Editor's Note: Lieutenant General Woodrow W. Vaughan graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point (Class of 1940) and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Quartermaster Corps. He was still a First Lieutenant stationed at Fort Meade, Maryland, when World War II broke out. In May 1942 he was reassigned to the 76th Infantry Division at Fort Meade and promoted to Captain. He attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from December 1942 to March 1943, during which time he was promoted to Major. Expecting to go overseas after that, he was less than pleased to find out he had been assigned to the China-Burma- India Theater of Operations. To an aspiring young Major, the CBI looked like the kiss of death (a real "career-ender") but he was determined to do his best.
In 1991, General Vaughan was inducted into the Quartermaster Corps Hall of Fame. What follows are excerpts from a lengthy interview conducted in the fall of 1992.
INTERVIEWER: How did you learn you were going to the Far East, and what was your reaction?
LTG VAUGHAN: My orders read to go to Camp Kilmore, New Jersey. About the time I got there I learned that I would be going some place in the Far East, in the China-Burma-India Theater. The information we got included a little pocket book guide on the Hindu language. So I figured if I was going to be learning Hindustani, I probably wouldn't be going to Europe. . .
[When I got those orders] I was sick, sick . . . and very disappointed. I knew that Europe was the center of activity. That's where the war was going to be fought. The stakes would be high, and the game would be won or lost on the outcome. So that's where I wanted to go. But when I got ordered to China, I thought, well this is the end of the road. What the hell, I didn't even know we had troops in China. Why are we there? Why am I going there? Nothing will ever happen, and I'll die on the vine.
So it was not a happy outlook as far as I was concerned. And I went there feeling I would probably spend the war in China. My contemporaries would win the war in Europe and reap all the benefits, and get promoted, and be able to tell their grandchildren how they won the war. And I'd be able to tell them how I saw the pagodas in the Far East.
Editor's Note: Then-Major Vaughan sailed on the British liner SS Mauritania from New York, to Trinidad, Rio, Cape Town, Madagascar, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), and landed in Bombay, India, in May 1943. He crossed northern India on a train, and flew "over the hump" to Kunming, China, in the far southwestern part of China near the Burma border. There he built and commanded the first General Depot in China.
INTERVIEWER: What was your mission in China?
LTG VAUGHAN: We had two principal missions in China when I first got there. We supported the 14th Air force, because it was the only U.S. force in combat. The 14th was commanded by Major General Claire Chennault, who had formerly been head of the "Flying Tigers" and was a close friend of Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang.
In addition we had advisors with all the Chinese ground forces, similar to what we had in Korea with the Korean units and what we had ultimately in Vietnam. And we supported not only the advisors, but also the Chinese ground forces in a wholesale sense -- with their equipment, ammunition, and materiel that they couldn't obtain locally. We didn't run supply routes from our depots down to the units. We turned it over at depots to Chinese units that then made the distribution to their field organizations.
The only way to get supplies into China was by air. They flew from probably twenty airfields located throughout eastern India. We hoped they would go to the airfield they were manifested to. But weather would sometimes close down one airfield and leave another one open. . . . Once it landed at the airfield, the movement of supplies from that point was by truck. If it were for U.S. forces use, we trucked it ourselves or directed Chinese transportation units to take it from point to point. If the supplies were going to the Chinese combat elements, they picked it up in bulk at our depots and distributed it through their own system to their units.
INTERVIEWER: Any lessons learned from dealing with the Chinese?
LTG VAUGHAN: I learned that we didn't have all the answers. By that I mean the tendency was to advise the Chinese to do it our way. Our way must be the best way. But I found that many times the Chinese had the better way. And so I guess what I learned was that while our advisors had to advise them on how to do things our way, because that's the only way we knew, it's good for an advisor to listen. Because some things might work in our culture, but don't work in theirs. . . . My tendency was to begin to talk the first month, and suddenly the second year I said, "well, I don't know as much as I thought."
Editor's Note: As might be expected, the CBI theater presented unique problems for Quartermasters. Since overland supply was not possible at first, everything had to be purchased locally or flown in. The Chinese built living quarters, storage and other facilities for the Americans, and furnished subsistence -- eggs, bacon, bread, chicken, etc. But to make the local food "taste like you were at home," said General Vaughan, they had flown in condiments such as "coffee, salt, pepper, jelly, peanut butter, ketchup, and other accessories." One item extremely rare, and therefore missed all the more in the CBI, was American beer.
