Chapter 18

National Security Reform and the Security Environment

The Three Pillars of Reform

Inadequate interagency coordination could be dubbed the “weather issue” for national security professionals over the past decade; the persistent topic of conversation in the national security community that affects everybody but that nobody can do anything about. Almost all major national security studies note interagency coordination is inadequate (see table 1). Moreover, from the outset of the global war on terror, President George W. Bush made it clear that national strategy would not depend exclusively on military power but rather on the integrated diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other capabilities of the Nation. Yet in the 7-plus years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and despite numerous efforts at reform, interagency coordination remains inadequate according to many leaders of the executive and legislative branches, as well as practitioners and experts in the field.

Cross-organizational collaboration thus emerges as a key leadership requirement and an imperative for more effectively managing regional security. Coordination also is a feature of professional military and interagency education, and an essential prerequisite for stabilization operations, intelligence collection, and homeland security activities. Although notable progress has been made in this area, a great deal more still needs to be done.

Growing Concern

The burgeoning consensus on the need to better integrate elements of national power has been a long time coming and dates back to the Cold War. Diplomats once safeguarded national interests in peacetime, while the military assumed that role in wartime. Although a simplification, that division of labor mirrored the American penchant for separating peace and war as different conditions that required either diplomatic or military competencies. Vestiges of the tendency to categorize security problems by discrete elements of national power remain, and that arrangement is not without some merit. However, containment of the Soviet Union helped cement the notion on the strategic level that all elements of national power had to be integrated to succeed. The National Security Act of 1947 codified this approach by establishing, inter alia, the National Security Council to assist the President in integrating American strategy.

Vietnam and other conflicts during the Cold War, as well as recent threats from proliferation, terrorism, and regional instability in 1980s and 1990s, have extended the consensus on integrating elements of national power from strategic planning to the actual conduct of military operations. A lesson from interventions in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, for example, was that success required significant cooperation among the government departments and agencies that control diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other elements of power, not only in Washington, but also in the field. At all levels, this problem involves both efficiency and effectiveness. Some security problems cannot be efficiently resolved by a single instrument of power, irrespective of level and quality of effort, and others cannot be resolved effectively at all without the well-integrated use of multiple instruments of power.

Defeating such threats requires not only diverse elements of power, but also command and control assets to make complicated decisions on which instrument takes precedence in which situation. Will collateral damage from bombing terrorist hideouts be justified by the bombing’s impact on the enemy? Is marginal financial assistance best spent on training indigenous forces or infrastructure projects to win local support from terrorists? Can short-term manipulation of information in support of military operations be justified when it damages the credibility of local authorities?

The Nation does not have the capacity to make tradeoffs to integrate and apply instruments of power—not for the “war on terror” or other security challenges that require integrated responses. An increasing number of defense and foreign policy experts believe that the United States must reform the national security system. In fact, in a recent
survey of over 250 books, articles, and studies on the subject, only 1 concluded that interagency coordination works well. Many experts have made the case for wholesale changes in the national security system to ensure interagency activities are integrated in the same way as joint military operations were reformed under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (see table 2).

Various initiatives to improve interagency coordination were undertaken prior to September 11, 2001, but the investigation of those terrorist events proved those initiatives to be insufficient. Similarly, many reforms subsequently enacted are proving inadequate. Before additional reforms with their associated costs are pursued, there must be greater assurance that the reforms will produce the desired outcome. To provide that assurance, recommendations on reforming national security policy must rest on three fundamental pillars of reform: rigorous problem analysis, multidisciplinary approaches, and a resolve to embrace solutions regardless of attendant political costs.

**Problem Analysis**

Although the need for interagency collaboration is clear, the problems involved are complex. Few studies that advocate national security system reform explain the inadequate collaboration of interagency activities. Most of these sources identify problems such as inadequate intelligence or inefficient unity of effort and then go into an exposition of ways to fix the problem. The lack of attention to problem analysis can produce recommendations based on conventional wisdom rather than the careful examination of the facts. For example, popular accounts of the national security system observe its flexibility. They claim that the President changes structures and processes to match his decisionmaking style. This is true, but these changes are superficial and have little impact on the performance of the national security system. Actually, the system is rigid and dominated by powerful bureaucracies that frustrate or veto collaboration when it runs counter to their interests. A number of Presidents have lamented the inflexibility of the system after leaving office.

Some assume that the National Security Council staff would be more efficient if its size was reduced and its bureaucracy eliminated. This observation was popularized during an investigation of the Eisenhower administration by Senator Henry Jackson and has become commonly accepted. Yet it is wrong. Presidents who have reduced the staff have not seen a corresponding increase in effectiveness. Moreover, such cuts are typically short-lived. The trend following the Cold War has been the slow but sure growth of the staff, not because national security advisors like large staffs but because the workload is crushing. The idea that a staff of 200 or 300 could oversee a national security establishment of approximately 4 million is unrealistic. Compared to other agency headquarters that are supposed to provide integration across functional divisions (such as the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency) and supply a range of services, the National Security Council staff is small and obviously insufficient. It is probably more important to increase its authority than its size, but both reforms are necessary.

Another mistaken bit of conventional wisdom is that leadership matters, while organizations do not.

U.S. Customs inspector checks seaport containers from ship at Port of Miami
Strangely, this observation is made in two different and contradictory ways. Some claim that the national security system is effective when managed by a few powerful leaders, perhaps with the President working only with a potent national security advisor (such as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger or Jimmy Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski). Alternatively, it is asserted that the system would function better if top leadership shared decisionmaking and consisted of people who knew, liked, and respected each other. But neither style of leadership ensures interagency collaboration. Strong national security advisors can formulate clear national policy by going around established interagency processes. However, during the policy implementation they encounter resistance from the same agencies and organizations they ignored during policy development. More collegial national security advisors may succeed in keeping organizational differences less public, but interagency frictions persist and still militate against unity of effort.

### Table 1. The Need to Reform Interagency Coordination

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Security Reform Studies</th>
<th>Excerpts from Studies (with emphasis added)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, 1997</strong></td>
<td>The national security apparatus established 50 years ago must adapt itself as it takes on a growing list of new challenges and responsibilities. It so far has been unable to integrate smoothly the resources and organizations needed to anticipate and mold a more secure international environment.</td>
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<td><strong>U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (Hart-Rudman), 2001</strong></td>
<td>Traditional national security agencies (State, Defense, CIA, NSC staff) will need to work together in new ways, and economic agencies (Treasury, Commerce, U.S. Trade Representative) will need to work more closely with the traditional national security community. In addition, other players, especially Justice and Transportation, will need to be integrated more fully into national security processes.</td>
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<td><strong>Beyond Goldwater Nichols: Phase 1, 2004</strong></td>
<td>The past decade of experience in complex contingency operations, from Somalia to Iraq, has demonstrated that success requires unity of effort not only from the military but also from across the U.S. government and an international coalition. In most cases, however, such unity of effort has proved elusive. Time and time again, the United States and its international partners have failed to fully integrate the political, military, economic, humanitarian and other dimensions into a coherent strategy for a given operation—sometimes with disastrous results.</td>
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<td><strong>9/11 Commission Report, 2004</strong></td>
<td>In each of our examples, no one was firmly in charge of managing the case. . . . Responsibility and accountability were diffuse. The agencies cooperated, some of the time. But even such cooperation as there was is not the same thing as joint action. . . . The problem is nearly intractable because of the way the government is currently structured.</td>
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<td><strong>In the Wake of War, Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force, 2005</strong></td>
<td>Despite some welcome initial moves, responsibility within the U.S. government for stabilization and reconstruction operations is diffuse and authority is uncertain. Policies delineating the proper role of the military and civilian agencies have yet to be articulated. Further, the civilian agencies involved in stabilization and reconstruction activities operate without the benefit of a “unified command” structure ensuring that policy, programs, and resources are properly aligned.</td>
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<td><strong>The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction</strong></td>
<td>Everywhere we looked, we found important (and obvious) issues of interagency coordination that went unattended, sensible Community-wide proposals blocked by pockets of resistance, and critical disputes left to fester. Strong interagency cooperation was more likely to result from bilateral “treaties” between big agencies than from Community-level management. This ground was well-plowed by the 9/11 Commission and by several other important assessments of the Intelligence Community over the past decade.</td>
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<td><strong>Project Horizon, 2006</strong></td>
<td>U.S. Government interagency effort too often lacks effective concentration of attention, resources, action and accountability.</td>
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<td><strong>A Smarter, More Secure America, CSIS Commission on Smart Power, 2007</strong></td>
<td>Implementing a smart power strategy will require a strategic reassessment of how the U.S. government is organized, coordinated, and budgeted.</td>
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<td><strong>America’s Role in the World, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2008</strong></td>
<td>The U.S. government does neither vertical coordination within agencies nor horizontal coordination between agencies well.</td>
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<td><strong>Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility, U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2008</strong></td>
<td>The subcommittee found a lack of unity of direction and unity of command. This results in a lack of unity of purpose. Among the efforts at staffing, training, applying lessons learned, and planning, there is no one person or organization in the lead for the whole of government.</td>
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There are two reasons why in-depth problem analysis is uncommon despite its obvious value. First, it is impolitic. It seems uncharitable to dissect the performance of people who are working hard under pressure to produce favorable outcomes. While it is possible to differentiate between the system and the leaders, it proves hard in practice to separate the two. Thus, some studies avoid detailed problem analysis and focus on ways of improving things. Second, problem analysis is difficult. As competing case studies illustrate, it can be hard to agree on the explanation for any given national security event. It is more challenging to explain system performance, since many variables influence outcomes and shift over time. Some experienced practitioners doubt that national security system performance can be explained with any precision. Hence, there is a tendency to identify a range of variables that are influential without assessing their relative merits. Yet the value of any recommendation on reform cannot exceed an understanding of the problems that the reform is intended to fix.

