

## Chapter 16

# American Contributions to Global Security

*They that have power to hurt and will do none,  
That do not the thing they most do show,  
Who, moving others, are themselves as stone,  
Unmoved, cold, and to temptation slow,  
They rightly do inherit heaven's graces  
And husband nature's riches from expense;  
They are the lords and owners of their faces,  
Others but stewards of their excellence.*

—William Shakespeare

### Balancing Leadership and Sustainability

By almost any measure, the United States contributes more to the maintenance of international security than does any other single country. Beyond this, American officials aspire to be good stewards of international security, creators and problem-solvers rather than destroyers or lone rangers. When America's actions fail to match its words or ideals, as they have on some occasions, its power to persuade and influence is sharply curtailed. Notwithstanding the real and perceived diminution of U.S. power in recent years, the United States remains the linchpin within the international system for traditional, hard security issues. Moreover, the limited will or capacity of other power centers to share the burdens of managing global order ensures that U.S. leadership, if exercised prudently, will remain in demand for years to come. America's global security role, however, will have to be recalibrated if it is to be effective and sustainable, especially given the growing breadth and complexity of the global security environment. And as William Shakespeare observed long ago, sometimes power is conveyed less by its use than by its stoic restraint.

The power of the United States is multifaceted, including political clout, as exemplified by being one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and economic power, as a convener of the Group of 7 (or 8 or 20), even if its share of gross domestic product has eroded from its peak 50 or 60 years ago. For the moment, the dollar is the world's reserve currency, even though a growing number of voices question whether that should

remain the case. But that preponderance has been most striking in the defense realm where America has continued to outspend other nations and enjoys unrivaled advantages in intelligence capabilities and airlift for the rapid deployment of its forces to all regions of the world. Whether or not the President of the United States can be considered the leader of the free world, he remains the elected leader of the strongest democracy. If America had not assumed a global security role after World War II, the world would surely be a less hospitable, less democratic, less prosperous place.

At the same time, the presence of the United States in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has been seen by others as divisive, costly, and insensitive, however benign its intentions. The decision to intervene in Iraq has exacted a huge price, at once sapping the legitimacy and authority of the United States to lead, project power, and strengthen stability and security around the world. The administration of George W. Bush recreated an image of the United States as the global policeman. Awakened from its post-Cold War slumber by an attack on the homeland, the United States vowed to mete out justice to all comers, expending its preponderant power in the so-called global war on terror. The hyper-reaction to September 11, 2001, accelerated the perception of America in decline with its legitimacy, like the dollar, sharply discounted. The United States lacks the means to mobilize other nations around its security missions, even while the aspirations of rising powers appear unattainable in light of complex global trends for the foreseeable future. The cost of waging simultaneous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is a burden that neither financiers nor military recruiters can shoulder indefinitely, at least not without greater participation from other nations and more realistic objectives. Critics contend that the lack of a clear strategy and even less a coherent integrated or grand strategy further reveals the limits of American preponderance. A younger generation of Americans may question the wisdom of assuming responsibility for global security; of greater importance, they may question the

value of retaining the ability to call the shots, enforce the peace, deter nuclear war, and intervene with relative impunity.

At a time when the United States is engaged in two major conflicts and in the midst of the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, it is essential to reexamine even the most basic assumptions. Americans have become so accustomed to wearing the mantle of international leadership that they tend to forget that they eschewed all such ambitions in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Does the absence of an effective system of collective security for enforcing peace, deterring war, and arresting terrorism and crimes against humanity mean that these burdens fall disproportionately on America by default if not by choice? While many would dispute that the United States is assigned this role, fewer would debate that it has played it since the end of World War II. Either way, how long can such a division of labor survive amid fluctuating trends in global power? Can the Nation sustain its preponderant role? And even if that is possible, should it be the world's policeman? There is nothing permanent about the U.S. global security role. Now that most Americans are aware that the United States is only one of several power centers, rather than some proto-empire or sole superpower, there is an opportunity to rebalance leadership with a sustainable, comprehensive strategy that not only in-

tegrates all instruments of policy, but also mobilizes other powers into action.

One thing that perpetuates the U.S. leadership role is an absence of other nations eager to assume such onerous responsibilities. Despite various allies and partners, America remains in a category by itself when it comes to deploying troops and weapons systems around the globe. Rather than building more effective international institutions in the decades since the Cold War, the United States has been boxed into a corner with few alternatives to deploying its own forces when major security threats arise. The Nation has become the indispensable security power in the world, but paradoxically its ability has been diminished and cannot endure in perpetuity.

That American conventional military preponderance still exists is undisputed. The United States has faced no peer competitor since the demise of the Soviet Union. Nor did the end of the Cold War lead the dominant military power in the world to return to the “business of doing business,” as some advised after Victory in Europe Day. Western Europe has reduced defense spending in recent years. Although a few countries make significant contributions, it is clear that European power projection will remain circumscribed by history (two world wars), political will (military versus social welfare), and perceived threats (porous borders).



U.S. Army (Christopher T. Sneed)

U.S. Soldiers and Afghan National Police patrol near Combat Outpost Sabari

Although the rise of Asia obviously offers potential for global security, so far Asian powers have kept their concentration on the pursuit of economic goals. South Asian and East Asian economies have opted for cautious, gradual defense buildups, in effect deciding military intervention threatens their growing prosperity. One nation that some consider has the long-term potential to supplant American power is feared more than admired by others for that reason. How a militarily capable and nationalistic China may attempt to shape the international environment instead of becoming a reputable stakeholder has justified the continuing U.S. military presence in the region,



U.S. Army (Edwin Bridges)

U.S. Soldiers and Iraqi soldier prepare to patrol in Baghdad

which is supported by most countries even if they do not wish the United States to militarize the region. The rise in Asian military power—an arms *walk*, rather than *race*—offers no relief for American military commitments, at least in the short to midterm. The Asian model continues to be a captive of economic strategy, whereas the unique aspect of the continuing U.S. leadership role is that it is often detached from economic imperatives. The United States needs to find a constant and holistic strategy for exercising its role as a resident Pacific power, peacefully managing strategic competition while increasingly expanding cooperation, especially over nontraditional security issues. In this endeavor, building on traditional alliances will remain critical, both to cope with traditional security issues and as a starting point for dealing with emerging regional and global challenges.

It is difficult to envision effective international efforts in the decade ahead to protect the world from the use of nuclear weapons, stabilize countries in conflict, and stanch genocide and humanitarian crises without significant U.S. leadership. Similarly, if new mechanisms are to be forged to help regulate the global order—including for finance, trade, energy, and the environment—active U.S. participation and leadership will be essential. No other state shares America’s unique attributes: a zeal to make the world a better place, potent expeditionary forces to project power on all continents and oceans, a large and open economy, and a melting-pot society built on freedom and the rule of law. The United States is recalibrating its security policy around smarter power rather than hard power alone, but the key to providing the Obama administration with purchase in the international arena remains diplomacy backed by a formidable military. Whether through settled or ad hoc collective security arrangements, no country appears ready to mobilize its instruments of power to address threats posed by state and nonstate actors.

