA)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack cargo (AKA)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Includes Iceland.
\(^b\) Includes Persian Gulf Command.
\(^c\) South Atlantic Naval Forces.
\(^d\) Includes SWPA, SOPAC, and CPA totals for the Army and POA totals for the Navy and Marine Corps.
\(^e\) All Army (including ground and service forces) personnel figures are based on STM-30, Strength of the Army, 1 January 1948.
\(^f\) Air Forces personnel and aircraft figures are based on AAF Statistical Digest, 1945, and USAF Statistical Digest, 1947.
\(^g\) Air Forces and Navy personnel in the Middle East Theater are included in the Mediterranean Theater totals.
\(^h\) All Army and Marine figures are based upon planners’ estimates in JCS 521/3, 4 February 1944, title: Strategic Deployment of U.S. Forces to 31 December 1944. Navy figures include both shore-based and ship-based personnel. Marine figures for 31 December 1943—furnished by the Office of Navy Comptroller—show 5,827 marines in Atlantic area and 156,507 in the Pacific. It has been impossible to reconcile Navy figures currently available with the planners’ estimates.
surmise without considering the effort being expended by the Navy and the Marine Corps, which were very much in the war, especially in the Pacific. Table 5 is an attempt to present in brief an approximation of the total war effort overseas at the end of 1943. Despite its given qualifications, it may serve to dispel somewhat the persistent illusion that the Pacific-Far East was being forgotten or neglected during the second year of the war. MacArthur and Nimitz were far from being forced to fight on a shoestring when compared with the European commanders. After two years of war, the balance of U.S. forces and resources between the European and Japanese arenas was fairly even.

Although the over-all deployment totals of U.S. armed strength against Japan showed a slight margin in personnel over that against Europe, the latter held a narrow edge in divisions and a comfortable lead in the number of aircraft. It should also be noted that the bulk of the heavier types of aircraft were operating against Germany. In the matter of transport aircraft, which were still in short supply, the European theaters enjoyed a small advantage over the Pacific-Far East. The Army had 849 in the former as opposed to 545 in the latter. This does not include about 165 planes that were assigned to the Air Transport Command for the Hump airlift; if these were added in, the totals would show some 710 in the war against Japan, a figure that compares quite favorably with the 849 deployed against Germany.\(^{10}\)

The greater part of U.S. naval power, including most of the newest combat ships, was stationed in the Pacific. Whereas Navy and Marine personnel formed only 22 percent of the effort against Germany, they composed over a half of the U.S. forces in the Pacific. In distribution of aircraft, only 6 percent of the planes in the Atlantic-Mediterranean area belonged to the Navy, while over 46 percent of those deployed in the Pacific bore Navy or Marine insignia.

Over-all figures on the amount of U.S. cargo shipping present in individual areas are incomplete. Insofar as the shipping under Army control is concerned, 549 ships, totaling 4,924,558 measurement tons and a troop capacity of 353,948, were on the Atlantic-Mediterranean run; 437 ships, totaling 3,837,287 measurement tons and a troop capacity of 160,590, were in the Pacific-Far East.\(^{11}\)

War Shipping Administration cargo ships allocated to the Army and Navy as of 1 January 1944 totaled 4,290,000 deadweight tons in the Pacific and 5,300,000 dead-weight tons in the Atlantic.\(^{12}\) Army and WSA allocations thus gave an edge to the European war, with approximately 55 percent of the shipping being devoted to the struggle against Germany. However, cargo ships controlled outright

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\(^{10}\) USAF Statistical Digest, 1947. The Army Air Forces received over 70 percent of factory deliveries of transport aircraft during 1943; the Navy, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union received the bulk of the remainder.

\(^{11}\) Data originally compiled from Rpts of Vessels Operations, Analysis Branch, Water Div, OCT, and reworked for Statistics, a volume to be published in the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.

\(^{12}\) WSA Shipping Summary, Aug 45, p. 40.
by the Navy are not included in these totals and inclusion of these might modify the European advantage somewhat. Unfortunately, the Navy figures on the distribution between the Atlantic and Pacific of cargo shipping under its control at the end of 1943 are not available.

Although no complete breakdown on the over-all distribution of landing craft and combat loaders in all categories exists, the preponderance of attack transports (APA's), attack cargo ships (AKA's), and LST's was in the Pacific at the end of 1943, while the European theaters enjoyed an edge in infantry landing craft (LCI's). The whole problem of landing craft shortages is, to say the least, puzzling. When the 1942 production program was completed in early 1943, American military authorities made no immediate attempt to establish a new program. Other urgent requirements for vessels such as destroyer escorts to combat the submarine menace in the Atlantic were placed at the top of the "must" lists. Despite the discussions at QUADRANT on landing craft for OVERLORD and for Pacific operations, there was a definite lull in construction during the summer of 1943, especially in the larger types of landing craft. During September and October the JCS approved increases in landing craft production, but since the augmentations would be small until the spring of 1944, OVERLORD would receive at best minor benefits from this somewhat tardy action. A later acceleration of production—in December following SEXTANT—promised mainly to aid the Pacific. The lateness of the decision to accelerate the program, the delay inherent in converting shipyards to landing craft production, changes in design, the winter weather, and the crowded conditions existing in most shipyards slowed down construction at the end of 1943, when time was at a premium. Only a herculean effort would enable the goals set at SEXTANT to be met, and the prospects for early 1944 were not very encouraging.

It is difficult to state with any certainty why the landing craft deficiency was allowed to develop and grow for so long without interference. The War Production Board did see the need for increased production in August 1943. The delay until the fall of 1943 in setting up a new and expanded program has led some students of industrial production to suggest that the principal strategic planners were at fault for not anticipating the needs of 1944 early enough to provide lead time for the builders to prepare for increased demands. This explanation appears to oversimplify a complex problem. The uncertainty about OVERLORD and Mediterranean operations had not been definitely resolved at QUADRANT. The submarine menace that had led to the high-priority escort vessel program in the spring of 1943 had abated considerably, but was still a matter of some concern to the planners. Moreover, despite the acknowledged primacy of the European war, the Navy continued to protect zealously the production and allocation of landing craft destined for the Pacific. The Navy also could not easily forget the unsettling effects that the 1942 landing craft program had had upon its over-

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all construction schedules. Not until the Allied political authorities had come to a resolute decision on strategy at the close of 1943 could the strategic and logistical planners proceed with full confidence that the cross-Channel assault would be carried out.

When all these statistics on the distribution of U.S. manpower and resources are considered, some of the implications of engaging in a multifront conflict become more obvious. It is apparent that a mere decision at the top levels labeling one war primary and the other secondary was not sufficient. The events of 1942 and 1943 demonstrated that a policy of opportunism on the fronts in both wars tended to annul any paper priorities and led to diversions usually unfavorable to projected long-range deployment schemes such as BOLERO. Limited and secondary offensives, covered by such catch phrases as "maintaining the strategic initiative" and "applying unremitting pressure," continued to absorb more men and resources than originally planned, frequently at the expense of long-range build-ups. The planners had found that it was impossible to keep a secondary war secondary as long as there was no definite and accepted long-range plan for the primary war. The tendency to expand subordinate operations in the absence of over-all decisions assigning top priority to the main effort was difficult to resist. In addition, after two years of American participation in the war the United States had acquired a number of "fixed charges" that were accorded preferential treatment in the allocation of U.S. resources—the so-called basic understandings, which consisted, to a large degree, of maintaining America's allies. To the diversions of the secondary fronts were added such charges as provision for the security of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles, fulfillment of the Soviet protocols, and aid to China, France, and Italy. It was not until OVERLORD was granted top priority at Sextant that it could compete with these other basic undertakings for American resources. The double war could finally begin to assume the focus and to flow in the channels planned by the War Department in the early stages of coalition warfare.

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14 A detailed account of the landing craft program during the last half of 1943, including attention to the Navy's role, may be found in Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943–45.
CHAPTER XVIII

Concentration for the Big Blow

January—May 1944

At the beginning of 1944 the main lines of strategy for the second front against Germany were fixed. To invade France from the west was the paramount task for the year ahead. OVERLORD was to be the greatest amphibious operation in history and the mightiest Allied undertaking of the war. Despite the almost unbroken series of Allied victories over the past year, Germany was far from defeated. The German war machine and civilian morale showed no signs of cracking. In Italy the stiff resistance put up by the German armed forces had combined with mud and weather to bring the Allied advance to a halt. In early November 1943 Hitler had begun to face the hard fact that Allied invasion of western Europe might come at any time. Hitherto, whenever a crisis arose, the German High Command had turned to the west for fresh forces. The heavy losses on the Soviet front, the campaign in Italy, and the threat to the Balkans had drawn off the best German divisions. "I can no longer justify the further weakening of the West in favor of other theaters of war," Hitler had informed his commanders on 3 November. Henceforth, he went on, forces and defenses in the West would be strengthened to throw back the expected invasion into the sea, or, at worst, to contain it in its beachhead.¹

In the months that followed the Germans found it difficult to adhere closely to the November directive. Demands from the Eastern Front continued and first-class divisions were hard to come by. Nevertheless, by the spring the Germans managed to replace their withdrawals from the West in quality if not in quantity, and Field Marshal Rommel assumed command of the defenses of western Europe. From information gleaned by German agents in the British Embassy at Ankara, the Germans learned the meaning of the code word OVERLORD in the early days of 1944 and concluded that the major Allied assault in 1944 would be in western Europe and not in the Balkans. Although they still did not know where or when the invasion would take place, their anxiety over the Balkans lessened, and they strove to complete the Atlantic Wall and preparations to hold the Allies as close to the sea as possible.²

The Allies were faced with the grim

² (1) Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 147ff.
(2) Pogue, Supreme Command, p. 164.
CONCENTRATION FOR THE BIG BLOW

prospect that behind the reinforced defenses of the Atlantic Wall the Germans were preparing for a desperate last-ditch effort that might hurl the invasion forces back and snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. Until the “big blow” across the Channel succeeded or failed, further major combined decisions on military strategy would have to wait. In the meantime, within the general pattern many critical problems—essentially logistical, tactical, and administrative—had to be settled.

The hard struggle Marshall had waged in 1943 to retain freedom of action in order to concentrate U.S. forces for the cross-Channel attack now appeared ready to pay off. However, an important question remained. After two years of diverting forces and resources to far-flung fronts and lines of communications, could the staff fulfill the requirements of the highly operational phase of global and coalition warfare and still gather enough strength and means in time to meet General Eisenhower’s needs?

Preparations for OVERLORD

General Eisenhower Takes Command

Following his departure from the Mediterranean and a hurried trip to the United States, General Eisenhower arrived in London on 14 January 1944. While in the United States he had conferred briefly with War Department officials and the President on his new assignment. Soon after his notification in early December that he had been appointed Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, he had begun to lay his plans and arrange his organization for OVERLORD. In London, he proceeded to plan for the invasion with the COSSAC staff, which he expanded into the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). His chief subordinates in the coalition command he was to forge included Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, his deputy; Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, commander of the First U.S. Army; General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, commanding general of the 21 Army Group in charge of the assault phase; Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, commander of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe; Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, Allied Naval Commander in Chief; Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Air Commander in Chief; and Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff. Eisenhower soon realized that much remained to be done in planning and preparing for OVERLORD. Three days after he arrived, he wrote to General Marshall:

It is obvious that strong and positive action is needed here in several directions. The location of various headquarters, the exact pattern of command, the tactics of the

1 For the high-level background discussions on the remodeling of Allied European and Mediterranean theater commands in order to prepare for OVERLORD, see especially: (1) pers ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 Dec 43, Paper 36, Book 14, Exec 9; (2) msg, Prime Minister to President, 19 Dec 43, SW files, War Plans, 57; (3) msg, President to Prime Minister, 20 Dec 43, SW files, War Plans, 59; (4) ltr, Stimson to President, 20 Dec 43, SW files, White House; (5) msg, Prime Minister to Hopkins, 22 Dec 19, Hopkins Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; and (6) Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 422-25.

2 A full discussion of the organization of General Eisenhower’s staff and command for the cross-Channel operation is contained in Pogue, Supreme Command, Chs. I–IV.
assault, and the strength in units and equipment, are all questions that have not yet been definitely settled. The most important of all these questions is that of increasing the strength of the initial assault wave in OVERLORD.6

In the next few months General Eisenhower and his staff were busily engaged in settling these questions and completing the myriad preparations necessary to carry out "the decisive act" of the war.7 Once General Eisenhower had been put in charge and the general directives for invading Europe had been issued, the burden of American staff work shifted from Washington to his headquarters in London. Relying heavily on Eisenhower's judgment, and on the "pick and shovel" work of his staff, the CCS made their decisions on the logistical, tactical, and organizational questions as they arose. Preparations for OVERLORD in the early months of 1944 illustrated clearly, the large role in strategic and operational planning for coalition warfare that the overseas commander and the large theater headquarters had come to play.

In Washington, General Marshall and his planning assistants closely followed the course of the final preparations and planning for OVERLORD. As always, the Army planning staff's particular preoccupation was with anything affecting deployment of the U.S. Army in the worldwide conflict. OVERLORD, the great effort toward which they had so long been pointing, was to be the climax of the wearying months of planning, organizing, training, equipping, and husbanding the citizen Army. With the decision made and the operation entrusted to General Eisenhower, the Washington staff turned its attention to many related problems, ranging from logistical preparations to politico-military terms on which the war might be concluded. Through staff studies, visits to the theater, and conferences with General Eisenhower and his staff representatives in Washington and London, the Washington planners sought to anticipate his needs and support his undertaking. From his vantage point in the Washington headquarters, the Chief of Staff gave counsel and offered suggestions to General Eisenhower—sometimes on his own initiative, sometimes by invitation. As usual, he left final decisions to the commander's judgment.

One interesting example where Marshall took the initiative was in the use of airborne troops. He was much attracted by the bold and relatively new idea of employing airborne troops strategically to execute a vertical envelopment en masse far behind the battle.

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lines. In early February he therefore submitted to General Eisenhower a proposal advanced by AAF headquarters to airdrop several divisions close to Paris before or on D Day and thereby upset German defensive plans. To present the specific plan he sent a small special mission composed of Brig. Gen. Frederick W. Evans, Commanding General, Troop Carrier Command, and Col. Bruce W. Bidwell, Operations Division airborne consultant. To Eisenhower he wrote in advance:

The trouble with this plan is that we have never done anything like this before, and frankly, that reaction makes me tired. Therefore I should like you to give these young men an opportunity to present the matter to you personally before your Staff tears it to ribbons. Please believe that, as usual, I do not want to embarrass you with undue pressure. I merely wish to be certain that you have viewed this possibility on a definite planning basis.8

Nevertheless, General Eisenhower and

8 Ltr, Marshall to Eisenhower, 10 Feb 44. Paper 199, Book 14, Exec 9.
his staff, fearing the immobility of the force in the airhead before the beachhead was secured and concerned with the need for immediate and close support of the beachhead landings, felt that the plan was not feasible, at least until after the beachhead was established.9 With some regret General Marshall bowed to the overseas commander's decision. In concluding the episode he wrote, characteristically:

I am sorry you do not see your way clear initially to commit the airborne effort en masse. I hope, however, that the visit of these two officers stimulated thought in the matter and served a useful purpose.10

From the beginning, General Marshall sought to strengthen the Supreme Commander's position vis-à-vis his superiors and his subordinates.11 A confirmed believer in giving the responsible commander wide latitude, he also believed in giving him capable assistants. He was particularly concerned that General Eisenhower be given outstanding corps and division commanders and offered him his pick.12 To place the best available personnel in the proper slots for OVERLORD, a heavy transatlantic correspondence flowed between the Washington Army headquarters and London in the early months of 1944. When General Marshall felt it necessary, he would prod the theater staff even as he would their Washington counterparts. Above all, General Marshall and his advisers remained on the lookout for anything that might jeopardize the agreed strategic pattern. OVERLORD was the key to victory in the global war, and it must not fail.

Windup of BOLERO

When General Eisenhower arrived in London in January 1944, the American build-up for OVERLORD was well under way. Only five months remained before the troops would board the ships for the fateful venture across the Channel. Fortunately, the groundwork in assembling, organizing, training, equipping, and accommodating the forces for the great amphibious undertaking had been well laid by Washington and London. On the basis of the 1942–43 experience with BOLERO, the pattern of Army staff action and even the basic machinery for getting the troops to the United Kingdom were already well established.13 Gone was the confusion and uncertainty that had plagued the efforts of the planners to carry out the original BOLERO plan. Now the cross-
Channel operation was a firm commitment and nothing was to be spared to ensure its success. As a result of previous measures taken and plans laid on both sides of the Atlantic, the Supreme Commander could feel reasonably assured that the required "cutting edge" in trained and equipped divisional strength would be available in time for the invasion.

The momentum of the build-up was greatly speeded in the early months of 1944. The period of January through May saw the consummation of the BOLERO movement begun by the War Department as far back as the spring of 1942. Following successive slowdowns and delays in favor of meeting the heavy requirements of the Mediterranean campaign and of the intensive build-up of air forces for the United Kingdom, the dispatch of U.S. combat divisions had been resumed in earnest in the fall of 1943. By January 1944, about half of the required U.S. combat divisions were already in the United Kingdom. The others were scheduled to arrive from the United States before D Day. Actually, the number of combat divisions grew from eleven on 1 January 1944 to twenty by 31 May 1944. In January the 4th Armored Division completed its overseas movement to the United Kingdom; in February, the 4th and 30th Infantry Divisions and the 5th and 6th Armored Divisions; in April, the 90th, 79th, and 83d Infantry Divisions; and in May the 35th Infantry Division. Keeping pace with the increase in divisions, the number of combat air groups in the European theater doubled in the first five months of 1944—from 51 1/4 to 102 groups. In the same period the total strength of U.S. troops in the United Kingdom also doubled—rising by the end of May to over a million and one half men. From the fall of 1943 to D Day, the flow of U.S. combat divisions averaged about two a month. As in the past, many of the units were transported from the United States to the United Kingdom in the large, fast, converted passenger liners—Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth. During this period an average of 150,000 men were transported each month. The fresh American units coming from the United States were well trained; those from the Mediterranean were battle tested.

At SEXTANT, on the basis of available ships and units, the CCS had accepted a troop ceiling in the United Kingdom for U.S. Army deployment of 1,476,300 by 31 May 1944. The theater headquarters' requests for D Day requirements exceeded these figures. To meet them the War Department diverted 20,-
Equally impressive was the record of cargo shipments in the five months preceding D Day. More than six million measurement tons poured into British ports. The way was paved in December 1943 when the European theater gained top priority for all necessary items of equipment. England became a bulging storehouse.

The flow of troop and cargo shipments did not become a really serious problem until spring. Even then the question was not essentially one of the availability of ships, troops, or cargoes. Rather, a crisis arose over the growing strain put on the port and inland transportation facilities in the United Kingdom. The movement into the United Kingdom during May overlapped the beginning of outloading of men and supplies for the cross-Channel operation. The limiting factor of port capacity—itself a product of labor shortages and availability of berths—fastened onto the entire build-up program. To meet the crisis, various adjustments and expedients were worked out by SHAEF and the British authorities. For its part, the War Department revised shipping schedules, ceilings, and priority lists. One direct effect of the crisis over port capacity was an agreement of the British authorities in late May to accept a temporary cut in the British import program. In spite of the serious strains and stresses on troop and cargo reception, the tremendous flow of supplies and troops to the United Kingdom was maintained in the final months preceding the invasion, though by 31 May there were still certain shortages in service troops, the shipment of some combat units had been deferred, and the problem of replacements had not yet been solved.

But the Sextant schedule for D Day had been exceeded by 50,000, and over a million and one half American troops were in the United Kingdom poised for the attack. Bolero was at last complete.

The 90-Division Gamble

The requirements in troops for Overlord accented certain Army-wide manpower pinches and made the planners take another serious look at the Army troop basis. During the Sextant Conference, the Joint Logistics Committee had estimated that there would be a serious shortage of service troops during 1944 for the war against Japan, and also a shortage of men for the B-29 program. The committee suggested that the Army troop basis be revised to anticipate these shortages and that the United States take a calculated risk and eliminate the fifteen infantry divisions that were to be set up in 1944. This would leave the Army with ninety divisions—forty-three for the war in Europe, seven for North Africa, twenty-two for the Pacific, and eighteen for the continental reserve. If necessary, service troops could be organized from invasion forces might not be equipped in the presence of plenty.” (See p. 299.)
the eighteen reserve divisions. A Strategy Section report in late December 1943 substantiated this estimate that ninety divisions would be enough to win the war, although it allocated fifty-eight divisions for Europe and North Africa, twenty-five for the Pacific, and kept only seven in reserve. The Strategy Section recognized the possibility that the Army might not be able to activate the additional fifteen divisions and remain within the 7,700,000-man ceiling adopted in November. The economy program had released some 212,000 men for reassignment during 1943, but Selective Service had fallen behind in its inductions, and the War Department was 200,000 men short of its 7,700,000 goal. On top of this, the rotation program approved in December would require 60,000 men during 1944, and the Air Forces had requested 130,000 men for its B-29 program. Even if Selective Service were to meet its quotas in 1944 and make up the 200,000-man deficit, there would be a cushion of only 22,000 men left over from the 212,000 recovered from the economy program. Besides, the Strategy Section concluded, there were no firm requirements for the fifteen additional infantry divisions.

Activation of the fifteen divisions was deferred, but the continuing scarcity of service troops led Marshall to call a conference of theater G-4’s in Washington in late January to consider the problem. He wrote personally to several theater commanders requesting their aid in effecting any economies possible and recommended a number of expediency to relieve the deficiency in service troops.

Estimates submitted by General Somervell in January anticipated a shortage of 40,000 service troops for ANVIL and 112,000 for Pacific operations, but no increase in the troop basis was made. The Army was trying desperately to stay within the 7,700,000 ceiling and to meet needs from within by rigid economy and adjustment. Discussing the whole Army personnel problem frankly with the JCS in early February, Marshall pointed out that the ground forces were short about 87,000–97,000 troops and were forced to take men from other divisions to fill up those going overseas. Economies had produced a saving of 100,000 men but the need for manpower for the B-29 program had eaten this up. Now there was a deficiency of 100,000 service troops for OVERLORD, ANVIL, and western Pacific operations, and a large number of tactical units was being used to help in the housekeeping of training establishments in the United States in order to release service forces for overseas duty. The need for service personnel often resulted in abbreviated training periods and less efficient troops. Marshall estimated that replacements and rotation fillers, added to induction shortages and ground force and service de-

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22 JCS 581/3, 4 Dec 43, title: Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan.
24 (1) Msg, Marshall to Harmon, 27 Jan 44, CMOUT 10668. (2) Ltr, Marshall to Devers, 27 Jan 44, WDCSA 320.2 TS, 4. See also below, p. 461, n. 32.
25 (1) Memo, Somervell for CofS, 26 Jan 44, sub: Sextant Requirements for Service Troops, WDCSA 320.2 TS, 4. (2) D/F, Handy for DCofS, 2 May 44, sub: Demobilization Planning Troop Basis, WDCSA 320.2 TS, 10.
iciencies, made the present deficit between 350,000 and 400,000 men.  

Marshall decided that the time had come for drastic action. The Army, he concluded, could not justify, in the face of such personnel shortages, the Army Specialized Training Program that had been set up to educate some of its more intelligent men in colleges. On 10 February, he cut back the program to 30,000 men, releasing 120,000 for distribution, mainly to ground and service forces. Later in the month he was able to secure Presidential pressure on the War Manpower Commission and the Selective Service to review occupational deferments and to provide the forces required by the armed services. By spring, most of the induction backlog had been made up.

Easing the manpower situation still left the question of whether there would be enough strategic reserve in the Army troop basis to insure the defeat of Germany once the troops were ashore in France. Of all the calculated risks taken by Marshall and his staff in preparing for invasion of the Continent, the greatest gamble was the decision to hold to the 90-division troop basis. Even on the eve of OVERLORD, there were some uneasy doubts about the gamble in high Washington military circles. On 10 May Secretary Stimson, long an advocate of a bold cross-Channel move, raised the issue with General Marshall. Stimson wrote:

> I have always felt that our contribution to the war should include so far as possible an overwhelming appearance of national strength when we actually get into the critical battle. By this I mean not merely strength on the battle front but in reserve. It has been our fate in the two world wars to come in as the final force after the other combatant nations had long been engaged. Our men have thus come to the field untested, even when well trained, to fight against veteran enemies. Such conditions make the appearance and possession of overwhelming strength on our part important both tactically and psychologically.  

Stimson feared this might not be the case on the Continent in 1944. Against the estimated fifty-six German divisions that were to defend France, the United States would have barely more than an equal number available for the offensive by the end of the summer. The average age of the men in the U.S. divisions was now rather high, and the Army would need a large number of replacements. Current Army calculations, both in the European theater and in the United States, seemed to Stimson “to shave the line of sufficiency rather narrowly instead of aiming at massive abundance.” When all the OVERLORD divisions had left the United States, there would remain in the United States only fourteen uncommitted divisions. These would constitute practically the only reserve for operations in France. The British could offer no such reserve to assist the United States. As a result, the Germans would not get a picture of overwhelming strength opposing them. Furthermore, the estimated German reserve of eleven divisions was almost as large as the American reserve. The German Army

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26 Min, 14th mtg JCS, 1 Feb 44.
CONCENTRATION FOR THE BIG BLOW

was better fed than in 1918, when German morale did not break. All of this led Stimson to fear that a stalemate might develop in November when climatic conditions on the Continent would reduce the power to maneuver. Even the advantageous factors of intensified air bombardment of Germany and the Soviet advance might not be enough to insure complete victory. The Russians, he observed, were still a long way from Germany. "Furthermore, the Russians are already reaching boundary lines where they conceivably might stop with their grand strategic objective of national defense satisfied by the eviction of the invader and the gaining back of all they had lost, plus the Baltic states."

To forestall a stalemate, Stimson asked Marshall, should not new manpower legislation be sought from Congress before the elections in November? Should not new divisions be activated now by the War Department?

On 16 May, just three weeks before Overlord was launched, General Marshall replied. He agreed that everything possible must be done to prevent a stalemate from developing in the fall, but he disagreed with Stimson's analysis and conclusions. Marshall wrote Stimson, "We are about to invade the Continent and have staked our success on our air superiority, on Soviet numerical preponderance, and on the high quality of our ground combat units." Exploiting these advantages, Marshall hoped, would convince the Germans of the futility of fighting for a stalemate. He felt "the air arm should be our most effective weapon in bringing home to the German people and the German Army the futility of continued resistance." As a result of recent conversations between Harriman and Stalin, he also believed the Russians would not break off their current efforts until Germany was defeated. Emphasizing that the Army was relying on the qualitative rather than the quantitative superiority of its ground force units, he declared, "Our equipment, high standard of training, and freshness should give us a superiority which the enemy cannot meet and which we could not achieve by resorting to a matching of numerical strength." Marshall pointed also to the advantages of the replacement system designed to keep U.S. divisions in the line at full strength, the preponderance of artillery, and the employment of air superiority in close tactical support.

Even on a strictly numerical basis, Marshall thought that the U.S. divisions would eventually compare very favorably with the German forces. Shipping and other logistical factors would limit the build-up in Europe to about four divisions a month, but even at that rate, by April 1945 the fifty-nine divisions available to the United States could be utilized. Adding some twenty-one British divisions, and an additional ten to fifteen U.S. and French divisions that could be made available for employment in France if a defensive position were assured in Italy, the Western Powers would have some ninety-five divisions to employ against the estimated fifty-six German divisions. The most troublesome factor, he informed Stimson, would be the comparatively slow rate of American build-up—a direct product of purely logistical limitations. That factor, above all others, might result in slowing down Allied operations, since the Germans, if they felt free to transfer divisions from

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29 (1) Memo, Marshall for SW, 16 May 44, sub: Increase in the Strength of the Army, SW files, Staff.
other fronts, could deploy their forces more rapidly than the Americans could build up theirs.

If, however, all current plans failed and a stalemate did occur in November, then Marshall felt new major strategic decisions would be required. A few additional divisions would probably not be enough to break the impasse. If new divisions and supporting units were now created, furthermore, "emasculating drafts" on existing divisions would result and current plans for their deployment would be upset. Thus, he reasoned, no far-reaching changes should be made in the Army troop basis until the outcome of the initial stages of the invasion were clear. "Considering the matter from all angles and with the realization of the hazards involved," Marshall concluded, "I believe that at the present time no increase should be made in the over-all strength of the Army, except as may prove to be necessary to provide replacements." Beyond "prudent" advance staff planning for increasing the troop basis, which he had ordered the War Department General Staff to undertake, Marshall was willing to stand pat. Clearly, he looked upon the Allied divisions in the Mediterranean as part of the strategic reserve for the invasion of the Continent. As the debate over ANVIL would show, he was anxious to make what he regarded the surplus U.S. and French divisions in Italy available to support the main effort in France, just as he had earlier been to extract the seven British and U.S. divisions from the Mediterranean for OVERLORD.30

Behind the calmly reasoned and formal language of Marshall's reply to Stimson lay one of the boldest calculations of the war.31 How great a calculated risk was being taken was further emphasized by the concomitant willingness of General Marshall and his staff to allocate military manpower for the B-29 program against Japan, instead of investing in more divisions. Only the future would disclose whether the bold calculation would be vindicated by the still largely untested divisions of the U.S. Army, a product of his own faith and struggles.

**OVERLORD Planning and Mediterranean Options**

The problem of strengthening the initial assault was less easily resolved than that of assembling trained and equipped troops for OVERLORD. When General Eisenhower took up his duties in London, the formal plan for invasion was still the outline presented by COS-SAC in July 1943. That plan had been developed on the basis of definite limits in the numbers of landing craft, ships, and other resources prescribed in CCS instructions. In line with the instructions, COSSAC had planned an assault by three divisions, with two additional divisions as an immediate follow-up. COSSAC proposed to land the three divisions on the coast between Caen and Carentan, though a particularly vexing problem was the fact that good-sized harbors were lacking in this stretch of the coast. General Eisenhower, General Montgomery, and General Bedell Smith, soon after their arrival in London, took up the cudgels for a revised plan of assault—one that would provide for a

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30 See below, this chapter.
stronger attack on a broader front and thereby speed the capture of the port of Cherbourg and facilitate the breakout from the initial bridgehead. Consequently, they insisted on a first assault by five divisions instead of three.\(^3\) The size and scope of any landing on the Normandy beaches, however, were limited by that ever-precious commodity, landing craft. Where could extra landing craft be found? The United States was committed to amphibious actions in the Pacific, and the necessary additional landing craft could not easily be diverted in time from that theater. Southeast Asia was already being stripped of its landing craft. The most likely source, therefore, was the Mediterranean, but the approximately two-division lift available there was required for ANVIL, the projected complementary attack against southern France that was to coincide with OVERLORD. If the Mediterranean landing craft were allocated to the OVERLORD operation, ANVIL would have to be canceled. The search for landing craft was on again in Washington and London. This time the increased demands for OVERLORD came into competition with the needs for the Mediterranean operations. Directly involved were the date of OVERLORD and the fate of ANVIL.

**Debate Over OVERLORD, ANVIL, and the Italian Campaign**

The ensuing Anglo-American debate in the early months of 1944 developed first as between OVERLORD and ANVIL, and then as between ANVIL and the Italian campaign. To obtain the additional lift for the OVERLORD assault, Generals Montgomery and Bedell Smith early in January recommended the abandonment of ANVIL except as a threat. On 17 January General Eisenhower reported to General Marshall:

> In order to assure themselves of what is deemed the necessary strength, most people here, including Montgomery, Smith and a number of others, have definitely recommended a serious reduction in ANVIL. This seems to me to be justified only as a last resort. I clearly appreciate—in fact much more than do these people—that the coming venture is the decisive act of the war from the viewpoint of the British-American effort. I know that this attack must succeed. However, I think the question to be weighed is that of increasing our insurance in obtaining the first-foothold on the beaches against the advantages that would accrue from a really successful ANVIL.\(^3\)

Two other considerations seemed important to Eisenhower. In the first place, the British and Americans at Tehran had definitely promised the Russians that ANVIL would take place. Secondly, the Americans had put a considerable investment into the French Army. If the southern France operation were not launched, a great number of U.S. and French forces would be locked in the Mediterranean and wasted. Eisenhower was determined, he informed Marshall, to explore every avenue for increasing the initial weight of OVERLORD before he would recommend any substantial weakening of ANVIL. General Marshall and his advisers shared these views. To them OVERLORD and ANVIL were essential parts of the same undertaking, and they

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\(^3\) (1) Msg, Prime Minister to President, 7 Jan 44, No. 536, Item 69b, Exec 10. (2) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 Feb 44, CM-IN 5606.

could not blithely accept cancellation of the one, much as they wished to strengthen the other.

Through January the planning staffs on both sides of the Atlantic studied the implications and costs of expanding the OVERLORD assault and sought ways out of the dilemma. In addition to an increased number of landing craft, more transport aircraft and additional fighter plane squadrons would be needed. Adjustments in air requirements did not appear to be nearly so critical.

On one expedient to secure extra landing craft British and American staffs could agree. If the target date for OVERLORD were postponed from 1 May to 31 May, an extra month's production would become available. The disadvantage of losing a month of good campaigning weather for ground forces in the west would be balanced by the improved prospect of favorable weather on the Soviet front and the additional time allowed for preparatory attacks of the Allied air forces over Europe. With Eisenhower and the British Chiefs of Staff willing, the JCS on 31 January agreed to the postponement.

The problem of ANVIL still remained and, in fact, became even more complicated. By the beginning of February, British opposition to ANVIL hardened. A new factor entered the debate. The

British were now as much concerned over the additional needs for the war in Italy as they were over those for the OVERLORD assault. They were convinced that the badly stalled Italian campaign must be started up again in earnest. Once again the familiar specter of the draining powers of secondary operations rose to plague the Washington staff. They must watch the allocations—especially of scarce resources—carefully. But Churchill, who firmly believed that a vigorous campaign in Italy in the first half of 1944 could offer the greatest assistance to the cross-Channel operation, felt some flexibility was justified in order to utilize every scrap of fighting strength fully. He later wrote, "Here the American clear-cut, logical, large-scale mass-production style of thought was formidable."35

Washington and London were both concerned by the stalemate in Italy. By the close of December 1943, the Allied campaign had bogged down just above the Volturno and Sangro Rivers in the face of rugged terrain, miserable weather, and resourceful German resistance. Following General Sir Henry M. Wilson's appointment as Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, the CCS, at Marshall's behest, on 7 January 1944 passed the executive direction of the Mediterranean to the British.

To serve as Wilson's deputy, General Devers, whom Eisenhower replaced as the commanding general of the European theater, was transferred from the United Kingdom. In addition, General

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34 In Washington, the AAF concluded that the increased requirement for fighter aircraft would have to be met essentially by the redistribution of the fighter load among the available forces already scheduled for OVERLORD. SHAEF's request for additional fighter squadrons was turned down by Washington. See msgs and papers filed with memo, Gen Hansell, AAF planner, for Adm Bieri, Gen Roberts, and Capt Donald B. Duncan, USN, 12 Mar 44, sub: Retention of Long Range Fighter Groups in the Mediterranean, with JPS 405/1 in ABC 384 Mediterranean (26 Oct 43), 3.

35 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 426.

36 (1) Memo, G. C. M. for Handy, no sub, 3 Jan 44, OPD 384 ETO, 21. (2) Min, 140th mtg CCS, 7 Jan 44. (3) D/F, OPD for TAG, 10 Jan 44, sub: Executive Direction for Mediterranean Theater, OPD 381 MTO, 21.
Devers succeeded Eisenhower as commander of the U.S. troops in the Mediterranean theater. Also, General Eaker was sent from the United Kingdom to relieve Air Chief Marshal Tedder as Allied Air Commander in the Mediterranean. Ensuing changes in command assignments between the ETO and NATO and reorganized boundaries and administrative adjustments between NATO and USAFIME (General Royce commandng), put into effect by the War Department in early 1944, were of a piece with the Army's efforts to emphasize and strengthen the supporting role of Mediterranean operations.

At the same time, the new Allied setup in the Mediterranean permitted Churchill to exercise a freer hand and play a more direct role in determining the conduct of the Italian campaign. He was determined to break the stalemate. At a meeting with the Allied commanders at Carthage on 26 December 1943 he had reached the decision to launch Operation SHINGLE (amphibious operation at Anzio). This decision he had confirmed in similar consultations at Marrakech on 7 and 8 January 1944. SHINGLE was designed as an end run around the right flank of the German Winter and Gustav Lines. The hope was that the Germans facing the Allied Fifth Army at the Gustav Line would be forced to fall back and leave the road to Rome open.

To carry out SHINGLE the President and the Joint Chiefs agreed—much to Churchill's delight—to a temporary delay in the departure of fifty-six LST’s scheduled for OVERLORD, on the condition that OVERLORD not be delayed. To compensate for the probable effects on OVERLORD preparations, the President insisted, however, that the other twelve LST's for OVERLORD depart from the Mediterranean as scheduled, and that the fifteen “ex-Andamans” LST’s arriving in the Mediterranean on 14 January proceed directly to the United King-

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38 USAFIME was to remain a separate theater, but the Balkans and Turkey were separated from it and placed within the boundaries of NATO. For exchanges on the administrative and boundary changes, see especially: (1) msg, Marshall to Eisenhower info Devers, 28 Jan 44, CM-OUT 12109; (2) Brigot msg, Marshall to Devers, 29 Jan 44, CM-OUT 12110; (3) memo, WD for CG’s AFG, AAF, ASF, NATO, USAFIME, and PGC, 29 Jan 44, sub: Comd in the Middle East-Central African Theater, with Paper 1 in ABC 381 (3-10-42), 1-B; (4) memo, Col Frederic H. Chaffee for ACoS, G-2, 31 Jan 44, sub: Ltr of Instrs to CG USAFIME, with Paper 1 in ABC 381 Middle East (3-10-42), 1-B; (5) msg, Marshall to Eisenhower and Royce, 22 Dec 43, CM-OUT 8553; and (6) msg, Marshall to Devers, 17 Jan 44, CM-OUT 6588.

39 Msg, Prime Minister to President, 26 Dec 43, No. 521, Item 63b, Exec 10. Present at the meeting were General Eisenhower (about to depart from the Mediterranean), Generals Bedell Smith and Wilson, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, General Harold Alexander, and Admiral Sir John Cunningham.

40 Msg, Prime Minister to President, 8 Jan 44, No. 540, Item 63b, Exec 10. Among those present at the Marrakech meetings were Lord Beaverbrook, General Wilson, Admiral John Cunningham, General Harold Alexander, General Devers, and General Bedell Smith.

In 1949 General Marshall recalled that he had had nothing to do with the Anzio decision. He also recalled that General Eisenhower told him that he was not in favor of the operation, but, knowing that he was to leave the theater before the operation was carried out, did not oppose it. Interview, Matthews, Lamson, and Hamilton with Marshall, 25 Jul 49, OCMH files. For Eisenhower's views of the decision on Anzio see, Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 212-13.
dom. General Marshall agreed to permit the 504th U.S. Parachute Regimental Combat Team, scheduled to depart for OVERLORD, to remain in the Mediterranean for Anzio. He also authorized a delay in the transfer of one medium bombardment group, two fighter groups, and two service groups until ten days after the SHINGLE D Day.

On 22 January the U.S. VI Corps landed successfully at Anzio, but the Germans contained the Fifth Army at the Gustav Line and the beachhead at Anzio, thereby preventing the link-up and a subsequent drive on Rome. Churchill summed up the net result neatly: "I had hoped that we were hurling a wildcat on the shore, but all we got was a stranded whale." By early February the British had concluded that the Germans intended to fight it out in central Italy; that some of the troops earmarked for ANVIL and a one-divisional lift for end runs should be set aside for General Alexander, who was in charge of the ground forces in Italy; and that the Allies must prosecute the Italian campaign vigorously.

General Marshall and his planning assistants were not opposed to the prosecution of the Italian campaign, at least as far as Rome or slightly north thereof, but they did believe that planning and preparations must be continued for ANVIL. If by April the Allies had still not established themselves north of Rome, then ANVIL would of necessity have to be abandoned since a considerable number of troops and at least a one-divisional lift would then be needed for continuing the fight in Italy. If, on the other hand, ANVIL were immediately called off, then there would be no chance of launching it in the spring even if conditions were favorable.

In the midst of the growing divergence of views between the War Department and the British, Eisenhower occupied a middle ground. His position was a difficult one. He agreed with the War Department's estimate of the significance of ANVIL, but he was charged with the success of OVERLORD and from his point of view the planning hazards began to make ANVIL appear less feasible. Throughout the debate, Eisenhower welcomed the Chief of Staff's personal views, stating at one point "... I feel that as long as you and I are in complete coordination as to purpose that you in Washington and I here can do a great deal to—
ward achieving the best overall results.”

The Chief of Staff, who considered the ANVIL issue an important one, did not hesitate to let his views be known. To find the Americans at this late date arguing strongly for a Mediterranean operation vis-à-vis the British could not help but strike him as a curious turnabout. On 7 February he wrote to General Eisenhower:

Judging from the discussions and differences of opinion at the present time the British and American Chiefs of Staff seem to have completely reversed themselves and we have become Mediterraneanites and they heavily pro-OVERLORD. Marshall quickly went on to add: “OVERLORD of course is paramount and it must be launched on a reasonably secure basis of which you are the best judge.” As always, the landing craft problem was making Anglo-American agreement on operations difficult. “Our difficulties in reaching a decision have been complicated by a battle of numbers, that is, a failure to reach a common ground as to what would be the actual facilities.” British and American planners in Washington had just agreed that there was sufficient lift to stage a seven-division OVERLORD (five divisions in the assault, two in the follow-up) and at the same time a two-division ANVIL on the basis of the 31 May target date. British planners in London, or Montgomery—Marshall said that he did not know which—apparently would not agree with these figures. Marshall asked Eisenhower whether he personally felt that, if landing craft thought to be available, OVERLORD would take so many that only a one-division lift would be left for ANVIL. If Eisenhower considered this to be the case, ANVIL just would have to suffer.

Between operations in Italy north of Rome and the ANVIL operation, Marshall raised other points for Eisenhower's consideration. If ANVIL were abandoned, there would be eight or nine less divisions heavily engaged with the enemy. Could Eisenhower afford to lose this pressure, especially in view of a possible French uprising against the Germans in southern France? Eisenhower should count up all the divisions that would be in the Mediterranean, consider the heavy requirements in Italy in view of the mountain masses north of Rome, and then weigh what bearing a considerable number of divisions engaged or advancing in southern France would have on OVERLORD. In concluding his statement of 7 February, Marshall sympathetically but pointedly advised Eisenhower: “I will use my influence here to agree with your desires. I merely wish to be certain that localitis is not developing and that the pressures on you have not warped your judgment.”

On the staff level, the same cautionary note was sounded by General Handy speaking via transatlantic phone the same day (7 February) to Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith. Summarizing the gist of Marshall's misgivings over the growing coolness toward ANVIL in the theater, he added: “He [Marshall] wants to know how much of this business is Montgomery and how much is Eisenhower.”

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47 Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 6 Feb 44, CM-IN 4147.
48 Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 7 Feb 44, CM-OUT 8771.
49 Ibid.
50 Penned notes on transcript of tel conv, Gen
Apparently stung by the Chief of Staff’s reference to "localitis," General Eisenhower responded quickly. Step by step he traced the evolution of his stand on OVERLORD and ANVIL. Even before his arrival in London in January, he said, he had become convinced of the need to strengthen the OVERLORD assault. Since his arrival he had been trying in every way to preserve ANVIL while at the same time trying to find the necessary strength for OVERLORD. He had resisted recommendations to abandon ANVIL. Only as a last resort would he do that. Between ANVIL and the continuation of the campaign in Italy he agreed with Marshall that ANVIL would be the more desirable of the supporting operations in the Mediterranean. But he also agreed that if the Allies could not soon achieve their aims in Italy, they would be committed to that campaign with nothing to spare for ANVIL. In any event, time was running out, and the Allies would soon have to make their decision. He assured Marshall that he had formed his own conclusions on these matters. To set Marshall’s mind completely at rest, he declared:

In the various campaigns of this War, I have occasionally had to modify slightly my own conceptions of campaign in order to achieve a unity of purpose and effort. I think this is inescapable in Allied operations but I assure you that I have never yet failed to give you my own clear personal convictions about every project and plan in prospect. So far as I am aware, no one here has tried to urge me to present any particular view, nor do I believe that I am particularly affected by localitis. I merely recognize that OVERLORD, which has been supported earnestly for more than two years by the US Chiefs of Staff, represents for the United States and the United Kingdom a crisis in the European War. Real success should do much to hasten the end of this conflict but a reverse will have opposite repercussions from which we would recover with the utmost difficulty.  

Eisenhower’s reply cleared the atmosphere considerably and reassured Marshall. If there were enough landing craft for a five-division lift and a two-division follow-up for OVERLORD, and also for a two-division lift for ANVIL, Eisenhower was in favor of ANVIL. But his response still left up in the air the question of the sufficiency of landing craft. At this time the “battle of numbers” between Washington and London planners entered a new stage. A mutual understanding appeared to have been reached as to the number of landing craft available for OVERLORD and ANVIL. The issue had boiled down to a technical question of loading capacities for personnel and vehicles for OVERLORD. Involved was a difference of about 14,000 troops out of a total number of approximately 176,000 desired for assault and immediate follow-up for the cross-Channel attack. There was also a difference concerning 1,000 vehicles out of a total of about 20,000.

London Landing Craft Conference. Now that Eisenhower was fully aware of the Washington staff’s views, Marshall felt that the JCS should follow the wishes of the overseas commander. In order to settle the whole issue, Marshall

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Handy and Gen Smith, 1690, 7 Feb 44, Paper 188, Book 14, Exec 9.

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51 Msg, Eisenhower for Marshall, 8 Feb 44, CM-IN 5606.
For a similar reply on the staff level, see tel conv between Gens Bedell Smith and Handy, 8 Feb 44, 1515Z–1555Z, Item 52a, Exec 10.
52 Many of the exchanges in the “battle of numbers” between Washington and London are filed in Item 52a, Exec 10.
therefore proposed that the JCS delegate its authority to General Eisenhower and that a conference be held between him and the British Chiefs of Staff. To advise General Eisenhower, he further proposed that Maj. Gen. John E. Hull of the Operations Division and a naval officer familiar with all aspects of the landing craft problem be sent to London. General Marshall’s proposals were promptly adopted by Washington and London.

General Hull, Admiral Cooke, and two colonels from the War Department’s planning staff, George A. Lincoln and Alexander D. Reid, hurriedly departed for London. Arriving in the United Kingdom on 12 February, they began on the following day a week-long series of conferences at SHAEF in Norfolk House. There, the officers brought by General Hull and Admiral Cooke became involved, as Colonel Lincoln wrote back to Washington, in detailed planning and analysis, though their original conception had been that they were “merely leg-men carrying information.”

