



# The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act

## A Ten-Year Retrospective


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edited by

Dennis J. Quinn



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## INTRODUCTION

On October 1, 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act went into effect. Goldwater-Nichols, as this law has come to be known, was designed to improve “jointness” in the Armed Forces. One former Secretary of Defense described the act as, “one of the landmark laws of American history. It is probably the greatest sea change in the history of the American military since the Continental Congress created the Continental Army in 1775.” Others, perhaps without such a long historical perspective, have judged it the most important change in defense organization since the National Security Act of 1947.

In December 1996, the National Defense University sponsored a symposium, “A Ten-Year Retrospective Symposium on Goldwater-Nichols.” The symposium attempted to determine what 10 years of Goldwater-Nichols had actually wrought for jointness. This volume is a record of the presentations from that symposium.

Approximately 400 persons attended the symposium. Among the more than 20 panelists and speakers were the act’s “movers and shakers.” General David Jones, often viewed as the father of Goldwater-Nichols, provided insights on the seminal thoughts and actions that led to the act. Jim Locher and Arch Barrett, former Congressional staffers credited with moving the proposals through legislative hurdles, provided additional insights on how Congress came to support DOD reorganization and what members of Congress expected from such reorganization.

The symposium, however, was not just a self-congratulatory meeting of those who favored the changes codified in Goldwater-Nichols. Panelists and discussants having present-day responsibilities within this reorganized DOD provided insights and evaluations on the impact of Goldwater-Nichols on present-day operations.

In an interesting comparative assessment, General Jones, the last Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to Goldwater-Nichols, was scheduled toward the start of the symposium, and General Shalikashvili, the most recent Chairman to be affected by Goldwater-Nichols, toward the end. Jones explained the factors that moved him to call for changes to the joint structure and what he had hoped to achieve by them. Shalikashvili provided his evaluation of the influence of those changes on present joint capabilities, and then provided his views on their potential for future jointness.

All the major aspects of the act were discussed at some point during the symposium, to include the following stipulations:

- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as an individual, is designated the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Previously the Chairman had little personal authority or influence as he merely represented the consensus of the corporately agreed upon position of the other Joint Chiefs.
- The Chairman is assigned new responsibilities in the areas of strategic planning, logistics, net assessments, joint doctrine, and programs and budgets.
- The position of Vice Chairman is created to assist the Chairman and act as the Chairman in his or her absence. The Vice Chairman outranks all other military officers except the Chairman.
- The Joint Staff is expanded and placed directly under the control of the Chairman. Previously, the Joint Staff had worked for the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and thus was subject to some rather complex bureaucratic procedures.
- The power and influence of the CINCs are increased by providing them authority over subordinate commands in their areas of responsibility, especially regarding joint training, force organization, and force employment.

- The Joint Specialty Officer program is mandated. This program consists of definitive military personnel requirements designed to ensure the services assign some of their highest quality officers to joint duty.

Congress intended that these changes should have two major impacts: improve the ability of the President and the Secretary of Defense to make correct security decisions based on clear, direct, and sound military advice, and create a joint, unified military fighting force, unhindered by service rivalry and self-interests.

Symposium participants generally agreed that in most of the major areas of Goldwater-Nichols concern, objectives had been achieved or real progress was being made. However, it was pointed out on several occasions that not everyone supported this legislation 10 years ago, and not everyone agrees with all its provisions today.

Ten years ago, resistance to changes in the joint arena was strong. As Mr. Locher points out in his paper, one service Chief stated that this legislation would “make hash out of our Defense structure”; another warned, “The bill would have very adverse consequences for our national defense.” One service secretary argued that the reforms “would create chaos . . . to the point where I would have deep concerns for the future of the United States.”

From hindsight, such concerns seem ill advised. However, as some symposium panelists and discussants pointed out, there were valid reasons for concern then, as there are valid reasons, if to a lesser degree, for concern now. Those who opposed Goldwater-Nichols argued that the joint versus service struggle was not a struggle over self-interests; rather, it was a struggle over different perspectives on how to build and field an effective fighting force.

There are valid tensions that exist in the joint services relationship, because of the differing responsibilities of the service chiefs and those of the Chairman and the CINCs. The symposium highlighted three tensions:

- The tension between readiness and modernization. Readiness is primarily the responsibility of the CINCs, and modernization primarily the responsibility of the services.
- Tension between regional and global perspectives, and their impact on setting priorities.
- The third tension, a result of the CINC focus on synergy, and the service focus on specialization.

Participants recognized that tensions exist in the dynamics of any major endeavor, and expressed confidence that the services and the CINCDoms would continue to expand common ground in their quest for Jointness.

In closing, the symposium participants looked to the future. They concluded that in striving for “jointness,” the act had achieved much, and there was still much to achieve. Then, participants went beyond Goldwater-Nichols and assessed the requirements of future operations relative to the Pentagon’s abilities in coordinating operations within American, foreign, and international nonmilitary agencies and organizations. The participants found these abilities wanting, but it was intriguing that the discussants treated “jointness” as a given and focused on how the joint force would interact with non-DOD agencies and organizations.

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# REFORM: THE BEGINNINGS

*David C. Jones*

A problem that has long plagued security forces is how to control vertical organizations in an increasingly horizontal world. The military services—Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines—are essentially vertical organizations with clearly defined roles and missions. With the advent of air power, the lines became blurred and the need for jointness—the horizontal—increased sharply. Eisenhower and others emerged from World War II with strong views on the need for a unified approach. However, strong counter pressures resulted in keeping jointness very constrained. The problems are not unique to the U.S. military.

During my first meeting with Marshal Akhromeyev, then Chief of the Soviet General Staff, I was surprised that he was not interested in talking about issues such as arms control. His real interest was our organizational arrangements and particularly the changes contemplated. He had read one of my articles in *The New York Times* and wanted to know about the progress being made.

I asked him why he had such a strong interest in this subject. He responded that he had similar problems. Although he didn't use the word "warlord" when talking about some of the Soviet commanders, the meaning was the same. He lamented especially about how Admiral Gorshkov had built the Soviet Navy as almost a completely independent force and that Akhromeyev had been unsuccessful in getting the Navy to be joint. My reaction was, welcome aboard!

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*General David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.), served as Air Force Chief of Staff (1974-78) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1978-82). He was in the forefront of the effort to reorganize the Joint Chiefs of Staff that resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.*

The British had similar problems. During many NATO meetings, I sat next to Admiral Terrance Lewin, then Chief of the British Defence Staff. Very often we exchanged notes on our mutual problems of the lack of sufficient jointness. We came up with similar recommendations. He put his in a memorandum to Margaret Thatcher that she quickly approved. Our process took 4½ years.

My first exposure to the joint system came while I was aide to General Curtis LeMay. LeMay told me my first responsibility as an aide was to learn, and he included me in almost all his meetings, even those with the JCS. There was a sharp contrast between the cumbersome procedures in the joint system and the very fast moving, highly efficient operations at the Strategic Air Command. My reaction was that someone should do something about the joint system, never realizing I would one day be involved.

My concerns about the joint system grew during my short tour in Vietnam, where the misuse of air power was never adequately addressed. The problem was not only Lyndon Johnson poring over target lists; more fundamental was our fighting five different U.S. air wars with little coordination or relationship.

When I became Air Force Chief of Staff in the summer of 1974, I felt the many long JCS meetings were an intrusion on my time. I believed my colleagues agreed with me, but we couldn't come to an agreement on how to change.

When my first term as Chairman began, I had great hopes that internally we chiefs could reform the system. A number of quite important changes were made, primarily dealing with organizations outside the Washington area. However, the fundamental problems were not resolved.

At the end of my first 2 years as Chairman, I became convinced that Admiral Mahan, the guru of naval strategy at the turn of the century, was right when he said that no military service could reorganize itself. The pressure had to come from

the outside. These words pertain even more to a joint organization. I hasten to add that I did not consider my colleagues to be negative or parochial. A chief is first the chief of his service. History has shown that a chief who does not fight tooth and nail for his own service may soon lose his effectiveness.

When appointed to a second term, I told Secretary of Defense Harold Brown that I intended to press for reorganization of the joint system during the next 2 years. He was very supportive and offered to help in any way he could. During my confirmation hearing, I stated my intention to address joint reorganization during the next 2 years. However, with the presidential election only 4 months away, nothing could be done in the meantime except to study and consult.

In my first meeting with Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger during the transition, I told him of my intentions; he responded that he looked forward to receiving my recommendations. When I raised the subject later, he stated that he did not want to address reorganization, for many would conclude the joint system was all screwed up and that would impact negatively on the budget. My comment was that we *were* screwed up, many on the Hill knew it, and credit would be given if the subject was addressed. Although Secretary Weinberger was very courteous whenever the subject was raised, I was never able to persuade him.

After the election it was clear to me that many who would be in the next administration were uneasy about some of the actions of the Joint Chiefs. Earlier one group of chiefs had supported SALT I, a somewhat different group supported the Panama Canal Treaty, and a somewhat different group had supported the SALT II. These were seen as disastrous by some of the new political appointees.

Their displeasure focused on me for two reasons. First, as Chairman, I was the logical one to hold most responsible. Second, there were strong leftover feelings from the B-1 days.

When President Carter canceled the B-1, I received word from Members of Congress almost demanding that the Air Force lead a fight to overturn the decision. We were told that many key Members would support the action and could get funds in the budget to continue the program.

I instructed Air Force leaders not to get involved for two reasons. First, it was wrong. As Chief of Staff, I expected that the officers working for me would carry out my decisions; the President should expect no less. Second, the Air Force had tried earlier, with me as the briefer, to overturn the decision to cancel the B-70 program. We won the battle on the Hill but lost it when the President got in the act. So much animosity had built up between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Air Force that the Air Force suffered for years thereafter. I was told by one senior Member of Congress that I would never be forgiven for not leading a fight to reverse the B-1 decision.

While on a Christmas trip to the Middle East during the presidential transition, I was in my hotel room overlooking the Old City of Jerusalem when my office called. My executive officer said he had some bad news for me—*The Washington Star* headline for that day read, “REAGAN TO DISMISS GENERAL JONES.” Like Harry Truman, I have a headline to wave.

When I returned to Washington, I did not raise the subject. However, I was asked by a Senator whether I intended to resign. My answer was absolutely not. Jim Schlesinger, Harold Brown, Barry Goldwater, and others came to my support. Jim wrote a scathing editorial in *The Washington Post* saying I was being fired for being insufficiently insubordinate. The action was then dropped.

It was clear that during the next 18 months I would be controversial, so I might as well contribute a little controversy of my own. The aborted action to fire me gave me some independence and straightened my desire to change the system. Whenever I strayed off the narrow path, the reaction was, “That is the holdover Chairman who will soon be gone.”

In 1981, I was realistic in knowing the odds against change were great. The Secretary of Defense was opposed, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed, the Department of the Navy was even more opposed, and Congress had almost always sided with the services when attempts were made to strengthen the joint systems. A Hail Mary pass was needed. With the help of many, a strategy started to evolve, and four key elements were developed over time:

- First, the driving force for change had to come from the Congress over the long haul. This was not only because of opposition from the Pentagon, but also because of the typical action by the Congress to reject inputs from the executive department designed to strengthen the joint system.
- Second, bipartisan allies had to be found. On the House side, the most supportive Members were Dick White, Ike Skelton, Bill Nichols, Les Aspin, and John Kasich. However, the most important help came from a staff member, Arch Barrett. Arch singlehandedly kept the subject alive for a major part of the 4½ years to enactment. There would not be a Goldwater-Nichols without him.

On the Senate side, Sam Nunn, Barry Goldwater, and Bill Cohen were most supportive. A special thanks went to Senator Thurmond for casting a deciding vote. Again a staffer, Jim Locher, was absolutely essential to success. His outstanding study of the problems convinced many, and there would not be Goldwater-Nichols without him, also.

All the former Secretaries of Defense weighed in to support the changes. This was very helpful. Also of importance was a study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which supported change.

- Third, the White House had to be neutralized. If the President had weighed in against change, we would have been dead in the water. Barry Goldwater and Bud

McFarlane were very helpful in keeping the White House out of the fray.

- Fourth, the press had to be engaged in the process in order to keep momentum going and to put pressure on Members of Congress to support change.