The question is how to balance leadership with sustainability. There are a variety of ideas in this chapter that may assist the administration of President Barack Obama both to reassess the global security role of the Nation and to contemplate recalibrating its use of power. Historian Williamson Murray reminds readers of a world before America assumed such commanding heights in the arena of international security, as well as some of the signal contributions of America’s leadership. Elaine Bunn makes clear in her section that allied management and international diplomacy will be vital to buttressing the fragile international nonproliferation regime. Linda Robinson outlines how in the coming months the United States can hand a more stable Iraq back to the Iraqis. Joseph Nye calls for the exercise of smart power, by which he refers more to how the Nation thinks rather than (and preferably before) it simply acts. All of these sections provide insights for the new administration as it tries to manage simultaneous crises and myriad long-term demands.

### America—Accidental Superpower?

From the vantage point of the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, the rise of America to dominance among the other powers in the last century had a certain air of inevitability about it. However, for those who actually witnessed the beginning of the new century in 1900, there was little anticipation that the coming decades would result in the so-called American century. In fact, most

Europeans saw Germany with its scientific, economic, and technological strength as the more likely candidate to become the great power of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. That was certainly how many Germans saw matters, and they attempted to realize that vision at the cost of millions of lives and world wars.

Such attitudes reflected more than European prejudices about a country that had little history or culture, a military that had fought just one war—which was a civil war at that—and a people who consisted of the “tired, poor, huddled masses” from various nations. In contrast, early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century Germany had a homogenous population, superior technology, premier scientific expertise, leading industries, and a military forged in the wars of German unification that became the most capable fighting force in the world.

By 1918, the United States had become a significant force in the balance of power. Thirty years later with the end of World War II, America became the dominant power in the world. The Nation would continue to dominate the international order during the Cold War. In retrospect, American dominance seems to have been a foregone conclusion, though it was anything but that. Admittedly, the ascendancy of the United States represented a combination of economic strength, geopolitical position, good fortune, gifted leaders, and appalling failures by its opponents. Nevertheless, contingency played a key role in American success. Specifically, there were turning points in the rise of the Nation: World War I, reaction to that conflict, World War II, and finally reaction to that conflict, which differed enormously from how things had unfolded in the 1920s.

U.S. foreign policy in 1900 was one of benign neglect at best. Americans saw themselves as removed from the turmoil of the old world that so many European immigrants had fled in order to escape conscription laws and class prejudice. Moreover, the oceans had protected the United States in the century since it had gained independence. Thus, George Washington’s warning against “entangling alliances” made sense to those who paid attention to world affairs. The outbreak of World War I in 1914 mobilized little support in the United States for intervention on either side. National attitudes did move swiftly to favor the Allies after German troops reportedly committed atrocities against civilians in Belgium, Luxembourg, and France. Nevertheless, Americans had no intention of involving their country in a conflict on the other side of the Atlantic.

That disposition began to change when Germany, which was waging unrestricted submarine warfare

against ships approaching the British Isles, advertised its aim to sink *Lusitania* on the front page of *The New York Times* in 1915. They achieved that objective and killed 1,198 of the 1,959 people on board the liner, including 128 Americans drowned in the Irish Sea. There is the possibility that if the Republican candidate in 1912, William Howard Taft, or the third party candidate, Theodore Roosevelt, won the election, the United States would have entered the war at that point. Threatened with war, the Germans ceased their unrestricted campaign.

U.S. Air Force (Samuel Bendet)



Marine light armored vehicles roll into Kuwait International Airport after retreat of Iraqi forces from Kuwait during Operation *Desert Storm*

But Woodrow Wilson won a divided election in 1912, and was reelected 4 years later with the campaign slogan “He Kept Us Out of War.” It turned out to be an ironic catchphrase because Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare in early 1917, which led the United States to eventually declare war. The outcome of World War I was close. American forces arrived in substantial numbers only in the summer of 1918, barely in time to tip the balance against the exhausted Reich.

The armistice resulted in a bad peace. The Treaty of Versailles, which attempted to make Germany pay for a war that it had started, was neither sufficiently harsh to keep it down nor mild enough to persuade it to accept defeat. Unfortunately, the Americans then withdrew from Europe, persuaded by intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic that World War I had been caused by arms merchants and that anything was

far better than war. During the 1920s, U.S. leaders refused to accept the notion that the Nation had responsibility even for the health of the world finances and the international economy, much less its security.

Instead, Americans focused on normalcy, isolationism, and the economic bubble of the 1920s. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930 ended international trade and turned a major recession into the Great Depression, which turned rejection of the outside world into national self-indulgence. Then in 1933, Franklin Roosevelt emerged as the leader America desperately needed. However, he only lived to become President because an assassin's shot missed him and instead killed the mayor of Chicago in early 1933. Coincidentally, 2 years earlier, Winston Churchill was almost killed in New York when he looked the wrong way when crossing the street and stepped off the curb into traffic. The survival of both men was essential to the rise of America: Churchill by keeping Britain in the war after the collapse of France, and Roosevelt by taking his country and people into the war. Without those two leaders in power in 1940, it is possible that the Anglo-American alliance may never have existed. Both recognized Adolf Hitler as a great threat. Roosevelt understood the moral danger of Germany. Churchill saw Hitler as not only a moral danger, but as a strategic one as well. He did not come to power until May 1940, at the precise moment when the Western powers had lost nearly all their strategic advantages after the fall of France.

Roosevelt took office almost simultaneously with Hitler becoming the German chancellor and confronted two great strategic problems. First, he had to deal with the upheaval of the Depression, which he could not resolve simply by solving the country's economic crisis. Only through reforms in the financial system and industrial sector could further crises be avoided. Those tasks demanded enormous focus and energy. Second, while Roosevelt recognized that Germany and Japan posed threats, Americans adamantly opposed involvement in world conflicts. Congress underlined that deep sense of isolationism by passing neutrality laws in the mid-1930s that forbade economic dealings with belligerent nations. Thus, as the international situation worsened, Roosevelt had little room to maneuver to provide the Nation's support to those willing to resist aggression.

American isolationist sentiment was so deep that Roosevelt could only muster a small budget allocation for the Navy in 1934 by ordering warships under the Works Progress Administration to ease unemployment. In this sense, Congress willfully

followed the dictates of the people until 1938 when it came to war planning. Only in 1938 did the Navy get substantial funding, and that was intended only for the defense of North America. The Army and Army Air Corps continued to receive only a pittance. The Czech crisis of September 1938 allowed Roosevelt to request funding to improve the Army Air Corps, but the Army itself did not emerge from the doldrums until the fall of France. At that point, some Americans began to recognize the growing danger of the international situation.

