

A Statement on the
Posture of the United States Army Reserve 2005

by

Lieutenant General James R. Helmly

Chief and Commander, United States Army Reserve

Presented to
The Committees and Subcommittees
of the

UNITED STATES SENATE

and the

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FIRST SESSION, 109th CONGRESS

The annual Army Reserve Posture Statement is an unclassified summary of Army Reserve roles, missions, accomplishments, plans, and programs.

Designed to reinforce the Chief, Army Reserve's posture and budget testimony before Congress, the Army Reserve Posture Statement serves a broad audience as a basic reference on the state of the Army Reserve.

This document is available on the Army Reserve web site at
<http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/soldiers/index.aspx>

Table of Contents

<u>PURPOSE OF THE ARMY RESERVE</u>	4
<u>RECOGNIZING THE NECESSITY FOR CHANGE</u>	
Dual Missions for Citizen-Warriors	6
A Smaller Army; an Army Reserve in Need of Refocusing	6
Filled with a Terrible Resolve	7
<u>EMBRACING PROFOUND CHANGE</u>	
A Catalyst for Change	7
Mobilization Issues	7
Even as We Speak	7
<u>TOWARD AN EXPEDITIONARY FUTURE</u>	
The Army Rotational Concept and the AREF	8
The AREF: Lynchpin of Army Reserve Readiness	8
<u>GENERATING THE FORCE</u>	
The New Force	9
Restructuring the Force	9
Optimizing the Force	9
The Army Modular Force	11
<u>FORCE GENERATION MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS</u>	
The Test	11
Recruiting and Retention	11
Officer Recruiting	12
Medical Officer Recruiting	12
Individual Augmentation Program	12
Full-Time Support	12
<u>FORCE GENERATION SUPPORT PROGRAMS</u>	
Army Well-Being Program	13
Welcome Home Citizen-Warrior Program	14
Medical Readiness and Medical Hold Improvements	15
Mobilized Soldiers Pay	15
<u>EQUIPPING THE FORCE</u>	
The Mother of Invention	15
New Equipping Strategy	17
<u>TRAINING THE FORCE</u>	
Cyclic Training	17
<u>SHELTERING THE FORCE</u>	
More than Bricks and Mortar	18
<u>READYING THE FORCE</u>	
The Cost of Readiness	19
Conclusion	19



The Purpose of the Army Reserve

“...to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.”



Title 10 USC, subsection 10102

"...The Army isn't just an ordinary institution, it's a great institution with an unparalleled set of enduring core values, a long, rich tradition, and a demonstrated ability to change and adapt to new situations... We must... develop a future force that is better able to meet the challenge of our security environment by... transforming the way the Army fights and the way it does business... We will keep the best of the past, while transforming to be better able to meet the challenge of the future."

Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey
Welcome Ceremony
December 6, 2004

Recognizing the Necessity for Change


Dual Missions for Citizen-Warriors

We are your Army Reserve. We are waging two battles simultaneously. First, we are 205,000 Citizen-Soldiers, serving with our Army at war, an integral and complementary part of our Army's capabilities, decisively engaged with the Army in joint and expeditionary operations around the world. In all, about 130,000 Army Reserve Soldiers have served on active duty since 2001, waging the Global War on Terror, and deploying in support of Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. We are an integral component of the world's best army, complementing the joint force with skill-rich capabilities. Simultaneously, we are an Army Reserve decisively engaged in the process of change, transforming itself to better meet the challenges of the 21st century and beyond. We are reinventing ourselves as Warriors even as we fight the war. The change is essential and profound, of a scope unprecedented in our history.

36 percent. Throughout these reductions, The Army essentially remained a smaller version of its Cold-War self, still oriented on large-scale, maneuver warfare appropriate to a campaign in the Fulda Gap and to Armageddon on the plains of Germany. Post-Cold War campaigns taught us that the wars of the 21st century would be a different item altogether. Future, regional conflicts would not be fought on open plains, by superpowers' massed armored formations, but by smaller units maneuvering their way through devastated urban areas and congested villages of the third world. Local warlords and strongmen with private militias would replace regular forces as adversaries. Speed, mobility, agility, and the correlation of forces became ascendant military virtues. An expeditionary force (Active and Reserve) would be the weapon of necessity to fight our country's battles, while essentially retaining campaign qualities. The roles of intelligence, special operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs forces were moving to center stage and beginning to expand and proliferate. Moreover, the fact that after Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Reserve component support had leveled off and was maintaining a *steady-state* of about 12.5 million mandays per year (up from an average of less than

a million mandays per year in the mid-eighties), raised some very interesting issues about overall force balance for Total Force planners. Things were changing profoundly, indeed.

During this period, the Army Reserve, reacting to these reductions realigned its internal command and control structure. Smaller commands were folded into one another wherever possible to increase command efficiency and reduce the size of the force structure. Command boundaries were redrawn and aligned with existing federal administrative regions



A Smaller Army: an Army Reserve Refocusing

After nearly 50 years of Cold War and a victory, our Armed Forces were reduced in size-- our active duty Armed Forces by 33 percent; our Army Reserve force by

regions to improve emergency planning, coordination, and response. Economies of scale and focus were achieved, while enhancing responsiveness and flexibility. All of this took place *before* September 11, 2001. Then the world changed.

Filled with a Terrible Resolve

In the wake of the attacks of September 11th, came the Global War on Terror, and Operations Enduring Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. The reduced Army and its smaller Reserve components were at war, and the system was being stressed. The need to change radically the operational paradigms of the Army and its Reserve components became ever more apparent. The Army leadership embarked on an ambitious and far-reaching program of change intended to redefine, realign, rebalance, and refocus the force to meet the new realities of the 21st century and beyond. The focus and expectations had changed because the realities of war had changed.

In a time of war when there were no secure rear areas, the Army's Chief of Staff declared that every Soldier would be a rifleman, a Warrior. The twenty-first century Reserve Soldier would become a new model Citizen-Warrior, who, though he would remain a citizen first and foremost, would always be a Warrior. Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom tested the mettle of these Warriors.

