

Chapter 20

Competitive Strategies for U.S. Engagement

After 9/11, the United States reduced its role in the world to one big idea: prosecuting the “global war on terrorism.” Inevitably, terrorism, which is a tactic, not a philosophy, failed to provide a universal organizing principle for U.S. security. Now American leaders face a wicked dilemma: how to recalibrate America’s strategy to meet myriad complex challenges with diminished power.

A sobering agenda besets today’s crisis managers: leaving Iraq more secure; stanching Afghanistan’s declining order; closing down Pakistan’s safe havens; preventing an Indo-Pakistan war; averting the stark choice between an “Iranian bomb or bombing Iran”;

rebuilding a fractured Arab-Israeli peace; balancing North Korea’s twin dangers of proliferation and instability; forging a limited nuclear partnership with Russia while tightrope-walking over its “near abroad”; preserving the non-use of weapons of mass destruction; overhauling the international financial architecture; forging new approaches to complex global challenges such as energy and environmental security—and others, including strategic surprises—will require tailored approaches, in-depth knowledge, and strategic patience.

Conflating disparate challenges under a single banner will not make them more manageable. We



AP Images (Lawrence Jackson)

President Obama approaches media to make statement on Capitol Hill

will have to do many things well, and we might begin by recognizing that today's immediate "crises" are inseparable from larger tectonic shifts.

This Global Strategic Assessment has focused on eight global trends driving tomorrow's complex security environment and five pathways to dealing with them. The challenges amount to a paradigm shift, and policymakers may increasingly find themselves operating in terra incognita.

First, even prior to the subprime mortgage crisis and Wall Street meltdown, a gradual global redistribution of economic power from the West to "the Rest" was under way. The saliency of this swing is rooted in history: Economic power is the bedrock of enduring military and political power. Unless some rising nations that have spent decades on the sidelines of the world's economic and trading system are engaged and bound by a common set of rules, the available means for dealing with security will shrink.

Second, we are on the cusp of, but not yet in, a multipolar world. Cold War bipolarity is moribund, even if major-power hostility is not. Unipolarity was derived from subtraction, but the world leaped into multiplication. No single power can mobilize others around its parochial agenda. And handling 21st-century challenges with 20th-century international machinery is Sisyphean. But while political power has fragmented, emerging or resurgent powers—including China, Russia, India, and Brazil—lack the desire or capacity to assume the mantle of leadership.

Third, the globalization of communications is challenging more than the virtual foundations of the information society. Technology is shifting power to the edge, allowing dispersed but networked groups, including terrorists and transnational criminals, to compete with the state's hierarchical structures. Personal, national, and international security are all jeopardized by the heightened risk of pernicious cyber attack. Networks are vulnerable; the wider the network, the wider the vulnerability.

Fourth, energy and environmental security have reached a tipping point. The industrial-era system based on cheap hydrocarbons and scant ecological regard is finished. Volatility in the price of oil and gas weakens the global economy, creates potential flashpoints, and transfers wealth to autocratic oil-exporting regimes. Even with energy conservation and innovation, the world faces another looming resource crisis over water. Consider just one fact: A person's access to fresh water in the Middle East is half of what it was 20 years ago, and it will be half again less in another two decades.

Fifth, the 9/11 tragedy and growing insecurity in Afghanistan today remind us of the growing challenge posed by fragile states and "ungoverned" spaces. There is no surefire way to build effective states. And there are too many weak states to address them at once or to consider investing everything in a solitary problem. There are some billion people in some 60 countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, left behind in dire poverty. While weak states are not automatically threats, fragile states may aid and abet a host of other problems, from piracy to trafficking to incubating terrorism and pandemics.

Transnational terrorism poses a sixth global trend. Stateless actors can inflict unprecedented damage, and we must be on our guard against catastrophic terrorism. Meanwhile, we will have to brace ourselves for conventional terror strikes, not only from al Qaeda central and the general Salafi jihadist movement but also by aggrieved local groups, as the November 2008 attack on Mumbai reminds. But passion is not strategy, and overreaction strengthens terrorists. Extensive use of military force will make our strongest instrument the leading liability.

Seventh, the character of war is changing. Low-level uses of force and greater civil-military integration, whether to interdict traffickers or conduct humanitarian operations, are becoming more necessary. Meanwhile, "modern" wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon have produced a renaissance in counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. In the future, capable opponents may seek to pursue "hybrid warfare"—combining conventional, irregular, and catastrophic forms of warfare. Hedging against potential peer competitors means balancing immediate demands with future requirements, not least with respect to conventional forces and space power.

An eighth trend shaping tomorrow's security environment is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our worst fears regarding mass-disruption weapons have not been realized, but important developments have made it increasingly possible that nuclear or biological weapons may be used in the coming years. Iran's prospective status as a nuclear "threshold" state may be the leading indicator that we are on the verge of a second nuclear age. Meanwhile, there is a growing danger that flourishing life sciences may spawn uncontrolled biological agents.

There is nothing foreordained about another American Century. Constraints on the Nation's resources preclude costly trial and error. Global order is not something managed on a budget. The Obama

administration will be hard pressed to manage global disorder without a game-changing strategy. Here are five pathways to initiate recalibration.

Heal thyself. To a remarkable degree, security hinges on America having its house in order. A stable economy is the first step. Restoring legitimacy will lower U.S. transaction costs around the world. Americans need to export hope, not fear, preparing as much for a long search for peace and prosperity as for a long war. Over time, better national education is the prerequisite for joining a globalized world.

Redefine problems. Ends should be realistic. In seeking to transform a region, one is more likely to be transformed; in a quixotic search for definitive victory or permanent peace, one is more apt to hasten exhaustion and failure. Preventing a 9/11 sequel is hard, but it need not produce bankruptcy. A broader definition of security will be needed, recognizing emerging interrelationships, for instance, among energy, the environment, food, and climate change.

Surge civilians. Complex challenges require a larger whole-of-government team of national security professionals, with particular new investments in diplomats and development specialists, as well as the arts of planning, implementation, and assessment. It is time to construct a serious civilian expeditionary corps for complex operations, including conflict prevention. A permanent surge of civilian capacity within the career bureaucracy might enhance government's ability to be more strategic, better trained, and more integrated.

Countermobilize. The United States can use its considerable standing to mobilize emerging power centers into action through not only bilateral alliances and coalitions of the willing but also multilateral institutions. Only a multitude of actors has a chance of tackling complex challenges. Some problems can become opportunities around which society and international actors may be catalyzed into action. For example, when it comes to countering a general threat such as terrorism, the most important partners are Muslims, who are best placed to marginalize a radical Salafi jihadist ideology.

Exercise strategic restraint. The United States cannot afford quagmires that drain resources without providing lasting security. The temptation to play world policeman from the Potomac is seductive; its allure is encouraged by inertia and by free riders. But it is neither America's sole responsibility nor its remit. A strong military is the U.S. ace in the hole, but better still are indirect approaches, strategies of leverage, and "smart power."

America cannot afford to be the world's exclusive security guarantor, but the world is ill prepared for American retrenchment. A shrewd and realistic strategy that balances broadening strategic ends with narrowing national means will require visionary leadership and the best that America has to offer.

The Greek poet Archilochus said that the fox knows many things and the hedgehog knows one big thing. Any "Obama Doctrine" will have to be as clever as the fox. Above all, the United States must keep its eye on multiple challenges, taking care not to exert its finite resources on any single problem.

This final chapter provides several specific approaches for the United States to recalibrate its strategy in the decade ahead: using a smarter blend of soft and hard power to pursue foreign policy and security objectives, as Professor Joseph Nye relates; reflecting on past experience to inform us about future policy, as Mark Kramer endeavors to do; countermobilizing against al Qaeda to turn its weaknesses against it, as Dr. Audrey Kurth Cronin prescribes; linking smarter policies to effective public diplomacy and strategic



U.S. Marine Corps (Andrew J. Carlsson)

Marine patrols in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, as part of International Security Assistance Force

communications, as Robert Reilly recommends; re-discovering psychological operations and information operations against specific threats, as Dr. Jerrold Post writes; following policy with careful policy implementation, as Ambassador Ronald Neumann expresses based on considerable first-hand experience; and, as Harlan Ullman suggests, adopting a comprehensive new strategy based on peace, prosperity, and partnership. These are but a few ideas. But as written above and suggested throughout this assessment, the task is to know how to grapple with many challenges, threats, and opportunities at the same time.

Restoring American Leadership through Smart Power

American soft power has declined in recent years. Soft power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction rather than either coercion or largesse. Public opinion polls indicate a serious decline in the attractiveness of the United States in Europe, Latin America, and most dramatically, across the entire



DOD (Bradley A. Lait)

General David Petraeus, commander, U.S. Central Command, testifies at Senate Armed Services Committee hearing about U.S. policy toward Pakistan and Afghanistan, April 2009

Muslim world. One important exception is non-Muslim countries of the East Asian region. There, a recent survey by the Pew Research Center shows that, despite Chinese efforts to increase its soft power, America remains dominant in all soft power categories.

The resources that produce soft power for a country include culture (attractiveness to others), values (demonstrated consistency), and policies (perceived inclusiveness and legitimacy). When pollsters ask why American soft power has declined, the respondents cite policies over culture or values. Since it is easier to change policy than culture, there is the possibility that the Nation can advocate new policies that will contribute to recovering some of its soft power.