The outbreak of a major European war in September 1939 split the country down the middle. Roosevelt was a lame duck because neither he nor most Americans considered the international situation desperate enough for him to seek a third term as President, something that had never happened before. The fall of France changed everything. Roosevelt initially considered that Britain was in a hopeless position. Thus, exchanges with Churchill underlined the desire on the part of Roosevelt to safeguard the Royal Navy if England fell to Germany. But Churchill was clear—he would not surrender. Yet without American economic aid, the British could not stay the course. Moreover, there were others in England willing to make a deal with Hitler.

In the midst of a third campaign for President, with isolationists in full cry, Roosevelt risked his political career by aiding Britain. Overruling his military advisors, Roosevelt ordered surplus armaments, including destroyers, sent to England. This action required great determination in the face of the looming elections that Roosevelt won, which allowed him to guide the United States with immense skill through the major challenges of a world war. In this sense, the serendipity of Roosevelt's survival of the attempt on his life in 1933 takes on added meaning.

Roosevelt ran again for President in 1944, despite failing health. His advisors pressured him to drop Henry Wallace as Vice President and put a relatively unknown senator, Harry Truman, on the ticket. If ever chance were a deciding factor in American history, this was it. Wallace would have been a disaster as President and could have lost the Cold War even before it began.

Truman on the other hand was an extraordinarily successful President. On the surface, he appeared unprepared by virtue of his education or background. But as a voracious reader of history, Truman developed a feel for international relations. Moreover, he was willing to make crucial decisions, such as dropping the atomic bomb. If he had difficulty in

understanding Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union at first, he was a fast learner who chose extraordinarily good advisors. Truman stood fast against Moscow at critical moments, such as the Berlin blockade. The Marshall Plan, written during his administration, represented his willingness to engage in world affairs to a degree that was absent from American leadership after World War I. Yet perhaps his greatest strength as a President was making decisions regardless of public opinion. His motto, “The buck stops here,” underscores the readiness to take responsibility. Similarly, the great triumph of his administration was setting the course that established the parameters of the contest with the Soviet Union and ensured that the United States played a role befitting its new economic and financial stature.

Contingency is a difficult matter to identify in retrospect. However, in thinking through the history of the past century, one should not lose sight of the fact that the rise of the United States to its current position was not inevitable. The Nation came close to abstaining from participation in World War I when a German victory would have limited the ability of America to influence European affairs. Then after World War I, the United States almost wrecked the international and global economic system through its shortsighted postwar isolationist policies.

Victory in World War II was the result of con-

tingency and chance. It is doubtful if anyone other than Roosevelt could have edged the United States slowly but deliberately into the conflict. He enabled Churchill to maintain a tenuous grip on power after the collapse of France. Finally, the emergence of Truman as a man of stature and substance was dependent on the idiosyncrasies of politicians trying to help Roosevelt win a fourth term. They picked the right man, but largely for the wrong reasons.

What looked nearly certain at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century—the rise of Germany to dominance in Europe—did not come to pass. Instead, an outlier country that no one expected to rise became the dominant power of the century. Yet even with its large population, favored geographic position, and powerful economy, this section has shown that America’s rise to power was not inevitable but grew out of a number of unpredictable events. No matter how certain the future looks, the prudent strategist hedges his bets.

### Deterrence and Defense

The North Korean nuclear test in 2006 and the ongoing Iranian quest for nuclear weapons highlight how dramatically the international security environment has changed since the Cold War. Some believe the world is approaching a tipping point where changes in the international arena could have a



U.S. Army

Brigadier General Anthony C. McAuliffe gives glider pilots last-minute instructions before takeoff from England, 1944

domino effect with countries scrambling to develop nuclear weapons or hedge capacities to quickly build nuclear arsenals. Under such a scenario, several U.S. allies who have previously renounced nuclear weapons might reconsider the decision, including Japan, South Korea, and Turkey.

Until now, American security guarantees, including extended deterrence in general and extended nuclear deterrence specifically, have been credited with persuading nations to renounce nuclear weapons. The United States is the only country that makes an explicit commitment to use nuclear weapons to protect other nations, 28 in all, including North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Testifying before Congress in 1997, Under Secretary of Defense Walt Slocombe stated that:

*the role of U.S. nuclear capability in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons often goes unnoticed. The extension of a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent to allies has been an important nonproliferation tool. It has removed incentives for key allies, in a still dangerous world, to develop and deploy their own nuclear forces, as many are technically capable of doing. Indeed, our*

*strong security relationships have probably played as great a role in nonproliferation over the past 40 years as has the [Non-Proliferation Treaty].*

In a world of proliferation challenges, reexamining extended deterrence, including extended prospects for nuclear deterrence, must become a serious priority for the United States.

To *extend* deterrence, the Nation must first be *able* to deter. There have been reassessments of deterrence over the last decade or so, but there is no consensus on what deterrence means, whom to deter, which capabilities to include, and how deterrence could be most effectively accomplished. These questions are coupled with the acknowledgment that there is less confidence in deterrence today than during the Cold War. However, there is recognition in the United States that it makes sense to examine whether and how deterrence concepts could be adapted, adjusted, and applied to the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This assessment must not only look at a range of potential adversaries and threats, but also explore methods and capabilities that would contribute to deterrence. The objective of deterrence operations according to the Joint Operating Concept released in 2006 is to

U.S. Air Force (D. Myles Cullen)



People's Liberation Army soldiers at Shenyang training base, China

“decisively influence the adversary’s decisionmaking calculus in order to prevent hostile actions against U.S. vital interests. . . . An adversary’s deterrence decision calculus focuses on their perception of three primary elements.” These elements are: first, benefits of a course of action; second, the costs of a course of action; and third, the consequences of restraint (namely, not taking action).

The challenge of altering the decisionmaking calculus of a potential enemy can be examined by looking at three factors. The first requires understanding who makes decisions, how they think and what they care about, how they are affected by domestic politics, what they regard as key objectives, how they weigh risks and gains, and what they believe about the deterrer. All those questions demand expertise on the region, country, group, or leader in question that should depend not only on government agencies, but also on policy centers, academe, allied organizations, and so forth. Furthermore, answers to some of these questions are difficult to discern, and others may never be answered. But learning as much as possible would seem desirable in the case of deterrence. In this way, some of the unknowns will become variables in the planning process.

Second, adapting the capabilities that go beyond nuclear weapons to deter specific actions by specific players in specific situations also is important. Non-nuclear deterrence can include both nonnuclear and nonkinetic passive and active strike defenses as well as nonmilitary tools such as diplomatic efforts, economic assistance, legal means, and even simple restraint.

