The U.S. Army War College and the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies of the University of Pittsburgh cosponsored a conference in Pittsburgh, PA, on June 27, 2000, as part of the Ridgway Center's series of events to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the Korean War. The conference focused on lessons from that conflict that will continue to have relevance as we enter a new millennium. The approximately 75 attendees included veterans, students, diplomats, professors, and authors; and their discussions interwove graphic war stories from the past with trenchant observations about possible future conflicts. The conference focused on warfighting, political, leadership, and organizational legacies and lessons from that crucial but "Forgotten War" which is finally getting some of the attention it deserves. This brief summary highlights the salient points raised and discussed during the meeting. The Ridgway Center will publish many of the papers presented there as part of an anthology of its Korean War commemorative activities.

Warfighting and Political Issues.

Though in the shadow of World War II, the Korean War looked like an aberration in the way the United States employs its military power. Most of this nation's conflicts have been mid or low intensity, involving traditional limitations in objectives, geography, technology, resources, or time. Korea had examples of all these restraints, and also revealed some new ones. Fears of retaliation with weapons of mass destruction influenced policymakers on both sides. Yet under that nuclear umbrella, the war was fought with leftover weapons from World War II. In Korea we began to see how public opinion shaped or reflected by the news media could accelerate or influence decisionmaking, and how speedier and global communications networks could attach strategic significance to tactical events. These trends will continue to restrain wars in the future, as will the sensitivity of regional economies to the threat of conflict.

Korea was different from previous limited wars because of the involvement of the United Nations (U.N.), and, though the conflict does not resemble current U.N. peacekeeping or humanitarian missions, there are many relevant lessons to be drawn from the U.N.'s first war. That organization still has no real capability to deter aggression, requiring the United States to establish lines that should not be crossed. However, the rest of the world perceives that the U.N., and the United States, are usually slow to respond to aggression or other crises until
considerable destruction has already occurred. Once involved, it is difficult for U.N. forces to achieve a lasting solution. The result is either an open-ended commitment with forces on the ground for many years, such as in Korea, or a restoration of the status quo that leaves the conditions in place that initially caused the problem. Postponing issues of governance is especially likely to ensure future conflict.

Korea also can teach us a great deal about the "class system" of member nations in the U.N., and the problems American forces and commanders have dealing with them in a coalition. We often enlist U.N. help to cover our operations with a "figleaf" of multilateralism, but then must deal with conflicting policies and objectives that result. On the other hand, allied countries often have a difficult time understanding the interplay of foreign policy concerns and domestic politics that shape American actions.

These coalition characteristics were particularly evident in the negotiation process that produced the Korean armistice, another aspect of the war with many lessons. Stopping the U.N. offensive in the summer of 1951 to begin peace talks was a major mistake, because it sacrificed initiative and momentum while reducing the incentive for the Communists to achieve a settlement. American policy became increasingly responsive to public opinion as the war continued. "War-weariness" at home affected our negotiating position, but so did moral concerns about the forced repatriation of prisoners of war. Despite President Eisenhower's later claims that nuclear threats produced an armistice, the best evidence supports a conclusion that Stalin's death was the most important reason for a change in the Communist position. Nuclear weapons were of little use politically or militarily. Once deterrence failed, mutual fear of retaliation prevented their employment.

Despite this lack of utility for weapons of mass destruction during the war, there were three important legacies for them afterwards. First, Korea led to the adoption of the expanded military missions and increased force requirements proposed by National Security Council Directive 68, considerably accelerating the buildup in the number and types of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal. Biological and chemical weapons programs also received increased American attention. Second, since both Koreas depended heavily on the nuclear umbrella of their superpower allies, those smaller nations were motivated to develop their own weapons when relations with their powerful sponsors cooled. The last legacy has been that the United States, the Soviet Union, and China have all tried to stabilize the region with bribes of potentially dangerous technology, especially to North Korea, in hopes that through these arrangements the region, and the technology, can be controlled.