Some analysts have drawn analogies between the global war on terror and the Cold War. Most instances of transnational terrorism in the last century took a generation to burn out. However, that characterization ignores one aspect of the analogy. Despite numerous problems, Cold War strategy involved a

smart combination of hard coercive power and the soft attractive power of ideas. The Berlin Wall fell not to an artillery barrage but to sledgehammers and bulldozers wielded by millions of people who had lost faith in communism.

It is improbable that the United States could ever attract the likes of Osama bin Laden. Hard power is necessary in such cases. But there is enormous diversity in the Muslim world. Witness Iran, where mullahs regard America as “The Great Satan,” but many young people want American videos to watch in the privacy of their homes. Many Muslims disagree with American values as well as policies, but that does not mean they side with the bin Ladens. At the strategic level, soft power can isolate extremists and deprive them of recruits. Even tactically, as Malcolm Nance has recently indicated, “soft power tools—giving small cash gifts; donating trucks, tractors, and animals to communities; and granting requests for immigration, education, and healthcare—can be vastly more effective than a show of force [given the] fluid diversity of the enemy.”

Success in the information age is not the result of whose army wins, but whose story wins. The current struggle against extreme Islamist terrorism is not a clash of civilizations, but a civil war within Islam. The United States cannot win unless the Muslim mainstream wins. Although hard power is needed in combating extremists, the soft power of attraction is required to win the hearts and minds of the majority. There has not been sufficient debate on the role of soft power. It is an analytical term of art and not a political slogan, which may explain why it has taken hold in academe in Europe, China, and India, but not America. In the current political climate, it makes a poor slogan—emotions after September 11, 2001, left little room for anything described as soft. The Nation needs soft power, but it is a difficult sell for politicians.

Soft power is not the solution to all problems. Although North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il watches Hollywood movies, they are unlikely to affect his nuclear weapons program. Moreover, soft power got nowhere in changing Taliban support for al Qaeda during the 1990s. But other goals such as promoting democracy and human rights are better achieved by soft power.

The term *smart power* describes strategies that combine the resources of hard and soft power. The Smart Power Commission, which was comprised of Members of Congress, retired diplomats and military officers, and heads of nonprofit organizations, concluded that America’s image and influence had

declined in recent years, and that the Nation had to move from exporting fear to inspiring optimism and hope. This bipartisan commission is not alone in that conclusion. Last year, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recommended committing more money and effort to soft power, including diplomacy, economic assistance, and communications, because the military alone cannot protect U.S. interests. He noted that defense spending totals almost \$500 billion annually compared with \$36 billion for the Department of State. “I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use soft power,” Secretary Gates remarked, “and for better integrating it with hard power.” He conceded that having the Pentagon seek additional resources for Foggy Bottom was like a man-bites-dog story, but these are not normal times.

Smart power is the ability to successfully combine the hard power of coercion with the soft power of attraction into a strategy. By and large, the United States managed such a combination during the Cold War, but more recently has overly relied on hard power because it is the visible source of American strength. The Pentagon is the best trained and resourced arm of government, but there are limits to what hard power can achieve on its own. The promotion of democracy, human rights, and civil society is not best dispensed from the barrel of a gun. Although the military has impressive operational capabilities, the practice of turning to the Pentagon because it can get things done in the field leads to a perception of an overmilitarized foreign policy.

Diplomacy and foreign assistance are often underfunded and neglected, in part because of the difficulty of demonstrating a short-term impact on critical challenges. In addition, wielding soft power is difficult because many of its resources reside in the private sector and civil society and in bilateral alliances, multilateral institutions, and transnational contacts. Moreover, American foreign policy institutions and personnel are fractured and compartmentalized, and there are also inadequate interagency processes for developing and funding a smart power strategy.

The Smart Power Commission acknowledged that terrorism is a continuing threat, but pointed out that over-responding to the provocations by extremists does more damage than the terrorists do. The commission argued that success against terrorism means developing a new central premise for U.S. foreign policy to replace the theme of a war on terror. A commitment to providing for the global good can provide that premise. America should become

a smart power by investing in global public goods—providing what people and governments around the world seek but are unable to attain without the leadership of the largest economy. By complementing military and economic might with greater investments in soft power, and focusing on global public goods, the United States can rebuild the framework needed to tackle tough global challenges.

U.S. Navy (John Kipp, Jr.)



Admiral Mullen greets Pakistan army chief of staff aboard USS *Abraham Lincoln* in North Arabian Sea

Specifically, the Smart Power Commission emphasized the following critical areas:

- **Alliances, Partnerships, and Multilateral Institutions.** Many of these important relationships have fallen into disarray in recent years, and a renewed investment in institutions will be essential.

- **Global Development.** Elevating the role of development in U.S. foreign policy can align interests with people around the world. An initiative on global public health would be the place to start.

- **Investment.** Public diplomacy should rely less on broadcasting and more on face-to-face contacts and exchanges. A new international understanding could be focused on young people.

- **Economic Integration.** Resisting protectionism and continuing engagement in the global economy are necessary for both growth and prosperity. Maintaining an open international economy requires attention to the inclusion of those that market changes leave behind both at home and abroad.

■ **Energy Security and Climate Change.** Global goods will be increasingly important on the agenda of world politics. A new foreign policy should develop an international consensus, and innovative technologies will be crucial in meeting the challenges of energy and environment.

Implementing a smart power strategy will require reassessing how government organization, coordination, and budgeting interact. The Nation should consider various creative solutions to maximize the ability to succeed, including appointing officials who can reach across bureaucracies to align resources in a smart power strategy. Leadership matters in foreign policy. Nations follow their interests, but their leaders define them in different ways. For a powerful nation such as the United States, the structure of world politics allows degrees of freedom in such definitions. It may be true, as some structuralists argue, that the most powerful state is like the big kid on the block who engenders jealousy and resentment in others, but it also matters whether that kid is seen as a bully or a helpful friend. Both substance and style matter. In terms of substantive policies, if the most powerful actor is seen as producing global public goods, it is likely to develop legitimacy and soft power.

Style matters even when public goods are the substance of policy. Charles Krauthammer argued for a new unilateralism that recognized America as the only superpower, strong enough to decide what is right and expectant that others would follow because they have little choice. But this idea is counterproductive. For instance, when an American delegate to the United Nations (UN) conference on climate change stated that “The [United States] will lead, and we will continue to lead, but leadership requires others to fall into line and follow,” the comment became a sore point that set back diplomatic efforts. It illustrates how insensitivity to the style and temperament of beholders undercuts the impact of soft power even when directed at producing global public goods.

Consultation and listening are key to soft power. The United States must learn to generate soft power, and relate it to hard power in smart strategies. The bad news is that the Nation is facing a difficult international environment. The good news is that it has used hard, soft, and smart power in equally difficult contexts in the past. In 1970, during the Vietnam War, America was viewed as unattractive in many parts of the world, but with changed policies and the passage of time, it was able to recover its soft power. It can do so again today.

Cold War Myths and Realities

Global politics from the late 1940s to the late 1980s was dominated by the Cold War. Four-and-a-half decades of competition between the United States and Soviet Union sparked crises and led both parties to deploy large military forces, including tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. While American and Soviet leaders managed to avoid all-out war, the lingering repercussions of the Cold War will be felt for decades to come. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought change to the international system, but aspects in the standoff between the superpowers are still relevant. Understanding the past is critical to foreign policy, but history rarely provides lessons on how to approach current issues. Policymakers are tempted to look for lessons that fit their preconceived notions. As a result, misleading myths about the Cold War persist. They should be discarded in favor of broad guidance for future foreign policy.

One tenacious myth about the Cold War is that America consistently adhered to the strategy of containment in seeking to deter and, when necessary, to challenge the expansion of communist influence beyond areas occupied by Soviet forces in 1944–1945 (Eastern Europe and North Korea). Not only op-ed writers, but also scholars of international relations and even some historians have depicted American strategy during the Cold War as based solely on the doctrine of containment. In an article published in July 2008, two experts on international affairs claimed that U.S. foreign policy during the long twilight struggle against its only heavyweight rival was shaped by a single template for global relations: the overarching strategy to contain Soviet communism.

In reality, U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War was not guided by an inflexible template. In some instances, America did not attempt to contain the spread of Soviet influence, but acquiesced in the victories by communist and leftist forces. For example, after the Soviet-backed regimes seized power in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and China in 1949, the United States undertook no military or covert action to reverse them. American inaction in these cases, whether wise or not, entailed significant costs. Declassified documents reveal that the failure to try to oppose the takeover of China emboldened Joseph Stalin, and subsequently contributed to the decision by the Soviet Union in 1950 to condone North Korean plans for the invasion of South Korea.

When the United States did attempt to contain the spread of Soviet influence, the record was mixed. America successfully rebuffed the North Korea inva-

sion and countered the Soviet Union in Western Europe and Japan, but in other cases U.S. efforts to deal with communist advances in places such as Cuba and Vietnam were unsuccessful. Even in Afghanistan in the 1980s, U.S. covert aid to anti-communist guerrillas for limited objectives oriented toward the Soviet Union did not actually succeed in dislodging the regime. Although the U.S.-backed resistance helped spur Mikhail Gorbachev to pull Soviet troops out of Afghanistan, the regime in Kabul survived for several years after the Soviet withdrawal was completed, in part because Moscow continued to provide vast quantities of military and economic support. Not until the Soviet Union collapsed and the successor Russian government abruptly ended assistance to the Afghan government did the communist regime in Kabul collapse.