An up-to-date detailed study of the problems and possible solutions was essential. For this I turned to Bill Brehm, former Assistant Secretary of the Army, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, and former head of Legislative Liaison for the Department. Bill was uniquely qualified for the task. He was highly respected for his integrity and balance. Furthermore, he had studied the organization of the Pentagon for Don Rumsfeld and had made some very important recommendations

Bill recruited five retired admirals and generals to participate in the study. They interviewed all the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs, and many others in positions of responsibility. All were very critical of the current system. This made it difficult for them to say later that changes were not necessary. The Brehm group put the story together so well that only the most hard-over opponents were unconvinced. Bill Brehm is an unsung hero of the reorganization efforts, and, again, there would not be Goldwater-Nichols without him. After much study and reflection, the main problems in the joint system were boiled down to four:

- First, having the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisory mechanism for the President and Secretary resulted in less-than-satisfactory inputs. The legislative requirement that the President or Secretary of Defense be informed if there were not unanimity among the Chiefs on an issue resulted in a de facto veto by any service.
- Second, the fact that the Joint Staff worked for the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs and not the Chairman

exacerbated the problem. Papers that went through four bureaucratic layers with five different organizations involved invariably resulted in little life left at the end. There were three options on an issue paper: put it in the “too-hard box”; send a “split” paper forward; or achieve unanimity through a watering-down process. Dean Acheson once said that JCS papers reminded him of the little old lady who didn’t know how she felt until she heard what she had to say. I know he was right, for I signed many such papers.

- Third, the Chairman was the only senior military officer who did not have a deputy. Here there were two basic problems. Better continuity was needed when the Chairman was out of town. The system of rotating the Joint Chiefs to fill in for the Chairman was not satisfactory. Furthermore, the Chairman was so loaded with “outside” activities that insufficient joint perspective was introduced into the budget process and other “inside” requirements. As a consequence, the joint input during the budget process was primarily an endorsement of the service inputs.

- Fourth, there was insufficient experience among officers normally assigned to the Joint Staff and insufficient promotion opportunities for the most talented. As the Brehm report pointed out, the generals and admirals on the Joint Staff served for only 2 years and the more junior officers for only 30 months. Compounding the problem was their lack of prior joint service before assuming a senior position on the Joint Staff.

The narrowing of the major problems to four made it quite easy to come up with the four recommended actions:

- First, make the Chairman the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the President. The Chairman would be expected to consult with the other Joint Chiefs before making an input. Furthermore, if a Joint Chief felt

very strongly that different advice should be forwarded, he or she would have a full right to submit advice on the subject.

- Second, require the Joint Staff to work for the Chairman rather than the corporate body. This would enable the Chairman to act far more effectively.
- Third, establish the position of Vice Chairman, with the individual being the second-ranking military officer. (Initially, we were unable to convince the Congress to make the Vice Chairman a “full” chief. The limitation was lifted as a result of Colin Powell’s efforts while he was Chairman.)
- Fourth, require greater joint experience before officers assume a senior joint position or are promoted within their service to flag rank. Ensure Joint Staff officers receive promotion opportunities at least equal to those on service staffs. (The personnel actions have been the most difficult of the recommendations to implement.)

These four recommendations emerged as key elements of Goldwater-Nichols.

Early in 1982 it was time to start engaging the press. In February, I sent up a trial balloon with an article in an obscure magazine, *Directors and Boards*. A similar article was published in March in the *Armed Forces Journal*. The next month the cause was helped by then Army Chief of Staff General Shy Meyer, who published an article recommending far more drastic action than we had. All of a sudden, we became the moderates. With the publishing of my November article in *The New York Times*, it was time for me to pass the baton to Arch Barrett, Jim Locher, and the congressional leaders. I had done the easy part by stirring the waters. The hard part was yet to come.

# BUILDING ON THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT

*James R. Locher III*

When Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Les Aspin, then Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, declared, "This is one of the landmark laws of American history. It is probably the greatest sea change in the history of the American military since the Continental Congress created the Continental Army in 1775."

Barry Goldwater, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, also measured the 1986 legislation in historic terms. He judged that the bill "will possibly be the most significant piece of defense organization legislation in the nation's history. . . . For the first time, we will have organizational arrangements that will lead to true unity of effort in the Pentagon and in the warfighting commands in the field."

In 1986, few understood why Aspin, Goldwater, and key colleagues—including Congressman Bill Nichols and Senator Sam Nunn—had such high expectations for the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Many in the Pentagon held an opposite view. Navy Secretary John Lehman said the legislation would "make a hash of our Defense structure." General P. X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps, argued that the reforms "would create chaos . . . to the point where I would have deep

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*James R. Locher III has over 25 years of Federal Government service in the executive and legislative branches, culminating in his appointment as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, 1989-93. In 1985, as a member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, he directed the bipartisan staff effort that resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.*

concerns for the future of the United States.” Air Force Secretary Russ Rourke warned, “The bill would have very adverse consequences for our national defense.”

The extent to which the Pentagon resisted and misjudged the Goldwater-Nichols Act is instructive. It reveals that the majority of military officers were then giving priority to service interests over genuine national interests and somehow had come to believe that their behavior in doing so was correct. Although both World War II and postwar experiences had clarified the need for an effectively integrated military establishment, resistance to a more unified approach continued to be the orientation of officers deeply immersed in their service cultures. Despite overwhelming evidence of the need, military officers resisted the creation of viable joint institutions that would lessen service independence and prerogatives. In 1985, Senator Goldwater lamented, “As someone who has devoted his entire life to the military, I am saddened that the services are still unable to put national interest above parochial interest.”

The Pentagon’s unyielding opposition to the Goldwater-Nichols Act also demonstrated that it knew little about organization issues. In line with the song, “Don’t Know Much About History, Don’t Know Much About Geography,” DOD could have written “Don’t Know Much About Organization.” Historical factors created this situation. For more than a century, the military was denied the initiative to reorganize itself. Not surprisingly, this off-limits area permanently disappeared as a topic of serious interest.

### **Origins of the Act**

The political conflict that produced the Goldwater-Nichols Act lasted 4 years and 241 days—a period longer than World War II. It pitted DOD against Capitol Hill in a bitter, divisive fight. The four military services fiercely resisted the proposed legislation. Pro-reform Members of Congress were equally

determined to overcome 40 years of military disunity and warfighting failures.

The public campaign to reform DOD began on February 3, 1982. On that date, General David Jones, the sitting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, broke ranks with his Pentagon colleagues and appealed to the House Armed Services Committee for reform of the joint system. General Jones had unsuccessfully tried for several years to reform the system from within.

In his fateful testimony, General Jones advised the House committee, "It is not sufficient to have just resources, dollars, and weapon systems; we must also have an organization which will allow us to develop the proper strategy, necessary planning, and the full warfighting capability." Then, with just nine words, General Jones started a profound revolution in military affairs and changed the course of American military history when he said, "We do not have an adequate organizational structure today."

Elements of the Pentagon vigorously attacked General Jones' arguments and sought to discredit him for what they viewed as turncoat behavior. Without his courageous call for reform, there would not have been a Goldwater-Nichols Act or the impressive record of military performance over the last decade.

Despite the unprecedented nature and seriousness of General Jones' appeal, only one congressman—Dick White, the Texas Democrat who chaired the Investigations Subcommittee—showed an early interest. And that interest was generated by Arch Barrett, a subcommittee staffer and defense organization expert. Arch Barrett, who provided the intellectual firepower for the House's reorganization efforts from start to finish, is another hero of Goldwater-Nichols. The Senate did not seriously engage the defense reorganization issue until more than a year later. And before both houses converged on comprehensive legislation, a total of almost 5 years would pass. What in the world took the Congress so long?

## **Congressional Challenges**

Defense reorganization was an enormous, complex challenge—both intellectually and politically—for Capitol Hill. Strong, independent, bipartisan leadership was imperative. Congressional leaders of defense reorganization needed to be capable of withstanding intense attacks from the Pentagon and its allies, while at the same time building a legislative consensus. Early congressional work on reorganization did not have such leadership; it was not until January 1985 that the needed leaders were in place.

In the Senate, Barry Goldwater became chairman of the Armed Services Committee and formed a partnership with Sam Nunn to take on defense reorganization as their highest priority. At the same time, Les Aspin ascended to the chairmanship of the House Armed Services Committee. He joined forces with Bill Nichols who had assumed the position of chairman of the Investigations Subcommittee 2 years earlier.

Capitol Hill also needed time to learn about defense organization. The two Armed Services Committees knew little about the inner workings of the Pentagon. Seldom did such matters come to their attention. The Congress needed to know enough about defense organization to draft comprehensive legislation. In the postwar period, Capitol Hill had not initiated defense organization legislation; it had merely responded to executive branch proposals and usually spent most of its time monitoring the fights over the legislation within the executive branch. In the mid-1980s, the Congress was formulating bold, comprehensive legislation without the assistance and over the objections of the Pentagon.

The Senate's early work on defense reorganization exemplified Congress' lack of knowledge. In mid-1983, when Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Tower launched an inquiry into defense reorganization, his interest had not been sparked by General Jones' arguments, but by the urging

of retired Marine General “Brute” Krulak, father of the current commandant.

Krulak convinced Tower that the Pentagon needed to return to the organizational arrangements of World War II, with the Joint Chiefs working directly for the president. The retired marine wanted the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be abolished, the Secretary of Defense taken out of the chain of command, and OSD reduced in half. Four months into his ill-considered inquiry, Tower recognized that the arguments for undoing the existing unifying elements of the Pentagon were intellectually indefensible. The committee chairman, at the urging of the Pentagon, then put his sights on defending the status quo.

In the face of unyielding Pentagon opposition, the Congress proceeded cautiously because it wanted to reassure itself that it was moving in the right direction. The two Armed Services Committees understood that flawed legislation could imperil the nation’s security. They spent years studying organization issues to be comfortable making judgments contrary to the arguments of most military professionals. The pro-reform views of many retired officers, think tanks, and universities helped to reassure Members of Congress. So did private meetings with active officers, such as Admiral Bill Crowe, who believed that significant reorganization was necessary.

Party politics also impeded congressional action. The Democrats controlled the House of Representatives, while the Senate and White House were in Republican hands. In the early going, President Ronald Reagan was content to support his old friend, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, in his resistance to reorganization. Recognizing the potential obstacle that party politics could create, the Pentagon and other reform opponents attempted and nearly succeeded in making defense reorganization a partisan issue.

These efforts did not succeed in part because the staff of the National Security Council became an unexpected ally of Capitol

Hill. National Security Adviser Bud McFarlane agreed with two of his staffers, Mike Donley and John Douglass, that many defense reforms had merit. McFarlane convinced President Ronald Reagan to create the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, called the Packard Commission after its chairman, former Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard. The commission took the initiative for the administration on defense reorganization, complicated the Pentagon's battle with Capitol Hill, and eventually supported congressional proposals.

Throughout the postwar period, the Congress and the services had been allies in opposing greater military unification. Diffusion of power in the Pentagon served congressional interests, in both its constitutional competition with the executive branch and its ability to influence resource decisions and other matters of local political interest. In formulating the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Congress set aside these institutional interests in order to strengthen central authority in the Department of Defense.

This new congressional thrust now made adversaries of Capitol Hill and the services. Behind the firm opposition of Secretary Weinberger and General Jack Vessey, General Jones' replacement as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD stonewalled every congressional proposal.

Congressional intrusion on sacred military turf heightened the Pentagon's opposition, as described by one officer: "To have the Hill tell us how to do our business was the most hated, odorous thing that you could suggest to a professional military guy. It was second only to the Russians raising their flag over Washington."

For decades, the Armed Services Committees and the four services had strong, deeply rooted connections. In the mid-1980s, military influence in the committees remained significant. Overcoming this influence took time. After Senators Goldwater and Nunn had worked for 13 months to convince their

colleagues of the need for reform, they could achieve only a shaky one-vote margin in their committee. The rest of the committee remained loyal to the services. The overwhelming approval that Congress eventually gave to the Goldwater-Nichols Act belies the closeness of decisive encounters.

Pentagon resistance factored in defense reorganization events until the end. Bowing to military opposition and sensitivities, President Reagan did not hold a public ceremony to sign the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

### **Significance of the Act**

The significance that Aspin, Goldwater, and others attached to the Goldwater-Nichols Act derived from their study of the history of the military establishment. From the beginning of the American republic until 1986, a period of nearly 200 years, the U.S. military was never effectively organized. For the first 150 years, strong antimilitary sentiments that dominated public and government attitudes determined this outcome. From America's first days until Pearl Harbor, the nation desired a small, amateur military in peacetime.

For the four decades after World War II, the dysfunctional organization of the military was a self-inflicted wound. During a period in which modern warfare demanded the integration of air, land, and sea capabilities, the services fought to preserve a high degree of separateness. It was not until the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that the nation finally created a unified military structure. It was not until passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that the military was freed, for the first time in the nation's history, from crippling ideological, political, conceptual, and parochial constraints.