**Table 2. National Security Reform Studies**

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<th>Objective</th>
<th>Key Provisions</th>
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<td>Strengthen civilian authority</td>
<td>“The secretary has sole and ultimate power within the Department of Defense on any matter on which the secretary chooses to act.”</td>
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| Improve military advice | Designated Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as principal military adviser  
Created JCS Vice Chairman position  
Directed the JCS Chairman to manage the Joint Staff |
| Place clear responsibility on combatant commanders for missions | Specified chain of command; removed JCS from the chain of command  
Ensured a combatant commander authority is commensurate with his responsibilities  
Prescribed authority of unified commanders |
| Increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning | Required Chairman to prepare fiscally constrained strategy  
Required Secretary of Defense to provide contingency planning guidance |
| Provide for the more efficient use of resources | Assigned six new duties to JCS Chairman on resource advice |
| Improve joint officer management | Established procedures for the selection, education, assignment, and promotion of joint officers |
| Enhance effectiveness of military operations | Assigned Chairman responsibility for joint doctrine and joint training policies |
| Improve DOD management | Reduced spans of control  
Mandated reductions in headquarters staffs |


**Broad Scope**

In-depth problem analysis becomes manageable if its scope is limited. Many studies of national security reform consider some portion of the entire national security system. Although the studies are valuable, the system can only be improved when examined holistically (see figure 1). In national security affairs, this means both the executive and legislative branches. Congress plays a key role in national security, codifying the responsibilities of departments and agencies, providing largesse, confirming officials, and overseeing national policy and its implementation. Yet many studies ignore Congress either because its reform is considered too difficult or because the experts consulted focus exclusively on the activities of the executive branch.

A holistic approach to the national security system requires looking at its diverse ingredients: leadership, structure, processes, human capital, resources, and so-called knowledge management. Some studies of national security reform are based on particular areas of organizational expertise such as human
capital, and many draw exclusively on practitioners and experts, but rarely do the studies adopt a broad scope of inquiry. Many national security reform efforts focus narrowly on one dimension of the system, particularly infrastructure. One pervading opinion on the inadequacy of reforms that led to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security was that the consolidation of 22 different agencies was emphasized to the exclusion of many other considerations such as organizational cultures, processes, and personnel incentives.

Another example of an insufficient organizational perspective is the current popularity of the recommendation to combine the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council. Because concerns such as shipping containers transiting American ports cross the line between domestic and international security affairs, it is assumed that combining these two councils will lead to a seamless approach to national security issues. But it is also important to consider other factors, such as culture, process, and leadership. Decisions are difficult to make in large, formal groups, which explains why the President uses the National Security Council primarily as a sounding board rather than for decisionmaking. Moreover, there are differences in operational cultures of foreign and domestic security organizations that must be accepted. Thus, the idea of combining the councils, which already have large formal and informal memberships, could reduce the willingness of the President to use the structure for decisionmaking. Instead, it would reinforce the pronounced tendency to make decisions in smaller, informal settings.

Figure 1. National Security System

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<tr>
<th>System Leadership/Management</th>
<th>Other System Functions</th>
<th>Organizational Elements</th>
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<tr>
<td>‣ Direction</td>
<td>‣ Sensemaking (warning)</td>
<td>‣ Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‣ Vision, goals, strategy</td>
<td>‣ Issue Management</td>
<td>‣ Structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‣ Communications</td>
<td>‣ Including external relations</td>
<td>‣ Processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‣ Resource Allocation</td>
<td>‣ Capacity Building</td>
<td>‣ Human Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‣ Decision Capabilities</td>
<td>‣ Decision Support</td>
<td>‣ Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‣ Best practices</td>
<td></td>
<td>‣ Knowledge Management</td>
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While effective reform of the national security system requires a multidisciplinary approach, the task ought to be distinguished from extant policies. Since reform efforts draw heavily on the experience of experts and practitioners, they tend to concentrate on policy prescriptions. In other words, instead of examining how and why the system functions as it does, most studies offer advice on specific issues. Policy analysis is valuable but, when mixed together with studies of national security reform focused on reorganization, detracts from pinpointing impediments to better performance.

Solutions

Assembling diverse expertise for holistic, multidisciplinary analysis and ensuring that it is grounded in practical knowledge of the national security system is a major challenge. Even when this occurs, there is another pitfall to be avoided: premature compromises that vitiate the impact of proffered solutions. Some national security reform study teams have conducted broad analysis but limit their recommendations to those supported by the team or considered politically practical. In doing so, they reduce the recommendations to half-measures that do not actually solve the problems that have been identified through hard work.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (commonly known as the 9/11 Commission) produced a report that serves as a cautionary tale. Well researched and written, the report identified major problems in the system and noted that effective management of transnational counterterrorist operations was missing, which was explained by the inability to collaborate. In the words of the report: “The agencies are like a set of specialists in a hospital, each ordering tests, looking for symptoms, and prescribing medications. What is missing is the attending physician who makes sure they work as a team.”

As the commission report indicated, the problems cannot be resolved without adjustments in the authorities of Cabinet officials. The report is worth quoting at length on this point:

"The problem is nearly intractable because of the way the government is currently structured. Lines of operational authority run to the expanding executive departments, and they are guarded for understandable reasons: the [Director of Central Intelligence] commands the CIA’s personnel overseas; the secretary of defense will not yield to others in conveying commands to military forces; the Justice Department will not give up the responsibility of deciding whether to seek arrest warrants. But the result is that each agency or department needs its own intelligence apparatus to support the performance of its duties. It is hard to “break down stovepipes” when there are so many stoves that are legally and politically entitled to have cast-iron pipes of their own.

Recalling the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986, Secretary Rumsfeld reminded us that to achieve better joint capability, each of the armed services had to “give up some of their turf and authorities and prerogatives.” Today, he said, the executive branch is “stove-piped much like the four services were nearly 20 years ago.” He wondered if it might be appropriate to ask agencies to “give up some of their existing turf and authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more efficient government wide joint effort.” Privately, other key officials have made the same point to us.

Given these conclusions it is surprising the 9/11 Commission did not also recommend circumscribing the authorities of Cabinet officers to ensure that counterterrorism operations would be managed on an interagency basis. Instead, it called for creating the National Counterterrorism Center, which was charged only with planning. The report stipulated that the center would not have responsibility for either policymaking or directing operations. The best
recommendation that a consensus would permit was an interagency organization for planning support.

The cumulative effect of national security reforms in recent decades is mixed. The need for greater collaboration and the dismal track record of efforts to provide it underscore the arguments for systemic reform. On the other hand, a degree of reorganization fatigue also has been setting in. While the time is ripe for systemic reform, no plan should be embraced without assurances that it will generate major and lasting improvements. The cost of a failed reform effort would be high, dampening any enthusiasm for changing the system in the future. Organizational reform efforts typically pass through an initial phase of lower productivity before generating better results, so a failure in executing a major overhaul of the current system would be far more costly. For this reason, proponents of systemic reform should be held to the highest standards and required to demonstrate an understanding of impediments to system performance, a holistic plan for reform, and a set of recommendations to solve identified problems.

Refining Jointness

Overall, the joint command system that has evolved since the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 has worked well and improved the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. Combatant commanders have clear authority and responsibility for military planning and operations within their regions and have often taken the lead in overall national security strategy in those areas of responsibility. In addition to smaller joint deployments, U.S. forces have been committed to major operations nine times since the Goldwater-Nichols Act became law and the Cold War ended.

The joint reform in the Department of Defense has been so successful that there have been proposals to extend the principles of joint military operations to integrate interagency operations. A study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies made such a recommendation, and the Project on National Security Reform, which is funded by Congress, has issued preliminary findings highlighting the segmented nature of interagency operations and calling for improved collaboration. Although extending the principles of jointness to the national security system has definite merit, it is time to look closely at the state of joint doctrine and organization.

Joint planning and operations can be improved through closer and more formal involvement of Service chiefs and component commanders. The Goldwater-Nichols Act made the combatant commanders, together with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responsible to the Secretary of Defense for planning and operations in their areas of responsibility and also relieved the chiefs and subordinate commanders of those responsibilities. The chiefs, who are concerned with the needs of their respective Services, were considered liabilities in joint planning and operations. They were believed to be more interested in Service prerogatives than the overall success of joint operations. The consultations among the Joint Chiefs, based on compromise, were thought to result in watered-down plans that awarded a piece of the action to each Service. During operations, the chiefs were faulted for meddling in the chain of command for the benefit of their Services.

Such concerns were justified by egregious cases in the past, such as the rivalry and confused chain of command during the Vietnam War. Operation Desert Storm, less than 5 years after passage of Goldwater-Nichols, showed flashes of inter-Service rivalry as well as moments of inspiring inter-Service integration. Today, senior officers have spent most of their professional careers in the Goldwater-Nichols world and comprise a new generation committed to jointness. By segregating the chiefs in Washington and the component commanders from the joint planning and operations process, the Armed Forces are losing the effectiveness of joint capabilities.

There are three compelling reasons why Service component commanders should be involved in planning at the regional level and Service chiefs should be involved at the national level and personally participate in the monitoring and adjustment of ongoing joint operations:

- Component commanders and Service chiefs have significant and relevant operational experience and can improve a plan, detect problems with operations, and recommend fixes.
- Because they are responsible for providing Service forces to the joint task forces that will carry out operations, they have valuable ideas on Service capabilities. With their responsibility for supporting operations, they will have an understanding of the limits of an operation, which are often crucial.
- If they have been involved in the planning and closely followed the progress of an operation, they will be committed to its success if it runs into difficulties.