At the same time, long-accepted Cold-War planning assumptions and expectations concerning duration of operations required continuous adjustment and recalculation to accommodate a period in which offensive operations had widely ceased, but in which counter-insurgency, combat, pacification and stability intermeshed in high tempo. Rotation timetables and troop levels were subject to frequent adjustments. Predictability was becoming a morale issue, and the potential adequacy of available troop levels was also being questioned in light of foreseen and developing strength management shortfalls. The problem was institutional.

The management problems that were emerging were clearly tied to obsolete, Cold-War models, based upon legacy force structure, personnel management and policy, and operational responses to unconventional and asymmetrical military threats. The key to meeting this challenge would have to be the development of a coherent and integrated plan that would change Army Reserve force structure, manpower planning training, equipping, and employment policies, and merge the results into an entirely new approach to future combat operations. Transformation and change were recognized not as processes separate from fighting the war on terror, but as necessary *preconditions* to successfully waging the war. Change became a strategic imperative.

Embracing Profound Change

A Catalyst for Change

The Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative (FRR). In

2003, the Army Reserve, having assessed its organization and many of its legacy management policies, began implementing the FRR, an integrated structural and manpower reorganization program that would realign force structure, and focus assets, resources, and policies on improving wartime readiness rather than peacetime, organizational-support missions. The project was an ambitious one that sought to remedy a hollow force and its inherent lack of readiness; build rotational depth into the force; create a command and control system that produced active duty-ready Soldiers and units; and established Soldier life-cycle management. It realigned support commands to focus their efforts on mobilization readiness rather than peacetime operations. It introduced a Reserve human resources lifecycle management system that offered personalized, centralized management, scheduled professional development education, facilitated assignments among all portions of the Selected Reserve. It developed leaders, and fully manned and resourced the Reserve structure. In sum, the FRR prepared the way for many personnel and force management features that support change and the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF).

Mobilization Issues

One other issue that the FRR addressed was the mobilization system. During the Cold War, mobilized Army Reserve units were typically sequenced to flow in a prescribed order at a modest readiness level. Preparation and qualification time were built into an *alert-mobilize-train-deploy* model, that was linear and rigidly sequential in nature. This system protected unit integrity and presupposed extensive post-mobilization training and that unit sets of mission-essential equipment would also be issued after mobilization. The old system also provided predictability in the process and a minimum of 30+ days from alert to mobilization. Partial mobilization authority allowed for a full year or more of employment in theater.

During the Bosnia and Kosovo period, Presidential Selected Reserve call-up authority was used to call up smaller numbers of Soldiers in accordance with the old model. However, because total Army Reserve requirements were relatively modest, we did not reach deep into the force and exhaust any one set of skill capabilities. The old system held up - for the time being.

Even as We Speak

Current mobilization practice (the new model) is built around combatant commanders' requests for forces (RFF) and deployment orders (DEPODs). Typically RFFs could consist of as little as one Soldier or range up to an entire unit. (Fifty-two percent of the Army Reserve's mobilizations under OEF and OIF have been for 6 Soldiers or less.) Typically, multiple RFFs are made and each element is placed on alert. Some have received short-fused

DEPORs in as few as a couple of days, while other elements have been left on alert awaiting orders for months. There has been little predictability in the process as required forces have been deployed from virtually anywhere on our troop list. A much higher deployment criterion was regularly called for, and this required the Army Reserve to perform extensive reassignment of Soldiers and realignment of equipment. Today, on average, 35 percent of the Soldiers in a deploying unit are reassigned from elsewhere. This has presented us with an extremely difficult challenge -- manage the current mobilization process to keep it from breaking the readiness of not-yet-alerted units. These remaining units will be needed later in the warfight and, if "cherry-picked," will not be able to reach deployment standards themselves without additional personnel reassignments.

Toward an Expeditionary Future


The Army Reserve Rotational Concept and the AREF

The centerpiece of the Army Reserve's change to the future is its expeditionary force packages, an integrated rotational model that grows out of the Army's efforts to transform itself and restructure its forces to remain relevant and responsive in an era of uncertainty and change.

The Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF) synchronizes Army Reserve structures, programs, and operations to sustain responsive, effective and available support of the Army mission. The AREF is a major institutional response to the changing nature of war, and a significant departure from historical Army mobilization and management models that had not contemplated sustained Reserve deployments as an essential feature of military campaigns. It supports the Army's concept of modularity, and the brigade combat teams that are organized under that concept to be more readily deployable and more capable of meeting combatant commanders' needs. The AREF is intended to make the Army Reserve's provision of campaign quality combat support and combat service support forces to the combatant commanders more sustainable.

AREF: the Lynchpin of Army Reserve Readiness

In August 2003, the Army Reserve, building upon the Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative, and Active component expeditionary structures, began to refine and implement a complementary expeditionary support force concept. The Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF), which itself reflects and complements Active component management models, provides available and ready Army Reserve Soldiers, and synchronizes Army Reserve equipping and training cycles to develop and sustain the readiness of Reserve component forces required to support



Active Army formations, readiness, and operations.

The Global War on Terror was as much as any other single factor, responsible for the development of the Army's expeditionary force concept and its Army Reserve counterpart, the AREF. The protracted nature of the GWOT as well as the heavy investment in equipment required to carry it out, mandated that certain planning factors had to be addressed for the long term if the war on terror was to be waged successfully. The expeditionary force concept is a solution to that problem. It allows a force of limited size to sustain a campaign for a long, if not indefinite period, by cycling its limited, though renewable, assets and resources through a synchronized, progressive, and focused schedule of deployments, engagements, and regeneration, refit, and retraining to achieve serial, selective readiness.

When we speak of assets and resources, we mean the personnel, equipment, and training needed for units to be campaign-ready when required for a predetermined period. In this case, we mean an institutional goal of units capable of deploying to the theater of operations for 9 months on 120 hours' notice every 5 years. We must generate the force; equip the force; and train the force to achieve adequate campaign readiness. We are focusing our efforts and assets on these areas in turn as the constituent units of the AREF move through their service cycles.

