Staff Ride Guide

Battle of First Bull Run

Ted Ballard

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by

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FOREWORD

The U.S. Army has long used the staff ride as a tool for professional development, conveying the lessons of the past to contemporary soldiers. In 1906 Maj. Eben Swift took twelve officer-students from Fort Leavenworth’s General Service and Staff School to the Chickamauga battlefield on the Army’s first official staff ride. Since that time Army educators have employed staff rides to provide officers a better understanding of past military operations, of the vagaries of war, and of military planning. A staff ride to an appropriate battlefield can also enliven a unit’s esprit de corps—a constant objective in peacetime or war.

To support such Army initiatives, the Center of Military History publishes staff ride guides, such as this one on the Battle of First Bull Run. This account is drawn principally from contemporary after action reports and from the sworn testimony of participants before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, a congressional entity created to investigate the Union defeats at First Bull Run and Ball’s Bluff.

A First Bull Run staff ride can offer significant military lessons. Revisiting this battle through the “eyes” of the men who were there, both leaders and rank-and-file soldiers, allows one insights into decision making under pressure and the human condition during battle. The campaign contains many lessons in command and control, communications, intelligence, logistics, the accommodation of advances in weapon technology, and mobilization in the absence of universal military training.

First Bull Run was a first battle—a major engagement after a prolonged period of peace. For some it constitutes a metaphor of the price paid for military unpreparedness. Hopefully, this volume will prove a useful tool for those conducting a staff ride to First Bull Run.

Washington, D.C. 30 October 2003
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Ted Ballard has been a historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History since 1980 and a part of the Center’s staff ride program since 1986. Battle of First Bull Run joins his other battlefield guides to Ball’s Bluff, Second Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and Wilderness/Spotsylvania. In addition to being the author of numerous articles on military history, he was a contributor to the Center’s publication, The Story of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps; the author of Rhineland, a brochure in the Center’s series commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of World War II; and a contributor to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command publication, American Military Heritage, and to the Virginia Army National Guard publication, The Tradition Continues: A History of the Virginia National Guard, 1607–1985.
PREFACE

On 16 July 1861, the largest army ever assembled on the North American continent up to that time marched from the vicinity of Washington, D.C., toward Manassas Junction, thirty miles to the southwest. Commanded by newly promoted Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, the Union force consisted of partly trained militia with ninety-day enlistments (almost untrained volunteers) and three newly organized battalions of Regulars. Many soldiers, unaccustomed to military discipline or road marches, left the ranks to obtain water, gather blackberries, or simply to rest as the march progressed.

Near Manassas, along a meandering stream known as Bull Run, waited the similarly untrained Confederate army commanded by Brig. Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard. This army would soon be joined by another Confederate force, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston.

After a minor clash of arms on 18 July, McDowell launched the first major land battle of the Civil War by attempting to turn the Confederate left flank on 21 July. A series of uncoordinated and sometimes confusing attacks and counterattacks by both sides finally ended in a defeat for the Union Army and its withdrawal to Washington.

The Battle of First Bull Run highlighted many of the problems and deficiencies that were typical of the first year of the war. Units were committed piecemeal, attacks were frontal, infantry failed to protect exposed artillery, tactical intelligence was nil, and neither commander was able to employ his whole force effectively. McDowell, with 35,000 men, was only able to commit about 18,000, and the combined Confederate forces, with about 32,000 men, committed only 18,000.

A First Bull Run staff ride can provide many lessons in command and control, communications, intelligence, weapons technology versus tactics, and the ever-present “fog” of battle. Hopefully, participants will see how decisions made by the various commanders can influence tactical outcomes, how terrain shapes engagements, and how technology, tactics, and organization interact in a battlefield setting.

Several persons assisted in the creation of this staff ride guide. At the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Linda F. Moten and Diane Sedore Arms of the Editorial Branch edited the manuscript, and in the Graphics Branch Teresa K. Jameson designed the final product. S. L. Dowdy turned sketch maps into finished products. John J. Hennessy, Assistant Superintendent, Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park,
was kind enough to review the narrative for historical accuracy. My thanks go to all.

In the narrative the names of Confederate personnel and units appear in italic type, Union personnel and units in regular type. Any errors that remain in the text are the sole responsibility of the author.

Washington, D.C. T E D  B A L L A R D
30 October 2003
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Cover: Capture of Ricketts’ Battery by Sidney E. King, courtesy of William V. Fleitz, Manassas National Battlefield Park.
BATTLE OF FIRST BULL RUN
FIRST BULL RUN: AN OVERVIEW

Prelude to Battle

On 15 April 1861, the day after South Carolina military forces had attacked and captured Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, President Abraham Lincoln issued a proclamation declaring an insurrection against the laws of the United States. Earlier, South Carolina and seven other Southern states had declared their secession from the Union and formed the Confederate States of America.

To suppress the rebellion and restore Federal law in the Southern states, Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers with ninety-day enlistments to augment the existing U.S. Army of about 15,000. He later accepted an additional 40,000 volunteers with three-year enlistments and increased the strength of the U.S. Army to almost 20,000. Lincoln's actions caused four more Southern states, including Virginia, to secede and join the Confederacy, and by 1 June the Confederate capital had been moved from Montgomery, Alabama, to Richmond, Virginia.

In Washington, D.C., as thousands of volunteers rushed to defend the capital, General in Chief Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott laid out his strategy to subdue the rebellious states. He proposed that an army of 80,000 men be organized and sail down the Mississippi River and capture New Orleans. While the Army “strangled” the Confederacy in the west, the U.S. Navy would blockade Southern ports along the eastern and Gulf coasts. The press ridiculed what they dubbed as Scott’s “Anaconda Plan.” Instead, many believed the capture of the Confederate capital at Richmond, only one hundred miles south of Washington, would quickly end the war.¹

By July 1861 thousands of volunteers were camped in and around Washington. Since General Scott was seventy-five years old and phys-

ically unable to lead this force, the administration searched for a more suitable field commander. Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase championed fellow Ohioan, 42-year-old Maj. Irvin McDowell. Although McDowell was a West Point graduate, his command experience was limited. In fact, he had spent most of his career engaged in various staff duties in the Adjutant General's Office. While stationed in Washington he had become acquainted with Chase, a former Ohio governor and senator. Now, through Chase's influence, McDowell was promoted three grades to brigadier general in the Regular Army and on 27 May was assigned command of the Department of Northeastern Virginia, which included the military forces in and around Washington.² (Map 1)


Under public and political pressure to begin offensive operations, McDowell was given very little time to train the newly inducted troops. Units were instructed in the maneuvering of regiments, but they received little or no training at the brigade or division level. In fact, on one occasion, when McDowell reviewed eight infantry regiments at one time, the visiting General Scott chastised him for "trying to make a big show."³

While McDowell organized the Army of Northeastern Virginia, a smaller Union command was organized and stationed northwest of Washington, near Harper's Ferry. Commanded by Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson, 18,000 men of the Department of Pennsylvania protected against a Confederate incursion from the Shenandoah Valley. Although almost seventy years old and a veteran of the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, Patterson had been given a three-month volunteer officer's

³ RJ CCW, 1:243.
commission in April 1861 and now commanded a varied force of Pennsylvania volunteers.

At Winchester, Virginia, southwest of Patterson's command, were 12,000 Confederate troops of the Army of the Shenandoah under 54-year-old General Joseph E. Johnston. Before the war Johnston had served as quartermaster general of the United States Army. Now, as a Confederate commander, he was charged with defending the Shenandoah Valley and,
if necessary, going to the support of Brig. Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard’s command at Manassas Junction. The Army of the Shenandoah consisted of five infantry brigades: the 1st, commanded by Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson; the 2d, commanded by Col. Francis S. Bartow; the 3d, commanded by Brig. Gen. Barnard E. Bee; the 4th, commanded by Col. Arnold Elzey; and the 5th, commanded by Brig. Gen. E. Kirby Smith. In addition to the infantry, there were twenty pieces of artillery and about 300 Virginia cavalrymen under Col. J. E. B. Stuart.

Thirty miles southwest of Washington, at Manassas Junction, the 22,000-man Confederate Army of the Potomac blocked McDowell’s route to Richmond and defended the junction of the Orange and Alexandria and Manassas Gap Railroads. That force was commanded by 43-year-old General Beauregard, a former West Point classmate of McDowell. Beauregard had commanded the Confederate troops that had forced the surrender of Fort Sumter, and the “Hero of Sumter” had been assigned to the Confederate army being organized at Manassas Junction. The Army of the Potomac was organized into seven infantry brigades. These were the 1st Brigade, under Brig. Gen. Milledge L. Bonham; 2d Brigade, under Brig. Gen. Richard S. Ewell; 3d Brigade, under Brig. Gen. David R. Jones; 4th Brigade, under Brig. Gen. James Longstreet; 5th Brigade, under Col. Philip St. George Cocke; 6th Brigade, under Col. Jubal A. Early; and 7th Brigade, under Col. Nathan G. Evans. Beauregard’s army also contained thirty-nine pieces of field artillery and a regiment of Virginia cavalry.

Expecting McDowell to march on Manassas Junction by way of Centreville, Beauregard began preparing a defensive position along the south bank of Bull Run, a small creek flowing into the Occoquan River. (Map 2) Beauregard placed his right flank near the railroad bridge at Union Mills, extending the line northward over seven miles along Bull Run to the Stone Bridge on the Warrenton Turnpike. General Ewell’s brigade was located near Union Mills; General Jones’ brigade was at McLean’s Ford, supported by the brigade of Colonel Early; General Longstreet’s brigade was placed at Blackburn’s Ford; General Bonham’s brigade was at Mitchell’s Ford; Colonel Cocke’s brigade was between Lewis’ and Ball’s fords; and Colonel Evans’ brigade held the army’s left flank at the Stone Bridge on the Warrenton Turnpike.4

McDowell planned to march his army toward Manassas Junction on 9 July and, while Patterson held Johnston’s army in the Shenandoah Valley, defeat Beauregard’s command. However, a lack of sufficient supplies postponed the maneuver for a week. Prior to the operation,

McDowell warned the War Department that unless Johnston was prevented from reinforcing Beauregard, McDowell felt he had little chance of victory. General Scott assured McDowell that if Johnston did manage to slip out of the valley “he would have Patterson on his heels.”

Finally, on 16 July, McDowell’s army headed for Manassas Junction. Amid cries of “On to Richmond,” the excited soldiers marched south, confident that in a few days the war would be over, won by one grand battle. Since some of his regiments wore gray uniforms like many of the Confederate units, McDowell ordered that U.S. flags be displayed prominently at all times to prevent units from firing at each other.

By the following day General Beauregard had been alerted to the Union advance and asked the Confederate government for reinforcements. An independent infantry brigade stationed at Fredericksburg, commanded by Brig. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes, was ordered to Manassas Junction, and in Richmond six companies of South Carolina infantry of the independent Hampton Legion, commanded by Col. Wade Hampton, boarded trains and hurried north.

McDowell had hoped to have his army at Centreville by 17 July, but the troops, unaccustomed to marching, moved in starts and stops. Along the route soldiers often broke ranks to wander off to pick apples or blackberries or to get water, regardless of the orders of their officers to remain in ranks. By 1130, 17 July, the head of McDowell’s army, Tyler’s division, had only reached Fairfax Courthouse. McDowell wanted the men to push on to Centreville, but they were too exhausted to continue and camped near Fairfax.

It was not until 1100 on 18 July that Tyler’s division arrived at Centreville. While McDowell brought up the rest of the army, Tyler was ordered to observe the roads to Bull Run and Warrenton but under no circumstances to bring on an engagement. However, Tyler led a portion of Colonel Richardson’s brigade to Blackburn’s Ford where it became engaged with troops of General Longstreet. An aide to McDowell, accompanying the expedition, reminded Tyler of the commanding general’s admonition not to bring on an engagement, but Tyler ordered up the remainder of Richardson’s brigade. After a brief clash Richardson’s brigade fell back to Centreville. Union casualties at what became known as the Battle of Blackburn’s Ford were eighty-three killed, wounded, and missing. The Confederates suffered fifteen killed and fifty-three wounded, of which several later died.

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5 RJ CCW, 1:36.  
7 Ibid., pp. 314, 446.
At Centreville McDowell personally rebuked Tyler for exceeding his orders. McDowell had been considering launching an attack against the Confederate right flank, east of Union Mills, but after Tyler’s action McDowell feared Beauregard had strengthened his right flank. McDowell began looking for a way around the Confederate left, near the Warrenton Turnpike. The narrow Stone Bridge carried turnpike traffic across Bull Run, but McDowell believed the bridge was heavily mined and sent engineers farther north, looking for another crossing point.

Also on the morning of 18 July Johnston had received a telegram suggesting he go to Beauregard’s assistance if possible. Johnston marched out of Winchester about noon, while Stuart’s cavalry screened the movement from Patterson. Patterson was completely deceived. One hour after Johnston’s departure Patterson telegraphed Washington, “I have succeeded, in accordance with the wishes of the General-in-Chief, in keeping General Johnston’s force at Winchester.”

About 0730 on 19 July, the first of Johnston’s command arrived at Piedmont Station (now Delaplane), a stop on the Manassas Gap Railroad. An hour and a half later Jackson’s brigade was the first to board cars and depart for Manassas Junction, arriving late in the afternoon. Bartow’s brigade followed shortly thereafter. The following morning, 20 July, Bee and a portion of his brigade, accompanied by Johnston, departed the station and arrived at Manassas Junction about noon. Johnston, being senior to Beauregard, assumed command of all Confederate forces at the junction, with his headquarters at the nearby Lewis house. General Smith remained at Piedmont to expedite the loading and transportation of the remainder of Johnston’s command. While Johnston’s infantry continued to move by rail, the cavalry and artillery continued to Manassas Junction by road.

The same day that Johnston arrived at Manassas Junction, more of McDowell’s troops arrived at Centreville. The divisions of Colonels Miles, Heintzelman, and Hunter arrived at the village and camped east and southeast of the town. The division of General Runyon was positioned between Fairfax and Alexandria, guarding the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Also on 20 July McDowell’s engineers reported two favorable crossing sites on Bull Run north of the Stone Bridge. The first, Poplar Ford, was a mile north of the bridge, and the other, Sudley Ford, was two miles north of the bridge. Still believing the Confederates had strengthened their right flank, McDowell decided to feint toward

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8 Ibid., p. 168.
Blackburn’s Ford and the Stone Bridge while his main attacking force marched around the Confederate left flank.