Third, the clarity and credibility of American messages in the mind of the deteree are critical. U.S. policymakers must have the mechanisms to assess how their words and actions are perceived, how they affect the calculations of each adversary, and how they might mitigate misperceptions that undermine the effectiveness of deterrence. Thus, one aspect of reassurance depends on the trust of allies in the ability of the United States to deter actions against their interests. As the Nation reexamines deterrence, it must consider the requirements for extended deterrence in the evolving security environment. How can America convince allies and friends that it will meet established security commitments so that they do not feel the need to develop nuclear weapons or other capabilities that would be counterproductive? While U.S. views on deterrence emerge, so may those of its allies. Inevitably, differences may arise over whom to deter, the role of offense and defense, and American versus other nations’ capabilities to underpin deterrence.

Extended deterrence is more than extended nuclear deterrence. Conventional capabilities are playing a greater role in extended deterrence. Defenses, particularly missile defenses, have gained acceptance and even enthusiasm as a complement to extended deterrence. Forward presence and force projection are also ways to extend deterrence to allies. Beyond military capabilities, extended deterrence rests on the entire fabric of the alliance relationship, including shared interests, dialogue, consultation, coordinated planning, and the overall health of the alliance. In addition, extending deterrence to allies is based on the reputation of America as a security guarantor, which is shaped by its global behaviors. Some allies have been conflicted in this regard, fearing abandonment and wondering if the United States will be there when needed. On the other hand, many fear military entrapment or entanglement by getting pulled into situations against their interests. To be assured, allies first and foremost need to have confidence in American judgment and reliability. Without this basic trust, specific capabilities do not really matter.

In terms of extended nuclear deterrence, however, guaranteeing reassurance and trust is more difficult. To achieve it, America must designate the characteristics of the nuclear forces required to make this contribution to international security. Yet assuring one’s allies offers little help in that regard. Establishing reassurance and trust does not define the size or composition of nuclear capabilities. It is impossible to claim that, for example, unless the Nation modernizes with the Reliable Replacement Warhead or retains a certain number of nuclear weapons, allies will no longer be assured.

It is not impossible for allies to feel insecure about the size, composition, and basing of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. That situation occurred in the late 1970s when Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of Germany was concerned that Soviet SS–20 missiles could decouple the U.S. strategic nuclear force from the defense of Europe, which led to fielding Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe. In short, by itself, the deployment of nuclear armed Tomahawk cruise missiles (TLAM–N) off the coast of Europe was insufficient coupling to reassure NATO Allies. Since it guaranteed their security, Allies cared about the precise composition and disposition of U.S. nuclear forces.

Nothing indicates that allies are insufficiently assured about American nuclear forces because of their structure or technical characteristics, but they may be convinced of it by the self-denigration

of U.S. nuclear capability. In particular, talk of the United States being self-deterred, which has been used to champion new nuclear weapons, is counter-productive for assurance and deterrence. Granted, it is a Catch-22: changes one thinks are required in a democracy cannot occur without public scrutiny and debate. Yet unless Americans reach a consensus to fill the identified gaps, pointing out gaps in U.S. nuclear capabilities can undermine assurance as well as deterrence.

According to some analysts, questions have arisen in Japan and Turkey about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee. There is interest in the Japanese defense community in discussing the exact types of conflict scenarios that could put the American nuclear guarantee into play. Such consultations are important in demonstrating the credibility of extended deterrence. For instance, must U.S. nuclear weapons be either deployed or deployable to a given region to reassure allies? At present, the only nuclear weapons deployed on allied territory are the remaining air-delivered bombs in several NATO countries that could be delivered by dual-capable U.S. or allied aircraft. The nuclear weapons in South Korea were removed almost two decades ago, and the extension of nuclear deterrence in the Pacific region since then has been by offshore forces.

The capability to deploy nuclear weapons to assure partners or deter a regional threat has also declined over the years. The Presidential initiatives of 1991 and 1992 eliminated most so-called tactical nuclear weapons. In 1994, the United States announced the decision to permanently give up the deployment of nuclear weapons on carriers or surface ships. While that decision retained the capability to redeploy TLAM-N on attack submarines, there have been budget debates almost every year over the TLAM-N. The Navy has sought to retire the missile because maintaining the capability requires special training for submarine crews and certification of some boats. That represents an allocation of people, time, and money that the Service would prefer to forego. Thus, the TLAM-N system has not been updated for years, and may soon atrophy regardless of the budgetary controversy. Yet Japan places enormous importance on the retention of the Tomahawk missile, even in a reserve status, as evidence of U.S. security guarantees. The question is whether Japan could be reassured about the nuclear guarantee by some other means.

If visible presence is essential for reassurance, perhaps other capabilities can be made visible. For

example, the media can cover the deployment of nuclear-capable B-2 bombers to Guam or Diego Garcia. Even nuclear submarines can send a deterrence and reassurance signal, such as when America withdrew intermediate-range missiles from Turkey in 1960 as a consequence of the Cuban missile crisis. In that case, a *Polaris* strategic submarine, which was deployed in the Mediterranean, called at the port of Izmir to demonstrate continuing nuclear presence in the area. Yet the question remains: How much does visibility matter to the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence?

Beyond visible nuclear forces or forces deployable to the region, there could be other ways to demonstrate the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. The options include discussions of nuclear scenarios, as suggested by some Japanese defense officials, or the institutionalization of exchanges on nuclear deterrence matters. Similarly, in light of the importance of the U.S.-NATO nuclear link in the perception of new Alliance members, the best way to promote that linkage in a changed environment also needs to be addressed.

In considering the size and composition of nuclear forces, it is necessary to address the issue of reassuring allies that the extended nuclear pledge remains viable and consider whether or not we will provide it to others who face new nuclear neighbors. However, planners should recognize that aspects of a nuclear posture that assure one ally may frighten another, whether those weapons are deployed on their territory or whether the United States modernizes nuclear weapons or develops new nuclear capabilities. As a result, American officials should consult with allies about what reassures them and which factors are most important to their remaining nonnuclear. Although it is unlikely the specifics of the nuclear arsenal will impact U.S. credibility, the perception of a lack of attention to nuclear issues could add up to allied concern. It is inattention that could undermine the nonproliferation aspects of its posture in providing cover for allies. In the end, if the United States is comfortable with its nuclear posture, it should make the case to allies that its security commitments, including extended nuclear deterrence, remain strong. This alone may reassure allies.

In the long term, the larger question is whether the Nation will continue to play a major role in the world, underpinning global stability and specifically extending nuclear deterrence to other states. In the near term, however, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the hands of others, the United States

must sustain a safe and reliable nuclear weapons capability. As long as America has a leading role, its nuclear weapons will be about more than its own security.

### Ending Conflict and Promoting Stability

The U.S. military is a far more battle-hardened and battle-weary force than it has been in three decades. As of July 3 2009, there were 130,000 American military personnel in Iraq and roughly 62,000 in Afghanistan. And there are also significant operational commitments in Djibouti, the former Yugoslavia, the Philippines, Thailand, Honduras, and Colombia. The United States has more troops deployed in real-world operations than since the Vietnam War, which involved as many as 500,000 Servicemembers in Southeast Asia. American troops are engaged in what are described as stability operations, which include counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and nationbuilding—and, contrary to popular belief, are just as challenging and deadly as traditional combat missions of the past.

