U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE PALESTINIANS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

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OF THE

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE PALESTINIANS, PART I

THURSDAY, JULY 26, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. GILMAN. The Subcommittee will come to order.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. This morning we will be hearing testimony from our new Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Ambassador William Burns, on U.S. policy toward the Palestinians and the continuing violence between the Palestinians and Israel.

The American stake in the region, and in the peace process, is enormous. Most recently, today's witness was the Ambassador to Jordan, and prior to that, he was the senior advisor to the President on the Middle East. Since taking up his position a few weeks ago, Assistant Secretary Burns has spent most of his time traveling in the region, attempting to reach agreement to try to implement a cease fire. We thank him for his tireless efforts and we welcome him before our Subcommittee this morning.

Regrettably, one of the parties to this conflict, namely, the Palestinians under Chairman Arafat, appear to have reverted to using violence as a way of advancing their positions, this despite the fact that Mr. Arafat sold himself as a statesman when he pledged to the late Prime Minister Rabin in September 1993 never again to use violence as a negotiating tactic.

The United States was a witness to these agreements and, in reliance on them, has accepted the PLO and the Palestinian Authority as negotiating partners. The questions now before us are: can we or anyone else negotiate with the Palestinian institutions? Are their commitments credible? Are they worth relying upon?

During President Clinton's term, Mr. Arafat was received at the White House more often than any other foreign leader. Yet, at the very end of President Clinton's term, Chairman Arafat could not bring himself to accept what, by all accounts, was an extremely generous offer at the Camp David summit of July of 2000.

Almost immediately thereafter, he allowed Palestinian violence to spin out of control as a means of trying to force Israel to give him a better deal than they would have obtained through negotiations.

It is unclear whether the Palestinian uprising was planned in advance. Many believe it was. Some knowledgeable observers say that the Palestinians are turning their dispute with Israel into an existential and religious conflict between the Jews and Muslims. Endless incitement against Israel emanates from official Palestinian sources.

When speaking to his constituents, Chairman Arafat routinely accuses Israel of using "uranium-tipped bullets." His wife, with then-First Lady Hillary Clinton looking on, falsely accused Israel of using poison gas against the Palestinians. The Arab countries right now are attempting to make an upcoming U.N. Conference on Racism, which will be held in Durban, South Africa, into a forum for denouncing Israel.

Eighteen Americans have been killed in Palestinian violence since the Oslo Accords. Six of these casualties have occurred since September 2000, when the latest uprising began.

We are also concerned that the territories of some of the neighboring Arab countries are apparently serving as transshipment points for mortars and other arms, financed by, among others, the state of Iran. They are being used to shell Israeli neighborhoods.

What we would like to accomplish at this morning's hearing is to learn just how the Administration now views its relationship with the Palestinians in the wake of Arafat's abrogation of his commitment and how it plans to rebuild the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. We anticipate that these questions will also be the subject of further hearings.

I now call on my colleague, our Ranking Member, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

This morning we will hear testimony from the new Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, William Burns, on U.S. policy toward the Palestinians and the continuing violence between the Palestinians and Israel. The American stake in the region, and in the peace process, is enormous.

Since taking up his position about five weeks ago, Assistant Secretary Burns has spent most of his time traveling in the region, attempting to reach agreement on and implement a ceasefire. We thank him for his tireless efforts and welcome him before the Subcommittee this morning.

Regrettably, one of the parties to this conflict, namely the Palestinians under Chairman Yasir Arafat, appear to have reverted to using violence as a way of advancing his position. This despite the fact that Arafat sold himself as a statesman when he pledged to the late Prime Minister Rabin in September 1993 never again to use violence as a negotiating tactic. The United States was a witness to these agreements and, in reliance on them, has accepted the PLO and the Palestinian Authority as negotiating partners. The questions now are: can we or anyone else negotiate with the Palestinian institutions? Are their commitments worth relying on?

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Some knowledgeable observers say that the Palestinians are turning their dispute with Israel into an existential and religious conflict between Jews and Muslims. Endless incitement against Israel emanates from official Palestinian sources. When

speaking to his constituents, Chairman Arafat routinely accuses Israel of using "uranium-tipped bullets." His wife, with then First Lady Hillary Clinton looking on, falsely accused Israel of using poison gas against the Palestinians. The Arab countries are right now attempting to make an upcoming U.N. Conference on Racism in Durban, South Africa into a forum for denouncing Israel.

Eighteen Americans have been killed or injured in Palestinian violence since the Oslo Accords, and six of these casualties have occurred since September 2000, when this latest uprising began.

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What we would like to accomplish at this morning's hearing is to learn how the Administration now sees its relationship with the Palestinians in the wake of Arafat's abrogation of his commitment to us, and how it plans to rebuild the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. We anticipate that these questions will also be the subject of further hearings.

I now call on my colleague, Mr. Ackerman, the ranking Member of the subcommittee.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you especially for scheduling today's hearing to examine the U.S. relationship with the Palestinians.

I, too, want to welcome Assistant Secretary Burns for the Subcommittee for what I hope will be regular visits, although he may want to reconsider that after today's session.

At the outset of the hearing, I think it is important to note the historic basis for congressional support of U.S. sponsorship of the Middle East peace process has been the explicit renunciation, both in word and deed, by the Palestinians, of all forms of violence to achieve their national aspirations, in return for which we have accepted the Palestinian Authority as a diplomatic partner for peace.

But events since last September have called into serious question whether we can assume any longer that we even have such a partner. The depth of that skepticism is evident in the action of the House on Tuesday, adopting language which I offered, together with Chairman Gilman and Mr. Lantos, that requires the President to report on Palestinian compliance with their commitments to non-violence and authorizes the President to sanction the Palestinians if he finds that they are violating their commitments.

For our part, we have learned that continued caution on the part of the United States government in condemning and sanctioning the Palestinian Authority for its brazen disregard of its principal obligation amounts to encouraging intransigence, if not the outright resort to violence.

Events over the last several months have led people to talk about a cycle of violence. Let me be clear about this. There is not a cycle of violence. There is a Palestinian violence and there is an Israeli response. If there were no Palestinian attacks, there would be no violence at all. Building apartments is not morally equivalent to blowing up teenagers at a discotheque.

The problem, it seems to me, is that Chairman Arafat learned the wrong lesson from last year's negotiations, that violence yields concessions. This is a lesson we must help him to unlearn. Yet President Bush and Secretary Powell have spoken of achieving a realistic level of violence, implicitly suggesting that our nation could accept some level other than zero.

Maybe it is not possible for Chairman Arafat to control every group of Palestinians, but, at this point, he does not even seem to

be trying to control any of them. Fatah and Force 17 are his organizations, yet they participate in attacks on Israelis. For his lack of effort, he gets the G–8, including the U.S., to announce their support for some kind of monitors. This is not the message that we should be sending.

The United States, as the invited patron of the peace process, has every right to expect Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority not only to call publicly and unequivocally for an immediate cessation of all attacks on Israel, its population, and its armed forces, but to then take all necessary steps to implement that pledge.

Our nation should insist publicly that the security forces under Chairman Arafat's control resume security cooperation with Israel, rearrest security detainees released in October of 2000, and take unmistakable steps to eradicate the local infrastructure of terrorist groups like Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hizbullah.

Until the Palestinian Authority demonstrates a genuine commitment to peace with Israel, the United States must demonstrate that there is a heavy price to pay for the Palestinian decision to resort to violence in order to win their aims.

I think you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from Secretary Burns.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ackerman.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Pitts?

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for your leadership in convening yet another important hearing this morning on United States policy toward the Palestinians.

Someone once said,

> "If you never visit Israel, you could write volumes about what is going on. If you visit a week, you could write a book. If you visit a month, an article. And if you spend a year there, you can't write anything because you do not know what to think."

This statement speaks to the great complexity of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the peace process, and I do not think there are any easy answers or solutions, but that does not mean that we should throw up our hands in hopeless frustration, nor should the Israelis or Palestinians.

The United States does have an extremely important role to play in bringing the two sides together and encouraging a dialogue that can lead to peace and stability in the region. We have been blessed with peace and prosperity throughout much of our history, and we have much to offer in the peace process, but we must be wise in our efforts and steadfast in our resolve for a lasting peace.

Let me be clear. Israel is our close ally and I believe we must help support her against those who seek to destroy her. But as the United States continues its involvement in the peace process, we must keep in mind that we are dealing with more than just political leaders from Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

We are dealing with families, innocent civilians, and children who want nothing more than to live in peace. I cannot imagine having to live each and every day under the threat of being a victim of an Islamic fundamentalist suicide bomber. Almost every day,

we pick up a paper and find another tragic killing of a terrorist in that region.

It becomes easy for us in the United States to point the finger at all the Palestinians, but is that right?

Like most Israelis, I think the vast majority of Palestinians simply want to live in peace. They want to be free to work and provide food and a good life for their families, too. Unfortunately, they are trapped between a tyrant in Yasir Arafat and hopelessness that leads them to believe that they will never prosper and live in peace.

This trapping has provided an opening to Islamic extremists, many of whom are from outside of Palestine, who are effectively teaching Palestinians, especially children, that violence is the only way to get the attention of the international community.

Palestinian children are learning math by counting figures of tanks and murdered Israelis. They are taught to hate Israelis and to kill them. They are taught that the greatest thing you can do for Allah is to sacrifice yourself in the murder of infidels, which I do not believe is a true teaching of Islam.

As many of you know, recently, two young boys, one of whom was a 14-year-old American citizen named Kobi Mandel, were brutally murdered in a terrorist attack earlier this year. Were they a threat? No. They were Israelis.

The Palestinians are being brainwashed and manipulated for the political gain of a few mad men and the longer this goes on, the harder it will be to turn around. We must teach ourselves to separate Islamic fundamentalists from the vast majority of Palestinian families. However hard it is, we must try to understand the world that most Palestinians see, and this is not easy to do, but the alternative, seeing them all as terrorists and rebels, is wrong and inaccurate and unjust.

As I mentioned before, Israel is a close ally to the United States, but this does not give Israel a blank check. I am deeply concerned about some human rights reports detailing excessive use of force against Palestinian civilians and the demolition of Palestinian homes and excessive rhetoric that leads to hostility. The United States stands as a beacon of justice for all people, including people in the Arab world.

The depth and breadth of this conflict cannot be underestimated. Our government desires to serve as a facilitator to help bring an end to the violence and the conflict, but, in the midst of that, we must stand for the basic rights of all people, both Jewish and Palestinian.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of Secretary Burns. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Pitts.

I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding these hearings.

Secretary Burns, thanks for being here.

It is a great tragedy in the Middle East, a greater tragedy because we came so close or at least it looked like we were coming close.

Had Chairman Arafat accepted the Camp David offer, a more generous offer than will ever be put on the table again by Israel, he would probably now be head of a Palestinian state with a progressing economy, technology—technology not only from Israel, but Europe and the United States—and substantial Islamic and western aid. It is not paradise, but it was good and it was that close. But instead of accepting that offer or even making a counteroffer, Chairman Arafat returned and started an Intifadah.

I want to say that violence of any kind as a way to achieve political objectives is unacceptable, but what is worse is that, when we view the violence of war, we usually see adults in uniforms killing other adults in uniform, and that is terrible, but it is far less terrible than what we see in the Middle East. We see terrorism where the object is to kill as many women and children of Israel as possible.

Now, Chairman Arafat, on the one hand, says he regrets these deliberate attacks on Israeli civilians, but look what happen to the individuals who perpetrate these attacks. They are praised as martyrs and their families are given pensions. That does not sound like a regretted activity. That sounds, instead, like activity sanctioned, approved, praised, and paid for by the Palestinian Authority.

But perhaps just as bad as terrorists killing children is when the Palestinian extremists send their own children, or at least the leadership urges these children, kids of 11 and 12 years, old to charge into barbed wire, almost hoping, I think actually hoping, for a tragic outcome, so long as that outcome occurs in front of CNN cameras.

Several decades ago, we had characterized Chairman Arafat's group as a terrorist organization. Today, or more recently at least, we viewed them as partners for peace, and I am not sure that if we do not see a change in the pronouncements, policies, and actions of the Palestinian Authority, that we might not have to return to the former designation. At very least, we would have to evaluate whether we as a Congress should provide any aid at all to any entity that operates under the jurisdiction or control of the Palestinian Authority.

Now, I want to generally associate myself with all the former opening statements. I do have one slight disagreement with my colleague from New York, Mr. Ackerman, who puts forward the theory that perhaps Arafat does not control what is going on. That is one way to look at it. I do not know if this is a real disagreement, but I think another way to look at is that it may be that Mr. Arafat's failure is not his ability to control, but that perhaps he does actually control what is going on and that he has ordered and sanctioned the terrorism that now grips the Middle East.

As I say, I do not think that is a real disagreement with my colleague from New York, and I yield back the balance of the time.

Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for his statement.

I recognize the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Berkley.

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing.

I am looking forward to hearing your testimony, Mr. Secretary.

I would like to associate myself with my colleague from California's remarks, Brad Sherman.

It is my strong believe that is my strong belief that it is past time for the United States to reevaluate our policy with regard to the Middle East peace process and the Palestinians.

In the past year, Israel has been subject to more violence than any time since the Yom Kippur war in 1973. Palestinian terrorism has been rampant and aimed at Israeli civilians, the worst example being the June 1st disco bombing in Tel Aviv that killed 20 Israeli teenagers.

While the Mitchell Report and the CIA negotiated cease fire provide a potential starting point for return to negotiations, the violence has not subsided enough for either of these proposals to become a reality. The United States must continue to send messages to the Palestinian leadership that more must be done to stop the violence.

Groups closely associated with Yasir Arafat such as Fatah, Arafat's Force 17 security force, and the Tanzim have all been involved in terrorist violence. It is obvious that Arafat and the Palestinians have decided to revert to terrorism. Therefore, it is time for American policy to regard them as terrorists.

It is time to send a very simple message, as others have expressed, that the Palestinians can either align themselves with Hamas, Hizbullah, and Saddam Hussein, or they can follow through on their promises of the last 10 years, refrain from violence, and negotiate in good faith for a lasting peace in the Middle East.

I am appalled when I hear well-meaning but misinformed people equate the horrendous, barbaric behavior of the Palestinians with the defensive tactics taken by the Israelis in an attempt to protect their citizens and save their tiny democratic nation.

Absent this refrain from violence on the part of the Palestinians, I believe it is time to revisit foreign aid for the Palestinians. America's recognition of, and foreign aid for the Palestinians is predicated on their renunciation of violence. It is crystal clear for the last year the Palestinian leadership has, at best, tacitly approved the violence and, at worst, and what I believe, has encouraged and participated in it. Either way, the American taxpayers should not be forced to fund Palestinian intransigence, violence, and terrorism.

Thank you very much. I yield back my time.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Ms. Berkley.

I would be pleased to recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, would like to echo my colleague's statement that there needs to be a consistent and simple message coming from the people of the United States, and that is that the sympathies for those who have grievances, when expressed in a non-violent way, in this country increase daily. However, the sympathies for the Palestinians among all of America have dropped off to near nil because of the escalated violence.

Violence, in fact, and the killing of non-combatants will not ever, in this country, lead to a change in policy. Just the opposite, as Ms. Berkley has said very accurately. Looking at the Palestinian aid on a near daily basis has to be an issue for this Administration as long as violence goes unchecked in the region.

I am personally appalled that our calls for the Palestinians to curb that violence which they can curb has not been heeded. Chairman Arafat has been given a tremendous responsibility, some funds to accomplish those responsibilities, and although I sympathize that this is a multi-faceted area and that, in fact, the PLO is not in control of every faction, there is no doubt among the people on this dais or among the Administration officials, and I think we will hear more about it today, that something could be done. Dramatic changes could be made to lower that violence and to give the opportunity for those items which were not addressed sufficiently in the last round of peace talks to be addressed.

But I can imagine no scenario in which the United States would reengage or the rest of the world would reengage to the benefit of the Palestinian people until or unless the violence stops. With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Issa.

We will now recognize Secretary Burns. You may submit your full statement for the record, summarize, or whatever you may deem appropriate. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. BURNS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. BURNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to be here today. I welcome the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee to discuss the situation in the Middle East and I would like to preface my opening comments on the Israeli-Palestinian issue with two statements.

First, I want to reaffirm our long-standing commitment to achieving a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the region, based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace. Likewise, our commitments to Israel's security and qualitative military edge and to peace and stability in the region remain firm. We are also committed to strong relations with our Arab partners. These commitments form the bedrock of U.S. interests in this vitally important region.

Second, I want to underscore the importance of viewing the Arab-Israeli issue in the context of our broader regional interests. In my statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at my confirmation hearing in May, I said that it is very important for us to view the region as a whole and understand the connections between issues. There is no issue that resonates more among the countries of the region than the Arab-Israeli conflict. Their views about this issue and about our role strongly influence other regional issues that concern us.

In pursuit of our objectives, we are fully and actively engaged with the Israelis and the Palestinians, with our friends in the region and our partners in the international community in efforts to end violence and restore trust and confidence so that the two parties can ultimately take up again the only mechanism available for achieving peace: direct negotiations.

Since my swearing in as Assistant Secretary some 5 weeks ago, most of my time has been spent working to help move toward im-

plementation of the recommendations called for by the Mitchell Committee. In that same period of time, Secretary Powell, George Tenet, and I each have visited the region to urge an end to this fruitless violence.

During his visit, the Secretary held extensive talks with Prime Minister Sharon and Chairman Arafat, President Mubarak, King Abdullah, and Crown Prince Abdullah to solicit their support for ending the violence and starting implementation of the Mitchell Report recommendations.

During my own visits to the region, including to the countries of the Gulf, immediately after the Secretary's trip, I delivered the same message and sought their support for our approach. In these visits and in subsequent contacts, we have repeatedly and strongly emphasized that violence and the use of force can never be a solution. They are a dead end for both sides.

As the President has made clear repeatedly, the only workable approach is the one outlined by the Mitchell Committee: stop the violence, rebuild confidence, and resume negotiations.

To move into the next phase of the Mitchell Report, the "cooling off period," we must see a sustained period of quiet. The Palestinians must undertake a 100 percent effort to end Palestinian-initiated violence. Specifically, this means reining in extremist factions, ordering a stop to attacks on Israelis, making arrests of those responsible for planning or carrying out acts of violence, and calling a halt to incitement.

The Israelis also have an obligation to help calm the situation on the ground, including stopping incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas, ending targeted killings, easing the closure, and ending demolitions and other provocative actions. And, for both sides, it means strengthening their security dialogue and cooperation.

In addition, the inflammatory rhetoric of both sides that only fuels public anger and anxiety must end. The two sides must begin to build a climate of confidence and hope by exercising genuine leadership and urging their populations to refrain from counterproductive behavior.

Our hope is to move into the cooling-off period as soon as possible. While there have been periods of relative calm since the Secretary's visit to the region in mid-June, they have been broken by renewed acts of violence, death, and destruction followed by reprisals and retaliation. There is a real urgency to moving forward.

The human toll of the violence now approaches over 600 dead and thousands more injured and maimed. Too many Israelis and Palestinians feel less secure, less hopeful, and less certain that peace is possible. We understand the difficult situation that Israelis have faced during the past months and admire their resolve.

Palestinians are suffering greatly and are increasingly without work and the means to support their families. The previously marginal quality of Palestinian health care has plummeted further as Palestinians are unable to receive even routine medical attention, have access to medicines, or receive critical care in hospitals.

The economic cost of the violence is equally high. The Palestinian economy is in shambles as a result of the violence and subsequently imposed Israeli restrictions. There are evident repercussions on Israel's economy as well. The absence of security, work, in-

come, food, and proper health care is feeding this sense of hopelessness and the consequent antagonism of each side toward the other.

In spite of the tragedies we have witnessed and the difficulties before us, we cannot allow ourselves to lose hope. In fact, we do have a basis to continue our work with the parties. Both sides have publicly stated their acceptance of the Mitchell Report recommendations and the need for the violence to end. In the international community and among our friends in the region, there is also widespread support for these recommendations as a road map for the parties to end the violence, rebuild trust and confidence, and return to the negotiating table.

As the Group of Eight Summit in Genoa last week, the assembled heads of state emphasized their shared view that the violence must be brought to a halt. They also gave their unconditional support to the Mitchell Committee recommendations, declaring that "implementation of the Mitchell Committee Report in its entirety is the only way forward."

Moreover, everyone—the parties, our friends in the region, our partners around the world and we ourselves—recognizes the very real dangers of an escalated conflict on the ground and throughout the region. Such a conflict is an invitation to extremists to exploit the situation and create further instability in the region. We must continue to do all we can to prevent that from happening.

At the outset of my remarks, I mentioned the centrality of this issue among our Arab friends in the region in addressing some of our other important regional policy challenges. My discussions with Gulf leaders, for example, focused almost exclusively on the Palestinian-Israeli situation and the urgent need to stop the violence and return to the negotiating table. These leaders are deeply concerned about the potentially broader impact of an escalating conflict on other regional issues of importance to us and to them.

They pointed out the rise in public dissatisfaction in their countries with the situation, with the direction it seems to be taking, and with America's role. I say this only to underscore how important it is that we consult with and listen to our friends in the region, all of whom renounce violence as a solution to Palestinian-Israeli differences and embrace a negotiated solution.

Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate the chance to meet with you today. I have enjoyed the opportunity to work closely with you and other Members of this Committee in my previous post as Ambassador to Jordan and I look forward very much to continuing that cooperation in my new position.

We have our work cut out for us in the Middle East. The challenges are enormous and so are the stakes for the United States. That makes close cooperation between the Administration and the Congress all the more essential as we pursue our common goal of protecting American interests in a turbulent and uncertain period.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burns follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. BURNS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today to discuss the situation in the Middle East. I'd like to preface my opening comments on the Israeli-Palestinian issue with two statements. First, I

want to reaffirm our long-standing commitment to achieving a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the region, based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace. Likewise, our commitments to Israel's security and qualitative military edge and to peace and stability in the region remain firm. We are also committed to strong relations with our Arab partners. These commitments form the bedrock of U.S. interests in this vitally important region.

Second, I want to underscore the importance of viewing the Arab-Israeli issue in the context of our broader regional interests. In my statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at my confirmation hearing in May, I said that it is very important for us to view the region as a whole and understand the connections between issues. There is no issue that resonates more among the countries of the region than the Arab-Israeli conflict. Their views about this issue and about our role strongly influence other regional issues that concern us.

In pursuit of our objectives, we are fully engaged with the Israelis and Palestinians, our friends in the region, and our partners in the international community in efforts to end violence and restore trust and confidence so that the two parties can ultimately take up again the only mechanism available for achieving peace: direct negotiations.

Since my swearing in as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs some five weeks ago, most of my time has been spent working to help move toward implementation of the recommendations called for by the Mitchell Committee. In that same period of time, Secretary Powell, DCI George Tenet and I each have visited the region to urge an end to this fruitless violence.

During his visit, the Secretary held extensive talks with Israeli Prime Minister Sharon and Chairman Arafat, Egyptian President Mubarak, Jordanian King Abdullah, and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah to solicit their support for ending the violence and starting implementation of the Mitchell Report recommendations. During my visit to the region, including to the countries of the Gulf, immediately after the Secretary's trip, I delivered the same message and sought their support for our approach. In these visits and in subsequent contacts, we have repeatedly emphasized that violence and the use of force can never be a solution. They are a dead end for both sides. As the President has made clear repeatedly, the only workable approach is the one outlined by the Mitchell Committee: stop the violence, rebuild confidence, and resume negotiations.

To move into the next phase of the Mitchell Report, the "cooling off period," we must see a sustained period of quiet. The Palestinians must undertake a 100 percent effort to end Palestinian-initiated violence; specifically, this means reining in extremist factions, ordering a stop to attacks on Israelis, making arrests of those responsible for planning or carrying out acts of violence, and calling a halt to incitement. The Israelis also have an obligation to calm the situation on the ground, including stopping incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas, ending targeted killings, easing the closure, and ending demolitions and other provocative actions. And, for both sides, it means strengthening their security dialogue and cooperation.