### **Taking Stock of the Act**

Now that we know how the act came about, was it worth it? Has Goldwater-Nichols worked? In the broad sweep of

American military history, recent years have been remarkable for the number and scope of significant achievements and successes by the Department of Defense. Superb leadership played an important role as did doctrine, training, education, and hardware developments that preceded the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Nevertheless, a significant body of evidence and numerous public assertions by senior defense officials and military officers argue that the act enormously contributed to the positive outcomes of recent years. The act validated the 1983 prediction of former Defense Secretary Jim Schlesinger: "Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements."

During the last 10 years, the Goldwater-Nichols Act transformed and revitalized the American military profession. Overwhelming successes in operations *Just Cause* in Panama and *Desert Shield/Storm* in the Persian Gulf region provided visible evidence of the act's effect. Secretary Perry reported, "All commentaries and after-action reports on Operation *Desert Shield/Storm* attribute the success of the operation to the fundamental structural changes in the chain of command brought about by Goldwater-Nichols."

Shortly after the Gulf War, *Forbes* magazine commented, "The extraordinarily efficient, smooth way our military has functioned in the Gulf is a tribute to . . . the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act, which shifted power from individual military services to officials responsible for coordinating them . . . The extraordinary achievements of Secretary Cheney and Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf would not have been possible without Goldwater-Nichols."

Secretary Perry recently used an historic yardstick to praise the legislation: "The Goldwater-Nichols Act is perhaps the most important Defense legislation since World War II." While serving as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Owens saw the legislation in even larger terms: "Goldwater-Nichols was the watershed event for the military since the

second World War. It changed significantly the culture of the U.S. military. In the last seven or eight years, we've progressed from a reluctant standing up of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, to a full acceptance by the services that this is the future of warfighting." In line with congressional expectations, it is clear that the Goldwater-Nichols Act has profoundly improved the performance and warfighting capabilities of the American military establishment.

### **Remaining Work**

The Department of Defense has come a long way since 1986, but there is plenty of work remaining to be done. Goldwater-Nichols fixed the basics and put the foundation back in order. Now it's time to build on that foundation.

Among the issues requiring Pentagon attention is the need to determine a better division of labor among OSD, the Joint Staff, and the military departments. For nearly four decades, the Joint Staff could not provide quality military advice, and the three military departments exercised considerable independence. As a result, defense secretaries continually expanded the tasks assigned to OSD. Now that all defense components are playing their assigned roles, the time has come to eliminate unnecessary duplication and over management. Of particular interest, the relations between the two top DOD headquarters staffs—the Office of the Secretary and the Joint Staff—are poorly defined.

The significant involvement of OSD in direct management activities raises another issue. Defense economics have created pressures for new defensewide activities, such as defense agencies and field activities. New missions, such as counterdrug and counterproliferation, have also required management by a unified organization. OSD picked up these management tasks as a secondary responsibility, but they now expend 25 percent of the defense budget. They have become an enormous appendage on the Secretary's Office, diverting OSD attention away from policy

making and complicating its ability to perform impartial oversight.

The Joint Staff is following the same path. Because it was reborn only in 1986, the Joint Staff has just begun to accumulate direct management responsibilities. It is now where the OSD was in the 1960s. Involvement of policy-level staffs in day-to-day management needs careful examination.

Everything in today's DOD is being downsized except for headquarters staffs. The Pentagon's corporate headquarters employs 30,000 personnel, and staffs within a 25-mile radius of Washington total 150,000. Past efforts to reduce this massive bureaucracy have failed. A skillful shell game has been played. Cuts mandated in an established organization are simply transferred to a new entity. DOD is literally choking on staff. The Pentagon must get serious about reducing this dysfunctional bloat.

The work of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) raises a number of exciting possibilities. DOD has long suffered from the lack of a mission perspective in its headquarters staffs. With the creation of the Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessments (JWCA), the JROC has provided a useful, although not yet fully mature, approach to considering mission needs. This development may foster changes elsewhere, such as restructuring the Future Years Defense Plan into JWGA-like categories; or reorganizing the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology or the Program Analysis and Evaluation staff along mission lines.

In 1993, the U.S. Atlantic Command was assigned responsibility to serve as the Joint Force integrator, trainer, and provider. This duty put the command at the tip of the spear of the Goldwater-Nichols revolution, and its new role seems like the next step in a natural evolution of jointness, but resistance has been encountered from the services and some geographic commands. There is a need to determine whether or not these dissenters have legitimate concerns.

In most instances, DOD has commendably implemented the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This has not been the case for the joint officer personnel policies. The Chairman at the time of the act's passage, Admiral Bill Crowe, otherwise a big supporter of defense reorganization, had an unfavorable view of the joint officer provisions. He believed that "the detailed legislation that mandated every aspect of the 'Joint Corps' from the selection process and the number of billets to promotional requirements was a serious mistake that threatened a horrendous case of congressional micro management. In this instance the chiefs were unanimous in their opposition, and I agreed with them wholeheartedly." Not surprisingly, with this attitude at the top, Joint Staff implementation sympathized with negative service attitudes for many years. Although the Joint Staff has taken a more purposeful approach in recent years, the Pentagon still lacks a vision of its needs for Joint officers and how to prepare and reward them.

### **New Organizational Challenges**

Although DOD has a full agenda of internal organization issues, an outside set of organization issues demands priority attention. This set centers on the need for improvements in interagency planning and coordination. This is the province of the National Security Council system, but the ability of the Pentagon to execute assigned missions now depends to a greater extent on the contributions of other departments and agencies. And increasingly, deployed forces find themselves in supporting roles in operations other than war.

The Pentagon has been slow to recognize this growing interdependence. Traditionally, DOD wanted to be assigned the entire mission and then be left alone. As Senator Nunn noted, "The old days of the Pentagon doing the entire mission are gone for good." But past habits are difficult to overcome.

## **Final Thoughts**

Quality attention to organization issues provides an enormous return. The Goldwater-Nichols Act paid off in impressive battlefield victories, prestige, public support, and deterrence. It created the environment and provided the tools for Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf and others to succeed.

As with all other aspects of our defense effort, our organizations must keep pace with our needs. This is not occurring. Seven years after the end of the Cold War, radical alteration of our strategic environment, revision of our strategy, and reductions in budgets and force levels, DOD has not made a single significant organizational change. Not one.

Inattention and weak understanding continue to be the biggest impediments to making needed organizational changes. We have never had a tradition of quality attention to organization issues, and we have not yet started to build one.

Service resistance also remains an impediment. The excessive Service parochialism of the postwar period has been tamed. But we are still plagued by service attitudes that have not adjusted to their diminished, yet still important, role. Too often, the services view each growth in joint authority as a loss of a birth right and resist accordingly.

In 1986, the Congress rescued the military from its troubled past and empowered the creation of the world's finest and most versatile armed forces. The Congress can come to the rescue only once every 25 to 30 years, if then; it is time for DOD to reform itself. Efforts to strengthen the nation's security will be imperfect without modern, innovative, properly focused organizations.

Part of our duty is to produce such organizations, and we will fail the men and women in uniform and the nation if we don't.

## A COMMANDER'S PERSPECTIVE

*Leighton W. Smith, Jr.*

I would find it hard to believe that either Goldwater or Nichols envisioned jointness being carried to the extent we saw in Bosnia. A U.S. Navy admiral commanding the first ever NATO land operations in a country that has no navy?

If nothing else was proven in that operation, we advanced the notion that one does not have to be a subject-matter expert at the tactical level to command a joint force. The important things to learn are first, understand the limits of your knowledge; second, have smart young officers, who can be trusted to give good advice; and third, as commander, exercise the common sense to listen to them.

I expect everyone has their own ideas of what Goldwater-Nichols was all about. But if you consider that one of the architects was a Republican senator from the west and the other a Democratic congressman from the south, you might agree that theirs was an unusual union, but instructive. Here were two strong-willed political leaders from opposite sides of the aisle, whose efforts, in part, were aimed at breaking down age-old barriers and misconceptions, and pulling people of different backgrounds together so that their shared experiences would introduce nondenominational balance to the warfighting staffs.

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Those staffs were to support the unified and specified combatant commanders, upon whose shoulders was placed the clear responsibility for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands. The net effect was to enhance the effectiveness of military operations.

We have made headway in busting through age-old animosities, in most cases brought about by ignorance of what the other services could bring to the fight. This effort was taken so that the unified and joint force commanders could spend their time considering a range of well-developed joint options provided by a staff familiar with the territory, rather than refereeing individual service squabbles while simultaneously getting well intentioned but frequently not helpful operational guidance from the service staffs in Washington.

Goldwater-Nichols put responsibility and accountability where it should be—on the man at the scene. But in order to ensure that they had the talent needed in developing the right plans, joint training, assignment, and promotion policies had to be changed.

One of the biggest hurdles was to bust through the paradigm that joint tours were career killers. I freely admit that I came from a very parochial school called carrier aviation. I commanded all the right things to make me an expert on navy air . . . and was enormously suspicious of anybody who tried to denigrate our carrier force. I did not know joint. Furthermore I was not anxious to learn joint. That is why, when I got orders to become the J-3 at U.S. European Command in August 1989, I figured I was done. I planned to spend the obligatory 2 years in the dead- end joint job . . . I mean, a sailor in the middle of Germany??? . . . then go off and start my second career. Boy was I wrong.

One of the first things General Jack Galvin, Commander in Chief, Europe, said to me was, Snuffy, you need to learn about the Army. Don't hide behind things you are familiar with. I want to see you around Army troops learning what they are all

about. What he didn't know was that I was almost equally ignorant on Air Force issues that mattered to him. So I set about educating myself. I had a lot of help, both from the J-3 folk, and from General Butch Saint at U.S. Army—Europe and General Bob Oakes at U.S. Air Force—Europe. What I learned is what most learn when they decide to do so: that while there are significant differences in the four services, there are, as well, and thank God, many similarities.

Rear Admiral Jim Stark, in giving a speech on why he liked marines, likened the services to owners of dogs—sometimes you see the owner and the dog taking on similar physical appearances and mannerisms. Let me restate the basics of Admiral Stark's analogy. The air force was pretty easy. They reminded him of a French poodle. A poodle always looks perfect, like it just came from the hairdresser. It sometimes seems a bit pampered. It always travels first class. But don't ever forget, poodles were bred as first-class hunting dogs, and they are very dangerous. They do their job well. The Army is supposedly like a Saint Bernard. It's big, heavy, and sometimes seems a bit clumsy. But its very powerful and has stamina. So you want it for the long haul. The Navy, God bless us, is a golden retriever. They are good natured and great around the house. Kids love 'em. They love the water, and go wandering off for long periods of time. Having some experience with both retrievers and the Navy, I would add that they go pretty much where others don't, or can't, and they stay as long as it takes to get the job done. The Marine Corps can be said to be two different breeds of dogs, either rottweilers or Dobermans, because marines come in two varieties . . . big and mean and skinny and mean. They're both territorial, aggressive on the attack, and tenacious on defense. They both have really short hair, and they always go for the throat.

While the humor in this analogy is obvious, so, too, is the bottom line: each of them represents a unique capability that is important in a fight. They look different, they act differently,

and sometimes they come up with different solutions to the same problem. But in a fight, they have one objective . . . to win, to win decisively and quickly. One aim of Goldwater-Nichols was to do just that. Win by wisely selecting from a menu of capabilities, capitalizing on the uniqueness of each service.

To do this there had to be individuals who could ensure that the commander on the scene understood the what, where, when, and how of the various services; how they fit together and complemented each other; and how to develop a set of options that met the specific and unique requirements of this or that crisis

Going back to Admiral Stark's analogy, Goldwater-Nichols also aimed, in large measure, to outfit those dogs with common collars, leashes, vets, kennels and trainers. The drafters of the legislation may have then gone too far and determined for the services the numbers of joint billets, how to train, career progression, and other issues that would probably have been better left to the services, unified commanders and/or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But my purpose in addressing this symposium is not to criticize (although I hope we will identify areas where the pendulum can be put more toward the middle) but to provide some thoughts, based on my personal experiences, on command relationships and the value of joint training for a large operation. Further, I hope to highlight areas where we may look for improvements in preparing our military for the future.

So, let me shift gears now and, through several vignettes, share some of my experiences from which I have drawn personal conclusions. The first occurred during my tour as the J-3 in U.S. European Command, a job I reported to without benefit of any formal joint training, other than a very enjoyable 1 year at Air Command and Staff College. On a Friday night near Patch Barracks in Vaihingen, Germany, then Brigadier General Tony Zinni, Colonel Frank Brewer, and I were about to enjoy dinner. Both Tony and Frank are marines, and both were in the J-3

organization with me. About halfway through the antipasto we received a message from our command center that President Bush had decided to “do something about the Kurdish situation in northern Iraq,” and General Jack Galvin wanted to talk to me ASAP. We busted back to the command center, arriving just in time to pick up a ringing phone with Jack Galvin on the other end

Without much preamble, this man whom I admire as much as any military officer on Earth, said, “Snuffy, the President wants to help the Kurds in northern Iraq. We need to get food and water in there, and faster is better than cheaper. An airlift operation is probably the best way. Do what you have to do to get it started, and call me tomorrow to tell me what you have done.”