The Army Reserve will provide units supporting Army Expeditionary Force Packages (AREP), consisting of trained and progressively mobilization-ready forces. The first two expeditionary packages (AREP) are expected to be ready for deployment in the fall of 2005. Army Reserve expeditionary packages will contain a number of units, each of which will move through a progressive readiness cycle. In a steady state, each Army Reserve expeditionary package has a *planned* activation period of 270 days to capitalize on the Presidential Reserve call-up with 6-7 months' "boots on the ground." The *goal* is a package rotation of one deployment in five years. Our analysis indicates that single-package availability to the combatant commands is sustainable over an indefinite period of time. In a surge state, the Army Reserve can make available up to 4 packages (roughly 40 percent of our force) for a limited period. Based on surveys from both in-theater and recently returned Soldiers, the Army Reserve believes this new strategy is sustainable over the long term.

"Transformation and change were recognized not as processes separate from fighting the war on terror, but as necessary preconditions to successfully waging the war. "

The benefits of these new training and equipping strategies to the Army are many. Most notably, they allow the Army Reserve to provide fully trained and equipped units and Soldiers, while reducing the need to reassign personnel and equipment upon receipt of mobilization orders. These strategies also position the Army Reserve for transformation to support the modular force structure of the Army.

Generating the Force

The New Force

The all-volunteer Army is required by its nature to constantly regenerate itself quantitatively and qualitatively if it is to survive. As with any living entity, it must change to accommodate external forces and events that impinge upon it and its mission. In the face of external change, the Army Reserve is restructuring its forces and rebalancing its skill inventories to support the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force. It also seeks to provide sustainability and predictability in mobilization and utilization of Reserve forces (while avoiding wholesale cross-leveling and its inevitable results). At the same time, we want to improve management efficiency, and focus training on skills and specialties required by the combatant commanders. These force-generation changes mirror similar major initiatives throughout the rest of the Army. Because they are being pursued concurrently while we are at war, they are complex, intricate, time-consuming, and dynamic; but once completed, they will enable us to remain engaged as an integral, complementary, participant in an expeditionary army with campaign qualities. As we noted earlier, they are an essential precondition to winning the war on terror.

Restructuring the Force

Significant changes originally undertaken as a part of the Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative remain central to the Army Reserve's strategic vision for regenerating and transforming its command and control force structure. In keeping with the *National Defense Strategy*, the *National Military Strategy*, OSD's comprehensive review of *Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense*, and the strategic global military environment, these changes provide the basis and rationale for moving from the older Army Reserve regional support commands, to operationally deployable commands. Peacetime command and control has been replaced with wartime readiness.

Optimizing the Force


The Army Reserve's Citizen-Soldiers have been continuously mobilized since 1995. Prior to September 11th, the annual manday usage for the Reserve components had leveled off at a steady state of about 12.5 million per

year (the equivalent of more than two traditional Army divisions). From the very beginning of the Global War on Terror, we have known that it would be a long war that had to be sustainable in order to be won. Because many of our military formations were misaligned to meet the current threat, our legacy force structure was being stressed in ways that we had not anticipated by missions that we had not contemplated (or if we did envision them, we did not foresee the degree and frequency to which they now occurred). This was particularly true in some military specialties that were assigned entirely or nearly so to the Reserve components. Military police, transportation, petroleum and water distribution, civil affairs and psychological operations units were among those finding themselves spread thin by heavier-than-anticipated demands for their specialized support services. They had been aligned for a different war than we were now fighting, a war based on a whole other set of operational assumptions that were no longer useful and functional. As a result, these units were experiencing sufficient stress to potentially challenge our ability to sustain the long push needed to bring the second Gulf War and the Global War on Terror to successful conclusions.

Based upon an analysis ordered by the Secretary of Defense, the military services undertook a comprehensive assessment of their forces and components, seeking ways to relieve the stress on certain high-demand-low-density units, particularly those that are found primarily in the Reserve components. "Optimizing" is intended to refocus Total Army assets on current and emerging missions. It will allow us to trim away low-demand force structure and convert it to directly usable forces to meet missions that would otherwise require more frequent repetitive mobilizations and deployments. More than 100,000 Active, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve spaces have been earmarked for restructuring and in some cases elimination between 2004 and 2011 as Cold-War over-structure. Specifically, the intent of optimizing is to

- Develop a flexible, modular force structure with a proper force mix and depth to sustain homeland defense, major combat operations, smaller-scale contingencies, stability operations, and other requirements of our defense strategy.

- Optimize the Army's ability to respond with a predominantly AC force within the first 15 days of an operation and ensure sufficient AC-RC force structure depth to sustain and support both operational rotations and contingencies.
- Develop plans to fully man Active and Reserve component units and improve the readiness of all our formations.
- Resource high-demand unit requirements by eliminating less-utilized force structure and capabilities.



Optimizing paves the path to modularity, stability, and predictability. It successfully regenerates and restructures the force, creating a flexible, modular Army Reserve that provides stability and predictability for our Soldiers, their families, communities and employers. This initiative will result in a rapid and responsive, campaign-quality Army, while maintaining the depth necessary to meet any threat across the full spectrum of conflict. We will eliminate unnecessary Cold-War over-structure to pay the bill; there will be no reduction in the number of Soldiers. Sustained operations will be the norm for the future, so we must optimize our capabilities to meet this reality.

Our formations must be relevant to the defense and military strategies -- modular, interoperable, and agile. They will optimize our capabilities and sustainability by expanding in specialties that are most in demand. We remain convinced that manning our forces at 100 percent

will increase readiness and reduce turbulence for Soldiers and their units. We further believe that building rotational-based, modular force packages will provide predictability and sustainability for Soldiers in the Army Reserve.