In addition, the inflammatory rhetoric of both sides that only fuels public anger and anxiety must end. The two sides must begin to build a climate of confidence and hope by exercising genuine leadership and urging their respective populations to refrain from counterproductive behavior.

Our hope is to move into the cooling-off period as soon as possible. While there have been periods of relative calm since the Secretary's visit to the region in mid-June, they have been broken by renewed acts of violence, death, and destruction followed by reprisals and retaliation. There is an urgency to moving forward.

The human toll of the violence now approaches over 600 dead, and thousands more injured and maimed. Too many Israelis and Palestinians feel less secure, less hopeful, and less certain that peace is possible. We understand the difficult situation that Israelis have faced during the past months and admire their resolve. Palestinians are suffering greatly and are increasingly without work and the means to support their families. The previously marginal quality of Palestinian health care has plummeted further as Palestinians are unable to receive even routine medical attention, have access to medicines, or receive critical care in hospitals. The economic cost of the violence is equally high. The Palestinian economy is in shambles as a result of the violence and subsequently imposed Israeli restrictions. There are evident repercussions on Israel's economy as well. But the absence of security, work, income, food, and proper health care is feeding this sense of hopelessness and the consequent antagonism of each side toward the other.

In spite of the tragedies we have witnessed and the difficulties before us, we cannot allow ourselves to lose hope. In fact, we do have a basis to continue our work with the parties. Both sides have publicly stated their acceptance of the Mitchell Report recommendations and the need for the violence to end. In the international

community and among our friends in the region, there is also widespread support for these recommendations as a road map for the parties to end the violence, rebuild trust and confidence, and return to the negotiating table.

At the Group of Eight Summit in Genoa, Italy last week, the assembled Heads of State emphasized their shared view that the violence must be brought to a halt. They also gave their unconditional support to the Mitchell Committee recommendations, declaring, ". . . implementation of the Mitchell Committee report in its entirety is the only way forward."

Moreover, everyone—the parties, our friends in the region, our partners around the world and we ourselves—recognizes the very real dangers of an escalated conflict on the ground and throughout the region. Such a conflict is an invitation to extremists to exploit the situation and create further instability in the region. We must continue to do all we can to prevent that from happening.

At the outset of my remarks, I mentioned the centrality of this issue among our Arab friends in the region in addressing some of our other important regional policy challenges. My discussions with Gulf leaders, for example, focused almost exclusively on the Palestinian-Israeli situation and the urgent need to stop the violence and return to the negotiating table. These leaders are deeply concerned about the potentially broader impact of an escalating conflict on other regional issues of importance to us and to them. They pointed out the rise in public dissatisfaction in their countries with the situation, with the direction it seems to be taking, and with America's role. I say this only to underscore how important it is that we consult with and listen to our friends in the region, all of whom renounce violence as a solution to Palestinian-Israeli differences and embrace a negotiated solution.

Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate the chance to meet with you today. I have enjoyed the opportunity to work closely with you and other members of this committee in my previous post as Ambassador to Jordan, and I look forward very much to continuing that cooperation in my new position. We have our work cut out for us in the Middle East. The challenges are enormous, and so are the stakes for the United States. That makes close cooperation between the Administration and the Congress all the more essential as we pursue our common goal of protecting American interests in a turbulent and uncertain period.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Secretary Burns. We thank you for your testimony and your willingness to be with us. We look forward to closely working with you in the days ahead.

Are we even close to a cooling-off period right now? The violence seems to be getting worse, not better.

Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, we are working very, very hard to try and urge the parties to move toward a cooling-off period.

Now, it is very important, as many of the Members of the Committee indicated before, for the Palestinian leadership to do more to rein in violence. There has been some progress, some improvement in some areas, for example, the resumption of security cooperation, which brings the security services on both sides into direct contact with one another, which was not happening for most of the Intifadah.

Some areas of the West Bank and Gaza have been relatively quiet, but it is a mixed picture, as I said, and it is absolutely clear that more needs to be done, and the focus of our efforts has been to press the importance of, particularly on the Palestinian side, doing more to rein in violence so that we can get into the next phase of implementation of Mitchell and sustain that through a period of rebuilding a level of trust and getting back to the negotiating table.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Secretary, in your testimony, you mentioned the Palestinians must undertake a 100 percent effort to end Palestinian-initiated violence. Now, there has been a lot of discussion about that concept of Mr. Arafat exerting 100 percent effort or achieving 100 percent results. Even if we were to hold him to that

effort standard, it seems to me that those efforts have been sorely lacking.

Do you agree that he could do much, much more to stop the violence as he did when he cracked down on the extremists in the past when it suited his purposes?

Of course, that would probably cost him a great deal of his support among his own people. He has failed to exercise political leadership to prepare his people for peace, and it is true that he failed to stop incitement. In fact, he himself participated in some of that incitement, and of course occasional Israeli overreaction and isolated incidents of Israeli vigilantes, sometimes with truly tragic results, have not helped the situation.

But Mr. Arafat apparently is not willing to take any risks for peace. Is he making a reasonable effort, say a 50 percent effort or 70 percent, any effort? How will we know when he achieves 100 percent effort?

Mr. BURNS. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I said, I think it is clear without assigning percentages that more needs to be done.

As I said, we have seen some progress in some areas, particularly in some geographic areas of the West Bank and Gaza, which reflect increased efforts on the part of Palestinian security services under the control of Mr. Arafat. But, as I said, more needs to be done in a number of areas and we will continue to press for that.

Mr. GILMAN. Do we see him truly trying to reduce the violence?

Mr. BURNS. In some areas, sir, I think we do, and we can see that through the efforts that go on in the trilateral security committee, but it is also absolutely clear that more needs to be done.

As you also mentioned, sir, it is a complicated picture. Incitement is a real problem and has been a problem for some years now. One of the things that the Mitchell Committee report, I think, makes clearest is the importance of beginning to take a more serious stance on that issue of incitement and that, I think, as we get into the implementation of the Mitchell Report, is something that is going to deserve a lot of our attention as well.

There have been, also, unfortunate statements as you indicated, sir, from senior members of the Israeli government, which have also fueled an atmosphere and been provocative to Palestinians and not helped calm the situation at all.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Secretary, as some of our colleagues have suggested, do you think we should withdraw any of the benefits we have given the Palestinians in reliance on their assurances, which have turned out to be without merit, that they are giving up on terrorism?

Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, I think it is important to understand first that we do not provide direct financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority.

The assistance moneys which we and the Congress have worked together on are provided through non-governmental organizations and contractors. For example, one of the areas in which we focused a good bit of our resources has been in water issues, which are of extraordinary importance, not just to Palestinians, but to Israelis as well, given the water constraints that both peoples face.

And I think, sir, I am sorry, just to finish, that given the dire situation economically and socially for Palestinians living in the

West Bank and Gaza, I think the attention and the resources that we are able to devote through NGOs on water projects of the sort that I mentioned can be extremely helpful.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, we are not giving direct benefits to them. We do give the PLO diplomatic recognition, offices and we recognize them in an official capacity. Now, there is some talk about maybe we should review those benefits.

Mr. Secretary, as you know, just in another incident where an American citizen was killed apparently by a Palestinian terrorists, and yet the Administration has ever posted any reward for the capture of anyone involved in the killing of Americans in Israel or the territories on its Web site. I had written to the Secretary of State about this more than a month ago and the issue has been raised repeatedly in the press and by some of my colleagues.

In fact, a department official was quoted in the newspaper as saying that, "The decision is being made at the political level. People have gone to Capitol Hill before in this issue, so it is under consideration," but that statement was made a year ago, and now the purpose of offering rewards and advertising them is to elicit information.

Can you tell us, is anything being done with regard to any rewards being offered?

Mr. BURNS. Yes, sir, I can. Let me just offer two comments. First, rewards are available for information leading to the arrest of anyone implicated in the murder of an American any place in the world, whether it is on the webpage or not. That is the first point.

The second point, sir, is that the Administration shares the concern of many Members of Congress and many Americans about the importance of finding a way to address this on the Web site and we are going to do that. We are looking now at exactly how we do that on the Web site, but we will move ahead and find a way of advertising on the Web site.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Secretary, one last question. I am running out of time.

Why has the Administration now come out in support of peace monitors when they initially were opposed to them? How can such monitoring be consistent with Israel's sensitivities and long-standing concerns about foreign monitoring?

Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, let me just say that our paramount focus right now is on implementation of the Mitchell report and getting to the point where we can get into the cooling-off period. That is the focus of our efforts, is the implementation of Mitchell.

As the G–8 statement suggested, the idea of third-party monitoring, some form of third-party monitoring, if it is accepted by both parties, could be useful in helping them to implement the Mitchell Committee recommendations.

We have done some very preliminary thinking, but we would obviously have to engage both parties on what they think about that idea and then consider how, if they saw merit in the idea, to help them facilitate implementation of Mitchell, we could contribute to that.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Before calling on Mr. Ackerman, I am going to ask our Vice Chairman of our Subcommittee, Mr. Chabot, if he could take over.

I am being called to the Floor for a quick appearance and I will try to be back as quickly as possible.

Mr. Ackerman?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Since the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, we have been providing assistance to the Palestinians on the basis of their acceptance of the very fundamental idea that their conflict with Israel can only be resolved by peaceful means. Clearly, they have departed from that position.

Are we providing any aid in any form to the Palestinians that is not humanitarian aid, either through NGOs or other sources?

Mr. BURNS. To the best of my knowledge, sir, we do not provide any direct financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority. The assistance we provide goes through NGOs, as well as contractors focused on projects of the sort that I mentioned, water projects, for example. There is also some technical training of Palestinians to help run those sorts of projects as well.

Mr. ACKERMAN. And there is no other aid provided through NGOs and no aid provided outside of NGOs?

Mr. BURNS. To the best of my knowledge, sir, our assistance flows through those two kind of channels.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. The travel advisory that has been issued vis-a-vis Israel—what effect has that had on the ability of the AID staff to monitor the assistance programs administered through the NGOs and how do we know what the NGOs are doing if the AID people can not monitor that because of the travel restrictions?

Mr. BURNS. Sir, the AID people, I think, have been able to keep a very careful eye on how the money is used, the progress of particular projects——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Without being on site?

Mr. BURNS. Well, they have managed to travel. We opened a water project recently in the course of the last week, which——

Mr. ACKERMAN. AID can travel despite the travel ban?

Mr. BURNS. AID is able to travel to some areas. Other areas are very difficult from time to time, and we have not been able to run projects in some areas because of security conditions.

Mr. ACKERMAN. The U.S. patronage of the peace process has been predicated on the idea that the conflict between the parties was a political one and that they have to come together to negotiate a mutually agreeable solution. Increasingly, the Palestinians, with support from other predominantly Arab countries, are trying to redefine in legal terms their conflict as international aggression and they are seeking the security council to mandate intervention and they have classified Israeli actions in completely different than political terms but in legal terms, using such phrases as "war crimes," "atrocities," "holocausts," "crimes against humanity," and they therefore conclude that their attack against Israel is legitimate resistance.

Does the United States view this conflict as a political issue, as we have always in the past, or a legal one, as the Palestinian Authority and others would now seek to recast it?

Mr. BURNS. I think the issue is one that can only be resolved through a political process and that is through direct negotiations

between the two parties. That has been the whole premise of our approach and that remains the foundation.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I would like to return to a question that Chairman Gilman raised, which is of some concern to quite a number of us, and that is the lack of posting on the Web site, whereas the Web site lists rewards for Americans who were killed by terrorists almost anywhere else in the world, and you stated that the rewards are nonetheless available even if they are not posted on the Web site.

I have been in places in the world where U.S. citizens have been killed or terrorized. In some places, it is on the Web site, in almost all places, it is on the Web site, but in other places, that is augmented by flyers and people going around and putting things on poles and letting people know. Is such a program in existence in Israel?

Mr. BURNS. As I said, sir, we are going to find a way to put it on the Web site. There are different forms that are used in different—regarding different countries around the world.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes, but none of them are used in Israel, it that seems like that is a glaring omission, which is problematic, which if you add on to that the fact that I assume is a fact, I have been told, that the U.S. Embassy in Israel has refused to send representatives to the funerals of Americans who have been killed by terrorists. Could you explain that?

Mr. BURNS. I am not sure that is true, sir, but I will check on it. I can not imagine that that is the case.

Mr. CHABOT. [Presiding.] The gentleman's time has expired.

The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes for questions.

Mr. Secretary, on April 28th in a rare session with foreign journalists, Palestinian Authority Chairman Arafat was questioned about his intention to arrest Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists believed by Israel to be involved in acts of deadly violence against Israelis over the past months.

Chairman Arafat replied publicly in English, and I quote,

> "I am not looking for Hamas or for Islamic Jihad or any other parties because we respect all these parties and there is a union between all of us."

Given that the U.S.-Palestinian relationship is predicated on the PLO's renunciation of terrorism and violence, that Arafat had officially disavowed the use of terrorism and violence on numerous occasions to the United States Government and had committed to work against terrorism and incitement in innumerable forums throughout the peace process, including in recent meetings with yourself and Mr. Tenet, many find troubling his declared union and respect for Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Numerous statements have confirmed the relationship between the Palestinian Authority and these terrorists. For example, Marwan Barghouti, head of Arafat's Fatah faction of the PLO and the West Bank and a champion of Palestinian violence against Israel, stated in the New Yorker that Fatah is working with the popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, formerly regarded as a rejectionist group, vis-a-vis Arafat.

In fact, Barghouti said, "We are all fighting together now," before lamenting the capture of a boat load of weapons from Lebanon to the Palestinian Authority-controlled territory by the IDF.

Given these declarations by Arafat and Barghouti, do you believe that Chairman Arafat is making a 100 percent effort to fight terrorism and incitement to violence amongst the Palestinian people and what percent effort would you say he is now making?

Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, as I said before, I can not assign a percentage except to say that it is absolutely clear that more needs to be done. More needs to be done to rein in violence, more needs to be done to curb incitement, which as I said before, has had a poisonous effect, not just over the last 10 months, but for years before that as well. So it is——

Mr. CHABOT. Would you be willing to say that a lot more effort is required on his part?

Mr. BURNS. I think it is true that a good deal more effort is required.

Mr. CHABOT. I would agree with that.

How can we ensure that there will be greater Palestinian compliance to their agreements? And do you agree that the basis of our relations with the Palestinians was their renunciation of violence and terrorism?

Mr. BURNS. I think it was one of the most important foundations, and it remains one of the most important foundations of the relationship, I think, coupled with a commitment to getting back to a political process and resolving the conflict through political means.

Violence, as I said before, is a dead end. It has to be made clear to people that it is a dead end, but it also has to be made clear that there is a political process that will work. There is a way to address the economic problems that people have. There is a way of reviving a sense of trust and confidence which does not exist now, and that does require efforts on the part of both sides.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. My next question, State Department spokesman Philip Reeker said in April that it was, "Outrageous and deplorable," that Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khomeni said that, "Jews exaggerated the extent of the Holocaust to gain international sympathy."

Yet Reeker said nothing about the fact that the official Palestinian Authority newspaper published an article in its April 13, 2001 edition calling the Holocaust a fable and saying that,

> "The figure of 6 million Jews cremated in the Nazi Auschwitz camps is a lie for propaganda as the most spacious vaults in the camp could not have even held 1 percent of that number. When Zionism cannot find an enemy to separate and repel the Jews, it invents such an enemy and so was the case with the Holocaust."

The State Department has also said nothing about the fact that the Egyptian government newspaper published an article in its April 18, 2001 edition which declared,

> "Thanks to Hitler, blessed memory, who, on behalf of the Palestinians revenged an advance against the most vile criminals on the face of the earth, although we do have a complaint against him, for his revenge on them was not enough."

Is it not strange that the State Department so forcefully condemns Holocaust denial statements by Iranian officials yet remains silent in the face of identical Holocaust denial statements by the Egyptian government and Yasir Arafat's Palestinian Authority officials?

Do you agree the Arafat and Egypt should be immune from criticism?

Mr. BURNS. The kind of comments that you just read, sir, are ugly and reprehensible and there is no excuse for them, whomever they come from.

Mr. CHABOT. And do you agree that we should be equally critical, whoever makes those kinds of comments?

Mr. BURNS. The statements that you read, whomever made them, are ugly and reprehensible and there is no excuse for them.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. CHABOT. I would be happy to yield. I will grant myself an additional minute and yield to the gentleman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the Chairman, and I thank the Chairman for bringing this up, although to some it might seem to be an extraneous comment, but within the seeds of the thought that the Chairman just read expressed by somebody else is the entire genesis of the argument of the Palestinians.

Israel, having been created by the United Nations and the international community because the Jewish people had no place to go when they were being annihilated by Hitler in all countries throughout the world where he could reach, they formed in addition to the country called Jordan, a country predominantly Palestinian, they formed a Jewish state, which was Israel.

If the Holocaust is denied, as is this current game plan which is part of a new overall strategy to discuss this in legal rather than political differences, denying the Holocaust and selling that notion internationally undermines the whole intention and contention for the existence of the state of Israel, and that is really what those statements are all about. It is not just another Hitler-denying, Holocaust-denying program. This is to delegitimize the very establishment of the state.

And I thank the Chairman for bringing that up.

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman for making those very important points and I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. It is, I think, clear that there are differences of opinion between us and others on the one hand and the Palestinian Authority on the other and that it is not an easy thing for Arafat to control some of the entities that operate in his territory.

On the other hand, I would like to put a chart into the record that shows that since June 13th when the Tenet plan was adopted, there have been between five and roughly 30 acts of violence by the Palestinian side every day.

Do you agree that Arafat could do a better job of controlling the violence, and if ultimately Arafat cannot control armed groups operating on territory he "controls," does it make any sense to go through with the Mitchell plan in which Israel negotiates concessions with the Palestinian Authority, the Israeli government then

must deliver those concessions and then the Palestinian Authority, having no power, does not have to do anything because they allegedly can not do anything?

So can Arafat do more and does it make sense for us to push forward with negotiations if he does not have the ability to deliver?

Mr. BURNS. I think, sir, to answer your questions, that he can do more. I think the advantage of the Mitchell report is that it provides a bridge back to a negotiating process. It does not prescribe how the negotiating process is going to work, but it is a pathway to rebuild a sense of trust between people and to find a way to sustain a cessation of violence in the interest of both peoples, and that requires steps on the part of both Palestinians and Israelis.

But the first and primary step is to rein in violence, and that is what we are working so hard to do now. But as Senator Mitchell and his colleagues pointed out very clearly, in order to sustain that cessation of violence, in order to sustain that serious effort, you have got to be able to move in to the rest of the Mitchell process so that both sides can see a sense of hope and can see that there is a political process that holds out a way of addressing their concerns and frustrations in a way that violence never will.

So I think that is the logic, sir, behind trying to move into Mitchell, but we have to see a serious effort to rein in violence.

Mr. SHERMAN. Shifting to Egypt, one of the decisions this country has to make is how much aid to provide Egypt and whether to mark that as military or economic aid. Now, money is fungible so, frankly, how we mark it is of only slight significance.

Since the Oslo Accords, Egypt has done a great deal to arm itself. It has spent in the neighborhood of $5 billion a year on defense at a time when it itself is a very poor country and it has very little in the way of military threats from its neighbors.

Is this level of military spending something that we should encourage or subsidize and what is the state of talks between Egypt and North Korea regarding the acquisition of the No Dong class missile with an 800-mile range and does it make sense for us to be providing money to Egypt if they spend this fungible money on something like an 800-mile range missile?

Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, on the second question that you asked, we have been in touch directly with some Members of the Committee and in a different forum, I would be glad to come up and discuss that with you as well on the recent conversations that we have had.

Mr. SHERMAN. Has the United States publicly opposed the acquisition of this missile by Egypt?

Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, we have been quite concerned about the whole problem of missile proliferation in the region, but I would be glad to come up and brief you in detail in a classified forum on that issue, and, as I said, we have been in touch with other Members of the Committee as well.

Sir, on the broader question about our security assistance for Egypt, I think it is very important to understand that this is an investment, as you well know, in our own security interests in the region. Egypt has been an important coalition partner for us. Ten years ago at Desert Storm, Egypt contributed, after the U.S. and Britain, the largest number of troops to the coalition at that time.

We have a very active exercise relationship with the Egyptians. The biggest military exercise we participate any place in the word is Bright Star, which the Egyptians host. The Egyptians play a critical role in protecting air and sea lanes through the Suez Canal, which are very important to us. Our security assistance relationship——

Mr. SHERMAN. Those air and sea lanes—are France and Britain planning to reconquer the Suez Canal or is there some other military force? I realize there is terrorism everywhere, but I am talking about $5 billion a year being spent on military, tanks, and planes. I think the Russian navy is no longer a threat to the Suez Canal, so these air and sea lanes that Egypt is defending, who are they defending them from?

Mr. BURNS. Well, I think the Egyptians have their own security concerns as do we about whether it is the Iranians or other countries in the region, but I think it is also important to note that we have built a fair amount of interoperability between our military, the Egyptians', and other militaries in the region, which really does serve our own security interests. So I think that our security assistance to Egypt over the years has been a very good investment, for us as well as for the Egyptians.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Pitts, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony.

The Palestinians are now using mortars and other forms of heavier weaponry against Israel. From where do the Palestinians obtain these heavier weapons and what can the Administration do, if anything, to prevent the flow of weapons to the Palestinian?

Is there any evidence that U.S. foreign assistance is freeing up Palestinian money for the purchase of weaponry?

Mr. BURNS. On the last question, sir, I know of no evidence to suggest that. We are obviously very much concerned about the smuggling of weaponry into the territories.

There is also a problem with regard to home-grown mortars and factories, some of which the Palestinian Authority has actually raided and closed down, but more of which are operating, and so it is a very serious problem that has to be addressed. I agree with you.

Mr. PITTS. And from where are these coming?

Mr. BURNS. Well, the home-grown ones, as I said with mortars, can be produced in local factories. The technology is not very complicated.

Mr. PITTS. Those that are not home-grown?

Mr. BURNS. There has been some concern about Iranian funding and support for weaponry that has gotten into Gaza, for example, which is, given the fragility of the situation there, a real concern.

Mr. PITTS. And what has the U.S. done or what can we do to prevent that flow of illegal weapons?

Mr. BURNS. Well, I think we need to continue to work with the parties, with our friends in the region who can control their own borders, whether it is the Egyptians or others. We exchange a lot of information with other parties to help them, at least, have a clear picture of the problem and we will continue to do that.

Mr. PITTS. Okay. Well, many Israelis from all political stripes now no longer consider Arafat a partner for peace. What is the Administration's view of Arafat at this time?

Does the Administration agree with the comments of the former Ambassador Martin Indyk that recent events demonstrate that Arafat has not forgone violence as a tool of political negotiations?

Mr. BURNS. I think we engage Arafat and the rest of the Palestinian leadership as the leaders of the Palestinians and the people with whom we have to work and whom we have to push in the direction of doing more to rein in violence and get us back to a political process, which is the only way to restore a sense of hope for Palestinians. And, so I think the direct engagement that we have with Arafat and with others in the Palestinian leadership is important so that we, as bluntly and candidly as we can, can impress upon them the importance of reining in violence and moving toward a political process. That is the only way in which Palestinians are going to be able to achieve a settlement.

Mr. PITTS. What has the United States done to pressure Arafat to rearrest Hamas and other Palestinian terrorists?

Mr. BURNS. That has been among the subjects we have raised directly with him a number of times; that is the importance of resuming counter-terrorism cooperation and the importance of moving decisively to prevent acts of terror and to act against those who are planning it. And that is a feature of almost every conversation we have had recently.