There are a number of negative and positive examples in the interaction of joint commanders and
Service components in the decades since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

In the months preceding the invasion of Iraq, the primary concern of the chiefs, based on their experience in earlier operations, was weaknesses in the planning of phase four. Their views were expressed in various ways, including the testimony by General Eric Shinseki before the Senate Armed Services Committee. However, without a formal role in the planning process, their views carried little weight, and they had no way to table recommendations to improve the plans. Once Baghdad fell, tensions immediately arose between the newly formed staff of Multinational Force–Iraq and the Service staffs back in Washington. The former group of officers, mostly serving on temporary duty, felt that the coalition was losing control of Iraq and called for additional forces. The Services were concerned about the readiness of personnel and equipment worn down by the deployment and subsequent operations. Had the chiefs been involved in planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, they could have fashioned recommendations to address both concerns.

In Kosovo, the Service chiefs played a more important role, although the process was far from smooth. In that case, the combatant commander launched an air operation that initially failed to achieve its objectives. When he requested that ground units be deployed, and in particular the Army’s Apache attack helicopters, the opposition on the Joint Chiefs of Staff played a role in delaying and reducing the effectiveness of the deployed forces. The combatant commander continued the operation using U.S. airpower with the informal cooperation from irregular units of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Eventually, the operation achieved its political objectives. The operation would have been more effective and succeeded more quickly if the original concept had included a branch plan based on the deployment of ground units. The Service chiefs would have participated in approving the plan, come to an agreement with the combatant commander on the conditions under which the branch plan would be activated, and prepared the necessary units to be on call.

When U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) organized the U.S. role in Australian-led operations in East Timor, component commanders were fully involved in the planning. One of the conditions of American participation included the decision not to contribute ground forces. The component commanders proposed ways to improve the U.S. contribution to the presence by the United Nations (UN) without deploying ground forces. In the operation, according to the Australian commanders of UN forces, the capabilities of the American contingent were crucial to its success.

In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, USPACOM deployed a small joint special operations task force to the southern Philippines to help the indigenous forces combat Abu Sayaf, a criminal/terrorist gang. Previously, task forces had been quick operations and did not require sustained logistics support. In this case, it was clear the operation would be long and new arrangements would have to be made. After intense discussion with USPACOM and approval from the Department of the Army, U.S. Army Pacific took on the responsibility. As the operation continued and tasks evolved, there was never any issue of providing logistic support. With the long-term commitment of the component commander, the mission continued.

The successes in USPACOM have been on a smaller scale than those of U.S. Central Command in Iraq or U.S. European Command in Kosovo. The command arrangements as well as the personalities were different, but the underlying command and control issue remained the same: reconciling the responsibilities of operational and Service component commanders. Both Service and component commanders fear exhausting operational forces, making them unable to meet new contingencies or build capabilities for the future. Operational commanders always want a comfortable margin to ensure mission success when unexpected but inevitable reverses arise in the field. The best way of reconciling legitimate and important differences in responsibilities is bringing...
leaders and their staffs into the same process where issues can be aired, analyzed, and decided.

When Service leaders and their staffs are brought into the joint process, the results are good. Gone are the days when leaders assume their Services can fight and win conflicts by themselves. On the contrary, when Service leaders are brought into the joint planning process, they become committed to mission success, and always come up with positive, innovative, and practical ways to integrate their Service with their joint partners to achieve mission success. It is the successful joint commander from joint task force level to the President himself who takes advantage of this joint wisdom of the leadership of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.

The Evolution of U.S. Southern Command

Problems in Latin America and the Caribbean, from drug cartels to natural disasters, increasingly demand interagency approaches. U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) has recognized these dynamics, and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense became an interagency-oriented command. The effects of the information age highlight various policy issues worth examining systematically, especially in light of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). USSOUTHCOM will continue to conduct military operations and security cooperation activities, while enhancing its ability to partner with private and public sector counterparts as well as the interagency community, in order to more effectively and efficiently promote and safeguard U.S. national interests within the region.

Challenges and Opportunities

In the USSOUTHCOM area of focus, which includes the Caribbean, Central America, South America, and adjacent waters, there are two tiers of concern. On one level, there are underlying social and economic challenges such as poverty, corruption, and income inequality. Many countries within the region experience disparities of wealth among their citizens, with attendant corruption problems. These socioeconomic inequalities complicate national development and contribute to instability. On another level, security issues pose serious threats. While the potential for state-to-state conflict remains relatively low, the United States must be vigilant, as incidents in 2008 along the Colombian border with Ecuador demonstrated. In addition, USSOUTHCOM faces

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Twenty-first Century Diplomacy

The Obama administration has inherited myriad recommendations on addressing challenges to the Nation as well as various plans designed to implement reforms in national security. One issue that all of the proposals have in common is the need for effective diplomatic action. Looking to the future, the United States must focus on emerging trends, threats, and opportunities; examine the means of conducting diplomacy; analyze relevant studies and findings; and prioritize the tasks required to ensure successful efforts to transform the institutions of American diplomacy.

One major challenge to diplomacy in the 21st century is extremism, which includes terrorists and their networks outside war zones. Such groups threaten the democracies that Philip Bobbit calls nations of consent by undermining their ways of life. This threat to liberty must be defeated. Another major challenge is extending pluralism and globalization to those people who have not benefited from them. Rising disparities in standards of living around the world that result from globalization are directly connected to the spread of extremism. To stem the rise of extremism in poverty-stricken areas, it is essential to bring processes of democracy and open markets to people who need opportunities to choose their own destiny. A third major challenge is nonproliferation. President John Kennedy predicted that 10 to 15 nuclear powers would emerge in the world. That day is rapidly approaching. Nuclear weapons must not fall into the hands of rogue states or nonstate actors who flout international laws and agreements. Finally, a major challenge is being posed to sustainable living that requires changing some basic attitudes on the environment. Although the current fear over the availability of critical resources is largely focused on energy, there will be concern in the future over supplies of water, food, and other essentials.

Diplomacy will benefit from national security reform that emphasizes collaborative solutions to issues that the Nation cannot address unilaterally. Such an approach calls for a strategic long view of international affairs because it is no longer possible to function on a case-by-case basis. American diplomats must not be reactive—content to report on conditions from abroad and then allow others to make decisions—but proactive. They will be tasked to carry out active policy responsibilities, working inside and outside of Embassies and overseas missions. Americans on the frontlines of diplomacy will have operational roles in
dealing with issues such as trafficking in people and drugs. One important aspect of diplomacy in the 21st century will be simultaneity, which requires analyzing issues within the broader context of their overall environment because no single issue holds the key to all others, which must be dealt with simultaneously.

The threat of extremism must be checked by increasing the effectiveness of not only military but also political means, particularly civil-military constructs, such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization emphasis on countering narcotics in Afghanistan is one case in point. Promoting democratic pluralism in troubled states, especially given current economic and financial problems, requires going back to fundamentals. An agenda that includes spreading democracy, free market institutions, and rule of law must emphasize American values. Despite other international commitments, the United States must support human rights around the globe. Diplomacy must be retained on the agenda because it has strategic value. To curb the spread of nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty must be revised to take account of international developments and persuade emerging nuclear powers to act responsibly. Efforts by Sam Nunn, Henry Kissinger, and other statesmen have been instrumental in focusing attention on this issue. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency must be strengthened and resourced, and regional conflicts that have prompted nuclear proliferation must be mediated. U.S. and allied influence is needed to prevent further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to ensure the development and fielding of missile defense systems.

Among the issues confronting the Nation is the sustainability of the environment. Americans are beginning to realize that energy security is not their only domestic problem and that changes in climate are impacting relations with neighbors and allies. For example, the opening by climate change of navigable Arctic sealanes through formerly ice-locked northern regions introduces new international trade and resource considerations in strategic relations with Canada. The east-west energy corridor that reaches from Central Asia to the developed nations of Europe has important consequences for all parties concerned since the uninterrupted supply of oil and natural gas is not only a vital economic necessity but also a critical political and strategic interest. Russia and the Caucasus are leveraging energy issues to influence their regional and international agendas. These issues have led some to suggest extending guarantees under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to energy security and protecting Alliance members against the manipulation of supplies. Finally, there is the growing issue of climate change. Although once ignored by many countries, its potential danger for humankind has forced governments to consider actions to curb its impact. In sum, there are many ways to change institutions to meet the challenges of the future.

Washington think tanks and policy centers have made a variety of dynamic recommendations on transforming American diplomacy. In a report on what is known as smart power, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) argued that the image of the United States is linked to how it promotes itself and that the ability to persuade others is as relevant as military strength. Active diplomacy provides an opportunity for the Nation to promote its ideals around the globe. Efforts to address global health issues such as HIV/AIDS and malaria illustrate how instruments of so-called soft power (that is, persuasive rather than coercive tools) can influence views of the United States. Another CSIS report, “The Embassy of the Future,” stressed the importance of preparing diplomatic personnel and constructing diversified platforms for active frontline missions abroad. In a report entitled “Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future,” the Stimson Center drew attention to the crisis in human capital that faces American Embassies and diplomatic missions overseas as well as the Department of State itself at home.
Strengthening agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development will be as critical as reforming international institutions such as the United Nations Security Council and the Group of Seven. It is necessary to restructure civilian agencies both to rationalize chains of command and reduce interagency rivalries in the way that the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 reformed the defense establishment. In addition, the Project on National Security Reform has proposed ways to deal with a globalized world in which the United States must protect itself against a range of multidimensional threats. These recommendations offer a solid basis for implementing concepts to reform national security structures and processes and should be considered by the Obama administration.