The Army Modular Force

Closely aligned to these force structure changes is the issue of the *Army Modular Force*. The Army has historically favored mobilizing its assets as discrete units. This practice helps ensure unit efficiency and morale as well as effectiveness by allowing Soldiers who have trained and worked together to be mobilized and to serve together. One of the lessons of the campaigns of the last 15 years is that our traditional NATO/ Cold-War divisional structure is no longer optimal for the nature of the wars we are now fighting. Expeditionary formations must be smaller, more adaptable, and provide combatant commanders greater flexibility when they task organize their forces to meet emerging threats and evolving situations. The intent is to develop interchangeable units (modules) that can be assigned with a minimum of cross-leveling of assets, across a spectrum of task-organized forces in what the Army calls its "plug and play" mode. All of the components of the Army share this organizational imperative. The Army Reserve is incorporating this principle in its restructuring and rebalancing initiatives, and has allocated 30,000 spaces to support modularization of its force.

Force Generation Management Programs

The Test

When we discuss "generating the force," we address issues that range from recruiting and retention and the tools associated with those functions, to the broader topic of human resource management and its supporting programs and policies. Ultimately, the issue is people -- attracting, retaining, and managing the best, most motivated and qualified people and Soldiers we can to make up our Army and its Army Reserve.

The Global War on Terror is the first real test of our all-volunteer force. It will sorely try the soul of our Armed Forces and our ability to recruit, retain, and manage the human resources we need to defend ourselves and our interests over time.

Recruiting and Retention

The Army Reserve has been working very hard to meet its programmed manpower goals. The challenges that we face in this area have caused us to reconsider our historic approach to manpower recruiting and management. We recognized the need to take more active steps toward meeting our Soldiers' needs and structuring their careers. While our level of success in this endeavor

remains to be seen, the array of initiatives and incentives to service that we have developed with the help of the Army and the Congress bodes well for the future. Among these initiatives are the following:

- Expanded Recruiting Force - we have reassigned 734 more Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) NCOs to the USAR recruiting force. This brings our recruiting force total to nearly 1,800.
- Incentives - During the preparation of the FY05 National Defense Authorization Act, we worked closely with members of the congressional oversight committees to improve the attractiveness of the Selective Reserve Incentive Program, enhance prior-service enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, and establish a \$6,000 officer accession bonus.
- For our own part, we have moved aggressively to
 - ◊ Realign Individual Ready Reserve and troop program unit mission responsibilities to increase retention.
 - ◊ Place 49 recruiting NCOs at transition points to work with Soldiers leaving the Active Army and help them find units to continue serving the nation.

Total U.S. Army Reserve			1,060,041
Ready Reserve			
322,127			
Selected Reserve		IRR	
206,775		115,352	
			<i>Individual Ready Reserve</i>
<small>PAID DRILL STRENGTH</small>	<small>AGR</small>	<small>IMA</small>	
TPU STR	14,501	4,943	
187,331	<i>Active/ Guard Reserve</i>	<i>Individual Mobilization Augmentee</i>	
<i>Troop Program Unit</i>			
<small>Source: 10 Jan 05 RCCPDS Strength Summary Report and HQC 307 Report</small>			
<small>* IRR Enlisted includes 950 Reserve Delayed Entry Program Enlistees</small>			

- ◊ Resource the start-up costs for the 734 new AGR recruiters.
- ◊ Realign funding to support increased bonuses and program enhancements.
- ◊ Increase funding support for national and local advertising.

Officer Recruiting

Currently, Army Reserve troop program units reflect a shortage of company grade officers. The Army is taking the following actions to remedy this shortfall:

- We have increased officer accessions into the Army Reserve. U.S. Army Cadet Command now has a formal mission for Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) for 670 cadets a year. In February 2005, we also implemented the officer accession and affiliation bonuses that were authorized in the FY05 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). These tools will enable us to attract more officers to serve in the Army Reserve and will help us with our accession mission.
- We have implemented the Army Reserve Green to Gold pilot program and plans are being made for its expansion. The Green to Gold program, which began at the University of Pittsburgh and now has been expanded to six universities, is managed by the 80th Division (Institutional Training). Army Reserve-wide there are approximately 35,000 enlisted service members who meet minimum requirements for appointment as commissioned officers.
- Active component and National Guard officer candidate schools remain a strong venue for appointment of company grade officers.
- Direct appointment remains a strong commissioning source.
- The Army has also implemented several initiatives that will greatly improve the retention of our junior officers. Some of the initiatives include:
 - (1) We've increased the number of officer basic course training seats and are reducing the time it takes for a reserve officer to get to training.
 - (2) We are now assigning newly commissioned officers directly to a troop unit rather than to the Individual Ready Reserve.
 - (3) We've streamlined promotions to first lieutenant and changed promotion policy for centralized promotion boards. These changes will enable us to increase retention while improving readiness.

Medical Officer Recruiting

The Army Medical Department (AMEDD) continues to be mindful of the challenges to the recruiting of medical professionals. We have taken active steps to address challenges and will continue to monitor these numbers to determine if additional changes are required. One of the most frequently cited barriers to effective AMEDD recruiting is repeated mobilizations. To address this we have implemented the 90-day boots-on-the-ground program for many critical, hard-to-recruit medical positions. This change, which allows shorter deployments, was developed

from input from our Reserve component AMEDD personnel, and today we believe it is successful. However, we will continue to monitor these types of challenges to ensure we maintain a ready force and will continue to work with AMEDD recruiters to develop initiatives tailored to meet current and emerging requirements.

Individual Augmentation Program

One of the significant force-generation challenges the Army Reserve faces is the large number of taskings to provide the Army with individual Soldiers, or small, non-task-organized groups of individuals to fill specific individual mobilization requirements. To fill these requests, the Army Reserve has typically had to mobilize groups of six or less Soldiers, making personnel tracking and accountability extremely difficult. To re-engineer and streamline the individual mobilization process and improve accountability, we established the United States Army Reserve Command Augmentation Unit (UAU) as a holding element for individual mobilized Soldiers.

Soldiers living in areas without a unit that supports their MOS or grade may be assigned to the UAU and attached to a troop unit near their home of record for training. Individual Augmentees may also support force generation requirements by being temporarily attached to fill critical MOS/grade shortfalls in mobilizing Army Reserve units.

Currently there are more than 7,500 Army Reserve Soldiers registered in the IA Program Volunteer database. Since October 2003, the IA Program has provided approximately 1,200 volunteers to fill individual augmentee mobilizations, replacement operations, World-wide Individual Augmentee System requirements, or be cross-leveled to fill critical military occupational specialties in deploying units.