LTG VAUGHAN: We had a rule in China that the beer ration, which troops around the world got (like six cans a month, or some number) it could be supplied as it arrived in the theater. But because it had to be flown from India to China, we had a rule against flying any of it in. So we led a pretty sparse existence so far as the "goodies" were concerned. In the winter of '44, just about Christmas time, I happened to be in India, and I was shown around warehouses in Assam. In them were mountains of things that had been brought that far for us, but couldn't go any further because we had no way to get them in except by air. One of the items was beer.
I said to myself, "why couldn't I give the people in China a Christmas present?" So I sat down and with the help of the people there, computed about how much we would need. I think we had at that time about 25 or 30,000 people [in theater]. I figured what it would take to give each man six cans of beer. We computed it out. It wasn't very many airplane loads, didn't seem like. So I said, "ship it."
We had a radio-telephone hookup. I got in touch with my exec in Kunming and said we're going to ship it over. And as soon as it arrives, get it distributed so that every soldier gets his six-pack before Christmas. Well, the people in India were hesitant to ship it because we did have a rule against it. And I said, "well, I'm the man that determines whether or not we get it or we don't get it. So I'm telling you, ship it. I'm giving you authority on behalf of the CG." General Wedemeyer [the new Theater Commander] was in Washington at the time. We shipped it over, got it distributed. And I must say that the people in China thought this was the greatest thing since sliced bread.
Not long after that General Wedemeyer returned. In early January he asked to see me. When I went in he inquired as whether I had authorized the shipment of beer. I said, "yes." And he said, "but you know we have a rule against that." I said, "Yes, sir." But it just seemed to me that our people had been there so long, not having a single bit of it. It wasn't going to take up too much of our valuable tonnage. And I got envious of what the troops in India were getting. They were getting double doses, because they were also drinking up our quota. I just decided it would be a good thing for the morale of the theater to do it. [So I told him,] "I did it. I take full responsibility."
He just said, "I understand your reasons for doing it. Just don't do it again." I never did it again, but I always thought down deep in my heart that he was glad I did it, but he couldn't officially sanction it.
Editor's Note: General Vaughan was introduced to "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, but had no firsthand dealings with him. However, as a member of General Wedemeyer's G4 staff he did come to know the latter quite well, and the two remained friends for years. After V-J Day, General Vaughan was in charge of redeployment operations throughout China, and later worked closely with General George C. Marshall's postwar mission to China. Instead of being the "career-ender" that he feared, the assignment to the CBI was a blessing in disguise. It marked the beginning of a truly spectacular career, with 38 years of active duty service as a Quartermaster officer.
INTERVIEWER: You thought by going to the Far East you would never make it to Lieutenant Colonel. But in fact you were promoted to full Colonel in November 1945, while still in China. And at age 27 that made you one of the youngest officers to hold that rank in the entire U.S. Army. What do you make of that?
LTG VAUGHAN: As I remarked earlier, when I was ordered there I was very disappointed because I felt that would be the end. There would be nothing going on. I wouldn't have an opportunity to do anything. . . . Well, I found that you never know when you have the opportunity. You can't predict ahead of time what will happen. [Going back to my West Point days, I learned] you have to recite every day, prepare yourself every day. Do whatever your job is that day as well as you can. And if the right circumstances come along, you're ready for them.
So while I went to China very disappointed, all my classmates who went to Europe, they were battalion commanders who were lieutenant colonels. And I was promoted maybe a year after they were. But when the China Theater split off from the India-Burma Theater [in late 1944], it produced a hierarchy of its own. It had to do for itself what it had been relying on others to do previous to that time. By being on the spot, I was made the G-4 of the rear echelon of the China Theater, and was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and subsequently to Colonel; and had many great opportunities and experiences, none of which I had anticipated when I first went there.
That was a big lesson in itself. Don't try to guide your career based upon where you think you ought to go to advance yourself along the line. You can't do that. There are too many ifs, ands, and buts; too many emergencies that happen, too many unusual things, too many things you can't possibly predict . . .
There were only three people in my [West Point] class who were promoted to Colonel in World War II. One was an Engineer officer who was in the European Theater, and was in a combat engineer unit that was exposed many times. He had an opportunity to display his ability and was made a Group Commander. Another was an Infantry regimental commander whose unit was decimated on the landing. He really took over a part of the beach and single-handedly led that part of the landing. When his regimental commander was killed, he was made regimental commander and promoted. And myself in the boondocks of China -- as far away from the "real" activity of World War II as one could have been. So you just don't know about the future. . . .