Although doctrine states that the primary role of the U.S. military is fighting and winning the Nation's wars, history indicates that stability operations have been the more common mission. They have included peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, and nationbuilding from the Western frontier of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to the South of the Reconstruction era, the Philippines at the end of the Spanish-American War, the Caribbean throughout the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Europe and Japan following World War II, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and current operations. According to the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study, the United States has lost more lives and treasure since the Cold War in stability operations than in traditional warfare. Increased emphasis on manmade and natural disasters in weak and failing states suggests that the Nation will have as much difficulty avoiding these crises in the future as it did in the past. Given the likelihood of stability operations, it is important to understand their nature and the factors determining their success or failure.

It may be tempting to ignore theoretical debates over terminology, but it would be a mistake. Words matter because they force us to agree on definitions, a process which in turn forces us to debate and fine tune our understanding about the nature of our environment and how we plan to operate. The term *irregular warfare*, which incorporates such disparate activities as stability operations, counterinsurgency, insurgency, and unconventional warfare in one single

concept, is not useful. A term that means everything actually does not really mean very much at all.

In the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, *stability operations* are defined as a subset of counterinsurgency or irregular warfare, which is confusing because one is not a subset of the other. Rather, it depends on the level of analysis. Tactically, stability operations represent a set of activities conducted during a mission in which the object is protecting people and establishing or maintaining order. In that context, stability operations could be a subset of a counterinsurgency campaign, conventional conflict, or irregular warfare, if such a thing actually exists. These are tasks in stability operations that the Army references in its full-spectrum doctrine. *Full-spectrum operations* are similar to the three-block war, which was explained by General Charles Krulak, the former commandant of the Marine Corps, in 1997:

*In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart—conducting peacekeeping operations—and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle—all on the same day . . . all within three city blocks.<sup>1</sup>*

At the strategic level, counterinsurgency can be regarded as a type of stability operation in which systems under stress are returned to or converted to stability. As the Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept of 2006 explained, such operations are mounted in order “to assist a state or region that is under severe stress or has collapsed due to either a natural or man-made disaster.”<sup>2</sup>

The causes of systemic stress or failure vary. For instance, a system can fail or come under severe stress because of major interstate or civil war, insurgency, low-grade or chronic political unrest, economic crisis, natural disaster, or a deadly combination involving several factors. Each case also varies with respect to political, cultural, economic, social, and other preconditions, including the relative competence and strength of the local government. When a system is under stress in this way, it is vulnerable to actions by spoilers from low-level criminals and gangs to dangerous warlords to insurgents, all of whom can exploit weak governance to generate chaos, violence, and social unrest. Even normal citizens may turn to crime to survive in such dangerous and anarchic situations. Recent examples include the looting of Baghdad and the chaos in New Orleans in

the wake of Hurricane Katrina. In those cases, a vacuum was created by external stresses placed on the system, which was exploited by miscreants of various sorts. In Iraq, a violent insurgency was given space to grow. As both cases demonstrate, either stopping or reversing such pandemonium is extremely difficult, especially for outside forces unfamiliar with the cultural landscape, as occurred in Iraq.

The initial goal of outside intervening forces is stopping chaos and violence. That task is the opposite of traditional military operations (maneuver warfare), which is to create chaos for the enemy forces. In sum, traditional military operations are focused on breaking down a system, whereas stability operations are about strengthening a system of political, economic, and social institutions under stress, preventing or reversing chaotic spirals into violence.

However, outside forces can only do so much. For stability to endure and human security to be maintained, the capacity of the local government must be restored or, in some cases, created in the first place. This may require full-scale nationbuilding depending on indigenous capacities to govern and the extent of damage sustained by existing institutions and resources.

Most successful stability operations have simple albeit not intuitive characteristics. Crafting a strategy for success or deciding to intervene in the first place requires an understanding of what it takes to succeed in a given situation. The following “top five” rules of thumb are derived from current and emerging doctrine, lessons learned, and best practices in recent and historical cases. They provide the basis of a point of departure for making realistic and practical decisions.

**1. Start with a Long-term Strategy:** “Cheap coats of paint won’t work.” Success in stability operations is time consuming. A comprehensive multiyear strategy that recognizes this reality must be crafted from the outset. Shortsighted strategies that do not accept what is needed for success fail to do the job, burn resources, and exhaust popular will at home. Moreover, research has indicated that Americans are unsupportive of interventions with strategies that were ill-conceived. Although sustaining domestic support is never easy, leaders stand a better chance if the American people understand the requirements from the beginning and also are convinced that there is an effective strategy in place.

**2. Keep the Host Nation in the Lead:** “Better [they] do it tolerably, than you do it perfectly.” The United States has become the most likely external

actor in stability or counterinsurgency operations in a foreign country. Thus, American forces will have either a supporting role with the host-nation government or a brokering role among the warring parties. In any case, local leaders must take the lead substantively as well as publicly. The U.S. goal should be helping the host nation achieve stability and the capacity to sustain peace and govern on its own. In practice, this means integrated planning with local authorities must begin on day one, even before deploying forces. One key reason for such planning is determining whether the host nation will consider legitimate grievances and address them in the political process. Defeating an insurgency without negotiation may be impossible for a democracy in the information age. Intervening in a situation where the local government is unwilling to commit to a political process to resolve the grievances of the people will be ineffectual at best and a great waste of blood and treasure at worst.

**3. Put the Population First:** “Protect the people where they sleep.” When violence breaks out, the people will seek security from whoever can provide it. Ideally, the local government should be the first to offer protection because its legitimacy is derived from the ability to protect the people. Thus, the population is the first priority for an intervening force. This priority should be coupled with the goal of turning over security to local military forces as soon as possible. As General David Petraeus has emphasized, protecting the population involves considerable risk because it means leaving secure bases to “live among the people.”

**4. Match Ends to Means:** The challenge of whole-of-government approach. Helping a nation build durable institutions, including mechanisms for security, governance, and economic development, will require diverse, nonmilitary skills. Currently, civilian experts must synchronize their efforts with military commanders in formulating a coherent whole-of-government strategy. The ability of civilian agencies to provide expertise is limited or lacking in some areas. In filling the gap on an ad hoc basis, the military has gradually developed limited proficiency in these areas. However, to succeed without muddling through in future missions, the United States must build that civilian capacity, which is a process that may take decades. In the meantime, any decision to engage abroad must be made in light of limited civilian expertise and a realistic understanding of the fact that the military must take up the slack. In such cases, there cannot be ambiguity over the fact that

the military cannot expect relief since the civilian capacity simply does not exist.