The notion that containment was the single template for U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War is also belied by instances when America went beyond attempting to curb the spread of Soviet or leftist influence. At various points in the Cold War, the United States tried to roll back Soviet or pro-Soviet forces through covert operations (Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, and Chile) or unilateral military action (the Dominican Republic and Grenada). The Nation also used diplomatic means, economic aid, and military assistance to forge amicable ties with states that

broke with the sphere of influence dominated by the Soviet Union, notably Yugoslavia, China, and Egypt.

The common view that American foreign policy meant to or could pursue a single approach in the Cold War is inaccurate. U.S. policymakers often showed flexibility, and could not rigidly adhere to a single template. No such template would have been feasible because there was often no consensus on key aspects of foreign policy. Both inside and outside the government, debate raged over the nature of the threat (internal and external) and the best means of responding. Protests against the Vietnam War and the controversy over aid to anti-communist forces in Nicaragua are cases in point. The bipartisanship of the 1950s was more the exception than the norm.

What does all this imply about U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century? First, no overarching strategy or template would be feasible or desirable. If a uniform template was impractical during the Cold War, it is all the more inappropriate today. Second, consensus on the goals and means of foreign policy is almost never guaranteed in advance, and would not necessarily be desirable even if it was. The best way to create a durable consensus is by pursuing policies that are successful. In the run-up to the Gulf War in 1991, for example, public and congressional opposition was strong. After the U.S. military deployed overwhelming force and drove the Iraqis out of Kuwait,



U.S. Army (Jacob H. Smith)

Iraqi soldiers patrol on joint air assault mission with coalition forces near Tarmiyah

support for the war soared. By contrast, public and congressional support for the Vietnam War was solid at the outset but waned as the conflict was escalated without any conclusive outcome. Consensus is not a prerequisite for the success of foreign policy, but success is a prerequisite for consensus. Third, most of the supposedly new challenges and threats of the post-Cold War era—international terrorism, anti-Americanism, Alliance crises, and nuclear proliferation—are not new. Nearly all the following threats were actually more severe during the Cold War:

International Terrorism. The number of international terrorist attacks was higher in the late 1960s and early 1970s than it has been since 1989. In the span of 1 year in 1971–1972, Black September launched spectacular terrorist attacks, including the assassination of the Jordanian prime minister, the simultaneous hijacking of multiple passenger aircraft and other individual hijackings, a massacre at Lod Airport by the Japanese Red Army, and the kidnapping and murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. No comparable string of attacks in such a short time has occurred in the post-Cold War era.

Anti-Americanism. The notion that the United States enjoyed popularity during the Cold War is a myth. Anti-Americanism is cyclical, and its surge in the late 1960s has never been surpassed. Demonstrations occurred in nearly all parts of the globe in 1968 against U.S. foreign policy. An unofficial war crimes tribunal convened in Stockholm put the Lyndon Johnson administration on trial not only over Vietnam, but also for covert action in Greece in 1967. In late 1979, in the wake of the revolution in Iran, anti-American attacks roiled the Islamic world. The United States, as the dominant nation in the world, is bound to be the target of resentment and hostility regardless of its policies. The choice of policies can influence the degree of hostility, but the notion that the United States was once loved around the world and could be loved again if only it adopts the right policies is a will o' the wisp.

Crises in the Alliance. The idea that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was cohesive in the face of the Soviet threat is another myth. In reality, the Alliance was almost constantly in crisis and nearly collapsed in the late 1960s when France pulled out of the integrated military command. The challenge led the Johnson administration to begin planning to disband the Alliance. NATO members overcame numerous intra-Alliance crises during the Cold War, and they are likely to experience periodic crises in the post-Cold War era.

Nuclear Terrorism. Threats of nuclear terrorism existed throughout the Cold War. After 1950, there were concerns that the Soviet Union might secretly transfer a nuclear bomb to an anti-American terrorist group or smuggle nuclear explosives through a U.S. port and detonate them in a crisis. From the early 1950s to the late 1980s, U.S. intelligence agencies and the RAND Corporation undertook many classified analyses of nuclear terrorism, some of which warned in dire terms of the likelihood of a near-term attack. The threat should not be discounted today, but concern over this threat is hardly something new.

Nuclear Proliferation. The spread of nuclear weapons was a concern for the United States in the Cold War, starting with the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1949, some 2 to 3 years ahead of U.S. intelligence estimates. So great was the concern over the impending Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1964 that the Johnson administration secretly debated whether to conduct a preemptive strike on its nuclear facilities. Nuclear proliferation was much greater during the Cold War than in the years since it ended. In addition, Great Britain, France, China, and India tested and deployed nuclear weapons during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, Pakistan and North Korea have tested them, making a net increase of one nuclear weapons state since 1989. During the Cold War, a nuclear weapons state emerged roughly every 5 years, whereas since then the rate has been less than half that. Nuclear proliferation remains a serious threat, but the threat has existed for some 60 years.

In attempting to prevent Soviet expansion and communist subversion, the United States often faced tradeoffs in its commitment to democratic values. The Cold War led to a vast expansion of national security, and American efforts to counter threats had some moral consequences. The excesses of the McCarthy era, narcotics and mind-control experiments, and wiretapping and infiltration of protest movements were among the notable examples. The Nation often supported authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Asia that fought communist insurgencies. Although U.S. officials encouraged those regimes to accept democratic reforms, their leaders were usually immune to such overtures and compromises were required. Similar tradeoffs are bound to arise today as the United States deals with countries in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

The Cold War also forced America to make choices on the treatment of enemy combatants

and terrorists. The Nation signed and ratified the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, but during the Vietnam War was unsure whether to extend those protections to Viet Cong prisoners of war. The administration ultimately decided to accord full coverage to all prisoners (Viet Cong as well as North Vietnamese), but the fact that the issue was debated indicates the challenges that arise when fighting guerrillas who do not abide by the laws of war. The United States at times was implicated in the abuse of insurgents in Latin America, notably when intelligence operatives distributed guidance on torture. But when U.S. political leaders learned about the torture manual, they regarded it as antithetical to American values. Despite compromises that the United States made during the Cold War, officials were unwilling to emulate the Soviet Union in resorting to torture. The underlying spirit of this episode in the Cold War is worth reviving today.

War of Ideas

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism in 2006 stated that “in the long run, winning the War on Terror means winning the battle of ideas.” That emphasis seems to be reflected in every strategic document since then, including the *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* in 2005, which called directly for “countering ideological support for terrorism.”

But the emphasis has not produced any results. In fact, the American side in the war of ideas has not yet shown up. Strategic communications or public diplomacy, which is intended to win such wars, has been the single weakest instrument of national strategy since September 11, 2001. By almost any index, the United States is not doing well; some even say it has already lost. After traveling 6 months in the Muslim world, Akbar Ahmed, who chairs Islamic Studies at American University, stated, “I felt like a warrior in the midst of the fray who knew the odds were against him but never quite realized that his side had already lost the war.” There are two reasons why the Nation is not winning this war: organizational dysfunction and intellectual confusion.

During the Cold War, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was charged with conducting the war of ideas. At one time, it had 10,000 employees, including foreign nationals, and an annual budget of \$1 billion. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the agency was dismantled. Public diplomacy, it seemed, was obsolete, a relic of the Cold War. During the

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Thinking Strategically about al Qaeda

As a terrorist movement, al Qaeda has sought to commit violence on a scale and at a pace never before encountered by the United States and its allies and friends around the world. A countermobilization strategy could be developed to combat al Qaeda by setting it apart from other jihadi groups, exploiting its internal divisions, hiving off its followers and supporters, calling attention to its wanton brutality, and facilitating a backlash to discredit and diminish the movement.

Devising such a counterstrategy requires understanding the classic approaches of terrorism—namely, compellence, provocation, polarization, mobilization, and eroding legitimacy. The first three use leverage to turn the traditional formulation of ends-ways-means of strategy on its head. For terrorists, strategy is not matching ends and means, since the reaction of target audiences can be the means or ends, or both. Moreover, these five strategies are not mutually exclusive.

Compellence normally seeks to influence one party to do something that another wants it to do. Ascribing the motives of terrorist groups to that of state activity is natural but can be misleading. Terrorists normally oversimplify complex situations through messages targeted at their audiences, not least of all in the West, which are disseminated on the Internet and over the news media.

Provocation attempts to force a state to react, to do something—usually not a specific policy but some type of firm action that works against its own interests. Compared to war, terrorism may be unimportant, but when it manages to provoke a state to act, it can indirectly cause even greater death and destruction.

Polarization can drive states to the right, fragmenting societies to the extent that moderate governance becomes impossible. It is particularly effective when used against democracies with guaranteed civil liberties and domestic support, but it can have unintended consequences that prevent a group from achieving its aims.

Mobilization is suited for a globalized world in which democratized communications, public access, reduced cost, frequent messaging, and visual exploitation afford groups such as al Qaeda the capabilities to leverage the effects of terrorist activities in an unprecedented way.

Eroding legitimacy isolates and undermines the state both at home and abroad, discredits its foreign and defense policies, and also complicates its ability to maintain its alliances with other states.

Because terrorism is often the instrument of weak nonstate actors, there are more examples of strategies of leverage than any other type. A terrorist group may use a combination of several approaches, but how the state responds certainly matters. Terrorism is the weak strategy of the weak, drawing strength from the actions of the state. Reactions by a government in the narrow framework of one strategy may be counterproductive with respect to defeating the others.

