The Battle of Vicksburg: The Key to Victory

CPT William T. Welch

 

The Civil War divided our nation, Americans fighting Americans, brother against brother. The war lasted four long years before the Confederate surrender at Appomattox, VA. Many historians say that a key battle fought westward was the turning point in the war: the Battle of Vicksburg. President Abraham Lincoln had declared "Vicksburg is the key...the war can never be brought to a close until that key is in our pocket."

On bluffs 250 feet high, the city of Vicksburg, MI, overlooks the Mississippi River on the Louisiana-Mississippi state boundary. The river was a key supply route for the Confederate forces in the West. These forces at Vicksburg, commanded by Lieutenant General John Clifford Pemperton, obtained soldiers and supplies from Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, and the Mississippi Yazoo Delta district. Vicksburg was one of the war’s great fortified strongholds. On the high bluffs, Confederate forces positioned artillery batteries ready to challenge the passage of Union ships. Gaining control of Vicksburg and the Mississippi River would open a major supply artery for the Union forces. The Union Navy accepted the Vicksburg challenge.

 

Naval Attempt

The Union command decided upon a naval attempt because of the natural terrain obstacles that surround Vicksburg. Ground forces would have a difficult time maneuvering through these obstacles. Captain David Farragut received the mission. Farragut had been very successful moving northward on the Mississippi River, taking New Orleans and Baton Rouge, LA, and Natchez, MS. Vicksburg’s bluffs proved too much for Farragut and his fleet. Farragut’s gun boats could not elevate their guns high enough to challenge the Confederate artillery batteries. Farragut had to withdraw to New Orleans, and Union leaders in Washington went back to the drawing board.

Strategists in Washington had no choice but to use ground forces and Major General Ulysses S. Grant to lead the attack on Vicksburg. Grant and his troops were in Corinth, TN. On 2 November 1862, they began moving south to Holly Springs, MS. Grant chose this route because the Mississippi Central Railroad originated in Grand Junction, IN. This railroad would serve as the logistics artery for the Union advance into Mississippi. On 13 November, Grant’s main force of 37,000 troops arrived at Holly Springs and immediately began establishing an advance supply base. Meanwhile, the rest of Grant’s troops, led by Major General William Sherman, waited in Memphis, TN.

In early December, Grant sent orders to Sherman to begin preparing for a move down the river. Grant was keeping Pemperton occupied with the threat of an overland advance. On 20 December, Sherman left Memphis with the help of a Naval flotilla commanded by Admiral David Porter. Sherman organized his forces into three divisions with the intent of assaulting Vicksburg on the east side of the river from the north. Meanwhile, Grant was diverting Pemperton’s attention from Sherman’s movement. The Confederate forces did not fall for the diversion and launched an attack on Grant’s logistics support.

 

Forrest and Van Dorn Raids

Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest and Major General Earl Van Dorn conducted a series of raids that successfully destroyed Grant’s line of communications and supply base. On 20 December, Forrest wrecked an important rail junction at Jackson, TN, breaking telegraph communications. Ironically, this was also the day Grant had received orders from Major General Henry Halleck, the commander of all ground forces, to order Major General John A. McClernand forward to participate in the operations against Vicksburg. Because of this raid, Grant was slow in reaching McClernand. This delay, in turn, caused McClernand to miss Sherman at Memphis.

On the very same day, Van Dorn surprised weakened Union forces and destroyed part of the Mississippi Central Railroad. He also captured a half-million dollar stockpile of supplies that Grant had accumulated to support his continued advance. Grant’s operations came to a screeching halt.

To make matters worse, McClernand, whom Grant had just ordered to move forward to join Sherman, wanted the Vicksburg expedition at the start. Upon linking up with Sherman, and being the senior of the two Union generals, he took command. McClernand decided to move north on the Mississippi River to the Arkansas River to assault the Port of Arkansas. That Port was taken on 11 January 1863. This was far from Grant’s objective. Grant immediately sent a message to Halleck calling McClernand’s diversion a "wild goose chase." A divided command now existed and now lay in the lap of Halleck in Washington.