For the maneuver to be successful McDowell felt he needed to act quickly. He had already begun to hear rumors that Johnston had slipped out of the valley and was headed for Manassas Junction. If the rumors were true, McDowell might soon be facing 34,000 Confederates, instead of 22,000. A nother reason for quick action was McDowell’s concern that the ninety-day enlistments of many of his regiments were about to expire. “In a few days I will lose many thousands of the best of this force,” he wrote Washington on the eve of battle. In fact, the next morning two units of McDowell’s command, their enlistments expiring that day, would turn a deaf ear to McDowell’s appeal to stay a few days longer. Instead, to the sounds of battle, they would march back to Washington to be mustered out of service.10

McDowell planned his attack for early the following morning. Richardson’s brigade, along with the brigade of Colonel Davies of Miles’ division, would feint toward Blackburn’s Ford. Tyler’s other brigades, Sherman, Keyes, and Schenck, would feint toward the Stone Bridge on the Warrenton Turnpike. Miles’ other brigade, commanded by Colonel Blenker, would remain in reserve at Centreville. While the attention of the Confederates was occupied east of Bull Run, Hunter’s and Heintzelman’s divisions, 13,000 men and 20 cannon, would march north around the Confederate left. Hunter would cross the stream at Sudley Ford, while Heintzelman would cross at Poplar Ford and align on Hunter’s left. Then, both divisions would march south to the Warrenton Turnpike. It was a workable plan but depended on the flanking force moving quickly before the Confederates discovered the ruse. McDowell ordered the march to begin at 0230 the following day and planned for Hunter’s column to cross Sudley Ford by 0700.11

Meanwhile, Johnston was concerned that Patterson might have followed him from the valley and expressed to Beauregard his desire to attack McDowell as soon as possible. Beauregard suggested an attack against the Union left flank. Ewell would advance across Bull Run at Union Mills, while the commands of Longstreet and Jones crossed at Blackburn’s and McLean’s Fords, respectively, and fell in on Ewell’s left. The three brigades would then march north to Centreville and attempt to turn McDowell’s left flank. Johnston asked Beauregard to place the plan in writing and he would approve it, which was done at 0430 the next day.12

11 Ibid., p. 318; RJCCW, 1:5, 39.
The Battle

About 0230 on Sunday, 21 July, units of McDowell’s army began leaving their camps at Centreville. From the start the march was beset with delays. Tyler’s division moved onto the Warrenton Turnpike first, which delayed the movement of the flanking columns of Hunter and Heintzelman. Tyler, stung by his rebuke from McDowell two days earlier, took his time and moved cautiously westward. Traveling with Tyler’s division was a 2 1/2-ton, 30-pounder Parrott rifle. When it arrived at the Cub Run Bridge, there was concern the structure might not hold the gun’s weight. The column halted while engineers reinforced the bridge, causing further delay.

It was not until 0530 that the rear of Tyler’s column finally crossed Cub Run Bridge, allowing Hunter and Heintzelman to cross and begin their march north toward Sudley and Poplar fords. (Map 3) The two commanders discovered, however, that the route chosen by the engineers soon turned into a little-used footpath through the woods. With frequent halts to clear trees and brush, the column slowly worked its way northward.

At 0600 the head of Tyler’s column reached the vicinity of the Stone Bridge. Sherman’s brigade deployed to the north side of the pike, while Schenck’s brigade moved to the south side. Keyes’ brigade remained on the turnpike, some distance in the rear in reserve. Tyler began his demon-
stration by having the 30-pounder Parrott rifle, joined by his other artillery, open fire across Bull Run.

On the west side of Bull Run, near the Stone Bridge, waited the 1,100-man brigade of 37-year-old Colonel Evans. Evans, a West Point graduate, was known as a tough, profane fighter and a hard drinker. Evans’ command consisted of the 4th South Carolina Infantry and the 1st Special Louisiana Infantry Battalion and two guns of the Lynchburg Artillery. As Union shells crashed in and around his command, Evans kept his men out of sight. After a while, with Union artillery eliciting no Confederate response, Tyler ordered skirmishers forward. Evans responded with his own skirmishers and sent word to Beauregard that he was under attack.

With no indication that the activity near Stone Bridge was anything but a small unit action, Beauregard continued with his plan to attack McDowell’s left at Centreville. Johnston, however, grew concerned about the growing sound of battle in the direction of the Stone Bridge and decided to send forces closer to the bridge as a precaution. About 0700 he ordered the brigades of Bee and Bartow, south of Blackburn’s Ford, to support Evans, while Jackson’s brigade, also south of Blackburn’s Ford, was ordered to a position between Ball’s and Mitchell’s fords where it could support either the brigades of Cocke or Bonham. The Hampton Legion, having just arrived from Richmond, was also ordered by Beauregard to march in the direction of the Stone Bridge. Elsewhere, Stuart’s cavalry, with about 300 troopers, guarded possible crossing sites along Bull Run between Mitchell’s and Ball’s fords, and Holmes’ brigade, having arrived from Fredericksburg two days earlier, had been placed in support of Ewell’s brigade at Union Mills.

Despite the shift of these troops away from his right, Beauregard proceeded with his attack plan. About 0700 he had sent orders for Ewell, Jones, and Longstreet to cross Bull Run and move together to Centreville. Upon receipt of their orders Jones and Longstreet crossed the creek and waited. However, for reasons unexplained, Ewell failed to receive his copy of the order. By 0800, when Johnston and Beauregard moved near Mitchell’s Ford in preparation for the attack, Ewell was still waiting on the south side of Bull Run.

As the sun rose higher in the sky scores of civilians, many traveling from Washington, began arriving on the heights at Centreville, all eager to witness the coming battle. Carriages containing congressmen and their families, reporters, and others crowded the roads and fields, eager to get a good view. Six miles to the west the smoke and noise of Tyler’s demonstration at the Stone Bridge maintained a sense of excitement.

While Tyler’s division skirmished with Evans and Beauregard’s flank attack stalled, Hunter’s and Heintzelman’s columns struggled
along the narrow wooded trail toward the northern fords. By 0800 the firing at the Stone Bridge had been going on for two hours, and Evans was growing uneasy that the action in his front might be a feint for an attack elsewhere. About 0830 Capt. E. Porter Alexander, commanding a Confederate signal station near the junction, was receiving a message from near the Stone Bridge when he noticed a flash of light on the horizon, a few miles north of the bridge. He immediately identified the reflection as coming from a bronze field gun. A closer look also discovered the sun glinting off large numbers of bayonets. Alexander had spotted Hunter’s and Heintzelman’s columns. He immediately sent Evans a message, “Look out for your left. You are flanked.”

Evans quickly took the Louisiana battalion and nine hundred men of the 4th South Carolina Infantry and headed in the direction of Sudley Ford. The remaining two hundred men of the South Carolina regiment stayed at the Stone Bridge. While Evans’ infantry moved to block the Union flank march, one gun of the Lynchburg Artillery moved to Buck Hill, north of the Stone house, and the other gun unlimbered just north of the turnpike, across the road from the home of a free African-American, James Robinson. Following a path from the Stone Bridge, Evans

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deployed his small command on the southern slope of Matthews’ Hill to cover the Manassas-Sudley Road.

Alexander also alerted Beauregard and Johnston to the Union flank march. Stationed a half mile south of Mitchell’s Ford, the two commanders were still waiting for word that Beauregard’s offensive had begun. Although Johnston was apprehensive that the Union troops seen north of the Stone Bridge might be Patterson’s force arriving from the valley, he decided to continue with the attack on Centreville.

About 0930, hours behind schedule, the head of Hunter’s column reached Sudley Ford. After a short halt to rest and replenish canteens the march resumed, past the Sudley Church, where parishioners preparing for Sunday service stopped to stare at the passing column. McDowell soon joined the column and urged haste. Meanwhile, Heintzelman’s division missed the road to the crossing at Poplar Ford and continued to follow Hunter. The result would be that both divisions would enter the battle one behind the other, rather than two abreast.

Leading Hunter’s advance south from Sudley Ford was the brigade of Colonel Burnside. Burnside’s command included the 1st and 2d Rhode Island Infantries, which were accompanied by the governor of Rhode Island, William Sprague. Sprague had come along to see how the Rhode Island units acquitted themselves in battle. Also in Burnside’s brigade were the 2d New Hampshire Infantry and the 71st New York Infantry, the latter regiment dragging two 12-pounder boat howitzers borrowed from
the Washington Navy Yard. Burnside's brigade artillery, Company A, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, was commanded by Capt. William Reynolds.

About 1030 Burnside's command approached Matthews' Hill and came under fire from Evans' skirmishers on the crest. After a couple of volleys the Confederate skirmishers withdrew to Evans' main command on the southern slope. Burnside deployed his brigade, and Reynolds' six, bronze, 14-pounder rifles unlimbered only 200 yards from Evans' line, the battery's right resting on the Manassas-Sudley Road. (Map 4) Reynolds' guns quickly became engaged with the two guns of the Lynchburg Artillery to the south.

While Burnside battled for Matthews' Hill, the brigade of Colonel Porter arrived behind Burnside's line. Porter's command consisted of the 8th New York Infantry, 14th New York State Militia (known as the 14th Brooklyn), 27th New York Infantry, a U.S. Infantry Battalion, a U.S. Marine Corps Battalion, and a U.S. Cavalry Battalion. Battery D, 5th U.S. Artillery, commanded by Capt. Charles Griffin, completed the brigade. Shortly after Porter's arrival, Hunter was wounded and carried to the rear, telling Burnside, "I leave the matter in your hands."14

About 1100 the brigades of Bee and Bartow (Bee in overall command of both brigades) arrived near the Henry house. Although earlier ordered toward the Stone Bridge, Bee had diverted his column toward the sound of the firing on Matthews' Hill. Bee's brigade contained the 4th Alabama Infantry and 2d Mississippi Infantry (the 6th North Carolina Infantry had yet to arrive from Piedmont Station). Bartow's command consisted of the 7th and 8th Georgia Infantries. Although Bartow's artillery, the Wise Artillery, had not accompanied the brigade, Bee had brought along his Staunton Artillery, commanded by Capt. John Imboden. Imboden unlimbered his four 6-pounder smoothbores in a depression about one hundred yards north of the Henry house and opened long-range fire on the Union artillery on Matthews' Hill.

Evans had seen the arrival of Bee and Bartow on Henry Hill and rode back to ask for support. Bee was at first reluctant, believing that Henry Hill was a better defensive position, and suggested Evans fall back instead. But Evans was adamant and Bee ordered the two brigades forward, where they extended Evans' right flank.

After McDowell arrived on Matthews' Hill to take command, Porter extended the Union line to Dogan Ridge, west of the Manassas-Sudley Road. Griffin's six guns and six guns of Battery I, 1st U.S. Artillery

BATTLE OF FIRST BULL RUN
21 July 1861
Situation at 1030–1100

Note: 1 Chain = 22 Yards
Contour Interval 10 feet
Scale of Chains

Bull Run

Map 4

(commanded by Capt. James D. Ricketts), of Franklin’s brigade, unlimbered in front of Porter’s line and opened fire.

With the fight growing in intensity on Matthews’ Hill, McDowell sent orders for Tyler to end his demonstration at the Stone Bridge and bring his brigades across Bull Run. About 1130 Sherman crossed his brigade, the 13th, 69th, and 79th New York and 2d Wisconsin Infantries, at a small ford several hundred yards north of the Stone Bridge. Tyler accompanied Keyes’ brigade, consisting of the 2d Maine and 1st, 2d, and 3d Connecticut Infantries, and followed Sherman across Bull Run. Schenck’s brigade remained on the east side of the stream in reserve.

On Matthews’ Hill Evans’ position was becoming untenable. Even with the assistance of Bee’s and Bartow’s brigades the Union line was extending beyond both Evans’ flanks. Franklin’s and Willcox’s brigades of Heintzelman’s division were also arriving, with Howard’s brigade not far behind. Franklin’s brigade included the 5th and 11th Massachusetts and 1st Minnesota Infantries. Willcox brought along the 11th and 38th New York and 1st and 4th Michigan Infantries. Also Evans received reports of Union forces (Tyler’s two brigades) crossing Bull Run to his rear near the Stone Bridge. Outnumbered and outflanked, Evans reluctantly gave the order to fall back to Henry Hill. (Map 5) The retreat was anything but orderly. Pounded by Union artillery, the three Confederate brigades became disorganized and intermingled as they hurried south across the turnpike. The Confederates rushed past the Robinson house and milled around southeast of the house while officers tried to reorganize the various units. Near the Robinson house the 600-man Hampton Legion arrived and set up a defensive position along the turnpike.

It was now shortly before noon, and to McDowell’s men on Matthews’ Hill it seemed they had just won a great victory. The Confederates appeared to be in full retreat. One of McDowell’s staff officers rode around the field shouting, “Victory, victory! We have done it!” Some soldiers, just arriving, lamented the fact that the war might be over and they had missed all the excitement.15 Although McDowell joined in the celebration, he had cause for concern, having learned from prisoners of war that at least a portion of Johnston’s army had arrived from the valley.16 Meanwhile, Burnside requested and received permission to withdraw his brigade to reorganize and replenish ammunition. The brigade withdrew a short distance where it would remain in reserve for the rest of the day.

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15 RJCCW, 1:201.
16 Ibid., p. 40.
Map 5

BATTLE OF FIRST BULL RUN
21 July 1861
Situation at 1100–1130

Contour Interval 10 feet
Scale of Chains
Note: 1 Chain = 22 Yards

Base Source: The Official Military Atlas of the Civil War, Plate V, Map I.
Near Blackburn's Ford Johnston had decided to ride toward the sound of fighting to the west. Any thought of a flank attack against Centreville was forgotten and the commands of Longstreet and Jones were withdrawn to their former positions south of Bull Run. Beauregard, his planned attack in shambles, followed Johnston.