Among the tasks required to transform American diplomacy is the need to change the attitude of national leaders. Diplomacy has been viewed as a tool of weakness used to make concessions. This negative attitude minimizes the proper role of diplomacy in conducting international affairs. Both civilian and military communities must support the enhancement of diplomatic capabilities. The fact that one of the vocal advocates of building diplomatic efforts is Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is indicative of the need for fundamental change in attitudes toward diplomacy.

Another task needed to revive American diplomacy is accountability. The rapid expansion of responsibilities for conducting diplomatic efforts has diffused accountability among departments, agencies, and special teams with overlapping mandates. When problems do arise, the absence of clear lines of accountability prevents effective decisions from being reached. This deficit must be addressed. There must be real transparency and someone ready to take responsibility.

Finally, there must be sustained efforts to develop the organizations and resources needed to reorient and expand the U.S. diplomatic corps. The prospect of tackling complex international issues raises the question of the availability of skilled people. In addition to career development and educational opportunities to groom the next generation of diplomats, ways must be found to enhance the ability of seasoned diplomats to deal with a changing world. This task involves both expanding knowledge and sharing information. It is essential to adopt new technologies together with practices to maximize the impact of diplomacy. To be effective, American diplomats must venture outside the confines of their Embassies and move into towns and the countryside. This practice will require shifting from risk avoidance to risk management to connect with indifferent or hostile groups and finding ways to communicate with a wider range of audiences.

The success of the Nation depends on pursuing active diplomacy, promoting national values, demonstrating integrity and accountability, and strengthening cooperation with allies and friends, all with the backing of the strongest military in the world. Although the United States has the capacity to act unilaterally in defense of its interests if required, it should strengthen alliances and partnerships as a positive way of enhancing its vital diplomatic role in the world.

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transnational security challenges such as narcotrafficking, urban gangs, inadequate disaster preparedness, and illicit movement of people across the region. If unchecked or unaddressed, these security challenges can aggravate traditional animosities and complicate latent bilateral issues, possibly leading to cross-border conflict. These transnational security challenges can destabilize partner nations and weaken fragile civil institutions.

A current that runs through these challenges is the need for a concerted interagency response. Historically, senior leaders have guided those departments, agencies, and related capabilities that protect the Nation from threats and assist partners, a process known as interagency coordination. Although there has been marked progress over the years in this whole-of-government approach, it remains clear that the government is not properly aligned across structural lines to systemically address challenges that the United States and its partners are encountering in the region. Against this backdrop of challenges are cultural, economic, and political trends that form building blocks for new approaches to enhancing national security in the hemisphere. Culturally, the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean share growing demographic links with the potential to alter national security interests over the next few decades. By 2050, nearly one-third of U.S. citizens may have a Latino heritage, which is a twofold increase over the 15 percent figure today. With these changes have come social and cultural trends that will likely increase the emphasis given by U.S. leaders to hemispheric and regional national security issues in the future.

Economically, the United States has vibrant relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, with substantial bilateral trade and commercial exchanges. With the large numbers of both legal and illegal immigrants entering the United States from the region, the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean receive significant financial support from the remittances of these immigrants. For example, Inter-American Development Bank studies estimate that $66.5 billion flowed to the region in remittances during 2007, with about three-quarters of it originating in the United States. Remittances are critical to countries such as Guyana, where the cash flows represent 43 percent of its gross national product. Almost 40 percent of all U.S. foreign trade involves the Americas, more than any other macro region in the

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Strategic Leadership

Strategic leadership has many characteristics in common with leadership at lower levels, but it also has some that are distinctive. There are six that we think will be particularly relevant to strategic leaders in the future: intellectual openness, nuance, intellectual agility, integration, teamwork, and ethics.

Intellectual openness. Because the scope of strategic leadership is so wide and the range of opinions on strategic issues is so diverse, leaders must be open to different points of view. Indeed, they should encourage subordinates, peers, and others to express their views as directly as possible—from those in the corridors of power and the public at large to allies and friends abroad. No one has a monopoly on relevant experience and practical wisdom about the complex issues facing American leadership.

Nuance. The problems that occupy the inboxes of strategic leaders involve ambiguity and complexity. If they were unambiguous and simple, they would be solved at lower levels. Strategic leaders must be able to recognize and deal with this ambiguity and complexity and the shades of nuance that they present. This requires effective skills in managing cognitive dissonance, for evidence and argumentation usually send conflicting signals. Denial is not one of those skills. Leaders may be able to deny that they perceive cognitive dissonance, but cannot make the conflicting signals disappear by denying them. A well-developed appreciation for nuance would generally reject an either/or approach, which in itself denies ambiguity and complexity. For military leaders in particular, this means that tactics, techniques, and procedures—though important, even necessary—may not always be up to the task at hand, which leads to consideration of another quality.

Intellectual agility. Strategic leaders do not have single-issue inboxes nor do they fully control their agendas. Strategic leaders must be able to transition with little or no warning, and at times turn on a dime, from one problem to another. It is the policy equivalent of the so-called three-block war. In practicing intellectual agility, strategic leaders must be informed and guided by doctrine and past experiences but not become slaves to them. Properly understood, military doctrine is authoritative, but requires judgment in its application. Too often, professional officers remember the former but not the latter and rigidly apply doctrine to situations that may be significantly different from those the doctrine writers envisioned.

Teamwork. Government operations on the strategic level require teamwork. Strategic leaders must build an effective team within their own agencies that includes career officials (both civilian and military) and political appointees. The former are nonpartisan experts and the latter, who also include experts, make administration policy. Strategic leaders must build effective
interagency teams to integrate and apply various instruments that the given problem demands. Increasingly in the 21st century, strategic leaders must build effective teams with coalition and alliance partners, whose cultural backgrounds and modes of operation frequently will be greatly different from their own.

Relationships are critical in building effective teamwork on all levels. Organizations do not cooperate or integrate; people do. Building relationships takes time, and new administrations sometimes do not have that luxury because real-world concerns will suddenly intrude. Thus, forming and molding relationships must start on day one. The key to strong and effective relationships is trust. It must be built and earned; it cannot simply be declared. It must be multidirectional, not unidirectional. For trust to hold in organizations, leaders on all levels must be both trustworthy and trusting. Both are necessary; neither by itself is sufficient.

Ethics. Ethics is always important, but especially given the challenges that the Nation confronts today. Strategic leaders must personally set and periodically recalibrate their own moral compasses. Doing so begins with one’s own moral values and principles, those inherited from family (and, for many, from religion) and nurtured in school. Professionals are guided by an ethos that defines and regulates their profession—military, public service, the law. All citizens, but especially public servants, must incorporate national values and principles, which for Americans include those enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. In an era when the world is shrinking, news is driven by a 24-hour cycle, and coalitions have become the norm, ethics also involve what the Founders called “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.”

Ethics must involve both ethical ends and ethical means, especially for strategic leaders who wrestle with the problems of today. Ethical ends can justify some means, but even the most ethical ends cannot justify any and all means. Leaders will be judged—by themselves and by others—not only by the goals they set, but also by the means they use in trying to achieve those goals. In every organization, regardless of size, leaders set the tone, including the ethical tone. Within military organizations, command climate starts at the top. It is reflected in what strategic leaders say and in what they do, and those who serve in their organizations, as well as those people outside who come into contact with them, pay attention to both words and deeds.

world. Technology also integrates the region with the United States. Internet usage in Latin America and the Caribbean over the last 8 years has grown by over 600 percent. In the area of energy interdependence, three of the top four companies that supply half of the oil to the United States are located in the Western Hemisphere, and many future sources of energy for the Nation reside in underexplored areas of the hemisphere.

Two domestic trends affect the potential of the USOUTHCOM approach to interagency partnering for enhanced security and stability in Latin America and the Caribbean. First, there is a growing political consensus on the need to better integrate military and nonmilitary elements of national power. Second, there have been advances in interagency coordination of civilian and military planning, especially with implementation of the Interagency Management System under Presidential directives on stabilization and reconstruction. Both trends have accelerated thinking about adopting the whole-of-government approach to national security within the region.

Rethinking the Command

With help from the interagency community, USOUTHCOM has sought to improve structure and processes to better perform its Title X mission. In 2006, the command was organized on the traditional J level, with slow, hierarchical staff processes, many of which date to Prussian or Napoleonic staff models. Such models were best attuned to a world of relative certainty with industrial age competitors, but they appear out of synch for the military in the 21st century. The command also was fine-tuned for executing joint military operations for a world in which joint operations increasingly needed to become interagency operations.

The value of partnering was evident in Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF–South), with the establishment of effective ways of countering the threat of narcotics from and within Latin America and the Caribbean. With strong interagency and multinational information fusion, a common set of mission objectives, and diverse representation by law enforcement, intelligence, and military personnel, JIATF–South became an effective model of interagency partnership.

At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, with assignment via the Department of Defense Top 25 Transformation Priorities, and authorities under Title X, Section 164, the command has reprised its
posture to meet new challenges, including structural changes based on recent lessons from U.S. operations around the world. In addition, this approach called on a command history of adaptation to regional dynamics that dates to the mid-1900s when the organization emerged from its earlier mission as the Panama Canal Department and then Caribbean Command.

The purpose of this approach was to adapt the span of operations to the transnational nature of security challenges today in the region and improve the ability of the command to harmonize its activities and planning with other U.S. Government departments and agencies. There has been significant progress in this area over the last 2 years, and the emerging issues from this process suggest items for the agenda of the congressionally mandated QDR.

**Salient Issues**

The continuing evolution of USSOUTHCOM will build on strong, existing command and control readiness under Title X to perform combat operations as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense when circumstances dictate in the defense of U.S. national interests. There are four areas of change that offer new or modified organizational approaches to improving the ability of the command to work with the interagency community.