**5. Do Not Go It Alone:** Victory is easier with friends. Conducting stability operations with allies in sanctioned multinational missions is preferable to unilateral action for two reasons: burdensharing and legitimacy. Americans are more likely to support engagement abroad if they do not have to foot the whole bill and believe that the mission is reasonable and valid. Moreover, local people are more likely to cooperate with outside forces if they regard them as legitimate. The perception of legitimacy is more common when regional or international bodies condone the intervention, recognize local authorities or agreements, publicly denounce insurgents and spoilers, and substantively promote investments in the economic future. Despite challenges in synchronizing tactics, technologies, and strategic objectives, efforts should be made to secure regional and international participation and support for intervention.

This framework and the five rules of thumb are offered as a starting point for leaders charged with deciding when and how to use force abroad. We must keep in mind that it is a delicate balance between the need to learn from experience so as not to repeat old mistakes on the one hand, and the need to avoid the trap of “fighting the last war” on the other. The guidelines presented here reflect a

desire to learn from recent and historical experience. They are presented as a snapshot in time, and like all lessons learned from experience, should be subject to thoughtful revision as circumstances inevitably change.

### Iraq Endgame: Internal and Regional Stability

The outlook for Iraq improved greatly because of the substantial decline in violence registered in 2007 and 2008. But serious challenges remain, and continued U.S. engagement will be needed to put the country on a stable footing. An endgame strategy is required for the final phase of the Iraq conflict. The broad challenges for U.S. policy are maintaining and expanding the downward trend in violence and crafting a formula for sustainable security and stability in Iraq and throughout the region. If a lasting peace is to be achieved, it will require Iraqis to reach agreement on questions of power-sharing and resources management in the new political order.

The United States has embarked on a gradual troop withdrawal and transition from combat to training and other security assistance roles. As the process continues, the way that these issues are addressed will affect the long-term outlook for Iraq and the region. In both the political and military realms, the administration faces significant choices



U.S. Air Force (All. E. Flisek)

Iraqi soldiers deliver tools to villagers in Bey'a

National Air and Space Museum



Soviet SS-20 and U.S. Pershing-II missiles, regarded as the most threatening missiles in their class, on display in National Air and Space Museum

in crafting its relationship with Iraq. Under a bilateral security agreement that took effect in 2009, U.S. troops are scheduled to leave Iraq no later than the end of 2011. While the combat mission for U.S. troops is ending, the Iraqi government may request assistance from the United States after that. In the formal declaration of principles signed in 2007, Iraq expressed a desire for continued American help to strengthen and professionalize its security forces and enable it to deter foreign threats. However, the bilateral agreement will be put to a referendum in 2009 and a new Iraqi government will be formed after elections at the end of the year. Thus, continuity in the relationship is not assured.

Iraqi security forces have grown in size and competence in recent years but will not become fully self-sufficient for 5 to 10 years. Given the institutions and resources available to Iraq, the expansion and professional development of its military is a straightforward if long-term task. With U.S. assistance, particularly air support and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, Iraqi security forces should be able to handle the present threat during the transition.

Nonetheless, two critical questions remain. First, will the Iraqis employ their security forces in a nonsectarian and nonpartisan manner? Failing to do so could reignite the conflict. Second, what course will future relations between the United States and the next Iraqi government take? Achieving stability inside Iraq and within the region will require the considered use of American political and military assistance to ensure successful outcomes to these questions.

Coalition and Iraqi forces achieved an amazing turnaround in the war during 2007 and 2008. By the end of 2008, violence in Iraq had fallen to a level not seen since the start of 2004. Various measures contributed to this trend. First, the addition of some 31,000 American troops and doubling of the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams have been highly successful. Second, and more importantly, the revised objectives of the joint campaign plan as well as changes in the way that U.S. forces are employed were fundamental to reducing the violence. Political accommodation became the main objective of the campaign plan that shifted the focus of the U.S. effort from attacking insurgents to providing security for the population and persuading antagonists to stop fighting. This engagement strategy succeeded in bringing Sunni insurgents and their supporters over to the American side. The resulting increase in human intelligence permitted more effective target-

ing of so-called irreconcilable elements of the Sunni insurgency, including al Qaeda in Iraq as well as hardcore Shia cells known as special groups. A ceasefire announced by Shia leader Moqtada al-Sadr in August 2007, which followed resolute action by the Iraqi government to check Sadrist provocations in Karbala, also dramatically contributed to the decline in violence.

The most immediate challenge is incorporating Sunnis in the political and economic life of Iraq so that their motivation for fighting is addressed and the insurgency does not resume. The ultimate resolution of the sectarian conflict will require agreement on the federal nature of the state. Additional decisions, legislation, and constitutional revisions also may be necessary. Without such agreements, internal stability will remain elusive and, in turn, affect prospects for regional stability. The ongoing intra-Shia competition must be channeled into the political arena, and Shia militias must be demobilized and employed. The rivalries and substantive differences among Shia groups are likely to continue, but the diversity of Shia opinion may actually promote but not preclude the formation of either multisectarian or nonsectarian coalitions.

The critical decision that the United States must make regarding Iraq is whether its continued assistance will be made contingent on political reconciliation and internal stability. Alternatively, America could either withdraw its support or provide unconditional support. The former choice would be ill advised given the geopolitical importance of the country and the latter could lead to exclusive rule by a Shia majority, which might rekindle the Sunni insurgency. In addition, Arab states would react negatively to the prospect of an alliance between Iraq and Iran.

The United States and other countries have an abiding interest in ensuring that the ceasefire among Iraqi factions is extended and strengthened. This fragile peace could unravel if steps are not taken to preserve it. The most urgent issues include incorporating those Sunnis who stopped fighting the government into the security forces and economic life of the nation; providing basic services and infrastructure to rebuild Sunni areas; and establishing the mechanisms to prevent the use of Iraqi or coalition forces for either sectarian or partisan purposes. While America does not have unlimited leverage, given the Iraqi need for security assistance and its genuine wariness of Iran, the United States should be able to persuade the Iraqi government to take these steps.


Although implementation of the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement will be critical in determining the future of relations, the national elections slated for late 2009 will also have an important impact. The elections may offer an opportunity to broaden representation in the Iraqi parliament, particularly by Sunni and secular groups that previously were not participants. A more broadly representative parliament and government could open the way for compromises on core issues. The United States has a vested interest in free and credible elections under rules that permit new leaders, parties, and coalitions to emerge and share in governing the country.

Even with a broadly representative parliament, it will take a long time to resolve deep-seated differences and past animosity. Outside diplomatic support may be needed to broker enduring compromises. The United States should be prepared together with the international community to appoint envoys and provide sustained diplomatic support to facilitate political solutions to the underlying causes of internal disagreement. America should fashion continuing assistance to the new Iraqi government in a way that facilitates resolution of the most contentious issues.