Discussions and debates over such technical factors as capability lift and operational availability (serviceability) rates of the various types of landing craft occupied much of the attention of the American party. As might be expected, the Americans were interested in exploring every expedient offering support for the feasibility of ANVIL. As negotiations progressed, the Americans formed certain impressions about the British attitude toward OVERLORD-ANVIL. On 15 February General Hull wrote to General Handy that the British planners thought very strongly “that OVERLORD is not only the main show but . . . the only one which would pay us dividends.” They saw, Hull believed, “no relationship between OVERLORD and ANVIL.” As far as the British were concerned, “ANVIL might be an operation in the Marshalls.”

On the following day Colonel Lincoln confirmed this impression in a memorandum for General Roberts. “As we thought,” he observed, “the local people, except the Supreme Commander, are not impressed with the value of ANVIL.”

While the planning and landing craft experts were calculating and recalculating availabilities and loading lift for over loadings and serviceability rates, see Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack*, Ch. V, and Pogue, *Supreme Command*, Ch. VI.

The minutes of the special conference in London and telephone exchanges with Washington are contained in: (1) SHAEF SGS 337/11 Supreme Comdr Conf; (2) Item 52a, Exec 10; (3) ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 271-81 (7 Jan 43); and (4) ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), 1–A.


Memo, Lincoln for Roberts, 16 Feb 44, no sub, with min, 132d mtg CCS, in ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43), 1–A.
ANVIL and OVERLORD, General Eisenhower, as representative for the JCS, and the British Chiefs were trying to arrive at a final decision on ANVIL. General Hull put forward the War Department contention that planning for ANVIL should be continued until early spring at least and then, if necessary, the operation might be called off. General Eisenhower took the same flexible stand—planning for ANVIL should be continued until it was obvious that the operation would have to be abandoned. To meet OVERLORD requirements for a strengthened assault and still retain sufficient craft for a two-division lift for ANVIL, General Eisenhower on 19 February recommended a shipping compromise whereby six U.S. AKA’s would be re-allocated from OVERLORD to ANVIL, and twenty British LST’s and twenty-one British LCI (L)’s would be reallocated from ANVIL to OVERLORD. This would still leave a shortage of fifteen LST’s for OVERLORD. Seven of these, he proposed, would be made up from U.S. production and the remainder by increasing the load of LST’s and the utilization of LCT’s.58

By this time the British Chiefs felt ANVIL should be immediately and completely canceled. To them the proposed shipping allocations would skimp both OVERLORD and ANVIL. Moreover, they contended, there was another and more important threat to be considered. The Italian campaign was not developing as expected, and the slow progress and heavy demands of that struggle made the prospect of ANVIL more remote than ever. As they saw it, Hitler had decided to fight it out south of Rome.

The opportunity thereby offered to bleed the German divisions would be in the best interests of the Allies. The requirements of the campaign in Italy should therefore be given priority above all others in the Mediterranean.59 On 21 February Montgomery wrote General Eisenhower, “I recommend very strongly that we now throw the whole weight of our opinion onto the scales against ANVIL. Let us have two really good major campaigns—one in Italy and one in OVERLORD.”60

In Washington U.S. staff concern over the British attitude toward ANVIL led to a swift reaction. The JCS asked for a conference with the President to discuss the subject. At the special meeting held on the 21st the President and JCS agreed that ANVIL should not be canceled. The President was particularly concerned about the Soviet reaction. He doubted that the Russians would favor cancellation and felt that the question should not even be taken up with the Russians at this time. He directed Eisenhower to call the attention of the British to the fact that, aside from military considerations, the Americans and the British were committed to the Russians and that no move should be made to abandon ANVIL without first taking the matter up with them.61 Eisenhower, fortified in his compromise stand by the support of the JCS and the President, refused to

58 Msg, Br COS to Br Joint Staff Mission, 19 Feb 44, CM-IN 14255.
go along with Montgomery's recommendation.62

On 24 February a compromise was agreed upon by Eisenhower and the British Chiefs of Staff whereby ANVIL was kept alive. The campaign in Italy was to have overriding priority over all other operations in the Mediterranean, current and prospective. Subject to that priority, the Allied commander in chief in the Mediterranean would prepare alternative plans to support OVERLORD. Of these, the first alternative would be ANVIL on approximately the date and scale originally planned (a two-division assault, to be launched simultaneously with OVERLORD). The reallocations of assault shipping and landing craft between OVERLORD and ANVIL proposed by General Eisenhower on 19 February would be put into effect and the craft were to sail in April. However, the compromise would be reviewed on 20 March in the light of the situation in Italy. If at that time it was decided that ANVIL was impracticable, the lift over and above that for one division would be withdrawn from the Mediterranean for OVERLORD. The President, the Prime Minister, and the CCS accepted this arrangement.63

Cancellation of a Simultaneous ANVIL. The compromise of late February did not settle the problem. The debate went on. General Eisenhower became more and more uneasy over permitting planning for the OVERLORD assault to remain unsettled because of uncertainty about the available landing craft. In the Mediterranean Generals Wilson and Alexander, concerned over the situation at Anzio, wanted the proposed transfers of LST's from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom delayed—a suggestion that appealed to the British Chiefs of Staff as strongly as it was resisted by the U.S. Chiefs.64 In the War Department the search for more lift for OVERLORD and ANVIL continued.

Inevitably, the spotlight shifted to Pacific allocations. In mid-March, General Somervell raised the issue. Observing that the approved deployment of assault lift and landing craft for the spring of 1944 gave the lion's share to operations in the Pacific, commonly regarded as the secondary effort, he asked whether the main effort in Europe might not be reinforced at the expense of the Pacific. General Handy's swift reply was in the negative. General Eisenhower had been given everything in the way of lift that he had requested except a small percentage of LST's and LCI (L)'s. The critical type of assault shipping for both OVERLORD and ANVIL was the LST. The Navy had stated that it had made every effort to get LST's to OVERLORD. It had sent none to the Pacific for several months and was taking so many of them from its training establishments that during a part of April none would be left to train new crews. Everything that could be gotten out of new production was going to Europe and craft could not be shifted from the

63 (1) Copy of msg, Leahy to President, 24 Feb 44, incl to memo, McFarland, JCS, for OPD and for Aide to COMINCH [U.S. Fleet], 24 Feb 44, sub: Msg from Br COS on Conclusions Agreed This Morning at Mtg Held Between Br COS and General Eisenhower, with Paper 17, Item 55, Exec 10. (2) CCS 465/11, 24 Feb 44, title: Recommendations of SCAEF on "OVERLORD" and "ANVIL." (3) Min, 147th mtg CCS, 25 Feb 44.
Pacific in time, even if it were so agreed.65

How heavily the strains and stresses of uncertainty were weighing on the SHAEF planning staff was reflected in a conversation between General Bedell Smith in London and Generals Handy and Hull in Washington on 17 March 1944:

Handy: Our thought is this—I am only giving you mine and Ed Hull’s—we better hang on to that [ANVIL] as long as we can. I am afraid you are the people who are going to regret more than anybody else cancelling it in the long run.

Smith: I thoroughly agree with you. But you can’t imagine the difficulties here in planning. It is enough to drive you mad with this uncertainty and these changes. When you have to sit down and figure the balance of divisions, the loading table and everything of that sort and you don’t know what kind of craft you are going to load them in or whether you are going to have as many as you think you are going to have, it is enough to drive a man insane.66

What made it worse, Smith went on to say, was that, “in order to keep ANVIL alive,” SHAEF had gone fifteen to seventeen LST’s short of its minimum requirements. As he put it, the SHAEF planning estimate was the “very lowest, skimpiest, mealiest figure that we can possibly calculate to get by on in the assumption there would be a strong landing in the Mediterranean. Any time anybody will guarantee us there will be a strong landing in the Mediterranean we will stick by that measly figure, but time is getting short.”67

Nobody in Washington or London could give that guarantee. Despite the vigorous and costly Allied attacks on the main front at Cassino in February and mid-March, the situation in Italy did not improve. The stalemate continued. There was still a gap between the bridgehead and the main battle line, and it became increasingly clear that the Allies could not soon start their drive on Rome. Between the demands of OVERLORD and the Italian campaign, ANVIL was being crushed.

When the time set for reviewing the Mediterranean situation came, General Wilson and the British Chiefs insisted that a simultaneous ANVIL be abandoned. It would be impossible, they argued, to withdraw troops from the battle line in Italy or landing craft from the Anzio beachhead in time. General Wilson could not promise a junction of the bridgehead and the main line before 15 May at the earliest. Generals Wilson and Eisenhower were now in agreement that the landing craft in the Mediterranean should be reduced to a one-division lift. On 21 March General Eisenhower also concluded that ANVIL as an operation to be carried out simultaneously with OVERLORD must be canceled. Their recommendations were adopted, and the landing craft in question were ordered to be reallocated to the United Kingdom from the Mediterranean.68

67 Ibid.
68 (1) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 21 Mar 44.
Planning for an expanded OVERLORD assault could go forward, but even so landing craft for the operation had been so closely figured that there would be few to spare.69

The move to strengthen the OVERLORD assault made a tight situation tighter. Direct repercussions resulted in planning for the Mediterranean, the by-now accepted secondary theater in the European war. Intensifying the competition for the precious lift between supporting undertakings for OVERLORD, it compelled the U.S. and British staffs to make choices between them. ANVIL had been pinched out—temporarily at least—by the demands of the now higher priority Italian campaign and the top-priority cross-Channel assault.

In other ways, cancellation of a simultaneous ANVIL offered a welcome relief to the two theaters. Aside from assault shipping, it removed the competition between the Mediterranean operations for cargo shipping, combat aircraft, and U.S. assault divisions. Ground troops on both of the Italian fronts were battle-weary, and units earmarked for ANVIL—especially the 3d and 45th Divisions—were needed at Anzio. To have opened a new front in the Mediterranean before the Italian land battle was decided, the Washington planners realized, would have been difficult, if not impossible.

Postponement of ANVIL also permitted adjustments and transfers of combat fighter aircraft and earmarked personnel between the European and the Mediterranean theaters to go forward.70

Nevertheless, certain pinches—particularly in service troops and replacements—continued in the Mediterranean. The effect of an expanded OVERLORD simply highlighted world-wide shortages. The War Department had early warned General Devers, as it had General Eisenhower, of the need to conserve manpower. To meet, in part, the critical shortage in service personnel, it had approved a plan to ship the 2d Cavalry Division and other combat units to the Mediterranean and reorganize them into service units. Arriving at Oran, North Africa, on 9 March 1944, the 2d Cavalry Division was inactivated on 10 May.71

To help solve his overhead and service problems as the Allies prepared to carry the attack northward, General Devers had already begun to close down Army supply and administrative installations in North Africa. As Devers expressed...
it, "we are trying in every way to roll up our tail as soon as possible."

By 31 May, despite the stringencies and uncertainties in Mediterranean plans, the War Department had sent the U.S. divisional strength from its carefully hoarded pool to the Mediterranean as planned. By that date eight U.S. divisions were in the Mediterranean theater—six, the 3d, 34th, 36th, 45th, and 88th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Armored Division, were in the theater by the end of 1943; the 85th Infantry Division completed its transfer by 9 January, and the 91st arrived between 18 April and 10 May.

**ANVIL Postponed Indefinitely.** The decision in late March to forego a simultaneous ANVIL by no means ended the debate over ANVIL versus the Italian campaign. The U.S. and the British Chiefs remained in agreement that the Anzio bridgehead must be joined with the main battle line in Italy. Prolonging the stalemate threatened not only to jeopardize the safety of the forces on the beachhead but also to upset the timetable for OVERLORD. The deadlock must be broken. What the major course of action should be in the Mediterranean once the bridgehead was linked to the Fifth Army front remained a question. Fruitless discussion continued in late March. Old differences between the two staffs were reargued. They now boiled down to a matter of options. Once the deadlock was broken, the British wanted to continue the Italian campaign, the Americans to launch ANVIL. The British argued that when an all-out offensive was launched in Italy it should continue until June, and then a final decision could be made on ANVIL in the light of the situation on the Italian and Normandy fronts. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff insisted that once the two Italian fronts were joined, nothing should interfere with ANVIL. If the British would agree to making plans and preparations for a 10 July two-division ANVIL, the Americans were even willing at one point to divert to the Mediterranean landing craft due to leave for the Pacific in late May and June. But as Marshall put it to Eisenhower, "We will not make this diversion which means a serious delay in the Pacific with the possibility of losing our momentum unless some sizable operation of the nature of ANVIL is on the books."

Landing craft would be diverted to the Mediterranean only for ANVIL. In the opinion of the JCS, the proposed 10 July ANVIL should even take precedence over getting to Rome, an objective to which the British attached great importance.

The offer to divert landing craft from the Pacific was turned down with regret. The British, who would have been quite happy to receive this windfall for increasing the general reserve in the Mediterranean, were not willing to accept it for a definitely scheduled ANVIL. To explain to the British staff the pointed American stand for a guaranteed *quid pro quo*, Dill reminded the British Chiefs of the strong pressures in the United States for greater action in the Pacific. The U.S. Chiefs had been, he indicated, "shocked and pained to find out . . . how gaily we proposed to accept

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their legacy while disregarding the terms of the will." How magnanimous an offer the Americans felt they were making could be understood "in view of the fact that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff are continually being abused for neglecting their theater."75

Back of the continued American pressure to keep ANVIL alive lay the familiar staff desire to end the war against Germany quickly, decisively, and with the fewest political embroilments. As General Roberts summed it up:

If we cancel ANVIL completely, the following will be true:

a. We get into political difficulties with the French.

b. OVERLORD will lose at least ten fighting divisions.

c. Our service forces continue to support the western Mediterranean.

d. Our divisions and the French divisions will be committed to a costly, unrenumerative, inching advance in Italy. The people of both the United States and France may or may not take this indefinitely.

e. Once committed to Italy, we have our forces pointed towards Southeastern Europe and will have the greatest difficulty in preventing their use for occupation forces in Austria, Hungary and southern Germany.76

As always, the fear of finding a sizable number of Allied combat divisions contained in the Mediterranean, instead of supporting the major offensive aimed at the heart of Germany, was haunting the Army staff. To General Roberts, the "least worst" course was to transfer some craft back to the United Kingdom and pull off an ANVIL as soon as possible.

The issue was dragging on and a decision had to be reached. The British could not agree that preparations for an ANVIL should have priority over continuation of the battle in Italy once the bridgehead had been linked up with the main battle line.77 In early April Churchill joined actively in the debate, urging that the choice be deferred. The option between Italy and ANVIL would not exist, he stated, unless the landing craft scheduled for the Pacific were diverted to the Mediterranean.78 Marshall countered that if any option were to exist, preparations for ANVIL would have to be started at once. Without a guarantee of a definite ANVIL, the United States would not feel justified in sacrificing the momentum that had been attained in the Pacific and was so important to shortening the war against Japan.79 To Marshall, Churchill further explained:

It is of course very painful for us to forego the invaluable addition to our landing craft in the Mediterranean which you so kindly offered under certain conditions and had no doubt great trouble to obtain. What I cannot bear is to agree beforehand to starve a battle or have to break it off just at the moment when success, after long efforts and heavy losses, may be in view.

He went on to say:

Dill tells me you had expected me to support ANVIL more vigorously in view of

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75 Msg, Dill to Br COS, 1 Apr 44, Item 66, Exec 10.
78 Msg, Prime Minister to Field Marshal Dill for Marshall, 12 Apr 44, Item 66, Exec 10.
79 Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower for Prime Minister, 13 Apr 44, CM-OUT 22810.
my enthusiasm for it when it was first proposed by you at Tehran. Please do me the justice to remember that the situation is vastly changed. In November we hoped to take Rome in January and there were many signs that the enemy was ready to move Northwards up the Italian peninsula. Instead of this, in spite of our great amphibious expedition... the enemy has brought down to the battle South of Rome the 8 mobile divisions we should have hoped a full scale Anvil would have contained....

The whole of this difficult question only arises out of the absurd shortage of LST's. How it is that the plans of two great Empires like Britain and the United States should be so much hamstrung and limited by a hundred, or two of these particular vessels will never be understood by history.

As a way out of the impasse, the British Chiefs proposed a compromise directive for General Wilson; the U.S. Chiefs on 18 April agreed to go along with it in order to forward operations in the Mediterranean without further delay.

Neither the target date for Anvil nor additional landing craft for the Mediterranean were mentioned. Allied resources and strength in the Mediterranean were to be deployed in an all-out offensive in Italy that was to have first priority. Within these terms, plans and preparations for Anvil or to exploit further the campaign in Italy might go forward. Overlord would have to make its own way. Anvil was deferred indefinitely.

On 12 May a full-scale ground offensive (Operation Diamon) was launched by the Allied command in Italy. The bridgehead and the main battle line were soon linked up and the deadlock in Italy was broken. On 4 June, two days before Overlord was launched, the Allies finally captured Rome.

Decline of the Turkey and Aegean Projects

The decision in favor of the Italian campaign did not mean that the U.S. staff had lost out completely and irrevocably to the British over Mediterranean policy. However, chagrined the Americans were by the deferment of Anvil, the same pressures of time and conflicting demands generated by Overlord also operated against Churchill's lingering hopes for Turkey and the Aegean. At the end of December 1943 he had observed to the British Chiefs of Staff: "I recognise that if the Turks will not play, we may have to sacrifice the Aegean policy, especially if it is marked up so high and so slow." The price that would interest the Turks in playing remained high. British negotiations with Turkish leaders bore no fruit, and by the end of January 1944 the forces and resources earmarked to support Turkey's entry into the war were interfering with the build-up for the approved operations against Germany. General Wilson urged delay in Turkey's entry, and the American staff, concerned lest the United States would have to commit forces and resources to the eastern Mediterranean, recommended suspension of plans to use Turkey as a base of operations. The British abandoned their negotiations and agreed to cancel

80 Msg, Prime Minister to Field Marshal Dill for Gen Marshall, 16 Apr 44, Item 16, Exec 3.
82 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 430.
CONCENTRATION FOR THE BIG BLOW

arrangements to operate from Turkey and to release the forces and the equipment. Churchill reluctantly became resigned to Turkish neutrality.

At the same time, any hope that he might have had for a more active Allied Balkan policy could not have been encouraged by the American coolness toward his suggestion for a joint expedition into Yugoslavia. At the meeting on 21 February with the JCS, the President informed them that he had refused to consider Churchill’s proposal for an expedition composed of British troops under an American commanding general. The President would not even consider a “token” U.S. force for such a project. In agreeing with the President’s stand, General Marshall stated emphatically “that would be very bad indeed and would probably be bound to result in a new war.”

Undoubtedly these blows to Churchill’s Mediterranean policy made him look more eagerly than ever toward a concentrated attack in Italy and the capture of Rome. This was one way—perhaps the only remaining way—of keeping alive his hopes for a more active course in the Mediterranean. Whether the new turn in that policy would result, as Army planners feared, in eventually pointing U.S. forces toward southeastern Europe, and in the permanent abandonment of ANVIL, only the future would disclose.

Despite his previous misgivings about OVERLORD, and whatever last card the Prime Minister might yet choose to play in the Mediterranean, encouraging reports of the Prime Minister’s attitude toward the cross-Channel undertaking filtered back to Washington. In March he wrote to General Marshall: “I am hardening very much on this operation as the time approaches in the sense of wishing to strike if humanly possible even if the limiting conditions we laid down at Moscow are not exactly fulfilled.” War Department officials visiting the Prime Minister in London sent back to Washington equally heartening news. In April John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, recorded that the Prime Minister told General McNarney and himself that he had opposed the operation during the past two years but now was for it.

I asked him how he really felt about it now and he said that if he had been responsible for the planning, he would have done it on a broader front and he would have liked to have had Turkey on our side and the Danube under threat as well as Norway cleaned up before we undertook this, but he was satisfied and all would find him completely committed with all his energy and all his spirit to the battle.

A similar report was forwarded by General Wedemeyer:

Both Eden and the P.M. [Prime Minister] reflect confidence relative to OVERLORD. The P.M. did state that if he had been able to persuade the Chiefs of Staff, the Allies

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83 (1) OPD brief, title: Notes . . . JPS 126th mtg, 9 Feb 44. Transfer of Br Lend-Lease Bombers From Mediterranean Air Comd to Turkey (JPS 376/1), with JPS 376/1 in ABC 384 Sweden-Turkey (25 Oct 43), 4. (2) OPD brief, title: Notes . . . JPS 130th mtg, 23 Feb 44. Action That May Be Necessary Should Turkey Enter the War (JPS 584), with JPS 584 in ABC 584 Mediterranean (3 Oct 43).

84 Min, mtg of the JCS with the President, 21 Feb 44, in WDCSA Min of Sp Mtgs.

85 Ltr, Field Marshal Dill to Gen Marshall, 12 Mar 44. Item 66, Exec 10. The letter contains a message from the Prime Minister.

86 Copy of Diary entry, 20 Apr 44, incl to memo, J. J. McCoy, ASW, for Marshall, 26 Apr 44, no sub, Paper 627, Book 18, Exec 9, Mr. McCoy, a distinguished lawyer, had served as an expert consultant to the Secretary of War in 1940 and had become Assistant Secretary of War in 1941.
would have gone through Turkey and the Balkans from the south and into Norway on the north, thus surrounding the enemy and further dispersing his forces. He added, however, that the die is cast and that we must carry OVERLORD through vigorously to a successful conclusion.\textsuperscript{87}

\textbf{OVERLORD and the Unconditional Surrender Formula}

Meanwhile, the desire to ensure the success of OVERLORD led the U.S. and British staffs to explore other than military ways of weakening the Germans' resistance and hastening their surrender. By the beginning of 1944 Allied planners had virtually given up the hope, embodied in the RANKIN plans, that Germany might surrender before OVERLORD D Day. They were hopeful, however, that a proper approach to the Germans, in conjunction with OVERLORD, might bring the war to a quick end.\textsuperscript{88} Inevitably, they considered the practicability of the unconditional surrender formula—the announced war aim of the Allies—as a propaganda weapon.

During the year that had passed since President Roosevelt had announced the unconditional surrender formula at Casablanca, the intention of the Western Allies to fight on until the Axis Powers surrendered unconditionally had been reiterated at each succeeding conference. The Army planners had accepted without question the presidential dictum as a basic concept in their strategic planning. To the military, unconditional surrender provided a clear-cut objective—the decisive defeat of the enemy—completely divorced from the problems of negotiated settlements or military stalemates. As long as political objectives and military considerations seemed compatible, unconditional surrender appeared a tenable concept.

The President's position had been fairly consistent since his Casablanca pronouncement. During the discussions between the United States and Great Britain on the Italian surrender, he had informed Churchill, "My thought is that we should come as close as possible to unconditional surrender followed by good treatment of the Italian people."\textsuperscript{89} This strong adherence to the principle while admitting some flexibility in its application was typical of his approach to the problem. It is true that on the part of the military there had been some apprehension that the logic of applying the formula vigorously to Italy might mean, in effect, that General Eisenhower, the military commander, would have to take over the government of Italy. But there seems to be little doubt that during the Italian surrender negotiations the Army planners had been content to follow the President's lead without dissent.

The surrender of Italy in September 1943 had given the formula its first trial as a practicable basis for ending a war, but because of the peculiar conditions prevailing in Italy the results had been inconclusive. The Germans were still in control of the greater part of the country and of many of the Italian armed forces, and it had been impossible for the new Italian Government to enforce obedience to its orders to surrender. With the Italian declaration of war against Germany in October and the

\textsuperscript{87} Ltr, A. C. [W.] to Tom [Gen Handy], 13 Apr 41, Paper 611, Book 18, Exec 9.
\textsuperscript{88} Pogue, \textit{Supreme Command}, p. 339.
\textsuperscript{89} Msg, President to Prime Minister, 25 Jul 43, filed with CCS 258/1 in ABC 381 Italy-Arm-Surr (5-9-43) 1-A.
Allied recognition of Italy as a belligerent, the situation had become even more confused. Although no immediate change in the surrender terms had been made, application of some of the fairly rigorous "Long Terms" of surrender that the Italians had signed on 29 September had been held in abeyance while Italy demonstrated her good faith in fighting on the side of the Allies. Thus, Italy could not be considered as a fair test case for unconditional surrender.

By the end of January 1944, with all eyes on OVERLORD, there were indications that some of the British planners harbored doubts as to the wisdom of clinging to the formula. The British Joint Intelligence Committee asked their American counterparts several pertinent questions. Pointing out that the German propaganda machine was using the unconditional surrender theme to stiffen German resistance at home and in the armed forces, they asked the American military to estimate the value of unconditional surrender in the light of past and present experience. They also asked for American opinion as to the desirability of amplifying the concept in order to weaken German armed resistance and to avoid complicating surrender negotiations with Germany.

The U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee, in their study of the problem, concluded that although unconditional surrender added a "background of determination" to the Allied coalition and eventually might have a material effect in breaking down German resistance, the German propaganda agencies were placing great stress on the policy as an indication of Allied intent to exterminate the German nation, enslave its people, and inflict all sorts of inhuman treatment upon the populace. In the absence of statements by the Allied leaders contradicting this propaganda, the German publicists were having considerable success in increasing the will to resist. The committee felt that any steps taken to counter this propaganda would help speed the German collapse.

Assistant Secretary of War McCloy was sharply critical of any softening of the unconditional surrender concept. Pointing out that the Germans' chief fear was the Soviet Army and what it might do once it reached Germany, he went on:

It is this ogre [the Soviet Army], rather than any phrase coined at a conference, which keeps them going. I would not, by setting up an easy way out, disabuse them of the thought that they cannot carry out their own devastations every generation without getting some of it themselves.

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee, on the other hand, was inclined to agree with the Joint Intelligence Committee. On 16 March the senior military advisers informed the JCS that it was in the military interest to have the unconditional surrender formula restated. Both Great Britain and the USSR should be consulted, and if there should be agreement on a change in policy, a joint announcement should be made before OVERLORD was launched. Conceivably, any modification or clari-

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90 See Smyth, Sicilian Campaign and the Surrender of Italy, for details of the Italian surrender.
91 JIC Memo for Info 93, 31 Jan 44, title: Effect of "Unconditional Surrender" Policy on German Morale. The memo is by the U.S. JIC.
92 JIC 159/1, 16 Feb 44, title: Effect of "Unconditional Surrender" Policy on German Morale.
fication of terms might weaken German resistance to the Normandy assault.94

The Army planners showed mixed feelings about any alteration in the unconditional surrender concept. General Russell of the Operations Division's Theater Group favored modification: "The harshness of the phrase aids propagandists in stiffening and prolonging resistance which in turn is costly to the Allied nations in lives and resources. It is not sentiment with me—just good business."95 A more cautious approach was taken by General Hull who felt that, while it might have been a mistake not to have elaborated on the concept when it was first stated, there was a danger that any softening at this stage of the war might be interpreted as a sign of weakness.96

To General Roberts it seemed clear that both Great Britain and the USSR had already begun to modify their attitudes toward Germany. Churchill's address to Commons on 22 February had softened the implications of unconditional surrender, and The Times of London had lately been opposing the dismemberment of Germany. The Russians also had been making overtures and discussing the future of Germany. In view of these unilateral changes in propaganda tactics, Roberts did not believe that a combined statement had to be sought. With respect to his own reaction to unconditional surrender, Roberts felt:

That dogmatic adherence to unconditional surrender overlooks practical considerations which may deny the U.S. as important a voice in European developments as our position warrants has been indicated recently by Ambassador Winant in his current reports to the State Department. From this and other various evidence, it would appear that the time is ripe for such propaganda as would assist us in achieving total victory in Europe at the earliest date. Such pronouncements as are made, however, should stress the necessity for the Germans to rid themselves of the substance as well as form of Nazism.

He then went on to comment on the proposed JCS memorandum for the President that recommended modification of the formula. He found the draft inadequate since there was not sufficient emphasis on the military factors involved. A "psychological blockbuster" of this type should be keyed to OVERLORD and to the need to reduce German resistance to the cross-Channel attack.97

During the last week in March, the JCS decided to ask the President to retreat from his hitherto adamant stand. Basing their recommendations upon the JSSC proposals of 16 March, they urged that a restatement be made at an early date so that it might "establish a favorable condition precedent to OVERLORD." The JCS draft statement for the President's approval was aimed at the German "people" as differentiated from their "gangster overlords" and reassured the "people" that there was no intention of destroying the German people and nation but rather the German capacity for military aggression.98

94 JCS 718/1, 16 Mar 44, title: Effect of "Unconditional Surrender" Policy on German Morale.
97 Memo, Roberts for Handy, 16 Mar 44, sub: Effects of "Unconditional Surrender" Policy on German Morale, filed with JCS 718/1 in ABC 887 Germany (18 Dec 43), 3.
98 Memo, Leahy for the President, 25 Mar 44, no sub, filed with JCS 718 in ABC 887 Germany (18 Dec 43), 3.
Although the President in his Christmas Eve speech of 1943 said, "The United Nations have no intention to enslave the German people" and the United Nations wished the Germans to have "a normal chance to develop, in peace, as useful and respectable members of the European family," he flatly refused to grant the JCS request for further clarification.

The trouble is that the reasoning of the memorandum presupposes a reconstitution of a German state which would give active cooperation apparently at once to peace in Europe.

A somewhat long study and personal experience in and out of Germany leads me to believe that German Philosophy cannot be changed by decree, law or military order. The change in German Philosophy must be evolutionary and may take two generations. To assume otherwise is to assume, of necessity, a period of quiet followed by a third world war.

I think that the simplest way of approaching this whole matter is to stick to what I have already said, (a) that the United Nations are determined to administer a total defeat to Germany as a whole (b) that the Allies have no intention of destroying the German people. Please note that I am not willing at this time to say that we do not intend to destroy the German nation. As long as the word "Reich" exists in Germany as expressing a nationhood, it will forever be associated with the present form of nationhood. If we admit that, we must seek to eliminate the very word "Reich" and what it stands for today.99

The State Department, which also had been trying to secure some modification of the unconditional surrender concept, especially in respect to the satellite nations, met with a similar rebuff. On 5 April the President informed Secretary Hull:

"I understand the problem thoroughly, but I want at all costs to prevent it from being said that the unconditional surrender principle has been abandoned. There is real danger if we start making exceptions to the general principle before a specific case arises."

. . . . . . . . . . . .

"I understand perfectly well that from time to time there will have to be exceptions not to the surrender principle but to the application of it in specific cases. This is a very different thing from changing the principle."100

In the meantime, SHAEF planners had also begun to question the practicability of a rigid unconditional surrender line. Lack of clarification of the principle had been handicapping the planning of their propaganda appeals to the German people. During Under Secretary Edward R. Stettinius' visit to London in mid-April, both Generals Eisenhower and Bedell Smith were earnest in their efforts to impress upon him the need for some further explanation of the concept in order to weaken the German will to resist. But the President evinced no enthusiasm for this suggestion and continued to hold firm to the theory of the original concept, in spite of his consent, under pressure from Great Britain and the USSR, to a modification in practice of surrender terms to Bulgaria and Rumania in May 1944.101 Although this was not to be the last effort to secure clarification or modification of the unconditional surrender concept, the firm position taken by the President tended to discourage the military—in Washington-

99 Memo, F. D. R. for JCS, 1 Apr 44, no sub, filed with Amendment to JCS 718/1, in ABC 387 Germany (18 Dec 43), 3.

100 Hull, Memoirs, II, 1577.

101 Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 399–41.
ton and in the theaters—from pursuing the subject with any determination.

The President’s emphatic reassertion of unconditional surrender undoubtedly disappointed those members of the British and U.S. staffs who had become convinced that clarification of the formula would reduce German resistance to OVERLORD. Staff efforts along more conventional military lines in Washington and London to pave the way for OVERLORD were more fruitful. In the early months of 1944, General Marshall and his advisers could feel comforted that they had made the necessary adjustments in planning, resources, and personnel to mount OVERLORD on “a reasonably secure basis” and to satisfy the immediate demands of the British in the Mediterranean. Both campaigns could go forward. The additional landing craft for a five-division OVERLORD assault had been acquired at the expense of a postponement of ANVIL. American hopes for a simultaneous southern France operation were disappointed even as British expectations for further advances in Italy were raised. The debate of the early months of 1944 had, however, led to no conclusive decision on Mediterranean strategy. The final settlement would have to come after OVERLORD D Day.
CHAPTER XIX

The Second Front and the Secondary War—The CBI
January–May 1944

While preparations for OVERLORD were being completed, the war in the Pacific, like the campaign in the Mediterranean, refused to stand still. The Sextant decision to give OVERLORD top priority did more than pave the way for concentration against Germany—it also introduced a standard of reference by which the Army planners could regulate the reinforcement of the war against Japan. With strategy in the global war back on the main track desired by the planners, the equation of balancing off Mediterranean with Pacific deployment was no longer necessary.

If the OVERLORD decision finally brought some order into Pacific deployment, it also generated pressures of time and resources that, directly or indirectly, had impact on planning for the secondary war. To ensure the necessary balance in plans, resources, and manpower in the CBI and the Pacific, while preparations for OVERLORD were being consummated, required the Army staff to be as watchful as ever. Plans and projects, moreover, had to be weighed against the expectation that OVERLORD would be successful and the war in Europe might soon be over. The results of such examination in the first six months after Sextant were to have important consequences for the relative weights of the CBI and the Pacific in the strategic scales against Japan.

The Consequences of Sextant

The Presidential decision at Sextant to accept the British view that the bulk of Southeast Asia Command’s landing craft might be put to better use in OVERLORD and ANVIL inaugurated a new era in Sino-American affairs. It necessitated a reassessment of the strategical value of the CBI in relation to the over-all war against Japan. The United States had little dispute with the British over the need of the landing craft for what were, after all, the major operations in the primary war. At the same time, the United States feared that the shift of landing craft would solidify the policy of delay and inaction in Burma to a point where it would be impossible to mount any important offensive there. The quicken-
ing pace of Pacific operations gave promise of outstripping and making anti-climactic any drive in Burma unless it were executed during 1944. Faced with the problem of getting CBI operations into phase with those in the Pacific, the Army planners still had to cope with Chinese reluctance to engage large forces in Burma and with British distaste for jungle warfare.

By his somewhat hasty message to the Generalissimo on 5 December, the President had complicated the task of the planners. Roosevelt had offered Chiang the choice of going ahead with the land operations in north Burma (TARZAN) or waiting until the fall, when sufficient resources would be on hand to mount an amphibious operation in the SEAC area. Both he and Mountbatten had incorrectly presupposed that SEAC would not have enough landing craft left to stage an amphibious move larger than a raid until that time. Not only did Chiang accept the delay, on 9 December he presented a new series of requirements, which, in his opinion, would be necessary to keep China in the war in the meantime. Besides a billion-dollar gold loan to sustain China's economy, the Generalissimo now wanted U.S. and Chinese air forces in China doubled and the Hump lift raised to 20,000 tons a month.

Possibly inured by this time to Chinese demands, the reaction of the Washington planners reflected no alarm. The Strategy Section felt that General Somervell's remarks before the JCS on China had been very appropriate:

A failure to carry out the Burma campaign would be bitterly resented by the Chinese. Despite this, he [Somervell] was convinced that the Generalissimo feels that he is now associated with the eventual winners of the war and that he would not withdraw from this association despite the disappointment at the loss of the Burma campaign.

This attitude was carried over into the President's 19 December reply to Chiang, which injected a note of firmness hitherto lacking in American-Chinese top-level exchanges. The major contribution that could be made to aid China, the President stated, was to open the land route of supply to China. The President hoped that Chiang would co-operate with Mountbatten by permitting the use of his Yunnan forces in north Burma. Additional transport planes, he went on, were en route to the CBI. These should make a target of 12,000 tons a month over the Hump feasible, provided, of course, Japanese activities in the meantime did not cause diversions from the Hump or succeed in interrupting the transport routes. Until logistical problems were solved, Chennault's air forces could not be increased. The President added that he had turned the request for a billion-dollar loan over to the Treasury Department for study.

Although the Generalissimo seemed to feel that the success or failure of Burma operations was a matter of life or death for China, he would not agree with the President's suggestion that he commit his Yunnan troops to a flanking attack in north Burma. He would, however,

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1 See Ch. XVI, above.
2 Msg, Chiang Kai-shek to President, 9 Dec 43, CM-IN 5966.
4 Msg, President to Stilwell for the Generalissimo, 20 Dec 43, in Stilwell Personal File, Book 5, Item 1546.
permit the use of the Ledo Chinese forces in the campaign, since he did not think their employment in Burma would adversely affect the situation in China.\(^5\)

While these negotiations were going on, Stilwell’s chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Thomas G. Hearn, reported that Mountbatten had succeeded in increasing his amphibious force from 20,000 to 30,000 troops, backed up by an even larger number of service troops. Plans were worked up in the theater for an amphibious operation against Akyab to satisfy Chiang’s insistence upon simultaneous land and sea operations. In Washington, the War Department prevailed upon the President again to urge the Generalissimo to commit the Yunnan units. Roosevelt pointed out that the urgent need of Hump resources precluded devoting them to any undertaking that would not yield results in the near future.\(^6\) The implied threat to Yunnan allocations if these troops were to remain inactive displayed the first signs of the President’s impatience with the continuance of the status quo.

When the Generalissimo held firmly to his conditions for moving the Yunnan forces, the British Chiefs of Staff acted unilaterally to dispense with all amphibious operations in SEAC during the current dry season. In early January 1944 they ordered Mountbatten to send his three remaining LST’s back to the Mediterranean. Since the approaching monsoon season would make amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal dangerous, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff perforce accepted their cancellation. The British action automatically postponed any seaborne assault until the fall.\(^7\)

Without an amphibious operation, plans for action in Burma were again reduced to limited ground offensives, and planners in the theater and in London and Washington began in January 1944 to re-examine the possible roles of both SEAC and China in the context of the general strategic picture. SEAC theater planners inclined toward building up the air route and sustaining Chennault and the B-29 program while conducting minor operations in Burma and preparing for an eventual campaign against the Malaya-Netherlands East Indies barrier and a subsequent advance northward. The Ledo Road would be constructed only as far as Myitkyina to support air ferry operations.\(^8\) To present these new plans to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Mountbatten proposed to send a mission (coded Axiom) to London and Washington, headed by his deputy chief of staff, General Wedemeyer. Stilwell, on the other hand, was diametrically opposed to such a shift of strategy, which would result in abandoning large-scale operations in Burma. He decided to follow the advice of his deputy commander, Maj.

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\(^5\) Msg, Chiang Kai-shek to Roosevelt, 23 Dec 43, CM-IN 14570.


Gen. Daniel I. Sultan, and send a U.S. mission to Washington to present his own views to the JCS.\footnote{(1) Ltr, Wedemeyer to Marshall, 17 Jan 44, no sub, OPD file on A. C. Wedemeyer. (2) Msg, Sultan to Stilwell, 14 Jan 44, in Stilwell Personal Radio File, Book 6A, Item 16. Although Stilwell in his capacity as commanding general of the U.S. forces in the CBI was authorized to send a mission to the War Department, Mountbatten felt that as Deputy Commander, SEAC, Stilwell was undercutting his commanding officer.}

The possibility of a change in strategy for SEAC posed for the United States the problem of the future role of China, for all U.S. personnel and equipment in the CBI were there to support China and only to aid SEAC insofar as it, in turn, tried to relieve China. By the beginning of 1944 the War Department General Staff had few illusions about the value of China in the war against Japan. Washington intelligence estimates recognized frankly that China had little desire to do any actual fighting, although it might engage in limited offensives to secure a voice at the peace table. According to these estimates, the main use of China would be to contain the Japanese divisions in China and provide air bases for Allied planes.\footnote{JIC 154/1, 30 Dec 43, title: China's Relations to the United Nations in the War Against Japan.}

General Roberts, the chief Army planner, examined the whole question of China's military value in detail and reported to Handy, "The only effective contributory effort toward the defeat of Japan from the China theater in 1945–1946 will be limited air support of the main effort in the Pacific area from bases now securely in our possession." He estimated that the Chinese Army could not be trained and equipped until 1946 or 1947, too late to support the Pacific drive. In view of these conclusions, he recommended that air strength in China be built up to provide support for the Pacific advance and that Chinese ground forces not be equipped any further until it was decided whether ground operations would actually accelerate the defeat of Japan.\footnote{Memo, Roberts for ACoS OPD, 8 Jan 44, sub: Future Military Value of the China Theater, OPD file on A. C. Wedemeyer.}

The report drew a quick protest from Handy, who pointed out that no consideration had been given to the fact that Japanese troops were being held down by the Chinese nor to the psychological or political factors, present and future, that were involved. "You could easily deduce from this paper," he concluded, "that the writer believes that continuation of China in the war is not worthwhile. In this true?"\footnote{Memo, Handy for Roberts, 8 Jan 44, no sub, OPD file on A. C. Wedemeyer.}

In defending the Roberts' estimate, which had been assembled by the Strategy Section, Col. Joseph J. Billo spoke frankly:

The purpose of the present paper is to offer a practical solution based on capabilities versus time, for the immediate critical problem that exists in China and Southeast Asia. Regardless of our political commitments and altruistic intentions, we are presently faced with a serious military situation that requires urgent decision and action. . . . China's past and present contribution to the war against Japan is recognized, as well as the necessity for maintaining China as a base. However, it is considered that only an unexpected catastrophe will cause her collapse. Our most practical recourse now to prevent such a collapse, as well as to provide support from that area for Pacific operations, is to build up air strength.\footnote{Memo, Billo for Roberts, 13 Jan 44, sub: Future Military Value of the China Theater, OPD file on A. C. Wedemeyer.}
General Hull sustained this stand, but went on to point out: "In some respects as regards China we have a bear by the tail. It is difficult to hold on but we cannot let loose." If the United States desired to use China as an air base and to keep the Japanese divisions in China pinned down, he continued, it would have to go on supporting China. The land route to China would not be ready in time to assist U.S. Pacific operations nor would the Chinese Army be able to take a port on the China coast. On the other hand, the United States could not take anything away from the CBI without interfering with the flow of supplies into China necessary to assure the accomplishment of the two vital purposes. In Hull's opinion, the War Department should carefully screen all requests from the CBI that did not benefit these two main projects. It was becoming evident that the U.S. investment in the CBI had reached a point where, although it had to be sustained for political and psychological reasons, it had become militarily and economically a losing proposition.

Since the United States seemed to have little choice about continuing its commitments in the CBI, the Operations Division proceeded to define its position for the forthcoming conferences between the War Department Staff, Stilwell's emissaries, and the AXIOM mission. For 1944, full-scale operations should be carried out in north Burma to exploit the land route to China, increase the air transport line via Myitkyina, and keep the initiative from the enemy—basically the familiar U.S. strategic line in the CBI. Operations toward Sumatra or Malaya might prove to be profitable, but American resources for those moves could not be promised until definite plans were formulated and studied.

While outwardly there was little change in the Army staff position by the beginning of February, there was at least a candid recognition that little could be expected from the CBI. From the grandiose schemes for utilizing China's manpower to the frank realization that the United States could not pull out of China even if it wanted to represented a marked shift in military thinking. Henceforth, planning could be conducted on a more realistic basis. China's role would be considered less and less important.

The Fate of SEAC

At a series of meetings held in Washington in early February, Army and Navy staff officers discussed with Stilwell's representatives such matters as strategy in SEAC, long-range penetration groups, the Ledo and Yunnan Chinese forces, and the intricate problems of logistics in the CBI. General Stilwell's views on the importance of north Burma operations and the build-up of the airlift over the Hump served to strengthen the position taken by Army planners. Soon after the staff meetings, Marshall informed the President of

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14 Memo, Hull for Handy, 20 Jan 44, no sub, OPD file on A. C. Wedemeyer.
15 Memo, Billo for Roberts, 1 Feb 44, sub: Asiatic Conf, filed with SS 244, in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 241-50 (7 Jan 43).
the existing divergences between the British and the Americans over future operations in SEAC, and forwarded the briefs submitted by both Mountbatten and Stilwell.\textsuperscript{17}

According to the Mountbatten concept, it seemed evident that since SEAC's amphibious resources had been taken away and Chiang had refused to commit his Yunnan forces, overland communication with China could not be re-established within any reasonable time. The quickest way of making contact with China, Mountbatten therefore felt, would be to open a port on the China coast, and if forces were made available after Germany's collapse, then SEAC's greatest contribution could be an operation against Sumatra (CULVERIN). Although Mountbatten's commanders in chief considered that this operation could not be mounted until the spring of 1945, he believed it could be carried out in October or November of 1944.\textsuperscript{18}

Stilwell's concept rejected the SEAC plan for several reasons. There was no certainty that operations along the Netherlands East Indies—China Seas route would open a port in China more quickly than those along the Burma—Yunnan road, he believed, and the former would require a frontal assault using large amphibious resources if Sumatra were to be attacked. Even granted that Sumatra were taken, the Japanese blockade of China would still be in effect, and the difficulties of a campaign in the NEI were largely unknown. Besides, Stilwell pointed out, the SEAC plan was premised upon the fact that Germany would be defeated at an early date, thus releasing large resources for the war against Japan, and this was a highly uncertain factor. He himself felt that the best way for SEAC to help the war effort would be to use its available resources now to defeat the enemy.\textsuperscript{19}

Since Stilwell's views accorded with those of the Army staff, Marshall, via the JCS, urged the British Chiefs to have Mountbatten prosecute the war in north Burma with all means available, with Myitkyina the minimum objective for the current dry season.\textsuperscript{20} He also prepared a message that the President sent to Churchill on 25 February supporting the U.S. position in regard to SEAC:

I am gravely concerned over the recent trends in strategy that favor an operation toward Sumatra [CULVERIN] and Malaya in the future rather than to face the immediate obstacles that confront us in Burma. I fail to see how an operation against Sumatra and Malaya, requiring tremendous resources and forces, can possibly be mounted until after the conclusion of the war in Europe. Lucrative as a successful CULVERIN might be, there appears much more to be gained by employing all the resources we now have available in an all-out drive into upper Burma so that we can build our air strength in China and insure the essential support for our westward advance to the Formosa—China—Luzon area.\textsuperscript{21}

Both Churchill and Mountbatten were inclined to blame Stilwell for this application of pressure to carry out the north Burma campaign. The Prime Minister asked the President to wait until Wedemeyer and the other members of the

\textsuperscript{17} Memo, Marshall for Leahy, 20 Feb 44, no sub, with two incls, Item 64, Exec 10.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{20} Msg, Marshall to Stilwell, 21 Feb 44, CM-OUT 8879.