**Integrated Partnering.** Under a dual-deputy structure, the civilian deputy will complement the three-star military deputy to the commander by providing increased expertise and oversight of command dealings with its interagency partners. Through the assignment of more interagency personnel (up to approximately 50) across the 1,200 members of the staff, USSOUTHCOM will benefit from the expertise of counterparts from the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development to the Departments of Energy, Commerce, and Justice, many of whom have either served within the region or been focused on regional planning and operations. A partnering directorate that merges the former J9 and J10 staff elements will be focused on the integration of the command with interagency processes and planning to more effectively support the whole-of-government implementation of U.S. regional policy and objectives.

**Multinational Cooperation.** USSOUTHCOM has reassigned personnel from headquarters to American Embassies in the region to improve support to Ambassadors and their country teams. In addition, in anticipation of occupying a new headquarters building by 2010, the command is expanding partner-nation representation and has begun planning for improved information security protocols to permit broader integration of their international expertise in daily operations.

**Strategic Communication.** In Latin America and the Caribbean region, the United States must improve its engagement in the marketplace of ideas to advance and protect its security interests. As such, the Office of Strategic Communication, with a developed planning and integration role, is being assigned to the chief of staff to institutionalize strategic communication approaches in all command correspondence and communication, both internally and externally.

**Public-Private Collaboration.** Just as events in the last few years underscored the importance of working more closely with interagency partners, senior leaders in the Department of Defense have recognized the need to adapt their organizations to better cooperate with the private sector. Whether nongovernmental organizations focused on humanitarian assistance objectives, or even in certain specific instances, multinational corporations with decades of experience in commerce and infrastructure trends in Latin America and the Caribbean, the organizations can share unique insights and perspectives. In some cases, especially in areas such as public health and capacity-building, partnerships can be forged to meet security concerns. USSOUTHCOM has created a public-private cooperation office to explore protocols for collaborative exchanges and identify activities to improve its ability to execute interagency operations in support of regional security objectives. These changes and the approach to reorganization underscore the critical enablers to success and highlight areas to explore in order to improve the capabilities of the command.

This reorganization requires both professional and procedural change in culture and mindset. Although USSOUTHCOM is prepared to lead combat operations, a premium has been put on partnerships and cooperation in support of U.S. civilian counterpart organizations. In addition, with greater coordination with interagency counterparts, training and education is needed across the government. While modest improvement has been made in this area for military personnel, the demand for civilian training, academic courses, and interagency assignments and exchanges is increasing. The 21st century will require greater integration and harmonization of planning, and existing shortfalls in these functions merit early
attention and resourcing in the deliberations. This includes language training and area studies, and a system of personnel incentives similar to the changes introduced in the Armed Forces under the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The promise of increased partnering with nations by building on the cultural, economic, and political linkages in the region has also demonstrated the need for rethinking the basic capacity of USSOUTHCOM within the area of focus. Service components need an improved ability to articulate requirements to support enhanced security cooperation in the region. One example of this approach is the decision to strengthen Naval Forces South by reestablishing the designation of the 4th Fleet. Although no ships will be permanently assigned to the force, this development increases the small planning staff and puts a more senior flag officer in command of this new numbered fleet that will represent maritime requirements across the Navy.

On the Horizon

In refining this reorganization, there are also longer term issues that merit attention in the wider context of the QDR. Progress has been recorded in the developing conceptual options for approaches by the United States within the region. Perhaps it is time to identify concrete steps in establishing regional interagency-led security organizations that would be more effective in unifying efforts by the Nation across regional boundaries.

The position of civilians in combatant commands, whether they represent the Department of Defense or other agencies, should continue to be refined. To understand the linkages and trends within the region, the relationships of combatant command structures in the Western Hemisphere should be reviewed based on previous studies, such as the notion of merging U.S. Northern Command and USSOUTHCOM that was examined in the QDR in 2006. There are both pros and cons to this merger that should be thoroughly vetted in the context of what is best for the peace and security of the Nation and the region in an interagency approach.

U.S. Southern Command will approach the new horizon in Latin America and the Caribbean with one goal in mind: to extend a hand to partner nation militaries in the hemisphere that are seeking positive security cooperation. Working together, the countries of the Americas can bring about positive and lasting changes in this beautiful and vibrant region.

Educating National Security Professionals

With the end of the Cold War and events of the mid-1990s, there was a realization that managing complex contingencies would pose near-term challenges. The threats would be less massive and kinetic in nature, but would stem from sectarian or communal violence leading to ethnic cleansing and internal displacement of peoples, dysfunctional economies, and competition for scarce resources. Both man-made and natural disasters were happening with some frequency, which added urgency to the security policy reviews at the end of the last decade. Based on the resulting critical analyses, Presidential Decision Directive 56, "Managing Complex Contingencies," was issued in 1997 to provide for multidepartmental collaboration and implementation. At its core was the premise that a reinforced program of education and training would replace vertical decisionmaking inside the executive branch with horizontal interagency coordination, planning, and execution.

As integration of national capabilities and resources became the goal for operations in crisis and contingency operations, it became clear that no formal process of education for the managers of these situations existed. The National Defense University, the Foreign Service Institute, and the U.S. Army War College were tasked to begin developing and presenting such a course of studies across the educational activities of Federal departments and agencies. The events of September 11, 2001, and their lessons reinforced the urgency of instituting such education and training. With operations in Southwest Asia embracing asymmetric threats and nation-building, even commanders and planners understood the need for dramatic changes. The transformational nature of building partnership capacity was codified in the QDR, which called for greater interagency representation in future crises and contingencies.

Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the need for a comprehensive and flexible system to address domestic security challenges. Like analyses of developments abroad, the review of the disaster in New Orleans and along the Gulf Coast found that stovepiped responses resulted in abysmal coordination. Assigning comparable priorities to domestic and international security challenges led to a comprehensive definition of national security in the Center for Strategic and International Studies report entitled Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, which urged an enhanced structure for interagency integration with attendant education and training.

Subsequently, the QDR process recommended that National Defense University expand its cur-
ricula with concentrated studies of interagency affairs. A pilot program was conducted in academic year 2007–2008 to validate instruction intended to produce military and civilian leaders to operate in an interagency environment. At the highest levels within the government, the goal to develop more vigorous programs for civilian managers was extended to senior staffs at both the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council. These initiatives support a recent directive that has formed civilian national security professionals into a distinct cadre with similar capabilities to their military counterparts for domestic and international crises.

President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13434 in May 2007, mandating a three-part program of education, training, and relevant experience for developing military as well as civilian national security professional (NSP) officers. The program applied to every department and agency with national security responsibilities and was supplemented by the national security strategy that laid out its principal components and how they were to be implemented. The focus is on a human capital process for selection, promotion, management, and incentivization.

The people known as national security professionals are responsible for developing strategy, implementing strategic plans, and executing missions in support of national security objectives. The Executive Steering Committee of the Office of Management and Budget envisions that the program will supply its members with “the knowledge, skills, abilities, attitudes, and experiences they need to work with their counterparts to plan and execute coordinated, effective interagency national security operations.” The individuals in the program will have the potential to function in those contingencies and crises when significant interaction is anticipated between two or more departments, agencies, or other entities. The designation of national security professional will be awarded to the occupants of positions who play a role in executing aspects of the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Defense Strategy, the National Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, and other national security frameworks and plans. As envisioned, this initiative will not include political appointees, who will receive national security training, education, and experience under a separate effort.
Understanding competencies that are common to national security professionals is paramount to developing effective training and education programs. Within the broad range of interagency operations, the capabilities that they will require are:

- strategic thinking—understanding national strategy documentation and being able to envision collaboration with other agencies, think strategically, and engage in interagency planning
- critical and creative thinking—analyzing issues with other agencies; seeking, evaluating, and synthesizing information from multiple sources; assessing and challenging assumptions; and offering alternative and creative solutions/courses of action
- leading interagency teams—creating a shared vision and unity of purpose among all players, winning their confidence and trust, and utilizing their knowledge, skills, and resources; developing and mentoring staff from other agencies, ensuring collaborative problem-solving, and managing internal conflicts
- maintaining global and cultural acuity—maintaining an integrated understanding of factors that influence national security (global/regional/country trends); possessing knowledge of relevant foreign cultures, histories, and languages; and knowing the structures, processes, and cultures of other agencies
- collaborating—working with agencies to accomplish goals; building and maintaining interagency networks and relationships; and encouraging collaboration, integration and information-sharing
- planning and managing—developing strategic and operational plans; executing interagency operations (including budgetary and financial management); conducting program management and evaluation; maintaining political and situation awareness; and navigating decisionmaking processes on the technical, policy, and political levels
- mediating and negotiating—tackling disputes with partners and stakeholders during operations
- communicating—clearly articulating information, managing expectations of diverse groups, listening actively, and tailoring approaches to different circumstances and audiences.

National security education, like work on shared attributes of national security professionals, is an ongoing, long-term initiative. Future political leadership must ensure that the program, as well as its members, is adequately resourced so that interagency planning and collaboration become institutionalized as opposed to improvised. Personality-driven and ad hoc leadership and procedures are inadequate for the complex challenges of this globalized environment.

The three core elements of the program must become components of personnel development. The training must embrace the above competencies and tailor them for special requirements such as disaster relief, counterinsurgency, strategic communications, and reconstruction. Educational programs must be provided for senior military and civilian leaders, and agencies without a culture of offering education to their personnel must be reoriented. Relationships with civilian academic institutions must be developed to formalize entry-level feeder programs that furnish graduates for the Federal workforce. Moreover, programs will be needed to track national security professionals throughout their careers as they mature and assume positions of greater responsibility.

Work experience, including rotational assignments with other agencies, must become routine for national security professionals. Although human resource considerations in compartmented bureaucracies make that practice challenging, personnel managers must develop procedures and incentives to facilitate such transfers. Only by encouraging promotions will national security as a career field become the foundation of interagency responses to contingencies and crises in the future. Those who receive training, education, and cross-department postings in their careers will be more competitive for designated positions as national security professionals, and these positions will be highly competitive in all departments and agencies of the national security community.