About noon Jackson's 2,600-man brigade arrived on Henry Hill. (Map 6) Jackson had earlier been ordered to a position near Ball's and Mitchell's fords but, like Bee and Bartow, marched instead to the sound of firing on Matthews' Hill. Arriving southeast of the Henry house, Jackson was met by an excited General Bee, shouting that the Federals were driving them back. Jackson responded calmly that his command would give them the bayonet, then moved his regiments into position on the southeast slope of a ridgeline about 400 yards from the Henry house. On Jackson's right, toward the Robinson house, Jackson placed the 5th Virginia Infantry. On that regiment's left the 4th Virginia Infantry moved into position, behind which was placed the 27th Virginia Infantry. The 2d Virginia Infantry extended Jackson's line southward, and the 33d Virginia Infantry held Jackson's left flank near the Manassas-Sudley Road.17

After Jackson's arrival Imboden's battery, nearly out of ammunition, began withdrawing from the vicinity of the Henry house. Jackson, however, halted the unit and ordered it into position along the ridge in front of Jackson's line. Even out of ammunition the battery could at least give the appearance of a threat. Shortly after Imboden relocated his battery, Beauregard and Johnston arrived, bringing additional guns from various batteries they had encountered along the way. As Jackson gestured for Imboden to go to the rear, Jackson was struck in the hand by a stray bullet. Jackson wrapped a handkerchief around his hand and assured Imboden the wound "was only a scratch—a mere scratch." Before withdrawing, Imboden received permission to fire his last three rounds. The young officer stood too close to the gun and suffered an injury that would cause permanent deafness in one ear. After Imboden's withdrawal, the guns brought by Johnston and Beauregard, thirteen in all, were placed on the ridge in front of Jackson's line.18

Near the Robinson house Johnston and Beauregard attempted to assist in rallying the remnants of Evans', Bee's, and Bartow's commands.

BATTLE OF FIRST BULL RUN
21 July 1861
Situation at 1200–1230

Note: 1 Chain = 22 Yards
Scale of Chains

Contour Interval 10 feet

Map 6

Discovering that all the officers of the 4th Alabama Infantry had been wounded, Johnston grabbed the unit’s colors and offered to lead the regiment personally, but Beauregard intervened and placed one of Bee’s aides in command of the Alabamians.19

On Matthews’ Hill and Dogan Ridge the brigades of Burnside and Porter of Hunter’s division; Franklin’s, Willcox’s, and Howard’s brigades of Heintzelman’s division; and Sherman’s brigade of Tyler’s division waited. McDowell made no immediate attempt to commit them to battle. Neither did McDowell give any orders to Keyes’ brigade, which had separated from Sherman and marched to Young’s Branch, just north of the Robinson house.

On Henry Hill the Confederates worked to establish a strong defense for an expected Union assault. Although Evans’, Bee’s, and Bartow’s commands were yet to be fully reorganized, Jackson’s brigade and the artillery brought forward by Johnston and Beauregard held the Confederate left flank and center, while the Hampton Legion on Jackson’s right, held the high ground around the Robinson house. With the situation on Henry Hill stabilized, Beauregard suggested that Johnston, although senior in command, return to his headquarters at the Lewis house and forward reinforcements to the battlefield. As Johnston later reported, he assigned Beauregard command of the army’s “left wing,” while Johnston retained overall army command. Johnston then rode back to his headquarters to hasten more troops to Henry Hill.20

While the Confederates brought up reinforcements to Henry Hill and McDowell rested his troops on Matthews’ Hill, Tyler was about to get the battle restarted. After crossing Bull Run Tyler had led Keyes’ brigade to a position along Young’s Branch, north of the Robinson house. Without any consultation with McDowell, Tyler ordered Keyes to attack the Henry Hill. About 1300 Keyes left the 1st and 2d Connecticut Infantries in reserve and sent the 2d Maine and 3d Connecticut Infantries across the turnpike and into the yard of the Robinson house. (Map 7) The Hampton Legion fell back and Keyes’ regiments soon confronted Jackson’s 5th Virginia Infantry. The 2d Maine Infantry and 5th Virginia Infantry were both uniformed in gray, and they hesitated to open fire on one another. But the Virginians took only a brief moment to determine the identity of the Maine regiment and opened the fight with a volley. For almost twenty minutes the two sides exchanged shots, with the Virginians, joined by the Hampton Legion, firing from the wood line, while the Maine and Connecticut regiments remained in the open ground around the Robinson

20 Ibid., p. 475.
BATTLE OF FIRST BULL RUN
21 July 1861
Situation at 1300

Note: 1 Chain = 22 Yards
Contour Interval 10 Feet
Scale of Chains

Map 7

house. Instead of committing the rest of his brigade as support, Keyes ordered the 2d Maine and 3d Connecticut Infantries to withdraw. The entire brigade then shifted east toward the Stone Bridge where it remained out of the fight for the rest of the day. Keyes' withdrawal was followed by another, short lull in the battle.

About 1400, almost two hours after the Union victory on Matthews' Hill, McDowell finally issued orders for a forward movement. But it was not for a general advance. Instead, he ordered Maj. William F. Barry, the Union army's chief of artillery, to send the batteries of Griffin and Ricketts from Dogan Ridge to Henry Hill. Both Griffin and Ricketts protested the move. Placement of the guns on Henry Hill would bring the artillery perilously close to the Confederate line. The battery commanders asked that they be sent to the high ground west of Henry Hill (Chinn Ridge). The order stood, however, and the two batteries, with Griffin leaving a disabled gun behind, limbered up and headed for Henry Hill.

The guns rumbled across the turnpike and up the Manassas-Sudley Road, with Ricketts unlimbering his left gun a hundred yards south of the Henry house. When Confederate sharpshooters in the house opened fire on Ricketts' men and horses, Ricketts ordered his guns to fire into the house, mortally wounding the 85-year-old, bed-ridden widow Judith Henry. Griffin's five guns soon unlimbered just north of the Henry house, and his and Ricketts' batteries began a close-range artillery duel with the Confederate artillery along Jackson's line, only three hundred yards away. One of the Union shells exploded near Beauregard, killing his horse and knocking the heel from one of his boots.

Shortly after the two Union batteries were in position, infantry from Heintzelman's division, ordered up by Major Barry, began to arrive on Henry Hill. (Map 8) To support Ricketts' battery, Willcox's 11th New York Infantry moved into position behind and slightly to the south of the guns. Franklin's 1st Minnesota Infantry moved farther south and fell in on the New Yorkers' right. The two infantry regiments suddenly found themselves confronting the 33d Virginia Infantry on the left of Jackson's line. Unsure of one another's identity, the units eyed each other briefly. The confusion resulted from the fact that the New York regiment was dressed in gray and the Virginians were still wearing civilian clothes. Both sides soon opened fire, and the New Yorkers and Minnesotans fell back to the Manassas-Sudley Road.

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21 RJCCW, 1:169.
BATTLE OF FIRST BULL RUN
21 July 1861
Situation at 1430–1500

Contour Interval 10 feet

Note: 1 Chain = 22 Yards

Scale of Chains


Map 8
Earlier, Jackson had placed Colonel Stuart, along with about a hundred and fifty cavalrymen, on the Manassas-Sudley Road southwest of the 33d Virginia Infantry. Stuart saw some of the gray-clad New Yorkers falling back and mistook the two Union regiments for retreating Confederates. He quickly rode forward, shouting, “Don’t run, boys; we are here.” The Northerners ignored the Confederate officer’s pleas, and, after seeing a color bearer passing with the United States flag, Stuart realized his mistake. He quickly ordered his men to charge, and the Union troops were driven into the woods west of the road. As Stuart’s men withdrew, additional Union troops began to arrive on Henry Hill. 24

The 14th Brooklyn of Porter’s brigade arrived behind Ricketts’ battery, and the 33d Virginia Infantry fell back to its former position in the wood line southeast of the Henry house. The Marine battalion of Porter’s brigade had arrived behind Griffin’s battery, but hearing the firing to the south of Ricketts’ battery the marines had fallen back to the turnpike. They were replaced by the 38th New York Infantry of Willcox’s brigade, which lay down below the crest of Henry Hill to escape the Confederate artillery fire.

It was now about 1430 and while three of his guns dueled with Confederate artillery in front of Jackson’s line, Griffin took his two remaining guns and moved about two hundred yards south of Ricketts’ position. (Map 9) That movement placed the two guns near the 33d Virginia Infantry. As the guns unlimbered and prepared to open fire, the Virginians calmly marched out of the woods and halted in front of the section. Griffin immediately gave the order to fire but Major Barry, who had accompanied the guns, shouted that the troops were actually part of Griffin’s infantry support. Griffin argued they were the enemy, and, while the two discussed the matter, the Virginians fired a volley that tore through the section. Griffin, Barry, and other survivors escaped back to the Manassas-Sudley Road, and the Virginians rushed forward and captured both guns. Said Griffin later, “that was the last of us.” 25

North of the Henry house gunners manning Griffin’s remaining three guns saw the

BATTLE OF FIRST BULL RUN
21 July 1861
Situation at 1500

Contour Interval 10 feet

Note: 1 Chain = 22 Yards

Scale of Chains

0 5 10 15 20 25

Map 9

capture of the section and withdrew their guns back to the turnpike. The 38th New York Infantry, although without a battery to support, remained lying behind the crest of the hill. The Confederate capture of the two guns was short-lived, however. The 14th Brooklyn rushed up the slope and drove the 33d Virginia Infantry back to the wood line and recaptured the two guns.

After recapturing Griffin's section, the 14th Brooklyn continued to fire into the left flank of Jackson's line, driving the 33d Virginia Infantry back through the 2d Virginia Infantry. Meanwhile, Colonel Cocke had been ordered to forward troops to the left and the first of them began to arrive on Henry Hill. Cocke's 49th Virginia Infantry arrived on Jackson's left, while two of his other regiments, the 8th and 18th Virginia Infantry, were not far behind. Two companies of the 2d Mississippi Infantry of Bee's brigade also arrived on the hill.

Under pressure from the 14th Brooklyn, a large portion of the 2d Virginia Infantry joined the retreat of the 33d Virginia Infantry, and Jackson saw the left of his line collapsing. While he sent his artillery to the rear, Jackson ordered the 4th and 27th Virginia Infantry forward.

They were joined by the 49th Virginia Infantry, two companies of the 2d Mississippi Infantry, and the 6th North Carolina Infantry of Bee's brigade, which had just arrived from Piedmont Station. In hand-to-hand combat the New Yorkers were driven back to the Manassas-Sudley Road and Ricketts' battery and Griffin's two guns captured. Ricketts himself was wounded in the thigh. For the next hour the Union guns would become the focal point of the fight on Henry Hill, as both sides fought to capture them.

While the Confederates halted among Ricketts' battery, the newly arrived 1st Michigan Infantry of Willcox's brigade attempted to recapture the guns but was driven back. The 5th and 11th Massachusetts Infantry of Franklin's brigade arrived next and made an attempt to reclaim the guns. Although the 5th Massachusetts Infantry broke and fled back toward the Manassas-Sudley Road, the 11th, wearing gray uniforms, drove the disorganized Confederates back and captured the guns. The 4th and 27th Virginia Infantry then fell back to their original positions.

Near the Robinson house Beauregard, seeing the guns again in Union hands, personally led the 5th Virginia Infantry and the Hampton Legion across the plateau. Bee joined in the assault, leading the 4th Alabama Infantry, followed by Bartow at the head of the 7th Georgia Infantry. As the Confederates passed over the ridge where Jackson had earlier placed his artillery, Bartow was shot and killed, and Bee fell mortally wounded. (Sometime earlier Bee is said to have pointed to Jackson's brigade and remarked that it was standing like "a stonewall." There is controversy as to exactly what Bee said, when he said it, or if he even said the phrase.)
Regardless, after the battle "Stonewall" Jackson and the Stonewall Brigade would go down in Southern legend.) Beauregard’s attack drove the 11th Massachusetts Infantry back to the Manassas-Sudley Road and Ricketts’ guns changed hands once again. While the Hampton Legion lay down around the Henry house and the 5th Virginia Infantry halted among Ricketts’ guns, Beauregard paused to offer assistance to the wounded Ricketts.26

Rather than launch large-scale, coordinated assaults against the Confederates on Henry Hill, McDowell had spent the morning and early afternoon allowing his army to be committed piecemeal, frittering away his numerical advantage. This allowed the Confederates to defend with lesser numbers while bringing reinforcements to the field. McDowell issued orders for forward movement, but again it would be gradual and uncoordinated. First, Howard’s 2,000-man brigade on Dogan Ridge was ordered to Chinn Ridge, south of the turnpike and several hundred yards west of Henry Hill. Sherman’s 3,000 men, also on Dogan Ridge, were sent to assault Henry Hill itself. Porter’s Regular infantry battalion was sent from Dogan Ridge to support Sherman.

About 1500, while Howard headed for Chinn Ridge, Sherman crossed the turnpike and halted on the Manassas-Sudley Road. The Regular infantry battalion halted along Chinn Branch, west of the Henry house and Manassas-Sudley Road. Sherman began his attack but, like earlier Union assaults, he would not commit his entire command at once. Instead, he sent the 13th New York Infantry up the slope of Henry Hill. The regiment soon engaged the Hampton Legion around the Henry house, where it halted, lay down, and continued a short-range gun battle. Sherman next ordered the 2d Wisconsin Infantry up the Manassas-Sudley Road. When abreast of the Henry house, the regiment left the road and advanced toward the house. Clad in gray uniforms, the Wisconsin troops took fire from Confederates on Henry Hill as well as from Union troops west of the Manassas-Sudley Road and were forced to fall back to the relative safety of the road.

Sherman’s 79th New York Infantry then moved forward. Commanded by Col. James Cameron, brother of Secretary of War Simon Cameron, the regiment charged to within yards of the Henry house. But Colonel Cameron was mortally wounded and the New Yorkers, like the Wisconsin troops before them, fell back to the Manassas-Sudley Road. As Sherman committed his last regiment, the 69th New York Infantry, two guns of Reynolds’ battery of Burnside’s brigade arrived and unlimbered in a clearing west of the Manassas-Sudley Road and opposite the Henry house.