Goldwater-Nichols provided Jack Galvin all the authority he needed to make that call. Working for him during *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, plus a few other crises, gave me the confidence I needed to press on with nothing more than those very succinct mission-type orders.

Over the next couple of hours an increasing number of joint-qualified officers, all very talented because they had worked during the preceding months in the European Command support for *Desert Shield/Desert Storm*, reported to become the brain trust for me and the CINC.

Within the first few hours of what was to become Operation *Provide Comfort*, I called Air Force Major General Jim Jamerson and asked if he would command the joint task force that would surely emerge. He had just returned from commanding Joint Task Force *Proven Force* (JTF-PF), the air operations out of Incerlik that proved very valuable (but hardly ever mentioned) during *Desert Storm*. Jim said that General Oakes was out of town, but he, Jim, felt certain that his boss would support his accepting my proposal. Jim and I agreed on a few basics and agreed to talk more later in the night.

I then called Brigadier General Jim Hobson, U.S. Air Force, who was commanding the unit that owned the C-130s in Europe to ask if he could provide some aircraft to Incerlik on Saturday. We agreed on six, because that's what was immediately available. We also tentatively agreed that we would shoot for noon on Sunday as the commencement of airdrop operations into the border region where most of the Kurds had gathered.

My next call was to Brigadier General Dick Potter, U.S. Army, who, as Special Operations Commander—Europe, was responsible for the special operations folks in theater. He had been in Turkey during *Desert Storm*, as well, and we knew we would be using special operations folks at some point, so Potter would be a key ingredient for success. This talented warrior was enjoying the first night of a well earned leave when I called. He spent the rest of that night driving back to the command center.

I then called Major General Bill Farmen, U.S. Army, who was stationed in Ankara as our Joint U.S. Logistics contact. Bill had been enormously helpful in getting Turkish approval for *Proven Force*. Now I would task his diplomatic skills even more. I told Bill we needed clearance for both jets and props, plus a lot of people, to arrive in Incerlik beginning in just a few hours. Bill basically said launch em, I'll figure out how to get to the right people in time. We did, and he did.

Finally, I called Vice Admiral Paul Ilg in London. Paul was Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy—Europe. Through him, I was able to get the Marine forces that were conducting an exercise off Sardinia to begin backloading so that they could move, with their helicopters and vehicles, to a port in Turkey. From there they could road march to Silopi, Turkey, in order to establish a support base from which helicopters would later deliver supplies.

At 7 a.m. the next morning, I was able to report to Jack Galvin that we had assets in route to Turkey and that the first airdrops, austere though they would be, would launch from Incerlik at noon on Sunday. In the space of a short night, we

had, without a single message or fax and without checking with Washington, put in motion elements from all services whose mission was to converge on southeastern Turkey by sea and air to "Help the Kurds." That night began what was later described by Colin Powell as one of the operations he was most proud of. But it was not without problems.

First, like most operations of this type, it was born of emotion, emotion that comes from having human tragedies of immense proportions fed live into the kitchens and dens of America, followed by graphic photos on the front page of the morning paper. Suddenly the necessity to do something becomes a political imperative, and instructions are issued to "do something." That's obviously a bit simplistic, but I want to make the point that there were no preplanned options on the table, at least none that I am aware of. Such a situation puts the military in a reactive mode, sometimes wondering what the mission is and what the duration will be. So, in *Provide Comfort*, the first mission was to "do something."

We translated that to air-dropping life-sustaining supplies. Later the mission became "stop the dying," followed by "get the Kurds out of the mountains and back to their villages in Iraq," followed by "figure out a way to protect the Kurds once we get them back to their villages."

The first piece of paper I saw on *Provide Comfort* has probably long since been lost, but I will tell you it estimated the duration of that operation to be about 11 days. That was in April 1991.

The good news about this operation was that from a command relationship perspective, Jim Jamerson, and later our chairman, General Shalikashvili, knew exactly for whom they worked and to whom they reported. That joint task force, like the five others we put together during my 21 months in the J-3 job, all reported directly to the CINC, bypassing the component commanders . . . and the inevitable service guidance that existed in the Pentagon in the pre-Goldwater-Nichols days.

I know that Jack Galvin maintained a continuous dialogue with the Washington gods—that's the way the system is supposed to work—but there was none of the direct calls from Washington to the commander in Turkey or the individual service component commanders, to give operational guidance or demand information that should rightfully go through the unified commander.

It does seem to me that there is room for deliberate planning in these sorts of situations. I realize that there are going to be the inevitable unexpected crises, but the fact is that most events in which our military has eventually become involved are not pop-up targets.

Additionally, the fact that there are so many different agencies that will become involved in humanitarian crises begs for some sort of contingency planning and, at minimum, a vehicle that will facilitate a broader understanding between members of the military and civilian agencies most likely to become involved. If this were made possible, at least we could achieve a state of equilibrium where the military is not seen as a threat to civil efforts—and the civilian agencies are not considered a hindrance or an impediment by the military. It would make the early days of any operation much smoother.

This has been suggested before, but the response from those at State and on the National Security Council to whom the suggestion was made was, "We can't even keep up with the flap du jour. How could you expect that we can find the time to do contingency planning?" I can't answer that question, but I can say that the suggestion is not new and does have merit.

Let me fast forward now to the most recent phase of my joint experiences. In my last job, I commanded four different organizations simultaneously. I was Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy—Europe, the Navy component commander with a Navy staff in London. We had Marine representation on the staff, but for all practical purposes we were "pure" Navy. In that U.S. hat, and because of my physical location in Naples, I

commanded Joint Task Force *Provide Promise* (JTF-PP), a U.S. team that exercised operational control of U.S. air assets conducting humanitarian air land and air drop operations in Bosnia. Additionally, we coordinated those operations with the other nations who were also participating in that same effort. For all practical purposes, we had tactical control of all air assets involved in that humanitarian endeavor.

Since our country requires a direct link from our national command authority to any U.S. military unit, especially when they are assigned to the United Nations, we used JTF-PF as the vehicle through which this direct link existed. Basically, we exercised OPCON of U.S. Army Forces operating in Macedonia, and a field hospital in Zagreb, alternately operated by Army, Air Force, and Navy medical teams, plus the few people we had working in Bosnia.

Most of the time I did not know whether the person on that staff was Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Force. They all wore their camouflage uniforms, and unless I really tried, I just couldn't tell. And what's more to the point, I didn't care. What I cared about was whether or not we were doing the job assigned, and we were.

What galled me though, was that this joint experience for these young warriors did not meet the requirements for joint credit. I was actually denied some very talented people who wanted very much to come, but they were in a "designated joint billet" and would lose their joint points if they worked for me in JTF-PP. We need to fix this, and I understand this issue is being reviewed. But the important issue here, again, is that from a commander's perspective, I can tell you that the people in our services can and do put aside service parochialism when they are nose-to-nose with real world operations.

I was also Commander in Chief—South, the NATO commander in the southern region with Bosnia and the Balkans in my area of responsibility, headquartered in Naples, Italy. This NATO command included Operation *Sharp Guard*, the naval

embargo enforcement operations in the Adriatic being conducted with navies from eight countries. It also included Operation *Deny Flight*, the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia. And finally, the Armed Forces South (AFSOUTH) job led to command of the Implementation Force (IFOR), the NATO-led multinational coalition with forces from 35 different countries.

Thus, I had a pure service command, Navy, in which I wanted people who were very smart about Navy issues. I did not require “jointness” on the U.S. Navy—Europe staff. What I needed were hard chargers who knew Navy systems, issues, tactics, techniques, and procedures cold. I did not tolerate running down other services from them or anyone else in any of my commands, but I did encourage imagination and initiative in how best to employ naval forces.

I had an alliance command, AFSOUTH, where I needed people who were not only joint but who also could operate within the NATO framework, which is not easy and requires time to be proficient in alliance matters. Such proficiency became extraordinarily important as we developed the operational plans that evolved into *Determined Effort*, the bombing operations in September, and *Joint Endeavor*, the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. All this had to be done while simultaneously staying abreast of the issues in the southern region, like the problems between Greece and Turkey.

And finally, I had the multinational coalition, IFOR, where I needed men and women with the wisdom of Solomon and the patience of Job. We not only had to deal with joint matters, but also with alliance, coalition, civil, and political problems as well as economics, police, the United Nations, private volunteer organizations (PVOs), and nongovernment organizations (NGOs).

You can see why I refer to my experiences in IFOR as the most exciting thing in which I have ever been involved. This experience was made even more intense by the association I had with so many bright young men and women from all over the

place who, with me, wrote the book on peace support operations daily.

I'm not sure we can ever train for every eventuality, but if there is an area where we can apply productive effort, I would suggest that it be in developing a better understanding of NGOs and PVOs. A new doctrinal manual is not the answer because these organizations would not read it, but they need to understand us as much as we need to understand them. We need to know who they are, how they function, what they do, what are their strengths and weaknesses, and how they view us. There are literally hundreds of PVOs and NGOs, so we could not expect to cover them all, but developing a cadre of knowledgeable officers and noncommissioned officers, beyond just our reserve civil affairs folks, is something that should be seriously considered.

I will close with this thought. It is inevitable that we are going to be involved in peace support and humanitarian crises and intervention operations in the future, and despite our best efforts, most of the operations will be reactive. These operations will require a very close working relationship among many agencies in Washington, as well as with a substantial number of NGOs and PVOs.

We had best sort out ways to improve the dialogue between the military and the political masters who will tell us to go, and the military and the civil agencies, and the military and the PVOs and NGOs, with whom we will work shoulder to shoulder on the front lines in sometimes very difficult and dangerous environments.

I hope these reflections of a commander have been helpful as input to a full retrospective on the impact of Goldwater-Nichols.

# ON REVOLUTIONS, BARRIERS, AND COMMON SENSE

*William K. Brehm*

*A long habit of not thinking a thing wrong gives it a superficial appearance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defense of custom.*

Thomas Paine, *Common Sense*

*Sentiment must submit to common sense.*

General George C. Marshall

## History of Department of Defense Reform

When I contemplate revolution I study historical examples—to learn from past revolutions and to develop momentum toward the next one.

Barriers to change are healthy. They bring out the best in us. True, they may also bring out the worst: those who fear change often strengthen the barriers with emotion or indifference rather than reason. Reason can be engaged, and emotion and indifference are problematic, but, at the end of the day, barriers ensure that the good ideas have been carefully tested.

DOD has experienced several genuine revolutions. Here are five. Some of these are still in process, none has achieved perfection, but all are amazing.

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*William K. Brehm served as Assistant Secretary of the Army from 1968 to 1970, and as Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1973 to 1977. In 1981-82, as a DOD consultant, he led a team assigned by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a plan for reforming the JCS organization, process, and incentives for Joint Service. Many of Mr. Brehm's recommendations from that effort provided the core changes implemented by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act.*

### **1947: The Formation of DOD**

After World War II the nation's leaders concluded that a single department should manage the Armed Forces. There was opposition, but Congress created the new Department of Defense anyway. The new department encompassed the cabinet-level War and Navy Departments and a comparable department for the newly independent Air Force. Each was to be headed by a secretary; each inherited or acquired a civilian secretariat; and each included a military leader (two in the Navy Department) who came equipped with a military staff. Thus, today DOD has nine major staff echelons with overlapping and layered functional responsibilities.

OSD grew as defense secretaries needed more staff help, in spite of all the staffs around. The Joint Staff, for example, was not controlled independently by the Chairman as one might have expected, but by a committee with a built-in conflict of interest, namely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Staff products were judged both as untimely and of limited value. As OSD grew, so, too, did the other staffs, to maintain symmetry among the functions and always to have the capability to respond.

The Congress wanted strong checks and balances in its new DOD; it got them and apparently didn't mind that the nine DOD staff echelons offered major opportunities for duplication, inefficiency, and lack of accountability. Opponents of change didn't mind that either; some particularly liked the fact that the Chairman was close to powerless.

Resistance to the formation of the DOD was significant. The barriers to change were overcome not so much through reason as through compromise. So, while the government took an important step forward in creating DOD, the result contained significant flaws.