Full-Time Support

The Army Reserve is a full partner in Army transformation, the Global War on Terror, and support for ongoing strategic operations in Iraq and other parts of the world. Full-time support (FTS) levels directly affect all facets of force generation and unit readiness - personnel, training, and equipment - by providing the core expertise and continuity required to effectively prepare for and efficiently transition to war. The Congress has long recognized that adequate levels of full-time support, both Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) and military technicians (MILTECHs), are essential for units to attain and maintain the heightened levels of mobilization readiness demanded the Global War on Terror and ongoing strategic operations.

The current FTS ramps for AGRs and MILTECHs, established in January 2001 by the Army, in cooperation with the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard, were designed to gradually achieve minimum essential resource levels (73 percent of requirements) in support of RC unit readiness.

The Army Reserve historically has had the lowest FTS percentage of any DOD Reserve component, including the Army National Guard, and this will still be the case when the current approved ramps reach end-state in FY 2010. The FY 2005 DOD average FTS manning level is 21 percent of end strength, while the FY 2005 total for the Army Reserve is 11.3 percent.

In FY 2005, the Army Reserve was tasked with additional FTS mission requirements above and beyond programmed requirements, including:

- Replacing 223 Active component training advisers (Title 11) to the Reserve components who will be reassigned to support Active component missions.
- Providing U.S. Army Recruiting Command 734 additional recruiters for FY 2005 and FY 2006.

In cooperation with the Department of the Army, the Army's Reserve components are revalidating their FTS requirements to ensure that existing FTS models and support structure remain relevant to current missions and the needs of the Soldier. We expect that, as a result of this effort, requirements may increase, not decrease. It is imperative that the programmed resourcing of full-time

support not only be maintained, but increased, as the Army Reserve restructures to move to a more ready, campaign-capable, and accessible future force.

Force Generation Support Programs

Army Reserve Well-Being Program

As a major element of its long-term force generation plan, the Army is formalizing the concept of well-being. The Army Reserve Well-Being Program enhances the institutional strength of the Army Reserve through a comprehensive strategy that integrates all well-being resources to enable Soldiers, civilians, retirees, veterans, and their families to become more self-reliant and better able to meet their personal needs and aspirations. Army well-being integrates and incorporates existing quality of life programs into a framework that supports performance, readiness, recruiting, and retention.

The Army Reserve's well-being program consists of more than 30 elements. Our goal is to raise awareness and an understanding of the relevance of well-being and its impact on Soldiers, civilians, family members, and The Army. We are developing strategic communications that inform, educate, and engage each Army Reserve well-being constituent. The Deployment Cycle Support Program, the Army Reserve Family Program, Army Reserve Rear Detachment Operations, and "Welcome Home, Warrior" program are among the most significant of the initiatives that provide force generation support for deployed Soldiers and their families.



Army Reserve Well-Being Architecture



<p><u>Values</u> Army Values Religious Support</p> <p><u>Professional Development</u> Training Personnel Management Workplace Maintenance Leader Development</p> <p><u>Espirit</u> Tradition Camaraderie Job Satisfaction Life-Style Satisfaction</p> <p><u>Health Care</u> Preventive Services Patient Care</p>	<p><u>Pay & Compensation</u> Military Base Pay Allowances Incentive and Special Pay Other Compensation RC Employer Support Finance Processing</p> <p><u>Continuous Learning</u> Continuing Education</p> <p><u>Leadership</u> Leadership Human Relations Military Bearing & Discipline</p> <p><u>Workplace Environment</u> Workplace Modernization</p>	<p><u>Family Programs</u> Deployment Cycle Support Dental Services</p> <p><u>Welfare</u> Safety Risk Reduction Legal Services Transition/Retirement Final Honors Community Referral</p> <p><u>Citizenship</u> Religious Programs Voting Assistance</p> <p><u>Financial Readiness</u> Personal Financial Management</p>
--	--	--

The Army Reserve – Training Soldiers and Growing Leaders

Deployment Cycle Support Program

The Deployment Cycle Support Program (DCS) supports all Soldiers and units undergoing reconstitution upon completing a deployment. It is a three-phase program. Phase 1 (redeployment) begins when the unit is released from its mission and reports to the rear assembly area in theater. Phase 2 (demobilization) involves five days of DCS/ reintegration focus training at the facility from which the unit mobilized. Phase 3 (reconstitution) consists of a series of sustainment activities at home station.

Army Reserve units and individual Soldiers (including Individual Ready Reserve and Individual Augmentee Soldiers) will return to Reserve status as quickly as possible, consistent with mission accomplishment, achieving required levels of readiness, and the need to complete key DCS tasks.

The Army Reserve is developing a DCS assistance team to support the completion of reconstitution activities at home station. Part of this effort will include reinforcement of key information previously provided at demobilization stations (e.g., information regarding medical and dental entitlements, Veterans Administration services, Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) services, and family reunion workshops). We are developing a DCS program (tools and techniques) to ensure that our Soldiers complete all DCS elements, and ensure that they have full access to all services throughout their personal reintegration.

Army Reserve Family Program

Support to Army Reserve Soldiers and their families has been paramount to our senior leadership since the beginning of the Global War on Terror. The Army Reserve is committed to providing a full range of essential support and service to all Soldiers and their families. Many initiatives implemented since September 2001 continue to be refined as funding becomes available.

The Army Reserve has nearly 150 full-time and contract family program staff members providing essential services to Reserve Soldiers and their families. Services are provided through 10 regional readiness commands and 26 other general officer commands or separate units in the continental United States, the 7th Army Reserve Command in Europe, the 9th Regional Support Command in Hawaii, and United States Army Civil and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne).

Services provided by Family Program personnel include support and assistance to unit leadership. Training programs include the following:

- Fundamental and Developmental Family Program Academy (FPA). Fundamental training includes the basics that help establish and maintain a viable, functioning family readiness group at the unit level. Developmental FPA training builds on those basics and

enhances the participants' capability to sustain and enhance unit family programs.