Under cover of Reynolds’ two guns, the 69th New York Infantry, joined by the 38th New York Infantry on its right, left the Manassas-Sudley Road and charged up the slope toward the Henry house. After a brief struggle in which Hampton was severely wounded, the 4th Alabama Infantry, 7th Georgia Infantry, and other Confederates were driven back to the woods south of the Henry house, and the two New York regiments captured Ricketts’ and Griffin’s guns. (Map 10)

The New Yorker’s celebration was short-lived. The 18th Virginia Infantry of Cocke’s brigade had arrived from Ball’s Ford and, along with remnants of various Confederate units, drove the New Yorkers back to the Manassas-Sudley Road and recaptured the Union guns. Cocke’s 8th Virginia Infantry also reached the Henry house from Ball’s Ford and set up a defensive position just west of the house. The Union guns and Henry Hill had changed hands for the last time. Sherman’s battered brigade, along with portions of other Union brigades in the woods west of the Manassas-Sudley Road, began withdrawing back to the Warrenton Turnpike. While the troops milled around the intersection near the Stone house and McDowell tried to rally them, some Hampton Legion soldiers turned one of Ricketts’ guns around and fired a few shots toward the Stone house.27

It was about 1600, and, with the Union threat against Henry Hill apparently over, the Confederates turned their attention to Chinn Ridge.

27 RJCCW, 1:147.
BATTLE OF FIRST BULL RUN
21 July 1861
Situation at 1530

Contour Interval 10 feet

Note: 1 Chain = 22 Yards

where Howard’s brigade had arrived. Leaving his 3d and 5th Maine Infantries in reserve near the Warrenton Turnpike, Howard had led the 2d Vermont and 4th Maine Infantries to the crest of Chinn Ridge and opened fire on Henry Hill. (Map 11) Howard’s arrival on the Confederate left flank, however, coincided with the arrival of fresh Confederate troops. About 1600 the 2d and 8th South Carolina Infantries of Bonham’s brigade reached Henry Hill from Mitchell’s Ford. The two regiments entered the Manassas-Sudley Road south of the Henry house and opened long-range fire on Howard’s men. Also appearing on the field was Colonel Elzey’s brigade, the last of Johnston’s troops to arrive from the valley that day. Accompanying Elzey was General Smith, whose brigade would not show up until the following day and who, by virtue of rank, briefly assumed command of Elzey’s brigade. Smith led the brigade to the Manassas-Sudley Road, where he was wounded, and Elzey resumed command. Along with Stuart’s 150 cavalrmen, Elzey crossed the Manassas-Sudley Road southwest of the Henry house and moved toward Chinn Ridge. Close behind Elzey was Colonel Early’s brigade, which had recently arrived from McLean’s Ford and now fell in on the left and perpendicular to Elzey’s line. Stuart’s cavalry covered Early’s left.

At a distance of about 200 yards Elzey and Early opened fire on Howard’s thin line. While the 2d Vermont and 4th Maine Infantries returned volley for volley, Howard rode back to the turnpike to bring forward his other regiments. With difficulty he managed to bring most of the men to the crest of the ridge, and they took their places on the firing line. However, under pressure from Elzey and Early, Howard’s command soon broke and fled back toward the turnpike. (Map 12)

It was now about 1700, and everywhere McDowell’s army was disintegrating. Thousands, in large and small groups or as individuals, began to leave the battlefield and head for Centreville. McDowell rode around the field trying to rally regiments and groups of soldiers, but most had had enough.

Unable to stop the mass exodus, McDowell gave orders for Porter’s Regular infantry battalion, near the intersection of the turnpike and Manassas-Sudley Road, to act as a rear guard as his army withdrew. The unit briefly held the crossroads, then retreated eastward with the rest of the army.

A few Confederate units attempted to pursue the retreating Union troops, but the victorious Confederates were almost as disorganized as their defeated counterparts. Some infantry regiments and cavalry harassed Union stragglers, while artillery firing from vantage points further prodded the Federal troops along. The Union retreat on the turnpike quickly turned into a route when an overturned wagon blocked the Cub
BATTLE OF FIRST BULL RUN
21 July 1861
Situation at 1630–1730
Contour Interval 10 feet

Base Source: The Official Military Atlas of the Civil War, Plate V, Map I.

Note: 1 Chain = 22 Yards
Run Bridge. Panic-stricken soldiers threw away their weapons, waded the stream to safety, and joined hundreds of civilian spectators attempting to escape eastward. Wagons and artillery were abandoned, including the 30-pounder Parrott rifle, which had opened the battle with such fanfare. Unable to reorganize his command at Centreville, McDowell gave the order to fall back to Fairfax and later to the capital.

Shortly after the close of the battle, President Jefferson Davis arrived by train from Richmond and reached the battlefield about 1800. Later, Davis met with Johnston and Beauregard at Beauregard’s headquarters.

In Washington President Lincoln and members of the cabinet waited for news of a Union victory. Instead, a telegram arrived stating “General McDowell’s army in full retreat through Centreville. The day is lost. Save Washington and the remnants of this army.”28 The tidings were happier in the Confederate capital. From the battlefield President Davis telegraphed Richmond, “We have won a glorious but dear-bought victory. Night closed on the enemy in full flight and closely pursued.”29

Summary

First Bull Run was a clash between relatively large, ill-trained bodies of recruits, led by inexperienced officers. Neither army commander was able to deploy his forces effectively, only 18,000 men from each side were actually engaged. Although McDowell had been active on the battlefield, he had expended most of his energy maneuvering nearby regiments and brigades, instead of controlling and coordinating the movements of his army as a whole. Other factors contributed to McDowell’s defeat: Patterson’s failure to hold Johnston in the valley; McDowell’s two-day delay at Centreville; allowing Tyler’s division to lead the march on 21 July thus delaying the flanking divisions of Hunter and Heintzelman; and the 2 1/2-hour delay after the Union victory on Matthews’ Hill, which allowed the Confederates to bring up reinforcements and establish a defensive position on Henry Hill.

On Henry Hill Beauregard had also limited his control to the regimental level, generally allowing the battle to continue on its own and only reacting to Union moves. Johnston’s decision to transport his infantry to the battlefield by rail played a major role in the Confederate victory. Although the trains were slow and a lack of sufficient cars did not allow the transport of large numbers of troops at one time, almost all of his army arrived in time to participate in the battle. After reaching Manassas

29 Ibid., p. 986.
Junction, Johnston had relinquished command of the battlefield to Beauregard, but his forwarding of reinforcements to the scene of fighting was decisive.

Compared to later battles, casualties at First Bull Run had not been especially heavy. Both Union and Confederate killed, wounded, and missing were a little over one thousand seven hundred each.

Three months after First Bull Run Union forces suffered another, smaller defeat at the Battle of Ball’s Bluff, near Leesburg, Virginia. The perceived military incompetence at First Bull Run and Ball’s Bluff led to the establishment of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, a congressional body created to investigate Northern military affairs. Concerning the Battle of First Bull Run, the committee listened to testimony from a variety of witnesses connected with McDowell’s army. Although the committee’s report concluded that the principal cause of defeat was Patterson’s failure to prevent Johnston from reinforcing Beauregard, Patterson’s enlistment had expired a few days after the battle, and he was no longer in the service. The Northern public clamored for another scapegoat, and McDowell bore the chief blame. On 25 July 1861, he was relieved of army command.30

First Bull Run demonstrated that the war would not be won by one grand battle, and both sides began preparing for a long and bloody conflict. In the North, Lincoln called for an additional 500,000 volunteers with three-year enlistments, and the men with ninety-day enlistments were sent home. In the South, once the euphoria of victory had worn off, Jefferson Davis called for 400,000 additional volunteers. The battle also showed the need for adequately trained and experienced officers and men. One year later many of the same soldiers who had fought at First Bull Run, now combat veterans, would have an opportunity to test their skills on the same battlefield.

30 RJCCW, 1:5.
**FURTHER READINGS**


CHRONOLOGY

(All times are approximate and are based on those given in the after action reports by unit commanders, in testimony before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, or in postwar reminiscences.)

27 May 1861

Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell is assigned command of the Department of Northeastern Virginia and the military forces camped in and around Washington.

9 July 1861

McDowell’s military force, called the Army of Northeastern Virginia, is scheduled to march to Manassas Junction on this day, but a lack of sufficient supplies delays the movement.

16 July 1861

McDowell’s army begins its march toward Manassas Junction.

By evening Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler’s division has reached Vienna, Col. David Hunter’s and Col. Dixon S. Miles’ divisions have arrived at Annandale, and Col. Samuel P. Heintzelman’s division is at Pohick Creek.

17 July 1861

Commanding the Confederate Army of the Potomac at Manassas Junction, Brig. Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard informs the Confederate War Department of McDowell’s advance and asks for reinforcements.

Confederate authorities order the independent brigade of Brig. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes at Fredericksburg to reinforce Beauregard. In
Richmond Col. Wade Hampton's independent Hampton Legion is also ordered to Manassas Junction. At Leesburg the 8th Virginia Infantry of Col. Philip St. George Cocke's brigade is ordered to Manassas Junction.

1130: The head of McDowell's army, Tyler's division, reaches Fairfax Courthouse.

18 July 1861

0100: At Winchester General Joseph E. Johnston receives a telegram from the Confederate War Department informing him of McDowell's advance and directing him to go to Beauregard's assistance "if practicable."

1100: Tyler's division arrives at Centreville. Tyler moves a portion of Col. Israel B. Richardson's brigade south of Centreville and instigates a lively skirmish in what becomes known as the Battle of Blackburn's Ford.

1200: Johnston's Army of the Shenandoah departs Winchester for Manassas Junction.

Hunter's and Miles' divisions arrive near Fairfax Courthouse, and Heintzelman's division near Sangster's Station (near what is now Clifton).

Unaware of Tyler's skirmish at Blackburn's Ford, McDowell personally reconnoiters the area around Sangster's Station, searching for a location to turn the Confederate right flank.

In the evening Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson's brigade, leading Johnston's army, camps near Paris, Virginia, seventeen miles from Winchester, while the remainder of the army halts along the Shenandoah River.

Although the skirmish at Blackburn's Ford provided McDowell with intelligence about Confederate positions and strength, he fears the skirmish has caused the Confederates to reinforce their right flank. McDowell orders his engineers to reconnoiter north of the Stone Bridge, on the Confederate left.
19 July 1861

0900: After arriving at Piedmont Station, Jackson’s brigade departs for Manassas Junction.

1500: Col. Francis S. Bartow’s brigade departs Piedmont Station for Manassas Junction.

Johnston directs his cavalry and artillery to continue to Manassas Junction by road.

20 July 1861

0700: Johnston boards a train for Manassas Junction, along with Brig. Gen. Barnard E. Bee and portions of Bee’s brigade.

Brig. Gen. E. Kirby Smith remains at Piedmont Station to expedite the transportation of the remainder of Johnston’s army.

1200: Johnston and Bee arrive at Manassas Junction. After Johnston suggests an attack against McDowell’s army, Beauregard proposes to attack the Union left flank at Centreville. Johnston requests that Beauregard put the plan in writing.

Hunter’s, Heintzelman’s, and Miles’ divisions arrive at Centreville. Brig. Gen. Theodore Runyon’s division guards the railroad from Alexandria.

McDowell’s engineers discover the undefended Sudley Ford and Poplar Ford, north of the Stone Bridge.

McDowell plans an attack for the following day. Hunter’s and Heintzelman’s divisions will march around the Confederate left, crossing at Sudley and Poplar fords, while other troops create diversions at the Stone Bridge and Blackburn’s Ford.

21 July 1861

0230: McDowell’s army begins its march against Beauregard. Tyler’s division (with the exception of Richardson’s brigade), followed by Hunter’s and Heintzelman’s divisions, march west on the Warrenton
Turnpike. Richardson's brigade, along with Col. Thomas A. Davies' brigade of Miles' division, moves toward Blackburn's Ford. Col. Louis Blenker's brigade of Miles' division remains at Centreville in reserve.

Beauregard submits his plan to attack the Union left flank at Centreville to Johnston, who approves it.

0530: Tyler's division clears the Cub Run Bridge and Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions follow. After crossing Cub Run, Hunter and Heintzelman turn north from the turnpike toward Sudley and Poplar fords.

0600: Tyler arrives in front of Stone Bridge and opens fire with his 30-pounder rifle on Col. Nathan G. Evans' brigade.

0700: Concerned about the artillery fire near the Stone Bridge, Johnston orders Bee, Bartow, and Jackson to move closer to the Confederate left to be able to provide support if needed. Beauregard also sends the newly arrived Hampton Legion to the left.

0800: Johnston and Beauregard place themselves on a hill to the rear of Brig. Gen. Milledge L. Bonham's brigade in anticipation of Beauregard's flank attack.

0830: Signal officer Capt. E. Porter Alexander discovers the Union column marching toward Sudley Ford to outflank the Confederate left and reports the movement to Evans and Johnston.

Evans moves the bulk of his command from the Stone Bridge to Matthews' Hill to block the Union flank march.

Although Johnston is apprehensive that the Union troops reported north of the Stone Bridge may be those of Patterson's army arriving from the Shenandoah Valley, he continues with the plan to attack Centreville.

0930: Hunter's division arrives at Sudley Ford. After a short delay the column crosses Bull Run and continues south. Instead of crossing at Poplar Ford, Heintzelman's division follows Hunter's division.

1030: The head of Hunter's column, Col. Ambrose E. Burnside's brigade, engages Evans' command on Matthews' Hill.
1100: As the firing increases on the Confederate left, Johnston and Beauregard ride toward Henry Hill.

Col. Andrew Porter's brigade of Hunter's division arrives on Matthews' Hill, moving onto nearby Dogan Ridge.

Capt. Charles Griffin's and Capt. James D. Ricketts' batteries arrive on Dogan Ridge.

The brigades of Bee and Bartow (with Bee in command of both units) arrive on Henry Hill and shortly thereafter both brigades move to Matthews' Hill to support Evans.

1130: Col. William T. Sherman's and Col. Erasmus Keyes' brigades of Tyler's division cross Bull Run, just north of the Stone Bridge. Sherman continues toward Matthews' Hill, Keyes, accompanied by Tyler, moves to Young's Branch, east of the Stone house.