In terms of frequency and effectiveness, these strategies are temporal, reflecting the political contexts in which they arise. Compellence best fit the mid-20th century because it aligned well

with nationalism, whose aims could be expressed in terms of territory. Provocation was suited to the 19th century because of the condition of declining autocratic regimes. Polarization figured in the early days of Marxism and reemerged at the end of the 20th century with terrorism designed to polarize racial, religious, tribal, linguistic, or ethnic groups. And mobilization is well adapted to the current world with changes in political organizations, communications, and trade.

The histories of terrorist groups point to various ways in which they may end: the destruction of leadership, failure to transition between generations, achieving their stated cause, negotiating a settlement, succumbing to military or police repression, losing popular support, and transitioning to other malignant activities such as criminality or war. Not all these pathways are probable for every group, and they are not all relevant to al Qaeda. For example, it is clear that al Qaeda will not end if Osama bin Laden is killed. Groups that have ended in this way have been hierarchical, reflecting to some degree a cult of personality, and lacking a viable successor, none of which describes al Qaeda. It will also not die out between generations, as al Qaeda has transitioned beyond its original structure and is a multigenerational threat. Likewise, achieving its cause or reaching a negotiated settlement is a pathway that does not apply to al Qaeda. Groups that have achieved their ends have limited goals. At least as articulated in recent years, al Qaeda seeks to mobilize the *umma* to rise up, throw off the influence of the West, eliminate its support for Arab regimes, and establish a new world order (sometimes called a caliphate).

Such objectives could not be achieved without overturning the international political system, and there is no evidence that al Qaeda has moved closer to achieving them. As for negotiations, engaging in a legitimate political process has historically required feasible, negotiable terms and a sense of stalemate. And terrorists seeking negotiations often have an incentive to find a way out of what they consider a losing cause. But none of this describes al Qaeda.

The remaining pathways deserve greater scrutiny. Although the campaign against al Qaeda has yielded results, the limits of driving the group into hiding and reducing its capacity to operate have been demonstrated. Democracies find it hard to sustain a policy of repression, which can undermine civil liberties and domestic support. American use of force signified Western resolve, killed al Qaeda leaders, and prevented attacks, but force alone cannot drive this group to its end. That would require a scorched-earth policy

that the United States would not tolerate.

The loss of popular support has ended many terrorist groups, and it is a plausible scenario for al Qaeda. Support can be compromised through miscalculation, especially in targeting. Attacks may cause revulsion among actual or potential constituencies: at least one-third of the victims of al Qaeda have been Muslims, the same people the group claims to protect. Another pathway is failing to convey a positive image or progress toward its goals, which applies to al Qaeda.

Finally, groups can transition from terrorism to criminal behavior or escalate to insurgency or conventional warfare, especially with state sponsorship. Some argue that this may have already happened in the case of al Qaeda, which would be unfortunate. In this connection, it is counterproductive to regard this group as a global insurgency because the term bestows legitimacy on al Qaeda, emphasizes territorial control, and puts the United States into a dichotomous strategic framework that precludes clear-eyed analysis of the strategies of leverage that are being used against America and its allies.

The question for policymakers in the midst of a terrorist campaign is not to ask how they are doing, but rather how they will it end. And the second question is not when the next attack will occur, but rather what comes after that event. Terrorism arises in political, social, and historical contexts that constantly evolve. But terrorist groups traditionally end in certain discernible ways. The challenge is knowing which ending fits a given terrorist group, to work synergistically with the process as it unfolds, and to push it further in that direction. Governments who get caught up in the short-term goals and spectacle of terrorist attacks overlook broader historical perspectives, that are crucial to reasserting state power and legitimacy, and the strategies of leverage exploit such mistakes. Driving a terrorist movement such as al Qaeda toward its end is much smarter than responding in a cause-and-effect manner to its tactical actions as they occur.

▲ *Continued from p. 479*

brief end-of-history fantasy, it was thought that the ideas of democratic, constitutional political order and free markets stood uncontested throughout the world. The war of ideas was over—and America had won.

The functions of USIA were relegated to the Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors. The senior official responsible for the war of ideas became the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, a third-tier position—which speaks volumes about the extent of the demotion of this activity as a consequence of the peace dividend. Within the State Department, public diplomacy functions were dispersed among regional and other bureaus, making coordination and control a major problem.

The attempt to situate public diplomacy in State has failed. One reason is that the department's role is diplomacy, *not* public diplomacy. It should not be expected to perform both, since these roles sometimes conflict. Public diplomacy attempts to reach people in other nations directly over the heads of their governments. This can complicate the job of the State Department, which has the responsibility of maintaining good relations with those governments. The difficulty of placing both roles in one institution was recently summarized by a commentator from the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy: “State does not recruit for public diplomacy; State does not test for public diplomacy; State does not train for public diplomacy; State has a glass ceiling for public diplomats.”

The Broadcasting Board of Governors assumed responsibility for non-defense government broadcasting, including the Voice of America. It became a standalone agency run by part-time board members, most of whom have had no experience in either foreign policy or public diplomacy. The eight-member board exercises executive power and is not directly accountable to anyone. Since the professional experience of the governors has been mainly in the national mass media, they have sought to impose that media culture on government broadcasting by refashioning much of it using American pop culture. Radio Sawa is the prime example of this approach.

Coordination through the White House Communications Office, National Security Council, and inter-agency bodies has made few improvements to this unsatisfactory situation. Lack of both an executive authority and a chain of command to execute strategic communications plans has hampered well-intend-

ed efforts. The Department of Defense occasionally has tried to fill the gap, but it is neither organized nor authorized to conduct public diplomacy except in a support role and on a reimbursable basis. The Pentagon was even prohibited from supporting a project involving posters to be displayed in 100 Embassies to publicize military relief efforts for the tsunami victims in Southeast Asia. This occurred because of a conflict between Title 10 and Title 22 responsibilities, resulting in the banning of images of U.S. forces rescuing and aiding victims in the region portrayed.



U.S. Marine Corps (Lora Harter)

Philippine civilians attend medical civic action program in Juban to receive veterinarian aid for animals during exercise Balikatan 2009

No government agency has possessed the capability to implement a sustained multifaceted strategy to win the war of ideas since USIA was dismantled. The events of September 11, 2001, revealed that the assumption on which the agency had been abolished, namely that the world embraced democratic pluralism, was not universally accepted by those to whom it applied. Seven years later, there are many individuals across the U.S. Government with the expertise to successfully conduct the war of ideas, but there still is no organization to execute this instrument of national power.

Secretary Gates stated in November 2007 that America is “miserable at communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as a society. . . . Al-Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the Internet than America.” Several days later, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld observed that “U.S. institutions of public diplomacy and strategic communications . . . no longer exist,” adding, “when the U.S. Information Agency became part of the

State Department in 1999, the country lost what had been a valuable institution capable of communicating America's message to international audiences powerfully and repeatedly." The consensus is that something is wrong, particularly within the Department of Defense, because this serious deficiency in national capabilities has grave consequences for the Armed Forces.

It may be time to create an organization that can propagate American ideals and institutions to the world and counter hostile propaganda. A strategic communications agency could maintain a focus on aiding liberals and moderates in Muslim-majority countries, and not get lost in daily spin control. It would have responsibility for developing and reinforcing an anti-authoritarian social and cultural network in the Islamic world. It would be independent of the Department of State, which could be inclined to downplay differences for the sake of relations with particular countries or regions. Moreover, it would be independent of the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency to avoid entanglement in their respective missions. Its director would report to the President and be responsible for the interagency coordination of all strategic communications efforts.

This agency should be funded to promote the free exchange of ideas in the Islamic world and beyond and to support allies in those regions. To put present efforts in budgetary perspective, current spending on U.S. public diplomacy is about the same as the McDonald's restaurant chain's worldwide advertising budget, and half of what Saudi Arabia gives annually to spread Wahhabism throughout the Muslim world and elsewhere. The approximately \$1.3 billion being spent on public diplomacy is 1/450th of the entire Pentagon budget.

An agency dedicated to the war of ideas would only be as effective as its understanding of the ideas that it propagates and the hostile ideas that it contests. Wars of ideas are fought over contending interpretations of reality such as the meaning of life for which people are willing to die.

Every threat to the existence of the United States has come on the level of moral principle, whether it has been Nazis and their racial theory or communists and their class theory. Both explicitly denied American moral principles as articulated in the Declaration of Independence. Today, radical Islamists deny those same principles with their own deformed theology. The resulting conflicts are conducted in terms of moral legitimacy. Defending one's ideas and attacking those of the enemy depend upon a moral

rhetoric and appeal to a moral comparison, such as the Axis of Evil and the Great Satan.

America is failing in this war of ideas because it has not seriously addressed the larger issue of moral legitimacy—its own and the enemy's—which is the real nub of the conflict. One needs compelling ideas to fight countervailing ideas. The United States has not engaged at the level on which this moral conflict is being waged. Instead, its message to the Islamic world has been preempted by American pop culture. It is not strange that the United States should turn to entertainment media, but it cannot entertain or advertise its way through a war of ideas. While pop culture itself creates enough problems, the U.S. Government ironically spreads it through the broadcasts of Radio Sawa and Radio Farda to the Arab and Persian worlds. By doing so, the Nation has inadvertently projected the image of itself as an adolescent, and is not taken seriously where it counts. An adolescent superpower is not a source of comfort to allies, and it is much less a magnet for those nations addressing the crisis of the day.