Mr. PITTS. And why has Arafat not rearrested those terrorists?

Mr. BURNS. Well, there have been some actions taken. There had been some arrests made, but as I said before when I was talking about the broader category, there is much more that needs to be done.

Mr. PITTS. Now, there are differences of opinion on the benefits of U.S. aid to Palestinians. What has U.S. assistance done to the Palestinian economy and how has our aid improved U.S. influence with the Palestinians?

Mr. BURNS. Well, I think, again, if you just take the example of water projects, whether it is waste water treatment facilities or a similar project, water constraints are among the biggest problems that Palestinians face in terms of economic development. It is an enormous problem for Israel as well as for Jordan and other countries in the region. So I think the efforts that we make to make better use of existing water resources for Palestinians are a direct benefit to Palestinian people and to their potential for economic development. And it also frees up resources for Israel and other countries in the region as well. So, that is just one example of the way in which our assistance moneys, I think, do make a difference for Palestinians.

Mr. PITTS. Is there any demonstration that it has increased our influence with the Palestinians?

Mr. BURNS. I think it contributes to improving the standard of living of Palestinians, to helping to avoid an even more dire situation for many Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. I think it is also appreciated by Palestinians who have the benefit, ordinary Palestinians who would not otherwise have the same access to water. So I think, in that sense, it is appreciated. I could not meas-

ure the influence more broadly in terms of policy or the behavior of——

Mr. PITTS. Well, just how much control does Arafat exercise? In the Administration's view, could he end the violence if he were completely committed to doing so?

Mr. BURNS. I am not sure that he could end the violence completely. I think he has a significant degree of control and I think it is important for him to exercise all of the control that he has.

Mr. PITTS. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GILMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Pitts.

Ms. Berkley, the gentlelady from Nevada.

Ms. BERKLEY. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to hearken back to your testimony where you talked about the quality of health care plummeting for the Palestinians and the living conditions being inhumane and unemployment rampant and the feeling of hopelessness that is growing, but I would like to submit to you that these conditions are, in my opinion, a direct result of Yasir Arafat walking away from the Camp David negotiations.

None of this had to be, and as Mr. Sherman stated in his testimony, we could be enjoying peace and prosperity in that region now, had the parties reached an accord, and it was not the Israelis that kept that from happening.

I have not been in Congress very long, but I have been very involved in Middle East issues for many, many years as a citizen activist. For many years, we would listen to Yasir Arafat's speeches translated in English that were very conciliatory and appeared to American audiences that he was, in fact, a true partner in peace.

We would also be privy to his speeches in Arabic, and to people in the Arab world and the Palestinians, it had a decidedly different flavor in the rhetoric that was not at all conciliatory and was quite explosive.

Now, we were told by the State Department year after year after year that this is what he had to say in the Arab world in order to maintain his position and that he was truly a moderate and what he was saying in English or to American audiences was how he really felt.

Now, I did not believe that then and I think his behavior, as of the past year, emphasizes my position that he has no intentions of sitting down as a true partner for peace and negotiating a true piece for all the people in the region.

Having said that, and I know that other people have asked this question, but let me ask it in a different way. Do you believe that Yasir Arafat has any control over the terrorist violence in the region?

Mr. BURNS. Yes, ma'am. I do believe he has a significant degree of control, not total control.

Ms. BERKLEY. Then what do we do as the American government to ensure that he exercises that control? Because we have not done a very good job convincing him that there is a price to pay for not doing what he has promised to do?

Mr. BURNS. Well, ma'am, we have pressed him at the highest levels of our government and we continue to urge him to recognize that reining in violence is the paramount concern right now and it

is a pathway to get back to the kind of process that offers real hope for Palestinians, both in terms of economic problems, as well as a potential for a political process.

Ms. BERKLEY. Well, how long do we continue to urge him before there is a price to pay for his not doing what he continues to promise to do?

Mr. BURNS. Well, I think, in many ways, Palestinians are paying a price. As you said, conditions are awful. I think it is very clear to Palestinians as well as to Israelis because, as one of your colleagues said earlier, I do believe that the vast majority of both Israelis and Palestinians want a peaceful solution and that the kind of extremist rhetoric that you see still represents a minority of both populations. But that is why it is so important for us to continue to press as hard as we can, because the pathway that the Palestinians are on now is a dead end and the virtue of Mitchell, as I mentioned before, is that it does offer a way to get back to a political process.

It does hold out things that, if the Palestinians are able to fulfill their obligations with regard to violence, offer a pathway to lift the closure, to end the kind of restrictive practices which make it so hard for Palestinians to live in the West Bank and Gaza right now. It offers a way of addressing concerns of incitement and the kind of rhetoric on both sides that really do make it more difficult to get out of the deep hole that the two parties are in right now and get back to a political process.

There is no magic formula beyond us, I think, continuing to push as hard as we can to take advantage of that opportunity because, otherwise, it is a pretty dismal future.

Ms. BERKLEY. The current conditions are completely unacceptable for both peoples, but I will submit to you that Arafat is not paying a price. His people are, but what Arafat has managed to do is blame the Israelis for their plight and they are becoming increasingly angrier at the Israelis as opposed to their own leadership for the position that they find themselves in now.

Let me just switch. It was widely reported recently that former President George Bush assured the Saudis that his son's heart was in the right place. Can you explain that statement?

Mr. BURNS. All I know about that is the press report that I saw.

Mr. GILMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired.

The gentlelady from Virginia, Ms. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Secretary.

A little while ago, you talked briefly about the G–8 statement calling for the monitors, and last week, I believe the United States supported that. My question to you is what countries do you see participating in this force to comprise the monitors and what international authority would have jurisdiction over it and do you believe it would be modeled after the lines of the multinational force and servers in Sinai, Egypt?

Mr. BURNS. Well, ma'am, as I stressed before, our focus right now is on implementation of the Mitchell report and especially on reining in violence so that we can get into the next phase of implementation of Mitchell.

What the G–8 statement suggested is that some form of third party monitoring, accepted by both parties because you could not go anywhere if it were not accepted by both parties, might be helpful in the process of facilitating implementation of Mitchell.

So, it is important for us not to get ahead of ourselves, I think. We have done some preliminary thinking on this. We obviously would have to engage both parties directly about what they have in mind and if they thought there was some value in this kind of a modest mechanism. What we are not thinking of now is a military force or a large number of observers, but a more modest mechanism which would help the two parties to implement their commitments under the Mitchell committee report.

So again, I think we have to take this step by step and keep our focus on getting the parties to do what is required to get into the next phase of Mitchell.

Ms. DAVIS. So we are not looking at the United States sending a peacekeeping military force over there at this point?

Mr. BURNS. No, ma'am.

Ms. DAVIS. I think we all understand and recognize the role that Egypt has played as a leader in the Arab world and I believe it was last September when Egypt removed the Ambassador from Israel. Will you be taking a position to encourage or put any kind of pressure on Egypt to put him back in Israel?

Mr. BURNS. We have encouraged the Egyptian government to return their Ambassador to Israel, but I think it is important to bear in mind that the Egyptians, including President Mubarak himself, have played a very active role, especially in the last 4 or 5 weeks that I have been working on this issue, in direct contacts with both parties, with Prime Minister Sharon, with whom he has spoken on the phone, as well as with Chairman Arafat.

So I think the Egyptians, as they have for many years in the past, have been very actively engaged in trying to urge an end to violence to take advantage of the Mitchell report and get back to the negotiating table.

Ms. DAVIS. Did the Egyptians not actually discourage Arafat from making the deal with Israel? When we had Mubarak and spoke to him, I thought he gave us the indication that he was not willing to get involved, that they had to work it out amongst themselves, and I guess I am hearing differently from you right now.

Mr. BURNS. Well, ma'am, I think there are two things that apply. First, it is obvious the parties themselves, Palestinians and Israelis, are going to have to negotiate directly, work out their differences, and work out an acceptable resolution. Second, parties like Egypt can play a very helpful and constructive role with both sides in trying to encourage them to look at the sort of steps which are going to be necessary to reach those kind of solutions; and I think the Egyptians, historically and particularly in the last 4 or 5 weeks, have played that role.

Ms. DAVIS. So you believe Mr. Mubarak is playing a role in trying to encourage Mr. Arafat to publicly denounce the violence and to put pressure on the Palestinians to stop the violence?

Mr. BURNS. I think the Egyptians and President Mubarak specifically have continued to play a helpful role in encouraging both sides to take advantage of the Mitchell report, to rein in violence,

to rebuild confidence, and take the other kind of measures that Mitchell and his colleagues laid out.

Ms. DAVIS. So then I can assume Mr. Mubarak has changed his position from what he had when he met with the International Relations Committee when he was here.

Mr. BURNS. No, ma'am. I do not think there is any question that either the Egyptians or anyone else can substitute for the parties. Palestinians and Israelis will have to make these decisions themselves. All I mean to say is the Egyptians have played a helpful role in helping to encourage the parties to move in that direction, just as we have tried to play and just as the Jordanians have continued to play. They can not speak for the parties, but they can offer their encouragement.

Ms. DAVIS. But would you not agree that Mr. Mubarak probably has some influence over Mr. Arafat?

Mr. BURNS. I think Egypt plays a very influential role in the region. I think their relationship is an important one for Palestinians and Egyptians, and, as I said, especially in the last 4 or 5 weeks, I think Egypt has tried to use that influence to move things in the right direction. And I think the direct contacts between Egypt and Israel are extremely important as well, and we urge the Egyptians to keep them up.

Mr. GILMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Secretary, good morning and thank you for taking this on, not the hearing, the job.

Tell me why I am wrong. Abba Eban is frequently quoted for saying that the PLO never fails to miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. I look at the events since a year ago, since Camp David, and I think he was wrong, that they do not view a peace with Israel and coexistence with Israel as an opportunity.

For some years before Oslo, I met with and listened to many Palestinian leaders speak, seemingly persuasively, about their recognition that Israel is a permanent part of the Middle East landscape, that the Palestinians wanted to live in peace with them. They had interests in Palestinian self-determination and independent states and withdrawal back to the 1967 borders and Jerusalem is a capital of that new state, but that underlying it was a willingness to live at peace and coexistence with Israel.

I watched the events from Camp David on what I believe the calculated effort by the leadership to encourage the start of the Intifadah long before Prime Minister Sharon, then Parliamentarian Sharon, went to the Temple Mount to resurrect the Intifadah in a very different form than had existed before, and I say they really do not want it, this has been a con, they conned me, they conned a lot of people, that the leadership of the PLO, now the Palestinian Authority, has never abandoned its original desire to push Israel off the map. That, to me, is the most likely explanation of the events that have transpired in the past 12 months.

Given the American position about wanting to get back to the final status talks through the steps promoted in the Mitchell report and all that stuff, square the American policy with my view and

tell me why I am wrong, because it would be silly to accept what I accepted and be pursuing that as the policy.

Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, I still think it is true that the vast majority of Palestinians want a peaceful solution to this issue and want to work out a permanent status settlement which would allow Israelis and Palestinians to live together in peace. I still believe that, on both sides, there is the potential for doing that.

Mr. BERMAN. How can you explain what has happened, then?

Mr. BURNS. Well, I think it is also true that, if you look back over the course of the last year—and I was not a direct participant in the negotiations at Camp David, a number of the direct participants are offering their own views now about what happened and why, and it is probably not a smart idea or a useful idea for me, not having been there, to offer a lot of specific judgments on what happened and who was responsible.

I think it is a very complicated diplomatic picture. I think it is probably best not to make sweeping judgments or point the finger exclusively at one party or the other. I think the truth is that a lot of opportunities were missed, mistakes were made, and I think hopefully people will learn from them.

We are in a state now which is so difficult that we are going to have to try and move inch by inch away from violence and back toward a political process, but keep in view the potential which was very clear from Camp David on through the last half of 2000, because the truth is, as people look back on it, there was serious engagement between Palestinians and Israelis.

Whatever mistakes were made or opportunities were missed, people did break a number of the taboos on issues which had not really been addressed directly by the parties before, and I hope that the day will come in the not too distant future, although it is going to be a painful process to get anywhere near there from where we are today, when the people can reengage on those issues.

And I have not, I guess to answer your question, lost all hope that it is possible for the two leaderships to engage on those issues. It is not going to happen tomorrow and it is going to be a very difficult road to get there, but I think there still is the potential for doing it, however many opportunities were missed in the last year and however tragic the consequences have been for ordinary Israelis and ordinary Palestinians.

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Cantor.

Mr. CANTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. I would like to ask you a question. Given the incredible provocations that I see by the Palestinians, over 6000 live fire incidents directed against Israel since last September that include almost daily killings of civilians, shooting mortars into Israeli towns and terrorist attacks in major Israeli cities, I believe the government of Israel has shown remarkable restraint, far greater restraint than any other country, including our own, would show in the face of such relentless lawless violent attacks.

In fact, I think the Prime Minister is under tremendous pressure every day to do far more to respond to those attacks. He has resisted the pressure because he understands the cost of escalating

the conflict, as you have pointed out in your remarks, but also because I think he has faith in the United States to help and pressure Mr. Arafat to put an end to the killings and the violence.

I believe that we in the United States have not done a great job in doing that, given the recent incidents and the ongoing incidents in Israel. In fact, I think that Chairman Arafat is gaining ground, having now secured the U.S. support for the long standing Palestinian goal of international observers.

I take this, and I believe this to be an untenable situation, and I think either we in the United States do all we can to help Israel or we are going to create the situation where Israel will have to act on its own, and if the United States cannot or will not do that, I, for one, am one that will support what Israel feels it needs to do. And my question to you is do you expect the Administration to do the same?

Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, our relationship with Israel has been and always will be a very close one. I think we have urged restraint on both sides, not as a favor to the other, but in the self interests of both parties and as a way of trying to end violence and get back to a political process as a way to try and calm the situation. That is a very difficult thing to do, but I think it has been admirable the extent to which restraint has been shown and we will continue to urge that.

I think, with regard, sir, to your comment on third-party monitoring, I think we have to keep in perspective that our focus right now is on implementation of Mitchell. The idea of third-party monitoring is something which would have to be accepted by both sides, and that is the premise of the whole idea. And what we are talking about is a fairly modest mechanism that both sides might see as a way to facilitate implementation of Mitchell, which is a report that both accepted.

So it is a fairly modest idea, and we are just at the very beginning stages of thinking it through.

Mr. CANTOR. I would just like to add, also, I recently submitted a bill to Congress relating to the systematic attempt by Chairman Arafat and his Waqf, the religious council which operates the daily management of the temple mount, their attempt to excavate and what is resulting in the erasing of Judeo-Christian heritage on the temple mount and I do not know if you have seen the bill, but my bill calls for the cessation of all U.S. aid directly, indirectly to Palestinian Authority and its instrumentality.

So do you have any comments or can you speak to that bill? Would you support such measures?

Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, on the issue that you raised, it is obviously a very serious concern and our consulate general in Jerusalem is looking into the issue. Based on the conversations that they have had so far with experts, we do not see any current excavations which would damage the religious heritage of the temple mount. But it is obviously a serious issue and we are going to follow it very closely.

Mr. CANTOR. If there is anybody that I could talk to or you could have call me, I just returned from 2 weeks ago and have up-to-date photographs and certainly saw for myself what is coming out.

Mr. BURNS. We would be glad to follow up with you, sir.

Mr. CANTOR. I would appreciate that.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. GILMAN. The Committee now will stand in recess. We have two votes on the Floor and we will be back as quickly as possible and will continue.

Mr. Secretary, thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. ISSA. [Presiding.] Mr. Secretary, earlier there was a question as to President Mubarak's role. I guess I will preface this by saying that I was also in that meeting and the questions and answers were related to President Mubarak's role in the Middle East peace negotiations and what he did or did not say to Chairman Arafat as to whether to take the deal. Without revisiting that, I would like you to give me your observations of our two closest allies to us and neutrals, or even friends, of Israel in the region, Jordan, Egypt, and what measures you believe they are taking and what role they are playing in this period of unsettled behavior.

Mr. BURNS. Well, thank you very much, Congressman.

I think both Egypt and Jordan, as I said before, have continued to play very constructive and helpful roles in support of the same objectives that we have, and that is to rein in violence and implement the rest of the Mitchell report as a way of getting back to negotiations.

Both have kept up their lines of communications with Israelis and with Palestinians, which is a very important thing to do and, in some ways, a politically difficult thing for both leaderships to do, given the deep frustrations and anger in larger parts of the Jordanian and Egyptian population. So it takes a certain amount of leadership to be able to continue to play that role, but I think it is a recognition of what they both have at stake.

Jordan in particular, where I served the last 3 years, has as much at stake in a resolution of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians as anybody other than the two parties themselves, and I think their efforts have reflected that and we continue to stay in very close touch.

Mr. ISSA. Additionally, there was a mention, and I think it is very noteworthy, of a seizure of weapons coming from Lebanon. Can you comment to the extent that you are aware of the various sources of weapons and the original parties, to the best you know, where these weapons may be coming from?

Mr. BURNS. Well, there is one instance which I can recall without getting into all the details where it is a faction which has been a rival, and in many respects, an enemy of the Palestinian Authority for some time which tried to smuggle weaponry into Gaza. It is the kind of act that not only fuels violence by giving people the means to carry out acts of violence, but it also makes it more difficult for the Palestinian Authority and its security services to do the things that they need to do.

Mr. ISSA. Perhaps a slightly astray question, but one that I think impacts the region, the activities of Hizbullah, primarily still operating in the south of Lebanon, impact the region. Can you comment on the impact and how it influences the perception of where Israel is being attacked from, and of course if you have any suggestions of constructive ways we can deal with this?

Mr. BURNS. Well, I think Hizbullah provocations and attacks across the blue line between Lebanon and Israel have been a real source of concern. The situation in that area is very fragile, especially coming against the backdrop of the continuing tensions between Palestinians and Israelis, and on my own travels through the region, including stops not just in Israel but in Lebanon and Syria about 2 weeks ago, I stressed the obvious to all the parties that this is a time when maximum restraint is extremely important because you can easily see one provocative act, by Hizbullah, for example, leading to an escalation which is very difficult for any of the parties to control and it is the last thing that anybody in the region needs right now.

Mr. ISSA. And this may not be something you can put a number on, but I think it is fair to say that Hizbullah will not voluntarily stop their activity. They will not answer to the requests of Jordan, certainly not Israel, certainly not Egypt, and not the PLO. In order to reduce their activities, would you describe what you think would be the level of effort and, if you can, in general terms of the level of troops they are funding or the type of effort that you think would allow for that to occur?

Mr. BURNS. I am sorry, sir. That would allow for?

Mr. ISSA. For the reduction in Hizbullah. I am going to make the bold assumption that it will not be a small task to recapture, if you will, the hearts and minds of the towns that harbor them and, in fact, to put the type of monitoring in that would allow a reduced level of freedom for those who would choose to, in the day or the night, run out and shell positions and the like as have been going on.

Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, I think one of the most important things that we have tried to contribute to and that the Lebanese government has been concerned about is meeting the economic and social needs of ordinary Lebanese in South Lebanon.

I think it is a very useful expenditure of our own resources to try and address some of those needs because it provides a kind of counter-balance to the very active social programs that Hizbullah, for example, sponsors there, and it is important to show people that the Lebanese government is addressing their needs and providing them the means for economic development, and so I think, in that sense, whatever we can contribute, and as you know we do contribute, in that effort is very valuable.

Mr. ISSA. And as a follow-up to that, we do contribute. We have humanitarian aid. We have NGOs that are operating with some 15 million plus dollars over the last several years, but I think it has been said here in the Full Committee that there is probably 100 million plus dollars coming in to support the Hizbullah's activities, primarily hospitals, schools, oil for widows in the winter, and so on. Do you think that, in fact, what we are putting in begins to displace the influence of those dollars?

Mr. BURNS. Well, I think, sir, it can offer a counter-balance. It offers an alternative for people to show that the Lebanese government, with that kind of support, can meet those needs, and I think that is a very important political reality that has to be addressed in the south of Lebanon and it provides a way in which the Leba-

nese government can really establish a degree of control and influence which it does not have now.

We also have continued to urge the Lebanese government to deploy its armed forces down to the border, but I think addressing economic and social needs is an important complement to that.

Mr. ISSA. I very much appreciate that. There are many places in which dollars and military aid come into various factions within Palestine and the West Bank. Could you comment on, assuming, for example, we plugged one hole, what the others would shift to and ultimately where the hardest one is for us to plug and any suggestions you have on limiting the arms, which is part of the problem in the region?

Mr. BURNS. It is, sir. It is a major concern and I think it is actually a concern for the Palestinian Authority in many respects, too, because of the funding that comes in to groups like Hamas, which can rival their influence as well. Some of it comes from private groups in terms of financial support, but we are also quite concerned, as I had tried to stress before, about the problem of arms smuggling as well, and we will keep a careful eye on that.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Secretary, I will make an assumption that is well above my pay grade. Let us assume for a moment that this Committee and the Congress as a whole gave you a blank check to work on these issues. You talked about South Lebanon and let us start with that.

Where would you put new additional dollars that you believe would be useful to help curb the violence throughout the region?

Mr. BURNS. I am not used to, in the State Department, getting blank checks from anyone.

Mr. ISSA. And, Mr. Secretary, you are not likely to get it, but it's always good to know where you would put it if you got it.

Mr. BURNS. That is a good way to start my tenure. Yes. Well, sir, I think just in general terms, I think there is enormous value in investing in some of the economies in the region, and I will just speak to my own experience in Jordan the last 3 years.

When you can couple our resources with a commitment on the part of the leadership, essentially, people are willing to help themselves and make ambitious and difficult economic changes to enable economies in the region to compete in a global economy, then that is a place where our resources, I think, can be very valuable because it creates a sense of hope for people. It provides a much more solid foundation for people to consider the kinds of political compromises which are going to be very important.

So without specifying particular countries, I think that is the kind of thing where, if we are careful in allocating resources in places where leaderships have committed themselves to doing everything they can to help themselves, I have seen in Jordan, and I am certain you can see in other parts of the region, the value of doing that.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. GILMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Issa, for taking over while we were on the Floor. Our next intervener is Mr. Schiff, the gentleman from California.

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I wanted to follow up, to some degree, on some of the comments made by Mr. Berman. I think, watching the events over the last year and Mr. Arafat's walk away from the table on the incredibly far-reaching offers that were made by Mr. Barak, would lead one either to the conclusion that I think Mr. Berman reaches that he was unwilling or, the alternative conclusion, he was unable to accept terms that, I think for most in Israel, were far beyond anyone anticipated the government going.

I wanted to get your sense of is this a problem that Mr. Arafat, among other things, has not prepared the Palestinian people, the sacrifices that would need to be made in order to find either a long-term or a short-term solution. And if that is the case, if both the Palestinian people and the surrounding Arab nations will never be prepared, under current leadership will never be prepared to go as far as necessary to meet the farthest point the Israeli people are willing to go, what can this Administration or this Congress do to change the climate in the Middle East to make the parties understand that mutual sacrifice is a necessary part of even a short-term solution?

If I first could get your sense of was that part of the problem and what remains to be done about it?

Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, as I said before, I think that a lot of opportunities were missed over the course of the last year. A lot of mistakes were made. I am not a big believer in finger-pointing myself or trying to precisely apportion blame. It is a very complicated diplomatic picture, but the truth is a lot of people lost out on opportunities.

I have not, myself, given up hope that we can not, some day, get back to the point where those kind of possibilities exist again, but I am also realistic. The two parties are in a very difficult situation right now and we are where we are, and what I think the United States has to do is to work as hard as we can.

It is not our exclusive responsibility. There are others in the international community in the region who have to play an important and constructive role, too, but I think we have to exercise leadership in our own interest in the region and in the interest of our relationship with Israel as well as the Palestinians.

To begin, two things: first, to push in a practical direction, which can only come if violence is reined in and we can get to the sort of modest stages of implementing the Mitchell Commission report, which is a bridge to get back to a negotiating process.