Outflanked, Evans, Bee, and Bartow are forced to withdraw from Matthews' Hill and fall back to Henry Hill.

The Hampton Legion arrives near the Robinson house on Henry Hill.

Hearing the increased firing coming from the left flank, Johnston scraps Beauregard's attack plan and rides toward Henry Hill. Beauregard follows.

1200: Jackson's brigade arrives on Henry Hill.

Johnston and Beauregard arrive on Henry Hill.

Jackson is slightly wounded.

1300: Keyes is ordered to attack Henry Hill near the Robinson house. He sends two of his four regiments forward, but they are driven back. Keyes' entire brigade withdraws to the vicinity of the Stone Bridge.

1400: Griffin's and Ricketts' batteries move from Dogan Ridge to Henry
Hill. Griffin unlimbers north of the Henry house and Ricketts south of the house.

1430: Griffin moves two guns of his battery to the right of Ricketts, where the 33d Virginia Infantry captures the guns. The remainder of Griffin’s battery withdraws from Henry Hill.

The 14th Brooklyn recaptures Griffin’s two guns.

The 4th and 27th Virginia Infantries, with assistance from the 49th Virginia Infantry, 6th North Carolina Infantry, and two companies of the 2d Mississippi Infantry, capture Ricketts’ battery and Griffin’s two guns.

The 1st Michigan Infantry attempts and fails to recapture Ricketts’ guns.

The 11th Massachusetts Infantry recaptures Ricketts’ battery, and the 4th and 27th Virginia Infantries fall back to their former positions.

The 5th Virginia Infantry, Hampton Legion, 4th Alabama Infantry, and 7th Georgia Infantry recapture Ricketts’ guns. Bee is mortally wounded and Bartow is killed. Ricketts is wounded and captured. The 11th Massachusetts Infantry falls back to the Manassas-Sudley Road.

1500: Sherman’s brigade begins an attack against Henry Hill, and Howard’s brigade moves to Chinn Ridge.

The 13th New York Infantry skirmishes with the Hampton Legion around the Henry house.

The 2d Wisconsin Infantry unsuccessfully assaults Henry Hill.

The 79th New York Infantry unsuccessfully assaults Henry Hill. The regiment commander, Col. James Cameron, brother of the Secretary of War, is killed.

Sherman’s last regiment, the 69th New York Infantry, along with the 38th New York Infantry of Willcox’s brigade, assault Henry Hill and recapture Ricketts’ and Griffin’s guns. Col. Wade Hampton is severely wounded.

The 18th Virginia Infantry of Cocke’s brigade, along with remnants of several other Confederate units on Henry Hill, recaptures the Union guns.
Sherman’s and other Union units near Henry Hill withdraw to the Warrenton Turnpike.

1530: Two regiments of Howard’s brigade arrive on Chinn Ridge. Two other regiments remain in reserve near the Warrenton Turnpike.


Howard brings forward his other two regiments to Chinn Ridge.

With the assistance of 150 troopers of Col. J. E. B. Stuart’s cavalry, the brigades of Elzey and Early outflank Howard’s brigade and drive it back to the Warrenton Turnpike.

1700: Retreat of the Union Army begins.
ORDER OF BATTLE, 21 JULY 1861

Army of Northeastern Virginia (United States Army)
Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell

1st Division (Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler)
   1st Brigade (Col. Erasmus Keyes)
      2d Maine Infantry
      1st Connecticut Infantry
      2d Connecticut Infantry
      3d Connecticut Infantry

   2d Brigade (Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck)
      2d New York Infantry
      1st Ohio Infantry
      2d Ohio Infantry
      Battery E, 2d U.S. Artillery

   3d Brigade (Col. William T. Sherman)
      13th New York Infantry
      69th New York Infantry
      79th New York Infantry
      2d Wisconsin Infantry
      Battery E, 3d U.S. Artillery

   4th Brigade (Col. Israel B. Richardson)
      1st Massachusetts Infantry
      12th New York Infantry
      2d Michigan Infantry
      3d Michigan Infantry
      Battery G, 1st U.S. Artillery
      Battery M, 2d U.S. Artillery

2d Division (Col. David Hunter)
   1st Brigade (Col. Andrew Porter)
      8th New York Infantry
      14th New York State Militia (known as the 14th Brooklyn and later redesignated 84th New York Volunteer Infantry)
      27th New York Infantry
U.S. Infantry Battalion
U.S. Marine Corps Battalion
U.S. Cavalry Battalion
Battery D, 5th U.S. Artillery

2d Brigade (Col. Ambrose E. Burnside)
  2d New Hampshire Infantry
  1st Rhode Island Infantry
  2d Rhode Island Infantry
  71st New York Infantry (with two 12-pounder boat howitzers)
  Battery A, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery

3d Division (Col. Samuel P. Heintzelman)
  1st Brigade (Col. William B. Franklin)
    5th Massachusetts Infantry
    11th Massachusetts Infantry
    1st Minnesota Infantry
    Battery I, 1st U.S. Artillery

  2d Brigade (Col. Orlando B. Willcox)
    11th New York Infantry
    38th New York Infantry
    1st Michigan Infantry
    4th Michigan Infantry
    Battery D, 2d U.S. Artillery

  3d Brigade (Col. Oliver O. Howard)
    3d Maine Infantry
    4th Maine Infantry
    5th Maine Infantry
    2d Vermont Infantry

4th Division (Brig. Gen. Theodore Runyon)
  Militia Brigade (three-month enlistment regiments)
    1st New Jersey Infantry
    2d New Jersey Infantry
    3d New Jersey Infantry
    4th New Jersey Infantry

  Volunteer Brigade (three-year enlistment regiments)
    1st New Jersey Infantry
2d New Jersey Infantry
3d New Jersey Infantry
41st New York Infantry

5th Division (Col. Dixon S. Miles)
1st Brigade (Col. Louis Blenker)
  8th New York Infantry
  29th New York Infantry
  39th New York Infantry
  27th Pennsylvania Infantry
  Battery A, 2d U.S. Artillery
  Bookwood’s New York battery (later redesignated
  2d New York Independent Battery)

2d Brigade (Col. Thomas A. Davies)
  16th New York Infantry
  18th New York Infantry
  31st New York Infantry
  32d New York Infantry
  Battery G, 2d U.S. Artillery

Army of the Shenandoah (Confederate States Army)
General Joseph E. Johnston

1st Brigade (Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson)
  2d Virginia Infantry
  4th Virginia Infantry
  5th Virginia Infantry
  27th Virginia Infantry
  33d Virginia Infantry
  Rockbridge Artillery (Virginia)

2d Brigade (Col. Francis S. Bartow)
  7th Georgia Infantry
  8th Georgia Infantry
  Wise Artillery (Virginia)

3d Brigade (Brig. Gen. Barnard E. Bee)
  4th Alabama Infantry
  2d Mississippi Infantry
  11th Mississippi Infantry
6th North Carolina Infantry
Staunton Artillery (Virginia)

4th Brigade (Col. Arnold Elzey)
1st Maryland Infantry
3d Tennessee Infantry
10th Virginia Infantry
Culpeper Artillery (Virginia)

5th Brigade (Brig. Gen. E. Kirby Smith)
(Although General Smith arrived at Manassas Junction on 21 July near the end of the battle, the infantry regiments in his brigade did not arrive until 22 July. Stanard’s Battery, however, arrived at the junction late on the evening of 20 July and during the battle was under the command of General Jackson on Henry Hill.)
19th Mississippi Infantry
8th Alabama Infantry
9th Alabama Infantry
10th Alabama Infantry
11th Alabama Infantry
Stanard’s Battery (Virginia)

Unattached
1st Virginia Cavalry (Col. J. E. B. Stuart)

Army of the Potomac (Confederate States Army)
Brig. Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard

1st Brigade (Brig. Gen. Milledge L. Bonham)
8th Louisiana Infantry
11th North Carolina Infantry
2d South Carolina Infantry
3d South Carolina Infantry
7th South Carolina Infantry
8th South Carolina Infantry
30th Virginia Cavalry (2 companies)
Alexandria Light Artillery (Virginia)
1st Company, Richmond Howitzers (Virginia)

2d Brigade (Brig. Gen. Richard S. Ewell)
5th Alabama Infantry
6th Alabama Infantry
6th Louisiana Infantry
Jennifer's Virginia Cavalry
Washington Artillery (4 guns) (Louisiana)

3d Brigade (Brig. Gen. David R. Jones)
17th Mississippi Infantry
18th Mississippi Infantry
5th South Carolina Infantry
30th Virginia Cavalry (1 company)
Washington Artillery (2 guns) (Louisiana)

4th Brigade (Brig. Gen. James Longstreet)
5th North Carolina Infantry
1st Virginia Infantry
11th Virginia Infantry
17th Virginia Infantry
24th Virginia Infantry
30th Virginia Cavalry (1 company)
Washington Artillery (2 guns) (Louisiana)

5th Brigade (Col. Philip St. George Cocke)
8th Virginia Infantry
18th Virginia Infantry
19th Virginia Infantry
28th Virginia Infantry
49th Virginia Infantry
Loudoun Artillery (Virginia)
Lynchburg Artillery (2 guns) (Virginia)

6th Brigade (Col. Jubal A. Early)
7th Louisiana Infantry
13th Mississippi Infantry
7th Virginia Infantry
Washington Artillery (5 guns) (Louisiana)

7th Brigade (Col. Nathan G. Evans)
1st Special Louisiana Infantry Battalion
4th South Carolina Infantry
30th Virginia Cavalry (2 companies)
Lynchburg Artillery (2 guns) (Virginia)
Unattached
(Brig. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes)
  1st Arkansas Infantry
  2d Tennessee Infantry
  Purcell Artillery (Virginia)

Unattached
(Col. Wade Hampton)
  Hampton (South Carolina) Legion (6 companies)
CASUALTIES

Estimates of numbers of casualties engaged in Civil War battles vary, and statistics on killed, wounded, captured, and missing are incomplete. Participants attempted to fill gaps as they wrote their official reports, and historians have tried to refine the data. The reports of casualties at First Bull Run shown in the Official Records are certainly inaccurate. Figures listed below do not include casualties incurred at Blackburn’s Ford on 17 July nor do they show missing-in-action figures for those soldiers who were absent for the battle but eventually returned to their units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ofcrs</td>
<td>Ofcrs</td>
<td>Ofcrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Union</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of Northeastern Virginia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Division</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>143</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Division</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Division</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>182</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Division</td>
<td>(not engaged)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Division</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>451</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>1,741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Confederate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of the Shenandoah</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of the Potomac</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>263</td>
<td>1,029</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>362</td>
<td>1,519</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>813</td>
<td>2,520</td>
<td>1,753</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the Battle of First Bull Run, the principal adversaries were the Union Army of Northeastern Virginia and two Confederate commands, the Army of the Potomac and Army of the Shenandoah. In July 1861 the Union army was organized into five infantry divisions of three to five brigades each. Each brigade contained three to five infantry regiments. An artillery battery was generally assigned to each brigade. The total number of Union troops present at the Battle of First Bull Run was about 35,000, although only about 18,000 were actually engaged.

The Confederate Army of the Potomac was organized into six infantry brigades, with each brigade containing three to six infantry regiments. Artillery batteries were assigned to various infantry brigades. The total number of troops in the Confederate Army of the Potomac was approximately 22,000.

The Confederate Army of the Shenandoah was also organized into brigades. It consisted of four brigades of three to five infantry regiments each, which totaled approximately 12,000 men. Each brigade was assigned one artillery battery. Although the combined strength of both Confederate armies was about 34,000, only about 18,000 were actually engaged at First Bull Run.

Throughout the Civil War the infantry regiment was the basic administrative and tactical unit of armies. Regimental headquarters consisted of a colonel, lieutenant colonel, adjutant, quartermaster, surgeon (with rank of major), two assistant surgeons, a chaplain, sergeant major, quartermaster sergeant, commissary sergeant, hospital steward, and two principal musicians. A captain, a first lieutenant, a second lieutenant, a first sergeant, four sergeants, eight corporals, two musicians, and one wagoner staffed each company.

The authorized strength of a Civil War infantry regiment was about 1,000 officers and men, who were arranged in ten companies plus a headquarters and (for the first half of the war at least) a band. Discharges for physical disability, disease, special assignments (bakers, hospital nurses, or wagoners), courts-martial, and battle injuries all combined to reduce effective combat strength. Before too long a typical regiment might be reduced to less than 500 troops.

Brigades were made up of two or more regiments, with four regiments being most common. Union brigades averaged 1,000 to 1,500 infantry, while a Confederate brigade averaged 1,500 to 1,800. Union brigades
were designated by a number within their division, while Confederate
brigades were designated by the name of a current or former commander.

Divisions were formed of two or more brigades. Union divisions con-
tained 2,500 to 4,000 infantrymen, while the Confederate infantry divi-
sion was somewhat larger, containing 5,000 to 6,000 men.

After First Bull Run, both sides eventually organized corps by com-
bining two or more divisions. Two or more corps constituted an army, the
largest operational organization.
TACTICS

Infantry

The tactical legacy of the eighteenth century had emphasized close-order formations of soldiers trained to maneuver in concert and fire by volleys. These “linear” tactics stressed the tactical offensive. Assault troops advanced in line, two ranks deep, with cadenced steps, stopping to fire volleys on command and finally rushing the last few yards to pierce the enemy line with a bayonet charge.

These tactics were adequate for troops armed with single-shot, muzzle-loading, smoothbore muskets with an effective range of about eighty yards. The close-order formation was therefore necessary to concentrate the firepower of these inaccurate weapons. Bayonet charges might then succeed because infantry could rush the last eighty yards before the defending infantrymen could reload their muskets after firing a volley.

The U.S. Army’s transition from smoothbore muskets to rifles in the mid-nineteenth century would have two main effects in the American Civil War: it would strengthen the tactical defensive and increase the number of casualties in the attacking force. With a weapon that could cause casualties out to 1,000 yards defenders firing rifles could decimate infantry formations attacking according to linear tactics.

A typical combat formation of a regiment might be six companies in the main line, with two in reserve, and two out in front in extended skirmish order. Additional companies might be fed into the skirmish line, or the skirmishers might regroup on the main line.