\textsuperscript{21} Memo, Marshall for Leahy, 24 Feb 44, no sub, OPD 381 Security, 297.
mission from SEAC reached the United States and presented Mountbatten’s side of the case before he made up his mind. Actually, the pressure for north Burma operations had begun to build up before either Stilwell’s views or his representatives arrived in the United States. The President and his military advisers had for many months consistently supported Burma as opposed to Sumatra operations. The President now felt that any southern Burma or Sumatra operations would be “shots in the dark” and would be far outweighed in importance by those planned for China. When it became evident that the State Department also was supporting the primacy of the north Burma campaign, it appeared that for the first time in the Far Eastern war a united U.S. front would be presented to the British and Chinese.

British resentment, especially as manifested at Mountbatten’s headquarters, over Stilwell’s alleged role in hardening the U.S. attitude occasioned unfavorable publicity in the American press and led Marshall in early March to instruct Stilwell to iron out this misunderstanding with Mountbatten. As he had once before, Marshall pointed out: “This is a matter of great importance not merely to your theater but in its effect on combined operations all over the world which depend upon our relationship with the British high officials.” He urged Stilwell to seek “a working basis, that is not complicated by suspicions and stiffness that makes Allied procedure unworkable.” The United States must avoid, he concluded, any “tragic repercussions to our serious disadvantage in other theaters.”

The rather intense discussion over the merits of north Burma versus Sumatra was temporarily relegated to an academic position by the Japanese themselves. Launching an attack in mid-March, they threatened to capture the Imphal Plain on the central Burma front and to cut the Assam line of communications. In the face of this challenge, SEAC was compelled to devote the greater part of its resources to halting the enemy drive. The question of SEAC’s future had to await the outcome of the Japanese attack, and it appeared that the press of circumstances might decide the problem for the Allies.

With the Japanese forcing the issue on the Imphal front and Stilwell’s Chinese forces edging forward from Ledo toward Myitkyina, the War Department renewed attempts to commit Chiang to using his Yunnan troops in order to help relieve some of the enemy

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Although Wedemeyer supported SEAC’s strategy loyally during the Axiom mission, he later stated that he did not believe in it in “heart and mind.” See ltr, Wedemeyer to Handy, 27 Oct 44, no sub, OPD 384 TS, 77.


The British and American staffs both explored the possibility of easing this strained situation by dividing the CBI into two theaters (China and Burma-India) and of simplifying the complicated command structure, but the logistical interdependence between China and Burma-India made the proposed solutions appear unfeasible to the War Department staff for the present. See: (1) msg, Dill to SACSEA, 10 Mar 44, Item 57, Exec 10; (2) msg, Mountbatten to Dill, 13 Mar 44, Item 57, Exec 10; and (3) memo for CoS, unsigned, 14 Mar 44, sub: Arguments Pro and Con Separating CBI Into Two Commands, Item 66, Exec 10.
pressure. The Generalissimo still hinged any advance of the Yunnan units upon an amphibious operation in the south, but in spite of his concern over communist movements in the north, he did allow the Ledo force to be reinforced with men who could be flown in from Yunnan.24

In early April, as the situation on the Imphal Plain grew more critical, a final Presidential effort to persuade Chiang to send the Yunnan forces into Burma was accompanied by a threat that supplies for those forces would be halted unless he did so. Whether this warning caused the Chinese to change their minds or whether they realized that further delay might be held against China later on, in mid-April Chiang ordered four Yunnan divisions to move into position to cross the Salween River into Burma.25

At long last, the three-pronged assault on north Burma was set in motion, although hardly under as auspicious circumstances as had been planned. But what would the capture of north Burma or even of all Burma mean at this juncture? The War Department had accepted the fact that China must be kept in the war. The opening of the Burma Road would allow the Allies to achieve this aim more easily, but with the growth of the airlift, the Burma Road would not be absolutely necessary. To the staff, the build-up of U.S. air forces in China to support the Pacific drive was important, but only if it could be brought into phase with Pacific operations. The rapid progress in the Pacific caused Handy to inform Somervell in mid-April:

During the past months, the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan has progressed to a point where it now appears probable that there will be no major land campaign in China supported from India and it is very doubtful that it will be possible or necessary to launch a major amphibious operation from India in support of the advance along the Philippines-Formosa-China coast line.26

The waning interest of the Army staff in Burma operations was borne out by an estimate of the Asiatic Section of the Operations Division in the latter part of March. If north Burma could be held south of Myitkyina, the necessary security for the Air Transport Command, the north Burma road, and the pipeline from India to China could be provided—all essential to support Pacific operations. The Army staff showed no enthusiasm for the reconquest of all Burma, since U.S. combat troops would probably have to be committed, and up to this point the Chief of Staff had shown no inclination to employ combat troops—except the long-range penetration group—in the CBI.27

In late March it seemed to the JCS that the CCS should send a new directive to Mountbatten instructing him to carry on operations most vigorously in north Burma even during the monsoon in order to build up the air route and lay the pipeline. Arnold informed the


26 Memo, Handy for Somervell, 19 Apr 44, sub: CCS 421—Expansion of India as a Base of Operations, OPD 381 TS, 351.

British that he was forming four new groups of transports (400 planes), which could be sent to SEAC starting in June to meet anticipated needs. The JCS were convinced that the greatest contribution SEAC could make to the war against Japan would be through timely support of the final Pacific advance.28

The need for a clear-cut directive to Mountbatten was strongly urged by Stilwell’s deputy, Sultan, who felt that powerful forces were at work in the theater to limit British operations in Burma, and by Stilwell himself, who believed that Chiang had given his Chinese commanders in Burma an order to slow down.29 In view of a lack of agreement between Churchill and his advisers on SEAC’s future role, the JCS decided in early May to give Stilwell more definite instructions on the part his forces would be expected to play. He was given responsibility for air support from China against Formosa, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, and the China coast before and during the advance on Formosa in February 1945. If possible without prejudice to his current operations, Stilwell would also give indirect support to the Mindanao landings in November 1944. The JCS recognized that air support of future Pacific operations from China would mean a major curtailment of supplies to ground forces in China, but they directed that stockpiling for the air support should begin immediately.30

The new JCS instructions marked the beginning of another phase of U.S. military policy in the CBI and went hand in hand with the more realistic attitude developing in Washington. No longer would Stilwell’s primary mission be to help the British in the Burma operations and improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army. Rather, he would develop the air link to China and build up forces and stores there to aid in the Pacific advance. The former primary goals would remain as paper objectives but would now be carried out only insofar as they assisted the growth of the air route and its protection. The opening of the Burma Road was retained as desirable mainly as a safety precaution for, although the airlift was recognized as the quickest and most certain method of helping the Pacific, the Army staff realized that a setback in the Pacific might allow development of the Burma–China road to be brought into phase again. The means for clearing, building, and using the Ledo and Burma Roads would not be available in time to be of value to Pacific operations, but the Army planners wanted to protect U.S. interests in the land route so that it could be used if projected plans went awry.31

The final version of the directive sent by the CCS to Mountbatten on 3 June followed American recommendations in the main. SEAC was to develop the air

28 (1) Min, 151st mtg CCS, 24 Mar 44. (2) Msg, Handy to Stilwell, 27 Mar 44, CM-OUT 14679.  
link to China in order to assist future Pacific operations and in the meantime was to press advantages against the enemy to allow exploitation of the overland route to China. The operations were to be carried out with those resources available in or definitely allocated to SEAC.  

The restriction on resources confirmed Marshall’s opinion of the role of the CBI, which he had expressed the preceding week when he turned down Stilwell’s request for a U.S. Army corps:

Japan should be defeated without undertaking a major campaign against her on the mainland of Asia if her defeat can be accomplished in this manner. Subsequent operations against the Japanese ground army in Asia should then be in the nature of a mopping up operation. The heavy requirements for our operations against Germany and for our main effort in the Pacific preclude our making available to you the American Corps you request to assist you in the reopening of ground communications with China.

Certain factors were beginning to emerge clearly out of the maze of negotiations and discussions on strategy and operations in the Asiatic theater during the six months after SEXTANT. The role of the theater was definitely to be subordinate to and dependent on the main advance in the Pacific. The possible large-scale use of Chinese ground troops had been discarded. Because China must be supported politically and kept in the war and because geographically it still offered itself as an air base, emphasis would in the future be placed upon the build-up of air forces alone, unless a delay in the Pacific advance allowed time to utilize China manpower. SEAC, too, would strengthen and develop the air route to China as its primary task. With the accent on speed becoming ever more important and air support becoming the most feasible means of aiding the main drive in the war against Japan, the chief burden in the Asiatic theater would be placed upon the complex air mechanism existing in the CBI.

The Mounting of the B–29 Offensive

One of General Stratemeyer’s favorite cartoons showed him sitting at his desk surrounded by pictures of his eight bosses, all of whom could give him orders in one or another of his capacities. The American air commander in the CBI had a status comparable to that of Stilwell, who also wore quite a number of hats. Part of Stratemeyer’s command, the Tenth Air Force, had been integrated with the RAF in India in December and was operating under Mountbatten. Another part of it, the Fourteenth Air Force in China, was at least technically under the jurisdiction of Chiang as theater commander. And although the India-China wing of the Air Transport Command received its assignments of tonnage from Stratemeyer as Stilwell’s deputy, control actually stemmed from Washington. By the spring of 1944, when the B–29’s arrived in the theater, another complex air factor would be added to the potpourri. The imposition of command upon command produced divided responsibilities and crisscrossing lines of authority that pro-
moted confusion, especially in times of crisis when heavy demands poured in from all sides. Supposedly, Stilwell was the control and co-ordinating point for all activity, but with his assumption of personal direction of the advance of the Chinese Ledo forces into north Burma in late 1943, he was often out of touch both with his own headquarters and with the over-all situation. Thus, during periods of emergency when central direction and co-ordination were most necessary, the tactical needs of the moment were often allowed to overshadow long-range strategic requirements.

It was natural in a theater of comparatively low priority that competition for men and equipment among the various subordinate commands should be quite keen. With the prospective introduction of the B–29 into the CBI, the rivalry became even more intense, since the new bomber program would affect all of the other theater projects. The reverberations of the preparations in late 1943 and in the early months of 1944 were felt also in projects and theaters remote from the CBI. To man the planes, the Air Forces had to secure an increase in their troop basis allotment and, to transport the first B–29 units to the CBI, a ship had to be taken from the United Kingdom run. In India and China airfields had to be built and facilities constructed to take care of the crews and planes, and this requirement drew Engineer and other service troops from such projects as the Ledo Road. In order to protect the huge bombers from Japanese surprise attacks, fighters had to be brought in to defend the fields in China, and the Tenth Air Force and RAF units were called upon to watch over the Calcutta airdromes. The President had promised Chiang in late December that fighter protection would be provided for the Cheng-tu bases, and thus in January two fighter groups (less planes) were ordered to be transferred from North Africa, along with one B–25 group (less planes) and two service groups. Eisenhower, then concerned over the requirements for ANVIL, immediately registered opposition to the shift and asked for reconsideration. Marshall overrode his objections and directed that the air units be transferred by 15 February. The Army in the meantime had prevailed upon the Navy to divert two escort carriers from the Atlantic–Mediterranean run to transport the first shipment of one hundred P–47's from the Mediterranean to the CBI so that they would arrive by the middle of March. This would deprive the Mediterranean and United Kingdom runs of the convoy protection provided by the carriers for two and one-half months during early 1944, but the Army wished to get the B–29's into operation as soon as possible.

The imminent transfer of these fighter groups caused Churchill some concern, and he approached the President in February with a view to canceling the

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move. After all, he declared, he had given up his Aegean projects and freed eight squadrons of fighters for OVERLORD. He was also expecting to send three “groups” of fighters from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom, but these would probably have to remain now and OVERLORD, despite its supreme priority, would be the loser.27 Roosevelt reassured him that OVERLORD would have sufficient fighter protection and pointed out that Air Marshal Sir John C. Slessor had indicated that if aid to Turkey were abandoned, the Mediterranean area could take the loss of the two groups to China and even spare some additional units for OVERLORD.28

In the CBI, the introduction of the P-47’s in April made a tight situation tighter. It soon became apparent that the installation of these fighter groups at Cheng-tu would mean another drain upon Hump tonnage, and the Fourteenth Air Force, which was receiving the bulk of the airlift, would be affected most severely. In December 1943 the Hump tonnage had gone over the 10,000-ton mark for the first time—to 13,450 tons. A further gain was registered in January, when 14,472 tons were flown in, but this was to be the peak until June. A critical gasoline shortage in the Assam line of communications throughout most of the early part of 1944 and diversions from the Hump caused by the Japanese assault on the Imphal region in March held down deliveries. During the period from February to June, combat aircraft were pressed into duty as transports, and, following their arrival in April, even B-29’s were temporarily converted into tankers to get supplies into the forward areas. The United States urged the British to militarize the Assam line of communications and thus remove the bottleneck. With Churchill’s blessing, American men and matériel helped the British improve the transport situation in Assam. Part of the strain on the line came from the huge quantities of gasoline devoured by the B-29’s. Although the B-29’s were supposed to be self-sufficient, over 10,000 tons were brought to Cheng-tu by the ATC for B-29 use in the period of February–September 1944.39

Sometimes the costs of mounting the B-29 offensive (MATTERHORN) were quite indirect. Originally, the project had been set up for China because China needed a boost in morale and because the Army staff thought that bases in China could be readied long before any suitable bases in the Pacific could be captured and prepared. However, in early 1944 doubts began to rise in some of the Army planners’ minds that the most efficient use could be made of the giant bombers from China, where logistics problems were so complex.

27 In all probability Churchill meant three squadrons.
Army planners suggested that part or all of the first eight groups be based in SWPA to strike at NEI oil targets. When the JWPC informed the Joint Staff Planners in February that twelve groups of B-29's could eventually be based in the Marianas, the Navy supported the Army planners and urged that the majority of the Superfortresses be located in SWPA and only one group be sent to China. Arnold, on the other hand, defended the original plan on the grounds that more bombs could be carried from bases in China to Japanese targets and that more Japanese shipping lay within reach of the China bases. When in late March MacArthur requested that a group of B-29's be based at Darwin to bomb NEI oil centers, Marshall informed him that some of these objectives would be attacked by long-range bombers from Ceylon, and that MacArthur's B-24's could hit others from SWPA.

While SWPA's petitions for B-29's were denied, plans went ahead to base the Superfortresses on the Marianas, and the JCS decided in early April to locate four of the eight MATTERHORN groups there with a target date of 30 September for beginning operations. This would supposedly mean that less fields and facilities and less service troops for construction and maintenance duties would be needed in the India-China area. Actually, it did not work out so simply since the CBI had so many construction programs under way and never seemed to have enough service troops. Building roads, airfields, bridges, and other facilities, laying pipelines, and running railroads, besides providing logistic support for all the U.S. troops and some of the Chinese forces, exacted a heavy toll on service troops. The War Department could do little to ameliorate the situation, for, as Somervell informed Sultan in April, the shortage was also being felt in the Pacific: "It will perhaps relieve you somewhat to know that the higher priority of operations against Germany is also operating to restrict the means available in the Pacific, so a slowing down there is in prospect. This may permit your effort to keep pace." 41

That was bleak comfort, but the Army became acutely aware that a balance must somehow be struck in the CBI between construction planned and units available to do the work. In mid-April a list of projects deemed "timely and feasible" was drawn up by the War Department in the order of importance and sent to the theater. Top priority went to raising Hump tonnage to 20,000 tons a month; second to the pipeline construction from Calcutta to Kunming; third to road construction from Ledo to Myitkyina, which would be continued on to Kunming if practicable; and last to a

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41 Quote is from ltr, Somervell to Sultan, 18 Apr 44, no sub, OPD 320.2 TS, 254. See also: (1) msg, JCS to Richardson for Nimitz, 6 Apr 44, CM-OUT 18999; (2) msg, Arnold to Sultan, 8 Apr 44, CM-OUT 20656; (3) msg, Marshall to Stilwell, 11 Apr 44, CM-OUT 21070; (4) msg, Sultan to Somervell, 13 Apr 44, CM-IN 9468.
pipeline between Kunming and Tu-shan in east China.\(^{42}\)

It was becoming increasingly imperative that Hump tonnage, which had sunk to 11,000 tons in March, be raised to 20,000 tons, since a stockpile of some 60,000 tons was required in China to mount the air support for the Pacific drive in early 1945. If such a program started in April 1944, General Arnold estimated that 60,000 tons could be accumulated in time by stockpiling 5,000 tons a month. Until the Hump traffic reached 20,000 tons, such a monthly accumulation would be impossible, especially in view of diversions that were likely to be made in time of crisis. In May 1944 an increase to 20,000 tons seemed quite remote to Sultan, who felt that terminal congestion in India and China and slow airfield construction were to blame.\(^{43}\) Fortunately, Sultan's view proved to be unduly pessimistic, for only two months later the Hump delivered over 25,000 tons to China, and deliveries continued to rise.

During the early months of 1944, while arrangements were being made to establish the MATTERHORN project, construct fields and facilities, and provide men and equipment, there had been a recurring discussion about the command of the very long range bombers. Initially, Marshall had proposed that Stilwell, under the JCS, would exercise direct command and control, using Tenth and Fourteenth Air Force facilities. The JCS had issued a directive to him in early March that left the choice of specific objectives to the JCS and listed the priority targets: coke ovens, Japanese industrial and urban areas, shipping concentrations, and aircraft industrial plants; the Palembang oil refineries on Sumatra would be a secondary goal. The directive made Stilwell responsible for the defense of B-29 bases in China and Mountbatten responsible for those in SEAC.\(^{44}\)

The arrangement proved to be temporary in the face of the growing interest of Chiang and Mountbatten in the command of aircraft that would operate from or through their theaters. The Army Air Forces had also devoted considerable thought to the problem and in early April proposed that since the bombers would be operating from several theaters and might be transferred whenever and wherever the need dictated, Arnold should be appointed commander of a new air force composed of all B-29's. The concept itself was not original, for a similar arrangement had been advocated by the Army as the logical organization for the Anti-Submarine Command set up as the Tenth Fleet under King in early 1943.\(^{45}\) The mobility gained would permit the planes to be employed economically wherever they could do the most good and would also lift the command problem from the purview of Chiang and Mountbatten. In spite of some opposition within the Operations Division to this establishment of an air force transcending theater boundaries—on the ground that the AAF

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\(^{44}\) (1) Msg, Marshall to Stilwell, 5 Jan 44, CM-OUT 1498. (2) Msg, Marshall to Stilwell, 8 Mar 44, CM-OUT 3058.

\(^{45}\) See Ch. II, above.
was not a self-supporting agency and could not provide the complete logistical support of any force—the JCS forthwith approved the AAF proposal. Arnold was made the executive agent of the JCS in carrying out their decisions regarding deployments, missions, and targets. Theater commanders were given the right to use the B-29’s in cases of emergency and were made responsible for defense of the bomber bases located in their areas. Thus the Twentieth Air Force came into being on 4 April 1944.46

To soften the blow to Chiang’s pride, the President personally informed him of the necessity for central control and command. The British were not so easily mollified. They made several attempts to bring direction of the B-29’s under the CCS, but the JCS countered that when the British were ready to take part in the very long range bombing program actively, the matter might be opened for reconsideration.47

In the first week of June, as Allied forces invaded France, the B-29’s carried out their first shakedown mission against installations at Bangkok. It was an important moment in the Pacific war, for it marked the initiation of an active threat to the Japanese “Inner Zone,” which hitherto had been out of range of land-based bombers and subject only to carrier nuisance raids. Employment of long-range strategic bombers would tighten the circle around Japan.

The Battle of the Air Transports

Significant as this event promised to be for over-all planning in the Pacific war, during the early portion of 1944 it could not completely overshadow the performance of another branch of the air arm, the transports. What the B-29 was to strategic planning, the transport was to tactical operations in Burma. The development of a critical transport situation, with its accompanying strains and stresses on operations in other theaters, reached its peak during the determined Japanese attack on the Imphal Plain in March.

The outbreak of intense fighting along the central India-Burma frontier produced a new kind of warfare built around the effective employment of transport aircraft. Although the emergence of a system of air transport and supply dated back to 1941 when the British had airlifted a battalion of troops from India to Iraq, operations had been on a relatively small scale and for short periods of time. In the war against Japan the Americans had first used the technique in the Burma Campaign in 1942 and later, on a larger scale, during Kenney’s airdrop in the Markham Valley of New Guinea in the late summer of 1943.48 Transport squadrons were also established during the fall of 1943 to supply the Wingate long-range penetration groups and the American GALAHAD forces. Arnold’s efforts during SEXTANT to find thirty-five scarce C-47’s for SEAC

46 (1) Memo, Carter for Roberts, 30 Mar 44, sub: JCS 742 Series, filed with JCS 742 in ABC 384.5 Japan (9 Nov 43). 1. (2) JCS 749/5, 1 Apr 44, title: Comd and Control of VLR Bombers in the War Against Japan. (3) JCS 749/6, 6 Apr 44, same title. (4) Memo, Roberts for Lindsay, 4 Jun 44, same sub, filed with CCS 501/6 in ABC 384.5 Japan (9 Nov 43). 2–A.

47 (1) Msg, President to Chiang Kai-shek, 12 Apr 44, CM-OUT 22183. (2) Min, 159th mtg CCS, 21 Apr 44. (3) CCS 501/5, 19 May 44, title: Control of the Strategic Air Force (VLR). (4) CCS 501/6, 31 May 44, same title.

48 Craven and Cate, AAF IV, 501.
emphasized the importance attached to the need for cargo and troop planes in the Burma operations.\(^49\)

There were two sources of transport supply in the CBI: the Troop Carrier Command, which, since the integration of Tenth Air Force and RAF units in December, formed an intrinsic part of the new Eastern Air Command under Stratemeyer; and the Air Transport Command, which was controlled from Washington. Any diversion from the latter would, of course, have to be approved by Washington authorities. During the British move along the Arakan coast in January and the ensuing Japanese attempt to cut them off, the British were supplied by air transport. When the Japanese threat became critical, Mountbatten temporarily borrowed twenty-five C-46's from the ATC. These were later replaced by thirty C-47's upon U.S. insistence that less Hump tonnage would be lost thereby. During February the Japanese were first halted and then forced to withdraw.\(^50\)

It was not surprising then that when the pattern of the Japanese attack upon the Imphal Plain repeated that of the Arakan thrust, Mountbatten should again turn to the ATC to help supply his cut-off units. There was even more justification on this occasion for diversions, since on 5 March Wingate's long-range groups had been dropped in central Burma behind the Japanese lines and were also entirely dependent on air supply. In order to meet the crisis and provide for future emergencies, Mountbatten asked for blanket authority to divert transports from the Hump whenever the need arose without reference to the CCS. Although the JCS agreed to permit the temporary diversion of thirty C-47's or twenty C-46's from the Hump, they would not grant him carte blanche for the future. In their opinion, Mountbatten's normal transport requirements were a concern of the British and, secondly, all U.S. operations in China were dependent upon the Hump and would suffer from diversions. To speed action on any subsequent requests from Mountbatten, however, Marshall asked Stilwell to delegate authority to Sultan to send future recommendations directly to the JCS, since Stilwell was not always immediately available.\(^51\)

As the battle on the Imphal front mounted in intensity, Mountbatten saw an opportunity in late March to turn the tide if he could keep the twenty C-46's borrowed from the Hump and secure seventy additional C-47's to fly reinforcements to the besieged units and the Wingate columns.\(^52\) The JCS granted Mountbatten permission to retain the C-46's, but the British could not provide the seventy C-47's and asked that Mountbatten be allowed to divert these from the Hump. In the ensuing exchange of telegrams between SEAC, Lon-

\(^49\) (1) Msg, Arnold to Giles, 26 Nov 43, CM-IN 16222. (2) Msg, Kuter to Giles, 26 Nov 43, CM-IN 16912. (3) Msg, Giles to Arnold, 27 Nov 43, CM-OUP 10690.
\(^52\) Wingate was killed in an airplane crash on 25 March.
don, and Washington, the British agreed to divert a squadron of fifteen RAF Dakotas (equivalent to C-47’s) from the Mediterranean and to provide thirty-two C-47’s from the United Kingdom, while the United States approved the dispatch of a troop carrier group of sixty-four C-47’s from the Mediterranean for thirty days’ service and agreed to allow Mountbatten to divert thirteen C-47’s from the Hump if this proved necessary. This quick improvisation to more than fulfill Mountbatten’s pleas allowed SEAC to carry out its plans and relieve a rather desperate situation.53

Improvements in the battle picture during April and the quick response of the CCS to his request allowed Mountbatten to refrain from asking for the thirteen Hump C-47’s and to return some of the twenty C-46’s he had borrowed earlier. Conditions warranted, in his opinion, the retention of seventy-nine aircraft borrowed from the Mediterranean, since he had to air supply four Yunnan Chinese divisions that had crossed the Salween into Burma in April. In spite of the protests of Wilson, the Mediterranean commander, the Combined Chiefs permitted SEAC to keep the seventy-nine planes either until they could be replaced by planes from the United States or until 15 June, whichever was earlier.54

The use of the transport planes to reinforce the beleaguered Allied troops and to turn the tide of battle baffled the Japanese and threw their attack timetables out of line. The failure of the Japanese to capture Allied stores blunted their drive and finally forced them to retreat. Essentially, it was a victory of machine over man. In June 1944, though Stilwell and his forces were still embattled at Myitkyina, the Japanese were withdrawing from the Imphal sector, and Japanese fortunes in Burma were on the ebb. The road to victory might be hard and slow for the Allies, but the initiation of a large-scale attack by the Japanese in Burma now began to recoil upon them.

The Decline of the CBI

By June it was apparent to the Army staff in Washington that the status of the CBI had altered considerably. The Sextant Conference, aided and abetted by the President’s hastiness, Chiang’s stubbornness, and Great Britain’s lack of enthusiasm, had been the turning point. Many of the earlier frustrations that had led to delays and modifications of operations had been eliminated, but time had overtaken the theater. Now its chief raison d’être lay in the possible support it could afford the main advance in the Pacific. SEAC’s attention was focused on the build-up of the air route over the Hump and, secondarily, on clearing north Burma of the enemy. China was

to be of value as an air base only, and Chinese manpower was relegated to a minor position. Major land campaigns on the Asiatic continent were to be avoided, and there was not enough time to equip and train Chinese troops for use in the U.S. drive through the Pacific.

The establishment of the B-29 in the CBI had brought the Japanese “Inner Zone” under attack, but forces were already at work to shift the bulk of the big bombers to bases in the Marianas, where logistics would not be so difficult. On the ground, the tide of Japanese expansion in Burma began to recede.

Now the prime interest of the enemy would be shifted to the airfields of eastern China, which, as Allied heavy bombers were brought in, would present a serious threat to the Japanese homeland. The Japanese reaction to this threat was a drive that opened in April and reached major proportions in May with advances into east China. But even if the Japanese were successful in capturing the airfields and eliminating CBI air support for the Pacific drive, they would only gain delay, not escape, for the CBI was no longer considered essential to the Allies for victory over Japan.
CHAPTER XX

The Second Front and the Secondary War—The Pacific

January–May 1944

The American Preserve

Although Sextant decisions did little more than confirm plans for the Pacific submitted by the United States, the agreement to mount Overlord produced a chain reaction that ultimately affected every theater of operations. Up to this time, high-level Anglo-American discussions had been mainly concerned with the planning of European-Mediterranean operations and the consideration of SEAC strategy. Little attention had been devoted in those discussions to the Pacific war, which had been maintained as an American preserve principally on the ground that the United States was contributing the bulk of the resources to fight the Japanese. Even at lower planning levels there had been but few combined efforts concerning the war in the Pacific. With Overlord pinned down, the Mediterranean ventures curtailed, and the rate of progress in SEAC slow, it was natural that British interest should be directed to the island warfare in the Pacific, which at last was showing definite signs of gathering momentum.

Recapture of former Empire possessions such as the Solomons and the Gilberts was not of vital strategic or economic importance to the British, but as the approach to the Asian mainland proceeded, the redemption of such key points as Hong Kong and Singapore would engage their attention more and more.

In an effort to retain American freedom of action in the Pacific, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee had urged the JCS at Sextant to set forth clearly the primacy of the Central Pacific advance over all other Pacific operations. Discerningly, the JSSC pointed out the principal weakness in the new U.S. policy of flexibility:

The history of our discussions with the British concerning the strategic concept for Europe clearly demonstrates the continuous difficulties which arise when the primacy of the operations in one part of a theater is not clearly set forth and accepted but remains the subject of debate, whenever operations are being considered in another part of the same theater. It is most desirable that we should profit by this experience and have no question in our own
minds as to where the primary effort is to be made in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{1}

But while the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were disinclined to have the British take part in Pacific planning at this juncture, they were themselves not yet ready to settle the course of future strategy in that area. The desire for speed and short cuts added to the uncertainties of enemy reaction and the presence of strong personalities in the theaters operated against the acceptance of one primary route and favored the development of a one-two punch that would keep the Japanese off balance and permit the maintenance of the strategic initiative.

Several factors came to the aid of the U.S. military leaders in the immediate post-SEXTANT era, granting them additional time to work on the problem. One was the split that had evolved between Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff on the proper role of Great Britain in the war against Japan. The Prime Minister was convinced that the main arena for British effort should be in the Indian Ocean, with Malaya and the NEI as the goal. His military advisers argued that if British forces were to play an important part in the war, they must be based on Australia and operate on MacArthur’s left flank in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{2} This difference of opinion served to delay British efforts to move into the Pacific area.

In early 1944 the British decided to send a naval task force to Australia in March of that year to operate under MacArthur and to build up a submarine force based on Australia during the latter half of 1944. Since MacArthur was anxious to increase his naval strength, it appeared that any possible U.S. naval objections might be overcome and that the British might gain an entering wedge into the Pacific war. In February the Japanese proceeded to help the U.S. Navy out of this potential embarrassment by shifting major fleet units to Singapore, where they would be closer to fuel supplies and temporarily out of reach of the U.S. naval and air forces. This move, altering the naval situation in the Indian Ocean, scuttled for the time being the project to transfer British warships to the Pacific. In early March Churchill queried the President whether the U.S. Fleet could get along without British help in the Pacific. If, he went on, the British could keep Japanese naval units pinned down at Singapore, the U.S. Fleet would have a “clear field” in the Pacific. Roosevelt assured him that the United States could manage until the summer of 1945 at least, and this assurance postponed any immediate need for settling the question of combined planning in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{3}

The U.S. planners were under no illusions that this would mark the end of British maneuvering and came to the conclusion that although SWPA could effectively use any British naval task

\textsuperscript{1} JCS 614, 2 Dec 43, title: Plan for the Defeat of Japan. The JCS noted this paper. See min, 133d mtg JCS, 3 Dec 43.


Forces, the added problem of command and war direction would probably make such aid undesirable. The main fear was that combined planning might slow down the increasing tempo of the war. The Strategy Section of the Operations Division believed that, to forestall further attempts, the U.S. Chiefs should determine post-Formosa operations as soon as possible and present the British with a fait accompli.\footnote{(1) SS 266, 11 Mar 44, title: British Naval Operations in the Pacific, ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 251-70 (7 Jan 43). (2) Memo, Billo for Chief S&P Gp OPD, 23 Apr 44, sub: Combined Planning for the War in the Pacific, filed with SS 287 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 285-96 (7 Jan 43).}

When the British planners approached their American counterparts in the spring of 1944 on the basis that they desired to know what British forces would be required after Germany’s defeat to finish the Japanese war, the Americans realized that rationalization of the U.S. unilateral stand on the Pacific would only lead to endless arguments. Instead, the American planners sought to delay entering into combined planning until their chiefs had settled upon the U.S. course of action.\footnote{(1) OPD brief, title: Notes ... 149th mtg JPS, 3 May 44, Policies, Combined Planning for the Defeat of Japan (JPS 451), filed with JPS 451 in ABC 981 Japan (9 May 44), 1-A.}

There were intimations on the eve of OVERLORD that the British Chiefs of Staff intended at least to discuss Pacific problems with the JCS, when they came to Europe for the invasion, in order to determine whether India or Australia should be built up as the British base of operations. General Roberts learned from U.S. military sources in London that the British Chiefs had a paper on Far Eastern strategy prepared, projecting a campaign by British and Empire units, aided by the United States, to take Ambonina (NEI) in late 1945 or early 1946. According to the report from London, the British Chiefs were not serious about this proposal, but would use it to try to commit the Prime Minister to the Pacific and permit an Australian build-up.\footnote{(1) Msg, Buford to Clarke for PAsmo, 31 May 44, CM-IN 25796. (2) Memo, unsigned, for Chief S&P Gp OPD, 5 Jun 44, no sub, ABC 981 (9-25-44), V. (3) Ehrman, Grand Strategy V, 459-62.}

How long the U.S. military could avoid a showdown over the question of British participation in the Pacific in the face of increasing high-level British interest was problematical. In any event, definite long-range decisions on Pacific strategy did not fit in with the doctrine of flexibility promulgated just before SEXTANT. By June the signs indicated that to maintain the American monopoly on future Pacific planning would require adroit and tactful handling, if it could be managed at all.

**Options in the Pacific**

The policy of flexibility gave the offense in the Pacific the advantage of surprise and allowed the transfer of strength from one axis to another. It had disadvantages as well. The main weakness, as the JSSC had pointed out, lay in the fact that the lack of long-range decisions opened each succeeding forward movement to debate and discussion. Temporarily restricted at the international level, the debate went on between the services in Washington, between the planners in the theater, and between the theater and Washington. The plethora of advice and opinions on the value and necessity of the next operation demanded a great deal of compro-
mish and conciliation, especially when theater planners and commanders did not agree with their own service opposites in Washington. During the winter of 1943-44 the search for some of the answers to the question “Where do we go next?” was constant.

At the Cairo conference the political and military leaders had approved the general plan for an advance to the Formosa–China–Luzon area and a schedule of planned operations for 1944. While the Central Pacific forces were proceeding via the Marshalls and Carolines to the Marianas, the SWPA forces would take the Vogelkop Peninsula in New Guinea and complete the conquest of the Bismarcks by seizing Kavieng on New Ireland and Manus Island in the Admiralties. This schedule had been set up for planning purposes only and embodied no hard-and-fast decisions to carry out the operations step by step. Favorable changes in the tactical or strategic situation, added to the desire for speeding up the war by short cuts, might allow some objectives to be bypassed. On the other hand, determined enemy resistance might force a slower pace or a shift of strength to one or the other axis of approach.

With Central Pacific units in possession of the Gilberts and preparing for the campaign against the Marshalls in January 1944, the question of their next point of attack came to the fore. A swing south to the Carolines would support SWPA and SOPAC forces fighting in New Guinea, on New Britain, and on Bougainville. If forces moved north against the Marianas, Truk might be bypassed and the B–29 offensive might get under way sooner. The possibility existed that such a move might eventually make Formosa a more attractive target than the Philippines and tend to lessen the importance of operations in the Southwest Pacific Area.

The plan (coded GRANITE) that

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7 See Ch. XVI above.
Nimitz submitted to Washington in January covered the Central Pacific advance through 1944 and recommended the orthodox approach via the Marshalls, the Carolines (including Truk), and the Marianas, leading to an eventual junction with SWPA forces in the Philippines. It also considered the alternative that Truk might be bypassed and the Palau’s seized instead. In essence, the plan agreed with MacArthur’s concept that reoccupation of the Philippines would be necessary in order to defeat Japan, but it also carefully stressed that the CCS had approved the primacy of the Central Pacific whenever conflicts in timing and resources occurred.

Priority of the Central Pacific over the other Pacific routes was particularly important at this stage in the Pacific war since the imbalance of shipping and landing craft was still acute and would probably remain so until after OVERLORD was launched. The War Department, in considering MacArthur’s RENO III, submitted in October 1943, had indicated that resources would not be sufficient to mount operations in the Arafura Sea southwest of New Guinea, which were a part of the second phase of RENO III. Marshall and Handy, who had returned in December from a post-SEXTANT visit to the Pacific, were aware of SWPA’s problems and supported MacArthur’s stand that the JCS should control allocations of shipping and landing craft. They also resisted successfully an attempt by the Navy to put the Kavieng operation under Nimitz rather than MacArthur. But they did agree with the Navy that the theater commanders should meet and coordinate their concepts of Pacific strategy before the JCS decided what allocations should be furnished by Nimitz for the next objective in the SWPA—completion of the conquest of the Bismarck Archipelago.

The theater conference, which was held at Pearl Harbor on 27–28 January and attended by representatives of SWPA, SOPAC, and CPA, disclosed several facts of interest in the light of later events. Perhaps the most surprising feature was the general feeling among the conferees, both Army and Navy, that greater emphasis should be placed upon naval and amphibious operations along the New Guinea axis to the Philippines rather than on those across the Central Pacific. The importance of the Philippines as a principal strategic objective was not questioned. In line with this consensus, the conference indicated that the Marianas were not regarded as important or necessary to the advance against Japan and were located too far from the Japanese mainland for the B-29 to be effectively used. Nimitz and Sutherland, MacArthur’s chief of staff, agreed that the Japanese homeland

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10 (1) Memo, Col Carl D. Silverthorne for Handy, 6 Dec 43, sub: Additional Points Which May Be Discussed in Central and South Pacific as Result of Sextant, Folder 9, Item 15, Exec 5. (2) Memo, Billo for G. A. Lincoln, 7 Dec 43, sub: Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan in 1944, filed with CCS 397 in ABC 384 Pacific (1–17–43), 2. (3) Memo for Handy, 7 Dec 43, no sub, Folder 9, Item 15, Exec 5.

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would have to be reached from bases in China. The conferees also felt that Truk could be bypassed and a move made right into the Palaus.¹²

The conferees reached no decisions, but MacArthur immediately urged the War Department that, in accord with general opinion at the conference, all forces be concentrated after the Marshalls operations along the New Guinea route, the shortest and most direct path to the Philippines. All long-range bombers (B-29's) should be made available to SWPA rather than located in the Marianas. He desired to place all naval forces under Halsey as his Allied naval commander and would welcome any British task forces that could be assigned. Time was short, he concluded, and since a decision was necessary, he was going to send Sutherland to Washington to present his views.¹³

Neither King nor the Joint planners were particularly pleased with the results of the conference. King pointed out that SEXTANT decisions had committed the United States to advances along the two axes and that as yet MacArthur had not submitted any plan to carry out these decisions. King believed in the current flexible strategy and mentioned the success that had so far accompanied the Central Pacific drive in the Gilberts and Marshalls. This compared very favorably with the slow progress in SWPA. He could not see putting most of the Pacific Fleet units under MacArthur to support a New Guinea advance, and he continued to maintain that the economic employment of the Navy required that strategic control of the Pacific remain the responsibility of a single naval commander.¹⁴

In answering King’s protests, Marshall called attention to the fact that the United States had a tremendous potential force in the Pacific provided it conformed to the basic principle of mass. "We have struggled since the outbreak of war over questions of command in various regions of the Pacific from the Aleutians to Australia. The time has now come, in my opinion, to divorce from our minds any thought other than a purely objective purpose to secure the maximum result in the shortest time from the means available." Since both RENO III and GRANITE called for additional forces and neither could be carried out until the JCS decided how many of their requirements could be met, agreement must be reached by the JCS as to the path to be followed to reach the Luzon and China coasts. He suggested that the matter be turned over to the JSSC for a report on the geographical objectives to be seized, the sequence in which they should be taken, and the best and quickest route or routes to be used to conclude the Pacific war. In preparing the study, the JSSC should assume that reinforcements from Europe would not become available until after 31 December 1944.¹⁵ King agreed that the JSSC should handle the question.¹⁶

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¹³ Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 5 Feb 44, CM-IN 1443.

¹⁴ Memo, King for CofS, 8 Feb 44, sub: CINCSWPAC Despatch C 121702, Feb 44, filed with JCS 986/2 in ABC 984 Pacific (28 Jun 43).

¹⁵ Memo, Marshall for King, 10 Feb 44, no sub, filed with JCS 986/2 in ABC 984 Pacific (28 Jun 43).

The Joint planners in the meantime had come to the conclusion that setting up the Philippines as an essential objective was too restrictive since the islands might eventually be bypassed. General Roberts, moreover, could not agree with MacArthur’s chief of staff, General Sutherland, that the United States should accept Mindanao as of primary importance in the Philippines and felt that U.S. forces should stay away from the coast of China. Both axes of advance to Luzon should be used, Roberts maintained, and the capture of both the Marianas and the Palaus would be desirable.\footnote{\textit{Operations in the Pacific Theater, filed with JCS 386/2 in ABC 384 Pacific (28 Jun 43).}}

In the midst of this divergence of opinion between the theater and headquarters staffs, Nimitz sent his chief of staff, Rear Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, to Washington in early February to present his views to the JCS. Sutherland was already on hand to set forth SWPA’s side of the controversy. Nimitz believed that if the capture of the island of Eniwetok in the western Marshalls could be managed right away, time schedules could be advanced, and Central Pacific forces could prepare to go into either the Carolines or the Marianas in June, since the SWPA units would not be in position by that time to allow the seizure of the Palaus.\footnote{(1) JPS 390, 5 Feb 44, title: Campaign Plan “Granite.” (2) Memo, Roberts for Handy, 8 Feb 44, no sub, Item 11, Exec 2.} This would leave the decision whether to go north or south of Truk to be made later on and preserve the concept of flexibility. During the ensuing debate, the Air Forces made a presentation on the future use of the B-29’s, favoring the use of the Marianas as the chief base, much to Sutherland’s chagrin.\footnote{(1) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 16 Feb 44, CM-IN 10999. (2) Memo, Marshall for Leahy and King, 24 Feb 44, no sub, Item 54, Exec 10. (4) Memo, Marshall for COMINCH and CNO, 2 Mar 44, no sub, OPD 381 Security, 287.}

As if to clinch the matter, the JSSC proposed that the Central Pacific route should be made the primary effort and that operations should be carried out in the Marianas and Palaus and then the drive should continue on to Formosa or Luzon. Operations in other areas should be decided upon the basis of their support of the Central Pacific offensive.\footnote{\textit{Operations in the Pacific Theater, filed with JCS 386/2 in ABC 384 Pacific (28 Jun 43).}}

MacArthur and Sutherland both tried to head off this apparent swing toward the Marianas, which might shift the emphasis away from SWPA. Marshall determined to reserve judgment until he could hear Nimitz himself in early March. In the interim, Marshall felt, the Joint planners should study the allotment of resources, the use of land-based air superiority, and the sequence of operations in the Pacific. The JCS should continue their direction of strategy on a flexible basis, utilizing the fleet and air arm to best advantage.\footnote{\textit{Operations in the Pacific Theater, filed with JCS 386/2 in ABC 384 Pacific (28 Jun 43).}}

While this debate was going on in Washington, several operations were carried out in the theaters that introduced new factors into the discussion. On 15 February South Pacific forces landed on Green Island (northern Solomons), slightly more than 100 miles from Rabaul. During the next two days carriers heavily attacked Truk, causing
the Japanese fleet to desert the base and head for the safer waters of the western Pacific and Singapore. The vulnerability of Truk to attack served to confirm the growing opinion that it could be bypassed. On the 17th Central Pacific forces invaded Eniwetok, and the possibility arose that Nimitz might go into either the Carolines or Marianas in June. SWPA, not to be outdone, conducted a reconnaissance in force of the Admiralties on 29 February and several days later committed the rest of the 1st Cavalry Division to the capture of this island group. On 5 March MacArthur announced that in mid-April he would aim at Hollandia rather than at Hansa Bay.22

The crux of the debate now boiled down to whether Truk should be bypassed to the north, with the Marianas the objective, or to the south, by taking the Palaus. On 8 March Sutherland submitted RENO IV to the JCS. The plan advocated bypassing Truk to the south, with Mindanao to be attacked in November 1944 and Luzon in January 1945. Sutherland contended that this would put Allied forces in the Philippines in 1944 when the Central Pacific forces would still be fighting in the Japanese mandates. By this time Nimitz had swung over to the support of the Marianas, and he was seconded by the JSSC. Sutherland’s brief for the necessity of seizing Kavieng was disallowed by the JCS on the grounds that Kavieng was now unnecessary and the Japanese forces there could be left to their fate.23

One of the principal arguments used by Sutherland against the Marianas was that they could not serve as a base to mount major operations against the China–Formosa–Luzon area because of their restricted facilities. King scotched this tack by indicating that divisions could be mounted in other rear areas and rendezvous at sea, just as they had for TORCH. He went on to express his opinion that the region along the New Guinea coast offered little in the way of suitable staging areas and would soon become a rear area of little importance.24

The directive issued by the JCS on 12 March was a compromise agreement that, on the surface at least, seemed unfavorable to MacArthur. Kavieng was canceled, with Mussau Islands and/or Emirau (both north of Kavieng) to be substituted if necessary. Hollandia was approved for 15 April. Truk was to be bypassed, but to the north, and the Marianas were to be invaded on 15 June. The forces would move southward again in September, when the Palaus would be seized by Central Pacific units in preparation for the big move by SWPA troops into Mindanao on 15 November. The decision was left open as to whether Formosa or Luzon would be the next objective, but a target date of 15 February was set up. SWPA was made responsible for planning for Luzon and POA for Formosa. All Marine units, naval


support, and combat loaders belonging to POA were to be returned by MacArthur by 5 May. When SWPA postponed the target date for Hollandia to 22 April, the JCS granted SWPA a week's extension for the retention of POA's forces and equipment.

Ostensibly, this was a setback for MacArthur, since his pleas for concentration on the New Guinea axis had been turned down and his arguments on bypassing Truk to the south and taking Kavieng were not accepted. But in spite of this apparent eclipse, his greatest ambition was still on the agenda—he was still slated to lead the Allied forces back to the Philippines.

The swiftly changing pattern of Pacific strategy was deceptive, for although adjustments were made in individual operations and timing, the basic missions remained constant. The JCS retained the double-barreled advance by SWPA and the Central Pacific, and the same general objective—the Formosa-Luzon-China coast area—remained the target. With the strategy settled insofar as the dominant concept of flexibility would permit, the JCS and their planners turned to another pressing problem that had been attendant upon the strategic decisions—the approaching breakup of the South Pacific Area and the reallocation of its forces.

End of a Mission

It had become evident to the South Pacific Army commander, General Har-
was dependent upon the Thirteenth Air Force for support. Marshall and Arnold wished to keep this air force intact and favored granting operational command to MacArthur right away, on the grounds that he could use it to best advantage and also effect the co-ordination with SWPA's Fifth Air Force, which was deemed necessary. Complete command by MacArthur would follow later on.  