Regarding that negotiating process, we are not going to be able to turn the clock back and move immediately back to the place that people were a year ago, but I think it also is important for the United States to continue to remind the parties, and here I think it is the vast majority of the Israelis and Palestinians as much as the leaderships, that there is a political pathway, that there is political hope out there, that there is a way in which, through a political process, you can reach a resolution of their differences that addresses the concerns and the aspirations of both peoples and allows them to live side by side.

I think it is important for us, as distant as that day may seem right now and as difficult as the situation is, for us to be able to

remind people that that is the only real possibility which exists right now.

Mr. SCHIFF. I do not disagree with that at all. The concern I have, though, is that even if you could turn back the clock a year, which plainly you cannot, that would not be good enough, because when the clock had been turned back before all the violence began or began anew, there still was not a climate suitable to reach a settlement.

I am not interested in trying to simply finger-point either, but the broader problem I am trying to get at is whether it is out of a failure of leadership or otherwise, it seems to me that the Palestinian constituency was not prepared to go as far as it would take.

How do we impress upon either the leadership in the Arab world or the Palestinian people what the brass tacks are of any kind of a short-term or long-term resolution?

Mr. BURNS. I think it is a very good question, Congressman, and it is a fair criticism, also, of what happened and what did not happen, because one of the real tests of leadership, whether it is Palestinian leadership or Israeli leadership, is preparing people for difficult choices and for people on both sides to understand that practical compromises are going to be essential if you are ever going to get that kind of a settlement.

I think one of the things, as I mentioned before, sir, that was most valuable in the Mitchell Commission report is that one of its recommendations does focus on the question of incitement, for example, which gets right to your point about preparing people for a future of coexistence.

Mr. SCHIFF. Probably the most graphic example is the failure in Palestinian textbooks to include mention of Israel. If even at the level of that preparation there is not a foundation, then what hope can there be for the children reading those textbooks a decade or two decades from now to have them willing to make the sacrifices necessary to achieve a meaningful peace?

Mr. BURNS. I think, sir, it is a test of leadership for Palestinians and it is also, in many way, a test of leadership for Israelis. The problem you mentioned about textbooks is a very real one and it has to be addressed and I think as we, hopefully, get to the point of implementing the Mitchell Commission report, that is something, that in whatever role we can play, we need to focus on.

It is important, also, for Israeli leadership to be equally direct about the kinds of things which have a very negative effect on the environment and make it more difficult to calm the situation, whether it is issues as I raised before, housing demolition, settlement activity, those kinds of things as well. So I think for both leaderships, it is very important to prepare people for the situation which hopefully we will return to one day.

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Wexler.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, Mr. Secretary, I would like to applaud Secretary Powell's good judgment in elevating you to head our Middle East team. Your record stands for itself and it is one of extraordinary integrity and thoughtfulness and you are a very decent man in a process that sometimes may not seem to be so decent.

Your expression of hope with respect to the idea that, still, the extreme elements or the extreme points of view are a minority and there still is a majority of both Palestinians and Israelis who generally desire peace—in my heart, I hope that is correct, but if I could read or share with you something you may already know, part of a note that was sent to the family of the suicide bomber in Tel Aviv, where the writer expressed that the suicide bomber in Tel Aviv was a hero, that his deed was heroic, and that, "to turn one's body into a bomb is the best example of willingness to make a sacrifice." That letter was from Yasir Arafat to the family of the Tel Aviv Suicide Bomber.

In that context, to follow Mr. Schiff's question with respect to incitement, this is not a novel discussion anymore, Palestinian textbooks, Palestinian television shows, Sesame Street type shows that applaud and encourage children to blow people up. This is not new and I am as guilty as anyone throughout the process of supporting the peace process. I overlooked it. I made excuses for it.

I said, "Well, that's only one show, but look at the other 20 shows that are not like that," but it seems to me those like yourself who are in charge of this program at this point have as great an obligation not just be hopeful, but also be realistic and be cognizant of past performance.

So in that regard, I am wondering what consequences can the United States lay out for the Palestinian Authority in terms of incitement rather than a discussion?

And you say both sides need to be direct, and I appreciate that, and it is a two-way street, but in terms of incitement, what standards can we set up and what consequences can we lay out so that, in fact, we know what will occur when the Palestinians, if they do, continue in this way?

Mr. BURNS. Well, I think one of the things I could offer, sir, is that, if and when we get to the stage of implementing the full body of the Mitchell report, and again, incitement is one of the clear recommendations, one of the clear issues that has to be tackled according to those recommendations, it is going to be very important, I think, for us and for others in the international community to hold people accountable for their obligations.

Both sides have said they accept Mitchell word for word, and, with regard to the question of incitement, that implies a clear sense of obligations for the Palestinian leadership, and I think we are going to have to be willing to speak out about those issues in a way that, maybe in the past, we have not always done.

Mr. WEXLER. Could you refresh my memory? In one of the past agreements, was there not a group or commission that was set up specifically for this purpose?

Mr. BURNS. Yes, sir.

Mr. WEXLER. It was after the Wye Agreement and it is a group that has met from time to time but had fallen essentially into disuse and, especially over the last 10 months, as the atmosphere in the region collapsed, has not met in a long time as far as I know, but it is the kind of issue that has to be addressed very seriously. I agree with you.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Wexler.

Mr. Engel.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, again, I want to thank you, as my colleague Mr. Wexler did, for the good work that you have done through the years and the good work that you continue to do.

My colleagues have all raised different points and I concur with virtually every point that has been raised. What disturbs me is that sometimes in some quarters from our government, I hear talks of even-handedness. Indeed, even in your remarks, and perhaps you are trying to be the diplomat, you said that, in the negotiations, people broke taboos. It really was not people that broke taboos. Prime Minister Barak broke taboos by talking about Jerusalem and doing all kinds of things.

And what disturbs me about it is that I think we send the wrong message, quite frankly, when we talk about even-handedness. Yes, we want an end to violence. Yes, violence needs to stop, but I think, quite frankly, there is a difference between one side which is deliberately inciting violence and causing children to get involved and another side where a lot of it is self-defence, a lot of it are different acts.

It is not orchestrated by the entity that is supposed to govern these people, and I just wish that we would not talk about both sides ought to end the violence. Yes, violence ought to end wherever it rears its ugly head, but in doing that, we equate one side with another, and frankly, I think it is really not in balance at all, and I would like you to comment on that because, even in your remarks, you tend to do that, and I just think we do a tremendous disservice to the whole process when we do that, because it gives the people that are encouraging kids to blow themselves up some hope.

Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, at first, I understand the seriousness of your point and of your concern and I do not think it is a question of equivalence. I think, in my mind, it is a more practical question. There is absolutely no doubt, as I have said before, that the Palestinian leadership needs to do more to rein in violence and that is something that we will continue to impress upon them at every level as clearly as we can.

Incitement, as was mentioned before, is also a problem that needs to be tackled head-on without any equivocation or dissembling, but at the same time, again, as a practical question, it is important to recognize the need to avoid other kind of steps which are provocative, whether it is housing demolitions, which is one example of that, and that is not a question, again, as I said, sir, of equivalency. It is a practical question of taking certain steps and avoiding certain steps that make it more difficult to calm the situation.

Mr. ENGEL. I do not want to read the whole thing, but a German television network just last month reported on its program a special titled, "The Father of the Terrorist," and focusing on the life of the Tel Aviv disco suicide bomber, his family and friends.

One of the things I want to just quote is it says,

> "The album, a tell-tale collection of condolence letters, this one here from the Hamas, but much more surprising for us,

> there is also a letter from Arafat. 'It was a heroic deed,' he lets his Embassy in Jordan write to the family. 'To turn ones body into a bomb is the best example of willingness to make a sacrifice,'"

signed Yasir Arafat.

I have a resolution that Mr. Cantor is sponsoring with me which is talking about the participation of children in organized Palestinian violence and we are asking our colleagues to really condemn that children are being urged on by their role models and people in positions of authority to take part in the violence.

They violate the basic principles embodied in the U.N. convention on the rights of the child, which says that persons under 15 should not take a direct part in hostilities, and I think it is important to condemn the Palestinian Authority for its abuse of the rights of the children as laid out in the U.N. convention, and I just wish that our government would be a little bit more forthcoming in laying the blame where the blame is.

Because I, too, had tremendous hopes for the peace process. I concur with what Mr. Berman said before when he said tell me how I am wrong.

I think this was a con job. I am sorry to have to say that, but I have come to the terrible conclusion that—you know, every time in the negotiations when it seemed that the parties were just about to make an agreement, the Palestinian side would throw in one more obstacle and the final obstacle was the right of return, which, in essence, takes away the whole Jewishness of the state of Israel, which is certainly something that no Prime Minister can accept, and I just think that we ought to be just a little louder and a little more forthcoming.

And the final thing I want to say is the Embassy. We ought to just move our Embassy to Jerusalem, because now what we are doing is rewarding the Palestinians for their intransigence by saying, well, we're going to wait again, and I think that President Clinton was wrong in not moving the Embassy and I think President Bush is wrong for not doing it not.

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Crowley.

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I showed Eliot an article here that he was reading earlier this morning. I got a chance to catch up, I guess, now, and that is the front page of today's New York Times which I am sure you have read this morning and it talks about the overall failure in the talks in the Mid-East and who is to blame, and that, according to this article, everyone has some share of the blame here, and this kind of piggybacks with what Eliot was talking about, is that there have been peace negotiations that have taken place in certain parts of the world that have hit rough spots and have broken down.

Look at Northern Ireland, for instance, where there has been some what of a breakdown on the negotiations at this point, but there has not been the level of violence, even in a percentage or a scale way in Northern Island as there has been in the Middle East, in other parts of the world as well when we have come to—especially when the United States is involved in the middle of those peace negotiations.

It seems to lay the blame everywhere, but simply the fact that violence occurred, that violence took place—and who was responsible for that violence? Was it the Israelis or was it the Palestinians? And I think that is sometimes where I do not think this is a very fair treatment in terms of who is to blame.

You know, you talk about the negotiations, but the bottom line is negotiations take place, they succeed, and they fail. They do not necessarily have to resort back to violence, and I think that is something that the article, in my opinion, is clearly missing.

I just want to go back. I do not know if anyone has touched on this, but the State Department's most recent PLO Commitments Compliance Act report issued at the end of March at this year is, at certain points, quite explicit in its description of the culpability of certain PLO elements in the ever-deteriorating situation in the Middle East.

Now, specifically, the report discusses the Tanzim, and more vaguely, Arafat's Palestinian police force, and I am just going to quote from one portion of that. It said,

> "Palestinian civilians throwing stones or Molotov cocktails were often joined by Palestinian police or Tanzim using firearms, shooting at Israeli troops or civilians, usually settlers, became common."

My question to you is are the Tanzim involved against Israeli targets, and if so, would you please characterize their actions, specifically either involving shootings, bombings, operational training for terrorists or all of the above?

Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, there is no question, as we made clear in that report, that there are individuals that belong to those organizations, Force 17 and Tanzim in particular, who have been involved in acts of violence against Israelis, and it is a question that not only is a serious concern but it is also something that we are very seriously reviewing.

One of the key factors that we look into, which is provided for in the criteria for designating such organizations, is the extent to which those individuals were directed in those actions by their leaderships and we are taking a very careful look at the information we have about that.

Mr. CROWLEY. So it is possible they will be designated a terrorist organization?

Mr. BURNS. We are very seriously reviewing that issue against the backdrop of the criteria that I mentioned.

Mr. CROWLEY. Well, I guess the question is whether or not Arafat or other leaders within the Palestinian Authority gave the Tanzim authority to shoot or to commit those acts.

Mr. BURNS. The issue, I think, as I understand it, sir, is exactly that. There is no question but that individuals have been involved, as you have said and we have said in that report. The issue is the extent to which they were directed by their leaderships, and that is something we are evaluating.

Mr. CROWLEY. And I know that there has been some question as to whether or not Arafat himself or high-level officials sanctioned those acts, but if I just bring to your attention, given the recent statements by Chairman Arafat and with respect for his union with

Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, I think one could make the reasonable determination that he did sanction those attacks, and I hope that those statements subsequent to those attacks since then will be taken into consideration.

Mr. BURNS. We will take a very careful look at all that information, sir.

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you.

And I yield back.

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Crowley.

I have just one or two more questions that I would like to ask. They were so close to a deal when Barak was still there. Why did not Mr. Arafat take advantage of that? Any thoughts about that, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. BURNS. Sir, as I said before, I am not sure it makes a lot of sense for me—I was not a direct participant in that period—to offer a judgment.

Mr. GILMAN. Yes. I recognize that, but in looking back?

Mr. BURNS. It is a very complicated diplomatic picture. Having experienced these things in earlier incarnations in my own career, generally, I shy away from making sweeping judgments about those kind of issues because it is very complicated, and, as I said before, you can easily see how a number of parties made mistakes and missed opportunities.

I think Palestinians obviously had a huge opportunity before them and it is important to learn lessons from that as, hopefully, we move back in the direction of a political process.

Mr. GILMAN. All right. Now, in the foreign aid appropriations bill for fiscal year 2002, there are provisions for the Ackerman-Gilman bill on PLO compliance. That is H.R. 1795. What is the Administration's position on conditioning assistance on PLO compliance in the foreign aid bill?

Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, I guess I would say several things. First, the Administration, as I have stressed, is quite concerned, as you are, about the issue of Palestinian compliance with their commitments.

Second, as I have described, including the efforts of President Bush, Secretary Powell, and many others in the Administration, we have continued to push very hard at every level of the Palestinian leadership to try and press for compliance with those commitments, particularly with regard to the question of violence.

But the third thing I would say in response to the particular legislation is that, in our judgment, it is going to make it more difficult for us to continue that kind of high-level press if some of the elements in the legislation are introduced and the possibility of sanctions is raised. That is going to make it more difficult for us to continue the kind of engagement that I think is going to be essential to bring about the compliance that we both seek.

Mr. GILMAN. Hopefully, it will give you more leverage in your negotiations.

Mr. Ackerman for the last question.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to take another shot at the question you asked from a different direction, if I might.

Rather than analyzing why Arafat might have rejected the Israeli proposal, how about a reading? On a scale of one to ten, how surprised were you and/or others in the department that Arafat rejected an offer of that magnitude?

Mr. BURNS. Well, sir, I do not think it was a simple question of who offered what and who rejected what. You had a complicated diplomatic picture that spread on from Camp David through the end of the year and the beginning of the year 2001 and there was still serious engagement going on directly between the two parties, without us being there, almost up until the eve of the Israeli election and a fair amount of ground covered between the two parties.

So I guess what surprised and, more than surprised, disappointed me, and I am sure many of my colleagues in the Administration as well as in the Congress, was that, given the grounds that the two parties had covered and given what seemed to be possible, that we not only were not able to reach a point of real political progress, but that we descended so rapidly into the extremely difficult and violent situation we are in now.

Mr. ACKERMAN. You are really good. I will let you go on that, but I want to ask you—you said in response to Mr. Gilman that a number of parties made mistakes and had missed opportunities. Could you just tell us the biggest mistake you think the Israelis made and the biggest mistake the Palestinians made, without doing that little dance that you're good at?

Mr. BURNS. I am sorry. I will not try and do the dance, but, honestly, I do not think it is going to be very helpful for me—I was not a direct participant—to offer a judgment. I think what is a disappointment, as I said, is that we were not able to achieve more political progress than we did.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank you, Mr. Secretary, and I thank you for your participation. This hearing, I believe, is extremely unusual in that it appeared to me that at least almost every participant in the hearing on both sides of the aisle had the same point of view, not that we are marching in lock step because that does not happen here, very rarely, but certainly I think the questions were indicative that most people on the Committee, at least this Subcommittee, view the facts relatively the same way and we appreciate you being here with us.

Mr. BURNS. Sure.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.

Just one last thought, we were informed that, during the Camp David negotiations, Arafat was told by the Egyptians that he should not compromise on Jerusalem. Is there any basis for that?

Mr. BURNS. I do not know, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. All right. Thank you very much for being here. Thank you for taking the time. We look forward to having more meetings with you.

The Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE PALESTINIANS, PART II

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:15 p.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. GILMAN. The Committee will come to order.

This morning we will hear testimony from President Clinton's former Special Envoy to the Middle East, Ambassador Dennis Ross, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and Ambassador of the United States to Israel, Ambassador Martin Indyk, and former Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs and Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, Ambassador Edward Walker, on U.S. policy toward the Palestinians as well, and the impact of the continuing violence between the Palestinians and Israel on regional stability. I want to thank our panelists for their tireless efforts to promote peace in the region and we welcome them before our Subcommittee this afternoon.

The events of September 11th have shown us that terrorism is a national security threat, not only to our country but to nations throughout the world. It is not just a price we pay for being a superpower, a some have portrayed it—not merely the "cost of doing business." It is an attack on our way of life, and it can have severe consequences throughout the world. It is not an acceptable "negotiating tactic."

The September 11th attacks have given Mr. Arafat, in the words of one Israeli leader, "the opportunity to climb down from the tree of violence and terror." We call on Chairman Arafat to demonstrate his sincerity in the worldwide anti-terrorism coalition by immediately and unconditionally rooting out the infrastructure of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

We have been asking Mr. Arafat to accomplish this for at least the past 6 years, but without adequate cooperation to date.

The September 11th attacks have traumatized our American people and awakened them to the dangers of suicide terrorism. We should remember that Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have employed suicide tactics for years. To Israelis, suicide bombings are not new.

Mr. Arafat's announcements of a ceasefire is certainly welcome, and we hope that it will hold, but it is not sufficient, in my esti-

mation, to qualify Mr. Arafat for membership in our emerging coalition.

The terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are not only an argument for retaining a very strong strategic relationship with Israel, but our relationship with countries with whom we are forming a coalition to fight terror, like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, is endangered by the continuing violence. But if the aim of this recent cease-fire is merely tactical, than Mr. Arafat misses the point entirely.

Chairman Arafat must realize that a full and complete cessation of all hostilities today is in his best interest. Our nation has an inherent lack of patience for the use of terrorism as a negotiating tactic. In the disaster that has now taken place in America, the Palestinians should see the grim prospects of their own future if they maintain their violent course of the past year as a means to achieve their national aspirations. In other words, the Palestinians are playing with fire if they choose to continue violence.

What we would like to accomplish at this afternoon's hearing is to learn how the expert witnesses now view our nation's relationship with the Palestinians in the wake of their 1 year of sustained violence, the wave of terror that has been unleashed on our shores, and the prospects for rebuilding Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

I now call on our Ranking Minority Member, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

This morning we will hear testimony from President Clinton's former Special Envoy to the Middle East, Ambassador Dennis Ross, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs and Ambassador of the United States to Israel, Ambassador Martin Indyk, and former Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs and Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, Edward Walker, on U.S. policy toward the Palestinians, and the impact of the continuing violence between the Palestinians and Israel on regional stability. I thank them for their tireless efforts to promote peace in the region and welcome them before the Subcommittee this morning

The events of September 11, 2001 have shown us that terrorism is a national security threat. It is not just a price we pay for being a superpower, as some have portrayed it—not merely the "cost of doing business." It is an attack on our way of life, and it can have severe consequences. It is not an acceptable "negotiating tactic."

The September 11 attacks give Arafat, in the words of one Israeli leader, "the opportunity to climb down from the tree of violence and terror." I call on Chairman Arafat to demonstrate his sincerity in the worldwide anti-terrorism coalition by immediately and unconditionally rooting out the infrastructure of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. We have been asking him to accomplish this for at least the past 6 years, but without adequate cooperation to date. The September 11 attacks traumatized the American people and awakened them to the danger of suicide terrorism. We should remind Chairman Arafat that Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have employed suicide tactics for years. To Israelis, suicide bombings are nothing new. Arafat's announcement of a ceasefire is certainly welcome, and we hope it holds, but it is not sufficient, in my estimation, to qualify Arafat for membership in our emerging coalition.

The terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are not only an argument for retaining a very strong strategic relationship with Israel, but our relationship with countries with whom we are forming a coalition to fight terror, like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, is endangered by the continuing violence. But if the aim of this recent cease-fire is merely tactical, than Arafat misses the point entirely.

Chairman Arafat must realize that a full and complete cessation of all hostilities today is in his best interests. The United States have an inherent lack of patience for the use of terrorism as a negotiating tactic. In the disaster that befell America, the Palestinians should see the grim prospects of their own future if they maintain the violent course of the past year as a means to achieve their national aspirations. In other words, the Palestinians are playing with fire if they chose to continue the violence.

What we would like to accomplish at this morning's hearing is to learn how the expert witnesses now view the United State's relationship with the Palestinians in the wake of their 1 year of sustained violence, the wave of terror that has been unleashed on our shores, and the prospects for rebuilding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

I now call on my colleague, Mr. Ackerman, the ranking Member of the subcommittee.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank and commend you for calling this second hearing to examine U.S. policy toward the Palestinians. We have a very distinguished group of witnesses with us, and I expect the hearing to be very informative.

Even with the nation's attention fixed on the horrendous damage in New York and at the Pentagon, and the military preparations underway, I think it is very important for this Subcommittee to continue to focus on a subject which is sure to remain at the heart of debate about U.S.-Middle East policy and our bilateral relations with the Arab states and the Islamic nations of the world.

In the time of crisis such as the one our nation now faces, the need for an active, discerning and vigorous foreign policy does not go away. In fact, it increases substantially.

The movement and actions of our troops and planes and ships will not eliminate the need for the United States to engage with other nations to achieve our common goals. Indeed, our nation's campaign against international terrorism can only be successful if the two components—democracy and military action—are used to complement each other.

Today, we will focus on America's goals vis-a-vis the Palestinians. Before going any further we ought to address the suggestion that some have made that the atrocities of September 11th were the result of America's policy of supporting Israel. This theory is not only wrong, it has things exactly backwards.

The forces of terror attacked Israel because they support the same values that we do. Israel is a bulkhead of freedom and democracy and western values in that part of the world.

The goal of the terrorists who have viciously attacked our nation was not to change our policy. Their intent was to assault our nation and everything that it represents.

On September 11th, freedom was attacked. Pluralism was attacked. Religious tolerance was attacked. Free expression was attacked. While it is true that the people we believe are responsible for the barbarism of September 11th do hate Israel, the significance of this fact lies not in the complexity of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but rather the character of the State of Israel.

Israel has been a target because Israel is a nation like the United States, open, diverse, democratic, capitalistic, and importantly, more importantly, a western society in its values, beliefs and orientation. Indeed, Israel has been under attack since its creation just for this reason.

Mr. Chairman, since September 2000, over 175 Israelis have been killed, more than 1700 have been injured by Palestinian terrorism of exactly the same nature as the attacks on the United States earlier this month. And every single one of these Israeli casualties represents a violation of the commitment to nonviolence the Palestinians once swore to uphold in their pursuit of peace with Israel.

Mr. Chairman, you and I, together with Mr. Lantos, the Ranking Member of our Full Committee, have introduced legislation to require the President to impose sanctions on the Palestinians for failing to meet their freely given commitments not to engage in or to passively allow any act of violence against Israel during the pursuit of a final settlement.

We introduced this legislation after our language was blocked from being offered as a Floor amendment to the State Department's Authorization Act because of objections from the Administration.

Perhaps now, after America has been attacked, the Administration will think more carefully about what message the United States ought to send about the acceptability of violence against civilians to achieve political ends.

The time has come too for the Palestinians to choose whether they will make a final and decisive break with their old bad habits. In the world that was remade on September 11th, there are, as the President said, only two sides: those fighting with American and against terrorism, and those who are supporting it.

This struggle, which I believe looks more like the Cold War than the Gulf War, demands of the Palestinian Authority a fundamental examination of the nature of their relationship with the United States, and I hope that with this review will come a genuine realization that the use of violence to achieve their national aspirations is morally wrong, self-defeating, and utterly unacceptable to all civilized nations and to none more so than to the United States of America.