Later in the Civil War the widespread use of the rifle often caused infantry assault formations to loosen up somewhat, with individual soldiers seeking available cover and concealment. However, because officers needed to maintain visual and verbal control of their commands during the noise, smoke, and chaos of combat, close-order tactics to some degree would continue to the end of the war.

Rapid movement of units on roads or cross-country was generally by formation of a column four men abreast. The speed of such columns was prescribed as two miles per hour. Upon reaching the field each regiment was typically formed into a line two ranks deep, the shoulders of each man in each rank touching the shoulders of the man on either side. The distance between ranks was prescribed as thirteen inches. A regiment of 500 men (250 men in each rank) might have a front of about 200 yards.
Both front and rear ranks were capable of firing, either by volley or individual fire.

Artillery

Throughout the war field artillery would generally be placed among infantry formations or on the flanks. Since Civil War field artillery was used for direct fire, guns might be placed a short distance in front of the infantry line, out of range of enemy small arms, to support offensive or defensive operations or to engage in "counterbattery" fire.

A popular prewar tactic was to have field artillery, with a typical range of 1,500 yards, advance with the infantry. The maneuver worked as long as the enemy was armed with the short-range smoothbore musket with a range of 100 yards or less. With the advent of the rifled musket in the mid-1850s, capable of a lethal range out to 1,000 yards, the tactic became obsolete. However, some were slow to grasp the implications of the effect of long-range small arms against artillery, and, when General McDowell ordered two batteries to within 400 yards of the Confederate line at First Bull Run, the decision quickly resulted in the loss of one battery and two other guns.

Cavalry

Traditionally, cavalry was considered the “eyes” of the army, scouting, guarding supply lines, and screening the army’s flanks from the enemy. When required, the cavalry could also disrupt enemy communication and supply lines, provide a mobile striking force, or defend key terrain.

Cavalry generally fought dismounted, with every fourth trooper holding the horses of his comrades. Either mounted or dismounted, troopers might advance in two ranks, the first rank firing and, while reloading, the second rank advanced through the first. The maneuver was repeated until the objective was obtained. If forced to fall back, the troops could reverse the maneuver. Prior to the Civil War, mounted cavalry charges against infantry were not uncommon, but with the widespread use of the long-range rifled musket such assaults were often suicidal.
SMALL ARMS

Although at the beginning of the Civil War the Regular Army was generally armed with rifled muskets, most of the combatants at Bull Run were state volunteers, armed with whatever weaponry that had been purchased by state authorities. These included various types and calibers of domestic and foreign smoothbores, some of which had only recently been converted from flintlock; and various types and calibers of rifles; and the longer rifled muskets.

In 1861 a shortage of rifles on both sides forced the Northern and Southern governments to issue the older smoothbore weapons or purchase weapons from European nations. As the war progressed most soldiers eventually were armed with rifled muskets, although even late in the war some troops on both sides still carried smoothbores.

During most of the war the standard infantry weapon was the .58-caliber rifled musket, adopted by the U.S. Army in 1855 to replace a .69-caliber smoothbore musket. The new infantry arm was muzzle loaded, its rifled barrel taking a hollow-based cylindroconical bullet slightly smaller than the bore. The loading procedure required the soldier to withdraw a paper cartridge (containing powder and bullet) from his cartridge box, tear open one end with his teeth, pour the powder into the muzzle, place the bullet in the muzzle, and ram it to the breech using a metal ramrod. A copper percussion cap was then placed on a hollow cone at the breech. To fire the weapon the hammer was cocked, and when the trigger was pulled the hammer struck the cap and ignited the powder charge. Each soldier was expected to be capable of loading and firing three aimed shots per minute. Although the maximum range of a rifled musket might be over 1,000 yards, actual fields of fire were often very short, the emphasis of musketry fire resting upon volume at close range rather than accuracy at long.

The basic ammunition allowance for each infantry soldier was 40 rounds in a leather cartridge box. When a large action was expected, 20 additional rounds were issued to each soldier, who placed them in his uniform pockets or knapsack. In addition, 100 rounds per man were held in the brigade or division trains and 100 rounds in the corps trains.

Officers generally carried both single- and multiple-shot handguns. Although the types of handguns used by both sides were innumerable, two of the most common were six-shot revolvers produced by Colt and Remington, both in .36- and .44-caliber. Union cavalrymen were initial-
ly armed with sabers and handguns, but soon added breech-loading carbines. In addition to Sharps and Spencer carbines, dozens of other types of breech-loaders, from .52- to .56-caliber, were issued. Confederate cavalrymen might be armed with a wide variety of handguns, shotguns, muzzle-loading carbines, or captured Federal weapons.

**Typical Civil War Small Arms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Effective Range (in yards)</th>
<th>Theoretical Rate of Fire (in rounds/minute)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. rifled musket, muzzle-loaded, .58-caliber</td>
<td>400–600</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Enfield rifled musket, muzzle-loaded, .577-caliber</td>
<td>400–600</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoothbore musket, muzzle-loaded, .69-caliber</td>
<td>100–200</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civil War field artillery was generally organized into batteries of four to six guns. Regulations prescribed a captain as battery commander, while lieutenants commanded two-gun “sections.” Each gun made up a platoon, under a sergeant (“chief of the piece”) with eight crewmen and six drivers.

For transport, each gun was attached to a two-wheeled cart, known as a limber, and drawn by a six-horse team. The limber chest carried thirty to fifty rounds of ammunition, depending on the type of guns in the battery. In addition to the limbers, each gun had at least one caisson, also drawn by a six-horse team. The caisson carried additional ammunition in its two chests, as well as a spare wheel and tools. A horse-drawn forge and a battery wagon with tools accompanied each battery. A battery at full regulation strength, including all officers, noncommissioned officers, buglers, horse holders, and other specialized functions, might exceed 100 officers and men. With spare horses included, a typical six-gun battery might have about 100 to 150 horses.

A battery could unlimber and fire an initial volley in about one minute, and each gun could continue firing two aimed shots a minute. A battery could “limber up” in about three minutes. Firing was by “direct fire,” that is, fire in which the target is in view of the gun. The prescribed distance between guns was 14 yards from hub to hub. Therefore, a six-gun battery would represent a normal front of little over 100 yards. Depth of the battery position, from the gun muzzle, passing the limber, to the rear of the caisson, was prescribed as 47 yards. In practice these measurements might be altered by terrain.

During firing, cannoneers took their positions as in the diagram below. At the command “commence firing,” the gunner ordered “load.”
While the gunner sighted the piece, Number 1 sponged the bore; Number 5 received a round from Number 7 at the limber and carried the round to Number 2, who placed it in the bore. Number 1 rammed the round to the breech while Number 3 placed a thumb over the vent to prevent premature detonation of the charge. When the gun was loaded and sighted, Number 3 inserted a vent pick in the vent and punctured the cartridge bag. Number 4 attached a lanyard to a friction primer and inserted the primer in the vent. At the command “fire,” Number 4 yanked the lanyard. Number 6 cut fuzes for exploding shells (if needed). The process was repeated until the command was given to cease firing.

### Typical Civil War Field Artillery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Tube Composition</th>
<th>Tube Length (in inches)</th>
<th>Effective Range at 5° Elevation (in yards)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-pdr smoothbore field gun</td>
<td>bronze</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-pdr smoothbore field howitzer</td>
<td>bronze</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-pdr Parrott rifle</td>
<td>iron</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-inch ordnance rifle</td>
<td>iron</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-pdr James rifle</td>
<td>bronze</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-pdr Parrott rifle</td>
<td>iron</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cannon were generally identified by the weight of their solid iron round shot, although some, like the 3-inch ordnance rifle, used the diameter of the bore for identification.

Artillery Projectiles

Four basic types of projectiles were employed by Civil War field artillery: solid shot, shells, case shot, and canister.

Solid Projectiles

Round (spherical) projectiles of solid iron for smoothbores were commonly called cannonballs or shot. When elongated for rifled weapons, the projectile was known as a bolt. Solid projectiles were used against opposing batteries, wagons, buildings, etc., as well as enemy personnel. While shot could ricochet across open ground against advancing infantry or cavalry, bolts tended to bury themselves upon impact with the ground and therefore were not used a great deal by field artillery.

Shell

The shell, whether spherical or conical, was a hollow iron projectile filled with a black powder bursting charge. It was designed to break into several ragged fragments. Spherical shells were exploded by fuzes set into an opening in the shell, which ignited the shell near the intended target. The time of detonation was determined by adjusting the length of the fuze. Rifled shells were detonated by similar timed fuzes or by a percussion fuze detonating the shell upon impact.
Case Shot

Case shot had a thinner wall than a shell and was filled with a number of small lead or iron balls (27 for a 12-pounder). A timed fuze ignited a small bursting charge inside the shell, which fragmented the casing and scattered the contents in the air. Case shot was intended to burst from 50 to 75 yards short of the target, the fragments being carried forward by the velocity of the shot.

Canister

Canister consisted of a tin cylinder in which was packed a number of iron or lead balls. Upon discharge the cylinder split open and the smaller projectiles fanned out. Canister was an extremely effective antipersonnel weapon, with an effective range of 400 yards. In emergencies double loads of canister could be used at ranges less than 200 yards, using a single propelling charge.
LOGISTICS

The logistical problems of transferring the Army of Northeastern Virginia from the vicinity of Washington to Manassas were enormous. Staff officers, who had never before seen any unit larger than a regiment, had to move over 30,000 troops, hundreds of wagons, and thousands of horses thirty miles through hostile territory. Columns were assigned march-routes, timetables were established, and troops were assigned to protect the army's line of communications back to Washington. To provide fresh meat, over two hundred head of beef cattle accompanied the marching columns.

Although Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell ordered wagons of rations, ammunition, medical supplies, and engineer tools to follow the troops, a shortage of vehicles hampered the operation. In addition, many wagons were not roadworthy, and teamsters were untrained and inexperienced. Yet, with all these difficulties, the Commissary Department was able to issue over 100,000 individual rations to division and brigade commands near Centreville during the campaign. At the lower unit level, however, inexperienced field commanders sometimes failed to reissue rations and ammunition to the troops, or, when these items were issued, the soldiers often tossed them away to avoid having to carry them during the heat of the day.

After the Union defeat, the return of McDowell's army to Washington could only be described as a disaster. Many soldiers panicked, threw away their weapons, and sought whatever egress was available, whether roads, woods, or fields. Teamsters cut loose teams from wagons and made their escape, leaving the vehicles to block the roads. The presence of large numbers of civilian wagons on the road between Centreville and Alexandria only added to the bottleneck. By the end of the day, about four thousand small arms, twenty-five pieces of artillery, and large amounts of other equipment had been abandoned, much to the benefit of the victorious Confederates.

The Confederates, although in a defensive position at Manassas, had their share of logistic problems. Lack of sufficient staff officers and mismanagement often resulted in Brig. Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard's troops sometimes going for twenty-four hours without rations. Initially, Confederate commissary officers obtained food from the surrounding countryside, but the removal of those officers by the authorities in Richmond just before the battle forced the soldiers to supply their own food by foraging from local citizens.
The most important logistical event regarding the Confederates at First Bull Run took place when the Army of the Shenandoah traveled thirty-four miles to the battlefield by rail. During 19–22 July General Joseph E. Johnston was able to transfer his command from Winchester to Manassas, most arriving in time to turn the tide of battle on 21 July. Although railroads had been transporting troops in Europe for some years, Johnston’s maneuver was a perfect illustration of how the railroad could affect the outcome of a military operation. Throughout the remainder of the war, the railroad would play an even greater role in transporting men and supplies over distances of thousands of miles.

U.S. Army Bureau System

Bureau chiefs and heads of staff departments were responsible for various aspects of the Army’s administration and logistics and reported directly to the Secretary of War. The division of responsibility and authority over them of the Secretary of War, the assistant secretaries, and the General in Chief was never spelled out. Therefore the supply departments functioned independently and without effective coordination throughout most of the Civil War, although the situation improved after Ulysses S. Grant took command in the spring of 1864.

Logistical support was entrusted to the heads of four supply departments in Washington. The Quartermaster General was responsible for clothing and equipment, forage, animals, transportation, and housing; the Commissary General for rations; the Chief of Ordnance for weapons, ammunition, and miscellaneous related equipment; and the Surgeon General for medical supplies and evacuation, treatment, and hospitalization of the wounded.

For other support there were the Adjutant General, the Inspector General, the Paymaster General, the Judge Advocate General, the Chief of Engineers, and the Chief of Topographical Engineers.

The military department was the basic organizational unit for administrative and logistical purposes, and the commander of each department controlled the support in that area with no intervening level between his departmental headquarters and the bureau chiefs in Washington. There were six departments when the war started (East, West, Texas, New Mexico, Utah, and Pacific). Later on, boundaries changed and several geographical departments were grouped together as a military “division” headquarters.

Army depots were located in major cities: Boston, Massachusetts; New York; Baltimore, Maryland; Washington, D.C.; Cincinnati, Ohio; Louisville, Kentucky; St. Louis, Missouri; Chicago, Illinois; New Orleans, Louisiana; and San Francisco, California. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, was
the chief depot and manufacturing center for clothing. Advance and temporary supply bases were established as needed to support active operations. Until 1864 most depot commanders were authorized the rank of captain who, despite the low rank and meager pay, had tremendous resources of men, money, and materiel under their control. There were a few exceptions, notably Col. Daniel H. Rucker at the Washington Quartermaster Depot and Col. George D. Ramsay at the Washington Arsenal. The primary function of the depots was to procure supplies and prepare them for use in the field by repacking, assembling, or other similar tasks.

Procurement was decentralized. Purchases were made on the market by low-bid contract in the major cities and producing areas by depot officers. Flour and some other commodities were procured closer to the troops when possible. Cattle were contracted for at specific points, and major beef depots were maintained at Washington (on the grounds of the unfinished Washington Monument); Alexandria, Virginia; and Louisville. The Subsistence Department developed a highly effective system of moving cattle on the hoof to the immediate rear of the armies in the field to be slaughtered by brigade butchers and issued to the troops the day before consumption. The Confederate Army used a similar system with depots at Richmond, Virginia; Staunton, Virginia; Raleigh, North Carolina; Atlanta, Georgia; Columbus, Georgia; Huntsville, Alabama; Montgomery, Alabama; Jackson, Mississippi; Little Rock, Arkansas; Alexandria, Louisiana; and San Antonio, Texas.