- Operation READY (Resources for Educating About Deployment and You) curriculum is a series of training modules, videotapes, and resource books published for the Army as resources for staff in training Army families affected by deployments.
- Chain of command training is designed to assist the personnel staff from the headquarters through the unit leadership in learning more about the scope of family programs within the Army Reserve.
- Deployment Cycle Support training provides instruction for unit personnel who assist and manage Soldiers and families during the mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and reunion phases of the deployment cycle.
- Mobilization/deployment and reunion briefings are provided by family program directors or coordinators at the unit level at the time mobilizations, deployments or reunions occur.
- Senior Volunteer Resource Instructor (SVRI) training provides initial and advanced training to volunteer instructors who represent the regional readiness command and Army Reserve.
- The Army Reserve provides direct support to families of Individual Ready Reserve and Individual Augmentation Soldiers. The staff contacts families by telephone within 48 hours of Soldier mobilization and follows up with additional information and points of contact. Assistance and support is currently being provided to 6,400 families.

Army Reserve Rear Detachment Operations (ARRDO).

The Army Reserve is reviewing its Rear Detachment Operations (ARRDO) procedures to identify systemic problems and develop solutions that update current guidance and outline the way ahead.

Inadequate information flow from forward command elements to rear detachment commanders, pay issues, and family support have surfaced as continuous challenges for Soldiers.

Given the magnitude and the unique nature of Army Reserve rear detachment operations, full-time support is critical to providing the stability to support current and future contingency operations.

Welcome Home Citizen—Warrior Program

This program is intended to ensure that each returning Citizen-Warrior understands that his contribution to accomplishing the mission and making the homeland more secure for all of our citizens is recognized and appreciated by the nation and The Army. The program is a vehicle for conveying public recognition and private gratitude that might otherwise slip by in the press of demobilization tasks and events and the rush to reunite families and

friends. Each returning Soldier is presented with a shadow-boxed American flag, a Welcome Home, Warrior-Hero flag, a Soldier and spouse pin set, and a commemorative coin. The Soldier and family reactions at these award ceremonies, which are held within 30 days of the units' return to home station, have been overwhelmingly positive, and suggest that recognition effort is sincerely appreciated.

Medical Readiness and Medical Hold Improvements

The Army Reserve has listened to the concerns of all its Soldiers and their families, and we have sought ways to provide the best healthcare possible and improve administrative processes for Soldiers and their families - before, during, and after mobilization. Since combatant commanders need a force that is medically fit and ready, the Army Reserve has placed increasing stress on medical readiness.

During the alert phase, the 90 days of pre-mobilization TRICARE benefits authorized in the FY04 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and made permanent in the FY05 NDAA is used to improve medical readiness of Army Reserve Soldiers. The Federal Strategic Health Alliance, also known as (FEDS_HEAL), is a huge success story for the Army Reserve. FEDS_HEAL is a joint venture between the Army Reserve and the Department of Health and Human Services. This unique program utilizes civilian medical and dental services across the United States to provide care to Army Reserve Soldiers in their neighborhoods. The program allows alerted Soldiers to receive required medical and dental services before they arrive at the mobilization site so they are medically ready to deploy with their units.

Because of its remarkable effectiveness, the FEDS_HEAL Program has expanded eightfold in the past four years, e.g., Army Reserve Soldiers received 47,500 dental exams; 20,600 physical exams; 58,100 immunizations; 3,600 eye exams; and 4,000 dental treatments through FEDS_HEAL in FY04, a tremendous boost to Army Reserve medical readiness.

Mobilized Soldier Pay

One of the difficulties that Reserve Soldiers have had to deal with while mobilized and deployed is pay discrepancies. The Army Reserve has worked hard to find effective short- and long-term solutions to these problems and to improve pay processing for our troops and their families. Pay support for tens of thousands of Army Reserve Soldiers deployed worldwide was significantly improved during the past year. Major actions to improve pay support include:

- Reserve Pay Training. The USAR Pay Center has assumed a vital role in training mobilizing USAR and ARNG finance units. Since April 2003, the Army

Reserve pay inquiry team has answered over 23,000 pay inquiries from mobilized Army Reserve Soldiers around the world.

- Publications and Soldiers' Guides. The Army Reserve published the "Army Reserve Finance Guide for Mobilizing Soldiers" in October 2004, and officials at the US Army Finance Command, in conjunction with the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard, have recently published a finance mobilization/demobilization standard operating procedure manual that clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of the various pay offices involved throughout all phases of a Soldier's mobilization.
- Automated Mob Pay Transactions. The Army Reserve has developed software applications to improve the timeliness and accuracy of mobilization pay. One application allows units to initiate mobilization pay and entitlements for Soldiers prior to their reporting to the mobilization station. Additionally, it reduces the amount of manual pay entitlement processing at the UPC and the mobilization station. We are also developing and testing software for the Forward Compatible Payroll system. DFAS is currently conducting software acceptance testing and an operational assessment. Once these tests are completed, three Army Reserve units will be serviced in a field test. Current plans call for the rest of the Army to come on board by mid-summer 2005.

Equipping the Force

The Mother of Invention

The prolonged nature of the GWOT and the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq prompted our Army to adopt an expeditionary force structure that supports long-term military actions. Our Army's efforts to "modularize" its structure to achieve depth, flexibility, agility, and predictability testify to the necessity of such a change in strategies. Equipping the resultant expeditionary force requires no less effort or innovation.

One of the lessons learned in the first Gulf War, which has been strongly reinforced in the second, is that wars in the deserts of Southwest Asia are as hard on equipment as they are on Soldiers. Our ability to equip our forces adequately for a prolonged campaign has become a major factor in our ability to close that campaign successfully.

For the Army Reserve, this means profound and enduring change in the way we do business. Our previous equipping strategy no longer fits how we go to war. The Army Reserve faces several challenges in equipping - wartime losses, compatibility, modernization, and resources. To focus our attention on this critically important aspect of war fighting, we have designated 2005 as the "Year of Equipping" in the Army Reserve.