The image of America as an adolescent superpower is particularly troubling in light of the upheaval in the Muslim world, which will have enormous consequences. The unavoidable clash of values spawned by the forces of globalization challenges Islam. The loss of faith makes life meaningless and therefore intolerable for most Muslims. The majority of Muslims interpret the threat of secular influences that are exacerbated by multiple nonstop satellite television channels as an attack on Islam itself. This conclusion has been responsible for a wave of vociferous responses.

In terms of this larger crisis in the Islamic world, the exiled Iranian philosopher Abdulkarim Soroush has said that "Muslims would like to live in a democratic milieu, and at the same time they would like to keep their faith as well. They do not want to live in a democratic atmosphere at the expense of their beliefs and convictions." The United States should not go out of its way to convince them that this is an impossibility. Rather, it ought to demonstrate that this is an American truism and that faith and freedom are by no means mutually exclusive in the modern world.

American pop culture does not depict freedom as an essential constituent of the moral order, but often as something inimical to it. In pop culture, the United States appears to offer young Muslims the choice between either greater freedom with no purpose, or personal submission to a higher purpose espoused by radical Islamists. So long as adversaries continue

to frame the question in those terms, America will contribute to its own defeat in the war of ideas.

The United States has not demonstrated that freedom has an indispensable moral meaning. In fact, it often unintentionally does the opposite. While serving as the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, Karen Hughes lauded American diversity, which is not effective against the divine mission of some adversaries. When the popular notion of American diversity becomes the message, it conveys the idea that the United States does not discriminate among various claims to truth. To many Muslims, diversity equals relativism and moral decline. Slogans simply do not reflect the moral principles on which American tolerance of diversity is based. These principles are not found on the Department of State Web site or in the *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*, which reflect no sense of subtlety or awareness. As Professor Harry Jaffa has commented, the United States is “telling others to accept the forms of our own political institutions, without any reference to the principles or convictions that give rise to those institutions.”

The first step in reinvigorating public diplomacy is reestablishing U.S. moral legitimacy and undermining adversaries through the serious exposition and promotion of ideas. Anything done in the name of public diplomacy that is not related to one of these

objectives is not relevant to the war of ideas and should be rejected. Under this standard, 85 percent of the activities listed in the current State Department Public Diplomacy Update would be eliminated. Moreover, the selection of target audiences should shift from those consumers of mass culture abroad to the educated and influential groups in foreign societies. These audiences should be reached via media that they take seriously—books, journals, films, theater, dialogues, and substantive exchanges. If the Nation wants to be taken seriously, it must win the war of ideas; but that war can be won only if the Nation takes *it* seriously.

Information Operations to Counter Terrorism and Rogue States

The end of the Cold War did not bring on the long-anticipated peace dividend. Rather, following the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent demise of the Soviet Union, there was a rise in ethnic conflict. The relative stability of the superpower rivalry has been succeeded by political-military crises precipitated by rogue states. The media have been filled with the names of leaders such as Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, Kim Jong Il, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Hugo Chavez, and Robert Mugabe, several of whom seek or already have weapons of mass destruction.

Low-intensity conflict and transnational terrorism are prominent features of the 21st-century security



U.S. Air Force (Eric Harris)

Provincial Reconstruction Team member talks with administrators at school that provides training for trades

environment. The last two decades have been punctuated by a series of terrorist events: the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993; the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack on Tokyo subways in 1995; the coordinated bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; the attack on the USS *Cole* in 2000; the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001; and the everyday suicide bombings by radical Palestinian groups in Israel. With few exceptions, these attacks were designed to cross the mass-casualty threshold. Terrorism is a vicious form of psychological warfare, waged through the media. One of the key goals in terrorist strategy is influencing selected audiences, including its potential

frequently, this is exactly what strategic thinking has proposed doing.

There is no one-size-fits-all model for deterrence. Rather, the approach should be tailored to the nature of an enemy—based on what one expert has called an actor-specific behavioral model. In countering terrorists and rogues, models of their psychologies, decisionmaking processes, and strategic cultures are an absolute necessary. Threats arise from relatively unknown and unfamiliar sources. One cannot optimally deter a potential enemy that one does not understand. And yet appropriate models and the requisite understanding are often unavailable. The nuanced political profiles of personalities are particularly important in the case of leader-dominant societies.

In the overreliance on technology, social science expertise has been insufficiently applied to the war for hearts and minds, leaving adversaries to operate on a relatively uncontested information battlefield. This has profoundly disadvantaged American national security. Individual terrorists are psychologically normal people, not crazed fanatics. It is not psychopathology, but rather group and collective psychology that is important in this sort of conflict, with a particular emphasis on collective identity that is vital to understanding the mind of the terrorist.

If indeed terrorism is a vicious species of psychological warfare, waged through the media, it must be countered by psychological warfare. Core elements of integrated information operations guided by understanding of the dynamics of terrorist groups include inhibiting potential terrorists from joining groups in the first place, producing tension within groups, facilitating the means to exit groups, reducing support for groups, and delegitimizing the leaders of groups.

Stemming the flow of recruits on which terrorist groups depend is the most critical challenge. The reservoir of hatred is deep, and hatred is bred especially among nationalist-separatist terrorists. Recruitment can be inhibited by deromanticizing terrorism, providing secular education to counter radical Wahabi *madrassas*, offering alternate means to redress legitimate grievances, and opening otherwise autocratic societies. Dissension can be promoted by exploiting the fact that underground groups are emotional pressure cookers, fostering paranoia by injecting rumors of traitors within the ranks, and alienating followers from their leaders. The means of facilitating an exit from groups include introducing amnesty programs, allowing reduced sentences for those who cooperate, using defectors as a source of rumors, and challeng-



U.S. Air Force (JoAnn S. Makinano)

Iraqi army commander presents plaque to imam and Sunni leader in Mosul, Iraq

recruits, in the West and throughout the political establishment. As has been seen in the case with rogue states, the United States and its allies have been insufficiently responsive to conducting psychological operations to counter them.

The strategy of deterrence and the doctrine of mutually assured destruction, which relied on the rationality of the Soviet Union, were formulated during the Cold War but are no longer relevant. To extrapolate from deterrence a new way of dealing with potential adversaries will inevitably lead to erroneous policies. What deters a superpower rival may be counterproductive in the case of an outlaw nation or terrorist group; indeed, it may prove to be an incentive rather than a deterrent. And yet all too

ing the ideological basis of extremism. One difficulty has been the relative silence of moderate voices in countering the language of extremism, which otherwise pervades the societies in question. In sermons at mosques, the behavior of martyrs is honored, just as those who martyr themselves for the cause of Tamil independence are honored.

Countering the voices of extremism is a tough job, one that cannot be plausibly carried out by the West, but must be addressed within Islam. The voices of moderation are beginning to be heard. Of particular note is the growing conflict among Islamic extremists led by Sayid Imam al-Sharif (also known as Dr. Fadl), a founding ideologue of al Qaeda and the former leader of the Egyptian terrorist group al Jihad. Fadl, a brilliant medical school classmate of Ayman al-Zawahiri (deputy and putative successor to Osama bin Laden) renowned for his knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence, formalized the rules of holy war in *The Essential Guide for Preparation*. This work by Fadl became the definitive ideological underpinning of al Qaeda, including axioms such as “jihad is the natural state of Islam” and that “Muslims must always be in conflict with non-believers.” In another of his texts, *The Compendium of the Pursuit of Divine Knowledge*, which is more than 1,000 pages long, Fadl provided al Qaeda with the theological justification for violence against all who opposed its extremist path, labeling them as nonbelievers.

But by 1994, Fadl was becoming disillusioned with al Qaeda because of its use of violent excesses that seemed to go beyond theological justification. As members of the Islamic Group imprisoned in Egypt began to consider other interpretations of jihad, they came to believe they had been manipulated into pursuing the path of violence. This rethinking culminated in the startling declaration by one revolutionary leader at a military trial in 1997 that the Islamic Group would cease all violent activity, and a series of publications was produced to explain their new thinking. One of the leaders asserted that “the Islamic Group does not believe in the creed of killing by nationality.”

After September 11, 2001, the Egyptian government exposed the debate taking place within its prisons, a move that threatened the foundation of al Qaeda. In 2007, Fadl undermined the agenda of bin Laden and Zawahiri in a rejection of al Qaeda doctrine that he faxed from jail that asserted, “We are prohibited from committing aggression even if the enemies of Islam do that.” The statement, which appeared in Egyptian and Kuwaiti media, was

rejected by Zawahiri: “I wonder if they now have fax machines in Egyptian jail cells? I wonder if they’re connected to the same line as the electric shock machines?” But the effect was damaging since it came from Fadl. Controversy over the theological justification of the extremism of al Qaeda doctrine arose, and increasing numbers of committed jihadists began repenting sins committed while they were misinformed. In addition to Egypt and Kuwait, deradicalization is under way in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, Singapore, and Indonesia. Although success has not been fully evaluated, the results are encouraging in Egypt. The program includes reducing support by society at large and potential recruits, marginalizing

U.S. Navy (Cristina R. Morrison)



Sailors deliver bags of rice to citizens in Sumatra, Indonesia, in wake of tsunami

the influence of al Qaeda, and delegitimizing the likes of bin Laden and Zawahiri.