### **1948: Racial Integration of the Military Forces**

President Harry S. Truman was a chief executive of considerable courage and determination. On July 26, 1948, he ordered the

end of segregation within the U.S. Armed Forces. Truman apparently took this action over considerable opposition.

Other actions followed: For example, in the early 1960s Defense Secretary Robert McNamara found to his outrage that off-base rental housing near some of our major military bases was often closed to African-Americans. The Secretary checked his authority and then made a very simple decision: either off-base housing is open to all or it is open to none. It did not take long for the landlords to get the message, and open housing became a reality.

Barriers notwithstanding, the military took the lead in equal opportunity in the United States nearly 20 years before the major civil rights legislation of the 1960s. The military continues that leadership now as it struggles to reach equal treatment for women.

### **1958: DOD Rationalization**

The launch of Sputnik in November 1957 sparked a revolution at DOD—a sweeping rationalization process that continues today.

First came the realization that technology and certain missions required central oversight. Thus in 1958, under the leadership of such men as Secretary Tom Gates, Army Major General Cy Betts, and Dr. Herb York, the rationalization process began, particularly in the area of strategic missiles—but not without opposition. Technology was a prime gem in each service's array of family jewels.

Then, in 1961, Robert McNamara expanded and drove the rationalization process with a vengeance. He could not understand, for example, why the separate military services should each be building the capability to destroy the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons. He organized the budget and force-level decision process around program lines. Programming was revolutionary; it established categories of activity that cut across service lines. The services were apprehensive about this;

in fact, it called into question their sacred division of roles and missions. Barriers quickly arose.

But there was something else playing here: the services lacked comprehensive analytical capability. Analysis was not part of the fabric of the DOD civilian-military dialogue. McNamara quickly established an analytical capability in his own office that began to affect presidential decisions in a major way. The services couldn't contend with it and began to lose the debates. Predictably they began to treat analysis with suspicion.

The transition toward a more rational, analytically based decision process was difficult, awkward, and even hostile at times. The barriers to the program-oriented approach were gradually overcome, but not until the services had grown their own analysis capability.

Rationalization—a true revolution—continues at DOD. Much of it now flows from top-down business re-engineering, such as that which the Marine Corps is doing under the direct leadership of their Commandant, General Chuck Krulak. Beneficial results are also evident in joint command and control, stemming from persistent, visionary leadership from people like Emmett Paige and Lieutenant General Al Edmonds. The effective use of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), begun by Admiral Bill Owens when he was Vice Chairman of the JCS, is further evidence of this movement toward greater rationalization. But the barriers to further rationalization are still there. Leading the department to make these improvements is difficult. It takes keen insight and courage.

### **1973: The End of Military Conscription**

Military conscription policy in the 1960s was the most insidiously divisive force experienced by Americans. More than the draft itself, the draft deferment policy (student and occupational deferments) of that period probably caused the deepest divisions. Compounding that problem was the failure of the President to

call the Reserve Components to active duty until very late in the Vietnam war. Thus, national policy drove young men to become professional students, to become teachers, to become ministers, to join the Reserves, or to leave the country. Opportunity, connections, and wealth were often ingredients abetting this process, and thus the policy was seen as grossly discriminatory. This created a terrible set of options to set before our young men. No one knows how many thousands of them sought those escape routes unaccompanied by the calling that normally is associated with a decision to go into teaching, to enter the ministry, to seek higher education, or to perform Reserve duty.

The active military suffered greatly during this time. Being highly visible in uniform they became lightning rods for public criticism, even though the criticism should have been leveled at the country's civilian leadership, for it was they who developed and perpetrated the conscription policies.

In the late 1960s it became obvious that conscription would be phased out. Emotions ran high. Some wanted to abolish the draft to force the precipitous withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam. They didn't prevail. The President's draft authority was extended, to June 30, 1973, allowing the time needed for the transition to a volunteer force.

The transition actually involved two legislative steps: The first was to make the draft as fair as possible for as long as it existed; the country at last overhauled the deferment policy and adopted a system of national registration and random selection (the "lottery"). The second step was to make adjustments in military salaries and the other elements needed to make a volunteer force feasible.

Ending the draft required a true cultural revolution. That it has succeeded so well is a tribute to the military leaders who made it work even though many of them were philosophically opposed. Barriers to this revolution were erected by those who equated conscription to patriotism, so much a part of the

American fabric had conscription become. Today, the likelihood of untrained civilians being called on short notice to military duty seems remote. It is an interesting residual that the felt connection between patriotism and conscription still manifests itself in mandatory registration of 18-year-old males, nearly a quarter-century after conscription was ended.

### **1986: Goldwater-Nichols and JCS Reform.**

Momentum toward changing the JCS system began long before 1986. General David C. Jones, a future chairman, saw the problems as a junior officer serving as an aide to General LeMay and in subsequent assignments as he moved up through the system. Evidence of the need for reform eventually became abundant. The external evidence, coupled with his private observations, compelled Chairman Jones while still in office in 1982 to dramatize the need for JCS reform and to propose specific changes.

Major change in our country without the impetus of crisis is very difficult to initiate, a point General Jones fully appreciated when he concluded that JCS reform was absolutely necessary. Thus, he had to contend not only with the traditional barriers that even Dwight Eisenhower could not overcome, but also had to convince the political leadership that a crisis did indeed exist, even if barely visible to most of them. He did both. We owe him a huge debt, both for his courage and for caring enough to bring about constructive change to the institution he served.

### **Is It Time for Another Revolution?**

- Today there are at least 30,000 persons in DOD "corporate" headquarters.
- In 1994 there were 150,000 DOD employees within a radius of 25 miles of the Pentagon, only 15 percent less than in 1987. DOD total strength declined more than twice as much in the same period.

- Between 1987 and 1994, active military strength dropped by 26 percent; DOD civilian strength decreased only 18 percent. During that period, the number of GS 1-11s fell by 24 percent—a third more than for civilians overall. Yet the GS 12-15s *increased* by 18 percent.
- There are now about 45 DOD civilian presidential appointments requiring Senate confirmation, an increase of over 40 percent in 20 years. Each presidential appointee has—pro-rata—about 600 or so staff. Not even Congress can top that.

We should be outraged by these figures and trends. One testimony to the overpopulation of the DOD headquarters is the frustration expressed by those who serve there. Under such circumstances it takes extraordinary people to achieve useful results. Fortunately, DOD has such people. But why do we make it so hard for them?

A Director of the Joint Staff recently expressed it this way: “We have a varsity and a junior varsity. The junior varsity are very good; the problem is they never get in the ball game because there is no time.” A Vice Chief of Staff for the Air Force expressed this view: “I do not know what to do with all the people on the Air Staff.”

As the OSD executive for manpower in 1974, I had three civilian counterparts in the military departments, and four military counterparts in the services, plus one more on the Joint Staff. I found that during the day, I worked the manpower issues with the generals and admirals; by and large they had the facts and could make things happen. Then in the evening, I gently informed my civilian counterparts in the secretariats about what we had decided during the day. These presidential appointees weren't necessarily ineffective; they just weren't necessary. As you hear this you must realize that I held one of those Military Department positions for 3 years, and it was one of the best jobs I've ever had.

As the DOD staffs grow in size and complexity, the issues necessarily get diced up into smaller and smaller pieces. There are then more people eligible to “chop” on each action; there are then more people who can say “no” or “wait.” Your college math will tell you that this is a complexity of geometric, not linear, proportions. Many good ideas in the Pentagon just turn yellow with age and die. How sad.

This situation is costly, not simply because of the extra salaries, but because it is very inefficient, and it is tough on morale. I find it particularly distressing that many capable military officers retire early because they are unwilling to put up with the frustration. Nearly half of all two-star officers serve in the Washington area. How many have really fulfilling jobs?

Serving as a presidential appointee should be serious business, but many appointees don't stick around long enough to notice. Over 30 years, from 1961 to 1991, the average tour for presidential appointees requiring senate confirmation was 19 months. Given that some served 6 years or more, one can see the amount of churning that goes on. During my 2 years as the OSD manpower executive, the assistant secretaryship in the Army was filled by three different persons.

The situation in the military leadership is not much better: Setting aside the Joint Chiefs and the Chairman, who normally serve 4 years, the average time in a senior position at the flag rank is about 24 months. This is driven both by the theory of multiple prerequisites for promotion (including joint assignments) and by the fact that we forcibly retire senior officers early, nominally at about 57 years of age, after 35 years of service. This is the point at which many civilian executives reach their peak production. The mandatory retirement convention stems from the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1981 but seems to reflect a period when life expectancy was short and when physical vigor to command troops was a prime consideration throughout a military career. If we were to raise the mandatory retirement point to, say, 40 years of service, and

couple that with a scrupulous evaluation process, we could significantly reduce the turnover in key jobs and still maintain promotion opportunity.

In sum, we entrust the management and leadership of the largest, most important enterprise in the country to a senior civilian and military group filling about 150 positions who—however able they may be—serve on the average less than 24 months in those positions.

The Department of Defense is nothing short of a daily miracle. It succeeds in spite of the rules governing its behavior. But it is an expensive and inefficient miracle, and it does not give its headquarters people the kind of joy and satisfaction that they deserve.

### **How Headquarters Grow: The “Unowned Inheritance”**

Left to itself as it is, DOD headquarters grow in a kind of one-way “ratcheting” process, through several means.

A new Defense Secretary inherits a headquarters so huge that the Secretary cannot possibly “own” a significant percentage of it. DOD headquarters are, in effect, a vast, “unowned inheritance,” and there it sits, largely untroubled by periodic or episodic changes in leadership.

When there is a problem to solve, and the existing organization cannot handle it to the Secretary’s satisfaction, then someone will create a cell to do so. Competent people will be assigned to that cell, and when finished they will go on to other things. The cell then becomes a worthy resting place for other ambitious newcomers or searching career employees; there are, after all, no cell sunset laws at DOD. Its newer occupants will busy themselves with their tiny sliver of activity, and they will defend both the cell and its sliver to the end. Supervisors, who measure their power by the number of organizational cells and people they command, have no incentive to do anything but

perpetuate that cell. The cell has now become a calcified part of the DOD organization

DOD headquarters also grow through the political appointment process. I noted earlier that the number of DOD positions that require Senate confirmation has expanded by over 40 percent in the last two decades. The growth is mostly in assistant secretaryships, serving detailed functional interests and constantly gathering constituency. What the advocates of establishing these offices fail to realize is that each new one lowers the visibility and effectiveness of all the others. The Senate confirmation process has become a treadmill due to the large number of appointees, the rapid turnover, and the difficulty of attracting qualified civilians to public service. But qualified or not, long term or not, a person in one of these positions merits a 3-window office, dining room privileges, and—on the average—several hundred staff.

Moreover, the White House recruiting office has penetrated the DOD organization, and again the ratchet is at work. The White House governs appointments even down to certain clerical positions. Each departing administration leaves behind a list of appointive jobs larger than the one it inherited. The list is immediately captured by the new White House appointments office, which is then determined to fill them. What successful company is run like that? The question of whether all these jobs are needed or not generally doesn't get asked. And, once the jobs are filled, it is too late.

OSD has also grown by augmenting its civilian staff with talented military people. The Congress in 1949 authorized a civilian staff for the new Secretary of Defense. The JCS in turn were authorized a military staff called the Joint Staff. One would imagine that when the Secretary of Defense needed advice from a military staff, he would get it from his Joint Staff. But the Joint Chiefs were not particularly interested in having the Secretary deal directly with the Joint Staff. Over the years they concocted a convoluted process that managed to stifle most good

ideas generated by Joint Staff officers, who were further handicapped by their lack of experience and understanding of joint activities. A succession of defense secretaries, frustrated by their inability to extract useful military advice (especially *joint* military advice) from the chiefs and the Joint Staff, gradually built their own Joint Military Staff and buried it in OSD where it exists until this day. These facts, perhaps more than any other, persuaded Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin to take JCS reform seriously and to put some energy behind it.

At my last count there were roughly three-quarters as many military officers in OSD as on the Joint Staff and two-thirds as many generals and admirals. When Goldwater-Nichols 1986 put the Joint Staff under the command of the Chairman and made the Chairman the principal military advisor, it removed the operational barrier between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff that had prevented the Secretary from getting useful joint military advice. Does the Secretary really need two Joint Staffs today, after Goldwater-Nichols?

All these sources of growth work like compound interest. A Defense Secretary, focused on military operations and the 5-year Defense Program, probably won't notice a 1-year, 5 percent growth in the headquarters strength—but that will double the staff in 15 years and quadruple it in 30 years. Do you wonder how we got to 30,000?