Fundamentally, both services were concerned over a probable shortage of bombers to carry out both the Granite plan and the Reno plan. When the JCS decided to extract parts of each plan for approval, the way was cleared for a settlement. In mid-March the Joint Chiefs accepted the recommendations of the Joint planners, which resulted in a division of the South Pacific forces and resources more or less on service lines. After the Hollandia operation in April, MacArthur would receive the XIV Corps and the 25th, 37th, 40th, 43d, 93d, and Americal Divisions. He would also assume control of the Thirteenth Air Force and was given the assurance that all combat and service troops not required in the South Pacific would eventually be sent to his area. In the light of current and prospective service troop shortages, this was an important item. The bulk of naval resources, except for specific units assigned to Seventh Fleet in SWPA, was to be given to Nimitz, along with all naval and Marine air units. The I Marine Amphibious Corps with the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions was also allocated to POA. MacArthur would assist Nimitz in providing long-range bombardment of Truk and the Palaus, and the two commanders were left to work out the details of the transfers between themselves. 

In anticipation of the transfers of men and matériel from the South Pacific Area—the bulk of them to begin in May 1944—the Army planners during March began to consider the problem of Army command reorganization in the Central Pacific and the future assignment of General Harmon and his staff. They maintained that there should be an over-all Army commander in POA and also an over-all Army Air commander, who would be responsible for Twentieth Air Force units located in the Pacific Ocean Areas. The Hawaiian Department and South Pacific Area should be set up as communications areas. In late May, Marshall approved the planners' recommendations and informed Richardson that he would become Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Pacific Ocean Areas, and that Harmon would be the new over-all Air commander, as well as Deputy Commander, Twentieth Air Force. Harmon was made directly responsible to Nimitz for all operational matters and placed under Richardson for such administrative control as was deemed necessary. The new command setup was to become effective on 1 August. 

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29 (1) Memo, Bessell for Roberts, 10 Feb 44, sub: Redeployment of South Pacific Forces, filed with JPS 391 in ABC 520.2 (10 Feb 44). (2) Min, 128th mtg JPS, 16 Feb 44. (3) JPS 391/1, 28 Feb 44, title: Redeployment of Forces in the Pacific Upon Completion of Forearm and Mercantile. (4) JCS 715/5, 17 Mar 44, title: Redeployment of Forces in the Pacific Following Operation RECKLESS. 

30 (1) Memo, Ritchie for Hull, 17 Mar 44, no sub, OPD 520.2 TS, 204. (2) Memo, Silverthorne for Hull, 17 Mar 44, sub: Comments on Draft of Memo.
The prospective termination of the South Pacific Area on 1 August as an active theater of operations and its future development as the South Pacific Base Command—primarily a staging and rehabilitation area—indicated the forward progress of the war. The two-pronged drive that had marked the initiation of the Allied offensive in the Pacific in 1942 had become one, and a new prong had been set in motion in the Central Pacific. Some of the strength of the South Pacific would go to SWPA, some would join the Central Pacific, and the residue would support both areas. The division, which would fortify both theaters, served also to strengthen the concept that the Pacific war would continue to be fought on two fronts, the basically Army approach of SWPA and the primarily naval advance of POA. The consistent inability of the two services to agree on any over-all commander for the Pacific would also tend to support the maintenance of this double offensive rather than the consolidation of forces and employment of the principle of mass and concentration so typical of the U.S. position in the European war.

Even the reapportionment of South Pacific resources did not satisfy the needs of SWPA and POA completely, and deficiencies soon rose to plague the planning for further advances in the Pacific. Strategy might be determined and combat forces provided to implement that strategy, but unless logistical support and transport could also be furnished, the other two would be impotent.

Of Troops and Transports

The anticipated need for service troops in the Pacific appeared more acute than ever in the early part of 1944. The Army-wide pinches in this category of manpower, intensified by the demands of OVERLORD, inevitably made a tight situation tighter. To MacArthur, along with other theater commanders, General Marshall had in January suggested rolling up rear bases no longer essential and employing the minimum number of service troops in intermediate areas. By concentrating supply and administrative functions and moving headquarters units forward quickly, further savings might be made. Employment of civilians wherever feasible might also cut down service troop requirements.

The implication that the tight service troop situation might necessitate reductions in the field drew a protest from MacArthur in February on the ground that any decrease would slow the tempo of operations and permit the Japanese to consolidate their positions. “The great problem of warfare in the Pacific is to move forces into contact and maintain them. Victory is dependent upon the solution of the logistic problem,” he stated. So urgent did he consider his requirements for service troops that he recommended that, if necessary, uncommitted combat units in the United States should be converted for the purpose.

The United States was not the only nation to feel the manpower pinch, for

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31 See Ch. XVIII, above.
32 (1) Ltr, Marshall to MacArthur, 23 Jan 44, no sub, WDCSA 929.2 SOPAC, TS. (2) See also above, p. 409, n. 24.
in the first half of 1944 the New Zealand and Australian Governments both requested the advice of the CCS on ways and means to cut down their armed forces to meet potential manpower shortages in food production areas. In March the CCS informed New Zealand that the 3d New Zealand Division in Italy would be sent home when conditions permitted and that two New Zealand brigade groups would be withdrawn from the Solomons after the projected end of the Bismarck campaign in May. A proposal by the Australians in early June to reduce their over-all military forces to six full-strength and combat-ready divisions by the end of 1944 was also approved by the CCS. In the process, some 30,000 Australians would be demobilized during the remainder of 1944.\(^{34}\) These additions to the home forces might help New Zealand and Australia to support themselves, but would not really solve the U.S. service troop problem since both areas were becoming rear zones and more distant from the combat locale. In the meantime, other elements were working adversely upon the U.S. service troop situation.

During the six months following SEXTANT, there was a steady westward flow of divisions and supporting units from the United States and Hawaii. In November 1943 SWPA had only four U.S. Army divisions—the 24th, 32d, and 41st Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division. In January the 6th Infantry Division was sent from the Central Pacific and the 31st Infantry Division followed from the United States in March. During May, the 33d Infantry Division arrived from Hawaii and the 11th Airborne from the United States, giving SWPA a total of eight divisions by June 1944.

To the South Pacific forces, which also included four Army divisions in November—the 25th, 37th, 43d, and Americal—two new outfits were added. The 40th Infantry Division arrived from Hawaii in December and January, and the 93d Infantry Division began to disembark in January from the United States. The transfer of these six Army divisions to SWPA’s control would by July 1944 provide MacArthur with fourteen Army divisions for his operations and other commitments.

Although the forward movement of the 6th, 33d, and 40th Divisions from Hawaii left the Central Pacific with only two Army divisions—the 7th and 27th Infantry—of the five present in November, four additional divisions were added from the United States by June. The 38th Infantry Division arrived in January, the 77th in March, the 98th in April, and the 81st in June. This made a grand total of twenty Army divisions in the Pacific in June 1944 as compared to thirteen at the time of SEXTANT.\(^{35}\)

The consequences of this increase in divisions and their supporting troops and their movement into the forward areas were not difficult to envision—longer lines of communications, more supplies and equipment to be handled, more construction to be completed, more

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bases to be staffed, and more ships to convey all the men and matériel necessary to perform these services. Some service troops could be obtained by closing out old bases and facilities, but in the forward areas labor problems would mount and local assistance would be at a minimum until the Philippines were reached. It was evident that the service troop question would probably remain prominent at least until the end of the year.

The arrival of new divisions also intensified an old dilemma—the utilization of available shipping, both cargo and personnel, to maintain the forces and to permit them to take part in the offensive against Japan. Army planners expected the troop shipping backlog to be made up by June, but believed that a dry-cargo ship deficiency would probably develop during mid-1944. Assault landing craft and transports would not be available for the Pacific in the desired quantity until after the Normandy invasion.

In the transfer of divisions between the United States, Hawaii, and the South-Southwest Pacific, the War Department devised a new system to conserve shipping. The same transports that unloaded the 38th Division in Hawaii in January 1944, picked up the 6th Division and conveyed it to SWPA. The 6th took over the 38th's equipment and supplies, which were already loaded, and left its own in Hawaii for the 38th to use. This co-ordinated the movements, saved a great deal of time by eliminating offloading and onloading of divisional equipment, and relieved some of the strain on the port facilities in the Hawaiian Islands. The procedure was worked out satisfactorily and used in April to move the 98th Division to Hawaii and the 33d to SWPA.

In spite of these economies, it was apparent to Somervell that a cargo ship squeeze would appear about May, so in March he asked if MacArthur could release any of the seventy-six Liberty ships operating in SWPA. The latter's reply indicated that he not only would have to hold on to what he had but also would require sizable additions to his cargo fleet during the summer if he were to carry out the instructions of the JCS. When Nimitz also requested ship increases, the JCS decided to grant the requirements of both for April, but in the meantime to call a shipping conference in Washington to survey the over-all situation. In informing POA and SWPA of the conference, the JCS voiced their concern: "The shortage in shipping during the coming months may affect the strategy of the war in both Europe and the Pacific, unless all concerned exercise the most rigid economy and adopt all possible expedients to conserve both personnel and cargo shipping."

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39 (1) Quote is from msg, JCS to MacArthur and Nimitz, 4 Apr 44, CM-OUT 18510. (2) JCS 768/2,
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In the midst of this serious situation, ANVIL was canceled as a simultaneous attack to coincide with OVERLORD, then the operation was postponed indefinitely, and the landing craft and shipping designated for it were reallocated.\(^4\) This was a fortunate turn of circumstances for the Pacific, since it allowed the JCS to meet the cargo ship requirements of MacArthur and Nimitz through July. The assault and landing craft situation continued to be acute, however, and transfers of these resources between POA and SWPA were effected to ease the problem. Insofar as the Pacific was concerned, no real solution to the assault and landing craft question could be expected until after OVERLORD was launched.\(^4\) Nevertheless, both MacArthur and Nimitz would be able to go ahead with their planned operations for the summer and in the meantime new developments might permit or make unnecessary further increments of shipping and landing craft. Although by June the service troop situation was still far from satisfactory and showed few signs of being alleviated, at least the shipping picture had brightened somewhat.

\textit{Eve of OVERLORD}

By the eve of OVERLORD, the war against Japan had reached an encouraging stage. MacArthur's forces had advanced along the northern coast of New Guinea as far as Biak Island. The Admiralties were firmly in Allied hands, and large groups of the enemy had been bypassed in the Bismarcks. Central Pacific forces were on the verge of thrusting from the Marshalls into the Marianas to begin isolating Truk and the Carolines. Only in the CBI was the scene less cheerful, and even there small rays of light could be glimpsed. Stillwell was on the offensive at Myitkyina, and Mountbatten had just about halted the Japanese at Imphal. On the other side of the ledger, the new Japanese drive in east China had assumed serious proportions and seemed likely to cause deep repercussions in China. On the whole, however, the enemy was either on the defensive or on the run.

Strategically, the six months after SEXTANT produced several important changes. Perhaps the foremost among these was the decline of the CBI in the strategic scale. Pacific strategy, on the other hand, had altered in detail but not in essence. The main objectives remained constant, and only the intermediate steps were changed to conform to new circumstances. It seemed settled that flexibility would be kept as a guide and that MacArthur and Nimitz would maintain their separate domains for the time being.

In the field of tactics, improvements in the Allied technique of amphibious warfare had enabled the acceleration of the SWPA and POA campaigns to continue. Increasing airpower and naval power had
forced the Japanese fleet to withdraw to safer retreats. In the CBI, the B-29 was ready to demonstrate its possibilities, and air transport had emerged as a potent aid to jungle warfare.

Perhaps the most serious obstacles that lay ahead in the war against Japan were the logistical difficulties that threatened to slow the pace. The need for a solution of the service troop shortage and the perennial danger of shipping and landing craft deficits might prove more balky questions to resolve than the strategic and tactical problems. Until these hurdles could be surmounted, it might be necessary for the progress of the war and the selection of objectives to hinge on logistics rather than strategy.

Until OVERLORD was completed and the outcome of the European conflict became clear, no far-reaching relief could be expected. The final resolution of problems of logistics and strategy would have to wait. As always, unexpected and competitive demands had arisen in the first five months of 1944 for available U.S. manpower, aircraft, shipping, and landing craft. To mount OVERLORD and at the same time satisfy the British in the Mediterranean, MacArthur and the Navy in the Pacific, and Chiang in China, delicate adjustments had been made and calculated risks taken in the wars against Germany and Japan. By early June all had come to hinge on the fate of OVERLORD. For the strategic planners in Washington the past, the present, and the future had come to focus on the cross-Channel assault. After more than three years of planning, General Marshall and his advisers could only sit back and wait. In the predawn hours of 5 June, despite forecasts of unfavorable winds and choppy seas, General Eisenhower made his historic decision to go ahead with the invasion. On 6 June the ships and craft of the mightiest armada ever gathered headed through the rough waters of the Channel toward the beaches of Normandy. With them rode the hopes of the free world.
CHAPTER XXI

The Promise of Military Victory
D Day to September 1944

The successful landings of Allied troops in Normandy on 6 June 1944 brought an end to a tense period of waiting for General Marshall and his staff. OVERLORD represented far more than the biggest combined amphibious operation of the war. It symbolized the consummation of the strategic pattern, upon which the Allies had finally agreed at Tehran, to strike directly at the heart of Germany. Some of the primary strategic ideas of the Army staff had at last been translated from the debating councils and planning stages into action. For the Americans, the success of OVERLORD signaled the triumph of the principles of mass and concentration, and of the notion of a decisive war. The invasion of northwest Europe had at last become a reality, the big drive across the Channel an accomplished fact.

Once the lodgment was established on the Continent, the OVERLORD phase was over, and the war against Germany settled into an essentially logistical and tactical struggle. It was left to General Eisenhower and the efficient coalition staff he had molded in SHAEF to fight the battles and make the decisions on the spot in order to bring about the defeat of the German armies in the field. Before the summer was over, the Allied armies, breaking out of their beachheads and overrunning France, appeared well on their way to accomplishing that goal. Meanwhile the Russians, who had started their own big drive on the Eastern Front, advanced into eastern and central Europe. The giant Allied nutcracker was beginning to crush the German forces.

With the troops ashore, the work of the Army planners in Washington with respect to European planning was all but done. The military pay-off appeared close at hand, and the defeat of both foes merely a question of time. It remained only to tie up the loose ends in global strategy—reach a final settlement on Mediterranean strategy and fashion plans for defeating Japan. With some confidence, therefore, the planners prepared to move their last pieces into position on the strategic chessboard.

ANVIL—The Last Rounds

With the capture of Rome on 4 June and the landings in Normandy two days later, the Allied offensive scene in Europe changed overnight. The long months of frustration in Italy and the equally long months of waiting in the United Kingdom had come to an end,
and the time for decision on the future course of the Mediterranean war had arrived. As the Allied armies pushed forward into northern Italy, the debate reopened between the British proponents of the continuation of the Italian campaign and the American champions of the Anvil operation. Would the prize be the occupation of all Italy, the capture of Istria and Trieste, and an advance through the Ljubljana Gap with all the attendant political and strategic consequences for the Balkans, or the direct strengthening of OVERLORD and the occupation of southern France? Broadly stated, was the final unfolding of the European war to be a matter of political or of military strategy for the West? Each side was confident that its concept would help OVERLORD and either pin down or draw off German units that might oppose Eisenhower's forces. Now the moment for choice had come. The Allies must either continue the Mediterranean drive and commit themselves to a strong and active offense in the south or throw their weight into the assault on Germany from the west and be content with a holding role in Italy.

The London Conference

Shortly after OVERLORD was launched, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff flew to England for an informal conference with the British. Their main reason was to be on hand should either of two contingencies arise: the Allied forces might obtain only an insecure footing in the beachhead area, and the CCS might be forced to decide whether to withdraw or to continue the operation; a German counterattack might be mounted seven or eight days after D Day and might require CCS action. Since the visit would be a precautionary measure for the most part, the JCS informed the British that they were not going to bring a large planning staff and accordingly would not be prepared for a full-dress conference. Meetings would be held on an informal basis and the discussion would be general, unless a crisis in OVERLORD arose. In addition to Marshall, Arnold, and King, the American party consisted of their plans officers, Handy, Kuter, and Cooke, plus half a dozen others, chiefly aides.

On 10, 11, 13, 14, and 15 June the CCS met for discussions. On 12 June they visited the Normandy beachhead. The expected German counterattack failed to materialize because Hitler and some of his staff continued to believe that the Allied forces still in the United Kingdom were destined to make a second landing, probably along the Channel coast. Strong German forces were held in the Channel area while the Allies were strengthening their hold in Normandy. Since the Allied position seemed to be fairly secure, the CCS were able to consider Mediterranean, Pacific, and Far Eastern affairs as well as OVERLORD's progress. General agreement was expressed that an amphibious operation from the Mediterranean should be carried out during the midsummer period, but in view of the fluid situation in both France and Italy, the conferees felt that options should be held

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1 See Note for Conf With Gen Brooke [latter part of May 1944], Item 843, Book 19, Exec 9.
2 Ibid.
3 Msg, Gen Handy to Gen W. B. Smith, 25 May 44, Item 843, Book 19, Exec 9.
open on where and when the operation should take place.

In the course of the discussion, Marshall pointed out that fifteen additional combat loaders were to be made available from the United States for the operation. He expressed interest in the possibilities of a landing at Sète on the Gulf of Lions. Such an operation might be exploited through the Carcassone Gap and might succeed in opening up a port on the Bay of Biscay, which would allow more troops to be brought in to aid OVERLORD. His special concern was to funnel the American divisions accumulating in the United States into the main front as soon as possible. Although the Allies could afford to take more time for their decision now that all seemed to be going well, he thought that the target date for any Mediterranean operation should be 25 July, which would accelerate the tempo somewhat.  

Significantly, little weight was attached to carrying out operations in the Marseille–Toulon–Riviera area similar to those the Joint planners had envisaged for ANVIL. If the operation were to be against southern France, Brooke, King, and Adm. Andrew B. Cunningham seemed to agree with Marshall that it

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8 Informal Notes of CCS 169th mtg. 11 Jun 44, Item 838, Book 19, Exec 9.
might well be a landing at Sète. Portal and King felt that if the Russians should launch an offensive toward the Balkans, the Anglo-American drive might be launched against the Istrian Peninsula. A third alternative, provided Eisenhower managed to reach the Loire River, might be a direct descent by sea on the Bay of Biscay. With the three possibilities in mind, as well as the original ANVIL project, the CCS decided to instruct Wilson and Eisenhower that Wilson would be responsible for planning for ANVIL, the Sète operation, and the Istrian venture, while Eisenhower would plan for the Bay of Biscay. The operation selected would be carried out on the basis of a three-division lift. Wilson and Eisenhower could discuss inter se the release of landing craft for this undertaking and troop carriers for a supporting paratroop operation. Final decision on the four options would be made according to the progress of OVERLORD and the Soviet offensive, but a target date of 25 July was to be sought.

Thus, once again, an ANVIL-type operation was put back on the active books, provided the Pisa-Rimini line in Italy was attained by late July. Where the operation would be set in motion would depend on circumstances, but the general consensus among the CCS at that time indicated that the Sète area was favored.

Final Debate and Decision

In the meantime, in Washington, the JWPC proceeded to examine the four choices and came out strongly for the retention of ANVIL. In their view, ANVIL would open ports more quickly, help OVERLORD more directly by drawing off or pinning down German troops, and make the most effective use of French troops.

Army planners were inclined to agree with this estimate, especially if OVERLORD were going forward according to plan. If OVERLORD should bog down, an operation via Sète, Toulouse, and Bordeaux or the direct seizure of St. Nazaire and Nantes and a later move against Bordeaux might be in order. OPD's Strategy Section doubted that Wilson had enough forces to carry out his favored plan—operations against Istria followed by an advance through northern Italy toward Ljubljana Gap. In addition, the winter weather and the poor line of communications would make it difficult to support such an operation, the French would very likely protest the use of their troops in the Balkans, and the relief of pressure on OVERLORD would be slight. The Strategy Section did not ignore the political implications of invading the Balkans, for the possibility of becoming involved in civil wars in Greece and Yugoslavia was taken into account. As Colonel Billo, chief of the section, warned, "Had we adopted a strategy to defeat Germany politically and economically then the suggested operation might be considered. Remember, too, the Austrians held off the Italians for 4 years in World War I."
While the Army planners were mulling over the Mediterranean possibilities, Marshall had flown from England to Italy to confer with Wilson and his commanders. Marshall evidently had some success in convincing Wilson of the urgent need of the Allies for a major port through which some forty to fifty divisions waiting in the United States could be sent to OVERLORD, since on 19 June the Mediterranean commander came out in favor of ANVIL with a 15 August target date provided the CCS agreed with Marshall that the need for a port was paramount. Otherwise, Wilson would prefer to push on in Italy toward Ljubljana Gap and southern Hungary.

Neither Marshall nor Eisenhower wanted an Adriatic diversion, and both urged that ANVIL be carried out at the earliest possible date. As Marshall cautioned Eisenhower on 22 June: “There should be no delay in getting a firm decision on ANVIL if we are to provide the necessary additional resources in time to make it possible to launch the operation at an earlier date than August 15th.”

Eisenhower urged the need for big ports and was apparently convinced that the capture of Marseille would furnish a more direct route northward for Allied forces to join in the battle for the Ruhr. He was willing to provide the additional resources only for ANVIL and firmly believed that the Allies could support but one major theater in the European war—the OVERLORD battle area. The President and the JCS lined up solidly behind him. Since the SHAEF staff frowned on a Bay of Biscay operation and viewed the Sète movement as impracticable because of the timing, the Americans swung back to the original ANVIL, this time for good.

In the meantime, circumstances had altered somewhat, and the British had decided to support operations into north Italy and the Ljubljana Gap as the most useful employment for Wilson’s forces. With Wilson and Alexander arguing for the continuation of the current offensive, Churchill and the British Chiefs launched an effort to save the Italian campaign. The Prime Minister directed his attack toward the President and Eisenhower, while the British Chiefs sought to sway their American opposites. The British did not accept the need for another major port since they thought that various small ports in Normandy could be developed to handle more traffic, nor did they see ANVIL as the operation most helpful to OVERLORD. While they were willing to release to OVERLORD at a later date some of the divisions earmarked for ANVIL, they believed that a shift at this point to Sète, Istria, or the Bay of Biscay would cause unacceptable delay.

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9 (1) Msg, Wilson to Eisenhower, 19 Jun 44, CM-IN 16279. (2) Memo [not used], 20 Jun 44, sub: Course of Action in the Mediterranean, Case 842, Book 19, Exec g. (3) James D. T. Hamilton, Southern France and Alsace, MS, OCMH files, Ch. IV. Wilson’s planning staff had come out strongly in favor of ANVIL because all previous preparations had been made with the landings in the Toulon-Marseille area in view. Troops, shipping, air forces, and logistics had been pointed toward ANVIL, and the staff believed that a shift at this point to Sète, Istria, or the Bay of Biscay would cause unacceptable delay.

10 Quote is from msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 22 Jun 44, CM-OUT 54372. See also msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 20 Jun 44, CM-IN 16616.


12 Hamilton, Southern France and Alsace, Ch. IV.
lieved that the pressure against the Germans in Italy should be maintained. Eisenhower should retain his landing craft to exploit the use of any small ports he might capture, and in the meantime Wilson and Alexander would pose a threat to southern France while they advanced into northern Italy.13

In the face of these onslaughts spearheaded by the Prime Minister, the American lines held firm. In late June the U.S. Joint Chiefs informed the British Chiefs that the JCS could not see Italy as a decisive theater and that the delay now taking place in reaching agreement on ANVIL was not in keeping with the early termination of the war. The President, moreover, felt that Eisenhower's wishes in the matter should be respected; besides, he told Churchill, Wilson had enough forces to carry on the drive in Italy.14

Churchill made an intense appeal in behalf of the Italian theater in an attempt to persuade the President. That he was thinking in terms of the political end results of a major victory in Italy—especially for the Balkans—was evident. He stressed the strong support of Wilson, Alexander, and Field Marshal Smuts for the project of an attack eastward across the Adriatic and the capture of Trieste. He argued that, to hasten the end of the European war, "Political considerations, such as the revolt of populations against the enemy or the submission and coming over of his satellites, are a valid and important factor."15 Political strategy must henceforth be merged with military strategy against Germany. At the same time, the British Chiefs pointed out to the Americans that the CCS, not Eisenhower, had the responsibility for deciding European strategy. Furthermore, the British Chiefs continued, there would not be enough air resources for both Italy and ANVIL.16

The President would not yield. He immediately replied to Churchill unequivocally: "The exploitation of 'OVERLORD,' our victorious advances in Italy, an early assault on Southern France, combined with the Soviet drives to the west—all as envisaged at Teheran—will most surely serve to realize our object—the unconditional surrender of Germany." Roosevelt reminded Churchill that Stalin had favored ANVIL and that they would have to inform the Soviet leader of any change in plans. The President clearly set forth his position on political objectives: "I agree that the political considerations you mention are important factors, but military operations based thereon must be definitely secondary to the primary operations of striking at the heart of Germany." To conduct an operation against Istria, he went on, would be to disregard two important considerations—the agreed grand strategy for an early defeat of Germany, and the time factor involved in a campaign to

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15 From note by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, 28 Jun 44, quoted in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 716-21.

16 (1) Msgs 717, and 718, Prime Minister to President, 28 Jun 44, Item 65c, Exec 10. (2) CCS 603/3, 28 Jun 44, title: Operations To Assist OVERLORD. (3) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 Jun 44, CM-IN 24126.
debouch from the Ljubljana Gap into Slovenia and Hungary. It was doubtful whether, on purely logistical grounds, more than six divisions could, "within a decisive period," be put into the fighting beyond the Ljubljana Gap. "I cannot agree," he declared, "to the employment of United States troops against Istria and into the Balkans, nor can I see the French agreeing to such use of French troops." If ANVIL were not launched, the whole question of French troops would have to be reopened. The President concluded:

At Teheran we agreed upon a definite plan of attack. That plan has gone well so far. Nothing has occurred to require any change. Now that we are fully involved in our major blow history will never forgive us if we lost precious time and lives in indecision and debate. My dear friend, I beg you to let us go ahead with our plan.

Finally, for purely political considerations over here, I should never survive even a slight setback in "OVERLORD" if it were known that fairly large forces had been diverted to the Balkans.17

Years later a still-annoyed Churchill was to write, "It was his [the President's] objections to a descent on the Istrian peninsula and a thrust against Vienna through the Ljubljana Gap that revealed both the rigidity of the American military plans and his own suspicion of what he called a campaign 'in the Balkans.'" Churchill vigorously denied that anyone involved in these discussions had "ever thought of moving armies into the Balkans." On the other hand, Istria and Trieste were, in the Prime Minister's opinion, strategic and political positions that "might exercise profound and widespread reactions, especially after the Russian advances."18

Whatever might have been the ultimate political or military effects of Churchill's Balkan policy—and this is still a moot point—he was not to win out. The President, in complete agreement with his staff on this score, held firm. On 2 July he asked the Prime Minister to authorize a directive to be sent to General Wilson setting the wheels in motion for an early ANVIL. He declared, "I am compelled by the logic of not dispersing our main efforts to a new theatre to agree with my Chiefs of Staff . . . . I always think of my early geometry—'a straight line is the shortest distance between two points.'"19 General Marshall and his staff could ask for nothing more.

After the President's personal plea, the Prime Minister consented to the issuance of the directive to Wilson rather than permit an impasse to arise. ANVIL would be launched with a target date of 15 August on a three-division assault basis; the amount of airborne lift would be decided later. The build-up would be to ten divisions; all other resources would be devoted to the Italian campaign. Wilson and Eisenhower were between themselves to arrange for the transfer of additional resources.20

17 Msg, President to Prime Minister, 29 Jun 44, quoted in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 721-23. See also (1) memo, C. K. G. for Handy, 30 Jun 44, sub: Info From White House (Col [Richard] Park, [Jr.]), Item 71, Exec 10, and (2) draft msg, President to Prime Minister, 1 Jul 44, Item 69c, Exec 10. Churchill's italics.

18 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 65. Italics are Churchill's.

19 Quoted in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 66.

In spite of this setback to the British, there were indications that they still did not consider the matter closed. As Churchill warned Hopkins in mid-July, "We have submitted under protest." The Anglo-American split over the Mediterranean, added to the mounting political pressures confronting the Allied coalition in Europe, evidently disturbed the Prime Minister, for he went on to say, "although we look like winning the war a most formidable set of problems is approaching us from every side, and personally I do not feel that anything but duty would make me encounter them." 21

The Army did not view the military prospect with great concern, for its intelligence estimates indicated that the Germans were not so strong in southern France as they appeared and that they would not attempt to fight to the end. Furthermore, G–2 did not believe that the Germans could withdraw troops from Italy for the support of operations in France. 22

During July the Army's preparations for ANVIL went forward. Roberts informed Devers that the Navy would provide twenty-eight LST's. He warned, however, that in view of the world-wide shortage of service forces, such troops would have to be withdrawn from Italy. Combat loaders and landing craft were transferred from SHAEF to the Mediterranean, and by 20 July Eisenhower had sent 416 tow planes and 225 glider pilots to the Mediterranean for the ANVIL airlift. 23

In mid-July Marshall agreed that Devers should form an army group and command ANVIL under Wilson until sufficient progress had been made into France by the ANVIL troops to permit Eisenhower to take over the force. Under Devers would be the Seventh Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, and the French forces. No decision had yet been made on further transfers of U.S. divisions or of the Fifth Army itself to France. In Marshall's opinion, however,

The main thing is that we push ANVIL to the utmost as the main effort in the Mediterranean. The large forces we will still have in Italy should enable us to maintain strong and unrelenting pressure on the enemy. While satisfying OVERLORD, we will do our utmost to support Wilson in the two battles he has to fight in Southern France and Italy.

But, he concluded,

There should be no waiting for a perfection of arrangements or for the optimum in supplies and equipment. I believe we are approaching the point where carefully planned bold and rapid action in the application of our forces may reap successes which will shorten the war. 24

In early August, shortly after the Allies broke through at St. Lô, the British made their final effort to cancel ANVIL—which had been renamed DRAGOON on 1 August. With the possibility of using the ports in Brittany to reinforce OVERLORD, Churchill and the British Chiefs tried again to persuade the President and the U.S. military leaders either to land the ANVIL forces through Breton ports or to allow them to remain

21 Msg, Prime Minister to Hopkins, 19 Jul 44, Item 68c, Exec 10.
22 Memo, Bisell for CofS, 3 Jul 44, no sub, Item 888, Book 20, Exec 9.
23 (1) Msg, Gen Roberts sgd Gen Marshall to Gen Devers for Brig Gen Reuben Jenkins, 5 Jul 44.
24 Msg, Marshall to Devers, 16 Jul 44, CM-OUT 61097. (2) Hamilton, Southern France and Alsace, Ch. IV. (3) Craven and Cate, AAF III, 419.
in Italy for an advance through the Ljubljana Gap. When the Americans pointed out that the condition of ports in Brittany was unknown and that they might be heavily defended or destroyed before capture, the British concentrated strongly on the advantages of the campaign in Italy and eastward. Eisenhower was subjected to intense pressure from Churchill to alter his stand on DRAGOON. He stoutly resisted. To Hopkins, the Prime Minister also sent a last-minute appeal in early August to intercede and influence Marshall.25

Washington Army planners received these latest British maneuvers with something less than enthusiasm. Since preparations for DRAGOON were so far advanced, they considered any change to a Brittany landing impracticable. Southern France operations were based on a quick turnaround of shipping and a shift would result in a delay in the release of shipping to other areas. The feeling continued to prevail that weather conditions and poor communications would make operations in the Balkans very difficult.26

Any worries that the Army planners may have had proved groundless, for Eisenhower clung firmly to DRAGOON as OVERLORD’s best concomitant. With the JCS, Hopkins, and the President in turn standing behind his decision, the British finally conceded defeat on 8 August and sought to salvage what they could of the Italian campaign.27

On 15 August the Seventh Army under Patch landed in southern France between Cannes and Hyères after intense sea and air bombardment of the coast. The Allied forces consisted of three U.S. divisions, the 3d, 36th, and 45th; seven French divisions; and one mixed British and U.S. airborne division. Before the Allied landings, the German High Command had considered pulling back the eleven German divisions in southern France to a defensive line closer to the German border, but nothing had been done about it. When the German staff learned that the landings were in force, they ordered their units south of the Loire to withdraw toward Germany.28 Thus, the Allied forces moved quickly inland against scattered resistance. By 11 September they had linked up with Eisenhower’s troops in northern France.

After more than two years of discussion, frequently spirited, the great debate over the Mediterranean and the cross-Channel attack was finally laid to rest. Despite valiant efforts of the British to win another reprieve for the Mediterranean, the American insistence on supplying extra punch to OVERLORD had carried the day and sounded the knell for any ambitious Mediterranean plans.

The debate in the summer of 1944 over the southern France operation represented, in one sense, the last gasp of the peripheral strategy espoused by

Churchill and his staff from the beginning of the European struggle. But by the summer of 1944 the war was entering a new era, and Churchill was already looking at the European continent with one eye on the retreating Germans and the other on the advancing Russians. Here was peripheral strategy with a new twist, designed, in effect, to contain the Soviet position in eastern Europe.

Although the forces remaining in Italy were quite strong enough to continue pressure against the Germans, they proved not overwhelming enough to strike the blow that would have finished the Italian campaign and permitted a penetration of the Balkans and Austria. A still disappointed Churchill has written in retrospect:

The Army which we had landed on the Riviera at such painful cost to our operations in Italy arrived too late to help Eisenhower's first main struggle in the north, while Alexander's offensive failed by the barest of margins to achieve the success it deserved and we so badly needed. Italy was not to be wholly free for another eight months; the right-handed drive to Vienna was denied to us; and, except in Greece, our military power to influence the liberation of Southeastern Europe was gone.29

Until the very last weeks of the European war, the front lines in the Mediterranean were to remain relatively static and the theater was to become, like the CBI, its counterpart in the Far East, a holding theater. The decline of the Mediterranean, along with that of the CBI theater, confirmed the triumph of the concept of a concentrated, decisive war against Germany.

CBI—The Asiatic Holding Theater

Although the decision to launch Anvil was the most important one the Allies had to make during the summer of 1944, there were indications that the war against Japan would soon become the main topic for military discussions. Even while the Normandy invasion was under way, the CCS, at the London meetings in June, considered the future of SEAC and the CBI, and the British again expressed their intention of taking a prominent part in the showdown with Japan.

The slow progress of SEAC's forces in turning the tide in north Burma and the continuing advance of the Japanese in east China were the dark spots in an otherwise bright strategic picture. The British reported at the London conference that Mountbatten would seek to clear the Kohima-Imphal road, take Myitkyina, and build up a defensive area south of Mogaung-Myitkyina. The main purpose would be to assure the maximum flow of supplies to China. The Americans, on the other hand, announced that the U.S. combat air strength in China had reached its peak.30

This leveling off of the China commitment was not surprising in view of the decline in importance of the CBI in U.S. strategic planning.

Since the Japanese had driven into Honan Province from the north and from Hankow in the south to open a rail route between north and central


30 (1) Min, 165th mtg CCS, 14 Jun 44. (2) Min, 166th mtg CCS, 15 Jun 44.
China during the spring of 1944, Chennault's need for additional tonnage to slow this advance had mounted. The Army had diverted Twentieth Air Force tonnage and had impressed heavy bombers into the transport service. As the Japanese pushed relentlessly on, Arnold suggested that Chennault should either receive at least 8,000 tons a month for the Fourteenth Air Force or the United States should pull everything out of China and utilize the means elsewhere, since Chennault could not do all the things expected of him on less tonnage. The Army planners were sympathetic but turned down the proposal—it was politically impossible to desert China, and Chennault could not be allocated 8,000 tons.\(^{31}\)

The rapid deterioration of the tactical situation led to further pleas from Chennault and Chiang during early June for the use of B-29 stocks in China and for the employment of the very long range bombers for tactical missions against Japanese centers in east China. Although the Joint Chiefs were willing to grant approval for specific supply diversions from time to time as necessity demanded, they were consistently opposed to the use of strategic bombers on tactical missions.\(^{32}\)

With defeat and retreat in prospect for the Chinese, Marshall asked Stilwell on 1 July if he thought he (Stilwell) could do anything more to improve the China situation. The pressure on the War Department, Marshall stated, was to increase the Hump tonnage for Chennault and equip and supply Chinese ground troops. "The latter presents the problem of an immense effort in transportation with a poorly directed and possibly completely wasteful procedure."\(^{33}\)

Stilwell's affirmative response was conditioned upon the President's obtaining the consent of Chiang to Stilwell's command of the Chinese forces. Without this authority, Stilwell felt, little could be done. Marshall secured JCS and Presidential approval of a proposal to promote Stilwell to a full general and to urge Chiang to accept him as over-all commander.\(^{34}\) All seemed to be settled when Chiang agreed to the President's suggestion in principle, but weeks dragged by without any further developments. Later requests to Chiang failed to elicit any action, and in August the President decided to send Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley as his personal representative to Chungking.\(^{35}\)

While Chiang delayed, the Japanese moved south into the Tung-Ting Lake district and on to Changsha. In July they had supplemented their southern drive by launching another attack north from Canton. It was obvious the Japanese would eventually threaten and perhaps neutralize the U.S. airfields in east


\(^{32}\) (1) Msg, Sultan to Marshall, 3 Jul 44, CM-IN 2088. (2) Memo, JCS for President, 4 Jul 44, no sub, Item 57, Exec 10. Msg was sent 6 July to Chiang.

China. If they could accomplish this, any support the Fourteenth Air Force could provide the Pacific advance would be meager indeed. The Assam line of communications was carrying over 200,000 tons a month by July and was expected to reach 300,000 by the end of the year. Hump tonnage itself climbed to over 18,000 tons in June, and by the end of the summer would amount to almost 30,000 tons a month. The increase in Hump tonnage did not serve to relieve the adverse situation in eastern China as much as had been expected since the problem of internal distribution within China still remained critical and large stores therefore gathered at the forward termini of the Hump run, far from the front areas. Although Chennault was given first priority on Hump tonnage, his air forces were not able to halt the Japanese advance, and by the time of the second Quebec (OCTAGON) conference in mid-September the Japanese were closing in on Kweilin.

In the meantime, Hurley arrived in Chungking in early September and after satisfactory preliminary conferences with Chiang secured his approval of Stilwell as over-all commander. Negotiations to bring about Stilwell’s actual assumption of command, however, dragged on for another month and culminated in a final falling out between Stilwell and the Generalissimo. Stilwell was recalled in October.

While matters were going from bad to worse in the China area, in Burma the Allied attack began to pick up momentum. The Japanese fell back slowly from the Imphal region during July, and Stilwell’s forces succeeded in destroying the last enemy resistance at Myitkyina in early August. In spite of these favorable developments, objectives in Burma continued to remain hazy and indefinite. The CCS directive issued to Mountbatten on 3 June had instructed him to concentrate on building up the air route to China, meanwhile pressing "advantages against the enemy." Although such vague terminology did not serve to promote a decisive course, SEAC headquarters produced several plans during the summer, two of which were presented to the CCS for consideration. The first, Plan Y (later CAPITAL), envisaged the capture of Mandalay by the familiar three-pronged assault, with British troops operating from the west and the Ledo and Yunnan Chinese approaching from the north and east, respectively. A second plan called Z (later DRACULA) projected an airborne and seaborne assault on Rangoon.

Mountbatten left for London in early August to present the two plans to his chiefs. It was readily apparent in Washington that, of the two, the United States should support the Mandalay plan since it would extend the protection of the air

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38 For a full account of the episode, see Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Command Problems, Chs. XI, XII.

39 Mountbatten Report, p. 54.

route farther south and keep the forces currently occupied in north Burma use-
fully employed. Although U.S. intelligence sources did not believe that any
operations in Burma would succeed in influencing enemy dispositions in the
Pacific, the Joint planners favored the Mandalay plan as being more in phase
with U.S. Pacific timing. The avail-
ability of forces and resources to mount
the Rangoon operation—favored by the
British as the best means to end the Bur-
ma commitment—would depend upon
the outcome of the European war, still
a highly uncertain factor insofar as
timing was concerned. In mid-August
the JCS turned down a British request
that SEAC's operations in north Burma
be delayed until the forces to take Ran-
goon became available. Instead, the
JCS urged that the Mandalay plan be
accepted, with the Rangoon operation to
be mounted in 1945 if all went well. The matter was still undecided when the
second Quebec conference convened in
September.

Although SEAC strategy had not been settled, there was considerable discus-
sion among the War Department plan-
ers during the summer of 1944 on the
role of the United States in future opera-
tions in the CBI. Marshall had in-
formed Sultan in August that no U.S.
divisions were scheduled for the CBI in
1945, and in the following month the
Chief of Staff turned down Churchill's
request for U.S. divisions to bolster the
Burma offensive, saying that all divisions
were allocated to the European or Pa-
cific theaters. The consistent Army
disinclination to involve large bodies of
U.S. ground forces in Burma and China
was not new, but now there was a growth
of sentiment within the War Department
favoring the gradual withdrawal of all
U.S. forces from Burma. General Rob-
erts, commenting on a suggestion to
transfer the Tenth Air Force to SWPA,
put the problem succinctly:

Our CBI investment is admittedly very
costly, but it is the only way we can keep
China in the war. The insurance may
come high, but I think we have to keep it
up, at least until we have a port of entry
on the China coast. I do not think it is a
matter of "appeasing the British" so much
as it is keeping up their newly acquired of-
fensive spirit.

Shortly after this, the Operations Divi-
sion's Strategy Section recommended
that since the main objective of the U.S.
forces was to assist China, U.S. and
Chinese forces should be withdrawn
from Burma after Lashio was reached,
so that the British could reconquer their
own colonial empire and the United
States would not receive the stigma of
helping them subjugate the native
populace. This mounting political
consciousness was typical of Army stra-

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41 (1) Msg, Stratemeyer to Arnold, 23 Jul 44, CM-
IN 19068. (2) JIC 204/1, 8 Aug 44, title: Japanese
Reactions to Proposed Operations in Burma. (3)
OPD brief, title: Notes . . . JPS 161st msg, 9 Aug 44,
Plans for Operations in Burma, filed with JPS
42 Leahy, I Was There, p. 256.
43 CCS 452/31, 31 Aug 44, title: Plans for Opera-
tions in Burma.
44 (1) Msg, Marshall to Sultan, 3 Aug 44, CM-
OUT 75530. (2) Memo, Marshall for Dill, 22 Sep
44, no sub, filed with SS 297 in ABC 381 SS Papers,
Nos. 214–27 (7 Jan 43).
45 Memo, Roberts for Barker, 10 Aug 44, sub:
Movement of Tenth Air Force, filed with JCS 774/3
in ABC Burma (8–25–42), 8.
46 Memo, Billo for Chief S&P Gp OPD, 31 Aug
44, no sub, filed with SS 901 in ABC 381 SS Papers,
Nos. 297–313 (7 Jan 43). See also msg, Stiwell to
Marshall, 25 Aug 44, CM-IN 24751 for a similar
thought.
tegic planning during the summer of 1944, when the problems of peace began to weigh more heavily upon the military staff. The United States was committed to aid China, but even this was now a limited commitment merely to keep China in the war. The U.S. acceptance of the CBI as a holding theater where the enemy could be kept occupied while the decisive engagements were being fought in the Pacific was at last complete.

**Target—Philippines**

At the London conference of June the CCS not only discussed CBI affairs but also considered various courses of action that might be followed to defeat the Japanese. Just before the JCS left for London they had decided to have all plans for operations subsequent to the Marianas re-examined to determine whether the tempo in the Pacific could be accelerated. This search for increased speed in the Pacific led to some interesting conversations with the British Chiefs of Staff at the London conference. The CCS discussed proposals to bypass the Philippines and Palaus in order to surprise the Japanese at Formosa and the alternative possibility of bypassing Formosa and going directly to Kyushu. They were in general agreement that it was important to do the unexpected when fighting the Japanese, but found it impossible at this point to decide just what form the "unexpected" should take. The Americans decided to query their Pacific commanders. Until the opinions of MacArthur and Nimitz were obtained, little could be done.

During June there were a number of signs that changes in the strategic situation might permit the tempo of the Pacific campaign to be stepped up. The reduction of Japanese air effectiveness, the continuing prospect of a favorable and decisive fleet engagement that would allow U.S. forces greater freedom of action, the indication that the enemy was increasing the strength of his Philippines-northern NEI defenses, and the recent drive by the Japanese in China that might preclude or decrease the air support of Pacific operations, tended to confirm the growing impression of the Washington Army staff that a reassessment of objectives might be in order.

And yet the Allied desire to do the unexpected and to maintain an attitude of flexibility in the matter of Pacific strategy had to be reconciled with strong influences that had tended to shape Pacific strategy along definite, consistent lines. Most important of these during the summer of 1944 was General MacArthur himself. His response to the JCS query sent to him during the time of the London conference on quickening the pace was swift and negative. He could not advance his current target dates because of logistical considerations. He also regarded as utterly unsound the suggestion of bypassing the Philippines and advancing toward either Formosa or the Japanese mainland. Not only were the Philippines necessary in a strategic sense, the United States had also a moral obli-

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47 (1) JCS 713/6, 29 May 44, title: Future Operations in the Pacific. (2) Min, 165th mtg CCS, 14 Jun 44.

48 Msg, JCS to CINCPAC and CINCSWPA, 13 Jun 44, CM-OUT 50007.

gation to liberate the Filipinos. MacArthur’s insistence upon the military and moral aspects of the Philippines question was an element that the military leaders could not disregard.

The Washington Joint planners were inclined to agree with MacArthur that it would not be feasible to accelerate the Pacific campaign, but they did not readily see the military necessity for capturing Mindanao. The Palaus, on the other hand, they deemed essential for any further advance, whether into the Philippines or to points north. With Japanese strength increasing in the Philippines, they felt that bypassing the Philippines should be considered.

By late June POA forces were struggling bitterly for Saipan in the Marianas, and SWPA troops were leapfrogging up the northern coast of New Guinea and engaged in the difficult fight for Biak Island. The war in the Pacific was, as King has since described it, in a “crossing-the-ocean” phase, during which most of the fighting consisted of amphibious assaults to seize small islands or limited beachheads. Even in New Guinea no attempts were made to penetrate the hinterland. The United States had the advantages of mobility, superior air and naval strength, and the element of surprise. The unwillingness of Army planners and General Marshall himself to get involved in costly land campaigns on the road to Japan—either on the mainland of Asia or on intermediate island land masses such as the Philippines and Formosa—caused them to weigh carefully every alternative to such a course. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Chief of Staff upheld the investigation of his planners into the question of bypassing the Philippines, and Formosa, too, if a direct assault upon Kyushu proved feasible. As he pointed out in his reply of 24 June to MacArthur’s plea for the Philippines, he did not believe the investigation unsound. He went on to caution the SWPA commander that personal and political considerations should not be allowed to override the main objective—the early conclusion of the war against Japan. The capture of Formosa and Kyushu would also serve to liberate the Philippines. Marshall made it clear that he himself, as well as the Navy, still favored the full employment of the Pacific Fleet.