The Palestinians have to choose which side of the fence to be on. After September 11th, there can be no more straddling.

Only a few weeks ago, I met with Chairman Arafat in Ramallah, and I handed him a list in Arabic of four individuals that the government of Israel had asked the Palestinian security forces to apprehend on five separate occasions. Then I watched a particularly Palestinian kind of "kabuki" dance. They looked at the list, they passed it from one to another,

> "Him. I don't know if we know him. Do we know him? I thought we arrested him. No, we arrested his brother. Was it his brother? No, I think it was him. I'm sure we got him. Didn't we get him?"

And this went on and on, and I was the sixth person to present this list.

The Palestinian Authority has been playing this kind of game for far too long and at far too great a price. Terrorists get taken into custody only to be released hours later. Terrorists get incarcerated in hotels where they can do their wicked work by phone and fax and visitors. And terrorists are picked up by the Palestinian secu-

rity forces only to put them in a protection plan to prevent them from being attacked and apprehended by the Israelis.

Palestinian leaders sit down with the very worst, most barbarious terrorists, and then speak plaintively of their commitment and desire for peace. This kind of offensive nonsense has got to stop. Either the Palestinian leadership is interested in peace or it is not.

Now, last week, Chairman Arafat promised to place all his capabilities at our country's service, and has offered to join a coalition to "end terrorism against unarmed civilians."

I hope this is for real. I really do, Mr. Chairman. There are some very promising signs but unfortunately we have a year of senseless bloodshed which makes this pledge seem a bit unreal, perhaps even a bit ridiculous. If Chairman Arafat and the people he leads are serious, they will have to do more than to read from the right set of talking points. They are going to have to take steps that they have been avoiding, ducking, or rejecting since this time last year. They are going to have to start making arrests, and when they put people in jail, they are going to have to keep them there even when there is a great deal of pressure to do otherwise. They are going to have to respond seriously to Israeli security requests, and more often still, they are going to have to act without being asked, and certainly without being reminded. They are going to have to control their security forces, and this means all of them and all the time. And they are going to have to be absolutely up front the with Palestinian people about where they stand and what they are doing. The days of talking peace in English on Monday, and preaching Jihad in Arabic on Friday have got to end.

The Palestinian account that the American Bank of Trust is in deep default. If they want to fix this, and I hope they will, they have to start making big deposits.

In my view, ending all attacks on Israel and conducting a campaign to destroy the infrastructure of Hamas, Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, are the only kind of payments that will suffice to open this account again.

As the President said, the choice is theirs. Either they are with us or they are with the terrorists, and I hope they choose more wisely than they did in 1990, when they decided to back Saddam Hussein.

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling the hearing, and I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. Pitts?

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening another important hearing regarding U.S. policy toward the Palestinians. I would like to submit my entire statement for the record, but would like to give some of it.

While the topic of this afternoon's hearings has always been a matter of U.S. priority, peace in the region has taken on a new sense of urgency in light of the September 11th terrorist attacks.

I want to begin by emphasizing that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that we are addressing today is complex. It has a long history. The roots of this conflict are deep. There are no easy answers or solutions.

Though this situation can seem hopeless and frustrating, we must realize that the United States does have an important role to play in bringing the two sides together. We are working to encourage a dialogue that can lead to peace and stability in the region. We have been blessed with peace and prosperity throughout much of our own history, and we have long sought to bring peace to other parts of the world.

While it may seem that the United States now has priorities for restoring peace and security in our homeland, we must realize the importance that peace in the Middle East has to our own circumstances. It is vital that the United States have strong allies on which it can depend.

Israel is a tremendously important strategic partner in an unstable region of the world. Our nation is committed to Israel's security. This does not, however, give Israel a blank check. Israel has an even greater responsibility in this peace process. Israel should continue negotiations and to work toward peace.

I am concerned about reports detailing human rights abuses such as the excessive use of force against Palestinian civilians, the demolition of Palestinian homes and the use of inflammatory rhetoric.

As the United States continues its involvement in this arena, we must keep in mind that we are dealing with more than just political leaders from Israel and the Palestinian Authority. We are dealing with families, innocent civilians and children who want nothing more than to live in peace.

The last 2 weeks have given Americans a terrifying taste of what it feels like to live in daily fear of attack. Before, we could only imagine how it felt to live each day under the threat of another suicide bomber. Now we know what it means to live with a feeling of terror as a daily companion.

Like most Israelis, the vast majority of Palestinians simply want to live in peace. They want to be free to work and provide food and a good life for their families. Unfortunately, many of them believe that they are trapped by a hopelessness that leads them to believe they will never prosper, live in peace. This helplessness or hopelessness has provided an opening to Islamic extremists, many of them from outside the country who are effectively teaching Palestinian children that violence is the only way to get the attention of the international community.

Palestinian children are learning math by counting figures of tanks and murdered Israelis. They are taught to hate Israelis and to kill them. They are taught that the greatest thing they can—that you can do for Allah is sacrifice yourself in the murder of infidels, which is not the true teaching of Islam. The Palestinians are being brainwashed and manipulated for the political gain of a few mad men, and the longer this goes on the harder it will be to turn around.

We must teach ourselves to separate terrorist from the vast majority of Palestinian families. Seeing them all as terrorist and rebels is wrong, inaccurate and unjust. Palestinians are also people created in the image of God. A violent response to frustration is something that this world is becoming more accustomed to seeing. It is contrary to what we teach our children. It is not a response that we can ever accept.

The poverty and hopelessness can be a breeding ground for terrorist recruitment, to acts of violence and false promises made by terrorists.

So we have a difficult task at hand in the Middle East. The challenges are great, overwhelming and so are the stakes for the United States. That makes having a steadfast resolve all the more essential as we pursue our common goal of protecting American interests in a tumultuous and uncertain period. We must be clear in communicating that terrorism should not be tolerated. We must act in this region with a firm but caring hand.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for bringing us here today to determine what the United States can do to promote peace in the Middle East. It is my hope that through our policies we can offer a new spirit of hope in the region.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pitts follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH R. PITTS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening another important hearing regarding U.S. policy toward the Palestinians. While the topic of this morning's hearing has always been a matter of U.S. priority, peace in the region has taken on a new sense of urgency in light of the September 11th terrorist attacks.

I want to begin by emphasizing that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that we are addressing today is complex and has a long history. The roots of this conflict are deep. There are no easy answers or solutions. Though this situation can seem hopeless and frustrating, we must realize that the United States does have an important role to play in bringing the two sides together. We are working to encourage a dialogue that can lead to peace and stability in the region. We have been blessed with peace and prosperity throughout much of our own history and we have long sought to bring peace to other parts of the world.

While it may seem that the United States now has priorities for restoring peace and security in our own homeland, we must realize the importance that peace in the Middle East has to our own circumstances. It is vital that the U.S. have strong allies on which it can depend.

Israel is a tremendously important strategic partner in an unstable region of the world. Our nation is committed to Israel's security. This does not, however, give Israel a blank check. Israel has an even greater responsibility in this peace process. Israel should continue negotiations and to work towards peace.

I am concerned about reports detailing the excessive use of force against the Palestinian civilians, the demolition of Palestinian homes, and the use of inflammatory rhetoric. As the United States continues its involvement in this arena, we must keep in mind that we are dealing with more than just political leaders from Israel and the Palestinian Authority. We are dealing with families, innocent civilians, and children who want nothing more than to live in peace.

The last two weeks have given Americans a terrifying taste of what is feels like to live in daily fear of attack. Before we could only imagine how it felt to live each day under the threat of another suicide bomber. Now we know what it means to live with the feeling of terror as a daily companion. Like most Israelis, the vast majority of Palestinians simply want to live in peace. They want to be free to work and provide food and a good life for their families. Unfortunately, many of them believe that they are trapped by a hopelessness that leads them to believe they will never prosper and live in peace. This helplessness has provided an opening to Islamic extremists (many from outside of the Palestinian community) who are effectively teaching Palestinian children that violence is the only way to get the attention of the international community. Palestinian children are learning math by counting figures of tanks and murdered Israelis. They are taught to hate Israelis and to kill them. They are taught that the greatest thing you can do for Allah is to sacrifice yourself in the murder of infidels (which is not the true teaching of Islam).

The Palestinians are being brainwashed and manipulated for the political gain of a few madmen. And, the longer this goes on, the harder it will be to turnaround. We must teach ourselves to separate terrorists from the vast majority of Palestinian

families. Seeing them all as terrorists and rebels is wrong, inaccurate and unjust. Palestinians are also people created in the image of God.

A violent response to frustration is something that this world is becoming more accustomed to seeing. It is contrary to what we teach our children and it is not a response that we can ever accept. The poverty and hopelessness can be a breeding ground for terrorist recruitment to acts of violence and false promises made by terrorists.

We have a difficult task at hand in the Middle East. The challenges are great and overwhelming, and so are the stakes for the United States. That makes having a steadfast resolve all the more essential as we pursue our common goal of protecting American interests in a tumultuous and uncertain period. We must be clear in communicating that terrorism should not be tolerated. We must act in this region with a firm but caring hand.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for bringing us here today to determine what the U.S. can do to promote peace in the Middle East. It is my hope that through our policies, we can offer a new spirit of hope in the region.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Pitts.

I am going to ask our colleagues, and I will call on each one who wants to make an opening statement, to please be brief since we are called back to the four at four o'clock for a security briefing by Secretary Powell and our defense secretary, and then there will be a vote intervening, so we do not have too much time for these distinguished panelists. Please be brief.

Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to also comment on the idea that if only we modified our policy toward Israel that this would be an effective way of making us safe from terrorism.

First of all, how did America react to Pearl Harbor? There were a few who said, well, if we only stop standing up for Chinese independence, we can placate those who attacked us. That would have been dishonorable and it would be dishonorable for us now to change our policy in response to an unprovoked attack.

But in this case, it would also be incredibly ineffective. Bin Laden's number one reason for waging war against us has nothing to do with today's hearing, but rather has to do with the fact that American troops are on the Arabian Peninsula defending Saudi Arabia and Kuwait from attack by Saddam Hussein. And only if we abandoned in an area with 75 percent of the world's oil reserves to whatever might occur, would bin Laden's chief objective be realized, and even then that would only wet his appetite. Any possible change, slight change, modest change in our policy toward Israel would only wet his appetite until he was able to force the destruction of all five million Jewish Israelis. And even then he would not rest. His appetite would be wetted.

But even if we were not worried about bin Laden, imagine what would happen to this country if we changed our foreign policy in response to this act of terror. How many people disagree with our policy in Colombia, Kovoso, Macedonia, Sumatra, Sir Lanka, Taiwan, and how many skyscrapers would they be willing to destroy in an effort to change our policy toward those areas?

We should instead renew and reinvigorate our alliance with Israel by providing Israel with the equipment necessary to intercept and decipher even more of the messages being sent in the Middle East. We must call upon Chairman Arafat to arrest terrorists, and we must remember those who danced in the streets of Nablus when they heard that thousands of Americans had per-

ished, and that cannot be blotted from our memory as easily as the Palestinian Authority was able to seize the video tapes.

We must also remember that the Palestinian Authority has treated those it calls martyrs, really suicide terrorists, with great honor and provided their families with pensions.

Mr. Chairman, it is now time for us to wage a war against terrorism and to ask on which side of the Palestinian Authority is in that war.

I yield back.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.

Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief, but I do want to take a brief moment to caution my colleagues as we address U.S. policy toward the Palestinians to see a clear distinction between the circumstances surrounding the Arab-Israeli issue and the senseless terrorist act that occurred on September 11, 2001.

Despite the recent escalations of violence, the situation between Palestinians and Israel has a solid political and economic dimension with grievances to be addressed on both sides. It is largely a regional conflict. It concerns territory and self-governance, and has hope for a final resolution through continued negotiations or to our colleagues here or renewed negotiations here perhaps.

Osama bin Laden and the—you would think I would be able to pronounce it—al-Qaeda network, on the other hand, represents an extreme system of beliefs, not consistent with Islam or any of the rest of the world's major religions. They are at war with western civilization, as many of my colleagues so rightfully put it, and they seek out of violence as the first resort rather than the last resort. With terrorists, there are no negotiations and their goal is death and destruction and terror, and our response must be the same.

If we are going to continue to hope for peace in the Middle East, we must recognize the difference between groups that are coming to the table negotiating a peace plan and for which there is a possible positive outcome, and those who focus only on death and destruction and for whom terror is their first choice.

And I want to hope that we all separate the two because, just as many of my colleagues before me said, there are those who want to tie the actions of Osama bid Laden to the Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine. Just as that is wrong to do, it is equally wrong to in fact tie to this terrorist act old grievances and old desires.

I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Issa follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DARRELL E. ISSA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Thank you, Chairman Gilman.

I want to take a brief moment to caution my colleagues as we address U.S. Policy towards the Palestinians to see the clear distinction between the circumstances surrounding the Arab-Israeli issue and the senseless terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.

Despite recent escalations in violence, the situation between the Palestinians and the Israelis has a solid political and economic dimension with grievances to be addressed on both sides. It is largely a regional conflict concerned with territory and self-governance and has hope for a final resolution through continued negotiation.

Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network, on the other hand, represent an extreme system of beliefs not consistent with Islam or any other major world religion. They are at war with western civilization itself and seek out violence as a first re-

sort, rather than a last resort. With terrorists, there are no negotiations because their goal is death, destruction, and terror.

If we are going to continue to hope for peace in the Middle East, we must recognize the difference between groups that are coming to the table to negotiate a peace plan and the violent fringe groups that make it on the evening news. It is my hope that as we focus our efforts to rid the world of terrorism, that this Committee does not fall into the trap of making parallels that don't exist.

I thank the Chairman for addressing this important issue and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Issa.

Mr. Engel?

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I too will be brief because I cannot think of a more distinguished panel and I am very anxious to listen to what they have to say.

I just want to say being a New Yorker that New York will obviously never be the same and the country will never be the same. And I think that perhaps we in the United States, unfortunately, now have a better understanding of what Israeli civilians have had to go through the years.

I need to disagree a little bit with my friend, Mr. Issa, because I do agree that in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict there are legitimate grievances on both sides. But I think what is the same is that the Palestinians and the terrorist groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad use civilian terror to try to further their goals, and the terrorists that knocked down the World Trade Center and went into the Pentagon also are trying to use civilian terror to achieve their goal, and this is what must be rejected.

I am tired of hearing the idiots in the State Department continue to talk about Israel using so-called disproportionate force or asking Israel to use restraint in the fight against terrorism. There can be no restraint in the fight against terrorism, as we have seen now in this country.

What terrorists have to have happen to them is they need to be erased. Their cells need to be broken up and they need to understand that there will be swift treatment of what they do because that is the only thing that terrorists will understand.

I am very mortified that President Bush did not include Hamas and Islamic Jihad on his list of groups to freeze assets. I think it is ludicrous to talk to Yasser Arafat and the Government of Syria and the Government of Iran to join in the war against terrorism so that we can somehow purify them or they can pretend that they are fighting terrorism when indeed they are in bed with the terrorists.

Mr. Ackerman is quite right when he says that Mr. Arafat speaks one thing in English for public consumption, and then says something quite different in Arabic. That to me is clearer than ever before.

And I think, having gone through the peace process, and I was a tremendous supporter of Oslo, and I know no one worked harder than Ambassador Ross in doing that, I have changed. I now no longer believe that Arafat wants peace or is inclined to stop using terrorism as a negotiating, violence as a negotiating tool. I wanted to believe that, but I no longer believe it given the events of the past year.

So I am anxious to hear what these gentlemen have to say. I think we need to be very careful and we need to understand that civilian terror is never acceptable. I don't care what anyone grievances are, I don't care how right anybody thinks the are, or how wronged anybody thinks they have been. Civilian terror is not acceptable. It is not acceptable in Israel. It is not acceptable in the United States. And it is not acceptable anywhere in the world.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Engel.

Mr. Cantor?

Mr. CANTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In light of September 11th terrorist attacks, I am more convinced than ever of the critical need for the United States to stand firmly with our democratic ally in the Middle East, Israel.

Recent statements and actions notwithstanding, in my opinion Yasser Arafat remains one of the largest obstacles to stability in the Middle East today. President Bush has noted that Chairman Arafat has not lived up to the commitments he has freely made, including the rearrest of individuals suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terrorism.

Chairman Arafat has done little to prevent acts of terrorism, and his inaction has in fact led to massive violence and terrorism against innocent Israelis, including women and children. He continues to use hostile and odious anti-semitic propaganda against the State of Israel, and refuses to stop terrorist attacks and inciteful rhetoric by organizations, individuals and groups under his control.

I would like at this time to thank the Chairman for his continued focus on examining the U.S. relationship with Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority, and I want to thank the panelists for being here as well.

The events of September 11th have shaken the world, and the response of the civilized nations has been unified in its focus to destroy international terrorism. I am hopeful that once and for all there will be no more talk of any moral equivalence of a terrorist attack on innocent people and a government's right to mobilize and defend its people with all its might.

And I would just like to ask the panelists, if they could in their remarks, address, if you will—we know that the United States is working very hard to enlist the cooperation of countries all over the world in our quest to rid the world of international terrorism, and seeking intelligence and information from nations that, yes, appear on the State Department's list of terrorist nations. Although the Palestinian Authority is not on there, the fact is we have had public statements by Mr. Arafat, and there is other evidence indicating his connection to Hamas, Islamic Jihad and others, and I would just ask you, if you could, just briefly during your remarks address the validity, the sincerity or the genuineness of any information that may be forthcoming by Mr. Arafat given his relationship with Hamas or Islamic Jihad.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cantor.

Ms. Berkley.

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is quite a pleasure to have the three of you here. I am most anxious to hear what you have to say, although I have heard you speak many times before.

The Chairman this morning told us that brevity is the very soul of eloquence, and I wish I could be eloquent at this moment, and I will submit my comments, but I do want to say a few words for the record.

Like many others, I was encouraged on September 18th, when the Palestinians announced that they would finally agree to a ceasefire, and the Israelis immediately agreed to halt all military operations. The ceasefire was immediately tested the very next day with the shooting death of an Israeli civilian in the West Bank, and it seems that again the Palestinians are unable to carry out their side of the bargain. Another unarmed Israeli civilian was killed while driving to her kibbutz just yesterday.

Almost 10 years into the so-called peace process and I, like my good friend, Elliot Engel, was a firm and steadfast believer and proponent of the peace process. I do believe at this point that Arafat used it for his own purposes and not for the purpose of peace. It is most unfortunate that there would have to be a ceasefire.

Yasser Arafat stood on the White House lawn as a symbol of a new Middle East where violence was to be replaced by negotiations, but Nobel Peace Prize notwithstanding, Arafat and the Palestinian leadership have never failed to incite violence when they thought it would be convenient for their cause.

A new report issued in accordance with the PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989 states unequivocally that the PA leadership did nothing to prevent, and they have incited violence in clear violation of previous commitments. An excerpt from the report reads,

> "Available evidence indicates that elements with the PLO, specifically Tanzim Force 17, and members of other security forces, were involved in acts of violence against Israelis. It is clear that these armed elements were not disciplined. Moreover senior PLO and PA leaders did little to prevent, and they have even encouraged an atmosphere of incitement to violence in the Palestinian media and through public statements of Palestinian officials."

At our last hearing I suggested that it was time for our Palestinian—for the Palestinians to make a choice between aligning themselves with the perpetrators of terror, Hamas, Hezbollah, Saddam Hussein, or they could follow through their promises of the last 10 years to refrain from violence and negotiate in good faith. I was delighted when our President used similar remarks in his speech on Thursday, which I thought was probably one of the more outstanding speeches I have heard.

If the United States is going to continue to have a relationship with the Palestinian people, it is essential that their leadership commit in both words and actions to ending the violence and must in no uncertain terms renounce terrorism once and for all. Arafat must finally send a message to Hamas, Islamic Jihad and any oth-

ers who would commit terrorist acts that there is no—that this kind—that this is no longer welcomed and acceptable.

If I could comment on Mr. Ackerman's meeting with Arafat and Erekat. We had a similar meeting 3 weeks ago when I was in Israel. At that time Erekat denied ever having received any list from anybody that had known and suspected terrorists on it. We know that to be an absolute bold-faced lie.

And I would also wish to admonish our Administration that when we put together our coalition to fight bin Laden, when we look to these people and have them mouth the words that they are going to renounce terrorism, they need to renounce terrorism period; not just in the United States, but throughout the world, particularly in Israel, because killing civilians is killing civilians, whether in Israel, England or New York City. And trying to make a distinction between the two, I think is offensive to civilized people across the planet.

Thank you.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Ms. Berkley.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Berkley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHELLEY BERKLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA

Thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this important hearing. I am pleased that the committee can hear from three distinguished scholars and diplomats with unparralled experience in the Middle East.

Like many others, I was encouraged on September 18th, when the Palestinians announced that they would finally agree to a cease fire, and the Israelis immediately agreed to halt all military operations. The cease-fire was tested the very next day with the shooting death of an Israeli civilian in the West Bank. And it seems that again the Palestinians are unable to carry out their side if the bargain as yet another unarmed Israeli civilian was killed while driving to her Kibbutz just yesterday.

Almost ten years into the so-called peace process it is ludicrous that there would have to be a cease-fire. Yasir Arafat stood on the White House lawn, as a symbol of a new Middle East where violence was replaced by negotiation. But Noble Peace Prize or not, Arafat and the Palestinian leadership has never failed to incite violence when they thought it was convenient for their cause.

In fact, a new report issued in accordance with the PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989, states unequivocally that the PA leadership did nothing to prevent, and may have incited violence in clear violation of previous commitments. An excerpt from the report reads, "Available evidence indicates that elements within the PLO, specifically Tanzim, Force 17, and members of other security forces, were involved in acts of violence against Israelis . . . it is clear that these armed elements were not disciplined . . . Moreover, senior PLO and PA leaders did little to prevent—and may even have encouraged—an atmosphere of incitement to violence in the Palestinian media and through the public statements of Palestinian officials."

At our last hearing I suggested that it was time for the Palestinians to make a choice between aligning themselves with the per-

petrators of terror, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Saddam Hussein or they could follow through on their promises of the last 10 years, refrain from violence, and negotiate in good faith. Especially in light if recent events, I reiterate this claim. You can not be friends with America if you are friends with terror and violence.

If the United States is going to continue to have a relationship with the Palestinian people, it is essential that their leadership commit in both word and action to ending the violence, and must in no uncertain terms renounce terrorism once and for all. Arafat must send a message to Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, and any others who would commit terrorist acts that there kind is no longer welcome.

Thank you very much.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you and the Ranking Member for holding this hearing. And I want to identify myself with your comments and those of the Ranking Member.

I will use the time given to me in an unusual way, Mr. Chairman. The media reported yesterday that a settler was killed in an automobile. It was a mother of three small children under the age of four. The mother was in her twenties. She viewed herself as a mother and her three small children called her mother.

I would like all of us to stand in a moment of silence in her memory.

[Moment of silence.]

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

We will now proceed with testimony by our panelists, and we thank them for being patient. Our first witness is Ambassador Ross, who is writing a book about his experiences in the pursuit of peace, and has recently joined the Washington Institute for Near East Policy as a distinguished fellow and counselor.

Ambassador Ross played a instrumental role in shaping U.S. involvement in the Middle East peace process during the prior Administrations as director of State Department's policy planning office during the Bush Administration and President Clinton's former special envoy to the Middle East. Ambassador Ross is no stranger to our Committee.

We welcome you back before us, Ambassador Ross. You may proceed. You may put your full statement in the record or you may shorten it, as you may desire.

Mr. ROSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GILMAN. Please press your button on your microphone.

Mr. ROSS. It would help, huh?