Iraqi security forces have grown rapidly in recent years, but the Iraqi government estimates that it will be unable to meet all internal and foreign defense needs until sometime between 2012 and 2018. Those forces exceeded 600,000 at the end of 2008 and eventually will number 640,000.<sup>3</sup> The ability of Iraq to plan and execute independent operations and resupply as well as maintain and administer its army and national police forces has grown steadily. Unfortunately, local police capability lags behind. The competence of Iraqi forces will improve over time with experience, even more rapidly if Americans train and advise them. Yet progress is only possible if national identity and military professionalism trump local and sectarian interests.

The growth of the Iraqi security forces has been constrained by a lack of midlevel officers. To meet this shortage, Iraq has mounted a sustained effort, graduating an average of 1,600 cadets annually from its military academies since 2005. Thousands of officers of the former Iraqi army also have been incorporated in the new security forces. However, since these forces have been built from the ground up, commands at brigade, division, and corps levels were formed last and are still in the process of maturing. The Iraqis will be hampered in the midterm by shortfalls in combat enablers, including aviation, combat service support, intelligence, and command

Deployments of U.S. Forces as of December 31, 2000



Deployments of U.S. Forces as of March 31, 2008



and control. Police and other internal organs of security lack adequate facilities, logistics, leadership, internal affairs, and forensic capabilities. Both the defense and interior ministries have improved their administrative capacity, but remain unable to fully execute their budgets. Although Iraq satisfied most of its defense requirements under the U.S. foreign military sales program, delivery was slow despite efforts by the Pentagon to expedite the process. As a result, Iraq looked for alternative sources of supply.

Pockets of sectarianism remain in the Iraqi security establishment, particularly in the police and facilities protection services. Moreover, there are risks that the government will use these forces as a tool to consolidate the power of one faction or sect, rather than enforce the law equitably for all Iraqis. For example, operational control of Iraqi special operations forces currently resides in the prime minister's office. To minimize the potential of sectarian or partisan use of this asset, which is the most capable of the Iraqi forces, the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq recommended in September 2007 that the special operations forces be placed under the Iraqi military chain of command, but the recommendation has not been accepted as yet.

Although Iraq continues to build a professional army, it will remain dependent on U.S. forces even as they draw down and assume a supporting role. Under a gradual drawdown and transition plan, U.S. surge brigades completed their tours and have been redeployed, leaving 15 combat brigades and some 155,000 troops in Iraq, and subsequent withdrawals are planned for this year. As outlined in the joint campaign plan, U.S. troops also began shifting from combat missions to tactical, operational, and finally strategic overwatch, as local conditions warranted.

The Multi-National Force plans to continue this gradual transition unless otherwise directed. In October 2008, the security of 13 provinces became the responsibility of Iraqis, and in 2009, all 18 provinces were to come under their control. Iraqi commands are planning and executing operations with U.S. advice when needed. Under the terms of the bilateral security agreement that went into effect in January 2009, the Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee has authority to coordinate all military operations according to Iraqi law and the conditions stipulated in the agreement. This agreement creates a significantly different operating environment from the one that was governed by the United Nations mandate, which expired in 2008. For example, U.S.

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## Darfur: A Complex Conflict

Since 2003, the western Sudanese province of Darfur has been a finger pointed at the conscience of the world. It has gained the attention of governments and humanitarian groups and generated countless pages of political commentary. Yet today the situation is less stable and more difficult than in the past. Civilian deaths reach into the hundreds of thousands, and refugees or internally displaced persons number in the millions. The minority government in Khartoum has adhered to its policy of destruction of the non-Arab population despite little or no support from Arab tribes, and the United States and its allies have passed the ball to the United Nations.

There are many tragedies in Africa and few real successes. Like Somalia, Congo-Kinshasa, and other areas, Darfur has become a humanitarian tragedy. In particular, international inaction and ineffectiveness have humanitarian costs of their own. The failure to stanch the Darfur crisis tarnishes the image of the United States as a world leader and a moral force. At the same time, in its failure to look beyond humanitarian crises, America has neglected to act in its own interest to secure a role in sub-Saharan Africa. The nations in this region are endowed with resources and have potential as U.S. trading and investment partners. The Sahel, which includes part of Sudan, represents a dividing line between the Muslim and non-Muslim world. The form that Islam will adopt in moving south in Africa has import for U.S. security interests. Yesterday's poster child of Africa was a hungry child, while tomorrow's may be the picture of dynamic development that is taking place to prepare countries in the region for active roles around the world.

President Idris Deby of Chad chaired negotiations in 2004 between Sudan and two rebel groups, the Sudanese Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement. The former was represented by Mini Minawi and the latter was headed by Khalil Ibrahim, who did not attend. Chief Salah Gosh led the Sudanese delegation. With only a handful of international observers, the three parties signed a ceasefire agreement on May 8, 2004. Although flawed and reached in an atmosphere of distrust, the agreement offered an opportunity for the international community to resolve the growing Darfur crisis. Yet the region had not gained attention in the United States and Europe where the focus remains on North-South negotiations in Kenya. The actions by the Sudanese government against the non-Arab population in Darfur were unpopular in Sudan, including the

army, and Khartoum remained a backwater that had not experienced the oil-driven economic growth that it enjoys today.

Following the signing of the North-South Agreement in 2005, the European Union promised support and asked the African Union to take on the peacekeeping mission. The African Union reluctantly agreed and began the mission with support from the United States and the European Union in an air of cautious optimism. This offered an opportunity for an American initiative to resolve the Darfur crisis with a combination of carrots and sticks, an opportunity that should have been linked to the North-South Agreement. However, the opportunity passed, and the government continued ethnic cleansing unimpeded. The African Union force took on the peacekeeping mission without requisite expertise or assets. Darfur became a popular cause for international celebrities who focus on humanitarian issues. China engaged the government to ensure a share of Sudanese resources, and other parties lined up to make investments in the largest African nation. The United States, devoid of colonial baggage and highly popular in Sudan outside the government, failed to take the lead.

Rebel leaders were hosted in Europe as America decided that the Sudanese Liberation Army must enter into negotiations. Yet rather than insist on compliance with the N'Djamena Agreement (formally known as the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement), the international community entered into another round of talks in Nigeria. But despite well-intentioned efforts, the Darfur problem was not resolved and began to deteriorate.

In response to its weak position, the government in Sudan concluded that there would not be strong reactions to the situation in Darfur. So it supported the attacks by the Jinjaweed militia on villages in the region. Aided by the failure of the world community to respond, President Omar al-Bashir and his confederates took the opportunity to divide the rebel groups. The United States tried to get the United Nations to impose tougher and tougher sanctions to no avail. After compelling the parties to the table in 2006, American envoy Robert Zoellick helped broker an agreement that was complex and unenforceable. Under pressure, Minawi signed the agreement but other groups did not. This split resulted in the downfall of Minawi within the Sudanese Liberation Army and in greater internal division. Furthermore, the United States did not engage with the Justice and

Equality Movement, fearful of the earlier relationship between Khalil Ibrahim and Hasan Turabi. But Khalil privately insisted that although he had worked with Turabi in the past, neither Turabi nor any leader had opposed the marginalization of the people of Darfur. He vowed that his only loyalty was to those people. Nevertheless, the international community blithely passed the buck to the United Nations with the result that nothing except bland resolutions ensued.