The Joint planners proceeded to lay out two courses that would be open to the United States until the Mindanao operations scheduled for November 1944 were definitely undertaken. The first lay through the Philippines, Formosa, and Ryukyus to Kyushu and Honshu and the other via the Bonins to either Kyushu or Hokkaido and thence to Honshu. The first involved the capture or control of large land masses, but was a steady and sure route. The second was a quicker course but more dangerous, since it depended upon the ability of the Navy and its carrier planes to control the air and sea. Both would be dependent not only upon the defeat of Germany, which would release additional resources, but also upon the neutralization of the Japanese Fleet, which would permit bolder action at less risk. To

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50 Msg, MacArthur to JCS, 18 Jun 44, CM-IN 15058.
52 King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, p. 533.
retain flexibility and freedom of choice as long as possible, the Joint planners recommended that a decision between the two routes be made after the Palau operation but before the Mindanao offensive. If Germany and the Japanese Fleet were still undefeated, then the course via the Philippines and Formosa should be followed. If both were beaten, the second route via the Bonins should be taken. Were only the fleet out of the way, Mindanao could be bypassed. By April 1945 there would be 29 divisions (including six Marine divisions) assigned to the conflict with Japan, plus 48 groups of Army planes, 154 squadrons of Navy land-based aircraft, and 5,259 carrier-based planes. If the U.S. forces could advance without land-based air support, the planners estimated, the war in the Pacific could be accelerated. In their view, entry of the Soviet Union into the war would have little effect upon the pace of the Pacific advance since, presumably, it would occur at a time when the United States had approached quite close to the final objective—the Japanese mainland.54

While the Washington staff planners were outlining bold, opportunistic courses of action, the Pacific theater commanders tended to become more cautious. Early in July Nimitz favored clingling to the strategy already agreed upon and indicated that there might even be some difficulty in meeting the target dates already set up. In his opinion, MacArthur's basic concept of advancing land-based air forces, ground troops, and naval forces at the same time was sound.55 A few days later MacArthur submitted his newest revision of the RENO plan to retake the Philippines. This version, known as RENO V, outlined an advance via the Vogelkop Peninsula and Morotai to southern Mindanao on 25 October and to Leyte on 15 November. The main effort against Luzon would be at Lingayen Gulf and would take place about 1 April 1945. It would require six divisions, including one airborne and one armored.56 No consideration was given in the plan to bypassing Luzon and taking Formosa instead. General Kenney criticized RENO V for the weaknesses of its air planning. He held that the plan provided for too little assistance from Navy carrier planes, not enough heavy bomber and intermediate air bases, and too few supporting bases. The Joint planners approved neither of postponing the target date for Luzon from 15 February to 1 April nor of accepting the Luzon operation without any provision for a direct advance from Mindanao to Formosa. They estimated that naval requirements of RENO V would absorb almost all of the Pacific Fleet units and would not only preclude any operations against Formosa but would also delay operations against the Japanese homeland for a full year.57

At a theater staff conference held in early July at Pearl Harbor to consider speeding up operations, representatives of POA and SWPA agreed that the scheduled operations should be retained. Nimitz supported the MacArthur concept of moving land, sea, and air forces forward en masse and agreed that the

54 JPS 404/7, 11 Jul 44, title: Future Operations in the Pacific.
55 Msg, Nimitz to King, 4 Jul 44, CM-IN 2926.
56 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 8 Jul 44, CM-IN 6202.
southern Philippines would have to be taken, but he could not share MacArthur’s belief in the necessity for taking Luzon before Formosa. A setback to the Japanese Fleet might well permit the Americans to bypass Luzon. In view of the accord reached at the theater conference on retaining scheduled operations, General Handy—in Washington—informed Marshall in mid-July that since MacArthur had the means to go on short of Luzon, no decision between Luzon and Formosa need be made now. He advised Marshall to await further developments.68

General Roberts, on the other hand, maintained that General MacArthur had given no indication of preparing an alternate plan that would show where RENO V could be cut off and the objectives already attained used to support Formosa operations. He asserted that MacArthur had made provision only for a continuous advance into Luzon after Mindanao was captured and had thus far not complied with the JCS directive of March 1944 to consider plans to support operations against Formosa. Although Luzon then appeared to be the more likely objective, Roberts felt that the JCS should approve only the first stages of RENO V—Morotai, Mindanao, and Leyte—and instruct MacArthur to prepare an alternate plan for the support of Formosa. Furthermore, he held that MacArthur’s latest proposal to include the Talaud Islands in order to provide more air cover for the invasion of the Philippines—thus postponing Mindanao to 15 November and Leyte to 20 December—was unacceptable.69

The much publicized Pearl Harbor conference of 27–28 July between the President, MacArthur, and Nimitz did little to clarify the strategy picture. MacArthur presented his brief for the Philippines and Nimitz spoke in favor of Formosa, although he agreed that a need for Luzon might develop. The President evidently acted as an intermediary in the meetings and lessened the areas of conflict. Oddly enough, neither MacArthur nor Nimitz requested additional forces, although potential service troop shortages for the Formosa operation were already becoming apparent. Despite the lack of decisions stemming from the conference, Leahy, who was also present, has recorded that it helped the President familiarize himself with Pacific problems and brought agreement between Nimitz and MacArthur on fundamental strategy.60

69 Leahy, I Was There, pp. 250–51.

It is difficult to reconcile Leahy’s statement that “MacArthur and Nimitz were now in agreement . . . that Japan could be forced to accept our terms of surrender by the use of sea and air power without an invasion of the Japanese homeland” with a teleconference report of 7 August 1944 between General Handy, et al., in Washington and Generals Giles, Hull, et al. in Australia, in which it was stated (apparently by Hull) “General MacArthur feels that the greatest time saver would be to bypass Formosa after the seizure of Luzon, and go on to Kyushu. . . .” See tel conf., between Washington and Brisbane, 7 Aug 44, in Item 1c, Exec 2.

For other accounts of the conference, see: (1) msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 1 Aug 44, CM-IN 496; (2) ltr, Richardson to Marshall, 1 Aug 44, no subj, Item 55, Exec 10; and (3) memo, unsigned, for Ritchie, 28 Jul 44, sub: Notes for SOWESPAC Conf.; filed with JCS Memo for Info 270 in ABC 384 Pacific (1–17–43), 4. For a discussion of the miscon-
At a later conference held on 7 August at SWPA headquarters, attended by Generals Hull, Giles, and Styer and Colonel Ritchie of the War Department, MacArthur asserted that he could conduct the Luzon campaign in a total of six weeks at the maximum and probably in less than thirty days. As for Formosa, he doubted the ability of SWPA air to neutralize Japanese bases in Luzon before an operation against Formosa could be mounted and held, moreover, that logistics and service troop shortages made the operation against Formosa impracticable. Since an assault on Formosa would presumably be a “massive undertaking,” he thought that Formosa should be bypassed and that the advance should proceed from Luzon to the Bonins and Ryukyus and then to Kyushu.\(^\text{61}\)

\(^{61}\) (1) Notes for discussion with Gen Marshall, no addressee, no date. (2) Notes on Conf, Aug 7, at GHQ SWPA, 7 Aug 44. Both filed with JCS 924/2 in ABC 584 Pacific (1–17–43), 5.
Pressure from the Navy for a directive to MacArthur and Nimitz to carry out the central and southern Philippines and Formosa operations had been mounting during the early summer. The Navy sought to pin the Army down on the Formosa operation so that Nimitz could go ahead with his planning on a firm basis. The Army position on Formosa was set forth by Handy:

We will hold off as long as we can of course but I think pretty soon we are going to have to put out some kind of directive. [We should] put out a directive covering immediate operations, and not stick out your [the War Department's] neck on things that are not going to happen for 7 to 9 months anyhow.62

The Army had taken a leaf from the British book, for the British had often used the same argument in European operations, especially in the Mediterranean. The Army task would be to press for acceptance of the central and southern Philippines operations and to defer a decision on Formosa and Luzon until later.

Several factors destined to influence the situation became more apparent as the summer wore on. Army troop shortages for the Palaus campaign had been pointed out by Nimitz back in June, when he warned that unless the deficiencies were remedied, the target date of 15 September might be delayed.63 In early July the War Department was forced to turn down MacArthur's request for an armored division for the Philippines since all armored divisions were scheduled for Europe, but it suggested that he might use four separate armored battalions already in the Pacific, for which a headquarters would be supplied. Colonel Ritchie of the Operations Division, in commenting upon this request, asserted that resources had to be considered very carefully until Germany was defeated and that the service troop problem also might be a determining element in a decision on Formosa and Luzon.64 During July the last U.S. Army division to be sent to the Pacific during the war, the 96th Infantry, arrived in Hawaii. This made twenty-one Army divisions available for future action—the peak of Army divisional deployment to the Pacific.

When in late July Nimitz forwarded his estimates for the Formosa operation, the service troop question was brought sharply into focus. There was a shortage of over 200,000 men, mainly service units, which would have to be met, plus additional air groups and shipping.65 The War Department subjected the estimated shortage to close scrutiny since it was so large. G-4 suggested that French civilians in France be used in service capacities, in order to permit service units allocated to Europe to be diverted to the Pacific.66 Since SWPA would need all of its service troops to support the Philippines operations and probably would also require any units that could be released from SOPAC as it rolled up rear areas, the POA shortages would

62 Tel conv between Handy, et al., in Washington and Giles, Hull, et al., in Brisbane, 7 Aug 44, Item 1c, Exec 2.
63 Msg, CINCPAC to COMINCH, 23 Jun 44, CM-IN 19096.
64 (1) Msg, MacArthur to AGWAR, 30 Jun 44, CM-IN 24607. (2) Memo, Ritchie for Bessell, 30 June 44, no sub, filed with CPS 320/6 in ARC 981 Japan (1 Jan 44). (3) Msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 1 Jul 44, CM-OUT 59609.
65 JLC 31/4, 8 Aug 44, title: Logistical Support, Pacific Campaign, 1944 and Beyond, Incl A.
either have to be made up in POA itself, which had no surplus, or by new allocations from the United States. The difficulties encountered in providing the service groups became a major obstacle in the Navy's attempt to secure approval of the Formosa operation.

Another factor influencing interservice discussion was the prospect that seizure of the southwestern tip of Formosa plus Amoy, as Nimitz now planned, might not be sufficient. If the Japanese were reinforced and could mount a counterattack, it might be necessary to conquer the whole island. Such an operation could very well prove to be, as MacArthur had termed it, a "massive undertaking." Although King and Nimitz remained noncommittal on this aspect, the Army questioned the practicability of mounting the operation under such circumstances. A lengthy campaign on Formosa, involving a passive populace and strong enemy defenses, would be costly in time and casualties. This picture contrasted sharply with the one drawn by MacArthur of a quick victory on Luzon backed by an active and sympathetic people.

During August the Army and the Navy planners sought to marshal their forces—the former in behalf of the Philippines and the latter for Formosa. Theater headquarters were instructed to make their personnel requirements for operations as low as possible and to try to advance the time of operations as much as possible. Meanwhile, the Army planners in Washington continued to investigate the relative advantages of the two objectives. The Army granted the better strategic location of Formosa, but pointed out that tactically the Philippines would be easier to take and troops could be employed more economically. Although B-29's from Formosa could at first deliver a greater weight of bomb tonnage against Japan, more airfields could eventually be built on Luzon.

A new set of target dates submitted by MacArthur on 27 August scheduled Morotai on 15 September, the Talauds on 15 October, Sarangani on 15 November, Bonifacio-Mindanao on 7 December, Leyte on 20 December, Aparri on 31 January, southern Mindanao on 15 February, and Lingayen Gulf on 20 February. Thus rescheduling again placed the Luzon operation in February rather than April and gave Marshall another talking point in its behalf.

Basically, however, the main point in the Luzon-Formosa debate in the summer of 1944 was the provision of means. Admiral Sherman's best estimate of the service troop shortage for Formosa was over 100,000, and this estimate assumed
sizable help from the South Pacific. As matters stood on 1 September, Marshall felt that any decision taken then would favor Luzon, but he did not wish to take that step until other elements—such as the defeat of Germany—that might enter into the making of a decision were considered. It must be remembered that the fall of Germany was still projected for the autumn of 1944; the resources released thereafter would easily take care of the shortages. Marshall and the Army received firm support from Admiral Leahy for the issuance of a directive that would cover operations only through Leyte.\footnote{Min, 171st mtg JCS, 1 Sep 44.}

The Army position was given additional backing from another quarter. Early in September the Joint planners recommended that the decision on Luzon-Formosa be made later. Leyte would be invaded on 20 December, and preparations would be made to launch the Luzon assault on 20 February or Formosa on 1 March, with the choice to be determined in the light of future events.\footnote{Memo, Roberts for Asst Secy WDGS, 3 Sep 44, sub: Future Operations in the Pacific (JCS 719/9), filed with JCS 719/9 in ABC 384 Formosa (8 Sep 43), 1-D.} King was not yet willing to give up a commitment to a Formosa operation. He proposed a directive limiting MacArthur to the central Philippines and giving Formosa the next priority. The Army protested that this proposal did not answer the question of how and when the United States would take Luzon or whence the means to take Formosa would come. The shortage of service troops and the possible requirement of additional Army divisions indicated further demands on the Army if the decision were made to take Formosa. Besides, there was a growing feeling in Army planning circles that after Luzon was captured Formosa should be bypassed and a direct descent upon Japan should be planned. Marshall posed a series of questions that he felt must be answered before a decision could be made. But Leahy, desiring to bring matters to a head, laid the cards on the table. Since the United States at the time had the means only for Luzon and since Luzon would be the least expensive operation to undertake insofar as casualties were concerned, it seemed apparent to Leahy that the United States should intensify the air bombardment and sea blockade of Japan and reoccupy the Philippines.\footnote{(1) Memo, Hull for Handy and Roberts, 2 Sep 44, sub: Pacific Strategy, and memo, J. J. B. [Billo] for Chief S&P Gp OPD, 7 Sep 44, sub: Pacific Strategy, both filed with JPS 404/12 in ABC 384 Pacific (1–17–43). (2) Min, 172d mtg JCS, 5 Sep 44. (3) Memo, Handy for CofS, 5 Sep 44, sub: Operations in the Western Pacific, Item 1c, Exec 2. (4) Memo, Col Hugh C. Johnson for Gen Roberts, 7 Sep 44, sub: Estimated Troop Availability for CAUSEWAY, filed with JCS 719/9 in ABC 384 Formosa (8 Sep 43), 1-D.}

The matter was given to the JSSC for urgent consideration. The committee supported the Navy stand that Formosa should be taken before Luzon, since it had to be taken anyway and a commitment was necessary if the 1 March target date were to be met. Marshall commented that the JSSC had in effect accepted and "made a decision" for Formosa without considering all aspects of the problem. He could not go along with the notion that postponing a decision would lengthen the war six months, as the committee suggested, but thought that by the end of October the situation would be a great deal clearer. Since the
Army would not agree to make a package directive for Leyte and Formosa. The Navy reluctantly agreed on 8 September to the issuance of a directive for Leyte alone with a target date of 20 December. Nimitz would support this operation and plan for Formosa-Amoy on 1 March or Luzon on 20 February as the case might be. MacArthur, after carrying out Leyte, would plan for the reduction of enemy air on Luzon in support of an attack on Formosa and the occupation of the northern Philippines. The two commanders in chief were to co-ordinate with each other and with the CBI and Twentieth Air Force for air support.  

The acceptance of Leyte as an objective left the course of Pacific operations after the seizure of the central Philippines pretty much unsettled. Whether the U.S. forces would move against Luzon or Formosa would depend largely upon developments in the war against Germany and Japanese reactions to projected carrier air strikes against the Philippines during September. In the meantime, planning for both campaigns would continue.

Strangulation or Invasion?

The long discussion over Formosa versus Luzon tended to obscure the importance of another subject that would increase in interest as the war neared its final stages—the proposition that Japan would surrender only as a result of invasion. There were several schools of thought on the subject. A blockade and bombardment group, of which Admiral Leahy was a member, felt that Japan could be strangled militarily and economically by air and sea attack and the government would therefore capitulate without invasion. Another group, strongest in the Army, was quite certain that, in the light of current experience with Japanese resistance, invasion and bitter struggle would be necessary to subdue the enemy. And, finally, there were those who straddled the fence.

In December 1943, at Sextant, this cautious, middle-of-the-road school had won the day, for the decision of the CCS had been “to obtain objectives from which . . . to invade Japan proper if this should prove necessary.” But in the early summer of 1944 the Joint planners had reviewed the over-all objective and come to the conclusion that invasion of the industrial heart of Japan would be required to defeat Japan. Acceptance of their recommendation, as was to be expected, was neither immediate nor wholehearted. Admiral Leahy, who was never convinced that invasion would be necessary, believed that the Navy, with some Army Air assistance, had already defeated Japan. The JWPC felt that the matter should be considered very carefully and that a conference should be held in the United States among MacArthur, Nimitz, Stilwell, and Washington service planners to iron out differences in opinion on strategy.

Despite this opposition, the JCS on 11 July decided to accept the invasion ob-

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75 (1) JCS 713/9, 2 Sep 44, title: Future Operations in the Pacific. (2) JCS 713/14, 7 Sep 44, title: Proposed Dir to CINCSWPA and CINCPOA. (3) Min, 173d mtg JCS, 8 Sep 44.

jective, since defeat by blockade and bombardment would probably involve an unacceptable delay. In presenting the matter to the British later in the day, Marshall gave the Army point of view:

As a result of recent operations in the Pacific, it was now clear to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that, in order to finish the war with the Japanese quickly, it will be necessary to invade the industrial heart of Japan. The means for this action were not available when the over-all concept had been originally discussed. It was now, however, within our power to do this and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff feel that our intention to undertake it should be appropriately indicated.\(^78\)

On 29 July the British agreed to the necessity for invasion provided priority for defeating the Germans was not altered and operations would not be carried out without CCS approval. The conditions were accepted by the JCS in early August.\(^79\)

Inscribing the invasion concept on the record was the beginning rather than the end of the matter. The JSSC accepted the invasion principle as necessary, but believed that operations to make it easier should be thoroughly studied and full use should be made of Allied ships and planes to avoid costly land campaigns. On 1 September the Chief of Staff requested General Embick, a member the JSSC, to make a study of the number of casualties that would be likely to occur in perimeter attacks on enemy bases as opposed to a surprise assault on the enemy homeland. In the face of Saipan losses, Marshall estimated that it would cost the United States 90,000 casualties to take Formosa, and that the high cost for that operation should be considered before rejecting the operation against Kyushu, where only one Japanese division was stationed, taking into account the fact that sustained fleet attacks would precede an assault on Kyushu.\(^80\) Although there was no accurate method of gauging the cost in lives, Embick favored the seizure of intermediate objectives and a reduction of Japanese capabilities before a direct assault on the home islands was attempted. He and other members of the JSSC supported a Formosa operation before undertaking Luzon as being less expensive in casualties provided both were to be seized. Once Formosa was captured, the Japanese would find it difficult to reinforce Luzon, while the capture of the latter would have little effect upon Japanese capabilities to strengthen Formosa.\(^81\)

The other members of the JCS quite naturally shared General Marshall’s concern over the question of the relative costs of a direct invasion as opposed to a war of attrition. Although all desired to take the course of action least expensive in casualties, there was little agreement as to which course would be the cheapest. Leahy felt that the President might ultimately have to decide whether to take a shorter course toward Japanese defeat at a possibly greater cost in lives or a longer course at a smaller cost. King, on the other hand, questioned the

\(^{78}\) CCS 417/3, 11 Jul 44, title: Over-all Objective in the War Against Japan.

\(^{79}\) (1) CCS 417/4, 29 Jul 44, title: Over-all Objective in the War Against Japan. (2) CCS 417/5, 4 Aug 44, same title.

\(^{80}\) (1) JCS 924/2, 30 Aug 44, title: Operations Against Japan Subsequent to Formosa. (2) Marshall for Embick, 1 Sep 44, no sub, WDCSA 381 TS.

\(^{81}\) (1) Memo, Embick for Marshall, 2 Sep 44, no sub, filed with JPS 404/12 in ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43). 5. (2) JCS 713/14, 7 Sep 44, title: Proposed Dir to CINCSWPA and CINCPOA.
validity of assuming that a longer war would mean less casualties in the final analysis. While Marshall was impressed by Leahy’s proposal that the President might have to make the final decision, he felt that in the meantime further studies should be made of the time and loss factors.  

Although sea blockade and air bombardment had inflicted very heavy losses upon the Japanese air and naval forces, intelligence estimates of early September indicated that the Japanese land armies appeared to be not only still intact but in fact stronger than they had been at the time of Pearl Harbor. If the fanatic and dogged last-ditch resistance hitherto shown in SWPA and the Central Pacific areas by Japanese troops were a portent of future opposition, actual invasion of their homeland would seem to be the only way to induce final surrender. There was no knowledge of the atom bomb in September 1944 in military planning circles except at the very top level. To have relied on the efficiency of naval and air operations to produce defeat might have been acceptable were there no pressure of time, but with the Army acutely aware of the American public’s distaste for long wars of attrition, it appeared to the military planners that the European OVERLORD might eventually have to be paralleled by a Pacific OVERLORD.

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82 Min. 172d mtg JCS, 5 Sep 44.
83 CCS 643/1, 9 Sep 44, title: Estimate of the Enemy Situation, Pacific-Far East.
CHAPTER XXII

Political Shadows

Although the Allied nations seemed to be moving swiftly toward victory during the summer of 1944, there were indications of powerful undercurrents at work. Political pressures in the coalition war were rising in the wake of the landings on the Continent. These pressures, warning of the inevitable weakening of the common bonds after the high tide of military triumph, were often obscured, at least for many Americans, by the necessity of first winning the war. Nevertheless the political questions, lying like dangerous reefs before the Allies, began to assume definite shape and foreshadowed the coming need for a firm hand on the tiller.

The spectacular advance of the Allies in Europe brought problems of postwar settlements to the fore and at the same time sharpened interest in the war against Japan on the part of those Allies who had Far Eastern and Pacific possessions. With the defeat of Germany presumably in the offing, the common danger in the West that had bound the Allies together would be removed and more attention could be devoted by each to strengthening national security for the postwar era and achieving national goals in the war against Japan. This emergence of national self-interest laid bare some of the stumbling blocks on the road to peace and also complicated the Allied effort to win the war.

As the summer advanced the Army planners found themselves forced to enter more and more into the realm of politics and diplomacy in order to cope with the changing problems of the coalition.

The Anglo-American Coalition

The differences of opinion between the Americans and British over ANVIL in relation to the significance of Mediterranean operations were but one facet of underlying disagreement over the type of war to be fought and objectives to be sought by the Anglo-American military coalition. The American concept of a military war to defeat Germany as quickly as possible, in order to release the means for a similar effort against Japan, envisioned as little involvement as possible in Europe's internal affairs both during and after the struggle. The recognition by the U.S. leaders that the occupation of Germany would be necessary did not carry any concomitant admission that the United States felt constrained to police other potential trouble areas unless this proved essential to defeating Germany. It is not surprising that this American reluctance to assume postwar responsibility for European affairs met with little enthusiasm from the British, whose greater experience and proximity to the situation made them more aware that the end of a war
usually meant the beginning of greater responsibility.

During the long discussions, between Sextant and September 1944, over the zones of occupation in Germany, the U.S. position on postwar European problems was more sharply delineated. In November 1943 the President had set forth his ideas on splitting Germany into several states and on the desirability of American occupation of northwestern Germany.¹ No decision had been made at Sextant, and the matter was turned over to COSSAC's staff for further study.² The COSSAC staff, in its report of late January 1944, opposed U.S. occupation of northwestern Germany since the British forces would be on the northern flank in the drive into Germany, and a change in position would necessitate administrative and logistical delay and confusion. Leahy, in commenting upon this objection, admitted that there were no essential military grounds for a reversal of zones, but the President clung quite firmly to his desire that the United States should take over northwestern Germany.³

In February in a strongly worded note to Stettinius, then Acting Secretary of State, the President spelled out some of his thoughts on America's role in postwar Europe:

I do not want the United States to have the post-war burden of reconstituting France, Italy and the Balkans. This is not our natural task at a distance of 3,500 miles or more. It is definitely a British task in which the British are far more vitally interested than we are.

From the point of view of the United States, our principal object is not to take part in the internal problems in southern Europe but is rather to take part in eliminating Germany at a possible and even probable cost of a third World War.

After ruling out objections to a transfer of zones after the war as specious, Roosevelt went on:

I have had to consider also the ease of maintaining American troops in some part of Germany. . . . Therefore, I think the American policy should be to occupy northwestern Germany, the British occupying the area from the Rhine south, and also being responsible for the policing of France and Italy, if this should become necessary.

In regard to the long range security of Britain against Germany, this is not a part of the first occupation. The British will have plenty of time to work that out. . . . The Americans by that time will be only too glad to retire all their military forces from Europe.

If anything further is needed to justify this disagreement with the British lines of demarcation, I can only add that political considerations in the United States make my decision conclusive.⁴

A few days later, the President in a more jocular mood wrote to Churchill in the same vein:

“Do please don’t” ask me to keep any American forces in France. I just cannot do it! I would have to bring them all back home. As I suggested before, I denounce in protest the paternity of Belgium, France, and Italy. You really ought to bring up and discipline your own children. In view of the fact that they may be your bulwark in future days, you should at least pay for the schooling now!⁵

¹ See Ch. XV above.
² Min, 144th mtg CCS, 4 Dec 43.
³ (1) OPD brief, Notes . . . 143d mtg JCS, 25 Jan 44, filed with JPS 391/5 in ABC 384 NW Europe (20 Aug 43). 1–A. (2) Min, 144th mtg CCS, 4 Feb 44.
⁴ Memo, F. D. R. for Actg Secy State, 21 Feb 44, no sub, filed with SS 231 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 227–40/10 (7 Jan 49).
⁵ Ltr, Roosevelt to Churchill, 29 Feb 44, no sub, Paper 69, Item 63C, Exec 10.
To the Army planners, the Presidential stand presented firm guidance on American policy in Europe during early 1944 and evoked a hearty "Hooray!" from General Roberts. Backed by Roosevelt, Ambassador Winant adhered to the U.S. claim for northwestern Germany before the European Advisory Commission in London during the spring of 1944, while a directive was issued to Eisenhower in May to plan for the occupation of the Netherlands and northwestern Germany, but not France, Austria, or the Balkans.

With the advent of summer came the first signs that the President might be weakening in his position somewhat and that he might not be averse to sending a token U.S. occupation force to Austria in order to ensure American participation in its postwar administration. Despite this break in his stand, Roosevelt continued to resist all efforts by the War and State Departments to reach a compromise with the British on the German zones. Although McCloy, Stettinius, and Hopkins joined in the attempt to overcome the President's objections to U.S. occupation of a southern zone by suggesting joint control of northern German and Lowland ports and coordinated occupation of northern Germany, he flatly turned them down. He remained confident that he could persuade the Prime Minister to agree to his own proposal. During this stalemate, the Army carried on its planning on a dual basis and made ready to occupy either northwestern or southwestern Germany, as the case might be.

There does not seem to be convincing evidence that Marshall or the Army planners felt very strongly about the question of zones in Germany, but rather that they simply followed the Presidential lead. During the pursuit of the Germans across France in August, Eisenhower's decision to move Allied troops into Germany according to previous plans—the British in the north and the Americans in the south—if Germany should collapse, met no opposition from the Washington staff. What was perhaps more important to the Army in the Anglo-American exchange on occupation policy in Europe was the knowledge that the President intended to keep U.S. occupational responsibilities in Europe on a very limited basis territorially. Although there was considerable discrepancy between the President's November 1943 estimate of 1,000,000 U.S. soldiers in Germany for a year or two and the

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* Memo, J. K. W. for Roberts, no date, no sub, filed with JCS 577/7 in ABC 584 NW Europe (20 Aug 43). 1-B.

1 Memo, Roberts for Handy, 21 Apr 44, sub: Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany, filed with JCS 577/9 in ABC 584 NW Europe (20 Aug 43), 1-B. (2) JCS 577/11, 1 May 44, title: Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany. (3) Memo, Leahy for Marshall, 25 May 44, no sub, filed with JWPC 222 in ABC 584 Europe (15 Aug 43). 1-A.

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9 Pogue, Supreme Command, p. 350.
Army's early summer of 1944 estimate of 400,000 troops at the end of a year after the defeat of Germany, both envisioned U.S. participation mainly in Germany and possibly the Lowlands.\(^\text{10}\)

Anticipating public demand for some demobilization after the defeat of Germany and Congressional economy drives in the postwar period, the Army's support of the President's restricted program was not surprising, for the Army staff remembered the disillusioning years following World War I. As Handy cautioned Roberts in the summer of 1944 in the related matter of postwar bases:

> It is my opinion that we should be careful not to over-extend—that is acquire bases which as a practical matter under peace conditions we will not have the forces to defend. They are a liability rather than an asset.\(^\text{11}\)

Although settlement of the zones of occupation was deferred until the President and Prime Minister met at Ocragon in September, the Army concept of a military war freed insofar as possible of postwar political objectives and long-range responsibilities had been given a powerful stimulus by the President. The strategic decisions that lay ahead in Europe, and in the war against Japan also, could not fail to be influenced by the American unity on this principle. The drive to beat the enemy as quickly as possible and as efficiently as possible was to be retained as first priority by the United States.

At first glance, it would be hard to reconcile American reluctance to accept British help in the Pacific war with this theme, but upon closer examination the reasons were consistent enough. It should be remembered that the almost exclusive American management of the Pacific war during the first two years of U.S. participation had been one of the features of the global conflict. As long as the United States had given at least paper recognition to the primacy of the European struggle, the Army and Navy were allowed to make all the strategic decisions in the Pacific and merely had to secure the acquiescence of the British. In spite of periodic complaints on the build-up of resources during the early stages of the Pacific war, this early growth of U.S. power was fostered by the critical nature of the situation and the realization that Japan must be stopped and contained. Once the enemy had been halted and the Allied counter-offensive had been loosed on Guadalcanal and in New Guinea, the momentum and the need to maintain the strategic initiative had drawn in an ever-increasing number of men, planes, and ships. By the end of August 1944 there were 1,073,746 Army personnel in the Pacific, exclusive of Alaska and the CBI.\(^\text{12}\)

The preponderance of U.S. manpower, air strength, and naval power had permitted the Americans to determine where and how those forces should be employed. Disputes and arguments had been on the service level for the most part, with Marshall and King working out compromises \textit{inter se}. More often
than not the Chief of Staff had to act as a mediator between the Navy and his own subordinate, MacArthur. Since this had all been within the family, so to speak, settlements had usually been amicable and, with the possible exception of the Philippines, decisions had always been based upon military needs rather than political desires.

It was natural, therefore, that, since Pacific affairs were proceeding so favorably, the Americans should wish to preserve the status quo. There were areas where other Allied nations might contribute to the defeat of Japan without prejudicing the American effort in the Pacific—particularly in the Central Pacific. The British could operate in the SEAC area, the Chinese in China, the Russians in Siberia and Manchuria, the French could join the British in southeast Asia, and the Dutch, Australians, and New Zealanders could assist MacArthur in SWPA. This compartmentalization of effort worked admirably in the early phases of the war because all Allied forces were nibbling at the Japanese perimeter, but the success of the U.S. march across the Pacific altered the situation. As the Americans had progressed from island to island, dealing successive defeats to the Japanese, they drew near to the more valuable of the overrun colonial possessions of Britain, France, and the Netherlands. It was to be expected that the three governments would display more intense interest and would seek to participate in decisions concerning their former territories. Everybody wanted to be in on the kill.

As far back as Casablanca, the British had stated their intention of getting into the Pacific war as soon as possible and had reiterated it at each succeeding conference. During the early part of 1944, the pressure they had been exerting to assume a future role in the showdown with Japan had mounted. When the CCS met in London in June, the British Chiefs of Staff sought guidance from the Joint Chiefs on the area in the war against Japan in which their assistance could best be employed. It was not surprising that the JCS recommended the Indian Ocean as the best and most helpful place, since the British forces could be based on India. As a second choice, the Americans thought that the western flank of SWPA in the NEI-Malaya area might be suitable. Since the United States forces would soon be leaving their Australian bases behind, there was a possibility that the British could use the bases by the time they were ready to mount their operations. The Americans realized British national policy demanded that the British play a sizable role in the defeat of Japan, but the Americans were anxious to channel that effort into areas under British direction such as SEAC, or, if necessary, into MacArthur's already mixed command rather than into the purely American organization in the Central Pacific.\(^\text{13}\)

Of course, any British participation would have to be self-supporting or it would be valueless, since otherwise U.S. units would have to be withdrawn from the Pacific to make room for the British.

To the U.S. staff, winning the war was

\(^{13}\) (1) Min, 163rd mtg CCS, 11 Jun 44. (2) Memo, Cooke for King, 13 Jun 44, sub: Br Participation in the War Against Japan, filed with JCS 453/1 in ABC 984 Japan (3 May 44), 1-A. (3) Memo, Handy for CoS, 13 Jun 44, sub: Br Participation in the War Against Japan, filed with JWPC 296/1 in ABC 984 Japan (3 May 44), 1-A. (4) Min, 165th mtg CCS, 14 Jun 44.
all important. As the JSSC counseled the Joint planners:

Our national interests do not require us to devise operations by U.S. forces which are not directly contributory to our main effort in order to seize areas of post-war strategic importance.

In general, our strategic policy does not require either the exclusion or inclusion of the British, Russian, Dutch or French from participation in the seizure of any enemy-held territory in the Far East. The question of participation in each case should be decided solely on the basis of military consideration from the U.S. point of view.

It is compatible with our strategy to permit the reoccupation of British, French, or Dutch territories in the Far East without our military participation.\(^1\)

In mid-July the British informed the United States that a force of six divisions, exclusive of Dominion troops, and a corps of two Dutch divisions would be available in 1945, if Germany were defeated by October 1944.\(^1\) It was apparent that the main British contribution and the most useful one would still be the fleet units that also were to become available in 1945.

Although the British effort would not make itself felt in the Pacific until at least mid-1945, both King and MacArthur were anxious to keep future British activities under close surveillance. Neither wanted British forces in the Netherlands East Indies unless they were under U.S. control, since both felt that it might prove difficult to dislodge the British once they got in. MacArthur, moreover, felt the British should first clean up the SEAC area and then, under his command, should help mop up in SWPA. He did not think it fair that the British be allowed to extend SEAC’s boundaries later on and reap the fruits of victory in SWPA that they had done so little to merit. In his opinion, it would be destructive of U.S. prestige in the Far East and would unquestionably have a most deleterious effect on future economic trends.\(^1\)

The British were highly alert to the political significance and necessity of having their forces take a prominent part in the main operations against Japan. In mid-August they offered their fleet for the big drive in the Central Pacific and, in case this proved impossible, suggested as an alternative that a British Empire task force with a British commander be formed to operate under MacArthur’s Supreme Command.\(^1\) There was considerable discussion in Washington of the British proposals. There was some doubt of British ability to form a task force, which was the more acceptable of the British naval offers. ASF authorities, moreover, did not believe that the British could spare six divisions and maintained that the United States would be called upon to supply them if they could be found. Ambassador Winant wrote Hopkins from London that the bottom of the British manpower barrel had been reached and that demobilization was inevitable after Germany’s defeat. Even

\(^{14}\) Memo T. T. H. for CofS, no date, sub: Notes for Conf With President, filed with CCS 681 in ABC 337 (14 Sep 44), 1.

\(^{15}\) CCS 619. 15 Jul 44. title: Scale of Br Army Efforts in the Pacific After the Defeat of Germany.


\(^{17}\) CCS 452/18, 15 Aug 44. title: Br Participation in the War Against Japan.
so, he went on, the British would have to be in on the final showdown or bad feeling in the postwar era might result. The Army planners looked at the British proposals with a critical eye. Since it would take nine months after Germany's defeat for the British to redeploy their land forces and four to seven months their air forces, they would not have much to fight with, except their Navy, until mid-1945. By that time, MacArthur should be well into the Philippines and Kenney and the Seventh Fleet would be "making hay" over the South China Sea.

Colonel Billo of the Strategy Section of the Operations Division stated, "Deployment of British forces does not involve strategy—they can neither hasten nor retard the defeat of Japan. Deployment must be based solely on high political policy." British policy, he continued, was clear: to reoccupy all British possessions where possible or to send along political officers with the occupying force; to regain their lost prestige in Australia and New Zealand; to restore French, Dutch, and Portuguese colonial possessions; and to obtain maximum U.S. aid in the political and economic reconstruction of these occupied territories. American policy, according to Billo, was not so definite. The United States was willing to permit the return of the former possessions with the exception of Hong Kong; it wished to remain the dominant power in the Japanese mandates, Philippines, and China; Hong Kong and French Indochina it would like to return to China: and the Philippines were to be freed, although necessary military bases would be retained. There were three major questions on postwar national policy that must be determined by the President if possible or, if not, by the JCS. Billo went on. First, did the United States want to remain the dominant power in the Southwest Pacific area? Next, did the United States want to retain any military bases in the area south of the line Solomons—French Indochina—Calcutta? If so, what? And, lastly, did the United States desire economic or political concessions in the Netherlands East Indies, Siam, or French Indochina? If yes, then what concessions? Until these questions were answered, he concluded, the problems of command, redeployment, boundaries, and division of responsibility could not be faced intelligently.

Billo's analysis was symptomatic of the growing importance of political elements in the strategic pattern during the summer of 1944. Decisions on the questions Colonel Billo raised could not be reached overnight, but the problem of British participation had to be determined as soon as possible. In early September Marshall recommended that the British offer of an Empire task force be accepted, since it would not interfere with MacArthur's planned operations and since the consideration of logistical support could be discussed at a later date. Any hope the Americans had of avoiding further debate on the subject was quickly dispelled by the British, who immediately pressed the JCS for an answer to their proposal for the use of their fleet in the main.
operations against Japan in the Pacific.\(^{21}\)

It appeared that the matter would be one of the main problems to be faced at OCTAGON.

The U.S. position on the entrance of Great Britain into the Central Pacific, therefore, was not inconsistent with its over-all stand for a military war uncomplicated by political elements. Desiring to remain apart from the internal conflicts and readjustments of Europe and the Far East, the United States also wished to keep the essentially American phase of the Pacific war that way in the interest of speed and efficiency. But with military desirability coming into conflict with political expediency, the necessity for compromise with the aspirations of the allies seemed likely to force some alteration in the American attitude.

The Soviet Ally

In contrast with the mounting impact of political problems in Anglo-American affairs in 1944, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the same period remained wholly on a military basis. That this condition prevailed may be ascribed not to unawareness on the part of U.S. military planners that political elements were entering the situation, but rather to the steady resistance of the President and his close advisers to any introduction of political or military bargaining with the Russians. The past sacrifices and the current successes of the USSR in its fight against Germany gave the Soviet authorities carte blanche in their dealings with the United States, in spite of intermittent warnings that the policy might now be outmoded and should be reassessed.

When Ambassador Harriman had suggested in February 1944 that Deane’s military mission screen or check Soviet requests for lend-lease supplies since there no longer was a crisis, the President’s Protocol Committee turned him down.\(^{22}\) Priorities for lend-lease to the Soviet Union continued to remain high and, for the time being at least, efforts to apply pressure on the Russians and to obtain some quid pro quo ceased.

Although direct pressure might be frowned upon, Marshall had pointed out to the President in late March that American aid served a highly useful purpose in itself:

An important factor enabling the Soviets to seize the offensive and retain it is Lend-Lease. Lend-Lease food and transport particularly have been vital factors in Soviet success. Combat aircraft, upon which the Soviet Air Forces relied so greatly, have been furnished in relatively great numbers (11,300 combat planes received). Should there be a full stoppage it is extremely doubtful whether Russia could retain efficiently her all-out offensive capabilities. Even defensively the supply of Lend-Lease food and transport would play an extremely vital role. It amounts to about a million tons a year. If Russia were deprived of it, Germany could probably still defeat the U.S.S.R. Lend-Lease is our trump card in dealing with U.S.S.R. and its control is possibly the most effective means we have to keep the Soviets on the offensive in connection with the second front.\(^{23}\)

\(^{21}\) (1) Min, 173d mtg JCS, 8 Sep 44. (2) Msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 11 Sep 44, CM-OUT 2981. (3) CCS 452/25, 11 Sep 44, title: Br Participation in the War Against Japan.


\(^{23}\) Memo, G. C. M. for President, 31 Mar 44, no sub, in WDCSA 091 Russia TS.
Thus, while the positive bargaining powers of lend-lease were not employed, the ever-present possibility that lend-lease might be curtailed or cut off was recognized as a weapon in reserve to ensure Soviet co-operation with OVERLORD.

An attempt by the JCS in May 1944 to set up a policy on lend-lease following the defeat of Germany that would limit U.S. aid exclusively to the Allied forces employed against Japan met with little success. After a delay of four months, the President informed the military that he would make such decisions on national policy himself.24

Unable to use its greatest potential weapon in treating with the USSR, the Army staff was forced to fall back upon its own devices and handle Soviet requests purely on a military basis. Late in April, when Deane recommended conditioning U.S. approval of Soviet petitions for heavy bombers and C-54’s upon Soviet reciprocity in the matter of bases for U.S. bombers to be used against Japan, the AAF informed him that bomber build-up and training time would preclude any use by the Russians of a bomber force before the spring of 1945. Since the United States was seeking to curtail aircraft production at the earliest moment and since current production estimates would not support the development of a Soviet bomber force that promised to be of little value in defeating Germany, it did not seem wise to the AAF to grant the request. The AAF also pointed out that the Russians would probably demand special equipment for the bombers that was not only still in short supply but also had not been released for use by America’s other allies.25

Although the War Department was disinclined to build up a Soviet bomber force, it was not averse to impressing the Russians with the efficiency and technical ability of the U.S. bomber forces. In an effort to improve Soviet-American relations during the fall of 1943 and to allow the Allied aircraft to bomb targets otherwise out of reach and thus subject the entire German Reich to long-range air attack, the Air Forces had proposed the institution of a shuttle bombing project (later called FRANTIC) between the Mediterranean and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and the USSR on the other. Such an operation would serve to demonstrate the solidarity of the three partners and would help to break ground for the later use of Siberian bases in the war against Japan. Despite the fact that Stalin’s approval had been won at Tehran, it took several months of negotiations before three bases in the Ukraine—Poltava, Mirgorod, and Piryatint—were selected and readied for use. On 2 June the first mission, called FRANTIC JOE and led by General Eaker, was flown from the Mediterranean to the new bases.26 Suspicious as ever of

24 (1) JCS 771/3, 5 May 44, title: Policy Concerning Assignments of Lend-Lease Munitions Following the Defeat of Germany. (2) Min, 162d mtg JCS, 9 May 44. (3) JCS 771/4, 10 May 44, title: Policy Concerning Assignments of Lend-Lease Munitions Following the Defeat of Germany. (4) Ltr, Roosevelt to Marshall, 9 Sep 44, no sub, filed with JCS 771/17 in ABC 490,3295 (15 Mar 44). (5) Roosevelt never did issue any instructions to the military on this matter, and it was not until July 1945 that President Harry S. Truman approved the JCS policy. See JCS 771/11, 6 Jul 45, title: Presidential Policy on Military Lend-Lease.

25 OPD brief, title: Notes . . . JPS 149th mtg, 3 May 44, sub: USSR Request for Heavy Bombers and Transport Aircraft, filed with JPS 442/1 in ABC 490,3295 USSR (24 Apr 44).

26 The detailed story of the shuttle bombing project may be found in Albert Lepawsky, History
foreigners on Soviet soil, the Russians insisted on setting up a complicated procedure of group visas for the U.S. airmen who entered the Soviet Union—a system that broke down in practice. Although there was some reluctance on the part of the Russians to permit the American bombers to strike at major strategic targets and despite a disastrous German raid on the shuttle airfields on the night of 21–22 June, seven missions were carried out during the summer.

With the rapid forward sweep of the Russians and the Allies toward Germany during this period, some objectives were eliminated as targets and others were brought within reach of the Allied bombers and fighters operating from France and Italy. As the obvious military reasons for shuttle bombing disappeared, the Russians began to show signs that they wished an end to the project. Their excuse was the limitations imposed by the approaching cold weather. Despite the desire of the War Department to hold on to the three bases in the Ukraine, a suggestion by Eaker that the United States place some restrictions on Soviet air operations in the Mediterranean–Balkans area in order to produce a change in the Soviet attitude toward the shuttle bases met with little encouragement.27

The outbreak of the Polish uprising against the Germans in Warsaw on 1 August led to the last shuttle bombing mission. Although the Soviet forces were almost within hailing distance of Warsaw by this time, the Russians not only made no move to aid the beleaguered Poles but also denounced the leaders of the revolt as reckless adventurers. Appeals for aid for the Poles from Churchill and Roosevelt had little effect upon Stalin until matters had become quite desperate. It was 11 September before he gave his consent for the Americans to airdrop supplies into Warsaw. The airdrop was carried out on 18 September, but few of the supplies reached Polish hands. Without sufficient supplies and with little hope of any relief, the insurrectionists were forced to surrender some two weeks later. With the collapse of the Polish revolt in Warsaw, the closing of the shuttle bases became inevitable. By the end of October only a small caretaking force remained at Poltava and the other two bases were shut down.

The value of the FRANTIC project is debatable. That it served to bring about some Soviet-American air collaboration and offered an opportunity for the United States to display its technical superiority, there can be little doubt. On the other hand, its strategic accomplishments are less apparent, for the Germans seem to have paid little attention to the whole operation, with the exception of their telling raid on 21–22 June. Most of the targets attacked during the FRANTIC missions could have been reached from the Mediterranean or the United Kingdom without using the shuttle bases. By the time that the first shuttle bombing mission got under way in June, the Allies were about to prove their good faith to the Russians with the landing in Normandy. Perhaps the greatest value of the FRANTIC

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27 (1) Ltr, Eaker to Arnold, 26 Aug 44, no sub. OPD 356 TS, 134. (2) Memo, Handy for Arnold, 6 Sep 44, sub: Russian Attitude Regarding Further Entry or Operations of Americans From Russia. OPD 356 TS, 134.
project lay in the political experience gained by the American negotiators, military and civilian, in their attempts to sustain the operation. In the face of frequent Soviet opposition, they managed to get approval for seven missions. This in itself was quite a feat, since the Russians had resisted all other efforts to introduce foreign troops to Soviet territory. Why the Russians consented to the shuttle bombing project and allowed it to be set up remains one of the more intriguing questions of Soviet-American wartime relations.