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DENNIS B. ROSS, COUNSELOR/DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

Mr. ROSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here. I would submit my full statement for the record, and I will offer a few comments to try to summarize what I think is most important.

Mr. GILMAN. Without objection.

Mr. ROSS. When we were invited to appear here, it was prior to September 11th, and obviously the comments that I would have made at that time would have been rather different than the comments I am about to make.

September 11th was a transforming event. As many have said, it was a defining moment. I think that President Bush was quite right when he said you either stand with us or you stand with the terrorists.

I also think that President Bush, Secretary Powell and others have been quite right in terms of saying this is no longer a war that we are simply having to counter; this is a war we are going to have to wage, and we are going to have to use all of the instruments that are available to us—legal instruments, law enforcement instruments, financial instruments, diplomatic instruments, military instruments.

But we need something even beyond that. We need to keep in mind that we are now having to wage a battle that has a major psychological component. One of the major problems we face in terms of dealing with terror is that terror flourishes in a climate where some see it as being legitimate. We are not going to be successful in contending with terror unless we can in fact delegitimize the use of terror, and that means we have to be prepared to do all we can to delegitimize any cause that thinks it can use terror for any purpose.

Terror is wrong. As many of you have said, it is always wrong. There cannot be one place where terror is fine and another place where it is not.

If in fact there are those who want to promote a cause using terror, we have to wage a campaign that makes it very clear on an international basis that that is not the case. No place is that more important than in the Middle East, because in the Middle East, unfortunately, and too often as reflected in the Arab medias, in particular, what one sees is that terror, suicide bombing is somehow seen as legitimate.

Too often we see that those who carry out suicide bombings are portrayed as martyrs, not as the monsters that they are. Too often we see that civilians who are killed are rationalized as just part of the struggle. Too often we see that those who are in fact recruiting kids to be human bombs are somehow celebrated as opposed to being condemned.

We have to see this change. It has to change now. When I say that I am not saying that I want to see censoring of the press in the Middle East. I would like to see a free press there. But I would like to see what appears that is clearly wrong have it condemned and discredited.

I am also not saying that there is not a legitimate cause that has to be addressed politically. I believe in fact the Palestinians have legitimate aspirations that are going to have to be addressed. But one thing has to be very clear, those leadership in the Middle East, including Chairman Arafat, but not limited to Chairman Arafat, have got to take on a climate that has become one in which terror is somehow seen as legitimate.

It is not good enough to condemn what happened here on September 11th if the behavior on a day-to-day basis does not reflect

it. It is not good enough to say you are going to be part of a coalition unless you are prepared to change a climate that somehow justifies the use of terror, justifies the use of suicide bombing.

The fact of the matter is what we need to see is a readiness on the part of Arab leaders and Chairman Arafat in particular to make it clear that suicide bombing is not a reflection of Islam. It is a perversion of Islam. It is not something that can promote the cause of the Palestinians. It is something that will discredit the cause of the Palestinians. It is not something that will advance Arab interests. It will threaten Arab interests.

We need to see that from leaders because they too are going to be threatened by this. They too have to say they have a stake in changing the climate.

Now, if that happens, if in fact we see that the ceasefire that Chairman Arafat declared, which in my judgment was not accidental, he understands the consequences of being lumped with Osama bin Laden. He understands what the consequences of a suicide bombing in Israel today would be for him and his cause. And he understands that it is important not to be on the wrong side of the world the way he was in 1990.

All of that has contributed to a ceasefire which is not perfect at this point, but there clearly are signs that it is different in terms of what they are trying to do, notwithstanding the fact that there have been some fatalities. There is a different message that has gone out, but more, clearly, has to be done.

If he does what is necessary in terms of really implementing what is required in a ceasefire in terms of stabilizing, and in terms of creating a climate that makes it clear that terror is unacceptable, is illegitimate and will not be tolerated, then in fact we do have to pursue a political process.

There is no military solution for the Israel. With all of their might, they are not going to be in a position where they can extinguish Palestinian aspirations. But for the Palestinians, violence is not only not the answer, it has been extremely destructive to what it is they want.

Almost exactly 1 year ago we were at a point where the Palestinians were closer to the achievement of their aspirations than any point in their history, and today they are very far away from it, and they are very far away from it because of violence. Violence has changed the realities.

It has made it impossible, frankly, to go back to where we were. It may well be at some point down the road, far down the road, the Clinton ideas could again become the basis of a solution, but we are not at a point where those kind of ideas can be discussed today. We are going to have to go back to first principles, and the first principle is the Israelis get security and the Palestinians get the Israelis out of their lives, no longer controlling their lives.

Every step that is taken, whether it is the implementation of the ceasefire, whether it is the implantation eventually, hopefully soon, of the Mitchell Report, whether it is our getting back to negotiations, every step somehow has to focus on how do you reaffirm for the Israelis they get security in reality, not in words, and the Palestinians get the end of the Israeli control of their lives in reality, not in words.

If we go to a political process, assuming that we have a ceasefire and stabilization, the agenda for those negotiations cannot be on Jerusalem, refugees and borders. When both sides have lost faith, not distrust and confidence, but faith in peacemaking, you have to focus on what is attainable and not what is impossible.

What is impossible is to deal with existential questions right now. If we get to negotiations, as I hope we will, those negotiations should focus on the following agenda: statehood, because the issue of statehood is something that has to be addressed in terms of what the relationship between the Palestinians economically, how does water work, health, environment, agriculture, these are all questions that will have to be addressed.

Security arrangements would be a second agenda item because, again, that is something that is not only required, but when dealing with either the question of terror or security cooperation or a border regime for security, if it was pursued at this stage, would in fact set the stage, I think, for being able to do more over time.

And lastly, disengagement. Disengagement, sometimes referred to as separation within Israel, is best addressed mutually, not unilaterally. If it were to be addressed mutually, then in fact it could contribute to that basic first principle I talked about. It means having the two sides disengage from points of friction. It means having the two sides; for the Israelis seeing that there can be security; and for the Palestinians seeing there is a process where the Israelis will not be controlling them.

In the end, if wait to see anything work, either on terrorism or peace, there has got to be truth-telling. When it comes to terror, it cannot be tolerated and it has to be stated as such. When it comes to peace, both sides are going to have to acknowledge that each side does have grievances; that they have to prepare their publics for peace, something that was definitely done during the Brock period, something that has not been done by the Palestinians; and that when you prepare your public for peace, it means that you actually have to concede, you have to compromise. You do not get everything.

Lastly, for our part, we too have to be prepared to tell the truth, and telling the truth for us means being prepared to stand up and say who is fulfilling their commitments and who is not. If there is one problem among a number that plagued us in the process, it is that there was never accountability.

Well, if commitments are going to be made, they are going to have to be fulfilled, and we are going to need to be very public in terms of saying that.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ross follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DENNIS B. ROSS, COUNSELOR/ DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

The horrific attack on America is a defining moment not just for us, but also for the world. It was an attack on civilization. It was an attack on humanity. It requires a change in our mindset. We are no longer countering terror; we are waging war against it. There can be no neutrals in such a struggle. As President Bush said, "You are either with us or you are with the terrorists."

In this struggle, as the President also made clear, we must use all the instruments in our arsenal: intelligence, law enforcement, financial, diplomatic, and military. But to be successful, we must focus as well on the psychological dimension of

fighting terror. Terror must be discredited. It must be delegitimized. We must wage an international campaign against the use of terror for any purpose. No "cause" justifies its use. Any cause that employs terror is itself delegitimized.

Nowhere is it more important for the international community to make this point than in the Middle East. While terror is a global phenomenon, it is a special problem in the Middle East precisely because it has been treated too often as legitimate. In the "struggle" with Israel, suicide bombers are portrayed as martyrs, not as monsters. Killing innocent non-combatants has been glorified, not rejected. Recruiting kids for human destruction has been celebrated, not condemned.

There can be no victory over terror if a climate that justifies it in certain circumstances is pervasive in one part of the world. It is good that Arab leaders condemned the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. But such condemnations will mean little in practice if there is no change in day-to-day behaviors that convey a tolerance for the use of terror. And, it has not been only the fringe that has done so.

Check nearly any Friday sermon broadcast by the Palestinian Authority over the last year and you will see that suicide bombers are glorified and calls for jihad against Israel and the United States are commonplace. The editorial in al-Hayat al-Jadida, perhaps the leading Palestinian newspaper, stated that the suicide bombers in Israel were in the "noble tradition" of those who bombed the U.S. Marines in Lebanon. The date of its publication: September 11, 2001. The Palestinian media and public posture are not unique in the area. A few days prior to the attack, an Egyptian journalist in one of Egypt's mainstream newspapers described how he had swelled with pride when he saw the suicide bombing of the pizza parlor in Jerusalem.

I am not calling for Arab leaders to prevent a free press. (Indeed, I would like to see a free press flourish in the area.) I am also not saying that the Palestinians specifically or the Arabs generally must give up their cause or their grievance; I continue to believe that the Palestinians have legitimate aspirations that must be addressed. But I am saying that we are long past the point where Middle Eastern leaders can continue to use their media as a safety valve, designed to release anger and appease extremist sentiments. They must discredit those sentiments, not acquiesce in them. They must condemn all such efforts to legitimize the use of terror.

It is time they made it clear that peace is legitimate; terror is not. That suicide bombing is not a reflection of Islam, but its perversion. That the Palestinian cause is not promoted by terror, but undermined by it. That Arab interests and everything they value are not advanced by terror, but threatened by it.

In short, it is time for Arab leaders to level with their publics and make it clear they will not tolerate terror. Absent that, it will be very difficult to succeed in the fight against terror. Absent that, Arab leaders should not expect that we would intervene decisively on Arab-Israeli peace. We have a responsibility to promote peace, but we stand no chance of succeeding in an environment where terror is considered a legitimate part of the struggle. If we are prepared to do our part, Middle Eastern leaders must also be prepared to do theirs.

For Chairman Arafat, this is the sine qua non for having a relationship with us. He declared a ceasefire because he knew his "cause" might be discredited otherwise. He understands well the consequence of his being considered the equivalent of Osama bin Laden. He understands well the consequence of being on the wrong side of the international community. And, he understands well the consequence of Hamas or Islamic Jihad suicide bombings in Israel now in terms of possible Israeli and American responses.

But his words cannot be taken at face value. What matters now is his behavior. Commitments must not only be made, but fulfilled. He must stop the glorification of suicide bombers, taking down the banners in Palestinian schools that treat bombers as heroes. He must make arrests of those who are planning or promoting terror. The Palestinian Authority can no longer be a safe haven for those who would kill Israelis.

For those who question whether Chairman Arafat has the power to do this, the answer is that every time he has cracked down he has succeeded. True, the environment is more difficult for him today, but he has contributed to that environment and he has a responsibility to change it.

Should he do so, it will be important to develop a credible negotiating process to deal with Palestinian grievances and needs. There is no military solution for the Israelis. No amount of force will extinguish Palestinian aspirations. By the same token, violence will not work for the Palestinians and no one should underestimate how destructive the effects of the last year have been on the ability to pursue peace.

We are not in the position we were at the end of the Clinton administration. We cannot simply pick up where things left off. Chairman Arafat could not say yes to

the Clinton ideas—ideas that would have produced an independent state in nearly all of the West Bank and an enlarged Gaza; a capital for that state in the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem; security arrangements that included an international presence in the Jordan Valley 6 years into the implementation period; and an unlimited right of return for Palestinians to their state, not to Israel.

Chairman Arafat's inability to accept the Clinton ideas—along with the violence and the new emphasis on right of return to Israel—convinced the Israeli public that he could not accept any ideas and was, in fact, neither interested in nor capable of making peace. Unfortunately, for their part, the Palestinian public has a mirror image of the Israelis. The Palestinian public was never told by their leadership what was offered and what was not accepted. They were constantly told that the Israelis were resisting their obligations on peace, rejecting the implementation of "international legitimacy." They believed that after seven-and-a-half years of Oslo, rather than ending Israeli control of their lives, the process was cementing that control. And, though, they initiated the Intifada, they saw the Israeli response as somehow treating them as if they were subhuman.

In an environment in which each side has lost faith in the process, it is an illusion to think that the most existential issues of Jerusalem, refugees, and borders can be resolved. The objectives at this stage must be more limited. Reestablishing faith in peaceful coexistence and peacemaking must be the first order of priority.

I believe that the only way to do that is to focus again on the fundamental premise of peacemaking: the Israelis get security; the Palestinians get an end of Israeli control of their lives. Both sides must see this premise being fulfilled not in words, not in abstractions, but in reality. Every step taken by each side must affirm it. Faith will not be restored overnight. But if the Israelis begin to feel secure, and the Palestinians begin to feel freer, peacemaking will again become feasible.

We should have no illusions. It will take time to recreate the conditions in which the core issues of permanent status can be addressed. In the meantime, assuming stabilization, we should seek to promote a more realistic agenda for the resumption of political negotiations. That agenda can deal with statehood, security arrangements, and disengagement.

Each can provide a bridge to the core questions of permanent status. Each has an inherent logic and need. Statehood as a principle is not contentious between the two sides. But what are the attributes of this state? What kind of relations will it have with Israel? Will its economy be linked to Israel's? Questions about water, environment, health, agriculture, must all be addressed. Similarly, there will be no agreement without systematic security arrangements. Dealing with terror, defining the terms of security cooperation, and exploring border security regimes are all essential issues for the present and the future. While security arrangements cannot be finalized until borders can be resolved, the psychology for taking the next step can be developed by productive negotiations on security. Finally, disengagement, or what some in Israel call separation, also responds to the temper of the times. Both sides need to disengage from the possible points of friction between them. Disengagement will involve some Israeli withdrawal. It is the way to deal with the territorial question in the near term. Done mutually, it can do much to foster security for the Israelis and end of Israeli control for the Palestinians.

There are no panaceas. For us and for the parties, the starting point in fighting terror and promoting peace is truth-telling. Truth-telling in terms of making it clear that terror is a threat and will not be tolerated. Truth-telling in terms of acknowledging that both sides, Israelis and Palestinians, have real grievances that must be alleviated. Truth-telling in terms of telling publics that there is no alternative to negotiations and hard compromises. And, particularly for us, truth-telling in terms of being willing to say who is living up to their commitments and who is not.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Ambassador Ross.

We will now hear from Ambassador Indyk, who is currently a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute in Washington where he works on Middle East policy. Ambassador Indyk has worked intimately with both the Arabs and the Israelis to help promote United States peace initiatives in that region. Martin Indyk served as Ambassador to Israel from 1999 until recently, and then as Assistant Secretary to State for Near Eastern Affairs from 1997 to 1999.

Thank you for being with us, Ambassador Indyk. Please proceed. You may put your full statement in the record, you may summarize, whatever you may feel appropriate.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR MARTIN INDYK, SENIOR FELLOW, FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Mr. INDYK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to put the whole statement into the record, and I will summarize it.

Mr. GILMAN. Without objection, the full statement will be admitted to the record.

Mr. INDYK. Mr. Chairman, it is a real pleasure to be before you and the other Members of the Committee again, especially since I no longer hold the offices of the U.S. Government, and therefore am not necessarily under the same kinds of cautions and constraints that I may have been in that position. It is a little more relaxed to address you today.

I want to associate myself with many of the remarks that have been made today, especially by my colleague, Dennis Ross.

History will surely mark September 11, 2001 as a day of infinite infamy, a turning point for the United States and the civilized world, as you have all remarked.

But what I want to argue today is that it could also mark a turning point for Palestinians and for Israelis. It could also mark the day in retrospect that we will see that the Intifada actually ended.

The potential for this kind of silver lining the very darkest of clouds, I believe, is already evident in Yasser Arafat's reaction to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Recognizing that the spontaneous glee shown by the Palestinian street in West Bank cities in east Jerusalem risked any remaining change for international intervention to pressure Israel, the Chairman took a series of steps designed, first of all, to show some empathy with American victims rather than with the suicide bombers who had taken Palestinian terror tactics and raised them to a new and heinous art form.

But beyond this public relations effort, the Chairman also took a number of other unusual steps for him to stop the Palestinian violence.

He declared another ceasefire, but this time he did it in Arabic, and he issued the unusual injunction to this forces not to fire, even in self-defense.

He appears to have persuaded both Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad to stop their terror activities, at least for the time being.

He made some arrest of lower-level people involved in terror activities.

He sent his police to patrol sensitive areas and friction points.

He made it clear to some of the Tanzim militia chief that the time had actually come for them to stop the drive-by shootings of Israelis.

And for the first time since the outbreak of the Intifada he went to Rafah in southern Gaza and visited what is essentially a gangland area that he has made no effort to control through the Intifada.

And finally, ordered the arrests there of mortar gangs that have been daily and nightly bombarding Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and also adjoining the Gaza Strip.

As a consequence, suicide bombing against Israelis appear to have ceased, at least for the last 10 days, and the number of violent incidents is, by Israel's accounting, declining, although the drive-by attack that killed the Israeli woman yesterday that Congressman Lantos referred to is an example that the violence and terrorism has by no means been stamped out completely. But the trend is down and the Israeli government is acknowledging that as well.

We have been through this kind of cycle several times before. Why should we believe that this time anything is different?

I think, first of all, it is important to realize that over the last year gradually, but definitively, the steam has gone out of the Intifada. It is not just over 500 Palestinians have been killed and more than 10,000 casualties, but the Palestinian economy is being devastated; that some 50 percent of Palestinians now live below the poverty line; that unemployment is around 40 percent; and that the Palestinian Authority itself is beginning to disintegrate.

It is also that the Palestinians lost what support they had, not only by some Members of the Committee, but more importantly, I would argue, they lost the support in Israel that they had. The peace camp is gone. The Israeli public has moved dramatically to the right. And instead of Prime Minster Barak, who was prepared to offer them something close to 97 percent of the West Bank, all of Gaza for an independent Palestinian state with its capital in east Jerusalem, as Dennis Ross has pointed out, that offer is no longer on the table, and there doesn't seem to be any political circumstances that one could imagine in Israel any time soon in which that offer could be put back on the table.

The Palestinians had also, before September 11th, lost the sympathy of much of the world. Certainly Yasser Arafat was persona non grata here in Washington and the United States was effectively blocking any efforts that he was making to produce through UN Security Council action some kind of international intervention on behalf of the Palestinians.

But I believe perhaps the most important failure of the Intifada was its failure to generate any significant support in the Arab world beyond lip service, political statements, Israel bashing rhetoric, and some financial support, limited financial support.

What the Palestinians were unable to do was to spread their Intifada to the Arab world in a way that would generate regional instability that would precipitate the kind of international intervention that Yasser Arafat was looking for.

President Mubarak of Egypt stood up clearly and said war is not in our interest. We are not going to go to war, and neither Egypt nor Jordan nor Saudi Arabia nor, for that matter, even the Syrians were prepared to allow this Israeli/Palestinian conflict to escape the West Bank and Gaza and engulf the Middle East.

And therefore the Intifada had to essentially move from being a popular revolt to a series of suicide acts by Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad on the one hand, and other kinds of violence and terrorism by the Tanzim militia and gangs of Palestinians essentially roaming the countryside looking for Israelis to shoot up.

That was before September 11th. After September the 11th, I think that Yasser Arafat came to understand that now he had bet-

ter find a way to put an end to this violence if he had any hope of gaining some international support for the Palestinian cause. He had now both the incentive and the justification for acting.

The incentive, as Dennis has suggested, comes from what Shimon Peres colorfully refers to as the phenomenon that "you cannot enter the non-smoker's club puffing on a fat cigar." And in this case any further terrorist acts emanating from areas under Yasser Arafat's control would fit very much the definition that our President, President Bush, has made clear he will apply, which is to say that he will draw no distinction between the terrorists and those that harbor them, and that you are either against the terrorists or you are with them, you are with us or you are with the terrorists.

And so Yasser Arafat, understanding that at this particular moment he faced the possibility of bringing a complete disaster down upon the heads of the Palestinians, decided to move.

The question now is what can be done about the fact that there is, it seems, such an incentive for Chairman Arafat to stop the violence.

Left to his own devices, as we have seen before, we cannot assume that he will continue to do the right thing. What he will need for his new calculus to be sustained is Israeli reciprocal steps and American engagement. Already Prime Minister Sharon has the first step in terms of stopping initiated actions by Israel into Palestinian territories. And I believe the government of Israel is ready to continue along that line. As Arafat takes steps to end the violence, I believe that the Israeli government will be prepared to ease up the pressure on the Palestinians, reduce the impact of the closures, redeploy the Israel defense forces, and help to create a more positive dynamic to get us out of this crisis.

All of these kinds of reciprocal steps have already been outlined and agreed upon by both parties in the Tenet work plan to stop the violence and the Mitchell recommendations. Both sides have accepted them with out reservation. The challenge has always been in the implementation. And we know from the experience of the last year that the implementation will not be effective unless we also actively engage with the parties.

And I regret to say that this cannot be done effectively simply from Washington. This is especially the case when our own leaders are understandably and necessarily preoccupied with a war on terror that they now are forced to wage.

Therefore, in my view, I believe that it is time now to appoint another special envoy to take on this special responsibility, and I have to say, Mr. Chairman, that I have never made such a recommendation before. I am not one to quickly pull this out of the hat at any opportunity. But there is now, I believe, an opportunity to stop the violence, and the envoy's objective should be to do that, not to try to achieve an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but something much more modest: an end to the violence, a restoration of a meaningful negotiating process as provided in the Mitchell Report.

The horrible events of September 11th, Mr. Chairman, may have created an opportunity to do some good in the region. I believe that with pressure Yasser Arafat applied through the auspices of the special envoy, we have an opportunity now to end the violence

there; that that will help in our efforts to promote a coalition against terror. It will take away the excuse that many will want to provide that they cannot join us in this effort because of the Palestinians problem. It will give us something to point to in that regard in terms of what we are doing, that we are cognizant of the need to keep that area of the Middle East calm while we prosecute our war on terror.

Most importantly, if we can stop the violence now by pressing Arafat to do the right think in a sustained way, it will help to reestablish the principle that many of you have referred to here, which is as vital to the war on terror as it is to the promotion of Middle East peace. Terrorism is an unacceptable, illegitimate and counterproductive means for the Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, or anybody to use to try to achieve their political objections.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Indyk follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR MARTIN INDYK, SENIOR FELLOW, FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

History will surely mark September 11, 2001 as a day of infinite infamy, a turning point for the United States and the civilized world. It could also mark a turning point for Palestinians and Israelis—the day the intifadah ended.

Whether that in fact is the case will depend above all on the actions of Chairman Arafat. But Israeli and American responses to efforts he has begun to make to stop the violence and terrorism can help create a new, positive dynamic in Israeli-Palestinian relations. If, as a result, a viable negotiating process replaces the bloodshed and hatred of the past year, America's war on terrorism will benefit. And if the Palestinian leadership definitively repudiates violence and terrorism as legitimate means of pursuing its political objectives, then Israeli-Palestinian peace becomes an achievable objective again.

This potential for a silver lining in the very darkest of clouds is already evident in Yasser Arafat's reaction to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Recognizing that the spontaneous glee shown by the Palestinian street in West Bank cities and east Jerusalem risked ending any remaining chance for international intervention to pressure Israel, Arafat took a series of steps designed to show empathy with America's victims rather than the suicide bombers who had taken Palestinian terror tactics and raised them to a new, heinous art form. But beyond the PR effort (which included his own personal donation of blood, memorial services at Palestinian schools, and suppression of media reporting of support for the terrorists), Arafat also took a number of other unusual steps to stop Palestinian violence:

- He declared another ceasefire, but this time issued the orders publicly, in Arabic, with the injunction to his forces not to fire, even in self-defense;
- He appears to have persuaded both Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) to stop their terror activities, at least for the time being;
- He made some arrests of lower-level people involved in terror activities;
- He sent his police to patrol sensitive areas and friction points;
- He made it clear to some Tanzim militias that this time he was actually serious about stopping drive-by shootings of Israelis;
- And for the first time since the outbreak of the intifadah he visited the gangland of southern Gaza and ordered the arrest of a mortar gang there.