### **What to Do?**

Max DePree says that one of the first obligations of a leader is to define reality for the organization. I am not the leader of DOD, but what I have just described is reality. So, what should we do? It is not a simple task to overcome 40 years of compounded staff growth. It is not simple to overcome habit patterns etched in tradition and judged “right” through a long habit of not thinking them “wrong.” But DOD really needs to change, and to do so it needs another revolution—but a planned revolution.

The DOD headquarters organization we have today is destined to implode through the pressures of the budget and the absolute necessity to improve core processes. If not managed well, this contraction may produce a scatterbrained solution. The Commandant of the Marine Corps says, "We are at an inflection point." I couldn't agree more. In thinking about what to do, there are at least three primary areas to look at:

- *The Military Department Secretariats.* There is at least one extra echelon in the nine-echelon management structure of DOD. It is manifest in the trappings that were carried over from the days when we had War and Navy Departments. I don't propose doing away with the military departments, but I do believe that the Military Department secretariat and military staff functions should be consolidated, and several of the presidential appointee positions eliminated. I would retain the positions of Secretary, Under Secretary (as the acquisition and R&D executive), General Counsel, and perhaps the Comptroller-FM. Candidates for these positions can be recruited reasonably well, whereas it is difficult to find private sector executives who know anything about military manpower and logistics. Their staffs, however, would be skeletal; each Joint Chief would be the true Chief of Staff for the service secretary and the secretary's few assistants.
- *OSD.* The tasks and positions that have been collected in OSD over four decades should be deeply scrubbed. For example, there is now an effective Joint Staff; a second joint military staff, buried in the OSD, is no longer needed. The joint military tasks that have been assigned to OSD over the decades should—if still needed—finally be assigned to the Joint Staff. OSD should be a policy-making body with financial oversight, with no more than 500 people, and far, far fewer assistant secretaries.
- *Core Competencies.* This term has become part of the popular jargon, but focusing on the things you must do and

can do well, and delegating or contracting out the rest, are serious and important tasks. The competition for resources is unrelenting; if DOD has any hope of maintaining a reasonable force structure, modernizing it, keeping it ready, and—above all—taking care of its people, it must become competitive. Today it is not. It's time to put a full court press on re-engineering. In sum, these are the steps I suggest:

1. Consolidate the military department secretariats with the service staffs, eliminating about ten assistant secretaryships.

2. In OSD, stop doing the things that add little or no value and zero out the offices doing these things.

3. Delegate OSD operational responsibilities to the level that understands them best. If necessary, collect the operational tasks OSD has accumulated that cannot be delegated and—where still needed—put them under a single presidential appointee who has DOD operational experience, perhaps a retired senior military officer.

4. Transfer the essential joint military staff activities now conducted in OSD to the Joint Staff and consolidate or further delegate those activities.

5. Focus the remainder of OSD on the critical programming, budget, and policy development activities.

6. Limit OSD to 500 people, and count everyone.

7. Reduce the number of DOD Senate-confirmed appointees by at least one-third.

8. Continue the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols 1986 through, for example, further enhancement and use of the JROC.

9. Contract out to specialists the administrative and business chores that are not part of the essential DOD core competencies; ask Congress to allow the DOD to retain the budgetary resources so liberated if the Department agrees to apply those resources to increased

combat capability and readiness. There is precedent for this.

The military secretaries and the business staff functions of OSD probably should report to a second Deputy Secretary of Defense who would manage the business functions of the Department and oversee an accelerated business process re-engineering effort. This would allow the existing Deputy (who becomes the "Principal Deputy") to focus on the larger issues of operational and strategic importance and to step in for the Secretary of Defense when needed.

### **Barriers to Change**

We all know the barriers. Here they are in no particular order of importance:

- *Traditions.* These take on many forms: Among the strongest and the best in DOD are the service traditions that create esprit and that provide continuity from one generation to the next. These are the traditions that will motivate people to put their lives and the lives of their friends in harm's way. They must be respected and preserved.

But, as George Marshall said, "Sentiment must give way to common sense." The tradition that treats the military departments as full-fledged cabinet positions is more sentimental than fundamental.

- *Checks and balances.* Congress and the American people want checks and balances in any organization that involves the capability to organize and employ military force. We have a surfeit of checks and balances and can afford to lose a few. It makes no sense to me to continue arrangements that foster inefficiency and low morale.

- *The tyranny of the in-box.* The arrangements in the Pentagon headquarters today frustrate the competent, and allow the urgent to drive out the important. We must make

reform a prime DOD management topic. If the need is not now seen as a crisis situation, it soon will be. It makes a lot of sense to get the homework done now and to go about the process thoughtfully.

- *Lack of conviction and courage.* This, I believe, speaks for itself.

## MEETING THE NEEDS OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*John P. White*

The Goldwater-Nichols Act is a subject of deep importance to the Department of Defense. As someone who served in the Department of Defense in the late 1970s, and then returned to the Pentagon in the mid-1990s, I am struck by the difference made by the act.

From the day I walked back into the building, it was clear that Goldwater-Nichols had made tremendous changes in the way DOD operates as an institution. It was also clear that those changes were largely for the better—in fact, they've been almost all for the better. There's no question that because of Goldwater-Nichols we are stronger. We are better at joint operations. The chain of command is more clear. The roles of the commanders in chief (CINCs) and the services are clearly enunciated. The President and the Secretary of Defense are better served by having the Chairman as their principal military advisor. The quality of the Joint Staff is utterly remarkable. And there is close, effective cooperation between OSD and the Joint Staff.

We have made great strides from where we were in the 1970s, and Goldwater-Nichols is the principal reason. As a result, our military institution is stronger and more versatile, and our nation more secure.

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In between my tours at the Pentagon, I also had the opportunity to participate as a member of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Defense Organization Project, chaired by Phil Odeen. This project was a precursor to Goldwater-Nichols, and its charter was to propose “a pragmatic and politically feasible agenda for strengthening the organizations and procedures through which this nation establishes and executes its Defense policies.” I also studied Goldwater-Nichols from my perspective as Chairman of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM). Indeed, CORM’s central goal—improving DOD operational effectiveness—was the same as that of Goldwater-Nichols. CORM’s central conclusion was, “Today . . . the emphasis must be on molding DOD into a cohesive set of institutions that work toward a common purpose—effective unified military operations.” Everything else DOD does—from developing doctrine to acquiring new weapons—must support that effort. Goldwater-Nichols has taken us far down that road. But the CORM concluded that we needed to do even more in order for Goldwater-Nichols to reach its full potential. Nothing I have seen as Deputy Secretary so far has dissuaded me from this view—indeed, quite the opposite. Even with the implementation of the lion’s share of CORM recommendations, more needs to be done.

As a general matter, there is no question in my mind that the Department of Defense needs to continue to change. The world around us is changing at a frantic pace. Our forces and military operations have changed dramatically to respond to the evolving security environment—but they need to change even more. Consequently, the way we support the warfighter is also changing. And when you start talking about supporting the warfighter, what you are really talking about is the relative roles of the key elements of the departments. This is the core issue that Goldwater-Nichols addressed.

This discussion is called a “retrospective” on Goldwater-Nichols, but this paper is more of a “prospective.” I want to

focus not so much on where we have been as on where we need to go when it comes to supporting joint military operations, namely the unified, regional commands. I want us to look at all that we do through the prism of Goldwater-Nichols. How can we realize the full potential of the philosophy underlying Goldwater-Nichols?

To date, the change brought on by Goldwater-Nichols is most evident in the way we conduct military operations. By specifying that military operations would be primarily joint operations under the responsibility of the CINCs, the law fundamentally changed the way the department worked. It made the lines of command more clear, and the fighting force more effective. Today, Joint Operations, once considered a major challenge, are now the norm whenever our military is called upon to uphold and defend American interests, whether it is in Panama, the Arabian Gulf, Haiti, Rwanda, or Bosnia.

Our recent operation to evacuate noncombatants from Liberia is a prime example of jointness at work. We initially went in with Air Force planes carrying Army Special Operations Forces and Navy SEALs. We then had a Marine Expeditionary Force relieve the Special Operations Forces. You have to remember too, that this was a pick-up game—it was come-as-you-are; there was no time for a lot of advanced planning. And it was done without great fanfare or comment, as if to say, “Of course we did it that way—that’s what we do.” Ten years ago it would have been front-page news that we could organize and execute this type of operation, with the newspapers delighting in the intramural fighting among the services. Today, we just did it, and the only questions that came up in the planning were who is where, what their capabilities were, and whether we could use them.

Some critics have said that we have taken jointness too far in the way we conduct operations. For instance, in Liberia we didn’t really need to pull in elements from all those different services. I would say that is definitely *not* the case. In Liberia,

we changed the force mix to meet mission requirements, both there and elsewhere.

Bosnia is another good example of joint operations. Bosnia, on the ground, is an Army show, and there's no quarrel about that anywhere in the Pentagon. But the ground forces have active, critical support from Air Force and Marine air, plus the 6th Fleet—all that under the command of a Navy admiral.

As I was thinking about the illustrations for this talk, I was reflecting on the conversations that I have every morning with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. As we talk about all the various operations we do, never once have we talked about or has anyone raised the issue of what service gets to do what in order to somehow share the opportunities. We have done it all as best we could based on what we thought were the assets, the requirements, and the mission. Of course, that's the way it ought to be, and in fact I think it works.

The real genius of Goldwater-Nichols in terms of joint operations is that it forced us to start doing in the 1980s what the strategic environment of the 1990s and beyond absolutely demands. Today, the range of potential security crises we could face means that joint operations have to be the norm. Indeed, for almost any conflict we can imagine, the key to victory will be the synchronized application of military force from land, sea, and air, along with coalition forces. Thanks to Goldwater-Nichols, no one does this any better than the U.S. military. That given, we still need to do better.

The true vision of Goldwater-Nichols won't be fulfilled until we have effective cooperation not just in operations but in the way we prepare for and support those operations. This means extending the philosophy that underlies Goldwater-Nichols to the areas of doctrine and training, requirements and acquisition, logistics and support, as well as personnel management.

Let's look at doctrine and training. The good news is, there's a lot of progress to report here, but we still have a long

way to go. There's a lot of excellent work being done on Joint Doctrine by the Joint Warfighting Center and on joint tactics, techniques and procedures by the Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center (JTASC) in the Tidewater area. In terms of sheer volume, we have published close to 70 manuals on Joint Doctrine, with another 40 in the works.

And, of course, the crowning achievement to date in the development of Joint Doctrine is the Chairman's *Joint Vision 2010*. General Shalikashvili calls this a "conceptual template" for moving the entire Armed Forces into the 21st century "jointly." It's a remarkable achievement and a far cry from the past when each of the services relied almost exclusively on its own vision of the future to guide decisions about developing forces. These supporting visions of each of the services are invaluable, but they are not complete without a joint warfighting vision that ties them together and defines the total capability that is needed.

My concern about Joint Doctrine is that we have done the easy work, but the hard work is still ahead; some of this has to do with solving *today's* problems with *today's* known capabilities and technology. There are some real vexing problems here that just haven't been worked out from a doctrinal standpoint. The role of deep attack is a good example. We have yet to define mission responsibility clearly, and we have two issues that have come up recently because they now have greater importance than in the past—force protection and counterproliferation. In both cases, we are not doing enough, and in both cases, as we turn to implementation, we have to look to Goldwater-Nichols as a guide to how to allocate responsibility. We have to allocate and execute those responsibilities in this larger context to make sure we do force protection and counterproliferation correctly. We are in the process of doing that. We have not finished yet, by a long shot.

One issue that is even further out and harder to deal with is information operations. Information operations are very important, very complicated, and as we are defining it, a very

new set of responsibilities and capabilities. We need to understand the roles of the CINCs, the Joint Staff, and the services; we have not done that yet. That has to be done in terms of the larger argument about how we are going to play with respect to these kinds of operations. There is an added complexity here because there is a large intelligence community-added set of functions and responsibilities that we also have to include. So we have a lot to do, but we are on the right path.

Even if you accept the premise that we are doing a pretty good job at developing Joint Doctrine—and again, let me make clear that I think Joint Vision 2010 is an excellent start—you are still faced with the problem of making that doctrine work in practice. How do we turn something like *Joint Vision 2010* into reality?

For starters, we are improving joint training by increasing our use of simulation, and by increasing our proficiency as an integrated team, especially in the area of weapons system interoperability. We have also made real progress in training Joint Task Force Commanders. But it is less clear that the warfighting forces themselves have benefitted from the same level of dedicated, routine Joint training. Joint training means more than a set of theater exercises every year. It has to mean a new attitude that focuses on Joint operations from the earliest training events.