On 12 January, Halleck settled the issue when he telegraphed Grant: "You are hereby authorized to relieve General McClernand from command of the expedition against Vicksburg. Giving it to the next in rank or taking it yourself." Realizing that relieving McClernand and putting Sherman in command would send political ripples all the way back to Washington, Grant chose to personally take command. Upon McClernand and Sherman’s return, he quietly deactivated McClernand’s Army of the Mississippi and reorganized his forces into four corps. The corps commanders were McClernand, Sherman, Major General James McPherson and Major General Stephen Hurlbut.

 

Back to Square One

At this point, Grant was right where he had started two months earlier. He traveled down the west side of the river, stopping northwest of Vicksburg. Grant tried four unsuccessful efforts to reach Vicksburg: two attempts to bypass the city to the south and two to cross the Yazoo Delta to the north.

The two attempts to bypass to the south involved digging canals through the waterways and rivers on the west side. Breaking levees and lack of engineer equipment caused these attempts to fail. The two attempts to cross the Yazoo Delta at first seemed promising, but the Confederate forces must have expected such attempts. Trees were cut to fall across the water and clog the waterways for the gunboats and ironclads. The date was March 1863 and Grant was still at square one.

Failure was nothing new to Grant. Since 1854, with his resignation of his commission followed by several projects he attempted as a civilian, he seemed always to fall short of success. Yet, through these failures, Grant seemed to emerge as a confident, respected leader who now enjoyed increasing support from President Lincoln and Halleck.

Grant thought he should withdraw to the north and attack along the Mississippi Central Railroad - his original intention. However, this strategy would appear as an admission of defeat, something Grant could not afford after his four failed attempts. Grant decided to march his troops south overland on the west side. He would run gunboats and transports at night past the bluffs to assist in crossing the river and then attack Vicksburg from the south.

 

Grant’s Campaign

Grant and Pemperton’s forces were about equal in size, about 50,000 each. This was not the force ratio Grant wanted to face. Grant organized his corps into three assaulting corps and one corps to protect his rear area. McClernand, Sherman and McPherson would lead the assaulting forces. Hurlbut would be the "stay-behind" commander. Grant started his campaign by sending McClernand south to Hard Times along the west bank to establish and repair a roadway for follow-on forces. Two weeks later Admiral Porter sailed eight gunships and eight transports past the bluffs, losing only one transport. Meanwhile, Grant was thinning Pemperton’s forces on the Vicksburg perimeter through diversions.

One diversion, commanded by Major General Frederick Steele, was to move a division north of Vicksburg to destroy supply stations and take livestock that Confederate forces needed. More importantly, Steele was to gain Pemperton’s attention to the north, spread his forces, and conceal Union movement to Hard Times. Steele was successful and rejoined Sherman to participate in the campaign. Hurlbut conducted the second diversion. He was to launch a pattern of cavalry raids to strain Pemperton’s already thin defenses. The biggest success of this campaign was that of Colonel Benjamin Grierson. His raid, from the Tennessee-Mississippi border to Baton Rouge, with only 1,000 soldiers drew a division from the defenses at Vicksburg. Sherman had the third diversion. He was to draw forces away from Vicksburg to Haynes Bluff. For this, he loaded 10 regiments worth of troops on transports and instructed every man to "look as numerous as possible." Sherman then moved the transports within view of the Confederate forces at Haynes Bluff, moved them out of sight, reboarded and repeated the process three times. This gave the appearance of 30 regiments instead of 10. This diversion resulted in the Haynes Bluff commander wiring an urgent message to Pemperton: "The enemy are in front of me in force such as has never been seen before at Vicksburg. Send me reinforcements." Meanwhile, Sherman was moving out to join Grant south of Vicksburg to report a mission complete.

Grant, with McClernand, was at Hard Times and ready to cross the river. Grand Gulf was to their front with Confederate forces. Porter’s gunboats had little effect. Grant was beginning to think his plan had failed, but luck was on his side. An escaped slave gave Grant information about a good road at Bruinsburg. Grant moved his forces further south. On 1 May, he was finally on the east side. Grant began establishing a supply base while waiting for Sherman and his forces.