The Importance of Stability Operations

During the Presidential campaign in 2000, Con- doleezza Rice said that extended peacekeeping could detract the Nation from its responsibilities in the Persian Gulf and Taiwan Straits, adding that “carrying out civil administration and police functions is simply going to degrade the American capability to do the things America has to do.” Moreover, George W. Bush indicated his disdain for stability operations, nationbuilding, and the like prior to the election when he commented: “I’m worried about an opponent who uses nation-building and the military in the same sentence.”

ment of State is supposed to lead an effort of which operations require political solutions. A former defense official pointed out that the directive refers to military support to stability operations, but fails to define what is meant by the term and does not clarify command and control in strategically directing such operations.

In theory, NSPD 44 addressed the question of control of stability operations: “The Secretary of State shall coordinate . . . efforts involving all U.S. departments and agencies with relevant capabilities to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.” The position of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was established in August 2004 as focal point in the Department of State for these activities. The decision to place a civilian in charge of stability operations is a sound one because the operations require political solutions.

Yet there is a tension in NSPD 44. The Department of State is supposed to lead an effort of which it is part. Moreover, Foreign Service Officers do not operate in potentially nonpermissive environments alone or with military counterparts. Indeed, the only deployable civilian asset in the national security arsenal is the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which was gutted after Vietnam. In short, NSPD 44 puts the Secretary of State in charge of operational missions outside the normal purview of the department. Indeed, the Secretary of State had to ask for Department of Defense personnel in 2006 to staff the Provincial Reconstruction Teams being organized for Afghanistan, which negated the purpose of providing civilian expertise.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates urged dramatic increases in civilian instruments of power: “We must focus our energies beyond the guns and steel of the military, beyond our brave Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen. We must also focus our energies on the other elements of national power that will be so crucial in the coming years.” In an effort to bolster the ranks of civilians available for stability operations, the Department of State officially launched the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) in 2008. This corps provides for 250 full-time first responders who can deploy in a crisis within 48 hours, 2,000 standby members deployable within 30 days, and 2,000 reservists. Whereas the active and standby members will come from the Federal Government, the reservists will be drawn from the private sector as well as state and local governments. Although the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization based the number of members in the corps on hypothetical planning for small, medium, and large stabilization operations, there have not been any systematic studies that estimate the requirement for civilian capabilities. The lack of holistic resource planning makes Congress dubious about funding such capabilities, especially when the requirements are not based on a compelling strategic narrative.

Issues raised by NSPD 44 regarding the role of the Secretary of State in stability operations should be revisited. Given the political implications of such missions, civilian control is best. Three logical choices exist for this lead civilian role: the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, or a new Cabinet-level portfolio established for stability operations. The difficulties of assigning responsibility for an interagency process to the Secretary of State have been discussed. If the National Security Advisor took the lead, there would be disadvantages to giving the National Security Council a more operational role, including detracting from its traditional responsibilities of
advising the President and executing policy coordination. As for creating a new Cabinet post, if the creation of the Department of Homeland Security taught us anything, it is that establishing new layers of bureaucracy is not an instant remedy to the problems of the national security community.

The debate on stability operations has not occurred yet, in part because the result will involve uncomfortable tradeoffs. Both civilian and military agencies concur that even after withdrawing from Iraq, the future will be marked by irregular threats. The last QDR argued for shifting the basic mission of the Armed Forces from traditional to irregular warfare. The joint strategic plan issued by the Department of State and USAID also depicts a world filled with nonstate challenges. If this is the case, then the United States must rebalance its toolkit and deepen its civilian capacity. Either the budget for national security will have to grow or money for this adjustment must come from another budget. The huge reset and modernization costs foretell the impending budgetary train wreck.

The CRC is a step in the right direction, but it is difficult to believe that 250 active civilian personnel will fit the bill in a future operating environment. This is especially striking when it is acknowledged that these 250 individuals cannot be deployed all of the time. The military usually plans on two units stateside for every one deployed: one preparing to deploy and the other returning and resetting from deployment. Accordingly, the United States would have about 80 civilians deployed at any time. Any sensible strategy will require far more resources. Even if the CRC is ultimately moved to another department or agency, or if an augmented USAID takes over its roles and absorbs the assets of the corps, greater civilian resources will be needed.

Partisans may assume that the Bush administration got everything about stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan either right or wrong. As with all complicated things, the truth is really somewhere in between. The standard enunciated by Senator Arthur Vandenberg in 1952 that “politics stops at the water’s edge” should be applied to the future of stability operations.

**Challenges for Intelligence**

Congressional and Executive Branch Reforms

President George W. Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) in December 2004. This was the first major restructuring of the Intelligence Community since the National Security Act of 1947, which created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and gave legal basis to the Intelligence Community itself. Fifty-seven years later, the 2004 legislation created the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who supplanted the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as the senior intelligence official, head of the Intelligence Community, and principal intelligence advisor to the President.

In its final report in March 2005, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) made 74 recommendations on how to improve intelligence. The President adopted 70 of the recommendations, and they were added to those changes legislated by the Congress.

The DNI today serves as the head of the Intelligence Community, the 16 intelligence organizations spread across 6 departments and 1 independent agency. He functions as the principal advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Homeland Security Council on matters of intelligence. The IRTPA also expanded DNI responsibilities (beyond those previously held by the DCI) to include those domestic issues that are a part of homeland security. The term national intelligence replaced the phrase national foreign intelligence. Congress included this provision to address the concern that agencies needed to share intelligence—foreign and domestic—better.

A Tale of Two Men

Ambassador John Negroponte served from April 2005 until January 2007 as the first DNI. Though not an intelligence professional, he had been a consumer of intelligence most of his government career. As his deputy, he had an intelligence professional, National Security Agency (NSA) Director Lieutenant General Michael Hayden, USAF. Working together, they set up the new DNI office.

Negroponte took 6 months to draft the first National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) designed to organize and direct the strategic efforts of the Intelligence Community. This strategy built upon the DCI Strategic Intent for the U.S. Intelligence Community of March 1999. Guided by the new concept of na-

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ional intelligence defined in the IRTPA, the NIS drew its objectives from the National Security Strategy of the United States of America. There are two notable features of the 2005 intelligence strategy. First, it was unclassified. Second, it assigned responsibility for accomplishing each mission and enterprise objective to a specific organization within the office of the DNI or to executive agents among the 16 intelligence components. The mission objectives are outwardly directed at the threats to our nation’s security. The enterprise objectives are inwardly directed at improving the capabilities of the Intelligence Community. Both promote greater integration and collaboration among the community’s 16 members.

A year later, Negroponte reported to Congress on progress made. High on the list was the establishment of six mission managers to address specific issues of great concern. They serve as the principal Intelligence Community officials overseeing all aspects of intelligence related to both functional and regional areas of focus—counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and counterintelligence, as well as the three regions of Iran, North Korea, and Cuba/Venezuela. Mission managers can call upon the resources of the entire Intelligence Community. They are responsible for understanding the needs of intelligence consumers—key policymakers in the executive branch and Congress. Mission managers provide specific guidance on collection priorities, integration, and gaps; assess analytic quality and needs; share intelligence produced; and recommend funding allocations.

As a second accomplishment, Negroponte cited the creation of new organizations within the CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to promote better intelligence coordination. The CIA, through the new National Clandestine Service, was given the responsibility to coordinate human intelligence among the CIA, Department of Defense, and FBI. The FBI, as mandated by the 2004 reform law, established a directorate of intelligence to give greater importance to domestic intelligence analysis and collection. Additional recommendations from the WMD Commission led to the creation of the National Security Branch, which combined the functions of intelligence, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and protection against WMD.

A third accomplishment focused on improvements in analytic tradecraft. The President’s Daily Briefing was opened to intelligence contributions beyond the CIA; the Long Range Analysis Unit was created under the National Intelligence Council to address issues of strategic, long-term concern rather than current intelligence; and the sourcing of national intelligence estimates was improved by including sections on the reliability of, nature of, and gaps in the intelligence used.

When he relinquished his position in January 2007, John Negroponte could point to a number of accomplishments in helping to carry out both the mandates of the IRTPA and recommendations of the WMD Commission. The Office of the DNI was organized, set up, staffed, and moving forward.

Retired Navy Vice Admiral Mike McConnell assumed his position as the second DNI in February 2007. A career naval intelligence officer and former Joint Chiefs of Staff J2, he had finished his military career as the Director of NSA. After retirement, he worked at Booz Allen Hamilton as senior military advisor. He worked at the National Security Agency as vice president focusing on intelligence and national security issues. This multifaceted experience—in intelligence, the military, and the private sector—prepared him well to deal with the issues he would confront as DNI.

McConnell built on the foundation of the NIS and in mid-April 2007 announced a 100-Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration. Six focus areas to improve the capabilities of the community included promoting a culture of collaboration; improving collection and analysis; building technology leadership and acquisition excellence; adopting modern business practices; accelerating information-sharing; and clarifying DNI authorities.

Possibly the most far reaching measure of the 100-Day Plan was the adoption of the civilian Intelligence Community Joint Duty program, which requires civilians interested in promotion to the senior ranks to complete at least one assignment outside their home agency. In fostering a culture of collaboration, the program gives intelligence professionals the opportunity to broaden and deepen their knowledge of the workings of other agencies. The aim is to create a cadre of senior intelligence professionals better able to understand the complex challenges facing the Nation and to help the Intelligence Community address those challenges in support of the policymakers.

The 100-Day Plan was followed by the 500-Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration. If the former was designed to reinvigorate the process, the latter was designed to sustain, accelerate, and expand the effort.