As a consequence, terrorist attacks on Israelis appear to have ceased and the number of violent incidents is declining.

We have been through this kind of cycle several times before in the course of the Intifadah. Yet each time Arafat took steps to halt the violence, his failure to follow through combined with an Israeli inability to tolerate casualties while he made his half-hearted efforts to prevent them led to the inevitable reinvigoration of the cycle of violence.

Why should this time be any different?

First, it's important to recognize that much of the steam had already gone out of the intifadah. By June 2001, popular demonstrations and confrontations at check-

points had all but ceased. The "struggle" had been left to armed gangs of Tanzim, Hamas and PIJ terrorists, a few mortar gangs in Gaza and the smugglers in Rafah.

The Palestinian society and economy had paid a very high price with nothing to show for the sacrifice of over 500 lives and the severe economic hardship resulting from Israel's tight closures of the West Bank and Gaza. Unemployment was over 40%, and some 50% of Palestinians were beneath the poverty line.

In Israel, Barak's "peace cabinet" which had been prepared to negotiate and make concessions under fire was replaced by Sharon's national unity government that refuses to even meet Arafat while violence continues. Rather than fall apart in the face of daily casualties, the Israeli polity had come together and shifted dramatically to the right in its attitudes toward the Palestinians. The independent Palestinian state on all of Gaza and 97 percent of the West Bank, with east Jerusalem as its capital, an Israeli offer which had been on the table at the end of 2000, was now lost, perhaps forever.

In stark contrast to the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration had essentially withdrawn from the arena. Arafat had become *persona non grata* in Washington and the US was blocking his efforts to internationalize the conflict through the UN Security Council. The EU had also become more sympathetic to Israel because of the far-reaching concessions the Barak government had been prepared to make. At the same time the Europeans had become more impatient with Arafat because of his tolerance of suicide bombers.

Perhaps most significant for any longer term Palestinian strategy of a war of attrition, the Arab world had only responded with lip service and minor financial subventions. The hope that the intifadah would generate regional instability which in turn would precipitate American-led, international intervention, proved forlorn. The Arab street had calmed down after some initial rumblings in the early days of the intifadah. And Arab leaders had made clear that they had no intention to be dragged back into war with Israel on the Palestinians' behalf. President Mubarak was particularly outspoken in this regard but enjoyed support from Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Even Syria, which has an interest in keeping pressure on Israel to remind it that the Golan Heights are occupied territory, was not prepared to allow Hezbollah to provoke an Israeli-Syrian confrontation.

In sum, before September 11, Arafat's every avenue had been blocked off. Lacking an exit strategy, he had resorted to what he does best, surfing the waves of Palestinian anger and violence in the hope that one would eventually carry him to a safe shore.

Instead he was hit by the tidal wave of September 11, which threatened to destroy any chance of salvation. Arafat understood immediately that if he allowed any further suicide bombings, he would immediately be cast into the same pariah status as the Al Quaeda terrorists. So as President Bush was making clear that the United States would "draw no distinction between the terrorists and those who harbor them," Arafat was already busy expressing his condolences, donating blood and suppressing Palestinian popular support for the World Trade Center and Pentagon bombings. By the time President Bush had declared that "you are either with us or you are with the terrorists," Arafat had convinced both Hamas and PIJ to stop their attacks, at least for the time being.

To be sure, Arafat did not want to repeat the mistake he had made in backing Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, a move which brought the Palestinian cause to its lowest point since the disaster of 1948. And this gives him an explanation for his own people for calling off the violence to prevent damage to the Palestinian cause. But Arafat also sees in this global crisis, an opportunity to rebuild his international standing, particularly in the United States, by bringing the Palestinians into the coalition against terrorism. By his calculation, that would do much to defuse Arab anger with America and help cement a coalition between the United States and the Islamic World. This belief in the importance of his own contribution to the war on terrorism helps provide him with his own incentive for demonstrating that he is in fact on the right side of President Bush's dividing line.

This significant change in Arafat's own calculus is behind the actions he has taken in recent days to end the violence. Even though Arafat's view of the contribution he can make is overblown, the United States has an interest in reinforcing his new calculus. While we focus our initial efforts on Usama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban, we do not need the distraction of a flare-up in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that would complicate our efforts to secure Arab backing for our coalition. Moreover, we also have a new opportunity to help put Israelis and Palestinians back on the long path to reconciliation. And that would help demonstrate to the Islamic world that we are cognizant of their concerns even while we are confronting the extremists and terrorists in their midst.

However, we cannot assume that left to his own devices, Arafat will continue to do the right thing. For his new calculus to be translated into a sustained effort to stop the violence and arrest the terrorists, Arafat will need Israeli reciprocal steps and American engagement. On the Israeli side, Sharon has already ordered the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to stop "initiated actions" into territory controlled by the Palestinian Authority. But as Arafat takes effective steps to prevent the recurrence of violent incidents, Sharon will need to ease the pressure on the Palestinian people by lifting the closures, redeploying the IDF and allowing a return to normal life. Both sides will then need to take confidence-building measures that will begin to heal the wounds of a year of bloody conflict and restore the trust and mutual respect so necessary to any resumption of negotiations.

All these reciprocal steps to end the violence, restore normalcy and rebuild trust are outlined in the Tenet work plan and the recommendations of the Mitchell Report. Both sides have accepted them without reservation. The challenge is in the implementation. And we know from the experience of the last year, that implementation will not be effective unless we actively engage with the parties, making clear that we intend to hold both sides to their commitments. Unfortunately, this cannot be done effectively by phone calls from Washington and instructions to our Ambassador in Israel and Consul General in Jerusalem. And this is especially the case when our leaders are necessarily preoccupied with waging the war on terror.

Therefore, in my view, now is the right time to appoint a Special Envoy to take on this specific responsibility. To be effective, the envoy would need to be a person of stature and experience, enjoying the trust of Israel and the respect of the Arab world. The Envoy would need to be seen in the Middle East as having the ear of the President, but would report to the Secretary of State and be staffed by the Near East Bureau. The Envoy's objective should not be to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, but something much more modest: an end to the violence and a restoration of meaningful negotiations as provided for in the Mitchell Report.

The Bush Administration abolished the Special Middle East Coordinator's position established by the Clinton Administration, believing correctly at the time that there was no real opportunity for peacemaking. But the horrible events of September 11 have created an opportunity to end the Palestinian-Israeli violence and this has become a more important priority now that we are embarked on a complicated war on terrorism and need to avoid distractions and sources of division. The appointment of an envoy would demonstrate our interest in the Palestinian issue even while our leaders devote themselves to the cause at hand. It would give us something to point to for those who would use our lack of engagement on the Palestinian issue as an excuse for not supporting the coalition. It would give us the means to keep Arafat focused on the tasks that he now needs to fulfill if he wants to be considered eligible to join the coalition.

Most importantly, it would help reestablish a principle vital to the war on terror as well as the promotion of Middle East peace: that terrorism is an unacceptable, illegitimate and counterproductive means for Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, or anybody to use to try to achieve political objectives.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Ambassador Indyk.

And now we will hear from Ambassador Walker, who testified earlier this year when he was still with the Administration. Recently became President and CEO of the Middle East Institute. Prior to assuming the position at MEI, Mr. Walker was Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs as a career Foreign Service Officer for nearly 35 years. Mr. Walker has served as the Ambassador to Israel from 1997 to 1999, and then as Ambassador to the Arab Republic of Egypt, prior to that as Ambassador to the Arab Republic of Egypt from 1994 to 1997. He also served as a Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN with Ambassador rank from 1993 to '94, and as Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates from 1998 through the period of the Gulf War, to 1992.

Welcome Ambassador Walker. You may put your full statement in the record and summarize, as you may desire.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD S. WALKER, PRESIDENT, MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

Mr. WALKER. Thank you. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will submit my statement for—full statement for the record.

Mr. GILMAN. Full statement for the record. It will be received without objection. Please proceed.

Mr. WALKER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for this opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee to discuss the Palestinian issue and the approach that should be taken by the United States. I especially appreciate this opportunity to speak to you as a private citizen with all the candor and frankness appropriate to the occasion.

Now, Mr. Chairman, there is no just and lasting peace in the Middle East without a resolution of all the issues concerning the Palestinians. Israel's security cannot be guaranteed unless the Palestinians are accorded a fair settlement. The issue is complicated, this I know all too well. But so long as the Palestinians are denied independence, dignity, self-respect and economic opportunity, as they are denied today, there can be no solution. And so long as the Israelis are denied a sense of well being and personal security as they are denied today, there can be no solution.

Whatever the situation that prevailed before September 11, that situation has changed irrevocably today. Our approach to the Palestinian issue has to be seen now in the context of the attack by radical fundamentalists on the United States and the war on which we are engaged against terrorism. Some elements in the Palestinian community, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, in particular, and certain cells in Hamas are a part of the worldwide network of terrorism.

We cannot turn a blind eye to acts of terrorism or violence directed against innocent civilians no matter what the source, the group, the excuse, the political justification, or the impact on our other interests. The people of the region and of the world must know that we are serious and that we will not rest until these groups are eliminated or abandon terrorism.

More particularly, Chairman Arafat must know and understand that this is no longer a question of an Israeli-Palestinian issue. And let me make this very clear, this is not a question of violence or resistance in a regional dispute or under terms of occupation. It is a very specific issue of terrorism that is directed at innocent civilians and the network that supports it. No international law, no Geneva Convention, and no true religion supports such action. Therefore, it must be dealt with by the Administration as a bilateral issue between the United States and the Palestinian Authority.

We have the right, based on the bodies of over 3,500 Americans, to demand Arafat's 150 percent cooperation with our, that is, U.S. security authorities efforts to stop these people, to arrest them and to prevent any, and I repeat, any further suicide bombs or car bombs or other attacks on innocent civilians whether it is in Israel or Buenos Aires, or Philadelphia. Here, and on this issue alone the call for 100 percent effectiveness and cooperation makes sense.

Clearly, guarantees by Arafat against this kind of terrorism will help establish conditions for resumed negotiations between Israel

and the Palestinians. But it will not solve the question of Israeli incursions into Palestinian areas; it will not stop settlers from encroaching on Palestinian lands; it will not stop Palestinians boys from throwing stones at Israeli settlers, police and the IDF; it will not stop the exchanges of fire between Palestinians security forces and Israeli outposts; or firing by Palestinians on settlers and settlers on Palestinians; and it will not stop Israeli assassination efforts. It is in this context that each side sincerely doubts the intentions of the other.

Perhaps it is true that Arafat missed an opportunity at Camp David, as some claim and many complain. But what we now know of the brutal efficiency of the radial fundamentalists argues strongly that neither Arafat nor the agreement would have survived very long in the absence of prior broad Arab and Islamic moderate support, particularly for a solution to the Jerusalem issue, and that support had not been fully developed prior to Camp David.

Let me add, Mr. Chairman, that Yasser Arafat is not going to be able to come back to the path of negotiations so long as all of his objectives seem blocked by the Israeli government. And in all candor, sir, over half the people in the U.S. Administration do not believe that Sharon will accept a true freeze on settlements. Most of the people I know in the Administration do not believe that Sharon is willing to contemplate a negotiated settlement on any terms but those that the Palestinians would consider total submission and surrender.

I hope that most of the people in the Administration are wrong, and we have to make that case. We have to decide. Then we have to work with the prime minister of Israel to see.

But only the United States, working in tandem with Europe and the Arab moderate states, can hope to provide the assurances about our positions and determination that Arafat will need and Sharon will need to move back to the table. If we are able to get Arafat to crack down on terrorism, just as the whole work defines it, the human bombs in the marketplaces, the clubs and pizza places, then that would be the first step.

From that starting place it may be possible to begin the construction of confidence and reduction of more general violence. No doubt, Prime Minister Sharon and Chairman Arafat both will have to have confidence that this time, as Dennis made very clear, the United States means what it says and that it will follow up on agreements and their implementation and that there will be a price if we are ignored.

In the absence of U.S. resolution, we will lose the support of Arab states in the region as violence in the occupied territories escalates and the local populations react and pressure their governments.

And with that loss, we could lose our fight against terrorism. The choices, in my view, are that stark. The way out begins with a single step. Arafat's full and effective cooperation to stop the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and elements of Hamas dead in their tracks. It is not the 100 percent cessation of all violence that Sharon was demanding. For that, further steps and assurances, particularly on settlements and the way forward will have to be much clearer. But from the foundation of no more bombs in the marketplace, bombs

that have destroyed so many past efforts to move the negotiations forward, we can build a new edifice.

Itzhak Rabin once said,

> "We will continue the fight against terror as if there is no peace process and we will the peace process as if there is no terror."

Words for us to live by.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD S. WALKER, PRESIDENT, MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to discuss the Palestinian issue and the approach taken by the United States. I especially appreciate the opportunity to speak to you as a private citizen with all the candor and frankness appropriate to the occasion. Thirty-four years of public service, almost all of it spent in the Middle East, render me almost incapable of unfiltered thought. However, for your subcommittee, I will do my best to air my analysis with a minimum of obfuscation. And I know, Mr. Chairman, that you will call me on it should I regress to my old ways.

Before starting in on the Palestinian issue, I would like to second the two opening points Assistant Secretary William Burns' made at your July 25, 2001 hearing. Bill is an exceptional diplomat, a fact that, no doubt, came to your attention during his testimony. And Bill was absolutely on target with his reaffirmation of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of Land for Peace. These concepts resonate with his second point, which supported a regional approach to finding solutions to disputes, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. We cannot cauterize the festering wound that is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to prevent it from infecting the rest of the Middle East.

Despite the success of the Egyptian and Jordanian tracks, and even with the thus far inconclusive results of the Syrian track, there is no—and let me repeat that word—*no* just and lasting peace in the Middle East without a resolution of all issues concerning the Palestinians. Israel's security cannot be guaranteed unless the Palestinians are accorded a fair settlement. The issue is complicated, this I know all too well. But so long as the Palestinians are denied independence, dignity, self-respect and economic opportunity, as they are denied today, there can be no solution. And so long as the Israelis are denied a sense of well being and personal security as they are denied today, there can be no solution.

Whatever the situation that prevailed before September 11, that situation has changed irrevocably today. Our approach to the Palestinian issue has to be seen now in the context of the attack by radical fundamentalists on the United States and the war on which we are engaged against terrorism. Some elements in the Palestinian community, the Palestinians Islamic Jihad, in particular, and certain cells in Hamas are a part of the worldwide network of terrorism that is mutually supportive and that constitutes a threat to us and to civilized states everywhere.

We cannot turn a blind eye to acts of terrorism or violence directed against innocent civilians no matter what the source, the group, the excuse, the political justification, or the impact on our other interests. The people of the region and the world must know that we are serious and that we will not rest until these groups are eliminated or abandon terrorism.

More particularly, Chairman Arafat must know and understand that this is no longer a question of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. And let me make this very clear, this is not a question of violence or resistance in a regional dispute or under terms of occupation. It is a very specific issue of terrorism that is directed at innocent civilians and the network that supports it. No international law, no Geneva Convention, and no true religion supports such action. Therefore, it must be dealt with by the Administration as a bilateral issue between the United States and the Palestinian Authority.

We have the right, based on the bodies of over 6000 Americans, to demand Arafat's 150% cooperation with our, that is US security authorities to stop these people, to arrest them and to prevent any, and I repeat, any further suicide bombs or car bombs or other attacks on innocent civilians whether it is in Israel or Buenos Aires, or Philadelphia. Here, and on this issue alone the call for 100% effectiveness and cooperation makes sense.

Clearly, guarantees by Arafat against this kind of terrorism will help establish conditions for resumed negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. But it will not solve the question of Israeli incursions into Palestinian areas; it will not stop settlers from encroaching on Palestinian lands; it will not stop Palestinian boys from throwing stones at Israeli settlers, police and the IDF; it will not stop the exchanges of fire between Palestinian security forces and Israeli outposts: or firing by Palestinians on settlers and settlers on Palestinians; and it will not stop Israeli assassination efforts. It is this kind of violence that George Tenet sought to dampen with the arrangements he negotiated so that the parties could move on the implementation of the Mitchell Commission proposals. And it is in this context that each side sincerely doubts the intentions of the other.

Arafat, I fear, has been told by many among the Palestinians and by others that Israel will back down and make compromises in the face of attacks on her people, witness the withdrawal from Lebanon. I have been told the same thing by a number of my acquaintances in the region. The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon under what appeared to be pressure from Hizb Allah had a profound effect on the Palestinians and other Arabs. It was leverage for all those who sought to undercut a negotiated solution. And it was argued to Arafat that he could resort to violence if an agreement was not on terms he could accept and survive. When he left Camp David the proximate cause of his departure was undoubtedly the certitude that he would be dead within a matter of days if he were seen to be making a compromise on Jerusalem.

Perhaps Arafat missed an opportunity at Camp David as some claim and many complain, but what we now know of the brutal efficiency of the radical fundamentalists, argues strongly that neither Arafat nor the agreement would have survived in the absence of prior broad Arab and Islamic moderate support which had not been developed by the President.

Arafat is not going to come back to the path of negotiations so long as all of his objectives seem blocked by the Israeli government. Over half the people in the US administration do not believe that Sharon will accept a true freeze on settlements, for example. After long experience with Israeli Prime Ministers, I do not believe it either.

Most people I know in the Administration do not believe the Sharon is willing to contemplate a negotiated settlement on any terms but those that the Palestinian would consider total submission and surrender. Arafat is not going to sell his "birthright" for a bowl of pottage. Bribes of food and economic benefits for his people are not going to be enough. Going back to the status quo ante is going back to occupation.

Only the United States, working in tandem with Europe and the Arab moderate states can hope to provide the assurances about our positions and determination that Arafat will need to move back to the table. But if we, the United States, are able to get Arafat to crack down on terrorism as the entire world defines it, the human bombs in the markets, clubs and pizza places, then that would be the first step. From that starting place it may be possible to begin the construction of confidence and reduction of more general violence. No doubt, Sharon and Arafat both will have to have confidence that this time, the United States means what it says, that it will follow up on agreements and their implementation and that there will be a price if we are ignored. And Arafat will have to believe that Sharon does not have a blank check from the Administration. In short, I believe that the United States will have to carry a significant burden on this issue.

In the absence of US resolution, we will lose the support of Arab states in the region as violence in the occupied territories escalates and local populations react and pressure their governments.

And with that loss, we will lose our fight against terrorism. The choices, in my view are that stark. The way out begins with a single step. Arafat's full and effective cooperation to stop the PIJ and elements of Hamas dead in their tracks. It is not the 100% cessation of all violence that Sharon is demanding. For that, further steps and assurances, particularly on settlements and the way forward will have to be much clearer. But f rom the foundation of no more bombs in the market place, bombs that have destroyed so many past efforts to move the negotiations forward, we can build a new edifice. Itzhak Rabin once said: "We will continue the fight against terror as if there is no peace process and we will continue the peace process as if there is no terror." Words for us to live by.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Ambassador Walker.

I have a few questions that I would like to address to our panelists.

Ambassador Indyk, you have called for the appointment of a special envoy; is that not correct? And what can a special envoy accomplish that has not been accomplished to date? Why recommend this step at this point?

Mr. INDYK. Mr. Chairman, to understand the importance of this is to realize that the Bush Administration understandably took a step back from engagement in the efforts to promote the peace process. They did so at the beginning of the Administration. They abolished Dennis Ross's position as special envoy because of this real sense, and the correct sense at the time, that there was not an opportunity to advance the peace process.

What I am talking about is a very different engagement. It is an engagement to stop the violence as the first requirement, and that, we have seen, can be started by Arafat, but in order to get him to do the hard things required, arresting the terrorist that he has let out of jail, stopping his own Tanzim Fatah militia from carrying out their drive-by shootings, arresting these mortar gangs, he is not going to do it just on his own.

We can see in the last 11 days the whole issue of getting a simple meeting between Yasser Arafat and Shimon Peres has plagued both parties. It has been very difficult to do. And left to their own devices, both sides will find it, just as they have before, impossible to break out of this kind of situation.

Yasser Arafat's inability to stop everything in its tracks immediately requires a certain patience and tolerance on the side of Israel, which is extremely difficult to expect of them in a situation where they are taking casualties on a daily basis, as they did yesterday.

And that is where we have a special role to play, which cannot be done by telephone from Washington. Especially not in a circumstance where our leaders are necessarily preoccupied with other events, prosecuting the war on terrorism. We need somebody who can go and basically engage in an effort at hand-holding on the Israeli side, and arm twisting on Arafat's side to make sure that we take advantage of this opportunity to get the parties to live up to their commitments, to create a series of reciprocal steps that are implemented according to things that both sides have already agreed upon.

We have in the situation now a circumstance in which Europeans, the UN are trying to fill the vacuum. But the fact of the matter is, especially after September 11th, no outside party has the kind of influence that we have now to be able to give to stop the violence.

Mr. GILMAN. Ambassador Indyk, if the special envoy makes no progress, how would that impact upon the peace process?

Mr. INDYK. Well, you know, first of all, I think that there is a good chance now that he could make progress for all the reasons that I have described. So it is always a question of weighing the risks involved here.

I also think it is important to be seen to be trying at this moment, so that we diffuse the issue so that——

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. INDYK [continuing]. We make clear that this is not something that we are ignoring while we are prosecuting the war on the terrorism.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Ambassador Walker, State Department reported and the International Terrorism for 2000 states that Israel alleges that the Palestinian security officials and Fatah members have taken part in violence against Israel.

Should we be placing Fatah or Tanzim on the list of terrorist organizations?

Mr. WALKER. Well, the State Department has said, and, you know, much of my knowledge comes from the stuff that I read there, that Tanzim activities are not demonstrably ordered from above. I do not quite know whether that is true or not.

Let me put it this way: If we find that organizations are engaged in acts of terrorism against innocent civilians, such as bombings in pizza huts and parlors and bars and so on, then I think there is no question of what we call those people—they are terrorists—and we should define them as such.

The kind of activity that Tanzim is involved in, you have to take a look at exactly what it is and who is instructing and ordering it as an organization; the same thing with Fatah.

Mr. GILMAN. Former Prime Minister Netanyahu appeared before our Committee last week, and when we asked the question how would you define Mr. Arafat with regard to terrorism, he said, "Mr. Arafat is a terrorist."

Do you agree with that?

Mr. WALKER. No, I do not.

Mr. GILMAN. Ambassador Ross, the Bush Administration's strategy to implement the recommendations of the Mitchell Commission.

In your estimation has our approach changed at all in the light of the September 11th attack? Should it change?

Mr. ROSS. I do not know that it needs to change in terms of whether or not there should be implementation of the Mitchell Report. I do think you have to look at the Mitchell Report as an instrument or a pathway. The Mitchell Report is not an objective. You have to decide—you have to decide what your objective is.

I believe the way to identify the right objective is focus on what is possible and what is not possible. What clearly is not possible is to go back to where we were at the end of the Clinton Administration.

On the other hand, you have an objective of trying to relegitimize the idea of peacemaking, try to relegitimize the idea of peaceful coexistence.

The Mitchell Report can be important in getting toward that for one reason. It is not just that we need to see a ceasefire, it is that we need to see both sides avoiding those steps that create a grievance on the part of the other. Where the Mitchell Report has, I think, great value, it is precisely in that area.

But again, I would treat it as part of a pathway. I would not treat it as an end in itself.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to address in the context of what our colleague, Congressman Issa said before, and that was to tie the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the disaster that occurred on 9–11 is wrong. And I want to take issue with that.

You know, we used to say when we were kids "sticks and stones can break my bones but names can never harm me." That is not true. People who call names incite people to do things. And I think that is what we have seen.