Identifying the theological basis of Islamist extremism as dubious can undermine its dogmatic certitude, but for the most part it has gone unchallenged. One challenge has been countering the viral spread of extremist ideology via the Internet. Although this debate is taking place among scholars, the message reaches an estimated 5,000 radical Islamist Web sites. This is a major factor as young people are increasingly being radicalized over the Internet.

Ironically, despite condemning globalization and its attendant evils, the Islamist extremists employ modern information technology to propagate their message. And these Islamists have a clear strategy on

using the Internet, as revealed in the following directive on an al Qaeda Web site:

Due to the advances of modern technology, it is easy to spread news, information, articles and other information over the Internet. We strongly urge Muslim Internet professionals to spread and disseminate news and information about the Jihad through e-mail lists, discussion groups, and their own websites. If you fail to do this, and our site closes down before you have done this, you may hold you to account before Allah on the Day of Judgment. . . . This way, even if our sites are closed down, the material will live on with the Grace of Allah.

Four months prior to the Madrid bombings in 2004, this posting appeared on the Internet:

In order to force the Spanish government to withdraw from Iraq, the resistance should deal painful blows to its forces. . . . It is necessary to make the utmost use of the upcoming general election in March next year. We think that the Spanish government could not tolerate more than two, maximum three blows, after which it will have to withdraw as a result of popular pressure. If its troops remain in Iraq after these blows, the victory of the Socialist Party is almost secured, and the withdrawal of the Spanish forces will be on its electoral program.

But words alone will not suffice. Our words must be complemented by our actions.

Public Diplomacy in Countering Adversaries

Just as an understanding of terrorist psychology is required in targeting information operations, public diplomacy and strategic communication programs designed to counter rogue states must be informed by a nuanced appreciation of leaders and their strategic culture. Importantly, public diplomacy and information operations must be thematically coordinated. A White House speech intended for a domestic audience can be counterproductive if delivered to an international audience.

The first Gulf War and invasion of Iraq illustrate opportunities taken and lost. An aggressive psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign was planned and executed for Operation *Desert Storm* by the 4th Psychological Operations Group with Army Reserve PSYOP units. These 650 Soldiers made a major contribution to the coalition psychological warfare effort. They developed and delivered 29 million

leaflets, which were distributed by balloons and from B-52s, and even smuggled some into Baghdad. Partly as a result of this campaign, 44 percent of the Iraqi army deserted, 17,000 defected, and more than 87,000 surrendered. It is judged that as a consequence of this successful PSYOP effort, tens of thousand of lives were saved. This was effective tactical battlefield PSYOP, derived from techniques developed and refined during World War II.

Effectively countering Saddam Hussein psychologically required a nuanced understanding of his political personality. Rather than being the madman of the Middle East, Saddam was a rational political actor who often miscalculated because he was surrounded by sycophants who for good reason were afraid to criticize him for fear of losing their jobs or lives. Thus, he could remain in touch with reality psychologically while being out of touch with it politically. Saddam had a traumatic background that left him wounded psychologically, so that criticism, no matter how constructive, was capable of wounding his fragile self-esteem at the peril of critics.

His residences provide an apt metaphor for the layers of his psychology. He was born in a mud hut in Tikrit, which symbolized the social and economic poverty in his early life. Despite the abuse and deprivation of those early years, at the age of 8, an uncle named Khayrallah filled him with compensatory dreams of glory, telling him that one day he would play a major role in Iraqi and Arab history by following the path of Saladin and Nebuchadnezzar, who had rescued Jerusalem from the Crusaders. Symbolizing his grandiose self-concept were the lavish palaces, which he built throughout Iraq. But what underlay the palaces? Underground bunkers of steel and reinforced concrete, bristling with weapons and communications equipment, symbolizing the siege state in Saddam's psychology, ready to be attacked, ready to lash back. But by the time he was discovered in a spider hole, ironically beneath a simple mud hit, his life was shattered.

Saddam wrapped himself in the Palestinian flag after a UN resolution called for him to pull out of Kuwait, indicating he would abide by the resolution when earlier resolutions on Israel and the occupied territories were honored, which made him a hero to the Palestinians. It was dreams of glory realized as he became a major world leader. He had the world by the throat.

Saddam probably could not have been deterred or reversed himself, for he had painted himself into a

corner. But he had abruptly changed direction in the past when it was pragmatic to do so, and could do so again, if and only if—a double contingency—he could retain his power base and not lose face. In the event, the emphatic statement made by President George H.W. Bush while pounding on the table—“There will be no face saving”—seemed designed to leave Saddam with no way out. It may have contributed to his decision that he could not withdraw without being humiliated and that he had to stand up to the coming massive air attack. As it was, Saddam declared victory on the fifth day of that attack. Since it had been predicted he could survive only 3 to 4 days, he could claim victory in the Arab context because he courageously resisted a superior adversary, and each succeeding day of defiance only magnified that achievement.

Saddam was surprised by the breadth of the coalition that President Bush assembled. In the period leading to the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam misjudged not only the impact of his action on his Arab neighbors but also the support of Russia and France. An adaptive leader who learned from experience, Saddam set out to unravel the coalition and the unanimity among the nations arrayed against him. With economic incentives, he eventually wooed Russia, China, and France without whose support the United States would be unable to rally UN action for coercive diplomacy and sanctions against Iraq. With carrots and sticks, he bullied his Arab neighbors and restored relations with them, as demonstrated by the call of Saudi Prince Abd Allah in 1997 for the Gulf Cooperation Council to “overcome the past with its events and pains.” The prodigal son was back. The United States failed to counter this aggressive diplomatic offensive with a strategic information operation and public diplomacy campaign, leading essentially to the unraveling of the coalition that had been so effective in stemming aggressive behavior by Saddam.

After the 1991 conflict, Saddam was obsessed with loyalty of the military, which had been fractured by the war. Those who showed any enthusiasm for his overthrow were jailed, tortured, and executed with their families. In the 2003 conflict, this significantly inhibited defection from within the senior ranks. There was fear of reprisal until Saddam was captured. It was loyalty at the barrel of a gun. His brutal revenge against those suspected of disloyalty was a highly effective psychological instrument designed to retain the allegiance of his own military leaders.

President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld delivered a particularly

adroit series of public diplomacy speeches in late 2002 during the run-up to Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. Convinced of the danger to U.S. troops from Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction, Secretary Rumsfeld indicated that the military had a major role to play in reconstruction. But he went on to say that if such weapons were used, all bets were off. Several weeks later, President Bush indicated that Saddam might well order the use of weapons of mass destruction. He added that in that event, Iraqi generals would be advised to disobey such an order. Such comments were designed both to inhibit the use of weapons of mass destruction and split Saddam from the Iraqi military leadership. Splitting leaders from their followers should be central to influence campaigns. But it can be particularly difficult to achieve in closed societies such as North Korea where the information environment is tightly controlled.

The Case of North Korea—Unlike Father, Unlike Son

Kim Il Sung, founding father of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), was a noted guerrilla leader who rose to power under Soviet patronage. He created the *juche* (independence) ideology of North Korea and consistently declared the goal of unifying Korea under his leadership. It was his son, Kim Jong Il, beginning with his first position at age 30 as director of the Bureau of Propaganda and Agitation, who created the cult of personality around his charismatic father as well as the notion of himself as the successor in that charismatic role. Kim Jong Il created the myth of the man born on Mount Paektu, a sacred Korean mountain from which the nation sprang, when in fact he was born in a hovel in the Soviet Union under Russian protection.

Kim Jong Il is a pale imitation of his father. He is not a nationbuilder or a guerrilla fighter, nor did he create an ideology. It is a case of unlike father, unlike son. Thus, the giant shadow of his father, the Eternal President, looms over the son. It is difficult enough succeeding a powerful father; it is impossible psychologically to step into the shoes of a godlike figure. That continuing pretense remains the daunting reality that challenges the ruler of North Korea. Disparities between the father and son contribute to profound insecurity of Kim Jong Il, who is trapped by the ideology of *juche* and reunification—“majesty sits uncomfortably on his shoulders.”

By the early 1970s, it became clear that Kim Il Sung was grooming Kim Jong Il to take over. The son

worked behind the scenes while his father remained the political face of the country. Kim Jong Il became Secretary of the Korean Workers Party in 1973 and a full member of the Politburo in 1974. He announced the Ten Principles that required absolute loyalty to his father. By early 1980s, Kim Jong Il had assumed daily control of the nation, including the intelligence apparatus, but he has never taken the title of President. He and his cronies enjoy a hedonistic lifestyle in Pyongyang. Kim Jong Il is insecure about his political and physical stature, once commenting that he “resembled the droppings of a midget.” Despite his grandiosity and egotism, this statement reveals his extreme insecurity about stepping into the godlike shoes of Kim Il Sung.

Kim Jong Il lives in a seven-story pleasure palace and recruits young girls from junior high school for so-called joy brigades to provide rest and relaxation for hardworking senior officials. While average North Koreans earn between \$900 and \$1,000 annually, he reportedly spent from \$650,000 to 800,000 annually during the 1990s on expensive cognac. Addicted to motion pictures, he supposedly has a collection of some 10,000 to 20,000 films. His concept of leadership may be influenced by images of Western movie heroes.