Two of the most significant accomplishments of the McConnell period were to update the 1978
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and Executive Order (EO) 12333, originally issued by President Ronald Reagan in December 1981. The former governs foreign intelligence wiretaps conducted within the United States. The latter is the keystone document outlining the roles and responsibilities of the members of the Intelligence Community.

The FISA update of June 2008 took more than 2 years to accomplish and improves the legal foundations for the Intelligence Community. It also updated domestic electronic surveillance in the era of the Internet and cell phone. After 14 months of negotiation on Capitol Hill, the measure passed in June with substantial bipartisan support: 293–129 in the House of Representatives and 69–28 in the Senate. It was held up over the question of whether to provide legal protection to telecommunication companies that participated in the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The compromise reached allowed the 40-odd lawsuits to be referred to the U.S. District Courts where they were filed. If the telecommunication companies can prove the Bush Administration authorized the surveillance, the suits will be dismissed.

The update of EO 12333 of July 2008 takes into account the 2004 law that created the DNI. It also allows the 3 years of experience since the enactment of that law to be captured in the effort to better integrate the work of the Intelligence Community. The purpose of the revised executive order is to strengthen the Nation’s intelligence capability to give government leaders a greater ability to understand the threats facing the country abroad and at home and to be able to respond to those threats with greater agility and speed with well-informed policy options.

Both measures were important achievements. They helped resolidify foundational pillars of the Intelligence Community that needed updating. Both will help the community do its work, which is to provide better intelligence. The former modernizes how it conducts domestic electronic surveillance; the latter provides clearer guidance on what each of the 16 components of the community is to undertake in the DNI era. Both are designed to provide policymakers a “decision advantage.”

Issues for the Future
The Obama administration must confront those threats that we know about today. They include defeating terrorists abroad and at home, preventing and countering the proliferation of WMD, bolstering the growth of democracy and sustaining peaceful democratic states, developing new ways to penetrate and analyze the most difficult targets, and supporting U.S. policy and combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cyberterrorism is also a topic of keen concern to policymakers and the Intelligence Community. The Internet has helped revolutionize business and economic activity throughout the country and the world; it has also introduced a vulnerability about which we need to know much more. One need only scan the daily newspapers and television/cable news programs for those issues that will require continuous attention.

Equally important as one looks to the horizon and beyond will be anticipating developments of strategic concern and identifying both opportunities as well as vulnerabilities for policymakers. Issues of little policy interest can quickly become matters of state requiring an immediate U.S. response. Others will include those having an impact on U.S. national security: scarcities in energy, food, water; climate change; demographic trends; disruptive civil technologies; financial and economic volatilities; and the reconfiguration of the international system as India, China, Brazil, and Russia claim (or reclaim in the case of Russia) a greater voice in international deliberations.

As the Intelligence Community focuses outwardly on the threats of today and tomorrow, it must also focus inwardly to improve capabilities. The following is simply a short list of measures to improve capabilities. It could be expanded. They include:

- ensuring an integrated information technology network where all members of the Intelligence Community can communicate on the same network. Known as the Single Information Environment, this goal is a key part of the 500 Day Plan.
- adapting the information-sharing strategy of the traditional Cold War paradigm/culture of “need-to-know” to the 21st-century terrorist threat environment requirement of “responsibility to provide.” This is a cultural shift of profound proportions that will take time to institute.
- supporting the logistical requirements to make the civilian Intelligence Community Joint Duty program function as intended across the 16 intelligence components. A review should examine whether the current support structure is adequate.
accelerating the security clearance process. It can take anywhere from 12 to 24 months for an individual hoping to work for the Intelligence Community to get a security clearance. A goal has been set to reduce the time to 60 days.

ensuring that the fundamental changes adopted by the FBI with the establishment of the National Security Branch have taken hold. A review would look at whether integrating the two cultures of intelligence analysis and law enforcement has indeed succeeded. A review would also examine if the full integration of the FBI into the work of the Intelligence Community has occurred.

Concluding Thoughts
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of was signed into law in 1986. It took another 10 years for the provisions the act to take full effect. The key word for military reform was *jointness*; the comparable word for intelligence reform has been *integration*. The Intelligence Community is 3 ½ years into its voyage. Its most critical mission today is counterterrorism. Working with military and law enforcement partners, the community has been able to play both offense and defense. Terrorists now have to spend more time worrying about their own security. The higher defensive walls that we have erected at home have made another September 11 event harder to execute—not impossible, but harder.

Most defense experts credit Goldwater-Nichols with having improved the operation of the military Services through a more unified military organization in the years since its passage. The Intelligence Community has made substantial progress. More remains to be done. For those who take the long view, and understand the cultural changes involved, time, patience, and *more* time and *more* patience, will be needed. One day, those supporters of a strong Intelligence Community will point to the changes enacted in 2004 and 2005 as having accomplished what Goldwater-Nichols did for the military. Both efforts, undertaken a generation apart, will be viewed as having been accomplished for the good of the Nation.

linepin of the IRTPA structure is the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who is the senior intelligence advisor to the President. However, unlike the Director of Central Intelligence, this position is separated from other intelligence components. Most observers and some participants characterize the new structure as a work in progress. There are five issues that should be considered in reviewing the state of play of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

**Structure**

The first issue involves the DNI structure. Can the DNI develop and execute the broad strategic guidance for the Intelligence Community envisioned by the authors of the IRTPA legislation? Most of their attention was centered on perceptions that the Intelligence Community did not collaborate or share information and lacked overarching business practices in personnel, information technology, and other areas. The issue is the apparent disconnect between the responsibilities of the DNI and actual authorities. The relationship with the Secretary of Defense is critical, but it is unlikely that much can be done to improve the role of the DNI by clarifying his authorities *vis-à-vis* the Secretary of Defense. But there are other things that can be done. A starting point would be to examine the goals of the DNI 100- and 500-day plans and ask: how many of those goals have
been implemented, and among those, what were the impediments? If the hurdles involved turf fights, how can they be surmounted? Here there also is a dilemma. Administrations feel compelled to leave their mark on agencies and policies as quickly as possible. It would be beneficial if the next DNI reviewed the 100- and 500-day plans and asked which of these initiatives should be continued rather than starting over again largely for the sake of novelty. If the DNI structure is not working as intended, the solution must come from Congress since the structure was created in legislation, not by executive order.

**Continuity**

Closely related to the duties of the DNI is the issue of tenure. Admiral Dennis Blair is the sixth leader of the Intelligence Community in 5 years. It is difficult to run an enterprise, established or new, with that sort of leadership turnover at the very top. The President should provide continuity to the greatest extent possible in filling the senior Intelligence Community positions, ideally making the terms of the position at least 3 to 4 years.

**Budget**

There are different ways to consider the intelligence budget. Purely in dollar terms, the National Intelligence Program as opposed to the Military Intelligence Program has gone from $26.8 billion to $43.5 billion over the last decade. (As a percentage of the total Federal budget, the national intelligence figure remains unchanged in that period.) There has been a considerable budget feast after nearly a decade of famine in the 1990s. However, the intelligence budget is going down and will undoubtedly become a poor cousin after financial bailouts, domestic needs, and defense and homeland security spending. The DNI should come up with a 5-year budget plan for the Intelligence Community and stick to it. It is difficult if not impossible to plan, build, and manage intelligence activities on a financial roller coaster. This planning is particularly critical when the need for new technical collection systems is considered. A system approved in 2009 will not begin collecting for 10 to 12 years; every start and stop attenuates an already difficult acquisition process.

**Personnel**

The Intelligence Community is undergoing the most dramatic generational change since its inception. Over half of the analysts serving in its 16 agencies have less than 3 years of experience. These intelligence officers think differently, behave differently, and have different career expectations than their predecessors. If the Intelligence Community cannot accommodate some of these differences, new officers will not stay, perpetuating the inexperience problem. Among the fixes easily achieved are creating a set career path for analysts; tying analyst training and education in their careers to this career path; standing up the National Intelligence University as proposed in the IRTPA; and improving mentoring programs in each component. The Intelligence Community does not put the same emphasis on career development and professional education and training as the Armed Forces, but it is high time for it to catch up.

**Standards**

Consideration should be given to initiating a discussion among intelligence officers, executive branch policymakers, Members of Congress, and even the media on analytic standards. How often should intelligence be right? What is a set of reasonable (albeit vague) expectations? It is time to get beyond the false legends, misperceptions, and caricatures relating to the tragedies of September 11, 2001, and the search for weapons of mass destruction. These five issues do not pose daunting tasks. But it should be remembered that the product of intelligence is analysis, which is the result of an intellectual process, not a mechanical one. There are limits on the extent to which this aspect of intelligence can be reformed or improved.

**Improving Homeland Resilience**

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, President Bush declared a two-front war to confront the threats and vulnerabilities highlighted by the tragic events of that day. One front involved taking the battle to the terrorists and those states that supported or provided them with safe havens. The other front was at home with the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command. But these fronts did not receive equal attention. Iraq and Afghanistan became the frontline in the global war on terror and have consumed an overwhelming amount of time and resources. For example, the direct costs of the two wars have averaged $300 million per day for 5 years. By contrast, Federal grants since September 11, 2001, to improve security at the sprawling port complexes in New York and New Jersey—which include refineries, chemical plants, and the largest container terminals on the East
Coast—have totaled just $100 million, or the equivalent of what taxpayers have spent every 8 hours to support military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This asymmetry in effort between offensive measures abroad and defensive measures at home suggests the national security community is still attempting to come to grips with three realities highlighted by the al Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington. First, the battleground of choice for current and future U.S. adversaries will more likely be in the civil and economic space than the conventional military domain. Direct engagement with the Armed Forces promises a losing proposition for those who feel compelled to confront U.S. power. However, myriad vulnerabilities, particularly critical infrastructure, translate into alluring targets where a relatively modest investment by terrorists is likely to yield costly societal and economic damage.