Supply Operations

Most of the unit's logistical needs were handled at the regimental level. The regimental quartermaster was often a line lieutenant designated by the regimental commander. In addition to his normal duties, the regimental quartermaster submitted requisitions for all quartermaster supplies and transport; accounted for regimental property including tents, camp equipment, extra clothing, wagons, forage, and animals; and issued supplies and managed the regimental trains. The regimental commissary officer, also designated from the line, requisitioned, accounted for, and issued rations. The regimental ordnance officer had similar duties regarding ammunition and managed the movement of the unit ammunition trains.

In theory, a fully qualified officer of the supply department concerned filled logistical staff positions above the regimental level. However, experienced officers were in perpetual short supply, and many authorized positions were filled by officers and noncommissioned officers from line units or were left vacant, the duties thus being performed by someone in addition to his own. This problem existed in both armies, where inexpe-
rience and ignorance of logistical principles and procedures generally reduced levels of support.

The Soldier's Load
The Union soldier carried about 45 pounds: musket and bayonet (14 pounds), 60 rounds of ammunition, 3 to 8 days' rations, canteen, blanket or overcoat, shelter half, ground sheet, mess gear (cup, knife, fork, spoon, and skillet), and personal items (sewing kit, razor, letters, Bible, etc.). Confederates usually had less.

Annual Clothing Issue
The Union infantry allowance consisted of 2 caps, 1 hat, 2 dress coats, 3 pairs of trousers, 3 flannel shirts, 3 flannel drawers, 4 pairs of stockings, and 4 pairs of shoes. Artillerymen and cavalrymen were issued boots instead of shoes. The allowance equaled $42.

Officially, the Confederate soldier was almost equally well clothed, but the Southern quartermaster was seldom able to supply the required items. Soldiers wore whatever came to hand, the home-dyed butternut jackets and trousers being characteristic items. Shortages of shoes were a constant problem.

Rations
The daily individual ration for a Union soldier consisted of 20 ounces of fresh or salt beef or 12 ounces of pork or bacon; and 1 pound of hard bread or 18 ounces of flour or 20 of cornmeal. Also, 1 gill of whiskey per day was issued in cases of excessive fatigue or severe exposure.

In addition to the daily individual ration, the following were issued to every 100 men: 15 pounds of beans or peas; 10 pounds of rice or hominy; 10 pounds of green coffee or 1.5 pounds of tea; 15 pounds of sugar; 4 quarts of vinegar; 3.75 pounds of salt; 4 ounces of pepper; 30 pounds of potatoes; and, when practicable, 1 quart of molasses.

Desiccated potatoes or mixed vegetables, a dehydrated concoction referred to by soldiers as "desecrated vegetables," could be substituted for beans, peas, rice, hominy, or fresh potatoes.

Basically, the Confederates got the same ration composition as Union soldiers but often in less quantity. Much of the meat and coffee that was issued was captured or obtained from sources other than the commissary department.

Wagons
An Army wagon, drawn by four horses over good roads, could carry 2,800 pounds. A good six-mule team, in the best season of the year, could
haul 4,000 pounds. In practice, wagons seldom hauled such loads because of poor roads.

The number of wagons authorized for the Union Army in August 1862 was as follows:

- corps headquarters: 4
- brigade or division headquarters: 3
- infantry regiment: 6
- battery of light artillery or squadron of cavalry: 3

Forage

The daily forage ration for horses was 14 pounds of hay and 12 pounds of oats, corn, or barley. For mules, the daily ration was 14 pounds of hay and 9 pounds of oats, corn, or barley.

Tents

In the field the Union Army utilized a variety of canvas tents. The wall tent measured approximately 7 feet high, 10 feet wide, and 12 feet deep and was issued to officers above company level. A typical hospital tent might be 14 feet long, 14 feet wide, and 11 feet high. Shelter tents were issued to company level officers and enlisted men. They consisted of two sections that buttoned together to form what is now often referred to as a “pup” tent. Each enlisted man received a shelter tent half and buttoned it together with that of a sleeping mate.

The number and kind of tents prescribed for the Union infantry in the field were as follows:

- corps headquarters (admin): 1 hospital
- division and brigade headquarters (admin): 1 wall
- corps, division, or brigade commander: 1 wall
- every two officers of the staff: 1 wall
- regimental colonel and field and staff officers: 1 wall each
- other officers of the regimental staff: 1 wall per 2 officers
- company officer: 1 shelter
- every enlisted man: 1 shelter half
- every officer’s servant: 1 shelter half

Baggage

Enlisted men of both armies were required to carry their own baggage. A Union order of September 1862 limited officers to blankets, one small valise or carpetbag, and a mess kit. Enlisted men carried their rations and personal belongings in a waterproofed canvas knapsack or haversack attached to a strap slung over one shoulder.
Irvin McDowell
1818–1885, Ohio
USMA 1838

After graduating from the U.S. Military Academy, McDowell served with the 1st Artillery and then returned to the academy as the adjutant. During the Mexican War he was brevetted a captain for "gallant and meritorious conduct." From then until the outbreak of the Civil War, McDowell was employed in various staff duties in Washington, New York, and Texas, being promoted to brevet major on 31 March 1856.

In 1861, at the urging of his close friend Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase, McDowell was promoted three grades to brigadier general in the Regular Army and assigned commander of the newly organized army at Washington. Although he requested more time to prepare his force, McDowell was ordered to advance immediately against the Confederate force at Manassas Junction. In the ensuing Battle of First Bull Run (21 July 1861), he dashed around the field, trying personally to encourage his men. Although the morning phase of the battle saw the Confederates driven back, by afternoon the Southern forces had counterattacked and routed the Federal forces. Northern officials and the public blamed McDowell for the defeat, and he was relieved of army command.

Afterward appointed commander of a division, he was later promoted to major general of volunteers (14 March 1862) and assigned command of the I Corps, Army of the Potomac. Officials in Washington, fearing for the safety of the capital, retained McDowell’s command, redesignated it the Army of the Rappahannock, and placed it along that river. Subsequently, McDowell’s army was consolidated with troops in the
Shenandoah Valley to create a force known as the Army of Virginia under Maj. Gen. John Pope. McDowell’s command was redesignated the III Corps.

The defeat at First Bull Run continued to haunt McDowell, and his officers and enlisted men generally disliked him. When he was injured in a riding accident in the summer of 1862, it was said that a portion of his command gave three cheers “for the horse that threw General McDowell.”

In the Battle of Second Bull Run (29–30 August 1862), the Army of Virginia was defeated and fell back into the defenses of Washington. Pope accused McDowell of not fully supporting him during the campaign, and McDowell was relieved of command. Although a court of inquiry found nothing to warrant a court-martial, a strong prejudice remained against McDowell in the public mind, and he held no further field command during the war. After commanding various military departments to 1882, McDowell retired from the service, with the rank of major general in the Regular Army.

Ambrose E. Burnside
1824–1881, Indiana
USMA 1847

Following service in the Mexican and Indian wars, Burnside resigned his commission in 1853 to manufacture firearms in Bristol, Rhode Island. He later patented a breech-loading carbine and served as treasurer of the Illinois Central Railroad.

Burnside entered the Civil War as a colonel of the 1st Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry and commanded a brigade at the Battle of First Bull Run (21 July 1861), where his command led the flank march to Sudley Ford and struck the Confederates on Matthews’ Hill. The fight was severe and Burnside’s command, running low on ammunition, was given permission to withdraw and resupply. The brigade remained in reserve until joining the retreat to Washington.

In August 1861 Burnside was promoted to brigadier general of volunteers and led a successful expedition against Confederate coastal instal-
lations in North Carolina in January–March 1862. This military success gained him promotion to major general of volunteers and commanding general, IX Corps.

In August 1862 Burnside's IX Corps began moving from the Carolinas to join Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of Virginia. While Burnside personally remained at Falmouth to forward arriving troops, the IX Corps, temporarily commanded by Maj. Gen. Jesse Reno, participated in the battles of Second Bull Run (29–30 August 1862) and Chantilly (1 September 1862).

On 14 September 1862, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, commanding the Army of the Potomac, placed Burnside in command of the army's "right wing," comprising the IX and Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's I Corps. At Antietam (17 September 1862) the IX Corps (accompanied by Burnside) was placed on the left of the Union army, where it eventually crossed Antietam Creek at the lower bridge to assault the Confederate right flank. However, the timely arrival from Harper's Ferry of Confederates under Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill drove Burnside and his command back to the bridge. In November, after President Abraham Lincoln grew weary of McClellan's failure to pursue Lee aggressively, Burnside was offered command of the Army of the Potomac. He accepted the appointment on 7 November due only to the urging of his friends who did not want Hooker to have the position. After his defeat at Fredericksburg (13 December 1862), Burnside was relieved the following January and transferred to the western theater.

As commander of the Army of the Ohio (25 March–12 December 1863) Burnside succeeded in the capture of Brig. Gen. John Hunt Morgan's Raiders and in the siege of Knoxville, Tennessee. In January 1864 he returned east to assume command again of the IX Corps and participated in Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's overland campaign from Wilderness to Petersburg. When charges were made that Burnside mishandled troops during an attack at Petersburg, he was relieved of command and resigned from the Army.

After the war Burnside was successful in engineering and managerial work with several railroads; served as governor of Rhode Island in 1866, being twice reelected; and served as a U.S. senator from Rhode Island until his death.

Erasmus D. Keyes
1810–1895, Massachusetts
USMA 1832

After graduating from West Point, Keyes served briefly at posts in Virginia, South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana. During 1844–1848 he
was assigned to West Point, becoming one of the few West Point-trained generals not to have participated in the Mexican War. Transferred west in 1849, Keyes was involved in suppressing Indian hostilities in California and Washington Territories until 1860, when he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and assigned as military secretary to Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott in Washington, D.C. In May 1861 Keyes was promoted to brigadier general of volunteers and was in command of a brigade at the Battle of First Bull Run in July. During that battle Keyes' command arrived on the Confederate right flank, but, after committing only half of his command to the attack, he fell back and fought no more that day.

In the spring of 1862 Keyes was appointed commander of the IV Corps, Army of the Potomac, and in May was promoted to major general of volunteers. After the Peninsula Campaign (June–July 1862), the IV Corps remained in the Yorktown area. In early 1863 Keyes' conduct during a raid against a Confederate position was called into question, and he asked for an official investigation, which was refused. He was relieved of command in July and served on a retirement board until his resignation in April 1864. Keyes then set out for California where he spent the rest of his life in gold-mining ventures and the wine-growing business. He died in France in 1895 while on a European tour.

Daniel Tyler
1799–1882, Connecticut
USMA 1819

Tyler, the son of a Revolutionary War officer, had planned to attend Yale, but instead was appointed to West Point. After graduation, he served in New England and later at Fort Monroe, Virginia, where he translated the French artillery drill manual. In 1828 Tyler was sent to France to study French artillery tactics further and attended the artillery school at Metz. His assignment abroad resulted in his translation and publication of an artillery field manual in 1829.

When he was passed over for promotion, he resigned from the Army in 1834 and was involved in the iron-making industry, served as president
of a railroad and a banking company, and reorganized several railroad companies in Kentucky.

With the outbreak of the Civil War, Tyler was commissioned a colonel of the 1st Connecticut Infantry in April 1861 and the following month was promoted to brigadier general of volunteers. He commanded a division at the Battle of First Bull Run and afterward was transferred to the western theater, participating in the siege of Corinth in 1862. Tyler was placed in command of the garrison at Harper’s Ferry in early 1863 and later commanded the District of Delaware until 1864, when he resigned his commission at age 65.

After the war Tyler traveled extensively in Europe, returning to establish an iron-making company in Alabama in 1872. There, he founded the town of Anniston, named after his daughter-in-law. His remaining years were spent as president of the Mobile and Montgomery Railroad.

Confederate Officers

Pierre G. T. Beauregard
1818-1893, Louisiana
USMA 1838

Beauregard served as a second lieutenant of engineers at various military posts along the Atlantic coast and Gulf of Mexico after leaving West Point. During the Mexican War he was brevetted a captain and then a major. Until the outbreak of the Civil War, Beauregard spent most of his time in Louisiana superintending the construction of forts along the lower Mississippi. In 1858 he ran unsuccessfully for mayor of New Orleans, and in 1861 he was appointed superintendent of West Point. After only four days at the academy Beauregard was relieved (possibly due to his outspoken sympathy for the South) and later resigned from the Army to accept a commission as brigadier general in the Confederate Army.
In April 1861 Beauregard commanded the successful Confederate attack on Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor and won overnight fame. Two months later he was assigned command of the Confederate army then being organized at Manassas Junction. Beauregard immediately prepared plans to capture Washington, but his constant bickering with Confederate President Jefferson Davis over reinforcements and his own grand strategy to win the war created tension between the army commander and the commander in chief.

On 21 July 1861, a Union army commanded by Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell approached Manassas and attacked Beauregard's left flank. McDowell's forces drove the Confederates to Henry Hill and a Union victory looked assured. At a critical moment, however, Confederate reinforcements arrived, struck the Union line, and sent the army in full retreat back to Washington. Beauregard, the "Hero of Sumter" and now of Manassas, was promoted to full general.

His career seemed on the upswing, but Beauregard soon allied himself with President Davis' opponents and too often made public his distrust and disdain for the government. Continued arguments with Davis and other Southern commanders resulted in his transfer to the western theater in early 1862 as second in command to General Albert Sidney Johnston in the Army of the Mississippi. After Johnston was killed at Shiloh, Beauregard assumed command of the army. Relations between Beauregard and Davis continued to deteriorate, and Beauregard was transferred first to the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida and next to the Department of North Carolina and Virginia as commander. He served in the latter position until early 1865, when he was relieved and placed in command of the Department of the West as a figurehead.