The swift tempo of operations during the summer of 1944 focused the attention of the Army upon the need for closer liaison with the Russians in regard both to the windup of the European war and to the expected association of the Soviet Union in the Japanese conflict. The Army planners were conscious of the fact that, despite Soviet promises to enter the Japanese war, the Russians had made no military commitments in the Far East. While the United States had been trying to keep the British out of the Pacific without a great deal of success, the attempts to lure the Russians into the war against Japan were also proving fruitless. As Arnold later commented, the USSR had no intentions of fighting a two-front war and kept all the negotiations in a planning stage.28 After Stalin's pledge at Sextant to enter the Far Eastern struggle as soon as Germany was beaten, little progress had been made in getting the Russians to plan concretely in the Far East.

It is true that U.S. officers were permitted to inspect Siberian ports in June—dressed as civilians, of course, lest the Japanese protest—but representations on the availability, location, and condition of airfields in the maritime provinces and the logistical implications of supplying these bases became bogged down in a mass of Soviet indifference and red tape despite a personal plea from Roosevelt to Stalin in August.29 The potential use of the northern route against Japan, a recurrent but never dominant planning theme during the whole war, was still under consideration by the Joint planners, yet the casual attitude displayed by the Soviet authorities suggested that nothing would be done to excite Japanese fears or resentment until the European commitment had run its course.

Whether the USSR would be essential to the defeat of Japan was still a moot question in the summer of 1944. The Joint planners felt that the enemy's capitulation would not be contingent upon the active participation of the USSR, since Soviet capabilities would not be great for some months after the defeat of Germany. On the other hand, General Embick, Army member of the JSSC, thought that the entry of the Soviet Union would be "of most cardinal importance" in holding down the Japanese Kwantung army on the mainland if the United States invaded Japan.30 There was little unanimity of opinion among the military leaders on the need for invasion itself, as has been shown, and the value of having the USSR in the

28 Arnold, Global Mission, p. 481.
30 (1) JCS 924, 30 Jun 44, title: Operations Against Japan Subsequent to Formosa. (2) Memo, Embick for Marshall, 2 Sep 44, no sub, filed with JCS 924/2 in ABC 384 Pacific (1–17–43), 5.
Pacific war rested mainly on the necessity for carrying out an assault on Japan. As an air base, Siberia would be useful but not indispensable to the bombardment of Japanese military and industrial targets. But, with the acceptance of the need for invasion in July by the Joint Chiefs for planning purposes, the desire to secure closer co-operation in the Far East with the Russians and to begin active planning for the day when the USSR would come into the war was intensified.\(^{31}\)

According to the U.S. staff in Moscow, opposition to Soviet planning on all air matters stemmed not from the Soviet Army or Air Staff but from political sources. There was apparently a studied attempt by Soviet authorities to avoid all air collaboration, and when in September, after six weeks, no replies had been given to the U.S. Far Eastern air base proposals, Harriman and his military advisers made another effort to secure application of pressure on the Russians in order to obtain due consideration for American requests.\(^{32}\)

Like its predecessors, this plea was not approved, and American policy continued to be one of shunning any semblance of making demands or seeking a *quid pro quo*. The "get tough" line was not to develop until a much later period.

By mid-September, U.S.-Soviet military affairs in regard to the Japanese war were still bogged down in unanswered requests. Administrative delay, once the familiar explanation of the British in Burma, had found a counterpart in the Soviet position in the Far East. Until the Russians were ready to intervene and had set their price, little success could be expected from the U.S. negotiations.

**The French Problem**

In direct contrast with the noncommittal attitude of the Soviet Union, France was eager to participate in the European and Far Eastern wars on as large a scale as possible. The French attitude was quite understandable. The necessity for restoring French prestige and national pride made the leaders of the French forces anxious to rebuild France's armed strength and to play an active and important role in the defeat of both Germany and Japan. Like Britain, France could not afford to have its possessions handed back to it as a gift without losing face in the Far East and, unless the French forces were able to strike back hard at their German conquerors, national morale might be seriously affected and postwar recovery might be made more difficult.

The U.S. Army staff, on the other hand, oriented to fighting an efficient and military war, could not be expected to be highly enthusiastic over the ambitious plans for raising and equipping new French divisions presented by the Washington representatives of the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) in late 1943. The prime factors of time and production had begun to operate against any increases in the French rearmament program that could not ostensibly be justified as contributing to the defeat of Germany. In commenting upon the French request to

\(^{31}\) JCS 1005/1, 31 Aug 44, title: Machinery for Coordination of U.S.-Soviet-Br Military Effort.

\(^{32}\) (1) Msg, Harriman, Maj Gen Robert L. Walsh, and Deane to Arnold, 8 Sep 44, CM-IN 7853. (2) Msg, Harriman and Deane to Arnold, 9 Sep 44, CM-IN 8275.
the JCS, Marshall had pointed out in November 1943 that the question of rearming more than the eleven divisions already approved at Casablanca was a matter of national policy and should be decided by the President on the basis of its postwar implications.\textsuperscript{33}

The problem of French rearmament was complicated during early 1944 by the involved relations between the Americans and British on the one hand and the French Committee of National Liberation on the other. With the President reluctant to recognize the committee as the provisional government of France and determined to stay out of French postwar problems, most of the guidance received from him was of a negative character. As he instructed Eisenhower in March, the defeat of Germany was his first aim, but he desired that democratic methods be fostered during the coming liberation of France so that favorable conditions could be established for the eventual formation of a representative French government.\textsuperscript{34} He refused to treat with the FCNL on a political level and insisted that any discussions regarding the future employment of the existing French forces be carried on with Eisenhower.\textsuperscript{35}

The disinclination of the President to bolster the authority of De Gaulle and the FCNL led to further problems during the spring. There were misunderstandings over the supplying of French resistance groups and over the issuance of invasion currency for OVERLORD forces. Since the British and Americans did not have a great deal of confidence in French security measures, little was revealed to the French leaders concerning the details of OVERLORD until the last possible moment. This, among other things, may have contributed to the failure of the negotiations to have De Gaulle broadcast an appeal to the French people on D Day for their co-operation with OVERLORD. Although De Gaulle’s visit to Washington in early July did serve to clear the atmosphere somewhat, the role the French forces would play in the liberation of France and in the defeat of Germany was still confused and uncertain.\textsuperscript{36}

In the face of this political impasse, Marshall attempted to keep the question of French rearmament on a military basis. In late July, when instructing the Joint Logistics Committee on considering French requests for rearming more divisions, he stated:

The Chief of Staff desires that an answer to all these questions (rearmament, French air forces, resistance groups, civilian labor) be arrived at which will utilize the available French manpower in a well-balanced fighting force to include the normal components of combat support troops and service troops with the necessary headquarters, consistent with manpower limitations, and solely with this objective: the utilization of French manpower as effectively as is possible in order to prosecute the war to a rapid conclusion. In other words, no consideration should be given, by any committee, to the development of a postwar French Army; only those troops

\textsuperscript{33} (1) JCS 561, 2 Nov 43, title: Rearmament of French Forces. (2) Vigneras, Rearming the French, Ch. XI. The total of eleven divisions was later reduced to eight upon Eisenhower’s recommendation.

\textsuperscript{34} (1) Ltr, Roosevelt to Stimson, 15 Mar 44, no sub, WDCSA 091 France TS. (2) Pogue, Supreme Command, Ch. VIII.

\textsuperscript{35} (1) Memo, Marshall for President, 25 Apr 44, sub: Employment of French Forces, WDCSA 091 France TS. (2) Memo, President for Marshall, 28 Apr 44, no sub, WDCSA 091 France TS.

\textsuperscript{36} (1) Pogue, Supreme Command, Ch. XIII. (2) Vigneras, Rearming the French, Ch. XI.
should be equipped and armed who can participate in the war at an early date.37

This military approach to French rearmament was further reflected when the British made a proposal to the JCS and State Department simultaneously in late August. The British suggested that, in the immediate postwar period, they would be responsible for equipping the forces of Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Norway, while the United States would take care of France. In this manner, they stated, the forces of these nations could be closely integrated with those of the United States and Great Britain.38 In turning the proposal over to Roberts, Handy cautioned: "This is purely postwar. I believe the U.S. Chiefs of Staff should approach it very carefully and make no commitments without President's approval."39

The initial military reaction to the British approach was unfavorable. The Joint Logistics Committee found that the plan, if accepted, might tend to foster spheres of influence that might restrict operations of U.S. manufacturers after the war. Besides committing the United States to rearming the French, the possible development of a closely knit western European bloc would exclude the Soviet Union and run counter to a strong international organization. The JLC suggested discussing any such plan on a tripartite basis with the USSR. The committee also recommended expanding the plan to include all liberated nations rather than just the western European group.40 When Marshall referred the matter to the JSSC, their recommendations disagreed, in part, with those of the JLC. The JSSC believed that rearming western European allies would permit the United States to reduce and then withdraw its occupational forces in Europe at earlier dates. Even though the JSSC favored the British plan conditionally, they also supported the JLC stand that any implication of U.S. encouragement of a western bloc should be avoided and the USSR should be consulted.41

While the subjects of French rearmament and postwar forces were being discussed, the Allies had completed their sweep across France and thousands of eligible Frenchmen, many of them already armed, were made available for employment in the war. The questions of how many could be used and how best they could be used continued to plague the Allies during the balance of the summer. If the fight against Germany were to be successfully concluded in the early fall of 1944, as was then expected, there would be no need for

37 JLC 140/2, 22 Jul 44, title: French Rearmament Plan.
38 CCS 653, 22 Aug 44, title: Policy for the Equipping of the Forces of the Western European Allies.
39 Quote in memo, C. K. G. for Roberts, 29 Aug 44, sub: CCS 653, filed with CCS 653 in ABC 400/3295 (2 Aug 45), 1-A.
40 JCS 1039, 8 Sep 44, title: Policy for the Equipping of the Forces of the Western European Allies.
41 (1) JCS 1039/1, 28 Sep 44, title: Policy for the Equipping of the Forces of the Western European Allies.

The JCS later approved the JSSC recommendations and informed the Secretary of State that resources for equipping French forces would be supplied from U.S. excess until the end of the war. They stipulated that the United States should not be excluded from dealing with other nations, since it was important that the American aircraft and munitions industries be encouraged in the postwar years. The President approved on 28 December 1944. See: (1) ltr, Leahy to Hull, 11 Oct 44, no sub, filed with JCS 1039/1 in ABC 400/3295 (2 Aug 45), 1-B; and (2) SWNCC 17, 5 Feb 45, title: Equipment of French Air Forces.
raising additional French combat divisions, but rather there would be a requirement for garrison, service, and line of communications troops. If, on the other hand, the campaign should drag on into 1945, an entirely different set of circumstances would prevail, and more French divisions could be very helpful. The solution to this problem would have to wait until the tactical situation on the Continent became clearer and the Allies could estimate more accurately the amount and kind of assistance they desired of France.  

While the French interest centered mainly on the European war during this period, the French also made approaches to the CCS on the matter of future participation in the war against Japan. As was to be expected, their chief consideration was Indochina, and matched the concern the Dutch and Portuguese were demonstrating for their colonial possessions in the Pacific. It was not surprising that these powers wished to regain their territories from the Japanese, nor that their efforts to do so were supported by the British, who had a similar stake in that area.

The political significance of succoring France and the other nations with colonial possessions was not lost upon the Army planners, who, as in the case with the British, saw no objections to the recovery of prewar possessions, provided no U.S. forces were involved in the process. The Army staff had no desire to incur the future enmity of native populations by allowing American soldiers to assist in the resubjugation of colonies, especially when the prospect of a rise in Asiatic nationalism sparked by Japanese wartime propaganda was likely to follow the close of hostilities. The problem of how to keep U.S. aid on a military basis and to ward off any political stigma would have to be faced in the days ahead.

**Relations With Other Nations**

The unwillingness of the United States to become entangled in Europe’s political affairs any more than was absolutely necessary to defeat Germany was shown not only in its relations with the great powers in Europe but also in its dealings with the smaller nations during mid-1944. In the traditional powder keg of the Balkans, the U.S. Army staff tread with a wary step. Supported by the President’s dictum on shunning U.S. postwar commitments in that area, the staff regarded the various British proposals with caution.

As Marshall had informed the JCS in April, he felt that equipping patriot forces in the Balkans for wartime use against the Germans was justified, but that there should be no complete rearming for postwar conditions. The Operations Division had recommended that U.S. participation in civil affairs in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Greece be limited to relief and rehabilitation and that in regard to Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania American participation be contingent upon actual employment of
U.S. forces in those countries. Agreeing with this proposal, the JCS had informed the British in late May that no U.S. forces would be employed in southern Europe on occupational duty and that any located in the area at the end of the war would be withdrawn as soon as practicable. This disclaimer of United States responsibility in the Balkans was sustained by the American stand on ANVIL versus Italy and the Balkans issue during the summer and proved to be one of the sore spots in Anglo-American relations for the rest of the war. By default, it left the question of Balkan hegemony to be settled between the British and the Russians, although the President still thought he should be consulted on any arrangements that were to be made.

Closely connected with the Balkan problem in many ways, the role of Turkey again came up for discussion in July. As the war had progressed, the necessity for Turkish entry on the Allied side had dwindled. The Russians became less inclined to attach importance to Turkish participation, and the U.S. military planners seemed disposed to agree with them. Strategically, Turkish forces could only be used against Bulgaria, and the Army staff was well aware that the USSR had special interests in Bulgaria. Faced with this situation, the Strategy Section concluded that there would be more disadvantages than advantages in having Turkey in the war. The United States would have to supply technicians and equipment that would utilize critical shipping. If the Turks attacked Bulgaria, Soviet forces would be brought into the southern Balkans, and neither the Turks nor the British wanted that to happen. The Strategy Section held that if the Germans evacuated Greece, the United States could redisplay its forces in the Mediterranean to allow the British to occupy Greece, but if the Germans did not, then no diversion should be made. Basically, the planners believed, the question of American support of British policy in the Mediterranean was a long-range decision that should be made primarily on the ground of whether the United States would need to retain a close Anglo-American alliance after the war. If close alliance were desirable, safe-guarding the British lines of communication in the Mediterranean should be assured.

Despite these stipulated disadvantages and possible alternatives to Turkish entry into the war, the JCS and State Department decided that Turkey should be urged to sever diplomatic relations with Germany as soon as practicable as a first step toward belligerency. But there were important provisos to this approval, in that the United States would

45 Memo, Lt Col Daniel C. Fahey, Jr., for Hilldring, 19 May 44, sub: Occupation of Certain Areas in the Mediterranean Theater Under RANKIN “C” Conditions, filed with JCS 577/12 in ABC 384 NW Europe (20 Aug 43), 1-B.
46 CCS 320/15, 27 May 44, title: Occupation of Certain Areas in the Mediterranean Theater Under RANKIN “C” Conditions. The paper also included Austria and was later modified when the President decided to take part in the occupation of Austria.
not commit itself to support a campaign in the Balkans and would not divert resources from agreed upon operations in the western Mediterranean. When the Turks expressed their concern over such a conditional approval, the United States at the beginning of August modified its position somewhat. If a Balkan campaign should develop, the United States would be willing to reconsider the matter and see if portions of Turkish requests for aid could be made available.50

The unsettled conditions in the Balkan-Aegean area and the possibility of a Soviet clash with the British as their interests conflicted were not overlooked by the Army planners. As Colonel Billo of the Strategy Section pointed out to Roberts early in September, the United States might be placed in the middle by ensuing circumstances and Germany's hope of creating dissension among the Allies in order to obtain more lenient peace terms might be realized.51 The Balkan problems, added to the troublesome dispute with the Soviet Union over the relief of Warsaw, made the potentiality for deepening rifts seem even more acute.52 There was little that the Army staff could do about the situation, but it was another element that had to be considered in making plans.

In addition to political and military headaches, there were also several diplomatic matters pertaining to European neutrals that required the Army staff's attention. Although neutrals were essentially the concern of the State Department, the trading of vital military materials to Germany by Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Portugal had long been a troublesome problem to the Army. In June, Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson recommended that the State Department cease applying gradual pressure upon these neutrals and insist that they stop supplying the enemy. Secretary Hull pointed out that the United States had to act in concert with the British in these matters and that current arrangements had secured some reduction in Swedish ball-bearing exports.53 However, when the Swedes later turned down an Anglo-American demand backed by the USSR for a change in Swedish policy vis-a-vis Germany, Hull suggested that the threat of taking control of Swedish interests in the United States might be used to increase the pressure. The Allied insistence upon further reductions in Swedish trade with Germany, added to the threat of postwar commercial disadvantages to Sweden should it continue such trade, produced a change in Swedish policy in late 1944, when the Swedes ceased their export trade with Germany.54

Switzerland, lacking the resources of Sweden, presented a somewhat different problem. As Marshall indicated to the CCS in July, the United States did not want the Swiss to use war materials imported from the Allies to supply the Germans. The British appreciated the

50 (1) Decision Amending JCS 958, 20 Jul 44, title: Severance of Diplomatic Relations with Germany by Turkey, in ABC 384 Sweden-Turkey (25 Oct 43), 4. (2) JCS 958/2, 1 Aug 44, same title.
51 Memo, Billo for Chief S&P Gp OPD, 5 Sep 44, sub: Declaration of War by Russia on Bulgaria, filed with SS 500 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 297-315 (7 Jan 43).
52 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, Ch. 9.
53 (1) Memo, Patterson for Stimson, 16 Jun 44, sub: European Neutrals, in SW files, Sweden, 10. (2) Ltrs, Hull to Stimson, 10 Jul 44, no sub, in OPD 336 TS, 98.
U.S. position, but did not favor strong measures such as cutting off exports to Switzerland. They preferred the use of persuasion and increased political pressure. Essentially, the whole question of dealing with the trade of Switzerland and other neutrals hinged upon the short-term military advantages of a severe Allied economic policy as measured against the long-term economic disadvantages and resentment against the Allies that the neutrals might carry over into the postwar period.

Marshall's attitude toward neutrals trading with Germany typified the Army approach to political problems in mid-1944. Although the Army staff was quite aware of the political implications involved in many of the matters brought to their attention, they received little encouragement from the President to concern themselves with these aspects of them. Co-ordination between the War Department and the State Department proceeded without the continuity that would have been most desirable. The intermittent character of the cooperation between the two departments could be blamed on neither entirely, since frequently it proved difficult to secure a decision from the President, who liked to handle his own foreign affairs. In the absence of top-level and positive political guidance, the Army was often forced to resort to its primary rule of thumb in making decisions—would a given proposal help to bring the war to an end more quickly and more efficiently? The attainment of postwar objectives, with the possible exception of military and air bases, was not in the Army province. If some of the courses of action supported by the Army staff during this period seem shortsighted, it was, at least in part, because the staff felt bound to limit its consideration to the military import of the matter and not because it was unaware of possible long-range political consequences.

Judged from the military standpoint, there could be no doubt in the summer of 1944 that the Army had been successful in prosecuting the war. The accelerated progress in Europe and in the Pacific attested to the soundness of the strategy it had supported. The approaching conference at Quebec would further confirm the general satisfaction the British and Americans felt with the military course of the war. Regardless of the appearance of disturbing political factors, the military pay-off was coming into sight, and to the Army staff military victory was the primary goal. As the coalition entered the last year of the war, the golden era of strategic planning—soon to be eclipsed by the ascending political star—reached its zenith.
CHAPTER XXIII

OCTAGON—End of an Era

As OCTAGON, the second Quebec conference, convened at the close of the summer of 1944 in the impressive Château Frontenac perched high on the north bank of the St. Lawrence, the Allied skein of victories in Europe and the Pacific extended unbroken from SEXTANT. Churchill could triumphantly assert, “Everything we had touched had turned to gold . . . .”

In Europe, the German position had steadily deteriorated during the summer. The impetus of OVERLORD and ANVIL-DRAGOON had brought the western allies to the German border. In the south they had breached the Pisa–Rimini line. In the east the Russians had marched into Poland and the Baltic states. One after another, German satellites—Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland—had defected from the Nazi standard. The three fronts—western, eastern, and southern—were converging. Intelligence estimates indicated that the German surrender would come by 1 December at the latest, although signs of internal collapse were not yet clearly evident.

In the Pacific, MacArthur’s forces by the end of the summer had established control over most of New Guinea. Nimitz had seized the southern Marianas. While the conference was in progress Morotai was assaulted by troops from the Southwest Pacific Area, and Pacific Ocean Area units landed in the southern Palaus. The encircling lines were being drawn ever closer about Japan. Only in the CBI could the situation be considered somewhat disturbing as the Japanese moved in on the American airfields in east China, but even in that theater some comfort could be gleaned from the favorable turn of events in north Burma and the mounting tonnage of the airlift to China.

From the point of view of General Marshall and his advisers, the Allied military engines in the West and in the East were finally headed in the right directions and approaching their destinations at the proper speed. It but remained to ensure that they stay on the tracks laid out for them and complete their journeys as quickly and as safely as possible. By OCTAGON the midwar era, the period of great strategic debate and decision, was drawing to a close, and a new era, with complex problems of its own for the Army planners, was beginning.

The Second Quebec Conference

In the glow of success and approaching victory, the Anglo-American conferees assembled on 12 September for the series of discussions fostered by the British.
U.S. staff attendance at the five-day conference was limited to the four Joint Chiefs of Staff, two of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the four Joint Staff Planners, three chiefs of operations, the two JCS secretaries, and twenty-two planning officers, a total of thirty-seven—a compact though representative group. Since, strategically speaking, there was in the view of the Americans relatively little to discuss, they had reluctantly consented to the meeting. Only after repeated pleas from Churchill had the President agreed to meet with him and the Combined staffs in another full-scale conference. The smooth functioning of the Allied forces in Europe indicated that operational strategy could well be left in the hands of the field commanders, and the Americans had little enthusiasm for a consideration of Pacific strategy at this time. The absence of pressing military affairs indicated that the center of the stage might well be occupied by political questions. In preparation for such an eventuality, the Operations Division had briefed the Chief of Staff on the two items that were held to be most urgent by the British: the U.S. proposal to withdraw the Fifth Army from Italy to France and the British proposal to join in the Pacific war.

The Operations Division believed part

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3 List, 29 Aug 44, title: Pers To Attend Octant [sic], Item 16, Exec 5.

4 (1) Leahy, I Was There, p. 299. (2) For the British background, see Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 146–49.
or all of the Fifth Army should be transferred to France if it could be used there effectively. The timing of such a move would depend on the progress or outcome of the offensive in Italy. If Eisenhower could not use the Fifth Army in France, the United States should employ it in a campaign toward Vienna rather than allow it to become involved in Balkan operations. The Army planners had no objections to the British engaging in operations in southeastern Europe as long as agreed-upon plans were not jeopardized. In fact, if it were possible, the United States should consider supporting the British in Balkan operations with shipping and transport planes. The indisposition to have U.S. troops become embroiled in the Balkans was similar to the reluctance to have them take part in the recovery of colonial areas in the Far East. The planners felt that on a long-term basis little good and much damage could result from such interference.

The United States did not propose to withdraw major Fifth Army units from Italy until General Wilson had completed the campaign then under way to defeat Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, and at the conference the British were reassured by Marshall on this point. With the southern France operation safely launched, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were more sympathetic to a British amphibious landing on the Istrion Peninsula, and King stated his willingness to allow Wilson to use the amphibious landing craft employed in the southern France operation, should Wilson decide to carry out the plan sponsored by the British. Since the shipping was also needed elsewhere, the CCS agreed to give Wilson until 10 October to make up his mind on the operation. From the American point of view, a British move against the Istrion Peninsula, which would supposedly be followed by a drive toward Vienna, might successfully skirt the controversial Balkans and bring additional pressure on Germany.

Other European matters were handled without difficulty. The CCS agreed that command of the forces in southern France should pass from Wilson to Eisenhower on 15 September. They found little fault with Eisenhower's expressed intention of striking through the West Wall into the Ruhr and Saar. His plan to make the main effort in the north also was approved, and the CCS seconded his desire to open the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam before poor weather conditions set in.

In an administrative move by the British, the strategic bombing effort was brought back under the CCS, with Portal and Arnold acting as executive agents. Apparently, the main reason for this change was to restore to more direct control of the Air Ministry the British bombers of Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris—who had been operating closely with Eisenhower's staff. The arrangement was to produce little effect upon American operations, which continued

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* * (1) Min, 172d mtg CCS, 12 Sep 44. (2) Min, 1st plenary mtg, OCTAGON, 13 Sep 44, OCTAGON Conf Book. (3) CCS 680/2, 16 Sep 44, title: Rpt to President and Prime Minister.

† (1) Min, 172d mtg CCS, 12 Sep 44. (2) Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 12 Sep 44, OCTAGON-Out 16. (3) CCS 674/1, 12 Sep 44, title: Assumption of Comd of DRAGOON Forces by SCAEF.
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to be carried out by co-ordination between Eisenhower and Spaatz.\(^8\)

Admitting their lack of authority to settle the question of occupation zones in Germany, the CSS sought guidance from the President and Prime Minister. The President, who had stubbornly resisted all previous efforts to arrange a compromise, suddenly changed his position and agreed to accept the original COSSAC proposal for British forces to occupy northwestern and U.S. forces southwestern Germany. Soviet forces were to control the eastern portion.\(^9\) Berlin would be administered under a tripartite control. To make it easier for

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\(^8\)(1) CCS 520/6, 14 Sep 44, title: Control of Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe Following the Establishment of Allied Forces on the Continent. (2) Craven and Cate, AAF III, 320–22.

\(^9\)The reasons behind the President's volte-face are still not entirely clear. Churchill suggests that by the time of OCTAGON the President, "evidently convinced by the [U.S. and British] military view," decided to accept the southwestern zone. (See Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 509–10.)

In commenting on the draft manuscript of this volume, Admiral Leahy recalled that the President had told him that "after tedious argument with Prime Minister Churchill he [Roosevelt] accepted the British contention that Northwest Germany would be of more value to the future of our friend and ally England than to the United States of America." Admiral Leahy's Comments on Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944, MS, 16 Jul 56, in OCMH files.

The official British historian of grand strategy, John Ehrman, indicates that the President by OCTAGON was informed of the British intention to assume responsibility for southeastern Europe and Austria and of the practicability of supplying U.S. forces in southern Germany via the Low Countries and northern Germany. Ehrman suggests that these developments removed the President's objections to the original agreement. (See John Ehrman, Grand Strategy V, 516.)

In view of the President's hitherto stubborn resistance to similar arguments and proposals, it seems more likely that another factor—the acceptance of the Morgenthau plan at OCTAGON—may have had greater influence on the President's decision. See n. 11, below.

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\(^10\)(1) Min, 172d mtg CCS, 12 Sep 44. (2) CCS 320/27, 16 Sep 44, title: Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany.

\(^11\)(1) Min, 1st plenary mtg, OCTAGON, 13 Sep 44, OCTAGON Conf Book. (2) Msg, President to Secy State, 15 Sep 44, filed with CCS 681/2 in ABC 337 (14 Sep 44), 1. (3) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 576–77. See also Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 156–57.

Shortly after OCTAGON, Secretary of the Treasury Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr., maintained that the President withheld his consent to an American occupation of a southwestern zone in Germany until the last minute because he wanted the British to be charged with implementation of the Morgenthau plan in the Ruhr and Saar areas in the northern zone. See memo of mtg, 20 Sep 44, by H. Freeman Matthews, in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 134–35.
With the end of the European war in sight, the Prime Minister also brought up the matter of continuing lend-lease aid, a vital subject to the British. Roosevelt agreed that Britain must rebuild its export trade if it were once more to pay its way after the war. He also thought it would be proper not to attach any conditions to future lend-lease that might jeopardize Britain’s recovery. Churchill assured him that no U.S. goods acquired by this method would be exported or sold for profit.\textsuperscript{12}

In an effort to secure closer Soviet cooperation in Europe and in the Far East, the conferees decided to set up a combined military committee in Moscow to represent the Chiefs of Staff of the Big Three on strategy and operational matters. The U.S. and British military heads of mission in the USSR would act for the CCS, and it was hoped that the Russians would appoint a senior General Staff officer to the committee.\textsuperscript{13}

The expected collapse of Germany in the near future served to focus more attention upon the war against Japan. Although the battle in the Pacific was far from over, the enemy’s position had become increasingly grim. According to intelligence estimates, Japanese aircraft production had increased, but heavy air losses had resulted in a serious shortage of trained pilots and crews. At sea, the Japanese Navy and merchant marine had suffered severely and the shipping outlook was critical. Henceforth, the Japanese Navy and Air Force would be committed only when the “Inner Zone” was menaced or attacked. Only the Japanese ground forces remained intact and capable of bitter and prolonged resistance.\textsuperscript{14} The United States would shortly be approaching the “Inner Zone” in its attempt to recapture the Philippines and stiff land battles appeared to lie ahead. There was certainty in the minds of the Army planners of final victory, but it was accompanied by feelings of caution and anxiety that arose from the conflicting desires to accelerate the war and to hold down casualties. With the acceptance of the invasion concept, during the summer of 1944, and its confirmation at the conference, the planners would be occupied in finding courses of action that, as to both speed and losses, would be acceptable to the military leaders and to the American people.

In this search, Kenney’s air forces and Halsey’s fleet carriers gave the planners a helping hand. In devastating sweeps over the Philippines in early September, Third Fleet aircraft dealt the Japanese crushing air blows that fittingly followed up the yeoman work of the Army Air Forces. The scarcity of air opposition led Halsey to suggest that the Palaus operation be canceled and that forces scheduled for the operations be assigned to MacArthur for an immediate descent upon Leyte. Here was the doctrine of flexibility at its peak, but a quick exchange of messages between Halsey, Nimitz, MacArthur, and the JCS at Quebec revealed that it was somewhat too daring. Halsey’s superiors still felt that the Palaus were necessary to further advance, though there was general willing-

\textsuperscript{12} Msg, President to Secy State, 15 Sep 44, filed with CCS 681/2 in ABC 337 (14 Sep 44), 1.

\textsuperscript{13} CCS 618/3, 12 Sep 44, title: Machinery for Coordination of U.S.-Soviet-Br Military Effort. The familiar delaying tactics on the part of the Russians followed. The committee was never established. See Deane, \textit{Strange Alliance}, pp. 153–54.

\textsuperscript{14} CCS 643/1, 9 Sep 44, title: Estimate of the Enemy Situation, Pacific-Far East.
ness to cancel the Yap operation and release three Army divisions—the 7th, 77th, and 96th—to MacArthur. It took only ninety minutes to secure the JCS’s blessing, and the target date for Leyte was dramatically pushed forward two whole months, to 20 October, while all intermediate operations after Morotai were canceled.\(^{15}\)

The swiftness with which the Pacific war was moving as the Navy and Air Forces shifted into high gear may have been one of the reasons that the British took a firm stand at the conference on their future participation in the main operations against Japan. The British had a considerable economic and political stake in the Far East and realized that the psychological effects of their defeat in 1941–42 would have to be erased by military victory. Churchill quite firmly opposed bypassing Singapore, which the President suggested might be too strongly garrisoned by the Japanese. Churchill emphasized that a campaign to recapture Singapore, in addition to engaging large forces of the enemy and helping the U.S. Pacific drive, would yield a “great prize.”\(^{16}\) Despite the fact that the capture of Singapore would probably come too late to affect the outcome of the war, the humiliating loss of 1942 had to be militarily redeemed to bolster imperial prestige throughout the Far East for the postwar era.

In the absence of guidance from the President on any future plans he may have had for Indochina and Hong Kong, the Army planners’ recommendations were consistent in eschewing employment of U.S. troops for political purposes. If the decision to recapture the Philippines had political overtones, it must be remembered that the Philippines were also a valuable military target and probably would have had to be taken anyway.

In spite of U.S. willingness to accept the participation of other interested Allies in the war against Japan and to acquiesce in the recovery of former possessions, a rather acrimonious CCS debate developed at OCTAGON over the size and area of the British contribution. The British wished to put their main fleet in the Pacific under Nimitz rather than employ it to clear the Indian Ocean or to harry the enemy’s flank in the Malaya-Netherlands East Indies sector. The British felt that they must make a good showing in the big operation against the Japanese homeland for political reasons. On the other hand, King could not see withdrawing U.S. naval units to make room for British forces when they were not needed and, in his opinion, could be used more profitably elsewhere. The fact that the President had twice accepted Churchill’s flat offer of the British Fleet made King’s position difficult to maintain, but he refused to make any definite arrangements on the use of British naval units. In the end, the CCS agreed that a balanced and self-supporting British fleet would participate in the main Pacific operations; the methods of its employment would be decided from time to time in accordance with prevailing circumstances. The British withdrew their alternative offer to form an Empire task force, since ac-

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\(^{16}\) Min, 1st plenary mtg, OCTAGON, 13 Sep 44, OCTAGON Conf Book.
ceptance of the fleet had been their preferred proposal. Nor was General Arnold enthusiastic about the British offer of very long range bomber assistance, which the British made for the first time at OCTAGON, though the conference agreed that Air Marshal Portal should prepare for planning purposes an estimate on the possible RAF contribution to the Japanese war. The British had succeeded in getting their fleet into the Pacific on paper, at least, but the indefinite terminology of the agreement foreshadowed further debate. Since the Army’s interests were less directly involved, Marshall could hold somewhat aloof from the debate, and when he did enter it, he could serve more as an intermediary than as a partisan.

While the JCS may have been less than enthusiastic over the British interest in the Pacific, they were in full accord with their ally’s desire to clean up the Burma commitment as quickly as possible. If the British were to take part in other operations in SEAC and recapture Singapore, they would first have to defeat the enemy in Burma and free the forces and resources tied down there. In order to carry out the Rangoon operation, however, some six divisions would have to be pulled out of Italy and northwestern Europe. This dependence upon the outcome in Europe made an attempt on Rangoon impossible until at least the spring of 1945. In the meantime, Mountbatten would try to advance in the direction of Mandalay with the aid of the Ledo and Yunnan Chinese forces. Land communication with China would be opened as soon as possible and the air route secured. If the Rangoon operation could not be carried out in early 1945, then the Mandalay advance would be exploited as far as possible. To assist the British effort in Burma, Churchill bid for two divisions from the United States—a request Marshall beat off on the ground that every division in the United States was already allocated either to Europe or to the Pacific.

The JCS could not accept the British proposal that, in planning for the defeat of Japan, a date of two years after the defeat of Germany be used for the redeployment of forces, planning of production, and allocation of manpower. Marshall informed the British Chiefs of Staff that the U.S. Army used a time factor of one year for redeployment and demobilization, but that for planning of production and allocation of manpower a compromise estimate of eighteen months would be satisfactory. The CCS adopted the U.S. suggestion and made provision for the periodic adjustment of this time element in the light of the course of the war. They also decided that there should be combined exploration into the problems of redeployment and available shipping for the period following the end of the European war.

In the operational field, the British early gave their assent to the U.S. sched-

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17 (1) Min, 1st plenary mtg, OCTAGON, 13 Sep 44. OCTAGON Conf Book. (2) Min, 174th mtg CCS, 14 Sep 44. (3) Arnold, Global Mission, p. 527. (4) Ehrman, Grand Strategy V, 500ff.

18 (1) Min, 1st plenary mtg, OCTAGON, 13 Sep 44. OCTAGON Conf Book. (2) Min, 174th mtg CCS, 14 Sep 44. (3) CCS 680/2, 16 Sep 44, title: Rpt to the President and Prime Minister.

19 (1) Min, 2d plenary mtg, OCTAGON, 16 Sep 44. OCTAGON Conf Book. (2) See Ch. XXI, above.

20 (1) CCS 678, 15 Sep 44, title: Planning Date for the End of the War Against Japan. (2) Min, 174th mtg CCS, 14 Sep 44.

21 (1) CCS 679, 14 Sep 44; title: Redeployment of Forces After the End of the War in Europe. (2) 175th mtg CCS, 15 Sep 44.
ule of Pacific objectives for 1944-45. The schedule was changed during the conference when the Leyte date was moved forward. Arnold reported on the B-29 and its parent organization, the Twentieth Air Force, which were operating from China, but which would soon be able to use the Marianas to strike at the Japanese homeland. Other B-29 groups would be based at airfields on Luzon or Formosa as they became available.

General Marshall’s suggestion toward the end of the meetings on a press statement to be issued by the President and Prime Minister would best seem to characterize the tenor of the conference:

... the only difficulty encountered at the Conference was the problem of providing employment for all the Allied forces who were eager to participate in the war against Japan. The difficulty had arisen as a result of the keenness of the competition to employ the maximum possible forces for the defeat of Japan.

The very fact that the disagreements were few and relatively minor would seem to mark the summit of coalition warfare and the “golden era” of combined strategic planning. Although the conference made no important decisions and might very well never have been held insofar as military strategy was concerned, it was the forerunner of the political meetings at Yalta and Potsdam. Churchill was much concerned about “the political dangers of divergencies” between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies with respect to Poland, Greece, and Yugoslavia, but his proposal to “add a word” to this effect to the communication to Stalin summarizing the military results of the conference was turned down by Roosevelt. The signs pointed unmistakably to fuller discussion and deeper consideration of political problems in the near future. Common military concerns would be increasingly dwarfed by the giant specter of national interests and international policy conflicts. Henceforth the problems of winning the war would come up against the problems of winning the peace.

This last of the midwar conferences was in some ways oddly reminiscent of the first in the series—Casablanca. Both were inconclusive conferences serving to mark a transition from one era to another. Casablanca initiated the predominantly military conferences of 1943-44, and OCTAGON was the first of the predominantly political gatherings that would epitomize the last year of the war. In January 1943 there had been no accepted over-all plan for the defeat of Germany, and strategy had been conducted on an opportunistic basis, as witness the decision to invade Sicily. By September 1944 the Allies stood in the same position in regard to Japan—flexibility was the keynote and timing of operations was sometimes determined on the spur of the moment, as the Leyte decision attests. At Casablanca the CCS were interested in the possible effects of the Combined Bomber Offensive upon Germany. At Quebec, the B-29 and its influence upon the Japanese were given considerable attention. One of the problems that occupied a great deal of time at Casablanca had been the ANAKIM

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22 (1) CCS 417/8, 9 Sep 44, title: Operations for the Defeat of Japan 1944-45. (2) Min, 173rd mtg CCS, 13 Sep 44. (3) Min, 174th mtg CCS, 14 Sep 44. 23 Min, 175th mtg CCS, 15 Sep 44. 24 (1) Min, 2d plenary mtg, OCTAGON, 16 Sep 44. OCTAGON Conf Book. (2) See also Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 148.
operation to clear Burma of the Japanese. After many vicissitudes during the ensuing months, a full cycle had been completed and the OCTAGON meetings placed an operation to drive the enemy from Burma back on the planning books.

As might be expected, there were also points of contrast between the two conferences, symbolizing the maturation of the U.S. staff planning and machinery as well as the progress of the war. U.S. staff preparations for the international conferences had been reduced almost to a science, and elaborate compilations of background material to brief the Chief of Staff and his assistants thoroughly were worked up beforehand. The Americans had learned the British committee procedure very well and were able to cope with their allies on an equal basis, a far cry from the experience of the overburdened staff at Casablanca. In planning for military operations, the U.S. staff and its chiefs had drawn much closer to the President and were able to present and keep a united American front vis-à-vis the British, but close coordination on political matters between the White House and the military staff was still wanting.

Basic concepts had also undergone quite a change between Casablanca and OCTAGON. The importance once ascribed to China had been modified by time and frustration to a shadow of its earlier manifestation. The hope that the USSR would enter the war against Japan had been much strengthened in the interim. The elaborate machinations of the Allies, from Casablanca on, to induce Turkey to enter the war against Germany had become of secondary importance; no mention at all was made of Turkey at OCTAGON. In fact, the Mediterranean issue, which had been such a source of controversy at Casablanca, drew little fire at OCTAGON. On the other hand, the cautious optimism of Casablanca regarding the possibility that Japan might not have to be invaded had been superseded by the grim assumption that assault of the enemy's homeland would be necessary. At Casablanca the Americans had sounded the offensive note against Japan. But the still conservative and, to a considerable degree, defensive attitude at Casablanca on the war in the East had given way to a more audacious, offensive spirit at OCTAGON. Speed had become the watchword of the U.S. staff, and the British, reluctant to countenance any major Pacific advances at Casablanca, were now eager not to be excluded from the main operations against Japan.

With OCTAGON, the cycle of great Anglo-American conferences concerned with the formulation of grand strategy came to an end. The midwar era began with the turning of the tide against the Axis Powers and ended with the complete alteration of the military situation in favor of the Allies. The era began with the transition of the Allies to the strategic initiative but without an agreed plan even for defeating Germany, the primary foe. It had opened with General Marshall's vigorous but vain last stand for the American case for a concentrated cross-Channel attack in 1943 as against the British case for continuing a Mediterranean policy. Great Britain, with a greater number of divisions in the field and greater experience in the war, was still the senior partner, and its influence in the Western strategic councils still tended to dominate. The USSR was battling for survival before
the gates of Stalingrad and pleading for a second front. From Casablanca on, General Marshall and the U.S. staff had conducted the search for an acceptable strategic formula against Germany that would ensure its speedy defeat and permit the United States to get on with the war against Japan. Their hopes had centered around perfecting plans for the invasion (and defeat) of Germany in 1944—the central thread in their strategic planning and debates of midwar. In the process the U.S. staff, intent on invasion across the Channel, learned to adjust its thinking to this and that operation as its skill in military diplomacy grew. By OCTAGON the strategy and plans against Germany, hammered out in and out of the midwar conferences and embodying the American case, were in process of realization. In September 1944 the end for Germany looked very near, although later events were to prove the planners overoptimistic in their belief that the war would be over by the end of the year at the maximum. The trend of the period for U.S. strategic planning was symbolized in the contrasting roles General Marshall played at Casablanca and at OCTAGON. At Casablanca—as at TRIDENT, QUADRANT, and SEXTANT-EUREKA—General Marshall had
served as counsel for the American case. By OCTAGON his midwar role as advocate was over. At that conference he appeared rather as a principal architect of victory, advising and checking on the almost-complete structure against the blueprints he had done so much to fashion.

Behind the Anglo-American strategic debates between Casablanca and OCTAGON, significant changes had taken place in the balance of military power within the coalition, a phenomenon having as important implications for the determination of war strategy as for the future relations among the partners in the wartime coalition. The Soviet bear, steadily gathering strength and confidence after Stalingrad, had been able to make its weight felt in the strategic scales at the Moscow and Tehran conferences, and in the summer of 1944 was demonstrating by a series of faits accomplis in its advance across Europe that it was a power to be reckoned with by the West in the future political settlement of Europe. In addition, the Americans by the close of the period had drawn abreast and begun to pass the British in deployed military strength in the field in Europe. OCTAGON would be the last time in World War II that Churchill, proud guardian of British power and prestige, could boast that

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\ldots \text{the British Empire effort in Europe, counted in terms of divisions in the field,} \]

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\text{was about equal to that of the United States. This was as it should be. He was proud that the British Empire could claim equal partnership with their great ally, the United States, whom he regarded as the greatest military power in the world.}
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More significant for the future, however, was his admission that “the British Empire effort had now reached its peak, whereas that of their ally was ever-increasing.”

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\text{Expansion and Distribution of U.S. Military Power}
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After almost three years of war, Marshall and his staff could survey the current status of the conflict with considerable satisfaction. Coalition planning had reached its peak, and Anglo-American disagreements had been few at OCTAGON. On the Continent, by the end of September 1944, Germany had been driven back in confusion to the dubious safety of the West Wall, and France and Belgium had been largely cleared of the enemy. The Russians striking in the Baltic provinces had invested Estonia and the greater part of Latvia. In the Balkans, most of Bulgaria and Rumania were under Soviet control, and the Germans were evacuating Greece. In the Pacific, the Japanese high command watched with growing uneasiness the American thrust toward the strategic Formosa-Luzon-China coast triangle. With the southern Palaus, Ulithi, and Morotai in Allied hands, the movement into the Philippines would soon follow. It was a sanguine moment for the strategic planners, for never had the road seemed more free of obstacles.

Strategically speaking, the course of the war had settled down into the channels originally laid out by the Army planners. The main weight of Army strength and power was being directed against the German war machine, which, in the planners’ view, could not hold out.
much longer. Once Germany collapsed, full attention could finally be given to the far Pacific. At long last the worn precept, "Knock Germany out first, then concentrate on Japan," showed signs of fulfillment.

Channeling U.S. military power to the United Kingdom for a concentrated attack against Germany had been a long struggle for General Marshall and his staff. During the first year after Pearl Harbor the cream of the trained American military manpower had been skimmed off; the available forces were deployed to meet the world-wide defensive and garrison needs of that critical period. The better part of 1942 had passed before U.S. military power began to have appreciable effect in the theaters of operation. The impact, however, was to be felt not in northwest Europe, on which the Army planners had set their sights, but in North Africa and at Guadalcanal. In the second year—the period between Casablanca and Sextant-Eureka—as the demands of diversionary offensive operations in the Pacific and the Mediterranean mounted, the Army staff gave serious attention to the limits of the manpower supply and made strenuous efforts to conserve the precious stock of growing military strength for the cross-Channel invasion. During that year of critical debate over global strategy, fewer U.S. divisions were actually sent overseas than in 1942. The better part of the year following Casablanca had passed before substantial U.S. ground combat power was finally being deployed to the United Kingdom.

The distribution of the Army effort from January through September 1944 accentuated the fact that the keynote for deployment was "more of the same," rather than any change from the trend established in late 1943. Actually, more divisions were sent overseas in the first nine months of 1944—the bulk of them going to the European Theater—than had been shipped overseas during the previous two years. To support Overlord and its follow-up operations, the Army funneled forces into the United Kingdom and later into continental Europe in ever-increasing numbers during the first three quarters of 1944. Slightly over two million men (2,053,417)—including 34 divisions and 103 air groups—were in the European theater at the end of this period, over 45 percent of the total number of troops overseas in all theaters. In the Mediterranean, on the southern flank, the United States had 712,915 troops, including 6 divisions and 46 air groups. If the 9,354 troops stationed in Africa and the Middle East and the 27,739 located in the Persian Gulf Command were counted in, a total of 2,803,425 U.S. Army troops, including 40 divisions and 149 air groups, was concentrated on the defeat of Germany.