A forceful international effort headed by the United States could have achieved a great deal. But leaders were focused on humanitarian issues, sanctions, and fears of endangering the North-South Agreement rather than the political and economic consequences of the conflict in Darfur. The result has been a worsened humanitarian situation, sanctions that have had little or no effect, and increasing violence and growing threat. At the same time, interest in Africa and its resources has grown, but America seems not to have grasped the importance of standing firm on Darfur to achieve larger interests in the region. People in sub-Saharan Africa ask why the United States has responded in Bosnia but not in Darfur, especially given the declaration by former Secretary of State Colin Powell concerning the ongoing genocide in Darfur.

The United Nations cannot resolve the problem of Darfur; only America has that capability. As such, the following outlines basic ideas on this humanitarian and security crisis:

- Call for a meeting of rebel leaders, in limited numbers, from all factions, including Khalil Ibrahim. Only a unified group can negotiate with the Sudanese government. Since unity is the desirable but unlikely outcome, this group should form a council representing all credible factions.

- Invite the non-Arab and Arab leadership of Darfur including the nomad tribes to meet, preferably in the United States. Although they have suffered, no major Arab tribe supports the government. Ensure humanitarian and development needs are translated into priorities to implement quickly.

- Invite the Sudanese government to send representatives to the United States for frank discussions. America must be prepared to name an Ambassador, remove Sudan from the list of terrorist states, and end sanctions in return for specific actions. The United States has allies among the Sudanese business leaders, who are Western-educated and prefer to work with American firms. Promoting strong

private business ties would be beneficial in eventually affecting change in Khartoum.

- Host a meeting of decisionmakers from the above groups in a secluded location (such as Dayton).
- Support a broad-based amnesty since parties threatened with arrest and the International Criminal Court are unlikely to negotiate. Sending a few culprits to The Hague may make some people feel better, but it could work against a lasting resolution. The importance of amnesty is a lesson from the success of the Salvadoran peace agreement in the 1980s.
- Work within traditional tribal administrative structures to allow for compensation for those groups driven from their homes and lands.
- Invite only a limited group of international observers to any negotiations to avoid the circus-like atmosphere that was created in Abuja by scores of diplomats, experts, and journalists competing for attention from the rebels and government. A more relevant group of observers might include representatives of the United Nations, European Union, African Union, and Arab League.

The United States has a chance to demonstrate that it is capable of taking a leadership role in the sub-Saharan Africa. America will have to recognize African nations as partners and not only the beneficiaries of humanitarian relief. U.S. resources would be better used to support private investments, agricultural development, water projects, education, health, infrastructure, and the development of human resources.

At stake is the image of America as a moral beacon and its respect for sub-Saharan Africa. Also threatened are relations with Sudan, a bridge between the Muslim north and non-Muslim south. It is the largest country in Africa, a key to the Nile, and a potential ally. The Sudanese people are not anti-American or generally radical. And the Bashir government is unpopular, the military is unenthusiastic, and the Southern Sudan referendum looms near. The United States should take the risk and assume leadership of an international effort to resolve the Darfur crisis.

▲ *Continued from p. 379*

military personnel come under Iraqi jurisdiction when off duty and off base, Iraqi warrants must be obtained for detentions, and detainees must be turned over to Iraqi custody.

Many questions remain over the implementation of the bilateral security agreement as well as the accompanying strategic framework. The pace of the U.S. troop withdrawal and the nature of future security and diplomatic relations will be determined through further bilateral negotiations. The security agreement provides for the possibility of a quicker withdrawal or revision of the existing agreement. The parliamentary elections may also affect the longer term resolution of these matters.

Despite broad areas of uncertainty, it is likely that U.S. forces will be increasingly dedicated to advisory and training roles for the next year or two. Given continued internal threats, Iraq will need combat enablers and counterterrorism assistance for some time. While American combat units departed urban areas in July 2009, U.S. advisors can be effective if dispersed among Iraqi forces to provide situational awareness. Depending on the threat from neighboring countries, some U.S. forces may be located along the borders as well. These missions and terms of assistance may be revisited in consultations with the new Iraqi government. U.S. force levels should be determined by troop-to-task analyses once missions have been agreed on.

If Iraq retains U.S. military training and advisory assistance, the formation of a multinational transition security command could be the vehicle to train, equip, and advise Iraqi forces. A small counterterrorism unit, if such a presence is desired, could be folded into this command.

Security and stability inside Iraq cannot be achieved if outside actors undermine the efforts to peacefully end the conflict. Diplomatic initiatives as well as other measures are needed to foster regional stability. The so-called neighbors process begun by the United States and Iraq should be enhanced to staunch the flow of insurgents and weapons into Iraq and to prevent tensions and provocations across borders. The United Nations has played a constructive and expanding role in diplomatic efforts both inside Iraq and regionally, and notably in efforts to address the crisis of internally displaced persons and refugees abroad. Despite successes in resettlement and repatriation, more than 4 million Iraqis remain displaced in their own country or are living as expatriates in surrounding nations. Most countries in

the region are interested in a security framework that prevents the spillover of conflict in Iraq and creation of a terrorist safe haven. To date, Arab neighbors and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council have been reluctant to support what is perceived as a sectarian-minded Shia government in Baghdad. To the extent the Iraqi government incorporates Sunnis in the police and military and provides services and jobs in areas where they live, regional Arab states should be prepared to support Iraq. The formation of an inclusive government in 2010 will greatly enhance prospects for such support. That will provide Iraq with the influence to counter Iranian efforts to Lebanonize Iraq and control political or military forces inside it.

The goal of regional diplomacy is not to create an anti-Iranian alliance that would destabilize the region or prompt reactions by Tehran, but rather to help defend Iraq and other countries against the destabilizing actions of Iran. Threats in this region demand multilateral and bilateral efforts to avoid war as well as the acquisition of destabilizing weapons of mass destruction. The specter of a poly-nuclear Middle East makes regional engagement a top imperative for U.S. foreign policy. **gsa**

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Charles C. Krulak, “The Three Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas,” speech presented at National Press Club, Washington, DC, December 15, 1997.

<sup>2</sup> Joint Staff, *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, December 2004).

<sup>3</sup> This information on the growth and requirements of the Iraqi security forces comes from testimony by Lieutenant General James M. Dubik, USA, to the House Armed Services Committee, July 9, 2008, and an interview by the author with General Nasir Abadi, vice chief of the Iraqi armed forces, on January 4, 2008.

## Contributors

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**Linda Robinson** is an author and consultant. Her latest book, *Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq* (Public Affairs, 2008), was named one of the 100 Notable Books of 2008 by *The New York Times*.