 

Grant’s Most Critical Decision

Grant was getting supplies from Memphis. This line of supply was too long, and Union forces had to get past the bluffs. Grant knew if he waited for supplies, Vicksburg would have time to be reinforced. Pemperton would also expect Grant to move north and attack from the south. Grant decided not to wait for supplies, to move to Jackson and to attack Vicksburg from the rear. The Union leaders in Washington did not support this "carry-what-you-can" plan and sent a message to Grant to wait for resupply coordination from Baton Rouge. This message arrived too late. Grant was in the execution phase.

Sherman joined Grant on 7 May, the same day Grant would begin his movement to Jackson. He moved his forces through Rocky Springs to Raymond. McClernand was ordered to move directly north to Auburn. Grant wanted Pemperton to think his next target was Champion’s Hill. McPherson and Sherman arrived at Raymond on 12 May after a quick battle that resulted in Confederate forces retreating to Jackson. McClernand joined up with Grant at Raymond. Grant ordered McPherson to move to Clinton to destroy the railroad to prevent reinforcements and resupply, then move eastward to Jackson. Sherman was to attack Jackson from Raymond and McClernand was to stay in Raymond and protect the rear and reinforce McPherson or Sherman.

Jackson, MS, had 6,000 Confederate troops to Grant’s 25,000 Union troops. Jackson was taken easily. General Joe Johnston, the commander at Jackson, retreated his forces north to Canton. Grant’s decision to continue his advance without supplies was the key to this victory. Had the Union forces waited for resupply, Confederate forces would have grown to 15,000 troops with another 9,000 close behind. Grant was now in position to take the key he initially came to take: Vicksburg.

Johnston sent word to Pemperton to join him at Clinton. Together, the Confederates would attack Grant from the rear. At the same time, Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States, ordered Pemperton to hold Vicksburg at all costs. Pemperton followed Davis’ order and decided to meet Grant at Champion’s Hill. At the end of one of the bloodiest battles of the Vicksburg Campaign, the Union prevailed. Grant continued his movement to Vicksburg.

At this point, the Confederate morale was very low while the Union’s confidence was increasing. Union forces seemed invincible. Grant’s success was having a definite impact.

When Grant reached Vicksburg in mid-May, he attempted two assaults that failed. The second assault on 22 May had worse results than the first on 17 May. Realizing his conventional attacks would not work, Grant decided to "settle down to regular siege operations." Pemperton could not get supplies in and no Confederate could get out. Grant knew Pemperton would not last long. Grant also received reinforcements to increase Union numbers to 70,000 to Pemperton’s 30,000 Confederates.

In early July, Pemperton began negotiations with Grant for the conditions of surrender. On 4 July 1863, the Confederates surrendered. Grant sent a message to Washington that the campaign was over, the Mississippi was open all the way to the Gulf, and the Confederacy was split.

Grant had learned some hard lessons at the start of the operation from the raids on his supply base by Forrest and Van Dorn. He knew the importance of supplies and the sustainment of his troops. However, Grant’s decision to cut off his supply line and live off the land gave him the advantage he needed to stay one step ahead of the Confederate forces. Also, Pemperton and Grant studied at West Point together, so Grant had to do the unexpected. Logistics, or the lack of logistics, was the difference between taking the key and being locked out.


About The Author:

CPT William T. Welch is a Distinguished Military Graduate of Northwestern State University in Natchitoches, Louisiana, with a bachelor of science degree in business administration. He is an Honor Graduate of the Air Defense Artillery Officer Basic Course, Distinguished Graduate of the Quartermaster Transition Course, and the Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course, as well as the Petroleum Officer Course. His previous assignments include Platoon Leader, C Battery, 2/44th Air Defense Artillery; Executive Officer, Headquarters, Company A, 626th Forward Support Battalion (FSB); and Battalion S1, 626th FSB, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He current assignment is with the 25th Division Support Command, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

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