His sensitivity to criticism influences his leadership style. He is at the center of a starburst,

receiving policy analysis from various groups on the United States, China, South Korea, Russia, and Japan, but without any coordination among the groups. Moreover, although he scans the Web for several hours daily and reportedly watches CNN, he has only an imperfect understanding of political reality, and his subordinates are reluctant to criticize him.

Kim Jong Il’s lack of empathy also affects his leadership style, including with his own people. He once recounted with pride the story of a disagreement with Kim Il Sung when his father plaintively asked: “Must we spend so much on the military? Can we not provide more to our people?” To which Kim Jong Il replied: “No, father, the military requires these funds.” This lack of empathy also contributes to his misunderstanding of potential adversaries, such as the United States.

The official policy of the DPRK is that the military has the top priority. Defense spending comes before the economy and the general population. The economy is broken and cannot be fixed. Pyongyang has not made the change from a centrally controlled communist-style economy, and the disproportionate military spending is leading to an implosion. As many as 3 million North Koreans have starved to death in famines. Hundreds of thousands lost their lives in subsequent relocation to government-run camps. Kim Jong Il asks

DOD (Cherie Cullen)



Secretary Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, brief press on plans for fiscal year 2010 at Pentagon, April 2009

the people to endure continuing hardships at the same time that he and the elites live in the lap of luxury.

Kim Jong Il overestimates his prowess and may have succumbed to his own propaganda as conveyed in the slogan “1 a match for 100,” suggesting that 1 North Korean soldier is a match for 100 from any other country. He looks to nuclear weapons as compensation for his weakened conventional forces, believing the United States to be casualty-averse. He exaggerates the strain in the relationship between Washington and Seoul and the popular dissent and political instability in South Korea, while underestimating potential internal dissent. Kim values his personal safety, wealth, and regime survival, the stability of Pyongyang, the comfort of the elites on whom he must rely, and the maintenance of total domestic control.

If the current diplomatic offensive becomes unraveled and Kim Jong Il again fails to live up to his commitments on dismantling the nuclear weapons program, information operations could well be incorporated in a coordinated and consistent national strategy. Communication must be clear and backed by deeds. If the violation of Agreed Framework had been overlooked and the shipment of heavy oil continued, America would have been seen as all bark and no bite.

An information operations campaign intended to split Kim and his leadership elite from their followers would include identifying Pyongyang as a prime military target by extensive overt surveillance, countering the 1-a-match-for-100 slogan by displaying American military capabilities, and educating lower level military and civilian audiences on the gap between their deprivation and the hedonism of national elites. Because of the major information blackout, this would require satellite communication and shortwave radio. No information operations campaign against North Korea can proceed unilaterally, but must involve close coordination with U.S. allies in the region and the concurrence of the Republic of Korea.

There has been insufficient attention to information warfare in dealing with adversaries and potential adversaries, thus leaving the information battlespace virtually uncontested. Actor-specific behavioral models are required to counter adversaries, from international terrorists to rogue states. One cannot fight adversaries who are not understood. And what deters one given adversary could incite another. The actor-specific behavioral models in turn should be the foundation for tailored psychological warfare programs, designed to sever the links between leaders and their followers.

Implementing Complex Operations

Washington is a policy town. For many great issues, from the Marshall Plan to global warming, policy decisions are critical. But focusing on policy can lead to the notion that a decision taken is an action completed. In complex situations, this can be a dangerous assumption because it can limit understanding of time lags in what local people accept as reality to which they can react. Similarly, there is only beginning to be a focus on the need for the implementation of hundreds or thousands of subordinate actions that do not flow automatically from policy decisions.

One example of the illusionary quality of policy is the lag time between fiscal decisions and their impact in the field. The Bush administration decided to recommend additional funding for Afghanistan’s economic development in 2006. The recommendation, divided into a base budget and supplemental request, went to Congress in 2007. Votes occurred in the summer and autumn and funds were released to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Embassy in Kabul. For road work, for example, contracts had to be awarded, engineering studies written, and so forth. In many areas, winter halted construction. Dirt could not fly until spring 2008—18 months *after* the decision, which is a long time in war. Finding ways to move funds more quickly is a recurring problem in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other contingencies. It is a problem that will occur again unless more thought is given to solving it.

Another implementation issue is planning. Much has been said about the missed opportunity for greater prewar planning on Iraq. But a second area of tension is largely unstudied—namely, between the need to plan and need to act. The Afghan war could not have been foreseen before September 11, 2001, and once it began there was no time for detailed planning. Reconstruction needs were huge; in many cases, new construction was required since nothing was there beforehand. International knowledge of the country was fragmentary and telling the Afghans to wait a year or two for a plan was unacceptable. Performance had to begin with planning following behind. This meant that plans would change as the knowledge grew and mistakes were discovered.

The Office of Management and Budget pressed for a comprehensive, 5-year development plan, but there were two major problems. First, there was no way of realistically gauging what other donors would do in the out years, and resources might have to be shifted to cover their projects if they did not perform. The

second problem was that needs were seen differently as lessons were being learned. At the outset, infrastructure was not made a high priority. Then the requirement for a major ring road around the country became obvious. Later, a series of secondary roads were seen as basic building blocks in economic development. By 2006, the insurgency was growing and the need for tertiary roads in combat areas became more critical than earlier developmental criteria indicated. A long-term plan could have been written at any point along the way, but it would have been dated within 6 months. Under such conditions, planning must remain flexible, which is the antithesis of the kind of comprehensive plan that is usually called for.

When problems mount, certain proposals frequently reoccur—they are not inherently wrong, but they overpromise. The most common of these proposals are the calls for a new strategy, for a single point of coordination, and for a wiring diagram of the chain of command to bring about improvements on the ground. Efforts to achieve such policy fixes to implementation problems waste a great deal of time that could have been better used to make real improvements.

The national need for clear strategic direction is an important responsibility of the President. But in multinational operations, agreed strategy is usually developed at a high level of generality. In strategic planning in World War II, NATO strategy in Afghanistan, and international strategy in Bosnia, strategic direction were only the starting points, and rather general ones at that. The devil is in the details that must be sorted by national representatives on the ground, which include militaries, embassies, development agencies, international organizations, support groups, and local government where it exists. Agreement in any capital on the major goals does not automatically lead to agreement on how to achieve them any more than it will at Cabinet level in the U.S. Government. Lack of agreement leads to wasted motion, work conducted at cross purposes, gaps in meeting essential needs, inefficient use of available resources, and a great deal of finger pointing.

The response to these problems is usually to call for a coordinator or single point of control. A designated senior person can help the situation, but less than is popularly supposed. National authorities do not just salute and take orders. Development organizations in many countries do not report to foreign ministries, nor do they necessarily agree on priorities. Military commanders may be subordinate in theory to senior multinational commanders, but

the latter must deal with nationally imposed limits on their forces, or *caveats* in NATO parlance. In addition to caveats, these commanders must consult their national headquarters before executing orders. Although senior-level coordinators may be helpful, they are not panaceas. Another concern is the chain of command. In Afghanistan, there is a particularly murky chain with some U.S. forces reporting to U.S. Central Command and others under NATO reporting to U.S. European Command, and some even reporting to both. And all of them have responsibilities that overlap with the Ambassador.

The need for improvement is clearer than the solution. In Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as well as more traditional peacekeeping missions, actions by the military influence what civilians accomplish, and the reverse is true as well. The military refusal to arrest war criminals in Bosnia undercut the civilian authorities. Lack of progress in development and effective government in Afghanistan complicates the military task. The point is simply that while improving the chain of command will help, it will not remove overlapping responsibilities. And when the operation is multinational, the problem increases geometrically.

There are many lessons about implementation that have been learned but generally not acted upon, including the following:

- Washington needs a different interactive process with the field. Strategic guidance needs to be clearer and micromanagement lessened. Differences between agencies need resolution. Often what happens is bureaucratic compromise and excessive management of action plans instead of decisions taken to the President. Field views that should govern implementation are lost.

- Military and civilian leaders either have to reach comfortable working relationships, or Washington needs to replace leaders. Fruitful cooperation with successive military commanders in Afghanistan but disagreements in the early period of operations in Bosnia and Iraq were never resolved.

- The need to plan and implement simultaneously requires getting more staff and more qualified staff into the field quickly and keeping the numbers high enough, with good people, both to oversee project implementation and handle strategic planning. We continue to try to do both jobs with a staff adequate for only one of the two functions.

- USAID needs a substantially increased ability to move money faster. Accomplishing this will mean

many changes, but a few of the basic ones are more staff and more ability to contract directly with local contractors without ponderous, gigantic American umbrella contracts.

■ We need a way to find money faster and shift it between needs. Our current process is designed for long-term debate with two exceptions: emergency relief and certain military funds, which have the twin result of involving the military more and more in economic operations for which they lack long-term competence while draining military manpower and attention from key warfighting tasks. Congress must be part of the solution since they hold the purse strings.

■ Expand the staff of the Department of State (and USAID). Having more flexible tools and putting them in civilian hands only makes sense if there are hands to wield them; right now, there are not enough.

■ Non-U.S. coordinators have a particular importance to improving operation coordination on the ground if they have the right personality, mandate, and staff. They are not a simple solution but have a role because they avoid the reactions that come if America is perceived as trying to run everything. Too often, the personality gets the focus but lacks the mandate and the resources. All three must be seen as a package or major mismatches between means and ends will continue.