Scattered through the Pacific, the Army had 1,102,422 men deployed against Japan, including 21 divisions and 35 air groups. There were no U.S. divisions in the CBI, but a total of 149,014 troops manned the lines of communications and 20 air groups were stationed in that theater. And even though the Alaskan garrison had been reduced, there were still 63,495 men, including two air groups, on duty there at the end of September. When these far-flung forces were totaled, they added up to

27 For the distribution of troops and units overseas, see: (1) STM-30, 1 Jan 48; and (2) AAF Statistical Digest, 1945.
1,314,931, including 21 Army divisions and 57 air groups, engaged in the war against Japan.\(^{28}\)

A comparison of the distribution of effort between the European and the Pacific-Far East wars points up the concentration of Army forces against Germany that had begun in 1943. Of the 1,833,937 men shipped overseas during the first nine months of 1944, over 75 percent had been sent to the European area; less than 22 percent had been assigned to the Pacific-Far East. The overall breakdown of Army troops overseas gave the war against Germany a 2 to 1 advantage over the Japanese conflict, and this was matched by the Army divisional distribution.\(^{29}\) Forty divisions were located in Europe and the Mediterranean with four more en route, as against twenty-one in the Pacific.\(^{30}\) In the air, the preponderance lay even more heavily in favor of Europe—149 groups, or 72 percent, were allocated to that struggle as opposed to 57 groups on the other side of the world. With the bulk of the Army’s combat strength overseas deployed against the Reich, and with most of the divisions that were in the United States slated to go to the European theater, the Chief of Staff and his planners could consider their original concept well on the way toward accomplishment. Although there were still over three and a half million men left in the continental United States at the end of September, there were only twenty-four combat divisions remaining, if the four en route were excluded.\(^{31}\) Though most of the twenty-four were eventually to be sent to Europe, the Army planners had hoped to maintain some of the divisions as a strategic reserve to cope with unforeseen emergencies. The estimated size of the reserve ranged from five to fifteen divisions, but no definite decision had ever been made by the Chief of Staff. With Germany supposedly on its last legs, there seemed little need for concern on that score. When the crisis caused by the Ardennes breakthrough of December 1944 denuded the United States of all the remaining divisions and left the strategic reserve a memory, the

\(^{28}\) Ibid.

\(^{29}\) The distribution of Army divisions at the end of September 1944 was as follows:

**Europe**

ETO 34 divisions:
- 1st, 2d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 10th, 26th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 35th, 36th, 44th, 45th, 79th, 80th, 83rd, 90th, 94th, 95th, 102nd, and 104th Infantry Divisions;
- 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 10th Armored Divisions;
- 17th, 82nd, and 101st Airborne Divisions (the 84th and 99th Infantry and the 11th and 12th Armored Divisions were en route).

MTO 6 divisions:
- 34th, 85th, 88th, 91st, 92d Infantry Divisions and 1st Armored Division.

**Pacific**

POA 5 divisions:
- 7th, 77th, 81st, 96th, and 98th Infantry Divisions.

SWPA 16 divisions:
- Americal, 6th, 24th, 25th, 27th, 31st, 32d, 33d, 37th, 58th, 80th, 1st, 43rd, 44th, 46th, and 99th Infantry Divisions; 1st Cavalry Division; 11th Airborne Division. See App. D-3, pp. 553-54, below.

\(^{30}\) It should be noted that there were in the Pacific at the end of September, in addition to the Army divisions, eleven separate Army infantry regiments, and five Marine divisions present and one forming. The eleven separate Army infantry regiments equaled the number of separate regiments then deployed against Germany.

\(^{31}\) Of the total of over three and a half million men, 2,165,000 were combat and support troops of various types (325,000 in divisions): 1,245,000 were in the administrative, training, and operational overhead of the three major commands (AAF, AGF, and ASF) carrying out zone of interior missions; and the remainder were 140,000 hospital patients, returnees from overseas, and others not available for overseas assignment.
possibility of having raised too few divisions rose again to cause War Department leaders from Stimson on down some anxious moments. Fortunately this was the last unpleasant surprise. Another such crisis would have found the divisional cupboard bare.

Besides the twenty-four divisions, there were some thirty-three air groups still assigned to the continental United States, mostly B-29 units preparing for the Pacific war. But even were these groups to be sent to the Pacific, the greater part of Army airpower would have been mounted against Germany.

Thus, in the long run, Marshall and his staff not only were able to reverse the trend toward the Pacific that had lasted well into 1943 but had also gone to the other extreme during 1944. Because of unexpected developments in the European war, not one division was sent to the Pacific after August 1944, and planned deployment totals for the Pacific for 1944 were never attained. European deployment, on the other hand, mounted steadily and substantially exceeded the planners' estimates. It was evident by September 1944 that the Army was going to complete World War II according to the original concept of “beat Germany first” and that the war against Japan would have to wait its turn. By the fall of 1944 the defeat of Germany was certain; the only uncertainty was the precise timing.

The Status of Strategy

The War Against Germany

Growing U.S. military strength on the European continent signified more than a fulfillment of the original strategic concept of defeating Germany first. It also assured the triumph of the U.S. staff principle of a decisive military war. To meet and defeat the armies of Germany in battle was the goal toward which the Americans had long been aiming. It was for this reason that General Marshall and his staff had sought to put a brake on diversionary deployments in the midwar period. To reverse the trend of 1942 and make the Mediterranean supply a strategic reserve for the cross-Channel undertaking had been part of this aim. The U.S. staff struggle from Casablanca onward to limit the Mediterranean advances begun with Torch, to favor western over eastern Mediterranean ventures, to reduce commitments to the Mediterranean, and to tie the Mediterranean undertakings to the support of the invasion of northwestern Europe were all directed to the goal of concentrating the main American military might against the German military machine. In 1945 that aim had taken concrete form in Marshall’s endeavors to ensure the return of the seven U.S. and British divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom. His labors finally proved successful and made Churchill, dreaming of a more aggressive military policy in Italy and the eastern Mediterranean, unhappy. In 1944 the struggle between the protagonists had again revolved largely around Marshall’s efforts to remove more Allied combat power from the Mediterranean.
in favor of the main continental drive as opposed to Churchill's attempts to direct that strength toward the east. This time the debate centered around the southern France operation, supported by the U.S. staff, vis-à-vis Churchill's eastern Mediterranean and southeastern European policy. The Americans again prevailed.

Back of the staff's fear of a policy of attritional and peripheral warfare against Germany in the midwar years lay its continued anxiety over the ultimate cost in men, money, and time—an anxiety made all the greater by the growing realization of the ultimate limits of U.S. manpower. For though the Americans were devoted to the principle of a decisive war, they were also fighting a war with a "guns-and-butter" policy. By 1943 the danger of overmobilization in the full tide of war presented itself to the military. If many more than ninety divisions were set aside as the nation's ground "cutting edge," the guns-and-butter policy might have been seriously jeopardized. It is true that more divisions could have been mobilized, if necessary, to fight an attritional—in Army terms an indecisive—war, but it is also true that this would have cut into production for American and Allied use and the high American standard of living both for civilians and for the armed forces, and ultimately would have had effects both on domestic politics and on relations with the Allies in the coalition. Neither the President nor the military was anxious to upset the apple cart and either disturb the American economy or put undue strain on the military and civilian population. To the military, the discernible limits in available military manpower and the fear of the effects of a long-continued period of maximum mobilization confirmed their concept of defeating Germany via a direct concentrated effort with a minimum of time, money, and manpower. By OCTAGON the U.S. concept of a decisive strategy had been clearly written into the pattern of Allied strategic decisions and was in process of realization.

The steady outstripping of British military power within the Allied coalition confirmed the trend that had begun to appear at the time of SEXTANT. By the end of 1943 the Americans had finally managed to reverse the trend of the first year and a half after Pearl Harbor during which the concepts of the more highly and longer mobilized British in the European war had been largely triumphant in Western Allied strategy councils. At the close of 1943 the Americans with their mighty industrial and military machine in high gear had, with Russian help, made the British yield to their ideas of continental strategy. The growing disparity of British military power vis-à-vis the American and the Russian within the coalition was to show up even more clearly after the summer of 1944. As the war against Germany stretched out beyond the hoped-for conclusion in 1944, British influence in Allied councils further declined. Between the growing power of the U.S. military machine, driving eastward intent on the destruction of the German armies, and the mighty Soviet bear, steadily gathering confidence and strength and making its weight felt in central and southeastern Europe, the British were largely left to their own devices to salvage what they could of their European and Mediterranean
policy. Clearly, the Allies entered the last year of the war with the foundations of the coalition in further transition—British influence on the wane, and the United States and the Soviet Union emerging as the two strongest military powers in Europe. Conscious of the American determination to withdraw from the Continent as quickly as possible after the defeat of Germany and the increasing signs of Soviet entrenchment in central and southeastern Europe, Churchill began to be alarmed.

To the Prime Minister the singleness of purpose of the Washington high command bent on the speedy destruction of German military power, despite the growing political character of the coalition war, was most frustrating. He has since lashed out: "In Washington especially longer and wider views should have prevailed." But if the U.S. staff and the British Prime Minister, operating on different levels, did not see eye to eye on the importance of military versus political objectives in the concluding phases of the European war, the Prime Minister was not alone in his awareness that the defeat of Germany might leave the Soviet Union the dominant power on the European continent. In the summer of 1944 the U.S. military staff advised the Secretary of State:

While the war with Germany is well advanced towards final conclusion, the defeat of Germany will leave Russia in a position of assured military dominance in eastern Europe and in the Middle East. While it is true the U.S. and British will occupy and control western Europe, their strength in that area will thereafter progressively decline with the withdrawal of all but their occupational and enforcement forces, for employment against Japan, or for demobilization.

Going further, they foresaw the inevitable emergence of the USSR in a dominant position on the continent of Asia as well:

In estimating Russia’s probable course as regards Japan, we must balance against such assurances as we have received from Russia, the fact that whether or not she enters the war, the fall of Japan will leave Russia in a dominant position on continental Northeast Asia, and, in so far as military power is concerned, able to impose her will in all that region.

The great historic changes in the international military balance in process would have important repercussions on the international political situation:

The successful termination of the war against our present enemies will find a world profoundly changed in respect of relative national military strengths, a change more comparable indeed with that occasioned by the fall of Rome than with any other change occurring during the succeeding fifteen hundred years. This is a fact of fundamental importance in its bearing upon future international political settlements and all discussions leading thereto. Aside from the elimination of Germany and Japan as military powers, and developments in the relative economic power of principal nations, there are technical and material factors which have contributed greatly to this change. Among these are the development of aviation, the general mechanization of warfare and the marked shift in the munitioning potentials of the great powers.

After the defeat of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union will be the only military powers of the first magnitude. This is due in each case to a combination of geographical position and extent, and vast munitioning potential. While the U.S. can project its military power into many areas overseas, it is nevertheless true

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34 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 455.
that the relative strength and geographic positions of these two powers preclude the military defeat of one of these powers by the other, even if that power were allied with the British Empire.

As to the British position after the war:

Both in an absolute and relative sense... the British Empire will emerge from the war having lost ground both economically and militarily.\(^{35}\)

Aware of the signs of growing and possibly irreconcilable conflicts between their partners in the coalition that might impair the progress of the war, the U.S. staff advocated postponement of territorial settlements until the military phase of the global conflict was over. In the absence of political instructions to the contrary, the military therefore fell back upon the task of applying the given resources and manpower to putting the finishing touches on the war against Germany and ending the disagreeable business as quickly as possible. For this task their tradition, training, organization, and planning had equipped them well. By the summer of 1944 the U.S. war machine had become highly proficient and, meshed with that of the British, was functioning with great precision. The staff would present the decisive military victory it had set out to achieve and let the chiefs of state and their political advisers deal with problems of territorial and political settlements. Thus for the Americans the war against Germany was to be concluded as the planners had wished to wage it from the beginning—a conventional war of concentration, a technical soldier's game.

The War Against Japan

As the war against Germany entered its final stage, the U.S. staff more than ever had its eyes on Japan. One of the main reasons behind the aim of bringing the war against Germany to a swift military conclusion was to ensure the defeat of Japan as quickly and cheaply as possible. In fact, concern for the Pacific war had made the staff redouble its efforts in the midwar period to reach a final settlement with the British on European strategy. But whereas in Europe the United States, despite its growing military power, bore equal responsibility with the British for strategy, in the war against Japan the United States, by virtue of geography, resources, and manpower, had, from the beginning, been the predominant partner.

To General Marshall and the U.S. staff the two wars had to be concluded as they had been waged from the beginning—as distinct but related efforts. Though war on the European continent had finally settled by OCTAGON into the channels long sought by the Army planning staff, the war against Japan, fought in jungles, on islands, on the sea, and in the air, across a vast ocean, promised to continue to follow more unconventional lines. Although the precise timing, full resources, and the final shape of Allied contributions to the defeat of Japan still awaited the end of the European conflict, the Americans continued to advance so rapidly across the Pacific that by the summer of 1944 they were overtaking even their most accelerated schedules. Before the ring finally closed around

\(^{35}\) JCS 975, 28 Jul 44, title: Fundamental Military Factors in Relation to Discussions Concerning Territorial Trusteeships and Settlements. This memo, drawn up by the JSSC, was, with minor amendments, forwarded by the JCS on 3 August 1944 to the Secretary of State. See JCS 975/4, 9 Jan 45, title: International Trusteeships.
Japan, the Army planners were destined to learn more about the costs of waging a “secondary” and “limited” war in the far Pacific—the war that refused to stand still.

For the Army planners perhaps the outstanding feature of the midwar period, aside from the final shaping of European strategy, was the evolution of the Pacific war into a dynamic movement that generated its own operations and compelled greater and greater attention to offensive strategy. Once the Guadalcanal Campaign had been launched and the strategic initiative seized, the Americans felt there was little choice but to go on. Each succeeding step forward postulated another. As the Japanese outposts were driven in, the approach to the larger land masses and strongpoints presented increased demands for men, planes, and shipping, often far in excess of the personnel and resources the Army was willing to allocate to the secondary war. During 1942 and early 1943, decisions had usually been made in favor of larger increments of troops and resources for the Pacific. This was understandable since the Japanese had to be contained and since no definite plans for the defeat of Europe had been accepted. During 1942 and early 1943, decisions had usually been made in favor of larger increments of troops and resources for the Pacific. This was understandable since the Japanese had to be contained and since no definite plans for the defeat of Europe had been accepted. The balancing of “diversions” to the Mediterranean by parallel allocations to the Pacific had continued during 1943. If the Mediterranean threatened to become, in Marshall’s phrase, “a suction pump,” the Pacific, in a sense, became the American safety valve.

But Marshall and his staff never forgot that Germany was to be beaten first, and at the Pacific Military Conference in March 1943 they had attempted to place a curb on Pacific expansion. Realizing that if the rising requirements of the Pacific were not checked the wherewithal for defeating Germany by a cross-Channel attack might find its way into the war against Japan instead, the Army began to be less generous with its resources. The task was not easy for the Chief of Staff and his Washington aides, for they had to withstand the persistent demands of Army commanders in the secondary war, the increasing pressure from the Navy to speed up the war and make full use of the fast-growing Pacific Fleet, and the efforts of the British and Chinese to obtain U.S. ground troops for the CBI.

The desire of MacArthur and Stilwell to get on with their own campaigns was perfectly comprehensible; their requests for more forces and resources was a recognized symptom of the rather general malady that the War Department planners came to know as “localitis.” It was almost impossible to cure. The Army planners handled the requests sympathetically in the main and often were able to devise ways and means of meeting at least part of the needs and requirements if it could be done without upsetting European plans.

Coping with the Navy proved to be a much more complex problem. To Marshall, anxious to preserve harmonious relations among the sister services as well as with the Allies, it must often have seemed as though he were engaged in a double coalition war in the Pacific. The main part of the Navy’s strength was devoted to the Pacific Fleet, and the Navy was anxious to prosecute the campaign across the Central Pacific with all its potential. The fact that the Army’s chief interest lay in the opposite direction—in Europe—and that Marshall permitted King to assume the role of spokes-
man for the U.S. role in the Pacific war in the CCS meetings often led to complications. Basically, the difficulties stemmed more from the inability of the two services to agree upon an over-all commander for the Pacific than from a lack of agreement on the proper route to Japan. Recognizing the primary interest and growing strength of the Navy in the Pacific, the Army still did not feel it could afford to abdicate its position as co-equal in the Pacific as long as MacArthur commanded the bulk of the Army forces there. Marshall, although he appreciated the advantages of opening a new front against Japan in the Central Pacific, faithfully defended MacArthur's views in the JCS meetings and managed to maintain the New Guinea-Philippines approach, despite the opinion of many of the high-level Joint planners that the Central Pacific advance should definitely be made the main route. If the command problem could have been settled, the necessity for JCS preoccupation with the continuing problems of routes and resources could have been minimized and the latter problems left in large measure to the discretion of the over-all commander. But with the Navy backing Nimitz and the Army, MacArthur, agreement proved impossible, and interservice negotiation and compromise provided the only solution.

In the Far East the Army's situation was different. Where the Army was forever urging action and expansion of operations, the British and Chinese were content by and large to hold on to what they had in Burma and China. Instead of playing a role of restraint, the Army staff pressed constantly for forward movement and gave whatever support it could to Stilwell in his attempts to spur the British and Chinese to greater efforts. While engaged in this usually unrewarded endeavor, it had at the same time to fend off requests of these two allies for more U.S. personnel, planes, and equipment. To get the British and Chinese to commit their forces to a campaign in the CBI and simultaneously prevent the sucking in of additional U.S. resources, especially ground forces, was often a feat more fitted to a tightrope walker than to a professional soldier.

To hold out in the face of these influential forces required a good deal of fortitude and ingenuity, but Marshall ably played the mediator and succeeded in hoarding the bulk of Army manpower and divisions for the assault on Normandy. By encouraging full naval and air action in the Pacific, he allowed the Navy and the autonomy-minded Air Forces to expend their surplus energy, while retaining control of the precious and limited supply of divisions. In the CBI, he urged complete employment of British, Indian, and Chinese ground forces backed by American air and service troops rather than U.S. combat divisions, either evading or denying requests from Chiang, Churchill, and Stilwell for U.S. divisions.

Resisting these attempts to build up Army commitments in the war against Japan had been especially difficult before the decision at Sextant to mount Overlord. With the definite agreement on European plans, the task became much easier. First priority went to Overlord, and a reliable brake could be applied to Pacific deployment. The story of Army deployment to the Pacific in midwar thus fell into two periods: the lush pre-Sextant era when Mediter-
ranean commitments permitted the Pacific effort to mushroom concomitantly; and the more stringent post-Sextant stage, when the requirements for Overlord had first call on Army resources and a definite damper was placed on excessive growth in the Pacific.

This did not mean that the Army desired in any way to prevent the full prosecution of the war against Japan while Germany was being beaten, but only that it realized the necessity for doing so with the forces and resources available rather than those desirable. The long-range planning that had its heyday during the latter months of 1943 was an expression of the desire of the Army planners to limit the Army effort in the Pacific until the European war was settled. When Marshall scotched long-range planning just before Sextant and came out in favor of flexibility or opportunism, it appeared that the constant drain fostered by hit-and-miss operations would continue. But the commitment to Overlord, following almost immediately, placed a more effective block on Pacific expansion than perhaps the adoption of a definitely scheduled long-range plan might have provided.

An indirect assist was given to the Washington staff by the succession of shipping and landing craft shortages and imbalances that exerted a direct influence on both the deployment and the operational pictures in the Pacific during these twenty-one months. The length of the line of communications and the need for a great deal of shipping as well as service personnel to operate the far end of this line effectively acted as a control factor. As long as shipping remained in short supply, the Pacific build-up could not proceed indiscriminately.

Although the Army staff in Washington tried to restrict Pacific growth, there was no more fervent believer in making the best of available means than Marshall himself. His ear was constantly open to better, speedier plans for shortening the war, and he encouraged the use of America's superior air and naval weapons and the introduction of more efficient instruments of warfare.

Carrying on a dynamic war on a flexible basis permitted a wide range of operational choices, but as far as the Army staff was concerned military need was the controlling factor during 1943-44. While the Army welcomed all Allies who could contribute to the defeat of Japan, shorten the time element, and perhaps lower the number of casualties that the United States would have to suffer, it showed a consistent disinclination to become involved in pulling the other Allies' colonial chestnuts out of the fire. Marshall and his advisers favored the use of British, French, and Chinese troops in the CBI and Dutch forces in SWPA on the ground that these nations could best deal with their overrun possessions either singly or in concert. They also desired Soviet entry into the war to engage the Japanese armies in northern China and Korea and to relieve any future American invasion of Japan of threats from this area.

Adopting a circumspect attitude, the Army proposed neither to interfere with operations to reinvest former colonial areas, nor to assist the forces of the United States' Allies in the task of resubjugation unless the military requirements for such undertakings could

36 See Chs. XXI and XXII, above.
be clearly related to the common aim of defeating Japan. Basically, the hope was to bring the war to a speedy conclusion and to save American lives without becoming embroiled in political and economic problems in the Far East. On the other hand, the Army staff realized that the Allies were determined to carry out operations to repossess their overrun dominions. In anticipation of such a drive in the SEAC–Netherlands East Indies area, the Army planners felt that operations against the northern and eastern coasts of Borneo, although not essential to winning the war, would militarily be the most rewarding tasks that the United States could perform in the area. The operations would provide control over the South China Sea, Java Sea, Sunda Strait, and Makassar Strait exits and would not interfere unduly with the main effort to the north.\(^7\)

The emergence of political consciousness among the Army staff became increasingly noticeable during 1944 and gave promise of becoming even more significant in the days ahead. As the war drew closer to the Japanese homeland, questions of political significance began to be raised. Although Marshall, from a military point of view, looked with approval upon the British desire to take part in the main operations against Japan, he and his staff realized the political motivation behind the desire. The Army was at one with the Navy on the problem of keeping the Central Pacific an American affair and the Chief of Staff was content to let King argue the question of a British fleet under Nimitz. Introducing a third party to the determination of Pacific operational strategy might have made the situation too complex and forced the decisions to be made on a higher level. Neither King nor Marshall would have cared for that, for they were well acquainted with the Prime Minister’s concepts of strategy for the war against Japan.

At the same time, growing British insistence on a full share in the war against Japan—especially in naval and air assistance—led to an extension of Marshall’s intermediary position—among the Navy, the AAF, and MacArthur—in the Pacific war. The Navy, anxious to reap the prestige to which it felt its exploits entitled it, and the AAF, ever autonomy-minded and anxious to complete its war record in a blaze of glory, could only consider the proffered British aid friendly but competitive. With the Army’s prestige less directly involved, Marshall’s mediative role therefore became all the more important.

The growth of political problems often brought up extraneous matters beyond the ken or power of the military to settle without more definite guidance from the President himself and, as 1944 wore on, it became increasingly evident to his close advisers that the President’s physical condition was steadily deteriorating. His illnesses came at shorter intervals and required longer periods of

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rest and care to conquer. As the need for his political skill and supervision grew, his ability to provide it lessened. In the absence of political direction, there was no guarantee that the Army staff would be prepared or equipped to handle the political problems as well as it had the military. To determine the most efficient and expeditious method of defeating an enemy had been the life-work of the military, but the complexities of political and economic negotiations, diplomatic maneuvering, and national political problems were part of a field in which most of the staff had less experience.

The Army staff faced its most difficult political situation in China, where diverse and complicated elements, both native and foreign, combined to produce a veritable maze. In the United States, China's struggle against Japan had long since won popular sympathy, and, although little accurate information on the state of China's resistance reached the public, Americans sustained a sense of responsibility for helping the underdog in its unequal fight.

Though the Army was aware of the sad state of military affairs in the Chinese armies, it had hopes that Chinese manpower could be trained and equipped to fight the Japanese and that air bases could be constructed in China to strike at the enemy homeland. During the first two years of the war, the Army made valiant attempts to get supplies and airpower to China. The airlift was built up, the line of communications was improved, pipelines were laid, and roads were constructed to assist China. U.S. officers and equipment were transported from the United States to the CBI under conditions of great difficulty in order to transform some of the Chinese Nationalist armies into modern combat units. Financial aid was dispensed to bolster the Chinese economy. Within the limits imposed by the transportation impediments, these stop-gap measures were employed to sustain China in the war until land and sea approaches could again be opened.

Perhaps the most important American factor in the China tangle was the attitude of the President and his group of political advisers. They hoped to see China become strong and democratic and a stabilizing power in the Far East, but, wavering between the hopes and realities of the China situation, the tactics they pursued during the war toward this end were inconsistent. With the public sympathizing over China's past, the Army concerned with its present, and the President visualizing its future, it is small wonder that each saw the picture through a different pair of spectacles.

To the U.S. Army staff, primarily interested in the very current task of fighting a decisive military war against Japan, Chinese apathy and disinclination to decisively engage the enemy proved disillusioning. Chiang Kai-shek's concern over the Chinese communists and the conditions he set on committing his troops against the Japanese deflated the Army's hopes that Chinese manpower would play an effective role in the war. The possibility of using Chinese air bases, however, remained until the Japanese thrust into the Kweilin area in mid-1944 thwarted that expectation.

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With the loss of those airfields and with the prospect of using bases in the Mari- 
asas for B-29 operations, the hope of effective air support from China for Pa- 
cific operations faded, and with it the military importance of China. The quickening pace of Pacific operations presented new and more inviting hori- 
zons. Although U.S. resources were concentrated on the more promising Pacific route, American commitments to China continued, and the military accepted the task of supporting it as a necessary though limited burden.

While this metamorphosis was in prog- 
ress the Army staff, led by Marshall and supported by Stimson, had consistently backed the efforts of Stilwell to secure Chinese co-operation. Nevertheless, the Army was only one element in the com- 
plex situation and had to cope with the Stilwell-Chennault controversy from 
within as well as Chinese, British, and American pressures from without. Add to these the fact that China was only one segment—and a relatively minor one at that—in the global strategic picture, and a clearer view of the Army’s predic- 
ament becomes possible. The removal of Stilwell in October 1944 served to re- 
lieve the situation somewhat and paved the way for a more impersonal approach to the problem of China’s role in the war, but with little consistent political guidance at the top level and with U.S. postwar objectives in the Far East largely idealistic and the methods of attaining them still undefined, the Army’s task of preparing China’s forces for the chal- 
lenges that lay ahead were tremendous, and time was fast running out.

Aside from the disappointment over China, prospects for the coming months appeared very good by October. In the Pacific the enemy was confused, uncer- 
tain, and forced to rely more and more upon its still potent ground forces. The Japanese Air Force had already been decimated and reduced to the rank of a second-rate airpower. 39 Although the Japanese Navy still possessed powerful units, it was loath to risk them in battle unless key points in the Empire’s defense system were threatened. The advantages of surprise, as well as of superior air and naval forces, lay with the Allies. They could choose the time and place and force the Japanese to fight on Allied terms, a complete reversal of the situation in early 1942 when the Japanese had held the initiative.

As far as the Americans were con- 
cerned, there would be enough air and sea power on hand for the tasks assigned to them in the Pacific, although the serv- ice troop shortages might slow the pace unless the war in Europe ended quickly. Ground forces appeared to be adequate for a Philippines campaign, and by the time this was completed, combat divi- 
sions should be available from Europe. As for shipping, there might be local squeezes, but there was enough in the Pacific to handle contemplated demands. Manpower and supply might prove to be a little tight at times; still and all, there should be sufficient forces and supplies to take the Philippines.

These factors were controlling in the final phases of the debate over Luzon and Formosa. The decision of the JCS during the Octagon Conference to ad- 
vance the target date of the attack on Leyte to 20 October had permitted the planning date for invasion of Luzon to be put forward to 20 December. Since

* Craven and Cate, AAF V, 746.
the war against Germany showed no signs of ending in the near future, the means to undertake the Formosa operation were still unavailable. After two weeks of debate, the JCS, on 3 October, decided that MacArthur should take Luzon after Leyte. Nimitz would support MacArthur during the operations in the Philippines and then would occupy positions in the Bonin Islands in January 1945 and in the Ryukyus in March. These operations ultimately made the seizure of Formosa unnecessary.

40 Msg, JCS to MacArthur and Nimitz, 3 Oct 44, CM-OUT 40782.

In the fall of 1944 military planning in the war against Japan entered its last stages. Plans were being laid to redeploy troops and equipment deemed necessary to finish the war against Japan as soon as they could be spared from the struggle in Europe. Tentative dates for the end of the war in Europe were established and shipping schedules drawn up. As soon as Germany surrendered, the stream of men and supplies would begin to flow to the Pacific.

For a discussion of the concluding phase of the Formosa-Luzon debate, see Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, Ch. 1.
Epilogue

Completing the Strategic Patterns

Although the fighting went on for almost another year, the main story of military strategy in World War II, except for the important and still unanswered question of how to defeat Japan, comes to an end in the fall of 1944. Once the Allied forces had become firmly lodged on the European continent and taken up the pursuit of the German foe, the war became, for General Marshall and his staff, essentially a matter of logistics and tactics—the Supreme Allied Commander assuming the responsibility for making decisions as military exigencies in the field dictated. But to Churchill, warily watching the swift Soviet advance into Poland and the Balkans, the war had become more than ever a contest for great political stakes, and he wished Western Allied strength diverted to fill the vacuum left by the retreating Germans in southeastern Europe, thereby forestalling the Soviet surge.1 In the last year of the European conflict the two approaches therefore boiled down to a question of military tactics versus political maneuvers.

Had the President joined with the Prime Minister, as he often had in the past, the U.S. staff’s concentration on bringing the war against Germany to a swift military conclusion might still have been tempered and the war steered more directly into political channels. But the President would not, and the Prime Minister by himself could not. Perhaps the President, as usual when his political objectives came into conflict with the possibility of a quick and decisive military ending of the war, once more yielded to the latter. Perhaps, growing ever more weary under the great burden he was carrying, he was anxious to get the military phase over and apply his remaining energies to the tasks of peace. As we now know, the President’s health had begun to weaken after Sextant, and his absences from Washington high councils had become more frequent. In any case, by 1944–45 the Commander in Chief was caught on the horns of a political dilemma confronting a U.S. President involved in a coalition war abroad. There is reason to believe that the President was not insensitive or unconcerned about the unilateral efforts of the Soviet Union to put its impress upon the shape of postwar Europe—as witness the dispute over the reconstruction of the Polish Government. But from the point of view of domestic political considerations, he had to fight a quick and decisive war—one that would justify U.S. entry and the dispatch of U.S. troops abroad. He had educated the American public to the need for active participation, but whether he could have led them to a prolonged war, or to a prolonged occupation by U.S. troops—such as might have resulted from the more active American role in southeastern Europe desired by the Prime Minister—was more doubtful. The American tradition of holding aloof

1Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, Ch. 5, and passim.
from European affairs, the strong spirit of isolationism only temporarily stilled in wartime, and the typical aversion of democracy to extended war efforts would in any case have made him less likely in 1944–45 to risk new military or political embroilments on the Continent in the process of ending the current conflict. The experience of World War I and domestic Realpolitik seemed to dictate that a U.S. President who led his country in international war must stay in it only long enough to administer a sound thrashing to the bullies who had dared to start it, hurry out of it with the least disarrangement of the American way of life and standard of living, "get the boys home," and then resume the traditional policy of remaining uninvolved in European affairs.

In Roosevelt's faith, the path of peace for Europe seemed to lead toward the long-range development of a healthy environment in which new moral, political, and economic factors might come into play rather than toward the traditional reliance on balance of military and political power. In fact certain measures, other than the thrusting of U.S. military weight into the path of the Soviet Union's advance, had from time to time suggested themselves to him as feasible ways of keeping the peace in Europe with friends and foes alike. It is a moot point whether these in time would have amounted to a well worked-out policy, or would have remained what they seemed to be in the summer of 1944—a number of inchoate threads, a composite of idealism and practicality, of optimism and reality. Roosevelt appeared to have put his faith in offering the USSR the hand of friendship; in his personal handling of Stalin and in Stalin's reasonable-ness; in a joint occupation of Europe with a million-man U.S. force to remain in certain selected areas of Germany for one or two years; in raising the economic standards of relatively backward areas and thereby preventing trouble spots from developing, as in the case of Iran; in a new international organization, the United Nations Organization; and in a system of United Nations trusteeships over key bases, as in North Africa. Whatever the explanation may be—whether through deliberate choice or drift, or a combination of the two—the fact remains that American national policy in the final year of the war placed no obstacles in the way of a decisive military ending of the European conflict.

By the summer of 1944 the signs of things to come were already apparent. Once on the Continent, new problems arose, and old problems, hitherto quiescent, became immediate—problems calling for policy decisions relating to Allied, liberated, and neutral countries. General Eisenhower was given more and more responsibility for political decisions or fell heir to them by default. In the absence of clear and consistent political guidance and direction from Washington, decisions were made by the commander in the field on the basis of military considerations. He fell back on the U.S. staff concept of bringing the enemy to bay and ending the war quickly and decisively with the least casualties. This trend, already apparent in 1944, became

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2 For the President's attitude toward Stalin, see Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 799, 850.
For the expressed interest of the President (and Hopkins), at Tehran, in Iran as a clinic or experimental station for the President's postwar notion of developing and stabilizing backward areas, see A. C. Millspaugh, Americans in Persia (Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1946), pp. 8, 206, 214–15.
even more marked in 1945 in the commander's decision to stop at the Elbe and not take Berlin or Prague ahead of the Russians.  

As usual, General Marshall and the U.S. staff backed the decisions of the commander in the field. Typical of Marshall's approach were two statements prepared in April 1945—the one in response to the British proposal to capture Berlin, the other concerning the liberation of Prague and western Czechoslovakia. With reference to Berlin, Marshall joined with his colleagues in the JCS in emphasizing to the British Chiefs of Staff "that the destruction of the German armed forces is more important than any political or psychological advantages which might be derived from possible capture of the German capital ahead of the Russians... Only Eisenhower is in a position to make a decision concerning his battle and the best way to exploit successes to the full." With respect to Prague and the rest of Czechoslovakia, Marshall commented, on a draft communication to Eisenhower, in his own hand: "Personally and aside from all logistic, tactical or strategical implications, I would be loath to hazard American lives for purely political purposes. Czechoslovakia will have to be cleared of German troops and we may have to cooperate with the Russians in

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9 Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 6 Apr 45, CM-OUT 64849. This message forwarded the reply of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

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Such views of the Army Chief of Staff took on added significance, for during the hiatus of Roosevelt's final days and his successor's early days in office the burden of dealing with important issues fell heavily on the senior military advisers in the Washington high command. Marshall's stand on these issues was entirely in accord with earlier Army strategic planning. Whatever the ultimate political implications, from the point of view of a decisive military ending of the war against Germany it made little difference whether the forces of the United States or those of the Soviet Union took Berlin and Prague.

The Prime Minister's inability to reverse the trend in the last year of the war bore testimony to the changed relationships between U.S. and British national military weight and to the shifting bases of the "Grand Alliance." Though the military power Marshall had managed to conserve for the invasion of the Continent gave the United States a powerful weapon, the United States did not choose to use it to political purpose. The Prime Minister had the purpose but not the power. By the end of 1943 British mobilization was practically complete. In the first half of 1944, with its manpower mobilized to the hilt, strains and stresses began to appear in its economy. After the middle of 1944 its production became increasingly unbalanced, and the British were to fight the remainder of the war with a contracting economy.

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8 Draft msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 28 Apr 45, OPD 581 TS, 123. The message was sent with the above comment; see msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 28 Apr 45, CM-OUT 74256.

9 Ehrman, Grand Strategy V, 44ff., 505-06. Ehrman advances the thesis that the British staked their all on the defeat of Germany in 1944, and the pro-
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The Americans, who had entered the war later, enjoyed the advantages of greater industrial capacity as well as greater manpower resources. They did not hit the peak of their military manpower mobilization until May 1945—the month Germany surrendered. Reaching their war production peak at the end of 1943, they were able to sustain it at a high level, keep it in balance with non-war production, taper off slightly in 1944, and still more in 1945 to V-E Day.\(^7\)

The greater capacity of the American economy and population to support a sustained, large-scale Allied offensive effort showed up clearly in the last year of the European war. In the initial stages of OVERLORD the U.S. and British divisions were nearly equal in numbers, but once entrenched on the Continent the preponderance in favor of the Americans became greater and greater. Through the huge stockpiles of American production already built up, and through his control of the increasing U.S. military manpower on the European continent, the SHAEF commander could put the imprint of U.S. staff views on winning the war. The British had to recognize this.\(^8\) Whatever political orientation Churchill hoped to give the Western Allied military effort, he had to yield.\(^9\)

Meanwhile, as the war with Germany drew to a close, the Allies still had to face the momentous problem of how to defeat Japan.\(^10\) Here, too, as the noose was drawn tighter around Japan in the last year of the conflict, questions of political versus military objectives came to the fore. In shaping the final strategy against Japan, it became more difficult to separate war from postwar concerns and the desires of partners in the coalition from purely American wishes. These factors intruded on the continuing debate over the need for a Pacific OVERLORD.

During the fall of 1944 the Washington planners explored the choices in the war against Japan and shaped plans for the encirclement and invasion of the home islands. As it turned out, much of the planning was altered materially or overtaken by events.

Thus, after the Luzon decision was made, the Washington planners believed that following the Okinawa operation, scheduled for March 1945, the choice would be between operations against other Ryukyu Islands, Hokkaido, and

\(^7\) (1) According to the Federal Reserve Board, the index of industrial production, using a 1935-39 base as the equivalent of 100, rose from 176 in December 1941 to a peak of 247 in October and November of 1943, and tapered off to 225 in May 1945. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945: A Supplement to the Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), App. 6, p. 330. (2) Bureau of the Budget, The United States at War, Chart 11, Industrial Production, p. 104. The report states that the quarterly rate of U.S. output of goods and services rose from $34 billion in the last quarter of 1941 to $52 billion in the second quarter of 1945 (p. 482).


\(^9\) Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 71, 267, 155-70.

\(^10\) For the detailed Pacific story, see Louis Morton, Strategy, Command, and Administration, a forthcoming volume in the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series, Pacific subs series. For other summaries of planning in the last year of the war against Japan, see: (1) Chs. XXIX and XXX of Vol. II, The Advance to Victory, in Sec. IV, The War Against Japan, prepared by Lt. Grace P. Hayes, USN, for the History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and (2) Cline, Washington Command Post, Ch. XVII.
along the China coast. The Army planners felt that Hokkaido would require too many forces and that weather conditions around the island were very poor. Although difficult terrain and inadequate sites for airfields discouraged operations in the China coast area, plans were prepared. To the planners, future development of airfields in the Ryukyus also merited consideration since pressure against Japan could then be intensified by air bombardment.

In the spring of 1945, the joint planners prepared detailed plans for the assault on Kyushu (coded OLYMPIC), scheduled for 1 November 1945, and for the final descent upon Honshu, set for 1 March 1946. In May 1945 the JCS issued a directive charging MacArthur with conduct of the campaign against Kyushu and Nimitz with the responsibility for the naval and amphibious phases of the operation. No final directive was ever issued for the invasion of Honshu.

The whole problem of the need for invasion was subjected to further debate and discussion during the first six months of 1945. The followers of the bombardment, blockade, and encirclement school held fast to their belief that invasion would not be necessary, and in mid-June the new President, Harry S. Truman, requested that a study on the cost in money and lives be prepared to help clarify the situation. Since the unknown factors and quantities in such an invasion were difficult to estimate, the study was never completed. The Army’s argument that plans and preparations should be made for the invasion was accepted as the safe course to follow.

This, briefly put, was the general planning situation when the atom bomb attacks of August 6th and 9th on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively, were launched. The dramatic dropping of the atom bomb came as a complete surprise to the American public and to the Army strategic planners, with the exception of three top officers in the Operations Division, who were in on the secret.\textsuperscript{11} If the disclosures of the postwar atomic spy trials can be accredited, the Russians were far better informed on U.S. progress on the bomb than the rank and file Army strategic planners.\textsuperscript{12}

Under the circumstances it is not to be wondered that the Army planners were still engaged in more or less conventional planning for a war that came to an unconventional and sudden end. In a sense the supersession of strategic plans by the revolutionary development in weapons was a fitting climax to a war that had defied Army plans from the beginning and shown throughout a strong tendency to go its own way. Henceforth, strategic planners had to take into account the existence of the most destructive weapon yet known to man.

It is significant that the Pacific “OVERLORD” never did come off, and that there was no “big blow” against the Japanese homeland. In contrast to the “soften them up by air, then attack by land” approach in Europe, the Pacific advance showed the ground forces winning air bases to permit Japan’s “Inner Zone” to be bombarded. The predominance of the Army and the Air Forces in Europe was supplanted by the Navy and the Air

\textsuperscript{11} The three OPD officers were Generals Hull and Craig, and Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln. See Cline, \textit{Washington Command Post}, p. 347n.

\textsuperscript{12} For an interesting indication of the revelations of the postwar spy trials, see \textit{The New York Times}, March 18, 1951.
Forces in the Pacific, where the Army ground and service forces played highly important but less dramatic roles. Had the atom bomb failed and an invasion proven necessary, however, the Army planners would have been remiss if they had not had the plans and preparations well under way. It should also be noted that regardless of which type of war was fought in World War II—concentration and invasion in Europe, or blockade, bombardment, and island hopping in the Pacific—each had required a tremendous outlay of American military strength and resources. What it meant to fight a secondary and limited war in the far Pacific at the end of a long line of communications—even without launching a Pacific OVERLORD—had been driven home to the Army planners more and more before the war with Japan ended.

Along with the question of invasion went the more intricate political problem of Soviet intentions in the Far East. It was the general belief among U.S. military leaders that, if an invasion were necessary, it would be desirable to have the Soviet forces pin down the Japanese in northern China, Manchuria, and Korea. The Army staff and General Marshall worked on this premise and, viewing it in the military light, especially in terms of possible savings in American lives, the Army was eager to have the USSR enter the war against Japan. But the precise time and terms of Soviet entry were still unresolved at the time of OCTAGON. At the Moscow Conference in October 1944, the United States agreed to build up stocks in the Far East (coded MILEPOST) in preparation for Russian entry. Stalin again told Harriman that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan two or three months after Germany was defeated and Soviet forces in the Far East were reinforced. At Yalta, Stalin and Roosevelt agreed upon the terms for Soviet intervention: the USSR would get Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands; Port Arthur would be leased to the USSR, and Dairen would become a free port; the Soviet lease on the Manchurian railroads would be revived; and Outer Mongolia would remain autonomous. The Soviet Union announced its readiness to conclude "a pact of friendship and alliance" with the "National Government of China" in order to support China in the war against Japan. Roosevelt assumed the responsibility for informing Chiang Kai-shek of the terms and for securing Chiang's approval. As Leahy has since remarked, there appeared to be little discussion between the political leaders on the matter. Perhaps if the Russians had been in the Pacific war longer, the later outcry against these concessions might not have been so great. But since there was no invasion and Japanese surrender on 14 August came so quickly after Soviet entry into the war (8 August), the belief that the Russians had duped the Anglo-Americans was to gain widespread credence in the West as the rift with the

13 Shortly after OCTAGON, General Handy informed General Marshall that, in his opinion, continued U.S. military success against Japan and a statement of American postwar intentions on the Asiatic mainland would force the Soviet Union to enter the war in order to secure a seat at the peace table and present its own demands. See D/F, Handy for CofS,  

14 For a statement of the terms of agreement at Yalta, see Department of State, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.  

15 Leahy, I Was There, p. 318.
Soviet Union broadened in the postwar years.\textsuperscript{16}

\textit{The Challenges of Victory and Peace}

Differences of opinion within the coalition that were later regarded as having stemmed from the Yalta Conference were foreshadowed during 1944. Strangely enough, the first cracks in the Allied armor appeared between the United States and Great Britain. The apparent British intention to foster the conservative elements in liberated nations such as Belgium, Italy, and Greece did not meet with enthusiasm in the United States, which looked to the Atlantic Charter as the guide to be used in determining such future governments. The British place in the war with Japan and the restoration of colonial territories in the Far East was another area of disagreement that had already arisen in 1944. The need for continued lend-lease to bolster British economy loomed as an added bone of contention, especially after the end of the war against Germany. Furthermore, besides the Russians' designs in the Far East, their attitude toward Poland, Iran, and the Balkans caused both the British and the Americans uneasiness.\textsuperscript{17} The seeds of altercation and dispute were growing as the common bond of danger weakened and the need for co-operation lessened. Eisenhower warned Marshall just before OCTAGON, "As signs of victory appear in the air, I note little instances that seem to indicate that Allies cannot hang together so effectively in prosperity as they can in adversity."\textsuperscript{18}

The curtain began to lift on the divergent national objectives and war aims of the Allies—objectives hitherto obscured by the peril the partners had shared, the unconditional surrender slogan, and the political declarations to which they had subscribed. The unconditional surrender concept, first announced at Casablanca, had been consistently advanced at the midwar conferences through OCTAGON as the agreed aim of the Allies in the war. But the passing of the common danger increasingly exposed the unconditional surrender formula, whatever its merits as a rallying cry for the Allies in midwar, to the harsh realities of conflicting postwar national political objectives. Unfortunately the doctrine, born in war and directed to the enemies' surrender, would offer no common peace aim or basis for the peace settlement.

Willy-nilly, the coalition war was becoming more and more political, and the stresses and strains that had already appeared to the Axis partners with the approach of defeat loomed before the Allied coalition as victory came into sight. The shift in the balance of military power between the United States and Great Britain, and in the relations of the Western Allies with the USSR—roughly marked by OCTAGON—heralded the uneasy day when the West would polarize around the United States and the East around the USSR. In the last year of the shooting war, in the field and

\textsuperscript{16} The problem of Soviet entry into the war against Japan is surveyed in the Department of Defense Documentary Report, The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945, October 1955.

\textsuperscript{17} Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 826, 856ff., 865.

\textsuperscript{18} Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 31 Aug 44, no sub, Item 57, Exec 10.
across international conference tables the representatives of the United States and of the USSR would meet face to face as the advance guard of the two nations emerging from the conflict as the most powerful in the world but whose relations—so important for future peace or war—were still in flux.

On the home front, the signs of unrest would also begin to appear. As victory drew closer, elements held in abeyance during the more doubtful days of fighting would again make themselves heard. The isolationists, now that the danger was passing, would again clamor for the United States to withdraw from foreign entanglements and mind its own business; economy-minded legislators would once more begin to examine the military budget with a critical eye and demand cutbacks and savings in production and expenditures; and parents, wives, and other relatives would become more vocal in their desire to bring the boys home. The comparatively free and easy days of beating the enemy would give way to the curbs and pressures of approaching peace.