One of the recommendations of CORM was that “Joint training be fully funded in the DOD budget and that the CINCs be given more control over the portions of service component training budgets that are integral to Joint training.” We are now well on the way to making this a reality. The Joint Training System will help us identify the Joint training requirements and priorities of the CINCs. And we are committed to increasing funding for the Chairman’s exercise program up to \$533 million in 2003—over a 10 percent increase from present levels.

Beyond funding, we have a number of important activities underway to improve Joint training. Notable among these is the

work going on at U.S. Atlantic Command and its Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center. The command's role as the joint force provider is maturing, but needs to take on greater and greater training responsibilities. As evidence of the great start they've had, they have designed a three-tier system involving training for tactical operations conducted by the services, joint field exercises involving troops from more than one service, and exercises designed to train joint commanders and their staffs. Moreover, this command has been instrumental in developing something called the Universal Joint Task List. What this does is set out all the tasks our military has to perform to carry out their missions. It's now accepted throughout the force as the means for determining who needs to train for what so the force will be ready for joint operations across the full range of missions.

In addition, the joint community, led by the Joint Warfighting Center and U.S. Atlantic Command with collaboration from the services, is developing a new set of tools to assist in the training of our Joint wafighters. Chief among these is the Joint Simulation System scheduled to come on line at the turn of the century. This system will allow us to conduct wargames in a common virtual environment for our CINCs, services, war colleges, and eventually our allies that is grounded in common principles of joint warfare. And it will operate through our real-world command and control system so we conduct joint training as a routine, without having to move troops and commanders from their home bases to a central location. We're also moving forward with a new system of special criteria to measure the state of joint readiness. U.S. Atlantic Command has pioneered with a prototype of this system that we are planning to enhance so we can have a better, quicker picture of our readiness to carry out joint operations, and to spot and correct problems in Joint readiness before they happen.

Another key step to turning joint vision into joint reality is improving the way we develop requirements and acquire

systems. Here again, we have made a lot of progress, but we cannot let up. Over the past few years, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has been given a much stronger role. This has been enormously beneficial in helping develop a truly Joint perspective on requirements and resources because it brings the services together under the leadership of the Vice-Chairman and makes them actually debate these issues and forge a consensus. JROC has evolved a lot, and I think all the participants are much more comfortable with the whole process. The services are still the primary source of new “mission needs statements,” and this is as it should be, but JROC reviews these requirements in a joint context with the warfighting needs of the CINCs as paramount. And thanks to two dynamic Vice Chiefs of Staff—Admiral Bill Owens, the former one, and General Joe Ralston, the current chief—the JROC is doing a superb job.

In the old days, there really wasn't a method for getting input of the CINCs on requirements and resource issues. Today, their views are heard in lots of ways. The CINCs have a major input to the Chairman's Program Recommendations (CPR) document that drives the defense planning guidance. Through the JROC, they are fully engaged during all phases of the program objective memorandum and budget process. Finally, they have an input to the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) that is the Chairman's fiscal input to the Secretary of Defense. I can tell you that the Secretary and I are heavily influenced by both the CPR and the CPA. There are also the annual Integrated Priority Lists, and, thanks to Goldwater-Nichols, CINCs also have direct communication with the Secretary. And, finally, they participate in the large number of Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment studies conducted under the auspices of the JROC.

These changes mean we now have better input from the CINCs into the requirements and resource allocation process. They also mean a stronger role for the Chairman, since he is responsible for coordinating their views and the views of the services; while the roles of the services remain central, as they

should. This has resulted in better support for joint warfighting needs. The success of these efforts can be seen in a series of program adjustments recommended in the past year, such as focusing and limiting unmanned aerial vehicle programs, and retiring the EF-111 while making necessary adjustments in the EA-6B fleet, and most importantly, the recent Joint Strike Fighter announcement.

The spirit of cooperation engendered by Goldwater-Nichols has made acquisition reform a real option. We still have a long way to go, but all the goals of acquisition reform are now achievable. Full implementation is one of our most important challenges, and it is inherently a joint challenge. The Secretary and I were talking about this the other day, when he said, "You know, this is the third time I've tried this. . . . It's the first time it's really worked, and in fact it's worked better than I thought it would three years ago when I began pushing it." That's because we have a spirit of cooperation in the department that we did not have before, where people recognize the requirement to make these kinds of reforms that are laid out in acquisition reform. What the department needs to do now is build on and expand cooperative joint acquisition programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter; ballistic missile defense; and the various guided weapon and missile programs being developed jointly such as the Joint Standoff Weapon and the Joint Direct Attack Munition.

Logistics support and general support are key areas where we can do better. We must make joint logistics capability a more integral part of our mission planning. Our goal should be to get the most combat power to the CINCs as rapidly as possible. Unfortunately, it is clear that our present lack of a joint logistics capability results in a lot of inefficiencies. In summer 1996 the Defense Science Board compared DOD logistics support with the commercial sector and found it wanting in almost all cases. For example, distribution of in-stock items took nearly a month for DOD—most commercial companies do it in 1 to 3 days. The Board did not address the question of joint logistics capability

head-on, but its observations and recommendations are relevant as we consider ways of improving our logistics and support system.

Our goal is to achieve a truly joint logistics system. To achieve this goal, we formed a Joint Staff working group to study ways of integrating the logistics systems of all the services. And we are looking at ways to use the tools of the information revolution to speed integration. For example, we are currently developing a Global Command Support System that will become part of the Global Command and Control System. This will produce a “super system” that will eventually permit users to get instantaneous logistical information—everything from spare parts to personnel—from any place on the globe.

In the area of general support, we are committed to revolutionizing how we do business by incorporating modern business practices and the latest information technology. I think of this revolution in military support as a complement to the revolution in military affairs. This revolution is every bit as important and involves enhancing the services’ core capabilities, expanding joint support and the in-theater role of the CINCs, and relying more heavily on the private sector, through outsourcing and other forms of cooperation. We have a great deal at stake, most importantly improving support for operations, but also saving billions of dollars that can be better used for force modernization.

Finally, turning joint vision into joint reality means assessing our personnel management practices. One of the most important contributions of Goldwater-Nichols was to require joint assignments and inaugurate the concept of the Joint Specialty Officer. Overnight, this enhanced the career value of joint assignments. As a result, the quality of officers assigned to joint entities improved dramatically. Today, as a general matter, the best officers don’t avoid joint tours—they fight for them. I see evidence of this every day as I interact with officers on the Joint

Staff and in OSD. The quality is far higher than it was back in the 1970s.

But I am skeptical that we are living up to the spirit of the law. Overall, we have had problems promoting Joint Specialty Officers and other officers in joint assignments at the rate required by Goldwater-Nichols. For FY95, the numbers are particularly good if you look in the lower ranks, say lieutenant colonel/commander and below, but those numbers are not as encouraging when you start getting up to colonel/captain and flag officer ranks. That has to change to ensure that officers being selected for flag rank have had a joint tour. And there are historical anomalies and inconsistencies in the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). Recognizing these problems, Secretary Perry recently approved the JDAL Validation Board, which will conduct a systematic review of the entire list to ensure that these joint billets truly comply with the intent of law and policy.

As joint and combined operations continue to dominate our work, it is imperative that our top leaders fully understand and are experienced in joint matters—even when they are wearing their service hats. But of course, there is a need for balance. In light of all of the changes in our overall needs now and in the future, it is time to reassess our career management goals. Do we have the proper mix of service and joint experiences from our officers? Are we developing future officers who will stress the innovation, flexibility, cooperation, and commitment that will be necessary for victory in combat in the next century?

As we talk about striving to fulfill the potential of Goldwater-Nichols in these areas—operations, doctrine and training, requirements and acquisition, logistics and support, and personnel management—it quickly becomes apparent that we are fundamentally changing the entire institution. That is what has been going on for the last 10 years, and it must continue.

One last area that should not avoid our scrutiny is OSD. OSD is by no means immune from the need for change. In fact, even apart from the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), we

are already doing a major reassessment of the size and scope of OSD responsibilities and considering whether some of its functions should be devolved back to the services. My belief is that the sole function of OSD should be to serve the Secretary with the policy advice and information he needs to make decisions. It should not be an OSD role to manage large, sustaining programs; it should help guide the changes that must be made, not manage them.

Change we must, change we will, but what exactly are the correct changes? That is the question facing the QDR. The QDR is nothing less than a total reassessment of America's defense strategy, force structure, military modernization programs, and Defense infrastructure and provides a blueprint for America's security strategy well into the next century. To be an effective blueprint, it is vitally important that the QDR be a fundamental taking stock, examining every aspect of our defense program: what we do, why we do it, how we do it, and how we pay for it. The QDR cannot just go through the motions; the goal is not to rationalize and protect what we have now, but to visualize and pursue what we will need for tomorrow. The point is, only if we are willing to consider major, fundamental change, can we transform DOD into a leaner, more responsive, more flexible organization that can meet the needs of our military forces into the 21st century. This means we have to be willing to question fundamentals on everything from strategy to acquisition to the relative roles of the CINCs and the services. This is the context in which we should consider and think about the kinds of changes I have mentioned here today to improve jointness and fulfill the potential of Goldwater-Nichols.

In summary, the changes obtained in joint operations, while still in need of improvement, must be reflected in all the other functions we perform in support of such operations:

- Improved Joint Doctrine and more effective joint training/joint readiness measures

- Better joint requirements definition, full implementation of acquisition reform, and expanded joint programs
- A revolution in logistics and support practices by developing joint logistics and implementing a revolution in business affairs
- A reassessment of officer management policies.

Is Goldwater-Nichols a success? So far so good, but we must continue to build on the momentum of the previous 10 years.

# GOLDWATER-NICHOLS TEN YEARS FROM NOW

*John M. Shalikashvili*

I am delighted to share with you my views on how well we have done in fulfilling the promise of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and perhaps to suggest what further reforms we might consider, as we look ahead to the 20th anniversary of the act.

It is said that we see what lies ahead by first understanding the past. So I will first try to give you my perspective on our progress in implementing Goldwater-Nichols by looking at some of the key areas in the legislation to see how we have measured up to the intent of the act. Let's begin in 1986. It was the peak year of defense spending in the Cold War era. We were moving smoothly toward our active component goals of 18 divisions in the Army, 600 ships in the Navy, 26 tactical fighter wings in the Air Force, 3 divisions in the Marine Corps, and strong Reserve Component forces as well.

The threat of the Soviet Union was very real and unambiguous. We faced the Soviets around the world with a global strategy of containment and deterrence. It was in every sense a bipolar world.

In 1986, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster occurred, foreshadowing the implosion of the Soviet Union. President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev met in Reykjavik, and the debate over the Strategic Defense Initiative was at its peak.

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Caspar Weinberger was Secretary of Defense and Admiral Bill Crowe was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The position of the Vice Chairman didn't exist at all, and John Shalikashvili was a "baby brigadier" in the 1st Armored Division in Europe, deeply involved in a Cold War that seemed as though it would go on forever.

Two recent military operations, although ultimately successful, had been accomplished in ways that suggested the need for better defense organization. They were the Libyan air strikes, Operation *Eldorado Canyon*, and the rescue of American medical students from the island of Grenada, Operation *Urgent Fury*. In both cases, there was a clear need for improvement in the integration and organization of our Armed Forces, a persistent theme of military reformers going all the way back to 1947.

The need for those improvements inspired the legislation that is now 10 years old; Goldwater-Nichols was, as it turns out, a truly visionary piece of work. I would like to give you a Chairman's report card on how well I think we've done so far in implementing this act. But before I give out my grades, let me first give out some "extra credit." Collectively, we must give credit to the role played by the services in making Goldwater-Nichols successful. Although there was some initial resistance, as there was across much of the defense establishment, I am very pleased with the role ultimately played by the services in making the cultural changes necessary to successfully move our Armed Forces to a new level of jointness. How well did we do in implementing the act?

- The first objective was "to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department." Generally, the provisions of the act in this regard have been implemented quite well, particularly through the Secretary's Defense Planning Guidance and his Contingency Planning Guidance. As we continue to work at smoothing the

integration of these documents into the broader budget and strategic planning cycles, there is much room for better coordination and direction. So, on balance, I would grade this area a high "B."

- Our second objective was "to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." I think this part of the act is an important success story. Through the increased responsibilities and authority given to the Chairman and the assignment of the Joint Staff to his direct support, we have broken free from the "lowest common denominator" recommendation that so often plagued us in the past. We have been able to provide far better, more focused advice. I would grade this portion of the act a solid "A."