The Korean War also provides us with lessons on the use of conventional forces, especially as a portent for the use of airpower in coming wars. The Far East Air Forces' "air pressure" strategy developed in 1952 was the result of the first systematic American study of the best way to apply airpower to produce a negotiated settlement in a limited war. Up to then, the air campaign had highlighted the difficulties of conducting aerial interdiction of a less technologically dependent army. The process of selecting objectives for the new campaign provides a model of how to plan the use of force in limited conflicts. Targeting moved from hydroelectric power facilities to cities and towns to irrigation dams in an attempt to find the right objective whose destruction could influence enemy decisionmakers to agree to an armistice. The same "imposed cost" approach was pursued in Vietnam and Kosovo. Another similarity between the bombing in Korea and Kosovo is that chosen vital targets are increasingly "dual-use," affecting civilians as well as the military, and the former tend to bear the heaviest brunt of casualties from air attacks on such objectives.

The Korean War furnishes three graphic examples of the achievement of strategic surprise in 1950. North Korea exploited American preoccupation with World War III in Europe to gain a significant advantage with the initial attack in June. Douglas MacArthur turned the tables in September at Inchon, showing that a "high risk" approach can be "low risk" if the other side thinks your option is impossible. But wishful thinking, "victory disease," and poor intelligence set the United States up to be surprised again by the Chinese intervention in November. Recent experience with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait demonstrates that, even with modern surveillance technology, it is still possible to achieve strategic surprise.

Leadership and Organizational Issues.

Considering the sponsors of the conference, it is not surprising that much discussion focused on the leadership of Matthew Ridgway. His restoration of the fighting spirit of Eighth Army after its disastrous defeat by massive Chinese Communist forces in late 1950 remains one of the greatest examples of motivational and transformational leadership in military history. He also helped change the U.S. Army as a whole, with his important role in the integration of the Armed Forces. Additionally, Ridgway was one of the first military officers involved deeply in foreign affairs, working extensively with the State Department on Latin America. He also served on the Military Staff Committee of the U. N. After leaving the Far East, he succeeded Eisenhower at NATO, and helped shape that organization. Ironically, his most frustrating assignment after Korea was back in Washington as Chief of Staff of the Army, fighting to keep his service up to strength in the face of massive budget cuts.

In his battle to keep the Army strong, Ridgway was trying to avoid a repeat of the lack of preparedness that had been so evident in American regular units deployed at the beginning of the Korean War. Problems were even worse in the Reserves in 1950. The next war was supposed to be dominated by atomic air attacks that would allow 2 years to mobilize the Army. That service was the last priority for the defense budget, and it did not pass much of its scarce funds down to the Reserves. The best Reserve units were initially earmarked to counter other Communist moves around the world, especially in Europe, and involuntary callups from the inactive reserves were designated for Korea. These soldiers, mostly enlisted men and junior officers, were generally less trained and less willing to serve, and problems with their mobilization caused a public outcry. Recall policies were contradictory and piecemeal. Despite plans to use unit replacements, the Army had to resort to individuals, which exacerbated the personnel turbulence. Improvisation characterized all policies concerning the employment of Reserve and National Guard soldiers during the war. The repercussions of this tumultuous experience reverberated in Vietnam, when political leaders were not willing to pay the political costs of a similar mobilization.

Conclusions.

As is apparent from these notes, the Korean War deserves much more attention and study, not just as an obligation to its veterans, but also because of the insights for the future it can offer. It provides a more useful model for the restrained application of military force, often under problematic U.N. auspices, than conflicts like World War II. However, the troubling lesson for policymakers from air campaigns from Korea to Kosovo appears to be that swift, violent, and massive assaults on the dual-use and civilian infrastructure of a nation is the best way to achieve success with airpower. Korea also furnishes important lessons for ground forces, which despite the threat of weapons of mass destruction, must be ready to fight with on-hand conventional weapons. Reserve and National Guard elements are even more important to the Total Army than they were in 1950, and the need for thorough mobilization and employment planning is critical for a wide range of future contingencies. Wars rarely happen when, where, or how a nation expects. With extensive American involvement around the world, a myriad of conflicting alarms and intelligence, and resourceful potential enemies capable of sophisticated deception operations, the possibility of future strategic surprise remains, perhaps in Taiwan or even Korea again. That embattled peninsula remains a volatile place, and, despite the recent visit by the South Korean president to Pyongyang, conference attendees remain very suspicious of the North Korean regime and its motives.

The views expressed in this conference brief are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This conference brief is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.