Everything is aimed at the units' in the expeditionary packages being able to deploy to support contingency operations. Such units must have priority of equipment fill when they deploy; however, as a result of the heavy equipment wear associated with desert operations, the use of stay-behind equipment, and other related issues, it is not possible for us to support full equipment issue for all of our units all of the time. Rather, we must intensively manage the equipping of our units not only in the theater of operations, but also during all of the stages of preparation and training leading to deployment to the theater. Using this staged process, we can ensure that each Soldier in each unit has the equipment he needs when he needs it.

We are losing equipment that has been destroyed in combat, and our aging inventory is wearing out under extremely heavy usage. The Army Materiel Command's projections from the theater indicate that battle losses and attrition will be as much as 12 percent of the equipment we sent to Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, to better equip incoming units, the Army has directed that a portion of Army Reserve equipment remain in theater as Stay-Behind Equipment (SBE). Wartime losses and SBE decrease equipment available for training for Army Reserve units preparing for deployment, homeland defense, or other contingency requirements.

Because the Army Reserve is 75 percent equipped to its authorized levels, and due to equipment losses, we must take extreme care of what we have available. Sustaining on-hand equipment is resource intensive and places great demand on Operations and Maintenance accounts. The Depot Maintenance Program is the Army Reserve's strategic sustainment base, and its only source to fully recondition, overhaul, and rebuild equipment to meet subsequent readiness requirements. Therefore, it is imperative that the Army Reserve maintain its current depot maintenance funding levels to meet mobilization equipment requirements, extend service life, reduce life-cycle costs, and improve safety for Army Reserve Soldiers.

The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) are essential to the Army Reserve equipping program and over the past five years has addressed a number of critical shortfalls. During that time, the Army Reserve has received an average of \$35 million annually to procure additional equipment that would have been impossible to procure from our base budget. Although the Army Reserve received \$40 million in NGREA funding for FY05, an equipment shortfall totaling more than one billion dollars still remains. We are continuing to work with Army and OSD leadership to resolve our equipping shortfalls, but additional congressional support remains the most viable solution.

New Equipping Strategy

The Army Reserve is actively working to help itself with equipment readiness. We have adopted an equipping strategy that is synchronized with the five-year AREF rotation cycle. As units progress through each year of the five-year cycle, their state of readiness increases incrementally. Units ready to deploy, are at the highest level of readiness (*Year One*). Units reconstituting from a deployment, are at the base level of readiness (*Year Five*). Units that are between reconstitution and deployment (*Years Two-Four*), receive the full complement of modernized equipment compatible with AC. This will allow Army Reserve units to train with their go-to-war systems prior to mobilization and deployment.

The equipping strategy goes one step further by identifying the equipment for the individual Soldier training that is done in *Year Five* and for collective training in *Years Two through Four*. The Army Reserve will rotate this equipment on the five-year AREF cycle through its five training readiness platforms in California, Texas, Wisconsin, New Jersey, and Arkansas. In *Year Four*, units will draw minimum-essential-equipment-for-training sets, which they will use through *Year One* for individual training at home station. Our goal is to fully equip units going into a theater of operations.

There are two important benefits that result from applying these equipping strategies. First, reduce the need to cross-level equipment upon receipt of mobilization orders. Second, the Army Reserve will provide transformed units that are fully interoperable and integrated into the Army's modular framework.

The Army Reserve is also investing aggressively in Depot Maintenance and Cascading of equipment. In the Depot Maintenance Program, operated by Army Material Command, the Army Reserve is overhauling and rebuilding hundreds of aging tractors into the newer configuration. In the area of recapitalization, the Army has provided the funding to rebuild hundreds of Army Reserve High Mobility Multi-Purpose Vehicles, Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks, and Heavy Equipment Transporter Systems.

Cascading, is the transfer of Active Army equipment to the Reserve components and is an essential method of equipping the Army Reserve. By cascading, we have integrated hundreds of tactical wheeled vehicles and almost a thousand M16A2 rifles into our inventory. We expect that the continued cascading of the newer model M16A2 rifles, coupled with NAREA funding, to eliminate the over 10,000 older, non-deployable, model M16A1 rifles still on-hand. Finally, the Army Reserve has initiated equipment conversion programs, such as the gas-to-diesel conversions we perform on generators, air compressors, and decontamination equipment. The conversion program allows us to

be more interoperable with the Active force.

We are continuing to work with the Active Army and OSD leadership to resolve our equipping shortfalls, and we appreciate continued congressional support of our transformation efforts.

Training the Force

Cyclic Training

The term "cyclic" suggests how the Army Reserve will train and develop a sustainable force capable of supporting the Joint Force and Army requirements. Tied directly to the rotational structure of the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF), cyclic readiness will simultaneously establish priorities for resources, synchronized readiness levels, and provide predictable training and deployment time frames for Army Reserve Soldiers, families, and employers. Cyclic readiness reflects a dramatic change in the Army resulting from the Global War on Terror and renders many of the manning, equipping, modernization, and training models and policies of the past simply irrelevant.

Train-Alert-Deploy. In the past the Army Reserve used a "tiered" system of readiness. The assumption was that the Army Reserve would have the time after being alerted to resource, train and deploy units when they were ready.

The strategic environment today does not afford us this luxury. The Army Reserve is not a supplemental force, but a force *complementary* to the Active Army. Thus, we must be ready to deploy whenever and wherever military forces are needed. Further, our force must be ready to deploy to support the combatant commander and also to perform homeland defense missions in support of civil authorities. Our forces must be ready to conduct their missions with very little time for pre-deployment training. Therefore, our readiness paradigm has changed from *alert-train-deploy* to *train-alert-deploy*. This means that we must start with a firm individual readiness base and devote the resources we have to training the Army Reserve Expeditionary Packages (AREPs) to ever higher states of collective readiness as they progress through each year of their five-year cycle. Our strategy is based on having a full array of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) capabilities ready and available to the nation.

Readiness Assessment. The readiness and training expectations for Army Reserve forces are the same as those for the Active component. While the standards are the same, the conditions under which the Army Reserve prepares for its missions are significantly different. The limited

*"train, alert,
and deploy"*

training time for our Citizen-Soldiers competes with numerous priorities and must be used effectively and efficiently.