Besides the frictions generating on the foreign and domestic fronts, the Army still had to cope with the immense problem of what to do with the beaten foes. The questions of administrative organization, government, economic aid, and psychological readjustments were only a few of the facets of the coming occupation. Surrender terms and the initiation of the occupation of both Germany and Japan engrossed the Army planners during most of 1945. Through the final year of the war, the responsibilities thrust upon Marshall and his staff would become more and more political. The issue of how many and which postwar bases the United States would seek to maintain, an object of concern to the Army and Navy since 1943, came to the fore. Although the President and his military advisers agreed upon the necessity for American postwar control of the Japanese mandated islands, the President desired that U.S. trusteeship be acquired through the United Nations rather than by right of conquest and occupation. Bases in the Philippines presented a different problem, since the islands were soon to become completely independent of the United States. Negotiations with the Filipino leaders continued during the remainder of the war, and the military were directly concerned in the settlement of the question.¹⁹

The change-over from the military to the politico-military phase of the war did not occur overnight. It became apparent after the Moscow Conference, accelerated during 1944, and assumed preeminence after OCTAGON. Henceforth, agreement among the Allies on military plans and war strategy would become less urgent than the need to arrive at acceptable politico-military terms on which the winning powers could continue to collaborate. To handle these new challenges after building up a staff mechanism geared to the predominantly military business of fighting a global and coalition war would necessitate considerable adjustment of Army staff processes and planning. It had taken the staff almost three years of war to build and perfect the military machine for carrying

through the invasion of the Continent. All their planning in midwar had been geared to achieving the decisive blow that had been a cardinal element in their strategic faith. Scarcely were the Western Allies ensconced on the Continent, however, when the challenges of victory and peace were upon the Army planners. They entered the last year of the war with the coalition disintegrating, with the President failing in health and no successor fully prepared, and with a smoothly functioning, well-organized politico-military machine lacking. To the growing vacuums in international collaboration would be added widening gaps in American national policy, and the military would fall heir—by default—to problems no longer easily divided into military and political, and for which little or no provision had been made. U.S. strategic planners had successfully made the shift from the period of prewar isolationism to the era of intensive wartime coalition experience. But after the summer of 1944 the Army, which had perfected its organization, planning, and preparations for the invasion of the Continent, faced a new planning environment. Strategic plans and their close partners—the manpower balance and troop basis, budgets, bases, organization of national defense, deployment and production plans, and relations with foreign powers and with a new international organization—would have to be threshed out as the Army staff sought a new basis for national security in the postwar world.

Against a backdrop of a war drawing to an unorthodox conclusion in which there were already glimmerings that the role of the Army in warfare might be changing—indeed that all warfare might be changing—and that the military and political balance in the world was in process of flux, the Chief of Staff and his advisers would begin to prepare for what might lie ahead. On the threshold of a new era—with the end of the shooting war in sight—they would begin to demobilize the wartime Army and prepare to meet the challenges of victory and peace.

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20 For a discussion of liaison machinery between the State Department, the War Department, and the White House, see Cline, Washington Command Post, Ch. XVI.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

At our last meeting on the IOWA you asked for the figures on deployment of U.S. forces (Army, Navy, Marines) and of British forces. These figures follow. The U.S. figures are accurate; the British figures are an estimate made by us. If more accurate figures on the British become available, they will be furnished to you.

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<tr>
<td>Overseas</td>
<td>3,631,000</td>
<td>3,961,000</td>
<td>4,936,000</td>
<td>5,523,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At home</td>
<td>6,497,000</td>
<td>6,567,000</td>
<td>5,791,000</td>
<td>5,399,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total personnel</strong></td>
<td>10,128,000</td>
<td>10,529,000</td>
<td>10,727,000</td>
<td>10,823,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combat airplanes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overseas</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>16,200</td>
<td>18,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

British (includes Dominions) ........ 4,412,000 4,412,000 4,490,000 4,510,000

Approximately 2,200,000 of above are in U. K. Total does not include 480,000 Dominion and Colonial forces estimated as in Home Areas for defense.

Combat airplanes ................. 8,500 9,000 9,300 9,600

A breakdown of these forces into U.S. Army, Navy and Marines and British, Army, Navy and Air Forces is available.

Chief of Staff

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1 This statistical summary submitted by General Marshall was used by the President in discussions with the British at Cairo. It is filed in Folder 3, Item 15, Exec 5.
DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES *
(22 Nov 43)
* Includes all Males and Females of Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>22 Nov 43</th>
<th>1 Jan 44</th>
<th>1 May 44</th>
<th>1 Jul 44</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overseas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
<td>2,320,000</td>
<td>2,550,000</td>
<td>3,303,000</td>
<td>3,679,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
<td>1,136,800</td>
<td>1,229,600</td>
<td>1,428,300</td>
<td>1,527,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Marines</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>182,200</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>216,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3,631,800</td>
<td>3,961,800</td>
<td>4,936,300</td>
<td>5,523,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cont. U.S. (Training)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
<td>5,130,000</td>
<td>5,150,000</td>
<td>4,397,000</td>
<td>4,020,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
<td>1,160,000</td>
<td>1,205,400</td>
<td>1,177,500</td>
<td>1,159,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Marines</td>
<td>270,000</td>
<td>212,200</td>
<td>217,000</td>
<td>219,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>6,497,000</td>
<td>6,567,600</td>
<td>5,791,500</td>
<td>5,399,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total strength</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
<td>7,450,000</td>
<td>7,700,000</td>
<td>7,700,000</td>
<td>7,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
<td>2,296,300</td>
<td>2,435,000</td>
<td>2,605,800</td>
<td>2,687,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Marines</td>
<td>382,000</td>
<td>394,400</td>
<td>422,000</td>
<td>436,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>10,128,300</td>
<td>10,529,400</td>
<td>10,727,800</td>
<td>10,823,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DEPLOYMENT OF BRITISH FORCES *
(22 Nov 43)
* Includes all Males and Females of Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>22 Nov 43</th>
<th>1 Jan 44</th>
<th>1 May 44</th>
<th>1 Jul 44</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseas</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Army</td>
<td>522,000</td>
<td>522,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>620,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
<td>1,822,000</td>
<td>1,822,000</td>
<td>1,900,000</td>
<td>1,920,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Army</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Strength</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Army</td>
<td>722,000</td>
<td>722,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>820,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,822,000</td>
<td>3,822,000</td>
<td>3,900,000</td>
<td>3,920,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures given above are U.S. estimates only.
The British Staff has not yet made the requested figures available.
The definitive account of the political implications of the suggested shift in power within the Allied coalition, beginning with Sextant, remains to be written. If, as some recent writers\(^1\) have contended, the Tehran conference marked an adjustment in the political balance of postwar Europe in favor of the USSR, it may be argued with equal plausibility that the political balance in Asia was also set in favor of the USSR, or at least against Nationalist China. At best, such conclusions are still speculative, as are equally facile conclusions on the relationships of wartime strategy and postwar political developments. Much remains to be explored and explained, and the full answer will probably not be found in the archives of the Western Allies. For example, much has been made in postwar journalistic writing of President Roosevelt’s alleged promises to the Soviet Union, beginning with Tehran, of territory in which the Chinese were long interested. Little if any attention has been paid to the question of what effect the revelation at Sextant of a dichotomy in thinking between the Western Allies over the importance of China’s war role might have had on the Soviet Union’s postwar policy for Asia.

That Stalin at Tehran was made aware of the current divergence of opinion between the Americans and British over Burma operations is evident. Sherwood, on the basis of his studies of the Hopkins Papers, has told how, shortly after Roosevelt arrived at Tehran, Stalin called at the President’s quarters in the Soviet Embassy. The only other men present at this first meeting between the two wartime leaders were the two interpreters, Bohlen and Pavlov. In the course of the conversation, “Roosevelt told Stalin of his conversations with Chiang Kai-shek and the plans for offensive operations in Burma.”\(^2\) In his own postwar memoirs, Churchill has revealed, “The fact that the President was in private contact with Marshal Stalin and dwelling at the Soviet Embassy, and that he had avoided ever seeing me alone since we left Cairo, . . . led me to seek a direct personal interview with Stalin.”\(^3\) At the ensuing private audience with Stalin on 30 November, during which he sought to make the British position on strategy clear to the Soviet leader, Churchill stated his lack of enthusiasm for “an amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal” for which the Americans were pressing. He also touched on how much sooner Japan would be beaten if the USSR entered the war in the Pacific.

\(^1\) See especially, Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, p. 142.

\(^2\) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 777.

\(^3\) Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 375-77.
The summary of the decisions of the Sextant Conference, sent by Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin at the close of the meetings back in Cairo—generally worded as they were—clearly showed that China would not get the amphibious operation Chiang had wanted and the Americans had urged upon Churchill.4

It can only be guessed whether the inconsistency between the American insistence at the Moscow Conference on treating China as a great power and the failure of the Western Allies at Sextant to agree to bolster that position and follow through with large-scale military action was carefully noted down by the leaders in the Kremlin, already confident of victory in Europe, for future reference and possible action. If this hypothesis is correct, then one clue to Soviet maneuvering over the price for its entry into the war against Japan and over the post-war settlement for Asia must be sought well before Yalta or Potsdam at Cairo-Tehran.

4 Msg, President and Prime Minister to Stalin, 6 Dec 43, Item 70, Exec 10. The message is quoted in Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 412.
Appendix C

PRINCIPALS AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES
JANUARY 1943–SEPTEMBER 1944

Casablanca—January 1943

United States
President Roosevelt
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins
Mr. W. Averell Harriman
General George C. Marshall
Admiral Ernest J. King
Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold
Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower
Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark
Brig. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer
Brig. Gen. John E. Hull
Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr.
Mr. Robert Murphy

Great Britain
Prime Minister Churchill
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound
Field Marshal Sir John Dill
General Sir Alan Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal
General Sir Harold Alexander
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder
Lord Louis Mountbatten
Lord Leathers
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay

France
General Henri Giraud

Trident—May 1943

United States
President Roosevelt
Admiral William D. Leahy
General George C. Marshall
Admiral Ernest J. King
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins
Lt. Gen. Stanley D. Embick
Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell
Vice Adm. Frederick J. Horne
Vice Adm. Russell Willson
Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault
Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild
Maj. Gen. Walter B. Smith
Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett
Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr.
Brig. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer

Great Britain
Prime Minister Churchill
Lord Leathers
Lord Cherwell
Lord Beaverbrook
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound
Field Marshal Sir John Dill
General Sir Alan Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal
Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell
Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse
Admiral Sir James Somerville
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay
Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready

China
Dr. T. V. Soong
APPENDIX C

QUADRANT—August 1943

*United States*

President Roosevelt
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins
Secretary of State Cordell Hull
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox
Admiral William D. Leahy
General George C. Marshall
Admiral Ernest J. King
General Henry H. Arnold
Mr. James C. Dunn
Mr. W. Averell Harriman
Mr. Lewis Douglas
Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell
Vice Adm. Russell Willson
Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr.
Rear Adm. Oscar C. Badger
Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy
Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild
Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks
Maj. Gen. Ray W. Barker
Brig. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter
Brig. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer

*Great Britain*

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound
Field Marshal Sir John Dill
General Sir Alan Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal
General Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
Vice Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay
Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Air Marshal Sir R. Welsh
Brigadier Orde C. Wingate

*China*

Dr. T. V. Soong
Maj. Gen. Chu Shih-ming

Moscow—October 1943

*United States*

Secretary of State Cordell Hull
Mr. W. Averell Harriman
Mr. Green H. Hackworth
Mr. James C. Dunn
Brig. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg

*Great Britain*

Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Sir William Strang
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay

*USSR*

Mr. V. M. Molotov
Marshal Voroshilov
Maj. Gen. Gryzlov
Mr. Andrei Vyshinsky
Mr. Maxim Litvinov
Mr. Berezhkov
Mr. Sergeyev
Mr. Saksin
STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE

Cairo—November–December 1943

**United States**
- President Roosevelt
- Mr. Harry L. Hopkins
- Hon. John J. McCloy
- Admiral William D. Leahy
- General George C. Marshall
- Admiral Ernest J. King
- General Henry H. Arnold
- Mr. John G. Winant
- Mr. Lawrence A. Steinhardt
- Mr. W. Averell Harriman
- Mr. Lewis Douglas
- General Dwight D. Eisenhower
- Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell
- Vice Adm. Russell Willson
- Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy
- Maj. Gen. Muir S. Farchild
- Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer
- Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer
- Maj. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler
- Maj. Gen. LeRoy Lutes
- Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr.
- Rear Adm. Bernard H. Bieri
- Rear Adm. Oscar C. Badger
- Brig. Gen. Frank N. Roberts
- Brig. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter
- Brig. Gen. Patrick H. Tansey
- Brig. Gen. Lyman P. Whitten

**Great Britain**
- Prime Minister Churchill
- Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden
- General Sir Alan Brooke
- Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal
- Admiral of the Fleet
  - Sir Andrew B. Cunningham
- Field Marshal Sir John Dill
- Field Marshal Jan C. Smuts
- General Sir Thomas Riddell-Webster
- General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson
- Admiral Sir John Cunningham
- Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder
- Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas
- Vice Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten
- Vice Adm. Sir A. U. Willis
- Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay
- Lt. Gen. Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart
- Lt. Gen. J. Stopford
- Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock
- Lord Leathers
- Lord Moran
- Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
- Sir Alexander Cadogan

**China**
- Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
- Mme. Chiang Kai-shek
- General Shang Chen
- Lt. Gen. Lin Wei
- Lt. Gen. Chu Shih-ming
- Lt. Gen. Chow Chih-jou
- Dr. Hollington K. Tong
Tehran—November—December 1943

**United States**

President Roosevelt
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins
Admiral William D. Leahy
General George C. Marshall
Admiral Ernest J. King
General Henry H. Arnold
Mr. W. Averell Harriman
Mr. John G. Winant
Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell
Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy
Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr.
Brig. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley

**Great Britain**

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden
General Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay
Lt. Gen. Martel
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr

**USSR**

Marshal Joseph V. Stalin
Mr. V. M. Molotov
Marshal K. E. Voroshilov

Octagon—September 1944

**United States**

President Roosevelt
Admiral William D. Leahy
General George C. Marshall
Admiral Ernest J. King
General Henry H. Arnold
Mr. Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
Mr. Harry D. White
Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell
Vice Adm. Emory S. Land
Vice Adm. Russell Willson
Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy
Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild
Maj. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter
Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross
Maj. Gen. Lucius D. Clay
Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr.
Rear Adm. Lynde D. McCormick
Rear Adm. Donald B. Duncan
Brig. Gen. Frank N. Roberts
Brig. Gen. Frank F. Everest

**Great Britain**

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden
Lord Cherwell
Lord Leathers
Lord Moran
General Sir Alan Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham
Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Admiral Sir Percy Noble
General Sir Hastings Ismay
Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready
Air Marshal Sir William Welsh
Maj. Gen. R. E. Laycock
Appendix D

SHIPMENT OF DIVISIONS OVERSEAS—JANUARY 1942–30 SEPTEMBER 1944

There is a vast amount of detailed information on the shipment of divisions overseas in World War II, but a simple table with precise dates and brief explanatory notes for the main phases in the movement of divisions overseas during this period has not been found in Department of the Army files. The sources of information on which the following table and the accompanying notes were based are scattered in diverse Army files and publications. Further detailed information can be secured by consulting official division records now located at the Field Records Division, Kansas City Records Center, Kansas City, Missouri.

The most useful sources consulted were: (1) division headquarters history data cards of the Organization and Directory Section, Operations Branch, Adjutant General’s Office; (2) “Combat Chronicle, An Outline History of U.S. Army Divisions,” prepared by Order of Battle Section, OCMH; (3) MS, “Order of Battle in the Pacific,” prepared by Order of Battle Section, OCMH, for the U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series; (4) “Order of Battle of the U.S. Army, World War II, European Theater of Operations,” prepared by the Theater Historian (Paris, 1945); (5) Strategic Plans Unit Study 4; and (6) division histories published by division associations. It was necessary to rely most heavily on the history data cards maintained by The Adjutant General’s Office. These history data cards were compiled during the war from whatever sources were available—water transportation reports, strength reports, station lists, postal reports, and AG letters—and are therefore not entirely accurate. The discrepancies, however, are minor and the margin for error usually falls within a 1–3 day spread.

There are a number of explanations for the discrepancies: scheduled departures might be changed or delayed; availability of shipping might send units of the division in different convoys; time of arrival of a ship might be reported as a different day from that of debarkation of the troops; and ships arriving at one harbor might be diverted to another harbor for unloading. The time factor might also account for differences of one day, depending on the use of the Washington or the local overseas date, or on the hour—before or after midnight.

The dates given in this table represent the closest possible adjustment of the conflicting data found in the records and are reliable within a very small margin of error.

In the study of the phases of movement of those divisions shipped overseas during this period, it appeared that, unless the movement was made on a ship the size of the Queen Mary or Queen
Elizabeth, a division's movement would usually be divided into shipments of an advance detachment, followed at a later date by the division headquarters and the main body of troops, and frequently by a rear-echelon movement of units held in port-of-embarkation backlog. If the destination was in a combat area, a regimental combat team would often comprise the first echelon of a divisional movement. In the light of piecemeal movements of the elements of a division, it was found most practicable in establishing dates to chart the movement of the division headquarters. The procedure was also followed in determining the location of the division as of 30 September 1944. These dates and locations do not necessarily coincide with the movement or position of other elements of the divisions. For a more detailed consideration of the movement of the divisions and their elements during 1942, the reader is referred to Matlof and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-42*, Appendix F.

In regard to campaign credits, only the divisional credits are listed, although in many cases individual divisional units were given campaign credits not accorded the division as a whole.

### Appendix D-1

**SHIPMENT OF DIVISIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Division *</th>
<th>Date of Sailing *</th>
<th>Port of Embarkation *</th>
<th>Initial Destination *</th>
<th>Date of Arrival Overseas *</th>
<th>Completion of Overseas Movements *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1942</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th</td>
<td>()</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>()</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th</td>
<td>15 Jan 42</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>26 Jan 42</td>
<td>May 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>()</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th</td>
<td>10 Mar 42</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>15 Mar 42</td>
<td>Apr 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st</td>
<td>19 Mar 42</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>7 Apr 42</td>
<td>May 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32d</td>
<td>22 Apr 42</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>14 May 42</td>
<td>May 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>30 Apr 42</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>11 May 42</td>
<td>May 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Armd</td>
<td>11 May 42</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>16 May 42</td>
<td>Jun 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th</td>
<td>26 May 42</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>Fiji Islands</td>
<td>10 Jun 42</td>
<td>Sep 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2 Aug 42</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>7 Aug 42</td>
<td>Aug 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th</td>
<td>23 Aug 42</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>1 Sep 42</td>
<td>Oct 42</td>
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<tr>
<td>43d</td>
<td>1 Oct 42</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>23 Oct 42</td>
<td>Oct 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th</td>
<td>5 Oct 42</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>11 Oct 42</td>
<td>Oct 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d</td>
<td>24 Oct 42</td>
<td>Hampton Roads</td>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>8 Nov 42</td>
<td>Jan 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Armd</td>
<td>12 Dec 42</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>25 Dec 42</td>
<td>Dec 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>12 Dec 42</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>25 Dec 42</td>
<td>Jan 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1943</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36th</td>
<td>1 Apr 43</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>13 Apr 43</td>
<td>Apr 43</td>
</tr>
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<td>7th</td>
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<td>8 Jun 43</td>
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<td>7 Jul 43</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>12 Jul 43</td>
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### Appendix D-1—SHIPMENT OF DIVISIONS— (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Date of Sailing</th>
<th>Port of Embarkation</th>
<th>Initial Destination</th>
<th>Date of Arrival Overseas</th>
<th>Completion of Overseas Movements</th>
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<td>Aug 44</td>
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<tr>
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<td>France</td>
<td>7 Sep 44</td>
<td>Sep 44</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>102d</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Sep 44</td>
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<td>20 Sep 44</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>1 Oct 44</td>
<td>Oct 44</td>
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<td>22 Sep 44</td>
<td>Hampton Roads</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>16 Oct 44</td>
<td>Nov 44</td>
</tr>
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<td>Boston</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>11 Oct 44</td>
<td>Oct 44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The dates and destinations, except where otherwise noted, refer to division headquarters. Subsequent movements are not shown.

* The dating is that given for “Completed Overseas Movement” in the chart, “Estimated Status of Divisions” as of 30 November 1945, as prepared by the Logistics Group, OPD.

* Activated in Philippines.

* Activated in Hawaii.

* Organised and constituted in New Caledonia on 21 May 1942 from units of Task Force 6814, which sailed from New York on 22 January 1942 and reached New Caledonia on 12 March 1942.
# Appendix D-2

## Activation and Combat Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Date of Activation</th>
<th>Combat Participation: Dec 41-Sep 44</th>
<th>Location 30 Sep 44</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippine</td>
<td>Jun 1921</td>
<td>Philippines—Lost in combat, May 1942.</td>
<td>Captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th</td>
<td>Oct 1941</td>
<td>Central Pacific, Guadalcanal, Northern Solomons.</td>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th</td>
<td>Feb 1941</td>
<td>Tunisia, Naples-Foggia, Rome-Arno, Anzio, No. Apennines.</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>May 1942</td>
<td>Guadalcanal, Northern Solomons.</td>
<td>Bougainville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th</td>
<td>Oct 1940</td>
<td>Western Pacific.</td>
<td>Espiritu Santo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st</td>
<td>Sep 1940</td>
<td>Papua, New Guinea.</td>
<td>New Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32d</td>
<td>Oct 1940</td>
<td>Papua, New Guinea.</td>
<td>New Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>Oct 1939</td>
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<td>France</td>
</tr>
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<td>Jul 1940</td>
<td>Tunisia, Naples-Foggia, Rome-Arno, Anzio, No. Apennines.</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>37th</td>
<td>Oct 1940</td>
<td>Northern Solomons.</td>
<td>Bougainville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>May 1917</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>40th</td>
<td>Mar 1941</td>
<td>Bismarck Archipelago.</td>
<td>New Britain</td>
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<td>43d</td>
<td>Feb 1941</td>
<td>Guadalcanal, Northern Solomons, New Guinea.</td>
<td>New Guinea</td>
</tr>
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<td>29th</td>
<td>Feb 1941</td>
<td>Normandy, No. France, Rhineland.</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
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<td>3d</td>
<td>Nov 1917</td>
<td>Algeria-Morocco, Tunisia, Sicily, Naples-Foggia, Rome-Arno, Anzio, So. France, Rhineland.</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Armd</td>
<td>Jul 1940</td>
<td>Sicily, Normandy, No. France, Rhineland.</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>Aug 1940</td>
<td>Tunisia, Sicily, Normandy, No. France, Rhineland.</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>36th</td>
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<td>Naples-Foggia, Rome-Arno, Anzio, So. France, Rhineland.</td>
<td>France</td>
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<td>Jul 1940</td>
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<td>Central Pac</td>
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<td>Mar 1942</td>
<td>Sicily, Naples-Foggia, Normandy, Rhineland.</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>45th</td>
<td>Sep 1940</td>
<td>Sicily, Naples-Foggia, Rome-Arno, Anzio, So. France, Rhineland.</td>
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<td>Sep 1917</td>
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<td>Feb 1941</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>8th</td>
<td>Jul 1940</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>88th</td>
<td>Jul 1942</td>
<td>Rome-Arno, No. Apennines.</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>85th</td>
<td>May 1942</td>
<td>Rome-Arno, No. Apennines.</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>New Guinea</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>Rome-Arno, No. Apennines.</td>
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Appendix D-2—Activation and Combat Participation—(continued)

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<tr>
<td>96th</td>
<td>Aug 1942</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(None)</td>
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<tr>
<td>99th</td>
<td>Nov 1942</td>
<td>(None)</td>
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</table>

* Activated in Philippines.

* Activated in Hawaii.

* National Guard divisions inducted into the federal service.

* Elements of the 9th, 34th, 1st Armored and 2d Armored saw action in the Algeria-French Morocco Campaign and elements of the 2d Armored also saw action in Tunisia.

* The Americal Division was organized and constituted in New Caledonia.

* The 2d Cavalry Division, first activated in April 1941, was partially disbanded in July 1942, fully reactivated in February 1943, and inactivated on 10 May 1944 in North Africa.

* The 370th Regimental Combat Team of the 92d Division arrived in Italy in August and was participating in the Rome-Arno and the Northern Apennines Campaigns as of 30 September 1944.
# Appendix E

## Deployment to Principal Theaters 31 December 1942—30 September 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theater</th>
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<td>European Theater</td>
<td>119,702</td>
<td>768,274</td>
<td>2,053,417</td>
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<td>Mediterranean Theater</td>
<td>227,092</td>
<td>597,658</td>
<td>712,915</td>
<td>742,700 (Aug 44)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Africa and Middle East</td>
<td>24,943</td>
<td>21,796</td>
<td>9,354</td>
<td>40,654 (Jun 43)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf Command</td>
<td>5,907</td>
<td>28,757</td>
<td>27,739</td>
<td>29,891 (Feb 44)</td>
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<td>Pacific Theaters</td>
<td>350,720</td>
<td>696,847</td>
<td>1,102,422</td>
<td>1,552,303 (Sep 45)</td>
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<td>China-Burma-India</td>
<td>17,087</td>
<td>94,550</td>
<td>149,014</td>
<td>199,085 (May 45)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alaska Command</td>
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<td>121,535</td>
<td>63,495</td>
<td>148,167 (Aug 45)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Caribbean Command</td>
<td>119,286</td>
<td>91,466</td>
<td>70,556</td>
<td>119,286 (Dec 42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Based on STM—30, 1 January 1948*
Bibliographical Note and Guide to Footnotes

This volume was written from several groups of records kept by the War Department during World War II, interpreted with the help of a number of other sources, principally armed forces' histories and published memoirs. From these sources may be established long and fairly complete series of official transactions in 1943–44 dealing with strategic planning. Most of the material on which the account is based may be found in the massive collections of World War II records that are in process of transfer to the National Archives and Records Service of the General Services Administration.

Primary Sources

Documents of several kinds were used in preparing this volume: (1) studies, plans, memoranda, reports, and other papers drawn up for use within the War Department; (2) correspondence of the War Department with the Navy and State Departments, with other U.S. Government agencies, and with the British Staff Mission; (3) messages to and from Army commanders in the field; (4) minutes of meetings of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff and their subcommittees, and papers circulated for consideration at these meetings, including the bound volumes containing the papers and minutes of the plenary conferences—from Casablanca through OCTAGON—presided over by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill; and (5) various records pertaining to the President—meetings at the White House, War Department correspondence with the President, and the President's own correspondence on military affairs with other heads of government. Each of the several groups of records in which these documents were found and consulted will be kept intact and in due course will be transferred to the National Archives of the United States. These records are described in detail in Federal Records of World War II, Volume II, Military Agencies, prepared by the General Services Administration, National Archives and Records Service, The National Archives (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951) (hereafter cited as Federal Reds).

While research ranged into every major category of the official records of the Department of the Army pertaining to strategic planning, most of the documents cited in this volume are in the records of the Office of the Chief of Staff (WDCSA) and of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff (OPD). Other records used include: (1) Office of the Secretary of War (SW) and the Assistant Secretary of War (ASW) (Federal Reds, pp. 68–77); (2) G–1, G–2, G–3, and G–4 of the War De-
partment General Staff (Federal Rcds, pp. 96–121); (3) Headquarters, Army Air Forces (AAF) (Federal Rcds, pp. 151–234); (4) Headquarters, Army Service Forces (ASF) (Federal Rcds, pp. 253–302); and (5) Office of The Adjutant General (TAGO) (Federal Rcds, pp. 63–67).

The files of the Office of the Chief of Staff covering the 1943–44 period are arranged according to the Army decimal system. Although the files are not large in comparison with those of other Army agencies, the collection contains many important documents that cannot be found elsewhere in Army files.

The records of the Operations Division in 1943–44 fall into four main categories:

(1) The official central correspondence file (OPD) is arranged according to the Army decimal system. In the field of strategy and matters of high policy, it is the most complete single collection of documents in the custody of the Army.

(2) The message center file is arranged chronologically in binders. This file is the most comprehensive collection of wartime radio messages outside the permanent file of the Staff Communications Office, Office of the Chief of Staff. In matters of joint and combined strategic planning, one of the most important collections of World War II records is the Strategy and Policy Group (S&P Gp) file. It is arranged according to the Army decimal system and identified by the letters “ABC” (American-British Conversations). The file contains a virtually complete set of papers issued by the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff and their subcommittees, with OPD drafts, comments, and related papers. In addition to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) papers, those of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), the Combined Staff Planners (CPS), the Joint Staff Planners (JPS), the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC), and the Joint Logistic Plans Committee (JLPC) are the most valuable for the story of strategic planning in 1943–44. The ABC collection also contains the important studies on plans and strategy worked up by the Strategy Section of the Strategy and Policy Group.

(4) The Executive Office file (Exec) is an informal collection of papers on policy and planning compiled in the Executive Office of OPD, primarily for the use of the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD. Since many of the documents in this file were considered of vital significance during the World War II period, their circulation was strictly limited and they cannot be found elsewhere in Department of the Army files. This file was informally arranged after the war into groups and assigned item numbers to permit easier identification.

The records of the Chief of Staff and of the Operations Division (with the exception of the Executive Office file) covering the 1943–44 period are located at the Departmental Records Branch, TAGO, Federal Records Center, Alexandria, Virginia. The Executive Office file is at present located in the Office of the Chief of Military History.

A special group of records, invaluable for the story of high policy and strategy, is that contained in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. In January 1942 there was established in the White House a communications center that came to
be known as the Map Room. Here were filed most of the messages sent or received by the President and his immediate staff concerning the conduct of the war and relations with Allies. The so-called Map Room papers are one portion (though an extremely important portion) of the papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt that are now in the Roosevelt Library. Also in that library are the papers of Harry Hopkins. The Roosevelt Library is administered by the National Archives and Records Service of the General Services Administration. Since permanent locational symbols are not yet available for use in citing individual documents contained therein, such documents are cited as being in the Roosevelt Papers or the Hopkins Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Microfilm copies of some of the Roosevelt and Hopkins documents cited are in the possession of the Office of the Chief of Military History.

In the annotation of these sources, the type of communication is always indicated. Normally four other kinds of descriptive information are presented: originator, addressee, date, and subject. A file reference is not given for documentation that may be readily located and positively identified without one—AG letters, messages in the Classified Message Center series, and minutes and paper of the JCS and CCS and their subordinate committees. AG letters can best be located by the decimal file classification and basic date; the classified messages can be located by the date and CM-IN or CM-OUT number in several file series; and the JCS and CCS papers and minutes can be found by the numbers assigned them by the JCS and CCS. The official files of the JCS and CCS are still under the control of the JCS (Federal Rcds, pp. 2–14).

Secondary Sources

There are few secondary sources that treat in great detail the topics covered in this volume, with the exception of the service histories and the memoirs written by the various participants in the events described. For this reason, no full formal bibliography of secondary works is presented. When such sources supplement or give evidence missing in official files, confirm or expand points of special significance, or provide background material of more than passing interest, they are cited in the footnotes.

Among the most valuable of the secondary sources consulted are the multivolume officially sponsored historical series dealing with the United States armed forces in World War II. These include published and unpublished works.

Army

The author has often used the work of his colleagues who are writing the history of the U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Among the most useful volumes, insofar as the history of strategic planning in 1943–44 is concerned, are the following, either published or in preparation:


Conn, Stetson, and Byron Fairchild,
The Framework of Hemisphere Defense  


Mathews, Sidney T., Drive on Rome


Smith, Robert Ross, Triumph in the Philippines

Smyth, Howard M., and Maj. Albert N. Garland, Sicily: The Surrender of Italy


In addition the author made use of the following manuscripts, now in the files of the Office of the Chief of Military History:

Bykofsky, Joseph, Transportation Service in China, Burma and India in World War II

Hamilton, James D. T., Southern France and Alsace

Lepawsky, Albert, History of Eastern Command, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe

Watson, Mark S., The Beginnings of Service Unification

Winnacker, Rudolph A., The Mediterranean Versus the Channel, 1943

Navy

The U.S. Navy has not undertaken comparable research into strategic planning, but valuable work has been done on Navy plans in the classified monographs prepared in the Historical Section
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The manuscript by Lt. Grace Persons Hayes, USN, on the war against Japan has been especially helpful. The following narratives of naval operations written by the skilled hand of Samuel Eliot Morison in the semiofficial series *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* have also been consulted:


**Army Air Forces**

For the operations of the Army Air Forces, the indispensable secondary source is the series published by the Air Force, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*. The following, which contain concise summaries of the strategic planning back of the operations described, have been used to advantage:

Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate (ed.), *Europe—TORCH TO POINTBLANK: August 1942 to December 1943*, II (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1949)

Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate (ed.), *Europe—ARGUMENT TO V-E Day: January 1944 to May 1945*, III (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1951)

Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate (ed.), *The Pacific—Guadalcanal to Saipan: August 1942 to July 1944*, IV (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1950)

Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate (ed.), *The Pacific—MATTERHORN to Nagasaki: June 1944 to August 1945*, V (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1953)

Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate (ed.), *Plans and Early Operations: January 1939 to August 1942*, I (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1948)

**British**

On the British side, special mention should be made of the well-written and illuminating work by John Ehrman on grand strategy, August 1943–August 1945, to which the author had access in manuscript form. This work has been published in the official British History Series of the Second World War as *Grand Strategy*, Vol. V (August 1943–September 1944) and Volume VI (October 1944–August 1945) (London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1956).
ords to which the author did not have access, notably:


Clark, Mark W., *Calculated Risk* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1950)


Kenney, George C., *General Kenney Reports* (New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949)


For the purposes of this volume, the most useful of these memoirs and biographies are those dealing with grand strategy and high policy. On the British side, the volumes written by the masterful hand of Churchill are of enormous value to the student of war strategy and statesmanship. Not the least of their contributions are the primary material, especially on the British side, not readily available elsewhere. On the American side, Sherwood's book on Roosevelt and Hopkins, a vivid, often firsthand account, remains one of the best of the
published volumes on wartime strategy and policy. Equally meritorious, but less extensive, is the treatment of American strategy and policy in the midwar years, as viewed by the Secretary of War, contained in the account by Stimson and Bundy. Deane's volume, *The Strange Alliance*, is an accurate, interesting, and the most informative of the eyewitness accounts of Anglo-American and Soviet wartime collaboration that has yet appeared. Volume II of Secretary of State Hull's *Memoirs* is especially useful for topics of which the Secretary had first-hand knowledge, for example, the Moscow Conference of October 1943. Unfortunately, it is often not as full as the student would wish on war diplomacy in the midwar period, doubtless because President Roosevelt often functioned in these years as his own Secretary of State.

Useful, related accounts by the wartime members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the memoirs of Arnold, Leahy, and King—the first especially informative on the Air side, and the latter two on the Navy side. Unfortunately, the memoirs of the fourth member, General Marshall, have yet to be written. Of the memoirs of the theater commanders, the most useful bearing on the European theater of operations is that of Eisenhower. The personal accounts by Bradley, Butcher, Clark, Montgomery, and Morgan are also helpful for phases of European and Mediterranean planning. For the war against Japan, the vivid accounts of Chennault and Stilwell proved valuable, as did, to a lesser extent, those of Kenney and Halsey.

III

Other useful secondary sources include published unofficial histories, official reports of the Chief of Staff and of the theater commanders, documentary reports, statistical reports, and special monographic studies. Some of the more valuable of these miscellaneous sources include:

- *Army Air Forces, Statistical Digest 1945* (Washington, 1945)
- *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945 to the Secretary of War* (Washington, 1945)
- *Mountbatten, Vice-Admiral the Earl, Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, 1943–1945* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951)
- *STM-30, Strength of the Army, 1 January 1948* (Washington, 1948)

Among the growing list of unofficial published histories useful as background studies of special phases of the general
subject of strategy, policy, and international relations are the volumes by Feis, Wilmot, and McNeill. Feis's work is a straightforward, balanced effort to unravel the China tangle. Wilmot's account of European strategy and diplomacy, presenting a postwar version of the British wartime strategic case, is highly readable and provocative, though its use of evidence and its interpretations are sometimes questionable. McNeill's work represents an interpretative approach to the wartime relations of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union—in their political, military, and economic aspects. The resultant synthesis is somewhat uneven—brilliant use of secondary materials and challenging interpretations at some points, but suffering from an obvious lack of access to primary materials at others.

A useful review of the War Department's activities in the later war years is contained in the Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff for 1943–45, with its helpful supplementary atlas. Mountbatten's Report is a postwar account by the Supreme Allied Commander in Southeast Asia in the later war years, shedding light on British plans and operations in that area. The Department of Defense Report is an informative, documentary survey of the problem of Soviet entry into the war against Japan in military planning from Pearl Harbor to the surrender of Japan in August 1945. The United States at War is a valuable survey of the administration of U.S. war programs, particularly in the various phases of economic mobilization. Indispensable tools for the study of wartime military manpower and aircraft and troop deployment are the USAF statistical digests and the strength of the Army reports—particularly the Air Force Digest of 1947 and STM–30, 1 January 1948, both of which contain corrected series of statistics of the war years.
# Glossary of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Army Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>American-British Conversations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACoFAS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of the Air Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACoS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actg</td>
<td>Acting</td>
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<tr>
<td>A. C. W.</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFHQ</td>
<td>Allied Force Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGF</td>
<td>Army Ground Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGWAR</td>
<td>Adjutant General, War Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKA</td>
<td>Attack cargo ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMET</td>
<td>Africa-Middle East Theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMMDEL</td>
<td>American Military Mission, Delhi. Code name for American Headquarters at New Delhi, India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APA</td>
<td>Attack transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>Army Service Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assoc</td>
<td>Associated</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Air Transport Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWPD</td>
<td>Air War Plans Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bd</td>
<td>Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>Br</td>
<td>British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bull</td>
<td>Bulletin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBI</td>
<td>China-Burma-India theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Combined Bomber Offensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>Combined Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Commanding general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CinC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSWPA</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. K. S.</td>
<td>Chiang Kai-shek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. L. J.</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Clyde L. Jones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM-IN</td>
<td>Classified message, incoming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM-OUT</td>
<td>Classified message, outgoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNAC</td>
<td>Chinese National Aviation Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Commanding officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CofAS</td>
<td>Chief of Air Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comd</td>
<td>Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comdr</td>
<td>Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMINCH</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMSOPAC</td>
<td>Commander, South Pacific Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf</td>
<td>Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conv</td>
<td>Conversation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Chiefs of Staff (British)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSSAC</td>
<td>Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSSEA</td>
<td>Communications identification—British Chiefs of Staff Southeast Asia Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Central Pacific Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Combined Staff Planners</td>
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<tr>
<td>CsofS</td>
<td>U.S. Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>Commander, Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTO</td>
<td>China Theater of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCoS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dept</td>
<td>Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>D/F</td>
<td>Disposition Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div</td>
<td>Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETO</td>
<td>European Theater of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exec</td>
<td>Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAN</td>
<td>Symbol for messages from Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force to the Combined Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCNL</td>
<td>French Committee of National Liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. D. R.</td>
<td>Franklin Delano Roosevelt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-1</td>
<td>Personnel Division, War Department General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-3</td>
<td>Operations Division, War Department General Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-4</td>
<td>Supply Division, War Department General Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>G. A. L.</td>
<td>Col. George A. Lincoln</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. C. M.</td>
<td>General George C. Marshall</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen</td>
<td>General</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gp</td>
<td>Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALPRO</td>
<td>Halverson Project—bombing detachment for China-Burma-India theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HB, OCT</td>
<td>Historical Branch, Office, Chief of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hist</td>
<td>History, historical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inf</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Info</td>
<td>Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interv</td>
<td>Interview</td>
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STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE

JAdC  Joint Administrative Committee
JB    Joint Board
JCS   Joint Chiefs of Staff
JC    Joint Intelligence Committee
J. J. B. Col. Joseph J. Billo
J. J. M. John J. McCloy
JLC   Joint Logistics Committee
JPS   Joint Staff Planners
JSSC  Joint Strategic Survey Committee
JUSSC Joint U.S. Strategic Committee
JWPC Joint War Plans Committee

LCI (L) Landing craft, infantry, large
LCT  Landing craft, tank
LCT (6) Landing craft, tank (Mark VI)
L. J. L. Lt. Col. Lawrence J. Lincoln
LSI  Landing ship, infantry, large
LSM  Landing ship, medium
LST  Landing ship, tank
Ltr of Instrs Letter of Instructions
LVT  Landing, vehicle, tracked

Mil  Military
MILID Military Intelligence Division
Min  Minutes
MM&D Matériel, Maintenance, and Distribution
M. S. F. Major Gen. Muir S. Fairchild
Msg  Message
Mtg  Meeting
MTO Mediterranean Theater of Operations

NAF Symbol for messages from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the
Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force
NATO North African Theater of Operations
n.d. No date
NEI Netherlands East Indies

OPD Operations Division
OSS Office of Strategic Services

PC Policy Committee (Operations Division)
Pers Personnel, personal
PGC Persian Gulf Command
PGSC Persian Gulf Service Command
P. L. F. Col. Paul L. Freeman, Jr.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POA</td>
<td>Pacific Ocean Area(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTO</td>
<td>Pacific Theater of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAAF</td>
<td>Royal Australian Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rcd</td>
<td>Record</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep</td>
<td>Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rev</td>
<td>Revised</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rpt</td>
<td>Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>S&amp;P</td>
<td>Strategy and Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACSEA</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAC</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEACOS</td>
<td>Communications identification—Southeast Asia Command to British Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secy</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGS</td>
<td>Secretary, General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJB</td>
<td>Secretary, Joint Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOPAC</td>
<td>South Pacific Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOS</td>
<td>Services of Supply</td>
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<td>SOWESPAC</td>
<td>Southwest Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sp</td>
<td>Special</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Strategy Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suppl</td>
<td>Supplemental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SW</td>
<td>Secretary of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWNCC</td>
<td>State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee</td>
</tr>
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<td>SWPA</td>
<td>Southwest Pacific Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>The Adjutant General</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAGO</td>
<td>The Adjutant General's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/Opns</td>
<td>Theater of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Army Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAFICA</td>
<td>United States Army Forces in Central Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAFIME</td>
<td>United States Army Forces in the Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFOR</td>
<td>United States Forces (radio address)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VLR</td>
<td>Very long range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wac</td>
<td>A member of the Women’s Army Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WD</td>
<td>War Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>WDC</td>
<td>Western Defense Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDCSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, U.S. Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDGCT</td>
<td>Identifying symbol—War Department, Organization and Training Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDGS</td>
<td>War Department General Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>WDMB</td>
<td>War Department Manpower Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPD</td>
<td>War Plans Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSA</td>
<td>War Shipping Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XAP</td>
<td>Civilian-manned transport</td>
</tr>
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Glossary of Code Names

**ACHSE**
German plan for the defense of northern Italy.

**ALACRITY**
Plan for the entry of a British force into the Azores on 8 October 1943.

**ANAKIM**
Plan for recapture of Burma.

**ANVIL**
Early plan for invasion of southern France.

**ARCADIA**

**AVALANCHE**
Invasion of Italy at Salerno.

**AXIOM**
Mission sent by SEAC to Washington and London in February 1944 to urge **CULVERIN**.

**BAYTOWN**
British invasion of Italy on Calabrian coast.

**BIGOT**
Special security procedure for future operations.

**BOLERO**
Build-up of U.S. forces and supplies in United Kingdom for cross-Channel attack.

**BRAID**
Cover name for General Marshall during Casablanca Conference.

**BRIMSTONE**
Plan for capture of Sardinia.

**BUCCANEER**
Plans for amphibious operation in Andaman Islands.

**BULLFROG**
Plan for an operation against Arakan (Burma) coast.

**BUTTRESS**
British operation against toe of Italy.

**CANNIBAL**
Unsuccessful British offensive against Akyab (Burma) in early 1943.

**CAPITAL**
Attack across the Chindwin River to Mandalay.

**CARTWHEEL**
Converging drives on Rabaul by South Pacific and SWPA forces.

**CAUSEWAY**
Operations against Formosa.

**CHAMPION**
Late 1943 plan for general offensive in Burma.

**COTTAGE**
Invasion of Kiska, 1943.

**CULVERIN**
Plan for assault on Sumatra.

**DIadem**
Full-scale ground offensive launched by the Allied Command in Italy, 12 May 1944.

**DRACULA**
Plan for attack on Rangoon, 1944.

**DRAGOON**
Final code name for invasion of southern France.

**ELKTON**
Plan for seizure of New Britain, New Guinea, and New Ireland area.

**Eureka**
International conference at Tehran, November 1943.

**FOREARM**
Kavieng.

**FORTUNE**
Planning group located in Algiers (12 July 1942).

**FRANTIC**
AAF shuttle bombing of Axis-controlled Europe from bases in United Kingdom, Italy, and USSR.

**FRANTIC Joe**
First Mediterranean-to-Russia air shuttle bombing mission.
GALAHAD American long-range penetration groups (Burma).
GALVANIC Operations in Gilbert Islands.
GOBLET Invasion of Italy at Cotrone.
GRANITE Plan for operations in POA in 1944.
GYMNAST Early plan for Allied invasion of northwest Africa.
HABAKKUKS Artificial landing field made of reinforced ice.
HARDIHOOD II Aid to Turkey, Phase II.
HUSKY Allied invasion of Sicily, July 1943.
JUPITER Plan for operations in northern Norway.
MATTERHORN Plan for operating B-29's from Cheng-tu against Japan.
MERCANTILE Manus Island.
MILEPOST Project to build up stocks in the Far East in preparation for the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan.
MODICUM Party sent to London to present Marshall Memorandum, April 1942.
MUSKET Projected landing on heel of Italy near Taranto, 1943.
NEPTUNE Actual 1944 operations within OVERLORD. Used for security reasons after September 1943 on all OVERLORD planning papers that referred to target area and date.
OCTAGON U.S.-British conference at Quebec, September 1944.
OVERLORD Allied cross-Channel invasion of northwest Europe, June 1944.
PLOUGH Force Project for training U.S. and Canadian volunteers for snow operations in northern Norway.
POINTBLANK Combined bomber offensive against Germany.
PRICELESS Post HUSKY Mediterranean operations.
QUADRANT U.S.-British conference at Quebec, August 1943.
RAINBOW Various plans prepared between 1939 and 1941 to meet Axis aggression involving more than one enemy.
RANKIN Plans for return to the Continent in the event of deterioration of the German position.
RAVENOUS 4 Corps plan for recapture of northern Burma.
RECKLESS Assault force for Hollandia operation.
RENO II SWPA operations along northern coast of New Guinea and thence to Mindanao, P. I.
ROUNDHAMMER A cross-Channel operation intermediate in size between SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP.
ROUNDUP Plan for major U.S.-British cross-Channel operation in 1943.
SATURN Establishment of British forces in Turkey prior to Turkey's entry into the war.
SAUCY Limited offensive to reopen land route from Burma to China.
SEXTANT International conference at Cairo November and December 1943.
SHINGLE Amphibious operation at Anzio, Italy.
SICKLE Build-up for a bomber offensive against Germany.
SLEDGEHAMMER Plan for limited cross-Channel attack in 1942.
SOAPSDUDS Early code for TIDALWAVE.
STATESMAN Early code for TIDALWAVE.
SYMBOL Casablanca Conference, 14–23 January 1943.
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<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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<td>TARZAN</td>
<td>India-based portion of general offensive in Burma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIDALWAVE</td>
<td>Low-level heavy bomber attack on Ploesti, Rumania, 1943.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TORCH</td>
<td>Allied invasion of northwest Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIDENT</td>
<td>U.S.-British conference held at Washington, May 1943.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWILIGHT</td>
<td>Plan to base B-29's in CBI.</td>
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