Where I come from, and I will disagree with my good friend, Ambassador Walker, I think, the answer he gave as to whether or not Yasser Arafat was a terrorist; certainly a former terrorist. But where I come from if you help plan the murder, then drive the guy to the murder, and then hide the triggerman, you get charged with the murder.

Arafat, we have been told today, has said some things which have resulted basically in a stopping of the firing of the guns even in self-defense, stopped the drive-by shootings. He stopped the suicide bombings. My goodness, this was the guy everybody was wringing their hands about a few weeks ago, gee, I wonder if he has the ability to stop this. Can he control this? Maybe it is beyond his control.

All of a sudden the guy turns into a magician, and snaps his fingers, and everything stops. Give me a break. The rhetoric that he has used over the years, the things that he has said as the leader, the chairman of the Palestinian Authority, his tolerance of those who have committed acts of terrorism against civilians, the blowing up of school buses, the blowing up of dance halls where little girls are going to a dance, or the pizza place, to allow that and to tolerate all of that over the years on a sustained, continuous level has lowered the threshold of what is acceptable as human behavior. That bar is laying on the floor it is so low. And whether or not he is complicitious in a direct fashion with Osama bin Laden still remains to be seen. But certainly he is Arafat, the enabler, because his language has tolerated that kind of behavior until it has resulted in this total disaster.

If I get one answer to one question from each of you today, I will be satisfied, and that question is: What do you know of any tie-ins between Mr. Arafat, the organizations which are supportive of Mr. Arafat, those within his coalition, those who are sympathetic to his cause and his goals and his means, and Mr. bin Laden and as al-Qaeda and those organizations?

Maybe we should start with Ambassador Indyk because you appear to be in the middle. [Laughter.]

Mr. INDYK. As far as I am aware off the top of my head, there is no connection.

Mr. ACKERMAN. And if I can just broaden that and include Saddam Hussein.

Mr. INDYK. Well, let me just talk about Arafat and his organizations within the PLO, is what I take it you are referring to.

I think it is important and it goes to this whole question of the relationship between what happened on September 11th and the Arab-Israeli issues, I think it is important to emphasize Osama bin Laden has never really focused on Israel and Israel-related issued.

As far as I am aware, the first that Osama bin Laden's operation turned up in Gaza or the West Bank was only a few months ago, and that was a small cell which the Israelis stumbled on, and were not previously aware of their activities there.

Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network has ben far more focused on Saudi Arabia and the American presence there; on Egypt, and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad is a critical element in the al-Qaeda organization, and other places in the region like Algeria. They have also found cells, of course, in Jordan and in even Syria and Lebanon.

So on that front, I do not think there is a direct connection. But I do want to associate myself with your comments about the climate, and I guess Dennis has referred to this as well.

I am afraid that it is a sorry reality that the youths of terrorism, the killing of innocent people, men, women and children, has become acceptable within the mainstream of Arab and even Islamic societies as a weapon of the oppressed, and that is something that has to be addressed not just by the political leadership in the Arab and Islamic world, but it needs to be addressed by the religious leadership as well because it is going to destroy their societies and their governments as well. It is very important. If they play a leadership role—now, it is not good enough for us to denounce it in our American or Australian accent, it is essential that they stand up and speak out against this kind of terrorism, which is not just un-Islamic, it is anti-Islamic.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Ambassador Walker.

Mr. WALKER. Yes, sir. I do not know of any specific ties, but I am not sure that it makes a lot of difference because if we are going to be against terrorism, we have to be against terrorism. And whatever their links are to Osama bin Laden or not, if they engage in the kind of terrorism we have been talking about this morning, then they are our enemy, they are the enemy of the Palestinians and the Israelis and the whole civilized world. So let us just keep it clear.

Now, Arafat, the magician, I would suggest that the world changed on September 11th, and that the equation that various leaders have used in the past to judge their actions has changed because for the first time, I think, the world understands that we are serious. There is no more playing around. There is no more excuses. There is no more, well, we have got negotiations tomorrow, and well, we do not want to upset the apple cart. And I think that Arafat may have, mind you, may have taken that equation, that new equation into account when he decided that he could bring power to bear on these groups, and their understanding of that fact allowed him to do it.

So I would suggest that it is something that we want to continue to make very clear to the world that this is not going to pass. We are going to pursue this to the end, which is a victory in the war against terrorism.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I agree with you on that point, but you know, I just want to punctuate that by saying we took very sad note of the fact that those loyal to Arafat jumped up and started to applaud before he held up the applause cue card.

Mr. WALKER. I agree.

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. WALKER. And there is—there is a lot to do in this area, particularly on the climate and particular in the statements on both sides, I might add.

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman's time as expired.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I could have——

Mr. GILMAN. I am going to ask the cooperation of my colleagues. We have 25 minutes in which to go to the Floor for the bipartisan briefing by Colin Powell, and by our defense secretary. And I am going to ask our colleagues if they will cooperate and limit their questions and answers to 3 minutes each.

And Mr. Ackerman, I am going to ask your cooperation in that so that each Member will have the opportunity to question.

We will now proceed to Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Walker, Ambassador Walker, I just want to follow up very quickly with a couple of short questions.

I am going to assume for a moment that Osama bin Laden, if peace came to the Middle East, at least as to Palestine and Israel's disputes, that Osama Bid Laden would not change what he is doing at all; is that correct?

Mr. WALKER. That is absolutely correct.

Mr. ISSA. And on the other hand, some elements related to the PLO over which the Chairman either does or does not have some authority would disband, at least some of them?

Mr. WALKER. Some of them certainly would.

Mr. ISSA. And the ones who would not at that point be in the same boat as Osama bin Laden?

Mr. WALKER. Would oppose our culture, our society, our freedom.

Mr. ISSA. Can we say today which ones are in that camp?

Mr. WALKER. The closest, I would say, is probably the Palestinians Islamic Jihad. It is a similar nature to the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and so on. They are similar.

Mr. ISSA. Right. And I would like to go on the record today as saying that at the point that we can determine that a group, if there were a just and amicable peace arrived at between the Palestinian people and Israel, those which would then find a new cause celebre, if we can isolate them, that in fact we should put them on that list even though they are not presently on that list.

Mr. WALKER. I certainly would agree with that, sir.

Mr. ISSA. Moving on to another issue, because obviously there are colleagues on both sides of this issue, but I for one would like to bifurcate the terrorist activities that we are trying to deal with today versus the goal of the Chairman, which is to continue the process of peace in the Palestinian region.

What I would like to do, I have been given a map and some talking points that I am going to ask that my assistant pass them around, and that they be included in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GILMAN. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

Israeli Proposal for the Palestinian State at Camp David II

Published in 'Le Monde Diplomatique', December 2000





Mr. ISSA. This is for Ambassador Ross.

Looking at the map, and I realize no map is perfect, but you are familiar with this ground more than probably any other man still living, do you see any inaccuracies in this map relative to the one that was proposed at Camp David II?

Mr. ROSS. The short answer to it, yeah, this is not accurate.

Mr. ISSA. And would you——

Mr. ROSS. And I will explain why.

Mr. ISSA. Please.

Mr. ROSS. Let me start most clearly. It is interesting how there have been a lot of mythologies that have been developed. One mythology——

Mr. ISSA. Truth, the first casualty of the Middle East.

Mr. ROSS. What I was saying, truth telling is where we need to start.

At Camp David, we never presented a comprehensive set of ideas.

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. I regret to have to cut——

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, if I could just ask that we get a written response, classified or unclassified, preferably classified, so that we could have a full understanding of the inaccuracies.

Mr. GILMAN. Without objection, we will——

Mr. ROSS. It does not need to be classified. I think it should all be in the open.

Mr. GILMAN. I will be——

Mr. ROSS. I will answer it.

[The information referred to follows:]

QUESTION POSED BY THE HONORABLE DARRELL E. ISSA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND AMBASSADOR ROSS' POST-HEARING WRITTEN RESPONSE

QUESTION BY THE HONORABLE DARRELL E. ISSA:

There have been many questions surrounding the issue of what was actually offered to the PLO at Camp David II. I have been given a map by the PLO, outlining their version of what was offered to them at Camp David II. I would be interested to know what, in your opinion, was offered to the Palestinians at this specific peace summit, and how your view differs from what the map represents.

RESPONSE BY AMBASSADOR DENNIS B. ROSS:

In response to the taken question, let me make the following points: there have been a number of mythologies created about what the Palestinians were offered, and the map in question is one of those mythologies. It is true that the maps the Israelis presented to the Palestinians would have dissected the Palestinian territories, but in the Clinton ideas the United States offered approximately 95% of the West Bank—and that 95% would have been contiguous. It would not have been dissected, bisected or trisected. In addition, that 95% would have provided the Palestinian state with its own border with Jordan. Peace will be possible when facts are faced and mythologies are not perpetuated.

Mr. GILMAN. The next inquiry is by Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. I would like to follow up on the comments of the distinguished gentleman from California, and dividing terrorist groups into those that would disband or not disband based upon what happens in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

I want to say that terrorism and killing civilians in the United States or outside the United States is totally unacceptable, and

that we would be wrong to divide terrorist groups into those that will not rest until every girl in America and in any country in the world is removed from school and some sort—and we have a Talibanization of the entire world, those that would rest if we withdrew our forces from Saudi Arabia, and those that supposedly would disband if only Israel made enormous concessions.

The issue is not whether the objective of the terrorist is or is not thought to be reasonable. The issue is whether terrorism is going to be allowed as a way of influencing policy. But I would like to shift to some of the panelists talking about a smaller than comprehensive partial resolution that might be in the cards in the next year or two, and this is a bit of a return to Camp David.

And that is, it seems obvious that these parties cannot reach an agreement on Jerusalem. Do you sense that the parties could reach an agreement on virtually everything else, including the right of return, and could Chairman Arafat agree that in a two-state solution with the Palestinians being given a state, then any right of return of Palestinians was to the Palestinian state and not to the other state in the area?

And I will leave that to any of the panelists.

Mr. ROSS. The short answer to your question is I do not believe so. He was offered a right of return to his state but not to Israel as part of the Clinton's ideas in December, and he rejected it.

Mr. SHERMAN. And even if he was given statehood and did not have to reach a conclusion about Jerusalem, even in a smaller context, that is not something that he can do or would do?

Mr. ROSS. Well, at Camp David, we tried different alternatives. We tried to different fallbacks, including deferring all Jerusalem, deferring part of Jerusalem. We did not put ideas for refugees on the table at that time. We did in December. The idea is we put on in December where a right of return to their state, meaning the Palestinian state, not to Israel. We said there would be under humanitarian rubric the ability of Palestinians to return to Israel, but it would an Israeli decision. Israel would have the sovereignty over who it is who would come back, and that was not something they were prepared to accept.

So the question really is, is Arafat different today than he was then, and I for one would have my doubts, but one could always probe these things.

My own view is, given the climate today on both sides where both sides still fundamentally question whether or not the other is interested in peace, I do not see how you can deal with existential questions.

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I guess, Ambassador Ross, it was interesting to hear you say you had your doubts as to whether Mr. Arafat was any different today than he was a year ago. And I guess, hearing the comments that I am hearing Ambassador Walker saying that he is not a terrorist, yet several weeks ago we were talking about this bad guy over there who performed or allowed terrorist activities, and then today we are hearing that we are going to use everything we can to fight the terrorist activi-

ties with Osama bin Laden, including maybe using Chairman Arafat.

And I guess my question to you is that, we all saw, and it has been referenced today, the dancing in the streets on September 11th by the Palestinians, and can we trust Chairman Arafat?

Should we be approaching him to help us in this?

You know, I read with interest that you said that he has done some things like arresting the low-level terrorists. What about high-level terrorists? I mean, is this man sincere? Do we trust him?

I for one am not sure we do.

Mr. WALKER. Mrs. Davis.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Walker.

Mrs. DAVIS. Anybody who wants to answer it, feel free.

Mr. WALKER. Mrs. Davis, I think that the real question is I do not think you can cross anyone—certainly not Arafat at this point——

Mr. GILMAN. Would you put the microphone a little closer?

Mr. WALKER. Yes. Sorry.

I do not think you can trust Arafat or take anybody at face value at this point. I think you have to have people prove themselves. The question is whether we look forward and we seek this kind of cooperation from Chairman Arafat, or not.

I do not discount the possibility, I disagree with my colleague, Dennis, and continue to believe that Chairman Arafat under the right circumstances might be able to resolve these cataclysmic issues, but he cannot do it alone. He cannot negotiate directly with Sharon and come to an agreement. He is going to have to have the broader support of the Arab world in order to make that kind of a decision.

So we have to look at the way we were—we are conducting ourselves. As Dennis said, there were certain things that you wanted to redo about the way we went about negotiations. I think that is very important for the future.

Mr. ROSS. A quick comment.

I would say a couple of points. First, Arafat has acted against terror every time he has felt personally threatened by it. In 1996, after four bombs in 9 days by Hamas, he cracked down on Hamas in ways that nobody else in the Islamic world had cracked down on some of the Islamic extremists. If he feels that that is the situation he is in today, he might do it again.

In terms of whether or not he is capable of doing more, the problem I have, and I guess this is where Ed and I probably disagree, Arafat cannot make peace until he can demonstrate that he can give up some of his mythologies. At no time in the last year of negotiations, neither at Camp David nor with the Clinton ideas at the very end, did he ever evidence any inclination or willingness or capability to give up those mythologies.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. GILMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired.

Mr. Engel?

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There is not much time so I just want to comment on some of the things that was said. Ambassador Indyk, you said that—essen-

tially, because of political reality Arafat has changed his behavior, at least recently.

You know, my only thing is what happens when the political reality changes? I believe he does not operate, he does not do anything unless he feels the pressure, and then he does things only when he feels the pressure. So I really feel that essentially he is insincere, and when things go back, when the heat is away a little bit, he will just go back to his old way.

And Ambassador Walker, you said that in order for there to be any kind of a deal the Palestinians need independence, dignity and self-respect. And I agree. And I think that is what Barak offered them and Arafat walked away from it.

Finally, I would like Ambassador Ross to comment on that. What happened, I mean? And if you can, also you started to say about the map, why this was not accurate. I wonder if you could explain that. But what happened?

To those of us, it seemed pretty much like Barak was offering him the sun, the moon and the stars, and even if he didn't want to accept it, he could have made some counter-proposals and squeezed a few more concessions out of Barak.

Instead, the way I see it, he chose to walk away and then start the Intifada. What happened? Why did he walk away?

Mr. ROSS. First, I think, again, one of the mythologies is that Barak did all the offering. The fact of the matter is the most important thing that was presented to Yasser Arafat was presented by President Clinton, and they were American ideas. He did not—it was not the case of turning down Barak. He turned down us. And he turned down us at a point when he could have had a state, an independent state in almost all of the West Bank, Gaza would have been increased by one-third in size. He would have had all of the Arab neighborhoods of east Jerusalem as the capital of that state. He would have had an international presence in the Jordan Valley starting at year six with the Israelis out of it, and he would have had the right of return to his state, and a very significant international fund and mechanism to deal with grievances and claims related to the refugees. He could not accept that.

Now, the reason I believe he could not accept it is because in the end it required him, as I said before, to give mythologies. The Israelis were being asked to give us mythologies. They were asked to give up the mythology at the time that all of Jerusalem, including the Arab part of Jerusalem, would always be Israeli. They were being asked to give up what had always been valued by the IDF as something that reached the level of a core belief that they had to have the Jordan Valley. They were prepared to do it.

He was being asked to give up the myth of right of return. In 1988, they accepted a two-state solution. The idea that you are going to have a two-state solution when you have right of return to your state into their state is completely illogical.

In the end, I believe he simply could not redefine himself. The question in my mind is have circumstances changed in the last year given the consequences of the Intifada that he might be different today.

I do not believe, by the way, that he planned the Intifada. Arafat is not a strategist. He is a tactician. He responds to the pressure

of the moment. And I believe what happened at the moment he saw an ability to sort of demonstrate that his hands were tied on the Haram al-Sharif, Temple Mount area, and he let the violence take place.

Once he knew it was coming, he let it take place. And like a surfer, he rode the waves.

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We have touched on it a bit, but the concept and he fact that the government run Palestinian press, the anti-Semitism, the anti-Americanism which the street folks hear day after day after day they are—what is taught in the schools even at a young age, you know, what these kids have to absorb, I cannot help but think that that just poisons the whole chance of ever having peace in that area of the world.

We talked about the streets breaking out in jubilation and celebrating the attacks on the United States. Now, what I saw on television was a relatively small group of people. However, it is my understanding that the AP had film of significantly larger numbers in other areas, four or five thousand people celebrating, but they were threatened with violence. If they released this statement, apparently they caved in because this has not been shown.

Do any of you gentlemen know about that? Can you relate anything about that to us?

Mr. INDYK. Maybe I will address it.

I think, first of all, your point about incitement is a very important and powerful one.

Mr. CHABOT. About what?

Mr. INDYK. Incitement.

Mr. CHABOT. Incitement.

Mr. INDYK. And it is one that has to be addressed. If we are going to get out of the crisis, and try to create a basis for resuming negotiations, then incitement has to be at the top of the agenda in terms of what Dennis refers to as changing the climate.

In terms of the expression of the tapes, the Foreign Press Association wrote a letter to Chairman Arafat complaining about that, so I think the Foreign Press Association in Israeli territories was satisfied that in fact this had taken place; that tapes were being confiscated, and they were suppressed.

And the reason is obvious; that Arafat understood that this was extremely damaging to him in the public relations battle that has been very much a war that the Israelis and Palestinians have been fighting throughout this Intifada.

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. I will yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.

Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. Yes. Under the possibility that Mr. Issa might not share with me your response to him, I would like you to use my time to continue your answer to him regarding the accuracy of these maps, and particularly in the context of claims by Palestinians since that time that what was offered was a massively partitioned West Bank where no one could go from one place to another without having to cross Israeli presence. I will stop there.

Mr. ROSS. What this map reflects is an interpretation of what the Palestinians, I think—well, let me put it this way—what the Palestinians are trying to portray is what was offered to them.

The fact of the matter is we are the ones at Camp David who offered a 9-percent annexation and a 1-percent swap. Let me highlight one thing to start with.

There was going to be a Jordanian-Palestinian border. This says there was no Jordanian-Palestinian border. It is true early in the negotiations the Israelis wanted a strip along this whole length that they would control, but that was not in fact what was presented.

Mr. ISSA. Actually, you will see in the footnotes that that is annotated as eventually under Palestinian sovereignty.

Mr. ROSS. It was not the case of eventually.

Mr. ISSA. Okay.

Mr. ROSS. So that simply is wrong.

Secondly, the notion that there were going to be these areas that were divided into Cantons because you are going to have roads that would cut all the way through is not true. Again, it was something that the Israelis requested, but it was not something that was presented, at least by us. Now, that is number one.

Number two, this is from Camp David. Now, what the Clinton ideas offered were—in territory was a range of four to 6 percent in swaps—I mean, four to 6 percent in annexation, and one to 3 percent in swaps. So you probably would have ended up with what it would have been, 5 percent annex for three settlement areas—blocks, and a 2-percent swap opposite Gaza which would have increased Gaza, as I said, by one-third in size.

In the 95 percent, in any map of 95 percent, again you would not have had this all divided up, and these roads that are put in here, again designed to divide it all up, were not going to be a part of what it is we presented.

So this is designed to make it look as if what was presented was unfair. But I would tell you, to this day I am not aware that the Palestinian leadership has ever presented to their public what it is the Clinton ideas were. Had they done that, perhaps the attitudes of the Palestinian public might be very different.

Mr. BERMAN. If I may just add, as pointed out by my colleagues from California, on the bottom of this is the words "Jerusalem Task Force, Orient House." This is not—this is——

Mr. ISSA. If the gentleman would yield, I am not giving this credibility.

Mr. BERMAN. No, no, I just——

Mr. ISSA. I brought it here specifically because the truth has not come out and this kind of questionable map serves only to hurt the cause of peace.

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Cantor.

Mr. CANTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If I could just turn the focus to the Administration's current efforts to build an international coalition against terror, I think something that we all support obviously. But the fact and the possibility that states that the U.S. deems terrorist nations may be able to become part of this coalition gives me some concern.

And I would just like to ask any of you or all of you if you think there needs to be some criterion which needs to be met by these nations in order to become part of the coalition, and let us say, for example, Syria or Iran, what would they have to do in order to gain some of the benefit of U.S. support to be part of that coalition against terrorism?

Mr. WALKER. I will take a stab of it.

I think that, first of all, we have to look at what states do in the future, not what they have done in the past. I think that is what the President said. I think it is a very smart thing to say because what we want to do is stop terrorism, and that should be our focus.

Now, if you take a state like Syria, we would want to be sure, I think, that they are not having terrorist training camps under their very noses in the Bekka Valley, and they would have to see that it is in their interest not to allow that kind of activity to go on. And we would want to have a dialogue with the Syrians on their past practices as well, so that we can be as reassured in our own minds as to the direction that they are moving in the future.

But I must say the letter that President Bashar Assad wrote to President Bush was a rather extraordinary document and one that we ought to capitalize on.

Mr. INDYK. Could I address that, Mr. Cantor, in the case of Iran because there I think we face a much more difficult problems? Iran is, according to the State Department's latest report, the preeminent state sponsor for terrorism. It operates a network of truly global reach, Hezbollah, through its Embassy, through the Revolutionary Guard, through the Iranian intelligence services.

And according to what I understand of the FBI's case here, they are connected to the killing of 19 Americans in the Kobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. And yet the Iranians are sending a signal that, you know, maybe they are sympathetic to what has happened and maybe they would cooperate in some way.

I think here we have to be very careful to avoid the perversion of our own purposes. While there can be some tacit understandings since the Iranians are very hostile to the Taliban and vice-versa, and their neighbors in Afghanistan, that there may be some concert of interest here that can be exploited tacitly.

We have a bill of particulars with Iran that the Iranians will need to address, and I think that that will have to be on our agenda because if we are going to be serious about the broader war on terrorism beyond the essential first task of dealing with the threat from Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network, we are going to have to see a change in Iranian behavior in terms of sponsorship of terrorism.

Mr. GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

I want to thank our panelists for this very substantive hearing, and we thank you for your time.

Mr. INDYK. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes.

Mr. INDYK. If I could just respond very briefly on what seemed to be an unclear statement for a moment.

Mr. GILMAN. We are being called to the Floor. Why do you not take it up with them directly, if you would.

Mr. INDYK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GILMAN. The Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State of California

Average Number of Palestinian Attacks per day (valid through July 21, 2001), statistics provided by the Israel Defense Forces



Daily Palestinian Attacks since acceptance of Tenet Plan on June 13
(statistics provided by Israel Defense Forces)



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, DC, August 27, 2001.

Hon. BENJAMIN GILMAN, *Chairman,*
Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia,
Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the hearing on July 26, you asked Assistant Secretary Burns whether the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv had refused to send representatives to the funerals of American citizens who had been killed in the recent violence.

Ambassador Kurtzer attended the August 10 funerals for both Malka Roth and Judith Greenbaum, the American citizens killed in the bombing in Jerusalem the previous day. Prior to this, I know that our officers have made every effort to contact and visit the families of the victims. Former Ambassador Indyk, for example, visited one victim's family members who live inside the green line, visited another family at the airport, and offered to visit a third victim's family at the hospital, but the family declined the offer.

Our Consulate personnel have visited families at the hospital or at their homes whenever the security situation allowed and the families agreed to the visit.

Unfortunately, the tense security situation prevailing in the West Bank has often prevented representatives of our staff from attending funerals of American citizens killed there. At the same time, let me assure you that they are committed to contacting and visiting the families at the earliest opportunity.

May I ask you to share this information with other members of the committee, or perhaps add this letter to the transcript of the session, so that members who share your concerns may be aware of the Department's position on this important issue.

Sincerely,

PAUL V. KELLY, *Assistant Secretary,*
Legislative Affairs.

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