- The third and fourth objectives are interrelated and I will grade them together. These two objectives enhanced the authority of our unified commanders over their forces and clarified their responsibilities, making them fully responsible for accomplishing the missions of their commands. The best proof of their success is where it matters most: in warfighting. General Powell said recently that "the invasion and liberation of Panama in December 1989 was the first full test of Goldwater-Nichols in a combat situation. It was something of a shakedown cruise for what we would be doing in *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* a year later." And since *Desert Storm*, in many different joint and combined operations, we have proven, again and again, the validity of these reforms. And the portions of the act involving the CINCs have been a key reason for these successes. In addition to operational improvements, the CINCs today have a far more influential voice in the resource and procurement process and in the execution of Joint training, both key goals of Goldwater-Nichols. Overall, this act, by providing both the responsibility and the authority needed by the CINCs, has made the Combatant Commanders vastly more capable

of fulfilling their warfighting role. It is a success story by any measure, rating a solid "A."

- The fifth objective was "to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and contingency planning." We've improved a great deal here. Our national security and national military strategies are both very good but not perfect. We are also closing in on the full integration of our CINC plans at the highest level. As a matter of fact, I believe that our major war plans, today, are the best I have seen in all the years that I've been reviewing such documents. On balance, I would assign a very high "B," because we still have some room for further improvement.

- A sixth objective was "to provide for more efficient use of defense resources." Overall, I think we've done fairly well here. A key part of our success in this area was in creating the position of Vice Chairman. The four great men who've served as "the Vice"—Bob Herres, Dave Jeremiah, Bill Owens, and now Joe Ralston—have enabled us to pay far greater attention to requirements to integrate them better and to influence programmatic issues at the highest levels of the Department of Defense. Under the leadership of our Vice Chairmen, the JROC has progressed from an acorn to a pretty good-sized oak tree. The Joint perspective gained through the maturation of the JROC process and its allied Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments has made a key difference. In a real sense, the JROC has become the collective voice of the warfighting CINCs in the programmatic world. The JROC input into the budgeting process, the Chairman's Program Assessment, and the Chairman's Program Recommendations have also had great impact. As Bill Owens and Jim Blaker noted, "The JROC represents the first major revision of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System since Secretary Robert McNamara put it in place more than three decades ago." I fully agree with that and applaud Bill Owens's pioneering

work in this area. In the end, I would assign a high “B” in this area, because I’m convinced that we can and will make further progress along the lines envisioned by Bill Owens and Joe Ralston.

- The seventh objective was “to improve Joint Officer management policies.” While we can celebrate some notable successes in this area, we must also register the need for still more improvements. For example, we’ve made terrific progress, particularly in the quality of officers assigned to joint staffs worldwide. There is absolutely no comparison with the way it was before Goldwater-Nichols, or even just a few years ago. All you have to do is spend a little time with the action officers on the Joint Staff to understand why so many consider it the premier military staff. On the other hand, when you look at the difficulties we are continuing to experience in getting our promotion statistics right and look at how many waivers are still required for many aspects of Joint Officer management, you realize that we still have a ways to go. On balance, we are between a B and a C in this area, and we must work harder.

- Our eighth and final objective was “to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.” This was a very broad goal, one that captures what might be termed the “cultural” elements of jointness: education, doctrine, training, and readiness assessment. I will grade each of these separately.

-Joint education, again stimulated by Goldwater-Nichols and the subsequent work done by Congressman Ike Skelton and his colleagues, is a major success story. We now have a Joint Professional Military Education structure, which provides for joint education throughout an officer’s career. Our pre-commissioning program currently providing a greater focus on jointness, which is an intermediate and senior service and joint school.

already passed a rigorous joint accreditation process. I have stressed that teaching joint skills and teamwork must not crowd out the first importance of Service core competencies. Rather, joint skills and teamwork must be built upon service core competencies, as we equip our future leaders for the challenges of Joint and Combined operations that have become our way of life. We are well on our way to accomplishing this objective, and I would give us a solid “B” in joint education.

-Joint Doctrine has emerged as a central organizing force in our military operations. The services, the CINCs, the defense agencies, and the Joint Staff have teamed with our Joint Warfighting Center to create a body of authoritative Joint Doctrine—our “play book”—which allows joint forces to operate together in a predictable and concerted fashion. Today, the bulk of our Joint Doctrine is now in place. And we now have an effective system to achieve closure on remaining doctrinal issues and to update our doctrine as required. The effectiveness and practical value of this Joint Doctrine have been demonstrated numerous times in Joint and Combined operations around the globe. Our Joint Doctrine is a vibrant and growing body of knowledge, a very successful aspect of Goldwater-Nichols. I give us an “A” in this area.

-Next is joint training. Our Joint Staff, assisted by the Joint Warfighting Center, has developed a comprehensive Joint Training System the CINCs and services are using to achieve better focus and balance in our worldwide joint training program. This requirements-based Joint Training System focuses scarce resources on our most important Joint Mission Essential Tasks, allowing us to be good stewards and good trainers at the same time. Additionally, the pioneering work of U.S. Atlantic Command as a Joint Force Trainer and Integrator has

been critical to the development of our superb Joint warfighting capabilities. As an aside, let me add that that command's Joint Task Force Training equals the best of our Service training opportunities. Overall, I am very pleased with our progress in joint training, and I know this progress will continue, especially with further advances in the use of innovative training technologies. This is certainly a high "B."

-In the area of Joint Readiness Assessment, we have improved a great deal, particularly in our ability to correctly evaluate the ability of the CINCs to execute their missions. We still have a way to go in this area particularly in refining our ability to use readiness data to predict future trends. But I'm confident we'll continue to improve. I think we rate a "B" in Joint Readiness Assessment overall.

So with 4 A's, 6 B's, and only one C, what's ahead for us? As we project ourselves out to the 20th anniversary of Goldwater-Nichols, what must we do to continue to improve our organization for national security? Frankly, the odds are good that 10 years from now, I will be running a hardware store somewhere. But with some luck, and the help of my nurse, and an invitation from NDU, I may be able to attend a future celebration like this one. But a decade from now, what will we be celebrating?

I hope that, first and foremost, we will be celebrating the full and complete implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, with a Chairman's report card that reflects straight A's across the board. I have no doubt that this is doable. However, I would like to focus more specifically on three key ideas that may find some resonance with all of you. I hope the first thing that we might celebrate will be progress toward the achievement of the core capabilities and interoperability needed by all of the services and Unified Commands, that will enable our Armed Forces to be

dominant across the spectrum of conflict in the year 2010 and beyond. Up to a short time ago, the services each had a different vision for the future. But today, because of the influence of Goldwater-Nichols and the CORM, we have a common vision, *Joint Vision 2010*, that lays out a common direction for all of the Armed Forces. *Joint Vision 2010* is the beginning of a process. It is the alpha, not the omega. It will certainly change over time, but I think, 10 years from now, we shall celebrate the success of that vision.

Already we see concerted efforts by the services to align their respective visions with *Joint Vision 2010*. We also see the positive involvement by the CINCs, as we wrestle with the implementation challenges ahead. I know *Joint Vision 2010* will continue to evolve and develop. In fact, we will soon publish an ambitious implementation plan.

*Joint Vision 2010* is our bridge to the next level of jointness, a conceptual template for the conduct of future Joint operations, and the link between Goldwater-Nichols and the 21st century military.

The second broad area of future effort I hope we will be celebrating 10 years from now is further improvement in how we organize and staff the senior staffs in the Department of Defense. One key issue here is the appropriate role for the OSD staff. There are those who suggest OSD should focus strictly on policy, remaining "a level above" any operational concerns. Others see operations and certain management functions as clearly within the purview of OSD.

I don't think it is a question of "either/or." We need to look at this complex issue, building on the suggestions of John White's CORM, and find in every issue area the appropriate level of involvement for OSD in operations and management, balancing that with their role in the development of overarching policy.

Another area needing attention is how best to create efficiencies between the service staffs and the Military Secretariat

staffs. As the CORM Report points out, there are areas of existing duplication, opportunities for consolidation of several staff functions, and the chance to improve the service headquarters management processes.

A staff-related idea, and one frequently discussed, involves the size of the defense bureaucracy. While I agree with the general proposition that the defense headquarters bureaucracy is too large, I think we need to be clear about something very fundamental: There is no free lunch! If we significantly shrink staff sizes, we simply won't be able to do all that we are required to do today. Only by shedding functions will we be able to make our defense bureaucracy significantly smaller. But, again, efforts to shrink the bureaucracy are certainly worth pursuing.

I hope that in 10 years we will be able to celebrate the harvest of these efficiencies in these organizational areas, building on the fine and continuing work by John White, Sam Nunn, and other influential and energetic advocates of continuing defense reform.

The third and, in my view, most important area for improvement I hope we can celebrate 10 years from now is the emergence of a broad reform movement focused on our national security structure and the entire Interagency process. I believe that is the next logical step.

Secretary Perry often pointed out the major challenges our 21st century CINCs will face in the emerging global environment. He has also recently developed a new concept to describe our efforts to shape the security environment. He calls it "Preventive Defense." His belief is that the positive engagement of our forces in this dangerous and volatile world will create the conditions that support peace, make war less likely, and make deterrence less necessary. This concept of "Preventive Defense" will be in effect our first line of defense. I agree completely. We have the ability and the obligation to help shape the future global security environment. But my belief

is that all of our national security assets—economic, political, cultural, and not just military—are important in this process.

Preventive Defense is very complex. It requires new levels of cooperation between those of us in the Department of Defense and the rest of the Interagency Community. A strong, well-understood link among the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Commerce, and the entire interagency community will be vital.

Look at many of the most recent challenges to U.S. national interests around the world: Rwanda and Zaire, Bosnia, Haiti, the Arabian Gulf. In every one of these operations, success required the involvement of a wide variety of interagency participants.

The good news is that, in all these operations, there have been fine examples of interagency cooperation. Certainly, the best recent example of this process of leveraging military force in support of diplomacy was our success in the Dayton Accords. For the first time, those who would be charged with the implementation of the military aspects of the agreement were there, not just as advisors but as actual negotiators. Likewise, we had great success in Haiti, where coordination between diplomacy and the threat of the use of military force proved so effective that it negated the need to storm the beaches.

But despite these successes, there is clearly considerable room for improvement. Problems in the interagency arena today remind me very much of the relationship among the services in 1986. We need an agreed-on, written-down, well-exercised organization and set of procedures to bring the full capability of the Department of Defense and all of the other relevant government departments and agencies to bear on the complex crises to which future presidents might commit us. Haiti and Bosnia are, on the one level, examples of progress made, but they are even better examples of how much further we can get, if we set our minds to it.

The key will be making sure that the military, which has vast resources for undertaking many of the tasks associated with these international crises, is an integrated part of a larger comprehensive national plan, and not in itself the main plan, or even worse, the only developed and exercised plan.

Over the next decade, there is no major peer competitor threatening the national survival of the United States. World War III is not looming before us, and the Cold War is finally over. We have an opportunity, a rare and precious opportunity, to shape the global environment. As President Roosevelt said: "We seek not only an end to war, but an end to the beginning of wars." That's even more true today.

If we can take the ideas and spirit of Goldwater-Nichols, a desire to reorganize and restructure in the name of efficiency and national security, and apply them to the entire interagency arena, we will make great gains in our nation's power. Then, at the 20th anniversary of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, we will be able to say, not only that ours is the best organized, most ready, and most effective military in the world, but also that ours is the most effective national security structure.

This symposium is a celebration of a great success. And I'd like to close by saying "thank you" to the visionaries who gave us the Goldwater-Nichols Act. I offer all of them our collective thanks for a job exceedingly well done. Without a doubt, Goldwater-Nichols has helped make ours the very best military in the world, bar none. And that truly is cause to celebrate.

## ABOUT THE EDITOR

Colonel Dennis J. Quinn, USA (Ret.), served primarily as a Military Intelligence Officer and Russian Area Officer. Overseas assignments included two tours of duty in Vietnam and three in Europe. Stateside assignments included positions as Current Intelligence Analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency; Intelligence Officer on the Army Staff, the Pentagon; Chief of Intelligence Production for the Army Intelligence Agency; Chief of the Strategy Department at the Army Command and General Staff College; and Senior Military Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

Colonel Quinn was awarded a B.A. degree in political science from Providence College, Rhode Island, and an M.A. degree in Slavic studies from the University of Kansas at Lawrence.

*This volume captures the perspectives of a group of defense officials and military professionals, each of whom was closely associated with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 as framer, implementer, or expert observer of this landmark piece of legislation:*

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Reform: The Beginnings

**JAMES R. LOCHER III**

Building on the Goldwater-Nichols Act

**LEIGHTON W. SMITH, JR.**

A Commander's Perspective

**WILLIAM K. BREHM**

On Revolutions, Barriers, and Common Sense

**JOHN P. WHITE**

Meeting the Needs of the Secretary of Defense

**JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI**

Goldwater-Nichols Ten Years from Now



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