After the war, Beauregard was offered commands in the Romanian and Egyptian armies but declined both. Instead, he returned to New Orleans where he played a prominent role in business, civil engineering, and political affairs; was president of two railroads; and was adjutant general of Louisiana for ten years.
Joseph E. Johnston
1807–1891, Virginia
USMA 1829

Johnston’s father, Peter Johnston, had served in the American Revolution with Henry “Lighthouse” Lee (the father of Robert E. Lee), and both sons were classmates at West Point. Johnston served with distinction in the Seminole and Mexican wars, being wounded five times during the latter.

After the Mexican War he was chief of the topographical engineers in Texas and during 1855–1860 was assigned as a lieutenant colonel of the 1st Cavalry. Promoted to brigadier general, Johnston became Quartermaster General of the U.S. Army, a position he held until May 1861. Upon the secession of Virginia from the Union, he resigned his commission and became a brigadier general and soon after a general in the Confederate service.

In July 1861 General Johnston, commanding the Army of the Shenandoah, eluded a Union force under Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson in the Shenandoah Valley and rushed to reinforce Beauregard’s Army of the Potomac at Manassas Junction. Johnston assumed overall command but elected to allow Beauregard to command the Confederate forces actually engaged. Although the senior commander on the field, Johnston received less publicity for his role during the battle than the more colorful, self-promoting Beauregard.

In the spring of 1862 Johnston moved his army to the Peninsula, between the James and York rivers, when Union forces under Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan landed at Fort Monroe. At the Battle of Fair Oaks (31 May 1862) he was twice wounded and carried from the field.

Johnston had recovered sufficiently by November to report for duty. By that time General Robert E. Lee was commanding Johnston’s forces, and he was assigned authority over the territory between the Appalachians and the Mississippi River. This authority was vague, with department heads reporting directly to Richmond rather than to Johnston.

Joseph E. Johnston (www.treasurenet.com/images/civilwar)
Believing he had fallen in disfavor with the Confederate President, Johnston asked to be relieved, but his request was denied.

A year later Johnston was assigned command of the Army of Tennessee and held that post until July 1864, when his plan of strategic withdrawal from Atlanta so displeased Davis that Johnston was relieved. He saw no more active service until he returned to duty in February 1865 to oppose Sherman’s march north. After his surrender to Sherman on 26 April 1865, Johnston went into retirement until 1879, when he was elected to the U.S. Congress and later served as U.S. commissioner of railroads.

Thomas J. Jackson
1824–1863, Virginia
USMA 1846

Having received the brevets of captain and major during the Mexican War, Jackson resigned his commission in 1852 to become an instructor at the Virginia Military Institute. At the beginning of the Civil War he was appointed first to the rank of colonel, then brigadier general. Early on the morning of 21 July 1861 Jackson commanded a brigade of Virginians near Manassas Junction on the Confederate right flank. When the Union assault struck the Confederate left, Jackson marched toward the fighting and placed his command on Henry Hill, where his brigade stood firm and served as a rallying point for others. It was there that he and his brigade earned the sobriquet “Stonewall.” Afterward, Jackson was promoted to major general.

In November Jackson was sent to the Shenandoah Valley, where the following year he waged what became known as the Valley Campaign against three Federal armies (May–June 1862). After defeating his adversaries and forcing the Federal government in Washington to delay reinforcements to the Union army then threatening Richmond, Jackson joined Confederate forces in the Seven Days’ Battles (25 June–1 July 1862). In late August Jackson’s lightning-like turning movement against Maj. Gen. John Pope’s Army of Virginia was a crucial factor in the victory that followed at Second Bull Run (29–30 August 1862).
In the Maryland campaign Jackson captured the Federal garrison at Harper’s Ferry before rejoining Lee at Sharpsburg in the Battle of Antietam (17 September 1862). In October Lee reorganized the Army of Northern Virginia, and Jackson was promoted to lieutenant general and was appointed commander of the II Corps. He commanded the right wing in the Confederate victory at Fredericksburg (13 December 1862), and his career reached its high point in the famous flank march around the Union army at Chancellorsville (1–4 May 1863). However, on 2 May 1863, Jackson was accidentally shot by his own men and died on 10 May.

Nathan G. Evans
1824–1868, South Carolina
USMA 1848

Known as Shanks because of his long, skinny legs, Evans served his pre–Civil War years in the Army on the frontier fighting hostile Indian tribes. In February 1861 he resigned to accept a major’s commission with the military forces of South Carolina. After the surrender of Fort Sumter in April, Evans accepted a captain’s commission in the Confederate cavalry and was shortly thereafter promoted to lieutenant colonel and later colonel. He was assigned command of an infantry brigade in Brig. Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard’s Army of the Potomac. In camp and field Evans had an attachment to strong drink, often keeping an aide nearby with a small keg of whiskey, which Evans referred to as his “barreletta.”

At the Battle of First Bull Run Evans’ small brigade was placed on the Confederate left and was able to hold off the Union’s flank attack long enough for reinforcements to arrive. Although his command was eventually forced to fall back, his delaying tactic allowed the Confederates time to shift additional forces from Manassas to the battlefield, which resulted in a Confederate victory.

In October 1861, while his brigade was stationed near Leesburg, Virginia, Evans’ forces defeated a Union attempt to cross the Potomac River in a fight called the Battle of Ball’s Bluff. The action resulted in his promotion to brigadier general.
Evans went on to participate in the 1862 battles of Second Bull Run, South Mountain, and Antietam and in November was transferred to Kinston, North Carolina. After he retreated in the face of a superior Union force, Evans was tried for intoxication and acquitted. Later, when charges of disobedience of orders were made against him, Evans was again acquitted. He was then relieved of command, and, although later reinstated, the remainder of his military career was obscure. Throughout 1863 Evans served in various military positions in Mississippi and Georgia and in the spring of 1864 transferred to South Carolina. Following the war, Evans settled in Alabama, where he became a high school principal.
**Suggested Stops**

Caution: Two heavily traveled highways divide the Manassas National Battlefield Park. U.S. Route 29 (Lee Highway) follows the historical roadbed of the Warrenton Turnpike, and Sudley Road (Route 234) crosses the turnpike at the Stone house. Use care when driving across or turning onto or off of these highways.

**Stop 1: Stone Bridge.** The Stone Bridge, crossing Bull Run, is located on Lee Highway, approximately a half mile east of its intersection with Route 234. A parking area is provided on the east side of the bridge.

**Summary**

At 0230, 21 July 1862, Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell’s troops began executing a three-pronged attack. While Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler’s division was to create a diversion at the Stone Bridge, the divisions of Col. David Hunter and Col. Samuel P. Heintzelman would march north and cross Bull Run at Sudley Ford. After turning the Confederate flank, McDowell hoped to destroy the Manassas Gap Railroad at or near Gainesville, thus breaking the line of communications between General Joseph E. Johnston, supposedly at Winchester, and Brig. Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard at Manassas Junction.

Although Tyler was to begin his movement at 0230, his division was over an hour late in getting onto the road. It was not until 0600 when Tyler arrived in the vicinity of the Stone Bridge and began his demonstration.

Defending the Stone Bridge was the small brigade of Col. Nathan G. Evans, about 1,100 men, posted along a ridge perpendicular to the Warrenton Turnpike and about 650 yards west of the bridge. By 0800 it was becoming apparent to Evans that Tyler’s demonstration was simply a feint. A Confederate signal station soon confirmed his suspicions when it alerted Evans to Union troops moving around his left. Evans left a small contingent of his command to watch the bridge and fell back about 1,700 yards to Matthews’ Hill in an attempt to block the Federal flank maneuver. Later during the morning the brigades of Col. Erasmus Keyes and Col. William T. Sherman of Tyler’s division crossed Bull Run at a farm ford about a quarter mile north of the bridge and marched to join McDowell’s forces near Matthews’ Hill.
Stop 2: Matthews’ Hill. This site is located three-quarters of a mile north of the intersection of Lee Highway and Route 234, on the east side of Route 234. A parking area is provided on the northern edge of the ridge.

Summary

The Federal flanking column had followed a narrow path through the woods to Sudley Ford, which it crossed about 0930. About 1030 the head of the column, led by the brigade of Col. Ambrose E. Burnside, reached Matthews’ Hill.

Evans’ troops opened fire and halted the Union column, but Col. Andrew Porter’s brigade soon arrived to support Burnside. Outnumbered, Evans sent an urgent request for reinforcements. While the brigades of Brig. Gen. Barnard E. Bee and Col. Francis S. Bartow moved from Henry Hill to Matthews’ Hill, Capt. John Imboden’s battery on Henry Hill opened fire on McDowell’s column. About 1200, after Heintzelman’s division had arrived on Matthews’ Hill and two brigades of Tyler’s division had crossed to the west side of Bull Run just north of the Stone Bridge, Evans’, Bee’s, and Bartow’s men were forced to retreat to Henry Hill.

Stop 3: Stone house. Constructed in the early part of the nineteenth century, this structure was the home of the Henry Matthews family during the Civil War. It is located on the north side of Lee Highway, near its junction with Route 234. A parking area is provided on the east side of the house.

Summary

After being driven from Matthews’ Hill, the Confederates withdrew past the Stone house to Henry Hill. Some Confederates sought shelter in the building to fire on the advancing Union troops until the 27th New York Infantry of Porter’s brigade drove them out of the house and across the Warrenton Turnpike. Later, McDowell would use the junction of the turnpike and Route 234 to launch a series of unsuccessful attacks against Henry Hill. Throughout the Union occupation of the intersection, wounded were placed in the relative safety of the Stone house, and a large red flag was displayed on the front of the building to mark it as a makeshift hospital. A well in the front yard provided water for the wounded and other soldiers in the area.

Stop 4: Ricketts’ and Griffin’s batteries. Located between the park Visitor Center and the Henry house.
Summary

In the morning the batteries of Capt. James D. Ricketts and Capt. Charles Griffin had been ordered from Dogan Ridge to Henry Hill. Ricketts arrived first and placed his guns just south of the Henry house. Immediately, Confederate snipers in the house started shooting Ricketts’ crewmen and horses. Ricketts turned his guns on the house and eliminated the enemy sharpshooters but also killed the widow Judith Henry. Because of the close proximity of the Confederate line, enemy fire from other parts of the field soon killed and wounded most of Ricketts’ crew and horses, and the guns were captured and recaptured several times during the day. Ricketts himself was severely wounded and captured. On the left of Ricketts’ guns, five guns of Griffin’s battery were placed just north of the Henry house. Two of Griffin’s guns were then moved to the right of Ricketts’ battery, where they were soon captured. Although somewhat protected from Confederate fire by terrain, the remaining three guns of Griffin’s battery still lost many crewmen and horses and were eventually forced to withdraw. During the 1861 battle the Henry house was severely damaged by artillery and small arms fire and by the following year was a complete ruin. The current structure was erected about 1870.

Stop 5: Robinson house. About 800 yards northeast of the Visitor Center stand the foundations of the Robinson house, a structure owned by the free African-American, James Robinson. The house was torn down in 1926 to permit the construction of a larger house, which burned in 1993.

Summary

As the disorganized remnants of the brigades of Evans, Bee, and Bartow retreated, the Hampton Legion arrived near the house and fired on approaching Union troops in the direction of Matthews’ Hill. About 1300, two regiments from Keyes’ brigade, the 3d Connecticut and 2d Maine Infantries, crossed the Warrenton Turnpike and advanced into the yard around the house. The Hampton Legion was driven back to the woods east of the house. The 5th Virginia Infantry of Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson’s brigade halted the Union advance by firing from the edge of the wood line about one hundred yards south of the Robinson house. Instead of supporting his attack by sending the remainder of his command forward, Keyes withdrew the regiments from around the Robinson house to the north side of the turnpike and fell back to a position near the Stone Bridge. There the brigade would remain idle for the remainder of the day.
Stop 6: Jackson’s position. Located between the Visitor Center and the Robinson house.

Summary

About noon, the five Virginia regiments of Jackson’s brigade arrived on the battlefield and were positioned along the wood line. Johnston and Beauregard arrived soon after, bringing artillery. Thirteen guns were placed on the slight elevation in front of Jackson’s line. The arrival of Jackson and the artillery stabilized the Confederate position on Henry Hill. It was from this line that several attacks were mounted to capture Ricketts’ battery, 400 yards to the west. According to legend, it was near here that Bee, while trying to rally his men, pointed toward Jackson’s brigade and called out, “Look! There stands Jackson like a stonewall!” The nickname “Stonewall” would afterward be associated with Jackson and his brigade.

Stop 7: Griffin’s section. Located yards southeast of the park Visitor Center and adjacent to the Visitor Center parking lot.

Summary

From a position north of the Henry house, Griffin brought two guns to this location to enfilade the Confederate line to the north. However, the 33d Virginia Infantry, in civilian attire, soon appeared at the edge of the wood line about a hundred yards away. Griffin was about to open fire on the Virginians when the Union artillery commander, Maj. William F. Barry, arrived and told Griffin to hold his fire because the troops at his front were actually friendly forces. Griffin protested, sure that the troops were Confederates, but Barry insisted and the troops held their fire. The Virginians then fired a volley into the battery, charged, and captured both guns. Griffin and Barry escaped. During the remainder of the day, the two guns would change hands several more times as elements of the two armies captured and recaptured Henry Hill.

Stop 8: Chinn Ridge. Located 1,000 yards west of the Visitor Center. A park road leads to a parking area near the foundations of the home of Benjamin T. Chinn.

Summary

In an attempt to outflank the Confederates on Henry Hill, McDowell sent Col. Oliver O. Howard’s brigade from Dogan Ridge, north of the
turnpike, to the crest of Chinn Ridge. However, a brigade led by Brig. Gen. E. Kirby Smith, the last of Johnston’s units to arrive from the Shenandoah Valley on 21 July, soon confronted Howard’s command. Although Smith was wounded, the brigade struck Howard’s men on their right flank and sent them retreating toward the Warrenton Turnpike. The withdrawal of these Union units was hastened by the arrival on Chinn Ridge of other Confederate regiments and also the brigade of Col. Jubal A. Early, who had brought his command from Blackburn’s Ford.

Shortly after 1600, as the Federal right flank collapsed on Chinn Ridge, Beauregard ordered an advance along his entire line. Soon almost all semblance of organization in McDowell’s army was lost, and the Union forces, in small and large groups, began their retreat toward Centreville.
Staff Ride Guide

Battle of First Bull Run

Ted Ballard

PIN: 080199-000