Leadership. The Army Reserve is strengthening its leaders by executing the Army Reserve Leadership Campaign Plan. The future Army Reserve demands leaders who are self-aware, adaptable and agile, and life-long learners. The quality of Army Reserve leadership is the foundation for achieving Army Reserve readiness and relevance for the 21st century. Institutional leader development consists of officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, civilian, and MILTECH training. The operational aspects of leader development occur in company-team leader and pre-command courses (battalion and brigade), battle staff simulation exercises, combat training center (CTC) or "CTC-like" events, and culminate in mission-rehearsal exercises. The self-development aspects of revitalized leader development include improved mentorship programs, a leader development assessment program that includes command climate surveys (also part of operational experiences), and use of Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) products.

Training Support. The integrated training divisions (ITD) provide support to AREF leaders. These ITDs will provide full-spectrum support for individual through collective training. All Army Reserve organizations are transforming. Separate divisional forces that support training (training support and institutional training divisions) are becoming integrated training divisions, with some current institutional training division capabilities migrating to the 84th Army Reserve Readiness Training Command (ARRTC). ITDs provide specialty reclassification training as a part of the NCO educational system throughout the five-year AREF cycle. In addition, these elements provide skill reinforcement and refresher training through the use of mobile training teams that partner with ITD collective training support organizations. Collective training support elements consist of training exercise developers, trained and certified observer/controllers, and simulations support elements. The ITDs are multi-component organizations composed of Active component, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve personnel. Thus, the ITD includes a combination of combat arms, combat support, combat service support, and simulations skills capable of simultaneously supporting both post-mobilization validation (if required) as well as pre-mobilization training support during *years two* and *three* of the AREF cycle.

Army Reserve Installations are a vital part of training and deployment activities we continue to upgrade and modernize our four major installations - Fort Dix, NJ, Fort McCoy, WI, Fort Hunter-Liggett/Parks Reserve Forces Training Area, CA, and Fort Buchanan, PR. We are also partnering with the Army National Guard to provide mutual and accessible training areas and ranges for Reserve component units.

Sheltering the Force

More than Bricks and Mortar

Today, the Army Reserve owns and operates buildings and facilities in a thousand communities across the nation. Our Reserve centers are frequently the most visible evidence of the presence of our Citizen-Warriors in their communities. These Reserve centers (many of them *joint* centers, operated with the Reserve components of other services) are representative of our Soldiers and the federal government to members of the community at large. They speak of us and of our commitment to the national defense and our national interests.

Our training, storage, and maintenance facilities stand as reminders of the nobility of service and the duty that all citizens owe to their country. They reflect upon our Soldiers' commitment, dedication, and professionalism. We are judged to some degree at least on the public face that our facilities present to those who see them daily and who mark their fortunes by what they see. Citizens who see clean, well-maintained, and modern facilities judge their occupants by appearances and measure their occupants' professional competence, in part, by the impression that these facilities present. Attractive, adequate facilities raise our fellow citizens' trust and confidence in their Army and its Reserve components.

In a time when recruiting and retention are challenging our best efforts, these facilities can be a great advantage if they tell the right story and assure our Soldiers that their leaders are concerned about their surroundings and the facilities in which they work and train, daily, weekly, monthly, and often at their own expense. Good facilities reflect the nation's esteem and priorities and encourage good Soldiers to stay with the program and to recruit others to the mission that they have themselves undertaken and that is symbolized by the facilities in which they train. Modern, uncrowded facilities speak eloquently of the investment that the federal government has made in the competence, well-being, morale, and dedication of its Citizen-Warriors. Investment in new Reserve facilities and maintenance and restoration of existing facilities are more than bricks and mortar, they are strong and indisputable evidence of the nation's recognition and gratitude, and the belle-weather of our commitment to our Citizen-Warriors who train and work within their walls.

The FY06 budget request includes four new Reserve training centers and second phases for two others, as well as the first phase of an NCO academy and six training ranges. When complete, the Reserve centers will support over 2,700 Army Reserve Soldiers, and the training ranges will support over 130,000 Soldiers from all Army components and other services. These projects are currently under design and will be ready for award in FY06. We can do more if we can do more.

Readying the Force

The Cost of Readiness

A trained and ready Army Reserve is essential to the Army's ability to execute the national military and security strategies. Currently the Army Reserve is fully engaged in the Global War on Terror, meeting the needs of the combatant commanders, transforming, and preparing for future mobilizations. Over the past 39 months, the Army Reserve mobilized and deployed units at much higher personnel and equipping levels than authorized and resourced. All of this has not been without cost in resources and readiness.

- Army Reserve readiness requires adequate resources - specifically in Reserve Personnel, Army (RPA), Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR), and Other Procurement, Army (OPA) funding-- to be fully operational, properly maintained, and mission capable.
- A large number of the Army Reserve's units will be required in follow-on rotations. In order to meet future requirements, the Army Reserve is working with the Active Army and OSD leadership to develop balanced, responsive, and effective strength management policies and programs.
- The Army Reserve needs support to modernize and re-equip its force in support of a modular Army engaged in the GWOT.

Conclusion

The Army Reserve is changing daily as it advances in the Global War on Terror. We face a battle with two fronts, each one feeding and feeding on, the other. The Global War on Terror drives us to rethink, reform, regenerate, and optimize our force so we can carry out our mission with greater efficiency and more effectively support the nation and the troops who are themselves supporting the same mission. Simultaneously, realigned, reset, and re-oriented, our Citizen-Warriors cycle through a progression of serial stages of preparation, mobilization, deployment, engagement, and regeneration in support of the same global campaign that precipitates the cycle. The military and political world of the 21st century has changed dramatically and exponentially in the past few years and the changes show no hint of slowing down. Your Army Reserve continues to perform its vital mission under Title 10, USC, providing trained, equipped, and ready individuals and forces to meet the nation's military needs. With the help of the Congress and our fellow citizens, we will continue to serve as an increasingly essential element of our Army and our nation.