Better implementation by itself is insufficient; it is just muddling through by another name. In principle, there is no reason that both policy and implementation cannot be done, although the reality is that it is not. The U.S. military is drawing lessons on using its capabilities on the ground, but the civil sector is behind. Neither Congress nor previous administrations have changed funding levels, legal authorities, or staffing to increase efficiency. Until policy direction and implementation are improved to provide authority and resources, these problems will continue.

Peace, Prosperity, and Partnership

To tackle crucial issues of national security, it is necessary to develop an overarching framework to bring together disparate elements of potential solutions and organize them around the common aims of peace, prosperity, and partnership. After 8 years of polarizing foreign policy, the Nation must chart a fundamentally new course to maintain national security. Some may argue for a return to a more prag-

matic, interest-based approach to policymaking while other observers call for greater emphasis on soft or smart power as the best means of achieving national objectives. And still other perspectives cannot be discounted.

It is tempting to critique the Bush administration in the area of national security. But the reality is grim. Iraq and Afghanistan are failing states not salvageable by military force alone. Pakistan is fragile and hindered by a new government that cannot overcome past animosities and govern in its best interests. Moreover, Americans are ambivalent over the prospects of a different form of a cold war with China and Russia. The future of NATO hangs in the balance in Afghanistan and in the transformation from a military to a security-based alliance. Even in



AP Images (Anja Niedringhaus)

Railway workers and police examine debris of destroyed train at Madrid's Atocha station, March 2004

this hemisphere, the United States seems incapable of fashioning rational policies toward its neighbors whether in reforming immigration statutes, fighting narcotraffickers, or normalizing relations with Cuba. And the concern over the health of the domestic economy—given the crises in the banking, mortgage, and investment sectors—often relegates foreign policy to the political back-burner.

Virtually every international organization created to improve security, including economic development, arose either from World War II or in the early years of the Cold War. The UN, NATO, the World Bank, and other mature institutions were designed in, as well as for, a bygone era. Whether these aging organizations can be modernized, redirected, or supplanted presents a global challenge for the 21st century.

Despite the harshness of this assessment, the United States has opportunities to exploit. First, it can adopt global and regional instead of bilateral approaches to conducting foreign and defense policy. For example, Iraq cannot be secured without regional cooperation. Neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan can become stable unless both states tackle their common threats. And dealing with the nuclear weapons ambitions of Iran will require other powers to be coopted in this process. Hence, cooperation by states, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations is crucial. That demands a global perspective, with effective outreach to regional components.

A new administration offers the opportunity to restore American prestige, influence, and reputation. Discarding past shibboleths such as the *global war on terror* and the *with-us-or-against-us* mentality is crucial to changing the perception of the United States throughout the world. Developing a viable strategic communications plan to explain American policy will be vital in this effort, which is something that the Bush administration failed to accomplish.

It will be necessary to harness governmental assets as well as appropriate resources from the private sector to advance foreign and defense policy. This also will require incorporating allies, friends, and other states, as well as nongovernmental organizations. Unilateral action has a place, but multilateralism in the broadest sense must become the new watchword. With new leaders in many capitals of the world, opportunities exist to either improve or restore relations. There are also opportunities in the fact that virtually every nation has major common and shared interests. No state wants nuclear war, not even Iran. None supports ruining the environment or destroying the planet. Few states advocate terrorism, although the definition of what actually constitutes terror is not universally accepted. By identifying shared interests and building on them as a basis for foreign and defense policy, America should create new or exploit old opportunities.

The United States and its allies and friends are fortunate in having very capable populations. The issue is mobilizing them to serve. This is something that the military has done although the strain of constant deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan is taking a toll. The Nation must find a way to galvanize the public resolve and use it. People have been, are, and will be the most precious national asset. Too often governments only give lip service to this reality.

Before laying out a framework and strategy for foreign and defense policy, an assessment of the hier-

archy of challenges, choices, and priorities is crucial. Obviously, debate over each item is warranted, but some consensus can be reached over the major issues that will shape the future even if dealing with each one may spark sharply different opinions of how to proceed.

Four categories apply to the hierarchy of challenges, choices, and priorities. First, there are some issues that are common to or shared by states. A state is an entity with a duly constituted government that adheres to the rule of law and has rational leadership, though not always defined in American terms. Iran and North Korea would be considered states. Common interests fall into this category. The next category contains issues common to both allies and friends beyond the shared interests. The third category includes unique issues that reflect unilateral preferences or dictates arising from specific laws or domestic constituencies. Finally, there is a category of issues that are important to others but that can generate indifference, ignorance, or disagreement. Parts of the Arab and Islamic world fall into this category, where a clash of values and cultures frequently arises over misperception or misunderstanding can lead to conflict. In some cases, the United States assigns little or no legitimacy or rationality to opposing views and attitudes.

It will be necessary to deal with the environment, climate change, population, resources, regional instability, weapons of mass destruction, radical extremism, and so forth. What is important is that most of these issues are linked, and the solutions to one set have consequences for the others that too often are ignored. The conclusion is that policies and solutions must be comprehensive. An example of comprehensiveness is found in the way combatant commanders execute their responsibilities. The Unified Command Plan established 10 geographic and functional commands: U.S. Northern Command (homeland defense), U.S. Southern Command (Latin America), U.S. Central Command (Greater Middle East), U.S. European Command (Europe, Russia, and former Soviet republics), U.S. Pacific Command (Asia), U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command (transformation, doctrine, training, and experimentation), U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. Transportation Command.

U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is a case in point. USSOUTHCOM has few warfighting responsibilities, although it is waging the so-called war on drugs. Its major task is preventing conflicts and crises before they erupt. But because prevention

cuts across many agencies of government and the military tool is insufficient alone, USSOUTHCOM has reorganized to reflect interagency staffing in which the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce and the Drug Enforcement Administration bring more relevant expertise and resources for dealing with the issues than does the Department of Defense.

Another example of the comprehensive approach can be found in NATO and its failure so far to engage in Afghanistan for reasons that go beyond the jurisdiction or mandate of the Alliance. NATO is basically in charge of the security sector, aiding and assisting the Afghan government in dealing with insurgency. But the country will only succeed with a functioning and legitimate government that provides basic services such as law and order, enfranchisement, employment, education, electricity, and water while tackling rampant corruption, crime, and the drug trade. A comprehensive plan to embrace these issues with clear responsibilities assigned and the means to establish accountability is essential. That has not happened and is a crucial reason why after nearly 7 years of conflict, Afghanistan has been unable to achieve internal stability.

The construct of peace, prosperity, and partnership seeks to achieve peace, which is defined as an absence of violence and the presence of stability, and prosperity, which means enhancing standards of living, through global, regional, and bilateral partnerships. With the proliferation of nongovernmental organizations, alliances, and other forms of international cooperation, great utility and promise rest in exploiting, integrating, and putting to better use an appropriate mix of these organizations committed to enhancing the goals of peace and prosperity.

While the United States once regarded itself as the sole superpower and drew on its power to lead the free world, it is time to abandon that position. Instead, because of its strength, America might become the great facilitator and enabler in forging new relationships even in areas where it may not be directly engaged or involved. Three examples demonstrate how this can and should be done: the NATO Alliance, maritime partnerships, and West Africa.

Politically, NATO is foundering. Of its 28 members, a majority opposes U.S. engagement in Iraq, fears that Washington might attack Iran, and is divided over Afghanistan. Strategically and structurally, NATO faces two dilemmas. The first involves the heart of the Alliance, Article V, which regards an attack against one as an attack against all members. Understood in the days of the Cold War as a military

strike by the Soviet Union into Europe, it is unclear what an attack would constitute today. On September 12, 2001, NATO invoked Article V for the first time after attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. But after Estonia was hit by a cyber attack that disrupted much of its electronics sector, no such invocation occurred. Even had it been clear that the perpetrator was a state, it is uncertain whether it was covered under Article V. The other dilemma involves Russia in the wake of the expansion of the Alliance after the Cold War. The establishment of the NATO-Russia Council was merely a palliative. Moscow's rising influence in an oil-hungry global community is unmistakable, as is its willingness to flex its muscle to the detriment of some NATO Allies. Russia is something the Alliance cannot defer indefinitely.

NATO's 60th anniversary in 2009 offers a great opportunity to interact with other security organizations, an activity that the United States can facilitate. It has begun outreach in the Middle East, Mediterranean, Australia, and Japan. The Shanghai Cooperative Organization, which consists of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with India, Pakistan, and Iran as observers, is an ideal objective. It would give the Alliance global reach through the exchange of observers and information, multinational contingency planning, and even joint military exercises.

Another example is maritime partnerships, which involve the U.S. Navy in a voluntary system of exchanging information at sea that could be expanded to coordinated operations from countering piracy to rescue and humanitarian missions. States can participate as much or little as they wish. But the net result would be a maritime security system that can be applied to a variety of tasks.

Finally, there is the Gulf of Guinea initiative in West Africa that was conceived by U.S. European Command and now is being conducted under the auspices of U.S. Africa Command. It assists local states in building a maritime regime to secure the energy infrastructure, including protection of the sealanes, with indigenous resources to provide both surveillance and at-sea capability.

The United States desperately needs a new national security strategy. Peace, prosperity, and partnership are the keystones of such a strategy: the global and regional appreciation of security, multilateral rather than bilateral preferences, and genuine humility in conducting security affairs. The challenges that the Nation faces are enormous, but the opportunities are extraordinary. **gsa**

Contributors

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