The second reality is that international borders are not a barrier to a committed enemy intent on infiltrating and carrying out an attack in the United States. Watch lists and visa restrictions can deter or intercept known terrorists, but they will not stop terrorists without records from entering by crossing the vast land and maritime borders of America. Furthermore, al Qaeda does not need to import weapons of mass destruction. On September 11, 2001, the terrorists converted fully fueled planes into missiles. The third reality is that the only way to safeguard the civil and economic space is by enlisting the participants who occupy it in the effort. Chances are that first preventers and first responders will be ordinary citizens. The only aircraft that did not reach its intended target was United Airlines Flight 93. The terrorists were foiled not by a national security response, but by passengers charging the cockpit. Despite the fact that Washington was defended by the actions of citizens aboard that plane, the Federal Government has not emphasized the importance of mobilizing Americans and the private sector in general to reduce exposure to acts of terrorism. Instead, the focus has been on improving the capacity to detect and intercept terrorists.

The Department of Homeland Security was established in 2003 to improve the coordination of both border and transportation security, and was the largest reorganization since the National Security Act of 1947. The department has three directorates (national protection and programs, science and technology, and management), five offices (policy, health affairs, intelligence and analysis, domestic nuclear detection, and operations coordination), and seven independent agencies (the Transportation Security Administration, Customs and Border Protection, Citizenship and Immigration Services, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Coast Guard, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Secret Service). Its formation involved the merging of functions and operations that were previously performed by 22 distinct agencies. The Bush administration also established the Homeland Security Council within the Executive Office of the President with responsibility for interagency coordination in support of the homeland security mission.

After 5 years, the Department of Homeland Security is struggling to gain its footing. The challenge is compounded by several organizational problems that should be addressed:

- It has little institutional memory because of the reliance on political appointees and government contractors and the high rates of personnel turnover in its first few years of operation.
- It has inadequate skilled headquarters-level staffing to improve coordination across components.
- The major procurement programs have been plagued by technical problems, cost overruns, and missed deadlines that require immediate managerial attention.
- Its mission requires active participation by other Federal departments that only have collaborated when there has been strong oversight and coordination by the White House.
- State and local officials and private sector leaders are disenchanted with DHS’s penchant for formulating top-down policies without access to requisite expertise and without providing adequate opportunities for input.
- Congressional oversight is fragmented, intrusive, and disruptive, with a total of 88 committees and subcommittees claiming some jurisdiction over the department or its component agencies.

While addressing these issues will require considerable investments in time and energy, they are only a subset of a critical imperative: to build a more resilient society with the goal of depriving enemies of the mass economic disruptions and fear dividend that they seek to inflict. Militarily, the American infrastructure is too large for terrorists to achieve destruction on a national scale. But an enemy can target vulnerabilities to generate anxiety that will spur Americans to overreact in costly and destructive ways. For instance, in the wake of the attacks on September 11, Federal authorities
closed U.S. airspace to foreign and domestic flights, halted the movement of ships entering major seaports, and slowed down traffic across the land borders with Canada and Mexico. These draconian reactions to the commandeering of four airliners by 19 men wielding box-cutters accomplished what no enemy of the United States could have aspired to accomplish by conventional military means: a virtual blockade of American trade and commerce.

The United States must strive to develop the kind of resilience that Britain displayed during World War II as V–1 flying bombs fell on London. Each night, Londoners headed to the shelters. When the all-clear signal sounded, they put out the fires, rescued wounded from the rubble, and went on about their lives until air raid warnings were sounded again. More than a half-century later, Londoners showed similar resilience when suicide bombers attacked the Underground. The objective of the terrorists may have been to cripple public transportation, but it was foiled by resolute commuters appearing the next morning to board the trains.

Building resilience requires a sustained commitment to four factors. The first is robustness: the ability to keep operating in the face of disaster. In some instances it translates into designing systems or structures, such as buildings and bridges that can withstand hazards. In others, such as energy, transportation, and communications networks, robustness means devising redundant or substitutable systems that can be brought to bear in breakdowns and work stoppages. Robustness also entails investing in and maintaining elements of critical infrastructure, such as dams and levees, so they withstand low-probability but high-consequence eventualities.

The second factor is resourcefulness in managing crises by identifying options, prioritizing means to control and mitigate damage, and communicating those decisions to the responders. Resourcefulness depends primarily on people, not technology. Ensuring that American society is resourceful demands both good contingency plans and well-equipped and trained National Guard units, public health officials, firefighters, police officers, hospital staffs, and emergency planners and responders. It also necessitates close coordination and integration with organizations such as the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and increasingly the private sector, to provide personnel, resources, and logistics to deal with the aftermath of catastrophic events.

The third factor is rapidly recovering, or getting things back to normal as quickly as possible after a disaster. If something critical turns out to be either too vulnerable or fragile to withstand an attack or crisis, it should be restored immediately. Competent emergency operations and the ability to deploy the right people and resources to the right place at the right time are crucial.

Finally, resilience means being willing and able to absorb new lessons that can be drawn from catastrophes. Based on experience, public officials, private
sector leaders, and individuals must be willing to accept and fund pragmatic changes that improve capabilities before the next crisis. Resilience is based on a traditional American strength: pulling together when disasters strike and volunteering when called on to defend the Nation. Ironically, one barrier to building a resilient homeland in the 21st century is the durability of the concept of national security that served well throughout the Cold War. The U.S.-Soviet struggle with the risk of thermonuclear war required a national security community that was exclusive. Countering espionage necessitated routinely vetting government personnel and sharing information only on a need-to-know basis. However, the resilience imperative requires just the opposite approach. When it comes to the participation of civil society and private sector, the byword of resilience becomes the need-to-have.

The Nation will need to do more than attend to organizational challenges that have hampered the Department of Homeland Security. Of paramount importance is defining both the homeland security and the homeland defense missions to embrace resilience and the necessary investments in outreach and community preparedness. In addition, the private sector that owns and operates much of the critical infrastructure must be given incentives to put in place protective, response, and recovery methods. Resilience is probably the best way to neutralize the chaos and fear that terrorists strive to create. In the age of global terror, it turns out that the best defense might well be a good defense, resting on a solid foundation of societal and infrastructure resilience.

NOTES

1 Some of the material developed for this section was previously published by the Project on National Security Reform, “Forging a New Shield,” November 2008.
2 Interagency coordination is the expression usually used to depict government unity of effort, but many complain that it insufficiently connotes the need to actively integrate efforts as opposed to merely sharing information in an attempt to avoid working at cross purposes. Interagency collaboration is used in this chapter to suggest a higher level of integration in which agencies and departments actively and effectively work together in an integrated effort to accomplish common goals.

Contributors

Dr. Christopher J. Lamb (Chapter Editor) is a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at National Defense University (NDU). He conducts research on national security strategy and policy, as well as U.S. defense strategy, requirements, plans and programs, and strategic military concepts. His research focuses on global military presence and capabilities-based planning.

Dennis Cutler Blair is Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and a retired U.S. Navy four-star admiral. He was confirmed by the U.S. Senate to serve in the administration of Barack Obama as DNI on January 28, 2009. He was Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. Previously, he was Director of the Joint Staff in the Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and served in budget and policy positions on several major Navy staffs and the National Security Council staff. He was also the first Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support.

Stephen E. Flynn is Ira A. Lipman Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism and National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Former adviser on homeland security for the U.S. Commission on National Security (Hart-Rudman Commission) and a retired Coast Guard officer, Mr. Flynn is author of The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation (Random House, 2007) and America the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism (HarperCollins, 2004).

Thomas P. Glakas is an analyst at the National Intelligence Council. Previously he served as a program manager for analytical development for the Central Intelligence Agency, and as a senior intelligence officer for the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Marc Grossman is a retired American Ambassador to Turkey. In 2005, he completed 29 years of public service when he retired from the Department of State as the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Mr. Grossman served as the State Department’s third-ranking official, supporting U.S. diplomacy worldwide. He previously
served as the Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Human Resources.

L. Erik Kjonnerod is Director of the Center for Applied Strategic Learning in INSS at NDU. Mr. Kjonnerod is a specialist in politico-military policy exercises and crisis decisionmaking simulations.

Dr. Mark M. Lowenthal is President and CEO of the Intelligence & Security Academy, LLC. He is the former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production and former Vice Chairman for Evaluation on the National Intelligence Council. Dr. Lowenthal is a prolific author, having published 5 books and over 90 articles or studies on intelligence and national security. He received his BA from Brooklyn College and his Ph.D. in history from Harvard University. He is an Adjunct Professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University.

General Richard B. Myers, USAF (Ret.), served as 15th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2001 to 2005. In this capacity, he served as the principal military advisor to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council. He previously served as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff where he was the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board, and a member of the National Security Council Deputies Committee and the Nuclear Weapons Council. General Myers is currently the National Defense University (NDU) Colin Powell Chair of Leadership, Ethics, and Character.

Dr. Albert C. Pierce is Director of the Institute for National Security Ethics and Leadership at NDU.

Dr. Tammy S. Schultz is a Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Prior to joining CNAS, she served as a Research Fellow and Director of Research and Policy (Acting) at the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. Dr. Schultz also conducts simulations at the Department of State for Foreign Service Officers and is an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University.

Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN, is North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme Allied Commander, U.S. European Command. He previously was Commander, U.S. Southern Command. Admiral Stavridis commanded the USS Enterprise Carrier Strike Group, conducting combat operations in the Persian Gulf in support of both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. He has served as a strategic and long-range planner on the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has also served as the executive assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and the senior military assistant to the Secretary of Defense.